judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.1.80 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1471/75.
P.H. Parekh for the appellants.
U.R. Lalit, B.P. Maheshwari and R.S. Rana for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
This is an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered on January 10, 1980.
The appellants before us are the Kalyan Municipal Council (referred to 834 hereinafter as 'the Municipal Council '), its Chief officer and the State of Maharashtra respectively.
Respondent No. 1 is a Private Limited Company and is the owner of an industrial undertaking within the limits of the Municipal Council.
We propose to refer to respondent No. 1 as 'the Company '.
The relevant facts lie within a narrow compass and there is no dispute regarding the same.
Property Tax was levied by the Municipal Council on the immovable properties of the Company within the territorial limits of the Municipal Council in respect of the years 1970 71, 1971 72 and 1972 73.
In September, 1973, the Municipal Council claimed that it had detected certain new construction and alterations in the existing construction belonging to the Company and a report to that effect was made to the Standing Committee.
A proposal was submitted to the Standing Committee to increase the property tax in respect of the said immovable property from 1.4.70 to 31.3.74.
On October 3, 1973, the Standing Committee passed a resolution increasing the rateable value of the said immovable property of the Company from 1.4.70 to 31.3.74.
After serving a notice on the Company as required under the provisions of Section 123(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act (referred to hereinafter as the 'said Act '), and hearing the objections filed by the Company against the proposed increase, a demand notice was issued on the Company on January 9, 1975 demanding an amount of Rs.51,626.69 and an appropriate amount of Educational Cess and additional Health Tax.
This notice of demand was challenged by the Company by way of Special Civil Application No. 147 of 1975 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which decided the said Special Civil Application held that the case was covered by the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ramchandra Ramappa Madgundi, [1972] 74 Bombay Law Reporter, p. 469.
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment has pointed out that there was no dispute that a notice dated November 17, 1973, being the notice as contemplated by Section 123(1) of the said Act was issued to the Company for amending the assessment list.
This notice was served after 17th November, 1973.
After analysing the provisions of Section 123 of the said Act and following the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench, the Division Bench took the view that alteration made in the assessment list after following the procedure under Section 123(1) of the said Act does not become effective for any period prior to the commencement of the official year in which the alteration in the assessment list is made and the Municipality is not entitled to levy tax for an official year or 835 any part thereof which is already expired.
The Division Bench pointed out in the present case the alteration in the assessment list was made after 31st March, 1974 and before 31st March, 1975.
In view of this the said alteration could not have the effect of increasing the assessment for any year prior to the year commencing from 1st April, 1974.
It is the correctness of this decision, which is sought to be assailed before us in this appeal.
Since the decision under appeal is based mainly on the said decision of a Full Bench in the case of Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ramchandra Ramappa Madgundi (supra), we may briefly refer to the said decision.
That decision was based on the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, but the ratio of the decision applies to the case before us, because the relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act and the said Act are in pari materia.
As far as the question raised before us is concerned, the provisions of Section 82, Sub section (3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 123(3) of the said Act.
The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in that case came to conclusion that the alteration made, under Section 82(3) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, in the assessment list prepared under Section 73 of that Act does not become effective for any period prior to the commencement of the official year in which the alteration in the assessment list is made and, therefore, the Municipality is not entitled to levy tax for an official year or any part thereof which has already expired.
It was also held that the expression "current official year" in Section 82(3) of that Act means the earliest day in the official year which is current when the amendment of the assessment list takes place, that is to say, the expression refers to that official year which is running at the time when the amendment is made by insertion or alteration of an entry under Section 82(1) of the Act.
The submission of Mr. Parekh, learned counsel for the appellants, is that the aforesaid case before the Full Bench was wrongly decided and, as the judgment under appeal follows the said decision of the Full Bench, that judgment is also erroneous and liable to be set aside.
In our view, this contention must be negatived in view of the decision of this Court rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli vs Subha Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors., [1976] 3 S.C.R. p. 883.
A perusal of the said decision makes it clear that this Court took the view that the scheme of relevant provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 shows that the official year is the unit of time for the levy of property tax under 836 that Act.
It was further held that the expression "current official year" in the context in which it occurs in Section 82, Sub section (3) clearly signifies the earliest day in the official year which is current when the amendment in the assessment list takes place and that expression refers only to the official year which is running at the time when the amendment is made by insertion or alteration of an entry under sub section (1) of Section 82.
Thereafter this Court goes on to point out as follows: "It would, therefore, seem clear, on a combined reading of Sub sections (1) and (3) of Section 82, that an amendment, in order to be effective in levying tax for an official year, must be made during the currency of the official year.
This is now well settled as a result of several decisions of Bombay High Court culminating in the Full Bench decision in Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ramchandra (supra) and we do not see any reason to take a different view.
" The aforesaid statement in the judgment of this Court clearly shows that the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ramchandra (supra) was approved by this Court.
The decision of the aforesaid Bench of this Court is binding on us and is clearly applicable to the case before us.
In that judgment this Court pointed out that once it was accepted that the process of levying the tax is complete only when the assessment list is authenticated and it is only then that the tax is levied on the ratepayers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the authentication must be made within the official year.
The tax, being a tax for the official year, must obviously be levied during the official year and since the levy of the tax is complete only when the assessment list is authenticated it must follow that the authentication must take place in the official year.
Mr. Parekh urged, although not with much conviction, that the decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli vs Subha Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors.
(supra) can be distinguished because in that case there was no question of any additional construction or new construction being detected.
In our view it is not possible to make any such distinction.
The question which arose before the Court was whether an assessment list which was finalised and authenticated on July 24, 1952, after the expiry of the official year 1951 52 on 31.3.1952, could be regarded as a good or valid assessment list for the official year 1951 52.
The entire scheme of the provisions 837 pertaining to the preparation of the assessment list and the levy of property tax under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, which is materially similar to the scheme under the said Act, was considered and the aforesaid conclusion were arrived at.
There is no substance in the contention that the said decision can be distinguished.
Moreover, with respect, we see no reason to take a different view from the one taken in the aforesaid case.
The official year is the unit of taxation as far as Municipal Property taxes are concerned and, if the contention of Mr. Parekh is accepted, the result would be that an assessment list could be altered at any time if the conditions set out in Section 123 of the said Act are satisfied, with the result that there would be complete uncertainty in the field of taxation of property and the unwarry purchasers of immovable property might be put to the difficulty of having of discharge the liabilities for property taxes for years long prior to the time when they purchased the immovable property in order to save the property from being sold in recovery proceedings.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
S.L. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
After levy of the property tax by the Kalyan Municipal Council ( 'the Municipal Council ') on the immovable properties of the Respondent No. 1 ( 'the company ') in respect of certain years, the Municipal Council detected certain new construction and alterations in the existing properties of the Company, and on October 3, 1973 a resolution was passed by the Standing Committee increasing the rateable value of the said immovable property from 1.4.70 to 31.3.74.
A demand notice, demanding additional property tax, Educational cess and Health Tax, was issued thereafter to the Company.
The Company challenged the notice of demand before the High Court.
The High Court decided in favour of the Company, holding that alteration made in the assessment list after following the procedure under section 123(1) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act (the 'said Act ') did not become effective for any period prior to the commencement of the official year in which the alteration in the assessment list was made and the Municipality was not entitled to levy tax for an official year or any part thereof which was already expired.
This appeal was filed in this Court against that decision of the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The ratio of the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ram Chandra Ramappa Madgundi, [1972] 74 Bombay Law Reporter 469, upon which the judgment of the High Court impugned in this case was based, applied to this case.
The appellants contended that the said case before the Full Bench had been wrongly decided and the judgment under appeal based on that decision was also erroneous.
this contention must be negatived in view of the decision of this Court in Municipal Corpora 833 tion of City of Hubli vs Subba Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors.
,[1976] 3 S.C.R. p. 883, which approved the said decision of the Full Bench of the High Court, and which is binding on the Court and clearly applicable to this case.
In that judgment, this Court had pointed out that once it was accepted that the process of levying the tax was complete only when the assessment list was authenticated and it was only then that the tax was levied on the rate payers, the authentication must be made within the official year.
