judgement:
il Appeal No,.
1084 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th September, 1976 of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 390/76 S.L. Bhatia and H.K. Puri for the Appellants.
Pogeshwar Prasad and (Miss) Rani Arora and Meera Bali for Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J.
This appeal by special leave raises a question of some interest and importance for decision.
The question is whether the provisions of the Slum Areas (Im provement and Clearance) Act, 96 of 1956, override those of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958.
If they do, no person can institute any suit or proceeding for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area without the previous permission in writing of the competent authori ty.
For the sake of brevity we will refer to these two enactments as the "Slum Clearance Act" and the "Delhi Rent Act" respectively.
The respondent is a government servant employed in the Railway Ministry (Railway Board) and was in that capacity occupying quarters allotted to him by the Government at Nanakpura, New Delhi.
By a letter dated December 24, 1975 the Assistant Director of Estates called upon the respondent to vacate the quarters on or before December 31, 1975 on the ground that he owned a residential house and was, therefore, liable to vacate the premises allotted to.
him by the Gov ernment.
The respondent was paying to the Government a monthly rent of Rs. 65.05 but since he did not vacate the premises as required, the Government started charging him after January 1, 1976 a monthly rent of Rs. 509.50 at the market rate.
The respondent owns a house bearing No. 5014, Ward No. XII, at Roshanara Road, New Delhi.
A part of that house is in the occupation of the appellants at a monthly rent of Rs. 6.25.
On being asked to vacate the official quarters, the respondent gave to the appellants a notice to quit and followed it up by filing an application for eviction against them under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act.
On March 12, 1976 the appellants filed before the Rent Controllor 11 1546 SC1/76 424 an affidavit under section 25B(4) of the Delhi Rent Act, setting out the grounds on which they sought to contest the applica tion for eviction and asking for leave to contest it.
One of such grounds was that the application was not maintain able since the respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority under section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act, the house being situated in a slum area.
By his order dated April 28, 1976 the Rent Controller rejected the application of the appellants for leave to contest the ejectment appli cation filed by the respondent.
As a sequiter, the Rent Controller passed an order on the same date stating that since the appellants ' application for leave to contest the ejectment application was rejected, respondent was enti tled to a decree for eviction.
The appellants were asked to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respond ent within two months of the order.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellants filed Civil Revision Application No. 390 of 1976 in the Delhi High Court, under the proviso to section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Act.
By reason of section 25B(8), no appeal or second appeal lies against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Rent Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in section 25B. The proviso confers power on the High Court, for the purposes of satisfying itself that an order made by the Rent Controller under section 25B is according to law, to call for the record of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
The revision application was heard by a learned single Judge of the High Court who, following his own earlier judgment in Civil Revision Application No. 280 of 1976, dismissed it, giving rise to this appeal.
A question was raised before the High Court as to wheth er at the relevant time the respondent was in occupation of the premises allotted to him by the Government, but it was not disputed before us that he was in occupation of the premises allotted to him by the Government when he filed the present proceedings for eviction of the appellants.
Thus, the only question which arises before us is whether, the premises being situated in the slum area, the application for eviction filed by the respondent is not maintainable for the reason that before filing it he had not obtained permis sion of the competent authority as required by section 19(1) of the Slum Clearance Act.
The landlord tenant relationship in Delhi was governed formerly by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 38 of 1952.
That Act, in so far as it applied to the Union terri tory of Delhi, was repealed by section 57 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958.
This latter Act was passed in order to provide a suitable machinery for expeditious adjudication of proceedings between landlords and tenants; to provide for the determination of standard rent payable by tenants; and to give to the tenants a large measure of protection against eviction.
Section 14 of the Act of 1958 affords to tenants substantially the same measure of protec tion which was available to them under section 13 of the Act of 1952.
425 While the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act of 1952 was in force, the Parliament enacted the , 96 of 1956, in order "to provide for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union territories" including Delhi, and "for the protection of tenants in such areas from ' eviction".
Section 19(1) of that Act, as originally enacted, made all decrees and orders for eviction of tenants in.
slum areas unexecutable, except with the previous permission in writing of the compe tent authority.
The vires of section 19 was challanged in Jyoti Pershad vs The Administrator for the Union territory of Delhi(1) on the ground that it violated articles 14 and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution.
The challenge was repelled by this Court on the ground that section 19 did not offend against the equal protection of laws guaranteed by article 14, that section 19(1) gave enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion and that the restrictions imposed by section 19 could not be said to be unreasonable.
Adverting to the non obstante clauses in secs.
19 (1) and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act and in sec.
38 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, the Court observed that the provisions of the former Act must, in respect of buildings in slum areas, operate in addition to the provisions of the latter Act.
Section 19(1) of the Slum Clearance Act was amended by Act 43 of 1964 which came into force on February 28, 1965.
Whereas under the unamended provision no person could exe cute any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, under the amended provision no person can, except with such permission, insti tute after the amendment any suit or proceeding for obtain ing any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area.
If such a decree or order was obtained before the amendment it cannot be execut ed without the requisite permission.
For a proper appreciation of the question involved in this appeal, it is necessary to notice the relevant provi sions of the two Acts under consideration.
We will refer first to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act and then to those of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
The former Act being of the year 1956 is anterior in point of time to the latter which was passed in 1958 but the more decisive provisions of the latter Act with which we are directly concerned in this appeal were incorporated in that Act in 1976.
The relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act are these: "section 19.
Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken without permission of the competent authority. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, (a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clear ance) Amendment Act, (1) ; 426 1964, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or (b) Where any decree or order is ob tained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order.
(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub section (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and contain ing such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of such application, the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the .circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission.
(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub section (3), the competent authority shall take into account the following factors, namely : (a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted; (b) whether the eviction is in the inter est of improvement and clearance of the slum areas; (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.
(5) where the competent authority re fuses to grant the, permission, it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant." "section 39.
Act to override other laws.
The provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder shah have.
effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.
" Having noticed the relevant provisions of the Slum Clearance Act we must refer to the following provisions of the Delhi Rent Act: "section 14(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for 427 the recovery of possession off the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the land lord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the prem ises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub section (1) on the ground speci fied in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.
(7) Where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession there of before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.
" "section 14A.
Right to recover immediate posses sion of premises to accrue to certain persons. (1) Where a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Gov ernment or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns, in the Union terri tory of Delhi, a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent Child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord, notwithstanding anything con tained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him: . " "S.25A. Provisions of this Chapter to have overriding effect.
The provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law, for the time being in force." "25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction. (1 ) Every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 428 14, or under section 14A, shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this section.
(4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid.
(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affi davit filed by the tenant discloses.
such facts ' as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of posses sion of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A. (6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable . " "25C. Act to have effect in a modified form in relation to certain persons. (1) Nothing contained in sub section (6) of section 14 shall apply to a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required by, or in pursuance of, an order made by that Govern ment or authority to vacate such residential accommodation, or, in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or depend ent child in the Union territory of Delhi.
(2) In the case of a landlord who, being a person of the category specified in sub sec tion (1), has obtained, on the ground speci fied in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions of subsec tion (7) of section 14 shall have effect as if for the words "six months" occurring therein, the words "two months" were substituted".
"section 54.
Nothing in this Act shah affect the provisions of the Administration of Evacu ee Property Act, 1950, or the , 429 1956, or the Delhi Tenants ' (Temporary Protec tion) Act, 1956.
" Sections 14A, 25A, 25B, and 25C were introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by Ordi nance 24 of 1975 which came into force on December 1, 1975.
The Ordinance was later replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment)Act, 18 of 1976, which was given effect from the date of the ordinance.
Sec tions 25A, 25B and 25C are contained in a newly introduced chapter, IIIA, called "Sum mary Trial of Certain Applications".
