judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 584 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.9.1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979.
A.B. Rohtagi and M.S. Mann for the Appellant.
Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court were delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J. I wholly agree with my learned brother Saikia, J. with regard to the reasoning and the conclusions.
He has succinctly stated the facts of the case and the relevant provisions of law and they need no reiteration.
I would add only few points which I deem relevant to be dealt with.
As regards the applicability of the limitation of six months period prescribed under Rule 18 for the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt.
under Section 42 of the Act, assailing legality or propriety of the scheme prepared or confirmation thereof or repartition made in pursuance thereof, it could be angulated from yet another perspective.
Indisputably Section 42 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1960 incorporating after the words any order passed "(Scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made)".
Rule 18 was made in exercise of the rule making power by the subordinate legislation.
After the amendment of Section 42 was made to exercise the revisional power by the State Govt.
against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, correspondingly, no amendment to Rule 18 was made bringing within its ambit scheme prepared or con firmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
It is unnecessary to go into the question whether Rule 18 was declared to be intra vires or not.
We proceed on the footing that Rule 18 is ultra vires and applies to the exercise of the revisional power by the State Govt.
under Section 42.
The omission to amend the Rule is an indication of the legislative animation that the limitation of six months prescribed under the Rule 18 would be confined to be ap plicable only to "any order passed by any officer under the Act.
Thereby, by necessary implication the prescription of the limitation of six months for filing revision petition against the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof would stand excluded.
It is no 580 doubt true as contended for respondents that the Consolida tion Officer who has prepared the scheme or confirmed it or modified or repartition made when it is objected to by the affected party, has to consider the objections and, as a part thereof by necessary implication, has to assign reasons and the record must contain reasons.
But the legislature made a dichotomy between the orders passed and scheme pre pared or confirmation thereof or repartition affected in pursuance thereof.
He is not free to take arbitrary deci sion.
Assigning reasons are sine quo non for application of the mind though he does not appear to communicate the rea sons therefore.
But to an order passed assigning reasons in its support and communication thereof are necessary concomi tants and this was made manifest when Section 19, 20 and 21 are looked into.
As regards the exercise of the power under Section 19 and 20 the statute does not envisage passing any orders.
But when exercise of the power in Sub sec.
20 of 21, the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limitation against those orders to the appellate forums.
This, also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42.
It is undoubted that the scheme prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof are amena ble to the revisional jurisdiction under section 42.
The State Govt. would consider the legality or propriety of the reasons or the grounds on which the scheme was initially prepared or confirmed or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
But that does not mean that it is an order made and the limitation of six months prescribed under Rule 18 would get attracted to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or modified or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
Thus I have.
little hesitation to hold that the prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by any officer under the Act; it would not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti tion made in pursuance thereof.
It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre scribed for exercise of the revisional power under Section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time.
What is a reasonable time is always a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances in each case.
When legisla ture chose not to fix a particular period of limitation by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particu lar period.
The long lapse of time may be a fact for the revisional authority to take into 581 account in the light of the facts and circumstances obtain able in an appropriate case.
No absolute or precise period of limitation could be predicated or laid.
Take for instance the facts of this case.
the previous Sarpanch is a benefici ary from the impugned order and has chosen not to take steps to have the scheme impugned by filing a revision under Section 42 of the Act.
The Gram Panchayat, being a juristic person, could not by itself except through the executive authority take.
any action against the scheme prepared by the Consolidation Officer to assail its legality or proprie ty by filing the revision.
The revision petition was filed soon after the new Sarpanch came into office.
Take another instance of a case where the officer concerned and the person benefitted, in confabulation, have made a scheme and repartition affected in pursuance thereto and kept it in dark to the knowledge of the person affected by the scheme prepared or the partition made.
Until the person affected had actual knowledge, it is not possible to become award of it.
The limitation begins to run from the date of the knowl edge of the fraud so played.
It is always open to the af fected person to come forward and say that for the first time he became aware of the scheme prepared or partition made in pursuance thereof only when his rights are sought to be interfered with or exercise of the enjoyment of the property is interdicted.
Therefore immediately within a reasonable time thereafter he is to file a revision before the State Govt.
Having had the knowledge of the impugned action if he stood by without taking any further action, it is always open to the other party to bring it to the notice of the State Govt.
of the ground or the circumstances under which the revision petitioner when he became aware of the scheme prepared or the repartition made and he deliberately chose to acquiesce to it and if the State Govt.
is satisfied of the same, unless satisfactory explanation for the delay is given, the State Govt.
may decline to interfere with the impugned action or may decline to entertain the revision petition itself.
Thus it could be seen that each case has to be angulated on its own given facts and circumstances as to the reasonable period of limitation within which the revi sional power is to be filed.
Even though more than 5 years time had elapsed from the date of the preparation of the scheme till date of the filing of the revision under Section 42, there is sufficient ground in this case for the new Sarpanch in not filing a revision within six months from the date of the original scheme and the State Govt.
is well justified in exercising the power under Section 42.
The High Court is unjustified in interfering with the order passed by the Consolidation Officer.
Accordingly, the appeal is al lowed.
No costs.
582 K.N. SAIKIA, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandi garh dated 21.9.1979 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 allowing the petition and setting aside the order of the Director, Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
The appellant Gram Panchayat, hereinafter referred to as the 'Panchayat ', was the owner of 1200 Bighas of land in village Kanonda, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak.
A Scheme of consolidation of holdings, hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme ', of the village was confirmed on 15.1.1974 under section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act '.
The Panchayat, there fore, moved an application under section 42 of the Act on 20.9.1977 for setting aside the Scheme, objecting to the utilisation of the land of value of /2/ (two annas) and allotments made to the other rightholders for their benefit.
On 24.1.
1979 a Mushtehri Mundadi was made for information of all the villagers concerned, but the rightholders were absent and ex party proceedings were taken against them.
The Panchayat 's case was that under the said Scheme the Panchay at land was consolidated, repartitioned and allotted to persons who did not have any right to hold the land.
Be sides, the land of Dharat containing two wells and a big house being religious place of worship was also partitioned under the Scheme and consequently the Panchayat has been reduced to a landless person, financially weakened and rendered incapable of rendering service in the village.
After hearing the parties the Director in his order dated 8.2.
1979 observed that it was evident from the perus al of the record that the Scheme of Consolidation of the village was confirmed on 15.1.
1974 whereas the application had been filed on 20.9.
1977 and as such the application had been filed too late.
After the expiry of six months period the application was time barred.
However, he said in his order: "In this case only to benefit some land own ers, the land of the value of two annas has been allotted due to which the deserving persons have been left over and they have not been given even Abadi plots.
Apart from this the Panchayat had no other land to cultivate, due to which the Panchayat is unable to devel op the agricultural schemes and in these circumstances of the matter I condone the delay in filing the present application.
" 583 He accordingly set aside the Scheme and remanded the case to the Consolidation Officer under section 21(2) of the Act with some directions.
Against that order the respondents moved the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 2247 of 1979 urging, inter alia, that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had condoned the delay without there being any ground for the same and that, in doing so, he had acted illegally and with material irregu larity.
The High Court held that from the observations of the Director it was evident that the delay was condoned on extraneous considerations as no reason whatsoever was given by the applicant in the application filed before him under section 42 of the Act as to why it was filed after the period of limitation.
In that view of the matter, holding that the Director of Consolidation of Holdings had acted illegally and with material irregularity in condoning the delay, the High Court by the impugned order dated 21.9.79 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the Director of Consolidation of Holdings dated 8.2.1979.
Mr. A.B. Rohtagi, the learned counsel for the appel lant, submits that the High Court erred in setting aside the Director of Consolidation 's order applying to the confirma tion of the Scheme the period of limitation of six months as prescribed in Rule 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consoli dation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules 1949, herein after referred to as 'the Rules ', inasmuch as that rule speaks only of orders and not of confirmation of the Scheme; and that a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundar, , taking the view that the bar of limitation under Rule 18 does not apply to those petitions under section 42 in which the legality or validity of a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is challenged has overruled AIR 1982 Punjab and Har yana 148 and that Full Bench decision has since been followed in Mr. Rohtagi further submits that on merits also there was ample justification for the Director to have taken the view it did inasmuch as Panchayat lands were taken into consolidation and repartitioned and allotted to persons who had no right to obtain the land thereby impoverishing the Panchayat and rendering it incapa ble of giving any help to the villagers.
Mr. Harbans Lal, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Full Bench decision that the limitation under rule 18 does not cover an order confirming a scheme is not tenable inasmuch as confirmation of a scheme is only by an order as contemplated under rule 18, and an applica tion challenging that order of confirmation has, there 584 fore, to be made within six months thereof; and that even assuming that there was no bar of limitation, an application had to be made within a reasonable time which, according to learned counsel, would be 'about two years '; and that by any standard the appellant 's application under section 42 was belated and could not have been allowed.
