judgement:
nder Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
K.L. Gauba, (Gopal Singh, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 337 to 343 and 481 of 1954.
K.L. Gauba, (section D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 344, 446 and 349 of 1954.
K. L. Gauba, (R. Patnaik and section D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No, 345 of 1954, 166 K.L. Gauba, (N. C.Chakravarty and section D. Sekhri, with him) for the Petitioner in Petition No. 347 of 1954.
K.L. Gauba, (B. Moropant and section D. Sekhri, with him), for the Petitioner in Petition No. 348 of 1954.
Rajni Patel and M. section K. Sastri, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954.
Rajni Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 365 and 366 of 1954.
J.B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the Petitioner in Petition No. 690 of 1954.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India (P. A. Mehta, R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale, with them), for the Respondents in all Petitions.
April 6.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.
These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution are directed against the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953, Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954 which was passed by the Legislature of the State of Bombay to abolish jagirs in the merged territories and merged areas in the State of Bombay.
The Bill was passed by the Legislature on the 22nd September 1953 and received the sanction of the Upper House on the 26th September 1953.
The President gave his assent to it on the 13th June 1954 and by a notification dated the 15th July 1954 it was brought into effect from the 1st August 1954.
In view of the notification the Petitioners filed these petitions on the 30th July 1954 challenging the vires of the Act (hereinafter called the impugned Act) and asking for the issue of appropriate writs restraining inter alia the State of Bombay from giving effect to its provisions.
On applications made to this Court on the 31st July 1954 the operation of the impugned Act was stayed pending the bearing and final disposal of the petitions, 167 The Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 337, 344, 345, 346, 347 and 349 of 1954 are relations of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Idar.
The Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 338 and 342 of 1954 are relations of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Chhota Udaipur.
The Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 339 and 341 are relations of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Devgad Baria.
The Petitioner in Petition No. 343 of 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Rajpipla.
The Petitioners in Petition No. 340 of 1954 are jagirdars of the erstwhile State of Rajpipla.
The Petitioner in Petition No. 348 of 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Bansda.
The Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 365 and 366 of 1954 are jagirdars of the erstwhile States of Idar and Lunawada respectively.
The Petitioner in Petition No. 481 of 1954 is a relation of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Mohanpur.
The Petitioners in Petition No. 690 of 1954 are the holders of personal Inams from the erstwhile State of Rajpipla.
All the petitioners except the last claim to be hereditary jagirdars under grants made by the respective States for the maintenance of themselves, their families and dependents and hold the jagirs as Jiwai Jagirs.
The holders of the personal Inams in Petition No. 690 of 1954 used to pay salami to the erstwhile State of Rajpila and are included within the definition of "jagirdar" being holders of agir villages within the meaning of the definition thereof contained in the impugned Act.
The Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954 claims to be the owner of 60 villages in the patta or territory of Moti Moree comprised in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or under lord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of jagir as given in the impugned Act and that therefore in any event the State of Bombay is not entitled to enforce the impugned Act against him.
All these Petitioners have challenged the vires of the imapugned Act mainly relying upon the agreements of merger entered into by the Rulers of the respective States with the Dominion of India on or about the 19th March 1948 and the collateral letters of guarantee 168 passed by the Ministry of States in their favour on subsequent dates, the contents of which were regarded as part of the merger agreements entered into by them with the Dominion of India.
The merger agreements were in the form given in Appendix XIII to the White Paper at page 183: "FORM OF MERGER AGREEMENT SIGNED BY RULERS OF GUJARAT AND DECCAN STATES AGREEMENT MADE THIS day of between the Governor General of India and the of Whereas in the immediate interests of is desirous that the administration of the State should be integrated as early as possible with that of the Province of in such manner as the Government of the Dominion of India may think fit; It is hereby agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1.
The of hereby cedes to the Dominion Government full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the Governance of the State and agrees to transfer the administration of the State to the Dominion Government on the day of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as "the said day").
As from the said day the Dominion Government will be competent to exercise the said powers, authority and jurisdiction in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit.
ARTICLE 2.
The shall with effect from the said day be entitled to receive from the revenues of the State annually for his privy purse the sum of rupees free of taxes.
This amount is intended to cover all the expenses of the Ruler and his family, including expenses on account of his personal staff, maintenance of his residences, 169 marriages and other ceremonies, etc.
and will neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.
The said sum may be drawn by the in four equal instalments in advance at the beginning of each quarter by presenting bills at the State Treasury or at such other Treasury as may be specified by the Dominion Government.
ARTICLE 3.
The shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of this agreement.
The will furnish to the Dominion Government before the day of 1948 an inventory of all the immovable property, securities and cash balance held by him as such private property.
If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the or State property, it shall be referred to such officer with judicial experience as the Dominion Government may nominate and the decision of that officer shall be final and binding on both parties.
ARTICLE 4.
The shall be entitled to all personalprivileges enjoyed by them whether within or outside the territories of the State, immediately before the 15th day of August 1947.
ARTICLE 5.
The Dominion Government guarantees the succession, according to law and custom, to the gadi of the State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles.
In confirmation whereof Mr. Vapal Pangunm Menon, Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of States, has appended his signature on behalf and with the authority of the Governor General of Indiab and has appended his 22 170 signature on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, of Dated Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States".
The letters of guarantee subsequently executed by the Ministry of States in favour of the respective Rulers contained the following guarantees: "(1) Your privy purse will be fixed in accordance with the formula applied in relation to the fixation of the privy purse of the Deccan States Rulers whose States have merged into the Bombay Province.
The amount will be fixed in perpetuity to you, your heirs and successors, and will neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.
It will be free of all taxes, whether imposed by the Government of Bombay or by the Government of India and it will not be taken into account in the assessment of your world income to income tax or super tax.
(2) The cash balances and other assets of your State on the day you transfer the administration of your State to the Dominion Government will, as far as possible, be spent for the benefit of the people of your State.
(3) You will be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all Darbari or private properties (as distinct from State Properties) belonging to you on the date of your making over the administration of your State to the Dominion Government.
Darbari properties will include palaces, houses, residences, guest houses, stables, garages, quarters, outhouses, etc.
which are at the date of transfer of administration in bonafide personal use or occupation of the Ruler or members of his family or personal staff, irrespective of whether the property is situated in the Capital, or at any other place in the State, or in Bombay, or anywhere else outside.
(4) The continuation in service of the permanent members of the public services of your State is hereby guaranteed on conditions which will be no less advantageous than those on which they were serving 171 on 1st April 1948.
In the event of continuation of service not being possible in any case, reasonable compensation will be paid.
(5) Pensions, gratuities, annuities, and allowances, granted by the State to the members of its public services who have retired or have proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement before 1st April 1948 as also the enjoyment of the ownership of Khangi villages, lands, jagir, grants, etc.
existing on 1st April 1948 are hereby Guaranteed.
This guarantee is without prejudice Co the right of Government of Bombay to issue any legislation which does, not discriminate against the states and their subjects.
(6) All emblems, insignia, articles and other Paraphernalia of the Ruler will be considered as belonging to, and be regarded as his private property.
(7) No order passed or action taken by you before the date of making over the administration to the Dominion Government will be questioned unless the order was passed or action taken after the 1st of April 1948 and is considered by the Government of India to be palpably unjust or unreasonable.
The decision of the Government of India in this respect will be final.
(8) No enquiry shall be made nor shall proceedings lie in any Court in India against you, whether in a personal capacity or otherwise, in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by you or under your authority during the period of your administration of the State.
(9) Every question of disputed succession in regard to a Gujarat State which has signed an agreement integrating the administration of the State with that of the Province of Bombay shall be decided by a Council of Rulers of Gujarat States after referring it to the High Court of Bombay and in accordance with the opinion given by that High Court.
All questions relating to the rights, dignities and privileges of the Ruler will also be considered by the Council of Rulers who shall make suitable recommendations to the Government of Bombay and the Government of India.
The Council shall consist of the Rulers of all 172 full jurisdictional Gujarat States, whether salute or non salute.
No ruler who is less than 21 years of age shall however be a member of the Council.
The Council will elect one of its members to be the President of the Council.
The President and the members of the Council will hold office for a term of five years from the date on which they enter upon the duties of their respective offices.
2.The contents of this letter will be regarded as part of the merger agreement entered into by you with the Governor General of India".
