judgement:
Appeal No. 2127 of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 27, 1969 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 280 of 1965.
H.R. Gokhale, Govind Das and G. section Chatterjee, for the appellant.
R.K. Garg, section C. Agarwala, and Sumitra Chakravarty for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
Respondent 1 was, in 1955, admitted as a trade apprentice by the appellant company in ' its works, the company 345 agreeing to bear the cost of his training as such apprentice, which it did for a period of 3 years.
On completion of his training, he was appointed in September 1958 as a skilled workman, i.e., as a fitter.
The letter of appointment under which he was engaged contained a clause which required him to execute a bond to serve the company for five years at least.
The object of that clause evidently was to ensure that he served the company at least for five years in consideration of the company having borne the expenses.of his training.
The evidence produced before the Industrial Tribunal shows that the practice of the company, set up at the instance of the Government of India and the Company 's Board of Directors, was to have a confidential inquiry made to verify the antecedents of its employees. 'Such verification not being practicable at the time of the appointment of each employee, it used to be done after a workman was appointed.
The object of such verification was to ascertain whether it was desirable or not in the interests of the company to continue the service of the employee in respect of whom such verification was made.
The inquiry was made through the police.
On receipt of a verification report from the police, the Senior Security Officer of the company would make his recommendation and the company would terminate the service of an employee where it was considered desirable in the company 's interests not to continue such an employee in service after giving 3 months ' notice or salary for that period in lieu thereof.
Throughout the period of his service commencing from Sep tember ' 1958 no action was ever taken against respondent 1 although he had at one time joined a strike in the company '; works and although he was an active member and the secretary of the workmen 's union.
A criminal case in relation to the said strike was filed against him but had been subsequently withdrawn.
Prima facie, the fact that no action was taken against him indicated that the company did not consider his active participation in the union activities objectionable so as to warrant any interference on its part.
In accordance with the practice of the company, however, a verification report about him was called for as was done in the case of other workmen also.
On such a report from the police, the Senior Security Officer recommended that it was not desirable to retain him in the company 's service any longer.
Respondent I at the time was working as a fitter in the blast furnace of the works.
On December 9, 1960 he was served with an order by which his service was terminated and was informed that he would be entitled to 3 months ' pay in lieu of a notice for that period.
346 On the union of which, as aforesaid, he was the secretary, having raised a dispute, alleging that the termination of his service was the result of victimisation and unfair labour practice,, the dispute was referred by the Government of Orissa to the Industrial Tribunal.
After inquairy, the Tribunal rejected the union 's allegation as to victimisation or unfair labour practice on account of any union activities carried on by respondent 1.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that it was improper on the part of the company not to have disclosed the said report to respondent 1 and not to have given him an opportunity to contest its contents and vindicate himself.
The Tribunal held that though the said order was in form one of termination of service, it was in fact punitive in nature and considering the action taken against respondent I as disproportionate further held that it was a case of victimisation, that consequently the, order was illegal and unjustified and directed reinstatement with full 'back wages.
The company filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing the said order.
Before the High Court the company urged (a) that the termination of the service of respondent 1 was in bona fide exercise of the employer 's right to do so, (b) that it did so only because of the said adverse report and (c) that even if it was held that the said order was not legal or justified, the proper relief to be granted to the respondent in the circumstances of.
the case was compensation and not reinstatement, which meant imposition of a workman against whom there was an adverse report and whom the company did not consider it desirable to retain in its service.
The High Court rejected these contentions and held that the Tribunal was right in holding that the termination of service of respondent I was not in bona fide exercise of the power of the employer to terminate an employee 's service, that it was punitive in character and was, therefore, not legal or justified.
The High Court also held that ordinarily the relief against an illegal termina tion of service was reinstatement though in some cases it may be considered inexpedient to do so, in which event a suitable compensation would be the proper relief.
Lastly, it held that the present case was not one of those exceptions to the general rule of reinstatement and the Tribunal having exercised its discretion it could not interfere with the Tribunal 's order.
The company thereupon applied for special leave from this Court.
Though it was granted, it was limited only to the question whether the relief to respondent I should have been reinstatement or compensation.
It is, therefore, not possible for us to go into the question whether the Tribunal and the High Court were right in their conclusion that the termination of the service of respondent I was not in bona fide exercise of the company 's right to order discharge simpliciter or whether the order was punitive in 347 nature and therefore was not legal in the absence of any domestic inquiry having been held.
