judgement:
tions (Crl.) Nos.
526 27 of 1988.
[Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Ram Jethmalani.
Shanti Bhushan, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, R.M. Tewari, P.K. Dey.
Sanjay Karol.
Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, Dr. B.L. Wadhera.
Ms. Nandita Jain and Mahesh Jethmalani for the Petitioners.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solocitor General, Ms. A Subhashini and Parmeshwaran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
On 22 January, 1986 Kehar Singh was convicted of an offence under section 120 B read with section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with the assassination of Smt.
Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, on 31 October, 1984 and was sentenced to death by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi.
His appeal was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi, and his subsequent appeal by special leave [Criminal Appeal No. 180 of 1987 to this Court was dismissed on 3 August, 1988.
A Review Petition filed thereafter by Kehar Singh was dismissed on 7 September, 1988 and later a writ petition was also dismissed by this Court.
On 14 October, 1988 his son, Rajinder Singh, presented petition to the President of India for the grant of pardon to Kehar Singh under article 72 of the Constitution.
In that petition reference was made to the evidence on the record of the criminal case and it was sought to be established that PG NO 1107 Kehar Singh was innocent, and that the verdict of the Courts that Kehar Singh was guilty was erroneous.
It was urged that it was a case for the exercise of clemency.
The petition included a prayer that Kehar Singh 's representative may be allowed to see the President in person in order to explain the case concerning him.
The petition was accompanied by extracts of the oral evidence recorded by the trial court.
On 23 October.
1988 counsel for Kehar Singh wrote to the President requesting an opportunity to present the case before him and for the grant of a hearing in the matter.
A letter dated 31 October, 1988 was received from the secretary to the President referring to the 'mercy petition ' and mentioning that in accordance with "the well established practice in respect of consideration of mercy petitions, it has not been possible to accept the request for a hearing".
On 3 November.
1988 a further letter was addressed to the President counsel refuting the existence of any practice not to accord a hearing On a petition under article 72 and requesting him to re consider his decision to deny a hearing.
On 15 November, 1988 the Secretary to the President wrote to counsel is follows: "Reference is invited to your letter dated November 3, 1988 on the subject mentioned above.
The letter has been perused by the President and its contents carefully considered.
The President is of the opinion that he cannot go into the merits of a case finally decided by the Highest Court of the Land.
Petition for grant of pardon on behalf of Shri Kehar Singh will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India".
Thereafter the President rejected the petition under article 72, and on 24 November, 1988 Kehar Singh was informed of the rejection of the petition.
His son, Rajinder Singh, it is said, came to know on 30 November, 1988 from the newspaper media that the date of execution of Kehar Singh had been fixed for 2 December, 1988.
The next day, 1 December, 1988 be filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi praying for an order restraining, the respondents from executing the sentence of death, and on the afternoon of the same day the High Court dismissed the petition.
Immediately upon dismissal of the writ petition, counsel moved this Court and subsequently field Special Leave Petition [Crl. No. 3084 of 1988 in this Court along with Writ Petitions Nos.
526 27 of 19888 under article 32 of the Constitution.
During the preliminary hearing late in the afternoon of the same day 1 December, 1988 this Court decided to entertain PG NO 1108 the writ petition and made an order directing that the execution of Kehar Singh should not be carried out meanwhile.
Some of the issues involved in these writ petitions and appeal were, it seems, raised in earlier cases but this Court did not find it necessary to enter into those questions in those cases.
Having regard to the seriousness of the controversy we have considered it appropriate to pronounce the opinion of this Court on those questions.
The first question is whether there is justification for the view that when exercising his powers under article 72 the President is precluded from entering into the merits of a case decided finally by this Court.
It is clear from the record before us that the petition presented under article 72 was specifically based on the assertion that Kehar Singh was innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.
That case put forward before the President is apparent from the contents of the petition and the copies of the oral evidence on the record or the criminal case.
An attempt was made by the learned Attorney General to show that the President had not declined to consider the evidence led in the criminal case, but on a plain reading of the documents we are unable to agree with him.
Clause (I) of Art 72 of the Constitution with which we are concerned, provides.
"The President shall have the power to grant pardon, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence: (a) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is by Court Martial: (b) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; (c) in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death.
" The Constitution of India, in keeping with modern constitutional practice, is a constitutive document, fundamental to the governance of the country, whereby, according to accepted political theory, the people of India PG NO 1109 have provided a constitutional polity consisting of certain primary organs, institutions and functionaries to exercise the powers provided in the Constitution.
All power belongs to the people, and it is entrusted by them to specified institutions and functionaries with the intention of working cut, maintaining and operating a constitutional order.
The Preambular statement of the Constitution begins with the significant recital: "We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic . do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.
" To any civilised society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members.
That is evident from the paramount position given by the Courts to article 21 of the Constitution.
These twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the political and social order, and consequently, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary are more sensitive to them than to the other attributes of daily existence.
The deprivation of personal liberty and the threat of the deprivation of life by the action of the State is in most civilised societies regarded seriously and recourse, either under express constitutional provision or through legislative enactment, is provided to the judicial organ.
But, the fallibility of human judgment being undeniable even in the most trained mind, a mind resourced by a harvest of experience, it has been considered appropriate that in the matter of life and personal liberty, the protection should be extended by entrusting power further to some high authority to scrutinise the validity of the threatened denial of life or the threatened or continued denial of personal liberty.
The power so entrusted is a power belonging to the people and reposed in the highest dignitary of the State.
