judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 901 of 1968.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 5 10 1966 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 97 of 1965.
J. P. Goyal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellant.
G. N. Dikshit and M. V. Goswami for Respondents.
J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad dated October 5, 1966, and raises a question of law regarding the applicability of sections 172 and 174 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re forms Act, 1950 (Act No. 1 of 1951).
,, It appears that the case had a checkered career and the dispute between the parties passed through several phases both before the Revenue Courts and in the High Court.
In order to appreciate the point of law involved in this appeal, it may be necessary to give a resume of be facts which culminated is the judgment of the High Court under appeal.
The dispute refers to lands comprised in Khata Nos.
1002, 1344 and 1411 of village Bishunpur in the District of Rae Bareli (U.P.).
It is not disputed that these Khattas originally belonged to one Harbans who died leaving behind three sons, namely Gurdin, Ramcharan and Ramadhin.
Ramcharan appears to have died issueless but Ramadhin died leaving a widow Smt.
Menda and a daughter from her Smt.
Phoola who was respondent No. 1.
The other son Gurdin died leaving a son Jit who had contested the present proceedings against Smt.
Phoola.
During the pendency of the present proceedings Jit also died and the proceedings have been continued by his son Ram Jivan Lallu.
The District of Rae Bareli fell in what was previously known as the Oudh Area of the United(1)Provinces.
The dispute between the parties appears to have arisen on the death of Ramadhin one of the sons of Harbans who died in 1916 leaving behind his widow Smt.
Menda.
At the time of the death of Ramadhin in 1916 the tenancy of the lands in dispute was governed by the provisions of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 hereinafter referred to J as 'the Rent Act of 1886 '.
Under the provisions of the Rent Act of 1886 Smt.
Menda was to continue in possession of the lands as an heir of Ramadhin but only during the fixed period of the tenancy on the rent payable to the landlord and was not entitled to renewal of the same.
The terms and conditions of the tenancy at the time of the death of Ramadhin were governed by s.48 of the Rent Act of 1886 which applied to the oudh Area where the lands in dispute were situate.
Under s.48 of the Rent Act of 1886 it is obvious that on It the death of a tenant his widow was to continue in occupation of the lands for the unexpired portion of the period for which the deceased tenant might have held the holding.
Accordingly Smt.
Menda continued to occupy the lands after the death of her husband in 1916.
Meanwhile five years later the Rent Act of 1886 was amended by U.P. Act 4 of 1921 under which the status of a statutory tenant was con feared on a person who was in possession of the lands on the date when the amendment came into force.
The amendment introduced a substantial change in s.48 of the Rent Act of 1886 and added clause '(1)(18) to s.3 which runs thus: "(18) "Statutory tenant" means a tenant to whom section 36 or section 37 applies.
Explanation.
A person who succeeds as an heir of a(1)statutory tenant under section 48 shall not be deemed to be 265 a statutory tenant unless he has obtained a patta from the landlord or has remained in occupation of the holding for three years after the expiration of the period for which he is entitled to retain occupation of the holding under section 48: "Provided that when a holding is held by two or more co tenants no person who succeeds as an heir of any such co tenant under section 48 shall be deemed to be a statutory tenant of the holding unless he has obtained a patta from the landlord, or has remained in occupation of the holding for three years after the expiration of the period for which the heir of the last surviving co tenant is entitled to retain occupation of the holding under section 48." By virtue of the Explanation extracted above, a tenant to whom sections 36 and 37 applied would be deemed to be a statutory tenant.
Section 36 of the Rent Act of 1886 runs thus: "Every tenant, not being a tenant with a right of occupancy or a sub tenant, shall be entitled to retain possession of the holding occupied by him at the commencement of the Oudh Rent (Amendment) Act, 1921, at the rent then payable by him, for a period of ten years from the date of the last change in his rent or the last alteration in the area of the holding, or where no such change or alteration has taken place, from the date on which the tenant was admitted to the occupation of the holding." As Smt.
Menda was in possession of the holding at the date when the amendment came into force, she would be clearly governed by section 36 and not section 37 of the Rent Act of 1886 which deals with tenants who were admitted to the occupation of the holding after the coming into force of the amendment.
Under section 36 the widow was entitled to retain possession of the holding acquired by her for a period of ten years from the date on which she was admitted to the occupation of the holding.
Thus the combined effect of section 3(18) and section 36 of the Rent Act of 1886 would be to clothe Smt.
Menda with the status and the rights of a statutory tenant.
Section 48 made the status of a statutory tenant heritable and provided as follows: "(1) When statutory tenant dies, his heir shall be entitled to retain occupation of the holding at the rent pay able by the deceased for a period of five years from the date of the tenant 's death, and to receive compensation under the provisions of this Act for improvements, if any, made on the holding by his predecessor in interest, but shall not be entitled to a renewal of the tenancy.
Provided that a person who succeeds as an heir of a deceased tenant to whom clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 62A applies shall be entitled to retain occupation of the holding at the rent payable by the deceased only for 266 the unexpired portion of the statutory period of the deceased tenant.
(2) Subject to any rights which he may have under section 22 as a representative of the deceased, a collateral relative who did not at the date of the death of the, deceased, share in the cultivation of the holding, shall not be deemed to be an heir of the deceased within the meaning of this section.
" In the instant case as Smt.
Menda had succeeded as an heir to her husband before the amendment of section 48 her case will be governed by the provisions of section 48 and she would be entitled to retain possession of the tenancy but not to a renewal thereof.
It appears that soon after the death of Ramadhin the Court of Wards claimed that the tenancy had escheated to the State because Ramadhin had left no heirs and that Ramadhin was only a tenant at will.
Menda appears to have resisted the claim of the Court of Wards.
which resulted in proceedings before the Revenue Courts which ultimately found that Smt.
Menda had acquired the independent rights of a statutory tenant and was, therefore, not liable to be ejected at the instance of the Court of Wards.
This order was passed by the Assistant Collector on June 4, 1926 and thereafter Smt.
Menda continued in possession of the holding as a statutory tenant under the amended Rent Act of 1921.
We might mention here that previous to the passing of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 the areas of Oudh and Agra in the United Provinces were governed by two separate Acts so far as the tenancies were concerned.
The areas in Agra were governed by the Agra Tenancy Act and those in Oudh by the Oudh Rent Act.
`The U.P. Tenancy Act 17 of 1939 appears to have consolidated the tenancies in the whole of the Province and the legislature passed one Act which would govern all the tenancies in the entire Province.
The U.P. Tenancy Act 17 of 1939 was passed on December 16, 1939 and by section 2 there of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 were repealed.
Section 29 of the Tenancy Act conferred the status of a hereditary tenant on any person who was a tenant of the land at the commencement of the Act.
Thus Smt.
Menda who continued to be in possession as a statutory tenant acquire the status of a hereditary tenant, under section 29(a) of the Tenancy Act which runs thus: "29.
Every person belonging to one or another of the following classes shall be a hereditary tenant, and subject to any contract which is not contrary to the provisions of section 4 shall be entitled to all the rights conferred, and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on hereditary tenants by this Act, namely: (a) every person who is, at the commencement of this Act, a tenant of land otherwise than as a permanent tenure holder, a fixed rate tenant, a tenant holding on special terms in Oudh, an ex Proprietary tenant, an occupancy tenant, 267 except as otherwise provided in this Act as a sub tenant or a tenant of sir :" The Tenancy Act having conferred heritable rights on the tenants to which section 29 applied also laid down an order of succession in which the rights of the tenants would pass after the death of the tenant.
Sections 36 and 37 of the Tenancy Act provided two different modes of devolution in the case of the death of a female tenant.
Section 36 runs thus: "36 (1) When a female tenant, other than a tenant mentioned in section 34, who either before or after the commencement of this Act has inherited an interest in a holding as a widow, as a mother, as a step mother, as a father 's mother, or, as a daughter dies or abandons such holding, or surrenders such holding, or a part of such holding or, in the case of a tenant inheriting as a widow or as a daughter, marries such holding or such part of such holding shall, not withstanding anything in section 45, devolve in accordance with the order of succession laid down in section 35 on the heir of the last male tenant, other than a tenant who inherited as a father 's father under the provisions of that section.
x x x x " Section 37 of the Tenancy Act runs thus: "when a female tenant, other than a tenant mentioned in section 34 or section 36 dies, her interest in the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given below: (a) male lineal descendants in the male line of descent: Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if any male descendant between him and the deceased is alive; (b) husband; (c) unmarried daughter, (d) daughter 's son; (e) brother (f) brother 's son.
" It will be seen that under section 36 of the Tenancy Act the heirs of the husband precedence over the daughter or the unmarried daughter, whereas in the case of a female tenant falling under section 37 of the Tenancy Act the unmarried daughter gets precedence over the brother the or brother 's son.