Lastly, counsel submits that there were three earlier applications dismissed by the Director under section 42 of the Act, including one by the Panchayat itself, and the Director had no power to review his own order.
The questions to be decided therefore are, whether for the purpose of limitation under rule 18 of the Rules confir mation of a scheme would be an order as envisaged in the rule; if it was not an order, whether the Director was justified in setting aside the scheme and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer; and whether the Direc tor 's order was one of review of his earlier order and as such beyond his jurisdiction.
To decide the first question we may conveniently refer to the provisions of the Act and rule 18 of the Rules.
Section 42 of the Act empowers the State Government to call for proceedings under the Act.
It says: "42.
Power of State Government to call for proceedings:The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repar tition made by any officer under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no order or scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed with out giving the parties interested notice ' to appear and opportunity to be heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.
" From a perusal of this section there arises no doubt that under it the State Government may for the stated purpose call for proceedings wherein any order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made by any officer under this Act.
Under the proviso the State 585 Government shall not vary or reverse any order or scheme or repartition without giving the interested parties opportuni ty of being heard except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have been vitiated by unlawful consideration.
There is therefore no doubt that this section envisages proceedings wherein order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under this section.
Rule 18 deals with limitation for application under section 42, and it reads: "18.
Limitation for application under section 42: An application under section 42 shall be made within six months of the date of the order against which it is filed: Provided that in computing the period of limitation, the time spent in ob taining certified copies of the orders and the grounds of appeal, if any, filed under sub section (3) or sub section(4) of section 21, required to accompany the application shall be excluded: Provided further, that an applica tion may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore if the appli cant satisfies the authority competent to take action under section 42 that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
" From a perusal of this rule there arises no doubt that for applying this rule the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application and in computing the period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob taining the certified copy is to be excluded.
While the Division Bench comprising P.C. Jain and Tewa tia, JJ of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the instant case applied the period of limitation to the confirmation of the scheme and in that view of the matter set aside the Director 's order, the Full Bench comprising P.C. Jain, Acting C.J., Tewatia and Tiwana, JJ.
held: "A bare perusal of rule 18 of the Rules would show that .it provides limitation only for petitions filed against orders 586 passed.
There is no reference in the Rules to a scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
The fact that in section 42 of the Act the words 'scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made ' have been added as a result of amendment, cannot justify the conclusion that in Rule 18 of the Rules these words have also to be read.
" We respectfully agree with this view.
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as we find it and the words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense.
Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word 'order ' namely, that in section 42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made; while in rule 18 it would include them.
The Full Bench therefore rightly held that rule 18 of the Rules does not apply to those proceedings in which the legality or validity of the scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made is chal lenged.
The Full Bench rightly approved the decision in Haqiqat Singh vs Addl.
Director, Consolidation of Holdings, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204, wherein it was held that a reading of section 42 as well as the scheme of the Act unmistakably pointed out that the statute made a clear distinction between order passed by an officer under the Act and the performance of duties by the authorities under the Act in the matter of preparation and confirmation of scheme of consolidation and re partition made in pursuance thereof.
So it could not possibly be held that preparation or confir mation of a scheme and the repartition carried would fail within the scope of 'order ' as used in rule 18 of the rules.
The rule did not come into play when a petitioner challenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation of the repartition made in pursuance there of.
The amendment made this position clear.
In a subsequent decision reported in Joginder Singh and Ors.
vs The Director, Consolidation of Holdings, decided on August 8, 1988, where the direct hold ers had not challenged any order of the consolidation au thorities but had attacked the validity of the scheme and the repartition, it was rightly held that the bar of limita tion of six months in rule 18 of the Rules was not attracted to the facts of that case.
Mr. Harbans Lal submits that the above decisions require reconsideration.
We do not agreed.
We have perused the provisions of the Act and rule 18.
The Act provides for the compulsory consolidation of, and for prevention of fragmen tation of, agricultural holdings in the 587 State of Punjab and for the assignment or reservation of land for common purposes of the village.
It appears that prior to the Act there were two methods of consolidation in vogue in the Province, one through the Revenue Department and the other through the Cooperative Department but the progress of consolidation was very slow and lengthy and the Act sought to remedy those defects.
Section 19 of the Act provides for publication of draft scheme and on such publi cation any person likely to be affected by such scheme, shall, within 30 days of such publication, communicate in writing to the Consolidation Officer any objections relating to the scheme.
The Consolidation Officer, shall, after considering the objections, if any received, submit the scheme with such amendment as he considers necessary togeth er with his remarks on the objections to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).
Thus, in this section we do not find any provisions for any order being passed.
Section 20 deals with confirmation of the scheme.
Under sub section(2) thereof if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section (1) of section 19 and also if no written or oral objections to the draft scheme are received under subsection (3) of that section by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) he shall confirm that scheme.
Under sub section (3) if any objections are received to the draft scheme published under sub section (1) of section 19 or if any written or oral objections are received by the Settle ment Officer (Consolidation) before the confirmation of the draft scheme by him the Settlement Officer(Consolidation) may after taking the objections into consideration together with the remarks thereon of the Consolidation Officer and also after considering the written or oral objections either confirm the scheme with or without modifications, or refuse to confirm it.
In case of such refusal the Settlement Offi cer (Consolidation) shall return the draft scheme, with such directions as may be necessary to the Consolidation Officer, for reconsideration and resubmission .
Under sub section (4) upon the consideration of the scheme under sub section (2) or (3) the scheme as confirmed shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.
Thus, this section also does not envisage passing of any order with reference to any person affected by the scheme.
It may be true, as Mr. Harbans Lal submits, that the confirmation may be done in the form of an order.
However, the word 'order ' has not been used by the legislature in this sec tion.
Section 21 deals with repartition.
Under sub section (1) of this section, the Consolidation Officer shall, after obtaining the advice of the land owners of the estate or estates concerned, carry out repartition in accordance with the scheme of consolidation of holdings 588 confirmed under section 20 and the boundaries of the hold ings as demarcated shall be shown on the Shajra which shall be published in the prescribed manner in the estate or estates concerned.
There is no provision of passing of any 'order ' under this sub section.
Under subsection (2) any person aggrieved by the repartition may file written objec tion within 15 days of the publication before the Consolida tion Officer who shall after hearing the objectors pass such orders as he considers proper confirming or modifying the repartition.
Thus this sub section envisages passing of orders on the objections after hearing the objectors.
Sub section (3) provides that any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer under sub section (2) may within one month of that order file an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) who shall after hearing the appellant pass such order as he considers proper.
This sub section also clearly envisages passing of an order on appeal by an aggrieved person as above.
Subsection (4) provides that any person aggrieved by the order of Settle ment Officer (Consolidation) under sub section (3) whether made before or after the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962 may within 60 days of that order appeal to the Assistant Director of Consolida tion and under sub section (5) any appeal against an order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) pending under sub section (4) immediately before the commencement of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Frag mentation) Second Amendment and Validation Act, 1962, either before the State or any officer to whom the powers of the State Government in this behalf have been delegated, shall be decided by the Assistant Director of Consolidation.
Thus, the above sub sections clearly envisage passing of orders by the respective authorities.
We have already extracted section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules.
It would be clear that though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a pro ceeding where an order was passed.
There is the maxim ex pressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
When certain persons or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred.
When mention has been made only of 'Orders ', the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are 589 excluded.
Again, Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretation.
The best interpretation is made from the context.
As we have seen, while section 19 and 20 did not envisage passing of any order section 21 envisaged passing of orders.
Section 42 deals with applications against or ders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition.
Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes 'preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition '.
We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench deci sion in Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings (supra).
Mr. Harbans Lal 's submission that even if no limitation was prescribed the application of the Panchayat before the Director was inordinately delayed is not tenable.
According to the learned counsel the period of two years would be reasonable period.
We are unable to agree.
In matters like Consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to reasonable period after which an appli cation could be made under section 42 of the Act.
The legis lature itself did not do so.
In the instant case the Pan chayat filed the application on 20th September, 1977 before the Director of Consolidation under section 42 of the Act praying for the revocation of the Scheme and for directions for fresh valuation to be ordered and repartition effected through appropriate authorities stating that the Sarpanch was not given any Nishan Dehi or demarcation on the spot nor was issued any passbook, and the petition was not filed earlier because the new Sarpanch came to know all these only a month ago and so the petition was claimed to be in time.
The original Sarpanch was a beneficiary out of the Panchayat land and he took no steps and the present Sarpanch took charge only a few months ago.
There were lot of complaints about valuation and allotments to rightholders.
Under the above circumstances when the Director himself considered it fit for granting the prayer, it cannot be said that the application was unreasonably delayed.
The next submission of Mr. Harbans Lal is equally un tenable.
