judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
1152, 1153, 1268, 1708, 1733 & 2539 of 1969.
From the judgment and decree dated the 23rd January 1968 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.A.O. Nos. 210 and 374/67.
M. C. Bhandare, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the appellant (In C.As.
1152 1153) & respondent No. 2 (in C.A. 1709/69).
B. D. Bal and P. P. Rao, for the appellants (in C.As.
1268 and 1733) and respondents Nos. 11 (in C.A. No. 1152), 11 and 12 (in 1153) .
S V. Gupte, A. Adil and K. J. John, for the appellants (In C.As.
1708 & 2539 and respondents 2 10 in C.As.
1152 1153, and for respondents 1 9 in C.A. 1268/69).
V. V. Nair, for the respondent No. 11 in C.A. 1733.
161 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C. J.
These six appeals are by certificate from the judgment dated 23 January, 1968 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in C.M.A. No. 210 and 374 of 1967 in that High Court.
Two questions arise for decision in these appeals.
First, whether in the circumstances of the case, there was any property of the Hyderabad Co perative Commercial Corporation Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Co operative Society.
Which could be attached by the decree holders, the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1708 of 1969 and Civil Appeal No. 2539 of 1969 in the hands of the Director of Civil Supplies.
Second, whether the dissolution of the Hyderabad Cooperative Commercial Corporation Ltd. by the Registrar of Co operative Societies was competent.
Syed Mohiuddin Khadri, hereinafter referred to as the decree holder, obtained on 24 August, 1959 a decree from the City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the Co operative Society for a sum of Rs. 6,91,293 11 Ps.
with interest.
On 23 November, 1959, the decree holder filed an Execution Petition before the City Civil Court against the Co operative Society for attachment inter alia of a sum of Rs. 4,50,000/ belonging to the Co operative society and in the custody of the ' Commissioner of Civil Supplies and the Accountant General, Hyderabad.
On 27 November, 1959, the City Civil Court issued a prohibitory order to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies to hold the said sum until further orders.
Pursuant to 'the order, on 2; December, 1959, the accountant General wrote to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies that in view of the order of the Court, no payment relating to the Co operative Society would be made by his office without the concurrence of the Court.
The decree holder contends that the attachment is valid.
The State contends that there was no debt due to the Co operative Society and therefore, there was no valid attachment.
The facts and circumstances under which the City Civil Court made an order for attachment are these.
The State budget for 1959 60 provides for payment of Rs. 4,50,000/ to the Co operative Society.
In the Execution Application, the decree holder stated that the sum of Rs. 4,50,000/ mentioned in the budget was a debt due to the Co operative Society.
The decree holder further alleged that the sum Of Rs. 4,50,000/ belonging to the Co operative Society was in the custody and control of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and the Accountant General, Hyderabad as evidenced by the budget provision and a letter dated 12 June, 1959 issued by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies to the District Treasury officers.
The letter dated 12 June, 1989 written by the Assistant Chief Accounts officer and approved by the Commissioner and addressed to District Treasury officers stated that "the fol lowing provisions for the Civil Supplies department are made under the above major head (meaning thereby Trading Civil Supplies) in ' the budget estimates for the year 1959 60: (1) payment to Hyderabad Co 162 operative Commercial Corporation Rs.
4,50,000/ .
You are requested to kindly make the payments under the above heads as per rules and intimate to this office the full particulars of the amounts and expenditure incurred in your district every fortnight on the 5th and 20th of the succeeding month to which they relate for watching the expenditure as a whole against the above provision".
The City Civil Court on these facts issued a prohibitory order on 27 November, 1959 directing the Commissioner of Civil Supplies to hold the sum until further orders.
The Accountant General, pursuant to the said prohibitory order, wrote to the Court on 2 December, 1959 that no payment relating to the Co operative Society would be made by his office without the concurrence of the Court.
The High Court held that the mere fact that the Commissioner of Civil Supplies directed the Treasury officer to make payments to the Co operative Society as and when occasion arose did not mean that the amount as a whole became the property of the Co operative Society in the hands of the Disbursing officer namely, the Commissioner of Civil Supplies.
The High Court held that the provisions of order 21, Rule 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply and the attachment affected and the prohibitory order made by the City Civil Court and the directions to deposit the amount were not valid.
It may be stated here that the State filed a suit C. section No. 1 of 1962 under order 21, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the order of attachment.
The suit was withdrawn by the Government.
The High Court held that the withdrawal of the suit did not preclude the Government from questioning the validity of the attachment.
On behalf of the State, it was contended that the budget appropriation of Rs. 4,50,000/ for the financial year 1959 60 did not make the sum the property of the Co operative Society in the custody of the Public officer.
It was also contended by the State that the said sum was not a debt due to the Co operative Society.
The State also contended that the rules require claim being made, bill being processed, scrutinity as to whether there is sufficient fund credited to the appropriation for payment and in the present case, there was no order for actual payment.
Another contention on behalf of the State was that even if the attachment was legal, it would cease to be so by the end of the financial year because the property was not brought into Court and the amount lapsed.
The documents in the present case and in particular the letter dated 12 June, 1959 and the letter dated 2 December, 1959 written by the Accountant General to the Court establish that there was a debt due to the Co operative Society and the attachment was validly made.
The letter dated 12 June, 1959 provided for payment and the payment was approved by the Commissioner.
The officers disbursing the amount were to pay in accordance with the rules and inform the Department about the expenditure incurred in that behalf.
There is intrinsic evidence in the letter dated 12 June, 1959 that the approval by the Commissioner is not only sanction of the payment but also approval of the same.
Payment in accordance with rules means that documents are to be 163 vouched and there should be particulars of payment and identification of the persons to whom payment is to be made.
The letter dated 2 December, 1959 written by the Accountant General to the Court is tantamount to the money being nationally brought to the Court.
The Accountant General said that the payment was not to be made except with the concurrence of the Court.
Thus it came into the control of and was held on behalf of the Court.
The amount of Rs. 4,50,000/ was not a mere budget provision but the documents show that the amount had ripened into a debt and an order for payment to the Co operative Society.
The sum of Rs. 4,50,000/ was impressed with the character of a debt due to the Co operative Society and it was validly attached.
The contention on behalf of the State that the amount was not brought into Court and therefore, the provision lapsed is devoid of substance.
The letter dated 12 June, 1959 provided for payment of the sum of Rs. 4,50,000/ .
The letter of the Accountant General dated December 2, 1959 indicated that the Accountant General pursuant to the order of the Court dated 27 November, 1959 brought the money to the Court.
Attachment of debts is a process by means of which a judgment creditor is enabled to reach money due to the judgment debtor which is in the hands of a third person.
These are garnishee proceedings.
To be capable of attachment, there must be in existence at the date when the attachment becomes operative something which the law recognises as a debt.
So long as there is a debt in existence, it is not necessary that it should be immediately payable.
Where any existing debt is payable by future instalments, the garnishee order may be made to become operative as and when each instalment becomes due.
The debt must be one which the judgment debtor could himself enforce for his own benefit.
A debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation (See Webb vs Stenton(1).
In the present case, the letter dated 12 June, 1959 proves that there is an obligation to pay the specified sum of Rs. 4,50,000/ to the Co operative Society.
The budget provision fastened on to the claim of the Co operative Society against the State and it ripened into a debt payable to the Co operative Society.
Therefore, in the circumstances, the attachment levied by he City Civil Court was perfected by bringing money to the Court.
The second question which falls for determination is whether the dissolution of the Co operative Society by the Registrar of Co operative Societies was competent.
The State Registrar of Co operative Societies on 6 September, 1960 cancelled the registration of the Co operative Society under section 53 of the Hyderabad Co operative Societies Act, 1952 and appointed a liquidator.
The decree holder filed Writ Petition No. 763 of 1960 on 2 November, 1960 before the High Court and impugned the validity of the order of liquidation.
The High Court on 19 September, 1961 dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of liquidation.
164 Though the High Court dismissed the writ petition, the High Court had to deal with the question of liquidation of the Co operative Society in C.M.A. No. 210 of 1967 and C.M.A. No. 374 of 1967.
These two out of the order of the City Civil Court dated 11 July, 1967 in the decree holder 's Execution Petition No. 95 of 1959.
The City Civil Court held that the judgment of the High Court upholding the validity of the order of dissolution and appointment of the liquidator in Writ Petition No. 763 of 1960 did not prevent the decree holder from contending that the State Registrar had no jurisdiction to pass the order of liquidation.
The High Court in the appeal in C.M.A. No. 210 of 1967 and C.M.A. No. 374 of 1967 held that though the High Court had decided in Writ Petition No. 763 of 1960 upholding the validity of the liquidation yet the order of liquidation could not be sustained because the delegation made under section SB of the Multiunit Co operative Societies Act, 1942 was incompetent.
The liquidator in Civil Appeal No. 1268 of 1969 and Civil Appeal No 1733 of 1969 submitted that the liquidator was interested only in sustaining the validity of the order of liquidation.
