judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4779 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.8.1987 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 393 of 1986.
Ashok Sen, Ms. section Janani and Mrs. Urmila Kapoor for the Appellant.
G.C. Lalwani and P.N. Misra for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
Leave granted.
The landlord Shri Shiv Chander Kapoor has preferred this appeal by special leave against the judgment dated August 3, 1987 passed by the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 393 of 1986 whereby the High Court dismissed the landlord 's appeal against the Order dated October 14, 1986 of the Rent Control Tribunal affirming in appeal the order dated August 9, 1985 of the Rent Controller dismissing the landlord 's application dated October 12, 1983 for restoration of possession of the premises let out for residence to the tenant Amar Bose for the limited period of three years w.e.f. June 8, 1980 under section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as the 'Act ').
The true scope of the enquiry con templated when the tenant assails validity of the Rent Controller 's permission granted under section 21 of the Act for creation of a tenancy for limited period arises for determination in the present case.
The premises is the second floor of the building beating No. 19/10, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi comprising of two rooms, a kitchen, bathroom and lavatory let out for resi dence on a monthly rent of Rs.800 apart from electricity and water charges.
The landlord offered to let out the premises for three years only w.e.f. June 8, 1980 for the reason that it would be needed by his family thereafter when his son got married, to which the tenant consented.
Accordingly, by an agreement in writing between the parties the premises was so let out for the limited period of three years w.e.f June 8, 1980 with the 302 permission of the Rent Controller obtained under section 21 of the Act.
The order of the Rent Controller is as under: "In view of the statements of the parties made above, I am satisfied that there is no collu sion or fraud.
I am also satisfied that the petitioner does not require the suit premises for a limited period of three years.
Permis sion, therefore, is hereby granted to the petitioner Sh.
Shiv Chander Kapoor to let out his premises No. 19/10, situated at Old Ra jinder Nagar, New Delhi, the details of which are given in the site plan Ext.
AI to the respondent for residential purpose for a limited period of three years with effect from 8.6.1980".
On failure of the tenant Amar Bose to restore possession of the premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of limited tenancy, an application dated October 12, 1983 was filed by the landlord before the Rent Controller praying for execution of the aforesaid order by delivery of vacant possession of the premises to the landlord.
The tenant filed his objection to the execution application which was replied by the landlord.
The Rent Controller by order dated August 9, 1985 rejected the landlord 's application taking the view that the permission granted under section 21 of the Act was invalid so that the tenant could not be evicted on expiry of the period of three years.
The landlord 's further appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal and then to the Delhi High Court failed.
Hence this further appeal.
The Rent Controller upheld the tenant 's objection that the landlord 's son being aged only about 19 or 20 years on the date of expiry of the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age prescribed by law for marriage being 21 years the ground that the premises would be needed on the son 's marriage after three years was untenable.
On this basis it was held that creation of tenancy for the limited period of three years amounted to fraud and misrepresenta tion by the landlord rendering invalid the permission grant ed under section 21 of the Act.
This view has been upheld by the Rent Control Tribunal and then the Delhi High Court, treating the grant of permission by Controller to be mechan ical and without application of mind.
The tenant also con tended that the landlord was in possession of the remaining building which comprises of sufficient accommodation to meet the bona fide need of the landlord 's family; and that the premises were constructed in 1972 and the second floor of the building was never occupied by the landlord being let out to other tenants from time to time.
In substance 303 the grounds taken by the tenant were two, namely (1) the landlord 's son was below the prescribed minimum age for marriage of 21 years on the date of the expiry of the period of three years of the limited tenancy which showed that the reason given was false, and (2) absence of bona fide need of the landlord for occupying the premises, namely, the second floor of the building.
The High Court 's order is based only on the first ground.
The scope of enquiry contemplated under section 21 of the Act when the tenant assails validity of the Controller 's permission to create a limited tenancy thereunder was seri ously debated at the heating of this appeal.
On behalf of the appellant/landlord it was urged that the scope is limit ed to examining only the existence of jurisdictional facts which permit grant of permission to creat a tenancy for limited period and no more.
On this basis, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the above first ground alone was within the scope of enquiry which too has been wrongly decided by the High Court on a misconstruction of Section 21.
On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the respondent tenant that the enquiry extends also to examining the other ground viz. existence of landlord 's bona fide need to occupy the premises on expiry of the period of limited tenancy.
The same earlier decisions of this Court on the point were relied on by both sides with equal vehemence in support of the rival contentions.
Section 21 is as under: "Recovery of possession in case of tenancies for limited period. (1) Where a landlord does not require the whole or any part of any premises for a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed mannner, lets the whole of the premises or part thereof as a residence for such period as may be agreed to in writing between the landlord and the tenant and the tenant does not, on the expiry of the said period, vacate such premises, then, not withstanding anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law, the Controller may, On an application made to him in this behalf by the landlord within such time as may be pre scribed, place the landlord in vacant posses sion of the premises or part thereof by evict ing the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises.
(2) While making an order under sub section (1), the Con 304 troller may award to the landlord such damages for the use or occupation of the premises at such rates as he considers proper in the circumstances of the case for the period from the date of such order till the date of actual vacation by the tenant".
Chapter III of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 compris ing of Sections 14 to 25 contains provisions relating to control of eviction of tenants.
The object of enacting the Rent Control laws is well known and it does not need an elaborate enunciation.
Suffice it ' to say that in view of acute shortage of housing accommodation, more particularly in the bigger cities, these laws have been enacted to regu late the letting of the available premises and an attempt has been made to reconcile the conflicting interests of landlords and the need for the protection of tenants.
Sec tion 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act gives protection to the tenants against eviction and specifies the grounds on which alone the landlord can obtain an order of the compe tent authority to recover possession of any premises let out to a tenant.
Apparently, it was realised that some premises may be available for being let only for a limited period where the landlord did not require the same during that period alone provided the landlord was assured of restora tion of possession on expiry of the limited period.
However, while enacting a provision permitting the creation of a tenancy for limited period to utilise such premises and alleviate to some extent the suffering of persons needing residential accommodation, it was necessary also to ensure that the provision was not misused by capricious landlords to circumvent Section 14 of the Act.
It was to achieve this dual purpose that Section 21 was enacted in the Delhi Act to encourage landlords who did not need any premises for a limited period only, to let it out for such period with the assurance of restoration of possession at the end of that period without being required to satisfy Section 14 of the Act.