The contention which has been urged before us by the Petitioners relying upon clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee aforesaid is that the enjoyment of the ownership of the jagirs existing on the 1st April, 1948 was guaranteed, that this guarantee was binding on the State of Bombay, that the State of Bombay and therefore the State Legislature had waived the right, if any, or in any event had no legislative competence to enact any legislation depriving the holders of the jagirs of their right of ownership over the same, and that even though the Government of Bombay has reserved to itself the right to issue any legislation which did not discriminate against the states and their subjects, the impugned Act was ultra vires inas much as no legislation could be undertaken which would have the effect of depriving the holders of the jagirs of their ownership over the same and the provisions of the impugned Act were in any event discriminatory against the States and their subjects or in other words the impugned Act was confiscatory and also discriminatory.
It was contended on the other hand on behalf of the State of Bombay that the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee were executed by the Dominion of India and were not binding on the State of Bombay, that the Petitioners were not parties to the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee and that they were not entitled to enforce the same, that even if they be treated as parties thereto the dispute between the parties arose out of the provisions of the agreements and covenants which were entered into or 173 executed before the commencement of the Constitution by the Rulers of the respective states and to which the Government of Dominion of India was a party and that therefore this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the said disputes by virtue of the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, that the State Legislature had plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of its sphere unless the Constitution itself expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, that no such prohibition could be spelt out of the terms of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee and that the impugned Act was intra vires the powers of the State Legislature and could not be challenged.
Once that position was established it was further urged that the jagirs in question were estates within the definition of the expression in article 31 A(2) (a) of the Constitution and the impugned legislation being a legislation providing for the acquisition by the State of the estates and the rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of the same could not be challenged as void on the ground that it was inconsistent with or abridged any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III of the Constitution, and that therefore the impugned Act could not be challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights of the Petitioners.
It was also urged that none of the provisions of the impugned Act were confiscatory or in any manner whatever discriminatory, fair and adequate compensation having been provided for the abolition of the jagirs and the States and their subjects not having been dealt within any discriminatory manner as compared with the subjects of the original State of Bombay.
As regards the contention that the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee were executed by the Dominion of India and were not binding on the State of Bombay it was urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the Government of the Dominion of India was certainly bound by those guarantees and this obligation of the Dominion Government devolved upon the Province of Bombay when the erstwhile States which were parties to the agreements of merger 174 and the letters of guarantee became merged in the Province of Bombay, under clause 8 of the States ' Merger (Governors ' Provinces) Order, 1949 (Appendix XLIV, White Paper, Page 297), that these obligations were thus deemed to have been undertaken by the Dominion Government on behalf of the absorbing Province, viz., the Province of Bombay and were binding upon the Province of Bombay, and that when the Constitution came into force from the 26th January 1950 all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of each Governors ' Province whether arising out of any contract or otherwise were under article 294 of the Constitution to be the rights, liabilities and obligations respectively of the Government of each corresponding State and these obligations of the Province of Bombay accordingly became the obligations of the State of Bombay.
It was further urged that the State of Bombay was thus bound by all the obli gations which bad been undertaken by the Dominion Government under the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee above referred to, and it could not lie in the mouth of the State of Bombay to repudiate the same.
This argument is not without force, but we do not consider it necessary to decide this question because even assuming that the State of Bombay was bound by these obligations, the question still remains how far the Petitioners before us are entitled to enforce these obligations against the State of Bombay.
The Petitioners were certainly not parties to these agreements of merger and letters of guarantee eo nominee.
They could only claim to be parties to the same by reason of the fact that the Rulers of the erstwhile States did not negotiate these agreements of merger or obtain the letters of guarantee only in respect of their personal rights and properties but also represented the States and their subjects in the matter of obtaining the same and the subject of these States were therefore represented by the Rulers and were entitled to the benefit of whatever obligations were undertaken by the Dominion of India qua the States and their subjects.
It is therefore arguable that the Rulers 175 of the erstwhile States as also their subjects would be in a position to enforce these obligations.
This position was however sought to be negatived by relying upon the following observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vajesingji Joravarsingji vs Secretary of State for India in Council(1) at page 360: "But a summary of the matter is this: when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time that is an act of state.
It matters not how the acquisition has been brought about.
It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognized ruler.
In all cases the result is the same.
Any inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal Courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised.
Such rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing.
Nay more, even if in a treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants to enforce these stipulations in the municipal Courts.
The right to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties".
These observations were quoted with approval in Secretary of State vs Sardar Rustsam Khan & Others(2) at page 124.
It was therefore urged that it will be the high contracting parties, viz., the Rulers of the respective States who would be in a position to enforce these obligations and not the Petitioners for whose benefit these obligations were undertaken by the Dominion Government.
We do not feel called upon to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of these contentions also for the simple reason that the Petitioners would be out of Court either way.
If they were deemed to be parties to the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee they would be faced with the bar to the maintainability of the petitions under article 363 of the Constitution which lays down that neither the Supreme (1) 51 Indian Appeals 357.(2) 68 Indian Appeals 109.176 Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any 'Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India. . . . was a party.
If on the other hand they were deemed not to have been parties to the same they would not be the contracting parties and would certainly not be able to enforce these obligations.
It was therefore urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the dispute between the parties did not arise out of the provisions of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee which were entered into or executed by the Rulers of the respective States and to which the Government of the Dominion of India was a party.
According to the Petitioners they merely challenged the vires of the impugned Act and relied upon clause 5 of the letters of guarantee in order to establish the position that the State Legislature had no legislative competence to legislate on the subject of the abolition of jagirs.
That was, it was submitted, not a dispute arising out of the agreements of merger and letters of guarantee but arose out of the act of the State Legislature in enacting the impugned Act in direct contravention of the guarantee incorporated in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
This argument however would not avail the Petitioners, because if one looked into the averments contained in their petitions it was clear that the whole ambit of the petitions was to enforce clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
The Petitioners relied upon clause 5 of the letters of guarantee which had been obtained by the Rulers of the erstwhile State from the Dominion Government and complained that the State Legislature had enacted the impugned Act which it had no power to enact having regard to clause 5 of the said letters of guarantee and were wrongfully depriving the Petitioners of the jagirs, the ownership of which had been guaranteed thereunder.
The whole of the petitions were nothing else except the 177 claim to enforce the Petitioners ' rights under the letters of guarantee, and the disputes therefore were clearly in respect of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee and were covered by article 363 (1) of the Constitution.
A similar contention had been raised on behalf of the plaintiffs in State of Seraikella and Others vs Union of India and Another(1) and was repelled by Kania, C.J. at page 490 as under: "The plaintiff contends firstly that it had signed the Instrument of Accession through its Ruler.
The State next complains that, acting beyond the powers given over under the Instrument of Accession,.the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are trespassing wrongfully on its legislative and executive functions, that the Dominion of India and the State of Bihar are making laws which they have no power to make, having regard to the Instrument of Accession, and are wrongfully interfering with the administration of the State beyond the rights given to them under the Instrument of Accession.
The whole plaint is nothing else except the claim to enforce the plaintiff 's right under the Instrument of Accession.
The dispute therefore in my opinion clearly is in respect of this Instrument of Accession and is covered by Article 363(1) of the Constitution of India.
The question of the validity of the different enactments and orders is also based on the rights claimed under the Instru ment of Accession so far as the plaintiff is concerned".
It could not therefore be urged that what the Petitioners were doing was not to enforce the obligations undertaken by the Dominion Government under the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee, or that the disputes between the parties did not arise out of the provisions of the agreements of merger and the letters of guarantee which were entered into or executed by the Rulers of the respective States and to which the Government of Dominion of India was a party within the meaning of Article 363 of the Constitution.
(1) ; 23 178 If that was the position the jurisdiction of this Court was ousted and this Court could not interfere in those disputes.
Assuming however that the Petitioners were entitled to enforce the obligation and guarantee incorporated in clause 5 of the letters of s guarantee the further difficulty in the way of the Petitioners is that the State Legislature was fully competent to enact the impugned Act notwithstanding the terms of the guarantee.
The legislative competence of the State Legislature can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and unless and until there is any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the State Legislature enjoys to legislate on the topics enumerated in the Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
It was conceded on behalf of the Petitioners that the topic of legislation which was covered by the impugned Act was well within List II of the said Schedule and the vires of the impugned Act could not be challenged on that ground.
The ground of attack was that the Dominion Government and therefore the State Government bad waived its right to legislate on the topic of the abolition of jagirs or had in any event put a fetter or limitation on their power to issue any legislation in that behalf by the terms of the guarantee contained in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
It was contended that under the terms of clause 5 an absolute guarantee had been given by the Dominion Government in regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jagirs and that the Dominion Government and therefore the State of Bombay were precluded from enacting any legislation which had the effect of destroying that ownership.
