judgement:
Appeal No.232 of 1960.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated October 6, 1958, of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 10 of 1958.
R. J. Kolah, Dwaraka Das, section N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, J. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for the Appellants.
Hardyal Hardy and D. Gupta for the Respondent.
November 29.
The Judgment of J. L. Kapur and J. C. Shah, JJ., was delivered by Kapur, J. M. Hidayatullah, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
KAPUR, J. This is an appeal pursuant to a certificate of the High Court of Bombay against the judgment and order of that Court in Income tax Reference No. 10 of 1958, answering the question referred to it against the assesses whose legal representatives are 744 the appellants before, us, the respondent being the Commissioner of Income tax.
The facts which have given rise to the appeal are that the late Mr. Annantrai P. Pattani, hereinafter called the assessee was, by Hazur Order dated December 10, 1937, appointed the Chief Dewan of Bhavnagar State.
On January 15, 1948, the Maharaja of Bhavnagar introduced responsible Government in his State and appointed the assessee as the Chairman of the Bhavnagar Durbar Bank but he received no salary for that post.
On the same date by another Hazur Order the Maharaja granted a monthly pension of Rs. 2,000 to the assessee.
The order was in the following terms: "He looked after us well in our childhood and rendered valuable services sincerely and with single minded loyalty to us and our State during extremely difficult period of the last war and thereafter, which has enhanced the prestige and prosperity of the State and given the State and the people a place of pride in India.
In appreciation of this, it is (hereby) decided to grant him a monthly pension of Rs. 2,000 two thousand which is the monthly salary he is drawing at present.
Date 22 1 1948.
" On May 31, 1950, the Maharaja directed Messrs. Premchand Roychand & Sons, Bombay, with whom he had an account "to pay by cheque to Mr. A.P. Pattani Rs. 5 lacs out of the amount lying to the credit of my account with you." This sum was paid to the assessee on June 12, 1950.
It is stated that the accountant of the Maharaja asked for instructions as to how that amount of Rs. 5 lacs was to be adjusted in the accounts and on December 27, 1950, the Maharaja made the following order: "In consideration of Shri Annantrai P. Pattani the Ex Diwan of our Bhavnagar State having rendered loyal and meritorious services Rs. 5,00,000 (Rupees Five Lacs) are given to him as gift.
Therefore, it is ordered that the said amount should be debited to our Personal Expense Account." On March 1, 1948, Bhavnagar State was merged in the United States of Saurashtra and the Maharaja ceased to be the ruler of the said State as from that 745 date.
The assessability of this sum of Rs. 5 lacs was raised in the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1951 52 and at the request of the ' assessee which is stated to be oral the Maharaja wrote on March 10, 1953, the following: "I confirm that in June 1950, 1 gave you a sum of rupees five lacs (Rs. 5,00,000) which wag a gift as a token of my affection and regard for you and your family.
This amount was paid to you by Premchand Roychand & Sons according to my letter of 31st May, 1950, from moneys in my account with them.
" On these facts the Income tax Officer held that Rs. 5,00,000 received on June 12, 1950, was liable to income tax under section 7(1) read with explanation (2) of that section as it stood before the amendment by the Finance Act, 1955.
The assessee took an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was dismissed.
Against that order an appeal was taken to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal but the Tribunal also dismissed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that looking to the circumstances they would attach more importance to the "contemporaneous document, i.e., the order of the 27th December, 1950"; which clearly mentioned why the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 was paid to the assessee.
The Tribunal was not inclined to "believe in the contents of that letter and would leave the matter at that.
" The reference is to the letter of the Maharaja dated March 10, 1953.
The Tribunal further held that there was no distinction between the Maha raja and the State and "assuming for a moment that this view of ours is not found to be correct, still it is clear from the Huzur Order No. 13 dated 22 1 1948 (vide para 2 above) that the assessee rendered services not only to the State, if it is distinct from.
the Maharaja but to the Maharaja as well; for that Huzur Order clearly refers to assessee rendering "valuable services sincerely and conscientiously to us and our State".
We would, therefore, hold that the amount of Rs. 5 lacs is a taxable receipt falling under Section 7(1) read with Explanation 2.
" At the instance of the assessee the following question of law was referred to the High Court: 746 "Whether the sum of Rs. 5 lacs has been properly ,brought to tax in the hands of the assessee for the assessment year 1951 52?" and a further question as to the applicability of section 4(3) (vii) of the Income tax Act was not referred on the ground that it did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal.
The High Court, on the findings given by the Tribunal came to the conclusion that section 7(1) explanation (2) of the Income tax Act applied.
It held that it was not possible to regard the receipt of this sum of money by the assessee as a windfall nor as a personal gift of the nature of a testimonial; that the gift was not made in appreciation of the personality or character of the assessee nor was it symbolical of its appreciation of his personal qualities; that the consideration for the gift was in terms stated to be past services and therefore it could not be treated as a mere gift by an employer to an employee when the Court did not know what motivated the making of that gift.
On the facts of the case the High Court reached the conclusion, though with some reluctance, that the case fell within the ambit of section 7(1), Explanation (2).
The High Court also held that this sum could not be exempted from tax on the ground that it was merely a casual or nonrecurring receipt because once connection with the employment was established there was no question of considering the recurring or the casual nature of the receipt.
During the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court the assessee died and his heirs and legal representatives were brought on the record and hence they are the appellants.
It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the facts showed that the sum paid cannot fall within section 7(1), Explanation (2), of the Income tax Act.
By Hazur Order dated January 22, 1948, the Maharaja had compensated the assessee for valuable services rendered and single minded loyalty to the Maharaja and to his State during the difficult period of the war and thereafter, which had added to the prestige and prosperity of the State and in appreciation of that the 747 Maharaja had granted to the assessee a monthly pension of Rs. 2,000, which was paid to the assessee even after the merger and of the establishment of the.
United States of Saurashtra from out of the public revenue.
At the time when Rs. 5,00,000 were paid, the State of Bhavnagar as such had ceased to exist.
The Maharaja was no longer a Ruling Chief but was the Governor of the State of Madras.
The order by which Messrs. Premchand Roychand & Sons, Bombay, were directed to pay the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 out of the account of the Maharaja does not mention any reason for payment.
When as is alleged an accountant of the Maharaja asked as to how that amount of Rs. 5,00,000 was to be adjusted in the accounts, the Maharaja wrote on December 27, 1950, what is described as an order and directed that the sum should be debited to his Personal Expense Account.