In other words, the policy of the law was that where a female tenant died having inherited an interest in the property from her husband then the male heirs of the husband should get preference over the female heirs.
Where, however, the female tenant had died having an independent and self acquired interest in the holding, her property was to pass in a different manner.
We are not concerned in this appeal with either section 36 or section 37 of the Tenancy Act, because Smt.
Menda had died some time in September 1952 L522SCI/76 268 when the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 had been replaced by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Abolition Act. ' In short, therefore, Smt.
Menda who originally occupied the lands in suit as a tenant on the death of her husband became a statutory tenant under the Rent Act of 1921, a hereditary tenant under the Tenancy Act and finally she acquired the status of a bhumidhar under the Abolition Act which came into force on July 1, 1952.
The relevant portion of section 18 of the Abolition Act may be extracted thus: 18.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands (a) in possession of or deemed to be held by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht, or an intermediary 's grove (b) held as a grove by, or in the personal cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh, (c) held by a fixed rate tenant or a rent free grantee as such, or (d) held as such by (1) an occupancy tenant, ' (ii) a hereditary tenant, (iii)a tenant on patta dawami or istamrari referred to in section 17 possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale.
(e) held by a grove holder, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary lessee, tenant, grantee or grove holder, as the case may be, who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession as bhumidhar thereof." As Smt.
Menda had already become a hereditary tenant under the Tenancy Act she automatically acquired the status of a Bhumidhar under the Abolition Act and by virtue of the legal fiction created by s.18(1) of the Abolition Act, the lands, having been vested in the State Government, were deemed to have been permanently settled with the bhumidhar, namely, Smt.
Menda in this case.
It is the admitted case of the parties that Smt.
Menda died some time in September 1952, i.e. Only a few months after coming into force of the Abolition Act.
The controversy between the parties now centers round the question as to who would succeed to the tenancy left by Smt.
Menda.
In other words, the matter to be decided is whether section 172 or section 174 of the Abolition Act would apply to the present case.
It is not disputed that Smt.
Menda died leaving a daughter Smt.
Phoola and her husband 's brother 's son Jit.
These were the two contending heirs for the property left by Smt.
Menda.
269 Sections 172 and 174 of the Abolition Act, insofar as they are A relevant, may be extracted as follows: "172.
(1) When a bhumidhar sirdar or asami, who has after the date of vesting, inherited an interest in any holding "(a) as a widow, widow of a male lineal descendent, in the male line of descent, mother or fathers mother dies, marries, abandons or surrenders of , such holding or part thereof; or (b) x x x the holding or the part shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171) or the last male bhumidhar, sirdar or asami.
X X "174.
When a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami (other than a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami mentioned in Section 171 or 172) who is a woman dies, her interest in the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given below: (a) son, son 's son, son 's son, son 's son 's son predeceased son 's widow and predeceased son 's predeceased son 's widow in equal shares per stripes: Provided firstly that the nearer shall exclude the remoter in the same branch: Provided secondly that a widow, who has remarried, shall be excluded; (d) daughter; x x x (g) brother 's son; x x x x It is, therefore, clear that the mode of succession to the property of Smt.
Menda would depend on the determination of the question whether Smt.
Menda had inherited an interest in any holding or had an independent interest in the holding.
This matter appears to have been canvassed before the Revenue Courts which upheld the plea of Smt.
Phoola.
To begin with on the death of Smt.
Phoola, Jit was successful in getting his name mutated in respect of the Khattas in dispute as being the nearest heir to Smt.
Menda.
The mutation was made by the Tahsilder Maharajgunj on July 30, 1954.
This mutation appears to have been challenged by Smt.
Phoola who claimed to be the daughter of Smt.
Menda and therefore a preferential heir to the property as compared to Jit.
In 1957 Smt Phoola filed a suit under section 209 of the Abolition Act for the ejectment of Jit from the disputed lands, on the ground that she was the sole legal heir of the 3 L522SCI/76 270 property left by Smt.
Menda.
In the meanwhile in 1961 a notification under section 4 of the Consolidation Act was issued bringing village Bishunpur m which the lands in dispute were situate under the consolidation operations.
Accordingly Smt.
Phoola filed an application during the consolidation operations before the Consolidation officer, Bachhrawan, for correction of the records under section 10(1) of " the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and prayed that the name of Jit in the Khattas in dispute may be struck off and Smt.
Phoola 's name may be mutated therein.
The Consolidation officer accepted the plea of Smt.
Phoola and he accordingly struck off the name of it from the Khattas and directed that Smt.
Phoola being the legal heir of Smt.
Menda her name be mutated in respect of the Khattas.
Thereafter Jit filed an appeal against the order of the Consolidation officer before the Settlement officer (Consolidations), Tahsil Maharajgunj, District Rae Bareli.
The Settlement officer by his order dated December 26, 1961 dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Consolidation officer.
Thereafter Jit filed a second appeal be fore the District Deputy Director of Consolidation, Rae Bareli, which was permitted under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it was in force then.
The District Deputy Director of Consolidation upheld the plea of Smt.
Phoola and held that she was entitled , to inherit the property of Smt.
Menda being her legal heir in preference to Jit who was merely her husband 's brother 's son and relied upon section 171 of the Abolition Act, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Thereafter Jit filed a revision before the Joint Director of Consolidation who also dismissed the revision as being concluded by a finding of fact.
Thereafter Jit filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court on December 21, 1962 and the writ petition was allowed by the Single Judge on August 6, 1965.
Phoola then filed a special appeal before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which reversed the decision of the Sing Judge and dismissed the writ petition filed by Jit upholding the plea of Smt.
Phoola.
There after Jit moved the High Court for granting leave to appeal to this Court and the same having been refused the present appeal by special leave has been filed in this Court.
In support of the appeal Mr. J. P. Goyal has submitted that the Division Bench as also the Revenue Courts had taken a wrong view of the law in holding that Smt.
Phoola was entitled to succeed to the property left by Smt.
Menda.
The learned counsel submitted that the present case squarely fell within the ambit of section 172 of the Abolition Act since Smt.
Menda had originally inherited the property from her husband Ramadhin and, therefore, according to the order of succession provided in section 171 of the Abolition Act which applied to section 172, Jit who was the son of the brother of Ramadhin would succeed in preference to the daughter of Smt.
Menda.
The respondents despite service did not appear and we requested Mr. G. N. Dikshit to assist the Court amicus curiae and we are grateful to him for the valuable assistance he rendered to us in deciding the complicated issues of law involved in this appeal.
Mr. Dikshit submitted that at the time when Ramadhin died the tenancy was not heritable and therefore the , question of Smt.
Menda having inherited the estate of her husband did 271 not arise and the tenancy held by Smt.
Menda must therefore be regarded as having been acquired by her in her own right as her self acquired property and, therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court and the Revenue Courts were right in upholding the plea of Smt.
Phoola.
We have gone through the entire record as also the judgment of the Single Judge and the Division Bench and we think that the Division Bench of the High Court has taken an erroneous view of the law in the present case.
The Division Bench found that although it was established that Smt.
Menda had inherited the property from her husband Ramadhin yet the finding of the Revenue Courts was that she had acquired the status of a statutory tenant independently and since there was no error of law in this finding of the Revenue Courts there was no reason for the Single Judge to set aside the order of the Joint Director of Consolidation and allow the petition.
It was argued before the High Court that the matter was concluded by a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mst.
Jaini & ors.
vs Ram Prasad(1) and the High Court appears to have brushed aside this decision on a strange process of reasoning which does not appeal to us at all.
the High Court observed as follows: "Mr. Misra has strenuously contended that Jaini vs Ram Prasad (1)supra) is clear authority for the proposition that even in the case of a statutory tenant succession would devolve under section 36 which, according to Mr. Misra is a counter part of section 172 read with section 171 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act.
Jaini vs Ram Prasad (supra) is clearly distinguishable because that case came up in appeal before this Court and not in the form of a writ or an appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge in a writ petition.
" It is obvious that whether a Division Bench decision is given in an appeal from an original suit or in a writ petition the ratio is binding on the subsequent Division Bench, and merely because the previous Division Bench judgment was given in a suit the subsequent Division Bench cannot refuse to follow the same because it was hearing the proceeding in a writ petition.
The rule of judicial precedent is a very salutary one and is aimed at achieving finality and homogeneity of judgments.
In case the Division Bench under appeal wanted to differ from the previous decision of the Division Bench of the same Court it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench but it was not open to it to ignore completely the previous decision on illogical and unintelligible grounds as given by the High Court.
We are further of the opinion that the Division Bench having found as a fact that Smt.
Menda had inherited the property initially from her husband erred in law in not applying the provisions of section 172 read with section 171 of the Abolition Act as a result of which Jit being her husband 's brother 's son was entitled to succeed to the estate left by Smt.