It is true that in Harbhajan Singh vs Karam Singh and Anr., ; , it has been held that there is no provision in the Act granting express power of Review to the State Government with regard to an order made under section 42 of the Act and in the absence of any such power the Director, Consolidation of Holdings could not have reviewed his previous order dismissing an application of the Panchay at 590 under section 42 of the Act, and if so done, the review order of the Director would be ultra vires and without jurisdiction.
In the instant case it has not been shown to us that the Panchayat earlier moved any application under section 42 on the same subject matter and the instant order of the Director amounted to a review of his own order.
There is no material to hold that the instant order of the Direc tor is an order of review of his earlier order; and Mr. Rohtagi clearly denied that it was so.
In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the im pugned order of the High Court and restore that of the Director, Consolidation.
We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant Panchayat owned 1200 Bighas of land in Village Kanonda Distt.
Rohtak in Haryana.
A Scheme of con solidation of Holdings under Section 20 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 was confirmed on 15.1.1974, as a result whereof the Panchayat 's land was consolidated, repartitioned and allot ted to persons, allegedly having no right to hold the same with the result, the Panchayat was reduced as a landless person, and financially weak.
The Panchayat, therefore, on 20.9.1977 moved an application under section 42 of the Act objecting to the utilization of the Land of the value of /2/ (Two annas) and the allotments made to other right holders.
After hearing the parties, the Director of Consolidation of Holdings by his order dated 8.2.79 set aside the scheme and remanded the case to the consolidation officer with some directions.
The Director took the view that even though the application had been made much beyond the period of limita tion of six months contemplated under Rule 18, yet in view of the fact that the Panchayat had no other land to culti vate due to which the Panchayat was unable to develop the agricultural Schemes, condoned the delay and allowed the application as aforesaid.
Against the said orders the Re spondents moved the High Court by means of a Writ Petition urging inter alia that the Director had condoned the delay without there being any ground for the same and thus had acted illegally.
The High Court held that the Director condoned the delay on extraneous considerations and accord ingly quashed the impugned 577 order of 8.2.79 passed by the Director.
Hence the Panchayat has filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (Per K.N. Saikia & M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.) Section 42 of the Act envisages proceedings wherein order is passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made.
These are the distinct proceedings for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction under this section.
[585B] Applying Rule 18, the application has to be one under section 42 of the Act, and it has to be against an order and under the first proviso, a certified copy of the order is required to accompany the application and in computing the period of limitation of six months, the time spent in ob taining the certified copy is to be excluded.
[585F].
Rule 18 has to be interpreted as it is found, and the words of the rule are simple, precise and unambiguous and no more is necessary than to understand these words in their natural and ordinary sense.
Two different meanings cannot be given to the same word "order" namely, that, in section 42 it does not include scheme prepared or confirmed or reparti tion made, while in Rule 18, it would include them.
[586B C] The Rule did not come into play when a petitioner chal lenged either the scheme of consolidation including its preparation or confirmation or the repartition made in pursuance thereof.
The amendment made this position clear.
[586E] Though section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a proceeding where an order was passed.
There is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.
When mention has been made only of "orders", the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are excluded.
[588F G] In matters like consolidation of Holdings by a scheme and the preparation and confirmation of the scheme and repartition thereafter, the objections may arise at various stages for various reasons and it will 578 not be possible to prescribe any hard and fast rule as to the reasonable period after which an application could be made under section 42 of the Act.
The Legislature itself did not do so.
[589C D] In the instant case, it has not been shown that the Panchayat earlier moved an application under section 42 on the same subject matter.
There is no material to hold that the instant order of the Director is an order of review of his earlier order.
[590A] (Per K. Ramaswamy, J.) As regards the exercise of the power under sections 19 & 20, the statute does not envisage passing any orders.
But when exercising the power, the officer is enjoined to pass orders and appeals are provided within the prescribed limi tation against those orders to the appellate forums.
This also, is an indication of the fact that the limitation of six months is confined to the orders to be revised under section 42.
[580C D] The prescription of limitation of six months under Rule 18 would be confined only to order passed by an officer under the Act, it would not apply to the revision filed against the scheme prepared on confirmed or repartition made in pursuance thereof.
[580F] It is undoubted that when there is no limitation pre scribed for exercise of the revisional power under section 42 against the schemes prepared or confirmed or repartition made, it would be exercised within a reasonable time.
[580G] What is reasonable time is always a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[580G] When legislature chose not to fix a particular period of limitation, by judicial dicta it is not permissible to limit to a particular period.
:While exercising power under Sec tion 42, the revisional authority may take into account the long lapse of time as a factor in the light of the facts and circumstances obtainable in an appropriate, case.
No abso lute or precise period of limitation could be predicted or laid.
[580H] Jagtar Singh vs Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Jullundar, AIR 1984 Punjab & Haryana 216, ap proved.
Haqiqat Singh vs Addl.
Director, Consolidation of Hold ings, AIR 1981 Punjab & Haryana 204; Joginder Singh & Ors.
vs The Director, 579 Consolidation of Holdings, and Harbha jan Singh vs Karam Singh & Anr., ; , referred to.


judgement:
minal Appeal No. 77 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 26, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 860 of 1957, arising out 155 1220 of the judgment and order dated December 23, 1957, of the Additional Sessions Judge at Ambala in Sessions No. 20 of 1957 and Trial No. 32 of 1957.
Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh, for the appellant.
Har Parshad and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
September 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J.
The appellant and one Prem were tried for the murder of Nirmala Devi, wife of Banwari Lal, a Practising lawyer at Rupar.
The appellant was sentenced to death while Prem was sentenced to imprisonment for life.
The appellant and Prem appealed against their conviction and sentence to the High Court of Punjab.
Their appeals were dismissed and their conviction and sentence were affirmed by the High Court.
The appellant obtained from this Court special leave to appeal and in the present appeal the only question for consideration is whether the appellant was rightly convicted and sentenced for the murder of Nirmala Devi.
The case of Prem is not before us.
At Rupar, Banwari Lal practised as a lawyer.
His wife, the deceased Nirmala Devi lived with him there with their child, eight months old.
With them also lived Banwari Lal 's sister Vina, a girl of about 16 to 17 years of age.
Banwari Lal had employed Prem as a servant about four months before the murder of Nirmala Devi on February 12, 1957.
This Prem was a youngster of about fourteen years of age at that time.
According to the prosecution, lie was an associate of the appellant who was posted at Rupar in the capacity of a foot constable in the police force.
The appellant and Prem became friendly and it is said that the appellant had an eye on the ornaments of the deceased Nirmala Devi, which she was in the habit of wearing when she went out.
The deceased was a young person in her twenties and of good character.
She used to be left alone in the house with her child, when Banwari Lal went to court and Vina went to school.
Prem, however, used to remain at the house.
It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant in 1221 conspiracy with Prem took advantage of the deceased being alone in the house, when the appellant went upstairs and killed Nirmala Devi and stole her ornaments, while Prem remained down stairs with her child.
Vina had returned from school round about, 12 30 in the afternoon as it was the recess time.
At that time Nirmala Devi was in the drawing room feeding her child.
Prem was also at the house at that time.
Vina again returned to the house at about 3 45 p.m.
She enquired from Prem as to where Nirmala Devi was and was told by him that he did not know as he himself had been absent from the house.
Vina, thereafter, went upstairs to the kitchen to take her food.
Banwari Lal had returned from court at about 3 15 p.m., earlier than usual, as he had to attend an election meeting at the Municipal Office.
He was accompanied by a pleader Sudarshan Kumar Jain who was going to Chandigarh.
He had intended to give him a cup of tea, but finding the door leading through the staircase to the residential portion looked and thinking that his wife was not at home, lie and his friend left for the Municipal Hall.
Banwari Lal returned to his house at about 4 45 p.m.
He enquired from Prem as to where his wife was and was informed by him that she had gone out.
He went upstairs and saw his sister Vina eating her food.
On opening the drawing room, however, Banwari Lal was stunned to find his wife lying dead on the floor in a pool of blood.
lie noticed several injuries on her and that some of her jewellery was missing.
He proceeded to the police station almost opposite to his house and lodged a First Information Report about the murder at 5 p.m.
There can be no manner of doubt that an audacious and a brutal murder of a young and a defenceless person had taken place with the intention of robbing her of her ornaments.
The fact of murder has been apply proved and has not been seriously questioned.
The only matter for consideration is Whether the evidence established that the deceased Nirmala Devi was murdered by the appellant with the assistance of Prem.
The evidence upon which the prosecution relied for 1222 conviction is the confession of Prem, the statement of the appellant which led to the recovery of the ornaments belonging to Nirmala Devi from the possession of one Raj Rani a mistress of the appellant, the recovery of a blood stained dagger from his belongings at the police station and his conduct after the murder.
So far as the confession of Prem was concerned, it was retracted by him in the Court of Session.
Prem 's statement under section 342 to the Committing Magistrate, however, which had been brought on to the record under section 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, clearly stated that the confession was a voluntary one.