It also stated, why it is not clear, that that sum was to be given to the assessee in consideration of the assessee 's loyal and meritorious services as a gift.
When asked later to clarify the reasons for making this gift the Maharaja made it clear that the gift was as a token of affection and regard for the assessee and his family and that the amount was paid by Messrs. Premchand Roychand & Sons from out of the private monies of the Maharaja with that firm.
The Income tax Appellate Tribunal took into account the two documents the first of which has been described as an order of December 27, 1950, which was treated as a "contemporaneous document" and the other the letter of March 10, 1953, which was about two years later.
The Tribunal did not accept the correctness of what was stated in the letter but attached a great deal of importance to the document of December 27, 1950, which the Tribunal thought was a con temporaneous document.
It appears to us that the Tribunal was in error in treating the document of December 27, 1950, as a contemporaneous document and because of this erroneous approach the finding that it has given cannot be treated as a finding of fact which should bind the court in its decision.
It is obvious that the reason why the 748 Tribunal attached all this importance to the document of December 27, 1950, was that it was contemporaneous.
It would be difficult to accept that a document written six months after the fact of payment could be termed as contemporaneous document particularly when the object of that document was only to instruct an accountant as to how he should make a particular entry.
The letter which was written by the Maharaja on March 10, 1953, was rejected because of the circumstances of the case one of which was the contemporaneous document.
It does not appear to us that the Tribunal gave sufficient or any consideration to the fact that the Maharaja had already passed an order of a liberal and almost generous grant of a pension of Rs. 2,000 per mensem which was in lieu of the services rendered by the assessee both to the State as well as to the Maharaja and his family and that pension was ordered before the merger of the State and when the employment of the assessee as the Dewan terminated.
According to what was stated in the letter of the Maharaja dated March 10, 1953, the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 was given as a gift in token of Maharaja 's affection and regard for the assessee and the assessee 's family.
There is no reason shown why the Maharaja should have aided and abetted the assessee in escaping income tax.
The only reason stated by the Tribunal is based on a wrong assumption as.
to the nature of the document of December 27, 1950.
The payment of Rs. 5,00,000 was sought to be brought within the purview of section 7(1) of the Act read with explanation (2).
This section at the relevant time provided: section 7(1) "The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head "Salaries" in respect of any salary or wages, any annuity, pension or gratuity and any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of, or in addition to, any salary or wages, which are due to him from; whether paid or not or are paid by or on behalf of. . . any private employer. . . . .
Explanation 2: A payment due to or received by 749 an assessee from an employer or former employer or from a provident or other fund, is to the extent to, which it does not consist of contributions by the ', assessee or interest on such contributions a profit received in lieu of salary for the purpose of this subsection, unless the payment is made solely as compensation for loss of employment and not by way of remuneration for past services;. . . .
Counsel for the appellants contended that the payment did not fall within this section because it was a gift made on account of personal qualifications and was a testimonial unconnected with any service rendered.
The submission was that the assessee had already been compensated for his services to the Maharaja personally and the State and this sum of Rs. 5 lacs was a gift in token of affection and regard and not as a payment in consideration of the services already rendered to the State or the Maharaja or both.
It will not be inappropriate to mention that in the document dated December 27, 1950, it is stated that Rs. 5,00,000 was paid to the assessee as ex Dewan of Bhavnagar State in consideration of his having rendered loyal and meritorious services to Bhavnagar State.
There is no mention in the document of December, 1950, of any services rendered to the Maharaja and it does not seem to have been considered by the Tribunal as to why the Maharaja should make out of his personal account the gift of such a large amount for something which was not done for the Maharaja specifically, particularly when the services to the State and to the Maharaja and his family had already been well compensated.
This lends support to the submission of the appellants that the amount was paid merely as a gift in token of Maharaja 's affection and regard for the assessee.
Mr. Kolah for the appellants relied on several cases in support of his contention that the amount was not liable to tax under section 7.
In Beynon vs Thorpe (1) the assessee resigned his position as a Managing Director of the Company; did no work for the company; did (1) 95 750 not attend any Board meetings and received no remuneration as a Director of the Company.
It was, however, a custom of the company to give to its retiring employees voluntary pension or allowance and the company voted a pension of pound 5,000 a year to the assessee but this resolution was rescinded and by another resolution pound 5,000 was voted to the assessee" not as or because he is a Director but as a personal gift".
The assessee was assessed under Schedule 'E ' in respect of both the pension and the final payment but these assessments were discharged on appeal by the Special Commissioners who decided that the allowances were gifts of personal nature only.
It was hold that the payments were not income assessable to income tax in the hands of the assessee.
Rowlatt, J., said at p. 14: "Now the question is whether this ceases to be a mere gift because what has led to it is a past employment, an employment which has ceased.
It has been.
made abundantly clear by the Court in Scotland in Duncan 's case(1) that this sort of sums received by a person cannot possibly be put as receipts from his office or in respect of his office or employment, and they said in terms of that kind in a case like this that these emoluments cannot be taxed under Schedule 'E ', and I am bound to say I think that goes a very long way to conclude this case.
But it is said that nevertheless they are in respect of the employment.
Well, it seems to me that is a complete fallacy.
It is nothing but a gift moved by the remembrance of past services already efficiently remunerated as services in them.
selves; it is merely a gift moved by that sort of gratitude or that sort of moral obligation if you please: it is merely a gift of that kind.
In this ease it happens to be very large; in many cases it is very small, but in all the cases it seems to me, whether it is large gift like this or whether it is a small gift to a humble servant they are exactly on the same footing as gifts which are made to a child or gifts which are made to any other person whom the giver thinks he ought to supply with funds for one reason or another; and as the (1) 751 Lord President in Scotland points out it is only a matter of history that the feeling between the parties which has generated the gift arises out of an employment." Mr. Kolah also relied on Reed vs Seymour (1).
In that case a committee of a Cricket Club granted a benefit match to a professional cricketer in their service.
Out of the profits of the benefit match the beneficiary, who was the assessee purchased a farm and assessment was made on him under Schedule 'E ' in respect of the proceeds of the benefit match but this was discharged by the General Commissioner on appeal.
This sum was held to be in the nature of a personal gift and not assessable *to income tax.
Viscount Cave in his speech posed the question which Rowlatt, J., put, i.e., "is it in the end a personal gift or is it remuneration"; if the latter it is subject to tax, if the former it is not.
In that case the test applied by Viscount Cave was that the terms of the assessee 's employment did not en title him to a benefit; the purpose for which the amount was paid was to express gratitude of the employers and of the cricket loving public for what he had done and in their appreciation of his personal qualities.