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has raised the following points: (1) Section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act does nothing more than to.
confer a right on a class of landlords to sue for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, which right was not available to that class under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 of that Act.
A person occupying premises allotted to him by the Government could not before the enactment of section 14A evict his own tenant because, so long as he was in possession of the accom modation allotted to him by the Government he could not satisfy the requirement of clause (e) that he should have no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; (2) Since section 14A merely furnishes one more cause of action in addition to the existing ones for which a landlord can obtain possession of, the premises let out by him, there is no reason why the application of the Slum Clear ance Act should be excluded in regard to proceedings arising out of the right conferred by section 14A, particularly when the right con ferred by the various clauses of the proviso to section 14(1) is plainly subject to the provi sions of the Slum Clearance Act; (3) Section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act expressly saves.
the operation of the Slum Clearance Act and since section 14A is incorporated into the Delhi Rent Act, the Slum Clearance Act would prevail over it; (4) In view of the non obstante clauses contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clear ance Act and section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act, every proceeding for eviction of a tenant under the Delhi Rent Act is subject to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act; (5) The Slum Clearance Act being a special act, the object of which is to afford an additional protection to tenants residing in slum areas, its provisions must have precedence over the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act which is in the nature of a general enactment governing the landlord tenant relationship.
The Slum Clearance Act applies only to notified locali ties in Delhi while the Delhi Rent Act is of general application to the entire territory of Delhi; (6) If it were intended that despite the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act, proceedings arising out of a right conferred by section 14A should not be subordinated to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act, nothing would have been easier for the legislature than to provide in section 14A itself or in the newly introduced Chapter IIIA that to such proceedings the provisions of the Slum Clear ance Act would have no application; and (7) To .deny precedence to the Slum Clearance Act over the Delhi Rent Act in matters arising out of section 14A or Chapter IIIA is to repeal the former Act by implication, pro tanto.
Law disfavours the doctrine of implied repeal.
430 Having considered these submissions carefully we are unable to accept any one of them.
It would not be condu cive to an adequate exposition or a proper understanding of the issues involved in the case to consider the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants seriatim.
The points raised by the appellants ' counsel are interdependent and since they depend for their validity on the thesis that the Slum Clearance Act must in any event have precedence over the Delhi Rent Act in all matters arising under the latter Act, it would be helpful to deal straight away with that contention.
Section 14A, and Chapter IlI A containing sections 25A, 25B and 25C, were introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by Ordi nance 24 of 1975 which was later replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 18 of 1976.
The amending Act was given effect from the date on which the ordinance was pub lished, namely, from December 1, 1975.
By section 25B every application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A has be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in the section.
Section 25A, which is the first of the collocation of sec tions appearing in Chapter IIIA, provides that the provi sions of that Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force.
The marginal note to section 25A reads: "provisions of this Chapter to have overriding effect." Section 25A may for convenience be split up into two parts, ignoring for the present purpose the reference to rules made under Chapter IIIA.
In the first place, that section provides that.
the provisions of Chapter IIIA con taining sections 25A, 25B and 25C shall have an overriding effect over every other provision of the Delhi Rent Act which is inconsistent with anything contained in Chapter IIIA.
Secondly, section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall also have overriding effect over anything incon sistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.
It is patent that by virtue of the first part of section 25A, the provisions of Chapter IIIA must prevail over the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act.
The reason is that to the extent to which section 54 saves the opera tion of the Slum Clearance Act, it is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter IIIA which prescribes a special proce dure for dealing with applications for eviction filed under clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act.
It is equally clear that by reason of the second part of section 25A also, the provisions of Chapter IIIA would prevail over those of the Slum Clearance Act.
The reason is that the relevant provisions of that Act devise an over riding procedure by reason of which no suit or proceeding can be instituted without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority.
Sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act are to that extent inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act and have to be subordinated to it.
The object of section 14A, as shown by its marginal note, is to confer a right on certain landlords to recover "immediate possession of premises" belonging to them and which are in the possession of their 431 tenants.
In the significant language of the.
marginal note, such a right is "to accrue" to a class of persons.
The same concept is pursued and clarified in the body of section 14A by providing that in the contingencies mentioned in the section, a right will accrue to the landlord "to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him".
The argument which was presented to us on the use of the word "immediately" in the body of section 14A has thus no substance.
The right conferred by section 14A has to be enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA.
That is the prescription of section 25B(1).
In order expressly to exclude the operation of all provisions inconsistent with Chapter IIIA whether such provisions are contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law like the Slum Clearance Act, section 25A was put on the statute book.
That section gives an over riding effect to the provisions of Chapter IIIA.
But the legislature did not rest content by providing merely that the procedural provisions contained in Chapter IIIA would have such over riding effect.
It took the precaution of making an additional provision in section 14A itself that on and from the date of the order passed by the Central Government or any local authority calling upon a per son to vacate the residential accommodation allotted to him, there shall accrue to such person a right to recover immediately the possession of any premises let out by him, "notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary . "The provisions of section 14A must, there fore, prevail over anything contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in the Slum Clearance Act.
In December 1975 when Ordinance 24 of 1975 was promul gated and later when the ordinance was replaced by Act 18 of 1976 the legislature was cognisant that by reason of the provisions contained in section 54 Of the Delhi Rent Act and further by reason of those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act, this latter Act would prevail over all other laws.
As a result, no proceeding could be insti tuted for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area nor could any decree or order be executed against the tenant of any such building or land, without the previous permission in writing of the competent authority.
The object of the legis lature in incorporating the non obstante clause both in sections 14A and 25A of the Delhi Rent Act was to free the proceed ings arising out of the right newly conferred by section 14A and falling within Chapter IIIA, from the restraint imposed by section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act and from the operation of section 39 thereof.
The reason for releasing such proceedings from the pre condition imposed by the Slum Clearance Act is that if the Government or the local authority asks a person to vacate the premises allotted to him by it on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, a provision ought to be made to enable such a person to obtain immedi ately the possession of his own house if it be in the occupation of a tenant.
To subject this facility to the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act, under which 432 the competent authority can grant the requisite permission only by applying the tests prescribed in section 19(4), would be to make illusory the right conferred by section 14A on the allot tee to obtain "immediate possession" of the premises let out by him to his tenant.
It is with a view to making that right truly effective that the legislature gave it prece dence over anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Delhi Rent Act itself or in any other Act like the Slum Clearance Act.
It is noteworthy that whereas section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IIIA over anything "inconsistent therewith" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force, section 14A does not qualify the overriding effect of what is contained therein, that is in section 14A, in reference to anything "inconsistent" therewith contained either in the Delhi Rent Act itself or in any other law.
Section 14A provides that there shall accrue a right to the lanlord to recover immediately possession of any premises.
let out by him notwithstanding "anything" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law for the time being in force.
In the context, the word "anything" would ordinarily mean "anything to the contrary", but the point of the matter is that the legislature.
has expressed its intention clearly and unequivocally in more than one way, that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act would have precedence over anything else contained in that Act itself or in any other law.
Section 25C contained in Chapter IIIA points in the same direction.
Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Act provides that where a landlord has acquired any premises by trans fer, no application for the recovery of possession thereof shall lie under sub section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.
A person who acquires by allotment any premises from the Central Government or a local authority would, by reason of section 14(6), be disabled .from asking for possession of his own house from his tenant under section 14A, before the expiry of five years from the date of allotment.
In order that the object of section 14A may not be frustrated, section 25C provides that nothing contained in section 14(6) shall apply to a landlord who is in possession of premises allotted to him by the Central Government or a local authority and who is required to vacate that residential accommodation.
Section 14(7) of the Delhi Rent Act provides that where an order for the recovery of possession is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub sec.
