judgement:
tion (Criminal) No. 403 of 1988.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Yatin N. Oza, P.H. Parekh and Sunil Dogra for the Petitioner.
PG NO 1083 P.S. Poti, Mrs. H. Wahi and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order of his detention dated August 3, 1988 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, under sub section (2) of section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti social Activities Act, 1985, hereinafter referred to as `the Act '.
The grounds on which the impugned order of detention has been made run into seven pages.
The relevant portions of which are extracted below: "In pursuance to Section 9(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti social Activities Act, 1985, Shri Piyush Kantilal Shah is hereby informed the grounds of detention as under: You are indulging into anti social activities by hoarding illegal foreign liquor and also selling it through yourself and through your servants near Navrangpura Municipal Bus stand and Navrang High School, Ahmedabad that the cases have been registered against you under Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and in which you have been arrested.
Police Stn.
C.R. Sections Qty.
seized Result No. No. 1.
Navrangpura 62/88 Prohibition 21795 Pending.
Navrangpura 114/88 Act 66(b) ML Ltr.
Pending 65(a) foreign investi (e), 81 Liquor.
gation Proh.
Act 139750 66(b), Ml.
65(a)(e), foreign 116(b) and liquor.
Carefully considering the complaint, identification marks on your face and charge sheet, it appears that you are a prohibition bootlegger and you are indulging into sale of foreign liquor in the aforesaid areas and you continue your anti social activities.
In the aforesaid area, you, your servants and associates indulge into use of force and violence and also beat innocent citizens by which an atmosphere of fear is created and by indulging into such PG NO 1084 activities, you are causing hindrance to maintenance of public order.
You also show dangerous weapons to the citizens and also create an atmosphere of fear and you are carrying on illegal liquor business.
Because of your fear, citizens residing nearby are not in a position to speak anything against you and also do not file complaint against you.
Because of your activities and your associates, the people of the aforesaid area feel insecurity of their life and property and all these activities are causing hindrance to public order.
To substantiate that you are indulging into anti social activities and that your activities are against the public order, certain persons residing in the aforesaid area who are peace loving have also given statements and the copy of the aforesaid statements are given to you.
Taking into consideration all that has been stated aforesaid, I am fully satisfied that you are prohibition bootlegger and by indulging into use of force and violence, you continue to indulge into illegal sale of liquor and you create an atmosphere of fear and terror by beating innocent citizens.
That action against you has been taken under ordinary law and you have been released on bail.
After being released on bail, you have continued your illegal anti social activities and therefore if once again actions are taken under ordinary law against you, there are possibilities of your being released on bail and your continuing anti social activities and since it is necessary to prevent you immediately for maintenance of public order, and since there is no other alternative, as a last resort I order to detain you under the aforesaid Act.
" It appears from the grounds extracted above and it is also not disputed that the petitioner has been prosecuted in two criminal cases.
In FIR relating to case No. 62/88, the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner is that he was caught red handed possessing English wines with foreign marks without any legal pass or permission to do so on April 13, 1988.
In the second case being case No. 114/88, the offence, as alleged to have been committed by the PG NO 1085 petitioner and as recorded in the FIR, is that he was caught while shifting 296 bottles of foreign liquors in an Ambassador car without any pass, permit or licence.
It is not disputed that in one of these two cases the petitioner has been acquitted and the other is pending, but the petitioner has not been convicted by any court.
In the grounds of detention, it is alleged that the petitioner is a prohibition bootlegger, and that by indulging in use of force and violence and by illegal sale of liquor, the petitioner creates an atmosphere of fear and terror by beating innocent citizens.
It is also alleged that the petitioner is indulging in anti social activities, and that the activities are against public order.
The statements of five persons, who have been described as witnesses Nos. 1 to 5, have been recorded before the order of detention was passed.
The copies of their statements have been given to the petitioner, but their names have not been disclosed to the petitioner, and it is not disputed before us that in view of section 9(2) of the Act, the detaining authority is entitled not to disclose the names of the detenu.
At this stage it may be stated that the representation of the petitioner is pending before the Advisory Board.
The question that has been raised on behalf of the respondents is whether in view of the pendency of the representation before the Advisory Board, the writ petition is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The question need not detain us long, for it has already been decided by this Court in Prabhu Dayal Deorah vs The District Magistrate, Kamrup, ; In paragraph 16 of the Report Mathew, J., speaking for himself and Mukherjee, J., observed inter alia as follows: "We think that the fact that the Advisory Board would have to consider the representations of the petitioners where they have also raised the contention that the grounds are vague would not in any way prevent this Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The detenu has a right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention.
That constitutional right includes within its compass the right to be furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds of the detention order.
And, if their constitutional right is violated, they have every right to come to this Court under PG NO 1086 Article 32 complaining that their detention is bad as violating their fundamental right.
As to what the Advisory Board might do in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not the concern of this Court.
" In the above observation, this Court has specifically laid down that even though a representation is pending before the Advisory Board, the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable before this Court.
In the Circumstances, we may proceed to dispose of the writ petition on merits.
In the detention order, the petitioner has been named as Piyush Kantilal Shah.
According to the petitioner, he is Piyush Kantilal Mehta and not Piyush Kantilal Shah.
It is alleged by the petitioner that the detaining authority has deliberately and mala fide detained him with a view to saving one Piyush Kantilal Shah.
In order to substantiate that his name is not Piyush Kantilal Shah, but Piyush Kantilal Mehta, the petitioner has filed certain Income Tax Challans, returns, a driving licence and some other documents wherein his name appears as Piyush Kantilal Mehta.
it is submitted by the petitioner that as he has been deliberately and wrongly described as Piyush Kantilal Shah in the order of detention, the same is illegal and should be quashed on this ground alone.
In his counter affidavit, the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, who is the detaining authority, has averred that the petitioner has made false attempts to show that he is not Piyush Kantilal Shah, but Piyush Kantilal Mehta.
It is pointed out that even at the time of the service of the order of detention, the petitioner had himself signed as Piyush Kantilal Shah in the presence of the Police Inspector, Navrangpura Police Station, Ahmedabad City.
It is submitted that the petitioner is trying to mislead this Court by making a false attempt of changing his surname.
We do not find any reason why we should not accept the statement of the Commissioner of Police as made in his affidavit.
It is not disputed that the petitioner has signed his name as Piyush Kantilal Shah when the order of detention was served upon him.