It was also stated that if the benefit had taken place after Seymour 's retirement no one would have sought to tax the proceeds as his income and the circumstance that it was given before but in contemplation of, retirement does not alter its quality and the whole sum was a testimonial and not a perquisite and therefore it was not a remuneration for services but a personal gift.
Counsel also relied on Moorehouse vs Dooland (2).
In that case a cricket professional was employed under a contract in which it was provided that collections shall be made for any meritorious performance by him in accordance with the rules for the time being of the employing Cricket League Club.
The assessee played twenty matches and on eleven occasions collections were made on his behalf under the rules of the Club and a total sum of pound 48 15s.
was collected.
This was sought to be taxed as fees, wages perquisites or profits (1) [1927] XI T.C. 625.
(2) 752 arising from his employment.
It was held that (1) the test of liability to tax on voluntary payments from the standpoint of the person who receives it was that it accrued to him by virtue of his office or employment, i.e., byway of remuneration of his services; (2) that if the assessee 's contract of employment entitled him to receive voluntary payments and (3) that the payment was of a periodic and recurring character.
On the other hand if a voluntary payment was made in circumstances which showed that it was given by way of a present or a testimonial on grounds personal to the recipient, the proper conclusion was that the payment was not profit accruing to the recipient by virtue of his office or employment but a gift to him as an individual paid and received by reason of his personal needs or by reason of his personal qualities.
Applying these principles the proceeds were by the terms of the contract of employment received by way of remuneration and were liable to tax.
In that case the payment was treated as being subject to tax because it was substantially in respect of services and accrued to the assessee by reason of his office.
It is quite clear that had the gift been as a testimonial or a contribution for specific performance peculiarly due to the personal qualities of the recipient, it would have been treated as a mere present.
The next case relied upon was David Mitchell vs Commissioner of Income tax (1) where the test laid was whether the payment was made in appreciation of .the personality and character of the assessee or in appreciation of the professional services rendered by him in order to give him an extra profit over and above the share of profit he might get from the firm for the services rendered.
Counsel for the respondent argued that the gift made by the Maharaja was not in respect of personal qualities of the recipient but was relatable to his office although made by an ex employer and was therefore taxable; that the gift was voluntary is clear but it is not quite clear how the amount can be said to be relatable to the office held by the recipient.
Even (1) 753 according to the case of the respondent the amount was paid about two years after the assessee had ceased to be an employee of the Maharaja or the State and immediately on his ceasing to be the Dewan of Bhavnagar State, the Maharaja had granted him a pension from out of the public funds for his services to the State as Dewan and for services rendered to the Maharaja and his family a handsome and a generous monthly pension of Rs. 2,000 per mensem.
Apart from the fact that the Tribunal relied upon a document which was not contemporaneous, it seems to have overlooked the fact that there was a gap of two years before the amount of Rs. 5,00,000 was paid by the Maharaja out of his personal funds.
Counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of this Court in P. Krishna Xenon vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, Travancore Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore (1).
In that case the assessee was a teacher who taught his disciples Vedanta philosophy without any motive or intention of making any profit.
One of the disciples made gifts of money to him on several occasions and it was contended by the assessee that he was not liable to tax on the amounts received from his disciple as he was not carrying on any vocation.
But it was held that in teaching Vedanta philosophy the assessee was carrying on a vocation and that the payments made by the disciple were received by the recipient from his vocation.
It was also held that if the voluntary payments had been made for reasons purely personal to the donee and not connected with his office or vocation, they would not be taxable but if they were made because of the office they would be taxable.
The question was not what the donor thought he was doing but why the donee received it.
The first thing to notice about that case is that those gifts were not made by the disciple as a gift to mark his esteem and affection for his preceptor but as was stated by the disciple in his affidavit he had paid those amounts because he had obtained the benefit of the teachings by the preceptor on Vedanta.
It was found in that case and the disciple admitted (1) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 133. 754 that he had received benefit from the teaching of his preceptor and that the gifts that he had made, even though as a mark of esteem and affection, were the result of teaching imparted by the preceptor and because the amounts were paid to the preceptor as preceptor and the imparting of the teaching was the causa causans of the making of the gift,; it was not merely causa sine qua non.
The payments were repeated and came with some regularity as the disciple visited the preceptor for receiving instructions.
It was in these circumstances that this court held the payments to the preceptor as payments because of the imparting of the teaching and therefore they were income arising from the vocation of the recipient as a teacher of Vedanta philosophy.
In our opinion the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 was not paid to the assessee in token of appreciation for the services rendered as a Dewan of Bhavnagar State but as a personal gift for the personal qualities of the assessee and as a token of personal esteem.
The appeal is therefore allowed and the order of the High Court set aside and the reference is answered against the Commissioner of Income tax.
The appellants will have their costs throughout.
HIDAYATULLAH, J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment just delivered by my brother, Kapur, J.
I regret very much my inability to agree that the appeal should be allowed and the order of the High Court set aside.
In my opinion, the High Court had correctly answered the question referred to it.
The facts of the case have been stated in detail in the judgment of my learned brother, and I need not repeat them but refer only to some of them briefly.
On June 12, 1950, a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was given by the Maharaja of Bhavnagar to the predecessor of the appellants, who was an ex Dewan of the State.
This was paid by Messrs. Premchand Roychand & Sons, Bombay, with whom the Maharaja had an account.
There is no contemporaneous record to show why this payment was made; but it appears that when the accountant of the Maharaja enquired how the amount 755 was to be entered in the books of account, the Maharaja issued an order on December 27, 1950, to the following effect: "In consideration of Shri Annantrai P. Pattani the Ex Diwan of our Bhavnagar State having rendered loyal and meritorious services Rs. 5,00,000 (Rupees Five lacs) are given to him as gift.
Therefore, it is ordered that the said amount should be debited to our Personal Expense Account." After the assessment proceedings had commenced in this case, the original assessee produced a letter written by the Maharaja on March 10, 1953, as follows: "I confirm that in June, 1950, I gave you a sum of rupees five lacs (Rs. 5,00,000) which was a gift as a token of my affection and regard for you and your family.
This amount was paid to you by Premchand Roychand & Sons according to my letter of 31st May, 1950, from moneys in my account with them.
" The question in this case was whether section 7(1) of the Income tax Act read with Explanation 2 to that section as it stood prior to the amendment in 1955, applied to this payment.
That section, so far as it is material, is as follows: "7(1).
