judgement:
l Appeal No.5 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 26, 1956, of the former Nagpur High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 66 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated April 14, 1956, of the said High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 6 of 1956.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, B. Sen, D. B. Padhya and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
R. V. section Mani, for the respondent.
April II.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.K. DAS J.
This is an appeal by special leave.
The appellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company), a public limited company having its registered office at Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh, its Manager, and Assistant Manager.
The respondent, Shreepathi Rao, joined the service of the Company as a typist on a salary of Rs. 30 per month in July, 1936.
He rose in rank from time to time and was appointed Deputy Head Clerk in 1947 in the grade of Rs. 120 10 225.
Since 1952 he has been receiving a basic salary of Rs. 245 per month.
On November 28, 1955, an explanation was called for from him with regard to the issue of certain bills to consumers of electricity called ".high tension consumers ", without having certain " notes for the information of consumers " printed at the back of the bills.
The respondent submitted his explanation on the next day, marking a copy thereof to one of the directors of the Company.
On December 2,1955, he was again asked to explain why he marked a copy of his explanation to one of the directors.
The respondent submitted an explanation in respect of this matter also.
On the same date, he was again asked to explain as to how and why certain " double adjustments " had been made in the accounts of 1954 relating to the consumers ' department of the Company, the allegation being that a sum of Rs. 1,05,894 7 7 which represented the amount of bills of the Central Railway had been deducted twice in the accounts.
The respondent submitted an explanation on December 3, 1955, in which he said that the charge was vague and that, after 1949, he was not in any way concerned with the preparation of summaries and annual statements of accounts of the consumers department.
On December 5, 1955, an order of suspension was made against the respondent which stated that the order was to take immediate effect and to remain in force until further orders, pending some investigation against the respondent.
Two days later, on December 7, 1955, a memorandum was served on the respondent terminating his services with effect from January 31,1956.
The memorandum, so far as it is relevant for our purpose, read We hereby give you notice under Standing Order 16(1) that your services will stand terminated as from 31st January, 1956.
The Company 's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose reasons ' for terminating your services.
" On December 19, 1955, a notice was served on the Company on behalf of the respondent wherein it was stated that the order of suspension dated December 5, 1955, and the order of termination dated December 7, 1955, were illegal and ultra vires and a request was made to withdraw the said orders and reinstate the respondent within 24 hours, failing which the respondent said that he would take legal action in the matter.
On December 26, 1955, the Company sent a reply to the notice denying the allegations, and the company further stated that it had no desire to enter into a discussion with the respondent as to the propriety of the orders passed.
On January 2, 1956, the respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court 466 at Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue of appropriate writs or directions quashing the orders of suspension and termination dated December 5, 1955, and December 7, 1955, respectively and asking for certain other reliefs.
This petition was heard by a learned single Judge on certain preliminary objections raised by the present appellants, and, by an order dated April 14, 1956, he upheld the preliminary objections and dismissed the petition.
The preliminary objections taken were these: it was urged that the service of the respondent was terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company, approved by the relevant authorities under the provisions of the (XX of 1946), hereinafter referred to as the central Act, and also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (C. P. and Berar Act XXlll of 1947), hereinafter called the local Act; and if the respondent had any grievance against the said Standing Orders, his only remedy was to get the Standing Orders amended as provided for in the relevant Act, but he had no right to move the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the orders passed against him or for reinstatement, etc.
Alternatively, it was urged that if the Standing Orders did not apply in the case of the respondent as was the respondent 's case, then the Ordinary law of master and servant applied, and the only remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal.
On these preliminary objections the learned Judge held (1) that the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders and therefore his case was not governed by the Standing Orders; (2) that the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was contractual and not statutory and the remedy of the respondent was to sue the Company in damages for wrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the Standing Orders so as to include the respondent and persons in his category, the only remedy open to the respondent was to take action under the relevant Act by approaching a recognised union to move in the matter.
467 On the dismissal of his petition, the respondent preferred an appeal under el.
10 of the Letters Patent.
This appeal was heard and allowed by a Division Bench on September 26, 1956, on the findings that (1) the Standing Orders did not apply to the respondent, though he was an employee within the meaning of that expression in section 2 (1) of the local Act ; (2) the conditions of the respondent 's service were governed by the provisions of the local Act and on a breach thereof, the respondent had a right to move the High Court for appropriate orders under article 226 of the Constitution; and (3) as the termination of the service of the respondent was without statutory authority, it must be vacated.
The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal, quashed the orders of suspension and termination of service and declared that the respondent continued to bean employee of the Company on terms which were applicable to him on the date of his suspension, namely, December 5, 1955.
There was also a direction to the Company to pay back wages to the respondent.
The appellants herein then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the Division Bench, dated September 26, 1956.
The present appeal has been brought in pursuance of the order granting special leave to the appellants.
The first and foremost question which arises for decision in this appeal is whether the Standing Orders of the Company apply to the respondent.
We have already stated and it is not in dispute that the Standing Orders were approved by the certifying officer under the provisions of the central Act and by the Labour Commissioner under section 30 of the local Act.
It is necessary to explain here the general scheme of the provisions of the two Acts under which the Standing Orders were approved.