Besides, this appeal is one against the High Court 's order refusing certiorari under its writ jurisdiction and not a direct appeal under article 136 of the Constitution against the Tribunal 's order.
These considerations will have to be kept in mind while we are considering this appeal.
Counsel for the appellant company argued that even though he could not challenge, in view of the limited special leave granted to the company, the finding that the impugned order was not termination simpliciter in bona fide exercise of the employer 's right to terminate the service of an employee, he was entitled to agitate the question whether or not the High Court, on the facts of this case, should have interfered and ordered compensation in place of reinstatement, particularly because : (a) the concerned employee was posted in the blast furnace, a crucial part of the company 's works, in respect of which the company could not hazard any risk, (b) the Tribunal had given a clear and firm finding against the case that the workman had been victimised on account of his union activities, and (c) the Tribunal and the High Court had both set aside the company 's order only because of their finding that it was punitive in nature and that the punishment was so disproportionate, that it amounted to victimisation.
The proper order, counsel submitted,) was to award compensation instead of imposing the service of an employee whom the company considered risky to retain in its service.
Mr. Garg, on the other hand, argued that the company 's action involved an important principle, in that, an employer cannot be allowed to terminate the services of his employees on police reports which are not disclosed to the workmen or before the Tribunal, and therefore, are not open to the workmen to challenge.
Such a course, he argued, would enable an employer to put an end to the service of a workman not because he is in fact a danger to the establishment but is merely a member of a party or an association whose views and policies such an employer does not like.
In such a case, he submitted, the termination of service would be in violation of the constitutional right of association of an individual and would be clearly unjustified, and therefore, it would not be a case for departure from the ordinary consequence flowing from an illegal order of termination of service.
There can be no doubt that the right of an employer to discharge or dismiss an employee is no longer absolute as it is subjected to severe restrictions.
In cases of both termination of service and dismissal, industrial adjudication is competent to grant relief, in the former case on the ground that the exercise of power was mala fide or colourable and in the latter case if it amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice or is in violation 348 of the principles of natural justice or is, otherwise not legal or justified. ' In such cases, a tribunal can award by way of relief to the concerned employee either reinstatement or compensation.
In the earlier stages the question whether one or the other of the two reliefs should be granted was held to be a matter of discretion for the tribunal.
(see Western India Automobile Association vs Industrial Tribunal( '), United Commercial Bank Ltd. vs U.P. Bank Employees Union( ').
The view then was that to lay down a general rule of reinstatement being the remedy in such cases would itself fetter the discretion of the tribunal which has to act in the interests of industrial harmony .
and peace and that it might well be that in some cases imposition of the service of a workman on an unwilling employer might not be conducive to such harmony and peace.
Later on, however, the earlier flexibility appears to have been abandoned and it was ruled that although no hard and fast rule could be laid down and the Tribunal would have to consider each case on its own merits and attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of the employer and the employee, the employee being entitled to security of service and protection Against wrongful dismissal, the normal rule in such cases should be reinstatement.
(sea Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs Workmen( ').
This conclusion was adhered to, in some of the subsequent decisions.
But in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd.( ') itself, as also in other subsequent cases, the rule was qualified to mean that in unusual or exceptional cases where it is not expedient to grant the normal relief of rein statement, the proper relief would be compensation and that that would meet the ends of justice.
The problem confronting industrial adjudication is to promote its two objectives, the security of employment and protection against wrongful discharge or dismissal on the one hand and industrial peace and harmony on the other, both leading ultimately to the goal of maximum possible production.
As exceptions to the general rule of reinstatement, there have been cases where reinstatement has not been considered as either desirable or expedient.
These were the cases where there ad en strained relations between the employer and the employee, where the post held by the aggrieved employee had been one of trust and confidence or where though dismissal or discharge was unsustainable owing to some infirmity in the impugned order, the employee was found to have been guilty of an activity subversive of prejudicial to the interests of the industry.
These cases are to be found in Assam Oil Co. Ltd. vs Workmen (4 ) Workmen of Charottar Gramodhar Sahakari Mandali Ltd. vs Charottar Gramo (1) [19491 F.C.R. 321, 348.
(2) (19521 (3) (4) ; 349 dhar Sahakari Mandali Ltd.( '), Doomur Dulung Tea Estate vs Workmen (2 ) and Ruby General Insurance.