The liquidator is not interested in the dispute between the State and the decree holder in regard to the order of attachment.
In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the decree holder and the liquidator on the validity of the order of liquidation, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Multi unit Co operative Societies Act, 1942.
The 1942 Act applies to Co operative Societies registered before the commencement of the Act and also to Societies which became registered after the commencement of the Act of 1942.
The Co operative Society was a Society registered before the Reorganisation of the States in 1956.
As such the Society is a Multi unit Society governed by the 1942 Act.
The decree holder did not challenge this position.
The contention of the decree holder is that under section 4 of the 1942 Act, the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies shall exercise in respect of any Co operative Society and to the exclusion of State Registrar, the powers and functions exercisable by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies of the State in which such Society is registered.
Section 5B of the 1942 Act which speaks of delegation of any power or authority exercisable by Central Registrar to be exercisable by Registrar of Co operative Societies of a State is contended by the decree holder to exclude the State Registrar from acquiring any power by delegation.
The decree holder contended that the power of delegation contemplated in section SB was confined only to matters mentioned in section 5A of the 1942 Act.
Under the 1942 Act Multi unit Co operative Societies whether registered before or after the coming into force of the Act were governed by the Co operative Societies Act of the States in which they were registered.
Under the 1942 Act and in particular sections 2 and 3 thereof, some powers like those of inspection, audit were given to Registrars of other States where such Societies had branches.
Under section 4(1) of the 1942 Act, the Central Government may, if it thinks fit, appoint a Central Registrar of the Co operative Societies.
165 Section 4(2) of the 1942 Act provides that the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies, if appointed, shall exercise in respect of any co operative society to which the 1942 Act applies, to the exclusion of State Registrars, the powers and functions exercisable by the Registrar of Co operative Societies of a State in which such Society is actually registered.
The powers which the Central Registrar is to exercise under the 1942 Act are powers under the Co operative Societies Act of the State where a particular Society is registered.
The powers exercisable by the State Registrar under the Co operative Societies Act are by reference under section 4(2) of the 1942 Act incorporated into the 1942 Act and exercisable by the Central Registrar where the Central Registrar is appointed by the Central Government.
The State Registrar was admittedly competent to exercise hl respect of the Co operative Society all powers under the Hyderabad Co operative Societies Act, 1952 referred to as the 1952 State Act.
Under the 1952 State Act, the State Registrar had the power to dissolve the Cooperative Society and appoint a liquidator.
The Central Government appointed a Central Registrar of Co operative Societies for the first time on 29 December, 1956.
If the matters had rested there, the State Registrar would have been divested of his powers over the Society under the State Act as from that date.
The matters, however, did not rest there.
Section 5B of the 1942 Act empowers the Central Government to delegate any power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar under the Act to State Registrars and certain other officers by a Notification published in the official Gazette.
Simultaneously with the appointment of the Central Registrar, the Central Government published a Notification on 29 December, 1956 delegating the powers or authority under the 1942 Act in relation to certain, matters including dissolution to the State Registrars and other officers mentioned in the Notification in respect of Societies registered in their respective States.
The Registrar of Societies, Andhra Pradesh was specifically mentioned in the Notifications The result of the Notification was that the powers under the State Act of 1952 of which the State Registrar was divested by the appointment of the Central Registrar were immediately restored to him.
[t is in exercise of these powers under the State Act of 1952 which were restored to the State Registrar that he passed the order of dissolution of the Society and appointed a liquidator on 6 September, 1960.
Section 5B of the 1942 Act empowers the Central Government to Delegate "any power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies under this Act" (meaning thereby the 1942 Act) to the State Registrars and other officers.
The language in section 5B of the 1942 Act is plain.
There are no words of limitation or reservation.
The expression "any power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies under this Act" takes in all powers under the ]942 Act including those under section 4(2) which are the powers under the State Act embodied by reference in that section.
The simultaneous introduction of section 5A and section 5B into the 1942 Act in the year 1956 with effect from 1 November, 1956 point 166 to the fact that section 5B follows section SA but does not confine section SB only to matters mentioned in section 5A of the 1942 Act.
The contention on behalf of the decree holder that the expression "any power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies under this Act" in section SB means only powers or authority under section 5A of the Act is unsound.
Section 5A of the 1942 act is a transitional provision regarding certain Cooperative Societies affected by the Reorganisation of States.
The provisions contained in section 5B of the 1942 Act do not have any words of restriction in their application only to Section 5A of the 1942 Act.
on the contrary, the provisions in section 5B of the 1942 Act speak of delegation of power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar under the 1942 Act.
Whatever powers are exercisable by the Central Registrar by reason of section 4(2) of the 1942 Act are capable of being delegated by reason of provisions contained in section SB of the 1942 Act.
The delegation by the Central Government of the powers exercisable by the Central Registrar to be exercised by the State Registrar is supported by the provision of the 1942 article The order of delegation being valid, the State Registrar was competent to dissolve the Co operative Society by the order dated 6 September, 1960.
It is, therefore, not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the contention of the decree holder challenging the validity of the order of dissolution of the Co operative Society and appointment of liquidator is barred by reason of constructive resjudicata on account of the dismissal of the Writ Petition No. 763 of 1960 filed by the decree holder in the High Court.
For these reasons, the judgment of the High Court is set aside.
The attachment of the sum of Rs. 4,50,000 is upheld.
The order of dissolution of the Co operative Society and appointment of the liquidator are held to be valid.
The High Court stated that "it will be open to the decree holder to take up execution against the Government.
for the amount due to him from the Co operative Society on the ground that the Government has taken over the entire assets and liabilities of the Co operative Society. ' We affirm that finding of the High Court.
Under the interim order of this Court, the liquidator deposited an amount of Rs. 90,000/ in the Court.
That amount was allowed to be withdrawn by the legal representative oil the decree holder on furnishing bank guarantee.
The liquidator asked for refund of that amount to the liquidator to enable him to discharge his duties according to law.
The decree holder will prefer the claim on account of attachment of Rs. 4,50,000/ before the Liquidator.
If in liquidation, it will appear that there are prior claims or that the decree holder will be entitled to any rateable distribution out of Rs. 4,50,000/ , the liquidator will make appropriate orders for payment of appropriate amount to the decree holder.
We make it clear that after payment by the liquidator to the decree holder whatever amount will remain due to the decree holder, it will be 167 open to the decree holder to take up execution against the Government for the amount due by the Co operative Society on the ground that the Government has taken over entire assets and liabilities of the Co operative Society subject, of course, to such contentions as the Government may have.
The appeals filed by the State are dismissed.
The decree holder will be entitled to costs in these appeals to be paid by the State.
The liquidator will retain costs out of the assets in his hands.
The amount of Rs. 90/ which has been withdrawn by the decree holder will now be refunded to the liquidator.
There will be one set of costs for the decree holders.
There will be similarly one set of costs for the liquidator.
P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant was a multi unit co operative society governed by the Multi Unit Co operative Societies Act, 1942 Section 4(1) of the Act confers on the Central Government power to appoint a Central Registrar of Co operative Societies.
According to section 4(2) the Central Registrar, if , appointed, shall exercise, in respect of any co operative society to which the Act applies to the exclusion of State Registrars, the powers and functions exercisable by the Registrar of Co operative Societies of a State in which such society is actually registered.
In 1952 the Hyderabad Co operative Societies Act was passed which provides that the State Registrar had the power to dissolve a co operative society and appoint a liquidator. 'I he Central Registrar of Co operative Societies was appointed in 1956.
Section 5B of the 1942 Act empowered the Central Government to delegate "any power of authority exercisable by the Central Registrar under the Act" to State Registrars by a notification.
In pursuance of this power the Central Government published a notification in 1956 delegating the powers (under the 1942 Act) to the State Registrars, one of which was the power to dissolve a co operative society.
The notification specifically mentioned the Registrar of Co operative Societies of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
As a result of this notification the powers of the Registrar of Co Operative Societies under the State Act of 1952, which were divested by the appointment of the Central Registrar. were immediately restored to him.
In 1960, the State Registrar of Co operative Societies passed an order of dissolution of the Society under section 53 of the 1952 Act and appointed a liquidator.
In the State budget for.
the year 1959 60 provision was made for payment of certain sums of money to the appellant society.
The respondent, a decree holder of the Co operative Society, in an execution petition sought attachment.
Out of the sum provided in the budget, a certain sum due to him from the appellant society contending that the sum mentioned in the budget was a debt due to the appellant society.
The execution court issued a prohibitory order to the Commissioner of Civil Supplies and the Accountant General to hold the said sum until further orders.
On appeal the High Court held that the mere fact that the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, in whose custody the money was, directed the concerned officials to make payments to the co operative society as and when occasion arose did not mean that the amount became the property of the Society.
It further held that the attachment and prohibitory order were invalid.
As regards the order of liquidation the High Court held that it could not be sustained because the delegation made under section 5B of the 1942 Act was incompetent. ^ HELD: The budget provision fastened on to the claim of the co operative society against the State and it ripened into a debt payable to the Co operative Society.