The tax, being a tax for the official year, must be levied during the official year and since the levy of the tax is complete only when the assessment list is authenticated, it must follow that the authentication must take place in the official year.
The official year is the unit of taxation as far as Municipal property taxes are concerned.
[836D,G,837A B] If an assessment list could be altered at any time if the conditions set out in Section 123 of the said Act are satisfied, the result would be that there would be complete uncertainty in the field of taxation of property and unwary purchasers of immovable property might be put to the difficulty of having to discharge the liabilities for property taxes for years long prior to the time when they had purchased the immovable property in order to save the property from being sold in recovery proceedings.
[837B C] Sholapur Municipal Corporation vs Ramchandra Ramappa Madgundi, [1972] 74 Bombay Law Reporter 469 and Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli vs Subha Rao Hanumatharao Prayag & Ors., ; , referred to.


judgement:
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 124 of 1988; (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) M.C. Kapadia, Y.P. Dhingra, B.K. Satija and S.S. Khanduja for the Petitioner.
P.S. Poti and M.N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: O R D E R After hearing learned counsel for the parties at quite some length, we are satisfied that the failure on the part of the State Government to consider and decide the representation made to them by the petitioner against his detention by an order of detention dated 11th June, 1987 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City under sub section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985, makes his continued detention invalid and constitutionally impermissible.
Apart from various other contentions, Shri Kapadia, learned counsel for the petitioner rightly contended that there was no explanation at all as to why the representation made by the petitioner to the State Government was not attended to and kept pending.
In view of the wholly unexplained and unduly long delay rather the undeniable failure on the part of the State Government in the disposal of the representation renders the detention of the petitioner illegal.
On the view that we take, there is no need to deal with various contentions 830 raised by him on behalf of the petitioner.
The learned counsel drew our attention to paragraph 8(e) of the Writ Petition where the petitioner avers inter alia that he had made a representation dated 15th July, 1987 to the Police Commissioner, Surat City, as also to the State Government but 'both the authorities had not considered the representation so made with utmost promptitude and that there was in fact no disposal of the said representation by the detaining authority as well as the State Government '.
This assertion of his is sought to be met by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City, the detaining authority, in the counter affidavit.
It is averred in paragraph III(e) that he had received the representation on 21st July, 1987 and rejected it on the same day after due consideration.
This is not a substantial compliance of the constitutional rights enshrined in article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The petitioner had the right not only to make a representation to the detaining authority but also to the State Government which had the power of revocation.
In view of this, Shri P.S. Poti, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government, with his usual fairness, rightly accepts that the denial in paragraph III(e) of the counter affidavit was not sufficient.
The fact remains that the allegation made by the petitioner that he had made a further representation to the State Government has not been controverted.
The State Government has disdained from filing any counter affidavit for obvious reasons.
In Mohinuddin vs District Magistrate, Beed & Ors., ; this Court had occasion to deal with this aspect.
In that case, there was wholly unexplained, unduly long delay in the disposal of the representation by the State Government and it was held that further detention of the detenu was rendered invalid and constitutionally impermissible.
The right of representation under article 22(5) is a valuable constitutional right and it is expected that the Government will ensure that the constitutional safeguards embodied in article 22(5) are strictly observed.
It was observed by one of us (SEN,J.): "We say and we think it necessary to repeat that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti social activities can never furnish an adequate reasons for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws.
The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of the procedural safeguards.
" It was next observed: 831 "It goes without saying that the constitutional right to make a representation guaranteed by article 22(5) must be taken to include by necessary implication the constitutional right to a proper consideration of the representation by the authority to whom it is made.
The right of representation under article 22(5) is a valuable constitutional right and is not a mere formality.
The representation made by the appellant addressed to the Chief Minister could not lie unattended to in the portals of the Secretariat while the Chief Minister was attending to other political affairs.
" In view of the failure in the disposal of the representation by the State Government, it must be held that the further detention of the petitioner is illegal and constitutionally impermissible.
The writ petition must therefore succeed and is allowed.
The order of detention passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City under sub section
(2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 is accordingly quashed.
We direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.
N.P.V. Petition allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The petitioner, who was detained under sub section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985, by an order dated 11th june, 1987 filed a writ petition in this Court, alleging that both the detaining authority as also the State Government had not considered the representation, dated 15th july, 1987 made by him, with utmost promptitude and that, in fact, there was no disposal of the said representation by these authorities.
In the counter affidavit filed by the detaining authority, it was averred that the representation, received by it on 21st July 1987 was duly considered and rejected the same day.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: The right of representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is a valuable and constitutional right.
The Government is expected to ensure that the constitutional safeguards embodied in Article 22(5) are strictly observed.
[830E F] Mohinuddin vs District Magistrate, Beed & Ors., ; relied on.
In the instant case, the petitioner had the right to make a representation not only to the detaining authority but also to the State Government which had the power to revocation.
Although the representation made by him to the detaining authority has been considered and rejected, this is not a substantial compliance of the 829 constitutional rights enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The allegation made by the petitioner that he made a further representation to the State Government had not been controverted.
The State Government had disdained from filing any counter affidavit for obvious reasons.
[830C E] The wholly unexplained and unduly long delay rather the undeniable failure on the part of the State Government in the disposal of the representation, renders the detention of the petitioner iilegal.
[829G H] The order of detention made under sub section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 is accordingly quashed.
[831D]


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 15667 of 1987.
813 From the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.1987 of the Patra High Court in Appellate Decree No. 133 of 1983.
G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua, S.M. Sarin and Aman Vachher for the Petitioner.
Salman Khurshid, Irshad Ahmad, V.D. Phadke and L.R. Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 11th November, 1987 of the High Court of Patna.
On 16th January, 1958 a lease deed was executed between the lessee Latifur Rehman and lessor Khaja Midhat Noor (hereinafter called the respondent) with permission to sub lease the same.
The said Latifur Rehman sub leased the premises to Burmah Shell Oil Distributing Company (the petitioner herein) for running a petrol pump and making necessary constructions thereon.
The lease was for a period of ten years which expired on 16th January, 1968.
It appears further that after the lease period had expired, the sub lessee, petitioner continued to pay the rent which was being accepted continuously from month to month by the respondent, the lessor.
A notice was issued by the respondent to the lessee terminating the lease and for giving vacant possession of the land by the 15th January, 1973 and also requiring the removal of the buildings, plant, etc., by the 16th January, 1973.
In the last two paras of the said notice, it was stated that the lessee was to surrender the lease hold land on the expiry of 15th January, 1973.
No notice was given separately to the petitioner terminating its lease.
A suit for ejectment was filed thereafter.
The lessee Latifur Rehman did not contest the suit for ejectment.
The petitioner, however, contested that proceeding.
The learned Munsiff I, Gaya, by his judgment dated 8th May, 1979 dismissed the suit holding that the notice terminating the lease was necessary and the notice in this case was invalid.
The plea of the landlord that the tenancy expired by afflux of time, was rejected.
On 22nd February, 1983 the 1st Additional Sub Judge, Gaya allowed the appeal of the landlord and held that the notice terminating the tenancy and asking the petitioner to surrender by the 15th January, 1973 was a valid notice.
The main question involved is, whether there was a valid termination of the lease and as such the sub lessee, the petitioner herein was 814 bound to deliver vacant possession.
A written statement had been filed by the petitioner, the sub lessee, wherein it was, inter alia, stated that it was holding over the lease hold property after the expiry of the lease by paying rent.
No notice terminating tenancy was received by it.
The validity of the notice to the lessee was also challenged.
The trial Court held that the lease was not extended for a fixed period of five years in absence of any written instrument.
The following two questions of law were re formulated by the High Court: (1) In absence of any registered instrument executed by both the parties i.e. the lessor and the lessee after the period stipulated in Ext.
4 i.e. the period of ten years, can it be said that the lease was extended automatically for a period of five years in terms of Ext. 4 or further whether the lessee was holding the suit property as tenancy from month to month? (2) If the first part of question (1) is held in negative and second part in the affirmative, as a consequence of which it must be held that the lease was required to be determined, whether the notice as contained in Ext.
7 validly terminated the lease of the lessee? Indubitably, the lessee came in possession of the property in question on 16th January, 1958.