This contention however could not be supported by the terms of clause 5 which embodied in the first part thereof the terms of the guarantee, and went on to provide in the second part that this guarantee was without prejudice to the right of the Government of Bombay to issue any legislation which did not discriminate against the States and their 179 subjects.
It was therefore not an absolute guarantee but was circumscribed or cut down by the reservation of the power to make law with respect to jagirs provided such law did not discriminate against the States and their subjects.
The right of the Government of Bombay which was thus reserved covered the whole of the guarantee embodied in the first part of the clause and there was nothing in these terms which would go to show that the ownership of the jagirs could not be touched and the legislation, if any, was to be enacted in regard to certain incidents of enjoyment of such ownership.
The right of the Government of Bombay to issue any legislation with regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jagir lands was expressly reserved and this right covered also legislation in regard to the abolition of the jagirs and the Government of Bombay was therefore entitled under the terms of this clause 5 to issue any legislation in regard to the same provided however that such legislation did not discriminate against the States and their subjects.
That was the only fetter or limitation, imposed upon the right of the Government of Bombay to issue any legislation in regard to the enjoyment of the ownership of jagir lands and if that fetter or limitation could also be imposed on the State Legislature the Petitioners would have had a right to challenge the impugned Act on the ground that it discriminated against the States and their subjects.
The fetter or limitation upon the legislative power of the State Legislature which had plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of the legislative heads specified in the Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution could only be imposed by the Constitution itself and not by any obligation which bad been undertaken by either the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay.
Under Article 246 the State Legislature was invested with the power to legislate on the topics enumerated in Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and this power was by virtue of article 245(1) subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
The Constitution itself laid down the fetters 180 or limitations on this power, e.g., in article 303 or article 286(2).
But unless and until the Court came to the conclusion that the Constitution itself had expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally the power of the State Legislature to enact legislation within its legislative competence was plenary.
Once the topic of legislation was comprised within any of the entries in the Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the fetter or limitation on such legislative power had to be found within the Constitution itself and if there was no such fetter or limitation to be found there the State Legislature had full competence to enact the impugned Act no matter whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay.
The Petitioners would have a legitimate grievance in the matter of the deprivation of their rights of ownership of the jagir lands in so far as the States and their subjects were discriminated against, but they would not be able to have their grievance redressed by this Court for the simple reason that the State Legisla ture was at all events competent to enact the impugned Act not being fettered at all by the terms of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
The provisions of article 294(b) of the Constitution which is said to have transferred the obligations of the Government of the Province to the State of Bombay would not by involving the transference of the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee to the State Government impose a fetter or limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact legislation on any of the topics enumerated in Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The remedy of the Petitioners would be else where and not in this forum.
The learned Judges of the Federal Court gave an answer to a similar complaint of the Taluqdars of Oudh made by them against the United Provinces Tenancy Act XVII of 1939 in Thakur 181 Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The United Provinces(1) at page 87: "We desire, however, to point out that what they are now claiming is that no Legislature in India has any right to alter the arrangements embodied in their sanads nearly a century ago; and, for all we know, they would deny the right of Parliament itself to do so.
We hope that no responsible Legislature or Government would ever treat as of no account solemn pledges given by their predecessors; but the readjustment of rights and duties is an inevitable process, and one of the functions of the Legislature in a modern State is to effect that readjustment, where circumstances have made it necessary, with justice to all concerned.
It is however, not for this 'Court to pronounce upon the wisdom or the justice, in the broader sense, of legislative acts; it can only say whether they were validly enacted. . . . . . . " These observations were quoted with approval by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The United Provinces(1) at page 122 and we also would observe in the same strain that we are not concerned with the policy of the State Legislature in enacting the impugned Act for abolition of jagirs but we are only concerned with the question whether the impugned Act was validly enacted.
No argument has been advanced before us which would enable us to hold that the impugned Act was ultra vires the State Legislature, the only ground of attack being that it was in contravention of the guarantee given in clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
But that position is of no avail to the Petitioners.
Considerable argument was addressed before us based on the comparison of the provisions of the various Acts of the Bombay State Legislature enacted during the years 1949 to 1953 in regard to the abolition of the various tenures obtaining within the State of Bombay with the provisions of the impugned Act, with a view to show that the provisions of the impugned Act were discriminatory against the States (1) (2) 1946 F.C.R. III.
182 and their subjects within the meaning of clause 5 of the letters of guarantee.
We have not thought it necessary to refer to the same in view of the conclusion which we have reached above that the impugned Act was intra vires the powers of the State Legislature and the State Legislature was quite competent to enact the same.
Even if it could be demonstrated that the provisions of the impugned Act were confiscatory as well as discriminatory in the manner suggested, the jagirs of the Petitioners (except in the case of the Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954) were all estates within the meaning of the term as defined in Article 31 A(2)(a) of the Constitution and even if the impugned Act provided for the acquisition of the estates or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modifica tion of any such rights the impugned Act could not be challenged as void on the ground that it was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part 11I of the Constitution.
Any challenge therefore on the ground of the impugned Act violating the fundamental rights of the Petitioners under article 14 or article 19(1)(f) or article 31(2) of the Constitution was not available to the Petitioners.
On the other hand if the grievance was that the impugned Act had brought about dis crimination in breach of clause 5 of the letters of gua rantee then the dispute clearly arose out of the letters of guarantee and would by article 363 be placed beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
The Petitions of the Petitioners except Petition No. 364 of 1954 which would be dealt with immediately hereafter therefore fail and are liable to be dismissed.
Petition No. 364 of 1954 In addition to the grounds common to all the Petitions which we have already dealt with above the Petitioner in Petition No. 364 of 1954 claims that he is the owner of the 60 villages in the Putta or territory of Moti Moree comprised in the erstwhile State of Idar as the Bhumia or underlord and contends that his holding does not fall within the definition of 183 jagir as given in the impugned Act.
In support of his contention he has traced the history of Moti Moree since 1250 A.D. and in any event since 1800 A.D when the then Chieftain of Moti Moree entered into a treaty with the Maharaja Zalimsinh of Modasa whereby in consideration of payment of Rs. 361 annually the said Zalimsinh agreed to protect Moti Moree against the attacks of the neighboring State of Doongarpur.
He has pointed out that thereafter Modasa was absorbed into the Taluka of Amnagar in 1821 and subsequently in about 1849 it reverted to Idar State and continued with the Idar State until the latter merged into the Province of Bombay in 1948.
He contends that he and his predecessors were enjoying and exercising full sovereign rights over Moti Moree ever since the said treaty of 1800 and their position had remained unchanged, their only liability being to pay Rs. 361 annually for protection.
He further contends that they were enjoying the rights of excise and customs and revenue, that they did not pay any revenue to the State of Idar and enjoyed and continued to enjoy rights over all lands, forests, minerals, river beds, village sites, etc.
and that when the Ruler of Idar wanted that there should be uniform customs levy throughout the State, the said Ruler had to give compensation to the Petitioner and had also similarly negotiated with them and had to pay compensation to them in respect of salt, opium, excise etc.
He has pointed out that Rs. 457 for customs ' Rs. 40 for opium and Rs. 7 for salt were being paid annually by the erstwhile State of Idar and thereafter by the Government of State of Bombay to him by way of compensation for these sovereign rights of his, which amounts were set off against Rs. 361 being the annual payment of protection which he paid as aforesaid to them.
These rights of his recognised by the erstwhile State of Idar and also by the State of Bombay constituted him a Thakur or underlord of Moti Moree and he contends that his estate of Moti Moree is not a jagir within the definition of the term given in the impugned Act.
Our attention has also been drawn in this behalf to 184 Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. 5 (1880), page 398, where Mori (Meghraj) is described as the estate of the original landlords Bhumias otherwise described as petty chiefs and underlords and to page 409 where the underlords (Bhumias) are stated to be the early chiefs who settled in Idar at least not later than the Rathod conquest (about 1250).
The State of Bombay on the other hand has denied the several allegations contained in the petition and contends that in the year 1891 the erstwhile State of Idar had conferred upon the Thakore of Moti Moree the powers of a Third Class Magistrate as an act of "grace", that in 1902 the management of the estate was taken over by the erstwhile State of Idar and one Kamdar Mathurlaji was appointed as Japtidar, that in 1910 the management was lifted as a special case and the arrears of Nazrana were ordered to be recovered in installments by the erstwhile State of Idar that in several documents Moti Moree was described as Bhomia Jagir within the definition of the term Jagir as given in the impugned Act and that the sum of Rs. 361 was still being regularly paid even after merger as "Kichari hak".