Menda in preference to Smt.
Phoola the daughter.
We now proceed to give reasons for this conclusion.
(1) A.I.R. 1952 All. 852.
272 Section 172 of the Abolition Act as extracted above provides that when a bhumidhar who has after the date of vesting inherited an interest in any holding dies the holding would devolve upon the heirs in accordance with the order of succession mentioned in section 171 of the Abolition Act.
It is manifest therefore that in order to determine the applicability of section 172 of the Abolition Act we must go to the origin of the title of the bhumidhar or the main source from " which the bhumidhar has derived interest in the holding.
It may be pertinent to note here that the statute uses the words "the holding or the part shall devolve" to denote that if it is found that a widow has inherited an interest in the holding from her husband, then it is the holding that devolves and not interest of the widow which ceased after her death.
Thus the statute seeks to make a clear cut distinction between a widow who has inherited an interest from her husband which is dealt with by section 172 of the Abolition Act and a widow who has acquired an independent interest in the holding which is covered by section 172 of the Abolition Act.
The High Court appears to have overlooked the fact that merely because Smt.
Menda having initially inherited possession or occupation of the holding from her husband acquired other types of interests merely by operation of law, that could not destroy the origin or the source of her title which was inheritance from her husband.
Nor can we regard the conferment of the status of a statutory tenant or a hereditary tenant or a bhumidhar under the various laws passed by the U.P. Legislature as amounting to an acquisition u. of a self acquired interest by the widow.
It was, however, argued by Mr. Dikshit that under the Rent Act of 1886 before its amendment by Act 4 of 1921 the estate which was held by Ramadhin was not heritable at all and, therefore, Smt.
Menda could not have inherited any interest in the tenancy on her husband 's death.
In this connection the learned counsel sought to draw a distinction between the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act which had made the tenancies heritable and the provisions of the Oudh lenience Act which did not make the tenancies heritable.
Although the argument appears to be extremely attractive, on closer scrutiny it is not tenable.
The words used in section 172 of the Abolition Act are "inherited an interest".
The statute has not defined the word "interest" and therefore it must be deemed to be of the widest possible amplitude.
It will include not only an absolute interest but also a limited interest, a precarious interest and an inchoate interest or the like.
Section 48 of the Rent Act of 1886 before its amendment by Act 4 of 1921 stood as follows: "48.
(1) The heir of a tenant who dies during the currency of the tenancy of a holding shall be entitled to retain to occupation of the holding at the rent payable by the deceased for the unexpired portion of the period for which the deceased tenant might have held without liability to enhancement or ejectment, and to receive compensation under the provisions of this Act for improvements, if any, made on the holding by himself or his predecessor in interest, but shall not be entitled to a renewal of the tenancy.
x x x The expressions "heir of a tenant" and "shall be entitled to retain occupation" clearly postulate that the right to retain the occupation of 273 the lands in dispute is given only to the heirs of the deceased tenant A which clearly indicates that the person who retains occupation would inherit or succeed to a limited right which the deceased tenant possessed under the Act.
In the instant case since Smt.
Menda continued to retain occupation of the lands on the death of her husband, she did so only as the heir of her husband and not otherwise, for if that was not to then she could not have been entitled to retain occupation.
The word 'entitled" clearly signifies that the occupant must have some right, however precarious or limited it may be.
In these circumstances, therefore, there can be no doubt that Smt.
Menda 's occupation of the tenancy on the death of Ramadhin was by way of inheritance only.
There was no other method by which she could have a right or claim to retain occupation of the holding.
It is true that the interest of Smt.
Menda was a very limited one and she could have been ejected by the landlord under certain circumstances.
But section 48 of the Rent Act of 1886 undoubtedly conferred two important rights on the heir of the deceased tenant (1) the right to retain occupation of the holding on the rent payable; and (2) to receive compensation for the improvements made.
In these circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that the occupation of the lands by Smt.
Menda on her husband 's death was purely in her individual or independent capacity or that the possession of the lands amounted to her self acquired property.
Section 174 of the Abolition Act would naturally apply only to such cases where` a widow does not inherit an interest from her husband but would include cases where the female tenant had an independent interest, namely, an interest which she possessed in the holding as her self acquired property, her stridden or the like.
That is why section 174 of the Abolition Act provides that it is the interest in any holding which devolves and not the holding.
Thus the language used in sections 172 and 174 of the Abolition Act unmistakably brings forth the distinction of the two contingencies in which the to sections are to apply.
The Revenue Courts have also held as a fact that initially Smt.
Menda had inherited the property from her husband but they have construed the conferment of the various kinds of status on Smt.
Menda after she had already invented the property as amounting to her self acquired property.
It seems to us that the Revenue Courts were wrong in misconstruing the scope and ambit of the words "inherited an interest in any holding" as mentioned in section 172 of the Abolition Act.
Section 172 A of the Abolition Act was introduced by an amendment of the Act in 1954 which makes the position absolutely clear, by declaring that where a sirdar or adhivasi who had inherited any interest in any holding as a widow, it would be deemed to be an accession to the holding of the last male holder thereof.
We are, however, not at all concerned with 8.
172 A of the Abolition Act, because Smt.
274 Menda had died two years before the amendment came into force and the question of succession to her estate would be governed by section 17 or section 174 of the Abolition Act.
In the Division Bench decision in Mst.
Jaini 's case (supra) the Allahabad High Court had taken the same view.
Malik, C.J., speaking for the Court observed thus: "Section 36 does not require that the tenancy as such should have been inherited by the widow.
All that it provides is that the widow should have inherited an interest in the holding.
The mere fact that she had to remain in possession for a further period of eight years before she could become the statutory tenant of the holding does not mean that she acquired no interest in the holding as a widow.
We fail to see how it could be said, in view of the language of section 36, that her acquisition of statutory rights had nothing to do with the fact that she had inherited an interest in the holding as widow of Bhau.
Section 36 was thus clearly applicable." The Division Bench also relied in the aforesaid case on an earlier unreported decision of a Single Judge of that Court in Sital vs Suraj Din(1) where exactly the same view was taken as the one we have taken in the instant case.
The observations of the learned Single Judge have been quoted by the Division Bench in the case referred to above thus: "We can assume that she acquired on the passing of the new Act (Act 4 of 1921) a fresh statutory period and a renewal of the tenancy but that does not take away the origin of her title.
It is only when a female tenant acquires tenancy rights which do not have their origin in inheritance that the case could be taken out of the` amble of section 36 to be governed by section 37.
" It would be seen that in this case the husband of the appellant had died in 1916 as in the instant case and yet the Court held that it is really the origin of the title that has to be seen and if the tenancy rights had their origin in inheritance then sections 36 & 37 would rot apply.
For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the origin of the title of Smt.
Menda lay in inheritance of the estate of her husband however limited or precarious it may have been.
This being the position, the succession to the estate of Smt.
Menda would have to be governed by the provisions of section 172 of the Abolition Act which has applied the provisions of section 171 regarding the order of succession.
In the order of succession given in section 171 of the Abolition Act brother 's son is a preferential heir.
It might be mentioned here that by virtue of the amendment of the Abolition Act in 1954 the married daughter was also introduced as an heir before brother 's son.
But this was not the position prior to 1954 when the married daughter was completely excluded from inheritance.
It is also not disputed that Smt.
Phoola was (1) Second Appeal No.421 of 1943 decided on 20 12 48.
275 a married daughter on the death of Smt.
Menda.
In these circumstances, therefore, the holding held by Smt.
Menda would devolve on Ramadhin 's brother 's son, namely, Jit and thereafter on his heir who is now continuing the present proceedings.
Thus the Tahsildar Maharajgunj was fully justified in mutating the name of Jit in respect of the lands in dispute instead of Smt.
Phoola.
the Revenue Courts as also the Division Bench of the High Court had taken a legally erroneous view in holding that the mode of succession would be governed by section 174 of the Abolition Act as the interest left by Smt.
Menda was her self acquired property.
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge is hereby restored.
In the peculiar circumstances of this case, and particularly having regard to the fact that the respondents have not appeared to contest the appeal before this Court, we make no order as to costs in this Court.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Under section 172 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, when a bhumidar who has, after the date of vesting, inherited an interest in any holding, dies, the holding or the part thereof shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of section 171).
Section 174 provides that when a bhumidar who is a woman dies, her interest in the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given in the section.
The appellant was the grandson (son 's son) of one brother while respondent No. I was the only daughter of another brother.
On the death of the(1)respondent 's father, her mother continued in possession of the lands as heir of her husband under the provisions of the Oudh Land Act, 1886.
U.P. Act 4 of 1921 which replaced the 1886 Act, conferred the status of a statutory tenant upon a person in possession of lands on the date of the amendment.
