judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 186 of 1976.
Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 27.10.1975 of the Kerala High Court in O .P.
No. 3743 of 1973.
Ajit Pudussery and B .P.
Singh for the Appellant.
A.S. Nambiar, K.R. Nambiar, V.J. Francis and N.M. Popli for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J.
The appellant who is owner of land comprised in R.S. Nos. 44/11 and 44/20 in village Thottapuzhasseri in Alleppey District, assailed the validity of the declaration made under Section 6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (Act 21 of 1962) made by the 2nd Respondent, Board of Revenue, Kerala State on 25.9.1973 and published in Kerala Gazette dated October 16, 1973 stating that the lands de scribed therein are needed for a public purpose namely for a playground for M.M.A. High School and directing the Revenue Divisional Officer, Changannur to order for acquisition of the same.
The grounds on which the challenge was made in the writ petition inter alia were that the property in question was mortgaged with the Maramon Marthomite Church, as the Church refused to return the property on accepting the money, the appellant filed a suit for redemption of the mortgage which was ultimately decreed and appellant got 537 possession of the property on October 8, 1973.
During the pendency of the suit the church authority moved the educa tional authorities as well as the Sub Collector for acquisi tion of the property for the school in order to wreak ven geance on the petitioner appellant.
It has also been alleged that the purported proposal to acquire the said property was made mala fide.
The land was situated about 3 furlongs away from the school and it was not convenient to be used as playground of the school, that there were more suitable land available for purpose of playground, that the land was required by the owner for purpose of constructing buildings for his sons.
The appellant raised all those objections within the prescribed time on receiving notice under section 5 of the said Act.
No notice was issued to the Education Department as required under Rule 5(b) & (c) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules and the objection made by the appel lant was decided by the respondents without hearing the Government Department or its representative.
As such the impugned declaration is illegal and bad and the proceeding for acquisition is also illegal and unwarranted.
The writ petition being O.P. No. 3743 of 1973 was dismissed by the High Court holding that there was no violation of the provi sions of Rule 5(b) & (c) of said Rules nor there was in fringement of Rule 6.
The instant appeal is on a certificate granted by the High Court under Section 133(1) of the Constitution of India.
The sole question that has been agitated before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellant is that provisions of Rule 5(b) & (c) of Kerala Land Acquisition Rules, 1963 are mandatory and the notice of the date of hearing of objection filed by a person interested in the land has to be given to the Departmental Officer requiring the land and failure to serve such notice will invalidate the declaration made under Section 6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 in short the said Act.
Several deci sions have been cited at the Bar in support of this conten tion.
The provisions of Section 5 read with Rule 5(b) & (c) of the said Rule have not been complied with in hearing objections.
The learned counsel for the respondent has, on other hand, submitted that the proposal for acquisition of the land in question for play ground of the said school was made at the instance of the Manager of the School, the 3rd re spondent.
The said proposal was considered by the Education Department which certified that the acquisition was for a public purpose viz for playground of the said school and also that the school agreed to place the necessary funds for payment of compensation for acquisition of the said land.
538 The appellant on receiving the notice under Section 3 of the said Act filed an objection to the proposed acquisition of the said lands in accordance with the provision of Sec tion 5 of the said Act as well as under Rule 3 of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1963.
The 1st respondent did not issue any notice of the objection filed by the appellant (peti tioner) to the Education Department as required under Sec tion 5 of the Act and Rule 5(b) & (c) and 6 of the Rules framed under the said Act though notice was issued to Re spondent No. 3, the Manager, M.M.A. High School, Maramon.
The 1st respondent, Sub Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) after hearing the petitioner appellant and his lawyer as well as the representation of the 3rd respondent submitted a report to the respondent No. 2, Board of Revenue, Kerala State recommending for the acquisition of the said land for the purpose of playground for the said High School.
The Board of Revenue, the respondent No. 2, after considering the report made a declaration under Section 6 of the said Act stating that the land specified in the notification under Section 3 of the Act is needed for a public purpose and the said declaration was published in the Kerala Gazette dated 16th October, 1973 and directed the Revenue Divisional Officer, Changannur to take order for acquisition of the lands.
It is convenient to mention that the procedure for requisition for acquiring land has been laid down by the Government in the Land Acquisition Manual.
Sub Clauses (a) & (b) of Clause (i) of Section 1 of Chapter 6 of the Manual is in these terms: "(i)(a) Application in all cases in which land is required by a department of Government other than the Revenue Depart ment should be sent by the Departmental Officer authorised in this behalf in the prescribed form (Form 2Appendix II) to the District Collector or to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, if any, appointed for the purpose.
In the applica tion it should be specifically stated whether the sanction of the competent authority exists for the work for which the land is required and for the acquisition of the land and whether necessary funds have been provided in the budget for meeting the cost of acquisition.
(b) Application from associations or private institutions other than educational institutions, should be sent in the prescribed form to the District Collector.
When land is required by a private educational institution, the Manager of the institution should send an application in the pre scribed form to the District Educational Officer concerned 539 who will forward it to the District Collector with a certif icate from the departmental officer authorised in this be half, to the effect that the acquisition is necessary as the land is required for a public purpose and that the private educational agency has agreed to meet the expenditure It is evident from this procedure that in case of land being required by the private educational institution.
the Manager of the institution shall send the application for acquisition of the land, The Education Department has to consider the application and to give a certificate to the effect that there was a public purpose for which the pro posed acquisition is asked for and the private educational institution is agreeable to meet the entire expenditure for acquisition of the said property.
In the instant case Educa tion Department after considering the requisition made by the Manager of the said school certified about the public purpose for which the land in question is required to be acquired and also that the school authority is ready and willing to meet the entire costs of the acquisition.
As has been stated hereinbefore that the appellant, the owner of the said plots of land submitted his objection to the appli cation for acquisition mainly on four grounds inter alia that the proposal for acquisition of the land has been made by the Manager of the said school malafide in as much as the said land was mortgaged previously with the Church authori ties and subsequently the mortgage was redeemed on the basis of a decree passed by the court in a suit and the said land was taken possession of by the applicant in execution of the said decree.
Secondly, this land is situated about 3 furlongs away from the said school and so it is not conven ient to use the land for a play ground of the school, third ly, there are other lands available in the locality which can be conveniently used for this purpose, fourthly, it has been stated in the objection petition that the land in question remains submerged during certain part of the year and so the same is not convenient for the purpose of play ground of the school.
The 3rd respondent on receiving notice of the objections appeared before the Sub Collector.
Re spondent No. 1 and reiterated that the objections are all without any basis and the land was needed for the playground of ' the school and the said land is being used for this purpose for a period of about10 years.