(1), the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.
Sub section (2) of section 25C reduces the period of six months to 'two months, which again emphasises that the object of the legislature is to confer a real, effective and immediate right on a class of landlords to obtain possession of premises let out by them to their tenants.
Whatever be the merits of that philosophy, the theory is that an allottee from the Central Government or a local authority should not be at the mercy of law 's delays while being faced with instant eviction by his landlord save on payment of what in practice is penal rent.
Faced with a Hobson 's choice, to quit the official residence or pay the market rent for it, the allottee had in turn to be afforded 433 a quick and expeditious remedy against his own tenant.
With that end in view it was provided that nothing, not even the Slum Clearance Act, shall stand in the way of the allottee from evicting his tenant by resorting to.
the summary proce dure prescribed by Chapter IIIA.The tenant is even de prived of the elementary right of a defendant to defend a proceeding brought against him, save on obtaining leave of the Rent Controller.
If the leave is refused, by section 25B(4) the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord is entitled to an order for eviction.
No appeal or second appeal lies against that order.
Section 25B(8) denies that right and provides instead for a revision to the High Court whose jurisdiction is limited to finding out whether the order complained of is according to law.
Speaking generally, the object and purpose of a legisla tion assume greater relevance if the language of the law is obscure and ambiguous.
But, it must be stated that we have referred to the object of the provisions newly introduced into the Delhi Rent Act in 1975 nor for seeking light from it for resolving an ambiguity, for there is none, but for a different purpose altogether.
When two or more laws oper ate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will over ride those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of inter pretation arise.
Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration.
A piquant situation, like the one before us, arose in Shri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd., (1) the competing statutes being the Banking Companies Act, 1949 as amended by Act 52 of 1953,and the Displaced persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951.
Sec tion 45A of the Banking Companies Act, which was introduced by the amending Act of 1953, and section 3 of the Displaced Persons Act 1951 contained each a non obstante clause, providing that certain provisions would have effect "not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force . " This Court resolved the conflict by considering the object and purpose of the two laws and giving precedence to the Banking Companies Act by observing: "It is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two Acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy under lying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. "(p. 615).
Asc indicated by us the special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act would be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act requiring permission of the compe tent authority were to prevail over them.
Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the contrary contained in the Slum Clearance Act.
For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied through the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the (1) ; 434 factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law.
That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.
Section 14A and Chapter IIIA having been enacted with effect from December 1, 1975 are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act which, in its present form, was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28, 1965 and in reference to section 39 of the same Act, which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed.
The legislature gave over riding effect to section 14A and Chapter IIIA with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy.
Therefore the later enactment must prevail over the former.
The same test was mentioned with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Narain 's case (Supra) at page 615.
Relying strongly on the finding at p. 151 in Jyoti Prasad 's case (supra) that "the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act," counsel for the appellants argues that the question of precedence as between the two Acts is concluded by that decision and we must therefore hold that the con flicting provisions of the two Acts must operate together with equal efficacy, with the result that the previous permission of the competent authority under the Slum Clear ance Act must be obtained before instituting any proceeding under Chapter IIIA of the Delhi Rent Act.
This submission overlooks that in Jyoti Prasad 's case (supra) which was decided in 1961, the Court did not have before it the amendments introduced into the Delhi Rent Act by the amend ing Act of 1976, and therefore no question arose as to the effect of the non obstante clauses contained in sections 14A and 25A of the Delhi Rent Act.
The decision is therefore not an authority for the proposition for which the appellants contend and the question arising before us cannot be held to be concluded by that decision.
The argument of implied repeal has also no substance in it because our reason for according priority to the provi sions of the Delhi Rent Act is not that the Slum Clearance Act stands impliedly repealed protanto.
Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non obstante clauses in the earlier law, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over these contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act We understand that the view which we are taking has been consistently taken by the learned Judges of the Delhi High Court in various cases.
They are right in their conclusion and accordingly, we uphold the judgment of the High Court and dismiss this appeal.
In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
Section 19 of the Slum Areas (improvement and Clear ance) Act 1956 provides that notwithstanding anything con tained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area.
Section 39 enacts that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwith standing anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.
Section 14A and Chapter IIIA called "Summary Trial of certain applications" containing sections 25A, 25B and 25C were introduced into the Delhi Rent Control Act with effect from December 1, 1975.
Section 14A provides that where the landlord who, being in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government, was required to vacate such residential accommodation on the ground that he Owns residential accommodation within the Union Territory, there shall accrue to such landlord, not withstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time being in force, a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him.
Section 25A provides (i) that the provisions of Chapter IlIA shall have an over riding effect over every other provision of the Delhi Rent Act which is inconsistent with anything con tained in Chapter IIIA and (ii) that the provisions of Chapter IIIA shall have over riding effect over anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.
Section 25 B prescribes special procedure for the disposal of appli cations for eviction.
Section 54 provides that nothing in the Act shall affect the provisions of the .
The respondent who was allotted government quarters in New Delhi was called upon by the Government to vacate the quarters on the ground that he owned a residential house in Delhi.
Since he did not vacate the quarters before the time given he was asked to pay a high penal rent.
His application under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction of the appellants, who were the tenants of the premises, was contested by them on the ground that since the house had been situated in a slum area, the respondent was not entitled to possession because he had not obtained permission of the competent authority under section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act.
This plea was rejected.
Their revision application was rejected by the High Court.
In appeal it was contended that the Slum Clearance Act being a special Act, its provisions must have precedence over the provisions of the Delhi Rent Act and to deny prece dence to the former Act In matters arising out of section 14A and Chapter IIIA was to repeal that Act by implication.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: The provisions of section 14A and Chapter IlIA of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act.
[434 G] 1 (a) By virtue of the first part of section 25A, the provi sions of Chapter IIIA must prevail over the provisions of section 54 of the Delhi Rent Act.
To the extent 422 to which section 54 saves the operation of the Slum Clearance Act, it is inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter IlIA which prescribes a special procedure for dealing with appli cations for eviction filed under cl.
(e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act [430 F] (b) By virtue of the second part of section 25A also the provisions of Chapter IlIA would prevail over those of the Slum Clearance Act.
Sections 19 and 391 of the Slum Clear ance Act are to that extent inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by Chapter IlIA of the Delhi Rent Act and have to be subordinated to it.
[430 G] 2(a) The object of section 14A is to confer a right on certain landlords to recover "immediate possession of premises" belonging to them and which are in the possession of their tenents.
such a right is "to accrue" to a class of persons.
The same concept is clarified by providing that in the contingencies mentioned in the section, a right will accure to the landlord "to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by him." [430 H] (b) The provisions of section 14A must prevail over anything contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in the Slum Clearance Act.
Section 25B(1) prescribes that the right conferred by section 14A has to be enforced in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Chapter ILIA.
Section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter ILIA.
[431 E] 3(a) The Legislature has expressed its intention clearly and unequivocally that the provisions of section 14A and Chapter IIIA would have precedence over anything else contained in that Act or in any other law.
The object of the Legisla ture in incorporating the non obstante clause both in section 14A and section 25A of the Delhi Rent Act was to free the proceedings arising out of the right newly conferred by section 14A and falling within Chapter IlIA from the restraint imposed by section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act and from the operation of section 39 thereof.
To subject that facility to the provision of the Slum Clearance Act would be to make illusory the right conferred by section 14A on the allottee to obtain "immediate possession" of the premises let out by him to his tenant.
[432D & 431F] (b) While section 25A gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter IlIA over anything "inconsistent therewith" contained elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law, section 14A does not qualify the over riding effect of what is contained therein i.e. in section 14A in refer ence to anything inconsistent therewith contained either in the Delhi Rent Act or in any other law.
