judgement:
l Appeals Nos. 1737 to 1745 of 1972.
From the Judgment and order dated the 9th December 1971 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeals Nos.661 662, 665, 666, 668, 681, 682, 684 of 1968.
And Civil Appeals Nos. 1870 & 1871 of 1972 From the Judgment and Order dated the 9th December, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeals Nos. 675 and 676 of 1968.
B. Sen, D. N. Misra, J. B. Dadachanji, O.C Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 1737 to 1745) B. D. Sharma, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 1870 71) Niren De, Attorney General of India, and O. P. Rana, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J.
The validity of schemes approved by the Uttar Pradesh Government under section 68D of the (Act 4 of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for inter State routes as a result of which private operators including those who had been granted permits by Regional Transport Authorities of Rajasthan were excluded from those routes has been called in question in civil appeals No. 1737 1745 of 1972 and civil appeals No. 1870 and 1871 of 1972 which have been filed on certificate against the common judgment of the Allahabad High Court.
This judgment would dispose of all the appeals.
It would be necessary to reproduce only the facts of the case giving rise to civil appeal No. 1738, for the counsel for the parties are agreed that the decision in that appeal would also govern the other appeals as the question of law involved in all these appeals is identical.
On June 14, 1960 a letter was sent by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to the Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh in reply to an earlier letter received from the Transport Commission Uttar Pradesh conveying approval of the Rajasthan Government for the nationalisation of the undermentioned routes for the operation of services by the State transport undertakings of both States in accordance with the reciprocal arrangement arrived at between the two States: 1.
Bharatpur Agra 2.
Bharatpur Mathura 564 3.
Alwar Mathura 4.
Mathura Kama Kosi via Goverdhan 5.
Agra Dholpur We are in the present appeals concerned with four of the routes, i.e. the routes mentioned above other than Bharatpur Mathura route.
Appeal No. 1738 of 1972 relates to Dholpur Agra route.
It may be mentioned that Dholpur, Bharatpur, Alwar and Kama Kosi are situated in Rajasthan, while Agra and Mathura are situated in Uttar ' Pradesh.
Notification dated December 4, 1961 was published in the U.P. Gazette dated December 9, 1961 by the Uttar Pradesh Government under section 68C of the Act in respect of proposed scheme for providing State road transport passenger services on inter State Agra Dholpur route.
According to the propose scheme, no persons other than the State transport undertaking would be permitted to provide any road transport services on the route or portions thereof.
The scheme also visualised the cancellation of the permits which had been granted to the private operators, including the appellants.
Objections were invited with regard to the proposed Scheme from persons affected by the scheme.
No objections were, however, filed against the aforesaid scheme and the same was approved under section 68D(2) of the Act by the Joint Judicial Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, who was the hearing authority, as per order dated July 30, 1962.
The Central Government conveyed its approval to the scheme under the proviso to sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act as per letter dated February 6, 1963.
Notification dated February 20, 1963 was published by the Uttar Pradesh Government in the official Gazette dated March 16, 1963 for the publication of the approved scheme under sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act.
Clauses 1, 2, 4 and 8 of the scheme read as under: "1.
The State Road Transport passenger services ' shall commence to operate from April 1, 1963 or thereafter.
State Road Transport passenger services shall be provided on the Inter State route Agra Dholpur of Agra Region.
No persons other than the State Transport Undertakings will be permitted to provide any Road Transport Services on this route or portions thereof specified in Clause (2) above.
The number of private Transport Vehicles on the route or portion thereof specified in clause (2) above shall be reduced to nil.
" It was also provided in the scheme that the permits of the private operators would stand cancelled.
Provision was made for compensation for the premature cancellation of the permits of the private operators.
No compensation was, however, to be paid when a permit for an alternative route or area in lieu thereof was offered by the Regional Transport Authority and accepted by the holder of the permit.
By 565 notification dated April 9, 1963 the permits in favour of the private operators, including the appellants, issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur and countersigned by ' the Regional Transport Authority, Agra were cancelled under sub section (2) of section 68F of the Act.
The appellants, who are bus operators of Rajasthan, and some others thereupon filed petitions under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge the validity of the above notifications.
The learned single Judge who heard the writ petitions came to the conclusion that a State could not by taking unilateral action provide transport services for a territory outside the limits of its own territory.