In England, the power is regarded as the royal prerogative of pardon exercised by the Sovereign, generally through the Home Secretary.
It is a power which is capable of exercise on a variety of grounds, for reasons of State as well as the desire to safeguard against judicial error.
It is an act of grace issuing from the Sovereign.
In the United States, however, after the founding of the Republic, a pardon by the President has been regarded not as a private act of grace but as a part of the constitutional scheme.
In an opinion, remarkable for its erudition and clarity, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in W.I. Biddle vs Vuco Perovich, ; enunciated this view and it has since been, affirmed in other decisions.
The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated PG NO 1110 also in the Indian Republic.
It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status.
It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context.
It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsel, Shri Ram Jethmalani and Shri Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the petitioners that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice.
We may point out that the Constitution Bench of this Court held in Maru Ram vs Union of India? ; that the power under article 72 is to be exercised on the advice of the Central Government and not by the President on his own, and that the advice of the Government binds the Head of the State .
To what areas does the power to scrutinise extend? In Ex parte William Wells, ; the United States Supreme Court pointed out that it was to be used "particularly when the circumstances of any case disclosed such uncertainties as made it doubtful it there should have been a conviction of the criminal, or when they are such as to show that there might be a mitigation of the punishment without lessening the obligation of vindicatory justice".
And in Ex parte Garland, ; at 370 decided shortly after the Civil War, Mr. Justice Field observed: "The inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur.
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blets out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. .if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights . " The classic exposition of the law is to be found in Exparte Philip Grossman; , ; where Chief Justice Taft explained: "Executive clemency exists to afford relief from under harshness or evident mistake in the operation or the enforcement of the criminal law.
The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt.
To afford a remedy, it has always been thought essential in popular governments, as well as in PG NO 1111 monarchies, to vest in some other authority than the courts power to ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judgments The dicta in Ex parte Philip Grossman (supra) was approved and adopted by this Court in Kuljit Singh vs Ll.
Governor of Delhi., [1982] 3 S.C.R. 58.
In actual practice, a sentence has been remitted in the exercise of this power on the discovery of a mistake committed by the High Court in disposing of a criminal appeal.
See Nar Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh, [ 1955] l S.C.R.238.
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by article 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on, the accused.
In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record.
The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed.
The president acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted.
He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it.
And this is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
In U.S. vs Benz; , at 358 Sutherland, J. observed: "The judicial power and the executive power over sentences are readily distinguishable.
To render judgment is a judicial function.
To carry the judgment into effect is an executive function.
To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment, but does not alter it qua a judgment.
To reduce a sentence by amendment alters the terms of the judgment itself and is judicial act as much as the imposition of the sentence in the first instance.
" The legal effect of a pardon is wholly different from a judicial supersession of the original sentence.
It is the nature of the power which is determinative.
In Sarat Chandra Rabha and Others vs Khagendranath Nath and Others, [196] 2 S.C.R. 133 at 138 140, Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Court addressed himself to the question whether the order of remission by the Governor of Assam had the effect of reducing the sentence imposed on the apellant in the same way in which an order of an appellate or revisional criminal PG NO 1112 court has the effect of reducing the sentence passed by a trial court, and after discussing the law relating to the power to grant pardon, he said: " .
Though, therefore, the effect of an order of remission is to wipe out that part of the sentence of imprisonment which has not been served out and thus in practice to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, in law the order of remission merely means that the rest of the sentence need not be undergone, leaving the order of conviction by the court and the sentence passed by it untouched.
In this view of the matter the order of remission passed in this case though it had the effect that the appellant was released from jail before he had served the full sentence of three years ' imprisonment and had actually served only about sixteen months ' imprisonment, did not in any way affect the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Court which remained as it was . " and again: " . .Now where the sentence imposed by a trial court is varied by way of reduction by the appellate or revisional court, the final sentence is again imposed by a court; but where a sentence imposed by .1 court is remitted in part under scction 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that has not the effect in law of reducing the sentence imposed by the court, though in effect the result may be that the convicted person suffers less imprisonment that that imposed by the court.
The order of remission affects the execution of the sentence imposed by the court but does not affect the sentence as such, which remains what it was in spite of the order of remission. ." It is apparent that the power under article 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power.
We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court.
In the course of argument, the further question raised was whether judicial review extends to an examination of the PG NO 1113 order passed by the President under article 72 of the Constitution.
At the outset we think it should be clearly understood that we are confined to the question as to the area and scope of the President 's power and not with the question whether it has been truly exercised on the merits.
Indeed, we think that the order of the President cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits except within the strict limitations defined in Maru Ram, etc.
vs Union of India.
; at 1249.
The function of determining whether the act of a constitutional or statutory functionary falls within the constitutional or legislative conferment of power, or is vitiated by self denial on an erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the power is a matter for the court.
In Special Reference No. 1 of 1964; , at 446, Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for the majority of this Court, observed: ". .Whether or not there is distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has entrusted to the Judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution . ." This Court in fact proceeded in State of Rajasthan and Others vs Union of India, [1978] I S.C. R. 1 at 80 81 to hold: ".
So long as a question arises whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the Court.
Indeed it would be its Constitutional obligation to do so . .this
Court is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to this Court is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and if so.
what are the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits.
It is for this Court to uphold the Constitutional values and to enforce the Constitutional limitations.
That is the essence of the Rule of Law . " and in Minerva Mills Ltd. vs Union of India.