The word 'anything ' occuring in "now withstanding anything contained" elsewhere in the Delhi Rent Act would ordinarily mean "anything to the contrary".
[432B C] (c) In order that the object of section 14A may not be frustrat ed, section 25C provides that nothing contained in section 14(6) shall apply to a landlord who is in possession of the premises allotted to him by the Central Government and who is re quired to vacate that residential accommodation.
Section 25C(2) reduces the period of six months prescribed under section 14(7) for recovery of possession of the premises to two months which emphasises that the object of the Legislature is to confer real, effective and immediate right on a class of landlords to obtain possession of premises let out by them to their tenents.[432F H] (4) To afford a quick and expeditious remedy against the tenant the Act provided that nothing, not even the Slum Clearance Act, shall stand in the way of an allottee of Government accommodation from evicting his tenant by resort ing to the summary procedure prescribed by Chapter IIIA.
The tenant is deprived of the right to defend a proceeding against him and to appeal or second appeal lies against the order of the Rent Controller.
The jurisdiction of the High Court m revision is limited to finding out whether the order complained of is according to law.
[433A B] (5(a) When two or more laws oVerate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause, cases of conflict have to be decided in.
reference to the object and purpose of the law under consideration In the instant case, the 423 special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of section 14A and Chapter IIIA would be frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act were to prevail over them.
Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the country contained in the Slum Clear ance Act.
[433 D & G] Sri Ram Narain vs The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. [1956] S.C.R. followed.
(b) Yet another test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.
Section 14A and Chapter IlIA having been enacted with effect from December 1, 1975 are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clear ance Act which was placed on the statute book with effect from February 28, 1965 and i.n reference to section 39 of the same Act which came into force in 1956 when the Act was passed.
The Legislature gave overriding effect to section 14 A and Chapter IlIA with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy.
[434A B]


judgement:
Appeal No. 690 of 1976.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th December, 1975 the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Appln.
No. 571/75.
G.S. Sanghi and Girish Chandra for the Appellants.
V.M. Tarkunde, K.L. Hathi and Mrs. P.C. Kapur for Re spondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
This appeal on certificate is from the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat.
The appellants 1 and 2 are respectively the Union of India and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.
The 1st respondent is Majur Mahajan Mandal (hereinafter to be described as the union), a registered trade union representing the majority of the textile workers of the five textile mills of Baroda (re spondents 2 to 6) who are not represented before us and who will be described hereinafter as the mills, Since some time in 1973, industrial disputes in respect of dearness allowance (D.A.) had been pending between the union and the mills in five references before the Industrial Court, Gujarat, being Reference Nos.
406, 407, 408, 409 and 421 of 1973.
The rate of D.A. for the employees in the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad had earlier been fixed by an award of an industrial Tribunal which will be referred to hereinafter as the Ahmedabad Rate.
The prevalent D.A. in 1973 in the mills with which we are concerned was 90% of the Ahmedabad Rate.
The union was raising the aforesaid disputes for increasing the D.A. to 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate with effect from October 1, 1972.
Hence the above references were pending before the Industrial Court.
As a result of negotiations between the parties during the pendency of the said disputes before the Industrial Court D.A. was agreed to be paid at the rate of 95% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. with effect from January 1, 1974, as will appear from an interim award of the Industrial Court dated June 21, 1974.
Thereafter by further negotiations the disputes regarding D.A. were finally resolved by the mills and the union entering into a settlement on June 28, 1974, by fixing D.A. at 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate with effect from January 1, 1974.
Awards were later made bY the Court in conformity with the said settlement in the pending disputes some time in August and September, 1974.
It is not disputed that the workers of the mills in pursuance of the settlement of the disputes received D.A. at 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate retrospectively with effect from 1st January, 1974.
It may even be assumed that the arrear D.A. for the past period from January 474 1, 1974, was paid to the workers in August or perhaps.
even later, that is to say, after 6th July, 1974, the signifi cance of which date we will immediately see.
While the aforesaid disputes were pending before the Industrial Court, The (briefly the Act), replacing the earlier Ordinance on the subject, came into force retrospectively from 6th July, 1974, the appointed day, under the Act.
This Act was passed as the preamble says, "to provide, in the interests of national economic development, for the compul sory deposit of additional emoluments and for the framing of a scheme in relation thereto, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto".
The employees to whom the Act is applicable are classi fied into three categories, namely, employees of the Govern ment, of local authorities and other employees.
The principal object of the Ordinance and later of the Act is to control the menacing inflationary trend which has been the bane of the country 's economy.
On the one hand there has been persistent demand from employees for revi sion of wages and increase of D.A. on account of the high cost of living and on the other the State has to tackle the national problem of mounting pressure of inflationary forces.
While, therefore, meeting with the demands for rise in emoluments, simultaneously, steps with equal force had to be taken so that the additional amounts disbursed do not immediately flow to the market adding a further fillip to inflation.
The Ordinance and later the Act thus provide for compulsory deposit for a period of one year of the whole of the additional wages and for a period of three years of half of the additional D.A.
The additional emoluments earned are thus impounded under the Act and are not immediately available to the employees for instant consumption.
The Act provides a scheme of beneficial forced saving and the deposited amounts will be finally repaid to the employees in different ways specified in the Act with interest at 21/2% over and above the Bank deposit rate.
Before we proceed further we may note some of the provi sions of the Act material for our purpose: By section 2(a) of the Act "appointed day" means the 6th day of July, 1974".
By section 2(b) " 'additional dearness allowance ' means such clearness allowance as may be sanctioned from time to time, after the appointed day, over and above the amount of dearness allowance payable in accordance with the rate in force immediately before the date from which such sanction of additional dearness allowance is to take effect".
* * * * By section 2(e) " 'dearness allowance ' means all cash payments, by whatever name called, made to an employee on account of rise in 475 the cost of living".
Under section 2(g) " 'emoluments ' include wages and dearness allowance".
Under section 5 every specified authority (herein the employer) shall open two separate accounts, namely, the Additional Wages Deposit Account and the Additional Dearness Allowance Deposit Account.
The employer shall open a sepa rate ledger account in the name of each employee.
Section 6(2)(b) of the Act enjoins on the employer a duty to make deductions and to remit to the nominated authority addition al wages and additional D.A. from emoluments disbursed after the appointed day.
In the case of additional wages it will be the whole amount and in the case of additional D.A. it will be half of it.
It is common ground that the Act applies to the mills which are the "employers" under the Act and also "specified au thorities" under the Additional Emoluments Compulsory Depos it (Employees other than employees of Government and Local Authorities) Scheme, 1974, which is made under section 10 of the Act.
The union applied to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus or other suitable order to permanently restrain the mills from effecting any deduc tion from the arrears of dearness allowance payable to their employees from January to June 1974 on the basis of the settlement of 28th June, 1974.
There was a further prayer to permanently restrain the mills from treating the base for calculation of additional D.A. at a rate less than the agreed 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate and to direct the mills not to deduct or deposit 21/2% of D.A. per month payable to each employee treating the same as not being additional D.A. within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act.
Lastly there was a prayer for refund of the amount already deducted by the mills.
The High Court allowed the writ application and also granted certificate to appeal to this Court.
The appellants contend that 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. to the workers was sanctioned after the appointed day, that is to say after 6th July, 1974, when the awards were made between August and September 1974 in pursuance of the settlement of June 28, 1974.
The claim of the appellants is two fold: First, since the increased D.A. to the work ers was sanctioned after the appointed day, only when the awards were made, the difference between the increased D.A. at 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate and the prevailing rate pay able in arrears from 1st January, 1974 to 30th June, 1974, will be additional D.A. in terms of section 2(b) of the Act and is, therefore, subject to deduction of 50% of the same.