The provision also contains an internal check upon an unscrupulous landlord by requiting the Rent Controller 's permission to be granted in the given circumstances only.
The conditions on which permission can be granted by the Rent Controller under Section 21 are specified in Section 21 itself.
A fortiori when the question arises about the valid ity of the Rent Controller 's permission it can be tested only with reference to the specified conditions subject to which alone permission can be granted by the Controller.
No outside factor can be imported either for grant of the permission thereunder or for adjudicating its validity at a subsequent stage.
Section 21 being in the nature of an exception to the ordinary mode of 305 eviction of tenants prescribed under section 14 of the Act, it must be strictly construed and the scope thereof limited to its contents.
Section 1 of the Act is by itself the complete provision relating to the creation of a tenancy for limited period and recovery of possession on expiry of that period.
Thus, Section 21 is a self contained code in this behalf.
Section 21 permits the creation of a tenancy for limited period "Where the landlord does not require the whole or any part of premises for a particular period"; and it is to be let for 'residence '.
These words of the provision specify the jurisdictional facts which alone permit creation of a tenancy for limited period.
The remaining provision provides the machinery for doing so by an agreement in writing be tween the landlord and the tenant on the basis of which permission of the Controller is obtained.
The provision further says that if On expiry of the said period the tenant does not vacate such premises, then 'notwithstanding any thing contained in Section 14 or in any other law ' the Con troller may on an application by the landlord place the landlord in vacant possession of the premises by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation of such premises.
The enquiry contemplated at the stage of grant of permission by the Controller under this provision requires the Controller to be satisfied that the landlord does not require such premises for a limited period only; and the said premises is to be let as a residence in terms of an agreement in writing between the landlord and tenant.
On satisfaction of the existence of these facts, the Con troller grants permission for creation of tenancy for a limited period under this provision.
When recovery of pos session of the premises is sought thereafter by the landlord under this provision then the Controller is to restore possession to the landlord "notwithstanding anything con tained in Section 14 or in any other law" subject only to the requirements of this provision.
Obviously it is the existence of a valid permission of the Controller for creation of a tenancy for limited period under this provision which brings into existence a valid limited tenancy and, therefore, such valid permission is a sine qua non of Controller 's jurisdiction to order restora tion of possession on expiry of that period under the second part of Section 21.
It is, therefore, the obligation of the Controller to examine the question of validity of his earli er permission, if such an objection is raised before he orders restoration of possesion to the landlord on expiry of the limited term.
However, that enquiry must be limited only to the existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permission and no more.
This is quite evident from the expression 'notwithstanding anything con tained in Section 14 or in any 306 other law '.
in the second part of Section 21 itself.
This is the inbuilt safeguard in the provision against its misuse.
We have no doubt that the language of Section 21 of the Act clearly forbids the Controller from embarking on an enquiry beyond the ambit of Section 21 itself which may impinge into the sphere of Section 14 of the Act or any other law.
We have no hesitation in holding that it is the existence of the aforesaid jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permission to create a limited tenancy which alone is required to be determined by the Controller, if and when, validity of his permission is assailed at a subsequent stage.
This being the scope of his enquiry while granting permission, the scope of enquiry at the subsequent stage cannot be wider.
For this reason any objection to the valid ity of the permission on a ground other than non existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permis sion is untenable and beyond the scope of the Controller 's power to examine validity of his earlier permission before directing restoration of possession to the landlord under section 21 of the Act.
In short, the scope of enquiry before the Controller when validity of the permission granted by him is assailed is to determine: whether, the permission accorded by him earlier was not really to the creation of a genuine tenancy for limited period but to a mere pretence of the landlord for circumventing the provisions of Section 147 If so, such an act being a fraud on the statute, it does not bind the tenant whose consent to the sham transaction is obtained taking advantage of his unequal bargaining power, and he can assail the permission.
It is equally plain that the object of enacting Section 21 to permit creation of tenancies for limited period should not be frustrated by unduly enlarging the scope of that enquiry at the behest of a tenant who having given his free consent to the creation of a genuine limited tenancy thereafter attempts to thwart restoration of possession to the landlord by raising untenable pleas in spite of the clear prohibition made by the words "notwith standing anything contained in Section 14 or in any other law" This delicate balance between the two conflicting interests has to be borne in mind, in order to give true effect to Section 21 and thereby to promote the object of its enactment.
We may now refer to the decisions of this Court.
S.B. Naronah vs Prem Kurnari Khanna, ; is the first decision on the point which deals comprehensively with the scope of Section 21 of the Act.
Krishna lyer, J. speak ing for the Bench said as follows: 307 "Parliament was presumably keen on maximising accommodation available for letting, realising the scarcity crises.
One source of such spare accommodation which is usually shy is poten tially vacant building or part thereof which the landlord is able to let out for a strictly limited period provided he has some credible assurance that when he needs he will get it back . .
The problem is felt most for residential uses.
So the law has to make itself credit worthy.
Section 21 is the answer".
"Section 21 overrides Section 14 precisely because it is otherwise hedged in with drastic limitations and safeguards itself against landlords ' abuses . .
What, then, are those conditions and safe guards? The first condition is that the land lord does not require the demised premises "for a particular period" only . .
The Controller must be satisfied that the landlord means what he says and it is not a case of his not requiring the property indefinitely as distinguished from a specific or particular limited period of say one year, two years or five years.
If a man has a house available for letting for an indefinite period and he so lets it, even if he specifies as a pretence, a period or term in the lease, Section 21 cannot be attracted.
On the other hand, if he gives a special reason why he can let out only for a limited period and requires the building at the end of that period . . it is good compliance.
The second condition is that the letting must be made for a resi dential purpose.
The house must be made over 'as a residence ' ." "The fact that a landlord and a potential tenant together apply, setting out the formal ingredients of Section 21, does not relieve the Controller from being vigilant to inquire and satisfy himself about the requisites of the landlord 's non requirement "for a particu lar period" and the letting itself being 'as a residence '.
A fraud on the statute cannot be permitted . . " "If he makes a mindless order the Court, when challenged 308 at the time of execution, will go into the question as to whether the twin conditions for sanction have really been fulfilled.
Of course, there will be a presumption in favour of the sanction being regular, but it will still be open to a party to make out his case that in fact and in truth the conditions which make for a valid sanction were not present . . " " . . the sanction granted under Section 21, if it has been procured by fraud or collu sion, cannot withstand invalidity because, otherwise, high public policy will be given and hostage to successful collusion . .
