judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1974.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16 10 1973 of the Delhi High Court in LPA No. 238/72.
Dr. L. M. Singhvi and Mahinder Narain for the Appellant.
Lal Narain Sinha Att.
of India, B. P. Maheshwari, Suresh Sethi and section K. Bhattacharyya for Respondent No. 1.
Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J.
Does the failure of the Standing Committee of the Delhi Municipal Corporation to consider under sub section
(3) of section 313, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, an application for sanction to a lay out plan within the period specified in the subsection result in a "deemed" grant of the sanction? That is the principal question raised in this appeal by special leave which is directed against the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court allowing a Letters Patent Appeal and dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant.
The appellant 's father, Amin Chand, owned a large parcel of land in village Chowkhandi near Tilak Nagar, Najafgarh Road, New Delhi.
The land was situated within the municipal limits of Delhi.
Amin Chand decided on developing the land as a residential colony named, after his father, the "Gangaram Vatika Colony".
He submitted a lay out plan for sanction under section 313 of the Delhi Municipal 1076 Corporation Act, 1957.
The plan was sanctioned by the Standing Committee of the Delhi Municipal Corporation by Resolution No. 17 passed on 10th December, 1958.
A revised lay out plan was approved by the Standing Committee by Resolution No. 871 dated 12th November, 1964.
Meanwhile, Amin Chand died, and the appellant, his son, thought it desirable that the lay out plan should include provision for the construction of a cinema.
Plots Nos.
33, 34 and 35 approved as separate units for the construction of residential houses in the lay out plan were selected as an amalgamated unit for the cinema.
An application dated 20th April, 1967, accompanied by a copy of the sanctioned lay out plan indicating the proposed changes, was filed by the appellant and he prayed for "an early sanction in terms of the provisions of section 313" of the Act.
The Town Planner of the Corporation informed him by letter dated 14th June, 1967 that his application did not fall within the purview of section 313 and that, moreover, the Master Plan did not envisage a cinema within a residential area, and therefore the request could not be considered.
Some correspondence followed between the appellant and the Corporation and concluded with a letter of 29th September, 1969 by the Corporation informing the appellant that his proposal could not be accepted because it would contravene the Master Plan of Delhi.
The Appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi alleging that the application had not been considered by the Standing Committee, and as the period prescribed by the statute for doing so had expired the revised lay out plan must be treated as having been sanctioned.
Accordingly, he prayed that the respondents be restrained from interfering with his right to raise the construction including the cinema building in accordance with the revised lay out plan.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court while disposing of the writ petition directed the Corporation to treat the revised lay out plan as having been approved, but observed that the appellant would not be entitled to construct a cinema on the land unless due compliance had been effected with other provisions of the law and that it was open to the Standing Committee under sub section
(5) of section 313 to prohibit the construction of the cinema.
The Corporation preferred a Letters Patent Appeal, and a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated 16th October, 1973 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
Section 313 of the Corporation Act consists of the following provisions: "313.
(1) Before utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with any land under section 312, the owner thereof shall send to the 1077 Commissioner a written application with a lay out plan of the land showing the following particulars, namely: (a) the plots into which the land is proposed to be divided for the erection of buildings thereon and the purpose or purposes for which such buildings are to be used; (b) the reservation or allotment of any site for any street, open space, park, recreation ground, school, market or any other public purpose; (c) the intended level, direction and width of street or streets, (d) the regular line of street or streets; (e) the arrangements to be made for levelling, paving, metalling, flagging, channelling, sewering, draining, conserving and lighting street or streets.
(2) The provisions of this Act and the bye laws made thereunder as to width of the public streets and the height of buildings abutting thereon, shall apply in the case of streets referred to in sub section (1) and all the particulars referred to in that sub section shall be subject to the sanction of the Standing Committee.
(3) Within sixty days after the receipt of any application under sub section (1) the Standing Committee shall either accord sanction to the lay out plan on such conditions as it may think fit or disallow it or ask for further information with respect to it.
(4) Such sanction shall be refused (a) if the particulars shown in the lay out plan would conflict with any arrangements which have been made or which are in the opinion of the Standing Committee likely to be made for carrying out any general scheme of development of Delhi whether contained in the master plan or a zonal development plan prepared for Delhi or not; or (b) if the said lay out plan does not conform to the provisions of this Act and bye laws made thereunder; or (c) if any street proposed in the plan is not designed so as to connect at one end with a street which is already open.
(5) No person shall utilise, sell or otherwise deal with any land or lay out or make any new street without or otherwise than in conformity with the orders of the Standing Committee 1078 and if further information is asked for, no step shall be taken to utilise, sell or otherwise deal with the land or to lay out or make the street until orders have been passed upon receipt of such information: Provided that the passing of such orders shall not be in any case delayed for more than sixty days after the Standing Committee has received the information which it considers necessary to enable it to deal with the said application.
(6) The lay out plan referred to earlier in this section shall, if so required by the Standing Committee, be prepared by a licensed town planner.
" The principal contention of the appellant before us is that on a true construction of section 313 it must be regarded that 'there is no restriction on his utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with the land in accordance with the lay out plan because the time prescribed by sub section
(3) for the Standing Committee to take action on the application had expired ', and reliance is place on Municipal Corporation of Delhi & ors.
vs Smt.
Kamala Bhandari & ors.(1).
It is necessary to examine for the purpose of this case what Parliament intended when enacting section 313.
Among the obligations vested in the Corporation under the Act are the construction, maintenance and improvement of streets.
Public streets vest in the Corporation and the Commissioner is enjoined to ensure their maintenance and repair.
Sections 313 to 316 related to private streets.
Section 312 provides that if the owner of any land utilises, sells, leases out or otherwise disposes of such land for the construction of buildings thereon, he must lay out and make a street or streets giving access to the plots in which the land is to be divided and connecting with an existing public or private street.
Sub section
(1) of section 313 obliges the owner of the land, before utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with the land under section 312 to apply to the Commissioner with a lay out plan of the land for sanction to the lay out plan.
The particulars detailed in sub section
(1) required in a lay out plan bear on the provisions of section 312.
The lay out plan will indicate in what manner the plots are proposed to be divided and the use to which they will be applied as well as the condition and direction of the streets, which provide access to them, so that it can be determined whether the private streets proposed in the lay out plan will adequately and sufficiently serve the buildings raised on the plots.
Sub section
(3) requires the Standing Committee, within sixty days after receipt of the application, either to accord sanction to the lay out plan or to disallow it 1079 or ask for further information in respect of it.
If further information is asked for, the ban on the owner utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with the land continues to operate until orders have been passed by the Standing Committee on receipt of the information.
That is sub section
Its proviso lays down that the passing of such orders shall not be in any case delayed for more than sixty days after the Standing Committee has received the information which it considers necessary.
Sub sections
(3) and (5) of section 313 prescribe a period within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application made under sub section
But neither sub section declares that if the Standing Committee does not deal with the application within the prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded.
The statute merely requires the Standing Committee to consider the application within sixty days.
It stops short of indicating what will be the result if the Standing Committee fails to do so.
If it intended that the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the matter within the prescribed period should imply a deemed sanction it would have said so.
They are two distinct things, the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the application within sixty days and that the failure should give rise to a right in the applicant to claim that sanction has been accorded.
The second does not necessarily follow from the first.
A right created by legal fiction is ordinarily the product of express legislation.
It seems to us that when sub section
(3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to sub section
(5) declares that the Standing Committee shall not in any case delay the passing of orders for more than sixty days the statute merely prescribes a standard of time within which it expects the Standing Committee to dispose of the matter.
It is a standard which the statute considers to be ' reasonable.
But non compliance does not result in a deemed sanction to the lay out plan.
Besides the absence of express language creating the legal consequence claimed by the appellant, there is nothing in the context to persuade us to accept the claim.
Parliament did not apparently view the matter of sanctioning a lay out plan as possessing the immediacy associated with the actual erection of a building or the execution of a work, where on the failure of the Commissioner to refuse sanction or to communicate such refusal within a specified period the applicant is entitled to commence and proceed with the building or work.
There is nothing in section 313 which has the contextual character of sections 336 and 337.
A perusal of sections 336 and 337 confirms that the cases covered there are controlled by a tightly woven time bound 1080 programme strongly indicating Parliament 's intent to regard the direction of a building and the execution of a work as matters of the utmost expedition and urgency.
Sub section
(3) of section 336 requires the Commissioner to communicate the sanction to the applicant and, where sanction is refused, to communicate the refusal with a statement of his reasons for such refusal.
If the period specified in sub section
(1) of section 337 has expired without the Commissioner refusing to sanction or, if refusing, without communicating the refusal, the applicant can commence and proceed with the projected building or work.