The learned Judge was of the view that in framing the scheme the State transport undertaking performed executive function of the State.
View was expressed that one State could not cancel permits held by the bus operators of another State.
Finding was also given that effective notice had not been given to the bus operators of.
Rajasthan as the notifications were published in the Gazette of Uttar Pradesh only.
The writ petitions were accordingly allowed and the impugned notifications were quashed by the learned single Judge.
On appeal the Division Bench of the High Court held that when an undertaking proposes a scheme and the same is approved by the State Government, the undertaking and the State Government really perform the functions of the Central Government under clause (2) of article 258 of the Constitution.
Regarding the cancellation of the permits, the Division Bench observed : "The Bus Operators of Uttar Pradesh held permits granted by the Transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh.
They could, however, not legally ply their vehicles on hire in Rajasthan beyond the limits of Uttar Pradesh without first having their permits countersigned by the transport authorities of Rajasthan.
What really happened was that when the Schemes were finalised, the permits of the operators of Uttar Pradesh were cancelled by the transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh and the counter signatures made by the Transport authorities of Rajasthan Were cancelled by those transport authorities.
Similarly, the permits held by those operators of Rajasthan were cancelled by the Transport authorities of Rajasthan and the counter signatures on those permits made by the transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh were cancelled by these transport authorities.
We, therefore, find no substance in this argument advanced on behalf of the respondents.
" The High Court repelled the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that they had no knowledge of the proposed schemes.
It was observed that the.
relevant provisions for publication of the schemes were complied with and that notices were put up on the notice boards of the State transport authorities of Uttar Pradesh as well as of Rajas than.
The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeals filed by 566 the State and held that the impugned schemes and notifications Were valid in law.
The Division Bench while allowing the appeals observed: "In consequence, we allow these appeals, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and hold that the impugned Schemes and notifications are valid in law.
The learned Single Judge has said in his judgment that individual petitions had raised some additional and separate grounds for questioning their exclusion from certain routes.
He, however, felt that it was not necessary to consider individual cases of petitioners as all the writ petitions could be decided on general grounds common to all the petitions emerging from admitted facts.
The individual grounds must now be considered by the learned Single Judge.
He, however, is no longer available in this Court and the papers of these cases will be laid before the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice for nominating a Bench.
" The correctness of the view taken by the Division Bench has been assailed in these appeals.
Before dealing with the contentions advanced, we may refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they existed at the relevant time.
Chapter IVA was inserted in the Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act 100 of 1956).
The said chapter came into force with effect from February 16, 1957 and consisted at the relevant time of sections 68A to 681.
Section 68A contains definitions.
According to clause (b) of that section, "State transport undertaking" means any undertaking providing road transport service, where such undertaking is carried on by, (i) the Central Government or a State Government; (ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corpora tions Act, 1950; (iii) the Delhi Road Transport Authority established under section 3 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950; (iv) any municipality or any corporation or company owned or controlled by the State Government.
Section 68B provides that the provisions of Chapter IVA and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.
Sections 68C and 68D at the relevant time read as under : "68C. Where any State transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in 567 such other manner as the State Government may direct.
68D. ( 1) Any person affected by the scheme published under section 68C may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official Gazette, file objections thereto before the State Government.
(2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme.
(3) The Scheme as approved or modified under subsection (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified route: Provided that no such scheme which relates to any inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government.
" Chapter IVA incorporates special provisions relating to State transport undertakings.
The provisions of this chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder have in view of section 68B an overriding, effect and would prevail even though they are inconsistent with anything contained in Chapter IV of the Act or any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any law.
Section 68C enables a State transport undertaking, as defined in section 68A of the Act, to prepare a scheme for nationalisation of transport service, with the particulars mentioned in the section, in case the State transport undertaking is of the opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or in any particular class, of such service should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise.
It is also provided that such a scheme shall be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as may be directed by the State Government.
Section 68D enables the persons.
Jr affected by the scheme to file objections within thirty days from the date of the publication of the proposed scheme in the Official Gazette before the State Government.
The State Government has thereafter to consider the objections after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter.
Power is given to the State Government to either approve the scheme or modify the same.
The scheme as approved or modified is then published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and thereupon the scheme becomes.
final.
The approved scheme then operates for the area or the route to 568 which it relates.