Collusion between the strong and the weak cannot confer validity where the mandatory prescriptions of the law are breached or betrayed".
(emphasis supplied) S.B. Naronah 's case has thereafter been consistently followed by this Court and treated as the correct analysis of Section 21.
With respect, we concur and reiterate that the scope of Section 21 is succinctly summarised in the above extracts.
There is nothing in this decision to support the respondent tenant 's contention in this appeal that the scope of enquiry is wider permitting determination of the landlord 's bona fide need of the pemises as if such a ground for eviction specified in Section 14 of the Act has to be proved.
Extending the enquiry to that extent will indeed be against the express prohibition enacted in Section 21 it self.
The next decision in V. section Rahi and Anr.
vs Smt.
Ram Chambeli, ; Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench applied the decision in S.B. Naronah 's case and pointed out that even though the initial presumption was that the permission granted by the Control ler under section 21 of the Act was regular yet the material produced should be examined in order to be satisfied that there has not been any misuse of the said provision by the landlord taking advantage of the helpless situation of the tenant due to house scarcity.
Facts of that case show that the scope of enquiry was limited only to examining existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of permis sion by the Controller.
In Smt.
Dhanwanti vs D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 SCC 1, it was held on the facts of that case that permissions for letting out to the same tenant for limited period obtained more than once after expiry of each said 309 period was by itself not sufficient to establish that the premises was available for being let out for an indefinite period; without showing absence of landlord 's intention to occupy the premises.
Notice was taken of the common knowl edge that it is not possible for a man to plan his future life with any degree of definiteness and changing circum stances may justify such a course.
The principle applied was the same and the ultimate conclusion was reached on the particular facts of that case.
In Inder Mohan Lal vs Ramesh Khanna, ; , it was held that the presumption of validity of the permission given by the Controller was not rebutted by the tenant since there was no evidence to show non existence of any of the essential conditions which enable the permission to be granted.
The earlier decisions of this Court starting with Naronah 's case were referred and the test indicated therein was applied.
In S.K. Lata vs R.C. Chhiba and Another, ; , the permission given by the Controller for creation of tenancy for a limited period was held to be vitiated on the ground of fraud on statute because the permission was ob tained without disclosing that the tenant had already been inducted under an oral lease and was in possession of the premises prior to the application made before the Control ler.
It was, therefore, held applying the same test that an essential condition for grant of sanction under section 21 by the Rent Controller did not exist.
Now the only remaining point is the requirement of notice during enquiry into validity of the Controller 's permission before ordering restoration of possession to the landlord.
A decision of this Court on this point isJ. R. Vohra vs India Export House (P) Ltd. & Anr.
, ; In J.R. Vohra 's case it was reiterated that the condi tions specified for grant of permission by the Controller under section 21 must be 'truely fulfilled and not by way of any make belief before the Controller grants his permission for the creation of such limited tenancy '.
After reiterating this position the Court proceeded to consider the require ment of a notice to the tenant before issuing warrant of possession in favour of landlord.
It was held that the competing claims of the landlord and the tenant can be harmonised not by insisting upon service of a prior notice on the tenant before the issuance of the warrant of posses sion to evict him but by insisting upon his approaching the Rent Controller during the currency of the limited tenancy for adjudication of his pleas no sooner he discovers facts and 310 circumstances that tend to vitiate ab initio the initial grant of permission.
It was observed that there is no reason for the tenant to wait till the landlord makes his applica tion for recovery of possession to raise his plea.
It was further observed that in case the tenant comes to know, aliunde, of the landlord 's application for recovery of possession even without notice to him, he may raise his plea at that stage and the Controller would enquire into the same but in that situation the tenant may run the risk of getting his plea rejected as an after thought.
It was expressly held in this decision that there is no obligation on the part of the Rent Controller to serve a notice on the tenant before issuing the warrant of possession on the landlord 's applica tion made after expiry of the period of limited tenancy for recovery of possession.
It is obvious from the decision in J.R. Vohra 's case that the tenant is expected to raise such a plea during currency of the limited tenancy and on such a plea being raised by the tenant enquiry into it is contemplated.
Even though it is not expressly said in Vohra 's case, it is implicit that on such an application being made by the tenant requiring adjudication by the Controller, it is the Controller 's obligation to issue notice of the same to the landlord and then to make the adjudication with opportunity to both sides to prove their respective contentions.
As for the requirement of notice to the tenant before issuing the warrant of possession in favour of the landlord on his application for recovery of possession on expiry of the limited tenancy, it appears to us also that no notice to the tenant at that stage is either contemplated or expedi ent.
This appears to be the reasonable view which is in accord with the scheme of Section 21.
Obviously notice is to be given of a fact which may otherwise be not known to the notice.
The period of limited tenancy and the date of its expiry are known to the tenant from the very inception.
The tenant is equally aware of his own default in restoring vacant possession of such premises to the landlord on expiry of that period.
It is only these facts, well known to the tenant, which compel the landlord to apply for recovery of possession pursuant to the tenant 's default.
The plea of invalidity, if any, of Controller 's earlier permission must equally be known to the tenant at least by then coupled with his knowledge that unless a declaration is made at his instance that the Controller 's permission is invalid, he must vacate, the limited tenancy having expired.
Why then should a notice to him at that stage be necessary and for what useful purpose? We cannot think of any good reason to require a notice to the tenant at that stage.
The object of enquiring into the validity of the Controller 's permission under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a limited tenancy 311 existed and the same was genuine; and it is not meant to permit raising of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the very object of its enactment.
This view protects the honest tenants and only curbs the frivolous and vexatious pleas.
There is another aspect of the matter.
The Controller 's permission when granted to create a limited tenancy under section 21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless de clared otherwise.
It is, therefore, for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceeding.
Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable.
The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the plea of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance, it is enforceability cannot be doubted.
In Wade 's Administrative Law, 6th Edn.
at pp 35 1 353, there is an illuminating discussion of this topic.
It has been pointed out that 'void ' is meaningless in an absolute sense; and 'unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders '.
In the words of Lord Diplock, "the order would be presumed to be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue".
For the above reasons, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in J.R. Vohra 's case (supra) that there is no obligation on the Controller to issue notice to the tenant of the landlord 's application for recovery of posses sion made on expiry of the period of tenancy for a limited period under section 21 of the Act, but an enquiry on the tenant 's plea has to be made to the extent indicated, if the tenant assails validity of the Controller 's permission even at that stage.