Indeed, his statement to the Committing Magistrate showed that the crime was committed by the appellant and that Prem had assisted him in the commission of that crime.
Although in the Court of Session Prem had retracted his confession, his memorandum of appeal in the High Court would indirectly suggest that the con fession made by him was voluntary and true.
Before we consider whether the confession was a voluntary and a true one, it is necessary to deal with the submission on behalf of the appellant that the confession, having been retracted by Prem, is irrelevant so far as the appellant is concerned as the retracted confession of an accused cannot be used against his co accused.
Although on behalf of the appellant it had not been argued that the retracted confession of Prem was inadmissible, we regard the submission that it was irrelevant and cannot be used against the appellant as tantamount to saying the same thing.
Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act states: " When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.
" It will be clear from the terms of this section that where more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, a confession made by any one of them affecting himself and any one of his co accused 1223 can be taken into consideration by the court not only against the maker of the confession but also against his co accused.
The Evidence Act nowhere provides that if the confession is retracted, it cannot be taken into consideration against the co accused or the confessing accused.
Accordingly, the provisions of the Evidence Act do not prevent the Court from taking into consideration a retracted confession against the confessing accused and his co accused.
Not a single decision of any of the courts in India was placed before us to show that a retracted confession was not admissible in evidence or that it was irrelevant as against a co accused.
An examination of the reported decisions of the various High Courts in India indicates that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view that although it may be taken into consideration against a co accused by virtue of the provisions of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, its value was extremely weak and there could be no conviction with out the fullest and strongest corroboration on material particulars.
The corroboration in the full sense implies corroboration not only as to the factum of the crime but also as to the connection of the (co accused with that crime.
In our opinion, there appears to be considerable justification for this view.
The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession, however, would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
Although a retracted confession is admissible against a co accused by virtue of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, as a matter of prudence and practice a court would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co accused without corroboration.
On this basis it is now to be seen whether the confession was voluntary and true.
It will then be necessary to consider whether the confession has received full and strong corroboration in material particulars both as to the crime and the appellant 's connection with that crime.
It was strongly urged that the police had adopted a device to get the accused Prem into their custody again on a charge of theft as lie had already been placed in the judicial lock up after his arrest in 1224 connection with the murder of the deceased Nirmala Devi.
He was arrested on June 25, 1957, in connection with a burglary which had taken place on December 5, 1956, and he had been since then in police custody in connection with the investigation of that case until July 10, 1957, the last day of remand to police custody.
On July 10, 1957, Prem made a confession before a Magistrate concerning the murder of Nirmala Devi.
Prem was discharged in the burglary case on July 20, 1957.
Having adopted this device of getting Prem into police custody the police were in a position to exercise great influence upon Prem, a, young ' lad of about 14 years of age.
When lie made his confession on July 10, 1957, he must have been still labouring under the influence of the police and sufficient time was not given by the Magistrate to remove that influence.
The Magistrate ought not to have recorded his confession on July 10, 1957.
He ought to have remanded Prem to jail custody for a few days in order that the police influence may be removed from his mind.
We have examined the record and find no justification for the suggestion made that the police adopted a device to got the accused Prem in to their custody again by arresting him in the burglary case of December 5, 1956.
It is true that the accused Prem was discharged from the burglary case on July 20, 1957, but there is nothing on the present record to suggest that his arrest in the burglary case of December 5, 1956, was without justification and that it was done purely for the purpose of getting him back into police custody.
It is true that Prem had been in police custody from June 25, 1957 to July 10, 1957, and the Magistrate might as well have refrained from recording his confession on July 10, 1957.
It is clear, however, from the record of the Magistrate that at 1 p.m. the accused Prem was produced before him by the police for the recording of his confession.
The Magistrate told him that lie was not a police officer but a Magistrate and that he was at liberty to think over the matter whether he would volunteer to make a confession and gave him time, until 2 p.m. for this purpose.
He further explained to Prem that he should 1225 consider himself quite free and not make a statement under the influence or temptation of anybody.
At 2 p.m. the Magistrate took various precautions.
All the doors and the windows of his room were closed.
Everyone, except Prem, was turned out.
The police were asked to stand in the verandah from where they could not see Prem.
Prem was again told that he must regard himself as quite free and should not be under the influence of the police or anybody else.
The Magistrate then put a series of questions which have been recorded in the form of questions and answers.
By question 7, the Magistrate enquired how long Prem had been in police custody and from where he bad been brought that day, to which, the answer was that some 5 months back he had been arrested since then sometimes he had been sent to jail and sometimes had been kept in police custody.
By question 8, the Magistrate asked whether he was kept awake during that period or had been given greased diet (Mnaggan giza, etc.), which we understand to mean whether he had been given greasy food which would induce a sleepy condition in persons eating such food, to which question he replied that he had enjoyed regular sleep and had been taking common diet.
At the beginning, of course, the police had kept him awake.
The Magistrate also enquired whether the police or any other person had made any promise or had given any undertaking to help Prem or had given all temptation to him or had influenced or frightened him.
If so, he should state this fully from his heart, to which Prem replied that he had not been given any promise, temptation or inducement, nor was he subjected to fear or exhortation.
He had been merely asked to make a true statement.
Prem then said that he would make his statement of his own free will and the Magistrate could believe him or not.
The Magistrate also asked Prem whether any one had beaten him or if there was any mark of injury on his body, to which, the answer was 'no '.
The Magistrate then examined the body of Prem and found that there was no mark of injury on his person.
The Magistrate then asked as to why he was making a confession, to which, Prem answered 1226 that he was doing so of his own free will and to lessen the burden of his heart.
The nature of the questions put and the manner in which the Magistrate examined Prem clearly showed that the Magistrate took every precaution to be satisfied whether Prem was going to make a voluntary statement.
We are satisfied that during the period of police custody between the 25th of June and July 10, 1957, Prem was not induced to make a confession.
He made the confession voluntarily.
That the confession was voluntary finds support from Prem 's statement to the Committing Magistrate under section 342 of the Code of ' Criminal Procedure.
In that statement Prem told the Magistrate in answer to various questions the following story: He had been employed as a domestic servant by the lawyer Banwari Lal.
He had developed during this period friendship with the appellant.
The appellant had told him that he would commit rape on Nirmala Devi and would rob her of her ornaments and, if she resisted, he would murder her.
He informed the appellant on February 11, 1957, that Nirmala Devi would be alone in her house at about mid day on February 12, 1957.
He had received on February 11, 1957, a dagger wrapped in a pajama from the appellant and bad kept it in the store behind the office of Banwari Lal On February 12, 1957, he informed the appellant that Nirmala Devi was alone in the house.
He had handed over the dagger and the pajama to the appellant on February 12, after taking it out of the store room.
The appellant had sought his assistance in the commission of rape, robbery and murder of Nirmala Devi and he had been promised a half share in the booty.
To the question whether he had kept watch over the house of Banwari Lal when the appellant entered it for committing rape, robbery and murder of Nirmala Devi, Prem answered that he was made to stand near the stair case by the appellant and that he kept watch while the appellant committed the crime.
He finally admitted to the Committing Magistrate that the confession which had been recorded on July 10, 1957, was a voluntary confession.
When asked whether he had to say anything else, Prem told the Committing 1227 Magistrate that he had made a true statement before him and also in the Court of the Magistrate who had recorded his confession.
Shorn of details the substance of the story told by Prem to the Committing Magistrate is in keeping with the substance of his confession recorded on July 10, 1957.
It is to be further remembered that the statement of Prem to the Committing Magistrate was brought on to the record of the Court of Session under section 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which directs that the statement should be read as evidence.
Although Prem retracted the confession in the Court of Session, his memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court showed that he had acted under the influence of the appellant and had been allured by him to achieve his object.
He, however, pleaded that be should not have received such severe punishment.
On the contrary, lie should have been acquitted.
These circumstances clearly indicate that the confession recorded on July 10, 1957, was a voluntary confession.
It remains now to be seen whether it was a truthful confession.
Prem asserted in his confession that he had acquaintance with the appellant previous to the appellant 's posting to Rupar and their association continued at Rupar.
There is nothing inherently improbable in this story of Prem.
It is true that there is not much evidence to corroborate Prem.
that lie and the appellant were acquainted and used to associate.
Banwari Lal had seen them talking to each other once or twice before the murder.
The police station at which the appellant was posted was almost opposite to the house of Banwari Lal where Prem was employed as a servant and there was every probability of the appellant and Prem meeting.
It is significant that on the day of murder of Nirmala Devi, in the afternoon, Prem was present in the compound of the police station with a child in a perambulator.
Foot constable Gurbachan Singh, P.W. 4, enquired from Prem as to why he had gone inside the police station.
On this the appellant asked Gurbachan Singh not to remonstrate with Prem as he was a mere, boy.
Gurbachan 156 1228 Singh had stated that previously he had never seen Prem going inside the police station with a perambulater.
