judgement:
Appeal No. 2383 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.4.1988 of the Hima chal Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 29 of 1988.
N.S. Hegde and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant.
469 Ms. Asha Jain Madan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M. SAHAI, J.
The short but interesting question of law that arises or consideration in this appeal, directed against judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, is if possession given to competent authority under Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972 (for brevity 'Requisition Act ') is vacation of premises without sufficient cause within second proviso to sub section (3) of Section 14 of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 deemed to have come into force with effect from 17th November 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ').
Sub section (3) of Section 14 is extracted below: "(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession (a) in the case of a residential building, if (i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another residential building owned by him, in the urban area concerned: Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without suffi cient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area;" It enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own occupa tion and he has no other building in the area concerned.
This right however stands deferred under second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a build ing in his use without sufficient cause.
The question is how the expression he has not vacated such building without sufficient cause ' in the second proviso should be construed.
It has two aspects one whether the proviso applies to volun tary vacation only or it extends to vacating under pressure of legal proceedings such as requisition order by competent Authority.
Second even assuming that the expression 'vacate such building ' is given wide interpretation does giving up possession in consequence of a requisition order amounts to vacation without sufficient cause? Vacate, normally, means to go away, to leave.
The setting or context in which the word has been used does not indicate ,my different meaning.
Nor it is 470 necessary to decide if it applies to voluntary vacation only as it was urged that even assuming that giving up possession in pursuance of requisition order is included in the proviso can it be said to be without sufficient cause Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes.
It has been construed liberally in keeping with its ordi nary dictionary meaning of adequate or enough.
That is any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be under stood as sufficient.
cause.
For instance economic difficulty in financial stringency or family reasons may compel a land lord to let out building in his occupation.
So long it is found to be genuine and bona fide and would amount to vacat ing a building for sufficient cause.
And the bar of second proviso stands lifted.
In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pretence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of landlord to approach the controller for necessary direction to tenant to hand over possession to him.
Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance of an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as, 'not without sufficient cause '.
A landlord has no option.
He is required to vacate under constraint of law.
Therefore the statutory restriction created by second proviso would not apply in such a case.
Does it make any difference in law or the action of the landlord is rendered without sufficient cause as he did not file any objection in requisition proceedings either under mistaken advice or ignorance of law? For this it is necessary to narrate facts in brief.
The appellant is owner of Kennilworth house/Simla and its annexure He was in occupation of first floor of Kennilworth house.
Second floor was let out to the District Judge, who, later was elevated to the Bench.
For his occupa tion the entire house was requisitioned.
The appellant did not file any objection.
After vacating, the building he applied for eviction to respondent from the annexe.
His application was rejected as it would found to be in teeth of the second proviso.
It was held that the order of requisi tion was passed because the appellant did not show any cause be filing any objection under sub section (2) of Section 3 of the Requisition Act even though proviso to the sub sec tion precluded any property or part from being requisitioned if it was in bonafide use by the owner.
The explanation of the appellant that he was advised by his lawyer not to file an objection as the building was required for a High Court judge, was not accepted.
Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could not adversely reflect on sufficiency of cause under Rent Control Act.
Reason for either arises in different circumstances.
Vacating a building, even under an incorrect order passed by a competent authority under Requis 471 tion Act would be for sufficient reason.
The Rent Control authorities could not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act.
Therefore it could not be a valid consider ation for holding that the building was vacated without sufficient cause.
The courts below thus committed an error of law in applying second proviso to reject the application filed on behalf of the appellant.
Even the finding on requirement of the appellant to occupy the building is not well founded.
The inference drawn by the two courts below that the appellant being a rich man would not occupy the annexe or that he would use it occa sionally is not well founded.
It being undisputed that the appellant has no other building in the urban area and it having been found that he vacated the other building for sufficient reason there was no fetter on the right of appel lant to seek eviction of the tenant.
In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The orders of all the courts below are set aside.
The applica tion of appellant shall stand allowed.
He shall approach the Rent Control authorities for appropriate directions.
Parties shall bear their own costs.
T.N.A Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
"Vacation " "Sufficient Cause" Meaning of.
Section 14(3) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act 1987 enables a landlord to obtain an order for eviction of the tenant if he requires the building for his own occu pation and he has no other building in the area concerned.
This right however stands deferred under second proviso for a period of five years if the landlord has vacated a build ing in use without sufficient cause.
The appellant, an owner of a house, was in occupation of first floor of the house, while the second floor was let out to a Judge.
His entire house is requisitioned for occupation of a Judge.
The appellant did not file any objection under section 3(2) of the Requisition Act.
However, after vacating the building he applied for eviction of respondent.
The Courts in view rejected his application by applying the second proviso to section 14(3) of the Himachal Rent Control Act.
468 Allowing the Landlord 's appeal and setting aside the order of Courts below, this Court, HELD: 1. 'Sufficient cause ' is an expression which is found in various statutes.
It has been construed liberally in keeping with its ordinary dictionary meaning as adequate or enough.
That is any justifiable reason resulting in vacation has to be understood as sufficient cause.
For instance economic difficulty or financial stringency or family reasons may compel a landlord to let out a building in his occupation.
So long it is found to be genuine and bona fide it would amount to vacating a building for suffi cient cause.
And the bar of second proviso stands lifted In other words if the vacation of the building was not a pre tence or pretext the proviso could not frustrate the right of landlord to approach the controller for necessary direc tion to tenant to hand over possession to him.
[470 B C] 1.1 Vacation of a building by landlord in pursuance of an order of requisition by the competent authority could not be characterised as 'not without sufficient cause '.
A land lord has no option.
He is required to vacate under con straint of law.
Therefore the statutory restriction created by second proviso would not apply in such a case.
[470 D] 2.
Validity or invalidity of an order under Requisition Act could not adversely reflect on sufficiency of cause under Rent Control Act.
Reason for either arises in differ ent circumstances.
Vacating a building, even under an incor rect order passed by a competent authority under Requisition Act would be for sufficient reason.
The Rent Control author ities could not examine merit of the order under Requisition Act Therefore it could not be a valid consideration for holding that the building was vacated without sufficient cause.