The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head 'Salaries ' in respect of any salary or wages, any annuity, pension or gratuity and any fees, commissions, perquisites or profits in lieu of, or in addition to, any salary or wages, which are allowed to him by or are due to him, whether paid or not, from, or are paid by or on behalf of any private employer;. . . . .
Explanation 2.
A payment due to or received by an assessee from an employer or former employer or from a provident or other fund, is to the extent to which it does not consist of contributions by the assessee or interest on such contributions a profit received in lieu of salary for the purpose of this subsection, unless the payment is made solely as compensation for loss of employment and not by way of remuneration for past services;. . .".
To determine whether the second Explanation applies 756 to the facts in this case, it has to be found if this pay ment was received by the assessee from a former employer by way of remuneration for past services.
The Tribunal did not accept the letter of the Maharaja, and observed as follows: "In support of the latter view Mr. Tricumdas strongly relied upon the letter dated 10 3 1953 addressed by the Maharaja to the assessee, vide para 2 above.
We have already indicated the circumstances in which that letter came to be written and would merely observe that we find it difficult to bring ourselves to believe in (sic) the contents of that letter and would leave the matter at that.
" This, in my opinion, is a finding upon the evidentiary .value of the letter of the Maharaja, and though the order of the Tribunal is worded mellifluously, the Tribunal 's decision is quite clearly that it was not per suaded to accept it.
Indeed, of the two documents, greater worth has to be attached to one which was issued before the controversy started and was written not to the assessee but to the Maharaja 's accountant who enquired how the account was to be adjusted.
The use of the word 'contemporaneous ' to describe the order to the accountant meant no more than this that it was earlier in time and very soon after the amount was given.
The Tribunal did not rely on any extra neous evidence in reaching its conclusion, but on something which had proceeded from the Maharaja himself.
The motive of the Maharaja may be irrelevant, because what has to be seen is not why the payment was made but for what the assessee had received it.
The Maharaja no doubt had been generous in fixing the pension at Rs. 2,000 per month.
But the payment of such a large sum was not just bounty but to reward the past services, which judged from the scale of the pension had not adequately been paid for in the past.
In this connection, the words of the Maharaja himself (and what better evidence can there be?) were that the amount was paid "in consideration of Shri Annantrai P. Pattani the Ex Dewan of our Bhavnagar State having rendered loyal and meritorious services Rs. 5,00,000 are given to him as gift".
757 The word gift ' does not alter the nature of the payment.
The Maharaja indeed made a gift, as he had stated over again; but this order quite clearly disclosees that it was by way of remuneration for past services.
The case, therefore, falls within the ruling of the a Supreme Court reported in P. Krishna Menon vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, Travancore Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore (1), and is indistinguishable from it.
In the earlier case of this Court, the person who gave the money did not even mention any past services; but this Court found that because the recipient had taught him Vedanta philosophy, the payment was really in the nature of remuneration for past services.
The facts in P. Krishna Menon 's case (1) were that the assessee was teaching his disciples Vedanta philosophy without any motive or intention of making a profit out of such activity.
One J. H. Levy who used to go to Travancore from England at intervals attended his teachings.
Levy had an account with Lloyd 's Bank at Bombay, and on December 31, 1944, Levy transferred the entire amount of Rs. 2,41,103 11 3 to the credit of an account which Levy got the assessee to open in his ' own name.
Levy made further remittances and by August 19, 1951, had paid about Rs. 4,50,000.
It was held by this Court that the assessee was carrying on a vocation.
In deciding the question whether the amounts were assessable to tax, this Court observed as follows: ". it seems to us that the present case is too plain to require any authority.
The only point is, whether the moneys were received by the appellant by virtue of his vocation.
Mr. Sastri contended that the facts showed that the payments were purely personal gifts.
He drew our attention to the affidavit of Levy where it is stated 'all sums of money paid into his account by me have been gifts to mark my esteem and affection for him and for no other reason '.
But Levy also there said, 'I have had the benefit of his teachings on Vedanta '.
It is important to remember however that the point is not what the donor (1) [1959] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 133.
96 758 thought he was doing but why the donee received it".
Sarkar, J., then referred to the dictum of Collins, M. R., in Herbert vs Mc Quade (1), which may be quoted here: "Now that judgment, whether or not the particular facts justified it, is certainly an affirmation of a principle of law that a payment may be liable to income tax although it is voluntary on the part of the persons who made it, and that the test is whether, from the standpoint of the person who receives it, it accrues to him in virtue of his office; if it does, it does not matter whether it was voluntary or whether it was compulsory on the part of the persons who paid it.
That seems to me to be the test; and if we once get to this that the money has come to or accrued to, a person by virtue of his office it seems to me that the liability to income tax is not negatived merely by reason of the fact that there was no legal obligation on the part of the persons who contributed the money to pay it." The learned Judge also referred to the observations of Rowlatt, J., in Reed vs Seymour (2) and of Viscount Cave, L. C., in Seymour vs Reed (3), and observed that the real question was, is the payment in the nature of a personal gift or is it a remuneration?, and quoted as the reply the words of the Lord Chancellor "If the latter, it is subject to the tax; if the former, it is not." Sarkar, J., also referred to the observations of Lord Ashbourne in Blakiston vs Cooper (4), which were: "It was suggested that the offerings were made as personal gifts to the Vicar as marks of esteem and respect.
Such reasons no doubt played their part in obtaining and increasing the amount of the offerings, but I cannot doubt that they were given to the vicar as vicar and that they formed part of the profits accruing by reason of his office.", and concluded as follows: "We have no doubt in this case that the imparting (1) (3) (2) (4) [1909] A.C. 104.
759 of the teaching was the causa causans of the making of the gift; it was not merely a causa sine qua non.
The payments were repeated and came with the same regularity as Levy 's visits to the appellant for receiving instructions in Vedanta.
We do not feel impressed by Mr. Sastri 's contention that the first payment of Rs. 2,41,103 11 3 was too large a sum to be paid as consideration.
In any case, we are not concerned in this case with that payment.
We are concerned with payments which are of much smaller amounts and as to which it has not been said that they were too large to be a consideration for the teaching.
And one must not forget that these are cases of voluntary payments and the question of the appraisement of the value of the teaching received in terms of money is not very material.
If the first payment was too big to have been paid for the teaching received, it was too big to have been given purely by way of gift.
" In my opinion, the case of this Court concludes the matter, and the Tribunal was within its rights in accepting one piece of evidence in preference to another, and the finding on the evidentiary value of the letter of the Maharaja was a matter essentially for the Tribunal to decide finally.
