judgement:
Civil Appeal Nos.
1837 1841 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.1976 of the Karnataka High Court in Misc.
First Appeal Nos. 557 to 561 of 1975.
Dr. Anand Prakash, Ms. Kitty Kumaramangalam and C.V. Subba Rao for the Appellant.
309 G.B. Pai, Dr. Shankar Ghosh, D.N. Mishra and Ms. Mridula Ray for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court rejecting the claim of the appellant Corporation for covering the factories the respondents under the provisions of the (the Act).
Section 1(4) excluses "seasonal factory" from the scope of the Act.
The "seasonal factory" is defined under Section 2(12) of the Act which is extracted hereunder: "Seasonal factory means a factory which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the following manufacturing processes, namely, cotton, ginning, cotton or jute pressing.
decortication of groundnuts, the manufacture of coffee, indigo, lac, rubber, sugar (includ ing gur) or tea or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the aforesaid processes.
" The factories of the respondents were excluded from the operation of the Act since they were declared to be the seasonal factories within the meaning of the above stated definition.
There is no dispute on this aspect.
By Amending Act 44 of 1966 which came into force with effect from 28th January 1968, the definition of "seasonal factory" has been amended.
The definition as amended reads: "Seasonal factory means a factory which is exclusively engaged in one or more of the following manufacturing processes, namely, cotton ginning, cotton or jute pressing.
decortication of groundnuts.
the manufacture of coffee, indigo, lac, rubber, sugar (includ ing gur) or tea or any manufacturing process which is incidental to or connected with any of the aforesaid processes and includes a factory which is engaged for a period not exceeding seven months in a year (a) in any process of blending, packing or re packing of tea or coffee; or 310 (b) in such other manufacturing process as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify; The expressions "manufacturing process" and "power" shall have the meaning respective ly assigned to them in the ".
After the said amendment, the Employees ' State Insur ance Corporation called upon the respondents to pay the contributions payable under the Act and threatened to take coercive steps to recover the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act and prosecute them.
Challenging the validity of the demand made, the respondents approached the Employees ' Insurance Court, inter alia contending that the amendment to the definition of the expression "seasonal factory" brought out by the Amending Act 44 of 1966 has not altered the position of the seasonal factory as obtained prior to the amendment and Section 1(4) of the Act would still continue to exclude such factory from the operation of the Act.
The Employees ' Insurance Court accepted the respondent 's plea.
The Karnataka High Court has also agreed with the view taken by the Employees ' Insurance Court.
The Corporation has now appealed to this Court.
The sole question for consideration is whether the respondents ' factories in view of the amendment to the definition of 'seasonal factory ' have lost the benefit of exclusion from the Act.
The High Court on this aspect has observed that the purpose of the amendment was to enlarge and not to restrict the statutory concept of 'seasonal factory ' and the position of respondents establishments as seasonal factories under and for the purpose of the Act remained unaltered even after the amendment.
The view ,taken by the High Court seems to be justified.
The statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which later became the Act 44 of 1966 indicates that the proposed amend ment was to bring within the scope of the definition of 'seasonal factory ', a factory which works for a period of not exceeding seven months in a year (a) in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee; or (b) in such other manufacturing process as the Cenrtral Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify.
The amendment therefore, was clearly in favour of the widening the definition of 'seasonal factory '.
The amendment is in the nature of expansion of the original definition as it is clear from the use of the words 'include a factory '.
311 The amendment does not restrict the original definition of "seasonal factory" but makes addition thereto by inclusion.
The word "include" in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension, and not with restriction, The word 'include ' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occur ring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpreta tion clause declares that they shall include.
(See: (i) Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary, 5th ed.
3, p. 1263 and (ii) C.I.T. Andhra Pradesh vs M/s Taj Mahal Hotel, Secun derabad; , (iii) State of Bombay vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors., ; at 875.
In view of these well accepted statutory construction, the decision of the High Court does not call for interfer ence.
In the result the appeals and the special leave petition fail and are dismissed with costs.
S.B. Appeals and petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The Regional Director, State Employees Corporation the appellant in the instant case claimed for covering the factories of the respondents M/s. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Sakdanha & Sons under the provisions of the .
Section 1(4) of the Act excludes "seasonal factory" from the scope of the Act.
The seasonal factory is defined under section 2(12)of the Act.
The factories of the respondents were excluded from the operation of the Act since they were declared to be seasonal factories within the meaning of the definition of section 2(12) of the Act.
By amending Act 44 of 1966 which came into force from 28th January, 1966,the definition of 'seasonal factory ' has been amended and accordingly the seasonal factory means a factory which exclusively engaged in one or more of the manufacturing processes detailed in the definition and includes a factory which is engaged for a period not exceed ing seven months in a year.
The expressions manufacturing process & power shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the .
So after the amendment the Corporation called upon the respondents to pay the contributions payable under the Act and threatened to take coercive steps to recover the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act and prosecute them.
The respondents challenged the demand made by the appel lants in the Employees Insurance Court contending that even the amending of 1966 has not altered the definition of seasonal factory, would still excludes such factory from the opera tion of the Act.
The Employees Insurance Court accepted the plea of the respondents and even the Karnataka High Court agreed to the view of aforesaid Court.
So the Corporation appealed to this Court.
The sole question before the Court for consideration is whether the respondents ' factories in view of the amendment to the definition of seasonal factory have lost the benefit of exclusion from the Act.
Dismissing the appeals and the special leave petition the Court, HELD: That in the instant case the High Court observa tion that the purpose of the definition by the amending act was to enlarge and not to restrict the Statutory concept of seasonal factory so the position of the respondents estab lishments as seasonal factories remain unaltered.
This view seems to be justified because the objects reasons of the Bill of the amending Act clearly indicates that the proposed amendment was to 'bring within the scope of the definition of seasonal factory ' a factory which works for a period of not exceeding seven months in a year a) in any process of blending, packing or repacking of tea or coffee b) in such other manufacturing processes as the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazettee specify.
Thus amendment is clearly in favour of widening the definition of seasonal factory ' because the word 'include ' in the Statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the mean ing of the preceeding words.
This is well accepted statutory construction that in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the words or phrases occuring in the body of the statute the word include is very generally used.
[310F 311C] Stroud 's Dictionary, 5th Edn.
3 page 1263.
C.I.T. Andhra Pradesh vs M/s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secun derabad, 971 ] 3 SCC 550 and State of Bombay vs The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha Ors., [1960] 2 SCR p. 666 at 875, referred to.


judgement:
on (CRL.) No. 1061 of 1982.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
M.A. Krishna Moorthy, A.S. Pundir, Din Dayal Sharma, Ms. Sangeeta Aggarwal, C.V. Subba Rao and Gopal Subramaniam for the appearing parties.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: Pursuant to our order of May 10, 1991, this matter was called on 11th July, 1991, when parties and both the Commis sioners were heard.
The report from the Executive Chairman of the U.P. State Legal Aid and Advice Board has been re ceived and looked into.
The proceeding has been pending in this Court for almost nine years.
In spite of all possible orders and directions made from time to time no substantial progress has yet been made.
The land records have got to be prepared; the forest land has to be identified and final action under the Forest Act has to be taken.
The exercise involved in this process is undoubtedly massive but that by itself would not justify a protracted proceeding.
When we made our order in May, 1991, we had a feeling that before the rains started there would be substantial progress.
The rainy season has come though rains are belat ed.
In these two months, however, there has been no progress.
Mr. R.P. Pandey, one of the Commissioners has been staying at Allahabad and he does not find it convenient to shift to the site.
As we indicated earlier, the matter has reached a stage where presence of all the officers and the Commissioners at the site has become almost indispensable Mr. Pandey has informed the Court that he would find it difficult to shift to the site.
We do not think much of his services can be utilised if he is allowed to stay at Allaha bad.
It would, therefore, be 404 necessary to substitute him by appointing some other judi cial officer as Commissioner.
Mr. Pandey had done good work during the period he was supervising the process.
We would suggest to the Secretary to the Commission appointed by us to make a report to us as to in what way Mr. Pandey can be compensated for the work done.
In place of Mr. R .P.