Under the central Act, the expression " Standing Orders " means rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule, and section 3 requires that within six months from the date on which the central Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the certifying officer five copies of the draft Standing Orders proposed by him 468 for adoption in his industrial establishment.
Sub section (2) of section 3 lays down that provision shall be made in such draft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment and where model Standing Orders have been prescribed, the draft shall so far as practicable, in conformity with such model.
The Schedule refers to the matters which are to he provided by Standing Orders, and item 8 of the Schedule relates to " termination of employment, and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workman We may state here that the central Act contains a definition of " workman " which, at the material time in this case, meant any person employed in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical, labour for hire or reward, but did not include any member of the armed forces.
Sections 4 to 10 of the central Act deal with (a) conditions for certification of Standing Orders, (b) certification of Standing Orders, (e) appeals, (d) date of operation of Standing Orders, (e) register of Standing Orders, (f) posting of Standing Orders and (g) duration and modification of Standing Orders.
There are similar provisions in the local Act,Chapter IV of which deals with Standing Orders.
Sub section (1) of section 30 of the local Act lays down Every employer, in respect of any industry to which this Act has been made applicable under subsection (3) of section 1, shall, within two months of the (late of such notification, submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1.
" Item 8 of Schedule I of the local Act is again " termination of employment, notice to be given by employer and employee ".
The other sub sections of section 30 lay down the procedure to be followed for the approval of Standing Orders by the Labour Commissioner, appeal by an aggrieved person, etc.
Sections 31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an amendment of the Standing Orders either at the instance of the employer or at the 469 instance of a representative of employees.
It is worthy of note that sub section
(1) of section 30 requires every employer to submit to the Labour Commissioner a copy of the Standing Orders concerning the relations between him and his employees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1.
The local Act defines the expression " employee " and, at the relevant time, it meant any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry.
It is worthy of note that the definition of " employee " in the local Act corresponds more or less to the definition of " workman " under the central Act.
There are some minor differences in the definition of the two expres sions in the two Acts, but with those differences we are not concerned in the present case.
The Standing Orders with which we are concerned in the present case came into force on November 14, 1951, and it is convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant Standing Orders.
Standing Order No. 2 defines certain expressions used in the Standing Orders.
It states In these Orders, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context (a) " employees " means all persons, male or female, employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company, either at Nagpur or at Wardha whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters.
(b) " The Manager " means the person appointed as such and includes the Assistant Manager and in relation to Wardha establishment " the Resident Engineer ".
(c) " Ticket " includes a Card, pass or token.
(d) " Workman " means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be " Workman " by the Management ".
Standing Order No. 3 classifies employees into certain categories and Standing Order No. 4 deals with tickets.
In substance, it says that every workman, permanent 6 470 or temporary, shall have a ticket or card, and an apprentice shall have an apprentice card; the tickets or cards issued shall be surrendered when the workman is discharged or ceases to belong to the class of employment for which the card or ticket is issued.
It is to be noticed that under the definition clause " workman " means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared, to be workmen by the management and Standing Order No. 4 makes it clear that every workman, permanent or temporary, will have a ticket.
Standing Order No. 16 deals with termination of employment, and cl.
(1) thereof, relevant for our purpose, must be quoted in full " For terminating the employment of a permanent employee, a notice in writing shall be given either by the employer or the employee, giving one calendar month 's notice.
The reasons for the termination of the services will be communicated to the employee in writing, if he so desires at the time of discharge, unless such a communication, in the opinion of the Management, may directly or indirectly lay the company and the Management or the person signing the communication open to criminal or civil proceedings at the instance of the employee, or the Company 's Managing Director is satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business of the Company to disclose the reasons and so orders in writing.
" Now, it is not in dispute that the respondent is a 'workman ' within the meaning of the Central Act and an 'employee ' as defined in the local Act.
controversy before us is as to whether he is an employee ' within the meaning of the Standing Orders.
Admittedly, no ticket has been issued to the respondent by the Company; his ticket number cannot, therefore, be included in the departmental muster.
The learned Judges of the High Court held that the inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster was an essential characteristic of an ' employee ' as defined for the purpose of the Standing Orders, and the mere fact of employment in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power House or Receiving Station of the Company was not enough to make a, 471 person so employed an 'employee ' within the meaning of the Standing Orders, and as the respondent did not fulfil the necessary condition of having his name and ticket number included in the departmental ' muster, he was not an 'employee ' as defined for the Standing Orders, which did not therefore apply to him.
On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that regard being had to the context and the entire body of the Standing Orders, the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct, and on a proper construction, inclusion of the name and ticket number in the departmental muster is not an essential characteristic of an 'employee ' as defined for the Standing Orders.
It is rightly pointed out that if the possession of a ticket and a ticket number is taken as an essential characteristic of an ' employee ', then there is hardly any difference between an 'employee ' and a 'workman ' as defined in the Standing Orders; because a 'workmen ' means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be workmen, and under Standing Order No. 4 all workmen must have tickets.
If a person em ployed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an employee, and if workmen are such categories of employees as have tickets, the distinction between the two disappears and.
it is difficult to understand why two definitions were necessary.
On a consideration, however, of ' the subject or context of the Standing Orders, read in their entirety and in harmony with one another, it becomes at once clear why two definitions are necessary and what is the distinction between the two classes , employees ' and ' workmen ' in the landing Orders.