I thus agree with the High Court in the answer which it gave, in agreement on facts with the Tribunal, and the reasons for which the answer was given.
I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.
BY COURT: In view of the majority judgment of the Court, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
A who was the Dewan of the State of Bhavnagar before responsible government was introduced in the State, was granted a monthly pension of Rs. 2,000 by the Maharaja of the State by an order dated January 15, 1948.
On March 1, 1948 the State of Bhavnagar was merged in the United States of Saurashtra and the Maharajah ceased to be the Ruler of the State.
Subsequently on May 31, 1950, the Maharaja directed his banker in Bombay to pay A a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs out of the amount lying to his credit and when he was asked for instructions as to how that sum was to be entered in the books of account he passed an order on December 27, 1950, to the effect that in consideration of A having rendered loyal and meritorious services the said sum was given to him as a gift and that the amount should be debited to his personal expense account.
The liability of the above sum for income tax was raised during the course of the assessment proceedings of A for the year 1951 52, and the assessee produced a letter dated March 10, 1953, written by the Maharajah at the request of the former, as follows: "I confirm that in June 1950, I gave you a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs which was a gift as a token of my affection and regard for you and your family. .
The Income tax Officer held that the amount was liable to income tax under section 7(1), read with explanation (2), of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922.
The Appellate Tribunal took into account the two documents dated December 27, 1950, and March 10, 1953, written by the Maharajah and considered that the first which clearly mentioned why the said sum was paid to the assessee, was more reliable for the reason that it was contemporaneous, than the second which was written more than 2 years later and the correctness of which they were not inclined to accept.
The Tribunal agreed with the Income tax Officer that the amount was a taxable receipt.
Held, (per Kapur and Shah, JJ.; Hidayatullah, J., dissenting), that on the facts of the case the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was given to the assessee not as a payment in consideration of the services already rendered by him as the Dewan of the State, but merely as a gift in token of the Maharajah 's affection and regard for the assessee, and, therefore, was not liable to be assessed to tax 743 under section 7(1), explanation (2), of the Indian Income tax Act,1922.
The Tribunal was in error in treating the document dated December 27, 1950, 'as a contemporaneous document while as a matter of fact it was written six months after the fact of payment, and because of this erroneous approach as a result of which the second letter had been rejected, the finding given by the Tribunal could not be treated as binding on the Court.
P. Krishna Menon vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, Travancore Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 133, distinguished.
Per Hidayatullah, J.
The use of the word "contemporaneous" to describe the order to the banker meant no more than this that it was earlier in time and very soon after the amount was given.
The word "gift" did not alter the nature of pay ment; the Maharaja indeed made a gift, as he had stated over again, but the order disclosed that it was by way of remuneration for past services.
The Tribunal was within its rights in accepting one piece of evidence in preference to another, and the finding on the evidentiary value of the letter of the Maharaja was a matter essentially for the Tribunal to decide finally.
The decision in P. Krishna Menon vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, Travancore Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore, [1959] Supp. 11 S.C.R. 133, was applicable and concluded the present case.


judgement:
Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 of 1957.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 31, 1954, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Misc.
Case No. 9 of 1953.
R. Ganapathi Iyer and D. Gupta, for the appellant in C. A. No. 98 of 1957 and respondents in C. A. No. 99 of 1957.
section K. Kapur and Naunit Lal, for the respondents in C. A. No. 98 of 1957 and appellant in C. k. No. 99 of 1957.
November 30.
MUDHOLKAR, J. These are cross appeals from two judgments of the erstwhile High Court of Madhya Bharat.
Both of them arise out of a writ petition presented by the Gwalior Sugar Company Ltd., who are respondents in C. A. 98 of 1957, in which they challenged the validity of the levy of a cess on sugarcane purchased by the respondents.
The grounds on which the validity of the cess is challenged are two.
The first ground is that it was not levied under any law and the second ground is that it is discriminatory against the respondents.
In order to appreciate these contentions it is necessary to set out certain facts.
In the year 1940 in pursuance of an agreement entered into between the Government of Gwalior State and Sir Homi Mehta and others a sugar factory was established at Dabra.
The name of that factory is The Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd. On June 20, 1946, the Maharaja Scindia, the ruler of Gwalior State constituted a Committee to consider the desirability of imposing a "cane cess on the lines of the United Provinces or Bihar and to recommend a procedure for fixation of sugar prices within the terms of the agreement subsisting between the Government and the factory".
The Report of the 621 Committee was submitted to the Maharaja by the Chairman on July 23, 1946.
In their report the Committee observed that in order to put the industry on a sure and stable footing it was absolutely necessary to develop the cane area and yield in the shortest possible time.
For this purpose the Committee recommended that it was essential to levy a cane cess of one anna per maund on all sugar cane purchased by the respondent factory.
At the foot of this report the Maharaja made the following endorsement "Guzarish sanctioned, J. M. Scindia, 27 7 46".
It may be mentioned that the Committee also recommended the establishment of a Cane Development Board.
This recommendation was also accepted by the Ruler.
On August 26, 1946, the Economic Adviser to the Government of Gwalior wrote a letter to the Manager of the respondent factory.
It will be useful to reproduce the text of that letter as it will have some relevance on the second ground on which the cess is challenged.
The letter runs thus: "Dear air, With a view to expand cane area and cane yield in the Harsi commanded area so that the Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd., be put on a sound and stable basis, the Gwalior Government have decided to impose a cane cess of one anna per maund on all sugarcane purchased by your factory.
The operation of this cess will start from the coming sugarcane crushing season.
The proceeds of the cess have been earmarked for cane development work in the Harsi region that will be undertaken by a Cane Development Board constituted for the purpose.
The Cane Development Board expects your co operation in this development work, which is proposed to be undertaken as soon as possible.
Yours sincerely, Secretary, Cane Development Board.
" The respondent factory protested against this levy.
After the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat, 79 622 the respondent made a representation to the Government of Madhya Bharat against the levy of the cess.
That representation was, however, rejected.
They, then, paid the cess for the years 1946 to 1948 amounting to Rs. 1,17,712 8 2.
The Government of Madhya Bharat made a demand from the respondents for a sum of Rs. 2,79,632 14 9 for the years 1949 to 1951.
The respondents challenged the demand upon the two grounds set out above and presented a petition before the High Court of Madhya Bharat for quashing the demand.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State of Madhya Bharat which was the successor State of the former Gwalior State.
The High Court granted the petition partially by holding that the State of Madhya Bharat was not entitled to recover the cess due from the respondents after January 26, 1950.