(a) Attachment of debts is a purpose by means of which a judgment creditor is enabled to reach money due to the judgment debtor which is in the hands of a third person.
These are garnishee proceedings.
To be capable of attachment 160 there must be in existence at the date when the attachment becomes operative something which the law recognises as a debt.
So long as there is a debt in existence it is not necessary that it should be immediately payable.
Where any existing debt is payable by future instalments, the garnishee order may be made to become operative as and when each instalment becomes due.
The debt must be one which the judgment debtor could himself enforce for his own benefit.
[163D F] The facts in present case establish that there was a debt due to the cooperative society and the attachment was validly made.
The amount in dispute was not a mere budget provision bull the documents show that the amount ripened into a date and an order for payment to the co operative society.
The sum was impressed with the character of a debt due to the co operative society and it was validly attached.
[163 F G] (b) The contention that the amount was not brought t into court and, therefore the provision lapsed is devoid of substance.
The letter written by the Accountant General to the court is tantamount to the money being nationally brought to the court. 'the Accountant General said that the payment was not to be made except with the concurrence of the court.
Thus it came into the control of and was held on behalf of the court.
[163A B] 2(a) The order of delegation is valid and the State Registrar was competent to dissolve the co operative society.
The contention of the decree holder that the expression "any power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar of Co operative Societies under this Act` in section 5B means only powers or authority under .
5A of the Act is unsound.
That expression takes m all powers under the 1942 Act including those under section 4(2) which are the powers under the State Act embodied by reference in that section.
[165F 166B] (b) The provisions contained in section 5B of the 1942 Act do not have any words of restriction in their application only to section 5A of the Act.
On the contrary, the provisions in section 5B of the Act speak of delegation of power or authority exercisable by the Central Registrar under the 1942 Act.
Whatever powers are exercisable by the Central Registrar by reason of section 4(2) are capable of being delegated by reason of provisions contained in section 5B of the 1942 Act.
The delegation by the Central Government of the powers exercisable by the Central Registrar to be exercised by the State Registrar is supported by the provisions of the 1942 Act.
[166B D] (c) The decree holder could, therefore prefer the claim on account of attachment before the liquidator who would make appropriate orders for payment of appropriate amount to the decree holder.
[166G H]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1330 of 1969 Appeal by special leave from the Award dated the 5th March, 1969 of that Fifth Industrial Tribunal.
West Bengal, in Case No. 26 of 1967.
V section Desai and R. B. Dater, for the appellant.
A. K. San and Sukumar Ghose, for respondent No. 1.
C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J.
This is an appeal by special leave filed by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. from the award dated 8 3 1969 made by the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal.
The Governor of West Bengal made the reference under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter called the Act, for adjudication on the following 5 issues: "(1) Allowance for the education of employees ' children, (2) House Building loan; (3) Free conveyance or conveyance allowance; (4) Revision of Lunch allowance; (5) Whether the following canteen employees should be made permanent" the names of 10 employees given.
The Tribunal granted no relief to the workmen on issues 2 and 3, allowed their claim in part in respect of issues 1, 4 and section Feeling aggrieved by the said award the appellant which is a Government company constituted under section 617 of the Companies Act, the shares of which are entirely owned by the Central Government, has filed this appeal.
The dispute relates to about 1,000 workmen working at the Barrackpore (West Bengal) branch of the Company 's repairing workshop represented by the Hindustan Aeronautics Workers ' Union, Barrackpore.
The competency of the Government of West Bengal to make the reference was challenged before the Tribunal as also here.
Mr. V. section Desai, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the appropriate government within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Act competent to make the reference was the Central Government, or, if a State Government, it was the Government of Karnataka where the Bangalore Divisional office of the Company is situated and under which works the Barrackpore branch.
Counsel stressed the point that the Central 233 Government owned the entire bundle of shares in the company.
It appoints and removes the Board of Directors as well as the Chairman and the Managing Director.
All matters of importance are reserved for the decision of the President of India and ultimately executed ill accordance with his directions.
The memorandum and articles of association of the company unmistakably point out the vital role and control of the Central Government in the matter of carrying on of the industry owned by the appellant.
Hence, counsel submitted that the industrial dispute in question concerned an industry which was carried on "under the authority of the Central Government" within the meaning of section 2(a) (i) of the Act and the Central Government was the only appropriate Government to make the reference under section 10.
The submission so made was identical to the one made before and repelled by this Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union vs The State of Bihar & ors.(1) wherein it has been said at page 1,000) "It is true that besides the Central Government having contributed the entire share capital, extensive powers are conferred on it, including the power to give directions as to how the company should function, the power to appoint directors`and even the power to determine the wages and salaries payable by the company to its employees.
But these powers are derived from the company 's memorandum of association and the articles of association and not by reason of the company being the agent of the Central Government.
The question whether a corporation is an agent of the State must depend on the facts of each case.
Where a statute setting up a corporation so provides, such a corporation can easily be identified as the agent of the State as in Graham v Public Works commissioners (1901) 2 K.B. 781 where Phillimore, J. said that the Crown does in certain cases establish with the consent of Parliament certain officials or hodies who are to be treated as agents of the Crown even though they have the power of contracting as principals.
In the absence of a statutory provision, however.
a commercial corporation acting on its own balefully even though it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government department.
will be ordinarily presumed not to be a servant or agent of the State.
The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government.
(see the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd vs The Commercial Tax officer.
Visakhapatnam) (1964) 4 S.C.R. 99 at 188 per Shah J. and Tamlin vs Hannaford (1950)1 K.B. 18 at 25, 26.
Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn where it is performing in substance govern mental and not commercial functions.
London Country 234 Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Association vs Michale) Mr. Desai made a futile and unsubstantial attempt to distinguish the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union on the ground that was the case of a Government company carrying on an industry where Private Sector.
Undertakings were also operating It was not an industry, as in the instant case, which the Government alone was entitled to carry on to the exception of the private operators.
The distinction so made is of no consequence and does not affect the ratio of the case in the least We may also add that by amendments in the definition of appropriate Government" in section 2(a)(i) from time to time certain statutory corporations were incorporated in the definition to make the Central Government an appropriate Government in relation to the industry carried on by them.
But no public company even if the shares were exclusively owned by the Government was attempted to be roped in the said definition.
The other leg of the argument to challenge the competency of the West Bengal Government to make the reference is also fruitless.
It may be assumed that the Barrackpore branch was under the control of the Bangalore division of the company.
Yet it was a separate branch engaged in an industry of repairs of air crafts or the like at Barrackpore.
For the purpose of the Act and on the facts of this case the Barrackpore branch was an industry carried on by the company as a separate unit.
The workers were receiving their pay packages at Barrackpore and were under the control of the officers of the company stationed there.
If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at Barrackpore where a considerable number of workmen were working the appropriate government concerned in the maintenance of the industrial peace was the West Bengal Government.
The grievances of the workmen of Barrackpore were their own and the cause of action in relation to the industrial dispute in question arose there.
The reference.
therefore, for adjudication of such a dispute by the Governor of West Bengal was good and valid.
The facts of the case of M/s Lipton Limited and another vs Their employees(1) cited on behalf of the appellant are clearly distinguishable.
The ratio of that case was pressed into service in vain on behalf of the appellant.
The first demand on behalf of the workmen as respects the education allowance of the children was chiefly based upon the educational facilities said to be available to the workmen of Bangalore.
On behalf of the management it was pointed out that certain educational facilities were given to the employees living in the township of Bangalore out not in the city of Bangalore.
The workmen working at Barrackpore had also been provided with certain educational facilities.
We, however, do not propose to go into the merits of the rival contentions.
In our opinion the award directing the company 235 to pay Rs. 12/ per month to each employee to meet educational expenses of their children irrespective of the number of children a particular workman may have is beyond the scope of the issue referred for adjudication.
The Tribunal while discussing this issue felt constrained to think that strictly speaking claim for allowance for the education of employees ' children could not form a subject matter of industry.
dispute.
Really it was a matter to be taken into consideration at the time of fixing their wages.
In substance and in effect the directions given by the Tribunal is by way of revision of the pay structure of the Barrackpore employees.
No such reference was either asked for or made.
The Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to change the wage structure in the garb of allowing educational expenses for the employees ' children.
We may add that on behalf of the appellant it was stated before us that the latest revised wage structure has taken the matter of education of the employees ' children into consideration, while, Mr. A. K. San, appearing for the workmen, did not accept it to be so.
If necessary and advisable a proper industrial 1) dispute may be raised in that regard in future but the award as it stands cannot be upheld.
Apropos issue No. 4 it was stated on behalf of the appellant that all staff and not only the supervisory staff were getting Rs. 1.50 as lunch allowance under circumstances similar to the ones under which the employees belonging to the supervisory staff were getting Rs. 1.50 as lunch allowance.
The award of the tribunal, therefore, was unnecessary and superfluous in that regard.