The expression ' employee ' denotes a larger group namely, all persons, male or females who are employed in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power House, or Receiving Station of the Company, either at Nagpur or Wardha. 'Workmen ' denotes a smaller group, viz., such categories of employees as have been declared to be workmen, and who must have a ticket.
Such a distinction is clearly intelligible in an industrial establishment, where for security and other reasons a system of tickets or passes is necessary for those who 472 work in the Power House or Mains Department or other places where essential machinery is installed while others, such as the clerical staff, may work in an office building where security demands are either nonexistent or much less insistent.
This distinction means that all 'workmen ' are 'employees ', but all ` employees ' are not 'workmen ' for the purpose of the Standing Orders, and the inclusion of ticket numbers in the departmental musters will be applicable to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued; but such inclusion is not an essential characteristic of an employee.
Let us now see if such a distinction is consistent with the Standing Orders as a whole.
Standing Order No. 3, which classifies employees, defines a probationer in cl.
(c) and says that a probationer means an employee who is appointed in a clear vacancy on probation for a period not exceeding twelve months, etc.
Standing Order No. 4 does not require the issue of a ticket to a probationer; yet a probationer is an employee.
It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do make a distinction between `employees ' and ` workmen ', and there may also be employees who have no tickets.
Some of the Standing Orders apply to workmen only, e. g., Standing Orders 12, 13, 14 and 15.
Other Standing Orders apply to all employees, whether they are workmen or not.
Standing Order No. 16 falls in the latter category ; it applies to all employees.
Standing Order No. 8 (b), we think, makes the position still more clear.
It says " Any employee, who after marking his attendance or presenting his ticket, card, or token, as the case may be, is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours without permission or without any sufficient reason, shall be liable to be treated as absent for the period of his absence.
" If every employee has to have a ticket, it is difficult to understand why this Standing Order should make a distinction between an employee who marks his attendance and another who presents his ticket, card or token.
Such a distinction is easily understandable when some employees do not possess a ticket, card or token, 473 so that they merely mark their attendance; while those who possess a ticket, card or token present it.
It has been suggested that Standing Order No. 4 is not exhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it talks of an issue of a ticket to every permanent workman, a card to every badli workman, a temporary ticket to every temporary workman, and an apprentice card to every apprentice.
It does not prescribe the issue of a pass or token, though the definition of a 'ticket ' includes a pass or token.
The suggestion further is that Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to other employees, so that there may be one kind of tickets issued to workmen under standing Order No. 4 and another kind of tickets to other employees under Standing Order No. 2 (a).
On this view, it, is suggested that the alternatives mentioned in Standing Order No. 8 (b) really amount to an option given to an employee either to mark his attendance or present his ticket.
It is, however, difficult to understand the necessity of an option of this kind when every employee must have a ticket, particularly when the exercise of such an option is likely to defeat the very purpose for which tickets are issued in an industrial establishment.
We do not, however, think that the case of the respondent is in any way strengthened by holding that Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself authorises the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen.
Even on that construction, the failure of the Company to issue tickets under Standing Order No. 2 (a) will not deprive the employees of their real status as employees and of the benefit of the Standing Orders.
The direction for the issue of tickets will, in that view of the Standing Order, be an enabling provision only and not an essential characteristic of an employee.
Further, Standing Order No. 4 provides for the surrender of tickets issued thereunder but Standing Order No. 2 (a), if it is construed as enabling the Company to issue tickets, makes no provision for the surrender of tickets when the employee ceases to be an employee.
This absence of any provision for surrender applicable to such tickets 474 clearly implies that issue of tickets is not contemplated by the Standing Order No. 2 (a) itself.
On behalf of the respondent, however, the main argument has been of a different character.
It has been argued that there need not be one set of Standing Orders for all employees, and the Standing Orders in question being confined to those employees to whom tickets had been issued, the respondent who had no ticket was outside their purview, and the result was that the Company had committed a breach of the statutory provision in section 30 of the local Act in the sense that no Standing Orders had been made in respect of the respondent and employees like him to whom tickets had not been issued.
It hag been argued that, therefore, no action could be taken against the respondent either under the Standing Orders or even under the ordinary law of master and servant.
We are unable to accept this argument as correct.
We have pointed out that the Standing Orders themselves make a distinction between 'employees ' and `work men ', and there may also be employees who have no tickets.
To hold that the Standing Orders apply to those employees only to whom tickets have been issued will make employees synonymous with workmen a result negatived by two separate definitions given in Standing Order No. 2.
The central Act as well as the local Act contemplate the making of Standing Orders for all employees in respect of matters which are required to be dealt with by Standing Orders.
The Standing Orders in question were not objected to as being defective or incomplete by workmen, and they have been approved by the appropriate authority and they must be construed with reference to their subject or context.
In the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, it should be held that they apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made.
We see no compelling reasons for holding that the Standing Orders do not apply to the respondent.
In our view, and having regard to the subject or context of the Standing Orders, the words whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters " in Standing Order No. 2 (a) do 475 not lay down any essential characteristic of employee and are applicable only in cases where tickets have been issued to an employee.
The essential content of the definition of an employee is employment in the Office, Mains Department, eta., of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha, and that of a workman the necessary declaration by the Company which would entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order No. 4.
There is also another relevant consideration which must be borne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question.