It is, however, alleged by the petitioner that he was forced to sign as Piyush Kantilal Shah.
It is difficult for us to believe that the detaining authority will force the petitioner to sign his name as Piyush Kantilal Shah, if really his name is Piyush Kantilal Mehta.
It may be that he has another name as Piyush Kantilal Mehta, but we are satisfied that the petitioner is also known as Piyush Kantilal Shah inasmuch as he himself had signed his name as Piyush Kantilal Shah.
PG NO.
1087 In the grounds of detention, the relevant portions of which have been extracted above, it has been alleged that the petitioner is a prohibition bootlegger and indulged in the sale of foreign liquor in the area in question and continues his anti social activities.
A bootlegger has been defined in section 2(b) of the Act as follows: "2(b).
`bootlegger ' means a person who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules and orders made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described above by or through any other person or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing.
" Now we may refer to section 3 of the Act providing for making orders detaining certain persons.
Section 3 reads as follows: "3.
(1) The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writting, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub section.
(3) When any order is made under this section by an authorised officer he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the PG NO 1088 making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government.
(4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
Explanation.
For the purpose of this sub section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health." Under sub section (1) of section 3, an order of detention of a person can be passed with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
Sub section (4) of section 3 contains a deeming provision.
Under sub section (4), a bootlegger or a dangerous person or a drug offender shall be deemed to be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when the activities of such a person affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
In other words, although sub section (4) contains a deeming provision, such deeming provision will not be attracted unless the activities of the person concerned affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
It is urged by Dr. Chitale, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that the grounds of detention are vague and there is nothing to show that the activities of the petitioner either affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
The learned Counsel submits that it is not enough to allege that the petitioner is a bootlegger, but there must be sufficient materials to show that the activities of the petitioner affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
PG NO 1089 In the grounds of detention, two criminal cases have been mentioned.
It is not disputed that in one of them the petitioner has been acquitted.
In the FIR relating to case No. 62/88, the allegations against the petitioner are that he was caught red handed with English Wines with foreign marks without any legal pass or permission.
In the FIR of the other case being Case No. 144/88, the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner was that the petitioner was caught while travelling in an Ambassador car with 296 bottles containing foreign liquor without any pass, permit or licence.
These cases have been mentioned in the detention order, presumably with a view to substantiating the allegation that the petitioner is a bootlegger.
There can be no doubt that the offences that have been alleged to have been committed by the petitioner have no bearing on the question of maintenance of public order.
It is also alleged in the grounds of detention that the petitioner, his servants and associates indulge in the use of force and violence and also beat innocent citizens by which an atmosphere of fear is created and by indulging in such activities, the petitioner is causing hindrance to the maintenance of public order.
It is further alleged that the petitioner shows dangerous weapons to the citizens and thereby create an atmosphere of fear.
These allegations are very general in character without reference to any particular incident or incidents in support of such allegations.
The detaining authority has sought to substantiate the said allegations and connect the activities of the petitioner with the question of maintenance of public order by the statements of five witnesses.
Apart from some minor incidents of beating by the petitioner, the witnesses have alleged that the petitioner is high handed and fierce by nature; his high handedness and bickering nature have caused terror to the public of the area; he is not afraid of the policy; his activities are anti social; he always keeps with him a knife and a revolver and he threatens surrounding people.
It is submitted by Dr Chitale that the allegations which have been made by the said five witnesses against the petitioner are also very general in character and do not involve the question of public order.
Counsel submits that there is a distinction between `law and order ' and 'public order .
The allegations made against the petitioner may give rise to a question of law and order but, surely, they have nothing to do with the question of public order.
A person may be very fierce by nature, but so long as the public generally are not affected by his activities or conduct, the question of maintenance of public order will not arise.
In order that an activity may be said to affect adversely the PG NO 1090 maintenance of public order, there must be materials to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public.
If any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order.
The commission of an offence will not necessarily come within the purview of `public order '.
In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in Pushkar Mukherjee vs State of West Bengal, ; where the distinction between `law and order ' and `public order ' has been clearly laid down.
Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: "Does the expression `public order ' take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder.
When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder.
Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order.
The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large.
In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest.
A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.
" In the instant case, the detaining authority, in our opinion, has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti social activities of the petitioner adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses.
But, such PG NO 1091 incidents, in our view, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.
The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community.
It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in sub section (4) of section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order We have carefully considered the offences alleged against the petitioner in the order of detention and also the allegations made by the witnesses and, in our opinion, these offences or the allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the members of the public of the area in question giving rise to the question of maintenance of public order.
The order of detention cannot, therefore, be upheld.
Coming back to the question of vagueness of the grounds, it is submitted by Mr. Poti, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, that the grounds are not vague, and that they are supported by the statements of the witnesses.
In our opinion, the statements of the witnesses are themselves vague and general in character.
In Pushkar Mukherjee 's case (supra), one of the grounds was "You have become a menace to the society and there have been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful citizens of Baraset and Khardah P.S. areas under 24 Paraganas District and the inhabitants thereof are in constant dread or disturbances of public order".
It was held by this Court that the ground was extremely vague and gave no particulars to enable the petitioners to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and it infringed the Constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
In the instant case, the grounds of detention are more or less similar to the grounds in Pushkar Mukherjee 's case (supra).
The statements of witnesses do not, in our opinion, remove the vagueness of the grounds.
Some other grounds have been urged by Dr. Chitale with a view to substantiating the invalidity of the order of detention.
As we have found that the order of detention cannot be sustained, as the grounds of detention suffer from vagueness and the allegations against the petitioner are not such as to raise the question of maintenance of public order, we do not think it necessary to consider the other grounds.
PG NO.
1092 For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order of detention and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith.
S.K.A. Petition allowed.

summary/full:
The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the legality of the order of his detention passed by the respondent under sub section (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities, Act, 1985.
In the grounds of detention, it was alleged that the petitioner was a prohibition bootlegger, indulging in use of force and violence, and by illegal sale of liquor the petitioner created an atmosphere of fear and terror by beating innocent citizens, thus indulging in anti social activities which were against public order.
The detention order also indicated that he was prosecuted in two criminal cases under the Excise Act and was acquitted in one case and the other case was pending.