The courts below thus committed an error of law in applying second proviso to reject the application filed on behalf of the appellant.
[470 H, 471 A B]


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 4289 of F 1991 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.1989 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2635 of 1989.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Krishnamurthy lyer, Bishamber Lal Khanna, H.K. Puri, Ms. Geetanjali Mohan, Ms. A.K. Verma, P.R. Ramasesh, MahabirSingh, R. Mohan and Ayyam Perumal for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by V. RAMASWAMI, J.
Leave granted in all Special Leave Peti tions.
526 In this batch of civil appeals, writ petition and trans ferred case, a common question of law arises as to whether the industries which manufacture sugar from sugar cane are covered by Entry 15 of Schedule I to the (Central Act 36 of 1977) (hereinafter called the 'Cess Act ').
Originally the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollu tion Act), 1974 (hereinafter called the Act) was enacted by the Parliament under Article 252 of the Constitution with a view to control the pollution of rivers and streams which has assumed considerable importance and urgency in recent years as a result of increasing industrialisation and urban isation.
The Act is intended to ensure that the domestic and industrial affluence are not allowed to be discharged into water coarses without adequate treatment.
This Act is now in force in almost all States and in all Union Territories.
The Act provides for the constitution of a Central Board by the Central Government and State Boards by the State Governments concerned for the prevention and control of water pollution.
There are also certain provisions relating to constitution of joint boards the details of which need not detain us.
The Act sets out in detail the functions and powers of these Boards.
Chapter VI of the Act requires the Central Govern ment and the State Governments to provide funds to the Central Board and the State Boards respectively for imple menting the provisions of the Act.
The Cess Act 36 of 1977 provides for levy of cess on water consumed by persons carrying on certain industries and by the local authorities with a view to augment the resources of the Central Board and the State Boards constituted for the prevention and control of water pollution.
Section 3 of the Cess Act which may be termed as the charging section states that "there shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the and utilisation thereunder".
The cess is payable by every person carrying on any specified industry and every local authority and is calculated on the basis of water consumed by such person or local authority as the case may be for any of the purposes specified in column I of Schedule II to the Act, at such rate not exceeding the rates specified in the corre sponding Entry in column II thereof as the Central Govern ment may by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time, specify.
"Specified industry" is defined in the Act as meaning any industry specified in Schedule I.
There are 15 entries in Schedule I and they read as follows: SCHEDULE I (See Section 2(c)) 1.
Ferrous metallurgical industry.
527 2.
Non ferrous metallurgical industry.
Mining industry.
Ore processing industry.
Petroleum industry.
Petro chemical industry.
Chemical industry.
Ceramic industry.
Cement industry.
Textile industry.
Paper industry.
Fertilizer industry.
Coal (including coke) industry.
Power (thermal and diesel) generating industry. ' 15.
Processing of animal or vegetable products industry.
The concerned assessing authorities have in all the cases under consideration issued notices demanding water cess from the sugar manufacturers on the ground that this industry falls under item 15 "processing of animal or vege table products industry".
The Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Allahabad High Court have taken the view that the sugar manufacturing industries would come within Entry 15 as "processing vegetable products industry".
On the other hand the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Patna High Court have taken the view that sugar manufacturing industries would not come within Entry 15 of the ist Schedule.
A writ petition which was filed in the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, by one of the sugar mills in Karnataka raising similar question has been withdrawn to this Court in transfer peti tion No. 276 of 1984 to be dealt with along with other appeals raising identical question.
Similarly another writ petition has been withdrawn from the Allahabad High Court in Transfer Petition No. 277 of 1984 to be dealt with along with this group of cases.
The object of the Act is to control the water pollution and to ensure 528 that industrial affluents are not allowed to be discharged into the water coarses without adequate treatment.
The Cess Act is not an enactment to regulate and control pollution but a fiscal measure to raise revenue for augmenting the resources of the Pollution Control Boards.
The levy and collection of cess provided under the Cess Act is on water consumed by persons carrying on the industries specified in the Schedule.
The Cess is levied on the person carrying on the specified industry.
The question is whether industries manufacturing sugar is covered by Entry 15 that is "process ing of vegetable product industry".
From the botanic point of view 'vegetable ' may include any plant but in common parlance it is understood as refer ring to edible plants or parts of edible plants.
The word 'vegetable ' has been defined in many ways.
In the World Book it is defined as follows: "In the usual sense, the word vegetable is applied to those plants whose leaves, stalks, roots or tubers are used for food, such as lettuce, asparagus, cabbage, beet and turnip.
It also includes several plants whose fruits are the edible portions, as peas, beans, melons and tomatoes.
" In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Ed. p. 1365, it is defined as: "Plant, esp.
herbaceous plant, used for culi nary purposes or for feeding cattle, e.g. cabbage, potato, turnip bean.
" Again in Webster 's International Dictionary, vegetable is defined as: "A plant used or cultivated for food for man or domestic animals, as the cabbage, turnip, potato, bean, dandelion, etc., also the edible part of such a plant, as prepared for market or the table.
Vegetables and fruits are some times loosely distinguished by the used need of cooking the former or the use of man, while the latter may be eaten raw; but the distinc tion often fails, as in the case of quinces, barberries, and other fruits, and lettuce, celery, and other vegetable.
Tomatoes if cooked are vegetables, if eaten raw are fruit.
" In the Encyclopaedie Britannica, vol.
23, 'vegetable ' is defined as: "A general term used as an adjective in refer ring to any kind of plant life or plant product, viz. 'vegetable matter '.
More common ly and specifically, in common language, the word is used 529 as a noun in referring to those generally herbaceous plants or any parts of such plants as are eaten by man.
The edible ' portions of many plants considered aS vegetables are in a botanical sense, fruits.
The common distinc tion between fruits and vegetables is often indefinite and confusing, since it is based generally on how the plant or plant part is used rather than on what it This Court in State of West Bengal & Ors.
vs Washi Ahmed etc.
; , with reference to the meaning of the word 'vegetable ' in Item (6) of Schedule I to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 held: "That the word 'vegetable ' in Item (6) of Schedule I to the Act must be construed as understood in common parlance and it must be given its popular sense meaning 'that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it ' and so construed, it denotes those classes of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table.