If that be so, the award may be a surplusage as it is conceded on behalf of the appellant that under the existing service conditions every employee eligible to get a lunch allowance was getting at the rate of Rs. 1.50 .
The 10 workmen sought to be made permanent under issue No. 5 were casual workmen before 4 1 1967 within the meaning of clause (b) (d) of Standing order I headed "Classification of workmen".
They were appointed as temporary workmen within the meaning of clause (b)(b) of Standing order I on and from 4 1 1967.
The 'Tribunal 's direction to make them permanent on and from 4.1.1968 treating them as probationers appointed in permanent vacancies was not justified.
The Tribunal did not go into the question as to whether more permanent workmen were necessary to be appointed in the canteen over and above the existing permanent strength to justify the making of the of workmen as permanent in the canteen where they II were working.
No direction of creation of new posts was given.
the evidence as adduced before tic Tribunal and on the basis of the 236 findings recorded by it, it is plain that the 10 workmen or ally of them could be made permanent only against the permanent vacancies and not otherwise.
On behalf of the appellant it was stated before us that all of them have been made permanent against such vacancies, while, on behalf of the workmen the assertion was that none of them has been made permanent so far.
The management has no objection 13 in absorbing, the 10 workmen concerned in permanent vacancies as and when they occur if any of the has not been already absorbed.
The workmen want nothing more than this.
In the result the appeal is allowed and substantially the award of the Tribunal is set aside but subject to the clarifications and observations made above.
In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The Government of West Bengal referred under section 10(1) of the , five issued for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.
The dispute was between the respondents workmen working at the Barkeeper branch of the appellant company 's workshop.
All the shares of the appellant are owned by the Central (Government.
and its Memorandum and Articles of Association point out the vital role and control of the Central Government in the matter et carrying on of the industry.
The Tribunal granted relief with respect to three issues.
In appeal to this Court, the competency of the Government to make the reference was challenged on the ground that the appropriate Government to make the reference was either the Central Government, because the industry was under the authority of the Central Government, or the State of Karnataka, since the works of the Barkeeper branch is under the Banglore Divisional office of the Company.
Rejecting the contention, but allowing the appeal to this Court on merits, ^ HELD: l (a) the submission regarding the competency of the Central Government is identical to the one made before this Court and repelled by this Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union vs The Sate of Bihar [233C] (b) The fact that the Government company in the Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union ease was carrying on an industry where Private Sector Undertakings were also operating, whereas, in the instant case, the Government alone was entitled to carry on to the exclusion of private operators.
would not make any difference.
[234B] (c) The definition of "appropriate Government" in section 2(a)(1) of the his been amended from time to time and certain statutory corporations were incorporated in the definition to make the Central Government the appropriate Government ' in relation to the industry carried on by them.
But no public company, even if the shares were exclusively owned by the Government, was brought within the definition.
[234C] (2) Assuming that the Barkeeper branch was under the control of the Bangalore Division of the Company, it was a separate branch working as a separate unit.
The workers were receiving their pay at Barkeeper, were under the control of the officers of the Company stationed there, their grievances were their own and the cause of action in relation to the industrial dispute arose there.
If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at Barrackpore, the appropriate Government concerned in its maintenance was the West Bengal Government, [234D F] M/s. Lipton Limited and another vs Their employees ; distinguished.
(3) On the first issue relating to allowance for the education l employees ' children the Tribunal directed the appellant to pay Rs. 12/ per month to each employees to meet the educational expenses of his children.
This direction is in elect a revision of the pay structure of the Barrackpore employees and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to change the ware structure in the garb of allowing educational expenses, [235A C] 232 (4) On the issue regarding revision of lunch allowance, the award of the Tribunal was unnecessary because all members of the staff were getting such lunch allowance.
[235E F] (5) As regards the directions of the Tribunal that certain canteen employees should be made permanent.
it was not justified because those workman were casual workmen appointed temporarily.
The workmen could be made permanent only against permanent vacancies and not otherwise, and there was no direction by the Tribunal for the creation of any new post.
[235 H]


judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
1213 1220.
1353, 1354, 1385 1386, 1387 1388, 1564, 1566 1567, 1579 1581.
1608, 1622, 1623 1624, 1626, 1630, 1647, 1764, 1862, 1432, 1433 & 1871 of 1974.
from the judgment and Order dated the 9th day of May 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court in W.P. Nos.
1497 1503 & 1505/1971.
221 A. K. Sen and B. D. Sharma, for the appellts (In C.A. Nos.
1213 1220 & 1862).
B. D. Sharma, for the appellants (In C.A. Nos. 1353, 1354 and 1647) .
Badri Das Sharma and section R. Srivastava, for the appellants (In C.A. Nos. 1623, 1432, 1433 and 1871).
D. V. Patel and section section Khanduja for the appellants (In C.A.No. 1385) .
S.S. Khanduja, for the appellants (In C.A. Nos.
1386 1388, 1530, 1564, 1566, 1567, 1579, 1580, 1581, 1606, 1622, 1624, 1626, 1630 & 1764).
L. M. Singhvi and section M. Jain, for the respondents (In all the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY C.J.
These appeals by certificate turn on the question as whether the excise license granted to the appellants rendered them lube to pay the stipulated lump sum mentioned in the licence.
These appeals relate to country liquor licences (a) for the years 1962 63 and 1963 64; (b) for the years 1967 68 and (c) for the years 1968 69, 1469 70 and 1970 71.
For the years 1962 63 and 1963 64 licences for sale of country liquor were given to contractors under a guaranteed system.
There was a total guaranteed amount.
Where the contractors failed to fulfil the guaranteed amount and there was a short fall,, demand notices were issued for the total short fall.
For the years 1967 68, 1968 69 and 1969 70 the liquor contractors obtained licences for sale of country liquor at a stipulated amount of license fee under the exclusive privilege system.
Where the contractors failed to pay the guaranteed amount there was a demand for a short fall.
The appellants who were the liquor contractors challenged the demand for short fall of the guaranteed amount.
The liquor contractors contended that what was being demanded as short fall amounted to levy of excise duty.
The State, on the other hand, contended that what was being realized from the liquor contractors was the guaranteed amount in the licence for the exclusive privilege of selling country liquor.
It may be stated here that there was no levy of excise duty prior to 6 March, 1964.
After the imposition of excise duty, the licences during the year 1967 68 and thereafter were issued for guaranteed sum under the exclusive privilege system.
The State contended that what was being demanded as short fall was the stipulated guaranteed amount which was excise revenue.
222 The licenses granted upto the year 1967 68 contained the following principal conditions (1) The licensee guarantees to the Governor of Rajasthan State that he, in the year concluding on. March . shall receive from the Government and sell such quantity of wine of which issue price shall not be less than Rs. (hereinafter known as the guaranteed price which are prevailing on . March. ) (2) The liquor shall be supplied to the licensee at the prevailing issue price, but the difference between such issue price and the issue price calculated at the prevailing rate on 31 March. shall not be included in the guarantee amount.
(3) The licensee will have to pay the shortfall, if any, between the price of the liquor obtained by him upto the end of any month at the issue price of 31 March . and the amount of guarantee multiplied by the months which have passed and divided by eleven at the godown by the tenth of the next month.
(4) In case of non payment, the licence will be cancelled and when cancelled this way, the above mentioned difference shall be recovered from security, cash deposits and remanant, if any, shall be recovered from the licensee and surety jointly and severally.
From 1968 69 the licences contained, inter alia, the following principal conditions: (1) The licensee will have to deposit Rs. as licence fee under section 24 of the Rajasthan Excise Act 1950 for his exclusive privilege as fixed by the Excise Commissioner.
From it the amount of excise duty will be adjusted towards the payment of the amount for the exclusive privilege but this adjustment will be limited to the payment of the amount for the exclusive privilege.
The licensee will have to deposit the aforesaid amount in 12 equal instalments and will have to deposit the monthly instalments by the 10th of the next month in Government Treasury.
The fees deposited by the license holder in that month in the form of the component of the issue price will be treated as excise duty under the instalment of the license fee.
(2) If the licence holder does not deposit the instalments for any two months as laid down in the aforesaid condition within the prescribed period then the officer issuing the license will have the right to realise the 223 amount of that instalment from the cash security of the licence holder or from his surety.
In addition to this, he will also have the right to cancel the licence of the licensee.
The appellants repeated the contention which had been advanced before the High Court that when the State Government wanted to enforce the guaranteed sum it amounted to recovery of excise duty by licence.
The appellants contended that the issue prices in the licence are exclusive of prices of container but inclusive of excise duty levied under the Government notification and therefore, enforcement of the guaranteed amount meant realisation of excise duty.
The appellants contended that unfulfilled guarantee amount which is sought to be recovered from the appellants is not balance of lump sum payment as price of exclusive privilege because the Government licence sanctioning guarantee system stated "that the licensee shall guarantee in respect of the year. income to the Government on account of the issue price of country liquor issued for sale at his shop during the year. " It was, therefore, said by the appellants that a promise to give income to the Government by purchasing a minimum quantity of liquor from the Government ware house was not equivalent to the payment o sum of money in consideration of grant of such privilege within the meaning of section 30 of the Rajasthan Excise Act.