It therefore contends that the Thakore of Moti Moree, the Petitioner is a jagirdar and Moti Moree is a jagir within the meaning of the definition thereof given in the impugned Act.
These allegations and counter allegations do not however carry the matter any further.
In order to exclude Moti Moree and the Petitioner from the operation of the impugned Act it will be necessary for the Petitioner to establish satisfactorily that Moti Moree is, not a jagir within the definition thereof given in the impugned Act.
Even though the allegations of the Petitioner go far enough to make it probable that Moti Moree was neither held by the Petitioner and his ancestors under a grant or was not recognised as a grant by the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Idar, that would not be enough to enable us to grant him the relief prayed for by him.
The question requires to be completely thrashed out and adjudicated upon by a Court of law after going into the evidence 185 adduced before it by both the parties.
The learned Attorney General appearing for the State of Bombay has therefore submitted that this question should be enquired into by a proper tribunal and the Petitioner should be referred to a civil suit in order to establish his rights.
We accordingly feel that the Petition No. 364 of 1954 should be adjourned till after the disposal of a civil suit to be filed by the Petitioner in the proper Court for a declaration that Moti Moree is not a jagir within the definition of the term as given in the impugned Act and for consequential reliefs.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has given us to understand that a formal notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code in this behalf has already been served by the Petitioner on the State of Bombay.
We therefore order that the Petitioner do file the necessary suit within 3 months from this date and this petition do stand adjourned till after the hearing and final disposal of that suit.
The stay granted by this Court in this petition will continue in the meanwhile.
We may record here that the learned Attorney General on behalf of the State of Bombay has also given his undertaking not to take any steps against the Petitioner in the meanwhile.
Petitions Nos.337 to 349, 365, 366, 481 and 690 of 1954 will therefore stand dismissed.
Petition No. 364 of 1954 will stand adjourned sine die till after the disposal of the civil suit to be filed by the Petitioner as above indicated.
If no such suit is filed within the aforesaid period this petition will also stand dismissed.
Each party will bear and pay the respective costs of the petitions.

summary/full:
Under Article 246(2) and (3) of the Constitution, the Legis lature of a State has plenary powers to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The legislative competence of the State Legisla 165 ture can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and unless there is any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on a subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the State Legislature enjoys to legislate on the topics enumerated in Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
In view of Article 246 of the Constitution, no curtailment of legislative competence can be spelt out of the terms of Clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee given by the Dominion Government to the Rulers of "States" subsequent to the agreements of Merger, which guaranteed, inter alia, the continuance of Jagirs in the merged "States".
Indeed, Clause 5 of the Letters of Guarantee itself saved the legislative right of the State of Bombay subject to the limitation that enactments of the State shall not be discriminatory in nature.
Attacks on the validity of the said Act on the basis of the rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 32(2) of the Constitution cannot be countenanced in view of Article 31 A(2)(a) of the Constitution, Article 363 (1) of the Constitution barred the jurisdiction of Courts in disputes arising out of any provision of the agreements of merger and the Letters of Guarantee.
Held, that Bombay Act XXXIX of 1954, the impugned Act, was intra vires the State Legislature.
Petitions Nos.
337 to 349, 365, 366, 481 and 690 of 1954 Dis.
missed.
Petition No. 364 of 1954 Adjourned.
Vajesingji vs Secretary of State (51 I.A. 357), Secretary of State vs Sardar Rustam (68 I.A. 109), State of Saraikella vs Union of India ; , Thakur Jagannath vs The United Provinces ([1943] F.C.R. 72), Thakur Jagannath vs The United Provinces ( , referred to.


judgement:
N: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 253 of 1971.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated 11.2.1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1285/70.
O. P. Rana, For the appellant Shiv Pujan Singh, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 381 GOSWAMI, J.
This appeal by special leave at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh is against the judgment of acquittal of the High Court of Allahabad.
Balram, Ram Khelawan and Rhuddi are three sons of one Ram Charan.
The injured Vishwanath (PWI), Shankar, Kankar and deceased Chhannu are sons of Balram.
Accused Sheo Murat, Ram Kishan, Shobha and Moti Lal are sons of Ram Khelawan.
Accused Shyam Lal is the son of accused Ram Kishan.
Shiv Nath (PW 2) e and Jagan Nath are sons of Bhuddi.
Thus all of them have branched off from Ram Charan and all the members have got share in their ancestral house at village Bhiwanipur.
In this ancestral house Vishwanath, Kankar, Chhannu, Jagan Nath and accused Ram Kishan along with his mother and married younger sister Bhagwantia resided.
All others along with the rest of the four accused lived in a nearby separate house.
on March 18, 1969, certain quarrel ensued between Bhagwantia and Kankar 's wife Patia.
Vishwanath tried to pacify both the quarrelling women.
Since Bhagwantia did not heed to Vishwanath 's words, the latter gave her one or two slaps.
Ram Kishan and his brothers were not in the village on that day but learning about this incident on the following day accused Sheo Murat, Ram Kishan, Shobha, Moti Lal and Shyam Lal went to Vishwanath 's place at about 7.00 or 8.00 P.M.
What followed may be described in the words of the in jured Vishwanath: "On the next day at 7 or 8 P.M.
I was sitting at the door of my osara.
My younger brothers, Kankar and Chhannu, were sitting at a short distance from me at the well.
Sheonath, my cousin, was also sitting near Kankar and Chhannu.
A burning lantern was hanging from a bamboo pole outside the osara; and there was sufficient light from it.
Ram Kishan, Shobha, Sheo Murat, Shyam Lal and Moti, accused present in the court, came there, Ram Kishan asked from me as to why I had slapped Bhagwantia and that I should come out and settle up.
I stood up and said, "Brother, what will you settle up".
At this Ram Kishan instigated his companions saying, "Beat the salas".
At once Shobha caught hold of my hand and Sheo Murat dealt knife blows to me.
Chhannu, my younger brother, came to save me, whereupon Shyam Lal and Moti caught hold of him and Sheo Murat started giving knife blows to him.
On hearing their instigation, Mohan, Phool Chand, Budhi and others came over there and began to forbid them.
Chhannu and I fell down on sustaining injuries.
Then all the five accused persons ran away with the knife.
" What has been stated above by Vishwanath has been repeated by Shiv Nath (PW 2), Hansla Prasad (PW 9).
Phool Chand (PW 10) and Sohan (PW 13).
The story given by these witnesses remains absolutely unshaken in the scanty cross examination by the defence.
Indeed there was little or no cross examination with regard to the incident itself.
10 L522SCI/76 382 Deceased Chhannu had the following external injuries on his person as stated by Dr. U. P. Singh who held the autopsy: (1) Incised stab wound 1/2X1/3", on right side chest, 1" medical to right nipple going into the chest cavity.
(2) Incised stab wound 1/2"x 1/4" x 1" to the right of left nipple and 1" below it, going into the chest cavity.
(3) Incised stab wound 1/2"x 1/4" abdominal cavity deep, on lower part of right side abdomen.
(4) Incised stab wound 1/2"x1/4"on lower part of abdomen, 3" above the joint of hip bones.
(S) Incised stab wound 1/2"x1/4" deep, on left hip.
(6) Incised stab wound 1/2"x1/4" chest cavity deep, on left side back, 6" below scapula.
(7) Abrasion 1/2"x 1/2" lateral aspect of right elbow.
(8) Abrasion 1/2"x1/2" on lateral aspect of right hand.
Internal examination revealed that the cartilage of fifth rib had been cut under injury No. (3).
There were punctured wounds ill the chest cavity in relation to injury Nos.
(1), (2) and (6).
Right vertrical of heart had a punctured wound 1/4"x1/4" and the pericardial cavity contained blood.
The upper lobe of left lung had a punctured wound 1/2" X 1/4" in relation to injury No. 2.
In the opinion of the Doctor death was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from injuries to heart and lungs.
Another Doctor Siddiqui (PW 5) found the following injuries on the person of Vishwanath: (1) Incised wound 1/4"x1/8"x 1 1/2" deep, on front side of lower part of neck, directed downwards, backwards and leftwords.
The wound was in the middle of the neck and 1" above the bone.
On coughing air passed through the wound.
(2) Incised wound 1/2"x1/8"x3" or more than this, abdominal cavity deep, 1 1/2" above and to the left of umbilious.