If it appears to the Commissioner that the site of the proposed building or work is likely to be affected by any scheme of acquisition of land for a public purpose or by any of the other public works mentioned in the proviso to sub section
(1) of section 337, he may withhold sanction of the proposed building or work, but even therefor not more than three months and the period specified in the sub section is computed as commencing from the expiry of such period.
That is not all.
On the sanction or deemed sanction, the applicant must under sub section
(3) of section 337 commence the erection of the building or execution of the work within one year.
Failure to do so will reduce him to the need for taking fresh steps for obtaining the sanction.
Then, before commencing the erection of the building or execution of the work with the period specified in sub section
(3), he is obliged, by virtue of sub section
(4) to give notice to the Commissioner of the proposed date of such commencement; and if the commencement does not take place within seven days fresh notice is necessary.
This network of provisions demonstrates the urgency attached by Parliament to the case where a building has to be erected or a work executed.
It is conspicuous by its absence in section 313.
We are, therefore, of opinion that if the Standing Committee does not consider the grant of sanction on the application made under sub section
(1) of section 313 within the specified period, it is not open to the applicant to regard the lay out plan as having been sanctioned.
We are unable to endorse the contrary view taken by the High Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi 's case (supra) and overrule that decision.
The application made by the appellant for sanction to the lay out plan must be regarded as pending before the Standing Committee and must now be disposed of without any further delay.
The appellate Bench of the High Court has taken the view that the application does not lie under section 313.
As we have already observed, the purpose of filing a lay out plan under sub section
(1) of section 313 is related immediately to determining whether the access pro 1081 vided by the proposed private streets sufficiently and adequately serves the purpose enacted in section 312, and that is why the lay out plan must show the particulars specified in sub section
(1) of section 313.
Sanction to the lay out plan is also a preliminary step in the process of utilising the land for the construction of buildings thereon.
It is necessary to obtain that sanction because it is a pre requisite to the grant of sanction for the erection of the building or the execution of the work.
Under sub section
(1) of section 336, it is open to the Commissioner to refuse sanction of a building or work, in cases falling under section 312, if the lay out plans have not been sanctioned in accordance with section 313.
In our view, the appellant was right in making the application under section 313 regard to the amalgamation of the three plots for the proposed construction of a cinema building.
The Standing Committee has to determine whether the lay out plan now proposed can be sanctioned.
It may refuse the sanction by reason of sub section
(4) of section 313 on any of the ground specified therein.
That will be a matter for the Standing Committee to consider.
The Appellate Bench of the High Court has held that the appellant is not entitled to invoke sub section
(3) of section 313 for the grant of sanction to the revised lay out plan.
The High Court was apparently of the view that section 313 is attracted only when the owner of the land has not yet utilised or otherwise dealt with the land and the application for sanction envisaged under section 313 is the first application made for the purpose.
The High Court has referred to the circumstances that the owner had already commenced to act on the sanction granted to the original lay out plan.
We think that the limited view taken by the High Court is not justified.
It is open to the owner of land, after obtaining sanction to the original lay out plan, to apply afresh for sanction to a revised lay out plan.
Circumstances may arise, after the original sanction was granted, requiring the owner to incorporate changes in the original lay out plan.
In that event, when an application is made for the grant of sanction to a revised lay out plan it is, as it were, an application for the grant of a fresh sanction.
There is a fresh lay out plan for which sanction is applied.
It is differently constituted from the original lay out plan.
Such an application will fall under section 313.
It is no bar to making such an application and entertaining it that the owner has commenced to utilise the land or otherwise dealt with it.
Section 312 implies that the land must be utilised in accordance with the lay out plan.
If the land has been utilised to any degree by the appellant before 20th April, 1967, the utilisation must conform to the original sanctioned lay out plan.
No utilisation by the appellant in the manner subsequently proposed is 1082 permissible unless and until sanction is accorded to the revised lay out plan.
If such sanction is refused, it is the original sanction which will continue to operate, and the lay out plan to which such sanction was granted is the one that matters.
In the circumstances, we direct the first respondent, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, to refer the application dated 20th April, 1967 along with the lay out plan accompanying it to its Standing Committee and the Standing Committee will dispose of the application expeditiously in accordance with law.
The appellant is not entitled to any further relief at this stage.
In the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs.

summary/full:
The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by sub section (1) of section 313 obliges the owner of the land, before utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with the land under section 312 to apply to the Commissioner with a layout plan of the land for sanction to the lay out plan.
Sub section (3) of the said section requires the Standing Committee, within sixty days after receipt of the application, either to accord sanction to the lay out plan or to disallow it or ask for further information in respect of it.
If further information is asked for, the ban on the owner utilising, selling or otherwise dealing with the land continues to operate until orders have been passed by the Standing Committee on receipt of the information.
The appellant 's father who owned a large parcel of land situated within the Municipal limits, decided on developing the land as a residential colony and submitted a lay out plan for sanction under section 313, which was sanctioned by the Standing Committee on 10th December, 1958.
After the death of the appellant 's father, the appellant thought it desirable that the lay out plan should include provision for the construction of a cinema and he submitted an application dated 20th April, 1967 accompanied by a copy of the sanctioned lay out plan indicating the proposed changes, and prayed for an early sanction in terms of the provisions of section 313.
The Town Planner of the Corporation informed by letter, dated 14th June, 1967 that as the application did not fall within the purview of section 313, and that as the Master Plan did not envisage a cinema within a residential area, the request could not be considered.
Some correspondence followed and ultimately by letter, dated 29th September, 1969 the appellant was informed that his proposal could not be accepted.
Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court alleging that the application had not been considered by the Standing Committee and as the period prescribed by the statute for doing so had expired the revised lay out plan must be treated as having been sanctioned.
The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the Corporation to treat the revised lay out plan as having been approved but observed that it was open to the Standing Committee under sub section (5) of section 313 to prohibit the construction of the cinema.
The respondent Corporation preferred a Letters Patent Appeal and the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was not entitled to invoke sub section (3) of section 313.
In the appeal to this Court, on the question, whether the failure of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation to consider under sub section 1074 (3) of section 313 of the Act, an application for sanction to a lay out plan within the period specified in the sub section can result in a deemed grant of the sanction: ^ HELD: 1.
Merely because the Standing Committee does not consider the grant of sanction on the application made under sub section (1) of section 313 within the specified period, does not entitle the applicant to regard the lay out plan as having been sanctioned.
[1080F] 2.
The Municipal Corporation is obliged to refer the application dated 20th April, 1967 alongwith the lay out plan accompanying it, to its Standing Committee to dispose of the application expeditiously in accordance with law.
[1082B] 3.
Sub sections (3) and (5) of section 313 prescribe a period within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application made under sub section (1).
But neither sub section declares that if the Standing Committee does not deal with the application within the prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded.
The statute merely requires the Standing Committee to consider the application within sixty days.
It stops short of indicating what will be the result if the Standing Committee fails to do so.
[1070C] 4.
If the Act intended that the failure of the Standing Committee to deal with the matter within the Prescribed period should imply a deemed sanction it would have said so.
[1070C] 5.
When sub section (3) declares that the Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of the application deal with it, and when the proviso to sub section (5) declares that the Standing Committee shall not in any case delay the passing of orders for more than sixty days the statute merely prescribes a standard of time within which it expects the Standing Committee to dispose of the matter.
It is a standard which the statute considers to be reasonable.
But non compliance does not result in a deemed sanction to the lay out plan.
[1070E F] 6.
Parliament did not apparently view the matter of sanctioning a lay out plan as possessing the immediacy associated with the actual erection of a building or the execution of a work, where on the failure of the Commissioner to refuse sanction or to communicate such refusal within a specified period the applicant is entitled to commence and proceed with the building or work.
[1070G] 7.
There is nothing in section 313 which has the contextual character of sections 336 and 337.
A perusal of sections 336 and 337 confirms that the cases covered there are controlled by a tightly woven time bound programme strongly indicating Parliament 's intent to regard the erection of a building and the execution of a work as matters of the utmost expedition and urgency.
This network of provisions demonstrate the urgency attached by Parliament to the case where a building has to be erected or a work executed.
[1079H 1080A, E] 8.
Sanction to the lay out plan is also a preliminary step in the process of utilising the land for the construction of buildings thereon.
It is necessary to obtain that sanction because it is a pre requisite to the grant of sanction for the erection of the building or the execution of the work.
[1081B] 9.
The appellant was right in making the application under section 313 in regard to the amalgamation of the three plots for the proposed construction 1075 of a cinema building.
The Standing Committee has to determine whether the lay out plan now proposed can be sanctioned.
It may refuse the sanction by reason of sub section (4) of section 313 on any of the grounds specified therein.
That will be a matter for the Standing Committee to consider.
[1081C D] 10.
It is open to the owner of the land, after obtaining sanction to the original lay out plan to apply afresh for sanction to a revised lay out plan.
Circumstances may arise, after the original sanction was granted, requiring the owner to incorporate changes in the original lay out plan.