Section 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory obligation on the employer to make, Standing Orders in respect of all his employees and a breach of the statutory obligation involves a criminal liability.
That being so, the court would be justified, if it can reasonably do so, to construe the Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory obligation.
We are not unmindful of the principle that in construing a statutory provision or rule, every word occurring therein must be given its proper meaning and weight.
The necessity of such an interpretation is all the more important in a definition clause.
But even a definition clause must derive its meaning from the context or subject.
In Courts vs The Kent Waterworks Company (1), the question for consideration was the interpretation of the appeal clause in an Act for Paving, Cleansing, Lighting, etc., of the Town and Parish of Woolwich (47 Geo.
III, Sess. 2, cap.
By the 16th section of the statute, " the commissioners are to make rates upon all and every the person or persons who do or shall hold, occupy, possess, etc., any land within the parish ".
The statute also gave a right of appeal to any person or persons aggrieved by any rate.
, but the appeal clause required the person or persons appealing against a rate to enter into a recognisance; the question was if this requirement was intended to exclude corporations from the purview of the ap.
peal clause, as corporations, it was urged, cannot enter, into a recognisance.
In interpreting the appeal clause, Bayley J. observed (1) ; ; 476 "But assuming that they cannot enter into a recognizance, yet if they ire persons capable of being aggrieved by and appealing against a rate, I should say that that part of the clause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable of appealing, and that the other part of the clause which requires a recognizance to be entered into applies only to those persons who are capable of entering into a recognizance, but is inapplicable to those who are not." The same principle of interpretation was applied in Perumal Goundan vs The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi (1), in construing the Explanation to O. XXXIII, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says inter alia that " a person is a pauper. . when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit ".
The question was if the aforesaid provision applied to companies.
It was held that it would be wrong to construe the provision to mean that only persons who possess wearing apparel can sue as paupers.
We are of the view that the same rule of construction should apply in the present case, and the words " whose names and ticket numbers are included in the depart.
mental musters " occurring in Standing Order No. 2(a) should be read as " whose names and ticket numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters " and should apply in the case of those employees only who possess tickets and whose ticket numbers are capable of being entered in departmental musters; they are not intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued and consequently whose names only are so entered.
The learned Judges of the High Court were influenced by the circumstance that in an earlier case D. C. Dungore vs section section Dandige Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954 decided by the same High Court on September 23, 1955) the Company took tip the stand that the Standing Orders applied to employees to Whom tickets had been issued a stand different from and inconsistent with that taken in the present case, (1) Mad.
477 It may be pointed out, however, that 1).
C. Dungore of the earlier case was not an employee within the meaning of the relevant Act, and there could be no Standing Orders in respect of his conditions of service.
Moreover, in the matter of construction of a statutory provision no question of estoppel arises, and the learned Judges had pointed out that the respondent himself thought that the Standing Orders applied to all employees.
We have rested our decision as to the applicability of the Standing Orders not on what the appellants or the respondent thought at one time or another, but on a true construction of the Standing Orders themselves, including the definition clause in Standing Order No. 2(a).
We take the view that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent.
This is really decisive of the appeal, because if the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1), the writ application which the respondent made to the High Court must fail.
The learned Attorney General appearing for the appellants addressed us on the scope and ambit of article 226 of the Constitution, and he contended that even if the respondent had been wrongfully dismissed by his private employer, the proper remedy was by mean,,; of a suit and not by invoking the special writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
These contentions raise important questions, but we do not think that we are called upon to decide them in this case.
Lastly, it has been urged oil behalf of the respondent that even if we hold that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent, we should remand the case to the High Court for a decision on merits of other points raised by the respondent, because the question whether the Standing Orders apply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the High Court and no decision was given on other points.
We asked learned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain for decision oil his writ application, once it is held that the Standing Orders apply to the respondent and 6 478 his service has been terminated in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1).
Learned Advocate then referred us to Standing Order No. 18, which provides for penalties for misconduct, and submitted that the provisions thereof have not been complied with by the appellants.
He particularly referred to cl.
(e) of Standing Order No. 18 and submitted that the order of suspension passed against the respondent was in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein.
The short answer to this argument is that no penalty for mis conduct has been imposed on the respondent under Standing Order No. 18.
The Company paid his salary to the respondent from the date of suspension to January 31, 1956, which also showed that no order was passed by way of punishment for misconduct.
The Company chose to terminate the service of the respondent in accordance with Standing Order No. 16, and did not think fit to proceed against the respondent for any alleged misconduct, and it was open to the Company to do so.
So far as Standing Order no 16.
is concerned, all the requirements thereof have been complied with.
That being the position, no other point remains for decision in the present case.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The judgment and order of the High Court dated September 26, 1956, are set aside and the writ petition of the respondent is dismissed.
In view of the stand which the appellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to the Standing Orders, we think it proper to say in this case that the parties must bear their own costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The services of the respondent, an employee of the appellant company, were terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the company, approved by the appropriate authorities under the provisions of the , and the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
Standing Order NO. 2(a) defined " employees " as " all persons . employed in the Office or Mains Department or Stores or Power House or Receiving Station of the Company . whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters ".
The Standing Orders also defined the term " workman " and provided that every workman should have a ticket.