Co. Ltd. vs P. P. Chopra(3).
These are, however, illustrative cases where an exception was made to the general rule.
No hard and fast rule as to which circumstances would in a given case constitute, an exception to the general rule can possibly be laid down as: the Tribunal in each case, keeping the objectives of industrial adjudication in mind, must in a spirit of fairness and justice confront the question whether the circumstances of the case require that an exception should be made and compensation would meet the ends of justice.
In the present case the facts are fairly clear.
As aforesaid, the concerned workman Was trained for a period of 3 years at the cost of the company.
On completion of his training the company engaged him as a skilled worker.
He worked as such from September 1958 to December 1960.
At the time of the termination of his service, he was working as a fitter in the blast furnace, a vital part of the company 's works, where both efficiency and trust would matter.
Even though he was said to have joined an illegal strike and a criminal case had been filed against him, no steps, even departmentally, were taken against him.
Prima facie, there fore, this was not a case where, the employer could be said to be anxious to wantonly or unreasonably terminate his service.
Even though he was an active member and the secretary of the union, the Tribunal found that the termination of his service was not due to victimisation or any unfair labour practice.
There can also be no dispute that the company ordered the termination of his service only because of the, adverse report of the police against him.
The report was called for 'by the company in accordance with its practice of verifying the workman 's antecedents.
The evidence was that such verification was made in the case of all workmen after they were engaged and that such verifi cation was not made before appointing them as it was not practicable to do so.
The practice was adopted at the instance of the Government and in accordance with the directions to that effect of the Board of Directors.
The letter of the Deputy Inspector General of Police communicating the report made on the investigation by the police was produced but neither the report nor the source of information on which it was based nor the name of the person who conducted the investigation was disclosed either to the workman or the, Tribunal.
The ground urged for such non disclosure was that the report was confidential and if disclosed it would not be possible for the company to have such investigations in future.
The reason appears to be that if the person conduct (1) C.A. 382 of 1966, dec.
on August 14, 1967.
(2) C.A. 516 of 1966 dec.
on October 26, 1967.
(3) C.A. 1735 of 1969,dec.
on September 12, 1969.
350 ing such investigation were produced for cross examination by the workman or if his report were to be disclosed, the name or names of the informants would come out with the result that no informant in future would readily come forward to give information about other workmen.
Even in criminal cases an investigating officer is not compelled to disclose the name of his informant.
But the Tribunal appears to have been impressed by the company 's refusal to disclose the report although it was clearly a confidential report.
The Tribunal thought that such a report might have been made by a person who was not a responsible police officer or that it might be based on mere rumour or hearsay evidence and might not be of a very convincing nature.
The High Court went one step further and observed that it might be "as contended by opposite party No. I that the report is based entirely on the trade union activities of the opposite party in which case the discharge would itself be improper." This observation was not warranted in view of the Tribunal 's clear finding that this was not a case of victimisation or unfair labour practice on account of the union activities of the workman.
The High Court further was of the view that "even if the Management terminated the services of Sri A. K. Ray, simply on the ground that it received an adverse report against him, the order of such termination of services in the circumstances cannot be treated as legal or justified.
" It also observed that "it was not admitted by the opposite party that there was any adverse police report against him.
" But the management had examined P. B. Kanungo, the Senior Personnel Officer, who had categorically testified that the management had received such an adverse report and on the basis of that report the company 's Security Officer had recommended the termination of service of the workman,.
There was no cross examination on this part of his evidence.
The High Court, therefore, was not entitled to proceed on the basis as if the fact of such adverse report was any longer in doubt.
Indeed, the grievance was 'not relating to the factum of such report, but its non disclosure and the Tribunal in consequence not being able to weigh its veracity.
The fact of the Management having received the police report which was adverse was no more in dispute; nor the fact that the company 's Security Officer on the strength of that report had recommended that it was not desirable to retain the workman in service.
The termination of his service was by no means singular in any way, for, the evid ence was that verification of antecedents of all workmen used to be similarly made and whenever the report was adverse an order of discharge used to be made.
Since the special leave granted to the company is limited only to the question of the kind of, relief that the Tribunal ought to have given, we arenot in a position to go into the question whether the termination of service was legal or justified.
We have, therefore, 351 to proceed on the footing that the Tribunal 's conclusion that it was not legal was right.
The question, however, still is whether the Tribunal was, in the circumstances of the case, justified in directing reinstatement.