The lease was for a period of ten years with a right of renewal for a further period of five years.
After the expiry of ten years, no instrument was executed by the parties and the lessee continued to remain in possession of the suit property.
The lessor accepted the rent and allowed the lessee to continue.
It is relevant in this connection to refer to the provisions of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ').
Section 106 of the Act deals with the duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage and section 107 deals how leases are to be made.
These sections read as follows: "106.
In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months ' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for 815 any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days ' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy.
Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, or if such tender or delivery is not practicable affixed to a conspicous part of the property.
A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.
All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.
" In view of the paragraph 1 of section 107 of the Act, since the lease was for a period exceeding one year, it could only have been extended by a registered instrument executed by both the lessor and the lessee.
In the absence of registered instrument, the lease shall be deemed to be "lease from month to month".
It is clear from the very language of section 107 of the Act which postulates that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the absence of registered instrument, it must be a 816 monthly lease.
The lessee and the sub lessee in the facts of this case continued to remain in possession of the property on payment of rent as a tenant from month to month.
The High Court so found.
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.
Section 116 of the Act which was placed before the High Court deals with the effect of holding over and provides as follows: "116.
If a lessee or under lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.
" It was submitted before the High Court that this was not a case of continuing of old tenancy for a period of five years but in view of the clear provisions of section 107 which we have noted hereinbefore and in the absence of a registered instrument, it must be held that it was holding over and not continuation of old tenancy for a further period of five years.
That would be the harmonious construction of section 107 read with section 116 in the facts of this case.
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right that the tenancy was automatically determined on the expiry of ten years which was stipulated in Ext.
Thereafter the lessee continued to hold the property and the lessor accepted the rent.
The lease was, therefore, renewed from month to month because it was not the case of any party that it was for agricultural purposes.
In that view of the matter, the termination of the lease could only be by giving a valid notice.
Such notice was given to the lessee but not to the sub lessee.
The respondent 's case is that a notice to sub lessee was not necessary.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that by Ext.
7 the lessee was asked to quit the lease hold premises on the expiry of 15th June, 1973.
Admittedly, in this case, the lease was executed on 16th January, 1958 and from that date the lease came into existence.
For computing the period of ten years the 16th January, 1958 had to be excluded.
The tenancy was, therefore, terminated on the expiry of 16th of the month.
The notice in the instant case of the quit which was Ext.
7 before the Court dated 30th November, 1972, 817 was given on behalf of the respondent to Latifur Rehman lessee.
In paragraph 4 of Ext.
7 it was stated that the lessee was to deliver the possession of the lease hold property by 16th January, 1973.
In paragraph 5 of Ext.
7 the lessee and sub lessee were required to remove the buildings, plants etc.
by the 16th January, 1973.
In the last but one and the last paragraph of Ext.
7 it was stated that the lessee was to surrender the properties of the lease hold land on the expiry of 15th January, 1973.
The question is whether there was a valid notice.
The High Court held that in the facts of this case, there was a valid notice of termination and after the valid notice of termination of the lease to the lessee, there was no need to give a fresh notice to the sub lessee.
Notice must be read in the context of the facts of each particular case having regard to the situation of the parties to whom it is addressed.
In Harihar Banerji and others vs Ramasashi Roy and others, 45 Indian Appeals 222 at page 225, the Judicial Committee observed as follows: ".
.that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law; that the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances; and, further, that they are to be construed, not with a desire to find faults in them which would render them defective, but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
" This is how the notices should be literally construed.
This decision was relied upon by this Court in Mangilal vs Suganchand Rathi; , There, however, the facts were different.
There the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiffs.
The defendant was in arrears of rent for one year to the extent of Rs. 1020.
On April 11, 1959 the plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant requiring him to remit to them Rs.1020 within one month from the date of service of notice, failing which suit for ejectment would be filed.
This notice was received by the defendant on April 16, 1959.
On June 25, 1959 the defendant sent a reply to the notice enclosing with it a cheque for Rs.1320.
This amount consisted of the rental arrears as well as the rent due right up to June 30, 1959.
The plaintiffs accepted the cheque and cashed it and gave a fresh notice on July 9, 1959 requiring the defen 818 dant to vacate the premises by the end of the month of July.
The defendant did not vacate the premises.
Then the plaintiffs filed a suit to eject the defendant upon the ground that the latter was in arrears of rent for one year and had failed to pay the arrears within one month of the service of the notice dated April 11, 1959 upon him.
From the undisputed facts it was clear that the defendant was in fact in arrears of rent and had failed to pay it within the time prescribed by cl.(a) of section 4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1953.
It was held that though the notice dated 11th April, 1959 could be construed to be composite notice under section 4(a) of the Accommodation Act and section 106 of the it was ineffective under section 106 of the because it was not a notice of 15 clear days.
In that case, the defendant had only 14 clear days ' notice.
Reference was made to the aforesaid decision of Harihar Banerji vs Ramsashi Roy (supra) which was distinguished by this Court.
This Court held that notice under section 106 of the Act must be strictly complied with.
In so holding this Court relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Subadini vs Durga Charan Law, I.L.R. which was construing a notice contemplated by section 106 of the Act and had held that in calculating the 15 days ' notice the day on which the notice was served was excluded and even if the day on which it expired was taken into account it would be clear that the defendant had only 14 clear days ' notice.
This position was again reiterated by the Calcutta High Court in Gobinda Chandra Saha vs Dwarka Nath Patita, A.I.R. This Court affirmed this view that notice must be understood in the light of Harihar Banerji vs Ramsashi Roy (supra).
This Court held that the suit was actually based upon the notice dated July 9, 1959 which gave more than 15 days ' clear notice to the defendant to vacate the premises.
This notice was a valid notice under section 106 of the Act.
In the instant case if all the paragraphs of Ext. 7 which is a notice in the instant case are read together in harmony it would be manifest that the lessee was directed to hand over the lease hold property on 16th January, 1973.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, in our opinion, there was a valid notice of termination of the lease of the lessee.
In any event the lessee did not dispute this contention.
The lessee accepted a valid termination of the lease hold property.
In Roop Chand Gupta vs Raghuvanshi (Pvt.) Ltd. and another; , , it was held by this Court that it is quite clear that law does not require that the sub lessee need be made a party, if there was a valid termination of the lease.
This Court reiterated that in 819 all cases where the landlord instituted a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and did not implead the sub lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate.
The decree in such a suit would bind the sub lessee.
This Court noted at page 1892 of the report that this might act harshly on the sub lessee; but this was a position well understood by him when he took the sub lease.
The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act.
In the facts of this case these observations apply more effectively.
The termination of the lease was not disputed by the lessee.
There is no allegation of any collusion between the lessee and the respondent.
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right.
The suit in question was instituted in May, 1979 and the valid notice to quit was given long after the expiry of the period of lease.
The sub lessee had long innings.
It is time for him to quit.
There is no merit in this petition.
The special leave petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
R.S.S. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
On 16th January, 1958 a lease deed was executed between the lessee and the lessor respondent in respect of the demised land for a period of ten years, with a right of renewal for a further period of five years, and with permission to sub lease the same.
The lessee sub leased the premises to the petitioner for running a petrol pump.
After the expiry of the lease period on 16th January, 1968, the lessor continued to accept the rent from month to month.
However, no fresh instrument was executed by the parties.
The lessor issued on 30th November, 1972 a notice to the lessee terminating the lease and for giving vacant possession of the land on the expiry of 15th January, 1973 after removing the structures by the 16th January, 1973.
No notice was given separately to the petitioner.
The lessee did not contest the suit filed on the basis of the notice.
The petitioner contested the proceedings and contended that it was holding over after the expiry of the lease, that no notice terminating tenancy was received by it, and that the notice was invalid.
The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the notice terminating the lease was necessary and the notice in this case was invalid.
The Court also rejected the lessor 's plea that the tenancy expired by afflux of time.
The trial Court, however, held that the lease was not extended for a fixed period of five years in absence of any written instrument.
The 1st Additional Sub Judge allowed the lessor 's appeal and held the notice valid.
The High Court upheld the appellate order.
812 Dismissing the special leave petition, it was, ^ HELD: (1) In view of paragraph 1 of section 107 of the a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving an yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the absence of a registered instrument, it must be a monthly lease.