Section 29 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which was a consolidating Act, conferred the status of a hereditary tenant on any person who was a tenant .
of the land at the commencement of the Act and so the mother acquired the status of a hereditary tenant.
The 1939 Act.
was replaced by the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act.
1950 under which she became a bhumidar.
The mother died in 1952.
On the death of the respondent 's mother the appellant got his name mutated in the revenue records as the nearest heir of the mother.
The respondent Sled a suit under section 21 of the Abolition Act 1950 claiming to be the sole legal heir to the property.
She also field an application before the Consolidation officer under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for mutation of her name in a place of the appellant 's, which was accepted.
On appeal to this Court it was contended that it was the appellant 's father who would succeed to the property in preference to the respondent and it was contended for the respondent that when the respondent 's father died, the tenancy was heritable and so the tenancy acquired by her mother was in her own right as self acquired property.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: (1) Section 172A which was introduced in 1954 has no application to this case because the mother died two Years before the amendment came into force and the question of succession to her estate would be governed by section 172 or section 174 of the Abolition Act.
[274 A] (2) The statute seeks to make a clear cut distinction between a widow who has inherited an interest from her husband dealt with in section 172 and widow who had acquired an independent interest in the holding covered by section 174.
[272 C] Mst.
Jaini & Ors.
vs Ram Prasad, A.I.R. 1952 All. 852, approved.
(3) (a) Section 172 uses the word 'holding or the Dart shall devolve ' to denote that if it was found that a widow had inherited an interest in the holding from her husband then it was the holding that devolved and not interest of the widow, which ceased after her death.
The High Court had overlooked the fact that merely because the mother having initially inherited possession or 263 occupation of the holding from her husband acquired other types of interest A by operation of law that could not destroy the origin or the source of her title which was inheritance from her husband.
Nor did the conferment of the status of a statutory tenant under the various laws passed by the legislature amount to an acquisition of a self acquired interest by the widow.
[272B, D) (b) The words "inherited an interest" occurring in section 172 are not defined in the statute and, therefore, they must be deemed to be of the widest possible amplitude.
[272F] (4) Section 174 applies only to such cases where the widow did not inherit an interest from her husband but had an independent interest in the holding which she possessed as her self acquired property Under section 174 it is the interest in any holding which devolves and not the holding.
The language used in Ss. 172 and 174 of the Abolition Act unmistakably brings forth the distinction between the two contingencies in which the two sections are to apply.
[273E F] (5) The High Court having found as a fact that the mother had inherited the property initially from her husband erred in law in not applying the provision of section 172 read with section 171 of the Abolition Act as a result of which her husband 's brother 's son was entitled to succeed to the estate left by her in preference to her daughter (respondent).
[271H] (6) The origin of the title of the mother lay in inheritance of the estate of her husband however limited or precarious it might have been.
The succession to the estate of the mother would have to be governed by the provisions of section 172 of the Abolition Act.
In the order of succession given in section 171 brother 's son was a preferential heir.
Before the amendment of the Abolition Act in 1954, married daughter was completely excluded from inheritance.
[274G H] In the instant case the respondent having married on the death of her mother in 1952 the holding held by the mother would devolve on the appellants father and thereafter, on the appellant as heir to his father.
(7) The expressions 'heir of a tenant ' and 'shall be entitled to retain occupation ' occurring in section 48 of the Rent Act 1886 before its amendment in 1921 clearly postulate that the right to retain the occupation of the lands in dispute was given to the heirs of the deceased tenant, which clearly indicated that the person who retained occupation would inherit or succeed to a limited right which the deceased tenant possessed under the Act.
[273A] In the instant case on the death of her husband occupation of the.
tenancy by the mother was by no way other than as heir of her husband.
It cannot be said that the occupation of the lands by the mother on her husband 's death was purely in her individual or independent capacity or that her possession of the lands amounted to her self acquired property.
[273D E] (8) Whether a decision is given in appeal from an original suit or in a writ petition the ratio is binding on the subsequent Division Bench and merely because the previous Division Bench judgment was given in a suit the subsequent Division Bench cannot refuse to follow the same on the ground that it was hearing the proceeding in a Writ petition.
The rule of judicial precedent is a salutary one and is aimed at achieving finality of judgments.
In case the Division Bench under appeal wanted to differ from the previous decision of the Division Bench of the same court it ought to have referred the matter to a large bench.
[271F G]


judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
58 59 and 880 883 of 1971.
From the Judgment and order dated 10 4 1970 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos.
437/67 and 520/68 and Tax Cases Nos.
135 138 of 1970 respectively.
P. Ram Reddy, A. V. Rangam and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Appellant in C.As.
58 59/71.
Sachin Chandra Chaudhury and Mrs. section Gopalakrishnan for Respondent.
Gobind Das.
P. H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for the Intervener (M/s Durga Steel) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J.
The two Civil Appeals Nos.58 59 of 1971 arise out of a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing two Writ Petitions filed against notices issued by a Commercial Tax officer showing institution of Sales tax assessment proceedings in respect of certain iron and steel goods for the assessment year 1965 66 in Writ Petition No. 437 of 1967 and for the assessment year 1966 67 in Writ Petition No. 520 of 1968.
The High Court of Madras had certified the cases as fit for appeal to this Court under Article 132 and 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.
Although, the Writ Petitions had been dismissed on the ground that they involve an investigation into the question of fact whether the iron and steel scrap, out of which the manufactured goods, sought to be subjected to Sales tax, had been made, were already taxed or not, yet, the State of Tamil Nadu was aggrieved by the decision of the Madras High Court holding that the manufactured goods, said to consist of "steel rounds, flats, angles, plates, bars" or similar goods in other forms and shapes, could not be taxed again if the material out of which they were made had already been subjected to sales ' tax once an iron and steel scrap as both were "Iron and steel".
It was possible to leave the assessing authorities free to decide all the questions which they had jurisdiction to consider.
But, it appears that the Madras High Court thought it proper to decide the question as the Sales ' tax 170 authorities had already adopted the view, in other cases, that such goods, though covered by the broad genus "Iron and Steel", were separately taxable commodities because each kind of "Iron and Steel" goods was a commercially different and separately taxable species or category.
Moreover, this very question was also before the High Court in regular revision petitions under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tamil Nadu Act ').
Civil Appeals Nos. 880 883 of 1971 arise out of four petitions for revision under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act for the years 1964 65 and 1965 66, which were allowed by the Madras High Court 4 setting aside assessment orders by following its judgment and decision mentioned above given on 24 6 1970 on Writ Petitions Nos.
437 of 1967 and 520 of 1968.
The Madras High Court had also granted Certificates of fitness for appeal to this Court under Article 132 read " with Article 133(1)(a)(c) in the four cases before it on revision petitions.
Hence, six cases were connected and heard together by us.
58 59 of 1971 before this Court, arise in all of them.
All the six cases before us relate to what are known as "declared goods" under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Central Act ').
It was claimed, on behalf of the r dealers, sought to be assessed in each case, that, by reason of the restrictions imposed by Section 15 of the Central Act, the levy of tax under the Tamil Nadu Act was not permissible.
The list of goods given there at No. (iv), as it stood in 1968, was: "(IV) Iron and Steel, that it to say (a) 'pig iron and iron scrap (b) iron plates sold in the same form in which they are directly Produced by the rolling mill; (C) steel scrap, steel ingots, steel billets, steel bars and rods; (d) (i) steel plates (ii) steel sheets, (iii) sheet bars and tin bars, sold in the same form in which they are (iv) rolled steel sections, directly produced by the rolling mill;" (v) tool alloy steel, , sole in the same from in which they are directly produced by the rolling mil;" By the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 61 of 1972, clause (iv) r was redrafted.
It now reads as follows: "(iv) iron and steel, that is to say (i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot, moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap andiron skull scrap; (ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes); (iii)skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, heebars and sleeper bars; 171 (iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagone and A hexagone, plain and ribbed or twister, in coil from as well as straight lengths): (v) steel structurals (angles, joints, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, sections or any other rolled sections); (vi) sheets, hoops, strips and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in rivetted condition; (vii)plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii)discs, rings, forgings and steel castings; (ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories; (x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel kull, turnings and borings; (xi) steel cubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings; (xii)tin plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tin free plates; (xiii)fish plate bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails heavy and crane rails; (xiv)wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets; (xv) wire rods and wires rolled, drawn, galvanised, alumanised, tinned or coated such as by copper; (xvi)defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories"; It will be seen that "Iron and Steel" is now divided into 16 categories which clearly embrace widely different commercial commodities, from mere scrap iron and left overs of processes of manufacturing to "wires" and "wheels, tyres, axles, and wheel sets".
Some of the enumerated items like "melting scrap" or "tool alloys" and "special steels" could serve as raw material out of which other goods are made and others are definitely varieties of manufactured goods.