It is true that some of the decisions of this Court have laid down that where the discharge or dismissal of a workman is not legal or justified, the relief which would ordinarily follow would be reinstatement.
The Tribunal however, has the discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the circumstances of a particular case are unusual or exceptional so as to make reinstatement inexpedient or improper.
The Tribunal has, therefore, to exercise its discretion Judicially and in accordance with well recognised principles in that regard and has to examine carefully the circumstances of each case and decide whether such a case is one of those exceptions to the general rule.
If the Tribunal were to exercise its discretion in disregard of such circumstances or the principles laid down by this Court it would be a case either of no exercise of discretion or of one riot legally exercised.
In either case the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction can interfere and cannot be content by simply saying that since the Tribunal has exercised its discretion it will not examine the circumstances of the case to ascertain whether or not such exercise was properly and in accordance with the well settled principles made.
If the High Court were to do so, it would be 'a refusal on its part to exercise jurisdiction.
In the present case, there could be no dispute that the company, in accordance with its practice, called for a verification report about the concerned workman.
The report was made by the police after investigation and on that being adverse, the company 's security officer recommended to the company that it was not in the interests of the company to retain the workman 's services.
There can be no doubt that the company terminated the service of the workman only because it felt that it was not desirable for reasons of security, to continue the workman in its service.
This is clear from the fact that it was otherwise not interested in terminating the workman 's service and had in fact insisted that the workman should bind himself to serve it at least for five years.
The termination of service was not on account,of victimisation or unfair labour practice as was clearly found by the Tribunal.
It is, therefore abundantly clear that the company passed the impugned order of termination of service ' on account of the said adverse report, the recommendation of its own security officer and on being satisfied that it would not be in the company 's interests to continue him in its service.
The Tribunal no doubt felt that it was not established whether the investigation and the report following it were properly done 352 and made, that the company ought to have disclosed it to the workman and given him an opportunity to vindicate himself and that the non disclosure of the report made the termination illegal and unjustified.
That may or may not be right.
But what was relevant, at the stage when the Tribunal came to decide what relief the workman was entitled to,, was the question whether the management genuinely apprehended as a result of.
the report that it would be risky to retain the workman in the company 's service.
They may have gone wrong in the manner of terminating the workman 's service as held by the Tribunal.
But, if the management truly believed that it was not possible to retain the workman in the company 's service on grounds of security and consequently could not place confidence in him any longer, that present case would be one of those exceptional cases where the general rule as to reinstatement could not properly be applied.
Thus of courie does not mean that in every case where the employer says that he has lost confidence in the workman, and therefore, has terminated his service that reinstatement cannot be granted and the Tribunal has to award compensation.
On the other hand, it on an examination of all the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the apprehensions of the employer were genuine and the employer truly felt that it was hazardous or prejudicial to the interests of the industry to retain the workman in his service on grounds of security, the case would be properly one where compensation would meet the ends of justice.
On a consideration of all the circumstances, the present case, in our view, was one such case.
The Tribunal exercised its discretion mechanically without weighing the circumstances of the case.
That was no exercise of discretion at all.
There is ample authority to the effect that if a statutory tribunal exercises its discretion on the basis of irrelevant considerations or without regard to relevant considerations, certiorari may properly issue to quash its order.
[See S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (2nd ed.) 324 325].
One such relevant consideration, the disregard of which would render its order amenable to interference, would be the well settled principles laid down in decisions binding on the tribunal to whom the discretion is entrusted.
The refusal by the High Court to interfere was equally mechanical and amounted to refusal to exercise, its jurisdiction.
Its order, therefore, becomes liable to interference.
There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that the order of reinstatement passed by the Tribunal was liable to be quashed and that the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with it merely .
on the ground that it could not do so as it was a case where the Tribunal had exercised its discretion.
The question next is ', having held that the order of reinstatement was not a proper order, in that, 353 it was not in consonance with the decided cases, do we simply quash the order of the Tribunal and that of the High Court and leave the concerned workman to pursue his further remedy ? The other alternative would be to remand the case to the, Tribunal to pass a suitable order.
In either case, in view of this judgment, no other order except that of compensation can be obtained by him.
If the case is remanded and the Tribunal on such remand passes an order of compensation and fixes the amount, such a course would mean further proceedings and a I possible appeal.
That would mean prolonging the dispute, which would hardly be fair to or conducive to the interests of the parties.