The respondent No. 1 after inspecting the site and after considering the objec tions and hearing the appellant and his lawyer submitted a report recommending for acquisition of the said land.
It will be evident from the inquiry report made under Section 3 of the said Act that the lands is in possession of the School and it is being used as its playground for the last 10 years.
The Management of the said School has no other alternative but to request 540 for acquisition of the said land for the above purpose.
it is also staled in the report that the proposed land is at a distance of 3 furlongs and there is no other convenient and suitable land more nearer to the school.
On considering this report the respondent No. 2, Board of Revenue made a declaration which has been notified in the Kerala Gazette on October 16, 1973 and directed proceeding for acquisition of the said land.
It is, therefore, clear that the Manager of the school submitted a requisition to the Education Department for a certificate as to the public purpose for acquisition of the said land for play ground o[ the school and also to the effect that the school has agreed to meet the entire expend iture in due compliance with the procedure laid down in the Kerala Land Acquisition Manual.
The Education Department made the necessary recommendations.
The proposal tot the acquisition of the plot was made at the instance of the Manager of the said private educational institution the respondent No. 3 and not by the Education Department.
Sec tion 5 enjoins that any person interested in any land which has been notified under sub clause 1 of Section 3 as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose may, within 30 days after publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land.
It has been further provided therein that objections shall be made to the Collector in writing and the Collector on receiving the objections shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by counsel and shall after hearing all such objec tions and after making such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary either made a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Sub Section 1 of Section 3 or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the Board of Revenue where the notification under Sub clause 1 of Section 3 has been made and published by the Collector.
Rule 3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules clearly states that after publication of the notifica tion under Section 3, the Collector shall issue a notice stating that the land is needed or is likely to be needed, as the case may be, for a public purpose and requiring all persons interested in the land to lodge before the Collector within 30 days after the issue of the notification, a state ment in writing of their objections, if any, to the proposed acquisition Rule 5(b) enjoins that after receiving the objections from a person interested in the land within prescribed time the Collector shall fix a date for hearing the objections and "give notice, thereof to the objector as well as to the departmental officer or company or the local 541 authority requiring the land, where such department is not the Revenue Department.
On a perusal of this provision it is clear that notice of the date of hearing of the objections has to be served not only on the objector but also to the Departmental Offi cer or Company or the local authority requiring the land, that is, where the requisition for acquisition of the land is made by the Departmental Officer, the Departmental Offi cer who requires the land for acquisition has to be served with a notice of the date of hearing of objections.
In the instant case the requisition was made not by the Education Department but by the Manager of M.M.A. High School, Mara mon.
The Education Department merely certified about the requirement of the land in question for a public purpose i.e. for playground of the school and that the entire cost of the requisition is agreed to be borne by the school.
The sole question agitated in regard to the validity of the declaration is that no notice of the date of hearing of objection has been served on the Education Department and as such the Education Department has no opportunity to consider the objections raised by the appellant and also to say whether the land in question was suitable for acquisition or whether other lands are available for this purpose for which the proposed acquisition is required to be made and non service of such a notice invalidates the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act by respondent No. 2.
It is only the private school as well as the owner of the land who are required to be informed as to the date when the objections will be heard under Section 5 of the said Act and only they are to be heard.
The High Court has rightly held that in the instant case there has been no violation of Rule 5(b) & (c) of the Rules.
The High Court has further held that there has not been any infringement of Rule 6.
It has also been held that it is inappropriate to issue notice to the Education Officer or Departmental Officer who certified about the public purpose as well as readiness of the School authority to pay the entire money for acquisition and failure to issue such a notice to the Departmental Officer would not amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and in fringement of the said Rule 5(b) & (c) of the said Rules.
We have mentioned hereinbefore that the proposal for acquisi tion of the land was made by the Manager of the school for the purpose of playground of the school and the requisition was thus made at the instance of the school.
The Education Department merely certified about the public purpose and also about the willingness on the part of the school author ity to bear the entire cost of acquisition.
The land is not sought to be acquired at the instance of the Depart 542 mental Officer and as such it has been rightly found by the High Court that non service of notice of hearing of the date of objection on the Education Department does not per se infringe the provisions of Rule 5(b) & (c) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rule, 1963.
We do not find any flew in the judgment rendered by the High Court.
Several decisions have been cited at the Bar to impress upon us the point that Rule 5 (b) & (c) read with Section 5 of the said Act are mandatory and non compliance therewith will render the declaration invalid and the entire acquisi tion proceedings on the basis of the said declaration will be illegal and unwarranted.
In the case of Lonappan vs Sub Collector, Palghat, AIR 1959 Kerala, 343 one Appu moved the authorities of the Education Department to acquire 1.12 acres of land in R.S. No. 125/7 for the construction of a building and for a play ground and a garden for his school.
On the recommendation of the Education Department the Gov ernment issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act proposing to acquire an area 1.12 acres in the said survey for this school.
Notice was issued to the appellant calling for appellant Lonappan, the owner of the land, for filing objections, if any, under Section 5 A of the Land Acquisition Act to the proposed acquisition and in that notice it was stated that the enquiry under Section 5 A would be held on 23.9.
The Sub Collector after hearing the appellant and his objections overruled his objections and recommended acquisition.
The appellant thereafter made application under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari and for other directions for quashing the proceedings and for granting other reliefs, on the ground that under Section 5 A the Sub Collector was bound by Rule 3 to give notice of those objections to the Education Depart ment at whose instance step for acquisition has been taken.
It was held that the object of Rule 3(b) of the Rules made by the Madras Government under Section 55(1) of the Act for giving notice to the concerned department before hearing of objections filed under Section 5 A is not merely to give the department an opportunity to maintain or support its origi nal requisition but also to provide an opportunity for the original requisition being reviewed or reconsidered by the department in the light of the objections raised by the owner of the land and other persons interested in it.
In State of Madras and Ors.
vs Periakkal and Ors., AIR 1974 Madras 383 the land acquisition proceedings were start ed at the instance of the Harijan Welfare Department for the purpose of constructing houses for the Harijans.
Notice of the date of hearing of the objections filed by the respond ent, owner of the land was not given to 543 the Harijans Welfare Department at whose instance the pro ceedings for acquisition were initiated under Rule 3(b) of the Rules made under Section 55(i) of the Land Acquisition Act.
It was held that under Rule 3(b) it is incumbent on the Collector to give notice of objection to the department requiring the land and copies of the objections had to be given to such other departments.
This is for enabling the department to file on or before the date fixed by the Col lector a statement by way of answer to the objections and also depute a representative to attend the enquiry.