[1981] 1 section C. R. 206 at 286 287, Bhagwati, J. said: ". the question arises as to which authority must decide what are the limits on the power conferred upon each organ or instrumentality of the State and whether such PG NO 1114 limits are transgressed or exceeded .
The Constitution has, therefore, created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent Machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review. ." It Will be noted that the learned Judge observed in S.P. Sampath Kumar vs Union of India, ; that this was also the view of the majority Judges in Minerva Mills Ltd. vs Union of India, (supra).
The learned Attorney General of India contends that the power exercised under article 72 is not justiciable, and that article 72 is an enabling provision and confers no right on any individual to invoke its protection.
The power, he says, can be exercised for political considerations, which are not amenable to judicially manageable standards.
In this connection, he has placed A.K. Roy, etc.
vs Union of India and Anr.
, ; before us.
Reference has also been made to D K.M. Nanavati vs The State of Bombay, [ i961] 1 SCR 497 to show that when there is an apparent conflict between the power to pardon vested in the President or the Governor and the judicial power of the Courts and attempt must be made to harmonise the provisions conferring the two different powers.
On the basis of Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State of Maharashtra and Ors., [ ; he urges that the power to grant remissions is exclusively within the province of the President.
He points out that the power given to the President is untrammelled and as the power proceeds on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, the advice likewise must be free from limitations, and that if the President gives no reasons for his order, the Court cannot ask for the reasons, all of which, the learned Attorney General says, establishes the non justiciable nature of the order.
Then he refers to the appointment of Judges by the President as proceeding from a sovereign power, and we are referred to Mohinder Singh vs State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1976 SC 2299; Joseph Peter vs State of Goa, Daman and Diu, ; as well as Riley and Others vs Attorney General of Jamaica and Another, [ and Council of Civil Service Unions and Others vs Minister for the Civil Service, ; besides Attorney General vs Times Newspapers Ltd., Our attention has been invited to paragraphs 949 to 951 in 8 Halsbury 's Laws of England to indicate the nature of the power of pardon and that it is not open to the Courts to question the manner of its exercise.
Reference to a passage in 104 Law Quarterly Review was followed by Horwitz vs Connor, Inspector General of Penal Establishments PG NO 1115 of Victoria; , Reliance was placed on the doctrine of the division of powers in support of the contention that it was not open to the judiciary to scrutinise the exercise of the "mercy" power, and much stress was laid on the observations in Michael De Freitas also called Michael Abdul Malik vs George Ramoutar and Ors., , 394., in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India, ; , 161 and in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors.
vs The State of Punjab, 11955] 2 S.C.R. 225, 235 6.
It seems to us that none of the submissions outlined above meets the case set up on behalf of the petitioner.
We are concerned here with the question whether the President is precluded from examining the merits of the criminal case concluded by the dismissal of the appeal by this Court or it is open to him to consider the merits and decide whether he should grant relief under article 72.
We are not concerned with the merits of the decision taken by the President, nor do we see any conflict between the powers of the President and the finality attaching to the judicial record, a matter to which we have adverted earlier.
Nor do we dispute that the power to pardon belongs exclusively to the President and the Governor under the Constitution.
There is also no question involved in this case of asking for the reasons for the President 's order.
And none of the cases cited for the respondents beginning with Mohinder Singh (supra) advance the case of the respondents any further.
The point is a simple one, and needs no elaborate exposition.
We have already pointed out that the Courts are the constitutional instrumentalities to go into the scope of article 72 and no attempt is being made to analyse the exercise of the power under article 72 on the merits.
As regards Michael de Freitas, (supra), that was, case from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, and in disposing it of the Privy Council observed that the prerogative of mercy lay solely in the discretion of the Sovereign and it was not open to the condemned person or his legal representatives to ascertain the information desired by them from the Home Secretary dealing with the case.
None of these observations deals with the point before us, and therefore they need not detain us.
Upon the considerations to which we have adverted, it appears to us clear that the question as to the area of the President 's power under Article 72 falls squarely within the judicial domain and can be examined by the court by way of judicial review.
The next question is whether the petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing from the President on his petition PG NO 1116 invoking the powers under Article 72.
It seems to us that there is no right in the condemned person to insist on an oral hearing before the President.
The proceeding before the President is of an executive character, and when the petitioner files his petition it is for him to submit with it all the requisite information necessary for the disposal of the petition.
He has no right to insist on presenting an oral argument.
The manner of consideration of the petition lies within the discretion of the President, and it is for him to decide how best he can acquaint himself with all the information that is necessary for its proper and effective disposal.
The President may consider sufficient the information furnished before him in the first instance or he may send for further material relevant to the issues which he considers pertinent, and he may, if he considers it will assist him in treating with the petition, give an oral hearing to the parties.
The matter lies entirely within his discretion.
As regards the considerations to be applied by the President to the petition, we need say nothing more as the law in this behalf has already been laid down by this Court in Maru Ram 's case (supra).
Learned counsel for the petitioners next urged that in order to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power under article 72 this Court should draw up a set of guidelines for regulating the exercise of the power.
It seems to us that there is sufficient indication in the terms of article 72 and in the history of the power enshrined in that provision as well as existing case law, and specific guidelines need not be spelled out.
Indeed, it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised guidelines, for we must remember that the power under Article 72 is of the widest amplitude, can contemplate a myriad kinds and categories of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case.
in which the merits and reasons of State may be profoundly assisted by prevailing occasion and passing time.
And it is of great significance that the function itself enjoys high status in the constitutional scheme.