" The interpretation of one of the entries in Schedule I to the Cess Act came up for consideration in Member Secre tary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution vs Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and others; , The question for consideration was whether manufacturing of rayon grade pulp a base material for manu facturing of synthetics or manmade fabrics is an industry as mentioned in Schedule I to the Cess Act.
It was held: .lm13 "Whether a particular industry is an industry as covered in Schedule I of the Act, it has to be judged normally by what that industry produces mainly.
Every industry carries out multifarious activities to reach its goal through various multifarious methods.
Whether a particular industry falls within the realm of taxation, must be judged by the predominant purpose and process and not by any ancillary or incidental process carried on by a particular industry in running its business." This Court also observed: "It has to be borne in mind that this Act with which we are concerned is an Act imposing li ability for cess.
The Act is fiscal in nature.
The Act must, therefore, be strictly construed in order to find out whether a liability is fas tened on a particular 530 industry.
The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose, and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to its natural construction of words.
See the observations In Re. Nicklethwait, 1985 (11) exhibit 452, 456.
Also see the observations in Tenant vs Smith ; and Lord Halsbury 's observa tions at page 154.
See also the observations of Lord Simonds in St. Aubyn vs A.G. 1951 (2) All.
ER, 473, 485.
Justice Rowlatt of England said a long time ago, that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment.
There is no equity about a tax.
There is no presumption as to tax.
Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied.
One has to look fairly at the language used.
See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndi cate vs IRC, , 71.
This Court has also reiterated the same view in Gursahai Saigal vs CIT, , CIT vs Mr. P. Firm, Muar, ; Controller of Estate duty vs Kantilal Trikamlal; , The question as to what is covered must be found out from the language according to its natural meaning fairly and squarely read.
See the obser vations in IRC vs Duke of Westminster, ([1963] AC 1, 24) and of this Court in A.V. Fernandez vs State of Kerala ; Justice Krishna Iyer of this Court in Martand Dairy & Fawn vs Union of India ; has observed that taxing consideration may stem from adminis trative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualisation or neat logic and so the literal, though pedestrain, interpretation must prevail." This Court considered the question as to whether sugar cane is green vegetable with reference to an exemption given under Sales Tax Enactment in the decision in M/s. Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. vs The State of Bihar [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 498.
This Court quoted with the approval a passage from the judgment of the Nagput High Court in Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants Association vs State of Madhya Pradesh (1956 (7) S.T.C. 99) wherein it was held "the word vegetable in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance that is denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for the table".
It was further held that sugarcane is normally considered to be a grass specie and it would not fail within the definition of words green vegetable.
The use of the word processing is also significant.
Processing of 531 vegetable products industry are normally understood in the sense they relate processing of vegetables which even after processing retain its character as vegetable.
Processing: Section 3(1), Marine Product Export Develop ment Authority Act, 1972 defines processing in relation to marine products, as including the preservation of such products as canning, freezing, drying, salting, smoking, peeling or filleting or any other method of processing which the authority made by notification in the Gazette of India, specified in this behalf.
Section 2(g) of the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority Act, 1985 defines processing in relation to scheduled products as including the process of preservation of such products such as canning, freezing, drying, salting, smok ing, peeling or rilleting and any other methods of process ing which the authority made by notification in the official Gazette specified in this behalf.
Thus processing as gener ally understood in marine, agricultural and food products industries is an action, operation or method of treatment applying it to something.
It is refining, development, preparation or converting of material especially that in a raw state into marketable form.
It would be interesting to note that this Act contains a Schedule of the agricultural or processed food products" which are to be governed by the Act which reads as follows: THE SCHEDULE (See Section 2(i)) 1.
Fruits, vegetables and their products.
Meat and meat products.
Poultry and poultry products.
Dairy products.
Confectionary, biscuits and bakery products.
Honey, jaggery and sugar products.
Cocoa and its products, chocolates of all kinds.
Alcoholic and non alcoholic beverages.
Cereal products.
532 10.
Cashewnuts, groundnuts, peanuts and wal nuts.
Pickles, chutneys and papads.
Guar Gum. 13.
Floriculture and floriculture products.
Herbal and medicinal plants.
In CST v.A.R.Alladin, AIR 1964 Guj. 27 the expression "who processes any goods" in the Bombay Sales Tax was held to refer to the subjecting of any goods to a treatment or process.
In Addl.
CIT vs Farrukhabad Cold Storage, held that processing of goods means that the goods must be adopted for a particular use.
The variety of acts performed in respect of goods or their subjection to a process need not be such as may lead to the production of any new article.
The act of subjecting ' goods to a particu lar temperature for a long period of time as in cold storage amounts to processing of goods.
On the other hand manufac ture is a transformation of an article which is commercially different from the one which is converted.
The essence of manufacture is the change of one object to another for the purpose of making it marketable.
In Union of India vs Delhi Cloth and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 79 this Court pointed out: "The word 'manufacture ' used as a verb is generally understood to mean as bringing into existence a new substance and does not mean 'merely ' to produce some change in a sub stance, however minor in consequence, the change may be." In the same decision the following passage from the Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases from an American Judgment was quoted with approval: "Manufacture implies a change but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation.
But something more is necessary and there must be transformation, a new and different article must emerges having a dis tinctive name, character or use.
" The essential point thus is that in manufacture some thing is brought into existence which is different from that originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commodity 533 whereas in the case of processing it is not necessary to produce a commer cially different article.
Processing essentially effectuates a change in form, contour, physical appearance or chemical combination or otherwise by artificial or natural means and in its more complicated form involves progressive action in performing, producing or making something.
Vide Com Products Refining 60.
vs Federal Trade Commission, CCA.
7, In the decisions under appeal, the Allahabad High Court held that sugar mills will come within the meaning of 'pro cessing vegetable products industry ' in Entry 15 on the ground that the word 'vegetable ' has been used in opposition to the expression 'animal ' and that it could not be given the meaning of vegetables which are kept on the dining tables for dinner purposes, and it has a wider amplitude.