Pandey we direct Shri Prem Singh, retired District Judge of the State to be appointed as one of the Commissioners.
The Registry shall cake steps to intimate him of the assignment at his Varanasi address.
At the hearing of the matter, on 11th July grievance was made that several directions out of the order of 10th May, 1991 had not been complied with.
Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, Senior Advocate for the State of Uttar Pradesh assured us in Court that immediate steps would be taken to comply with all the directions excepting the requirement of depositing of Rs.20 lakhs with the Secretary of the Commission.
We have considered his stand in regard to the direction for deposit ing Rs.20 lakhs and are prepared to modify the amount of Rs.20 lakhs to Rs.5 lakhs in view of the assurance that more of funds can come on requisition without loss of time.
That amount may be kept in deposit with the Secretary in the imprest account within two weeks hence.
The State of Uttar Pradesh shall file an affidavit that all the directions made on 10th May as modified now have been complied with within three weeks from today in the Registry of this Court.
Some time back, the Chief Secretary had set up a small Committee at Lucknow for monitoring the work.
We suggest to the Chief Secretary that he may revive the Committee which on account of the intervening disturbances of law and order followed by the general elections had perhaps been abandoned so that coordinated activity may be possible.
We request Mr. Justice Loomba, Executive Chairman of U.P. State Legal Aid and Advice Board to continue to super vise the work which he has been doing already so that the monitoring at the spot can 'appropriately be cross checked He is requested to send monthly reports to the Court.
The matter may be placed again five weeks hence.
Petition disposed of with interim directions.

summary/full:
Under Section 20 of the Forest Act, 1927 certain areas were declared as reserve forest.
On behalf of the inhabi tants of the areas, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition challenging their eviction from the said areas.
From time to time this Court had been passing interim orders and directions.
This Court also appointed Commissioners for the purpose of preparation of land records, identification of forest land and the final action to be taken under the Forest Act.
Reviewing the progress made so far and passing interim directions, this Court, HELD: 1.
The exercise involved in the process of prepar ing the records, identification of forest land and final action under the Forest Act, is undoubtedly massive but that by itself would not justify a protracted proceeding.
[403E] 2.
Mr. R.P. Pandey, one of the Commissioners has been staying at Allahabad and he does not find it convenient to shift to the site.
The matter has reached a stage where presence of all the officers and the Commissioners at the site has become almost indispensable.
Not much of his serv ices can be utilised if he is allowed to stay at Allahabad.
It would, therefore, be necessary to substitute him by appointing some other judicial officer as Commissioner.
In his place, Shri Prem Singh, retired District Judge would be appointed as one of the Commissioners.
The Registry shall take steps to intimate him of the assignment at his V arana si address.
[403G H; 404A B] 3.
With regard to the direction for depositing Rs.20 lakhs it is modified as Rs.5 lakhs in view of the assurance that more funds can come on requisition without loss of time.
[404D] 403 4.
The Chief Secretary may revive the Committee set up to monitor the work.
[404E F] 5.
The Executive Chairman of U.P. State Legal Aid and Advice Board would continue to supervise the work and send monthly reports to the Court.
[404F G]


judgement:
N: Civil Appeal Nos.
5969 70 (NM) of 1990.
From the Order dated 21.8.1990 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control), Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal Nos.
ED/SB/T/945/80 A and ED/SB/T/A. No. 586/81 A (Order No. 1284 to 1286/90 A.).
Dr. Debi Paul, Harish Salve, Darshan Singh, Ms. Suman J. Khaitan and Ms. Priya Hingorani for the appellant.
A. Subba Rao for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: These appeals arise out of and directed against the common appellate order dated 21.8.1990 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi ( 'Tribunal ' for short) m ' Appeals Nos.
ED/SB/T 945/80A and ED/SB/T/586/8 1A.
By the same order another appeal of the appellant was also disposed of but that matter is not car ried up in appeal here.
The appellant, M/s. Texmaco Ltd., pursuant to con tracts entered into in this behalf with the Railway Adminis tration fabricated and delivered to the Railways wagon bodies mounted on "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways.
The invoices raised by the appellant respecting these wagons reflected only the price of the wagon bodies without includ ing the value of the "wheel sets" on which the wagon bodies were mounted.
The goods were cleared for purposes of Excise duties on such invoice value.
The Revenue raised demand for recovery of short levy and sought to recover the unpaid duty on the value of the "wheel sets" also.
This claim for recov ery of the short levy having been adjudicated against the appellant, an appeal was taken before the Tribunal.
Before the Tribunal, it would appear, two contentions were raised: First that the goods manufactured by the appel lant were only the wagon bodies mounted on the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railway Administration and that, therefore, the assessable value could only be the value of the wagon bodies excluding the "wheel sets" 326 supplied by the Railways and, secondly, that at all events the value in excess of the 'invoice value ' which represented the price of the wagonbodies was exempt from levy of duty under the Exemption Notification No. 120/75 CE dated 30 April, 1975 issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
What is implicit in the second contention is that, but for the said Notification No. 120/75 CE dated 30.4.1975, the assessable value would otherwise require the exclusion in it the value of the "wheel sets" also on the premise that the "wheel sets" became an integral part of the wagons, even though the "wheel sets" had been supplied free of cost by the Railways themselves.
The Notification No. 120/75 CE exempted "so much of the duty of excise . . as is in excess of the duty calculated on the basis of invoice prices".
On the first contention: that the 'assessable value ' of the 'goods ' could not include the "wheel sets" which were not fabricated or manufactured by the appellant, the Tribu nal, rejecting the contention said: "On going through the facts and in view of the clear findings given by the lower authorities that no wagon is complete without the wheels; what has been cleared and removed by the appellants is the wagon mounted on wheel sets and not the wagon body alone .
On the issue of determination of assessable value, the Supreme Court has held that for the purpose of levy of excise duty, the value of the article is the full intrinsic value of the article inclusive of the cost of the materials and components supplied free by the customer and irrespective of the fact that no expenditure was incurred by the manufactur er on such components." No fault can be found with this reasoning of the Tribunal, indeed, considerations of ownership of the goods are extra neous to levy of duties of excise which are imposts on manufacture.
The second contention on which Dr. Pal laid particu lar emphasis, indeed, assumes the correctness of the first proposition and claims exemption on the strength of the Notification No. 120/75 CE.
That Notification says: "The Central Government has exempted goods falling 327 under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the (1 of 1944), cleared from the factory of manufac ture, on sale, from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is in excess of the duty calculated on the basis of the invoice price (excluding duty and local taxes, if any, included in such price) charged by the manu facturer for the sale of such goods: Provided that the aforesaid exemp tion shall be admissible only if (i) the manufacturer files with the Superin tendent of Central Excise having jurisdiction a written declaration to the effect that he opts to avail of the said exemption: (ii) Omitted as unnecessary (iii) (iv) the invoice price is not influenced by any commercial, financial or other relation ship whether by contract or otherwise between the manufacturer or any person associated in business with the manufacturer and the buyer other than the relationship created by sale of the aforesaid goods: (v) Omitted as unnecessary.
Provided . (Omitted as unnecessary) The Tribunal also rejected the claims for exemption under the Notification.
It said: "We are unable to agree with the arguments of the appellants ' counsel that assessable value of the article is different from the consideration received by the appel lants to claim benefit under Notification 120/75.
To claim exemption on benefit under Notification 120/75 it should be subjected to in compliance with the conditions specified therein.
Condition No. IV of Notification No. 120/75 required that the invoice value should be 328 the full commercial price of the article.
According to the decision of the Supreme Court (supra) the value of the article is the in trinsic value and not restricted consideration received by the appellant as urged by the appellants ' counsel.
In the view we have taken, the appellants are not entitled to concession under Notification No. 120/75 dated 30.4.
1975 .
Dr. Pal appearing in support of the appeals urged that the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in its construc tion of the exemption Notification and in its reasoning that there was something in Clause (iv) of the Notification which detracted from the permissibility of its benefit in the present case.
Dr. Pal said that it was erroneous to read the said condition as requiring the 'invoice value ' to be the full commercial price of the goods including therein the value of the "wheelsets".