No ticket had been issued to the respondent by the company, and consequently his ticket number was not included in the departmental muster.
The respondent challenged the validity of the order terminating his services by an application made before the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution on the grounds, inter alia, that the Standing Orders in question were confined to those employees only to whom tickets were issued, and that as no ticket was issued to him he was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders which did not therefore apply to him and, consequently, the termination of his services under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal: Held, (1) that the words " whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters " occurring in Standing Order NO. 2 (a) should be read as " whose names and ticket numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters "; Cortis vs The Kent Water Works Company ; ; ; and Perumal Goundan vs The Thirumalarayapuram jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, Mad. 624, applied.
(2)that under the Standing Orders, in which a distinction is made between 'employees ' and 'workmen ', while every workman must have a ticket, there may be employees who may have no tickets the possession of which is not an essential characteristic of an employee; and, (3)that the Standing Orders apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been made.
464 Accordingly, the Standing Orders were applicable to the respondent and the termination of his service in accordance with Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and, therefore, the application made by him to the High Court must fail.


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 2086 (N) of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.1976 of the Rajasthan High Court in D .B.
Civil Misc.
Appeal No. 73 of 1970.
C.M. Lodha and H.M. Singh for the Appellants.
B.R. Sabharwal, P.R. Ramasesh and H. Wahi for the Re spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Rajasthan High Court affirming the award made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udaipur.
763 In the night between the 3rd and 4th December, 1966, Hari Singh, since deceased, the husband of the appellant No. 1 and the father of the appellant No. 2, hired an Ambassador car belonging to the.
Rajasthan Mahila Parishad for going to his native village at 'Kangeti in Madhya Pradesh from Udai pur in Rajasthan.
When the car had gone 21 miles from Udai pur, it collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction.
It skidded and hit against a tree.
As a result of the accident, Hari Singh died on the spot and one Shanker Lal who was also travelling in the same car and happened to be the friend of Hari Singh received some injuries.
At the time of his death, Hari Singh was only 25.
He left behind him his wife, the appellant No. 1 who was only 18 and the appellant No. 2, his daughter, then only a child.
The appellants filed a petition before the Motor Acci dent Claims Tribunal, Udaipur, claiming a sum of Rs. 1 lac as compensation.
The Tribunal came to the finding that the accident which resulted in the death of Hari Singh was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car.
The Tribunal disposed of the issue as to the claim of the appellants for compensation of Rs. 1 lac as follows: "Claimants of Case No. 3 of 1967 have claimed compensation of Rs. 1 lac which appears to be excessive.
In my opinion an amount of Rs. 10,000 would be adequate.
The issue is decided accordingly.
" The Tribunal has not given any reason why the claim of the appellants for compensation of Rs. 1 lac could not be accepted.
At this stage, it may be stated that the case of the Insurance Company which was the opposite party No. 3 before the Tribunal was that its liability was only up to a sum of Rs.4,000.
Issue No. 7 that was framed by the Tribunal relating to the liability of the Insurance Company is ex tracted below: "7.
Whether the liability of opposite party No. 3 cannot exceed Rs.4,000 in each case.
" The finding of the Tribunal on Issue No. 7 is as follows: "The learned counsel for the claimants conced ed that the liability of the Insurance Company could not exceed 764 Rs.4,000 in each case.
Issue is accordingly decided in favour of the Opposite Party No.3.
" Upon the said findings, the Tribunal made an award for Rs. 10,000 in favour of the appellants against the opposite parties including the Rajasthan Mahila Parishad and the driver of the truck assessing the liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.4,000 only.
Being aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, the appel lants preferred an appeal to the Rajasthan High Court chal lenging only the adequacy of the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal.
A cross objection was also filed by the Rajasthan Mahila Parishad, the owner of the car.
The High Court, as stated already, affirmed the award and dis missed the appeal and the cross objection.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
The first point that has been urged by Mr. Lodha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, is that the High Court was not justified in affirming the award of the Tribunal for Rs. 10,000 only as compensation.
It appears from the evidence of the appellant No. 1 that the father of the deceased had a dairy farm, a poultry farm, a flour mill and an agricultural farm.
The deceased used to look after the business and his monthly income was about Rs. 1,000 and that out of the said income, about Rs.700 used to be spent and the total saving was only Rs.300 a month.
As against this evidence, no evidence was led by the respond ents regarding the income of the deceased.
The High Court, in affirming the award of the Tribunal as to the quantum of compensation observed as follows: "It appears to us from the evidence so led by the claimants that Hari Singh at the time of his death was in fact a student and may be that whenever he could spare time, he looked after the various business activities of his father which according to Rajendra Kumari are still running.
He had devoted himself to the family business and had no prospects whatever dependent upon education.
While estimating the benefits derived from the various business activities one cannot lose sight of the con tingencies of losses and fluctuations in income that occur in such types of business.
We do realise that the loss of a husband to a young Rajput girl is something which no amount of money can compensate, yet in the circum stances of the case, we do not find 765 that the amount of compensation fixed by the Tribunal was too high or too low.
We feel ' that it represents the just and proper compen sation.
" We are unable to understand the reasons given by the High Court in finding that the amount of compensation as awarded by the Tribunal was quite adequate.
The High Court has not disbelieved the evidence of the appellant No. 1 that her husband had an income of Rs. 1,000 a month.