In these circumstances we decided that it would be more proper that we ourselves should determine the amount of compensation which would meet the ends of justice.
Having come to that conclusion, we heard counsel for both the parties.
After doing so and taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the present case we have come to the conclusion in the light also of the decisions of this Court such as Assam Oil Co. vs Its Workmen( '), Utkal Machinery Ltd. vs Workmen( ') and the recent case of Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs P. P. Chopra(3) that compensation ', for a period of two years at the rate of Rs. 160/ per month, that being the last salary drawn by the concerned workman, would meet, the ends of justice.
We accordingly allow the appeal, quash the order of the Tribunal and the High Court and instead direct the appellant company to pay to the 1st respondent Rs. 3840 as and by way of compensation.
There will be no order of costs.
R.K.P.S. Appeal allowed.
(1) ; (2) ; (3) C.A. 1735 of 1969 decided on September 12, 1969.

summary/full:
The first respondent was appointed in 1958 as a skilled workman by the appellant Company.
He had executed a bond to serve the Company for five years in consideration of the Company having borne.the expenses of his training.
In accordance with the practice of the Company a verification report about him was called for as was done in the case of other workmen also.
On a report from the Police the Security Officer recommended that it was not desirable to retain the respondent in the company 's service any longer.
The respondent at the time was working as a fitter in the blast furnace of the works.
In December 1960 he was served with an order by which his service was terminated.
The Industrial Tribunal, on a reference of the dispute, rejected the Union 's allegation as to victimisation or unfair labour practice.
Nevertheless it held that it was improper on the part of the Company not to have disclosed the report to the respondent, that the order of termination was in fact punitive in nature and considering the action taken as disproportionate the order was illegal and unjustified.
The Tribunal therefore directed reinstatement with full back wages.
On a petition for a Writ of Certiorari the High Court upheld the Tribunal 's order.
It also held that the case was not one of those exceptions to the general rule of reinstatement and the Tribunal having exercised its discretion it could not interfere with the Tribunal 's order.
The appeal to this Court was limited only to the question whether the relief to the first respondent should have been reinstatement or compensation.
HELD : (1) In the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in directing reinstatement and the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the order of the Tribunal merely on the ground that it could not do so as it was a case where the Tribunal had exercised its Discretion.
The Tribunal has the discretion to award compensation instead of reinstatement if the circumstances of a Particular case are unusual or exceptional so as to make reinstatement inexpedient or improper.
The Tribunal has to exercise its discretion judicially and in accordance with the well recognised principles in that regard and has to examine carefully the circumstances of each case and decide whether such a case is one of those exceptions to the general rule.
If the Tribunal were to exercise down by this Court it would be a case either of no exercise of discretion or of one not legally exercised.
In either case the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction can interfere and cannot be content by simply saying, that since the Tribunal has exercised its discretion, it will not examine the circumstances of the case to ascertain whether or not such exercise 344 was properly and in accordance with settled principles made.
If the High Court were to do so, it would be a refusal on its part to exercise jurisdiction.
[351 B E] In the present case the termination of service was not on account of victimisation or unfair labour practice.
It is clear that the Company terminated the service of the workman only because it felt that it was not desirable for reason of security to continue the workman in its service.
Therefore what was relevant at the stage when the Tribunal came to decide what relief the workman was entitled to was the question whether the management genuinely apprehended as a result of the report that it would be risky to retain the workman in the company 's service.
If, on an examination, of the circumstances of the case the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the apprehensions of the employer were genuine and the employer truly felt that it was hazardous or prejudicial to the interests of the industry to retain the workman in his service on grounds of security the case would be properly one where , compensation would meet the ends of justice.
The present case is one such.
The Tribunal exercised its discretion mechanically without weighing, the circumstances of the case and the refusal by the High Court to interfere was equally mechanical and amounted to refusal to exercise jurisdiction.
A GI Western India ' Automobile Association vs Industrial Tribunal , 348; United Commercial Bank Ltd. vs U.P. Bank Employees Union, [19521 ; Punjab National Bank Ltd. vs Workmen, ; Assam Oil Co. Ltd. vs Workmen, ; ; Working of Charottar Gramodhar Sahakari Mandali Ltd. vs Charottar Gramodhar Sahakari Mandali Ltd., C.A. 382 of 1966, dec.
on August 14, 1967; Deomur Dulung Tea Estate vs Workmen, C.A. 516 of 1966, dec. on October 26, 1967; and Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs P.P. Chopra, C.A. 1735 of 1969, dec. on September 12, 1969, referred to.