It was further of the view that in interpreting the word 'veg etable ' one has to keep in mind the object for which the Cess Act was made.
The learned Judges then stated that sugar industry is one of the main source of causing water pollu tion and since the object of the Pollution Act and the Cess Act were intended to control water pollution and since the entries are to be given a wider meaning sugar industry would be covered by the Act.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court also took a similar line of reasoning and said that 'vegetable products ' essentially mean what belongs to the plant kingdom as opposed to the animal kingdom.
In another words the word 'vegetable ' has been used in contra distinction to the word 'animal '.
Though the learned Judges were not prepared.to hold that sugar cane is vegetable, the word 'product ' gives a definite colour, meaning thereby all that belongs to the world of plants would come within the entry.
We are unable to appredate the reasonings of the learned judges.
Pollution Act may be a regulating Act but Cess Act is a fiscal enactment, as is held by this Court in Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution vs Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and Others (supra) and Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs The Cess Appellate Committee & Anr., JT There fore we have to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment and there is no room for bringing within the provision of the Act anything by impli cation.
Unless we give the botanical meaning to the word 'vegetable ' it is not possible to conclude sugar cane as vegetable.
The Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case Nos.
4413 of 1981 and 2346 of 1983 M/s Champaran Sugar Co. Ltd. vs State of Bihar & 534 Ors.
held that sugar manufacturing industry would not fall under Entry 15 Of Schedule I.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court also seems to be as the same view and it had dismissed a Writ Petition without a speaking order.
Construction of words and the meaning to be given for such words shall normally depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the statute in which it is occurring and to the fitness of the matter to the statute.
The meaning given to the same word occurring in a. social security measure or a regulating enactment may not be apposite or appropriate when the same word is interpreted with reference to a taxing statute.
The Cess Act is a fiscal enactment.
In the context in which the word 'vegetable ' is used in Entry 15 'vegetable product ' means product of or made of or out of vegetable. 'Vegetables ' as understood in common parlance are not products of manufacture unless we say that agriculture is an industry for certain purposes and vegetables are products of that industry.
In order to bring an industry within any of the entires in Schedule I it has to be seen what is the end product produced by that industry.
Sugar cane is not a vegetable though it may be an agricultural product.
If the botanic meaning of vegetable as referring to any and every kind of plant life is to be given then some of the indus tries listed in Schedule I like Paper Industry and Textile Industry and even chemical industry which are covered by other entries could also be brought within Entry 15.
The word vegetable in the context does not attract the botanic meaning.
The sugar manufacturing industry do not, therefore, come within Entry 15 of Schedule I of the Cess Act.
In Civil Appeal (arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 814 of 1990) the appellant is Haryana Distillery who purchases molasses which is a by product of the .manufacture of sugar and manufactures alcohol.
Manufacture of alchohol was held by the High Court to come within Entry 15 of Sched ule I as processing agricultural prOduct industry.
We have held already that the industry manufacturing sugar itself is not an industry within the meaning of Entry 15 and a fortio ri the manufacture of alcohol from molasses could not be considered to be an industry within Entry 15 of Schedule I.
In the result we allow Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP Nos.
15828 of 1989, 7496 of 1989, 778, 814, 830, 1286, 1433 of 1990 and SLP No . . . of 1991 entitled Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd & Anr.
vs Union of India & Ors.
Writ Petition No. 77 of 1990, and Transfer CaSe (C) Nos.
6 of 1986 & 91 of 1989 and dismiss Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP Nos.
9558 62 of 1988) and the Rule Nisi is made abso lute.
N.P.V. Appeals disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Section 3 of the Water (Prevention of Pollution and Control) Cess Act, 1977 provided that water cess was payable by every person carrying on any specified industry and every local authority, for the purposes of the .
"Specified industry" was defined in the Act meaning any industry specified in Schedule 1.
There were 15 items under Schedule I, including "processing of animal or vegetable products industry", under Entry 15.
The question for consideration in the batch of appeals, writ petitions and transferred cases arising out of the notices issued by the concerned assessing authorities de manding water cess from the sugar manufacturers was whether sugar manufacturing industry fell under Entry 15 of Schedule I of the .
Disposing of the appeals, writ petitions and transferred cases, this Court, HELD: 1.
In the context in which the word 'vegetable ' is used in Entry 15, Schedule I of the , 'vegetable product ' means product of or made of or out of 524 vegetable. 'Vegetables ' as understood in common parlance are not products of manufacture unless it is said that agricul ture is an industry for certain purposes and vegetables are products of that industry.
In order to bring an industry within any of the entries in Schedule 1 it has to be seen what is the end product produced by that industry.
Sugarcane is not a vegetable though it may be an agricultural product.
If the botanic meaning of vegetable as referring to any and every kind of plant life is to be given then some of the industries listed in Schedule I like Paper Industry and Textile Industry and even Chemical Industry which are cov ered by other entries could also be brought within Entry 15.
The word 'vegetable ' in the context does not attract the botanic meaning.
The sugar manufacturing industry does not, therefore, come within Entry 15 of Schedule I of the Cess Act.
Consequently, the manufacture of alcohol from molasses, which is a by product of manufacture of sugar, could not be considered to be an industry within Entry 15 of Schedule I. [534 C E, F] 2.1 The word 'vegetable ' has been defined in many ways.
From the botanic point of view 'vegetable ' may include any plant but in common parlance it is understood as referred to edible plants or parts of edible plants.
Unless the botani cal meaning is given to the word 'vegetable ' it is not possible to conclude sugarcane as vegetable.
[528 C] 2.2 Pollution Act may be a regulating Act, but Cess Act is a fiscal enactment.
Therefore, the Court has to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment and no room for bringing within the provision of the Cess Act anything by implication.
[533 E,F] State of West Bengal & Ors.
vs Washi Ahmed Etc.
; ; Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution vs
Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and others; , , M/s Motipur Zamind ary Co. (P) Ltd. vs The State of Bihar, [1962] Suppl.
1 SCR 498 and Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs The Cess Appel late Committee & Anr., JT , referred to.