The appellants contended that the amounts of money sought to he recovered from the licensee under the exclusive privilege system introduced from the year 1968 as well as under the guarantee system prevalent prior to the year 1968 are nothing but demands for excise duty on unlifted liquor.
The reasons advanced by the appellants are that under the exclusive privilege system of licensing introduced in 1968 the amount was agreed to be paid and deposited specifically towards excise duty given as a component of the issue price for the supply of country liquor and was agreed to be adjusted in the amount of the exclusive privilege.
The appellants also submitted that the word 'issue price ' was a composite name for 'cost price of liquor ' and 'excise duty leviable thereon ' and therefore, an agreement by the licensees under the guarantee system to pay 'issue price ' was tantamount to an agree not pay 'cost price ' and 'excise duty ' as distinct items though described as issue price.
The appellants contended that licences under both systems of Guarantee and Exclusive Privilege contain a term about the payment and adjustment of excise duty and under both systems 'excise duty ' is a distinct item agreed to be paid as such in terms of the licences.
The licences were granted under the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 (referred to as the Act.) Section 24 of the Act confers power on the Excise Commissioner to grant any person a license for the exclusive privilege.
224 (1) of manufacturing or supply by wholesale, or of both, or (2) of selling by wholesale, or by retail, or (3) of manufacturing or of supplying by wholesale, or of both, and of selling by retail, any country liquor or intoxicating drug within any local area of those parts of the State of Rajasthan to which the Act extends.
Section 28 of the Act provides that an excise duty or a countervailing duty, as the case may be, at such rate or rates as the State Government shall direct, may be imposed either generally or for any specified area, on any excisable article imported or exported, or transported or manufactured, cultivated or collected under any licence granted under the Act, or manufactured in any distillery, pot still or brewery established or licensed under the Act.
The Explanation to section 28 provides that duty may be imposed under this section at different rates according to the places to which any excisable article or intoxicating drug is to be removed for consumption or according to the varying strength and quality of such article.
Section 29 of the Act provides that subject to such rules regulating the time, place and manner of payment, as the State Government may prescribe such duty may be levied in such one or more ways as the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette direct.
Section 30 of the Act provides that instead of or in addition to any duty leviable under Chapter V which contains Sections 28, 29 and L 30), the Excise Commissioner may accept payment of a sum in consideration of` the grant of the licence for exclusive privilege under section The Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956 provide in rule 67 I, 67 J, 67 K and 67 L the different forms of procedure for grant of exclusive privilege Rule 67 I provides that licence for exclusive privilege of selling by retail of country liquor within any local area under section 24 of the Act may be granted on condition of payment of such lump sum instead of or in addition to excise duty, as may be determined by the Excise Commissioner and subject to such other terms and conditions as may be laid down by him.
Rule 67 J provides that a licence under rule 67 I may be granted by way of allotment by negotiation in accordance with the procedure laid down in sub rules 2 to 4 of rule 67 J. Rule 67 K provides that subject to such general or special directions as may be issued by the Excise Commissioner from time to time, the District Excise officer may put the licence under Rule 67 I to action for any area.
In such an auction the Presiding officer shall call upon for lump sum payment for exclusive privilege payable instead of or in addition to excise duty as may be directed by the Excise Commissioner.
Rule 67 L provides that the Excise Commissioner may at his discretion grant licence under rule 67 I for any area by negotiation with any third party.
There is a proviso that highest 225 bidder or highest tenderer if any shall be given a chance to make higher offer unless he has been debarred from holding licence or has rejected the offer under Rule 67(2).
The license fee stipulated to be paid by the appellants is the price or consideration or rental which the Government charges from the licensees for parting with its privilege in stipulated lump sum payment and is a normal incident of a trading or business transaction.
This Court in the recent decision in Nashirwar and Ors.
vs State of Madhya Pradesh and ors.(1) and in the unreported decision Hari Shanker vs Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner(2) held that the State has exclusive right to manufacture and sell liquor and to sell the said right in order to raise revenue.
The nature of the trade is such that the State confers the right to vend liquor by farming out either by auction or by private treaty.
Rental is the consideration for the privilege granted by the Government for manufacturing or vending liquor.
Rental is neither a tax nor an excise duty.
Rental is the consideration for the agreement for grant of privilege by the Government.
The licences in the present case are contracts between the parties.
The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts.
They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others.
The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous.
The reasons given by the High Court were that the licensees accepted the licence by excluding their competitors and it would not be open to the licences to challenge the terms either on the ground of inconvenient consequence of terms or of harshness of terms.
The legal position is also correctly stated in Madhavan vs Assistant Excise Commissioner, Palghat and ors.(3) where it is said that the rental charged by the State for licences is the consideration for the privilege of vending liquor.
The licenses in the present appeals voluntarily contracted to pay the guaranteed sum of the stipulated lump sum for the exclusive privilege to vend liquor.
In the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act 1938 case,(4) it has been said that in several Acts by which excise duties are imposed it is provided that duty is able articles from the place of manufacture or production and there is no provision for the imposition of an excise duty on retail sales.
Many Acts provide for lump sum payments in certain cases by manufacturers and retailers, which may be described payments either for privilege or as consideration for the temporary grant of a monopoly, but these are clearly not excise duties or anything like them.
(Sec at pp.
53 and 54).
This Court in M/s. Guruswamy & Co. etc.
vs State of Mysore & ors.(5) considered the question whether the payment of shop rent 226 for the exclusive privilege of sale of liquor in a specified shop is an excise duty.
In Guruswami 's case (supra) the petitioners paid shop rent or the 'kist ' for a group of toddy shops amounting to Rs. 3,61,116 a month.
This 'kist ' amount was determined at the auction sale of exclusive privilege of vending toddy in the shops.
The notification for auction mentioned rates of duty, price, etcetera on the several kinds of excisable articles.
The notification also mentioned that health cess at a certain rate shall also be payable on the shop rent and tree tax on toddy and other duties of excise levied.
The petitioners challenged the authority of the State to levy and collect health cess.
The main ground was that the health cess was hl reality a tax and not a mere cess.
This Court said that the true character or nature of levy in Guruswami 's case (supra) was that it was a payment for the exclusive privilege of selling toddy.
The payment had no close relation to the production or manufacture of toddy.
The only relation the levy had to production or manufacture was that it enabled the licensee to sell it.
The excise duty is paid on toddy in the form of tree tax.
He who keeps toddy pays tree tax.
The privilege of selling toddy was auctioned well before the goods came into existence.
In view of these characteristics the health cess was found not to be excise duty.
The taxable event in regard to the health cess was not the manufacture or production of goods but the acceptance of the licence to sell the goods.
A Bench decision of this Court in State of Orissa and ors vs Harinarayan Jaiswal and ors.
(1) considered the grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture and sale of country liquor by licensees.
This Court held that the power given to the Government to sell the exclusive privilege in such manner as it thinks fit is a very wide power.
In Coverjee B. Bharucha vs The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and ors.(2) this Court held that an important purpose of selling the exclusive right to sell liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue.
Excise revenue forms an important part of ' State revenues.
The power of the Government to sell the exclusive privilege is by public auction or by negotiation.
The fact that the 1. price fetched by the sale of country liquor is an excise revenue does not change the nature of the right.
The sale is a mode of raising revenue.
The decisions of this Court establish that the lump sum amount voluntarily agreed to by the appellants to pay to the State are not levies of excise duty but are in the nature of lease money or rental or lump sum amount for the exclusive privilege of retail sales granted by the States to the appellants.
There is no levy of excise duty in enforcing the payment of the guaranteed sum or the stipulated lump sum mentioned in the licences, for these reasons.
First, the licenses were granted to the appellants after offer and acceptance or by accepting their tenders or auction bid.
I 227 The appellants stipulated to pay lump sum amounts as the price for the exclusive privilege of vending country liquor.
The appellants agreed to pay what they considered to be equivalent to the value of the right.
Second, the stipulated payment has no relation to the production or manufacture of country liquor except hat it enables the licensee to sell it.
The country liquor is produced by the distilleries.
Under section 28 of the Act and under the relevant duty notifications he excise levy is on the manufacture and not on the sale or retail of liquor.
Under the duty notifications no excise duty is levied or collected from the liquor contractors who are liable only to pay the price of liquor.
The taxable event is not the sale of liquor to the contractors but the manufacture of liquor.
What the liquor contractors pay in consideration of the license is a payment for the exclusive privilege for selling country liquor.
The liability for excise is on the distillery and the liquor contractors are not concerned with it.
Before 1965 there was no excise duty.
The appellants were required to pay the guaranteed amount.
After the imposition of excise duty the position is not altered because the privilege of selling is granted by section or by offer and acceptance before the goods came into existence.
Excise contracts are settled in the preceding year.
Third, the stipulated 1) amounts payable by the appellants have relation only to what the appellants foresaw they could recoup by the sale of country liquor from the liquor shops licensed to them.