Finally, an appeal was made by Shri Shanti Bhushan to us to reconsider the constitutional validity of the statutory provisions in the Indian Penal Code providing for the sentence of death.
The learned Attorney General, with his usual fairness did not dispute Shri Shanti Bhushan 's right to raise the question in this proceeding.
Shri Shanti Bhushan has laid great emphasis on the dissenting judgment in Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab, [ ; We have considered the matter, and we feel bound by the law laid down by this Court in that matter.
The learned Attorney General has drawn our attention to the circumstance that PG NO 1117 only six sections, 120B, 121, 132, 302, 307 and 396, of the Indian Penal Code enable the imposition of the sentence of death, that besides the doctrine continues to hold the field that the benefit of reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, and that under the present criminal law the imposition of a death sentence is an exception (for which special reasons must be given) rather than the rule, that the statistics disclose that a mere 29 persons were hanged when 85,000 murders were committed during the period 1974 to 1978 and therefore, the learned Attorney General says, there is no case for reconsideration of the question.
Besides, he points out, Articles 21 and 134 of the Constitution specifically contemplate the existence of a death penalty.
In the circumstances, we think the matter may lie where it does.
In the result, having regard to the view taken by us on the question concerning the area and scope of the President 's power under Article 72 of the Constitution, we hold that the petition invoking that power shall be deemed to be pending before the President to be dealt with and disposed of afresh.
The sentence of death imposed on Kehar Singh shall remain in abeyance meanwhile.
These Writ Petitions and the Special Leave Petition are concluded accordingly.

summary/full:
The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by special leave filed by Kehar Singh, against his conviction and sentence of death awarded under section 120 B read with section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in connection with the assassination of the then Minister of India.
Indira Gandhi.
A Review Petition filed thereafter by Kehar Singh was dismissed on 7th September, 1988 and later a writ petition was also dismissed by this Court.
On 14th October, 1988 Kehar Singh 's son presented a petition to the President of lndia for the grant of pardon to Kehar Singh under Article 72 of the Constitution on the ground that the evidence on record of the criminal case established that Kehar Singh was innocent and the verdict of the courts that Kehar Singh was guilty, was erroneous.
In the petition, he also urged that it was a fit case of clemency and prayed that Kehar Singh 's representative may be allowed to see the President in person in order to explain the case concerning him.
His request for hearing was not accepted on the ground that it was not in accordance with "the well established practice in respect of consideration of mercy petitions".
Thereafter, in response to a further letter written by counsel for Kehar Singh to the President of India refuting the existence of any practice not to accord a hearing on a petition under Article 72, the Secretary to the President wrote to counsel that the President is of the opinion that he cannot go into the merits of a case finally decided by the highest Court of the land and that the petition for grant of pardon on behalf of Kehar Singh will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of lndia.
The President of India thereafter rejected the said petition.
Hence these writ petitions and the special leave petition to this Court.
PG NO 1102 PG NO 1103 The main issues involved in the writ petitions and the S.L.P. were: (a) whether there is justification for the view that when exercising his powers under article 72, the President is precluded from entering into the merits of a case decided finally by the Supreme Court; (b) to what areas does the power of the President to scrutinise extend; and (c) whether the petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing from the President in his petition invoking the powers under article 72.
Disposing of the petitions, HELD: 1(i) The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme and it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic.
It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status.
It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context.
[1109H; 1110A B] W. I. Biddle vs Vuco Perovich, ; referred to. 1 (ii) The power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of article 74(1) of the Constitution.
must act in accordance with such advice.
[1110B] Maru Ram vs Union of lndia; , followed.
2[i] It is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by article 72 of the Constitution of scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on, the accused.
In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record.
The judicial record remains intact.
and undisturbed.
The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the court acted.
He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it.
And this is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
[111lC D] 2(ii) The legal of a effect of a pardon is wholly different from a judicial supersession of the original sentence.
It is the nature of the power which is determinative.
[1111G] Kuljit Singh vs Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1982] 3 S.C.R. 58; Nar A Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh, [19S5] I S.C.R. PG NO 1104 238 and Sarat Chandra Rabha and Others vs Khagendranath Nath and Others, ; , followed.
Ex Parte William Wells, ; , Ex Parte Garland, ; at 370; Ex Parte Philip Grossman, ; ; B and U.S. vs Benz, ; at 358 referred to.
3(i) There is no right in the condemned person to insist on an oral hearing before the President.
The proceeding before the President is of an executive character, and when the petitioner files his petition, it is for him to submit with it all the requisite information necessary for the disposal of the petition.
He has no right to insist on presenting on oral argument.
[1116A B] 3(ii) The manner of consideration of the petition lies within the discretion of the President, and it is for him to decide how best he can acquaint himself with all the information that is necessary for its proper and effective disposal.
The President may consider sufficient the information furnished before him in the first instance or he may send for further material relevant to the issues which he considers pertinent, and he may, if he considers it will assist him in treating with the petition, give an 'oral hearing to the parties.
The matter lies entirely within his discretion.
[1116B C] 3(iii) As regards the considerations to he applied by the President to the petition, the law in this behalf has already been laid down by this Court in Maru Ram etc.
vs Union of India [1981] I S.C.R. 1196.
[1116D] 4.
There is sufficient indication in the terms of article 72 and in the history of the power enshrined in that provision as well as existing case law, and specific guidelines need not be spelled out for regulating the exercise of the power by the President.