It is also provided that if a scheme relates to an interState route, the game shall not be deemed to be an approved scheme unless, it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government '.
It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that a State Government cannot approve a scheme for inter State route under section 68D of the Act as the powers of the State Government can operate within its own territory and cannot operate in an area beyond the territorial limits of the State.
This contention, in our opinion, cannot be accepted as it runs counter to the plain language of the proviso to sub section (2) of section 68D of the Act.
According to the proviso, no scheme which relates to an inter State route shall be deemed to be an approved scheme unless it has been published in the Official Gazette with the previous approval of the Central Government.
The proviso manifestly contemplates that the State Government can in accordance with the procedure laid down in Chapter IVA of the Act approve a scheme relating to an inter State route and publish the same.
The only limitation on the power of the State Government in this respect is that it should before publishing the scheme obtain the prior approval of the Central Government.
Such previous approval of the Central Government was admittedly obtained in respect of the inter State route with which we are concerned, as per letter dated February 19, 1963.
An inter State route is one of which one of the termini falls in one State and the other in another State.
Agra Dholpur route is admitted an inter State route as the termini of the route are situated in two different States.
In the face of the proviso to sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act, we find it difficult to accede to the submission that the Uttar Pradesh Government was not competent to approve and publish the impugned scheme relating to Agra Dholpur route.
There is no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that approval of the State Government for a scheme relating to an inter State route can only be in respect of that portion of the route which is within its own territory and not in respect of the entire inter State route.
If the approval of the State Government was to be accorded in respect of that portion of inter State route which was within its own territory, there would have been no necessity to obtain the prior approval of the Central Government.
A State Government is competent to approve a scheme for nationalisation of transport service on a route within its own territory if it complies with the other necessary formalities prescribed by law.
There is in such an event no necessity to obtain any approval of the Central Government.
The necessity of obtaining prior approval of the Central Government arises because the scheme envisages nationalisation of transport service not only for that part of the inter State route which is within the territorial limits of the State Government approving the scheme but also for the remaining part of the route which is.
outside the said territorial limits.
Inter State route would normally cover the entire route and not merely the portion of the, route which is within the territorial limits of the State Government which accords approval.
569 It has then been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that when a State Government approves a scheme, it makes law and as a State Government cannot make law for areas outside its territorial limits, the scheme approved by the State Government in respect of an inter State route is unconstitutional.
This argument, in our opinion, is fallacious and untenable.
A scheme approved by a State Government is undoubtedly law as defined in clause (3) of article 13 of the Constitution, according to which unless the context otherwise requires, "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law.
The above definition of "law" is for the purpose of article 13 in the context of laws violative of fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution.
The State Government in approving a scheme does not legislate in the sense the legislature of a State makes law under article 245 of the Constitution for the whole or any part of the State.
The limitation on the power of a State Legislature to make laws for the whole or any part of the State and not for areas outside the territorial limits of the State cannot be invoked for the purpose of placing a restriction on the power confined upon the State Government by Parliamentary legislation to approve a scheme relating to an inter State route.
Contention has also been advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that the State Government in approving a scheme exercises executive power.
Such executive power, according to the contention, cannot operate in areas beyond the territorial limits of the State.
In this connection, we find that the was enacted by the Central Legislature.
Chapter IVA of the Act containing the sections with which we are concerned was inserted in the Act by the Union Parliament.
The State Government in approving a scheme in respect of an inter State route under sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act exercises a statutory power which has been vested in it by a law made by the Parliament.
The said law related to the creation of a State monopoly in the matter of transport service.
The executive power of the Union and each State under article 298 of the Constitution extends, inter alia, to the carrying on of any trade or business.
There is nothing in article 298 to show that the trade or business carried on by a State must be restricted to the area within its territorial limits.
On the contrary, the article envisages the carrying on of the trade and business by a State without any territorial limitations.
The only restriction on the executive power of the State in this respect is contained in clause (b ) of the proviso to that article.
According to that clause, the executive power of the State shall, in so far as such trade or business is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws, be subject to legislation by Parliament.
Entry 35 in List III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution relates to mechically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied.
Under, entry 21 in List III of the Seventh Schedule, the Parliament can make laws for commercial and industrial monopolies.
The expression "commercial and industrial monopolies".