This has to be done in order to give an opportunity to the department requiring the land to traverse the objections, if any, filed by the person interested in the land, so that in the light of the reply of the department, a decision may be arrived at for the purpose of making the declaration under Section 6.
It has been held that the Rule being not mandatory its effect is that in the absence of service of such notice acquisition proceedings are not invalidated.
In State of Mysore & Ors.
vs V.K. Kangan & Ors., ; at 371.
The land was sought to be acquired for an Engineering College at the instance of the Education Depart ment of the State of Mysore, Section 4 notification was issued in the year 1960.
After an enquiry into the objec tions filed under Section 5 A the Land Acquisition Officer sent his report to the Government.
Government overruled the objections and issued a notification under Section 6.
The Education Department at whose instance the land was sought to be acquired was not given notice as required by Rule 3(b) of Madras Land Acquisition Rules.
The respondents filed a Writ Petition in the High Court challenging the validity of both the notifications on the ground that the Education Department was not consulted.
The High Court upheld the contention of the respondents and quashed the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act on the ground that if the Department concerned filed any reply pursuant to the notice issued, the objector would know what the Department has stated by way of reply and at the stage of hearing of objections, the objector might adduce evidence or address arguments to meet what is stated in such reply.
The objector could further urge before the Government that the reasons given by the department in reply to the objections should not be accepted.
It was held that Section 5 A requires the Collector to make a report after hearing the objections.
It does not mean that a rule cannot be framed which would enable the department concerned to place its view point before the Collector when considering the objection under Section 5A.
The proceedings of the Collector are quasi judicial and it is only proper that he should be apprised of the attitude of the department requiring the land in the light of the objections filed.
It would be 544 helpful to the Government in making the decision to have before it the answer to the objection by the department in order to appreciate the rival view points.
Rule 3(b) is not ultra vires Section 5A.
It has been held that Rule 3(b) was enacted for the purpose of enabling the Collector to have all the relevant materials before him for coming to a conclusion to be incor porated in the report to be sent to the Government in order to enable the Government to make proper decision.
Rule 3(b) is mandatory and non service of the notice on the Government Department at whose instance the requisition for acquisition was initiated, the notification under Sec tion 6 becomes bad and as such the same was quashed.
This decision is not applicable to the instant case for the simple reason that the requisition was not made at the instance of the Government Department but at the instance of the Manager, private school and the Education Department merely has given a note certifying that the purpose of the requisition is a public purpose and that the school agreed to bear the entire costs.
In these circumstances it cannot be contended that the requisition has been made by the Education Department or by its officer for acquisition of the land in question.
There fore, in our considered opinion the ruling cited above is not applicable to the instant case.
In the premises aforesaid the only conclusion that follows is to dismiss the appeal.
In the facts and circum stances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.
Y. Lal Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant owned land hearing R.S. Nos. 44/11 and 44/20 in village Thottapuzhasseri in Kerala State.
Respond ent 3, M.M.A. High School moved an application under Sub clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (i) of Section 1 of Chapter 6 of the Land Acquisition Manual before the State 's Education Department praying that the aforesaid land be requisitioned for a public purpose for construction of a playground for the school.
The State authorities after complying with the requirements of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, issued a declaration under Section 6 of the Act stating the lands described therein were needed for a public purpose viz. construction of a playground for the school.
The appel lant challenged the validity of the declaration by filing a writ petition before the High Court, contending, that (i) the proposal to acquire the property was mala fide; (ii) that the declaration was bad as no notice was issued to the Education Department as required by Rule 5(b) and (c) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules and (iii) that the appellant needed the property for construction of houses for his sons.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that there was no violation of the provisions of Rule 5(b) and (c) of the Rules nor was there any infringement of Rule 6.
Hence this appeal by the appellant by certificate.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: The requisition in the instant case, was not made at the instance of the Government Department but at the instance of the Manager, private school and the Education Department merely has given a note certifying that the purpose of the requisition is a public purpose and that the school agreed to bear the entire costs.
[544C D] It cannot therefore be contended that the requisition has been made by the Education Department or by its officer for acquisition of the land in question.
[541C] 536 The High Court has rightly held that there has been no violation of Rule 5(b) and (c) or 6 of the Rules.
[541F] That it is inappropriate to issue notice to the Education Officer or Departmental Officer who certified about the public purpose as well as readiness of the school authority to pay the entire money for acquisition and failure to issue such a notice to the Departmental Officer would not amount to violation of the principles of natural justice and in fringement of the said Rule 5(b) and (c) of the said Rules.
[541 F G] Lonappan vs Sub Collector, Palghat, AIR 1959 Kerala 343; State of Madras and Ors.
vs Periakkal and Ors., AIR 1974 Madras 383 and State of Mysore and Ors.
vs V.K. Kangan and Ors., ; at 371, referred to.


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.11.1977 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 332 of 1971.
Khanna for the Appellants.
D. Goburdhan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FATHIMA BEEVI, J.
This appeal by special leave is di rected against the judgment and order dated 9.11.1977 of the High Court of Patna whereby the conviction and sentences of the appellants for the offences under Sections 302,394 and 34, I .P.C., have been confirmed.
The three appellants are brothers.
The deceased, Bigna Bedia, lived with his wife Sohagia Bedia and sons in village Karmatola.
The incident happened on the night of 5/6.9.
Bigna was sleeping 574 along with his son Jhalku in the verandah while Sohagia was sleeping along with Malku on cot.
At about midnight, the intrud ers entered the house by cutting the tatti and attacked Sohagia and her husband.
Binga Bedia sustained fatal injuries and died instantaneously.
Sohagia was injured.
The intruders took away the utensils and two she goats kept at one end of the verandah.
Jiwan Bedia, the brother of the deceased, on being informed by Jhalku and Lalku about the incident reached the house and after making enquiries, he lodged the first information report at the police station at about 10.00 A.M in the next morning.
The crime was registered against unidentified persons.
In the course of the investigation these appellants were arrested and were finally charge sheeted.
There had been ill feeling between the appellants on the one hand and the deceased and his wife on the other, though the appellants are the sons of the eider sister of Sohagia.
The prosecution case is that on account of enmity, the three appellants committed the crime.
Sohagia claimed to be an eye witness.
According to this witness, the three appellants were armed.
Gurja had a tangi, Birja had a lathi and Mukund had a pharsa.
On entering the house Gurja and Birja dealt blows on Sohagia with the weapons they had.
She got injured and cried.
On hearing the alarm, the deceased was awakened from sleep and when he was trying to get up, all the three appellants left her and killed her husband.
P.W. 14 asserted that Gurja had been flashing a torch and that she had iden tified all the three appellants.