The intervention of the appellant suggests that he knew Prem and was friendly towards him.
Prem 's story that he was employed as a servant by Banwari Lal is corroborated by the evidence of Banwari Lal himself, his sister Vina and his clerk Naranjan Das.
In the nature of things there could be no corroboration of Prem 's story about the appellant 's proposal to rape and rob Nirmala Devi and, if necessary, to murder her.
According to Prem 's confession a day before the murder he had been given a dagger by the appellant along with a _pajama and that Prem took the pajama and the dagger to the upper storey of Banwari Lal 's house having concealed it in the kothri of firewood which was near the office room of Banwari Lal.
This part of his story receives corroboration from the evidence of Banwari Lal that after the murder he had found a blood stained pajama, Exbt.
P. 14, banging on the door of the store room which is at the back of the residential portion of the house.
Banwari Lal is supported by Nand Lal, P.W. 34, Motor Mobile Patrol Sub Inspector, who recorded the First Information of Banwari Lal.
According to him, he found the pajama hanging on one of the shutters of an almirah fixed in the wall in the fuel room situate at the back of the room where Nirmala Devi was found lying dead.
It was bloodstained.
Banwari Lal had clearly stated that this pajama did not belong to him or any one in his house.
The existence of the pajama in Banwari Lal 's house lends corroboration to the story of Prem that he had been given this pajama and that he had concealed it in the kothri of fire wood near the office of Banwari Lal.
The statement of Prem that he had asked Raj sabziwala to bring down the perambulator of the child and that he did so, finds corroboration from the evidence of Gurbachan Singh that in the afternoon he found Prem accused in the police station with a child in a perambulator.
The presence of the accused Prem at Banwari Lal 's house near about the time of the murder appears to 1229 be clear.
When Vina had left for her school at 9 45 a.m., Prem was in the house.
Vina returned to the house from her school at about 12 30 noon.
At that time Prem was present in the verandah in front of the office.
When she finally returned from the school at about 3 45 p.m., apparently Prem was not in the house but arrived shortly thereafter.
The murder was committed at any time between 12 30 p.m. and 2 15 p.m. if the appellant was the murderer, because Gurbachan Singh 's evidence showed that the appellant was at the thana at 2 15 p.m.
Apparently, the appellant went out with Gurbachan Singh and returned to the thana with him in time for Gurbachan Singh to be on duty from 3 p.m.
If the appellant was the murderer he must have committed the murder before 2 15 p.m. Nirmala Devi was alive at 12 30 p.m. when Vina saw her feeding her child.
Assuming that Vina did not stay long, as she had come to get some money to purchase a copy book, it would not be unreasonable to assume that Nirmala Devi was alive up to 12 40 or 12 45 p.m.
The interval of time between that and 2 15 p.m., when the appellant was seen at the police station, is about 1 1/2 hours.
It would be probable that during this time Prem was present in the house and when he says that lie was present there there is no inherent improbability in his statement.
At 3 45 p.m., when Vina arrived, no doubt Prem was not in the house, but he came shortly thereafter and Vina took from him the child of Nirmala Devi.
This clearly shows that Prem had gone out of the house with the child of Nirmala Devi which one would not normally expect him to do at that time of the day, if Nirmala Devi had left the house to do shopping or to visit anyone.
If Nirmala Devi was in the house and alive it was most unlikely that Prem accused would have taken her child out of the house.
Prem 's statement that he was amusing the child while the appellant was doing his nefarious work appears to be true, because the child was with him and he had been seen at the police station with a child in a perambulator.
If the circumstances tend to show that in all probability Prem was in the house from 12 30 p.m. to 2 15 p.m. then his 1230 story that he was present at the house when the appellant came there appears to be a truthful statement.
It is significant that when Vina arrived at the house at 3 45 p.m. she found the door of the stair case locked.
When Prem arrived she saw the key in his hand, although Prem had said it was lying on the floor.
He opened the lock of the door of the stair case with that key and Vinia went upstairs to the second floor where she went to the kitchen and took her food.
When Banwari Lal arrived at his house at about 3 15 p.m. he found his office room locked from outside.
He wanted to go to the residential portion for taking tea, but found the door of the stair case locked from outside.
Finding the door of the stair case leading to the residential portion of his house locked, he came down and went away in connection with the election work.
On his return he enquired from Prem about the whereabouts of his wife and Prem told him that she had gone out.
He wished to go upstairs to the residential portion of the house and Prem at his request opened the lock of the stair case, the key being with him.
According to Banwari Lal, the usual practice was to lock the door of the office which adjoins the stair case and to bolt the other door from inside, but on the day of the murder the door adjoining the stair case was looked while the other door was lying open.
Banwari Lal 's clerk, Naranjan Das, came to the house at 4 15 or 4 30 p.m.
He went up to the verandah in front of the office and found both the doors of the office locked from outside.
He asked Prem to open the office, but Prem told him that the key of one of the locks which was fixed on the door adjoining the stair case, had been lost.
He gave the key of the other lock and then Prem took out a key from his pocket and opened the lock fixed on the other door of the office.
There is no reason to distrust all this evidence which would indicate that after Vina had left the house on her first visit at about 12 30 p.m. the two doors were locked from outside which was something unusual and that the keys of the looks of these doors were with Prem.
He had given evasive answers about the keys to Vinia and Naranjan Das 1231 while the key was in his pocket.
These circumstances also indicate the truthfulness of Prem 's statement that he was present in the house during the period in which Nirmala Devi was murdered.
His statement in the confession that the appellant had locked the door and had thrown the key in tile office verandah and that while he sat there, the child, while playing, picked up the key and that he said to the girl (presumably Vina) there was the key and then he un locked the door appears to be true.
Reference in some detail to the various statements of Prem in the confession and the circumstances proved by the evidence of various witnesses became necessary in order to ascertain whether Prem had made a truthful statement about his presence at the house during the period in which Nirmala Devi was murdered and also as to the part he had played in assisting the appellant to commit the murder.
While it is true that in the confession Prem does not attribute to himself any participation in the murder itself, it is not to be for gotten that the murder of Nirmala Devi could not have taken place without his aid.
Whoever entered the house of Banwari Lal in broad day light could not have gone upstairs without the knowledge and cooperation of Prem.
According to his statement lie knew what was the intention of the appellant and to assist him in the accomplishment of his purpose he had concealed in his master 's house the pajama and the dagger given to him by the appellant.
If he did not actually participate in the murder he would be equally guilty of the murder if that murder was committed with his aid and his connivance.
The confession, as a whole, concerning the murder of the deceased appears to us to be true and we have no hesitation, after a very careful consideration of all the circumstances appearing in the case, in saying so.
In our opinion, Prem 's confession was not only voluntary and true but it had been corroborated in material particulars regarding the general story told by him in his confession.
The other question which now remains for consideration is whether the confession received material corroboration connecting the appellant with the murder of Nirmala Devi.
1232 Amongst the appellant 's possessions a dagger was recovered which appeared to be blood stained but owing to the long delay in sending it to the Chemical Examiner its origin could not be determined.
From the medical evidence it appears that the dagger in question could have inflicted the kind of injuries suffered by Nirmala Devi.
The most important corroboration, however, is the recovery of the ornaments of the deceased.
These ornaments, according to Banwari Lal, she had been wearing on the day of the murder when he left for court.
On some statement made by the appellant his mistress Raj Rani was visited by the authorities and in the presence of respectable witnesses some ornaments were recovered and they were identified as the ornaments of the deceased.
The evidence of Raj Rani also showed that these ornaments were given to her by the appellant.
She apparently had no reason to depose against the appellant, because she had said in her evidence that she wished to meet the appellant before giving clue to the ornaments and that she wished to give the ornaments to the police in his presence.
The defence case was not that these ornaments did not belong to the deceased but that, on the contrary, they were hers but had been produced by Banwari Lal during the police investigation and that it was falsely alleged that they had been recovered from Raj Rani.
The evidence of Charan Dass, P. W. 24, President of the Municipal Committee of Rupar, however, clearly shows that in his presence the appellant made a statement to the police to the effect that one gold kara and seven gold bangles had been given by him to Raj Rani.
This statement was made on August 3, 1957.
His evidence also shows that on August 9, 1957, he accompanied the police party from Rupar to Jangpura and that Raj Rani took them to her sister 's house.
She brought out a trunk from inside the room.
She opened the lock of the trunk and produced from it a tin box which contained a gold kara and seven gold bangles.
The evidence of GoriShanker, a Municipal Commissioner of Rupar is to the same effect and corroborated Charan Dass.
The courts below believed these two witnesses.
We have examined 1233 their evidence with some care in view of the submission on behalf of the appellant that they should not be relied upon.
There is nothing in their evidence to show that they were in any way hostile to the appellant or had any motive to depose against him.
The courts below having believed these witnesses, we would not ordinarily go behind their view on a question of fact.