It may be mentioned that it was conceded on behalf of the respondent company before the High Court that the State was entitled to recover the cess prior to January 26, 1950.
Later, however, the respondents preferred a review petition to the High Court in which they sought relief even in respect of the cess for the period prior to January 26, 1950.
The review petition was dismissed by the High Court upon the ground that no such petition lay.
The respondents are challenging the view of the High Court in C. A. No. 99 of 1957.
After the coming into force of the States Reorganization Act, 1956, the State of Madhya Pradesh has been substituted for the State of Madhya Bharat and they are shown as appellants and respondents respectively in the two appeals.
The High Court struck down the cess upon the ground that the order dated July 27, 1946, of the Gwalior Durbar was only an executive order and not a law under article 265 of the Constitution and that, therefore, there was no authority for the imposition of the cess after January 26, 1950.
This point is covered by the decision of this Court in Madhaorao Phalke vs The State of Madhya Bharat and Another (1) decided on October 3, 1960.
In the course of the judgment of this Court delivered by Gajendragadkar, J., he pointed out: (1) ; 623 "It would thus be seen that though Sir Madhya Rao was gradually taking steps to associate the public with the government of the State and with that object he was establishing institutions consistent with the democratic form of rule, he had maintained all his powers as a sovereign with himself and had not delegated any of his powers in favour of any of the said bodies.
In other words, despite the creation of these bodies the Maharaja continued to be an absolute monarch in whom were vested the supreme power of th e legislature, the executive and the judiciary. "In dealing with the question as to whether the orders issued by such an absolute monarch amount to a law or regulation having the force of law, or whether they constitute merely administrative orders, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction between executive orders and legislative commands is likely to be merely academic where the Ruler is the source of all power.
There was no constitutional limitation upon the authority of the Ruler to act in any capacity he liked; he would be the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and all his orders, how ever issued, would have the force of law and would govern and regulate the affairs of the State including the rights of the citizens.
"It is also clear that an order issued by an absolute monarch in an Indian State which had the force of law would amount to an existing law under article 372 of the Constitution." From these observations it would be quite clear that the endorsement of the Maharaja on the Guzarish whereby he accepted the recommendation of the Committee about imposing a cess on the sugarcane crushed by the factory amounted to a law, however informal that endorsement may appear to be.
Since it was a law enacted by the Maharaja then, with the coming into force of the Constitution, it became an existing law under article 372 and thus it satisfies the requirements of article 265 of the Constitution.
624 Disagreeing with the High Court we therefore hold that the cess was imposed by authority of law.
What remains to be considered is whether this cess violates the guarantee of equal protection contained in article 14 of the Constitution.
What was urged Ltd. before the High Court and what was also urged before us was that this is the only sugar factory in the present State of Madhya Pradesh which is liable to pay the cess whereas other sugar factories are exempt therefrom.
The result of this is that those other sugar factories do not have to pay this cess and are thus better placed in the matter of carrying on their business of manufacturing and marketing of sugar than the respondents and so there is discrimination against the respondents in that respect.
It seems to us, however, that this cannot be regarded as discrimination at all, even after the formation of the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The reason is that the difference arises out of the historical background to the imposition of this cess.
It has recently been held by this Court in M. K. Prithi Rajji vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors (1) decided on November 2, 1960, that geographical classification based upon certain historical factors is a permissible mode of classification.
In our opinion, the principle underlying that decision would also apply to the present case.
In view of the decision, Mr. Kapur the learned counsel for the respondents sought to rest his argument on a somewhat different ground.
That ground is that under the order of June 27, 1946, the respondent factory alone was made liable to pay cess and that no similar liability was imposed upon any other factory in Gwalior.
It would, however, appear that at that time no other sugar factory was at all in existence in the Gwalior State.
The respondent factory was the first to be established and for all we know is even today the only sugar factory in the area which formerly constituted the State of Gwalior.
We have already quoted the letter written by the Economic Adviser to the Gwalior Government addressed to the Management of the Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd. From that letter it would (1) C.A. NO. 327 of 1956.
625 appear that the cess was imposed for a definite purpose and that was to expand the cane area in the Harsi commanded region so that the Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd., that is, the respondent factory would be put on a sound and stable basis.
It will, therefore, be clear that far from discriminating against the factory, the whole object of the cess was to do something for the benefit of the factory and for the benefit of the sugar industry in the State which was at that date in its infancy.
Apart from the fact that in the matter of taxation the legislature enjoys a wide discretion, it should be borne in mind that a tax cannot be struck down as discriminatory unless the Court finds that it has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between an individual and an individual or upon grounds of race, religion, creed, language or the like.
There was no question of doing anything like this in the year 1946 when no other sugar factory existed in the State of Gwalior.
The cess was thus good in law when enacted and it has not been rendered void under article 13 by reason of the coming into force of the Constitution on the ground that it violates article 14.
In our opinion, therefore, both the grounds on which the validity of the cess is challenged are ill conceived and the cess is a perfectly valid one.
It would, therefore, be competent to the State of Madhya Pradesh to realise that cess from the respondent factory.
Upon the view we have taken in the matter in C. A. No. 98 of 1957 nothing remains to be considered in C. A. No. 99 of 1957.
Accordingly we allow the appeal by the State and dismiss that of the respondents.
The costs of the appeal will be borne by the respondents in C. A. No. 98 of 1957.
As both the appeals were argued together, there will be only one set of hearing fees.
Appeal No. 98 allowed.
Appeal No. 99 dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
In order to put the sugar industry on a stable footing, for which it was necessary to develop the cane area, the Ruler of the erstwhile Gwalior State by an order dated 27 7 1946 sanctioned the levy of cess of one anna per maund on all sugar cane purchased by the respondent company.
When the Government of Madhya Bharat, which was the successor state of the former Gwalior State, made a demand for payment of the cess, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court of Madhya Bharat challenging the legality of the levy on the grounds (1) that the order dated 27 7 1946 was only an executive order and not a law under article 265 of the Constitution of India and that, therefore, there was no authority for the imposition of the cess after January 26, 1950, and (2) that the levy was discriminatory and violated article 14 inasmuch as while the respondent was made liable to pay the cess the other sugar factories in the State were exempt.
It was found that at the time when cess was first levied there was no sugar factory in existence in the Gwalior State other than that of the respondent.
Held, that (i) the Ruler of an Indian State was an absolute monarch in which there was no constitutional limitation to act in any manner be liked, he being the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive.