She also stated that she became unconscious and regained consciousness only the next day when the police arrived at the scene.
According to the prosecution, P.W. 14 is the only eye witness.
Lalku and Jhalku who ran to the house of P.W 1 had not seen the as sailants.
The trial court accepted the testimony of P.W. 14 corroborated by the medical evidence and other circumstances as the basis for the conviction.
The High Court agreed with the trial court in holding that the prosecution has succeed ed to bring home the guilt of all the appellants.
The learned counsel for the appellants urged before us that the testimony of P.W. 14 suffers from serious infirmi ties casting reasonable doubt as to the identity of the assailants and the conviction is therefore unwarranted.
The circumstances relied on by the learned counsel is that in the first information report the identity of the accused had not been revealed.
It is argued that if P.W. 14 had identi fied the assailants, it would have been possible for P.W. 1 to disclose the identity of the accused at the time the first information report was lodged and the circumstances are such that the statements 575 of P.W. 14 are inspired and the prosecution has introduced the theory of unconsciousness of P.W. 14 only in an attempt to explain away the lacuna.
To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to scrutinise the first information report in detail.
P.W. 1, Jiwan Bedia, is the full brother of the deceased.
He has been residing in village Jawabera which is at a distance of about half a kilometer from Karmatola.
Lalku and Jhalku reached his house at about midnight and raised hulla that some thieves had entered their house and killed their father and were also killing their mother.
On hearing this, P.W. 1 got up and went to village Jawabera where he informed his gotias about the incident.
Then taking Sawna Bedia, Jhopra Bedia and others along with him he went to the house of Bigna Bedia.
There he did not find any thief.
On entering the house, he found Bigna Bedia lying dead with bleeding injuries on his head and legs.
The wife of Bigna was also injured with a cut injury on her face.
He learnt there from the wife and both the sons of Bigna that 5 or 6 persons had entered the house by cutting the tatti and had inflicted injuries on Bigna and his wife with tangi, bhujali etc.
and they also removed the lock and peg and took away utensils and two she goats from the house.
P.W. 1 then went to the villagers of Karmatola and told them about this incident.
P.W. 1 also contacted the Mukhia of the village Hindebilli and others before going to the police station.
P.W. 1 in narrating the incident in the Fard byan stated that he learnt from the wife and sons of the deceased that 5 or 6 persons had entered the house and committed the crime and details could be furnished by the widow and the sons of the deceased.
P.W. 1, no doubt, in cross examination supported the version of P.W. 14 that Sohagia was lying unconscious when he reached the house at night and she narrated the incident after regaining consciousness the next day when the police reached there.
The statement of P.W. 1 at the earliest point of time belies the truth of what he has deposed before the court.
He had been categoric that he made enquiries with the wife and sons of the deceased before proceeding to the police station and asserted that 5 or 6 unknown persons had committed the crime.
It clearly indicates that an attempt had been made by the prosecution to introduce the case of unconsciousness of P.W. 14 to explain the infirmity.
It may be that P.W. 14 on account of the shock could not have been so eloquent and depressed, but P.W. 1 had been in the house the whole night and he had contacted all the concerned persons and also made enquiries.
The statement in exhibit p. 6 that details would be given by the wife and sons who were present in the house also affirms that he could not gather any 576 useful information regarding the identity of the assailants.
The courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence of P.W. 14 in the correct perspective in the light of the clinching evidence in the case.
The circumstances that the identity of the assailants was unknown until the police arrived at the scene is clear indication that P.W. 14 or her children had not identified the assailants at the time of the occurrence.
It could be that on account of enmity and ill will their suspicion has turned against these appellants and inspired by that suspicion, the investigation had been misdirected.
We do not therefore consider it safe to sustain the conviction when there is reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the appellants.
The benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the appellants.
In the result, the appeal is allowed.
The convictions and sentences are set aside.
The bail bonds shall stand canceled.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellants were convicted for offences under sections 302,394 and 34 IPC.
They were alleged to have entered the house of the deceased at midnight and attacked him and his wife, PW 14, with sharp edged weapons.
He sustained fatal injuries and died instantaneously.
His wife was injured.
Their two sons ran to the house of uncle PW 1, at a distance to inform him of the incident.
They had not seen the assail ants.
By the time PW 1 reached the scene the assailants had fled.
He had been in the house the whole night and contacted all the concerned persons.
In the FIR that he lodged at about 10 a.m. the next morning the assailants were not named.
The prosecution case was that the appellants had commit ted the crime on account of enmity.
PW 14, who claimed to be an eye witness, deposed that she had identified the appel lants.
She also stated that she became unconscious and regained consciousness only the next day when the police arrived.
PW 1 supported her version.
The trial court accepted the testimony of PW 14.
The High Court agreed with it.
In this appeal by special leave, it was contended for the appellants that if PW 14 had identified the assailants, it would have been possible for PW 1 to disclose the identi ty of the accused at the time the first information report was lodged, and that the prosecution had introduced the theory of unconsciousness of PW 14 only in an attempt to explain away the lacuna Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.
It is not safe to sustain the conviction when there is 573 reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the appel lants in the crime.
The benefit of doubt must necessarily go to them.
The statement of PW 1 at the earliest point of time belies the truth of what he had deposed before the court.
He had been categoric in the FIR that he had made enquiries with the wife and sons of the deceased before proceeding to the police station and asserted that five or six unknown persons had committed the crime.
He had also stated that details could be furnished by the widow and sons of the deceased.
This affirmed that he could not gather any useful information regarding identity of the assailants.
All the same, in cross examination he supported the version of PW 14 that she was lying unconscious when he reached the house at night and she narrated the incident after regaining con sciousness when the police reached there.
It clearly indi cates that an attempt had been made by the prosecution to introduce the case of unconsciousness of PW 14 to explain the infirmity.
[576F; G] 3.
The circumstance that the identity of the assailants was unknown until the police arrived at the scene showed that PW 14 or her children had not identified the assailants at the time of the occurrence.
The courts below have failed to appreciate her evidence in the correct perspective in the light of the clinching evidence.
[576B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2335 of 1989.
From Order No. 766/88 C dated 24.10.1988 of the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. B/847/85 C. V. Sreedharan, N.M. Poppli and V.J. Francis for the Appel lant.
Ashok H. Desai, Solicitor General, Ms. Randharangaswami and P. Parmeswaran for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ.
This is an appeal from the order of the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called 'the CEGAT ') dated 24th Octo ber, 1988 under section 35 L(b) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').
The appeal which the CEGAT disposed of had been filed by the Collector of Central Excise, Guntur against the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras dated 6th February, 1985.