Direction of wound was backwards, slightly upwards and towards centre of abdomen.
The injuries were fresh and described by the Doctor as dangerous.
All the five accused were charged under section 302/149 IPC for causing the death of Chhannu and also under section 307/149 IPC for attempting to murder Vishwanath.
While Sheo Murat was charged under section 149 IPC the other four accused were charged also under section 147 IPC.
The Sessions Judge convicted accused Sheo Murat under section 148, 307 and 302 IPC.
He was sentenced to death under section 302 IPC, to seven years rigorous imprisonment under section 307 IPC, and to two years rigorous imprisonment under section 148 IPC.
Accused Ram Kishan, Shobha, Moti Lal and Shyam Lal (the present respondents) were convicted under section 302/149 IPC, section 307 read with section 149 and section 383 147 IPC.
These four accused were sentenced to one year 's rigorous A imprisonment under section 147 IPC, to seven years ' rigorous imprisonment under section 307/149 IPC and to imprisonment for life under section 302/149 IPC.
The sentences of all the accused were to run concurrently.
The accused appealed to the High Court.
There was also a reference under section 374, Criminal Procedure Code, to the High Court for confirmation of the death sentence on Sheo Murat.
Both the matters were heard together by the High 1 Court and a common judgment was delivered on February 11, 1971.
The High Court maintained conviction and sentence of the accused Sheo Murat under section 307 IPC and also maintained his conviction under section 302 IPC but reduced the sentence to imprisonment for life.
The conviction and sentence of Sheo Murat under section 148 IPC were, however, set aside.
The conviction and sentence of the four other accused (the present respondents) were set C aside.
The State prayed for special leave against the rejection of the reference by reducing the death sentence to imprisonment for life but this Court rejected the same.
The State 's special leave application with regard to the respondents ' acquittal was, however, admitted on October 13, 1971 and non bailable warrants were issued against them.
We are, therefore, not concerned in this appeal with the conviction of accused Sheo Murat, who was the assailant of the deceased as well as of Vishwanath.
We have to consider whether the High Court has committed a grave and palpable error in acquitting the respondents resulting in miscarriage of justice.
It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal this Court is slow to interfere with the decision of the High Court, even though it has interfered with the conviction by the trial court, where the same is reached after a proper appreciation of the entire evidence.
The possibility that it may just be reasonably feasible for this Court to take a different view of the evidence from that of the High Court is not the test in an appeal against acquittal.
Even so, we are unable in this case to sustain the order of the High Court for the reasons, which will presently follow.
We have already quoted the evidence of Vishwanath which is unerringly corroborated by all the other eye witnesses.
Both the trial court as well as the High Court believed the evidence.
Indeed the High Court has observed and, in our opinion, rightly that "there is no infirmity in the prosecution case".
We then find that the High Court has read the evidence in a rather unusual way which is at once obvious when we peruse the judgment.
We are not told wherefrom the High Court could describe the evidence as follows: "After reaching the house of Vishwanath they (the accused persons) entered into a conversation which became heated and ultimately ended in exchange of abuses".
The High Court also observed that "it is not at an clear from the prosecution evidence whether Shohha kept on holding Vishwanath till the very end i.e. 384 till both the knife injuries had been caused to him, or whether he let go his hold as soon as Sheo Murat started the attack".
The High Court further observed that "there is nothing in the prosecution evidence to indicate in what order those injuries were caused to Chhannu, and whether or not the injuries on the back were caused first".
The High Court further gave unusual importance to the statement of PW 13 when he deposed in cross examination to the following effects: "I cannot remember whether the two persons who had caught hold of Chhannu had held him from the front or from the back or from the side.
Further, I do not remember whether they were holding him each with both his arms or whether each of them held him only with one arm.
I do not re collect whether Sheo Murat had caused injuries to Chhannu from the front side or from the back side".
We are unable to appreciate how the evidence of PW 13, who could not remember certain details, could help the court in coming to any conclusion for the purpose of displacing the clear and unambiguous prosecution evidence.
The injuries on the two victims are res, ipso loquiter and tell tale.
Accused Shobha caught hold of Vishwanath 's hands and Sheo Murat gave him two stab blows, one on the neck and the other on the abdomen.
When deceased Chhannu advanced in order to save Vishwanath he was caught by accused Shyam Lal and Moti Lal and Sheo Murat gave as many as six stab injuries in quick succession.
None of these stab wounds are on any part of the hands or arms which would have necessarily been caused if the victims were not caught hold of by a person or persons while they were attacked with a knife.
It would be unnatural to expect that the victims would not have exercised their natural instinct of self preservation by trying to stave off the stab in juries by raising their hands.
And in that process if they were not caught hold of by some person or persons there would have been one or two injuries on the hands or arms.
This would clearly go to show that the story that Vishwanath was caught by Shobha and Chhannu was caught by Moti Lal and Shyam Lal, as deposed to by the PWs, stands corroborated by the medical evidence.
The High Court completely ignored this most relevant and important aspect in the prosecution case but felt satisfied to acquit the accused on the sole ground that there was no evidence to show whether Shobha caught Vishwanath all the time when the two blows were given and also whether Moti Lal and Shyam Lal were catching hold of deceased Chhannu during the entire period of the assault.
The High Court particularly felt in that direction because PW 13 being an independent witness could not re collect certain things to which we have already referred to above.
The injuries would clearly show that the victims were caught hold of by a Person or persons when these were inflicted upon them.
We are clearly of opinion that this is a completely erroneous view of the prosecution evidence adduced in this case resulting in failure of justice.
We are further satisfied that if the High Court had not read 385 the evidence by introducing an extraneous gloss for the purpose of its A conclusion it could not have acquitted the accused.
It is also evidence that the accused came in a body to challenge Vishwanath for the previous day 's incident.
Although the four respondents were unarmed, Sheo Murat had a knife with him.
There is nothing to show from the evidence that Vishwanath gave any provocation to the accused persons.
He only replied to the challenge by saying "Brother, what will you settle up" ? At this Ram Kishan instigated the other accused persons saying "beat the salas".
At once accused Shobha caught held of Vishwanath 's hands and Sheo Murat stabbed him twice with his knife.
Assunung the respondents had no earlier knowledge about Sheo Murat 's carrying a knife, from this moment they came to know that Sheo Murat had a knife with which he had already stabbed Vishwanath.
What did they then do when deceased Chhannu came to the aid of Vishwanath to save him from further assault ? Now Moti Lal and Shyam Lal caught hold of Chhannu and Sheo Murat inflicted several stab blows in quick succession.
It is, therefore, clear that Moti Lal and Shyam Lal shared the common intention with Sheo Murat in inflicting stab injuries to Chhannu by participating in the assault.
Sheo Murat has been convicted under section 302 IPC.
We may only give these two accused Moti Lal and Shyam Lal benefit of doubt with regard to participation with Sheo Murat in the common intention to cause death of Chhannu.
It is, however, absolutely impossible to relieve them of any liability whatsoever in connection with the stab injuries which were facilitated by their catching hold of Chhanu when Sheo Murat was inflicting the stab wounds.
There is no escape from the conclusion on this evidence that Moti Lal and Shyam Lal shared at least the common intention.
with Sheo Murat to cause grievous hurt under section 326 IPC.
A clear case has been established against both the accused persons under section 326/34 IPC.
They are, therefore, convicted under section 326/34 IPC and sentenced to four years ' rigorous imprisonment.
With regard to accused Ram Kishan he merely instigated by saying "beat the salas".
He is the person who started the affair by challenging Vishwanath and also instigating the other accused persons to beat.
From this alone it is not possible to attribute to him any common intention to cause more than simple assault.
He is, therefore, found guilty only under section 323/109 IPC.
He is, therefore, convicted under section 323/109 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Accused Shobha, who caught hold of Vishwanath to facilitate the two stab injuries on him by Sheo Murat, is also guilty under section 326/34 IPC.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of doubt only with regard to section 307 IPC but the evidence clearly establishes the case under section 326/34 lPC.
He is accordingly convicted under section 326/34 IPC and sentenced to four years ' rigorous imprisonment.
386 We should observe that no prejudice is caused to the accused by alteration of the conviction to section 326/34 although they had been originally charged under section 302/149 and section 307/149 IPC on the particular facts of the prosecution case which clearly pointed to participation by the respective accused in the two attacks and which they had to meet in the trial.