In that event, when an application is made for the grant of sanction to a revised lay out plan it is, as it were, an application for the grant of a fresh sanction.
There is a fresh lay out plan for which sanction is applied.
It is differently constituted from the original lay out plan.
Such an application would fall under section 313.
[1081F G] In the instant case the application made by the appellant for sanction to the lay out plan must be regarded as pending before the Standing Committee which must be disposed of without any further delay.
[1080G] Municipal Corporation of Delhi & ors.
versus Smt.
Kamla Bhandari & Ors.
I.L.R. (1970) 1, Delhi 66 disapproved.


judgement:
os. 102,105 to 110 of 1956.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
N. C. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and janardhan Sharma; for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 102, 105 to 108 of 1956.
Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 109 and 110 of 1956.
C.K.Daphtary, SoliCitor General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R. H Dhebar, for respondents in Petitions Nos. 102 and 105 of 1956.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in Petitions Nos. 106 to 110 of 1956.
September 17.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.
These are petitions filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of writs in the nature of habeas corpus.
They arise on the same facts and raise the same questions.
On 13 1 1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, passed orders under section 3(2) of the IV of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), directing the detention of the present petitioners, and pursuant thereto, they were actually arrested on 16 1 1956.
The grounds on which the orders were made were formulated on 19 1 1956, and communicated to the petitioners the next day.
On 21 1 1956 the Commissioner reported the fact of the order and the grounds therefor to the State Govern 655 ment, which approved of the same on 231 1956.
The contention of the petitioners before us is that when the Commissioner passed the orders for detention on 13 1 1956, it was his duty under section 3(3) to report that fact forthwith to the State Government and as be did not do so until 21 1 1956, he had acted in contravention of the statute, and that the detention was therefore illegal.
That raises the question as to what "forthwith" in section 3 (3) of the Act signifies, and whether on the facts the report was made "forthwith", within the meaning of that word in that sub section.
The word "forthwith", it has been observed, is of elastic import.
In its literal sense, it might be construed as meaning that the act to be performed forth;with in relation to another should follow it automatically without any interval of time, or, as held in some of the American.
authorities, should be performed at one and the same time as the other.
But even in America, the preponderance of judicial opinion does not favour this construction.
In Corpus Juris, Volume 26, page 998 the position is thus stated: "Although the term has received a strict conStruction, ordinarily it is not to be strictly construed, but should receive a liberal or reasonable construction .
Some regard must be had to the nature of the act or thing to be performed and the circumstances of the case".
In England, there is a long catena of decisions interpreting the word "forthwith" occurring in statutes, rules and contracts, and their trend has been to construe it liberally.
As early as 1767, discussing the meaning of the word 'immediately ' and the word "forthwith" his been held to have the same significance Lord Hardwicke observed in Rex vs Francis "But then the word immediately, is strongly insisted on, as, a word which excludes all mesne acts and time; and therefore, that this taking away the money must necessarily be 'in the presence of Cox.
(1) Cun. 165; ; , 1183.
656 But all the nine Judges held this word immediately, to be of so loose a signification, and not to imply necessarily, that the money was taken away in Cox 's presence.
For this word does neither in its use and application, nor in its grammatical construction, exclude all mesne acts or time But it is more necessary and proper in this case, to consider the signification of this word in the legal, way.
And it is plain, that in this acceptation, it is not understood to exclude mesne acts or time And on the Statute Hue and Cry, 27 Eliz. c. 13, section 11, where ' the words with as much convenient speed as may be, are made use of, all the precedents have expressed these words, by the word immediate, as may be seen in the books.
The last case which I shall mention on this point, is that of the writs of habeas corpus, issuing out of this Court, which are most frequently made returnable immediately; and in this case the word is never understood either to exclude mesne acts or time, but only means, with convenient speed In Beg.
vs The Justices of Worcester(1), where the question was as to the meaning of the word "forthwith" in section 50 of 6 Will.
IV, Coleridge, J. observed: "I agree that this word 'forthwith ' is not to receive a strict construction like the word 'immediately ',, so that whatever follows, must be done immediately after that which has been done before.
By referring to section 50, it seems that whatever is to be done under it, ought to be done without any unreasonable delay.
I think that the word 'forthwith ' there used, must be considered as having that meaning ' The meaning of the word "immediately" came up for consideration in Thompson vs Gibson(2).
Holding that it was not to be construed literally, Lord Abinger C. B. observed: "If they" (acts of Parliament) "could be construed literally, consistently with common sense and justice, undoubtedly they ought; and if I could see, (1) [1889] 7 Dowl.
789 791: 54 R.R. 902 (903).
(2) (1841] 8 M. & NV. 282 ; ,1047.
657 upon this act of, Parliament, that it was the intention of the legislature that not a single moment 's interval should take place before the granting of the certificate, I should think myself bound to defer to that declared intention.
But it is admitted that this cannot be its interpretation; we are therefore to see how, consistently with common sense and the principles of justice, the words 'immediately afterwards ' are to be construed.
If they do not mean that it is to be done the very instant afterwards,do they mean within ten minutes, or a quarter of an hour, afterwards? I think we should interpret them to mean, within such reason able time as will exclude the danger of intervening facts operating upon the mind of the Judge, so as to disturb the impression made upon it by the evidence in the cause".
In agreeing with this opinion, Alderson, B. expressly approved of the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Rex vs Francis(1).
This construction of the word 'immediately ' was adopted in Page vs Pearce(), Lord Abinger C. B. observing: "It has already been decided, and necessarily so, that the words 'immediately afterwards 'in the statute, cannot be construed literally; and if you abandon the literal construction of the words, what can you substitute but 'within a reasonable time? '. " In The Queen vs The Justice 3 of Berkshire(3), where the point was as to the meaning of "forthwith" in section 52 of 35 & 36 Vict., Chapter 94, Cockburn C. J. observed: "The question is substantially one of fact.
It is impossible to lay down any bard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word 'immediately ', in all cases.
The words 'forthwith ' and 'immediately ' have the same meaning.
They are stronger than the expression within a reasonable time ', and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether there has been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case".
(1) dun.
165: ; , 1188.
(2) ; (678): (1212).
(3) (471).
658 The same construction. has been put on the word "forthwith " occurring in contracts.
In Hudson and others vs Hill and others(1) which was a case of charterparty, it was observed at page 280: " Forthwith ' means without unreasonable delay.
The difference between undertaking to do something 'forthwith ' and kithin a specified time is familiar to everyone conversant with law.
To do a thing 'forthwith ' is to do it as soon as is reasonably convenient".
In Reg.
vs Price(2), it was held by the Privy Council that the word "forthwith" in a bail bond meant within a reasonable time from the service of notice.
On these authorities, it may be taken, an act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay.
But it is argued by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the view taken in the above decisions as to the meaning of the word "forthwith" has been abandoned in the later decisions, and that under the law as it stands, when an act has to be performed forthwith in relation to another, what has to be decided is not whether it was done within a reasonable time, but whether it was done so closely upon the other as to form together one continuous act.
He relied in support of this opinion on the decision in Be Muscovitch(3), affirming that in Re Muscovitch(1).
That was a decision on rule 132 of the Bankruptcy Rules which provided that "Upon entering an appeal, a copy of the notice of appeal shall forthwith be sent by the appellant to the registrar of the court appealed from".
The facts were that the appeal was lodged in time on 25 10 1938 but the notice was served on 28 10 1938, and it was found that there was "no satisfactory reason or no reason at all, why there was any delay in the matter" (Re Muscovitch(4)).
On that, it was held that the requisition that "the notice shall forthwith be sent" was not satisfied.
This is authority only for the position that when an Act is done after an interval of time and there is no explanation forthcoming for (1) (280).
(2) ; 8 Moore P.C. 208: (3) (4) , 659 the delay, it cannot be held to have been done "forthwith".
That is made clear by Sir Wilfrid Greene M. R. in the following passage in Re Muscovitch(1) at page 139: "Having regard to the construction which was put upon the word 'forthwith ' which is peremptory, and. admits of no interval of time between the entry of the appeal and the sending of the notice save such as may be imposed by circumstances, which cannot be avoided, I find it impossible in the present case to say that the notice was sent forthwith within the meaning of the rule".
Reliance is also placed for the petitioners on the decision in Ex parte Lamb: In re Southam(2), which was followed in Re Muscovitch(1).
There, construing the word "forthwith" in rule 144 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, which corresponds to rule 132, which was the subject of interpretation in Re Muscovitch(1), Jessel M. R. observed at page 173: "Ithink that the word 'forthwith ' must be construed according to the circumstances in which it is used Where, as in Hyde vs Watt8(3), there is a covenant to insure a man 's life, there must of necessity be some delay, for the act could not be done in a moment.
But where an act which is required to be done 'forthwith ' can be done without delay, it ought to be so done".
In that case also, the learned Judges found that the delay was not explained.