World Book, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Ed.
p. 1365, Webster 's International Dictionary and Encyclopaedia Brit tannica, Vol. 23, referred to.
2.3 Construction of words and the meaning to be given for such words shall normally depend on the nature, scope and purpose of the statute in which it is occurring and to the fitness of the matter to the 525 statute.
The meaning given to the same word occurring in a social security measure or a regulating enactment may not be apposite or.
appropriate when the same word is interpreted with reference to a taxing state.
The Cess Act is a fiscal enactment.
[534 B] 3.1.
Processing of vegetable products industry is nor mally understood in the sense that it relates to processing of vegetables, which even after processing retain its char acter as vegetable.
[530 H,531A] 3.2 Processing as generally understood in marine, agri cultural and food products industries is an action, opera tion or method of treatment applying it to something.
It is refining, development, preparation or converting of material especially that in a raw state into marketable form.
In manufacture something is brought into existence, which is different from that originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commod ity, whereas in the case of processing it is not necessary to produce a commercially different article.
[531 C,D] 3.3 Processing essentially effectuates a change in form, cantour, physical appearance or chemical combination or otherwise by artificial or natural means and in its more complicated form involves progressive action in performing, producing or making something.
[533 A,B] CST v.
A.R.Aladin, AIR 1964 Guj. 27.
CIT vs Farruk habad Cold Storage, ; Union of India vs Delhi Cloth and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 79 and Corn Products Refining Co. vs Federal Trade Commission, CCA.7. , referred to.


judgement:
peaINo. 4235 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.6.1987 of the Cal cutta High Court in original order No. 129 of 1985 and/915 of 1983.
A.K. Ganguly, A.K. Chakraborty, A.D. Sikri and Ms. Mridula Ray for the Appellants.
D.N. Mukherjee and Rathin Das for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PUNCHHI, J.
We are required in this matter to interplay some of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regu lation) Act, 1976 to determine whether the appellant herein had any excess vacant land.
Probhavati Poddar (Proforma respondent herein) was the owner of two properties in the city of Calcutta being (i) premises No. P 290, C.I.T. Road, comprising 414.56 sq.
of land of which 321 sq.
was covered by a build ing, constructed thereon long before the coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereafter referred to as 'the Act '), with a dwelling unit therein, and (ii) property No. P 210, C.I.T. Scheme VII(M), Calcutta comprising 339.65 sq.
of vacant land.
Hereaf ter these would be referred to as the 'built up property ' and 'vacant property ' respectively.
The exact date/period of the construction of the built up property is not available on the present record but the litigation has proceeded on the footing that it was constructed long before February 17, 1976, the day when the Act came into force in the State of West Bengal.
The State 1egislatures of 11 States, including the State of West Bengal, considered it desirable to have a uniform legislation enacted by Parlia 506 ment for the imposition of ceiling on urban property for the country as a whole, and in compliance with clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, passed a Resolution to that effect.
Accordingly, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 was introduced in the Lock Sabha on January 28, 1976 covering all the Union Territories and the 11 resolving States.
After the passing of the Bill by the Parliament, the Act came into force on February 17, 1976 at once.
Later from time to time, the Act was adopted by some other States after passing Resolutions under Article 252(1) of the Constitu tion.
The Act now apparently is in force in 17 States and all the Union Territories in the country.
The primary object and purpose of the Act was to provide for the imposition of the ceiling on vacant land in urban ag glomerations, for the 'acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein, and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to sub serve the common good, and in furtherance of the directive princi ples of Articles 39(B) & (C) of the Constitution.
These features were .spelled out by this Court in Union of India etc.
V.B. Chaudhary etc.
[1979]3 SCR 802.
That it is valid piece of legislation, save and except Section 27(1), and had received the protective umbrella of Article 31 C as it stood prior to its amendment by 42nd Amendment Act was held by this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji etc.
vs Union of India & Others.
[1981]1 SCC 166. "Appointed day" has been defined in Section 2 A of the Act.
It means (i) in relation to any State to which the Act applies in the first instance, the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Par liament, and (ii) in relation to any State which adopts the Act under Clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, the date of such adoption.
In relation to the State of West Bengal, in which the town of Calcutta is situated, the "appointed day" is January 28, 1976.
It is thus evident that between the appointed day and the date of enforcement of the Act, there is a 20 day 's gap.
The Act ordains a ceiling limit of 500 sq. mtrs.
for the urban agglomeration of Calcutta, as per item 15 of Category A in .Schedule
I of the Act.
Both the properties of Smt.
Poddar,.
the proforma respondent herein, thus became liable to be screened by the Authorities under the Act.
Before hand on July 8, 1978, Smt.
Poddar entered into an agreement with Smt.
Meera Gupta, the appellant herein, to sell the vacant property on 507 terms entered.
On November 23, 1978, the proposed vendor and the proposed vendee gave notice under Section 26 of the Act to the Competent Authority, appointed for the purpose of the proposed sale.
On August 7, 1980, the competent authority in exercise of powers under Section 6(2) of the said Act, issued a notice under Section 6(1) thereof to Smt.
Poddar directing her to file a statement in Form No. 1 on the basis that she held vacant land in the Calcutta Urban Area in excess of the ceiling limit of 500 sq. mtrs.
Having got no response, a reminder was sent to her, but in vain.
The Competent Authority thereafter initiated suomo to proceed ings against Smt.
Poddar and sent her a draft statement on September 18, 1979, exercising powers under Section 8(1) of the Act intimating that she could submit her objection, if any, to the draft statement.
It was specified in the said statement that she was tentatively required to surrender 254.21 sq.
of land (figure arrived by totalling .414.56 sq. mtrs.
of the built up property and 339.65 sq. mtrs.
of the vacant property to 754.21 sq. mtrs, are substracting therefrom 500 sq.
resulting in 254.21 sq. mtrs.).
The objections of Smt.
Poddar filed to the draft statement were rejected by the Competent Authority, who published the final statement under section 9 of the Act vesting the said 254.21 sq.
of excess land in the State, and the same was communicated to Smt.
Poddar on June 22, 1981.
She preferred an appeal under Section 33 of the Act before the Special Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal, the Appellate Author ity under the Act, but the same was dismissed in default on January 18, 1983.