[815G H] (2) The High Court was right in holding that the lessee and the sub lessee, in the facts of this case, continued to remain in possession as a tenant from month to month.
[816A B] (3) The High Court was right that the tenancy was automatically determined on the expiry of ten years.
The lease was thereafter renewed from month to month which could only be terminated by giving a valid notice.
[816E F] (4) The notice of termination must be read in the context of the facts of each particular case having regard to the situation of the parties to whom it is addressed.
If all the paragraphs of the notice in the instant case are read together in harmony it would be manifest that the lessee was directed to handover the lease hold property on 16th January, 1973, and hence the notice was a valid notice of termination of the lease under section 106 of the Act.
[817C;818F] (5) Law does not require that the sub lessee need be made a party, if there was a valid termination of the lease.
In all cases where the landlord instituted a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and did not implead the sub lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an object is quite legitimate.
The decree in such a suit would bind the sub lessee.
[818H;819A B] Harihar Banerji vs Ramsashi Roy, 45 Indian Appeals 222;Mangilal vs Suganchand Rathi, ; ;Subadini vs Durga Charan Law, I.L.R. ;Gobinda Chandra Saha vs Dwarka Nath Patita, A.I.R. 1915 Cal. 313 and Roop Chand Gupta vs Raghuvanshi (Pvt.) Ltd., ; , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1110 (NT) of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.1984 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, passed in M.P. NO. 104 of 1984.
Gobind Das, Mrs. Sushma Suri, Mrs. Indra Sawhney and C.V.S. Rao for the Appellants.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Sanjay Sarin, Abdul Chitale and S.K. Gambhir, for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
This is an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur (Indore Bench) in M. Petition No. 104 of 1984.
The appeal is filed at the instance of the 841 Union of India, Collector of Central Excise, Indore and two other excise officers.
The respondents are the original petitioners in the aforesaid petition.
We propose to refer to the parties by the description in the petition.
The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal can be shortly stated.
The petitioner No. 1 is a Company manufacturing spun yarn.
According to the petitioners, in the manufacture of the said product they use as raw material cellulosic fibres and non cellulosic fibres.
Some time prior to 7th July, 1983, the petitioners filed a classification list in respect of the spun yarn manufactured by them showing the same as covered by Item No. 18(III) (i) in the First Schedule to the (referred to hereinafter as the "Central Excise Act").
The said schedule is generally referred to as the "Central Excises Tariff".
This classification was on the basis that the spun yarn was manufactured by them out of non cellulosic synthetic waste.
The said classification list was approved by the excise authorities on 7th July, 1983.
A supplementary classification list was approved on 15th October, 1983.
The petitioners were clearing the goods on the basis of aforesaid classification lists.
It appears that samples were drawn out of the spun yarn manufactured by the petitioners and sent for chemical examination.
There are some reports submitted by the Chemical Analyser, with the details of which we are not concerned.
Without giving any show cause notice or affording any opportunity to the petitioners to be heard, on 7th February, 1984, the Superintendent of Central Excise issued a notice of demand for a total sum of Rs.26,47,749.39 against the petitioner No. 1 on the footing that there was short payment of excise duty.
This was done on the ground that the yarn manufactured by the petitioners had been manufactured out of waste of synthetic fibres in blend of viscose fibres (of noncellulosic origin) and hence the said goods manufactured by them were liable to be classified under Central Excises Tariff Item No. 18(III)(ii).
It is an admitted position that the yarn manufacturing process used by the petitioners was with the aid of power.
The petitioners filed the aforesaid writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the validity of the said notice of demand dated 7th February, 1984.
The High Court granted an interim stay of the operation of the demand notice on 9th February, 1984.
On the same day, namely, 9th February, 1984, an order was passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise modifying the approval granted to the aforesaid classification lists submitted by the petitioners which had been approved 842 as aforesaid and classifying the aforesaid product under Item No. 18(III) (ii) of Schedule 1 of the Central Excises Act.
On 10th February, 1984 a notice was issued by the Superintendent, Central Excise on the petitioner No. 1 reciting inter alia that the Assistant Collector had modified the approval of the classification lists on 9th February, 1984 and calling upon the petitioner No. 1 to show cause why the duty short levied should not be recovered from them under the provisions of Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act.
A second similar show cause notice was also issued.
The petitioner No. 1 wrote to the excise authorities pointing out that in view of the aforesaid writ petition filed by the appellant, the adjudication proceedings should be stayed till writ petition was disposed of.
This request was turned down on 5th March, 1984 and orders of adjudication were passed by the Assistant Collector modifying the classification lists and confirming the demand made under the aforesaid notice of demand.
The petitioners thereupon amended the aforesaid writ petition filed by them and challenged the two show cause notices as well as the said orders of adjudication dated 5th March, 1984.
The petitioners also filed an appeal before the Collector of Central Excises (Appeal) against the orders of adjudication dated 5th March, 1984.
On 24th November, 1984 by the impugned judgment, the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the aforesaid writ petition in part.
Mulye, J. held by his judgment that the writ petition was allowed to the extent that the demand for recovery of Rs.26,47,749.39 for the period 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984, which was the period referred to in the demand notice was quashed.
However, the learned Judge directed the Collector, Central Excise before whom the appeal filed by the petitioners was pending to decide the appeal in respect of the demand made by the excise authorities for the subsequent period.
Giani, J., the other learned judge, in his concurring judgment set aside the two roders issued by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Ujjain Division both dated 5th March, 1984 as set out earlier.
Copies of these adjudication orders are at Annexure R/10 and R/11 respectively to the writ petition.
Very shortly put, both the Judges held that the notice of demand and the orders modifying the classification list served on the petitioners were bad in law and ordered that the same be quashed.
A perusal of the judgment also clearly indicates that the Division Bench directed that the Collector, Central Excise (Appeal) should hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits after giving the petitioners an adequate opportunity to put their case and their evidence before him in respect of the period from 7th February, 1984 onwards.
Thus, the Division Bench took the view that the show cause notice served on the petitioners could be treated as valid and effective only in respect of the period 843 from 7th February, 1984 onwards and not retrospectively from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984 being the period for which the demand has already been made in the demand notice dated 9th February, 1984.
As far as the relevant items in the First Schedule of the Central Excises Act are concerned, it is not necessary to set out the same in detail.
It will be enough to point out that if the cellulosic spun yarn made by a manufacturer with the aid of power contains man made fibre of non cellulosic origin, it will fall under Item No. 18(III) (ii), but if it does not contain any man made fibre of non cellulosic origin, it will fall under Item No. 18(III) (i) and duty would be leviable there at a lower rate.
The relevant portion of Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act runs as follows: "When any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded, a Central Excise Officer may, within six months from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the duty which has not been levied or paid or which has been short levied or short paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice: Provided that where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful mis statement or suppression of fact, or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty, by such person or his agent, the provisions of this sub section shall have effect, as if for the words "Central Excise Officer", the words "Collector of Central Excise" and for the words "six months", the words "five years" were substituted.
" A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that before any demand is made on any person chargeable in respect of non levy or short levy or under payment of duty, a notice requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amounts specified in the notice must be served on him.
It is the admitted position in the present case that no such notice was served.
It would thus appear that the aforesaid demand notice dated 7th February, 1984 was in violation of the provisions of Section 11 A and is bad in law.
Mr. Govind Das, learned 844 counsel for the appellant, however, contended that although the aforesaid Section provides that no demand could be made against a person thereunder without affording that person an adequate opportunity to show cause against the same, in the present case, though no prior show cause notice was given and the petitioners were not given an opportunity to be heard before the notice of demand was issued, such a notice was issued and an opportunity to show cause was given after the demand was made and the demand confirmed after hearing and hence it must be regarded as valid.
It was submitted by him that a post facto show cause notice should be regarded as adequate in law.
In support of this contention Mr. Govind Das tried to place reliance on certain decisions where a view has been taken that in cases where urgent and emergent action is required, an opportunity to be heard can be given after the order affecting a person adversely is passed and that where a particular Act does not provide for any such opportunity to be heard being given before an adverse order is passed, a post facto opportunity to be heard might, in certain cases, be regarded as adequate compliance with principles of natural justice.