Indeed, it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised guidelines, since the power under Article 72 is of the widest amplitude, can contemplate a myriad kinds and categories of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case, in which the merits and reasons of State may be profoundly assisted by prevailing occasion and passing time.
[1116F F] 5.
The question as to the area of the President 's power under Article 72 falls squarely within the judicial domain and can be examined by the court by way of judicial review.
However, the order of the President cannot be subjected to PG NO 1105 judicial review on its merits except within the strict limitations defined in Maru Ram etc.
vs Union of India ; at 1249.
The function of determining whether the act of a constitutional or statutory functionary falls within the constitutional or legislative conferment of power, or is vitiated by self denial on an erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the scope of the power is a matter for the court.
[1115G; 1113B C] Special Reference No. I of 1964, [1965j I S.C.R. 413 at 446; State Rajasthan and Ors.
vs Union of India, ; at 80 82; Minerva Mills Ltd. vs Union of India, ; at 286 287; S.P. Sampath Kumar vs Union of India, [1987] I S.C.C. 124; A.k.
Roy, etc.
vs Union of India and Anr., ; and K.M. Nanavati vs The State of Bombay, [1961] I S.C.R. 497, referred to.
Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State of Maharashtra and Ors., ; ; Mohinder Singh vs State of Punjab, A.I.R. , Joseph Peter vs State of Goa, Daman and Diu, ; ; Riley and Others vs Attorney General of Jamaica and Another, ; Council of Civil Service Unions and Others vs Minister for the Civil Service, ; ; Attorney General vs Times Newspapers Ltd. ; Horwitz vs Connor Inspector General of Penal Establishments of Victoria, [1908] 6 C.I.R. 38; Michael De Feritas also called Michael Abdul Malik y. Ceorge Ramoutar and Ors., , 394, Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India, ; , 161 and Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Ors.
vs The State of Punjab, , 235 6, distinguished.
In the instant case, having regard to the view taken on the question concerning the area and scope of the President 's power under article 72 of the Constitution, the Court directed that the petition invoking that power shall be deemed to be pending before the President to be dealt with and disposed of afresh.
The sentence of death imposed on Kehar Singh shall remain in abeyance meanwhile.
[1117C D] The Constitution of India, in keeping with modern constitutional practice, is a constitutive document, fundamental to the governance of the country, whereby, according to accepted political theory, the people of India have provided a constitutional polity consisting of certain primary organs, institutions and functionaries to exercise the powers provided in the Constitution.
[1108H; 1109A] PG NO 1106 All power belongs to the people, and it is entrusted by them to specified institutions and functionaries with the intention of working out, maintaining and operating a constitutional order.
[1109B ] To any civilised society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members.
That is evident from the paramount position given by the Courts to article 21 of the Constitution.
[1109C] The Courts are the constitutional instrumentalities to go into the scope of Article 72.
[1115B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2311 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.1986 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 326 of 1980.
Rajinder Sachhar, Aruneshwar Gupta and Sunil Malhotra for the Appellant.
D.K. Kapoor, Indu Goswamy and Harish N. Salve for the Respondents.
The order in question was passed by the High Court in second appeal.
In order to appreciate the controversy in this appeal, it is necessary to refer to certain facts.
In 1947 three rooms and a courtyard in Prem ises Nos.
22 16 2222, Gali Inder Chammar Teliwara, Delhi as an Evacuee Property was given on tenancy to the appellant by the Custodian of the Evacuee property.
In 1956, the entire property was jointly purchased by the father of the respond ent and Smt.
Sham Kaur from the Custodian of the Evacuee property.
Sham Kaur had paid 50 per cent of the consid eration money, i.e., Rs.25,700 towards the sale amount.
It was a joint purchase.
Sham Kaur died in 1975 and her legal heirs became the co landlords of the disputed prem ises.
In June 1975 the father of the respondents had filed an Eviction Petition against the appellant on the ground that the premises in question was required bona fide by the landlord under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter called the said Act.
Legal heirs of Smt.
Sham Kaur were, however, not impleaded as parties.
On 28th of October, 1976 the First Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissed the suit for eviction.
Several grounds had been taken in defence by the appellant herein before the First Additional Rent Controller.
It was contended, inter alia that the respondent had no locus standi to file the petition and that the respondent was not the sole owner of the premises in occupation of the appellant.
It was further contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in view of the aforesaid conten tion.
Other owners had not been joined as parties and as such the suit was not maintainable, it was submitted.
It was further urged that the permission granted by the Slum Au thority was invalid.
Service of a proper notice dated 12th July, 1972 was denied.
The respondent had filed reply to the opposition by the appellant.
The First Additional Rent Controller held that there was proper service of the notice.
But the validity of the notice was challenged on the ground that the premises were previously evacuee property.
A cer tificate of sale had been issued in favour of one Sunder Singh and the respondent.
The respondent had admitted that the sale certificate was issued in the joint name of Smt.
Sham Kaur, widow of Sunder Singh and the respondent.
It was stated that the premises were let out to the appellant by the Custodian of the Evacuee Property and he had not entered into any separate agreement of lease and the terms of the lease were never settled in the presence of the respondent.
In view of this admission it was held that 71 Smt.
Sham Kaur and the appellant both became owners of the property in question and both had become landlords of the premises in suit.
It was argued that the other co owner ceased to be landlord of the premises because rent was continuously paid to the respondent.
The First Additional Rent Controller held against the respondent in respect of this contention.
He was of the opinion that one of the co landlords could receive payment on behalf of the other.