And the observation of Lush L. J. in the same case was that "the word 'forthwith ' has not a fixed and an absolute meaning; it must be construed with reference to the objects of the rule and the circumstances of the case".
There is nothing in the decisions in Re Muscovitch(1) and Ex parte Lamb: In re Southam(2) which can be considered as marking a departure from the construction put on the word "forthwith" in the earlier authorities that it meant only that the act should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition, and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained.
(1) (2) (3) ; 660 It is argued for the petitioners that even if the con.
struction put on the word "forthwith" in the above decisions is accepted as correct, it must, in any event, yield to any contrary intention expressed in the statute, and that the provisions of the Act afforded clear indication of such an intention.
It is co intended that the legislature while providing in section 7 that the grounds should be communicated to the detenu "as soon as may be" has enacted that the report under section 3(3) should be sent "forth with", that the use of two different expressions in the two sections is a clear indication that they do not mean the same thing, that as the words "as soon as may be" import that the act might be performed in a reasonable time, the word "forthwith" which is more peremptory must be construed as excluding it.
The decisions in Emperor vs Phuchai(1) and in K. U. Kulkarni vs Ganpat Teli(2) were quoted in support of the position that when two different expressions are used in different parts of the same clause or section, they should be construed as used in different senses.
We agree that "forthwith" in section 3(3) cannot mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in section 7, and that the former is more peremptory than the latter.
The difference between the two expressions lies, in our opinion, in this that while under section 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under section 3(3) what is allowed is only the period during which he could not, without any fault of his own, send the report.
Under section 7 the question is whether the time taken for communicating the grounds is reasonably requisite.
Under section 3(3) it is whether the report has been sent at the earliest point of time possible, and when there is an inter val of time between the date of the order and the date of the report, what has to be con sidered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided.
(1) I.L.R. 50 All.
909: A.I.R. 1929 All.
(2) I.L.R. [1942] Bom.
287: A.I.R. 1942 Bom.
661 It was contended that as section 7 required that the communication should be made not later than 5 days from the date of the order, and as section 3(3) was more peremptory than section 7 in that it required that the report should be made forthwith, the period allowable under section 3(3) could not exceed 5 days, and that as in these cases the reports were sent 8 days later, they could not be held to have been sent forthwith.
This argument mixes up two different matters contained in section 7.
The period of 5 days provided therein is an absolute one and is independent of the period which is permissible under the expression "as soon as may be", which must, by its very nature, be indefinite depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
It will be as erroneous to read 5 days into the period allowable under the expression "as soon as may be" as to read the 12 days within which the State has to approve the order under section 3(3) into the period which is allowable under the expression "forthwith".
The result then is that the report sent by the Commissioner to the State on 21 1 1956 could be held to have been sent "forthwith" as required by section 3(3), only if the authority could satisfy us that, in spite of all diligence, it was not in a position to send the report during the period from 13th to 21st January 1956.
We must now examine the facts from the above standpoint.
The Commissioner of Police has filed an affidavit explaining why the reports were not sent till 21,st January 1956, though the orders themselves had been made as early as 13th January 1956.
Ever since the publication of the proposal to form a State of Maharashtra without the city of Bombay, there ,had been considerable agitation for the establishment of a Samyuktha Maharashtra with the city of Bombay included in it.
An action committee had been set up on 15 11 1955 for the purpose, and there had been hartal and morchas resulting in outbursts of lawlessness and violence and in the burning of a police chowki.
The final decision on the question was expected to be taken and announced in the middle of January 1956, and the atmosphere was highly sur charged.
It was in this situation that the Commis 662 sioner decided to take action under section 3(2) of the Act against the leading spirits of the movement, and passed the present orders for detention against the petitioners on 13 1 1956.
In his affidavit the Commissioner states that he decided first "to locate the persons against whom orders of detention were made by me on the 13th January 1956 and after having done so, to arrest all of them simultaneously so that none of them may go underground or abscond or evade execution of the detention orders".
Then the affidavit goes on to state: "It was not possible for me to send the report earlier as the situation in the City of Greater Bombay was tense, pregnant with danger on the 13th January 1956, and continued to be so till 16th January 1956, and actual rioting occurred during that night and those riots continued till 22nd January 1956.
I and my staff were kept extremely busy all throughout in maintaining law and order and simultaneously taking steps to round up miscreants.
In this unusual and tense situation, it was not possible to make a report earlier than the day on which it was made".
We see no reason for not accepting these statements.
What happened on the 16th and the following days are now matters of history.
The great city of bombay was convulsed in disorders, which are among the worst that this country has witnessed.
The Bombay police had a most difficult task to perform in securing life and property, and the authorities must have been working at high pressure in maintaining law and order.
It is obvious that the Commissioner was not sleeping over the orders which he had passed or lounging supinely over them.
The delay such as it is due, to causes not of his making, but to causes to which the activities of the petitioners very largely contributed.
We have no hesitation in accepting the affidavit, and we bold that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that when they were sent by him, they were sent "forthwith" within the meaning of section 3(3) of the Act.
663 Mr. section C. Gupta put forward some special contentions on behalf of the petitioners in C.M.Ps.
109 and 110 of 1956.
He contended that as the order originally made against the petitioner in C.M.P. No. 109 of 1956 was that he should be detained in Arthur Road Prison, Bombay the subsequent order of the Commissioner by which he was detained in Nasik Prison was without jurisdiction.
It is clear from the affidavit of the Commissioner that the petitioner was not ordered to be detained in Arthur Road Prison but in Nasik Road Central Prison, and that he was kept temporarily in Arthur Road Prison, pending arrangements to transport him to Nasik.
It was next contended that the materials on which the orders of detention were made and set out in the communications addressed to the petitioners all related to their past activities, and that they could not constitute grounds for detention in future.
This contention is clearly unsound.
What a person is likely to do in future can only be a matter of inference from various circumstances, and his past record will be valuable, and often the only, record on which it could be made.
It was finally contended that what was alleged against the petitioners was only that they advocated hartal, and that was not a ground for making an order of detention.
But the charge in these cases was that the petitioners instigated hartal bringing about a complete stoppage of work, business and transport with a view to promote lawlessness and disorder, and that is a ground on which an order could be made under section 3(2).
All the contentions urged by the petitioners therefore fail, and these petitions must be dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Section 3(3) of the , provides that when an order of detention is made by an officer mentioned in section 3(2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made. . and no such order. shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.
On 13th January 1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, passed orders under section 3(2) of the directing the detention of the petitioners and in pursuance thereof ' they were arrested on 16th January 1956 The grounds on which the orders were made were furnished to the petitioners on 20th January 1956 and the next day the Commissioner reported the fact of the order and the grounds therefor to the State Government which approved of the same on 23rd January 1956.
The petitioners contested the validity of the detention on the ground that when the Commissioner passed the orders for detention on 13th January 1956 it was his duty under section 3(3) to report that fact forthwith to the State Government, and as he did not do so until 21st January '1956 he had acted in contravention of the statute and that the detention was therefore illegal.
It was found that the delay in sending the report could not have been avoided by the Commissioner and that it was due to causes to which the petitioners had very largely con tributed.
Held, that the word "forthwith" in section 3(3) of the , has not a fixed and an absolute meaning and it must be construed with reference to the object of the section and the circumstances of the case.
It cannot mean the same thing as "as soon as may be" in section 7 of the Act and the former is more peremptory than the latter.
The difference between the two .
expressions lies in this that while under a. 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under section 3(3) what is allowed is only the 654 period during which he could not, without any fault of his own, send the report.
An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay.
The Queen vs The Justices of Berkshire ([1878 79] 4 Q.B.D. 469), Hudson and others vs Hill and others ([1874] 43 L. J. C.P. 273), and Beg.
vs Price, ; , relied on.


judgement:
ition No. 5287 of 1980.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution).
P. H. Parekh, Amicus Curiae for the Petitioner.
B. D. Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.
The moral of this case is poignant: So long as an iron curtain divides the law set by the Constitution and lit by the Supreme Court from the minions of the State, so long shall this Court 's writ remain a mystic myth and harmless half truth making law in the books and law in action distant neighbours.
This shall not be.
The sombre scenario unfurled by this habeas corpus proceeding begins with a telegram (dated 3 10 1980) on behalf of the prisoners the petitioners to one of us, complaining, manu brevi, of insufferable, illegal solitary confinement punctuated by periods of iron fetters, a lot shared by two others with him in Jaipur Central Jail.
This trauma laden message reads: "Convict Kishore Singh Ravinder Dev Pareek Surjeet Singh Central Jail Jaipur confined in cells with fetters illegally unconstitutionally more than eight months habeas corpus writ prayed order enquiry and save .
Daulat Singh" This grievance of the prisoners in 'twisted gyves ' triggered off judicial action with telegraphic speed, as it were, and the Bench directed that the prisoners be forthwith liberated from solitary confinement and freed from fetters in terms of the law laid down by this Court in Sunil Batra 's case.