Having regard, however, to the con sequences which arise as a result of the acceptance of their evidence in this particular case, we have examined their evidence in the light of the submission made on behalf of the appellant.
It was suggested that at the earlier stage the police investigation was not properly conducted and the public were dissatisfied.
A deputation of influential persons met the Chief Minister as a result of which a more active and thorough investigation took place.
It may be that influential persons of Rupar interviewed the Chief Minister, being dissatisfied with the manner in which the investigation was taking place.
There is, however, nothing to show that Charan Dass or Gori Shanker were amongst those who had interviewed the Chief Minister or that they had taken part in any agitation against the police concerning the manner of the investigation.
It is difficult to believe that two responsible persons such as the President of the Municipal Committee and one of its members would go out of their way to depose to certain events which would provide very strong evidence against the appellant and lead to his conviction on a capital charge, unless they had really heard the statement of the appellant and witnessed the recovery as deposed to by them.
It was then suggested that, apparently, Charan Dass had no real reason to go to the police station on August 3, 1957, and, therefore, his story that he heard the appellant make the statement which led to the recovery of the ornaments was false.
Charan Dass, however, had stated the reason for his visiting the police station.
He went there to complain to the police that people parked their push carts in the bazar and thus obstructed the passage.
In our opinion, as the President of the Municipal Committee of Rupar, if a nuisance was 1234 being created by people parking their push carts in the bazar, it was a natural thing for him to go to the police station in order to get such obstruction removed and for the police to see that the nuisance did not continue.
We can find nothing strange in the conduct of Charan Dass or Gori Shanker in having gone to the police station in the circumstances deposed to by them.
We have no hesitation in believing the evidence of Charan Dass and Gori Shanker that the appellant made a statement to the effect that he had given one gold kara and seven gold bangles to Raj Rani and that the same were recovered from Raj Rani in their presence.
It would appear, therefore, on the evidence of Raj Rani and these witnesses, that not long after the murder of Nirmala Devi the appellant was in possession of her ornaments and that he had given them to Raj Rani.
The ornaments being in possession of the appellant soon after the murder would show that he either stole the ornaments or was in possession of them knowing or having reason to believe that they were stolen properties.
Nirmala Devi had been murdered by someone who had stolen her ornaments.
According to the confession of Prem it was the appellant who had gone up stairs where Nirmala Devi was Sometime after the departure of Vina.
He had given the appellant the pajama and the dagger.
Thereafter, the appellant left the house leaving the pajama behind.
After the departure of the appellant no outsider entered the house.
It is clear, therefore, that in order to steal the ornaments the thief killed Nirmala Devi.
The circumstances clearly indicate that the thief was no other than the appellant.
It seems to us, therefore, that the confession of Prem receives strong and substantial corroboration connecting the appellant with the crime of the murder of the deceased Nirmala Devi.
The conduct of the appellant from 2 15 p.m. onwards clearly shows that he was in a disturbed state of mind which is consistent with his having committed the crime, It is curious that lie was uttering the word I Nirmala.
It had been suggested to Gurbachan Singh that the Assistant Sub Inspector Rikhi Ram had a 1235 daughter with whom the appellant had illicit connection and that her name was Nirmala, but the witness stated that he had no knowledge about it.
The appellant in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Sessions Judge admitted that he was shouting out the name of Nirmala but he had a love affair with a girl named Nirmala, daughter of Rikhi Ram.
We are not prepared to accept the explanation of the appellant as to how he was calling out the name of Nirmala so soon after the murder of Nirmala Devi.
This conduct of the appellant may not by itself have been corroboration of sufficient importance to enable a court to convict the appellant on the retracted confession of Prem.
No stronger and no better corroboration, however, of the confession of Prem could be had than the evidence which showed that the appellant had been in possession of Nirmala Devi 's ornaments soon after her murder.
There were several comments made on the evidence by the learned Advocate for the appellant, but those comments were with reference to unimportant matters and were not at all relevant.
In an appeal by special leave it is not ordinarily permissible to make submissions on questions of fact.
The principal matter with which we have been concerned in this appeal was whether the confession of Prem had been corroborated in material particulars regarding the general story told by him and in material particulars tending to connect the appellant with the murder of the deceased.
We have no hesitation in saying that the confession of Prem has been amply corroborated in both respects.
Recovery of the ornaments of the deceased at the instance of the appellant incriminated him to the fullest extent and lent the strongest corroboration to the con fession of Prem from which it was apparent that no other person than the appellant could have murdered Nirmala Devi.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant was tried along with P for the offence of murder.
The prosecution case was that the appellant, in conspiracy with P who was employed as a servant in the house of the deceased, took advantage of the deceased being alone in the house with her child, went upstairs and killed her and stole her ornaments, while P remained downstairs with the child.
The evidence upon which the prosecution relied for conviction consisted of the confession of P, the statement of the appellant which led to the recovery of the ornaments belonging to the deceased from the possession of the mistress of the appellant, the recovery of a blood stained dagger from his belongings at the police station and his conduct after the murder.
The confession of P was later retracted by him in the Court of 'Session.
It was contended for the appellant that a retracted confession of an accused cannot be used against his co accused Held, that a voluntary and true confession made by an accused though it was subsequently retracted by him, can be taken into consideration against a co accused by virtue Of section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, but as a matter of prudence and practice the court should not act upon it to sustain a conviction of the co accused without full and strong corroboration in material particulars both as to the crime and as to his connection with that crime.
The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted con fession would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
Held, further, that on the evidence in the case the confes sion of P was voluntary and true and was strongly corroborated in material particulars both concerning the general story told in the confession concerning the crime and the appellant 's connection with crime.


judgement:
(Civil) No. 1155 of 1987.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
S.P. Malik and Mrs. Lalitha Kaushik for the Petitioner.
Anil Dev Singh, R. Venkataramani, R.B. Mishra and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
The petitioner was the Additional Registrar of this Court.
His normal date of retirement was March 31, 1987.
He, however, sought for voluntary retirement from the service of this Court and on his application in that regard, the following order dated December 6, 1985 was communicated to him by the Registrar of this Court: "OFFICE ORDER The Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of India has accepted the notice of Shri section Banerjee, Offg.
Additional Registrar (Perma nent Deputy Registrar), seeking voluntary retirement from service under the provisions of Rule 48A of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, and has permitted him to retire voluntarily from the service of the Registry of the Supreme Court of India with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986.
" 564 It is clear from the order extracted above that the petitioner was permitted to retire voluntarily from the service of the Registry of the Supreme Court with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986.
After the retirement of the petitioner, the Fourth Central Pay Commission (for short 'Pay Commission ') gave its report recommending the revision of salaries and pension of the Government employees.
It is not disputed that the above recommendations of the Pay Commission have been accepted by the Government and that the benefit thereof is also avail able to the employees of this Court.
Paragraph 17.3 of Chapter 17 of Part II at page 93 of the Report of the Pay Commission provides as follows: "17.3 In the case of employees retiring during the period January 1, 1986 to September 30, 1986, Government may consider treating the entire dearness allowance drawn by them up to December 31, 1985 as pay for pensionary bene fits.
" The petitioner claimed the benefit of the recommendation of the Pay Commission as contained in the said paragraph 17.3, but it was not allowed on the ground that he did not, as he was not entitled to, draw salary for January 1, 1986 in view of the proviso to rule 5(2) of the Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules '.
Rule 5(2) reads as follows: "5(2).
The day on which a Government servant retires or is retired or is discharged or is allowed to resign from service, as the case may be, shall be treated as his last working day.
The date of death shall also be treated as a working day.
Provided that in the case of a Gov ernment servant who is retired pre maturely or who retires voluntarily under clause (j) to (m) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules or Rule 48 (or Rule 48 A) as the case may be, the date of retirement shall be treated as a non working day.
" At the hearing of the writ petition, it has also been vehemently urged on behalf of the respondents that as in view of the proviso to rule 5(2) of the Rules, the date of retirement of the petitioner should be treated as a non working day or, in other words, as the petitioner was not entitled to the salary for the day of his retirement, he was not 565 entitled to the benefit of the recommendation of the Pay Commission as contained in paragraph.
17.3 of the report extracted above.
Under paragraph 17.3, the benefits recommended will be available to employees retiring during the period, January 1, 1986 to September 30, 1986.
So the employees retiring on January 1, 1986 will be entitled to the benefit under para graph 17.3.
The question that arises for our consideration is whether the petitioner has retired on January 1, 1986.
We have already extracted the order of this Court dated Decem ber 6, 1985 whereby the petitioner was permitted to retire voluntarily from the service of the Registry of the Supreme Court with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986.
It is true that in view of the proviso to rule 5(2) of the Rules, the petitioner will not be entitled to any salary for the day on which he actually retired.
But, in our opinion, that has no bearing on the question as to the date of re tirement.
Can it be said that the petitioner retired on December 31, 1985? The answer must be in the negative.