We shall now consider the merits of this case on the basis indicated above.
The High Court has upheld rejection of the landlord 's application for recovery of possession under section 21 of the Act on the ground that the land lord 's son would be about 19 or 20 years old on expiry of three years period of limited lease but he could not be married till he attained the prescribed minimum age of 21 years which showed that the Controller 's order granting permission was mindless and was obtained by fraud.
The permission has, therefore, been held invalid.
In our opin ion, the High Court as well as the authorities below it misconstrued the requirements of Section 21 of the Act.
It is not a case where the landlord did not have a son who was expected to be 312 married some time after three years.
In substance the reason for availability of the accommodation for the limited period of three years only given by the landlord was that the premises was not needed by the landlord till his son got married some time after three years.
The reason was not to be construed as a statement that the son was to be married exactly on the date on which three years expired.
The date of son 's marriage could not be foreseen or estimated with such precision as to coincide with the date of expiry of the limited lease.
All that has to be seen is whether the period of limited tenancy was indicated by the landlord with refer ence to a foreseeable future event and the estimate of time of its occurrence was not unreasonable.
When the period of limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a future event, the happening of which is reasonably certain at that time though the precise date of the future event cannot be pre dicted with precision, the landlord 's estimate of the period after which the event is expected to happen, unless unrea sonable must be accepted for this purpose as genuine.
This would satisfy the test of a genuine limited tenancy if there be no other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence adopted by the landlord.
This test is fully satisfied in the present case.
Merely because the son 's age then was about one year below the prescribed minimum age for marriage the estimate of landlord that he would not need the premises for three years only till his son 's marriage cannot be treated as a pretence.
One year 's period for settling and arranging performance of the marriage is nothing unusual since exist ence of the basic facts is undisputed.
Existence of this jurisdictional fact to justify the permission has not been negatived and no material has been produced by the tenant to substantiate his plea.
The other ground taken by the respondent tenant is that the existing accommodation available with the landlord is sufficient for the needs of his family.
It is sufficient to state that the enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this behalf is not the same as that for determining existence of the ground of bona fide need of the landlord for an order of eviction under section 14 of the Act, and Section 14 is expressly superceded by Section 21.
This question is, there fore, beyond the scope of the present enquiry.
The respondent tenant also contended that the premises was constructed in 1972 and the landlord had never occupied this premises viz., the second floor of the building for his personal use and had even let out the first floor prior to 1980.
In the present case the respondenttenant did not produce any material to prove letting out of any part of the building much less this premises i.e. second floor of the building.
313 After the arguments were concluded before us and the judg ment was reserved, the respondent has filed an application under order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 15 1 C.P.C. for admitting additional evidence to show letting out of the second floor of the building.
It has been stated that the evidence could not be produced in the Courts below since the objections were not listed for investigation by the Courts.
No cogent ground is shown to permit any additional evidence when no attempt to produce any evidence was made in any of the Courts below upto the High Court or even here till conclusion of the hearing before us.
The application is rejected.
The lease for limited period of three years ex pired in 1983 and more than six years have been spent since then in this litigation at the stage of recovery of posses sion.
The facts of the case indicate that the respondent 's plea is a clear after thought and is baseless.
The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having been proved by the respondent tenant even after objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy there was no ground to refuse restoration of possession to the landlord.
More than twice the period of the limited lease has expired even after the date of expiry of the lease.
We see no reason to delay any more the relief due to the landlord.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
The impugned orders passed by the Rent Controller, Rent Control Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the landlord 's application for recovery of possession is allowed.
The respondent tenant shall also pay Rs.2,000 as costs to the appellant landlord in addition to an amount equal to that calculated on the basis of the monthly rent for the entire period till the date of restoration of possession.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
This is a land lord 's appeal.
By an agreement in writing between the parties, the second floor of the premises bear ing No. 19/10, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi was let out to the Respondent for a limited period of three years w.e.f.
June 8, 1980, with the permission of the Rent Controller obtained under section 21 of the Act.
The Respondent tenat having failed to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question, after the expiry of the stipulated period, the appellant moved an application before the Rent Controller for execution of his order by delivery of possession of the premises to him.
The Respondent tenant filed an objection to the said application to which the appellant replied duly.
The Rent Controller rejected the appellant 's application taking the view that the permission granted under section 21 of the Act was invalid and thus the tenant could not be evicted on the expiry of 3 years.
The Rent Controller there by upheld the tenant 's objection that the landlord 's son being aged only 19 or 20 years, on the date of the expiry of the period of limited tenancy while the minimum age pre scribed by law for marriage being 21 years the ground that the premises were needed for the son 's marriage was not tenable.
The Rent Controller accordingly held that creation of limited tenancy amounted to fraud and misrepresantation by the landlord which rendered the permission invalid.
The appellant 's appeal to the Tribunal as also to the High Court having failed, he has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
The Tribunal and the High Court affirmed the view of the Rent Controller treating the grant of permission by the Controller to be mechanical and without application of mind.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: The object of enquiring into the validity of the Control 300 ler 's permission under section 21 is only to ensure that essentials of a limited tenancy existed and the same was genuine; and it is not meant to permit raising of frivolous pleas which would frustrate the very object of its enact ment.
This view protects the honest tenants and only curbs the frivolous and vexatious pleas.
[310H; 311A] Controller 's permission when granted to create a limited tenancy under sec.
21 of the Act is presumed to be valid unless declared otherwise.
It is, therefore, for the person assailing its validity to get such a declaration from a proper forum in a proper proceedings.
Unless this is done, the order remains enforceable.
The duty is clearly on the tenant himself to raise the pleas of invalidity and unless the order is declared invalid at his instance, its enforce ability cannot be doubted.
[31lB C] All that has to be seen is whether the period of limited tenancy was indicated by the landlord with reference to a foreseeable future event and the estimate of time of its occurrence was not unreasonable.
[312B] When the period of limited tenancy is stated on the basis of a future event the happening of which is reasonably certain at that time though the precise date of the future event cannot be predicted with precision, the landlord 's estimate of the period after which the event is expected to happen, unless unreasonable must be accepted for this pur pose as genuine.
This would satisfy the test of a genuine limited tenancy if there be no other factor indicating it to be a mere pretence adopted by the landlord.