It is true that Hari Singh was a student at the time of his death, but he was also looking after the business of his father and earning a sum of Rs. 1,000 a month.
There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the appellant No. 1 about the income of Hari Singh.
Even at the modest computation, the contribution of Hari Singh towards his family could not he less than Rs.500 per month, that is, Rs.6,000 per year.
Taking the normal span of life to be 60 years, Hari Singh would have lived for another 35 years.
It is apparent that the appellants have been deprived of more than a lac of rupees and, accordingly, their claim for Rs. 1 lac on account of compensation was quite reasonable.
Both the Tribunal and the High Court were not justified in assessing the amount of compensation pay able to the appellants at Rs. 10,000 only.
The next question is as to the liability of the Insur ance Company, the respondent No. 4 herein.
It has been already noticed that the appellants conceded before the Tribunal that the liability of the Insurance Company did not exceed the sum of Rs.4, '000.
Indeed, as the law stood at the material time, the maximum liability of the Insurance Compa ny in such a case was only to the tune of Rs.4,000.
In the appeal before the High Court, the appellants did not chal lenge the finding of the Tribunal that the statutory liabil ity of the Insurance Company was Rs.4,000 Only as conceded to by the appellants.
For the first time in this Court, it is submitted that the respondent No. 4 is liable for the entire amount of compensation.
It is urged by Mr. Lodha appearing for the appellants that it was incumbent upon the respondent No. 4 to file before the Tribunal the policy of Insurance in order to show that apart from the statutory liability up to Rs.4,000, the respondent No. 4 had no fur ther liability under the policy in excess of the statutory liability.
In support of the contention, much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Jugal Kishore & Ors.
, In that case, it has been observed that where the Insurance Company concerned wishes to take a defence in a claim petition that its liability 766 is not in excess of the statutory liability, it.
should ' file a copy of the Insurance policy along with its defence.
This decision, in our opinion, is not applicable to the facts of the instant case.
It has been already noticed that before the Tribunal the appellants had categorically admit ted that the liability of the Insurance Company extended to Rs.4,000 only.
In the circumstances, we do not think that it was incumbent upon the Insurance Company to file the policy.
The contention made on behalf of the appellants is, accordingly, rejected.
In the result, we direct that the appellants are enti tled to a sum of Rs. 1 lac (Rupees one lac only) on account of compensation.
Out of the said sum, the Insurance Company, the respondent No. 4, is liable to pay Rs.4,000 only and the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 including the Rajasthan Mahila Parishad are jointly and severally liable to pay to the appellants the remaining amount.
The respondent shall depos it the decretal amount to the extent of their respective liabilities in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udaipur, within two months .from date; in default, the decretal amount or so much thereof as will remain outstanding will bear interest at twelve per cent per annum till realisation.
The appeal is allowed.
The judgment and decree of the High Court are modified to the extent indicated above, There will be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeal al lowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Appellants 1 and 2 are the wife and daughter respective ly of the deceased who died in a road accident, while trav elling in a hired car, which collided with a truck.
He died on the spot.
At the time of his death he was 25.
Appellants filed a petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal claiming a compensation of Rs.1 lac.
The Tribunal 's finding was that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the car.
Without giving reasons, the Tribunal awarded only Rs.10,000 against the owner of the car and the truck driver, and also assessed the liability of the Insurance Company to the extent of Rs.4,000.
Against the award the appellants filed an appeal to the High Court challenging the adequacy of the compensation awarded.
The owner of the car filed a cross objection.
The High Court affirmed the award and dismissed the appeal, as also the cross objection, stating that the compensation awarded was just and proper.
This appeal, by special leave, is against the High Court 's judgment affirming the Tribunal 's award.
On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that High Court was not justified in affirming the Tribunal 's award of only Rs. 10,000 as compensation.
Allowing the appeal, HELD: 1.
The appellants are entitled to a sum of Rs.l lac on account of compensation.
Out of this amount the Insurance Company, i.e., Respondent No. 4 is liable to pay Rs.4,000 and the other respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay to the appellants the remaining amount.
[766C] 762 2.
It is true that the deceased was a student at the time of his death, but he was also looking after the busi ness of his father and earning about Rs.l,O00 a month.
Even at the modest computation, the contribution of the deceased towards his family could not be less than Rs.500 per month, i.e. Rs.6,000 per year.
Taking the normal span of life to be 60 years, he would have lived for another 35 years.
It is apparent that the appellants have been deprived of more than a lac of rupees and, accordingly their Claim for Rs.l lac on account of compensation was quite reasonable.
Both the Tribunal and the High Court were not justified in assessing the amount of compensation payable to the appellants at Rs. 10,000 only.
[765B D] 3.
As the law stood at the material time, the maximum liability of the Insurance Company in such a case was only to the tune of Rs.4,000.
In the appeal before the High Court, the appellants did not challenge the finding of the Tribunal that the statutory liability of the Insurance Company was Rs.4,000 only as conceded to by the appellants themselves.
In the circumstances, it Was not incumbent upon the Insurance Company to file the policy.
[766A B] National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Jugal Kishore & Ors., , distinguished.
[This Court directed that the decretal amount should be paid within two mouths and in case of default, it will bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum till realisation.] [766D]


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 2 193 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 706 of 1973.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale and Ashok Grover for the Appellant.