Second, for future deductions of additional D.A., after the appointed day, the base for calculation of additional D.A. should be 95% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. which was pre vailing prior to 6th July, 1974, in terms of the interim award of 21st June, 1974.
In other words, for future deductions of additional D.A. after 6th July, 1974 the appellants claim that the workers should be treated as if they were in receipt of D.A., prior to the appointed day, at 95% of the Ahmedabad Rate which had been in force in terms of the interim award of 21st June, 1974, which is the earli er sanction for the 95% rate.
Hence, 2 1/2% (that is 50% of 5% being the difference between 95% and 100%) of the same will be liable for deduction under the Act from 6th July, 1974.
According to the appellants, the benefit of 100% was available only after the making of the awards which was, thus, sanctioned after 476 the appointed day notwithstanding the fact that the settle ment had been entered upon on 28th June, 1974.
Section 2(b) will, therefore, be clearly attracted, according to the appellants.
It is submitted by the appellants that the word "sanc tioned" in the definition of 'additional dearness allowance ' under section 2(b) is very significant.
It is contended that the settlement during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the industrial Court has to be approved by the Court before it can be said to be sanctioned within the meaning of the provisions of section 2(b).
Reference is made to section 115A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.
That section, so far as it is material for our pur pose, provides that if any agreement is arrived at between an employer and the union which are parties to an industrial dispute pending before an Industrial Court the award in such proceeding shall be made in terms of such agreement unless the Industrial Court is satisfied that the agreement was in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the consent of either party to the agreement was caused by mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence, coercion or threat.
Relying on section 115A, it is submitted by the appellants, that unless the award is made in pursuance of the settlement under the said section the settlement is inchoate and cannot be said to be effective, in law, prior to the making of the award which was done, in the instant case, between August and September 1974.
It is, therefore, submitted that the additional D.A. can be said to be sanc tioned only under the award which was made admittedly after the appointed day, that is after July 6, 1974.
We are unable to accept this contention.
It is true that an agreement arrived at between the parties during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Industrial Court has to be placed before that Court.
It is also true that if the Industrial Court is satisfied that certain conditions enumerated in section 115A exist it will not recognise the settlement and dispose of the dispute in accordance with law.
If, however, the conditions enumerated in section 115A do not exist the award "shall be made" in terms of the settlement.
There is No. other option.
In this particular case the settlement was placed before the Industrial Court which ultimately passed the awards in conformity with the terms of the settlement.
We are not required to consider a case where the Industrial Court has not approved of the settlement under section 115A.
Once, therefore, the award is made in terms of the settlement, under section 75 of the Bombay Industrial Rela tions Act, the award shall come into operation on the date specified in the award or where no such date is specified therein on the date on which it is published under section 74.
We are informed that the awards have not yet been published but that should not detain us in this case.
It is common ground that the awards were in terms of the settle ment which had retrospective operation from January 1, 1974.
Since the settlement has merged in the awards the terms of the awards are those specified in the settlement.
It is those dates which 477 are, therefore, specified in the awards and, under section 75 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the awards came into operation with effect from January 1, 1974.
The sanc tion of the awards in such a case is the sanction under the settlement and since the settlement was prior to July 6, 1974, the additional D.A. cannot be said to be sanctioned after the appointed day.
100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. will be payable to the workers with effect from January 1, 1974 and the sanction for that rise was on 28th June, 1974, the date of the settlement which was prior to the appointed day.
Sanction must have relevance to the reality of the transaction between the parties.
The settlement of 28th June, 1974, makes the increased D.A. of 100% payable with effect from January 1, 1974.
Hence the said rate of in creased D.A. which was payable to the workers between Janu ary 1, 1974 and July 5, 1974, was sanctioned prior to the appointed day.
We have already noted the definition of additional D.A. in section 2(b) which is an integrated definition.
The definition clause has twin components both of which will have to be satisfied in order that a particular amount can be held to.
be additional D.A.
To put it clearly the two components are ( 1 ) additional D.A. is that part of the D.A. which is sanctioned after the appointed day; and (2) which is over and above what was payable immediately before the date from which sanction of the particular rise in D.A. is to take effect.
With regard to the first component any unilateral deci sion to increase the D.A. or a bilateral settlement for its increase, to take only two instances, must take place after the appointed day.
It is manifest that if the sanction is after the appointed day it is then only the question of additional D.A. will arise within the meaning of section 2(b).
Once it is found that the sanction of rise in DA.
is prior to the appointed day, section 2(b) will not at all be attracted.
In that event it will not be necessary even to.
consider the second component of the definition mentioned above.
In the instant case we have already held that the rise in D.A. to 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. was sanctioned under the settle ment of 28th June, 1974, that is, before the appointed day.
One of the principal components of the definition clause is, therefore, clearly absent in this case since there is no sanction for any rise in D.A. after the appointed day.
We should observe that this is not a case where Explana tion I to section 2(b) is applicable.
Mr. Singhvi for the appellants submits that in view of the aim and object of the Act the Court should lean in favour of an interpretation advancing the remedy by constru ing the word "sanctioned" in section 2(b) to .mean sanc tioned by the award and not by the settlement.
We have already given our reasons for our inability to accept this submission.
One other reason may be added.
478 The Act recognises agreements and settlements in the same way as awards of Tribunals, vide, section 2(c).
The definition of "additional wages" under section 2(c) clearly points to that.
Any wage revision "whether by or under an agreement or settlement between the parties or any award . "comes within the sweep of the aforesaid defi nition clause.
Agreements and settlements are separately and distinctly mentioned along with awards.
Settlement is a type of sanction recognised under the Act.
There is, there fore, sufficient warrant under the Act to give effect to the sanction by voluntary settlement in respect of D.A. when the same has never been repudiated by any of the concerned parties.
When there is no ambiguity in the word "sanctioned" in section 2(b), recourse to the aim and object of the Act is not even called for in this case.
Both the contentions of the appellants, therefore, fail on the solitary.
ground, namely, that the particular sanc tion of additional D.A. in this case is not after the ap pointed day.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
P.B .R.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Section 2(b) of the defines additional dearness allowance to mean such dearness allowance as may be sanctioned from time to time after the appointed day, i.e., July 6, 1974 over and above the amount of dearness allowance payable in accordance with the rate in force immediately before the date from which such sanction of additional dearness allowance is to take effect.
Section 6(2) (b) enjoins on the employer the duty to make deductions and to remit to the nominated au thority additional dearness allowance from the emoluments disbursed after the appointed day.
Section 115A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 provides that if any agreement is arrived at between the employer and employees who are parties to an industrial dispute pending before the industrial court, the award in such proceeding shall be made in terms of such agreement, except in certain circumstances stated therein.
As a result of negotiations between the employers and employees a settlement was entered into between the parties on June 28, 1974 enhancing the dearness allowance with retrospective effect from January 1, 1974.
The Indus trial Court before which certain disputes were pending gave the award conformity with the settlement sometime in August September, 1974.
Arrears of dearness allowance were paid after the appointed day.
In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the employees ' Union, the High Court issued a writ re straining the employers from effecting any deduction from the arrears of D.A. payable to the employees on the basis of the settlement and granted certain other reliefs.
In appeal it was contended that since the settlement of June 28, 1974 could not be effective prior to the award made in August September 1974 additional dearness allow ance could be said to be sanctioned only after the award and so the provisions of section 2(b) would be attracted.
Dismissing the appeal HELD: One of the components of cl. 2(b) namely, that the additional dearness allowance is that part of the D.A. which is sanctioned after the appointed day, is absent since there was no sanction for any rise in dearness allowance after the appointed day.
[477 G] (1) According to section 115A of the Bombay Industrial Rela tions Act if the conditions enumerated therein did not exist the award "shall be made" in terms of the settle ment.