There are several varieties of country liquor and rates of excise levy on these varieties are different.
The appellants are not bound to take any particular quaintly or any particular quality of any variety.
Without reference to any quantity or quality, it is impossible to predicate the alleged levy of excise duty.
Before imposition of excise duty in 1965, the issue price did not have even a notional component of excise duty under Issue Price Rules.
Therefore, no excise duty could be attributed to the contractual amounts payable by the appellants.
The references to excise duty in licences under the guarantee system or exclusive privilege system prevalent subsequent to the year 1965 are only for the purposes of adjustment or concession as a unit of measure.
It is not all excise duty currently imposed or levied in the year of the licence that is being collected with regard to undrawn liquor because the adjustment of issue price is with reference to the issue price prevailing in the preceding year.
Rule 67 A of the Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1966 defines value as the price current on the 1st January preceding the financial ye`ar to which the guarantee relates.
Under Rule 67 A licences for retail shops of country liquor under the guarantee system may be granted to persons guaranteeing to draw from a Government warehouse and sell in a financial year or part thereof, country liquor of a specified value, called the ` 'amount of guarantee. ' The explanation to Rule 67 A is that 'value ' for the purpose of that rule shall be the total issue price at Government warehouse calculated at the rate of such price current on.
the I first day of January preceding the financial year to which the guarantee relates.
The licences under the guarantee system are granted either by inviting tenders or by auction or by negotiation.
The amount of 228 guarantee under Rule 67 A be (a) where a licence is granted by invitng tenders the amount of the tender accepted for the grant of the licence; (b) where a licence is granted by auction the amount of the bid accepted for the grant of the licence; and (c) where a Licence is granted by auction or negotiation, the amount of guarantee shall be the amount determined by the Excise Commissioner and accepted by the licensee.
The lump sum amount stipulated under the agreement is not to be equated with issue price.
The issue price is payable only when the contractors take delivery of a particular quantity of specified value of country liquor.
The issue price relates only to liquor drawn by the contractors and does not pertain to undrawn liquor.
No excise duty is or can be collected on undrawn liquor.
The issue price is the price at which country liquor is sold to the liquor contractors.
So far as the liquor contractors are concerned, they pay the price of the liquor even though the price may include the component of excise duty in respect of which they have no direct liability.
Illustrations may be found in case of a person buying a match box or a motor car or a refrigerator.
When the purchaser pays the price of match box, or a motor car or a refrigerator the price includes excise duty Levied and collected on the manufacture of these goods.
The price of goods necessarily includes different components but the price a buyer pays is different from duties and taxes paid or payable by the manufacturers.
The incidence of all the components of cost and taxes is inevitably passed on to the consumer.
What the consumer pays is the price of the goods and not the antecedent components as such.
The licences after stipulating an agreed sum of money which is payable by The licences under the licences provide a scheme of remission.
The liquor contractor is given a remission in the matter of his obligation to pay the stipulated amount to the extent of the excise duty component of The issue price paid by him.
The excise duty component of the issue price is, therefore, only a measure of the quantum or extent of the concession or the remission to be given to the liquor contractor.
The concession is not what is paid by the contractor to the State but it is a remission or a reduction in the stipulated amount for exclusive privilege allowed by the State to the contractor.
The lump sum amount payable for the exclusive privilege is not to be confused with the issue price.
In essence what is sought to be recovered from the liquor contractors is the shortfall occasioned on account of failure on the part of liquor contractor to fulfil the terms of licence.
The contractual obligation of the appellants to pay the stipulated amounts is Not dependent on the quantum of liquor sold by them which is relevant only for the purpose of remission to be earned by them under the licence.
No excise duty is charged or chargeable on undrawn liquor under the licence.
To suggest that the licence obliges the contractors to pay excise duty on undrawn liquor is totally mis 229 reading the conditions of the licence.
The excise duty is collected only in relation to the quantity and quality of the country liquor which is drawn.
No excise duty can be predicated in respect of undrawn liquor.
Adjustment by way of reduction in the contractual liability of the appellants to the extent of a specific and quantified portion of the issue price is purely a measure of concession or remission and is a method of calculation.
The question of adjustment arises only when liquor is drawn, otherwise the formula of remission does not come into the picture at all.
The appellants relied on the decision of this Court in Bimal Chandra Banerjee vs State of Madhya Pradesh(1) in support of the contention that the attempt on the part of the State to enforce the full guaranteed amount or stipulated sum is collecting excise duty.
In Bimal Chandra Banerjee 's case (supra) a levy of excise duty on undrawn liquor was imposed in terms by the State Government by a notification amending the Rules and by an alteration in the conditions of the license.
It was provided that certain minimum quantity of liquor would have to be withdrawn by each contractor who was to be liable to make good every month the deficit monthly average of the total minimum duty on or before the 10th of each month following the months to which the deficit duty relates.
The decision there was that in imposing the excise duty on undrawn liquor by the impugned notification, the State Government was exercising powers which it did not possess.
In the present case, the State Government has not imposed any excise duty on the licensee.
On the contrary, the licence only takes into account the excise duty component of the issue price for the purposes of giving a concession or remission to the contractors.
In Bimal Chandra Banerjee 's case (supra), the impugned notification was assailed on the ground that it exceeded the Legislative competence of the State.
No such question arises here.
The scheme or remission in the present case is that if the liquor contractor purchased liquor of the value, the excise duty whereof equalled the price of the exclusive privilege, the; liquor con tractor is to be given credit therefor.
The agreements give the liquor contractors an exclusive privilege to sell country liquor in a specified area for the period fixed for a stipulated sum of money for enjoying the privilege.
If the contractors do not sell any liquor they arc yet bound to pay the stipulated sum.
IF they sell liquor they are given the benefit of remission in the price of the exclusive privilege.
The measure for this remission is the excise duty leviable to the extent that the liquor contractors can neutralise the entire amount of exclusive privilege in the excise duty payable by them.
If the contractors fail to lift adequate quantity of liquor and thereby fail in neutralising the entire price of exclusive privilege the contractors are not called upon to pay excise duty.
For these reasons the contentions of the appellants fail.
The ap peals arc dismissed save what follows hereinafter in Civil Appeal No. 230 1433 of 1974 and Civil Appal No. 1871 of 1974.
Parties to pay and bear their own costs as they did in the High Court.
In Civil Appeal No. 1433 of 1974 there is a short supply of liquor in respect of the year 1963 64.
In Civil Appeal No. 1871 of 1974 there is a short supply of liquor in respect of the year 1967 68.
In these appeals for these two years, the order will be the same as order dated 29 August, 1974 in Civil Appeals No. l 170, 1171 and 117 of 1974, with the modification that if there has been any interim stay in these matters, the interim stay will stand vacated.
V.M.K. Appeals dismissed.

summary/full:
The licenses for sale of country liquor were granted under the Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950.
For the years 1962 63 and 1963 64 licenses for sale of country liquor were given to contractors under a guaranteed system.
There was a total Guarantee amount.
Where the contractors failed to fulfil the guaranteed amount and there was a short fall, demand notices were issued for the total short fall.
There was no levy of excise duty prior to 6 March, 1964.
For the years 1967 68, 1968 69 and 1969 70 the liquor contractors obtained licences for sale of country liquor at a specified amount of licence fee under the exclusive privilege system.
Where the contractors failed to pay the guaranteed amount there was a demand for a shortfall.
The appellants who were the liquor contractors challenged the demand for short fall of the guaranteed amount by way of writ petitions in the High Court.
Their contention was that what was being demanded as short fall amounted to levy of excise duty. 'the State on the other hand, contended that what was being realised from the liquor contractors was the guaranteed amount in the licence for the exclusive privilege of selling country liquor.
The State further contended that what was being demanded for the year 1967 68 and thereafter as short fall was the stipulate guaranteed amount which was excise revenue.
The High Court accepted the contentions of the State and dismissed the writ petitions.
These appeals have been preferred on the basis of the certificate granted by the High Court.
It was contended for the appellants: (i) The issue prices in the licence are exclusive of prices of container but inclusive of excise duty levied under the.
Government notification and therefore, enforcement of the guaranteed amount meant realisation of excise duty.
(ii) A promise to give income to the Government by purchasing a. minimum quantity of liquor from the Government were house was not equivalent to the Payment of sum of money in consideration of grant of such privilege within the meaning of section 30 of the Act; (iii) 'The amounts of money sought to be recovered from the licensee under the exclusive privilege system introduced from the year 1968 as well as under the guarantee system.
prevalent prior to the year 1968 are nothing but demands for excise duty on uplifted liquor; (iv) 'the word 'issue price ' occurring in the conditions attached to the licences granted upto the year.
1967 68 was a composite name for 'cost price of liquor ' and 'excise duty leviable thereon ' and therefore an agreement by the licensees under the guarantee system to pay 'issue price ' was tantamount to an agreement to pay 'cost price ' and 'excise duty ' as distinct items though described as issue price; (v) 'the licences under both system of Guarantee and Exclusive Privilege contain a term about the payment and adjustment of excise duty and under both systems 'excise duty ' ii a distinct item agreed to be paid as such in terms of the licences.