The short question which arises in this appeal is whether the lamination of duty paid kraft paper with polyethylene resulting in 'polyethylene laminated kraft paper ' would amount to 'manufacture ' and excisable under law or not.
It appears that the Collector (Appeals) in his order following his earlier order in respect of the appellant herein had taken the view that polyethylene laminated or coated kraft paper obtained from duty paid kraft paper is not liable to duty again.
632 The Collector of Central Excise, (Appeals), Madras had followed the decision of the Division Bench of Andhra Pra desh High Court in the case of Standard Packagings, Nellore vs Union of India, for reaching the aforesaid finding and held that the appellant would be eligible to claim refund of duty paid by them in this re gard.
Lamination, indisputably by the well settled principles of excise law, amounts to 'manufacture '.
This question, in our opinion, is settled by the decisions of this Court.
Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Empire Industries Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs Krishna Carbon Paper Co., We are, there fore, of the opinion that by process of lamination of kraft paper with polyethylene different goods come into being.
Laminated kraft paper is distinct, separate and different goods known in the market as such from the kraft paper.
Counsel for the appellant sought to contend that the kraft paper was duty paid goods and there was no change in the essential characteristic or the user of the paper after lamination.
The fact that the duty has been paid on the kraft paper is irrelevant for consideration of the issue before us.
If duty has been paid, then benefit of credit for the duty paid would be available to the appellant under rule 56 A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
The further contention urged on behalf of the appellant that the goods belong to the same entry is also not relevant because even if the goods belong to the same entry, the goods are different identifiable goods, known as such in the market.
If that is so, the manufacture occurs and if manu facture takes places, it is dutiable. 'Manufacture ' is bringing into being goods as known in the excise laws, that is to say, known in the market having distinct, separate and identifiable function.
On this score, in our opinion, there is sufficient evidence.
If that is the position, then the appellant was liable to pay duty.
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of the CEGAT impugned in this appeal does not contain any error.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.
There will, however, no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeal dis missed.

summary/full:
To a question whether lamination of duty paid kraft paper with polyethylene resulting in 'polyethylene laminated paper ' would amount to 'manufacture ' and excisable under Excise Law, the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) an swered in the negative, and held that the appellant was eligible to claim refund of duty paid by it.
In reaching this finding he followed the decision in Standard Packag ings, Nellore vs Union of India, AP.
Against the said order, the Collector of Central Excise preferred an appeal before the Customs, Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal reversed the order of the Collector (Appeals) and held that the appellant was liable to duty.
Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 35 L(b) of the .
It was contended that duty was already paid on kraft paper and there was no change in the essential characteristic or the user of the paper after lamination, and that both the goods belong to the same entry.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: 1.1.
By process of lamination of kraft paper with polyethylene different goods come into being.
Laminated kraft paper is distinct, separate and different from the kraft paper.
Lamination, indisputably by the well settled principles of excise law, amounts to manufacture.
[632C D] 631 1.2. 'Manufacture ' is bringing into being goods as known in the excise laws, that is to say, known in the market having distinct, separate and identifiable function.
[632F] 1.3.
Even if the goods belong to the same entry, the goods are different identifiable goods, known as such in the market.
If that is so, manufacture occurs, and if manufac ture takes place, it is dutiable.
[632F] Empire Industries Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; and Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs Krishna Carbon Paper Co., , relied on.


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 123 17 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1987 of the Madhya 619 Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 3308 of 1985.
M.K. Ramamurthy and A.K. Sanghi for the Petitioners.
Vinod Bobde, P.S. Nair and K.V. Sreekumar for the Respond ents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered This petition for special leave is against the judgment dated 2.9.1987 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismiss ing the petitioners ' writ petition (M.P. No. 3308 of 1985).
The petitioners demand regularisation of their services claiming to be daily rated workmen for a long time in the mines of the Diamond Mining Project, Panna of the National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. Their demands are of regularisation and "equal pay for equal work" on the ground that they are discharging the same duties as the regular workers.
The management has throughout denied the petition ers ' claim and alleged that, in fact, the petitioners have been continued on rolls on humanitarian grounds for several years, even though there is no work for them; and as such, there is no question of regularising the petitioners and giving them the pay of regular workers when in fact they are not doing any work for a long time.
The High Court rejected the petitioners ' claim and came to the following conclusion: "The petitioners are not regular employees, they do not have any specific job to do, they are surplus to the establish ment and merely kept on the roll on humanitarian ground.
The respondents are also running in heavy losses during the last three years and it is not possible to absorb the petitioners immediately as regular workmen.
In fact, the petitioners are being paid their daily wages in spite of their being no work available for them.
" Aggrieved by dismissal of the writ petition, the petitioners have filed this petition for special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
In response to notice of this petition, a counter affi davit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 reiterat ing the stand taken before the High Court.
It has been stated therein that there is no vacancy in the establishment to absorb the petitioners and the accumulated loss to 620 the establishment as on 31st March, 1988 is Rs. 10,29,40,583.
A copy of the balance sheet has also been enclosed with the counter affidavit.
It has been stated that the petitioners being surplus to the requirement of the Project, they cannot be regularised and their retention on the rolls is purely on humanitarian grounds so far.
Further facts have been stated in support of their contention.
It has also been stated that a Voluntary Retirement Scheme offering considerable amount to these daily rated workmen has been framed, which is Annexure R V to the counter affi davit.
This document shows the amount of retrenchment com pensation and the ex gratia payment offered to the 63 daily rated workmen under this Scheme.
The 54 petitioners are included therein.
It was stated at the hearing before us that 9 out of these 63 daily rated workers mentioned in Annexure R V have accepted this Scheme of Voluntary Retire ment and respondent No. 2 is prepared to give benefit of the same even to those who may not have agitated their claim.
We do not find any ground to interfere with the High Court 's decision in view of the clear findings supported by evidence that there are no vacancies or work available in the establishment for absorption of the petitioners and that for quite some time they have been continued on rolls and paid in spite of there being no work for them.
On these facts, the question of directing their absorption and regu larisation does not arise.
The principle of regularisation of a daily rated workman and payment 'to him of the pay equal to that of a regular workman arises only when the daily rated workman is doing the same work as the regular workman and there being a vacancy available for him, he is not absorbed against it or not even paid the equal pay for the period during which the same work is taken from him.
On the clear findings in this case, this is not the position.
This petition must, therefore, fail.
In spite of our above conclusion, keeping in view the offer made on behalf of respondent No. 2 in the counter affidavit together with Annexure R V thereto which was reiterated at the heating before us, we direct that all the 63 daily rated workmen including the 54 petitioners herein mentioned in the aforesaid Annexure R V to the counter affidavit be given the benefit of the Voluntary Retirement Scheme framed by respondent No. 2 and they be paid the specified amounts in addition to their all other dues.