That order dated October 6, 1980 reads : "We appoint Shri P. H. Parekh as amicus curiae, 997 If the petitioner is in solitary confinement, he will be released from solitary confinement forthwith in the light of the decision of this Court in Sunil Batra 's case.
The Superintendent of the Central Jail concerned will report to this Court on 21st October 1980 the number of cases with particulars of persons in solitary confinement in that prison.
He will appear in person on that date.
Notice to Shri B. D. Sharma, Standing Counsel for the State of Rajasthan.
Counsel 's services, under our litigative process, are a necessary facility for remedial justice and so we took this step of appointing Shri P. H. Parekh as amount curiae.
The whole bar, if it has a larger dedication, is amicus curiae, because no cause should be dearer to a people oriented, justice centred profession, despite its esoteric genes, elitist strands and lucrative slant, than to be a decisive actor in the democracy of judicial remedies so that no man be he poor man or prisoner, dissenter, delinquent, eccentric or extremist shall suffer what the law forbids.
In this Court, the members of the bar, whenever called up by the bench have kept the door ajar and unfailingly helped the Court as free janitors of justice and free forensic functionaries at the service of any one aggrieved by injustice and seeking legal justice.
After all, the great proposition that inspires the calling of justicing by the Bench and the Bar alike is best expressed by Dr. Martin Luther King (Jr) in his letter from Alabama Prison : Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.
Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly.
We must, even here, record our appreciation of Shri Parekh 's passion for the prisoners ' cause coupled with pains taking presentation of the grievances they had.
So too Shri B. D. Sharma 's commitment to jail justice, beyond jailor 's injustice i.e. his client 's brief.
In retrospect, we feel it was right that we took quick action to liberate the three prisoners from their callously lonely, barbarously fettered solitary custody.
Justice must be instant and it has been wisely said: "Caution, caution, sir ! It is nothing but The word of cowardice ! Where human bondage and personal torture are involved, to wait is to defeat.
In personal liberty jurisprudence, this court has not tarried or teetered and shall not.
The reason is clear.
The writ must right the wrong forthwith or must stand self condemned as make believe.
Where justice is in jeopardy 998 or freedom is in fetters the court is not non aligned and acts with sensitive speed.
Time is of the essence where otherwise torture is the consequence.
The order of this court dated 6 10 1980 brought counsel on both sides into the scene, set free the prisoners from the hateful 'solitary ' and summoned before us the presence of the Superintendent dent of the Prison on 21 10 1980 to answer for his breach of the fundamental law laid down in Sunil Batra On that day, i.e. 21 10 1980, after a brief hearing, we directed: "The respondent will file a detailed affidavit giving particulars and also produce the proceedings relating to the enquiry held resulting in solitary confinement.
The prisoner will be produced on 24 10 1980 in this Court and Shri Parekh will be allowed to interview him." Pursuant to this order, the Superintendent of the Jail submitted his explanation for what in the light of the Batra (supra) ratio, is unlaw.
We will presently consider the conduct of the delinquent jailor but the more disturbing episode brought to our painful notice was the violence allegedly used by the escort police on the person of one prisoner, Surjeet Singh, while in transit and testified to by the visible wounds counsel found.
Shri Parekh shocked us into shame by seeking lo show us the physical injuries inflicted.
If the writ of this court brings a person from the Jaipur Prison to judicial presence can it be that a little set of constables in custody during transit violate, with brazen brutality, and criminal immunity the person of their charges and the hands of the law hang limp in the face of such lawlessness ? "Justice without power is inefficient; power without justice is tyranny.
Justice and power must therefore be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and what ever is powerful may be just." (Blaise Pascal) So, we ordered: "We are very disturbed to be told by Shri Parekh, amicus curiae that one of the prisoners, Surjeet Singh while being taken to this Court was manhandled severely.
Counsel says that there are bruises and other signs of injuries on his person.
The Superintendent of the Jail, who is present in Court, will take special care to see that this prisoner is taken to Jaipur safely.
The Superintendent will take the prisoner Surjeet Singh to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital today for examination of the prisoner 999 and also for proper treatment which may be suggested by the Doctor in the Hospital.
In the light of the medical report the Superintendent will lay first information before the Police Station concerned against the constables who are the escorting police.
It will be open to the prisoner himself to lay a complaint and facilities will be afforded by the prison authorities.
We make it clear that the investigation should not have the slightest taint of departmental inclination to help a policeman if there is evidence of delinquency.
A report will be put into this Court about what has been done, by 31 10 1980.
" Thereafter, the medical report, of which we have been apprised by Shri Parekh, the report against the constables concerned, reported Jo us by Shri Sharma, are taking their course.
We do not make any observations thereon as that is the subject of a separate enquiry.
Even so, no police life style which relies more on fists than on writs, on torture more than on culture, can control crime, because means boomerang on ends and re fuel the vice which, it seeks to extinguish.
Secondly, the State must re educate the constabulary out of their sadistic arts and inculcate a respect for the human person a process which must begin more by example than by precept if the lower rungs are really to emulate.
Thirdly, if any of these escort policemen are found to have misconducted themselves, no sense of police solidarity or in service comity should induce the authorities to hide the crime.
Condign action, quickly taken is surer guarantee of community credence than bruiting about that 'all is well with the police, the critics are always in the wrong '.
Nothing is more cowardly and unconscionable than a person in police custody being beaten up and nothing inflicts a deeper wound on our constitutional culture than a State official running berserk regardless of human rights.
We believe the basic pathology which makes police cruelty possible will receive Government 's serious attention.
Who will police the police? What psychic stress and social deprivation of the constabulary 's lifestyle need corrective healings ? When will 'wits, not fists ' become a police kit ? When will the roots of 'third degree ' be plucked out and the fresh shoots of humanist respect put out? We make these observations in the humane hope that article 21, with its profound concern for life and limb, will become dysfunctional unless the agencies of the law in the police and prison establishments have sympathy for the humanist creed of that Article.
This Court has frowned upon handcuffs save in the 'rarest of rare ' cases where security will be seriously jeopardized unless iron restraint is necessarily clamped on the prisoner.
We are heartened to know that there are States where escorting is done with civility 1000 and humanity.
For instance, para 443 of the Kerala Police Manual.
1970, Vol.
II, reads : "443.
(1) The use of hand cuffs or ropes causes humiliation to the person subjected to the restraint, and is contrary to the modern policy regarding the treatment of offenders.
Therefore, handcuffing and/or binding shall be restricted to cases where a person in custody is of a desperate character, or where there are reasons to believe that he will use violence or attempt to escape or where there are other similar reasons necessitating such a step.
We mention this here since policemen who beat those in their custody may with easy conscience handcuff and footcuff their charges, a course contrary to article 21.
The harrowing facts, in substantial measure emerge even from the statement of the case by the State.
The petitioners have admittedly been kept in separate solitary rooms for long periods from 8 months to 11 months spells long enough to be regarded as barbarous if Sunil Batra 's (supra) is to prevail.
Admittedly, cross bar fetters were put in Kishore Singh for several days and on Surjeet Singh for 30 days counsel for the petitioner has rightly submitted that flimsy grounds like "loitering in the prison", behaving insolently and in an "uncivilised" manner tearing off his history ticket, were the foundation for the torturesome treatment of solitary confinement and cross bar fetters.
We have read the affidavit of the Superintendent and feel utterly unsatisfied, that the mandate in Sunil Batra (supra) has been obeyed.
This ease and the uncivilised orders of cellular solitude and traumatic fetters compels us to repeat what we stated earlier in Sunil Batra (11).
The essence of the matter is that in our era of human rights consciousness the habeas writ has functional plurality and the constitutional regard for human decency and dignity is tested by this capability.
We ideologically accept the words of Will Durant: It is time for all good men to come to the aid of their party, whose name is civilization.
Likewise, we endorse, as part of our constitutional thought, what the British Government 's White Paper (3), titled "People in Prison", stated with telling effect: 1001 A society that believes in the worth of individual beings can have the quality of its belief judged, at least in part, by the quality of its prison and probation services and of the resources made available to them.
We do not accept the Superintendent 's version that he had given a hearing to the prisoners before punishing them It is a self defensive pretence and perhaps the only veracious alibis available to him are that the vintage Prison Rules (Rule l(f) Part 16 and Rule 79 of the Rajasthan Prison Rules, 1951) support the administrative absolutism of the prison boss and more to the point as counsel Shri Sharma candidly stated.
The Superintendent was 'innocent ' of the benign prescriptions in Sunil Batra (11) decision(1).
Indeed, Shri Sharma, convincingly persuaded us to take a lenient view of the delinquency of the Superintendent by emphasising that he had taken the Prison Superintendent through the effective exercise of reading and explaining the Batra rulings and assuring us that no more of solitary confinement disguised as "keeping in separate cell" and imposition of fetters will take place, save in the rarest of rare cases and with strict adherence to the procedural safeguards contained in the decisions of this Court relating to the punishment of prisoners.