[312C D] The enquiry contemplated under section 21 in this behalf is not the same as that for determining existence of ground of bona fide need of the landlord for an order of eviction under section 14 of the Act, and section 14 is expressly superseded by section 21.
The scope of enquiry is limited only to the existence of the jurisdictional facts at the time of grant of the permission when its validity is chal lenged subsequently.
[312F] The absence of existence of any jurisdictional fact not having been proved by the respondent tenant even after objecting to recovery of possession on expiry of the period of limited tenancy, there was no ground to refuse restora tion of possession to the landlord.
[313C] S.B. Naronah vs Prem Kumari Khanna, ; ; V.S. Rahi & Anr.
vs Smt.
Ram Chambeli, ; ; Smt.
Dhanwanti vs D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 SCC 1; Inder Mohan Lal vs 301 Ramesh Khanna; , ; S.K. Lata vs R.C. Chhiba & Anr,, ; and J.R. Vohra vs India Export Hlouse (P) Ltd. & Anr.
, ; , referred to.


judgement:
s the event of redemption happened.
The doc trine of id certum est quod certum reddi potest is clearly applicable to the case.
[290D E] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4754 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.5.1989 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No 450 of 1988.
V.M. Tarkunde, B.L. Kachhawan and Badridas Sharma for the Appelant.
Aruneshwar Gupta and section Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
Special leave is granted.
This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the re spondent against her brother, the appellant, for specific performance of an alleged contract of sale dated 23.6.1965 in respect of a house.
The property was under a mortgage and according to the plaintiff 's case, the defendant had agreed to execute a deed of sale on the redemption of the mort 289 gage by her, which she did in 1970.
In spite of her repeated demands the defendant failed to respect the agreement which necessitated the institution of the suit.
The defendant appellant, besides pleading limitation, denied the agreement as also the plaintiff 's allegation that she had redeemed the mortgage.
The question of limitation was taken up by the trial court as a preliminary issue and decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The order has been confirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
The plaintiff served a notice in July 1984 demanding specific performance before filing the suit.
It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that since the alleged agreement is said to have been executed in June 1965, the suit is barred by limitation, and alternatively, even count ing the period of limitation from the alleged redemption in 1970, the suit has been filed after more than 14 years, that is, long after the expiry of three years ' period prescribed under Article 54 of the of 1963.
The High Court has rejected the argument holding that since the cause of action of the suit was dependent on the redemption of the mortgage and no period was fixed within which it was neces sary for the respondent to have redeemed the mortgage, it cannot be said that a date was 'fixed ' within the meaning of the third column of Article 54, which reads thus: Description period of Time from which of suit limitation period begins to run "54.
For specific three years The date fixed for the per performance.
formance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
" As the notice preceding the suit was admittedly served within three years, the defendant 's plea of limitation was rejected.
The relevant provisions in the alleged agreement of sale as quoted in the judgment of the trial court reads as follows: 290 "This house is under mortgage with Jethmal Bastimal for Rs. 1000.
When you will get this house, the description of which is given below, redeemed from M/s Jeth Mat Bastimal and take the papers of the registry in your pos session, on that day I will have the sale deed of the said house, written, executed and registered in your favour." (emphasis supplied The question is whether a date was 'fixed ' for the perform ance of the agreement and in our view the answer is in the affirmative.
It is true that a particular date from the calander was not mentioned in the document and the date was not ascertainable originally, but as soon as the plaintiff redeemed the mortgage, it became an ascertained date.
If the plaintiff had, immediately after the redemption, flied the suit, could it be thrown out on the ground that she was not entitled to the specific performance asked for? We do not think so.
She would have been within her rights to assert that she had performed her part of the contract and was entitled to insist that her brother should complete his part.
The agreement is a typical illustration of a contin gent contract within the meaning of section 31 of the and became enforceable as soon as the event of redemption (by the plaintiff hereself) happened.
We agree with the view of the Madras High Court in R. Muniswami Goundar and Another vs
B.M. Shamanna Gouda and Others, expressed in slightly different circum stances.
The doctrine of id certurn est quod certum reddi potest is clearly applicable to the case before us which in the language of Herbert Broom (in his book dealing with legal maxims) is that certainty need not be ascertained at the time; for if, in the fluxion of time, a day will arrive which will make it certain, that is sufficient.
A similar question had arisen in Duncombe vs The Brighton Club and Norfolk Hotel Company, , relied upon in the Madras case.
Under an agreement, the plaintiff had supplied some furniture to the defendant for which payment was made but after .some delay.
He claimed interest.
The rule at Common Law did not allow interest in such a case, and the plaintiff in support of his claim relied upon a statutory provision which could come to his aid only if the price was payable at a certain time.
Blackburn, J. observed that he did not have the slightest hasitation in saying that the agreement contemplated a particular day, which, when the goods were delivered would be ascertained, and then the money would be payable at a certain time; but rejected the plaintiff 's demand on the ground that the price did not become payable by the written instrument at a certain time.
The other learned Judges did not agree with him, and held that the statute did 291 not require that the document should specify the time of payment by mentioning the day of payment.
If it specified the event upon which the payment was to be made, and if the time of event was capable of being ascertained, the require ments of the section were satisfied.
The same is the posi tion in the case before us.
The requirement of Article 54 is not that the actual day should necessarily be ascertained upon the face of the deed, but that the basis of the calcu lation which was to make it certain should be found therein.
We, accordingly, hold that under the agreement the date for the defendant to execute the sale deed was fixed, although not by mentioning a certain date but by a reference to the happening of a certain event, namely, the redemption of the mortgage; and, immediately after the redemption by the plaintiff, the defendant became liable to execute the sale deed which the plaintiff was entitled to enforce.
The period of limitation thus started running on that date.
The case is, therefore, covered by the first part of Article 54 (third column) and not the second part.
The learned counsel for the respondent relied on several decisions in support of the opinion of the High Court in the impugned judgment but they do not appear to help him.
In Sathula Venkanna vs Namuduri Venkatakrishnayya and Another, , it was observed that in cases where a right to enforce specific performance vests in a third party to whom the ascertainment of the date on which performance becomes due need not necessarily be known, the doctrine certum est quod certum reddi potest does not apply.
Without expressing their final opinion the learned Judges observed that it might be right to apply the doctrine be tween the actual parties to the contract who would get the benefit and be subject to the liabilities under that con tract; "but in cases where a person is entitled to bring a suit on the contract who may not and need not, and very likely may not be aware of the date becoming fixed", the doctrine could not apply.
In Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao vs Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao, AIR 1944 Madras 2 18, the vendor promised to execute the sale deed when both of his brothers, who were studying elsewhere, returned to the village.
It was held that it was not a case where it could be said that a date was fixed for the performance of the contract as the event mentioned therein was too indefinite to be regarded as fixing a date.
The performance was dependant on both the brothers of the vendor coming to the village, in which the intending purchaser had no say at all.
Apart from the ques tion of limitation, the defendant could not effectively rely upon such a clause to defeat the very contract.
In Kashi Prasad vs Chhabi Lal and Others, AIR 1933 Allahabad 410(2), the plaintiff created two usufructuary mortgages and there after a third mortgage in 292 favour of the defendants for a sum of Rs.8,500.
Out of this sum an amount of Rs.6,000 was left with the mortgagees for payment to the earlier creditors.
The suit was instituted on the allegation that the defendants had failed to redeem the earlier mortgages.
The plaintiff prayed for a direction to the defendants to redeem the mortgages.
The document did not indicate as to the time when the defendants were obliged to redeem the earlier mortgages, and a plea of limitation was taken on the ground that the date was fixed by necessary implication and could be ascertained by reference to the surrounding circumstances.
In this background the court observed that the use of the word 'fixed ' implies that it should be fixed definitely and should not be left to be gathered from surrounding circumstances of the case.
All these cases are clearly distinguishable.
For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned judg ments of the High Court and the trial court are set aside and the suit is dismissed.
The appeal is accordingly al lowed, but the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The period of limitation of three years for specific performance of a contract begins to run under the third column of Article 54 of the from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
Under an agreement dated June 23, 1965 the plaintiff respondent, sister of the defendant appellant, undertook to redeem the disputed property under mortgage and the appel lant agreed to execute the sale deed of the said property in her favour on the date she took papers of the registry in her possession.
She redeemed the property in 1970.
The appellant, however, failed to respect the agreement in spite of repeated demands.
The respondent served a notice in July 1984 demanding specific performance before filing the suit.
The appellant pleaded limitation.
The trial court decided the issue in favour of the respondent.
That order was confirmed by the High Court on the view that since the cause of action of the suit was dependent on the redemption of the mortgage and no period was fixed within which it was necessary for the respondent to have redeemed the mortgage, it could not be said that a date was ' 'fixed" within the meaning of the third column of Article 54.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, HELD: 1.1 The requirement of Article 54 of the Limita tion Act, 1963 is not that the actual day should necessarily be ascertained upon the face of the deed, but that the basis of the calculation which was to make it certain should be found therein.
[291A B] 1.2 In the instant case, under the agreement the date for the appellant to execute the sale deed was fixed, al though not by mentioning 288 a certain date but by a reference to the happening of a certain event, namely, the redemption of the mortgage; and, immediately after the redemption by the respondent, the appellant became liable to execute the sale deed which the respondent was entitled to enforce.
The period of limitation thus started running on that date.
The case, is, therefore, covered by the first part of Article 54 (third column) and not the second part.
[291B C] R. Muniswami Goundar & Anr.
B.M. Shamanna Gouda & Ors., and Duncombe vs The Brighton Club Sathula Venkanna vs Namuduri Venkatakrishnayya & Anr., ; Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao vs Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao, AIR 1944 Madras 218 and Kashi Prasad vs Chhabi Lal & Ors '., AIR 1933 Allahabad 410 (2) distin guished 2.
The agreement in the instant case is a typical illustration of a contingent contract within the meaning of section 31 of the


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4802 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1987 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 24 of 1986.
Anil Dev Singh, C. Ramesh, C.V.S. Rao and P. Parmeshwa ran for the Appellants.
S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda and S.M. Satin for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETrY, J.
Special Leave granted.
This case raises yet another variant of a vexed ques tion.
Does Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (as amended by Act 68 of 1984) providing for higher solatium proprio rigore apply to award made subsequent to 24 Septem ber 1984 even though the acquisition commenced prior to the said date.
The appeal also raises another important question as to the applicability of section 23(IA) providing addi tional amount of compensation to award made in such acquisi tion proceedings.
The facts are not in dispute and may be stated as follows: By notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the 'Act ') published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the respondent for estab lishing Naval Air Station Dabolim.
On 23 February 1968, notification under section 6 was published in the Gazette.
On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining compensation at the rate of 40 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent.
The claimant had sought reference under section 18 of the Act and reference was duly made to the Civil Court (District Judge).
On 339 28th May 1985, the Court after investigation of the claim awarded compensation at Rs.3 per square meter.
The Court also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment of compensation.
Not being satisfied, the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of compensation and also solatium at 30 per cent.
This claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984.
The High Court accepted the appeal and granted the reliefs in the following terms: "The impugned award dated 28th May, 1986, is modified.
The appellant is entitled to the added benefits.
In that he shall be entitled to have the compensation at the rate of 12% of the market value from the date of section 4 notification till the date of possession or the date of award, whichever is earlier.
The appellant is further entitled to interest at the rate of 9% for the first year from the date of taking over possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till the date of deposit or payment as the case may be.
The appellant shall be entitled to further 15 per cent solatium in addition to the 15 per cent already granted to him.
To the extent indicat ed above, the award shall stand modified.
" The High Court has thus granted three more reliefs to the claimant: (i) Additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent of the market value from the date of notification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession; (ii) interest at the rare of 9% for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subsequent years; and (iii) solatium at 30 per cent on the market value.
There is no grievance made in this appeal as to the second of the reliefs granted to the claimant.
The claimant is entitled to the interest under section 28 of the Act.
The challenge is only against the first and the third of the said reliefs.
They were evidently given under the amended sections 23(IA) and 23(2) of the Act.
We will first take up the question of solatium.
On 30 April 1982, the corresponding Bill of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, namely, Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 1982, was introduced in Parliament.
On 24th September 1984 it became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 68 of 1984, when it received assent of the President.
Before the amend ment, Section 23(2) provided solatium at 15 340 per cent on the market value.
After amendment by Act 68 of 1984 solatium was raised to 30 per cent on the market val ued.
Section 23(2) now reads: "23(2) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of (thirty per centum) on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition." The question herein is whether the higher solatium is attracted to the present case.