Before hand the appellant herein filed suit No. 121 of 1981 against Smt.
Poddar in the Calcutta High Court claiming specific performance of the agreement dated July 8, 1978.
On August 21, 1981, a decree for specific performance was passed in favour of the appellant in the usual terms.
Pursu ant to the said decree, the deed of conveyance in respect of the vacant property was executed in favour of the appellant on November 19, 1981 for a consideration of Rs.1,26,000/ paid over to Smt.
Poddar.
Possession of the vacant property was delivered to the appellant and necessary entries were made in the municipal and revenue registers.
The appellant then got scent of the dismissal of the appeal of Smt.
Poddar in default on July 2, 1983.
The appel lant then filed a Review Petition before the Appellate Authority stating, inter alia, that she had become the owner of the vacant property and prayed for retrieval of the same from being treated as excess land in the hands of Smt.
Podar.
The Review Petition was rejected on August 10, 1983, which occasioned a petition under Article 226 of the Consti tution being filed by the appellant in the Calcutta 508 High Court on a variety of grounds.
The Writ Petition was opposed on each and every ground.
The learned Single Judge, before whom the writ petition was placed, taking aid from some observations in two decisions of this Court in Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji 's case (supra), and State of U.P. & Others vs L J. Johnson & Others, allowed the writ petition on November 27, 1984.
On appeal by the State of West Bengal and its responding officers, a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment and order of the Single Judge on June 5, 1987 in Appeal No. 129 of 1985, leading to this appeal by special leave at the instance of the appellant.
The matter having come before a two Judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us was a member, on 28.7.1988, it was felt that lohnson 's case (supra) may have to be tested, and thus the matter was ordered to be heard by a larger Bench at least of three Judges.
This is how the matter stands placed before us.
As said at the outset, we have to interplay some of the provisions occurring in Chapter 3 titled as "Ceiling on Vacant Lands" in the Act.
We shall presently set out those provisions which have a bearing in the case.
But before we do that we do not wish to leave the impression that we have not viewed the statute as a whole.
The endeavour on our behalf to construe the provisions has not left any part thereof altogether.
So we proceed thenceforth to the interpretative process.
Section 3 of the Act provides that except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub section (2) of Section 1.
Ceiling limit of vacant land in case of every person like the prece dessor in interest of the appellant is 500 sq.
as set up under Section 4.
Clauses (g) and (q) defining "vacant land" and "land appurtenant" and sub sections (9) and (11) of Section 4 which have precedence in engaging our attention are set out below, but without the Explanation to sub sec tion (11), for it is not relevant for our purpose: "2(g) "Land appurtenant", in rela tion to any building means (i) in an area where there are building regulations, the minimum extent of land required under such regulations to be kept as open space for the enjoyment of such building, which is no case shall exceed five hundred square meters; or (ii) in an area where there are no building regulations, an extent of five hundred square metres contiguous to the land oc 509 cupied by such building, and includes, in the case of any building constructed before the appointed day and with a dwelling unit therein, an additional extent not exceeding five hundred square metres of land, if any, contiguous to the minimum extent referred to in subclause (i) or the extent referred to in sub clause (ii), as the case may be; 2(q) "Vacant Land", means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agricul ture, in an urban agglomeration, but does not include (i) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regula tions in force in the area in which such land is situated; (ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day with the approval of the appropriate authority and the land appurtenant to such building; and (iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, the land occupied by any building which has been constructed before, or is being constructed on, the appointed day and the land appurtenant to such building.
4(9) where a person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein, the extent of such other land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculat ing the extent of vacant land held by such person.
4(11) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothing in sub sections (5), (6), (7), (9) and (10) shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in sub clause (ii) or sub clause (iii) of clause (q) of section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter.
" To begin with "vacant land" as per the definition given in clause (q) of Section 2 means land as such, not being land mainly used for the put 510 pose of agriculture, but situated in an urban agglomeration. "Vacant Land", however, does not include, as per the defini tion, land of three categories.
The first category is land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated.
But this is a category with which we are not concerned in the instant case.
Johnson 's case (supra) is of this category.
The second category is of land occupied by any building in an area, where there are building regula tions, which has been constructed upon, or is under con struction on the appointed day, with the approval of the appropriate authority, and the land appurtenant to such building.
This means that if the building stood constructed on the land prior to January 28, 1976, the land occupied under the building is not vacant land.
It also covers the land on which any building was in the process of construc tion on January 28, 1976 with the approval of the appropri ate authority.
That too is not "vacant land".
Additionally, the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings is also not "vacant land".
The third category likewise conditioned is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are no building regulations, which has been constructed before January 28, 1976 or is in the process of construction on such date, and the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings.
The aforesaid three categories of lands would otherwise be "vacant land" but for the definitional exclusion.
The specific non inclusion of these three categories of land is by itself an integral part of the definitional and function al sphere.
The question that arises what happens to lands over which buildings are commenced after the appointed day and the building progresses to complete thereafter.
On the appointed day, these lands were vacant lands, but not so thereafter because of the surface change.
Here the skill of the draftsman and the wisdom of the legislature comes to the fore in cognizing and filling up the gap period and covering it up in the scheme of sub section (9) of Section 4.
The visible contrast between "vacant land" and "any other land" held by a person on which there is a building with a dwell ing unit therein becomes prominent.
The said "any other land" is reckoned and brought at par with the "vacant land" for the purpose of calculating the final extent of vacant land.
It seems to us that the expression "vacant land" in the first portion of the provision connotes land minus land under buildings constructed or in the process of construc tion before and on the appointed day, and the expression "vacant land" in the latter portion of the provision con notes the sum total of "vacant land" of the first order and distinctly the "other land" on which is a building with a dwelling unit therein of which construction commenced after the appointed day, and the land appurtenant thereto.
Such an interpretation is required by the conext 511 as otherwise the concept of the appointed day and the gap period would be rendered otiose.
The legislature cannot be accused to have indulged in trickery or futility in giving something with one hand and taking it away with the other.