Rejecting the contentions and dismissing the appeals (except C.A. No. 1433.
of 1974 and C.A. No. 1871 of 1974).
^ HELD: (1) Provisions of section 24, 28, 29 and 30 of the Act and rules 67 A, 67 I, 67 S, 67 K and 67 L of Rajasthan Excise Rules, 1956, clearly established that the licence fee stipulated to be paid by the appellants is the price or consideration or rental which the Government charges from the licensees for parting with its privilege in stipulated lump sum payment and is a normal incident of trading or business transaction.
[225A B] 220 Nashirwar and Ors.
vs State of Madhya Pradesh and ors.
[1975] Vol.
I S.C.C. 29, Hari Shanker V. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner decided on 21 January, ]975 in Civil Appeal No. 365 of 1969, Madhavan V. Assistant Excise Commissioner.
Palghat and ors.s.
Kerala 71, Central Province Barer sale of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxatation Act 1938.
case reported in 11939] F.C.R. 18, M/s. Guruswaamy & Co. etc.
vs State of Mysore & ors,. , State of Orissa and ors.
vs Harinarayan Jaswal and ors.
[1972]3 S.C.R. 784 and Coverjee B. Bharuchua vs The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer.
and ors.
; , referred to.
(2) The licences in the present case are contracts between the parties.
The licensees voluntary accepted the contracts.
They fully exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others.
The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment were onerous.
[225D] (3) There is no levy.
Of excise duty in enforcing the payment of the guaranteed sum or the stipulated sum mentioned in the licenses.
Because, (1) The licences were granted to the appellants after offer and acceptance or by accepting their lenders or auction bid.
The appellants stipulated to pay lump sum amount.
as the price for the exclusive privilege of vending country liquor.
they agreed to pay that they considered to be equivalent of the right; (ii) The liability for excise is on the distillery and the liquor contractors are not concerned with it.
Before: 1965; there was no excise duty.
After the imposition of excise duly: the position is not altered because the privilege of selling is granted 'by auction or by.
Offer and acceptance before the goods came into existence.
and (iii) 'The stipulation, amounts payable by the appellants have relation only to what they foresaw they could recoup by the sale of country liquor from the liquor shops licensed to them.
There are several varieties of country liquor and rates of excise levy on these varieties are different.
The appellants are not bound to take any particular quantity or any particular quality of any variety.
Without reference to any quantity or quality, it is impossible to predicate the alleged levy of excise duty.
[226G 227 E] (4) The lump sum amount stipulated under the agreement is not to 'be equated with issue price.
The issue price is payable only when the contractors take delivery of a particular quantity of specified value of country liquor.
the issue price relates only to liquor drawn by the contractors and does not pertain to undrawn liquor.
No excise duty is or can be collected on undrawn liquor.
The issue price is the price at which country liquor is sold to the liquor contractors.
So far as the liquor contractors are concerned, they pay the price of the liquor even though the price may include the component of excise duty in respect of which they have no direct liability.
[228B D] (5) In the present case, the State Government has not imposed any excise duty On the licensee.
On the contrary, the license only takes into account the excise duty component of the issue price for the purpose of giving a concession or remission to the contractors.
The scheme of remission is that is the liquor contractor purchased liquor of the value, the excise duty whereof equalled the price of the exclusive privilege, the liquor contractor is to be given credit therefore.
The question.
Of adjustment arises only when liquor is drawn, otherwise the formula of remission does not come into the picture at all.
In essence what is sought to be recovered from the liquor contractor is the shortfall occasioned on account of failure on the part of liquor contractor to fulfill the terms of license.
[228G;229BC, F H] Bimal Chandra Banerjee vs State of Madhya Pradesh ; , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 795 of 1975.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 7th December, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in special appeal No. 189 of 1969.
B. Sen, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi, for the appellant.
252 J. P. Goyal, D. P. Mukherjee and Reghunath Singh, for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J.
This is an appeal by special leave.
It is said that by a notification dated 27 4 1961 issued under section 3(b) of the U P Industrial Disputes Act U.P. Act XXVIII of 1947 herein after called the Act, the recommendations of the first Sugar Wage Board were directed to come in force with effect from November 1, 1960.
Certain Sugar Mills including the appellants are said to have refused to implement the provisions of the notification dated 27 4 1961.
This gave rise to an industrial dispute.
Eventually the State Government of Uttar Pradesh by its order dated 22 9 1966 refused to make a reference for adjudication of the dispute under section 4K of the Act.
Respondent No. 1 filed a writ application in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India asking for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the government dated 22 6 1966 and a writ of mandamus directing them to make a reference.
A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ application.
But the same was allowed in a Special Appeal by a Bench of the High Court.
The two appellants approached this Court 1 for grant of special leave.
It was granted "limited to the question as to whether the High Court was justified in giving directions to respondents 1 and 2 to refer the dispute of the workmen for adjudication under section 4K or the U.P.
" In the Special Appeal the High Court has taken the view following the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.(1) that when action was taken under section 3(b) of the Act it was obligatory for the State Government to make a reference under section 4K for adjudication of the Industrial dispute raised in relation to the said action.
The High Court on a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case allowed the writ petition and quashed the order the State Government dated 22 6 1966 by grant of a writ of certiorari.
In this appeal since the special leave was granted on a limited question we are not called upon to interfere with the said portion of the order of the High Court.
But it further directed the State Government and the Labour Commissioner to refer the dispute for adjudication in exercise of their power under section 4K of the Act.
It seems to have been so done on the view that it was obligatory for be State Government to do so 11 after the issuance of the notification under section 3(b) of the Act.
In our opinion this was not correct.
The decision of this Court in the case of Basti Sugar Mills (supra) was given with reference to clause (d) of section 3 of the Act as it stood prior to the amendment made by U.P. Act I of 1957.
By the said amending Act, clause (d) was dropped and substituted by another clause (d) with which we are not concerned and the provision 253 of making a reference was made in section 4K. Section 4K of the Act is in pari materia with section 10(1) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 central Act XIV of 1947.
It has been pointed out by this Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors.
vs The State of Bombay & Anr.(1) that the power of the Government under section 10(1) of the Central Act is discretionary and it is open to the Government under certain circumstances by taking into consideration the relevant factors to refuse to make a reference.
Section 4K of the Act divorced from the context and set up of section 3 stands on the same footing.
Clause (d) of section 3 as it stood in the Act before 1957 was so interwoven and inter connected with the exercise of the power in clause (b) that it led this Court to opine that a writ mandamus could be issued directing the State Government to make a reference under section 3(d) of the Act as it stood before the 1957 amendment.
In our judgment, however, the position has changed after the amendment brought about in the year 1957.
In the judgment of this Court delivered a few days ago, namely M/s Mahabir Jute Mills ltd.
Gorakhpore vs Shri Shibban Lal Saxena & Ors.(2) it has been held on a consideration of the provisions low contained in section 4K of the Act that after quashing the order of the Government refusing to make a reference the High Court could ask the Government to reconsider the matter but it could not give peremptory directions to make a reference.
We may, however, take note of a sentence occurring in the judgment of this Court in the case of Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors.(3) which reads thus: "If the appropriate Government refuses to make a reference for irrelevant considerations, or on extraneous grounds, or acts malafide, that, of course, would be another matter; in such a case a party would be entitled to move the High Court for a writ of mandamus.
" We think what was meant to be conveyed by the sentence aforesaid was that the party would be entitled to move the High Court for interfering with the order of the Government and not necessarily for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the Government to make reference.
The mandamus would be to reconsider the matter.
It does not seem to be quite reasonable to take the view that after the refusal of the Government to make a reference is quashed a writ of mandamus to make a reference must necessarily follow.
The matter has still to be left for the exercise of the power by the Government on relevant considerations in the light of the judgment quashing the order of refusal.
For the reasons stated above we allow this appeal only to the extent that the order of the High Court made in the Special Appeal directing the Government of U.P. and the Labour Commissioner to 254 make a reference under section 4K of the Act is not sustainable and is set aside.
We were informed at the bar that two references have already been made in pursuance of the said direction.
It is plain that the said order made cannot hold good when we have set aside the order of the High Court giving the direction in pursuance of which the references have been made.
It will, however, be open to the State Government to reconsider the matter in the light of the judgment of the High Court and within the ambit of well settled principles of law for exercise of their power of reference and to take such decision in the matter as they may think fit and proper to take in accordance with law.
We shall make no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Under section 3(b) of the U.P. , the State Government issued a notification directing that the recommendations of the First Sugar Wage Board were to come into force from November 1, 1960.
The appellant refused to implement the provisions of the notification.
There was, consequently in industrial dispute but the State Government passed an order refusing to refer the dispute for adjudication under section 4K of the Act.