Since the respondents are detained in jail in pursuance of the non bailable warrants issued by this Court on October 13, 1971, at the time of granting special leave, they will be entitled to the benefit of section 438, Criminal Procedure Codes, and that period shall be set off against the sentences which we have passed in this apepal.
In the result the judgment of the High Court is set aside, the appeal is allowed and the four accused stand convicted and sentenced as aforesaid subject to the observations mentioned above.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The accused and the deceased are close relatives, as per the following pedigree: Ramcharan (1) Ram Khelawan (2) Balram (3) Khuddi (4) Vishwanath Shankar Kanker Channu Shivnath Jagannath (PW)SI S2 S3 S4 (PW2) (Deceased) Sheo Murat Ram Kishan Shobha Moti Lal Bhagwantia (Acd) SI (Acd) S2 (Acd) S3 (Acd) S4 (Sister) Dl Shyam Lal (Acd) Vishwanath, Kanker, deceased Channu, Jagannath.
accused Ram Kishan along with his mother and sister Bhagwantia were living in the ancestral house at village Bhiwanipur, while the rest lived in a nearby separate house.
On March 18, 1969, Vishwanath tried to pacify the quarrel between his brother Kankar 's wife and Bhagwantia his cousin sister and when she refused to heed to his words, he gave one or two slaps to Bhagwantia.
The real brothers of Bhagwantia viz., Ram Kishan, Shobha, Moti Lal and Shyamlal s/o Ram Krishan all accused, went the next day to Vishwanath 's house and demanded an explanation for beating Bhagwantia and wanted a settlement.
Since Vishwanath said there was nothing in fact to be settled, Ram Kishan instigated the rest to beat Vishwanath.
Shobha caught hold of Vishwanath while Sheo Murat dealt knife blows which resulted in two grievous incised injuries.
Channu who came to the rescue was caught hold of by Shyam Lal and Moti and Sheo Murat dealt knife blows causing five fatal incised wounds and two abrasions to which he succumbed.
On the above version of the incident by the injured Vishwanath, PW 1 in the complaint and in evidence at the trial, which was unerringly corroborated by PWs 9. 10. 13 and unshaken in the cross examination, the Sessions Court convicted Sheo Murat under section 302/149 I.P.C. for causing the death of Channu and under section 307 /149 I P.C. for attempting to murder Vishwanath, though the charges were under section 302, 307 and 148, I.P.C. and sentenced him to death under section 302, I.P.C. seven years ' rigorous imprisonment under section 307 I.P.C. and to two years ' rigorous imprisonment under section 148.
I.P.C. Accused Ram Kishan.
Shobha.
Moti Lal and Shyamlal, the respondents in this Court were convicted under section 302/149 I.P.C., under section 307 read with section 149 I.P.C. and section 147 I.P.C. They were sentenced to one year 's rigorous imprisonment under section 147 T.P.C. to seven year 's rigorous imprisonment under section 307/149 I.P.C. and to imprisonment for life under section 307 /149.
The accused appealed to the High Court and there was a reference under section 374 Cr.
P.C. for the confirmation of death sentence.
By a common judgment, the High Court (i) set aside the conviction and sentences 380 of all the present respondents and also that of Sheo Murat under section 148, I.P.C.; (ii) maintained the convictions under section 307 I.P.C. and also under section 302 I.P.C. but altered the death sentence to one of life imprisonment and rejected the reference.
This Court rejected the State 's special leave petition against the alteration of the death sentence but granted special leave against the acquittal of the respondents alone and issued non bailable warrants.
Allowing the appeal, and convicting the accused and sentencing them to different terms with the benefit of set off under section 428, Cr.
P.C. (Act 2 of 1973), tho Court, ^ HELD: (1) It is well established that in an appeal against acguittal, this Court is slow to interfere under article 136 of the Constitution with the decision of the High Court.
The possibility that it may just be reasonably feasible for the Court to take a different vie v of the evidence from that of the High Court is not the test in an appeal against acquittal.
[383 D E] (2) In the instant case, the injuries on the two victims are "res ipso loquitor ' and tell tale.
The prosecution case that Vishwanath was caught by Shobha and Channu was caught hold of by Motilal and Shyamlal is corroborated by the medical evidence.
None of the stab wounds are on any part of the hands or arms which would have necessarily been caused.
if the victims were not caught hold of by a person or persons, while they were attacked with a knife.
It would be unnatural to expect that the victims would not have exercised their natural instinct of self preservation by trying to stave off the stab injuries by raising their hands.
And in that process if they were not caught hold of by some person or persons, there would have been one or two injuries on the hands or arms.
The High Court completely ignored this most relevant and important aspect in the prosecution, when it observed: "It is not at all clear from the prosecution evidence whether Shobha k kept on holding Vishwanath till the very end i.e. till both the knife injuries had been caused to him, or whether he let go his hold as soon as Sheo Murat started the attack".
"There is nothing in the prosecution evidence to indicate what order those injuries were caused to Channu and whether or not the injuries on the back were caused first".
This erroneous view taken by.
the High Court of the prosecution evidence adduceed in this case and the introduction by the High Court of an extraneous gloss for the purpose of its conclusion viz., "After reaching the house of Vishwanath they (the accused persons) entered into a conversation which became heated and ultimately ended in exchange of abuses".
resulted in failure of justice.
[383G H, 384C E] (3) No prejudice is caused in the instant case to the accused by alteration of the conviction to sections 326/34 although they had been originally charged under section 302/149 and sections 307/149, I.P.C.
On the particular fact of the prosecution case which clearly pointed to participation by the respective accused with tho two attacks and which they had to meet in the trial.
[385F G]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969 (Appeal by Special leave from the Award dated the 1st April 1969 of the Addl.
Industrial Tribunal, Delhi in I. D. No. 83 of 1968) and Civil Appeals Nos.
1857 1859/70.
(Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 17th November 1969 of the Addl.
Labour Court, Madras in claim Petition Nos.
627 and 629 of 1968).
M. K. Ramamurthi and Jitendra Sharma and Janardan Sharma, for the appellants in both the appeals.
371 section N. Andley, (Rameshwar Nath and B. R. Mehta in CAs 1857 A 59/70) for respondents in both the appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J.
As the main question for determination in these appeals by special leave is common, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.
Civil Appeal No. 2307 of 1969 The respondent company in this appeal has its Head office at Bombay.
It manufactures tyres at its Bombay factory and sells the tyres and other accessories in the markets throughout the country.
The company has a Distribution office at Nicholson Road, Delhi.
There was a strike in the Bombay factory from 3rd March, 1967 to 16th May, 1967 and again from 4th October, 1967.
As a result of the strike there was a short supply of tyres etc.
to the Distribution office.
In the Delhi office, there were 30 employees at the relevant time.
17 workmen out of 30 were laid off by the management as per their notice dated the 3rd February, 1968, which was to the following effect: "Management is unable to give employment to the following workmen due to much reduced production in the company 's factory resulting from strike in one of the factory departments.
These workmen are, therefore, laid off in accordance with law with effect from 5th February, 1968." The lay off of the 17 workmen whose names were mentioned in the notice was recalled by the management on the 22nd April, 1968.
The workmen were not given their wages or compensation for the period of lay off.
An industrial dispute was raised and referred by the Delhi Administration on the 17th April, 1968 even when the layoff was in operation.
The reference was in the following terms: "Whether the action of the management to 'lay off ' 17 workmen with effect from 5th Feb. 1968 is illegal and/or unjustified, and if so, to what relief are these workmen entitled? The Presiding officer of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi has held that the workmen are not entitled to any lay off compensation.
Hence this is an appeal by their Union.
We were informed at the Bar that some of the workmen out of the batch of 17 have settled their disputes with the management and their cases were not represented by the Union in this appeal.
Hence this judgment will not affect the compromise or the settlement arrived at between the management and some of the workmen.
The question which for our determination is whether the management had a right to lay off their workmen and whether the workmen are entitled to claim wages or compensation.
372 The simple dictionary meaning according to the Concise oxford Dictionary of the term 'lay off ' is "period during which a workman is temporarily discharged.
" The term 'lay off ' has been well known in the industrial arena.
Disputes were often raised in relation to the 'lay off ' of the workmen in various industries.
Sometime compensation was awarded for the period of lay off but many a time when the lay off was found to be justified workmen were not found entitled to any wages or compensation.
In Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd. vs Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Labour Union(l) the standing order of the company provided that the company could under certain circumstances "stop any machine or machines or department or departments, wholly or partially for any period or periods without notice or without compensation in lieu of notice." In such a situation for the closure of the factory for a certain period, no claim for compensation was allowed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India.