(ii)In the circumstances of the case it would be proper for this Court to determine the amount of compensation.
Compensation for a period of two years at the rate of Rs. 160 per month, that being the last salary drawn by the concerned workman would meet the ends of justice.
[353 DI Assam Oil Co. Ltd. vs Workmen, [19601 3 S.C.R. 457 and Utkal Machinery Ltd. vs Workmen, ; , referred to.


judgement:
Appeal No. 1914 of 1968.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 12, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 301 of 1966.
C.K. Daphtary, R. N. Banerjee, P. N. Tiwari and 0.
C. Mathur, for the appellant.
S.C. Agarwala, R. K. Garg and section Chakravarty, for respon dents Nos. 1 and 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
On May 9, 1956 the appellant company appointed respondent 3 as a foreman on probation for a period of six months.
On expiry of that period the probationary period was extended from time to time and ultimately respondent 3 was transferred to the labour office of the company.
On May 29, 1957, while respondent 3 was still serving his probationary period, the company terminated his service.
The matter was thereupon taken up by respondent 1 before the Regional Conciliation Officer, Bareilly who registered the case as Case No. 83B/57.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, no conciliation could be arrived at and the State Government declined to make a reference for adjudication under the U.P. (hereinafter called the Act).
On the said refusal, respondent 3 filed a writ petition in the High Court for a mandamus.
The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the decision of the State Government to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication was a matter of its discretion.
By about the end of 1962 the respondent union made further representation to the State Government and by its order dated August 28, 1963 the Government made a reference of the dispute regarding the said termination of the service of respondent 3 to the Labour Court for adjudication.
By its order dated March 22, 1965 the Labour Court rejected the reference on the ground that there was no industrial dispute, and therefore, the reference was not maintainable.
Respondents I to 3 thereupon 'filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by a learned Single Judge.
An appeal against the said order filed by 373 the appellant company was dismissed.
This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the order of the High Court dismissing the appellant company 's writ petition.
Counsel for the appellant company, in support of the appeal, raised the following points : (1) Was it possible for the respondent union to validly espouse the cause of respondent 3 when he was not a member at the date when his service was terminated Even if it was, was there in fact an espousal so as to convert his individual dispute into an industrial dispute ? (2) Do the words "at any time" in section 4(k) of the Act have any limitations, or can the Government refer a dispute, for adjudication after the lapse of about six years, as in this case, after the accrual of the cause of the dispute ? (3) In what circumstances can the Government refer such a dispute for adjudication after it has once refused to do so ? The definition of 'industrial dispute ' in section 2(l).of the Act is in the same language as that in section 2(k) of the .
The expression 'industrial dispute ', therefore, must bear the same meaning as it is assigned to that expression in the Central Act.
It is now well settled by a long series of decisions that notwithstanding the wide language of the definition in section 2(k) of the Central Act, the dispute contemplated there is not an individual dispute but one involving a substantial number of work men.
However, a dispute, though originally an individual dispute, may become.
an industrial dispute if it were to be espoused and made a common cause by workmen as a body or by a considerable section of them.
Section 4(k) of the Act, therefore, must be held to empower the Government to make a reference of such a dispute only for adjudication.
It provides that where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute for adjudication to a labour court or to a tribunal depending upon whether the matter.
of the industrial dispute falls under one or the other Schedule to the Act.
The first question that falls for determination is whether where a dispute is originally an individual dispute but becomes an industrial one as a result of its being espoused by a union or,a substantial number of workmen, the concerned workman should have been a member of such union at the time when the cause of such dispute arises.
It appears that at one time there was a conflict of judicial opinion on this question.
Some of the High Courts took the view that in order that an individual dispute may be converted into an industrial dispute on, as aforesaid, its being espoused by a substantial number of workmen, the concerned workman must be a member of the union at the time of the accrual of the cause of the dispute.
Thus, in Padarthy, Ratnam & Co. vs Industrial Sup.
CI(NP)70 9 374 Tribunal(1) the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman might develop into an industrial dispute if the cause is espoused by a union of which he is a member, and that the membership of the union which would give it the jurisdiction to espouse his cause must be anterior to the date of the dismissal and not subsequent to it.