In his writ petition to this Court the petitioner contended that the grounds of detention were vague and there was nothing to show that his activities either affected or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, and that it is not sufficient to allege that he is a bootlegger to warrant his detention.
The respondent challenged the maintainability of the writ petition in view of the pendency of the representation of the petitioner before the Advisory Board and also contended that the grounds were not vague being supported by statements of the witnesses.
Allowing the writ petition and quashing the order of detention, and directing the release of the petitioner, this Court.
PG NO 1081 PG NO 1082 HELD: A person may be very fierce by nature, but so long as the public generally are not affected by his activities on conduct, the question of maintenance of public order will not arise.
In order that an activity may be said to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, there must be material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public.
If any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order.
[1089H; 1090A B] The Commission of an offence will not necessarily come within the purview of `public order '.
[1090B] Pushkar Mukherjee vs State of West Bengal, ; , relied on.
In the instant case, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti social activities of the petitioner adversely effect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
It is true some incidents of beating by the petitioner had taken place, as alleged by the witnesses.
But, such incidents do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.
[1090H; 1091A] It may be that the petitioner is a bootlegger within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act, but merely because he is a bootlegger he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the Act unless, as laid down in sub section (4) of Section 3 of the Act, his activities as a bootlegger affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
[1091B] Even though a representation is pending before the Advisory Board, the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable before the Court.
[1086B] Prabhu Dayal Deorah vs The District Magistrate, Kamrup, ; , relied on.


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos. 8 & 9 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.2.1987 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 179 and 149 of 1987.
T.U. Mehta, A. Subba Rao, P. Parmeshwaran, Harish N. Salve, N.D. Garg, Rajiv K. Garg, P.H. Parekh, Ms. Ayesha Misra and M.N. Shroff for the appearing parties.
By these two special leave petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Union of India and the Chief and the Joint Chief Controllers of Imports and Exports seek special leave to appeal from two appellate Judgments of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judica ture at Bombay Both dated 17.2.1987 in appeal Nos. 179 of 1987 and 149 of 1987 affirming in appeal orders of learned Single Judges dated 5.9.1985 in W.P. 1125 of 1985 and dated 19.9.1985 in W.P. 1918 of 1986, respectively, by which the writ petitions filed by M/s. Suksha International and M/s. Nutan Gems, respondents in these appeals, were allowed and appellants directed to revalidate 4 the imprest licences of the respondents and endorse them for import of OGL items, under paragraph 185[4] of the Import Export Policy of 1982 83 [AM 1983.] 2.
Special leave, in both the petitions, is granted and the appeals taken up for final hearing, heard and disposed of by this common judgment.
We have heard Shri Subbarao, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Harish Salve, learned counsel for the respondents who were the writ peti tioners before the High Court.
M/s. Suksha International, respondent in SLP 2579 of 1987, is a diamond exporter and is a registered Export House for the purposes of the Import Export Policy.
The said export house was granted an Imprest Licence No. 0451365 dated 15.6.1981 of a value of (Rs. 1,53,80,000) for import of 'uncut ' and 'unset ' diamonds with corresponding export obligations.
Respondent claimed that upon the due fulfilment by it of its export obligations it became entitled to revalidation and endorsement for export of OCM items of the imprest, Accordingly, on 3.8.1983 the said Export House applied under paragraph 185(4) of AM/83 policy, for such revalidation and endorsement of its imprest licence.
Appellant No. 3 by his decision dated 21.9.1983, rejected this claim of the re spondent.
Aggrieved by this rejection, respondent filed in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution a writ petition assailing the legality of the order dated 21.9.1983 and seeking a mandamus to the appellants to en dorse the Imprest Licence.
Learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated 5.9.
1986 allowed the writ petition and issued the direction preyed for.
This order was carried up in appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court in appeal No. 179 of 1987.
The appeal came to be dismissed on 17.2.
M/s. Nutan Gems, respondent in SLP 2580 of 1987 is a recognised Export House which had, similarly, been granted an Imprest Licence dated 24.2.
1983 for the import of uncut and unset diamonds with certain export obligations attached to it and that after the due discharge of the export obliga tions, Respondent became entitled to a revalidation and endorsement of the Imprest Licence for import of DGL items.
The application dated 19.1.1984 made in this behalf by the respondent was rejected by appellant No. 6 by his order dated 19.3.
M/s. Nutan Gems filed writ petition No. 1813 of 1985 in the High Court for issue of an appropriate writ quashing the said order of rejection and directing appellants to revalidate and endorse the 5 Imprest Licence.
On 19.9.1985.
Learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition.
This Order was affirmed in appeal No. 149 of 1985 by the Division Bench on 17.2.
These appellate judgments of the High Court are assailed in these appeals.
Though a number of contentions are raised in the Memorandum of Special Leave Petition, the points, however, pressed at the hearing admit of being formulated thus: (a) that in the Import Export Policy, 1982 83 the entitlement of Registered Export Houses to the facility of revalidation and endorsement of OGL items under paragraph 185(4) is subject to and conditioned upon the express limitation in clause (7) of paragraph 185 of the Policy and that the High Court was in error in di recting revalidation and endorsement without reference to the mandatory prescription in clause (7).
(b) that the High Court was in error in ignoring the contention of the appellants that respondents had rendered themselves disentitled to relief on ground of the inordi nate and unexplained delay in filing the writ petitions.
In W.P. 1125 of 1985 (from which SLP 2579 of 1987 arises) the rejection of the prayer for revalidation was on 21.9.
1983 and the writ petition was filed in April, 1985; and in WP 1813 of 1985 (from which SLP 2580 of 1987 arises) the rejection of the prayer was on 18.3.1984 and the writ petition was filed on 10.9.1986, after a lapse of one and a half years in each case.
(c) that, at all events, the direc tions issued for the endorsement must be limited only to items as limited by the pro nouncement of this Court in Rajprakash Chemi cals Ltd. vs Union of India, and D. Navinchandra & Co. vs Union of India, ; and other cases bearing on the question; and not in terms now directed by the High Court.
We may first dispose of contention (c) on which there does not appear to be much controversy.
Shri Subba Rao submitted that the High Court was in clear error in brushing aside this argument and affirming the learned Single Judge on the basis that the S.L.P. filed by 6 the appellants in Ripal Kumar & Co. 's case had been rejected by this Court.