We are of the view these cases have no relevance in considering the questions before us because it is quite apparent that in the present case no urgent or emergent action was required and Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act clearly provides that prior show cause notice must be issued to the person against whom any demand on ground of short levy or non levy of payment of excise duty is proposed to be made.
In Gokak Patel Vokkart Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise, Belgaum, ; this Court has held that the provisions of Section 11 A(1) & (2) of make it clear that the statutory scheme is that in the situations covered by sub section (1), a notice of show cause has to be issued and sub Section (2) requires that the cause shown by way of representation has to be considered by the prescribed authority and then only the amount has to be determined.
The scheme is in consonance with the rules of natural justice.
An opportunity to be heard is intended to be afforded to the person who is likely to be prejudiced when the order is made before making the order.
Notice is thus a condition precedent to a demand under sub Section (2).
In view of the aforesaid decision the submission of Mr. Govind Das must be rejected and it must be held that the aforesaid notice of demand was clearly bad in law and the High Court was fully, with respect, justified in quashing the same.
The next submission of Mr. Govind Das was that, in any event, 845 as the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) had been directed to examine the merits of the matter in respect of alleged short levy or non levy and the modification of the classification lists after allowing adequate opportunity to the petitioners to show cause in respect of the period from 7th February, 1984, onwards, the question as to whether there was short levy or non levy in respect of the period from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984 should even also be allowed to be decided by the Collector.
It was submitted by Mr. Govind Das that although the notice of demand may be set aside the notice to show cause dated 9/10th February, 1984 should be treated as a valid and effective notice in respect of the period from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984 as well as the period from 7th February, 1984 onwards.
In this connection, it is the submission of Dr. Chitale that this notice merely asked the petitioners to show cause against calculation or determination of the amount of short levy and not against the alteration in the classification lists on the basis of which short levy was alleged and hence, in respect of the said period from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984 the show cause notice is liable to be struck down.
In our view the submission of Dr. Chitale deserves to be accepted.
The opening paragraph of the show cause notice refers to the service of notice of demand dated 7th February, 1984 for Rs.26,47,749.39 on the petitioner.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said notice run as follows: "AND whereas the Assistant Collector Central Excise, Ujjain under his letter C.N. V(18)III/I/1/83/371 1374 dated 9th Feb., 84 has modified approval of the classification lists of the party and has directed that the short levied should be quantified by the Inspector, Central Excise, Biaora/Superintendent Central Excise, Ujjain and confirmation or otherwise of such short levied and recoveries if any would be ordered by him (Assistant Collector Central Excise, Division Ujjain) after following the prescribed procedure.
THEREFORE, in accordance with the said order of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise Division, Ujjain, you are called upon to show cause to the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Ujjain within 10 days of the receipt of this show cause notice as to why the short levies of Rs.26,47,749.39 should not be recovered from you, under Section 11 A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
" A reading of these paragraphs clearly shows that the notice set 846 out as an established fact that the classification lists submitted by the petitioners had been modified by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Ujjain and the only matter with respect to which the petitioners were asked to show cause was with regard to the quantification of the amount of the short levy and consequently, the amount which was liable to be recovered from the petitioner No. 1.
This notice, therefore, cannot be regarded as a show cause notice against the modification of the classification lists in respect of the aforesaid period.
In these circumstances, the show cause notice is bad in law and of no legal effect as far as the said earlier period is concerned.
Under Section 11 A of the Central Excise Act, the notice can relate only to a period of six months prior to the issue of that notice except in cases where it is alleged the short levy or short payment has occurred by reason of fraud, collusion or wilful misrepresentation or suppression of facts or contravention of the provisions of the said Act or rules made by the period concerned, as contemplated in the proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 11 A.
No such case has been sought to be made here in the said show cause notice.
The result is that the said show cause notice must be struck down in so far as period upto 6th February, 1984 is concerned, and can be regarded as a proper show cause notice only in respect of the subsequent period from 7th February, 1984 onwards.
We are, therefore, of the view that under the said show cause notice the question of short levy or non levy of excise duty prior to 6th February, 1984 cannot be gone into by the Collector and the High Court was right in the view which it took.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
S.L. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The respondent No. 1 in this appeal was manufacturing Spun yarn.
In the manufacture of the said product, the respondents used as raw material cellulosic fibres and non cellulosic fibres.
Prior to 7th July, 1983, the respondents had filed a classification list in respect of the spun yarn manufactured by them showing the same as covered by Item No. 18 (III) (i) in the first schedule to the Central Excises and Salts Act, 1944 ("Central Excises Act").
This classification was on the basis that the spun yarn was manufactured by them out of non collulosic synthetic waste.
The said classification list was approved by the excise authorities on 7th July, 1983.
A supplementary classification list was approved on 15th October, 1983.
Samples were drawn out of the spun yarn manufactured by the respondents and sent for chemical analysis.
Reports were submitted by the Chemical Analyser.
On 7th February, 1984, the Superintendent of Central Excises issued a demand notice against the respondent No. 1 on the footing that there was short payment of excise duty as the goods manufactured by the respondents were liable to be classified under Central Excises Tariff Item No. 18(III) (ii).
The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the notice of demand.
On 9th February, 1984, the Assistant Collector of Central Excises passed an order modifying the approval granted to the classification lists submitted by the respondents and classifying the aforesaid product of the respondents under Item No. 18(III) (ii) of Schedule I of the Central Excises Act, on the basis of which the Superintendent, Central Excises, issued on the 10th February, 1984, a notice to the respondent No. 1, calling upon them to show cause why duty short levied should not be recovered from them under the provisions of section 11 A of the Central Excises Act.
A second similar show cause notice was also issued.
The Assistant Collector passed orders of adjudication dated 5th 839 March, 1984, modifying the classification lists and confirming the demand made under the aforesaid notice of demand.
The respondents petitioners thereupon amended their aforesaid writ petition to challenge the two show cause notices and the orders of adjudication.
The petitioners also filed an appeal before the Collector of Central Excises against the said orders of adjudication.
The High Court allowed the writ petition in part, quashing the notice of demand for the period 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984, and the orders modifying the classification lists, and directing the Collector, Central Excises to hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits considering their evidence in respect of the period from 7th February, 1984 onwards.
The High Court took the view that the show cause notice served on the petitioner could be treated as valid only in respect of the period from 7th February, 1984, onwards and not retrospectively from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984.
The Union of India, the Collector of Central Excises and other Excise officers then moved this Court by this appeal against the decision of the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: If the Cellulosic spun yarn made by a manufacturer with the aid of power contains man made fibre of non cellulosic origin, it will fall under Item No, 18(III) (ii), but if it does not contain any man made fibre of non cellulosic origin, it will fall under Item No. 18(III) (i) and duty would be leviable there at a lower rate.
[843B C] Under the provisions of Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act, before any demand is made on any person chargeable in respect of non levy or short levy or under payment of duty, a notice requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amounts specified in the notice must be served on him.
In this case, no such notice was served.
The aforesaid notice of demand dated 7th February, 1984, was in violation of the provisions of Section 11 A and is bad in law, and the High Court was fully justified in quashing the same.
[843G H;844G H] The appellants contended that although the notice of demand might be set aside, the notice to show cause dated 9th/10th February, 1984, should be treated as a valid notice in respect of the period from 15th August, 1983 to 6th February, 1984 and the period from 7th February, 1984, onwards.
The notice referred to the service of notice of demand dated 7th February, 1984 on the respondent No. 1.
The notice set out as an established fact that the classification lists submitted by the 840 respondents had been modified by the Assistant Collector, and the only matter with respect to which the respondents were asked to show cause was with regard to the quantification of the amount of short levy which was liable to be recovered from the respondent No. 1.
The Notice could not be regarded as a show cause notice against the modification of the classification lists in respect of the aforesaid period.
The show cause notice was bad in law and of no legal effect as far as the earlier period was concerned.
Under Section 11 A of the Central Excises Act, the notice can relate only to a period of six months period to the issue of that notice except in cases where it is alleged that the short levy or payment has occurred by reason of fraud, collusion or wilful misrepresentation or suppression of facts or contravention of the provisions of the said Act or rules, as contemplated in the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 11 A.