We are aware of the distinction betwen a lay off and a closure.
But just to point out the history of the law we have referred to this case.
Then came an amendment in the hereinafter referred to as the Act by Act 43 of 1953.
In section 2 clause (kkk) was added to say: "lay off" (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the break down of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched Explanation Every workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of the industrial establishment and who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time appointed for the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given employment by the employer within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be deemed to have been laid off for that day within the meaning of this clause: Provided that if the workman, instead of being given employment at the commencement of any shift for any day is asked to present himself for the purpose during the second half of the shift for the day and is given employment then, he shall be deemed to have been laid off only for one half of that day: Provided further that if he is not given any such employment even after so presenting himself, he shall not be deemed to have been laid off for the second half of the shift for the day and shall be entitled to full basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of the day. '" (1) [1952] II Labour Law Journal, 37.
373 By the same Amending Act, Chapter VA was introduced in the Act to provide for lay off and retrenchment compensation.
Section 25A excluded the Industrial Establishment in which less than 50 workmen on an average per working day had been employed in the preceding calendar month from the application of Sections 25C to 25E. Section 25 C provides for the right of laid off workmen for compensation and broadly speaking compensation allowable is 50% of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable 13 to the workman had he not been laid off.
It would be noticed that the sections dealing with the matters of lay off in Chapter VA are not applicable to certain types of Industrial Establishments.
The respondent is one such Establishment because it employed only 30 workmen at its Delhi office at the relevant time.
In such a situation the question beset with difficulty of solution is whether the laid off workmen were entitled to any compensation, if so, what '? We shall now read section 25 J.
It says: "(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946: Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act or Rules, orders or notifications issued thereunder or under any standing orders or under any award, contract of service or otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act.
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State in so far as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to layoff and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
" The effect of the provisions aforesaid is that for the period of lay off in an Industrial Establishment to which the said provisions apply, compensation will have to be paid in accordance with section 25C.
But if a workman is entitled to benefits which are more favourable to him than those provided in the Act, he shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits.
The rights and liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as it relate to lay off and retrenchment, except as provided in section 25J, have got to be determined in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VA.
The ticklish question which does not admit of an easy answer is as to the source of the power of management to lay off a workman.
The employer has a right to terminate the services of a workman.
Therefore, his power to retrench presents no difficulty as retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever as mentioned in clause (oo) of section 2 of the 374 Act.
But lay off means the failure, refusal or inability of employer on account of contingencies mentioned in clause (kkk) to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment.
It has been called a temporary discharge of the workman or a temporary suspension of his contract of service.
Strictly speaking, it is not so.
It is merely a fact of temporary unemployment of the workman in the work of the Industrial Establishment.
Mr. section N. Andley submitted with reference to the explanation and the provisions appended to clause (kkk) that the power to lay off a workman is inherent in the definition.
We do not find any words in the definition clause to indicate the conferment of any power on the employer to lay off a workman.
His failure or inability to give employment by itself militates against the theory of conferment of power.
The power to lay off for the failure or inability to give employment has to be searched somewhere else.
No section in the Act confers this power.
There are two small matters which present some difficulty in the solution of the problem.
In explanation (1) appended to sub section ( 2) of section 25B the words used are: "he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing order made under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment.
" indicating that a workman can be laid off under the also.
But it is strange to find that no section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary implication confers any power, even on the management of the Industrial Establishment to which the relevant provisions are applicable, to lay off a workman.
Clause (ii) of section 25E says: "No compensation shall be paid to a workman who has been laid off If he does not present himself for work at the establishment at the appointed time during normal working hours at least once a day." This indicates that there is neither a temporary discharge of the work man nor a temporary suspension of his contract of service.
Under the general law of Master and Servants an employer may discharge an employee either temporarily or permanently but that cannot be without adequate notice.
Mere refusal or inability to give employment to the workman when he reports for duty on one or more grounds mentioned in clause (kkk) of section 2 is not a temporary discharge of the work man.
Such a power, therefore, must be found out from the terms of contract of service or the Standing orders governing the establishment.
In the instant case the number of workmen being only 30, there were no Standing orders certified under the Industrial employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
Nor was there any term of contract of service conferring any such right of lay off.
In such a situation the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the workmen were laid off without any authority of law or the power in the management under the contract of service.
In Industrial Establishments where there is a power in the management to lay off a workman and to which the 375 provisions of Chapter VA apply, the question of payment of compensation will be governed and determined by the said provisions.
Otherwise Chapter VA is not a complete Code as was argued on behalf of the respondent company in the matter of payment of lay off compensation.
This case, therefore, goes out of Chapter VA.
Ordinarily and generally the workmen would be entitled to their full wages but in a reference made under section 10(l) of the Act, it is open to the Tribunal or the Court to award a lesser sum finding the justifiability of the lay off.
` In The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & others vs Hotel Workers ' Union(l) in a case of suspension of a workman it was said by Wanchoo, J. as he then was, delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court at page 482: "Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work.
he will have to pay wages during the so called period of suspension.
Where, however.
there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relation of master and servant with the consequence that ` the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay.
" The same principle was reiterated in V. P. Gindroniya vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.(2) We have referred to the suspension cases because in our opinion the principles governing the case of lay off are very akin to those applicable to a suspension case.
In Veiyra (M. A.) vs Fernandez (C. P.) and another(3) a Bench of the Bombay High Court opined that under the general law the employer was free to dispense with the services of a workman but under the he was under an obligation to lay him off; that being so, the action of lay off by the employer could not .
be questioned as being ultra vires.
We do not think that the view expressed by the Bomby High Court is correct.
There is an important decision of this Court in Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors.
vs The Management(4) on which reliance was placed heavily by Mr. M. K. Ramamurti appearing for the appellant and also by Mr. Andley for the respondent.
One of the question for consideration was whether section 25C of the Act recognises the common law right of the management to declare a lay off for reasons other than those specified in the relevant clause of the Standing order.
While considering this question, Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was.
said at page 554: "The question which we are concerned with at this stage is whether it can be said that s.25C recognises a common law (1) ; (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 448.
(3) [1956] I Labour Law Journal, 547.
(4) []964] S S.C.R. 548.
376 right of the industrial employer to lay off his workmen.
This question must, in our opinion, be answered in the negative.
When the laying off of the workmen is referred to in section 25C, it is the laying off as defined by section 2 (kkk) and so, workmen who can claim the benefit of section 25C must be workmen who are laid off and laid off for reasons contemplated by section 2 (kkk); that is all that section 25C means.
Then follows a sentence which was pressed into service by the respondent.
It says: "If any case is not covered by the Standing orders, it will necessarily be governed by the provisions of the Act, and layoff would be permissible only where one or the other of the factors mentioned by section 2 (kkk) is present, and for such lay off compensation would be awarded under section 25C." In our opinion, in the context, the sentence aforesaid means that if the power of lay off is there in the Standing orders but the grounds of lay off are not covered by them, rather, are governed by the provisions of the Act, then lay off would be permissible only on one or the other of the factors mentioned in clause (kkk).
Subsequent discussions at pages 558 and 559 lend ample support to the appellant 's argument that there is no provision in the Act specifically providing that an employer would be entitled to lay off his workmen for the reasons prescribed by section 2 (kkk).
Mr. Andley placed strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in Sanjhi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand & Ors.
vs Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains Kirana Merchants Workers ' Union & Anr.(l) The statute under consideration in this case was the and it was held that the Act was intended to be a comprehensive and exhaustive law dealing with the entire subject of bonus of the persons to whom it should apply.
The Bonus Act was not to apply to certain Establishments.
Argument before the Court was that bonus was payable de hors the Act in such establishment also.
This argument was repe11ed and in that connection it was observed at page 381: "It will be noticed that though the confers substantive rights on workmen with regard to lay off, retrenchment compensation, etc., it does not create or confer any such statutory right as to payment to bonus.
Bonus was so far the creature of industrial adjudication and was made payable by the employers under the machinery provided under that Act and other corresponding Acts enacted for ,.
investigation and settlement of disputes raised thereunder.
There was, therefore, no question of Parliament having to delete or modify item S in the Third Schedule to or any such provision in any corresponding Act or its having to exclude any right to bonus thereunder by any categorical exclusion in the present case." And finally it was held at page 385: "Considering the history of the legislation, the background and the circumstances in which the Act was enacted, the (1) [1969] I S.C.C. 366.