Shri Harish Salve, however, submitted that the decisions of this Court in Indo Afgan Chamber of Com merce vs Union of India; , ; Rajprakash Chemi cals Ltd. vs Union of India, ; Union of India vs Godrej Soaps (Pvt.) Ltd., ; and D. Navinchandra & Co. vs Union of India, ; etc do not have any direct beating on the question of the enti tlement of the Export Houses to revalidation and endorsement for OCL items under para 185(4) of A M 1983 Policy but relate to the question as to the limitations on the permis sibility of the items of import, consequent upon the changes in the policy.
This question becomes relevant, says Shri Salve, at a stage which is subsequent to the revalidation and endorsement of the Imprest Licence and that the position in the present cases has not yet reached that stage.
Howev er, he submitted that as to the choice of items permissible for import, the matter would of course, have to be deter mined the guided by these pronouncements.
As Contention (c) is not in controversy it is not necessary to dwell on it any further.
What, however, remain to be considered are the contentions (a) and (b).
Re: Contention (a): Clauses (3), (4), (5) and (7) of para 185 of the policy provide: (3) Where REP licence has been issued to the Export House on its own exports, the facility of importing OGL items under sub para(1) above will be allowed without debit to the value of such REP licence, provided the value of such imports does not exceed the value of the REP licence.
(4) The facility for import of OGL items available in sub para (3) above, may also be allowed, on merits, to Export Houses against their advance/imprest licences on account of which they are rendered ineligible to obtain REP licence.
In such cases, however, the value upto which the OGL import may be allowed, will not exceed the value to which the Export House would have been eligible to the REP licence, had he not obtained advance/imprest licence in question.
This facility will be available to the Export House after he has discharged the export obligation imposed on the advance/imprest licence.
There fore, if by the time, the Export House becomes eligible to this facility, 7 the advance/imprest licence has expired, or, if the original validity left unused by that time is less than six months, the licensing authority will revalidate the licence simulta neously so as to give to the licence holder a time of six months for the purpose of import ing OGL item under this facility.
(5) Export Houses who wish to take advantage of this facility of import of OGL items should get the licences concerned en dorsed by the licensing authority as under: "This licence will also be valid for import of OGL items under para 125 of Import Export Policy, 1982 83, subject to the condi tions laid down, and shall be nontransferable." (7) Import of OGL items by Export Houses under these provisions shall be subject to the condition, inter alia that the shipment of goods shall take place within the validity of the OGL i.e. 31st March, 1983.
or within the validity period of the import licence itself (without any grace period), whichever date is earlier.
This restriction will also apply to licences issued before 1.4.1982 in respect of items which continue to be on OGL in 1982 83 policy.
(The restriction regarding grace period will not, however, apply in cases where shipment can be made within the permis sible grace period on or before 31.3.1981).
Appellants ' contention is that clauses (4) and (7) of para 135 are part of an integrated policy scheme, providing for certain incentives to export houses and have to be read together and that the import of OGL items is strictly sub ject to the specific condition that the shipment of goods shall take place within the validity of the OGL i.e. 31.3.1983 or within the validity period of the licence itself which ever date is earlier.
If this condition is held to be attracted to the case of an Imprest Licence also, then, quite obviously, the claim in the writ petitions would have to fail, as the application for revalidation is beyond the outer most time limit set for the import itself.
Indeed, this question was left open by this Court while dismissing SLP 7389 of 1985 (Union of India vs Messrs H. Patel & Co.).
In its order dated 19.7.1985 this Court said: " . .
We, however, make it very clear that we express 8 no opinion on the validity of the above said contention based on paragraph 185(7) referred to above.
The true effect of the said provi sion is left open to be considered in an appropriate case when an occasion arises to do so.
Sri Salve, submitted that in the very nature of the procedures and exercises inherent in the effectuation of an imprest licence, as distinguished from Replenishment Li cence, the Export House has first to import the uncut and unset diamonds and thereafter fulfill its export obligations of cut and polished diamonds as a necessary antecedent for the effectuation of its entitlement to a revalidation and endorsement for OGL items.
The very nature of the time consuming transactions that are required to be gone through preceding the very creation of the right to revalidation and endorsement are inconsistent with the feasibility of compli ance with the time schedule in para 185(7).
Learned Counsel says that the view that should commend itself, both on construction and in equity, is that having regard to the innate differences in the nature of the obligations and conditions to be fulfilled between the holders of imprest licences on the one hand and the replenishment licences on the other and having regard, further, to the circumstances that export houses, which, under Imprest Licences, have first to import uncut and unset diamonds and thereafter fulfill their export obligations before becoming entitled to the import of OGL items, it would be a wholly unreasonable exercise in construction to import the condition in clause (7) into clause (4) and that clause (4) should, therefore, be treated on its true construction, as a special provision constituting an exception to the generality of the provision in clause (7).
Otherwise, says counsel, the resulting posi tion would be that the satisfaction of the cumulative condi tions in clauses (4) and (7) by an Export House under an Imprest Licence would well nigh be impossible.
This way of hormonising clauses (4) and (7) of para 185, it is submitted, has commended itself to the High Court in several other writ petitions involving the interpretation of clauses (4) and (7) of paragraph 185 of the AM 1983 policy.
Sri Salve submits that it is reasonable to exclude imprest licences from the requirement of clause (7).
We have considered the rival contentions on the point.
Para 185(4) was intended to provide certain incen tives to the Export Houses which, upon grant of Imprest Licences, fulfill their countervailing obligations in the matter of export commitments.
The provision 9 is a beneficial one.
Clauses (4) and (7), no doubt, on their plain wording present certain constructional difficulties and the view sought to be put across by Shri Subba Rao for the appellant, on the plain language of clause (7), is not without possibilities.
However, the basis of a harmonious construction which commended itself to the High Court in other similar cases appears to us to advance and promote the objects of the policy in paragraph 185(4) and is, at all events, not an unreasonable view to take of the matter.
In some of these cases this Court has declined to interfere with this interpretation by rejecting petitions for special leave.
Acceptance of the interpretation suggested by Shri Subba Rao would, in our opinion, unduly restrict the scope of the beneficial provision and, in many instances which would otherwise fall within the beneficial scope of the policy in para 185(4), take away with one hand what the policy gives with the other.
We think we should accept the submissions of Shri Harish Salve which is consistent with the view taken of the matter by the High Court in other cases and hold that the conditions in para 185(4) of the policy would not be attracted to the case of Export Houses which are granted Imprest Licences.