570 as held by this Court in the case of H.C. Narayanappa and Ors.
vs The State of Mysore and Ors.
(1) is wide enough to include grant or creation of commercial or industrial monopolies to the State and citizens as well as control of monopolies.
, Dealing with the question of State monopoly in the matter of transport service as envisaged by Chapter IVA of the Act, Shah J. speaking for the Court observed in the above mentioned case "The amplitude of the powers under the entry in the concurrent list expressly dealing with commercial and industrial monopolies cannot be presumed to be restricted by the generality of the expression trade and commerce in the State list.
If the argument of the petitioners and the intervener that legislation relating to monopoly in respect of trade and industry is within the exclusive competence of the State be accepted, the Union Parliament cannot legislate to create monopolies in the Union Government in respect of any commercial or trading venture even though power to carry on any trade or business under a monopoly is reserved to the Union by the combined operation of article 298, and the law which is protected from the attack that it infringes the fundamental freedom to carry on business by article 19(6).
We are therefore of the view that Chapter IVA could competently be enacted by the Parliament under entry No. 21 read with entry No. 35 of the Concurrent List".
A scheme approved by the State Government under sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act effectuates the object of State monopoly in the matter of transport service.
Such a scheme, in our opinion, does not entail encroachment by one State Government upon the executive sphere of another State Government.
The action taken by the Uttar Pradesh Government in furtherance of the objective of a State monopoly in accordance with the statute made by Parliament cannot, in our opinion, be struck down on the ground of encroachment upon the executive power of the Rajasthan Government.
In any cast, there is no question of encroachment upon the executive domain of the State of Rajasthan in the present case as the whole thing is being done by the Uttar Pradesh Government with the concurrence of the Government of Rajasthan and the two Governments are acting in concert.
In view of the above, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the validity of the action of the Uttar Pradesh Government in according approval to the scheme can be sustained under clause (2) of article 258 of the Constitution.
The appellants have not challenged the constitutional validity of the proviso to sub section (3) of section 68D of the Act.
It has, however, been urged on their behalf that the proviso should be construed in such a manner so as not to contravene the articles of the Constitution.
In our opinion, the construction which we have placed upon the aforesaid proviso entails no contravention of the articles of the Constitution.
(1) [1960] 3 S.C.P. 742.
571 We may not deal with some of the cases which have been cited on behalf of the appellants.
The case of King Emperor vs Sibnath Banerji and Ors.
(1) related to the validity of Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939.
The Rule was held to be valid.
It was also held that it was not necessary for the Governor to be personally satisfied before an order under the above Rule could be made.
Dealing with the term "executive", the Judicial Committee held that it includes both a decision as to action and the carrying out of such a decision.
Their Lordships further expressed disagreement with the view which sought narrow reading of sections 49(2) and 124(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The case of In re The (2) related to the delegation of legislative power and the 'difference between delegation of legislative power and conditional legislation.
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors.
vs Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr.
(3) dealt with the procedure to be followed for nationalising transport service.
None of the above cited cases, in our opinion, are of any real assistance to the appellants because the question involved in these appeals is materially different.
There is no force in these appeals.
The same are accordingly dismissed with costs.
One hearing fee.
P. B. R. Appeal dismissed.
(1) 72 I.A. 241.
(3) [1959] 1 Sapp.
S.C.R. 319.

summary/full:
In accordance with a reciprocal arrangement arrived at between the Governments of U.P. and Rajasthan certain bus routes between these two States had been nationalised.
Under the proposed scheme, approved under section 68D of the (4 of 1939) which was duly approved by the Central Government under the proviso to sub s.3 of section 68D, no person other than the State Transport Undertaking was permitted to provide any road transport services on the routes or portions thereof and permits which had already been granted to private operators were cancelled.
The High Court held that the impugned schemes and notifications were valid in Law.
In appeal to this Court it was contended (i) that a State Government cannot approve a Scheme for inter State route under section 68D of the Act as the power of the State Government can only operate within its own territory; (ii) that as a State Government cannot make law for areas outside its territorial limits, the scheme approved by it in respect of inter State routes is unconstitutional and (iii) that in approving a scheme a State Government exercises executive power which cannot operate in areas beyond the territorial limits of the State.
Dismissing the appeals, HELD : The contention runs counter to the plain language of the proviso to subs.
(3) of section 68D.