We accept the bona fides of the prison official but emphasise that violation of article 21 as interpreted by this Court in its recent decisions, if repeated, will be visited with more serious consequences.
Even so, we will refer to the scripture relied on as absolvent of the sin complained of and reiterate Tersely the mandatory prescriptions and prescriptions implicit in article 21 and elucidated by case law.
Rules 79 and 1(f) of Part VI of the Rajasthan Prisons Rules, may be extracted here: 79. "Special Precautions for security: The Superintendent shall use his discretion in ordering such special precautions as may be necessary to be taken for the security of any important prisoner, whether he has received any warning from the Magistrate or not, as the Superintendent is the sole Judge of what measures are necessary for the safe custody of the prisoners; he shall be held responsible for seeing that precautions taken are reasonably sufficient for the purpose.
1 (f) Cells may be used for the confinement of convicted criminal prisoners who are in the opinion of the Superintendent, likely to exercise a bad influence over other prisoners, if kept in their association.
1002 These Rules were framed under section 46 of the Prisons Act which also may be read at this stage: 46.
The Superintendent may examine any person touching any such offence, and determine thereupon and punish such offence by . (6) imposition of handcuffs of such pattern and weight, in such manner and for such period, as may be prescribed by rules made by the Governor General in Council; (7) imposition of fetters of such pattern and weight in such manner and for such period, as may be prescribed by the rules made by Governor General in Council; (8) separate confinement for any period not exceeding three months; Explanation.
Separate confinement means such confinement with or without labour as secludes a prisoner from communication with, but not from sight of other prisoners, and allows, him not less than one hour 's exercise per diem and to have his meals in association with one or more other prisoners; . . . (9) Cellular confinement means such confinement with or without labour as entirely secludes a prisoner from communication with, but not from sight of other prisoners; We cannot agree that either the Section or the Rules can be read in the absolutist expansionism the prison authorities would like us to read.
That would virtually mean that prisoners are non persons to be dealt with at the mercy of the prison echelons.
This country has no totalitarian territory even within the walled world we call prison.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 operate within the prisons in the manner explained.
in Sunil Batra (I) (supra), by a Constitution Bench of this Court.
It is significant that the two opinions given separately in that judgment agree in spirit and substance, in reasoning and conclusions.
Batra in that case was stated to be in a separate confinement and not solitary cell.
An identical plea has been put forward here too.
For the reasons given in Sunil Batra 's case we must overrule the extenuatory submission that a separate cell is different from solitary confinement.
The petitioners will, therefore, be entitled Jo move within the confines of the prison like others undergoing rigorous imprisonment.
If special restrictions 1003 of a punitive or harsh character have to be imposed for convincing security reasons, it is necessary to comply with natural justice as indicated in Sunil Batra case.
Moreover, there must be an appeal not from Caeser to Caeser, but from a prison authority to a judicial organ when such treatment is meted out.
Sobraj in the same case (Sunil Batra, supra) was kept in fetters and reasons more persuasive than in the present case were put forward in defence.
This Court, however, directed "such fetters shall forthwith be removed".
Of course, we do not place any absolute ban but insist that only in extreme cases of compelling necessity for security of other prisoners or against escape can such fettering be resorted to.
Human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution not to be bartered away for mere apprehensions entertained by jail officials.
The latter decision of this Court in Sunil Batra 11 clothes with flesh and blood the principles laid down in Sunil Batra (I) (supra).
In Rakesh Kaushik the position has advanced further and concrete directions have been issued which we extract here because the law laid down by this Court applies not to one State or the other but to all national institutions in the country: "(2) He will further enquire, with specific reference to the charges of personal assault and compulsion for collaboration in canteen swindle and other vices made by the prisoner against the Superintendent and the Dy.
Superintendent.
(3) He will go into the question of the directives issued in the concluding portion of Sunil Batra 's case (W.P. 1009/79) with a view to ascertain whether these directions have been substantially complied with and to the extent there is shortfall or default whether there is any reasonable explanation therefor.
(4) Being a Visitor of the jail, it is part of his visitatorial functions for the Sessions Judge to acquaint himself with the condition of tension, vice and violence and prisoners ' grievances . . .
We hold that the jail authorities in Rajasthan will comply with the principles so laid down.
We read down section 46 and Rules 1(f) and 79 of the Rajasthan Prison Rules and sustain them in this limited fashion 1004 We direct the Respondents to act accordingly.
Further we remind that the Sessions Judges in the State of Rajasthan to remember the rulings of this Court in Sunil Batra I & 11 and Rakesh Kaushik (supra) and act in such manner that judicial authority over sentences and the conditions of their incarceration are not eroded by judicial in action.
We find that the old rules and circulars and instructions issued under the Prisons Act are read incongruously with the Constitution.
especially article 21 and interpretation put upon it by this Court.
therefore, direct the State Government of Rajasthan and indeed, all the other State Governments in the country to convert the rulings of this Court bearing on Prison Administration into rules and instructions forthwith so that violation of the prisoners ' freedoms can be avoided and habeas corpus litigation may not proliferate.
After all, human rights are as much cherished by the State as by the citizen.
Since the petitioners have been released from separate confinement and from cross bar fetters and since counsel for the State has assured us that nothing will be done in violation of the propositions set out in the catena of cases of this court (Sunil Batra I & 11 and Rakesh Kaushik (supra) ), we deem it unnecessary to give any further directives pursuant to this habeas corpus application.
N.V.K. Petition allowed.

summary/full:
One of the petitioners, in a telegram to one of the Judges of this Court complained of insufferable, illegal solitary confinement.
He also complained that he was kept in iron fetters alongwith the other two petitioners.
By an order of this Court, the petitioners were directed to be set free from solitary confinement and brought before the Court.
When the prisoners were brought before the Court they alleged that, while in transit, violence had been used by the escort police on the person of one of the petitioners resulting in deep wounds on his person.
The Superintendent of Prisons who was present in the Court was directed to take special care of the prisoner after giving him proper medical treatment.
Allowing the petition ^ HELD: 1.
Article 21 would become dysfunctional unless the agencies of the law in the police and prison establishments have sympathy for the humanist creed of that Article.
The State must re educate the police and , F, inculcate a respect for the human person.
If any of the escort were found to have misconducted themselves they should be given condign punishment.
[999G, D, E] 2.
By keeping the prisoners in separate solitary rooms for long periods ranging from 8 to 11 months, putting cross bar fetters for several days on the flimsy grounds of loitering in the prison, behaving insolently and in and; uncivilised manner the prison authorities have acted in utter disregard of the mandate of this Court in Sunil Batra.
[1000D E] 3.
The Jail Superintendent 's version that he had given a hearing to the prisoners before punishing them cannot be believed.
Neither section 46 of the Prisons Act nor Rule 79 of the Rajasthan Prison Rules can be read in the absolutist expansionism, the Prison Authorities would like them to be read.
That would virtually mean that prisoners are not persons to be dealt with at the mercy of the prison echelons.
Articles 14, 19 and 21 operate within the prisons in the manner explained in Sunil Batra.
A separate Cell is not different from solitary confinement.
[1001, 1002G H] (i) If special restrictions of a punitive or harsh character have been imposed for convincing security reasons, it is necessary to comply with natural justice as indicated in Sunil Batra.
There must be an appeal from a prison authority to a judicial organ when such treatment is meted out.
[1003A] 996 (ii) Section 46 of the Prisons Act and Rules 1(f) and 79 of the Rajasthan; Prison Rules are valid subject to the directions given by this Court in Rakesh Kaushik.
[1003G] (iii) The Sessions Judges in the State of Rajasthan should remember the rulings of this Court in Sunil Batra 1 and 11 and Rakesh Kaushik and act in such manner that judicial authority over sentences and the conditions of their incarceration are not eroded by judicial in action.
[1004A] Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration ; Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration ; , Rakesh Kaushik vs B. L. Vig, Superintendents Central jail, New Delhi ; applied.


judgement:
tition Nos.
626 630 of 1979.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution) Raghubir Malhotra, Yash Pal, N. D. Garg and section K. Bisaria for the Petitioners.
Miss. A Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.
section T. Desai, Miss Bina Gupta and Praveen Kumar for other Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J.
The petitioners have filed these writ petitions under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the Central Secretariat Service (Amendment) Rules, 1979 and of the Regulations made consequent thereto by the Union of India for the purpose of holding a departmental competitive examination limited to candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for filling up vacancies reserved for those categories in Grade I of the Central Secretariat Service.
The petitioners are permanent Section Officers in the Central Secretariat Service and almost all of them are presently officiating as Under Secretaries in different Ministries.
The next higher category in the Central Secretariat Service above the Section Officers ' Grade consists of Grade I posts.