Accordingly we hold and answer contention (a) against the appellants.
(10) Re: Contention (b): This pertains to appellants ' plea of delay as a bar to relief.
Appellants have aired a serious grievance over this aspect.
Shri Subba Rao streneously contended that the re spondents had approached the High Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay of over one and a half years in each of these cases and that appellants ' objection as to the disentitlement of the respondents to relief on the ground of delay was not even so much as adverted to by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench.
Learned counsel submit ted that promptitude and vigilant pursuit of legal remedies with diligence is basic to the entitlement to relief in the jurisdiction under Article 226, which is both extraordinary and discretionary and that in the present cases the delay of one and a half years in moving the Court should have been held crucial particularly where grant of import licence is cancelled.
The pleadings in the writ petitions are not before us.
We will proceed on the assumption that appellants had taken this objection before the learned Single Judge of the High Court and raised the plea as to the bar of delay in their appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court.
If this point had been taken, we are afraid the High Court 10 was not justified in ignoring it or brushing it aside.
Indeed the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petitions in both these cases by short orders in similar terms, relying upon an earlier decision dated 19/20th August, 1985, in writ petition No. 2477 of 1984.
The relevant part of the order reads: "Relevant facts and circumstances of this petition are similar to the relevant facts and circumstances in Writ Petition No. 2477 of 1984 decided by this Court on 19/20th August, 1985.
Besides, as in the said Writ Petition No. 2477 of 1984, in the present case also there is no such delay as to preclude the petitioners from the relief claimed.
In all the circumstances and for reasons stated in Writ Petition No. 2477 of 1984 the following order is passed on this Writ Petition.
The petition succeeds and the same is allowed.
" Thereafter, the learned judge proceeded to issue specific directions.
Shri Subba Rao would say that the reference in the order by learned Single Judge to the contention on the point of delay as bar to relief had nothing to do with the specif ic contention of the appellants ' that there was inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the Court.
This, learned counsel submits, would be clear, by a reference to the aspect of the delay dealt with and considered in WP 2477 of 1984, on which the learned Single Judge relied.
The order of the same learned Single Judge in WP 2477 of 1984, in which the particular aspect of delay is considered is at para 8 of that order.
That para in the order in WP 2477 of 1984 reads: "Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the petitioners were not entitled to relief because of delay.
It is not possible to agree.
After the redemp tion certificate on 16th November, 1983, application for revalidation and OGL endorse ment was made within four months therefrom on 12th March, 1984.
There is, in the circum stances, no such delay as to warrant its ejection on that ground.
The contention thus fails and is rejected.
" Shri Subba Rao submits that the delay referred to in the above paragraph is the delay in seeking revalidation and endorsement after 11 the issue of redemption certificate and not the delay in filing the writ petition and that in both the present cases the plea of delay in filing the writ petitions has not received due consideration by the High Court.
Shri Subba Rao referred to a number of pronouncements of this Court, to substantiate that such unexplained delay particularly in matters dealing with import licences would bar relief and that un explained delay, by itself and without more, is a factor disentitling a person to relief.
He submitted that absence of prejudice to the opposite party, by itself, would not justify delay and that in the context of grant of import licences passage of time brings with it, as here, problems of conflicting policy considerations.
Where change of policy would impart crucial significance to the delays, Courts, learned counsel says, should insist upon even a higher degree of promptitude.
He, accordingly, submitted that the writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground alone of delay in filing them.
This contention of the appellant cannot be brushed aside.
If appellants had raised a specific plea of delay as a bar to the grant of relief and the delays in the present cases, having regard to the nature of the subject matter, were not inconsiderable it was perhaps necessary for the High Court to have specifically dealt with the plea.
The aspect of delay adverted to by the learned Single Judge in the course of the order was a different one.
However, we think it would be somewhat unfair for the respondents, who have succeeded in the High Court, to decide this question without an opportunity to them to satisfy the Court as to the reasons, if any, for the delay and as to the sufficiency of such reasons.
We assume that the plea had been taken before the High Court by the appellants as this submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was not controverted.
We think it would be appropriate that the appellants ' appeals before the High Court are remitted to the High Court for such consideration as the Appellate Bench may now bestow on this contention of the appellants.
If the appellate bench is persuaded to view that the delay is satisfactorily explained it may proceed to confirm the orders of the learned Single Judge, subject, of course, to the question of permissibility of the importable items to be determined in the light of the pronouncements of this Court referred to at contention (c).
If, on the contrary, the delay is held by the Division Bench to be such as to disen title respondents to relief, the Division Bench may proceed to allow the appeals and dismiss the writ petitions.
All other controversies in the appeal shall be held to have been concluded in favour of the respondents.
12 Accordingly, the appellate judgments of the High Court under appeal are set aside and the appeals 149 of 1987 and 179 of 1987 before the High Court are remitted for a fresh disposal as indicated above.
The High Court might also consider the desirability of a very early disposal of the appeals.
These appeals are disposed of accordingly.
There will, however, be no order as to costs in these appeals.
N.V.K. Appeals disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The respondents in the appeals were recognised Export Houses which had been granted Imprest licences for the import of 'uncut ' and 'unset ' diamonds with certain export obligations attached to them.
After the due discharge of the export obligations, the respondents became entitled to revalidation and endorsement of the said Imprestlicence for import of OGL items.
The said Export Houses applied under paragraph 185(4) of AM83 policy for revalidation and endorsement of the Imprest Licences.
The appellant No. 3, the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, rejected this claim of the respondents.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of rejection, respondents filed writ petitions in the High Court assailing the legality of the orders 2 rejecting their claims, and seeking a mandamus to the appel lants to endorse the Imprest Licences.
Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ peti tions, and the order was affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench.
In the appeals by the Union of India to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that: (a) in the Import Export Policy 1982 83, the entitlement of Registered Export Houses to the facility of revalidation and endorse ment of OGL items under paragraph 184 is subject to and conditioned upon the express limitations contained in clause (7) of paragraph 185 of the Policy, and that the High Court was in error in directing revalidation and endorsement without reference to the mandatory prescription provided in the said clause, and (b) that the High Court was in error in ignoring the contentions of the appellants that the respond ents had rendered themselves disentitled to relief on the ground of the inordinate and unexplained delay of one and a half years in the filing of the writ petitions.