In the face of the proviso it is difficult to hold that the U.P. Government was not competent to approve and publish the impugned scheme.
The proviso manifestly contemplates that the State Government can, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Ch.
IVA of the Act, approve a scheme relating to an inter State route and publish the same.
In the instant case the previous approval of the Central Government was admittedly obtained in respect of the two different States.
[568B E] (b) If the approval of the State Government was to be accorded in respect of that portion of inter State route which was within is own territory, there would have been no necessity to obtain the prior approval of the Central Government.
The necessity of obtaining prior approval of the Central Government arises because the scheme envisages nationalisation of transport service not only for that part of the inter State which is within the territorial limits of the State Government approving the scheme but also for the remaining part of the route which is outside the said territorial limits.
Inter State route would normally cover the entire route and not merely the portion of the route which is within the territorial limits of the State.
Government which accords approval.
[568G H] (ii) The State Government in approving a scheme does not legislate in the sense the legislature of a State makes law under article 245 of the constitution for the whole or any part of the State.
The limitation on the power of a State Legislature to make laws for the whole or any part of the State and not for areas outside the territorial limits of the State cannot be invoked for the purpose of placing a restriction on the power conferred upon the State Government by Parliamentary legislation to approve a scheme relating to an inter State route, [569 C D] (iii) The executive power of the Union and each State under article 298 of the Constitution extends to the carrying on of any trade or business.
There is nothing in article 298 to show that the trade or business carried on by a State must 563 be restricted to the area within its territorial limits.
The article envisages the carrying on of trade and business by a State without any territorial limitations.
A scheme approved by the State Government under sub section
(3) of section 68D effectuates the object of State monopoly in the matter of transport service.
Such a scheme does not entail encroachment by one State Government upon the executive sphere of another State Government.
In the instant case there is no question of encroachment upon the executive domain of one State Government by another because the whole thing is being done by the two Governments acting in concert.
(569F G)


judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 80 of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd October, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1069 (Murder Reference No. 3 of 1969) Harjinder Singh and section Sodhi, for the appellant G. Das and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent 695 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the High Court of Delhi: confirming the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Penal Code but reducing the sentence of death imposed on him by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi to life imprisonment.
The charge against the appellant is that on the night between the 17th and 18 August, 1968 lie committed the murder of one Ram Kumar.
On April 11, 1968 Ram Kumar, his brother Shiv Kumar, their mother and the appellant left Kanpur for Moradnagar.
On,April 15 Ram Kumar, Shiv Kumar and the appellant left Moradnagar for Delhi for purchasing a secondhand motor cycle.
Shiv Kumar went back to Moradnagar for catching a bus to Kanpur.
At about 7 15 p.m. on April 15, 1968 Ram Kumar and the appellant booked a room at Hindustan Hotel, Ballimaran, Delhi.
They signed their names in the hotel register and entered therein their Kanpur address.
On the 16th they were admittedly together and while in search of a motor cycle they met Abdul Hafeez, Babu Khan and Om Prakash.
On the 17th morning Ram Kumar and the appellant struck a deal with Babu Khan and Om Prakash agreeing to purchase from them a motor cycle for Rs. 1,000/ .
Ram Kumar paid a sum of Rs. 251 by way of advance and the sellers agreed to ,deliver the motor cycle in the evening.
At about 6 p.m. on the 17th evening Babu Khan and Om Prakash went to Hindustan Hotel with the motor cycle and met Ram Kumar, who told them that he was short of money by three or four hundred rupees and that he had sent the appellant to get the amount from his (the appellant 's) Ustad.
Babu Khan and Om Prakash waited till about 9 30 p.m. but the appellant did not turn up and so they went away with the motor cycle.
The case of the prosecution is that at about 12 30 a.m. on the night between the 17th and 18th the deceased Ram Kumar and the appellant were seen going to their hotel room by Lal Chand, a partner of the hotel.
It is further alleged that at about 10 a.m. on the 8th morning, Lal Chand and his brother Tek Chand saw the appellant locking the room and leaving the hotel.
On April 20th, the hotel premises were full of a foul smell and thereupon the lock of the room which was occupied by Ram Kumar and the appellant was broken open.
Inside the room was found the dead body of Ram Kumar with two stab injuries, one near the right eye brow and the other near the right ear and nine contused lacerated wounds on the scalp, each injury being brain deep.