Recruitment to the Grade I posts are made under Rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules; vacancies are filled by the promotion of, inter alia, permanent officers of the Section officers ' Grade who satisfy certain prescribed qualifications.
For the purpose of such promotion a select list is prepared.
1187 The preparation of the select list is governed by the Central Secretariat Service (Promotion to Grade I & Selection Grade) Regulations, 1964.
The select list is to be prepared once every year.
The names of eligible officers are arranged in a single list by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms in the Cabinet Secretariat in accordance with the field of selection determined by the Selection Committee.
Pursuant to an Office Memorandum issued by the Department on 20th July, 1974, 15% and 7/12% of the promotion posts stand reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates respectively.
The petitioners along with several other officials were included in the field of selection for the purpose of drawing up the select list for the year 1977 for promotion to the Grade I posts.
After an interview by the Selection Committee, ninety one unreserved vacancies were filled from the first ninety one candidates in the general category.
Twenty seven vacancies, reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, remained unfilled because no candidate belonging to those categories was found suitable for including in the field of selection.
For the purpose of filling those reserved vacancies, the Government of India decided to hold a limited departmental competitive examination confined to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Accordingly, the President enacted the Central Secretariat Service (Amendment) Rules, 1979 whereby sub rule (2a) was inserted below sub rule (2) of Rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules.
Regulations, described as the Central Secretariat Service Grade I (Limited Departmental Competitive Examination for filling the vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulations, 1979 were promulgated providing for the holding of a limited departmental competitive examination, including a statement of the conditions of eligibility and indicating how the selection would take place on such examination.
The first such examination was scheduled for July, 1979.
The case of the petitioners in the writ petitions is that the Government of India was not empowered to fill up the reserved vacancies by recourse to a departmental competitive examination for candidates from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and that instead the Government should have dereserved the vacancies and made them available to candidates falling under the general category.
Had that been done, the petitioners say, they would have been considered for promotion and, having regard to their position in the select list, they allege that they stood a probable chance of being promoted to Grade I.
The petitioners pray that the amendment of 1188 Rule 12, Central Secretariat Service Rules and the framing of regulations pursuant to the amendment should be declared ultra vires, and alternatively the amendment of the rules and the framing of the related regulations be regarded as prospective only and not affecting the twenty seven reserved vacancies pertaining to the year 1977.
It is also prayed that the Union of India should be directed to take immediate steps for de reserving the twenty seven vacancies for the year 1977 and upon such de reservation the petitioners be considered for filling those twenty seven vacancies.
The reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotion posts from class II to class I of Government services flows from the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms Office Memorandum No. 10/41/73 Estt.
(SCT), dated 20th July, 1974.
Paragraph 2 of the Office Memorandum spells out how the vacancies should be filled up.
The selection is made from among Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe officers who are within the normal zone of consideration.
If candidates qualifying on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority do not fill up all the reserved vacancies, those remaining unfilled are to be filled by selecting candidates of the two communities who are in the zone of consideration irrespective of merit but subject to their being considered fit for promotion.
A select list is then prepared of all the selected officers, general as well as those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, arranged in the order of merit and seniority according to principles laid down by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
For determining the number of vacancies to be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in a select list, a separate roster prescribed by an Office Memorandum dated 22nd April, 1970 is followed.
Then, the relevant provision declares: "If, owing to non availability of suitable candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, it becomes necessary to de reserve a reserved vacancy, a reference for de reservation should be made to this Department indicating whether the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates eligible for promotion in reserved vacancies have been considered in the manner indicated in this Office Memorandum." A further provision prohibits the carrying forward of reservations from year to year in the event of an adequate number of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates not being available in any particular year.
1189 Shri Raghubir Malhotra, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, opened with the contention that the reservation of vacancies for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by the Office Memorandum dated 20th July, 1974 was invalid.
It was urged that the Office Memorandum possessed at best the status of departmental instructions and could not amend the Central Secretariat Service Rules.
It is not, it was said, a case of administrative instructions filling any gap or area left uncovered by that body of rules but, on the contrary, it is a case where administrative instructions have been made inconsistently with the rules.
At the outset an objection was taken by the respondents to our entertaining the contention because, they point out, it is not a contention raised in the writ petitions and should not be allowed to be raised for the first time by way of oral submission in the course of arguments during the final hearing of the writ petitions.
It is not denied by learned counsel for the petitioners that the point has not been specifically and clearly raised in the writ petitions, but he asks us to consider it by reason of what he describes as "its fundamental importance".
We have carefully perused the writ petitions, and it is plain that the entire scope of the petitions is limited to challenging the validity and application of the Central Secretariat Service (Amendment) Rules, 1979 and the consequent regulations for holding a limited departmental competitive examination.
No relief has been sought for quashing the Office Memorandum dated 20th July, 1974.
No ground has been taken in the writ petitions assailing the validity of the Office Memorandum on the basis now pressed before us.
We are of opinion that the courts should ordinarily insist on the parties being confined to their specific written pleadings and should not be permitted to deviate from them by way of modification or supplementation except through the well known process of formally applying for amendment.
We do not mean that justice should be available to only those who approach the court confined in a straight jacket.
But there is a procedure known to the law, and long established by codified practice and good reason, for seeking amendment of the pleadings.
If undue laxity and a too easy informality is permitted to enter the proceedings of a court it will not be long before a contemptuous familiarity assails its institutional dignity and ushers in chaos and confusion undermining its effectiveness.
Like every public institution, the courts function in the security of public confidence, and public confidence resides most where institutional discipline prevails.
Besides this, oral submissions raising new points for the first time tend to do grave injury to a contesting party by depriving it of the opportunity, to which the principles of natural justice hold it entitled, of adequately preparing its response.
1190 We must, therefore, decline to entertain the point now raised concerning the validity of the Office Memorandum.
We shall now proceed directly to the principal contentions raised in the writ petitions.
It is first contended that sub rule (2a) of Rule 12, newly enacted in the Central Secretariat Service Rules, and the related Regulations, providing for a limited departmental competitive examination for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are invalid because the Central Government should have dereserved the twenty seven vacancies when it was found that suitable Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates were not available for inclusion within the field of selection.
There is no merit in this contention.
Whether or not reserved vacancies should be de reserved is a matter falling primarily within the administrative discretion of the Government.
There is no right in candidates seeking to fill vacancies belonging to the general category to insist on dereservation of reserved vacancies so long as it is possible in law to fill the reserved vacancies.
If at all, a claim in that behalf can arise only if no valid arrangement can be made for filling the reserved vacancies, and dereservation is called for by reason of the prohibition, in clause (v) of paragraph 2 of the Office Memorandum dated 20th July, 1974, against the carry forward of reservations from year to year in the event of an adequate number of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates not being available in any particular year.
Before reaching this extremity, the Government acts wholly within its power in adopting an alternative arrangement for filling the reserved vacancies.
Dereservation as a process should be resorted to only when it is not reasonably possible, within the contemplation of law, to fill the reserved vacancies.
The process of dereservation would otherwise be antagonistic to the principle embodied in Article 16(4) and Article 46 of the Constitution.
Paragraph 10.4 in the Brochure on Reservation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Services, prepared by the Government of India, provides that dereservation should be proposed only when such a course becomes inevitable due to non availability of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates for appointment against the reserved vacancies after having fully observed the procedure prescribed in this behalf and after applying relaxed standards in the case of such candidates.
Once a decision has been taken to reserve vacancies for a backward class of citizens, the programming effected to that end should not be disturbed unless the avenues for fulfilling it have been explored and have failed.
If the petitioners can succeed in showing that the provisions in the Central Secretariat Service Rules, and the consequent Regulations, 1191 providing for holding the limited departmental competitive examination are ultra vires and void and there is no evidence of any other appropriate arrangement for filling the reserved vacancies they may have a case for contending that as there is no prospect of finding suitable Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates for appointment to the reserved vacancies it is only reasonable that the Government should dereserve the vacancies in view of the prohibition against carrying them forward to the next year.
That takes us then to the validity of sub rule (2a) of rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules and the Regulations of 1979.
Their validity is challenged by the petitioners on the ground that they violate Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as they result in two avenues of promotion for Government servants belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, while a single avenue only of promotion is available to other Government servants.
Ex facie, the contention must fail.
The two avenues of promotion pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners consist in, one, the preparation of a list of officers falling within the field of selection, both of the general category as well as members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and their selection on the basis of the principles laid down and, two, the selection of candidates of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes consequent upon the limited departmental competitive examination.
While considering this submission, we must remember that resort to the limited departmental competitive examination is not simultaneous with the preparation of the list embodying the field of selection.
The question of holding the examination arises only, as sub rule (2a) of rule 12 declares, when the reserved vacancies cannot be fined because eligible officers from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not available through the original process.
Resort to the further process arises because of the constitutional mandate in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, because reserved vacancies must be filled if that is possible.