Subject to this direction, the special leave petition is dismissed.
No costs.
P.S.S. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
The petitioners, claiming to be daily rated workmen of the respondent Corporation in a writ before the High Court demanded regularisation of their services and equal pay for equal work on the ground that they were discharging the same duties as the regular workers.
Their claim was contested by the respondents on the ground that there was no work for them for a long time and they had been continued on rolls on humanitarian grounds.
The High Court rejected their claim.
In their counter affidavit to the special leave petition it was stated on behalf of the respondents that there was no vacancy in the establishment to absorb the petitioners, that they were surplus to the requirement of the project and that it had proposed a scheme of voluntary retirement for their benefit which some of them had accepted.
Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court, HELD: 1.
The principle of regularisation of a daily rated workmen and payment to him of the pay equal to that of a regular workman arises only when he is doing the same work as the regular workman and there being a vacancy available for him, he is not absorbed against it or not even paid the equal pay for the period during which the same work is taken from him.
[620E F] 2.
In the instant case, there were no vacancies or work available in the establishment for absorption of the peti tioners.
The question of directing their absorption and regularisation, therefore, does not arise.
However, they be given the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme and paid the specified amounts in addition to other dues.
[619H; 620A; G]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No, 307 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W. No. 3689 of 1984.
G.B. Pai, Ms. Urmila Kapoor and section Janani for the Appellant.
Prithivi Raj, Vishnu Mathut and Ms. section Dikshit for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J.
When the service of an employee is terminated consequent upon the employer accepting the resignation voluntarily tendered by the employee, does the termination so brought about amount to 'Retrenchment ' within the meaning of Section 2(s) read with Section 6N of the Uttar Pradesh , is the question which we are called upon to decide in this appeal by special leave.
The facts relevant to be stated for the disposal of this appeal are as under: Ram Singh was employed by the appellant company on 10th March, 1960 and was posted in the Bradma machine section of the company.
His duties were to attend to the printing of shares, pay sheets, registers, ESI cards etc.
, relating to the appellant company.
On 1st November, 1970 he addressed a letter of resignation to the Manager of the appellant compa ny in the following words: "R/Sir, I regret to bring to your kind notice that my family circum stances do not permit me to continue my service and hence I am compelled to sever my connections with these Mills imme diately.
I, therefore, request your goodself kindly to arrange for the payment of all my dues at an early date.
" Two days thereafter he wrote another letter to the Manager of the company which reads as under: 526 "R/Sir, Since I have already tendered my resignation from my serv ices, I request you kindly to depute somebody in the Bradma Office taking charge and learning the work, so that the entrusted work may be carried on smoothly.
Thanking you so much for making early arrangement as re quested.
" A copy of this letter was endorsed to the Special Executive of the appellant company for information and necessary action.
On receipt of the above letters, the Manager of the appellant company replied as under: "The resignation tendered by you vide your letter dated 1st instant, is hereby accepted with effect from 16th instant.
Please hand over charge of the Company 's properties in your possession to Shri R.S. Mathur and collect payment in full and final settlement from the Mills Pay Office." After the receipt of this letter the charge of the Bradma Section was handed over by the employee to the said R.S. Mathur on 15th November, 1970.
The amount due to the employee by way of salary, allowances, etc., upto 16th November, 1970 was worked out but the actual payment was received by the employee on 22nd December, 1970.
He was also paid his service gratuity at the end of February, 1971.
It appears that the employee raised an industrial dispute and sought a reference under Section 4K of the State Act.
The employee 's demand for a reference was initially rejected by the State Government on 12th November, 1973 but it came to be accepted subsequently on 28th November, 1974.
The appel lant company thereupon filed a writ petition challenging the said reference made by the State Government but the High Court dismissed the petition on 7th September, 1981.
Pursu ant to the reference, the Labour Court made an Award in favour of the employee on 25th January, 1984.
The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the employee 's resignation was not voluntary and, therefore, his services had been wrongly terminated with effect from 15th November, 1970.
He was ordered to be reinstated.
Against this Award of the Labour Court the appellant approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court came to the conclusion that the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily 527 and without any threat or coercion.
It also took the view that the claim for overtime wages was an after thought.
However, considering the definition of 'retrenchment ' in Section 2(s), the High Court came to the conclusion that the termination of service of the employee fell within the said definition and as the appellant company had failed to ob serve the requirements of section 6N, the termination of service was clearly invalid.
The approach to the High Court is reflected in the following passage of its Judgment: 8"The contention raised is that there was no act of the employer in this connection and hence this may not be said to be a case of retrenchment of the respondent.
To this I do not find possible to agree.
There is no denial that the respondent had been in continuous service for not less than one year within the meaning of Section 6N.
According to Section 2(s), retrenchment covers termination by the employ er of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever.
To this there are exceptions applicable where the termination is by way of punishment inflicted as a result of a discipli nary_ action or voluntary retirement of the workman or retirement of the workman on attaining the age of superannu ation.
The provision is in pari materia with section 2(00) of the Central Act.
The case does not fail within any of these exceptions.
Voluntary retirement of a workman may not stand in need of acceptance by the employer; this may be hedged in with certain conditions such as those relating to certain number of years having been put in service and the like, but resignation may be tendered at any time though it requires acceptance to be effective.
There is retrenchment under law where the services of a workman stand terminated for any reason whatsoever.
This may not be a consequence directly flowing from an act of the employer.
The material factor would be whether there is determination of the rela tionship of employer and workman between the parties.
If as a consequence this relationship has ceased or has been brought to an end, there is the resultant termination of the services of the workman.
" In support of this view reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in The State Bank of India vs N. Sundara Money, ; ; Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs The Presid ing Officer, Labour Court, Orissa & Others, ; , Delhi Cloth and General Mills LId.
vs Shambhu Nath Mukherji and Others, ; ; Santosh 528 Gupta vs State Bank of Patiala, ; and L. Robert D 'Souza vs Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Another, ; Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court in Corporation of Cochin vs Jalaji & Others, Proceeding further the High Court concluded as under: " . . the present is a case where there was act of the employer also before the termination became effective.
As discussed above, the resignation tendered by the respondent could not take effect without the acceptance on the part of the employer.
The acceptance was accorded on November 4, 1970, expressly in writing.
This clearly is an act of the employer which put a seal to the matter and brought about cessation of the relationship of the employer and the work man.
Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that it was a case of retrenchment.
It remains to be seen on relevant material whether in fact there was compliance made of the requirement of section 6N." However, the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court, Kanpur was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Labour Court for a decision on the question whether there was an infraction of section 6N. The High Court, however, made it clear that "the issue of resignation shall not be open to read judication".