Since the settlement in this case had merged in the award, the terms of the award are those specified in the settlement.
The sanction of the award in such a case was the sanction under the settlement and since the settlement was prior to the appointed day, additional dearness allow ance could not be said to be sanctioned after the appoint ed day.
[476 F & H] In the instant case the Industrial Court having passed the award in conformity with the terms of the settlement, the award came into operation on the date specified in it.
(2) Sanction must have relevance to the reality of the transaction between the parties.
Increased dearness allowance payable between January 1, 1974 and July 5, 1974 was sanctioned prior t.o the appointed day.
Once it is found that the sanction was prior to the appointed day, section 2(b) would not be attracted.
[4 (3) From the definition of "additional wages" in section 2(c) it is clear that the Act recognises agreements and settle ments in the same way as awards of Tribunals.
Any wage revision "whether by or under an agreement or settlement between the parties or any award" comes within the sweep of the definition clause.
Agreements and settlements are distinctly mentioned along with awards.
Settlement is a type of sanction recognised under the Act.
There is there fore sufficient warrant under the Act to give effect to the sanction by voluntary settlement in respect of D.A.
When there is no ambiguity in the word "sanctioned" in section 2(b) recourse to the aim and object of the Act is not called for.
[478 A B]


judgement:
Appeal No. 1860 of 1968.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and decree dated the 29th January, 1968, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 472/ 60).
R.P. Bhatt, B.R. Agarwala and Janendra Lal, for the appel lants.
Sachin Chaudhary, Prakash Mehta, Ravinder Narain and K.L. John of M/s. 1.
B. Dadachanji & Co. for the respond ents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave which is directed against the judgment and decree dated January 29, 1968, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay involves a question of the applicability or otherwise of the doctrine of frustration embodied in section 56 of the Contract Act which to use the words of Viscount Maugham in Joseph Con stantine Steamship Line Limited vs Imperial Smelting Corpo ration Ltd. (1) "is only a special case of the discharge of contract by an impossibility of performance arising after the contract was made" or to use the language of Mukherjea, J. in Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneeram Bangut & Co. & Anr.(2) "is really an aspect or part of the law off discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegali ty of the act agreed to be done and hence becomes within the purview of section 56 of the ." The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a short compass and may be briefly stated: The respondents who are the owners of four plots of agricultural land admeasuring 7 acres and 13 gunthas and a bungalow standing thereon situate in village Majwade, near Pokhran Talao Road, Thana, having bought the same from Homi D. Dubash under a sale deed dated September 9, 1953 agreed to sell the same to the appellants in lieu of Rs. 25,000/ vide agreement dated May 16, 1957, relevant clauses whereof provided as follows : "5.
If the purchasers shall insist on any requisitions or objections as to the title, evidence of title, conveyance, posses sion, receipt of rent or any other matters on the abstract of or this agreement or connected with the sale which the Vendors shall be unable or on any ground unwilling to remove or comply with, the Vendors shall be at liberty notwithstanding any negotiation or litigation in respect of such requisition or objection, to give to the Purchasers or their Solicitors notice in writing of their intention to re scind the contract for sale unless such requisition or objection be withdrawn and if such notice be given and the requisition or objection be not withdrawn within ten days after the day on which the notice was sent, the contract shall, without further notice be rescinded.
The Vendors shall thereupon return to the purchasers the deposit but without any interest,costs of investigating the title or other compensation or payment whatever.
(1) , 168.
(2) ; 513 6.
if the title be not approved by the Purchaser 's attorneys or if the purchase is not completed within the said period of two months owing to any default on the Vendors ' part, it shall be at the option of the Pur chaser to rescind this agreement and in that event the Purchaser shall be entitled to receive back the earnest money from the Ven dors, together with out of pocket costs incurred in the preparation of this agree ment and investigation of title, advertise ment, Bataid, correspondence etc.
But in ease of the Vendors wilful default the Ven dors shall also pay to the Purchasers interest at 6% per annum on the amount of earnest money from the date hereof fill the date of return of the earnest money and all costs of the Purchasers.
If the sale is not completed within time provided for completion owing to the fault of the Purchaser, the Vendors shall be entitled to put an end to this contract and to for feit the earnest money.
" Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement, the respondents ' attorneys delivered the documents of title to the appellants attorneys on May 17, 1957 for investigation of title and in the third week of May, 1957 the respondents gave possession of the aforesaid property to the appellants in part perform ance of the said agreement.
On August 22, 1957, the re spondents and the appellants made a joint ,application to the District Deputy Collector, Thana Prant, under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') seeking permission to sell and purchase the aforesaid agricultural land.
Section 63 of the Act reads: "63.
(1) Save as provided in this Act (a) no sale (including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue), gift, exchange or lease of any land or interest therein, or (b) no mortgage of any land or interest therein, in which the possession of the mort gaged property is delivered to the mortga gee, shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist (or who being an agricul turist will after such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, hold land exceeding two thirds of the ceiling area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 or who is not an agri cultural labourer): Provided that the Collector or an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may grant permission for such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, on such conditions as may be prescribed . . " It may be mentioned that the conditions alluded to in the proviso to the above quoted section 63 have been pre scribed by Rule 36 514 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agriculutral Lands Rules, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules ') the relevant por tion whereof is to the following effect: "36.
Conditions on which permission for sale, etc., of land under section 63 may be granted. (1) The Collector or other officer authorised under the proviso to sub section (1 ) of section 63 shall not grant permission for sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage of any land in favour of a person who is not either an agriculturist or agricultural labourer or who, being an agriculturist, cultivates per sonally laud not less than the ceiling area whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant unless any of the follow ing conditions are satisfied. . (f) the land is required for cultivating it personally by a person, who, not being an agriculturist, intends to take to the profes sion of agriculture and to whom the Collector after having regard to the order of priority mention in clause (c) of sub section (2) of section 32 P, has given a certificate that such person intends to take to the profession of agriculture and is capable of cultivating land personally; . " By means of communication No. TNC.48 dated December 8, 1958, the Prant Officer, Thana, informed the respondents that their request to sell the aforesaid lands to appellant No. 1 could not be granted as the intending purchaser had not obtained the certificate from the Collector to the effect that "he intends to take to the profession of agri culture and is capable of cultivating land personally.
" On January 21, 1959, the respondents ' attorneys wrote to the appellants informing them that no effect could be given to the aforesaid agreement of sale dated May 17, 1957 as the permission under the Act to sell the suit property had been refused by the Prant Officer by his letter dated December 8, 1958 (supra) for appellant No. 1 's failure to obtain the certificate to the effect that he intended to take to the profession of agriculture and was capable of cultivating land personally.
The respondents ' attorneys also called upon the appellants by means of the said communication to return the tite deeds adding that on the return of the title deeds, the earnest money paid by them at the time of execu tion of the aforesaid agreement would be returned to them.
On March 4, 1959, the appellants ' advocate wrote to the respondents ' attorneys requesting them to authorise the appellants to approach the higher authorities for securing the necessary permission.
On March 14, 1959, the respond ents ' attorneys wrote to the appellants ' attorneys evasively replying that no useful purpose would be served by approach ing the higher authorities having regard to the provisions of the Act.
On the respondents ' refusal to cooperate with the appellants in the matter of obtaining permission or sanction under the Act, appellant No. 1 made an application to the Collector, Thana District, Thana on April 8, 1959, bringing the above mentioned facts to his notice and re questing him to grant him a certificate of an agriculturist and the necessary permission to purchase the aforesaid plots of land.
Acceding to the request of appellant No. 1, the Additional Collector.