Indeed, Mr. Anti Dev Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, frankly conceded that the peti tioner could not be said to have retired on December 31, 1985.
It is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had retired from the service of this Court on December 31, 1985.
Then it must be held that the petitioner had retired with effect from January 1, 1986 and that is also the order of this Court dated December 6, 1985.
It may be that the petitioner had retired with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986 as per the said order of this Court, that is to say, as soon as January 1, 1986 had com menced the petitioner retired.
But, nevertheless, it has to be said that the petitioner had retired on January 1, 1986 and not on December 31, 1985.
In the circumstances, the petitioner comes within the purview of paragraph 17.3 of the recommendations of the Pay Commission.
After the conclusion of the hearing of the writ peti tion, an additional affidavit purported to have been af firmed by Mr. P.L. Sakarwal, the Director (Justice) of the Department of Justice.
In paragraph 8 of the affidavit the deponent has craved leave of this Court to file this addi tional affidavit.
It does not appear from the copy of the purported additional affidavit whether it has been affirmed or not inasmuch as no date of affirmation has been mentioned therein.
Be that as it may, a photocopy of the Office Memo randum dated April 14, 1987 of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Pensions & Pensioners ' Welfare has been annexed.
It is submitted in the additional affidavit that the pension of Government servants retiring between 1.1.1986 and 30.6.1987 is to be governed in terms of 566 paragraphs 10.1, 10.2 and 11 of the said Office Memorandum.
Further, it has been submitted that the petitioner had ceased to be in the employment of the Supreme Court with effect from 1.1.1986 (F.N.) and, accordingly, the said Office Memorandum is not applicable to the petitioner.
Paragraph 3.1 of the Office Memorandum provides, inter alia, that the revised provisions as per these orders shall apply to Government servants who retire/die in harness on or after 1.1.1986.
The said Office Memorandum will, therefore, be applicable to Government servants retiring on 1.1.1986.
There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the Office Memorandum dated April 14, 1987 will not apply to the petitioner.
Be that as it may, we have already held that the petitioner had retired with effect from 1.1.1986 and he comes within the purview of paragraph 17.3 of the recommen dations of the Pay Commission.
In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to calculate and pay to the petitioner within three months from today his pension in accordance with the recommendation of the Pay Commission as contained in paragraph 17.3 extracted above.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Petition allowed.

summary/full:
Paragraph 17.3 of Chapter 17, Part II of the Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission entitled Government em ployees retiring during the period January 1, 1986 to Sep tember 30, 1986 to consideration of the entire dearness allowance drawn by them upto December 31, 1985 as pay for pensionary benefits.
Rule 5(2) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 permits the day on which a Government servant retires from service to be treated as his last working day.
The proviso thereto, however, states that in the case of a Government servant who retires voluntarily under Rule 48 A the date of retirement shall be treated as a non working day.
The petitioner was permitted to retire voluntarily from the service of the Registry of the Supreme Court under the provisions of Rule 48 A of the Rules with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986 by an order dated December 6, 1985.
His claim to the benefit of paragraph 17.3 was not acceded to.
In the writ petition it was contended for the respond ents that as in view of the proviso to rule 5(2) of the Rules the petitioner was not entitled to the salary for the day of his retirement, he was not entitled to the benefit of paragraph 17.3.
Allowing the writ petition, HELD: Under paragraph 17.3 of Chapter 17, Part II of the Report of the Fourth Central Pay Commission the benefits recommended will be available to employees retiring during the period, January 1, 1986 to September 30, 1986.
In the instant case, the petitioner was permitted to retire volun tarily from the service of the 563 Registry of the Supreme Court with effect from the forenoon of January 1, 1986.
The fact that under the proviso to rule 5(2) of the Rules, the petitioner will not be entitled to any salary for the day on which he actually retired has no bearing on the question as to the date of retirement.
The petitioner could not be said to have retired on December 31, 1985.
It has then to be said that he had retired with effect from January 1, 1986 and that is also the order of this Court dated December 6, 1985.
He, therefore, comes within the purview of paragraph 17.3 of the recommendations of the Pay Commission.
[565A E] The respondents to calculate and pay to the petitioner within three months his pension in accordance with the recommendation of the Pay Commission as contained in para graph 17.3.
[566D]


judgement:
No. 5222 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) (With Writ Petition Nos. 443 and 754 of 1988) R.K. Garg, S.K. Verma, P. Anshu Mishra and R.S. Singh for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 5222 of 1985.
G.B. Pai and S.K. Sinha for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.754 of 1988.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. A. Subhashini, Probir Mitra and K. Swamy for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: Workmen of Rohtas Industries Limited situated at Dalmi anagar in District Rohtas within the State of Bihar sent a letter addressed to Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of this Court on 8th of July, 1985, alleging that the Company had four units, namely, paper and boards, cement, asbestos and vege table ghee plant; the management closed down the industries with effect from 9th of September, 1984, and have denied employment to about 10,000 employees.
It was prayed that there should be immediate restoration of electricity to the colony, payment 618 of salary and wages for the period since closure should be directed and compensation as per the amendment to the Indus trial Disputes Act in 1984 and dues under the provident fund account, gratuity etc.
should also be directed to be paid.
This letter was registered as a writ petition and notice was issued.
In the meantime by order dated 22.5.
1986, the Patna High Court appointed a Provisional Liquidator under the Companies Act.
In the writ proceedings before this Court the employers, the Provisional Liquidator, the State of Bihar and the Union of India have, in due course, appeared.
On 27.4.1987, the Court made an interim order in the matter of payment of arrear wages by sale of assets.
On 22.7.1987, the Court took note of the fact that the proposal for restructuring of the Company was afoot in terms of its suggestion and stated that claims of the financial institu tions would be considered later.
On October 28, 1987, the Court stated: "This Court had issued notice to the Union of India and learned Attorney General to ascer tain if it is possible to revive the company which has suddenly gone sick.
Learned Attorney General states that in the meantime which received assent of the President on 8th January, 1986 has come into force and a Board in terms of section 4 thereof has now been constituted.
He suggests that a reference may be made to that Board and the Board may be called upon to frame the Scheme as contemplat ed under section 18 of the Act for revival of the company and instead of allowing the Scheme to be dealt with further under the Act, the Board may be called upon to submit its Report along with the Scheme for consideration of this Court.
He also submits that in the spe cial facts of the case there is no necessity to subject the Scheme to a statutory appeal.
Counsel for the petitioners agrees that an effort may be made as per the suggestion of the learned Attorney General.
" The Central Government made a reference to the Board within one week as directed by the Court and the Board was given four months ' time to frame the Scheme.
On 7.9.1988, this Court took note of the fact that the State of Bihar was inclined for nationalisation of the Company.
The Union of India filed an affidavit that if any proposal is mooted for nationalisation, it would be supported.
This Court stated in this order of 7.9.1988: 619 "On examining the matter in this background we are of the view that it is in the interest of everyone that the industrial establishment should be revived and sooner it is the better.
In these circumstances, we direct that a Committee with the Industries Secretary of the Union of India as its Chairman be immediately constituted to work out the modalities of nationalisation.
The Committee should consist of the Secretary, Industries, Government of Bihar, senior representatives of the creditor financial institutions, Finance Secretary of Government of India or his representative and representative of Reserve Bank of India.
The Committee should examine the matter and submit its report within six weeks . . . " On 9.8.1989, the Court took note of the report by saying: "The report submitted to this Court indicates that three units excepting paper unit are viable and can be revived.
On the 13th of December, 1988, this Court considered the report and adjourned the matter to give an opportunity to the parties to explore the modalities of revival of the three viable units.
No substantial progress has been made as we find.
By the adjourned date the modali ties should be discussed and finalised and reported to the Court so that an order can be made to revive the three units.
The report indicated that in regard to paper unit, the Committee was not of the opinion that it was viable.
Learned Attorney General and Mr. Pal had been requested by the Court to explore the possibilities of revival of the paper unit.
Ms. Subhashini on behalf of the learned Attorney General states that given two weeks ' time further discussions shall be held and a complete decision may be reached as regards the paper unit . . " A joint memorandum was filed by the Union of India and the State of Bihar on 12.9.1989 which the Court rejected on account of the fact that there was no clear and definite indication in the memorandum as to revival.
Thereafter, the State of Bihar and the Union of India have filed their statements separately and a copy of the memorandum prepared by the learned Attorney General and circulated has also been filed before us.
We have also heard learned counsel for the parties in the matter.
620 It is not disputed that there is a huge amount of wages outstanding to the workmen.
Several financial institutions have large dues to recover from the Company.
The Trustees of the Debenture Trust Deeds have also sought to intervene in this Court to maintain their claim.
Apart from these, the owners of the Company have also pleaded that they are enti tled to compensation in the event of the properties of the Company being taken away by way of nationalisation.
As already noted, the Company has been closed down for more than five years now.
A lot of assets are fast becoming useless and will soon become junk.