The petitioners could complain if such a need arose in respect of general category vacancies and was not supplied.
It has not been shown that the general category vacancies have remained unfilled for want of suitable candidates.
No need has arisen of being compelled to resort to a further process of selection in regard to such vacancies.
In the circumstances, it is not possible to see how a legitimate complaint can be laid by the petitioners on the basis alleged before us.
It has been urged that the decision of the Government not to dereserve the twenty seven vacancies is vitiated by legal malice.
Having regard to the considerations to which we have adverted, we see no substance in that submission.
1192 The next contention on behalf of the petitioners is that sub rule (2a) of rule 12 enacted in 1979 operates prospectively only and cannot effect the twenty seven vacancies to be filled in the Select List of 1977.
The argument proceeds on the assumption that the Select List of 1977 must be completed during the year 1977.
The submission is formed in fallacy.
There is no requirement in law that the Select List pertaining to a particular year must be finalised within that year.
It is open to the Government to complete the process of selection and finalise it after the expiry of that year.
It seems that when the Government found that suitable candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were not available for inclusion in the field of selection, it decided to consider the advisability of adopting some other mode of filling the reserved vacancies.
It appears that on 10th August.
1978 the Government stated in Parliament that as no Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe officers could be included in the field of consideration proposals for filling the vacancies through some special method had been taken up with the Union Public Service Commission.
The Select List for 1977, which included already ninety one names of officers appointed to the general category vacancies, was held in abeyance for the purpose of filling the twenty seven reserved vacancies.
After discussion with the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission and consideration of the alternatives before it the Government decided on holding a limited departmental competitive examination.
As long as the Select List was not declared final, no officer could claim any right.
In the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to say that in holding the departmental competitive examination the Government was applying sub rule (2a) of rule 12, and the Regulations, retrospectively.
A grievance has also been made of the circumstance that the qualifying standard for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates appearing at the limited departmental competitive examination is as low as four years approved and continuous service in the Section officer 's Grade, while a period of ten years is insisted on in the case of officers who do not belong to either class and are considered for vacancies in the general category.
The definition of "crucial date" in clause (a) of Regulation 2 of the Regulations of 1979 as a point of reference qualifying the eligibility standard, it is urged, permits an even lower eligibility standard for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates.
It is now well accepted, and has been affirmed by successive decisions of this Court, that relaxed eligibility criteria would be justified in the case of candidates of backward classes.
The principle finds expression also in the original rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules.
The record before us 1193 indicates that the lower eligibility standard was decided on after consultation with the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission.
As regards the number of years of approved service considered sufficient for eligibility, we find that even if we consider ourselves entitled to go into that question the paucity of relevant material does not permit us to express any opinion in the matter.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has also challenged the reservation of the twenty seven vacancies on the ground that the vacancies pertain to selection posts.
On this point, we find ourselves bound by the decision of this Court in General Manager, Southern Railway vs Rangachari(1) where it has been held that Article 16(4) of the Constitution extends to selection posts.
C Finally, learned counsel for the petitioners challenges the reservation of vacancies on the ground that they are irrational, inhibiting and do not provide for healthy growth of the services besides offending the equality provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Having regard to the percentage of vacancies reserved under the office memorandum dated 20th July, 1974, we consider that the case falls within the.
principles laid down in M. R. Balaji vs State of Mysore.(2) The majority view in State of Kerala vs N. M. Thomas(3) supports the validity of the reservation.
Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

summary/full:
The Central Secretariat Service (Amendment) Rules 1979 which inserted sub rule (2a) below sub rule (2) of Rule 12 of the Rules provided for the holding of a limited departmental competitive examination, including a statement of the conditions of eligibility and indicating how the selection would take place on such examination.
The next higher category in the Central Secretariat Service above the Section officers ' Grade consists of Grade I posts.
Recruitment to the Grade I posts are made under Rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules.
For the purpose of such promotion a select list is prepared.
Pursuant to an office Memorandum issued by the Department on 20th July, 1974, 15%, and 7%, of the promotion posts stand reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes candidates respectively.
The petitioners were permanent Section officers in the Central Secretariat Service and officiating as Under Secretaries in different Ministries.
They alongwith several other officials were included in the field of selection for the purpose of drawing up the select list for the year 1977 for promotion to Grade I posts.
Twenty seven vacancies reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, remained unfilled because no candidate belonging to those categories was found suitable.
For the purpose of filling those reserved vacancies, the Government of India decided to hold a limited departmental competitive examination confined to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The petitioners argued that (i) the reservation of vacancies for members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by the office Memorandum dated 20th July, 1974 was invalid (ii) the newly enacted sub rule (2a) of Rule 12, in the Central Secretariat Service Rules and the related regulations were invalid and the rule operated prospectively only and could not affect the 27 vacancies to be filled in the select list of 1977.
The Respondents took a preliminary objection that it was not a contention raised in the writ petitions and should not be allowed to be raised for the first time by way of oral submission.
Dismissing the petition.
^ HELD: 1.
The entire scope of the petitions is limited to challenging the validity and application of the Central Secretariat Service (Amendment) Rules, 1979 and the consequent regulations for holding a limited departmental competitive examination.
No relief has been sought for quashing the office Memorandum dated 20th July, 1974.
No ground has been taken in the writ petitions assailing the validity of the office Memorandum.
The Courts should 1185 ordinarily insist on the parties being confined to their specific written pleadings and should not be permitted to deviate from them by way of modification or supplementation except through the well known process of formally applying for amendment.
It is not that justice should be available to only those who approach the court confined in a straight jacket; but there is a procedure known to the law, and long established by codified practice and good reason, for seeking amendment of the pleadings.
[1189D F] If undue laxity and a too easy informality is permitted to enter the proceedings of a court, it will not be long before a contemptuous familiarity assails its institutional dignity and ushers in chaos and confusion undermining its effectiveness.
[1189 F G] Oral submission raising new points for the first time tend to do grave injury to a contesting party by depriving it of the opportunity, to which the principles of natural justice held it entitled, of adequately preparing its response.
[1189G H] Whether or not reserved vacancies should be dereserved is a matter falling primarily within the administrative discretion of the Government.
There is no right in candidates seeking to fill vacancies belonging to the general category to insist on dereservation of reserved vacancies so long as it is possible in law to fill the reserved vacancies.
If at all, a claim in that behalf can arise only if no valid arrangement can be made for filling the reserved vacancies and dereservation is called for by reason of the prohibition, in clause (v) of paragraph 2 of the office memorandum dated 20th July, 1974, against the carry forward of reservations from year to year in the event of an adequate number of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates not being available in any particular year.
Before reaching this extremity, the Government acts wholly within its power in adopting an alternative arrangement for filling the reserved vacancies.
Dereservation as a process should be resorted to only when it is not reasonably possible, within the contemplation of law, to fill the reserved vacancies.
The process of dereservation would otherwise be antagonistic to the principle embodied in Article 16(4) and Article 46 of the Constitution.
[1190G F] 3.
Once a decision has been taken to reserve vacancies for a backward class of citizens, the programming effected to that end should not be disturbed unless the avenues for fulfilling it have been explored and have failed.
It is only reasonable that the Government should dereserve the vacancies in view of the prohibition against carrying them forward to the next year.
[1190 G H, 1191B] 4.
The question of holding the examination arises only, as sub rule (2a) of rule 12 declares that when the reserved vacancies cannot be filled because eligible officers from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not available through the original process.
Resort to the further process arises because of the constitutional mandate in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes because reserved vacancies must be filled if that is possible.
It has not been shown that the general category vacancies have remained unfilled for want of suitable candidates.
No need has arisen of being compelled to resort to a further process of selection in regard to such vacancies.
There is no requirement in law that the select list pertaining to a particular year must be finalized within that year.
[1191 E G, 1192 B] It is open to the Government to complete the process of selection and finalise it after the expiry of that year.
It seems that when the Government found that suitable candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 1186 were not available for inclusion in the field of selection, it decided to consider the advisability of adopting some other mode of filling the reserved vacancies.
The select list for 1977, which included already ninety one names of officers appointed to the general category vacancies, was held in abeyance for the purpose of filling the twenty seven reserved vacancies.
After discussion with the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission and consideration of the alternatives before it the Government decided on holding a limited departmental competitive examination.
As long as the select list was not declared final, no officer could claim any right.
[1192B E] 6.
It is now well accepted, and has been affirmed by successive decisions of this Court, that relaxed eligibility criteria would be justified in the case of candidates of backward classes.
The principle finds expression also in the original rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Service Rules.
The record indicates that the lower eligibility standard was decided on after consultation with the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission.
[1192 GH, 1193A] General Manager, Southern Railway vs Rangachari, ; M. R. Balaji vs State of Mysore [1963] Supply.
1 S.C.R. 434 State of Kerala vs N. M. Thomas. , affirmed.