Dr. Pal said that clause (iv) did no more than merely importing the requirement that the invoice price should reflect a transaction at arms ' length and not that appellant 's invoice price should also include the value of the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways.
Dr. Pal further urged that the very purpose of the exemption was to relieve the manufacturer from bearing the burden of the duty on such part of the assessable value as did not reflect the value of his supply and services but represented the value of the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railway Adminis tration itself free of charge.
If Clause (iv) was construed in the way in which the Tribunal did, the effect, counsel said, would be to take away with one hand what the notifica tion gave with the other.
Shri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the Revenue, with his usual tenacity contended that Clause (iv) of the Notifi cation signified and imported idea of full value of the manufactured goods being required to be reflected in the invoice and that the reasoning of, and the conclusion reached by, the Tribunal was correct.
On a consideration of the matter we are afraid the Tribu nal fell in to an error in its understanding of the notifi cation.
The Notification posits and predicates the possibil ity that the 'invoice value ' could be lesser than the "assessable value" and, taking into account the need to mitigate the hardship on the manufacturer of being called upon to pay ' duty on the value in excess of the invoice value, seeks to exempt the manufacturer from payment of duty "in excess of the duty calculated on the basis of the 'i nvoice price '.
There is no dipute in this case that the invoice price represented the value of the wagons, less the value of the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways.
The invoice price 329 could not be required to include the value of the "wheel sets".
But the "assessable value" would take into account the full commercial value including that of the "wheel sets".
It is in order to mitigate the hardship that may arise by requiring the manufacturer to pay duty on this difference in such cases that the Notification No. 120/75 came to be promulgated.
There is nothing in Clause (iv) which enjoins upon the appellant to include the value of the "wheel sets".
The contract between the parties does not also require this.
The way in which the Tribunal looked at the Notification is neither good sense nor good law.
Such con struction would make the Notification and the exemption contemplated thereunder meaningless.
The need for the exemp tion arose in view of the fact that "assessable value" was higher than the 'invoice value '.
Requiring the former and the latter to be the same as something compelled by Clause (iv) is really to construe the Notification against itself.
Shri Subba Rao placed strong reliance on the pro nouncement of this Court in M/s. Burn Standard Company Ltd. & Anr.
vs Union of India & Ors., [1991] 3 Judgments Today 108.
On the contentions raised and argued in that case the judgment, if we may say so with great respect, is correct.
The question of the effect of the exemption Notification No. 120/7.5 CE was not raised and argued in that case.
That apart, the exemption Notification itself makes it clear that it does not apply or is attracted to every case automatical ly, but that the manufacturer should expressly opt for the benefit of the Notification.
Since no such claim was made in that case, the decision therein is of no assistance to the revenue.
We accordingly allow these appeals; set aside the order of the authorities as well the affirming order of the Tribunal under appeal and hold that the appellant was enti tled under the said Notification No 120/75/CE, to exemption from that part of the duty as was in excess of the invoice price which, we hold, was not required to include the value of the "wheel sets".
V.P.R. Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant pursuant to contracts entered into with the Railway Administration fabricated and delivered to the Railways wagon bodies mounted on "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways.
The appellant 's invoices, reflected only the price of the wagonbodies without including the value of the "wheel sets" on which the wagon bodies were mounted.
The goods were cleared for purposes of Excise duties on such invoice value.
The Revenue raised demand for recovery of short levy and sought to recover the unpaid duty on the value of the "wheel sets" also.
The claim for recovery of the short levy having been adjudicated against the appellant, appeals were filed before the Tribunal, by the appellant contending that the goods manufactured by the appellant were only the wagon bodies mounted on the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railway Adminis tration; and therefore, the assessable value could only be the value of the wagon bodies excluding the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways; and that at all events the value in excess of the 'invoice value ' which represented the price of the wagon bodies was exempt from levy of duty under the Exemption Notification No. 120/75CE dated 30th April, 1975 issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeals, against which, the present appeals were filed before this Court.
The appellant contended that the Tribunal misdirected itself in law in its construction of the exemption Notifica tion and in its reasoning that there was something in Clause (iv) of the Notification which detracted from the permissi bility of its benefit in the present case; that 324 it was erroneous to read the condition as requiring the 'invoice value ' to be the full commercial price of the goods including therein the value of the "wheel sets"; that the very purpose of the exemption was to relieve the manufactur er from bearing the burden of the duty on such part of the assessable value as did not reflect the value of his supply and services but represented the value of the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railway Administration itself free of charge.
The Revenue Respondent contended that Clause (iv) of the Notification signified and imported the idea of full value of the manufactured goods being required to be reflected in the invoice and that the reasoning of, and the conclusion reached by, the Tribunal was correct.
This Court allowing the appeals, HELD. 1.
The Notification posits and predicates the possibility that the invoice value ' could be lesser than the "assessable value" and, taking into account the need to mitigate the hardship on the manufacturer of being called upon to pay duty on the value in excess of the invoice value, seeks to exempt the manufacturer from payment of duty "inexcess of the duty" calculated on the basis of the 'i nvoiceprice '.
[328G H] 2.
The way in which the Tribunal looked at the Notifica tion is neither good sense nor good law.
Such construction would make the Notification and the exemption contemplated thereunder meaningless.
The need for the exemption arose in view of the fact that "assessablevalue" was higher than the 'invoice value '.
Requiring the former and the latter to be the same as something compelled by Clause (iv) is really to construe the Notification against itself.
[329B C] 3.
In this case, there is no dispute that the invoice price represented the value of the wagons, less the value of the "wheel sets" supplied by the Railways.
The invoice price could not be required to include the value of the "wheel sets".
But the "assessable value" would take into account the full commercial value including that of the "wheel sets".
1t is in order to mitigate the hardship that may arise by requiring the manufacturer to pay duty on this difference in such cases that the Notification No. 120/75 came to be promulgated.
[328H 329B] 4.
There is nothing in Clause (iv) which enjoins upon the appellant to include the value of the "wheel sets".
The contract between the parties does not also require this.
[329B] 325 M/s. Burn Standard Company Ltd. & Anr.
vs Union of India


judgement:
Appeal No. 120 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1949, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 55 of 1946, arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 26, 1945, of the Court of the District Judge of Bellary in Original Suit No. 39 of 1943.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Chaudhury for B. K. B. Naidu, for the appellant.
K.N. Rajagopala Sastri and M. section K. Sastri, for the respondents.
December 19.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM, J.
This appeal is before us on a certificate granted by the High Court as according to that Court a substantial question of law arose in the case which was stated by it to be " Is the adoption of the second defendant invalid, as the approval or consent of the five trustees mentioned in paragraph 14 of the will of Kari Veerappa, Exbt.
P 2(a) was not obtained; and is the authority to adopt at an end if any one of those five persons did not accept the trusteeship or died before the adoption or refused to give their approval ".
In view of certain matters about to be stated, the question of law as propounded by the High Court does not require to be considered.
Kari Veerappa was the last male owner of the estate mentioned in his will, Exbt.
P 2(a), which he executed on October 10, 1920.
Under this will he authorised his wife Setra Veeravva, first defendant, to adopt a son for the purpose of continuation of his family as 970 he had no issue.
The authority to adopt was in the following terms: " I have given her permission to adopt as many times as would be necessary, should the previous adoption be unsuccessful.
But Veeravva must adopt only a boy approved by the respectable persons appointed by me in paragraph 14; should Veeravva die before making any adoption, the persons becoming trustees should arrange for the adoption of a boy for the continuation of my family in accordance with my kulachara (family usage) At this stage it is unnecessary to refer to the other provisions of the will of Kari Veerappa.
This gentle.
man died on October 23, 1920.
After his death, his widow made two attempts to adopt a son in accordance with his will.
The first attempt was in 1939 which did not accomplish the purpose of the will as the person alleged to have been adopted died.
The validity of this adoption was being questioned, but as the boy said to have been adopted had died, effects to dispute the adoption did not materialise.
Veeravva thereafter, on October 11, 1942, adopted second defendant, Sesalvada Kotra Basayya.
Two documents in this connection are on the record.
The first document is Exbt.