Thana 515 by his order dated June 6, 1959 granted to the former the requisite certificate under Rule 36 of the Rules as also the permission to purchase the aforesaid plots of land from the respondents as required under section 63(1) of the Act read with Rule 36 of the Rules.
The said order ran as follows : No. CB/TNC, 1800 Collector 's Office, Thana, Thana, 6th June, 1959.
Read: Application of the applicant Shri G.G. Patel, dated the 8th April, 1959.
Read: Papers ending with Mamlatdar, Thana 's No. TNC.
400 dated the 11th May, 1959.
ORDER A certificate is hereby granted to Shri Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel residing at House No. 404, Majiwade, Taluka Thana on his appli cation dated 8th April, 1959 under subclause 'C ' of clause 1 of Rule 36 that he intends to take to the profession of Agriculture.
After having gone through the merits of the priority list mentioned in clause (C) of section 2 of section 32 P, through the Mamlatdar Thana, permission is hereby granted to Shri Govindb hai Gordhanbhai Patel to purchase the land mentioned below from Shri Ibrahim Ismail Jetpurwala etc.
under section 63(1) read with Rule 36 under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricul tural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 on the conditions as mentioned under : Village section No. H. No. Area Majiwade 415 Part 6 51/4 289 2 (Part) 0 36 1/2 280 1 (Part) 0 7 280 4 0 5 7 13 3/4 Conditions : Permission to purchase the land mentioned above is granted subject to the condition that if the applicant Shri G.G. Patel ceases to cultivate the land personally or transfers his interest in the said land by sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage without the previous sanction of the Collector, the permission given under sub section ( 1 ) of section 63 shall be deemed to have been cancelled.
Sd/ For Addition al Collector, Tha na" 516 On June 25, 1959, the appellants ' attorneys addressed a communication to the respondents ' attorneys forwarding therewith a copy of the aforesaid order No. CB/TEC/1800 dated June 6,1959, made by the Additional Collector, Thana granting permission to appellant No. 1 for the purchase of the aforesaid plots of land and requesting the respondents to let them know as to when their clients would desire to complete the sale and further asking them whether they had got the property transferred to their names in the records of the Collector of Thana, whereupon the respondents ' advo cate by his letter dated June 30, 1959 addressed to the appellants ' attorneys replied saying that his clients could not take notice of the aforesaid permission.
Thereafter the respondents served a notice on the appellants on August 25, 1959 calling upon them to return the title deeds and to restore possession of the aforesaid property.
Thereupon, the appellants ' advocate wrote to the respondents attorneys on November 24, 1959 pointing out to them that appellant No. 1 having obtained the requisite sanction from the Collector, the respondents were bound to complete the sale and to execute the conveyance in favour of appellant No. 1 and that the aforesaid agreement could not be put an end to in the manner in which the respondents were attempting to do.
Not heeding the aforesaid communication of the appellants dated November 24, 1959, the respondents filed a civil suit, being suit No. 36 of 1959 on November 17, 1959 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thana, for declaration that the aforesaid agreement dated May 16, 1957 was void in law and of no legal effect and for possession of the aforesaid property as also for compensation at the rate of Rs. 150/ per mensem for wrongful retention of the property from June, 1957 till delivery of possession thereof.
In spite of the stout resistance put up by the appellants, the trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the respondents subject to their paying to the appellants or depositing in Court the earnest money of Rs. 5,000/ and the compensation amount of Rs. 882.25 holding inter alia that the aforesaid agree ment dated May 16, 1957 which was void ab initio being violative of section 63 of the Act was discovered by the respondents to be void in June, 1957 when they found that the permission under section 63 of the Act was necessary.
Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the appellants took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay but their appeal remained unsuccessful.
The High Court held that the aforesaid agreement to sell was not void ab initio as section 63 of the Act itself envisaged sale etc.
in favour of a nonagriculturist with the permission of the Collector or an officer authorised by the State Govern ment in that behalf subject to the conditions which may be prescribed and Rule 36 of he Rules prescribed only a certif icate by the relevant authority to the effect that the intending purchaser intended to adopt the profession of an agriculturist.
The High Court, however, opined that the aforesaid agreement became incapable of being performed on December 8, 1959 when the Prant Officer declined permission to the respondents to sell the property to the appellants.
Rejecting the contention advanced on behalf of the appel lants the effect that the aforesaid letter dated January 21, 1959 written by the respondents to the appellants did not terminate or rescind the agreement, the High Court further held that the said letter amounted to cancellation of the agreement.
517 Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Bhatt, counsel for the appellants, has vehemently urged that the aforesaid order passed by the Prant Officer refusing permission to the respondents to sell the lands did not make the contract impossible of performance; that the said order was merely administrative in character and did not bar the making of the second application by the appellants under section 63 of the Act; that the said agreement was subsisting on June 25, 1959 when the appellants obtained the requisite permission and the certificate from the Additional Collector, Thana, and that section 56 of the was not attracted in the present case as the contract had not become impossible of performance.
Mr. Sachin Chaudhary, counsel for the respondents, has, on the other hand, contended that the agreement became impossible of performance and as such void on December 8, 1958, when the Prant Officer refused to permit the respond ents to sell the suit property to the appellants, and that the Prant Officer who had co ordinate jurisdiction with the Collector under section 63 of the Act having refused to grant permission to the respondents to sell the suit proper ty by his order dated December 8, 1958, which was of quasi judicial character and had not been set aside either in appeal or revision, it was not open to the Collector to grant the permission to the appellants.
Two questions arise for determination in this case (1) whether the order of the Prant Officer dated December 8, 1958, rendered the aforesaid agreement dated May 16, 1957 impossible of performance and as such void under section 56 of the and (2) whether in view of the aforesaid order of refusal by the Prant Officer, Thana dated December 8, 1958, the Additional Collector, Thana, was not competent to grant the sanction and the certificate under section 63 of the Act and Rule 36 of the Rules.
The answer to the first question depends on the construction of the expression 'impossible of performance ' occurring in section 56 of the which lays down: "56.
An agreement to do an act impossi ble in itself is void A contract to do an act which after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
Where one person has promised to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promisee for any loss which such promise sustains through the non performance of the promise.
" The meaning of the aforesaid expression 'impossible of performance ' as used in the above quoted section would be clear from the, following observation made by Lord Loreburn in Tampfin Steamship 518 Co. Ltd. vs
Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Co. Ltd(1) 403 which is generally considered to contain a classic and terse exposition of the law relating to frustration: "The parties shall be excused if sub stantially the whole contract becomes impossi ble of performance or in other words imprac ticable by some cause for which neither was responsible.
" We find ourselves in complete accord with this view which also finds support from the decisions of this Court in Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneerarn Bangur and Co. and Anr.
(supra) and Smt.
Sushila Devi and Anr.
vs Hari Singh and Ors.(2) where it was held that the performance of a contract becomes impossible if it becomes impracticable from the point of view of the object and the purpose which the par ties had in view and if an untoward event or change of circumstances totally upsets the very foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, it can very well be said that the promisor found it impossible to do the act which he promised to do.
It would be advantageous at this stage to refer to the following observations made by Mukherjee, J. Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneerarn Bangur and Co. and Anr (supra) which is a leading authority on the subject of frustration: "The first paragraph of the section lays down the law in the same way as in England.
It speaks of something which is impossible inherently or by its very nature, and no one can obviously be directed to perform such an act.
The second paragraph enunciates the law relating to discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibility or illegality of the act agreed to be done.
The wording of this paragraph is quite general and though the illustrations attached to it are not at all happy, they cannot derogate from the general words used in the enactment.
This much is clear that the word "impossible" has not been used here in the sense of physical or literal impossibility.
The performance of an act may not be literally impossible but it may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose which the .parties had in view; and if an untoward event or change of circumstances totally upsets the very foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, R can very well be said that the promisor found it impossible to do the act which he promised to do.