In other words, the only question which the Labour Court was required to consider was whether the retrenchment was in conformity with section 6N of the State Act.
Feeling aggrieved by this order the appel lant company has approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The State Act, i.e., Uttar Pradesh was enacted to provide powers to prevent strikes and lock outs, to settle industrial disputes and for other incidental matters.
Section 2(s) defines the term 'Retrench ment ' as under: "2(s): 'Retrenchment ' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of discipli nary action, but does not include (i) voluntary retirement of the workmen; or 529 (ii) retirement of the workmen on reaching the age of super annuation if the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf.
" This definition is in pari materia with the definition of 'retrenchment ' found in section 2(00) of the Central Act i.e. as it stood prior to its amendment by Act LIX of 1984.
Section 6N the State Act reads as under: "6N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman.
No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month 's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice; Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days ' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the State Government.
" This section substantially reproduces section 25F of the Central Act.
In the Central Act the proviso came to be omitted by Act LIX of 1984 and instead clause (bb) came to be added to section 2(00).
The first question which we must consider is whether in the background of facts stated earlier it can be said that the services of the employee were terminated by way of 'retrenchment ' as understood by 530 section 2(s) and, if yes, whether the employer was required to comply with the provisions of section 6N of the State Act.
It becomes clear on a plain reading of the definition of the term 'retrenchment ' that it comprises of two parts; the first part is the inclusive part which defines retrench ment whereas the second part is in the nature of an excep tion and excludes two types of cases from the scope and ambit of the said definition.
Under the first part termina tion of an employee 's service by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than by way of punishment inflicted as a disciplinary measure, amounts to retrenchment.
Under the second part cases of (i) voluntary retirement & (ii) retire ment on superannuation are excluded from purview of the first part of the definition.
Termination of service can be brought about in diverse ways by an employer but every termination is not retrenchment, as for example, termination of service by way of punishment for proved misconduct.
The words 'for any reason whatsoever ' are undoubtedly words of wide import and hence termination of service by the employer will attract the definition of retrenchment unless it is shown to be penal in nature brought about by way of disci plinary action or as falling within one of the two exclusion clauses extracted earlier.
In order to counter the employ ee 's contention that he was retrenched from service on the employer having communicated the acceptance of his resigna tion, the employer has placed reliance on the first clause, namely, that the workman had voluntarily retired from serv ice.
The letter dated 1st November, 1970 written by the employee to the Manager of the appellant company expressing his desire to resign his job shows that it was a voluntary act on the part of the employee.
This was followed by anoth er letter of 3rd November, 1970 whereby the workman request ed the company to depute someone to take charge of the Bradma office so that he gets acquainted with the work to ensure a smooth take over.
It was on this request of the employee that the appellant company accepted his resignation by the letter of 4th November, 1970 with effect from 16th November, 1970.
From this correspondence it is crystal clear that the employee desired to sever his relations with the appellant company on account of his family circumstances.
But for this request made by the employee there was no reason for the appellant company to terminate the contract of service on its own.
Just as an employer has a right to terminate the service of an employee, an employee too has a fight to put an end to the contract of employment by inform ing his employer of his intention to give up the job.
This fight is specifically conferred by clause 21 of the Standing Orders certified under Section 5 of the Industrial Employ ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
This clause reads as under: 531 "Any permanent clerk desirous of leaving the company 's service shall give one month 's notice in writing to the Manager unless he has a specific agreement providing for a longer or shorter notice.
If any permanent clerk leaves the service of the company without giving notice, he shall be liable to be sued for damages." Similar clause with reduced notice period is also to be found in the certified Standing Orders for operatives.
Therefore, one of the ways of terminating the contract of employment is resignation.
If an employee makes his inten tion to resign his job known to the employer and the latter accepts the resignation, the contract of employment comes to an end and with it stands severed the employer employee relationship.
Under the common law the resignation is not complete until it is accepted by the proper authority and before such acceptance an employee can change his mind and withdraw the resignation but once the resignation is accept ed the contract comes to an end and the relationship of master and servant stands snapped.
Merely because the em ployer is expected to accept the employee 's resignation it cannot be said that the employer has brought about an end to the contract of employment so as to bring the case within the first part of the definition of retrenchment.
A contract of service can be determined by either party to the con tract.
If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may amount to retrenchment unless it is by way of punishment for proved misconduct.
But if an employee takes the initia tive and exercises his right to put an end to the contract of service and the employer merely assents to it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the employment.
In such cases the employer is merely acceding to the employee 's request, may be even reluctantly.
Here the employee 's role is active while the employer 's role is passive and formal.
The employer cannot force an unwilling employee to work for him.
Under clause 21 of the certified Standing Orders all that the employee is required to do is to give the employer a notice to quit and on the expiry of the notice period his service would come to an end.
A formal acceptance of the employee 's desire by the employer cannot mean that it is the employer who is putting an end to the contract of employ ment.
It would be unfair to saddle the employer with the liability to pay compensation even where the service is terminated on the specific request of the employee.
Such an intention cannot be attributed to the legislature.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that where a contract of service is determined on the employee exercising his right to quite, such termination cannot be said to be at the instance of the employer 532 to fall within the first part of the definition of retrench ment in section 2(s) of the State Act.
The High Court has placed reliance on ,four decisions of this Court to which we may now advert.
In Sundara Money 's case the employment was for a fixed duration of 9 days, on the expiry whereof the service was to end.
This condition was imposed unilaterally.
The employment was to terminate not because the employee did not desire to serve but because of the unilateral condition imposed by the employer.
The initiative for the termination, therefore, came from the employer attracting the wide terminology of section 2(00).
In Hindustan Steel Ltd. the termination of service was by efflux of time.
Placing reliance on the law laid down in Sundara Money 's case and the proviso to section 25F(a), this Court held that the termination of service was by way of retrenchment.
In the case of Delhi Cloth Mills the employ ee 's name was taken as automatically removed from the rolls of the company under the Standing Orders for continued absence without prior intimation.
The striking off the name was clearly an act of the employer resulting in termination of service amounting to retrenchment.
Santosh Gupta 's was a case of termination of service on account of her failure to pass the prescribed test.
That was the reason for terminat ing her service.
All the same it was the employer 's action which resulted in the termination of her service attracting section 2(00).
In the case of Robert D 'souza the termination was rounded on the ground of unauthorised absence from duty which clearly was an act of the employer.
In all the. above cases on which the High Court placed reliance, no question of termination of service on the employee voluntarily ten dering his resignation arose for consideration.
These cases are, therefore, not helpful since they turn on their own special facts.