A similar view was also taken by the High Courts of Kerala and Punjab.
(see Shamsuddin vs State of Kerala( ') and Khadi Grainodyog Bhawan Workers ' Union vs E. Krishnamurthy, Industrial Tribunal( ').
In a later decision, however, the High Court of Punjab appears to have taken a contrary view.
In Muller & Phipps (India) (P) Ltd. vs Their Employees ' Union( ') the dispute related to the retrenchment of a workman and the failure of the employer to re employ him in spite of its having re employed two other employees out of their turn as against the turn of the con cerned workman.
The High Court rejected the employer 's con tention that the espousal of the union was not valid as it was made after the retrenched workman had ceased on his being retrenched to be a member of the union on the ground that if that contention were to be upheld it would mean that no union can ever espouse the cause of a retrenched workman.
In Workmen vs Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.( '), the union which espoused the causE of the workman came into existence after his dismissal.
The workman naturally became its member after his dismissal.
The High Court disagreed with the Tribunal, which had rejected the reference, 'and held that even if, oN the date of the dismissal of a workman, the dispute was an individual dispute,, it may under some circumstances become an industrial dispute on the date of the reference and that the validity of the reference has to be judged on the facts, as they stand on the date of the reference and not at the date of the dismissal.
Therefore, even if there was no union at the date of the workman 's dismissal to espouse his cause, if such a union comes into existence before the reference and the dismissed workman becomes its member and the union thereupon espouses his cause that would be sufficient.
It also held that there was no principle in support of the view that the union must be in existence at the time of the dismissal.
After the decision by this Court in Workmen vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate(") there can be no doubt that though the words "any person" in the definition of an industrial dispute in section 2 (k) of the Central Act are very wide and would on a mere literal interpretation include a dispute relating to any person, considering the scheme and the objects of the Act all disputes are not industrial disputes and that a dispute becomes an industrial dis (1) [19581 (2) (3) A.I.R. 1966 Pun.
(4) (5) (6) [19581 S.C.R. 1156.
375 pute where the person in respect of whom it is raised is one in whose employment, non employment, terms of employment or.
conditions of labour the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest.
The question, therefore, which would arise in cases where the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged, is whether there was between the parties to the reference, i.e, the employer and his workmen, an industrial dispute.
The parties to the industrial dispute are obviously the parties to the reference, and therefore the dispute must be an industrial dispute between such parties.
It follows, therefore, that though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute, the workmen may make that dispute as their own, that is to say, espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and are directly and substantially interested in the employment, non employment, or conditions of work of the concerned workman.
This premise pre supposes that though at the date when the cause of the dispute arises that dispute is an individual dispute, such a dispute can become an industrial dispute if it is spoused by the workmen or a substantial section of them after the cause of the dispute, e.g., dismissal, has taken place.
It may be that at the date of such dismissal there is no union or that the workmen are not sufficiently organised to take up the cause of the concerned workman and no espousal for that or any other reason takes place at the time when such cause occurs.
But that cannot mean that because there was no such union in existence on that date, the dispute cannot become an industrial one if it is taken up later on by the union or by a substantial section of the workmen.
If it is insisted that the concerned workman must be a member of the union at the date of his dismissal, the result would be that if at that period of time there is no union in that particular industry and it comes into existence later on then the dismissal of such a workman can never be an industrial dispute although the other workmen have a community of interest in the matter of his dismissal, and the cause for which or the manner in which his dismissal is brought about directly and substantially affects the other workmen.
The only condition for an individual dispute turning into an industrial dispute, as, laid down in the case of Dimakuchi Tea Estate(), is the necessity of a community of interest and not whether the concerned workman was or was not a member of the union at the time of his dismissal.
The parties to the reference being the employer and his employees, the test must necessarily be whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest even though such a dispute relates to a single workman.
It must follow that the existence of such an interest, evidenced by the espousal by them of the cause, must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs, otherwise, as aforesaid, in some (1) ; 376 cases a dispute which was originally an individual one cannot become an industrial dispute.
Further, the community of interest does not depend on whether the concerned workman was a member or not at the date when the cause occurred, for, without his being a member the dispute may be such that other workmen by having a common interest therein would be justified in taking up the dispute as their own and espousing it.