Disposing of the Appeals, the Court, HELD: l(a) Para 185(4) was intended to provide certain incentives to the Export Houses which, upon grant of Im prest Licences, fulfil their countervailing obligations in the matter of export commitments.
The provision is a benefi cial one.
[8H; 9A] 1(b) Clauses (4) and (7), no doubt, on their plain wording present certain constructional difficulties, and it is possible to take the view that the said clauses are part of an integrated policy scheme, providing for certain incen tives to export houses and have to be read together.
This view, however, will unduly restrict the scope of the benefi cial provision.
[9A, C] 1(c) That the conditions in para 185(4) of the Policy would not be attracted to the case of Export Houses which are granted Imprest Licences, would be a harmonious con struction of clauses (4) and (7) which appears to advance and promote the objects of the policy in Paragraph 185(4) and is, at all events, not an unreasonable view to take of the matter.
[9B] 1(d) An interpretation which would unduly restrict the beneficial scope of the policy in para 185(4), would take away with one hand what the policy of the law gives with the other.
[9C] 3 2(a) If appellants had raised a specific plea of delay as a bar to the grant of relief and the delays in the present cases, having regard to the nature of the subject matter, were not inconsiderable it was perhaps necessary for the High Court to have specifically dealt with the plea.
The aspect of delay adverted to by the Single Judge was a different one viz. the delay in seeking revalidation and endorsement after the issue of the redemption certifi cate and not the delay in the filing of the writ petitions.
[11D] 2(b) It would therefore he appropriate that the appel lants ' appeals before the High Court are remitted to the Appellate Bench of the High Court.
If the Appellate Bench is persuaded to view that the delay is satisfactorily explained it may proceed to confirm the orders of the Single Judge subject to the question that the permissibility of the importable items be determined in the light of the pro nouncements of this Court in Rajprakash Chemicals Ltd. vs Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1621 and D. Navinchandra & Co. vs Union of India; , If the delay is held by the Appellate Bench to be such as to disentitle the respond ents to relief, it will proceed to allow the appeals and dismiss the writ petitions.
[11F H]


judgement:
ition (Civil) No. 12847 of 1985 & 1081 of 1987.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
R.B. Mehrotra, Amicus Curiae, Kishan Patnayak in person, and Ranjan Dwivedi for the Petitioners.
G. Rath, Advocate General, Orissa, R.K. Mehta, Inderjit Roy, Ms. Mona Mehta, K.R. Nagaraja, and Ms. Madhu Moolchan dani for the Respondents.
60 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 12847 of 1985 has its origin in a letter written by Shri Kishen Pattnayak and Shri Kapil Narayan Tiwary, two social and political workers, addressed to the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of India.
In this letter, they have brought to the notice of this Court the miserable condition of the inhabitants of the district of Kalahandi in the State of Orissa on account of extreme poverty.
It is alleged that the people of Kalahandi, in order to save themselves from starvation deaths, are com pelled to subject themselves to distress sale of labour on a large scale resulting in exploitation of landless labours by the well to do landlords.
It is alleged that in view of distress sale of labour and paddy, the small peasants are deprived of the legitimate price of paddy and they somehow eke out their daily existence.
Further, their case is that being victims of 'chill penury ', the people of Kalahandi are sometimes forced to sell their children.
It has been prayed that the State Government should be directed to take immedi ate steps for the purpose of ameliorating the misery of the people of the District of Kalahandi.
On receipt of the said letter, this Court directed the same to be treated as a writ petition and it was registered as such.
Another writ petition being Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1081 of 1987 has been filed by the Indian People 's Front.
This writ petition not only relates to the misery of the people of Kalahandi, but also of the people of another district, namely, the district of Koraput.
In this writ petition, it has been alleged that the starvation deaths of the inhabitants of the districts of Koraput and Kalahandi are due to utter negligence and callousness of the adminis tration and the Government of Orissa.
It is alleged that the starvation deaths, drought diseases and famine have been the continuing phenomena in the said two districts since 1985.
The Government of Orissa has been accused of utter failure to protect the lives of the people of the two districts.
The State of Orissa appeared in both these writ peti tions and opposed the same by filing counter affidavits denying the allegations of the petitioners.
The State of Orissa filed two statements one dated October 20, 1986 consisting of 160 pages and the other dated December 1, 1986 consisting of 181 pages.
In these statements, it has been alleged by the State of Orissa that the State Government has implemented the social welfare measures in the district of Kalahandi.
61 In order to ascertain the correct state of affairs, this Court by its order dated January 16, 1987 requested the District Judge of Kalahandi to enquire as to whether the State Government has, in fact, implemented the social wel fare measures in the district of Kalahandi and whether such measures were adequate to meet the needs of the people there.
The learned District Judge was asked to submit a report to this Court.
It was further directed by this Court that the learned District Judge, while preparing his report, would consider the feasibility of the implementation of some suggestions made by the petitioners regarding the steps to be taken for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of the people in the said district.
The learned District Judge has since submitted his report which runs into 36 1 pages.
The petitioners are not at all satisfied with the said report of the learned Dis trict Judge.
They have challenged the correctness of facts found by him, particularly with regard to the question of starvation deaths.
It has been stated by the learned Dis trict Judge that there was hardly any case of starvation death; on the other hand, there has been implementation by the Government of the social welfare measures.
We do not think it necessary to consider the report of the learned District Judge.
It is agreed by the parties including Shri Pattnayak, the petitioner No. 1 in Writ Petition No. 12847 of 1985, who has appeared before us in person, that some steps should be taken for the purpose of alleviating the miseries and sorrows of the poor inhabitants of both the said districts.
It is not disputed that the people of the districts of Kalahandi and Koraput are very poor and most of them have been living below the poverty line.
Although the learned District Judge 's report is against the alleged starvation deaths, we are of the view that the happening of one or two cases of starvation deaths cannot altogether be ruled out.
Shri Pattnayak laid much emphasis in his submissions on the duty of the Government to take immediate steps to prevent starvation deaths.
He has submitted before us some suggestions in writing, So far as prevention of starvation deaths is concerned, his suggestion are inter alia that the Government should constitute a 11 Member Committee, of which the majority should be social workers, for the purpose of supervising matters arising out of drought and other natural calamities.
This committee may be called the Kalahandi Relief Implementation Committee (KRIC).