Receipt of rent by one landlord would not by itself make him the exclusive owner when the premises were in fact owned by more than on owner.
The First Additional Rent Controller held that in the premises the respondent alone could not terminate the tenancy of the appellant.
The First Additional Rent Controller distinguished the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagan Nath, ; The First Additional Rent Controller held that one co owner could not terminate the tenancy when the property was owned by joint owners.
The First Additional Rent Controller also found that the landlord being respondent herein was not able to prove that there was no reasonably suitable accommodation with him.
It was also held that his bona fide reasonable requirement was not proved.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the First Additional Rent Controller the respondent herein went up in appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi.
The Rent Control Tribunal noticed that the ground for eviction taken up by the respondent was under section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
The property in dispute had been let out for residential purpose and was bona fide required by the respondent for himself and members of his family residing with him.
The Tribunal no ticed that the respondent had a large family comprising of 3 sons and 5 daughters and the accommodation with him was insufficient and he had no reasonably suitable accommodation with him.
The Rent Control Tribunal after taking into considera tion the judgment of Shri Jaspal Singh, Additional District Judge, Delhi, in connection with the suit filed by Smt.
Sham Kaur for specific performance of the agreement to sell came to the conclusion that the bona fide of the requirement was established.
The premises was let out according to Tribunal for the residential purpose and it was bona fide required by the landlord for his requirement and for the members of his family and that he had no other sufficiently reasonable accommodation with him to satisfy his needs.
On the question whether one co owner could institute the suit for the evic tion in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribu nal came to the conclusion that he could.
On the question of the property being let out for residential or 72 commercial purposes after analysing the evidence that the use of the property had been all along residential and the property had been used only for residential purpose, the Tribunal was of the view that it would not be proper to accept the position that the purpose of letting was residen tial cum commercial.
On the question of the bona fide requirement the Tribu nal took into consideration the members of the family of the respondent and noted that the evidence was that the family consisted of respondent himself, his wife, 3 sons, all of which were married and 5 daughters.
Though the daughters of the respondent were married the Tribunal came to the conclu sion that the respondent as landlord had a right to ask for accommodation for the daughters occasional visits.
It has also not been proved according to the Tribunal that the sons of the respondent were not staying with him and therefore their requirement had also to be taken into consideration.
Thereafter, taking into consideration need for a pooja room, one sitting room and one barsati and keeping in view the large family of the respondent the Tribunal came to that conclusion that the property in view of the present family dependents of the respondent was bona fide required.
On the question whether one co owner being able to maintain the action for eviction, the Tribunal came to the conclusion in view of the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagannath (supra) and the decision of this Court in Kanta Goel vs B.P. Pathak and others; , , in the facts and circumstances of the case that the respond ent landlord as a co owner alone could have maintained the eviction petition.
Aggrieved thereby there was a further second appeal by the appellant to the High Court.
The High Court on 30th January, 1986 dismissed the second appeal.
The High Court held that the action for eviction was justified in view of section 14(1)(e) of the Act and the need of the landlord was bona fide and further the High Court affirmed the view that a co owner in the facts and circumstances of the case was entitled to maintain an action for eviction.
The High Court, therefore, rejected the second appeal.
Aggrieved thereby the tenant is before this Court in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Two conten tions were urged by Mr. Rajinder Sachhar appearing on behalf of the tenant.
It was submitted that in the absence of the other co owner, Smt.
Sham Kaur, the suit for eviction was incompetent.
It was secondly urged that the bona 73 fide need was not properly proved and the High Court was in error in upholding the order of eviction on this ground.
The first question was gone into by this Court in the decision of Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagannath (supra).
There the plain tiff respondent was a co owner of the suit properties.
He had filed a suit for the eviction on grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement.
The Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court decreed the suit having held that the plea of reasonable requirement by the members of the family for whose benefit the premises were held was established.
A single Judge of the High Court reversed the decision but the Division Bench restored the Trial Court 's order.
There was an appeal by the tenant defendant.
This Court held that the co owner was as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property was.
This Court reiterated that jurisprudentially it was not correct to say that a co owner of the property was not its owner.
He owned every part of the composite property along with others and it could not be said that he was only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property.
The position would change only when partition would take place and therefore, this Court found that it was not possible to accept the submis sion that the plaintiff in that case who admittedly was a landlord and co owner of the premises was not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
It may be mentioned incidentally that in essential respects the provision of section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is similar or pari materia to section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
It is not necessary, this Court reiterated, to establish that the plaintiff was the only owner of the property for the purpose of section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Act as long as he was the co owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants.
This plea of the defendant tenant, this Court found, could not there fore be accepted.
This Court was of the opinion that the plea pertained to the domain of the frame of the suit as if the suit was bad for non joinder of other plaintiff such a plea should have been raised, according to this Court, for whatever it was worth at the earliest opportunity.
It was not done in that case.
This however is not the position in the instant case before us.
This plea was taken in defence and raised as an issue before the Additional Rent Control ler.
Secondly, it was held by this Court that the relation ship between the parties being that of the landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction.
The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Evidence Act.
He could not deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy.
Under the general law, in a suit between 74 landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property was irrelevant.
It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non pleading of other co owners as such.
There had been clear acknowledgment and admission in that case of the defendants and on concurrent findings of this Court held the action was valid.
The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Kanta Goel vs B.P. Pathak (supra).
In that case a portion of the first floor of a building was let out by the owners to the appellant before this Court.
The owner died leaving 3 sons and a daughter.
The first respondent who was in occupation of a government allotment was required by government to vacate these premises.