No such case was made out in the said show cause notice.
The said show cause notice must be struck down in so far as the period upto 6th February, 1984, was concerned and could be regarded as a proper show cause notice only in respect of the subsequent period from 7th February, 1984 onwards.
Under the said show cause notice, the question of short levy or non levy of excise duty prior to 6th February, 1984, could not be gone into by the Collector and the High Court was right in the view it took.
[845B C;846A E] Gokak Patel Vokkart Ltd. vs Collector of Central Excise, Belgaum, ; , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 5858 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.5.83 of the Allahabad High Court of in S.A. No. 1281 of 74.
S.K. Bisaria, A.P. Malhotra, J.K. Nayyar and R.S. Sharma for the Appellant.
Shakil Ahmed Syed for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 822 OJHA, J.
This is a tenant 's appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing, his second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment of the appellant filed by the landlord respondent in respect of a shop.
One of the questions which came up for consideration in the suit was as to whether the U.P. (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947 (U.P. Act III of 1947) was or was not applicable to the shop in question.
The trial court held that the said Act was not applicable.
Other pleas raised in defence by the appellant having failed, a decree for eviction and for recovery of damages for use and occupation was passed against him on 19th August, 1971.
The trial court, however, directed the parties to bear their own costs.
Against that decree an appeal was preferred by the appellant.
During the pendency of the appeal, the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 13 of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was enforced with effect from 15th July, 1972.
The appellant made deposit contemplated by Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act on 19th July, 1972, that is, within one month from 15th July, 1972, which was the date of the commencement of the Act, in the lower appellate court and asserted that in view of the deposit so made he was entitled to be absolved from his liability for eviction from the disputed shop.
The amount so deposited, however, did not include the costs of the suit.
Subsequently, the appellant was permitted to deposit even the costs of the suit by the lower appellate court but at his own risk.
In regard to the claim of the appellant that he was entitled to be absolved from his liability for eviction on account of the deposit made by him on 19th July, 1972, it was urged on behalf of the landlord respondent that since the costs of the suit had not been deposited and the subsequent deposit thereof was beyond one month contemplated by Section 39 of the Act, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the said Section read with Section 40.
For the appellant, on the other hand, it was urged that since the trial court had directed the parties to bear their own costs the benefit of the aforesaid Sections could not be denied to him for non deposit of the costs of the suit.
In the alternative, it was asserted by him that since the costs even of the suit were deposited subsequently the delay in the deposit was liable to be condoned.
However, neither the main plea nor the alternative plea found favour with the lower appellate court and it dismissed the appeal with costs.
It further passed a decree for the costs of the suit also in favour of the landlord respondent by allowing the cross objection filed by her in this behalf.
823 Aggrieved by the decree passed by the lower appellate court the appellant preferred a second appeal which was dismissed by the High Court by the judgment appealed against.
The pleas which were raised by the appellant before the lower appellate court and the High Court in regard to the scope of Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act have been reiterated before us by his learned counsel.
In support of his alternative submission that the delay in depositing the costs of the suit deserved to be condoned, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Krishna Kumar Gupta vs Addl.
District Judge IV and others, On the facts of the instant case, however, we do not find it necessary to go into the question as to whether the delay in making deposit contemplated by Section 39 can be condoned or not because in our opinion the appeal deserves to be allowed on the main submission made by learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that since the trial court had directed the parties to bear their own costs as a result of which the costs of the suit were not payable by the appellant on the date of the deposit, the non deposit of the said costs within one month from 15th July, 1972 as contemplated by Section 39 of the Act could not deprive him of the benefit of the said Section.
What was the true import of the expression 'full costs ' used in Section 39 of the Act, came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in R.D.Ram Nath & Co. and another vs Girdhari Lal and another, [1975] A.L.J. Page 1.
In so far as is relevant for the present case it was held: "The expression 'full costs of the suit ' in respect of a pending suit will represent the amount of court fee paid on the plaint and on other documents and other taxable expenses incurred by the landlord by the date of deposit together with such amount of the Advocate 's fee and the fee of his clerk as is taxable on the contested scale whether any certificate of fee has or has not been filed by the date of deposit.
In case of a first appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the trial court it will represent the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order together with the amount paid as court fee on the memorandum of appeal or revision and other documents and other taxable expenses incurred in the first appellate or revisional court including the Advocate 's fee and the fee of his clerk which are to be computed in the manner stated above." 824 This decision was cited before the learned Judge who decided the appellant 's second appeal with particular emphasis on the words 'the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order ' with regard to the deposit to be made in case of a first appeal or revision filed against a decree or order of the trial court.
The learned Judge, however, took the view that since an appeal was a continuation of the suit the aforesaid words appear to have been mentioned by the Bench rather loosely.
He also pointed out that in case the cross objection filed by the landlord was ultimately allowed the costs of the trial court would become payable and in this view of the matter also the costs of the suit had to be deposited notwithstanding the fact that the trial court had directed the parties to bear their own costs.
According to the learned Judge the words 'landlord 's full costs of the suit ' were not the same thing as the costs awarded to the plaintiff in a suit and that the word 'landlord ' had been used in Section 39 purposely in order to distinguish it from the plaintiff of the suit.
He further took the view that 'landlord 's full costs of the suit ' in Section 39 really meant all those taxable costs which were capable of being ascertained on the date of the deposit.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties we find it difficult to agree with the view that the words 'the costs awarded to the landlord in the decree or order ' were used loosely.
Irrespective of the actual amount of costs that may have been incurred by the landlord in prosecuting a suit he is entitled to recover from the tenant only such costs which in law are known as taxable costs and are made payable by the tenant to the landlord.
The matter may be clarified by an illustration.
Take a case where court fee in excess of what is prescribed has been actually paid by the landlord.
Notwithstanding such payment the tenant, even on the suit being decreed with costs, will not be liable to pay the excess amount of court fee, inasmuch as law does not permit it to be taxed.
The same would be the position in regard to the fee paid by the landlord to his counsel in excess of such fee as is taxable.
For this reason even though the word 'taxable ' has not been prefixed to the words 'costs of the suit ' in Section 39 of the Act, the concept of taxable costs has been introduced therein in the process of interpretation of the said Section.
On principle, we do not find much difference in a case where the costs incurred by the landlord have been made specifically not payable by the tenant to the landlord by a decree or order of the court.
In our opinion non deposit of such costs which, either on account of the relevant rules or some specific order of the court are not payable by the tenant to the landlord on the date of deposit contemplated by Section 39 or 40, as the case may be, cannot deprive the 825 tenant of the benefit of these two sections.
The fact that in appeal there was a possibility of costs of the suit also being awarded to the landlord by reversing the decree of the trial court in this behalf will, in our opinion, not be material.
As regards the use of the word 'landlord ' in place of the word 'plaintiff ' in Section 39 of the Act suffice it to point out that since the Act deals with landlords and tenants the word 'landlord ' was used in Section 39 also as it was used in various other sections.
This circumstances, in our opinion, could not be used for holding that even if costs are not payable to the landlord on the date of deposit because of some specific order of the court it would still be payable.
We would, however, like to emphasise that since Section 39 contemplates deposit of full costs of suit also, in cases falling under this category, namely, where because of a decree or an order passed by the court below depriving the landlord of his costs, the tenant is not liable to pay the amount of costs on the date when the deposit contemplated by Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act is made in an appellate or revisional court, such court in order to safeguard the interests of the landlord and to give effect to the intention of the legislature expressed in Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act will require the tenant to deposit such costs also in supersession of the decree or order of the subordinate court in this behalf, if other conditions of these two sections have been complied with, before passing an order giving him the benefit of these sections, namely, of absolving him from his liability for eviction from the premises in question.
Such a course would meet the ends of justice and safeguard the interests of both the parties.
In doing so, in cases falling under the aforesaid category, the court will neither be condoning any default nor extending the time for depositing costs of the suit beyond the date contemplated by Section 39, in as much as on that date such costs were not payable by the tenant because of an order of court passed in this behalf.
In the instant case the costs of the suit had already been deposited by the tenant and only an order permitting the landlord to withdraw the same was needed.