R.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.N. SAIKIA, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the appellant 's regular second appeal No. 706 of 1973 dismissing the appeal and allowing the respondent 's civil writ petition against the order passed by the Assistant Collector.
Late Wg.
K.K. Majumdar, of the Indian Air Force, father of the appellant laid down his life during the second world war.
He was conferred a gallantary award posthumously by the Government wherewith 442 Kanals and 10 Marlas of land bearing Chak Nos.
535 G V situated in Tehsil and District Layallpur was granted to him and was allotted to the appel lant Shri S.K. Majumdar who took possession on July 24, 1947.
Consequent to the partition of the country the family of 820 late Wg.
K.K. Majumdar had to migrate to India where the Government allotted 69 standard acres and 2 units of land to the appellant in Village Dhogri, Tehsil and District Jullundhur as compensation for the land left behind at Layallpur, Pakistan.
Out of this land 19 standard acres came under possession of the respondent Malik Labhu Masih (now deceased) as a tenant.
On February 26, 1961 Malik Labhu Masih filed an applica tion under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ', to the Assistant Collector stating that he was a tenant in respect of the land in question and should be granted permission to purchase it.
As per order of the Assistant Collector Grade I, Jullundhur dated 15th January, 1962 the said Labhu Masih was granted the requisite permission subject to the payment of Rs.21,007.88 P. in 10 equal half yearly instalments of Rs.2100.80 P. each.
The appellant appealed therefrom to the Collector Jullundhur who upheld the permission to purchase but enhanced the amount payable to the appellant as landlord to Rs.23,133.53 P.
During the pendency of the said proceed ings the appellant moved an application under section 9 read with section 14A of the Act for ejectment of the respondent and obtained an order on 27th September, 1961.
The respond ent moved a revision petition before the Commissioner in the proceedings initiated under section 18 of the Act and the Commissioner made recommendation to the Financial Commis sioner for setting aside the orders of the Assistant Collec tor and the ColleCtor allowing the purchase of land by the respondent on the ground that the application of the appel lant for ejectment of the respondent had since been allowed.
The Financial Commissioner accordingly set aside the order of purchase.
The respondent impugned that order in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in writ petition No. 1158 of 1963 and the High Court quashed that order on 30th August, 1966.
On July 3, 1970 the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for possession of the lands contending that the respondent had entered on a part of the land as tenant and subsequently applied for purchase of the land under section 18 of the Act but by virtue of section 19 DD of the Act, which was inserted on August 3, 1968 with retrospective effect, the suit property of gallantry award was exempted from the provisions of the ' Act and as such the respondent could not purchase the land under section 18 of the Act and the orders passed by the Assistant Collector as also of High Court were nullity and the respondent was consequently liable to be ejected.
The trial court dismissed the suit.
The appellant 's appeal therefrom was also having been dis missed by the Additional District Judge Jullundhur, the appellant preferred second appeal to the High 821 Court of Punjab and Haryana which also dismissed the appeal holding that section 19 DD of the Act was not applicable to the suit land and the tenant could purchase it under section 18.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High Court was in error in holding that the land in question having been granted to the appellant S.K. Majumdar, the landlord, in the year 1946 the same could not be said to be covered by the provisions of section 19 DD of the Act.
We are inclined to agree.
Though the Memorandum No. 2354 C Lahore, dated the 30th March, 1946 from D.S.D. to the Commissioner, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions on the subject Award of land in the Punjab for acts of gallantry in the field ' with reference to Punjab Government Memorandum No. 3583 C dated 30th November, 1944 contained the instruc tions to allot two squares rectangles of land to the heir of the grantee noted in the margin in accordance with the orders contained in the aforesaid Memorandum, and showed the appellant Shri S.K. Majumdar, it could not been said that the grant itself was to the appellant.
The said Memorandum No. 3583 C dated 30th November, 1944 clearly showed that the Government had decided that in the case of posthumous grants allotments would be made to the heirs in the following order: "(a) the male lineal descendants of the de ceased in the male line of descent.
" I, having not been in dispute that the appellant S.K. Majum dar was the male lineal descendant of the deceased Wg.
K.K. Majumdar, the allotment was to be made in his name and hence it was done so.
Section 19 DD of the Act which was inserted by the Punjab Act No. 12 of 1968 and was to be deemed always to have been inserted said: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any land is granted for gallantry at any time before the 26th day of January, 1950 to any member of the armed forces, wheth er maintained by the Central Government or by any Indian State, then, so long as such land or, any portion thereof, as the case may be, has not passed from the original grantee into more than three successive hands by inheri tance or bequest, and is held by the grantee, or any of such hands, such land or portion, as the case may be, shall 822 not be taken into account on computing the surplus area under this Act, nor shall any tenant of such land or portion have the right to purchase it under section 18.
Provided that where such land or portion has passed into more than three such hands and the person holding such land or portion, immediately before the 3rd August, 1967, is a person to whom it has passed by inheritance or bequest, the exemption under this section shall apply, to such land or portion thereof, as the case may be, during the life time of such person.