He took proceedings under section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, against the tenant of the other portion of the first floor and after evicting that tenant kept those premises vacant.
Thereafter, he again took proceedings under section 14A against the appellant.
The other respondents did not join with the first respondent.
The first respondent claimed that he became the sole owner of the first floor under the will of his father followed by a partition between himself and his brother.
The appellant contended that the respondent was not the sole owner and that the other respondents should have been made parties to the proceedings.
The Rent Controller overruled the appel lant 's contention and ordered eviction.
The High Court impleaded the other respondents and confirmed the order of eviction.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that, (1) the 1st respondent was not the appellant 's landlord; (2) the premises were not in the 1st respondent 's name and had not been let out by him; (3) the co heirs should have been impleaded before the Controller; (4) the Controller should have allowed the appellant to contest the owner 's will; and (5) Section 14A could be used twice over for eviction of tenants from more than one premises.
Allowing the appeal, this Court held that on reading in the context of the Rent Control Law, the simple sense of the situation was that there should be a building which is let out, a landlord who collected rent and a tenant who paid it.
The appellant, as the tenant, had been paying rent to the 1st respondent.
The latter, together with the other respondents constituted the body of landlords and by consent, implicit or otherwise, the 1st respondent was collecting rent on behalf of all.
He therefore functioned as a landlord and was entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord. 'In his name ' and 'let out ' by him read in the spirit of the provision and without violence to the words of the section clearly convey the idea that the premises must be owned by him directly and the lessee must be under him directly, 75 which is the case, where the 1st respondent as heir steps into the shoes of his father who owned the building.
He represents the former owner and lessor falls within section 14A of the Act.
The accent on 'name ' is only to pre empt the common class of benami evasions.
It was further held that a co owner is as much the owner of the entire property as any sole owner.
Therefore, there was no substance in the conten tion that the absence of the other co owners disentitled the other co owners from suing for eviction.
In the High Court, the other co owners who were parties did not object to the claim of the 1st owner to the first floor on the strength of the will.
The objection to the will was not a serious objec tion.
The other finding is not relevant for the present purpose.
In Kanta Goel case (supra) this Court followed the decision in Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagannath (supra).
This Court left open the question as to what would happen if some of the co owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the claimant co owner.
Relying on the two aforesaid decisions in the facts of this case, in so far as the ratio of the two decisions was concerned, Mr. Rajind er Sachhar contended that as yet there is no principle established by this Court that any one of the co owners could maintain an action for eviction.
In the instant case, it was contended that it was on record that a suit had been filed by Smt.
Sham Kaur against the respondent for specific performance of an agreement to sell a portion of the proper ty and for direction to him to execute the sale deed with respect to a portion of the premises bearing Nos.
22 16 to 2222.
That suit was decreed by Shri Jaspal Singh, Additional District Judge, Delhi and Sunder Singh was ordered to exe cute the sale deed in favour of the co owner Smt.
Sham Kaur.
The High Court however recorded that the case of the parties was that there was an appeal against the judgment and decree and the same was pending and the portion with respect to which the direction has been given was not the portion which is in occupation of the tenant and which is the subject matter of this eviction petition.
It appears that even according to the decree this portion, i.e., 3 rooms and the courtyard in question which is the subject matter of dispute in the instant case, falls in the share of Sunder Singh who had filed the eviction petition.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that other cotenant the widow, Smt.
Sham Kaur or her representatives wanted the appellant to continue.
This in our opinion falls within the ratio of Kanta Goel vs B.P. Pathak (supra) where this Court clearly held that when the other co owner did not object to the eviction one co owner could maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of other co owner.
Here also Smt.
Sham Kaur and her heirs did not object to 76 the claim for eviction made by the respondents herein.
In that view of the matter and in the circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the ratio of the said case will apply and this suit will be maintainable even in the absence of all the owners to the eviction proceedings.
In Tej Bhan Madan vs II Additional District Judge and others; , this Court reiterated that there can be a denial of the title by the tenant of his landlord without the tenant renouncing his character as such where, for instance, he sets up a plea of jus tertii.
But the implication of the ground on which the denial of the title was made was that if the tenant appellant could not have denied the vendor 's title by virtue of the inhibitions of the attornment, he could not question the vendee 's title either.
The tenant did himself no service by this stand.
This Court reiterated that the principle that the tenant cannot deny the title of the landlord in its basic founda tions, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate.
The law is that the estoppel of a tenant under section 116 of the Evidence Act was a recognition and statu tory assimilation of the equitable principles underlying the estoppel in relation to tenants.
In this case the rent had all along been collected by the respondent.
On the question of bona fide it was contended before us by Mr. Sachhar that in the High Court, immediately prior to the filing of the petition the landlord had rented out a few rooms on the ground floor, as such it pleaded that there was no bona fide.
This point, the High Court noted, was not raised in the first appeal.
Furthermore, it was not specifi cally raised in the pleadings.
Therefore, the High Court found that it was not proper for the parties to raise this question in the second appeal.
The High Court was right and we cannot interfere on this ground.
The High Court was also invited to interfere with the findings of fact as to the bona fide nature of the need of the landlord.
The High Court 's attention was drawn on the finding of the 1st Addl.
Rent Controller contained in paragraph 11 of the judgment wherein it was held that the landlord was having reasonably suitable accommodation.
That plea had been reversed, it was contended, without going into the merits of the case by the Tribunal.