According to medical evidence the stab injuries were caused with a pointed, sharp edged weapon ,while the other injuries were caused by a hard, blunt substance.
Soon after the discovery of Ram Kumar 's dead body Lal Chand lodged the First Information Report at the Lahori Gate police station stating that two, persons who had entered their names as Nasim Mahazroo and Ram Kumar occupied a room in his hotel on April 15, 696 that he had seen them entering the room at about 10 30 p.m. of the night between 17th and 18th April and that the younger of the two (namely Nasim, the appellant) had locked the room at about 10 a.m. on the 18th and had not returned since then.
The First Information Report then refers to the circumstances in which the dead body of Ram Kumar was found in the room.
The appellant could not be found at Kanpur where he normally resides and it was on May 4, 1968 that he was arrested at Gaya (Bihar) in the house of his sister.
On a search of that house an attache case containing clothes, a spanner set, an allenkey set and a connecting, rod are said to have been recovered.
According to the prosecution.
, the appellant committed the murder of Ram Kumar with the motive of committing theft of about six or seven hundred rupees which he had kept with him for purchasing the motorcycle.
The appellant admitted that he was on friendly terms with Ram Kumar and that they had gone to Delhi for purchasing a motor cycle.
He also admitted that Ram Kumar agreed to purchase the motor cycle from Babu Khan and Om Prakash, that a sum of Rs. 25/ was given to Om Prakash by way of advance, that he, the appellant, was asked by Ram Kumar to raise some money from his Ustad to make up the price of the motor cycle and that during his absence, Om Prakash and Babu khan had come to the hotel but had, left before he reached the hotel.
The version of the appellant is that he was unable to get the required amount from his Ustad and therefore on reaching the hotel at about 9 p.m. on the 17th he told Ram Kumar that be would go to Kanpur and bring the amount.
He claims to have left for Kanpur by the 9 45 p.m. train reaching there at 6 a.m. on the 18th.
He obtained a sum of Rs. 450/ on April 19 from one Rafi and arrived in Delhi on the evening of April 20.
He says that be went to Ballimaran where the Hindustan Hotel is situated and on hearing rumors that a person was murdered in the hotel and that his name was involved in it he Bed to Gaya out of fear.
He denied that any of the incriminating articles were recovered from his sister 's house.
This is a case of circumstantial evidence and it is therefore necessary to find whether the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are capable of supporting the sole inference that the appellant is guilty of the crime of which he is charged.
The circumstances, in the first place, have to be established by the prosecution by clear and cogent evidence and those circumstances must not be consistent with the innocence of the accused.
For determining whether the circumstances established on the evidence raise but one inference consistent with the guilt of the accused, regard must be had to the totality of the circumstances.
Individual circumstances considered in isolation and divorced from the context of the overall picture emerging from a consideration of the diverse circumstances and their conjoint effect may by themselves appear innocuous.
It, is only when the various circums tances are considered conjointly that it becomes possible to understand and appreciate their true effect.
If a person is seen running 697 away on the heels of a murder, the explanation that he was fleeing in panic is apparently not irrational.
Blood stains on the clothes can be attributed plausibly to a bleeding nose.
Even the possession of a weapon like a knife can be explained by citing a variety of acceptable answers ' But such circumstances cannot be considered in watertight compartments.
If a person is found running away from the scene of murder with blood stained clothes and a knife in his hand, it would, in a proper context, be consistent with the rule of circumstantial evidence to hold that he had committed the murder.
The circumstances on which the High Court relies are these (1) that on April 15, 1968 the appellant and the deceased .Ram Kumar arrived at Delhi for purchasing a motorcycle; (2) that on the evening of the 15th they occupied Room No. 2 in the Hindustan Hotel, Delhi; (3) that on the 16th, the two were together and were looking out for a secondhand motor cycle; (4) that on the 17th the deceased agreed to purchase a, motor cycle from Babu Khan and Om Prakash and paid a sum of Rs. 25/ to Om Prakash by way of advance.
The motor cycle needed repairs and the sellers agreed to deliver it in.
the evening; (5) that the price of the motor cycle was fixed at Rs. 1000/but the deceased was short of money by about Rs. 400/ ; (6) that on the evening of the 17th Babu Khan and Om Prakash went to the hotel to deliver the motor_cycle when the deceased told them that the appellant had gone to bring the money from his Ustad.