Although various theories have been propounded by the Judges and jurists in Eng land regarding the judicial basis of the doctrine of frustration, yet the essential idea upon which the doctrine is based is that of impossibility of performance of the con tract: in fact impossibility and frustration are often used as interchangeable expres sions.
The changed circumstances, it is said, make the performance of the contract impossible and the parties are absolved from the further (1) (2) 519 performance of it as they did not promise.
perform an impossibility.
" In the instant case, there is no term or condition in the agreement in question which stipulates that the agree ment would be treated as having become impracticable on the refusel of the Prant Officer to grant the permission under section 63 of the Act.
The parties are, ' therefore, gov erned purely by section 56 of the Contract Act according to which a contract becomes void only if something supervenes after its execution which renders it impracticable.
On the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents, the ques tion that arises is whether the above quoted order of the Prant Officer, Thana Prant, dated December 8, 1958, rendered the contract impracticable.
The answer to this question is obviously in the negative.
The said order, it will be noted, was not of such a catastrophic character as can be said to have struck at the very root of the whole object and purpose for which the parties had entered into the bargain in question or to have rendered the contract impracticable or impossible of performance.
A careful perusal of the order would show that it was neither conclusive nor was it passed on the merits of the aforesaid application.
The permission was refused by the Prant Officer only on the technical ground that the appellants had not obtained the requisite certificate as contemplated by rule 36(f) of the Rules.
It did not in any way prohibit the appellants from making a fresh application to the Collector, Thana Prant, who in view of the Phraseology of section 63 of the Act read with clause (f) of rule 35 of the Rules appears to be the only authority competent to grant the requisite certificate.
The said order also did not put any fetter on the appellants to apply to the Collector or the Additional Collector for grant of the requisite permission for sale and purchase of the land after obtaining the aforesaid certificate.
We, are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that no untoward event or change of circumstances supervened to make the agreement factually or legally impossible of performance so as, to attract section 56 of the Contract Act.
The answer to the second question turns on the answer to two subsidiary questions (i) whether in according or declining to accord permission under the proviso to section 63 (1) of the Act, the Collector or the officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf acts in an adminis trative capacity or a judicial or a quasi judicial capaci ty and (ii) whether the aforesaid order dated December 8, 1958 passed by the Prant Officer, Thana was one on merits or otherwise.
Turning to the question (i), it has to be ob served that there is nothing in section 63 of the Act to indicate that in exercising his jurisdiction under the proviso to sub section (1) of the section, the Collector or the authorised officer has to act judicially or in conformi ty with the recognised judicial norms.
There is also nothing in the aforesaid Section of the Act requiring the Collector or the authorised officer to determine any ques tion affecting the right of any party.
The function which the Collector or the authorised officer discharges under the aforesaid proviso is, therefore, an administrative one and not judicial or quasi judicial.
It will be apposite to advert to a few decisions 17 1546 SCI/76 520 bearing on the matter.
In A.K. Bhaskar vs Advocate General(1) a full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that the decision of the Advocate General granting or refusing to grant the sanction under section 92 of the Civil Proce dure Code was neither judicial nor quasijudicial notwith standing the fact that he has to form an opinion and come to conclusion one way or the other.
To the similar effect are the decisions of Allahabad and Rajasthan High Courts in Shantanand vs Advocate General(2) and Shrimali Lal vs Advo cate General(3).
In Abdul Kasim vs Md. Dawood(4) it was held that in granting or withholding sanction to file a suit under section 55(2) of the Muslim Wakfs Act, 1954, the Wakf Board does not act in, a judicial or quasijudicial capacity but only in an administrative capacity.
In The State of Madras vs
C.P. Sarathy and Anr.(5).
It was held by this Court that the act of the Government in making a reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was merely an administrative act and the fact that the Government before making a reference under section 10(1) of the Act had to satisfy itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute existed did not make the act judicial or quasi judicial.
In regard to question (ii), it may be stated that al though the Prant Officer may have been exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the Collector, Thana Prant, he did not pass any orders on the merits of the previous application made by the respondents and endorsed by the appellants seeking permission to sell and purchase the suit property.
The order, as already stated, was passed by him on the ground that the intending purchaser had not obtained the certificate required under rule 36(f) of the Rules.
It is well recognised that the dismissal of a proceeding by an authority not on merits but merely on account of a formal defect will not attract the applicability of the general principles of Res judicata and will not debar the authority exercising concurrent jurisdiction from entertaining the subsequent proceedings for same relief and passing proper orders on merits.
(See Putali Meheti vs Tulja.(6) where the rejection of a previous suit for the plaintiff 's omission to produce a certificate of the Collector under section 6 of the Pensions Act was held not to bar a second suit on the same cause of action, and Pethaperumal vs Murugandi(7) where rejection of the first suit for recovery of money for plaintiff 's failure (1) A.I.R. 1962 Ker.
(2) A. I.R. 1955 All.
372 (3) A.I.R. 1955 Raj. 166.
(4) A. I.R. 1961 Mad. 244.
(5) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 53 (6) I.LR.
3 Born.
(7) 521 to produce succession certificate was held not to bar a second proceeding for the same relief.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the previous order passed by the Prant Officer being merely an administrative order and not having been passed on the merits of the case, it did not, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, impair the power of the Collector to pass the impugned order on the merits of the matter under proviso to section 63 (1) of the Act on the grant of the requisite certificate under rule 36(f) of the Rules.
For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below and dismiss the respondents ' suit but in the circumstances of the ease without any order as to costs.
M.P. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The respondents agreed to sell their agricultural land to the appellants.
The title deeds and possession of the land were given to the appellants and both parties jointly applied to the District Deputy Collector, Thana Prant, under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, seeking permission for the sale.
The permission was refused on the ground that the intending purchaser had failed to obtain a certificate from the Collector under Rule 36(f) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules 1956, that he intended to take to the profession of agricul ture and was capable of cultivating land personally.
The appellants thereafter obtained the requisite sanction from the Additional Collector, Thana, in spite of the respond ents ' non cooperation.
A suit by the respondents for de claring the agreement void in law was decreed by the Trial Court.
In appeal, the High Court opined that the Prant Officer 's refusal to permit the sate had rendered the agree ment impossible of performance.
Allowing the appeal, the Court.
HELD: (1) The parties are governed by section 56 of the Contract Act according to which a contract becomes void only if something supervenes after its execution which renders it impracticable or impossible of performance.
The order of the Prant Officer was not of such a catastrophic character.
[519A C] Satyabrata Ghose vs Mugneeram Bangur & Co. & Anr. ; ; Smt.
Sushila Devi & Anr.
vs Hari Singh & Ors.
and Tamplin Steamship Co. Lid vs Anglo Mexican Petroleum products Co. Ltd. , 403, applied.
Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. vs Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd. at 168, referred to.
(2) The function which the Collector or the authorised officer discharges under the proviso to section 63(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is an administra tive one and not judicial or quasi judicial.
[519G H] The State of Madras vs C.P. Sarathy & Anr.
AIR 1953 S.C. 53; A.K. Bhaskar vs Advocate General AIR 1962 Kerala 90; Shantanand vs Advocate General AIR 1955 All. 372; Shrimali Lal vs Advocate General AIR 1955 Raj. 166 and Abdul Kasim vs Md. Dawood AIR 1961 Mad.
similarity marked.
(3) The dismissal of a proceeding by an authority not on merits but merely on account of a formal defect will not attract the applicability of the general principles of res judicata and will not debar the authority exercising concur rent jurisdiction from entertaining the subsequent proceed ings for the same relief and passing proper orders on merits.
[520 F H] Putali Mehati vs Tulia I.L.R. and Pethaparu mal vs Murugandi , applied.