D 25 dated the 18th of September, 1942, which was a registered agreement to adopt the second defendant.
The second document is also a registered document, which is described as the deed of adoption and is dated June 23, 1943.
This clearly states that on October 11, 1942, Veeravva had adopted the 2nd defendant.
Reference was also made in this document to the agreement of September 18, 1942.
The appellant claiming to be the nearest reversioner of Kari Veerappa filed the present suit asking for a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant by Veeravva was invalid and not binding on the appellant or the other reversioners to the estate of the late Kari Veerappa.
The suit filed by the appellant was heard by the District Judge of Bellary who dismissed it.
The appellant appealed to the High Court of Madras.
His appeal was dismissed and the decision of the District 971 Judge was substantially affirmed.
The High Court did not allow compensatory costs granted by the District Judge, nor did it agree with his finding that the appellant had failed to prove the relationship he had propounded and that lie was not a reversioner at all, far less the nearest reversioner.
In the opinion of the High Court, the appellant was a relative and a reversioner, though he had not proved that he was the nearest reversioner alive at the time the appeal was heard and that he need not prove this until he actually sought to recover possession of the property after Veeravva 's death.
When this appeal came on for hearing the learned Advocate for the respondents took a preliminary objection that the suit filed by the plaintiff must in any event fail, having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the (30 of 1956), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Hence the present appeal arising out of that suit must also fail.
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that either there was a valid adoption or there was not.
If there was a valid adoption and the decisions of the High Court and the District Judge on this question were correct, then obviously the suit of the appellant must be dismissed.
If, on the other hand, it was found that the adoption of the second defendant by Veeravva was either invalid or, in fact, had not taken place, then under the provisions of section 14 of the Act, Veeravva became the full owner of her husband 's estate and was not a limited owner thereof.
Consequently, the appellant 's suit was not maintainable.
In, view of this submission we are of the opinion that the point raised by way of preliminary objection must first be considered and decided.
It is well settled that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration any change in the law (vide the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri(1).
Section 14 of the Act states: " 14(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
(1) 972 Explanation.
In this sub section, " property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2)Nothing contained in sub section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.
" On behalf of the appellant it was urged that section 14 of the Act did not apply to the facts of the present case because the estate of Veerappa was not in possession of his widow Veeravva but was in possession of the second defendant at the time the Act came into force and, secondly, because under sub section
(2) of section 14 Veeravva got a restricted estate under the will Exbt.
P 2(a) and the agreement to adopt, Exbt.
It was submitted that the widow , s power of adoption did not depend on her ownership of the estate of her husband.
That power in the present case was derived under the Hindu law either from the authority conferred by her husband or the consent of his agnates.
The Act did not enlarge her power of adoption and did not render an invalid adoption made by her immune from attack by the reversioners during her life time.
The act of Veeravva in the present case was to bring in a stranger.
The appellant as a rever sioner was, therefore, entitled during the life time of Veeravva to bring the present suit to obtain a declaration that the adoption of the second defendant was invalid.
The question raised by the preliminary objection taken by the respondents must be considered an the assumption that the adoption of the second defendant 973 was invalid.
The provisions of a. 14 of the Act would not arise for consideration, if the second defendant had been validly adopted.
It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether the provisions of section 14 apply to the facts of the present case.
It was strongly urged on behalf of the appellant that the words " any property possessed by a female Hindu " in section 14 of the Act referred to actual possession of the property whether the property was acquired before or after the Act came into force.
This was a condition precedent to the applicability of the provisions of section 14 to the present case.
Since the Act came into force on June 17, 1956, and the decision of the High Court was given on March 25, 1955, the question as to who was in actual possession of the estate of Veerappa did not arise for consideration on the case of the appellant set out in his plaint.
The appellant should accordingly be given an opportunity to have a finding recorded on this question after the taking of evidence in that respect.
On behalf of the respondents it was urged that the words " any property possessed by a female Hindu " did not refer merely to actual physical possession only but to ownership and possession in law as well.
It was further urged on behalf of the respondents that even if it be assumed that the words " possessed by a female Hindu " mean actual possession then, in the present case, it had been proved that Veeravva was in actual possession of the estate of Veerappa when the Act came into force.
It could not be disputed that on the death of Veerappa, Veeravva came into possession of his estate and that she remained in possession at least until 1942 when the adoption of the second defendant is said to have taken place.
But even on the adoption of the second defendant, the agreement to adopt dated September 18, 1942, stated that Veeravva was to remain in possession of her husband 's estate during her life time in spite of the adoption.
In the written statement filed by Veeravva and the second defendant it was clearly stated in para.
6 thereof that Veeravva came into possession of her husband 's property and that she recovered possession 974 of the property covered by the decree in 0.
section 20 of 1921 on the file of the Subordinate Judge 's Court, Bellary, and that she had been in sole possession of the said property up to date and that although she had adopted the second defendant on October 11, 1942, it was subject to retention of the enjoyment, possession and management by her of her husband 's property during her life time.
An affidavit had been filed in this Court by the second defendant in which he has clearly admitted that Veeravva is still in possession of his adoptive father 's estate in pursuance of the agreement of September 18, 1942.
This was an admission against his own interest by the second defendant which he was not likely to make unless it was a fact that Veeravva was in possession of the estate since her husband 's death up to the present.
In answer to the affidavit of the second defendant and Veeravva that she was in actual possession, the appellant had failed to file an affidavit with any clear assertion that to his knowledge Veeravva was not in Possession.
The affidavit filed by the appellant was in the nature of submissions made to the Court rather than an affidavit in which facts to his knowledge were asserted.
In para.
2 he had made the significant statement " I understand that the possession of the suit properties has been and is now, in truth and in fact, with the alleged adopted son, the second petitioner.
He is in possession of these properties and is dealing with them." He did not disclose bow he came to under.
stand this.
He certainly did not assert that all that was stated in para.
2 was to his knowledge.
As an alternative, the appellant in para.
4 of his affidavit had submitted ,If I succeed in proving that the adoption is not true and valid, the petitioners cannot turn round and say that the possession of the first petitioner is that of a widow of an intestate and invoke the provisions of section 14 of the Succession Act." He had further submitted in this paragraph that, even on the case of the respondents set out in their petition for adding additional grounds, Veeravva 's estate was divested by the adoption, and as she came into possession by reason of the ante adoption agreement 975 Exbt.
D 25, section 14 of the Act was not applicable.
It seems to us that if it were permissible to decide the question of Veeravva 's possession on only the affidavits before us, we would find no difficulty in holding that she was in possession of her husband 's estate when the Act came into force.
It is to be remembered, however, that this question has arisen now and the appellant has had no real opportunity to establish his assertion that the second defendant is in actual possession and not Veeravva.
It is necessary therefore to consider the true scope and effect of the provisions of sub section
(1) of a. 14 of the Act.
If the words " possessed by a female Hindu " occurring therein refer only to actual physical possession, it may be necessary to call for a finding on the question of such possession; if, on the contrary, these words have a wide connotation and include constructive possession or possession in law, the preliminary objection can be determined on the footing that Veeravva was in such possession at the relevant time.
The provisions of section 14 of the Act have been the subject of scrutiny and interpretation by various High Courts.
In the case of Rama Ayodhya Missir vs Raghunath Missir (1) and in the case of Mt. Janki Kuer vs Chhathu Prasad (2) the Patna High Court took the view that the effect of sections 14 and 15 of the Act was that a reversioner recognised as such under the Hindu law was no more a reversioner, as a female Hindu possessing any property, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, held not a limited estate but an absolute estate therein, and after the coming into force of the Act, he had no right of reversion or any kind Of Spes successionsis.
The High Courts of Calcutta, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have taken a view which does not support the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the aforesaid cases, The High Court of 'Madhya Pradesh in the case of Mt. Lukai vs Niranjan (3) dissented from the decisions of the Patna High Court in the above mentioned cases. ' Indeed, the Patna High Court in the case of (1)A.I.R. 1957 Pat. 480.
(2) A.I.R. 1957 Pat.
(3) A.I.R. 1058 Madh.
Pra. 160.