, Consequently, the order dated 27 7 1946 issued by the Ruler of Gwalior State amounted to a law enacted by him and became an existing law under article 372 of the Constitution of India.
The levy of cess was therefore by authority of law within the meaning of article 265; Madhaorao Phalke vs The State of Madhya Bharat, ; , followed.
(2) the levy of cess did not contravene article 14 because (a) the object was cane development in the particular area and a geographical classification based upon historical factors was a permissible mode of classification, and (b) a tax could not be struck down as discriminatory unless it was found that it was imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between 620 an individual and individual; and particularly, in the instant case, where when cess was first sought to be levied, there was no other sugar factory existing in the State.


judgement:
15 of 1959, 14 of 1960 and 21 of 1959.
Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Frank Anthony and J. B. Dadachanji, for the petitioners (In Petns.
Nos. 15 and 21 of 1959).
612 H. J. Umrigar, O. P. Rana and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the petitioners (In Petn.
No. 14 of 1960).
L. K. Jha and section P. Varma, for the respondent (In Petn.
No. 15 of 1959).
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, M. Adhikari, Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent (In Petn.
No. 14 of 1960).
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India and C. P. Lal, for the respondent (In Petn.
No. 21 of 1959).
November 23.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K. DAS, J.
These three writ petitions have been heard together, as they raise common questions of law and fact.
They relate, however, to three different enactments made by the Legislatures of three different States Bihar in writ petition No. 15, Uttar Pradesh in writ petition No. 21, and Madhya Pradesh in writ petition No. 14.
The petitioners in the several petitions have challenged the 'validity of a number of provisions of the enactments in question and, in some cases, also of the rules made thereunder.
The impugned provisions are similar in nature, but are not exactly the same.
Therefore, we shall first state in general terms the case of the petitioners and then consider in detail and separately the impugned provisions in each case.
But before we do so, it is necessary to refer to some background history of the legislation under consideration in these cases.
In the year 1958 this Court had to consider the validity of certain provisions of three Acts: (1) The Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, (Bihar Act II of 1956); (2) the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (U. P. Act 1 of 1956); and (3) the Central Provinces and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 (C. P. and Berar Act LII of 1949).
The Bihar Act put a total ban on the slaughter of all 613 categories of animals of the species of bovine cattle.
The U. P. Act put a total ban on the slaughter of cows and her progeny which included bulls, bullocks, heifers and calves.
The C. P. and Berar Act placed a total ban on the slaughter of cows, male or female calves of cows, bulls, bullocks, and heifers, and the slaughter of buffaloes (male or female, adults or calves) was permitted only under a certificate granted by the proper authorities.
These three Acts were enacted in pursuance of the directive principle of State policy contained in article 48 of the Constitution.
The petitioners who challenged the various provisions of the aforesaid Acts in 1958 were engaged in the butcher 's trade and its subsidiary undertakings; they challenged the constitutional validity of the Acts on the ground that they infringed their fundamental rights under articles 14, 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
In the decision which this Court gave in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs The State, of Bihar (1), it held (i) that a total ban on the slaughter of cows of all ages and calves of cows and of she buffaloes, male or female, was quite reasonable and valid; (ii) that a total ban on the slaughter of she buffaloes or breeding bulls, or working bullocks (cattle as well as buffaloes) so long as they were capable of being used as milch or draught cattle was also reasonable and valid; and (iii) that a total ban on slaughter of she buffaloes, bulls and bullocks (cattle or buffalo) after they ceased to be capable of yielding milk or of breeding or working as draught animals was not in the interests of the general public and was invalid.
In the result this Court directed the respondent States not to enforce their respective Acts in so far as they were declared void by it.
This led to some amending or new legislation, and we are concerned in these three cases with the provisions of these amending or new Acts and the rules made thereunder.
In Bihar (Writ Petition No. 15 of 1959) the impugned Act is called the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals (1) ; 78 614 (Amendment) Act, 1959 which received the assent of the Governor on January 13, 1959.
in Uttar Pradesh (Writ Petition No. 21 of 1959) the impugned Act is called the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act, 1958 and in Madhya Pradesh (Writ Petition No ' 14 of 1960) a new Act was passed called the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1959 (Act 18 of 1959) which received the assent of the President on July 24, 1959 and came into force on January 15, 1960.
The rules made there under are called the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Cattle Preservation Rules, 1959.
The general case of the petitioners, who are several in number in each of the three cases, is that they are citizens of India and carry on their profession and trade of butchers; they allege that the various provisions of the impugned legislation infringe their fundamental rights in that they, for all practical purposes, have put a total ban on the slaughter of she buffaloes, bulls or bullocks, even after such animals have ceased to be useful, and have virtually put an end to their profession and trade.
It is pointed out that the age up to which the animals referred to above cannot be slaughtered (20 or 25 years) has been put so high that the practical effect is that no animals can be slaughtered, and the amending or new legislation has put in other restrictions so arbitrary and unreasonable in nature that in effect they amount to a prohibition or destruction of the petitioner 's right to carry on their trade and profession.
The following allegations quoted from one of the petitions (Writ Petition No. 15 of 1959) give a general idea of the nature of the case which the petitioners have put forward: "That there is good professional authority for the view that even in countries where animal husbandry is organised on a highly progressive and scientific basis, cattle seldom live beyond 15 or 16 years.
That there is also good authority to the effect that even pedigree breeding bulls are usually discarded at the age of 12 or 14 years.
, That in India bulls and bullocks and she buffaloes rarely live even up to the age of 15 years; draught bullocks begin to age after eight years, 615 That the raising of the age limit from 15 to 20 years is arbitrary, unreasonable and against the general public interests and is repugnant to and infringes the, fundamental rights of the, petitioners under Article 19 (1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
That section 3 of the amending Act is a mala fide, colourable exercise of power, repugnant to the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19 (1)(f) and (g).
That this arbitrary raising of the age limit will be against the public interests For the following among ' other reasons: (i) That there will, in fact, be no bulls or bullocks or she buffaloes available for slaughter as few, if any, of such animals survive in India up to the age of 15 years; (ii) that the profession, trade and occupation of millions of Muslims will be permanently and irreparably injured; (iii) that millions of members of the minority communities such as Christians, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslims, for whom cattle beef is a staple item of their diet, will be deprived of this diet; (iv) that the menace of the rapidly increasing uneconomic cattle population in such matters as the destruction of crops, being a public nuisance, will be accentuated by this arbitrary age limit, and in effect will ensure that bulls and bullocks cannot be slaughtered; (v) that the menace of the rapidly increasing population of uneconomic cattle to the fodder and other animal food resources of the country will be accentuated.