" From the language of this section and from the fact that the date of the award of the grant of the land for gallantry having been before the 26th day of January, 1950 so long as such land or, any portion thereof, as the case may be, had not passed from the original grantee into more than three successive hands by inheritance or bequest and was held by the grantee, or any of such hands, such land or portion, as the case may be, should not be taken into account on comput ing the surplus area under the Act.
nor shall any tenant of such land or portion have the right to purchase it under section 18.
Mr. R.K. Garg the learned counsel for the respondents, while not refuting the proposition of law, points out that the land in respect of which the respondent has obtained the order of purchase as tenant is not the land granted to Wg.
K.K. Majumdar for gallantry award.
That land was in Layallpur and the suit land in respect of which the respond ent acquired socially beneficial right of purchase is situ ate at village Dhogri Tehsil and District Jullundhur in the State of Punjab and as such it cannot be exempted under section 19 DD.
Dr. Chitale answers that this land was given as compensation for the gallantry award land left behind by the awardee family at Layallpur as a result of partition of the country and as such equity demands that privilege of exemption should be acquired by the compensation land.
Besides, Dr. Chitale submits, that equity is in favour of the appellant who has acquired the right to purchase as tenant in occupation after a long time.
We are referred to the provisions of the .
It is an Act to provide for the payment of compensation and reha bilitation grants to displaced persons and for matters connected therewith.
We have not been shown in it any provi sion to the effect that any land given as compensation to 823 a displaced person for loss of gallantry award land may imbibe the convent of exemption available under section 19 DD of the Act.
We are consequently of the view that there is no basis for holding that the exemption in respect of the gallantry award land will be available in respect of the land given under the as compensation for the loss thereof.
We find no infirmity in the High Court judgment on this count.
Equity is being claimed by both the parties.
Under the circumstances we have no other alternative but to let the loss lie where it falls.
As the maxim is, 'in aequali jure, melior est conditio possidentis '.
Where the equities are equal, the law should prevail.
The respondent 's right to purchase must, therefore, prevail.
In the result, this appeal fails and hence dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
The stay order stands vacated.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The father of the appellant was conferred a gallantry award posthumously by the Government wherewith a piece of land situated in Lyallpur district was granted to him, and was allotted to the appellant who took possession on July 24, 1947.
Consequent to the partition of the country the family migrated to India where the Government allotted about 69 standard acres of land in Jullundur district as compensa tion for the land left behind in Pakistan.
Out of this land 19 standard acres came under the possession of the respond ent as a tenant.
On February, 1961 the respondent filed an application under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 to the Assistant Collector stating that he was a tenant in respect of the aforesaid land and should be granted permis sion to purchase the same.
The Assistant Collector granted the requisite permission subject to the payment of Rs.21,007.88P in ten equal half yearly instalments.
The appellant appealed to the Collector who upheld the permis sion to purchase, but enhanced the amount payable to the appellant as landlord.
During the pendency of these proceedings the appellant moved an application under section 9 read with section 14A of the Act for ejectment of the 818 respondent and obtained an order an 27th September, 1961.
The respondent moved a revision petition before the Commissioner in the proceedings initiated under section 18 of the Act, and the Commissioner made a recommendation to the Financial Commissioner for setting aside the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Collector allowing the purchase of land by the respondent on the ground that the application of the appellant for the ejectment of the respondent had since been allowed.
The Financial Commissioner, set aside the order of purchase.
The respondents ' writ petition chal lenging this order was allowed and the High Court quashed that order on 30th August, 1966.
On July 3, 1970 the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for possession of the land contending that the respondent had entered on a part of land as tenant and subsequently applied for the purchase of the land under section 18, but by virtue of section 19 DD of the Act inserted on August 3, 1968 with retrospective effect, the suit property of gallantry award was exempted from the provisions of the Act.
The Trial court dismissed the suit.
The order was affirmed in appeal by the Additional District Judge, and the second appeal to the High Court was also dismissed holding that section 19 DD of the Act was applicable to the suit land and the tenant could purchase it under section 18.
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was in error in holding that the land in question having been granted to the appel lant, the landlord in the year 1946 the same could not be said to be covered by the provisions of section 19 DD of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953.
It was also contended that equity is in favour of the appellant as the land was as compensation for the gallantry award land left by the awardee family at Layallpur as a result of partition of the country, and that the privilege of exemption should be acquired by the compensation land, and that the appellant has acquired the right to purchase as a tenant in occupation after a long time.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1.
From the language of section 19 DD of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 which was inserted by the Punjab Act No. 12 of 1968 and from the fact that the date of the award of the grant of the land for gallantry having been before the 26th day of January, 1950 so long as such land or, any portion thereof, had not passed from the original grantee into more than three successive 819 hands by inheritance or bequest, and was held by the gran tee, or any of such hands, such land or portion, as the case may be, should not be taken into account in computing the surplus area under the Act, nor shall any tenant of such land or portion have the right to purchase it under section 18.
[822C D] 1.2.
There is no basis for holding that the exemption in respect of the gallantry award land will be available in respect of the land given under the as compensation for the loss thereof.
There is no infirmity in the High Court judgment on this Court.
[823A B] 1.3.
Equity is being claimed by both the parties.
Under the circumstances there is no other alternative but to let the loss lie where it fails.
As the maxim is, 'in aequali jure, melior est conditio possidentis ' Where the equities are equal, the law should prevail the respondent 's right to purchase must, therefore, prevail.
[823B C]