976 Harak Singh vs KailaSh Singh (1) overruled its previous decisions referred to above, and rightly pointed out that the object of the Act was to improve the legal status of Hindu women, enlarging their limited interest in property inherited or held by them to an absolute interest, provided they were in possession of the property when the Act came into force and, therefore, in a position to take advantage of its beneficial provisions; but the Act was not intended to benefit alienees who with their eyes open purchased the property from the limited owners without justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time when the vendors had only a limited interest of Hindu women.
In the case before us, the essential question for con sideration is as to how the words "any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether aquired before or after the commencement of this Act " in a. 14 of the Act should be interpreted.
Section 14 refers to property which was either acquired before or after the commencement of the Act and that such property should be possessed by a female Hindu.
Reference to property acquired before the commencement of the Act certainly makes the provisions of the section re trospective, but even in such a case the property must be possessed by a female Hindu at the time the Act came into force in order to make the provisions of the section applicable.
There is no question in the present case that Veeravva acquired the property of her deceased husband before the commencement of the Act.
In order that the provisions of section 14 may apply to the present case it will have to be further established that the property was possessed by her at the time the Act came into force.
It was the case of the appellant that the estate of Veerappa was in actual possession of the second defendant and not Veeravva at the relevant time.
On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the words " possessed by " had a wider meaning than actual physical possession, although physical possession may be included in the expression.
(1) A.I.R. 1958 Pat.
977 In the case of Gaddam Venkayamma vs Gaddam Veerayya (1) Viswanatha Sastri, J., with whom Satyanarayana Raju, J., agreed, expressed the opinion that "the word ' possessed ' in section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force.
course, possession referred to in section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female but may be possession in law.
The possession of a licensee, lessee or a mortgagee from the female owner or the possession of a guardian or a trustee or an agent of the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of section 14.
The word " possessed " is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context possession means the state of owning or having in one 's hands or power.
it includes possession by receipt of rents and profits.
" The learned Judges expressed the view that even if a trespasser were in possession of the land belonging to a female owner, it might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the female owner, provided the trespasser had not perfected his title.
We do not think that it is necessary in the present case to go to the extent to which the learned Judges went.
It is sufficient to say that possessed " in section 14 is used in a broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in one 's hand or power.
In the case of Gostha Behari vs Haridas Samanta (2), P. N. Mookherjee, J., expressed his opinion as to the meaning of the words " any property possessed by a female Hindu " in the following words: "The opening words in " property possessed by a female Hindu obviously mean that to come within the purview of the section the property must be in possession of the female concerned at the date of the commencement of the Act.
They clearly contemplate the female 's possession when the Act came into force.
That possession might have been either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law, but unless the female Hindu, whose limited estate in the disputed property is claimed to have been transformed into (1) A.I.R. 1957 Andh.
Pra. 280.
123 (2) A.I.R. 1957 Cal.
557, 559.
978 absolute estate under this particular section, was at least in such possession, taking the word " possession " in its widest connotation, when the Act came into force, the section would not apply ".
In our opinion, the view expressed above is the correct view as to how the words " any property possessed by a female Hindu " should be interpreted.
In the present case if the adoption was invalid, the full owner of Veerappa 's estate was his widow Veeravva and even if it be assumed that the second defendant was in actual possession of the estate his possession was merely permissive and Veeravva must be regarded as being in constructive possession of it through the second defendant.
In this situation, at the time when the Act came into force, the property of Veerappa must be regarded in law as being possessed by Veeravva.
It was suggested that according to the will of Veerappa, Exbt.
P_2(a), in the properties mentioned in para.
1 of that will, Veeravva got only a restricted estate.
The provisions of para.
4 of the will, however, make it clear that they would come into force only if the trustees mentioned in the will and Veeravva should disagree.
No material was shown to us that, in fact, the trustees and Veeravva had disagreed and that the provisions of para.
4 were given effect to.
Paragraph 12 of the will also showed that if the adoption was invalid, the property devolved on Veeravva as in intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that the provisions of para.
4 are of no assistance to the appellant in applying the provisions of sub section
(2) of section 14 of the Act.
Reference was also made to the contents of the agreement, Exbt.
D 25, dated September 18, 1942, in this connection.
It is clear. ' however, that by this agreement no estate was conferred on Veeravva and she did not thereby acquire any estate, much less a restricted estate.
All that this document stated was that there was an agreement between the guardians of the boy to be adopted and Veeravva that even if the boy is adopted, Veeravva would remain in possession and enjoyment of her husband 's estate during her life time.
In our opinion, there is 979 no material on the record by which it can reasonably be said that the provisions of sub section
(2) of section 14 of the Act applied to the present case.
It was urged that the act of Veeravva in adopting the second defendant was to bring in a stranger and this action of hers could be questioned by a reversioner, as any alienation made by her, during her life time.
Reference was made to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, Illustration (f).
In our opinion, this is of no avail to the appellant, because Illustration (f) obviously refers to a Hindu widow 's estate and has no reference to a full owner.
The right of a reversioner as one of the heirs under section 42, Specific Relief Act, is limited to the question of preserving the estate of a limited owner for the benefit of the entire body of reversioners; but as against a full owner, the reversioner has no such right.
In our opinion, under the Act Veeravva becoming a full owner of her husband 's estate, the suit could not succeed and the appeal must accordingly fail.
In our opinion, the appellant 's suit was not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of section 14 of the Act, even if it be assumed that there was no valid adoption of the second defendant.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
Sub section (1) of section 14 Of the , provided: " Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner." A suit instituted by the nearest reversioner of K for a declaration that the adoption made by K 's widow was invalid, was dismissed and during the pendency of the appeal filed against the decree dismissing the suit, the , came into force.
At the hearing of the appeal the respondent raised the preliminary objection that even if the adoption were held to be invalid, the appellant 's suit must fail in view of the provisions of section 14 Of the Act under which K 's widow, who was a party to the suit and the appeal, would be entitled to a full ownership of her husband 's properties, while it was urged for the appellant that section 14 Of the Act did not apply to the facts of the case because the properties were not in, the possession of K 's widow, but were only with the adopted son at the time the Act came into force.
Held, that the word "possession" in section 14 Of the , is used in the widest connotation and it may be either actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law.
969 Gostha Behari vs Haridas Samanta, A.I.R. 1957 Cal.
557, approved.
In the present case, if the adoption was invalid K 's widow would be the full owner of K 's estate, and even if it be assumed that the adopted son was in actual possession of the estate, his possession was merely permissive and K 's widow must be regarded as being in constructive possession of it through him.
Accordingly, section 14 was applicable and as K 's widow became a full owner of her husband 's estate, the appellant 's suit was not maintainable.


judgement:
: Criminal Appeal (Con tempt) No. 144 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.1.87 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl.
Original Contempt Petition No. 22 of 1985.
Mahabir Shingh for the Appellant.
S.K. Bisaria, (N.P.) for the Respondents.
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by AHMADI, J. I am in complete agreement with my learned Brother Agrawal, J. that there is no merit in this appeal but I would like to add a few words of my own.
The appellant, a practising Advocate, having failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad inter im injunction pending filing of a counter by the opposite party, switched gear from persuasive advocacy to derogatory remarks in the fond hope that such tactic would succeed and the learned Judge would be browbeaten into submission.
Fortunately the learned Judges was made of sterner stuff and refused to succumb to such unprofessional conduct.
Instead he made a record of the disrespectful and derogatory remarks made with intent to tarnish his image as a Judicial Officer and forwarded a report to the District Judge who in turn reported the matter to the High Court to enable it to initi ate proceedings for contempt of court against the appellant.
The exact words uttered by the appellant, reproduced in the 316 judgment of my learned brother, leave no doubt that the intention of the appellant was to cast aspersions on the integrity of the learned Judge and to lower him in the esteem of others by creating doubts regarding his honesty, judicial impartiality and independence.
The tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud.
And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gim micks with a view to browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful.
When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to be fair name of the judiciary.
Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times bla tant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order.
Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned judge but the entire institution.
The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impar tiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the Presiding Judi cial Officers with impunity.
It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system.
An independent judiciary is of vital importance to any free society.
Judicial independence was not achieved overnight.