"Any other land"in the sequence would thus mean any other built upon land except the one excluded from the expression "vacant land" on account of it being occupied by a building which stood constructed, or was in the process of construc tion, on the appointed day.
Such interpretation of ours finds support from Section 5 of the Act which pursues and does not leave alone transfer of vacant land in the gap period.
It provides as follows: "5.
TRANSFER OF VACANT LAND (1) In any State to which this Act applies in the first in stance, where any person who had held vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of this Act, has transferred such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, the extent of the land so trans ferred shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person and the excess vacant land in relation to such person shall, for the pur poses of this Chapter, be selected out of the vacant land held by him after such transfer and in case the entire excess vacant land cannot be so selected, the balance, or, where no vacant land is held by him after the trans fer, the entire excess vacant land, shall be selected out of the vacant land held by the transferee: Provided that where such person has trans ferred his vacant land to more than one per son, the balance, or, as the case may be, the entire excess vacant land aforesaid, shall be selected out of the vacant land held by each of the transferees in the same proportion as the area of the vacant land transferred to him bears to the total area of the land trans ferred to all the transferees.
(2) Where any excess vacant land is selected out of the vacant land transferred under sub section (1), the transfer of the excess vacant land so selected shah be deemed to be null and void.
(3) In any State to which this Act applies in the first instance and in any State which adopts this Act under clause (1) of Article 252 of the Constitution, no person holding vacant land 512 in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under Section 6 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been pub lished under sub section (1.) of Section 10; and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void." [Underlining ours].
The underlining is reflective of the scheme of the Act in as much as transfers of vacant land within the gap period are ignorable, and likewise, in our view, vacant land brought under construction of building by a person within the gap period is also ignorable for the purposes of calcu lating the extent of vacant land, so that the provisions of law are not defeated by human ingenuity.
At this juncture, sub section (11) of Section 4 may be noticed.
It provides removal of doubts declaring.
inter alia, that nothing in sub section (9) shall be construed as empowering the competent authority to declare any land referred to in sub clause (ii) or sub clause (iii) of clause (q) of Section 2 as excess vacant land under this Chapter.
Though this provision is not happily worded, yet when mean ingfully construed in the context, it means that a building which gets excluded by virtue of the definition of "vacant land" gets clothed with the protective cloak for not being reckoned again as any other land, over which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein.
Sub section (11) of Section 4 means to convey that what is not vacant land under sub clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (q) of Section 2 cannot go to add up as "vacant land" under sub section (9) of Section 4 by descriptive overlapping.
If we wipe out the distinction of "vacant land" and "any other land" as demon strated in sub section (9) of section 4, we strangulate and destroy the spirit and life blood of the "appointed day" and the gap period.
We would loathe giving such a construction and would rather opt for a construction which carries out the objectives of the Act, primary of which is to fix a ceiling limit on the holding of vacant lands, conditioned as they are on the appointed day, and as held on the date of the commencement of the Act.
It would be worthwhile at this stage to take note of the expression "land appurtenant" as defined in Section 2(g).
When related to any building in an area where there are building regulations, as well as in an area where there are no building regulations, the additional extent as permitted is based on the principle of contiguity.
The expression applies to buildings constructed before the "appointed day" as well as to buildings, construction of which commenced before the "appointed day", and was in progress on that day.
It, no doubt, applies to buildings, constructed thereafter too.
513 When we import this understanding to sub section (9) of Section 4, two different results discernably follow, based on the commencement of the construction.
If the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein had begun after the appointed day, then it is all the same "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
And if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein on land had been completed or was in progress by and on the appointee day, then is not "any ' other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
This is the interpretation which commends to us of sub section (9) of Section 4 as also of sub section (11) of Section 4 and the definitive expres sions used therein as explained and highlighted earlier.
Applying that interpretation on the facts found by the High Court we hold that the built up property, which in any event had been built up prior to the commencement of the Act, and it is nobody 's case that construction thereof had begun after the "appointed day", is outside the purview of "vacant land".
If that is excluded from being reckoned towards calculating the extent of vacant land held by the predeces sor in interest of the appellant, the vacant land in the vacant property cannot be declared excess for that is within the permissible limits.
Even if no land is left as land appurtenant to the built up area, then 93.56 sq. mtrs, the remainder plus 339.65 sq. mtrs, of the unbuilt property would total up to the figure less than 500 sq.
; again within the permissible limit.
Therefore, interpretation to the contrary of the dealt with provisions by the Division Bench of the High Court, bereft as it is of the concept of the appointed day and the gap period, would have to give way, meriting the acceptance of this appeal and setting aside of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court by issuing the necessary writ, direction and order so as to quash the entire proceedings towards declaring excess land in the hands of the appellant and her predecessor in title.
We order accordingly.
The interpretation we have put to the provisions pertinently relate to sub clause (ii) and (iii) of clause (q) of Section 2.
This interpretation in express terms cannot apply to sub clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2.
Johnson 's case (supra) as said before, is a case under sub clause (i) of clause (q) of Section 2.
In the instant case, there appears to be no occasion to test its correctness or even to dilate upon the judgments of the High Courts reported in AIR 1981 Madhya Pradesh 17, AIR 1984 Bombay 122 and AIR 1987 Allahabad 272, cited at the bar.
As a result, this appeal is allowed.
The appellant shall have her costs throughout.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant 's predecessor in interest, respondent herein, was the owner of two properties consisting of a 'built up property ' and a 'vacant property ' in the city of Calcutta.
The built up property comprised of 414.56 sq. mtrs.
of land of which 321 sq.
was covered by a build ing with a dwelling unit therein and the said property was constructed long before the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regula tion) Act, 1976 came into force.
The second property com prised of 339.65 sq.
of vacant land.
The Act came into force on February 17, 1976 but under Section 2A of the Act the appointed day in relation to State of West Bengal was 28th January, 1976.
Thus between the appointed day and the date of enforcement of the Act there was a 20 days ' gap.
On 8th July, 1978 the respondent entered into an agree ment with the appellant to sell the vacant property.
Since both the properties were covered by the Urban agglomeration as specified in category 'A ' in Scheduled 1 to the 1976 Act, under which the ceiling limit prescribed was 500 sq.