The learned counsel for the landlord respondent while supporting the judgment appealed against placed reliance on a subsequent decision by Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt.
Phoolwati vs Gyan Chand Verma and another, [1985] ALL.
L.J. Page 826 1.
It was pointed out by him that the judgment under appeal in the instant case on the point in question, has been approved in the case of Smt.
Phoolwati (supra).
In our opinion, the decision in the case of Smt.
Phoolwati (supra) is distinguishable on facts.
That was a case where during the pendency of the suit the landlord had sought permission to file some papers but her application, made in this behalf, was rejected by the trial court.
Against that order the landlord preferred a revision which was allowed with costs which amount, as quantified in the formal order, came to Rs.132.10.
The amount which was deposited by the tenant in order to claim the benefit of Section 39 of the Act, however, did not include this sum.
It was urged on behalf of the tenant that since the sum of Rs.132.10 represented costs awarded in a revision arising not out of the main decree but out of an interlocutory order it was not necessary to be deposited.
This plea was repelled and in doing so reliance was indeed placed on the decision in the case of R.D. Ram Nath & Co. (supra).
Emphasis was placed on the words 'other taxable expenses incurred ' occurring in that part of the judgment in the case of R.D. Ram Nath & Co. (supra) which has been extracted above.
Another circumstance which was relied on by the tenant in that case was that even though the revision against the interlocutory order had been dismissed with costs, the amount of Rs.132.10 even though mentioned in the formal order was not included in the ultimate decree which was passed in the suit.
It is in this background that it was held that the said amount of Rs.132.10 fell within the expression of 'landlord 's full costs of the suit ' notwithstanding the fact that it was not shown in the decree.
It was thus a case where the sum of Rs.132.10 had specifically been made payable by the tenant to the landlord in the revision against the interlocutory order but for some reason was omitted to be included in the ultimate decree.
It was not a case where the costs of the revision had been directed to be borne by the parties so that it was rendered not payable by the tenant.
Since the question in regard to the effect of costs not being allowed by a decree or order did not arise in the case of Smt.
Phoolwati (supra) there was really no occasion to approve in that case the judgment appealed against in the instant case.
In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the opinion that on the facts of the instant case the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act and to be absolved from his liability to be evicted from the shop in question on account of the deposit made by him on 19th July, 1972 referred to above.
In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the suit of the plaintiff 827 respondent in so far as the eviction of the appellant from the shop in question is concerned, is dismissed.
The landlord respondent shall be entitled to withdraw the various amounts including costs of suit deposited by the tenant appellant in the courts below.
In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
In a suit for ejectment filed by the landlord respondent a decree for eviction from a shop was passed against the tenant appellant on 19th August, 1971.
The Trial Court however directed the parties to bear their own costs.
During the pendency of the tenant 's appeal, the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was enforced with effect from 15th July, 1972.
The appellant made the deposit contemplated by section 39 read with section 40 of the Act within one month in the lower appellate court and asserted that in view of the deposit so made he was entitled to be absolved from his liability for eviction.
The deposit, however, did not include the costs of the suit.
The landlord contested the tenant 's claim on the ground that since the costs of the suit had not been deposited within time, the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of section 39 read with section 40.
In defence, the tenant urged that since the trial Court had directed the parties to bear their own costs the benefit of the aforesaid sections could not be denied to him.
In the alternative, it was asserted that the delay in the deposit of costs was liable to be condoned.
These contentions did not find favour with the lower appellate court and it dismissed the appeal with costs.
The tenant 's second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court.
The High Court held that the costs of the suit had to be deposited notwithstanding the fact that the trial court had directed the parties to bear their own costs.
According to the High Court, the words 'landlord 's full costs of the suit ' were not the same thing as the costs awarded to the plaintiff in a suit but really meant all those taxable costs which were capable of being ascertained on the date of the deposit.
In this Court the appellant reiterated the pleas raised in the courts below.
Allowing the appeal, it was, 821 ^ HELD: (1) Irrespective of the actual amount of costs that may have been incurred by the landlord in prosecuting a suit, he is entitled to recover from the tenant only such costs which in law are known as taxable costs and are made payable to the landlord.
[824E] (2) Non deposit of such costs which, either on account of the relevant rules or some specific order of the court are not payable by the tenant to the landlord on the date of deposit contemplated by section 39 or 40, cannot deprive the tenant of the benefit of these two sections.
The fact that in appeal there was a possibility of costs of the suit also being awarded to the landlord by reversing the decree of the trial court in this behalf will not be material.
[824H;825A] (3) In cases falling under this category, the appellate or revisional court in order to safeguard the interests of the landlord and to give effect to the intention of the legislature expressed in section 39 read with section 40 of the Act, will require the tenant to deposit such costs also in supersession of the decree or order of the subordinate court in this behalf before passing an order giving him the benefit of these sections.
[825E] (4) The appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 39 read with Section 40 of the Act and to be absolved from his liability to be evicted from the shop in question.
[826G H] Krishna Kumar Gupta vs Additional District Judge IV, ;R.D. Ram Nath & Co. vs Girdhari Lal, and Smt.
Phoolwati vs Gyan Chand Verma, [1985] All L.J. 1, referred to.


judgement:
Appeals Nos. 35 & 36 of 1954.
1505 Appeals from the judgments and order dated August 28, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 34 and 35 of 1952, arising out of the orders dated January 24, 1952, of the said High Court exercising its Civil Original Jurisdiction in Misc.
Applications Nos. 302 of 1951 and 303, 304 and 305 of 1951 respectively.
R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, section N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
H. N. Sanyal, Addl.
Solicitor General of India, N. P. Nathwani and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 3 in C. A 35 & No. 5 in C. A. 36.
D. H. Buch and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2 in C. A. 35 & Nos. 2 4 in C. A. 36. 1958.
March 19.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J.
These appeals arise out of petitions made to the Bombay High Court under article 226 for writs of certiorari.
The appellant is the manager of the Tata Mills Limited, which carries on business in the manufacture and sale of textile goods in Bombay and as such is responsible for the payment of wages under the .
The first respondent was the Authority under the at the times material to these appeals.
The sixth respondent is the present Authority.
The Authority is entrusted with the duty of deciding cases falling within the purview of the Act.
The second, third, fourth and fifth respondents are employees in the Mills.
A dispute arose about a claim made by the operatives of the Mills for a bonus for the year 1948.
This was referred to the Industrial Court at Bombay which made an award on April 23, 1949, and awarded a bonus equivalent to four and a half months ' wages subject to certain conditions of which only the sixth is material here.
It runs as follows: " Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are 1506 not in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November 1949.
In such cases, claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mill concerned." Those operatives who made a claim before the date fixed above were duly paid but payment was refused to the third respondent, who applied much later, on the ground that the condition subject to which the award was made was not fulfilled.
The third respondent thereupon made an application before the first respondent, the Authority under the .
Similar claims were made by the second, fourth and fifth respondents for a bonus for the year 1949.
The, Industrial Court awarded a bonus equal to two months ' wages and in the sixth condition put the date as December 31, 1950.
By this time Labour Appellate Tribunals came into existence, so both sides filed appeals against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of Bombay.
The appeals failed and the award was upheld.
After that, the matter followed the same pattern.
Respondents 2, 4 and 5 applied for their bonus after December 31, 1950.
The Mills refused to pay and these respondents applied to the first respondent, the Authority under the .
The two sets of claims, that is to say, the claim of the third respondent for a bonus for the year 1948 and the claims of the second, fourth and fifth respondents for bonuses for the year 1949, were heard together.
The appellant contested these applications on two grounds.
He questioned the jurisdiction of the Authority to entertain the petitions made to it.
He also contended that, in any event, as the condition subject to which the award was made, namely, an application on or before November 30, 1949, was not fulfilled, the claim for a bonus did not lie.
The first respondent held that it had jurisdiction and, after hearing the parties on the merits, decreed the various claims.
1507 The appellant thereupon filed writ petitions in the High Court.
They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J.
An appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard by the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J.
They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in another case dated March 11, 1952, and, following that decision, dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments, as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision.
The appellant then applied for a certificate for leave to appeal here.
This was granted by Chagla C. J. and Dixit J. on February 2, 1953.