Since we have inherited this concept from the British, it would not be out of place to mention the struggle strong willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and many others had to put up with the Crown as well as the Parliament at considerable personal risk.
And when a member of the profession like the appellant who should know better so lightly trifles with the much endeared concept of judicial independence to secure small gains it only betrays a lack of respect for the martyrs of judicial independence and for the institution itself.
Their sacrifice would go waste if we are not jealous to protect the fair name of the judiciary from unwarranted attacks on its inde pendence.
And here is a member of the profession who has repeated his performance presumable because he was let off lightly on the first occasion.
Soft justice is not the answer not that the High Court has been harsh with him what I mean is he cannot be let off on an apology which is far from sincere His apology was follow, there was no remorse no regret it was only a device to escape the rigour of the law.
What he said in his affidavit was that he had not uttered the words attributed to him by the learned 317 Judge; in other words the learned judge was lying adding insult to injury and yet if the court finds him guilty (he contested the matter tooth and nail) his unqualified apology may be accepted.
This is no apology, it is merely a device to escape.
The High Court rightly did not accept it.
That is what this Court had done in a similar situation in L.D. Jaikwal vs State of U.P., [ ; This Court described it as a 'paper apology and refused to accept it in the following words: "We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished.
Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing.
If such an apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in fact be virtually issuing a 'licence ' to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity.
It will be rather difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their self respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price for it.
And no sitting judge will feel free to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on account of fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes.
If this situation were to be counte nanced, advocates who can cow down the Judges, and make them fail in line with their wishes, by threats of character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by the liti gants to the advocates who are mindful of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts.
" When a member of the Bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is highly painful it pleases none but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of the individual Judge and his office and the prestige of the institution.
Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in the hope that the concerned Bar Council will chasten its member for failure to maintain proper ethical norms.
If timely action is taken by Bar Councils, the decline in the ethical values can be easily arrested.
By refusing to interfere with the impugned order of the High 318 Court this Court is not merely punishing the appellant but is in fact upholding the independence of the Judiciary.
Let me conclude with the hope that this Court will not be called upon to deal with such a situation in future.
For the above reasons I agree that the appeal be dismissed.
S.C. AGRAWAL, J.
This appeal filed under section 19(1)(b) of the , 197 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated January 13, 1987 whereby the appellant has been convicted for having committed contempt of court under section 2(c)(i) of the Act and has been sentenced to pay Rs. 1,000 as fine and in case of default in payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days.
The appellant, who is practising as an Advocate at Narnaul, was representing the plaintiff in Civil Suit titled Hari Ram vs Municipal Committee.
On September 20, 1985, the appellant appeared in the said suit for the plaintiff and orally prayed for ex parte ad:interim stay.
The said request was declined by the Subordinate Judge, Narnaul, who ordered for issuance of notice to the defendants for September 24,1985.
On September 24, 1985, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma ap peared for the defendants and requested for a date for filing a reply to the said application which request was not opposed by the appellant but the appellant prayed for ad interim stay in favour of the plaintiff.
The Subordinate Judge told the appellant that the question of ad interim stay would be considered after filing of the reply by the defendants and adjourned the case for September 26, 1985.
It appears that the appellant was not satisfied with this order passed by the Subordinate Judge and according to the Subor dinate Judge, Shri S.R. Sharma, the appellant uttered the following words in the Court: "You are wholly favouring the Municipal Com mittee.
Are you sitting as Judge or as Admin istrator of Municipal Committee? To me it seems that your are deciding the case as Administrator of Municipal Committee.
You are acting as, if you are a contractor of the Municipal Committee.
I do not expect any justice from you.
I do not think that you will grant stay to me as you are fully siding with the Municipal Committee.
You are not granting stay to me as you are in collusing with the Deputy Commissioner and under his (Deputy Commissioner) influence, you do not want to 319 grant stay to me and that he will complain against me to the Hon 'ble High Court.
" On September 25, 1985, the Subordinate Judge submitted a report exhibit P.A. to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul for taking necessary action against the appellant wherein the aforementioned words alleged to have been uttered by the appellant were set out.
The District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul submitted a report dated October 12, 1985, to the High Court and on the basis of the said report, proceedings for contempt were initiated against the appellant by the High Court.
The appellant submitted a reply by way of affi davit wherein he denied to have uttered the words mentioned in the report of Shri S.R. Sharma, Subordinate Judge, Nar naul to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul and also offered an unqualified apology.
Shri S.R. Sharma fi|ed his affidavit in the High Court and he was also examined as a witness, In addition, the High Court examined Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma, who was at the relevant time reader in the court of Shri S.R. Sharma, and three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari La| Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma.
The appellant did hot examine himself as a witness before the High Court.
The High Court found that the appellant had attacked the integrity of the learned Sub Judge by saying that he was a contractor of the Municipal Committee, that he was in collu sion with the Deputy Commissioner and he was under his influence and that the attack made on the learned Sub Judge disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity would vitally shake the confidence of the public in him and that the aspersions made against the Sub Judge were much more than merely insult and, in fact, they scandalise the court in such a way as to create distrust in the people 's mind and impair confidence of the people in court.
The High Court was, therefore, of the view that the appellant had brought himself clearly within the ambit of contempt of court and he was accordingly found guilty under section 2(c)(i) of the Act.
As regards the apology tendered by the appellant, the High Court observed that this was not the first occasion and earlier also the proceedings for contempt had been initiated against him in pursuance of a report made by Shri K.K. Chopra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Narnaul in C.O.C.P. No. 12 of 1983 wherein also the appellant had tendered an unqualified apology in the High Court and the rule against him was discharged and that the appellant is addicted to using contemptuous language and making scurri lous attacks on the judges.
The High Court held that apology must, in order to dilute the gravity of the 320 offence, be voluntary, unconditional and indicative of remorse and contrition and it should be tendered at the earliest opportunity and further, that the aspersions men tioned in the letter exhibit P.A. at 'A ' to 'A ' sent by Shri S.R. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul were made by the appellant with a design and were not simply thoughtless and in such a case, the appellant cannot be allowed to get away by simply feeling sorry by way of apolo gy as the easiest way.
The High Court did not, therefore, accept the apology tendered by the appellant.
Shri Mahabir Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant had uttered the words mentioned in the letter exhibit P.A. sent by Shri S.R. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul.
Shri Mahabir Singh has invited our attention to the statements of the witnesses who were examined before the High Court and has laid partic ular emphasis on the statement of Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, Advocate, who was representing the defendant Municipal Committee in the Civil Suit before the Subordinate Judge and was present in the court at the relevant time and who has stated that the appellant has not used any unparliamentary or foul language towards Shri S.R. Sharma, Sub Judge.
Shri Mahabir Singh has also referred to the statements of Shri Gyan Chand Sharma, Advocate and Shri Satya Narain Sharma, Advocate who have stated that they were present in the court of SubJudge, Narnaul on September 24, 1985 at about 2 or 2.15 p.m. when the appellant had requested the Subordinate Judge to grant ad interim stay against the Municipal Commit tee for demolition of a chabutra in the case of Hari Ram vs Municipal Committee and the said request of the appellant was declined by Shri S.R. Sharma and that the appellant did not use any discourteous or impolite language against Shri S.R. Sharma.
We have carefully perused the statements of the three Advocates mentioned above on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mahabir Singh.
Their evidence has to be considered along with the statements of the Sub JUdge, Shri S.R. Sharma Narnual and Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma, who was posted as reader in the court of ShriS.R. Sharma at that time.
Shri S.R. Sharma, during the course of examination in chief has stated that when he did not pass orders for interim injunc tion in favour of the appellant, he started speaking loudly and used defamatory language.
He has also repeated the language which was used by the appellant which in substance was in the same terms as mentioned in his letter exhibit P.A. addressed to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul, Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma in his deposition has stated: 321 ".
Shri M.B. Sanghi repeatedly tried to compel Shri Sita Ram Sharma to issue the ad interim injunction in favour of his client, but Shri Sita Ram Sharma had declined that request without hearing the arguments.
Shri M.B. Sanghi then stated that he had no hope of justice from Shri Sita Ram Sharma as the latter was behaving like an Administrator of the Municipal Committee.