The High Court however noted that during the pendency of the second appeal an application was filed on behalf of the appellant tenant seeking that certain events subsequent to the passing of the impugned judgment may be permitted to be brought on record.
The application was directed to be considered at the time of the hearing of the appeal before the High Court.
The High Court appointed one Advocate as the Local Commissioner to visit the 77 premises and give his report regarding three rooms on the ground floor of the premises in dispute which according to the appellant had fallen vacant and was then in the occupa tion of the landlord.
The landlord 's case was that the rooms were in occupation of the legal heirs of the tenants.
It was pleaded that those rooms could not be used for residential purposes as they were merely meant to be used as stores.
The Commissioner appointed by the High Court filed a report which corroborated the stand of the landlord respondent.
The High Court had considered all this.
In that view of the matter it was not possible for the High Court to have fur ther interfered with the findings of the appellate court.
Our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court in Vinod Kumar Arora vs Surjit Kumar, [1987] 3 Supreme Court Cases 711.
We do not find that the High Court has committed any error in following the principles enunciated in that decision.
Indeed, interference by the High Court with the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court would have in this case been unwarranted.
There was nothing so far as the service of notice was concerned.
In view of the principle enunciated by this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs Yesodal Ammal, ; we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondentappellant was entitled to maintain this eviction petition alone and he had proved the grounds for eviction and that his need was bona fide and that he had no other suitable accommodation in his possession.
In the premises, there is no merit in this appeal.
The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
In 1947 three rooms and a courtyard in an evacuee 's property were given on tenancy to the appellant by the Custodian of Evacuee Property.
In 1956 the entire property was jointly purchased by the father of the respondent and a lady.
The lady died in 1975 and her legal heirs became the co landlords of the disputed premises.
In June 1975, the father of the respondents filed an eviction petition against the appellant on the ground that the premises was required bona fide by the landlord under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
The legal heirs of the joint purchaser viz the lady, were, however, not impleaded as parties.
The appellant contested this petition alleging that the respondent had no locus standi to file the petition, that the respondent was not the sole owner of the premises in occupation of the appellant, that there was no relation ship of landlord and tenant existing between the parties, that as other owners were not joined as parties the eviction petition was not maintainable, and further that the permis sion granted by the Slum Authority was invalid.
The Addi tional Rent Controller held that one of the co landlords could receive payment on behalf of the other and that re ceipt of rent by one landlord would not by itself make him exclusive owner when the premises were in fact owned by more than one owner and consequently the respondent alone could not terminate the tenancy of the appellant.
He further held that one coowner could not terminate the tenancy when the property was owned by joint owners and that the respondent landlord was not able to prove that there was no reasonable suitable accommodation with him and that his claim for bona fide reasonably requirement was not proved.
He accordingly dismissed the suit for eviction.
68 Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Rent Control ler, the respondent filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the respondent was entitled to claim the premises on the ground of bona fide requirement for the use of his family, and that the property had all along been used for residential purposes and that it would not be proper to accept the view that the purpose of letting out was residential cure commercial On the question whether one coowner could maintain the suit for eviction the Tribu nal held that in the circumstances of the case the respond ent landlord as a co owner alone could have maintained the eviction petition.
The appellant filed a second appeal and the High Court rejected the same on the ground that the action for eviction was justified in view of section 14(1)(e) of the Act, and that the need of the landlord was bona fide, and further the High Court affirmed the view that a co owner in the facts and circumstances of the case was entitled to maintain an action for eviction.
In the appeal by special leave to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant tenant that in the absence of the other co owner the suit for eviction was incompetent, and that the bona fide need was not properly proved and the High Court was in error in upholding the order of eviction on this ground.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: 1.
When the other co owner did not object to the eviction one co owner could maintain an action for eviction even in the absence of the other co owner.
[75D] In the instant case, the direction given by the Court in the suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell filed by Smt.
Sham Kaur against the respondent landlord, was not with respect to the portion of the property which was in the occupation of the tenant appellant and which was the subject matter of the eviction petition.
The three rooms and the courtyard in question, the subject matter of dispute, fails in the share of Sunder Singh respondent who had filed the eviction petition.
Furthermore there is no evidence that Smt.
Sham Kaur or her representatives wanted the appellants to continue.
[75E G] Kanta Goel vs B.P. Pathak and others; , ; Sri Ram Pasricha vs Jagan Nath ; referred to.
The law is that the estoppel of a tenant under sec tion 116 of the Evidence Act was a recognition and statutory assimilation of the equitable principles underlying the estoppel in relation to tenants.
[76D] In the instant case, the rent had all along been col lected by the respondent from the appellant.
[76D] Tej Bhan Madan vs II Additional District Judge and others; , , referred to.
The High Court noted that the plea of the appellant that immediately prior to the filing of the petition, the landlord had rented out a few rooms on the ground floor, was not specifically raised in the pleadings nor in the first appeal, and rightly held that it was not proper to raise this question in the second appeal.
[76E F] 4.
The High Court appointed an Advocate as Local Commis sioner to visit the premises and give his report.
The report corroborated the stand of the landlord respondent.
In that view of the matter it was not possible for the High Court to have further interfered with the findings of the Appellate Court.
[77B] Vinod Kumar Arora vs Surjit Kurnar ; referred to.
The respondent was, therefore, entitled to maintain the eviction petition alone and he had proved the grounds for eviction and that his need was bona fide and that he had no other suitable accommodation in his possession.
[77E] V. Dhanpal Chettiar vs Yesodai Ammal, ; , referred to.