The nonofficial members should not be members of any political party and should belong to well known organisa tions of social work, such as, Sarvodaya Gandhi Peace Foun dation and registered voluntary agen 62 cies, as contained in the State approved list of voluntary agencies.
He has also enumerated the duties of the Commit tee.
The learned Advocate General of Orissa, appearing on behalf of the State of Orissa, has drawn our attention to paragraph 39 of the Orissa Relief Code which provides as follows: "39.
Reports on starvation: (i) In spite of taking adequate precautions in providing relief works for able bodied persons, and gratuitous relief and feeding programmes for those who cannot under take physical labour and other relief meas ures, reports of starvation cases very often appear in the Press.
Whenever a report of death due to starvation is published and it comes to the notice of the Collector, he shall immediately cause an enquiry into the allega tion.
The enquiry shall be conducted by a gazetted officer in the presence of the Sar panch, Ward Member or some gentlemen of the village and the result of the enquiry reported in the Pro forma in Appendix VI within 48 hours, if possible.
The Pro forma is not exhaustive.
The Collector should include such other information which he considers necessary to give Government a complete picture of the situation in which the alleged death has taken place.
If all the information cannot be col lected forthwith a preliminary report should be furnished immediately to be followed by a complete report soon.
(ii) After the receipt of the enquiry report, the Collector shall review the relief measures undertaken in the area and also if he deems proper, may visit the area himself or depute a senior officer to take stock of the situation and be satisfied about the adequacy of labour employment, food position, and other relief arrangements.
He should take further steps to alleviate distress in the area as far as possible.
In case he considers necessary to further strengthen the relief measures, he shall furnish concrete proposals promptly with necessary justification through the Revenue Divisional Commissioner to the Board of Reve nue/Special Relief Commissioner.
" In this connection, we may also refer to paragraph 40 relat ing to 63 verification of Press reports and issue of contradiction, if any.
Paragraph 40 reads as follows: "40.
Verification of Press reports and issue of contradiction, if any Besides alleging starvation deaths, reports on large scale migration of population on account of lack of work, scarcity of drinking water, outbreak of epidemics etc.
appear in the Press very often.
The Collector shall take steps to get such reports immediately verified by proper enquiry or otherwise and if found true should take immediate remedial action.
Proper publicity relating to the relief measures undertaken should also be given.
If on the other hand, the report is found inaccurate, exaggerated or incor rect a contradiction stating the correct facts may be issued by the Collector immediately.
Copies of such contradictions should be made available to the higher author ities.
" It is apparent from paragraph 39 that ample provision has been made for taking steps as soon as the report of starvation death is published or any starvation death comes to the notice of the Collector.
It is also submitted by the learned Advocate General that there is a district level Natural Calamities Committee consisting of the Collector, other officials and the popular representatives like MPs and MLAs of the district, who are required to review the progress of relief work and the measures taken to meet the drought conditions from time to time.
He submits that instead of constituting another Com mittee, the Natural Calamities Committee will serve the purpose.
Shri Pattnayak also agrees that another separate Committee need not be constituted, but he submits that the Natural Calamities Committee should include at least five non official and non political members belonging to well known organisations of social work, such as, Sarvodaya Gandhi Peace Foundation and registered voluntary agencies, as already suggested by him.
The learned Advocate General states that the Government has no objection to induct into the Committee non officials, such as, representatives of the recognised voluntary organisations as suggested by Shri Pattnayak.
In the circumstances, we direct the Government of Orissa that it shall, within a month from date, nominate the names of at least five persons belonging to the recognised volun tary organisations like Sarvodaya Gandhi Peace Foundation, Ramakrishna Mission, Bharat Sewa Sangha and registered voluntary agencies as members of the said 64 Natural Calamities Committee of the district.
We also accept the suggestion of Shri Pattnayak that the Committee shall hold at least one meeting every two months.
The function of the Committee will not be confined only to the cases of starvation deaths, but it shall be responsible for looking after the welfare of the people of the district.
We are given to understand that there is also such a dis trict level Natural Calamities committee in the district of Koraput.
We make it clear that the Government will also nominate at least five such persons belonging to recognised voluntary organisations within a month from today and the Committee will also perform the same functions.
So far as the district of Kalahandi is concerned, it has been urged by the learned Advocate General that the Govern ment of Orissa has already undertaken appropriate measures for mitigating the miseries of the people of that district.
The steps which have been taken by the Government may be stated in brief.
The State Government has allotted a sum of Rs.8054 lakhs for Kalahandi during the Sixth Plan.
The State Government is fully aware of the situation in Kalahandi and constant vigilance is maintained under the direct supervi sion of the Chief Minister to redress the distress of the people.
The labour intensive work has been undertaken by the government on a massive scale to provide employment opportu nity to the people of the district of Kalahandi.
During the year 1984 85, in areas of acute distress, free feeding pro gramme has been undertaken on a massive scale.
During 1987 88 the coverage under the Normal Feeding Programme was 2,12,800 persons.
Besides, 1,20,000 persons were also cov ered under the Emergency Drought Feeding Programme covering all the drought affected areas of the district.
In 128 Gram Panchayats where crop damage was more than 50%, 1,20,000 persons were covered under the Emergency Feeding Programme during 1987 88.
During the current year, preliminary survey indicated that crop damage was likely to occur in 74 Gram Panchayats and, accordingly, 40,000 persons from the said affected areas have been covered under the Emergency Feeding Programme in addition to the Normal Feeding Programme for 2,12,800 persons.
Under the Area Development Approach Pro gramme for Total Backwardness Scheme covering certain blocks, about 20,000 persons are being fed under the Feeding Programme.
According to the Government, 2,72,000 persons are being covered by the Feeding Programme in Kalahandi district in 1988.
Kalahandi is a drought prone district and Government has, according to the learned Attorney General, already taken a number of 65 major, medium and small Irrigation Projects in the said district to provide irrigation facilities for agricultur ists.
485 tube Wells are stated to have been dug as a major source of drinking water in Kalanandi.
The Government has also started aforestation programme so as to prevent the recurrence of drought conditions.
Much facilities are stated to have been given to the weavers of the district.
Elaborate measures have also been taken for ensuring that poor cultivators are not coerced to sell their surplus paddy at a lower rate on account of their poverty.
The Orissa Agricultural Produce Marketing Act is being strictly implemented.