Section 23(2) has been given limited retrospectivity by supplying transitional provisions under section 30(2).
Section 30(2) reads: "30.
Transitional provisions: (1) xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (2) The provisions of sub section (2) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the princi pal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1984, in the House of the People) and before the commence ment of this Act." The scope of retrospective operation of Section 23(2) was first explained in Kamalajammaniavaru vs Special Land Acquisition Officer, A two Judge Bench held that the award of 30 per cent solatium will apply only where the award appealed against was made by the Collector of Court during the period between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984.
This decision was rendered on 14 February 1985.
Shortly thereafter there was another decision by a three Judge Bench in Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chand igarh; , There a contrary view was ex pressed.
It was held that even if an award is made by the Collector or Court on or before 30 April, 1982, and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30 April 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, 30 per cent solatium under section 23(2) should be 341 allowed.
In taking that view, Bhag Singh overruled Kamala jammannavaru and approved of the opinion expressed in anoth er three Judge Bench in State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh, But the recent Constitution Bench in Union of India vs Raghubir Singh, ; has overruled Bhag Singh and Mohinder Singh and reiterated the view ex pressed in Kamalajammanaivaru.
Pathak, CJ., speaking for the Court in Raghubir Singh case rounded off his discussion thus (at 782): "We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates.
The word 'or ' is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under section 30(2) is sought to be extended.
If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates.
If the pro ceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of section 30(2) will be applied.
But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984." In stating thus, the decision has set at rest the con troversy as to entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending Act.
Section 23(2) was held to apply to awards made in between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984.
Obviously they must be awards in acquisition commenced prior to the said dates.
The award may be of the Collector or Court.
One or the other must receive thirty per cent solatium on the market value of the land.
More important, that the higher solatium could also be given by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeals against such award.
But these decisions do not solve the problem presented here.
The award with which we are concerned does not fall within the interregnum i.e. between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984.
To repeat the facts: The acquisition com menced on 26 October 1967 when the notification under sec tion 4(1) of the Act was published.
On 5 March 342 1969 the Collector made the award and on 28 May 1985 the reference court made the award.
Both the awards, thus appar ently fall outside the period prescribed under section 30(2).
Counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid facts rules out the applicability of section 30(2) in the first place.
Secondly, he also ruled out the applicability of section 23(2).
The first contention was based on the plain terms of Section 30(2) and the second on the ground that section 23(2) with its isolated splendour is not retrospective in operation.
He thus submitted that the claimant 's case could not be saved for higher solatium either under Transitional Provisions or by amended Section 23(2) of the Act and it was gone both ways.
This submission reminds us of the words of Shakespeare in the Merchant of Venice, where Luncelot tells Jessica: "Truely then I fear you are damned both by father and mother.
When I shun scylla your father, I fail into charybdis your mother.
Well, you are gone both ways." (The Merchant of Venice 3.5).
The submission that Section 23(2) by itself has no retrospective operation seems to be justified.
It is signif icant to note that section 23(2) forms part of a scheme of determining compensation for land acquired under the Act.
It provides 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acqui sition.
It thus operates on the market value of the land acquired.
The market value of the land is required to be determined at the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1).
It cannot be determined with reference to any other date.
That has been expressly provided for under section 23(1) of the Act.
In the instant case, section 4(1) notification was published on 20 October 1967.
The Amending Act 68 of 1984 came into force on 24 September 1984.
The amended section 23(2) by itself is not retrospec tive in operation.
It can not proprio vigore apply to awards in respect of acquisition proceedings commenced prior to 24 September 1984.
If, therefore, section 30(2) does not cover the present case, then amended Section 23(2) has no part to play.
This in effect is the result of the plain meaning rule of interpreting Section 30(2) of the Amending Act 68 of 1984.
But then, it would seem very odd indeed and anomalous too to exclude the present case from the operation of sec tion 30(2).
Section 30(2) is the Transitional 343 Provisions.
The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provi sions in any Act or amendment is to clarify as to when and how the operative parts of the enactments are to take ef fect.
The Transitional Provisions generally are intended to take care of the events during the period of transition.
Mr. Francis Bennion in his book on Statutory Interpretation (14 Edition, p. 442) outlines the purpose of such provisions: "189.
Transitional Provisions Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enactments, it commonly also in cludes transitional provisions which regulates the coming into operation of those enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition.
Where an Act fails to include such provisions expressly, the Court is required to draw such inferences as to the intended tran sitional arrangements as, in the light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parlia ment to have intended.
" The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended.
This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question.
That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose.
A statute is neither a literary text nor a devine revelation "Words are certainly not crystals, trans parent and unchanged" as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned.
(Town vs Eisher; , , 425, 1918).
Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said.
"Stat utes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. vs Yensavage, 2 at 553.) Section 30(2) provides that amended provisions of Sec tion 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the collector or Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984, or to an appellate order therefrom passed by the High Court or Supreme Court.
The purpose of these provisions seems to be that the awards made in that interregnum must get higher solatium in as much as to awards made subsequent to 24 September 1984.
Perhaps it was thought that awards made after the commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984 would be taken care of by the amended Section 23(2).
The case like the present one seems to have escaped attention by innocent lack of due care in the drafting.
344 The result would be an obvious anomaly as will be indicated presently.
If there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the Court could shape the law to remove the anomaly.
If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurd ity or inconsistency, the Court could discard such interpre tation and adopt an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of the legislature.
That could be done, if necessary even by modification of the language used.
[See: Mahadeolal Kanodia vs The Administrator General of West Bengal, The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the Court decide.
They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific cases.
If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legis lature but not within the literal meaning of the statute, then the court must strike the balance.
The criticism that the literal interpretation of Section 30(2), if adhered to would lead to unjust result seems to be justified.
Take for example; two acquisition proceedings of two adjacent pieces of land, required for the same public purpose.
Let us say that they were initiated on the same day a day sometime prior to 30 April 1982.
In one of them the award of the Collector is made on 23 September 1984 and in the other on 25 September 1984.
Under the terms of Sec tion 30(2) the benefit of higher solatium is available to the first award and not to the second.
Take another example; the proceedings of acquisition initiated, say, in the year 1960 in which award was made on 1 May 1982.
Then the amended Section 23(2) shall apply and higher solatium is entitled.
But in an acquisition initiated on 23 September 1984, and award made in the year 1989 the higher solatium is ruled out.