Shri M.B. Sanghi, addressed Shri Sita Ram Sharma saying that he (Sh.
Sita Ram Sharma) was under the pressure of Deputy Commissioner, Narnaul.
" Nothing has been brought out during the course of exami nationin chief of these witnesses which may show that they were deposing falsely against the appellant.
The High Court has placed reliance on the testimony of these witnesses in preference to the testimony of three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma.
After considering the evidence of all the witnesses, I am inclined to agree with the appreciation of the evidence by the High Court.
I find no reason to discard the testimony of Shri S.R. Sharma who has been corroborated by his reader, Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma.
Considering the language used by the appellant in the Court of Shri S.R. Sharma, as mentioned by him in his report exhibit P.A. to the District & Sessions Judge, Narnaul and repeated by him in his statement before the High Court it must be held that the appellant had made an attack on the learned Subordinate Judge which was disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity and would vitally shake the confidence of the public in him and that the aspersions made by the appellant had the effect of scandalising the court in such a way as to create distrust in the people 's mind and impair confidence of the people in court.
The appellant has, therefore, been rightly held guilty of having committed the contempt of court under section 2(c)(i) of the Act.
Shri Mahabir Singh has urged that the appellant is a fairly senior Advocate and has been practising for more than 20 years and since he had tendered unqualified apology before the High Court the same ought to have been accepted.
With regard to apology in proceedings for contempt of court, it is well settled that an apology is not a weapon of de fence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it in tended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness.
(See: M.Y. Shareef & Anr.
vs The Hon 'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur & Ors., ; at p. 764).
In the instant case, I find that in his affidavit in reply to the notice issued by the High Court which is annexed at Annexure II, the appel lant first 322 denied having used the words as mentioned by Shri S.R. Sharma in his report sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Narnual or having shown disrespect in any manner whatsoever to Shri S.R. Sharma, the Presiding Officer of the court of Sub Judge, Narnaul on September 24, 1985.
In para 3 of the said affidavit, the appellant has stated as under: "That if this Hon 'ble Court comes to the conclusion that the deponent has committed contempt, the deponent tenders an unqualified apology to this Hon 'ble Court and begs for forgiveness.
The deponent is a senior and respected member of the Narnaul Bar besides that being law abiding citizen has greatest respect and regards for the judiciary and all the Presiding Officers.
" This would show that the apology that was tendered by the appellant before the High Court was to be taken into consideration in the event of the High Court finding the appellant guilty of having committed contempt of court.
Moreover in the present case, it has been found that this was not the first occasion in which proceedings for contempt of court had been initiated against the appellant and on an earlier occasion also proceedings for contempt of court had been initiated against the appellant in pursuance of a report of Shri K.K. Chopra, the then Chief Judicial Magis trate, Narnaul and in those proceedings the rule issued against the appellant was discharged on his tendering un qualified apology before the High Court.
In those proceed ings also the appellant is said to have made disparaging remarks against the Judge.
Keeping in view the said circum stance, the High Court has found that the appellant was addicted to using contemptuous language and making scurri lous attacks on judges.
Having regard to the fact that incidents of insubordination and use of improper language towards the judges are on the increase, the High Court was of the view that the appellant could not be allowed to get away by simply feeling sorry by way of apology as the easi est way.
I am unable to say that the High Court was not justified in taking this view.
Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the appellant, a fairly senior advocate, is prone to use dispar aging and contemptuous remarks against judges, I am of the opinion that this is not a case in which the apology ten dered by the appellant may be accepted.
I, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
G.N. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
Unable to secure an ad interim stay in favour of his client, the appellant, a practising Advocate, uttered cer tain words imputing motives to the Sub Judge in refusing to grant the stay.
The sub Judge submitted a report to the District and Sessions Judge setting out the words uttered by the appellant, for taking necessary action against him.
The District and Sessions Judge in turn submitted a report to the High Court, and proceedings for contempt were initiated by the High Court.
In the contempt proceedings the appellant denied having uttered the words mentioned in the report of the Sub Judge and also offered unqualified apology.
The High Court held that the appellant was guilty of contempt of Court, under Section 2(c)(i) of the , as he had attacked the integrity of the Sub Judge by equating him with a Contractor of the Municipal Committee and by charging that he was in collusion with the Deputy Commissioner and was under his influence.
The High Court further held that the attack on the SubJudge, dispar aging in character and derogatory to his dignity, would vitally shake the confidence of the public in him.
The High Court did not accept the apology tendered by the appellant because the appellant 313 was addicted to using contemptuous language and making scurrilous attacks on the Judges, and had in an earlier contempt proceeding too tendered an unqualified apology on the basis of which the rule against him was discharged.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the petitioner preferred the present appeal before this Court.
It was contended by him that he did not utter the words, as would be revealed by the statements of the three Advocates exam ined before the High Court, who had stated that the appel lant did not use any discourteous, unparliamentary or impo lite language against the Sub Judge.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (Per Agrawal, J.) 1.1.
The appellant had made an attack on the learned Subordinate Judge which was disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity and would vitally shake the confi dence of the public in him and that the aspersions made by the appellant had the effect of scandalising the Court in such a way as to create distrust in the people 's mind and impair confidence of the prople in Court.
The appellant has, therefore, been rightly held guilty of having committed the contempt of court under section 2(c)(i) of the Act.
[319E G] 1.2.
The High Court, in its appreciation of evidence, has rightly placed reliance on the testimony of the Sub Judge corroborated by the evidence of the Reader in his Court, in preference to the testimony of the three Advo cates.
[321C] 2.
It is well settled that an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but it is in tended to be evidence of real contriteness.
The apology that was tendered by the appellant before the High Court was so concluded as to be taken into consideration in the event of the High Court finding the appellant guilty of having com mitted contempt of court.
Moreover this was not the first occasion in which proceedings for contempt of court had been initiated against the appellant and on an earlier occasion also proceedings for contempt of court had been initiated against him in pursuance of a report of the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, and in those proceedings the rule issued against the appellant was discharged on his tendering unqualified apology before the High Court.
In those proceed ings also the appellant is said to have made 314 disparaging remarks against the Judge.
Keeping in view the said circumstance, the High Court has found that the appel lant was addicted to using contemptuous language and making scurrilous attacks on Judges.
Having regard to the fact that incidents of insubordination and use of improper language towards the Judges are on the increase, it could not be said that the High Court was not justified in taking the view that the appellant could not be allowed to get away by simply feeling sorry by way of apology as the easiest way.
The apology tendered by the appellant could not, therefore, be accepted.
[321G H; 322A B] M.Y. Shareef & Anr.
vs The Hon 'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur & Ors., ; , relied on.
Per Ahmadi, J. (Concurring): 1.
The exact words uttered by the appellant, leave no doubt that the intention of the appellant was to cast aspersions on the integrity of the Judge and to lower him in the esteem of others by creating doubts regarding his honesty, judicial impartiality and independence.
The tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud.
And, when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful.
When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary.
Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disre spectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to taming a Judge into submission to secure a desired order.
Such cases raise larger issues touching the independ ence of not only the concerned Judge but the entire institu tion.
The foundation of our system which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity.
The much cherished judicial independence which is of vital importance to any free Society, has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also from those who are an integral part of the system.
[315H; 316A E] 2.
In the instant case, the appellant repeated his performance presumably because he was let off lightly on the first occasion.
Softjustice is not the answer.
The appellant cannot be let off on an apology which is far from sincere.
His apology was hollow, there was no remorse no regret it was only a device to escape the rigour of the 315 law.
The High Court rightly did not accept it.
[316G H; 317A B] L.D. Jaikwal vs State of U.P., ; , relied on.
When a member of the Bar is required to be punished for use of contemptuous language it is highly painful it pleases none but painful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of individual Judge and his office and the prestige of the institution.
Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against erring members of the profession in the hope that the con cerned Bar Council will chasten its members for failure to maintain proper ethical norms.
If timely action is taken by Bar Councils, the decline in the ethical values can be easily arrested.
[317G]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1821 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17 4.
1990 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi in R.A. No. 117/88 in T.A. No. 351 of 1986.