(vi) that the competition between the rapidly increasing cattle population, a large percentage I of which is uneconomic and useless, add the human population for available land will be accentuated; (vii) that this piece of legislation will ensure the steady increase of useless bulls and bullocks and must react disastrously against any attempt to improve milk production, bullock power or animal husbandry generally." 616 Similar allegations have been made in the other two petitions also.
The correctness of these allegations has been con.
tested on behalf of the respondent States, which through some of their officers have filed affidavits in reply.
We shall presently examine at greater length the averments made in these affidavits, but we may indicate here in broad outline what their general effect is.
In Bihar the age below which the slaughter of she buffaloes, bulls and bullocks is prohibited is 25 years.
The respondent State has taken the plea that the usefulness or longevity of live stock for breeding and other purposes depends to a very great extent on (a) better animal husbandry facilities like feeding and management and (b) control of animal diseases, and as these facilities are now available in a greater measure, the legislature came to the conclusion that a bull or bullock or a she buffalo below 25 years of age continues to remain useful; if a bull, bullock or shebuffalo is permanently incapacitated below that age the impugned provision permits its slaughter and therefore the legislation which is challenged conforms to the decision of this Court and does not violate any fundamental right.
In Uttar Pradesh the age is 20 years as respects bulls or bullocks, with a further restriction to be referred to later.
The reply of the res pondent State is that bulls or bullocks do not become unfit at the age of 12 or 14 years as alleged by the petitioners; on the contrary, they continue to be useful and at no time they become entirely useless.
It is then stated in the affidavit: "As a matter of fact, the age up to which the animals can live and are serviceable depends upon the care and attention they receive and the quality of the grass on which they are grazed. . . . . .According to a high authority the average age of an ox under favourable conditions would be between 15 to 20 years.
Even under conditions prevailing in Uttar Pradesh, bulls can live upto 20 years or more as would appear from an analysis of a survey report of the animal husbandry department.
" 617 On these averments the respondent State contends that the legislation is valid.
In Madhya Pradesh also the age is 20 years.
The Under Secretary to the( State Government in the Agricultural Department ' has made the reply affidavit in which it has been stated inter alia that conditions in Madhya Pradesh are different from conditions in other States.
The affidavit then states: "The State of Madhya Pradesh has a total area of 107,589,000 acres, out of which total cropped area is 43,572,000 acres.
Forest area is 33,443,000 acres, area not available for cultivation is 11,555,000 acres, uncultivated land is 18,405,000 acres and fallow land is 5,834,000 acres.
It will thus be seen that this State has a large forest area and plenty of grass land for pasturage.
As the forests supply the greater part of the fuel needs of the human population, the dung of animals is largely available as manure.
The legislature considered that bulls, bullocks and buffaloes are useful in this State till they are well past twenty years of age and that they should not be slaughtered till they are past that age and are also unfit for work or breeding.
The problem of animals dying of slow starvation or of worthless animals depriving useful animals of fodder needs no consideration in this State.
The agricultural community in the State benefits by the existence of animals as long as they are useful.
" There are also further averments as to the shortage of breeding bulls, working bullocks and she buffaloes in Madhya Pradesh.
On these averments the contention of the respondent State is that the cattle in that State are useful up to the age of 20 years.
We have indicated above in general terms the case of the petitioners and the reply which the respondent States have given.
We proceed now to a detailed consideration of the impugned legislation in each case.
(1) We take up first the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals (Amendment) Act, 1959 and the rules made under the main Act of 1955.
Section 3 of the Act as amended reads: "section 3.

summary/full:
In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs The State of Bihar the Supreme Court held that a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and she buffaloes after they had ceased to be useful was not in the interests of the general public and was invalid.
Thereafter, the Bihar Legislature passed the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals (Amendment) Act, 1958, the Uttar Pradesh Legislature passed the U. P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter (Amendment) Act, 1958 and the Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed a new Act, the M. P. Agricultural Cattle Preservation Act, 1959.
Section 3 of the Bihar Act prohibited the slaughter of a bull, bullock or she buffalo except when it was over 25 years of age and had become useless.
Rule 3 of the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Rules, 1960 prescribed that the certificate for slaughtering an animal could be granted only with the concurrence of the Veterinary Officer and the Chairman or Chief Officer of a District Board, Municipality etc., and if the two differed, then according to the decision of the Sub Divisional Animal Husbandary Officer.
Section 3 of the U. P. Act permitted the slaughter of a bull or bullock only if it was over 20 years of age and was permanently unfit.
It further provided that the animal could not be slaughtered within 20 days of the grant of 'a certificate that it was fit to be slaughtered and gave a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by the order granting the certificate.
Section 4(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Act provided that no bull, bullock or buffallo could be slaughtered except upon a certificate issued by the competent authority and section 4(2)(a) provided that no certificate could be issued unless the animal was over 20 years of age and was unfit for work or breeding.
Section 4(3) gave a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority.
Section 5 provided that no animal 611 shall be slaughtered within 10 days of the date of the issue of the certificate and where an appeal was preferred against the grant of the certificate, till the time such appeal was disposed of.
The petitioners, who carried on the profession and trade of butchers, contended that the various provisions of the three Acts set out above infringed their fundamental rights by practically putting a total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and she buffaloes even after the animal had ceased to be useful and thus virtually put an end to their profession and trade.
Held, (i) that the ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and she buffaloes below the age of 20 or 25 years was not a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public and was void.
A bull, bullock or buffalo did not remain useful after 15 years, and whatever little use it may have then was greatly offset by the economic disadvantages of feeding and maintaining unserviceable cattle.
The additional condition that the animal must, apart from being above 20 or 25 years of age, also be unfit was a further unreasonable restriction.
Section 3 of the Bihar Act, section 3 of the U. P. Act and section 4(2)(a) of the M. P. Act were invalid.
(ii) Rule 3 of the Bihar Rules was bad as it imposed dis proportionate restrictions on the rights of the petitioners.
The procedure involved such expenditure of money and time as made the obtaining of the certificate not worthwhile.
(iii) The provisions in the Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh Acts providing that the animal shall not be slaughtered within 20 and10 days respectively of the issue of the certificate and that any person aggrieved by the order of the competent authority, may appeal against it, were likely to hold up the slaughter of the animal for a long time and practically put a total ban on slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes even after they had ceased to be useful.
These provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of the petitioners and were void.
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi vs The State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629, State of Madras vs V. G. Row, ; and The State of Bihar vs Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga, , referred to.