Several attempts were made to dispose of some of the stocks held by the Official Liquidator but for one reason or the other it has not been possible to complete the sale and though this Court had directed that the sale proceeds would be utilised for pay ment of arrears wages, that has not been feasible.
Claims have been laid against the Company and are perhaps awaiting adjudication.
If the Company is not revived and gets liqui dated, the liabilities would turn out to be far in excess of the assets and notwithstanding first or second charge on the assets, the creditors may not appreciably benefit.
This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that living to about 10,000 families had been denied for over five years and apart from national loss, the workmen have been put to serious jeopardy.
In these circumstances, we are satisfied that it is of paramount importance that the Company in respect of the viable units should be revived and allowed to come into production.
Unless there be a moratorium in regard to the liabilities of the Company for a reasonable time, the attempt to revive the Company in respect of the three units is bound to be frustrated upon the intervention of the creditors, whereas once the company is revived and big commercial activities are carried on, profit is bound to be earned and a conscientious and prudent administration would certainly, in due course, provide adequate funds for satis faction of the debts.
At present the question is one of priorities.
It has to be prudently decided as to which ones should be allowed to go ahead and which should be made to wait.
In this background and on the basis of the memoranda filed by the State of Bihar and the Union of India and the note prepared by learned Attorney General and made available to us by Mr. Pal for the other side with the Attorney Gener al 's consent, we give the following directions: 1.
The State of Bihar shall appoint an authorised officer from the Senior IAS cadre with appropriate commercial back ground 621 to be the Rehabilitation Administrator.
The Provisional Liquidator appointed by the High Court of Patna shall hand over to the Administrator all the assets of the Company which he has taken over under orders of the Court.
Such assets of the Company which have not yet been taken over by the Provisional Liquidator shall upon the appropriate officer being designated vest in him forthwith and he is clothed with the necessary power under our present orders to take such steps as are necessary to take over possession of such assets of the Company.
In the event of a dispute arising out of the decision of the Administrator that the asset is of the company and is to be taken over by the Administrator, an appeal shall be maintainable before a Division Bench of the Patna High Court and the Judges to constitute such Bench shall be nominated by the learned Chief Justice.
For convenience the same Judges shall contin ue on the nominated Bench for a reasonable period.
The assets of the Company encumbered with financial and other institutions shall not be available to be proceeded against for a period of one year from today and there shall be a moratorium for a period of one year in regard to pro ceedings taken and pending or to be taken against the Compa ny hereafter and limitation shall remain suspended for the period under our orders of today.
It would be open to the Court on being moved to extend the moratorium.
The costs of the entire assets to be taken over by the State Government of Bihar as per the book value and the dues against the company are estimated to be within the limit of Rs. 15 crores.
The State Government of Bihar has undertaken before us to deposit the amount of Rs. 15 crores with the Administrator within eight weeks from today.
A similar amount of Rs. 15 crores shall be advanced by the Union of India to the State of Bihar from out of plan assistance for the State.
The sum of Rs. 15 crores paid by the State Gov ernment shall be utilised, in due course, for payment of arrears of wages to the workers and for disbursement of secured loans of financial institutions and other parties for which security of the Company 's assets had been fur nished.
The Administrator shall open an account with the lead nationalised Bank for the State of Bihar operating at Dalmianagar into which the two sums of money being Rs. 15 crores each shall be credited.
622 5.
The Administrator shall set up one Committee with a retired High Court Judge, a retired District Judge and an Accounts Officer with at least five years ' experience as Financial Advisor to the State Government to examine the claims of the owners of the Company and other parties in cluding financial institutions.
This should be done within six months from now.
Once the list of creditors is settled with all reasonable particulars, the matter should be re ported to this Court for directions and it shall be open to this Court to finally indicate the figure at which each such claim shall be settled.
An inventory of all the articles shall be made within four weeks from now.
Steps shall be taken to form a new company within four weeks from now.
Appointment of technical consultants and other competent officers shall be undertaken within two months hence.
The asbestos, cement and vanaspati plants shall be commissioned after effecting such repairs as may be neces sary.
The retrenched employees shall come back to work in phases.
The first phase shall admit a thousand workers, the second phase shall admit an equal number and in the third phase, such number of further workers as may be necessary to run the industries in a viable way shall be finalised.
All expeditious steps as may be possible shall be taken to provide employment.
Steps shall be taken to explore the viability of the paper unit within three months after the Company is re commissioned in respect of the three units.
Liberty is given to the parties to apply in the event of necessity but it is made clear that no extension in regard to payment of the fifteen crores of rupees by the State Government and the Union Government shall be granted.
Every attempt should be made by all concerned to give effect to the order keeping its true purport and spirit in view.
We do not intend to leave doubts in any one 's mind that the purpose of our order is to revive the Company and make it work viably.
Everyone charged with the responsibility of implementing the order of the Court shall, therefore, be expected to work in such a way as would fulfil that purpose.
We direct that the case shall remain pending in this Court and shall not be taken to have been disposed of by this order.
Call the case on 1st of March, 1990.

summary/full:
Four large industrial units owned by the respondent company were closed down with effect from September 9, 1984 resulting in denial of employment to about 10,000 employees.
In the writ petition, the workmen sought immediate payment of salary and wages for the period since closure and compen sation as per the amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act in 1984 and payment of dues under the provident fund ac count, gratuity etc.
The High Court had in the meantime on May 22, 1986 appointed a provisional liquidator under the Companies Act.
This Court on October 29, 1987 had directed the Central Government to make a reference to the Board constituted in terms of s.4 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985, which had come into force, to frame a scheme as contemplated under section 10 thereof for revival of the company and submit it for consideration of the Court within four months time.
On September 7, 1988, the Court took note of the fact that the State of Bihar was inclined for nationalisation of the company and directed a committee with the Industries Secre tary to the Union of India as its Chairman to be immediately constituted to work out the modalities of nationalisation.
On December 13, 1988 the Court considered the report of the committee indicating that three units, excepting paper and boards unit, were viable and could be revived, and adjourned the matter to give an opportunity to the parties to explore the possibilities of revival of the viable units.
Till August 8, 1989 no substantial progress had been made.
There after the State of Bihar and the Union of India filed their statements separately and the memorandum prepared by the Attorney General was also made available to the Court.
In this background the Court, HELD: 1.
Living to about 10000 families has been denied for over five years and apart from national loss, the work men have been 616 put to serious jeopardy.
There is a huge amount of wages outstanding to them.
Several financial institutions have large dues to recover from the company.
The Trustees of the Debenture Trust Deeds have also sought to intervene to maintain their claim.
Apart from these, the owners of the company have also pleaded that they are entitled to compen sation in the event of the properties of the company being taken away by way of nationalisation.
A lot of assets are fast becoming useless and will soon become junk.
If the company gets liquidated, the liabilities would turn out to be far in excess of the assets and notwithstanding first or second charge on the assets, the creditors may not apprecia bly benefit.
It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the company in respect of viable units should be revived and allowed to come into production.
[620D, A C] 2.1 The State of Bihar is directed to appoint an autho rised officer to be the Rehabilitation Administrator.
[620H] 2.2 The Provisional Liquidator appointed by the High Court shall hand over to the Administrator all the assets of the company which he had taken over under orders of that Court.
The assets of the company not yet taken over shall vest forthwith in the Administrator.
[621A] 2.3 The assets of the company encumbered with financial and other institutions shall not be available to be proceed ed against for a period of one year, and there shall be a moratorium for a period of one year in regard to proceedings taken and pending or to be taken against the company hereaf ter, and limitation shall remain suspended for the period.
[621D E] 2.4 The State Government of Bihar shall deposit within eight weeks an amount of Rs. 15 crores with the Administra tor against the cost of assets to be taken over.
A similar sum of Rs. 15 crores shall be advanced by the Union of India to the State from out of plan assistance.
The sum paid by the State shall be utilised, in due course for payment of arrears of wages of the workers and for disbursement of secured loans of financial institutions and other parties for which security of the company 's assets had been fur nished.
The Administrator shall open an account with the lead nationalised bank for the State operating at Dalmiana gar into which the two sums of money shall be credited.
[621F H] 2.5 The Administrator shah set up a Committee with a retired 617 High Court Judge, a retired District Judge and an Accounts Officer to examine the claims of the owners of the company and other parties including financial institutions within six months and to report the matter to the Court for direc tions.
[622A] 2.6 An inventory of all the articles shall be made within four weeks.
Steps shall be taken to form a new compa ny within four weeks.
Appointment of technical consultants and other competent officers shall be undertaken within two months.
The retrenched employees shall come back to work in phases.
Steps shall be taken to explore the viability of the paper unit within three months after the company is recom missioned in respect of the three units.
Liberty is given to the parties to apply in the event of necessity.
[622C D & E] 2.7 The case shall remain pending, to be called again on March 1, 1990.
[622H]