Babu Khan and Om, Prakash waited till about 9 p.m. and since the appellant had hot returned till then they left with the motor cycle; (7) that Lal Chand (P.W. 1), a partner of the hotel saw the appellant and the deceased coming to the hotel at about 12 30 a.m.; (8) that at about 10 a.m. on the 18th Lal Chand and his brother Tek Chand (P.W. 2) who run the hotel in partnership saw the appellant locking Room No. 2 and leaving the hotel; (9) that the appellant went to Kanpur on the 18th and got new clothes stitched for himself from a tailor there on, payment of Rs. 60/ as tailoring, charges.
Appellant was generally in poor financial circumstances; (10) that during his stay at Kanpur the appellant stayed at 'Himachal Hotel ' in an assumed name. 'section N. Gander.
He booked a room in the hotel at 5 30 p.m. on the 18th and left the hotel at 4 p.m. on the 19th; 698 (11) that the appellant was traced at Gaya, Bihar, on May 4.1968 in the house of his sister.
On a search of that house a 'connecting rod ' having stains of human blood was recovered along with other articles.
There is clear and un controverted evidence to show that the deceased bad, a sum at least of about Rs. 700/ with him, that he wanted .to purchase a motorcycle, that he and the appellant were occupying Room No. 2 in the Hindustan Hotel, that it was agreed to purchase a motor cycle for Rs. 1000/ from Babu Khan and Om Prakash and that the deceased had deputed the appellant on the 17th evening to get the deficit amount of about Rs. 300./ from the latter 's Ustad.
These facts were never disputed and are not in dispute before us eithe r.
The crucial point of time at which the prosecution and the defence part company is the mid night between the 17th and the 18th.
Lal Chand has stated in his evidence that at about 12 30 a.m. he saw the deceased and the appellant entering Room No. 2.
It was urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that Lal Chand may have made a mistake in identifying the. companion of the deceased but we see no foundation for this submission.
Lal Chand is a proprietor of the Hindustan Hotel and he was neither interested in the deceased nor did he have any grudge against a customer like the appellant.
It is significant that in the First Information Report which Lal Chand lodged at the Lahori Gate police station on the evening of the 20th, he has specifically mentioned that he saw the deceased and the appellant entering the room at about 12 30 a.m. on the night between the 17th and the 18th.
At the time when that Report was lodged no one had any clue to the murder and Lal Chand could not have started building up a theory of his own so as to implicate the appellant falsely.
The evidence of Lal Chand shows that the appellant and the deceased spent the night in Room No. 2.
Counsel for the appellant also challenged the evidence of Lal Chand and Tek Chand that they saw the appellant locking the room at about 10 a.m. on the 18th and leaving the hotel.
This fact is also specifically mentioned in the First Information Report which, in our opinion.
is a highly significant circumstance.
The case of the appellant is that he left Delhi at about 9.45 p.m. on the 17th and therefore be could not have been seen locking the room at 10 a.m. on the 18th.
The evidence of Chhedi Lal, the Manager of Yasin Tailors, Kanpur, is relied upon as showing that the appellant was in Kanpur at least at about 2 pm.
on the 18th and therefore he could not have left Delhi as late as at 10 a.m.
The train takes more than 8 hours to cover the 'distance between Delhi and Kanpur.
Chhedi Lal was obviously trying to offer a helping hand to the, appellant but even then his evidence does not show that the appellant had delivered the cloth to him at 2 p.m, on the 18th.
In answer to, a question put by the learned Sessions Judge, Chhedi Lal stated that he did not remember the exact time when the cloth was delivered to him by the appellant and that the 'Cloth may have been delivered at any time between 12 noon and 8 p.m. 699 on the 18th.
The Sessions Court and the High Court were therefore.
, right in accepting the evidence of Lal Chand and Tek Chand that the appellant locked the room at about 10 a.m. and left the hotel.
These two circumstances are by themselves sufficient to determine the guilt of the appellant.
The appellant and the deceased occupied a room in the Hindustan Hotel, they were seen entering the room together at mid night between the 17th and 18th and the appellant locked the room on the 18th morning and left the hotel.
From that room was discovered the dead body of.
Ram Kumar on the 20th.