The G reason given, in the statement of objects and reasons of the 1972 Act, for an elucidation of the "definition" of iron and steel, was that the "definition" had led to varying interpretations by assessing authorities and the courts so that a comprehensive list of specified declared iron and steel goods would remove ambiguity.
The Select Committee, which recommended the amendment, called each specified category "a sub item" falling under "Iron and Steer '.
Apparently, the intention was to consider each "sub item" as a separate taxable commodity for purposes of Sales ' tax.
Perhaps some items could overlap, but no difficultly arises in cases before us due to this feature.
As we have 172 pointed out, the statement of reasons for amendment spoke of Section 14(iv) as a "definition" of "Iron and Steel".
A definition is expected to be exhaustive.
Its very terms may, however, show that it is not meant to be exhaustive.
For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be defined "includes" what it specifies, but, in `that case, the definition itself is not complete.
Although, we have looked at the subsequent amendment of 1972 in order to find an indication of the original intention, because subsequent history of legislation is not irrelevant, yet, we think that, even if we confine our attention to Section 14 as it originally stood at the relevant time, with which we are concerned in the cases before us, the object was not to lay down that all the categories or sub items of goods, as specified separately even before the amendment of 1972, were to b viewed as a single saleable commodity called "Iron and Steel" for purposes of determining a starting point for a series of sales.
The more natural and normal meaning of such a mode of listing special or declared kinds of goods seems to us to be that the object of specification was to enumerate only those categories of items, each of which was to serve as a new starting point for a series of sales, which were to be classed as "declared" goods.
What we have inferred above also appears to us to be the significance and effect of the use of words "that is to say" in accordance with their normal connotation and effect.
Thus, in Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn.5, at page 2753, we find: "THAT IS TO SAY.
(1) 'That is to say ' is the commencement of an ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause.
It has the following properties: (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause: (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict it: see this explained with many examples, Stukeloy vs Butler Hob. 171"; The quotation, given above, from Stroud 's Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily, the expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined.
Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed.
In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words "that is to say", this expression may be followed by illustrative in stances.
In Megh Raj & Anr.vs Allah Rakhia & Ors.(1) the words "that is to say.
", with reference to a general category "land" were held to introduce "the most general concept" when followed, inter alia, by the words: "Rights in or over land.
Both were wide classes.
The object of using them or subject matter of legislation was, obviously, to lay down a wide power to legislate.
But, in the context of single point sales ' tax, subject to special conditions when imposed on separate categories of specified goods, the expression was apparently employed to specifically enumerate separate categories of goods on a given list.
The purpose of such specification and enumeration in a statute dealing with sales ' tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute at separate class for a series of sales.
Otherwise, the listing itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it.
Learned Counsel appearing for an intervener argued that the chemical position of iron and steel affords a clue to the meaning of "Iron and Steel" as used in Section 14 of the Central Act.
We are unable to agree that this could be what Parliament or any legislature would be thinking of when enumerating items to be taxed as commercial goods.
The ordinary meaning to be assigned to a taxable item in a list of specified items is that each item so specified is considered as a separately taxable item for purposes of single point taxation in a series of sales unless the contrary is shown.
Some confusion has arisen because the separate items are all listed under one heading "Iron and Steel".
If the object was to make iron and steel taxable as a substance, the entry could have been: "Goods of Iron and Steel." Perhaps even this would not have been clear enough.
The entry to clearly have that meaning would have to be: "Iron and Steel irrespective of change of form shape or character of goods made out of them".
This is the very unusual meaning which the respondents would like us to adopt.
If that was the meaning, sales ' tax law itself would undergo a change from being a law which normally taxes sales of "goods" to a law which taxes sales of substances out of which goods are made.
We, however, prefer the more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item.
This means that each item so specified forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to the genus: ' 'Iron and Steel." Hence, if iron and steel "plates" are melted t and converted into "wire" and then sold in the market, such wire would only be taxable once so long as it retains its identity as a commercial goods belonging to the category "wire" made of either iron or steel.
The mere fact that the substance or raw material out of which it is made has also been taxed in some other form, when it was sold as a separate commercial commodity, would make up difference for purposes of the law of sales ' tax.
The object appears to us to be to tax sales of.
goods of each variety and not the sale of the substance.
Out of which they are made.
As we all know, sales ' tax law is intended to tax sales of different commercial commodities and not to tax the production or manufacture of particular substances out of which these commodities may have 174 been made.
As soon as separate commercial commodities emerge or come into existence, they become separately taxable goods or entities for purposes of sales ' tax.
Where commercial goods, without change of their identity as such goods, are merely subjected to some processing or finishing or are`merely jointed together, they may remain commercially the same goods which cannot be taxed again, in a series sales, so long as they retain their identity as goods of a particular type.
In State of Madhya Bharat vs Hiralal(1) this Court held that a dealer, who bought some scrap iron locally and imported some iron plates from outside and then converted the material into bars, flats and plates, by rolling them in his mills, and then sold them, was still entitled to exemption given to iron and steel from sales tax.
But, in that case, the language of the provision giving the exemption justified this interpretation.
The exemption was given to a sale by either an importer or a purchaser of "goods prepared from any metal other than gold or silver.
In that context, it had become necessary to examine whether the exemption from sales ' tax was meant for all goods made out of a particular sub stance, or for goods as separate commercial commodities.
This Court held that the raw material from which the goods were made was decisive for the purposes of the exemption given.
This Court said (at p 315): "A comparison of the said two Notifications brings out the distinction between raw materials of iron and steel and the goods prepared from iron and steel while the former is exempted from tax, the latter is taxed.
Therefore, iron and steel used as raw material for manufacturing other goods are exempted from taxation.
So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials, they enjoy the exemption.
Scrap iron purchased by the respondent was merely re rolled into bars, flats and plates.
They were processed for convenience of sale.
The raw materials were only re rolled to give them attractive and acceptable forms.
They did not in the process lose their character as iron and steel.
The dealer sold 'Iron and steel ' in the shape of bars,` flats and plates and the customer purchased 'iron and steel ' in that shape.
We, therefore, hold that the bars, flats and plates sold by the assessee are iron and steel exempted under the Notification.
" The law to be interpreted in Hiralal 's case (supra) was entirely different.
In interpreting it, this Court did observe that a mere change of the form of a substance excepted from sales ' tax did not matter.
The language of the notifications involved there made it clear that the exemption was for the metal used.
In the cases before us now the object of single point taxation is the commercial commodity and not the sub stance out of which it is made.
each commercial commodity here becomes a separate object of taxation in series of sales of that commercial commodity so long as it retains its identity as that commodity.
vs (1) [1966] 17 S.T.C. 313, 315.
175 The State of Punjab & ors.(1) where Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for a Constitution Bench of this Court, said at (p. 447).
"Now coming to Civil Appeals Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965, the first additional point raised is that when iron scrap is converted into rolled steel it`does not involve the process of manufacture.
Before the High Court this contention was not pressed.
That apart, it is clear that scrap iron ingots undergo a vital change in the process of manufacture and are converted into a different commodity, viz, rolled steer sections.
During the process the scarp iron loses its identity and becomes a new marketable commodity.
" The process is certainly one of manufacture.
It is true that the question whether goods to be taxed have been subjected to a manufacturing process so as to produce a new market able commodity, is the decisive test in determining whether an excise duty is leviable or not on certain goods.
No doubt, in the law dealing with the sales tax, the taxable event is the sale and not the manufacture of goods.
Nevertheless, if the question is whether a new commercial commodity has come into existence or not, so that its sale is a new taxable event, in the Sales ' Tax law, it may also become necessary to consider whether a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity, has taken place.
The law of sale tax is also concerned with "goods" of various descriptions.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine when they cease to be goods of one taxable description and become those of a commercially different category and description.
It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under "Iron and Steel" constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly new.
It follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax.
We think that the Madras High Court had committed an error in applying Hiralal 's case (supra) to the decision of cases now before us which turns really on a correct interpretation of Section 14 of the Central Act.
On the question now before us, we approve of the reasoning adopted by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Devgun Iron & Steel Rolling Mills vs State of PunJab(2).
Section 15 of the Central Act places certain restrictions and conditions upon State enactments imposing Sales tax.
It says: Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so for as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or (1) (1967) 20 S.T.C. 430 at 447.
(2) (1961) 12 S.T.C. p. 590 176 purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely: (a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed three per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof,.
and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage; (b) where a tax has been levied under that law in respect of the sale or purchase inside the State of any declared goods and such goods are sold in the course of inter State trade or commerce, and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale ill the course of inter State trade or commerce in such manner and subject to such condition as may be provided in any law in force in that State".
It has not been shown to us that any provision of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act violates Section 15 of the Central Act enacted in accordance with Article 266(3) of the Constitution.
Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act leviesm taxes on sales and purchases of "goods" as defined in Section 2(j) of the Act: "(j) 'goods, means all kinds of movable property (other than newspapers, actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities) and includes all materials, commodities, and articles (including these to be used in the fitting out, improvement or repair of movable property), and all growing crops grass or things attached to, or forming part of, the land which are agree to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale," Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Act lays down: "4. Tax in respect of declared goods.
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, the tax under this Act shall be payable by a dealer or the sale or purchase inside the State of declared goods at the rate and only at the point specified against each in the Second Schedule on the turn over in such goods in each year, whatever be the quantum of turnover in that year".
Item 4 of the second schedule specifies the rates of tax in accordance with the Central Act.
It reproduces Section 14(iv) of the Central Act.
On an amendment of Section 14(iv) of the Central Act, serial No. 4 of the second schedule of the Tamil Nadu Act was also correspondingly amended so as to reproduce the sixteen items found in Section 14(iv) of the Central Act.
Other provisions only fortify our conclusion.
177 The result is that we allow these appeals.
We set aside the orders of the High Court and restore the orders of the assessing authorities in cases giving rise to Civil Appeals Nos. 880 883 of 1971.
In cases but of which Civil Appeals Nos.58 59 of 1971 arise, we set aside the judgment of the High Court but maintain its order dismissing the Writ Petitions and order that the assessing authorities will now proceed to determine such question of fact and law as still survive for determination after the decision given above of the question considered by us.
The parties will bear their own costs.
P.H.P. Appeals allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The respondents are dealers under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act.
Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act declares certain goods enumerated therein of ` ' special importance in inter state trade or commerce.
The list of goods given at serial No. IV reads as under: (IV) Iron and Steel, that is to say (a) pig iron and iron scrap .
(b) iron plates sold in the same form in which they are directly produced by the rolling mill; (c) steel scrap, steel ingots, steel billets, steel bars and rods, (d) (i) steel plates (ii) steel sheets, (iii) sheet bars and tin bars, (iv) rolled steel sections, I mill.
(v) tool alloy steel, J sole in the same from in which they are directly produced by the rolling mill.
The said clause IV was amended by the Central Sales Tax Amendment Act, Act 61 of 1972 by which certain more entries were added.
Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act provides that the tax payable under a State Law on sale or purchase of declared goods shall not be levied at more than one stage.
Respondents used to purchase iron scrap and thereafter used to convert them into steel rounds, flats, plates etc.
The scrap was already subject to tax once.
The respondents contended that the entry Iron & Steel was wide enough to include scrap as well as the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc.
made out of the scrap which was subject to tax once and that, therefore, the sale of the steel rounds, flats, plates, etc., cannot be subjected to tax again under the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Act.
The High Court accepted the contention of the respondents.
Allowing an appeal by certificate, ^ HELD: 1.
The intention was to consider each sub item in clause IV as a separate taxable commodity for purposes of sales tax.
The object was not to lay down that all the categories or sub items of goods specified separately were to be viewed as a single saleable commodity called iron and steel for purposes j of determining a starting point for a series of sales.
The note against sub division of Clause IV makes it clear that even each sub category of a sub item retains its identity as a commercially separate item for purposes of sales tax so long as it retains the sub division.
[171Gm, 172B C] 2.
The expression 'that is to say ' is employed to make it clear and fix the meaning of words to be explained or defined.
Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word 'includes ' is generally employed.
The precise meaning of the words 169 that is to say ' must vary with the context.
The purpose of the expression in a sales A lax law would be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute separate class for a series of sales.
[172F H, 173B] 3.
The chemical composition of iron and steel cannot afford a clue to the meaning of iron and steel.
Sales Tax Law taxes sales of goods and is not a taxation on sales of substance out of which goods are made.
We prefer to follow the more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification numbering of each item.
State of Madhya Pradesh vs Hira Lal; (1966) 17 STC 313 315 distinguished.
The case cf Devidas applied.
[173C. E F] 4.
It has not been shown to, us that any provision of the Tamilnadu Sales Tax Act violates section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act enacted in accordance with Article 286(3) of the Constitution.
Section 2(j) of the Tamil Nadu Act defines goods and section 4 imposes charge in respect of tax on declared goods.
The Tamilnadu Act borrows clause (IV) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.
[176 C H] C


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 381 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 10th January, 1973 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigharh in Criminal Revision No. 606 of 1974.
V. C. Mahajan, section K. Mehta and K. R. Nagaraja for the Appellant.
Ram Sarup and R. A. Gupta for Respondent No. 1 H. section Marwah and section P. Nayar for Respondent No. 2 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by j, GOSWAMI, J.
On April 19, 1973, the respondent Om Parkash (hereinafter to be described as the accused) inflicted as many as five stab wounds on the appellant Suraj Bhan.
The injuries were very severe as will be found from the description given below: "1.
Incised wound 5 cm x 2 cm x oblique spindle shape on the left side of the front of abdomen, 8 cm below the xiphisternum and 6 cm to the left of mid line.
Depth `not probed edges were fresh.
Incised wound 2 1/2 cm x 1 cm oblique, 6 cm on the left and 2 cm above injury No. 1, spindle J shaped.
Edges were fresh and depth was not probed.
Incised wound 2 1/2 cm x 1 cm horizontal, spindle shaped 6 cm above the left anterior superior iliac spine Depth was not probed and edges were fresh.
Incised wound 1 cm X 1/4 cm X 2 mm deep, horizontal 6 cm inner to end at the level of f left anterior superior iliac spine, edges were fresh.
Penetrating wound 5 cm x 2 1/2 cm x cavity deep, horizontal on the front of abdomen 2 cm to the right of mid line 10 cm below the level of xiphisternum, edges were clean cut and fresh the coils of small intestine protruding through the wound.
" The appellant had also to under go an operation.
There is no doubt that prompt and proper medical attention alone saved the i` appellant from death.
The accused was convicted under section 307 IPC by the trial court by its judgment dated February 26, 1974 and sentenced to 10 years ' rigorous imprisonment and also to a fine of Rs. 200/ in default rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Although the accused gave his 301 age as 19 years, according to the trial court he appeared to be aged about 23 years.
The accused appealed to the High Court against his conviction and sentence.
The appeal was numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 1974.
The injured Suraj Bhan also filed a Criminal Revision Application being numbered as 606 of 1974 for enhancement of the sentence passed on the accused.
The appeal was decided by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on January 10, 1975.
It appears from the judgment of the High Court in that appeal that conviction of the accused was not challenged.
The only point that was argued was that the accused was entitled to set off the period of his detention as an under trial prisoner against the period of imprisonment imposed upon him under section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) which came into force from April 1, 1974.
It appears also from the judgment that the State did not oppose the aforesaid submission on behalf of the accused.
The learned single Judge, therefore, passed the order in the following terms: There is force in this submission of the learned counsel which is not opposed by the State counsel.
I am of the view that the ends of justice will be met if the term of imprisonment of the convict appellant is reduced to that already undergone by him." Having said.
so the learned single Judge dismissed the appeal maintaining the conviction and reduced the accused 's term of imprisonment to that already undergo by him and also maintained the sentence of fine.
Including ' the pre conviction detention the accused served only one year and eight months of the sentence.
It appears the State did not choose to prefer any appeal against the grossly inadequate sentence passed by the High Court.
On the other hand the injured Suraj` Bhan made an application to the High Court for a certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to this Court under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution without success and thereafter obtained special leave from this Court after notice to the respondents including the State to show cause why special leave to appeal should not be granted.
We have described the above facts in some detail as we fail to appreciate why the State in this case should have ordinarily ignored to take notice of such a grossly lenient sentence.
G The order of the High Court was clearly unsustainable even in terms of section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, as the only set off which was urged for under the section and which was admissible, was a period of about nine months which the accused had served as an under trial prisoner prior to the conviction.
It is also clear from section 428, Criminal Procedure Code itself that even though the conviction was prior to the enforcement of the Code of Criminal Procedure, benefit of section 428 would be avail able to such a conviction.
Indeed section 428 does not contemplate any 5 L522SCI/76 302 challenge to a conviction or a sentence.
It confers a benefit on a convict reducing his liability to undergo imprisonment out of the sentence imposed for the period which he had already served as an under trial prisoner.
The procedure to invoke section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, could be a miscellaneous application by the accused to the court at any time while the sentence runs for passing an appropriate order for reducing the term of imprisonment which is the mandate of the section.
In the appeal before the High Court there was no scope for the High Court to reduce the sentence only to the period already under gone under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, in view of the only point argued before it.
Since in an attempt to murder hurt was caused, the maximum punishment under second part of section 307 IPC would be imprisonment for life.