In a writ petition filed by the respondent, the High Court, following the decision of this Court in State of U.P. vs Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. ; , issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the State Government refusing to make a reference, and also, issued a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and the Labour Commissioner to refer the dispute for, adjudication under section 4 K.
Allowing the appeal to his Court against the issue of the writ of mandamus: ^ HELD: (1) 'The power of the Government under section 10 of the (Central Act) is discretionary and it is open to the Government, taking into consideration relevant factors, to refuse to make a reference that is, the High Court may, after quashing the order of the Government refuse to make a reference, ask the Government to re consider the matter but it could not give peremptory directions to make a reference.
Section 4 K of the U.P. Act, divorced from the context and setup of s.3 is in pari Materia with and stands on the same footing, as section 10(1) of the Central Act.
[253B] M/s Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. Gorakhpore vs Shri Shibban Lal Saxena & Ors.
Civil Appeal No. 781 of 1973, followed.
(2) Section 3(d), as it stood in the U.P. Act before 1957, was so interwoven and inter connected with the exercise of the power in cl.
(b) that it led this Court in the Basti Sugar Mills case to opine that a writ of mandamus could be issued directing the State Government to make a reference.
The position, however, has changed after the amendments brought about in 1957 [253B C) (3) The observation that, if the Government refuses to make a reference on the basis of irrelevant considerations, the party may move the High Court for a writ of mandamus in the Bombay Union of Journalists case ; 35 only means that a writ of mandamus could be issued to the Government to re consider the matter.
[253F] (4) The reference of the dispute made by the Government in pursuance of the direction of the High Court cannot hold good, but the State Government may reconsider the matter and exercise its discretion either to refer the dispute or not within the ambit of well settled principles of law.
[254A B]


judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
493 495 of 1 974 Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 9th August, 1973 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition Nos.
1470 to 1472 of 1973.
K. section Ramamurthi, T. N. Vallinayagam, R. N. Nath and V. Maya Krishnan, for the appellant.
M. Natesan, K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the order of the High Court of Madras in three Civil Revision Petitions under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) briefly the (Act) whereby the High Court refused to interfere A with the orders of the appellate authority under the Act holding that the appellant (hereinafter to be described as the landlord) has no right to evict the respondents (hereinafter to be described as the tenants) from the premises in question on the ground of demolition and reconstruction.
The tenancy under the landlord is admitted by the tenants there is also no question with regard to validity of the notice of eviction.
The only questions in controversy in these appeals are whether the landlord in this case, who is the holder of life interest in the property, is entitled to evict the tenants under section 14(1) (b) of the Act on the ground that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for demolition and for reconstruction.
The second question raised` in one of the appeals is whether a single petition is maintainable to evict the tenants from two different tenancies one for residential purpose and the other for non residential purpose.
The latter point has been held by the High Court in favour of the landlord but the tenants are raising it in seeking to support the earlier order of the appellate authority.
The premises are situated at Anna Pinai Street, Madras.
Originally the premises belonged to late section Manicka Chettyar, father of section M. Gopalakrislina, the present landlord.
By virtue of a Deed of Settlement executed by section Manicka Chettyar on May 9, 1934, possession of the premises was delivered to his wife, Manoranjithammal, as trustee and guardian an of his three minor children, section M. Gopalakrishna then aged 13` years, and his two minor daughters, Indrani Ammal and Palani Ammal.
We are not concerned with the various directions in the Deed of Settlement except to note the admitted position that Manoranjithammal was allowed to enjoy the rents and profits of the property for her life time subject to certain charges mentioned in the Deed.
After the life time of the settlor 's wife, his son, section M. Gopalakrishna (appellant) shall enjoy the rents and profits of the said property. for his life time" subject lo certain charges on account of his two sisters.
It is further mentioned in the Deed that after the life time of Gopalakrishna, his son and son 's heir of any predeceased son living at that time shall enjoy the property subject to identical charges as absolute owners, with right of sale, gift, etc.
There are further directions in case of other contingencies with which we are not concerned.
We may, however, note that section M. Gopalakrishna is issueless.
From the above terms of the Settlement it is contended by the tenants that the landlord has only a life interest in the premises in question and that it is inherent in such a life interest that it is not permissible for the landlord to invoke section 14(1) (b) as grounds for eviction of the: tenants by demolition of the property for the purpose of reconstruction.
It is emphasised that since the interest of the remainder man may be prejudiced? the landlord with a life interest in the premises cannot evict the tenants on these grounds.
The Rent, Controller held that the requirement of the landlords bona fide and ordered for eviction of the tenants.
The Court of Small Causes, 275 which is the appellate authority, allowed the appeals lodged by the tenants against the orders of eviction and set aside the orders of eviction.
As noticed earlier the High Court refused to interfere in revision.
The High Court agreed with the! view of the appellate authority that the landlord had no right to ask for eviction of the respondents on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, he admittedly having only a life interest or right to enjoy the property for his life.
The appellant sub mits that this view is not legally tenable.
Before we proceed to consider the point in controversy, we may read section 14(1)(b): 14.
"Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction. (1) Notwithstandig anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of section 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord the Controller shall, if he is satisfied (b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date".
The expression landlord is defined under section 2(6) as follows: " 'Landlord ' includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own ac count or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant".
x x x x This inclusive definition o landlord would clearly take in its sweep the present landlord who holds a life interest in the premises and who admittedly has been on his own right under the Deed of Settlement as a trustee receiving rents of the premises from the tenants.
We are not even concerned with the question as has been sought to be established in the case by proving that there is no possibility or any objection from the daughters of the settlor or from any other remainder man.
It is sufficient to observe that the rights between section M. Gopalakrishna and the remainder man with regard to the terms of the Deed of Settlement win have to be worked out in appropriate proceedings, if necessary and the general law win govern the matter if any occasion arises.
On the other hand, the Act with which we are concerned is a self contained and complete code for regulation of the rights between landlord and tenants as defined in the Act (See M/s Raval and Co. vs K. G. 276 Ramachandra and others (1).
Thus a controversy that may arise between a landlord and others, who are not his tenants under the Act, is outside the ken of this Act.
Even a possible dispute, imaginary or real, between the landlord and the remainder man cannot affect adjudication of the claim of the landlord against his tenants under the provisions of the Act.
It win also not affect the efficacy of the nature of the plea of bona fide on the part of the landlord, if otherwise so.
Such questions as are raised in this appeal by the tenants are, therefore, irrelevant in a litigation between the landlord and tenants when a suit for eviction is instituted by the former on any of the grounds available to him under the Act.
It is clear that when the objection on the score of the landlord being a holder of life interest and hence incapable of invoking section 14 (1) (b) fails the suit must be decreed.
lt was strenuously submitted by Mr. Natesan that a tenant with a life interest cannot be allowed to demolish the property in order to reconstruct it as that action would, per se be not bona fide.
We are unable to accede to this submission.
A landlord has every right to demolish his property in order to build a new structure on the site with view to improve his business or to get better returns on his investment.
Such a step per se, cannot be characterised as mala fide on the part of the landlord.
There is therefore.
no merit in this contention.
Mr. Natesan faintly submitted that a single petition with regard to two different tenancies, although in the same premises, one for residential purpose and the other for non residential purpose, is not maintainable.
We do not find any substance in such a contention when the tenancy is one.
In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court as well as that of the appellate authority are set aside.
The order of the Controller allowing eviction of the tenants stands restored.
We win, however, allow time to the tenants upto 31st January, 1976, to vacate the premises on the distinct condition that they shall submit affidavits in this Court undertaking to vacate the premises by the aforesaid date within two weeks from to day.
The appellant win be entitled to his costs in these appeals.
One set of costs P.H.P. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant landlord is a holder of life interest in the property in question He filed a suit against the tenant for eviction on the grounds of bona fide requirement by him for demolition and reconstruction.
The Rent Controller held the requirement of the landlord bona fide and ordered eviction of the tenant.
The appellant filed one petition for evicting the tenants in respect of two different tenancies, one for residential purpose and the other for non residential purpose.
The appellate Authority under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 dismissed the appellant 's application for eviction on the ground that a landlord having a life interest cannot seek eviction for bona fide requirement for demolition and reconstruction.
The High Court in Revision refused to inter fere with the order of the Appellate Authority under the Act.
On appeal by special leave, it was contended by the appellant that the land lord having a life interest is entitled to evict the tenant for bona fide requirement for demolition and reconstruction under section 14 of the Act.
The respondent contended that granting of the application of the landlord might prejudice the interest of the remainder man. ^ HELD: Allowing the appeal, (1) Definition of landlord under section 2(6) is wide enough to include the appellant who holds a life interest in the premises.
The right between the appellant and the remainder man with regard to the deed of settlement would have to be worked out in appropriate proceedings. 'The Act in question is a self contained and, complete Code for regulation of the rights between the land lord and tenants.
Even a possible dispute between the landlord and the remainder man cannot affect adjudication of the claim of the landlord against his tenants under the provisions of the Act.
[275F 276D] (2) A single petition with regard to two tenancies in the same premises is maintainable when the tenancy is one.
[276D E]