The first question that we have to decide is whether the first respondent had jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to him as the Authority under the .
This depends on whether these bonuses are " wages " within the meaning of the definition in section 2(vi) of the Act.
The scope of the Authority 's jurisdiction is set out in section 15 of the Act.
It is to bear and decide (1)all claims arising out of deduction from wages, and (2) all claims regarding delay in the payment of wages.
Therefore, unless these bonuses are " wages " within the meaning of the Act, the Authority will have no jurisdiction.
The definition of " wages " in section 2(vi) of the Act is long and complicated but leaving aside the clauses in it that are not material for our present purpose, it runs " 'Wages ' means all remuneration. . . which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration 191 191 1508 of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include. . . and then five matters that are not included are set out.
Now consider this clause by clause. " ' Wages ' means all remuneration.
" Is bonus a remuneration ? We think it is Remuneration is only a more formal version of " payment " and payment is a recompense for service rendered.
Now it is true that bonus in the abstract need not be for services rendered and in that sense need not be a remuneration; for example, there is a shareholder 's bonus in certain companies, and there is a life insurance bonus and so forth.
But that is not the kind of bonus contemplated here because the kind of remuneration that the definition contemplates is one that is payable " in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment.
" Therefore, the kind of bonus that this definition con templates is one that is remuneration for services rendered or work done.
Accordingly, it is a " remuneration " and as the definition includes all remuneration of a specified kind, we are of opinion that bonus of the kind contemplated here falls within the clause that says it must be " remuneration ".
Next comes a clause that limits the kind of remuneration, for, though the opening words are " all remuneration " the words that follow limit it to all remuneration of the kind specified in the next clause, that is, to remuneration " which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled.
" Now the question is whether the kind of bonus contemplated by this definition must be a bonus that is payable as a clause of the contract of employment.
We think it is, and for this reason.
If we equate " bonus " with " remuneration ", the 1509 definition says clearly enough that the bonus must be such that it is payable "if the terms of the contract are fulfilled", that is to say, it will not be payable if the terms are not fulfilled.
Now, we can understand a position where a statute declares that whenever the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled the bonus shall be payable; equally, we can envisage a situation in which an employer engages to pay a bonus should the terms of the contract of employment be fulfilled, by a separate and independent agreement that is riot part of the contract of employment.
In either case, the matter could be said to fall within this part of the definition.
But we can see no way in which a bonus can be said to be payable if and when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled outside these two cases (namely, legislation, or a separate contract that is not part of the contract of employment), except when it is payable by reason of a term, express or implied, in the contract of employment itself.
In any event, if there are such cases, the present is not one of them, for the bonus here is payable under an award of an Industrial Court and has nothing to do with the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment, except indirectly.
It was argued that as an Industrial Court can direct payment of bonus should an industrial dispute arise in that behalf, the matter falls within the definition.
But does it ? One of the matters that an Industrial Court might take into consideration before awarding a bonus is whether all the terms of the contract of employment have been duly fulfilled and it is possible that such a Court might refuse to award a bonus in cases where the terms were not fulfilled, but it would not be bound by such a consideration and its right to make an award of bonus is not conditional on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, whereas, under the definition, that is an essential ingredient.
Therefore, even if due fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment was to be one of the reasons for the award, the bonus so awarded would not be payable because the terms of the contract 1510 had been fulfilled but because of an industrial dispute and because in order to settle it, the Court awarded the bonus.
It is not necessary to analyse the definition any further (except for one clause) because, even if all the other ingredients are present, the clause we have just considered would exclude a bonus of the kind we have here, that is to say, a bonus awarded by an Industrial Court.
The clause we have yet to examine is this: " and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable.
" It was contended that the words " and includes any bonus " stand by themselves and that the words that follow must be disregarded when bonus is under consideration because they relate only to "additional remuneration " and riot to " bonus ".
Now, it may be possible to say that the words " of the nature aforesaid " only govern the words " additional remuneration " and that they do not apply to "bonus", with the result that the inclusion clause " and includes any bonus etc." would refer to two separate things, namely, (1) bonus and (2)other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid.
In our opinion, the clause means (1) "bonus. . . which would be so payable ", and (2)" other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable.
" If that is correct, then the words " which would be so payable " throw us back to the earlier part of the definition and we reach the position that the kind of bonus that is included by the inclusion clause is the kind that would be payable " if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, are fulfilled.
" There is another reason for reaching this conclusion.
The opening words of the definition make it clear that " wages " means remuneration that is payable when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled.
Therefore, that is something certain.
1511 One knows ahead of time that if the terms of the contract are fulfilled, then the bonus is payable.
It may be that the exact amount has yet to be determined but the fact that bonus is payable and can be claimed as soon as the terms of the contract are fulfilled is a matter that can be predicated beforehand, that is to say, even before the terms of the contract are fulfilled, or indeed, even before the work has started if the contract is made that far ahead.
But that is not the case when bonus is awarded by an Industrial Court, for there it is impossible to say ahead of time whether bonus will be awarded or not; indeed, at the time the contract is entered into, it would be impossible to say whether such a claim could be laid at a II because a difference of opinion between one worker and his employer about the right to bonus would Dot necessarily lead to an industrial dispute.
When an Industrial Court awards a bonus, independent of any contract, it does so only if there is an available surplus for a distribution of bonus and the amount of the award would depend on the extent of the surplus available for that purpose.
Therefore, the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment is not an essential ingredient of an award of an Industrial Court.
In F. W. Heilgers & Co. vs N. C. Chakravarthi the learned Judges of the Federal Court held that a bonus not payable under a contract of employment does not fall within the definition of "wages" in section 2(vi) of the , as it stood before the amendment in 1957.
We are concerned with the old definition here and not the amended one, so the present case is, in our opinion, covered by that authority.
It is true that no bonus had been awarded in Heilgers ' case (1) and that therefore there was no ascertained sum, whereas there is one in the present case, or rather a sum that is ascertainable, but that was only one of the grounds on which the learned Judges proceeded.
They held that in order to bring a particular (1) , 360. 1512 payment under the definition of "wages", two things are necessary " (1) a definite sum, and (2) a contract indicating when the sum becomes payable "; and they said " It is obvious that unless there is an express provision for paying a stipulated sum, the definition will not cover such a payment.
" The bonus in the present case is not payable because of a contract but because of the award of an Industrial Court.
Therefore, according to the Federal Court, it is not " wages " within the meaning of the .
In 1957 the definition was amended and the following was added: " wages ' means and includes (c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name); but does not include (1) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not form part of remuneration payable under the terms of employment The change would have been unnecessary had the law been otherwise under the old definition; nor is it possible to say that the clause was added by way of abundant caution because the Federal Court decided otherwise in 1949.
In view of this amendment, and in view of the Federal Court 's decision, we do not feel justified in taking a different view, especially as we think the decision was right.
The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court tried to distinguish the Federal Court 's judgment on the ground that no bonus had been declared there and ,so there was no ascertained sum, but, as we have pointed out, the ratio of the decision covers the present case and, in any case, that is our view quite apart from their conclusion.
1513 On this view, it is not necessary to consider the other points that were argued because, if the definition of wages ", as it stood before the amendment, is not wide enough to include a bonus of the kind we have here, namely, one payable under an award of an Industrial Court, then, the Authority under the had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to it under section 15 of the Act.
The appeals are allowed with costs.
The decisions of the learned High Court Judges are set aside and also the decrees of the Authority under the .
There will be only one set of costs.
Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
The Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded bonus equal to 4 1/2 months ' wages to the operatives of the Tata Mills Ltd. and directed that those operatives who were no longer in the service of the Mills should be paid the bonus in one lump sum by a fixed date and in such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mills.
The operatives who made a claim before the date fixed were duly paid but payment was refused to operatives who applied after that date.
The operatives who had been refused payment made applications to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.
The Mills contended that the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, but the contention was rejected.
The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by a Single judge and an appeal against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench: Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not wages within the meaning of section 2(Vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications made to it under section I5 of the Act.
Though such bonus was remuneration it was not remuneration payable on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, as required by section 2(vi).
F. W. Heilgers & Co. vs N. C. Chakravarthi, [1949] F.C.R. 356, followed.