The sum of Rs. 700/ which the deceased had on him was found missing and at the Kanpur end, the appellant was indulging in what for a man of his means was a spree of extravagance.
He obtained terylene cloth and paid a bill of Rs. 60/ to the tailor while his friend was lying dead at Delhi.
The appellant is supposed to have gone to.
Kanpur to obtain the deficit sum of Rs. 300/ and if he was truly on such a bona fide mission, it passes comprehension that he should have stayed in the Himachal Hotel, Kanpur in the false name of section N. Gander.
The conduct of the appellant after his arrival at Kanpur on the 18th is a valuable link in the chain of causation.
He knew that the.amount was required by his friend urgently and that his friend was waiting for him in Delhi.
On his own showing, he had a merry time.in Kanpur and according to him it was on the 20th that he went back to Delhi.
And what should he have done ?.
He says that he went to, Ballimaran locality where the Hindustan Hotel is situated and then to the hotel itself.
Having come to know there that he was being involved in a murder which had taken place in the hotel, he claims to, have fled to Gaya, out of sheer fear.
This explanation is wholly irrational and is false.
He and the deceased were on intimate terms and there is evidence showing that the deceased and his family used to treat him as of their own kin.
If he were innocent, he would have in quired about his benefactor in a moment of sorrow and would not have.run away under the magic spell of a strange sense of fear.
Added to the weight of these circumstances is the discovery of the blood stained connecting rod from the house of the appellant 's sister.
That discovery was challenged before us because the two witnesses who acted as Panchas to the seizure memo turned hostile and the prosecution was left to depend on the testimony of two police officers to prove the discovery.
That the two witnesses turned hostile was not surprising because both of them are closely related to the appellant.
It would have been better if the prosecution had examined the other Panch, Sayyed Habib ul Rab, who is described as a retired Judge in the Memo of Seizure.
The Investigating Officer, however was not asked as to why he was not examined and we see no warrant for assuming that the witness though available was.
deliberately kept back.
The postmortem report shows that on the person of the deceased were found two stab injuries and nine contused lacerated wounds.
700 The nature of the injuries shows that two different weapons were used in the commission of Ram Kumar 's murder.
But in the light of the various circumstances discussed above, it is impossible to accept the inference pressed upon us on behalf of the appellant that not only were two different weapons used but at least two persons had participated in the commission of the murder.
Even granting that there was more than.
one person, there is no doubt that the appellant had ;participated and was a key figure in the commission of the crime.
We therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of conviction and sentence.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant and the deceased who were friends, came to Delhi to purchase a motor cycle and stayed in a hotel.
The deceased fell short of money and the appellant promised to get it, from someone known to him.
Two prosecution witnesses saw the deceased and the appellant entering the room of the 'hotel ,on the night of the occurrence and the appellant leaving the hotel room in the morning on the following day.
Two days later the room was broken open and the dead body of the deceased was recovered.
The appellant was arrested at Gaya in his sister 's house and an attache case containing clothes, a spanner set, an allenkey set and a connecting rod were recovered from him.
The appellant was convicted under section 302 Penal Code.
by the Sessions Judge.
In appeal the High Court reduced the sentence to life imprisonment.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD : In a case of circumstantial evidence it is necessary to find whether the circumstances on which the prosecution relies are capable of supporting the sole inference that the appellant is guilty of the crime of which he is charged.
The circumstances have to be established by the prosecution by clear and cogent evidence and those circumstances must not be consistent with the innocence of the accused.
For determining whether the.
circumstances established on evidence raise but one inference consistent with the guilt of the accused, regard must be had to the totality of the circumstances.
Individual circumstances considered in isolation and divorced ' from the context of the overall picture emerging from a consideration of the diverse circumstances and their conjoint ,effect may by themselves appear innocuous.
It is only when the various circumstances are considered conjointly that it becomes possible to understand and appreciate their true effect. ' [696G H] In the instant case, the circumstances that, the appellant and the deceased who occupied a room in the hotel were seen entering the room together at midnight on the night of the occurrence, the appellant was seen locking the room and leaving.
the hotel, the dead body was recovered from the room, the appellant was found indulging in what for a man of his means was a spree of extravagance, and a blood stained connecting rod was recovered from the house of the appellant 's sister where he was found, all point to , the guilt of the accused.