The injured was not satisfied with the maximum punishment of ten years contained in the first part of the section and moved the High Court in revision for enhancement of the sentence.
The revision was separately discussed by the High Court for the "reasons recorded in Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 1974" and it is this order of the High Court in revision that special leave was obtained by the appellant.
In the absence of an appeal against the judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 442 of 1974.
either by the State or by the injured, that Judgment has become final which means that the accused 's sentence remains to be for a period of one year and eight months and a fine of Rs. 200/ in default rigorous imprisonment for one year.
The scope of the criminal revision before the High Court was whether the sentence of ten years should be further enhanced but that sentence itself disappeared by virtue of the Judgment of the High Court in the criminal appeal.
The criminal revision, therefore, be came infructuous and we can do nothing about it while the Judgment of the High Court remains operative.
Unfortunately that judgment in the criminal appeal is not before us in this Court.
Although, therefore, we cannot approve of such a grossly lenient sentence in the present case, we have no other alternative than to dismiss the present appeal.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The respondent "OP" inflicted five stab wounds on the appellant "S" on 19 4 1973 but the appellant survived thanks to prompt medical attention and are immediate operation.
The trial court convicted "OP" under section 307 I.P.C. by its judgment dated 26 2 74 and sentenced him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and also to a fine of Rs. 200/ The accused "OP" filed a Criminal Appeal No. 442/74) in the Punjab High Court on the ground that he was entitled to set off u/s 428 of the Crl.
P.C. 1973 (Act 2 of 1974), the period of his detention as an under trial prisoner against the period of imprisonment imposed upon him.
The appellant "S" also filed a Criminal Revision No. 606/ 74 74 in the High Court for enhancement of the sentence against the accused.
Since there was no opposition from the State to the plea in the criminal appeal, the High Court accepting the appeal, reduced the sentence of the term of imprisonment to that already undergone by him.
Against the said appeal, there was no further appeal either by the State or by "S" and therefore the orders became final.
The criminal revision filed by "S" was however dismissed separately by the High Court for the "reasons recorded in Criminal Appeal No. 442/74".
Unable to obtain leave under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, "S" obtained special leave after notice to the accused "OP" and the State.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: (1) It is clear from section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) itself that even though the conviction was prior to the enforcement of the code of criminal procedure benefit of Section 428 would be available to such a conviction.
Indeed section 428 does not contemplate any challenge to a conviction or a sentence.
It confers a benefit on a convict reducing his liability to undergo imprisonment out of the sentence imposed for the period which he had already served as an under trial prisoner.
[301H, 302A] (2) The procedure to invoke Section 428 Criminal Procedure Code could be a Miscellaneous application by the accused to the court at any time while the sentence runs for passing appropriate order reducing the term of imprisonment which is the mandate of the section.
[302A] (3) In the instant case, in the absence of an appeal against the judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 442/74 either by the State or by the injured, that judgment has become final.
The scope of criminal revision before the High Court was whether the sentence of ten years should be further enhanced, but that sentence itself disappeared by virtue of the judgment of the High Court in the Criminal Appeal.
The criminal revision therefore became infructuous and the Supreme Court can do nothing about it while the judgment of the High Court remains operative.
1302D, E P] Obiter: The order of the High Court was clearly unsustainable even in terms of section 428 Criminal Procedure Code as the only set off which was 300 urged for under the section and which was admissible, was a period of about nine months of pretrial detention.
[The Court disapproved of such a grossly lenient sentence imposed by the High Court and deprecated that the State ignored to take notice of such a grossly lenient sentence and for not preferring an appeal to the Court.]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1968.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 17th July, 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 989 of 1965.
Narayan Nettar and K. R. Nagaraja for the Appellant.
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and Vineet Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.
The circumstances leading to this appeal, directed against a judgment of the High Court of Mysore, are as follows: The respondent herein entered the service of the Princely State of Mysore in 1935 as Instructor of Tailoring in the Department of Public Instructions.
In 1949, three occupational Institutes (Polytechnics) at Hassan, Devangere and Chintamani were started in the State.
The respondent was sent on deputation to serve in the Polytechnic at Devangere as Instructor in Tailoring and he joined the new post on November 28, 1949.
One Shri K. Narayanaswamy Chetty who was also an Instructor in Tailoring in the Department of Public instruction was also deputed to the occupational Institute at Hassan and joined duty there on December 1, 1949.
This K. N. Chetty was .
far junior to the respondent in service.
Special officer in Charge of the three occupational Institutes considered the names of the respondent and K. N. Chetty for absorption as Instructors in Tailoring and recommended for their absorption with effect from the respective dates of their joining duty, after deputation, in the Institutes.
Accordingly K. N. Chetty was absorbed with effect from December 1, 1949, but no order was passed in the case of the respondent despite repeated representations made by the latter.
In 1953, the then State of Mysore set up the Department of Technical Education and the Polytechnic at Devangere became part of that Department.
The respondent continued tp serve on deputation in that Department.
In 1955, for no fault of the respondent, the Government passed orders reverting him to his parent Department.
On June 11, 1956, the respondent was again posted on deputation as Instructor in Tailoring in the Polytechnic at Bellary "on provisional basis".
The intervening period between his reversion and reposting to the Polytechnic was treated as leave.
On the re organization of States with effect from November 1, 1956, his services were allotted to the new State of Mysore.
The respondent continued to make representations to the effect that like other employees who were taken on deputation from other Departments, he should also be absorbed in the Department of Technical Education with effect from November 28, 1949, which was the date on which he initially came on deputation.
257 His specific grievance was that in any case, he could not be discriminated against and treated differently from K. N. Chetty who was junior to him in the parent Department and came on deputation to the Polytechnic establishment subsequently.
The State Government referred the respondent 's case to the Public Service Commission who examined it and by a communication, dated February 2, 1960, made these recommendations in favour of the respondent: "It is stated in the Government letter dated 26 10 1959 that the Director who was the Unit officer for both the departments ordered the transfer of Sri Srinivasa Murthy who was fully qualified as Tailoring Instructor in the Technical Education Department and there was no need to classify the vacancy post to which he was transferred under the then existing rules.
Along with him Sri K. Narayanaswamy C: Chetty who was his junior and possessing similar qualifications was transferred as Tailoring Instructor in the Technical Education Department and was absorbed in the same department by Government in consultation with the Public Service Commission.
The case of Sri Srinivasamurthy is on all fours with that of Sri Narayanaswamy Chetty and he is deserving of similar treatment.
D ' In view of the above, and since Sri Srinivasa Murthy, who was fully qualified was transferred in 1949 by the Director and appointed as Tailoring Instructor under the rules then in force, and as his reversion at this distance of time for no fault of his would cause a great hardship to him, the Commission are of the opinion that he may be absorbed as Tailoring Instructor from the date of his appointment as such as has been ordered in the case of Sri K. Narayanaswamy Chetty." In the opinion of the Commission, the temporary reversion of the respondent to his parent department in 1955 56, was not justified.
Ultimately, the Government by order, dated February 19, 1964, ordered the absorption of the respondent in the Department of Technical Education in the grade of Rs. 150 with effect from the date of the order, in the vacancy in which he was working, subject to these conditions.
(a) that he would not be entitled to the benefit of revision of scales of pay that had been effected in 1957 & 1961 by way of increments or weightage benefit accruing .
thereunder, (b) that he would not be given any more financial benefit or revision of pay or additional increments for his previous service.
Against this order the respondent made representations to the Government praying that his absorption should be related back to 1949 and he be given the benefit of the revisions of pay scale, including weightage benefit.
The Government did not accept the representation.
258 On April 21, 1965, the respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing his absorption in the Department of Technical Education from the date of his initial appointment therein, namely, November 28, 1949, and to give him benefits of the revisions of pay scales effected in 1957 and 1961 and weightage benefits thereunder.
The order dated February 19, 1964, was impugned on the ground that he had been invidiously discriminated against in the matter of absorption and appointment, while his junior K. Narayanaswamy Chetty, whose case was identical in all respects, and six other officers who were similarly situated, were absorbed in the Department of Technical Education with effect from the initial date of joining duty on deputation.
It was contended that in making the impugned order, contrary to the recommendations of the State Public Service Commission, the State Government had acted arbitrarily and in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The petition was opposed by the appellant, who in its counter affidavit.
contended that the respondent had no legal right to be absorbed in the service of the Department of Technical Education from a particular anterior date, or to be given the revised pay scales applicable to those borne permanently in the service of that Department.
It was further contended that the case of the respondent did not stand on the same footing as that of Narayanaswamy Chetty because the order of Chetty 's absorption was passed in 1951 and that of the respondent 's absorption in 1964, and there was a break in the service of the respondent in the Department of Technical Education, in 1955 56.