, the appellant and the respondent gave a notice of the pro posed sale under Section 26 of the Act to the competent authority.
The competent authority held that the respondent was holding 25421 sq.
of land in excess of the ceiling limit.
The excess land was determined by totalling 414.56 sq.
of the built up property and 339.65 sq. mtrs.
of vacant property to 754.21 sq.
, and substracting 502 therefrom 500 sq.mtrs.
resulting in 254.21 sq. mtrs.
in excess of the ceiling limit.
Accordingly the competent authority issued order vesting the excess land in the State.
Against the decision of the competent authority the respond ent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority which was dismissed in default.
In the meantime the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for specific performance of the agreement dated 8th July, 1978 which was decreed and consequently a deed of conveyance was executed in favour of the appellant and the possession of the property was also given to her.
Subsequently the appellant came to know of the dis missal of the respondent 's appeal.
Thereupon she filed a Review Petition before the Appellate Authority stating that she had become the owner of the vacant property and prayed for retrieval of the same from being treated as excess land in the hands of respondent which was dismissed.
The appel lant filed a writ petition in the High Court and a Single Judge allowed the same.
On appeal by State a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the judgment of the Single Judge.
Against the decision of the Division Bench, appeal was filed in this Court.
Setting aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
The primary objective of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 is to fix a ceiling limit on the holding of vacant lands, conditioned as they are on the appointed day, and as held on the date of commencement of the Act.
[512 F] 2.
Under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1973 no person is entitled to bold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit.
Ceiling limit of vacant land in case of every person like the predecessor in interest of the appellant is 500 sq.
as set up under Section 4.
[508 E F] 2.1 However, as per Section 2(g), 'Vacant land ' does not include land of three categories.
The first category is land on which construction of a building is not permissible under building regulation in force in the area in which such land is situated.
The second category is of land occu pied by any building in an area, where there are building regulations, which has 503 been constructed upon, or is under construction on the appointed day, with the approval of the appropriate authori ty, and the land appurtenant tO such building.
Thus if the building stood constructed on the land prior to January 28, 1976, the land occupied under the building is not vacant land.
It also covers the land on which any building was in the process of construction on January 28, 1976 with the approval of the appropriate authority.
Additionally, the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings is also not "vacant land".
The third category likewise conditioned is of land occupied by any building in an area where there are no building regulations, which has been constructed before January 28, 1976 or is in the process of construction on such date, and the land appurtenant to these two kinds of buildings.
[510A D] 2.2 The expression "land appurtenant" as defined in Section 2(g) when related to any building in an area where there are building regulations as well as in an area where there are no building regulations reveals that the addition al extent as permitted is based on the principle of conti guity.
The expression applies to buildings constructed before the "appointed day" as well as to buildings, con struction of which commenced before the "appointed day", and was in progress on that day.
Therefore, if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein had begun after the appointed day, then it is all the same "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
And if the construction of a building with a dwelling unit therein on land had been completed or was in progress by and on the appointed day, then it is not "any other land" to be reckoned for calculating the extent of vacant land held by a person.
[512G H, 513A B] The built up property in question had been constructed prior to the commencement of the Act.
Therefore, it is outside the purview of "vacant land".
If that is excluded from being reckoned towards calculating the extent of vacant land held by the predecessor in interest of the appellant, the vacant land in the vacant property cannot be declared excess for that is within the permissible limits.
Even if no land is left as land appurtenant to the built up area, then 93.56 sq. mtrs.
the remainder plus 339.65 sq.
of the unbuilt property would total up to the figure less than 500 sq.
; which is again within the permissible limit.
Accordingly the entire proceedings towards declaring excess land in the hands of the appellant and her predecessor in title are quashed.
[513C E] 504 State of U.P. & Or3.
L.J. Johnson & Ors. , held inapplicable.
Union of India etc.
V.B. Chaudhary etc.
; ; Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji etc.
vs Union of India & Ors., , referred to.
Eastern Oxygen vs State AIR 1981 M.P. 17; Prabhakar Narhar Pawar vs State, AIR 1984 Bom.
122; State vs Radha Raman Aggarwal, AIR 1987 All. 272, cited.
In the scheme of sub section (9) of Section 4 of the Act the visible contrast between "vacant land" and "any other land" held by a person on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein is prominent.
The said "any other land" is reckoned and brought at par with the "vacant land" for the purpose of calculating the final extent of vacant land.
The expression "vacant land" in the first portion of the provision connotes land minus land under buildings constructed or in the process of construction before and on the appointed day, and the expression "vacant land" in the latter portion of the provision connotes the sum total of "vacant land" of the first order and distinctly the "other land" on which is a building with a dwelling unit therein of which construction commenced after the appointed day, and the land appurtenant thereto.
Such an interpreta tion is required by the context as otherwise the concept of the appointed day and the gap period would be rendered otiose.
The legislature cannot be accused to have indulged in trickery in giving something with one hand and taking it away with the other.
"Any other land" in the sequence would thus mean any other built upon land except the one excluded from the expression "vacant land" on account of it being occupied by a building which stood constructed.
or was in the process of construction, on the appointed day.
[510F H, 511A B] 4.
Section 5 is reflective of the scheme of the Act in as much as transfers of vacant land within the gap period are ignorable, and likewise, vacant land brought under construction of building by a person within the j gap period is also ignorable for the purposes of calculat ing the extent of vacant land, so that the provision of law are not defeated by human ingenuity.
[512 BC] 5.
Though Sub section (11) of Section 4 is not happily worded, yet when meaningfully construed in the context, it means that a building which 505 gets excluded by virtue of the definition of "vacant land" gets clothed with the protective cloak for not being reck oned again as any other land, over which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein.
This provision means to convey that what is not vacant land under sub clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (q) of Section 2 cannot go to add up as "vacant land" under sub section (9) of Section 4 by descrip tive overlapping.
To wipe out the distinction of "vacant land" and "any other land" as demonstrated in sub section (9) of section 4 is to strangulate and destroy the spirit and life blood of the "appointed day" and the gap period.
[512 D F]