377 object of the Act and its scheme, it is not possible to accept A the construction suggested on behalf of the respondents that the Act is not an exhaustive Act dealing comprehensively with the subject matter of bonus in all its aspects or that Parliament still left it open to those to whom the Act does not apply by reason of its provisions either as to exclusion or exemption to raise a dispute with regard to bonus through Industrial adjudication under the or other corresponding law.
" In a case of compensation for lay off the position is quite distinct and different.
If the term of contract of service or the statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give the power of lay off to the employer, the employer will be bound to pay compensation for the period of lay off which ordinarily and generally would be equal to the full wages of the concerned workmen.
If, however, the terms of r employment confer a right of lay off on the management, then, in the case of an industrial establishment which is governed by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in accordance with the provisions contained therein.
But compensation or no compensation will be payable in the case of an industrial establishment to which the provisions of Chapter VA do not apply, and it will be so as per the terms of the employment.
In Kanhaiya Lal Gupta vs Ajeet Kumar Dey and others(l) a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court seem to have rightly held that in the absence of any term in the contract of service or in the statute or in the statutory rules or standing orders an employer has no right to lay off a workman without paying him wages.
A learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court took an identical view in the case of Steel and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs Additional District Judge, Rohtak and others.
(2) The majority view of the Bombay High Court in K. T. Rolling Mills Private Ltd. and another vs M. R. Meher and other(8) that it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal under the Act to award lay off compensation to workmen employed in an 'Industrial Establishment ' to which section 25 C does not apply, is not correct.
The source of the power of the employer to lay off workmen does not seem to have been canvassed or discussed by the Bombay High Court in the said judgment.
In the case of the Delhi office of the respondent the Tribunal has held that the lay off was justified.
It was open to the Tribunal to award a lesser amount of compensation than the full wages.
Instead of sending back the case to the Tribunal, we direct that 75% the basic wages and dearness allowance would be paid to the workmen concerned for the period of lay off.
As we have said above this will not cover the case of those workmen who have settled or compromised their disputes with the management.
Civil Appeals 1857 1859 (NL) of 1970 In these appeals the facts are identical to those in the other appeal.
There were only 33 employees in the Madras office of the respondent company.
Certain workmen were laid off for identical reasons from the (1) [1967] II Labour Law Journal, 761.
(2) [1972] 1 Labour Law Journal, 284.
(3) A.I.R. 1963 Bombay, 146.
378 5th February, 1968.
The lay off was lifted on the 29th April, 1968.
The concerned workmen filed petitions under section 33C (2) of the Act for computation of their wages for the period of lay off.
Holding that the lay off was justified and valid the Presiding officer of the Additional Labour Court, Madras has dismissed their applications for salary and allowances for the period of lay off.
Hence these appeals.
In a reference under section 10 (1) of the Act it is open to the Tribunal or the Court to award compensation which may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages and dearness allowance.
But no such power exists in the Labour Court under section 33C (2) of the Act.
only the money due has got to be quantified.
If the lay off could be held to be in accordance with the terms of the contract of service, no compensation at all could be allowed under section 33C (2) of the Act, while, in the reference some compensation could be allowed.
Similarly on the view expressed above that the respondent company had no power to lay off any workmen, there is no escape from the position that the entire sum payable to the laid off workmen except the workmen who have settled or compromised, has got to be computed and quantified under section 33C(2) of the Act for the period of lay off.
For the reasons stated above all the appeals are allowed.
In Civil Appeal No. 2307/1969 in place of the order of the Tribunal, an order is made on the lines indicated above.
And in Civil Appeals 1857 to 1859/1970 the orders of the Labour Court are set aside and the cases of the appellants are remitted back to that Court for computation and quantification of the sums payable to the concerned workmen for the period of lay off.
There will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals.
S.R Appeals allowed: Orders in CA 2307/69 modified : CAs 1857 1859/70 remitted hock to the Tribunal.

summary/full:
The respondent company manufacturing tyres in Bombay, due to the general strike in its factory between the period 3rd March 1967 and 16th May 1967 and again from 4th October 1967 and due to the consequent short supply of tyres had to lay off 17 out of its 30 workmen in the Delhi distribution office and also some out of its 33 workmen in its Madras distribution office.
The workmen in the Delhi and Madras offices were called back to duty on 22nd April 1968 and 29th April 1968 respectively.
The workmen were not given their wages or compensation for the period of lay off.
An industrial dispute was raised and referred to the tribunal by the Delhi Administration even when the lay off was in operation.
The Presiding officer of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi held that the workmen were not entitled to any layoff compensation.
The workmen in Madras filed petitions under section 33C(2) of the for computation of their wages for the period of their lay off.
The Presiding officer of the Additional Labour Court, Madras, holding that the lay off was justified, dismissed their applications.
on appeal to this Court by special leave, ^ HELD: (I) The simple dictionary meaning according to the concise oxford Dictionary of the term "lay ofF ' is "period during which a workman is temporarily discharged".
Lay off means the failure, refusal or inability of employer on account of contingencies mentioned in cl.
(kkk) of section 2 of the , to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the Muster Rolls of his Industrial Establishment.
It has been called a temporary discharge of the workmen or a temporary suspension of his contract of service.
Strictly speaking, it is not so.
It is merely a fact of temporary unemployment of the workman in the work of the lndustrial Establihment.
Mere refusal or inability to give employment to the workman when he reports for duty on one or more grounds mentioned in cl.
(kkk) of section 2 is not a temporary discharge of the workman.
[372A, 374A, B, G] Gaya Cotton & Jute Mills Ltd. vs Gaya Cotton & lute Mills Labour Union [1952] II Labour Law Journal 37, referred to.
(2)(i) That the power to lay off a workman is inherent in the definition in cl.
(kkk) of section 2 is not correct, since no words in the definition clause to indicate the conferment of any power on the employer to lay off a workman can be found.
His failure or inability to give employment, by itself militates against the theory of conferment of power.
No section in Chapter VA in express language or by necessary implication confers any power, even on the management of the Industrial Establishment to which the relevant provisions are applicable, to lay off a workman.
There is no provision in the Act specifically providing that an employer would be entitled to lay off his workmen 370 for the reasons prescribed by section 2 (kkk).
Such a power, therefore, must be found out from the terms of contract of service or the Standing orders governing the Establishment.
[374 B G] (ii) In the instant case, the number of workmen being only 3, there being no Standing orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act (Act 20 of 1946), 1946, and there being no contract of service conferring any such right of lay off, the inescapable conclusion is that the workmen were laid off without any authority of law or the power in the management under the contract of service.
[374 G H] The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi & others vs Hotel Workers Union ; and V. P. Gindroniya vs State of Madhya Pradesh & ors.
[1970] 3 S.C.R. 448, referred to.
Veiyra (MA ) Fernandez (CP.) and another [1956] 1 Labour Law Journal.
547, reversed.
Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate and ors.
vs The Management [19641 S S.C.R. 548, applied.
Sanghi Jeevaraj Ghewar Chand & ors vs Secretary Madras Challies Grains Kirana Merchants Workers Union and Anr. , distinguished.
(3) If the terms of a contract of service or the statutory terms engrafted in the Standing orders do not give the power to lay off to the employer, the employer would be bound to pay compensation for the period of lay off which ordinarily and general would be equal to the full wages of the concerned V workman.
If, however, the terms of employment confer a right of lay off on the management then in the case of an Industrial Establishment which is governed by Chapter VA, compensation will be payable in accordance with the provisions contained therein.
But compensation or no compensation will be payable in the case of an Industrial Establishment to which the provisions of Chapter VA do not apply and it will be so as per the terms of employment.
[377 B D] Kanhaiya Lal Gupta vs Ajeet Kumar Dey and others [1967] II Labour Law Journal.
761 and Steel and General Mills Co. Ltd v Additional District judge Rohtak and others [1972] 1 Labour Law Journal, 2847 approved.
K. T Rolling Mills Private Ltd. and another vs M R Meher and others A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 146.
reversed.
(4) In a reference under section 10(l) of the Act.
it is open to the tribunal or court to award compensation which may not be equal to the full amount of basic wages and dearness allowance.
But no such power exists in the Labour Court under section 33C(2) of the Act.
Only the money due has to be quantified.
If the lay off could be held to be in accordance with the terms of contract of service.
no compensation at all could be allowed under section 33C(2) of the Act, while in the reference some compensation could be allowed.
[378 B Cl [In the instant case as regards the workmen in the Delhi case.
the court held 75% of the basic wages and dearness allowance would be the adequate compensation for the lay off period.]