The entire procurement of paddy has been en trusted to the Food Corporation of India and the State Cooperative Marketing Federation.
These two Organisations specialised in such purchases, are possessed of godowns and have their local centres throughout the State for purchase of surplus paddy.
The FCI at the request of the State Gov ernment, has established purchase centres at Junagarh, Khariar Road and Kesinga in the district of Kalahandi.
The FCI has also made arrangements for direct purchase of paddy at Dharmagarh, Junagarh and Narala.
The State Cooperative Marketing Federation has also opened direct purchase centres at Boden and Sinapalli in the district of Kalahandi.
Fur thermore, when surplus paddy comes to market, additional purchase centres are provided for purchase of the surplus paddy.
The minimum purchase price for paddy is fixed by the Government of India.
Adequate funds are provided to the purchasing agents to purchase the surplus paddy at the rates prescribed by the Government.
State Government also ensures that unscrupulous traders do not coerce the farmers to sell paddy at a distress price.
Assistance to agriculturists is also being given by the Government.
Due to drought conditions, the Kharif crop was damaged in some areas of Kalahandi district in 1987 88.
To enable cultivators to undertake resowing, Government is stated to have supplied seeds free of cost in mini bags.
The measures which have been taken and are being taken, as stated in the written note submitted by the learned Advocate General, have been briefly mentioned.
There is no reason not to accept the statements made on behalf of the State of Orissa that the measures, stated above, are being taken for the purpose of mitigating hunger, 66 poverty, starvation deaths, etc.
of the people of Kalahandi.
If such measures are taken, there can be no doubt that it will alleviate to a great extent the miseries of the people of Kalahandi.
Such measures are also being taken in respect of the district of Koraput.
The Natural Calamities Committee shall also keep a watch over the working of the social welfare measures which are being taken and may be taken in future.
Shri Pattnayak also does not dispute that if such measures are continued to be taken, it will be a great relief to the people of Kalahandi and Koraput.
We hope and trust that in view of the prompt action that has been taken by the Government, soon the miseries of the people of these two districts will be over.
As prayed for by Shri Pattnayak, the petitioners are granted liberty to mention before this Court, if necessary.
The Writ Petitions are disposed of as above.
There will be no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Petitions disposed of.

summary/full:
Two social workers addressed a letter to this Court bringing to its notice the miserable conditions of the people of the district of Kalahandi in the State of Orissa on account of extreme poverty.
The said letter was treated as a writ petition.
The petitioners in this petition alleged that in the district of Kalahandi on account of extreme poverty, there are starvation deaths and in order to save themselves from starvation deaths, people are compelled to subject themselves to distress sale of labour and paddy resulting in exploitation of landless labourers, deprivation of legitimate price of paddy to small peasants.
It was also alleged that on account of 'chill penury ' people of Kala handi district are even forced to sell their children.
In the other writ petition, Indian Peoples ' Front al leged miserable conditions of the people of Koraput district in addition to the Kalahandi district.
It was alleged that the starvation deaths, drought diseases and famine have been the continuing phenomenon in the said two districts.
The petitioners accused the Government of Orissa of its failure to 58 protect the lives of the people of the two districts of Kalahandi and Koraput and sought directions that the State of Orissa should be directed to take immediate steps to alleviate the miseries and sorrows of the people of the said two districts.
With a view to ascertaining the correct state of affairs and to know whether the State has implemented the social welfare measures, and the adequacy of such measures to meet the needs of the people, the Court directed the District Judge of Kalahandi to submit a report.
The learned District Judge in its report submitted that the State Government has implemented social welfare measures and there was hardly any case of starvation death.
The correctness of the facts found by the District Judge in his report was challenged by the petitioners, particular ly the question of starvation deaths.
The petitioners sug gested that for the purpose of supervising relief work, a Committee of 11 member should be constituted comprising members of well known social organisations.
On behalf of the State it was stated by the Attorney General that district level Natural Calamities Committees consisting of Collector, Officials, MPs and MLAs are already existing and these Committees review the progress of relief work and the measures taken to meet the drought conditions.
It was submitted that members of voluntary social organisa tions can be inducted in these existing Committees instead of constituting a new Committee as suggested by the peti tioners.
The attention of the Court was also drawn to para 39 of the Orissa Relief Code dealing with enquiry in cases of starvation deaths and relief measures to be taken in such cases.
It was stated that for the purpose of alleviating the miseries and sorrows of the people in the district of Kala handi, State has already undertaken appropriate social meas ures, namely, allocation of Rs.8054 lakhs for Kalahandi during the Sixth Plan, constant vigilance under the direct supervision of the Chief Minister for redressal of the distress of the people, undertaking of massive scale labour intensive work to provide employment, free feeding programme in areas of acute distress, Emergency Feeding Programme in drought affected areas and crop damage areas, undertaking of a number of major, medium and small irrigation projects, digging of tube wells for drinking water, starting affores tation programme to prevent recurrence of drought condi tions, fixation of minimum purchase price for paddy, provid ing adequate funds to purchasing agents to purchase surplus paddy at prescribed rates, direct procurement of entire paddy through Food Corporation of India and State Co opera tive 59 Marketing Federation, strict implementation of the Orissa Agricultural Produce Marketing Act and free supply of seeds to agriculturists in drought affected areas.
Disposing these petitions, the Court, HELD: 1.
It is not disputed that the people of Kalahandi and Koraput are very poor and most of them have been living below the poverty line.
Though the report of the District Judge is against the starvation deaths the happening of one or two cases of starvation deaths cannot altogether be ruled out.
[1E F] 2.
Paragraph 39 of the Orissa Relief Code makes ample provision for taking steps in case of starvation deaths.
[63D] 3.
The State Government shall nominate at least S per sons belonging to the recognised voluntary social organisa tion like Sarvodaya Gandhi Peace Foundation, Ramakrishna Mission, Bharat Sewa Sangha and registered voluntary agen cies as contained in the State approved list of voluntary agencies as members of the said existing district level Natural Calamities Committees of the Districts of Kalahandi and Koraput.
[64B C] 4.
The said Committees shall hold one meeting every two mouths and shall be responsible for looking into the starva tion deaths and the welfare of the people of these dis tricts.
These committees shall also keep a watch over the working of the social welfare measures taken and which are likely to be taken by the State Government.
[66A, B] The social welfare measures and prompt action taken by Government of Orissa will help in ending the miseries of the people.