O.P. Saxena and Mukul Gupta for the Appellant.
J.D. Jain, Kailash Vasudev, Ms. Sushma Suri and S.N. Terdal for the Respondents.
332 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
This appeal is from an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi and concerns with the scope of Rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Service (CCA) Rules, 1965 ( 'the Rules ') The facts leading to the appeal are these: The appellant was a cash clerk in the establishment of Delhi Milk Scheme, New Delhi.
There was some criminal case connected with the forgery of a cheque in which the appellant was arrayed as an accused.
Pending investigation of the criminal case, he was placed under suspension.
The order of suspension was made on March 27, 1976 under Rule 10(2) of the Rules.
On January 10, 1976 his services were terminated under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
On March 7, 1980, the appellant was acquitted in the criminal case.
On January 5, 1981 the appellant filed a civil suit in the District Court, New Delhi, challenging the order of termination of his services.
The suit was transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal for disposal.
The Tribunal has, by its judgment dated September 5, 1988 set aside the termination order with the following conditions: "(i) The impugned order of termination dated 10.1.1978 is quashed.
Consequently, status quo ante as in regard to applicant being under suspension will continue from 10.1.1978.
(ii) It will be open to the competent authori ty to take a final decision on the continuance or otherwise of the suspension in the light of the judgment of Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 7.3.80 in case No. 57/2.
It will be open to the competent authority to revoke the order of suspension and reinstate the plaintiff into service as cash clerk.
In that event, the pay and allowances of the plaintiff during the period of his actual suspension from 27.3. 1976 to 10.1.78 and deemed suspension thereaf ter shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of F.R. 54 B. Necessary adjust ments, if any, should be made or in regard to the subsistence allowance already paid to him.
The defendants shall also consider and decide whether the period of actual and deemed sus pension shall be treated as a period spent on duty or not.
333 (iii) It will also be open to the competent authority, if so advised, to continue the plaintiff on suspension if it is decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him based on his conduct which led to his prosecu tion before the criminal court.
The discipli nary proceedings if initiated should be com pleted within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order.
(iv) The competent authority shall take appro priate decision as regards (ii) and (iii) above within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order.
" Pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal management made an order dated November 10, 1988 under Rule 10(4) of the Rules placing the petitioner under suspension w.e.f. January 10, 1978.
The appellant shall be deemed to have been sus pended from the date of the original order of termination.
The management also directed that there should be further enquiry ' against the appellant.
The relevant portion of the order dated November 10, 1988 reads: "AND whereas the undersigned on a considera tion of the circumstances of the case, has also decided that a further enquiry should be held under the provision of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 against the said Shri Mohinder Singh, exhibit Cash Clerk on the allegation which led to his termination of service.
NOW THEREFORE the undersigned hereby: (i) set aside the order of termination of services of Shri Mohinder Singh, exhibit Cash Clerk (ii) directs that further enquiry should be held under the provisions of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 against Shri Mohinder Singh on the alle gations of misappropriation of Govt.
Money which led to the termination of service.
(iii) directs that the said Shri Mohinder Singh, exhibit Cash Clerk shall under sub rule 4 of Rule 10 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 be deemed to have been placed under suspension w.e.f. 10.1.
1978 and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders.
(Baldev Chand) Disciplinary Authority Dy.
General Manager (A)" 334 After holding the enquiry the appellant was again dis missed from service.
That order was made on December 1, 1989.
It is said that the dismissal has been challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal.
From the above narration of facts it will be seen that the Tribunal while setting aside the termination order has directed that the appellant shall continue in suspension from January 10, 1978.
The management while deciding to hold further enquiry has also directed that the appellant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension w.e.f.
Janu ary 10, 1978.
The management made this order under Rule 10(4) which reads as follows: "Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the disci plinary authority on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders: Provided that no such further inquiry shall be ordered unless it is intended to meet a situation where the Court has passed an order purely on technical grounds without going into the merits of the case.
" There are three requirements for the application of Rule 10(4); (i) The Government servant is dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired as a measure of penalty; (ii) the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement is set aside or declared or rendered void by a decision of a Court of Law; (iii) The disciplinary authority decides to hold a further inquiry against the Government servant on the allegations on which the original order of penalty was imposed.
If these three requirements are satisfied then the Government servant ,shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of original order of penalty of dismissal, removal or com pulsory retirements and he shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders.
335 The order of the Tribunal and the management as to the retrospective suspension of the appellant cannot be sus tained under Rule 10(4) of the Rules.
It may be relevant to remember that the original order of termination was not passed against the appellant as a measure of punishment.
It was a 'simpliciter termination ' of the appellants ' service under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules 1965.
The Tribunal has set aside that order on the ground that it amounts to punishment and the order of punishment could not have been made without holding an inquiry against the appel lant.
But that is not the same thing to state that the management made an order terminating the services of the appellant by way of penalty.
The management treated the said order as a simpliciter discharge.
Rule 10(4) therefore, has no application to the case of the appellant.
Secondly, it would be misnomer to call it a further inquiry as contemplated under Rule 10(4).
There was no question of the management deciding to hold a further in quiry since there was no earlier inquiry against the appel lant.
The power to place delinquent officer under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service would be available pro vided if the original order of dismissal, removal or compul sory retirement from service was made by way of penalty and that order has been set aside by a Court of law.
Since there was no inquiry leading to the removal of the appellant in the first instance, the decision to hold fresh inquiry does not attract Rule 10(4).
The retrospective suspension of the appellant is therefore, unjustified and without authority of law.
However, it may be stated that the order of suspension dated November 10, 1988 would operate prospectively and the appellant would be entitled to reinstatement with all back wages till that day since the original order of termination has been set aside by the Tribunal.
The appeal is accordingly allowed modifying the impugned order.
In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant, a cash clerk in the establishment of Delhi Milk Scheme, was placed under suspension under Rule 10(2) of the Central Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, pending investigation into a crimi nal case, connected with the forgery of a cheque, in which he was arrayed as an accused.
Subsequently, his services were terminated under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Serv ices (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
Though he was acquit ted in the criminal case, he was not re instated.
However, the Central Administrative Tribunal set aside the termina tion order and directed that the appellant would continue to be under suspension from the original date of termination of service, and that it would be open to the competent authori ty, to revoke his suspension and re instate him in service or continue him under suspension, if it decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.
Pursuant to the decision of the Tribunal, the Management passed an order under Rule 10(4) of the Rules placing the appellant under suspension from the date of original order of termination and also directed that there should be fur ther enquiry against the appellant.
Allowing the appeal preferred by the appellant and modifying the Tribunal 's order, HELD: 1.1 There are three requirements for the applica tion of Rule 10(4) of the Central Civil Services (Classifi cation, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
These are (i) the Government servant is dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired as a measure of penalty; (ii) the said 331 penalty is set aside or declared or rendered void by a decision of a Court of Law; and (iii) the disciplinary authority decides to hold a further inquiry against the Government servant on the allegations on which the original order of penalty was imposed.
[334F G] 1.2 In the instant case, the original order of termina tion was not passed against the appellant as a measure of punishment.
It was a 'simpliciter termination ' under Rule 5(1) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965.
The Tribu nal has set aside that order on the ground that it amounts to punishment and the order of punishment could not have been made without holding an inquiry.
But that is not the same thing to state that the Management made an order termi nating the services by way of penalty.
It treated the said order as a simpliciter discharge.
Hence Rule 10(4) has no application.
Besides, there was no question of the Manage ment deciding to hold a further inquiry, since there was no earlier inquiry against the appellant and it would be misno mer to call it a further enquiry as contemplated under Rule 10(4).
[335B C] 1.3 Thus, the power to place a delinquent officer under suspension from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service would be available provided the original order was made by way of penalty and that order has been set aside by a Court of Law.
Since there was no inquiry leading to the removal of the appellant in the first instance, the decision to hold fresh inquiry does not attract Rule 10(4).
The retrospective suspension of the appellant is, therefore, unjustified and without authority of law.
However the order of suspension would operate prospectively and the appellant would be entitled to re instatement with all back wages till that day since the original order of termination has been set aside by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal 's order is modified according ly.
[335D G]