None of them deals with a case of voluntary resignation tendered by an employee.
We may now examine the question from another angle, namely, whether an employee whose resignation has been accepted by the employer falls within the first exclusion clause to the definition of the term 'retrenchment '.
There can be no doubt that a resignation must be voluntarily tendered for if it is tendered on account of duress or coercion, it ceases to be a voluntary act of the employee expressing a desire to quite service.
In the present case the High Court has come to the conclusion that the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily.
Does termination of service brought about by the acceptance of resignation fall with the expression 'voluntary retirement '? The meaning of the term 'resign ' and 'retire ' in different dictionaries is as under: 533 TABLE Name of the Meaning of 'Resign ' Meaning of 'Retire ' Dictionary Black 's Law Formal renouncement to terminate employ Dictionary or relinquishment ment or service upon (5th Edn.) of an office.
reaching retirement age.
Shorter Ox To relinquish, The act of retiring ford English surrender, give up or withdrawing to Dictionary or hand over (some or from a place or (Revised thing); esp., an from a place or Edn. of 1973) office, position, position.
right, claim, etc.
To give up an office or position; to retire.
The Random To give up an office To withdraw from of House Dic , position etc.; to fice business or tionary relinquish (right, active life claim, agreement etc.) From the aforesaid dictionary meanings it becomes clear that when an employee resigns his office, he formally relin quishes or withdraws from his office.
It implies that he has taken a mental decision to sever his relationship with his employer and thereby put an end to the contract of service.
As pointed out earlier just as an employer can terminate the services of his employee under the contract.
So also an employee can inform his employer that he does not desire to serve him any more.
Albeit, the employee would have to give notice of his intention to snap the existing relationship to enable the employer to make alternative arrangements so that his work does not suffer.
The period of notice will depend on the period prescribed by the terms of employment and if no such period is prescribed, a reasonable time must be given before the relationship is determined.
If an employee is not permitted by the terms of his contract to determine the relationship of master and servant, such an employment may be branded as bonded labour.
That is why in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs Brojonath Ganguly, [1986] 3SCC 156 at page 228 this Court observed as under: 534 "By entering upon a contract of employment a person does not sign a bond of slavery and a permanent employee cannot be deprived of his right to resign.
A resignation by an employ ee would, however, normally require to be accepted by the employer in order to be effective." In the present case the employee 's request contained in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to the contract of service.
The meaning of term 'resign ' as found in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary includes 'retirement '.
Therefore, when an employee volun tarily tenders his resignation it is an act by which he voluntarily gives up his job.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that such a situation would be covered by the ex pression 'voluntary retirement ' within the meaning of cluase (i) of Section 2(s) of the State Act.
In Santosh Gupta 's case Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed as under: "Voluntary retrenchment of a workman or the retrenchment of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation can hardly be described as termination, by the employer, of the service of a workman".
(Here the word 'retrenchment ' has reference to 'retirement '.) above observation clearly supports the view which com mends to us.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was not right in concluding that because the employer accepted the resignation offer voluntarily made by the employee, he terminated the service of the employee and such termination, therefore, fell within the expression 'retrenchment ' rendering him liable to compensate the em ployee under section 6N.
We are also of the view that this was a case of 'volun voluntary retirement ' within the mean ing of the first exception to section 2(s) and therefore the question of grant of compensation under section oN does not arise.
We, therefore, cannot allow the view of the High Court to stand.
For the above reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the orders of the Courts below and hold that the employee is not entitled to any compensation under section 6N of the State Act.
The appeal is allowed accordingly.
No costs throughout.
Lal Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
One Ram Singh was appointed by the appellant company on 10.3.1960.
On 1.11.1970, he addressed a letter of resigna tion to the Manager of the company saying that owing to his family circumstances, it was no longer possible for him to continue in service and that he was compelled to sever his connections with the company.
He made a demand of all his dues.
He wrote another letter two days later that someone should be posted in the section where he was working in order that he may learn the work are: printing of shares, pay sheets and pay registers etc.
The appellant company conveyed the acceptance of the resignation with effect from the 16th November, 1970 and paid all his dues on 22.12.1970.
The amount of gratuity was also paid later.
Ram Singh there after raised an industrial dispute and sought a reference under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Initially his demand was not accepted by the State Govern ment but later the State Government accepted his demand on 28.11.1974 whereupon the appellant company filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the said reference made by the State Government but the High Court dismissed the petition.
The Labour Court thereafter made an award on the reference, in favour of the employee.
It came to the conclusion that the employee 's resignation was not voluntary and therefore his services had been wrongly terminated and accordingly he was directed to be reinstated.
The appellant challenged the validity of the said award under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court.
The High Court came to the conclusion that the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily but it held that termination of the service of the employee fell within the definition of 'r etrenchment ' as contained in Section 2(s) and as the appel lant company had failed to comply with the requirement of Section 6N, the termination of service was invalid.
The High Court accordingly set aside the order of reinstatement passed by 524 the Labour Court and remanded the matter to the Labour Court for a decision on the question whether there was infraction of the provisions of Section 6N. Being aggrieved by that order of the High Court, the appellant company has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: Where a contract of service is determined on the employee exercising his right to quit, such termination cannot be said to be at the instance of the employer to fail within the first part of the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(s) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
[531H; 532A] A contract of service can be determined by either party to the contract.
If it is determined at the behest of the employer it may amount to retrenchment unless it is by way of punishment for proved misconduct.
But if an employee takes the initiative and exercises his right to put an end to the contract of service and the employer merely assents to it, it cannot be said that the employer has terminated the employment.
In such cases the employer is merely acced ing to the employee 's request, may be even reluctantly.
Here the employee 's role is active while the employer 's role is passive and formal.
The employer cannot force an unwilling employee to work for him.
[531E F] When an employee resigns his office, he formally relin quishes or withdraws from his office.
it implies that he has taken a mental decision to sever his relationship with his employer and thereby put an end to the contract of service.
[533E] In the present case the employee 's request contained in the letter of resignation was accepted by the employer and that brought an end to the contract of service.
[534B] This was a case of 'voluntary retirement ' within the meaning of the first exception to section 2(s) and therefore the question of grant of compensation under section 6N did not arise.
The employee is not entitled to any compensation under section 6N of the State Act.
[534F] The State Bank of India vs
N. Sundara Money; , ; Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs The Presiding Officer, Labour court, Orissa and Ors., ; ; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. vs Shambhu Nath Mukherji and others; , ; Santosh (Gupta vs State Bank of Patiala, ; ; L. Robert D 'souza vs, Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr., [1982] 1SCC 645 and 525 Corporation of Cochin vs Jalaji and Ors., [1984] 1 LLJ