This is the intrinsic illogicality if the award made after 24 September 1984, is not given higher solatium.
Such a construction of Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided.
We, therefore, hold that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the present case.
This would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the pur pose of Section 30(2).
In this view of the matter, the higher solutium allowed by the High Court is kept undis turbed.
This takes us to the second question which we have formulated at the beginning of the judgment: Whether the claimant is entitled to additional amount of compensation provided under Section 23(IA) of the Act? This is equally a fundamental question and seemingly not covered by any of the previous decisions of this Court.
345 Section 23(IA) reads as follows: "In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notifica tion under Section 4, sub section (!), in respect of such land to the date of award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation: In computing the period referred to in this sub section any period or periods during which the proceedings for the aquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.
" The objective words used in this sub section are similar to those that are used in Section 23(2).
It enjoins a duty on the Court to award the additional amount at twelve per cent on the market value of the land for the period prescribed thereunder.
But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act.
It also operates on the market value of the land acquired.
It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the date of publica tion of notification under section 4(1).
But the legislature has given new starting point for operation of section 23(IA) for certain cases.
That will be found from Section 30 sub section l(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions.
They read as follows: Section 30: Transitional Provisions: (1) The provision of sub section (IA) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted clause (a) of section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to: (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April 1982 the date of intro duction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill 1982 [in the House of the People] in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date.
346 (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.
" Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30 April 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date.
Section 30 sub section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(IA) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30 April 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date.
If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded.
Section 30 sub section (1)(b) provides that section 23(l A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30 April 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before 24 September 1984.
The final point to note is that Section 30 sub section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in section 30 sub section (2).
In the case before us, on 26 October 1967, the notifica tion under section 4 was issued.
On 5 March 1969 the Collec tor made the award.
The result is that on 30 April 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector.
Therefore, section 30 sub section (1)(a) is not attracted to the case.
Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30 April 1982, section 30 sub section (1)(b) is also not applicable to the case.
Here, the case is really gone by both ways.
It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis.
The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23( I A).
Before we part with the case, it is important that we should refer to two authorities of the High Courts which have taken contrary view.
As to the applicability of Section 23(IA) to pending cases, the Karnataka High Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Dandeli vs Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179 at 183 (FB) has expressed the view that for giving an addi tional amount calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the market value of the land, no distinction could be made respecting lands acquired before or after the coming into force of the Amending Act.
In all pending cases whether on reference or on appeal, the Court is required to apply the provisions of Section '23(1A) in determining compensa tion payable to claimants.
For this conclusion the Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in 347 Bhag Singh case.
The Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai etc.
vs Government of Goa, Daman and Diu and Ant., AIR 1987 Bom 214 at 217 (FB) has also accepted a similar line of reasoning.
In fact the reasons are so much similar, the cases look like twins.
Both the High Courts have focussed attention on the terms and phraseology used in Section 30 sub section (1) namely," . . shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation has also been proceedings for acquisition . . ".
The conclusion has also been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23(lA).
It was said that it enjoins a duty on the court to award the amount in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not be ignored.
The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh appears to be the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the conclusion.
But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology used in Section 30 sub section (1) is quite similar to that used in Section 30 sub section (2).
The scope of those words has already been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since Bhag Singh has been overruled in Raghubir Singh.
The view taken by the High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay therefore, could no longer be cosidered as good law and the said decisions are accordingly overruled.
In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
The judg ment of the High Court is modified and the compensation award under Section 23(IA) is deleted.
The judgment and decree in other respects are kept undisturbed. ' In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
By a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and published in the Government Gazette on 26.10.1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land of the Respondent on 23.2.1968.
A notifica tion under section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette and on 5.3.1969.
The Land Acquisition Officer declared award, determining compensation at the rate of 4 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent.
At the instance of the respondent claimant, a reference under section 18 of the Act was made to the Distt.
judge on May 28, 1985.
The Civil Court awarded compensation at Rs.3 per square meter and also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession of the land by the State till payment of compensation.
Being dissatisfied, the Respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking enhancement both of compensation and solatium at the rate of 30 per cent.
The High Court allowed the appeal, and granted three reliefs viz; (1) Additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent of the market value from the date of the notification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession; (2) interest at the rate of 9 percent for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subse quent.
years and (3) Solatium at 30 per cent on the market value.
The appellant has thus filed the instant appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
There is no grievance as regards the interest awarded.
The challenge relates to the grant of enhanced solatium and the additional amount of compensation.
Appellants ' conten tion is that sections 30(2) and 23(2) are not at all at tracted and the claim of the Respondent on the said two counts is not sustainable.
337 Partly allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: Section 30(2) provides that the amended provisions of section 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court between 30th April 1982 and 24th Septem ber 1984, or to an appellate order therefrom passed by the High Court or Supreme Court.
The purpose of these provisions seems to be that the awards made in that interregnum must get higher solatium in as much as to awards made subsequent thereto.
[343G H] If there is obvious anamoly in the application of law, the Court could shape the law to remove the anamoly.
The Legislatures do not always deal with specific controversies which the Court decide.
They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the Courts to decide specific cases.
If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the liter al meaning of the statute, then the Court must strike the balance.
So construing the Court held that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the present case.
[344A C] In the instant case, on October 26, 1967, the notifica tion under section 4 was issued.
On March 5, 1969, the Collector made the award.
The result is that on April 30, 1982 there was no proceeding pending before the Collector.
Therefore Section 30, sub section (1)(a) is not attracted to the case.
Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30th April 1982 Section 30, sub section (1)(b) is also not applicable to the case.
The case is therefore really gone by both ways.
The claimant is therefore not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(IA).
[346E F] The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provisions in any Act or amendment is to clarify as to when and how the operative parts of the enactments are to take effect.
The transitional provisions generally are intended to take care of the events during the period of transition.
[343A] Kamalajammaniavaru vs Special Land Acquisition Offi cer, ; Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandigarh, ; ; State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh, ; Union of India vs Raghubir Singh, ; ; Towne vs Eisher, ; ,425, 1918; Lenigh Valley Coal Co. vs Yensavage, at 553; Mahadeolal Kanodia vs The Administrator General of West Bengal, ; , referred to.
338 Special Land Acauisition Officer, Dandeli vs Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179 at 183 (FB); Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai etc.
vs Government of Goa Daman & Diu & Anr.
, AIR 1987 Bom.
214 at 217 (FB), overruled.