It was stated that the absorption of the employees which came on : deputation from a particular date, was a concession which could not be claimed as of right, and consequently, a writ of mandamus, as prayed for by the respondent, should not be issued.
The High Court allowed the writ petition and issued a direction that the absorption of the respondent in the Department of Technical Education, be given effect from November 28, 1949 when he initially resumed duty on deputation to the Polytechnic at Devangere.
The High Court further declared that he will be entitled to all consequential benefits from such absorption including the benefit of revision of pay scales in the years 1957 and 1961 and also weightage benefits.
Hence this appeal by the State.
Mr. Nettar appearing for the appellant contends that this case is fully covered by this Court 's decision in K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty and Anr.
vs State of Mysore and Anr.
The point canvassed by the Counsel is, that the absorption of K. N. Chetty and five others, with effect from particular anterior dates, was not made in pursuance of any principle of policy or statutory rule, but was done as a matter of concession.
It is urged that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to enforce a mere concession.
Counsel has further made an attempt to show that the respondent and K. N. Chetty were not similarly situated because there was a break in the respondent 's service with the Department of Technical Education.
(1) ; 259 As against this, Mrs. Shyamla Pappu submits that in Rajalakshmiah Setty 's case (supra), the facts were entirely different.
It is emphasised that in the present case, seven employees had come on deputation from other Departments to the Polytechnics and all of them, excepting the respondent, were absorbed permanently in the Department of Technical Education with effect from the dates on which they came on deputation.
Even Narayanaswamy Chetty, who was admittedly junior to the respondent, and was identically situated, was accorded the same treatment.
It is urged that this principle of policy r was ignored in the case of the respondent, and he was without reason singled out for unfair discriminatory treatment.
It is pointed out that his so called "reversion" to the parent Department in 1958 for a short period, was a misnomer.
It was not a reduction in rank, nor a break in the continuity of his service.
Moreover, it was, as the Public Service Commission found, undeserved and could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be considered a ground for meting out discriminatory treatment to the respondent.
We find a good deal of force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondent.
Rajalakshmiah Setty vs State of Mysore (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
In that case, the Government of the then State of Mysore, by a notification dated December 12, 1949, directed that the promotions of 63 petitioners therein, from the post of Surveyors as Assistant Engineers were to take effect from that date irrespective of the dates on which they were put in charge of sub divisions.
But by a notification dated May 17, 1950, the Government showed a concession to a different batch of 41 Surveyors, who had been placed in charge of different sub divisions between March 1944 and January 1946, by promoting them as Assistant Engineers, with effect from the dates of occurrence of vacancies, according to seniority.
In November 1958, another batch of 107 persons were similarly promoted as Assistant Engineers with retrospective effect from 1st November 1956, when the new State of Mysore emerged under the States Reorganization Act.
The petitioners therein filed a writ petition praying for the issue of mandamus directing the State to fix their seniority, also, on the basis that they had become Assistant Engineers from the dates on which the vacancies to which they had been posted had occurred. ' The High Court dismissed petition.
On appeal, this Court ; held that the concession shown to the batch of 41 persons who had been appointed before the petitioners and to the batch of 107 persons who had been appointed thereafter, were mere ad hoc concessions and not something which they could.
claim as of right.
It was observed that there was no service rule which the State Government had transgressed, nor the State had evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant Engineers from surveyors.
It may be noted that the grant of the relief prayed for by the 63 petitioners, would have unsettled and caused wholesale alterations of 260 the seniority list with regard to the entire cadre of Engineers thus affecting persons who were not before the Court and who would have been r condemned unheard.
Further, acceptance of the petitioners ' contentions would have unsettled pre Constitution matters, and it would have been directly productive of results going against section 115(7) of the States Re organization Act.
Furthermore, the petitioners in that case .
claimed to be promoted with ' effect from past dates.
There was no , principle of policy or service rule on the basis of which they could ` claim such promotions as of right. ' Lastly, the petitioners in that case were found guilty of serious laches.
Such impediments in the way of the relief claimed by the respondent, do not exist in the present case.
It appears to us that the acceptance of the respondent 's contentions in the present case cannot lead to any untoward results such as were apprehended in Rajalakshmiah 's case (supra).
Indeed, it has not been shown that the absorption of the respondent with effect from November, 1949, would adversely affect even Narayanaswamy Chetty, who was admittedly junior to him in the parent Department.
On the` other hand, it is an undisputed fact that sit other employees, who were similarly situated, were absorbed from the dates on which they initially joined duty, after deputation to the Polytechnics.
It is not the case of the appellant that this principle whereby the absorption in the Department of Technical Education was related back to the date on which a person initially came on deputation, was ever departed from, excepting in the case of the respondent.
This being the case, the High Court was right in holding that the State Government had evolved a principle "that if a person was deputed to the Department of Technical Education from another department and he stayed on in that other department for a reasonable long time his absorption in that department should be made to relate back to the date on which he was initially sent".
There was no justification whatever to depart from this principle of policy in the case of the respondent, who was, in all material respects, in the same situation as K. N. Chetty.
very rightly, the High Court has held that his "impermissible reversion" for a short while in 1955 to the parent department was no ground to hold that he was not similarly situated as K. Nariayanaswamy Chetty.
This so called reversion to the parent Department for a short period in 1955 56, could not by any reckoning, be treated as a break in his service, this period having been treated as leave.
Nor did it amount u ' to reduction in rank.
In any case, this 'reversion ' was not ordered owing to any fault of the respondent.
It is not the appellant 's case " that the respondent 's work in the Department of Technical Education 261 was found unsatisfactory or that he was not otherwise suitable or qualified to hold the post of Tailoring Instructor in that Department.
That he was suitable to be absorbed in that post, is manifest from the recommendation of the Public Service Commission and is implicit in the impugned order, itself.
For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that in the special circumstances of this case, the High Court was fully justified in granting the relief, it did, to the respondent.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The respondent entered service of the State of Mysore in 1935 as instructor of Tailoring in the Department of Public Instruction.
In 1949 he went on deputation in the Polytechnic Institute at Devangere.
One K. N. Chetty who was far junior to respondent was also sent on deputation to another similar institution in 1949.
K. N. Chetty was absorbed from the date he went or deputation in the new post but respondent was not so absorbed.
In 1955, for no fault of the respondent, Government passed orders reverting him to his parent department.
In 1956, respondent, was again posted on deputation.
The intervening period between his reversion and re posting was treated as leave.
On reorganisation of State respondent 's services were allotted to the new State of Mysore.
The respondent made several representations and stated that he was discriminated against and treated differently from K. N. Chetty who was junior to him in the parent department.
The Public Service Commission found that respondent 's case was on all fours with that of Chetty and that he deserved similar treatment.
The Commission found that the temporary reversion of the respondent lo his parent department was not justified.
The Government in 1964 ordered the absorption of the respondent in the Department of Technical Education from the date of the order subject to the conditions that he would not be entitled to the benefit of revision of scales of pay that had been effected in 1957 and 1961 and that he would not be given any more financial benefit or revision of pay or addition increment for his previous service.
The respondent filed a Writ Petition challenging these condition and praying for a direction that he should be absorbed in the Department of Technical Education from the date of his initial appointment in 1949, and granted consequential benefits or the revision of pay scales etc.
The appellant opposed the Writ Petition on the grounds that the respondent had no legal right to be absorbed in the Department of Technical, Education with effect from.
a particular interior date or to be given the revised pay scales applicable to those borne permanently in the service of that department.
Chetty 's case was sought to be distinguished on the ground that he was absorbed in the year 1951 as against the respondent 's absorption in 1964 and that there was a break in the service of the respondent.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and issued a direction that absorption of the respondent in the Department of Technical Education be given effect from 1949 when he initially assumed duty on deputation.
The High Court also declared that he would be entitled to all consequential benefits.
The appellant in an appeal by Special Leave relied on the judgment of this Hon 'ble Court in the case of K. V. Rajalakshmiah Setty vs State of Mysore [1967] 2 S.C.I. 70.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: In the present case it appears that the State had evolved a principle pursuant to which all the employees who came on deputation from the departments to the Polytechnic excepting the respondent, were absorbed permanently in the Department of Technical Education with effect from the dates on which they came on deputation.
Even Chetty who was admittedly junior to the respondent and was identically situated was accorded the same treatment.
It is an undisputed fact that 6 other employees who were similarly situated were absorbed from the date on which they initially joined duty after deputation to the Polytechnic.
[259 A C, 260 D] 256 There was no justification whatever to depart from this principle of policy in the case of the respondent.
His reversion was not ordered owing to any fault on his part.
The said reversion could not be treated as a break in service since it was treated as leave, nor did it amount to reduction in rank.
60 F H] The High Court was therefore, justified in granting the relief, it did to the respondent.
261 Bl 'Rajalakshmiah Setty vs State of Mysore, ; , distinguished.