Any controversy on the question as to whether it is necessary for a concerned workman to be a member of the union which has espoused his cause at the time when that cause arose has been finally set.
at rest by the decision in Bombay Union of Journalists vs The "Hindu", Bombay( ') where this Court laid down that the test whether an individual dispute got converted into an industrial dispute depended on whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up and supported by the union of workmen of the ,employer against whom the dispute was raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of such workmen.
(see also Workmen vs M/s Dharampal Premchand (2 ) and Workmen of Indian Express (P) Ltd. vs The Management (I).
The argument, therefore, that the reference in this case was not competent on the .ground that the concerned workman was not a member of the union at the date when the cause giving rise to the dispute arose, and that therefore, the union could not have espoused the dispute to convert it into an industrial dispute is not correct and cannot be upheld,.
The next question is whether the expression "at any time" in section 4(k) means what its literal meaning connotes, or whether in the context in which it is used it has any limitations.
Counsel for the company argued that the concerned workman was admittedly not a member of the respondent union in the beginning of 1959 when the State Government refused to make the reference, that he became a member of the respondent union in July 1962, that it was thereafter that the respondent union revived the said dispute which had ceased to be alive after the Government 's said refusal and that it was at the instance of the Union that the Government later on ,changed its mind and in August 1963 agreed to make the reference.
The contention was that the Government having once declined to refer the dispute, could not change its mind after a lapse of nearly six years after the dispute arose and that though the expression "at any time" does not apparently signify any limit, it must be construed to mean that once the Government had refused to make the reference after considering the matter and the employer thereupon had been led to believe that the dispute was not to be agitated in a tribunal and had consequently made his own arrangement, the Government cannot, on a further agitation by the (1) ; (2) (3) [1991] 1 S.C. Cases 228.
377 union, take a somersault and decide to refer it for adjudication.
It was argued that if it were so, it would mean that a workman, who after termination of his service, has already obtained another employment, can still go to the union, become its member and ask the union to agitate the dispute by espousing it.
Such an action, if permitted, would cause dislocation in the industry as when the employer has in the meantime made his own arrangement by appointing a substitute in place of the dismissed workman on finding that the latter had already found other employment.
The legislature, the argument proceeded, could not, therefore, have used the words "at any time" to mean after any, length of time.
From the words used in section 4(k) of the Act there can be no doubt that the legislature has left the question of making or refusing to make a reference for adjudication to, the discretion of the Government.
But the discretion is neither unfettered nor arbitrary for the section clearly provides that there must exist an industrial dispute as defined by the Act or such a dispute must be apprehended when the Government decides to refer it for adjudication.
No reference thus can be made unless at the time when the Gov ernment decides to make it an industrial dispute between the employer and his employees either exists or is apprehended.
Therefore, the expression "at any time".
though seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context in which it appears.
Ordinarily, the question of making a reference would arise after conciliation proceedings have been gone through and the conciliation officer has made a failure report.
But the Government need not wait until such a procedure has been completed.
In an urgent case, it can "at any time", i.e., even when such proceedings have not begun.
or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for adjudication.
The expression "at any time" thus takes in such cases as where the Government decides to make a reference without waiting for conciliation proceedings to begin or to be completed.
As already stated, the expression "at any time" in the context in which it is used postulates that a reference can only be made if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.
No reference is contemplated by the section when the dispute is hot an industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, for,instance, where it is already adjudicated or in respect of which there is an agreement or a settlement between the parties or where the industry in question is no longer in existence.
In the State of Madras vs C. P. Sarathy(1) this Court held on construction of section 1 0 ( 1 ) of the Central Act that the, function of the appropriate Government thereunder is an administrative function.
It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute, its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication so that the industrial relations bet (1) [19531 S.C.R. 334, at 346.
378 ween the employer and his employees may not continue to remain disturbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible.
In the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it, it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or be cause it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference.
But where it reconsiders its earlier decision it can make the reference, only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard to that and no other industrial dispute.
Sindhu Resettlement Corporation, Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal( ').
Such a view has been taken by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Madras, Allahabad, Rajasthan, Punjab and Madhya Pradesh.
(see Gurumurthi (G.) V. Ramulu (K.)( ') Vasudeva Rao vs State of Mysore( ') Rawalpindi Victory Transport Co. (P) Ltd. vs State of Punjab( '), Champion Cycle Industries vs State of U.P. (5), Goodyear (India) Ltd., Jaipur vs Industrial Tribunal (6) and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur ( 7 ) .
The reason given in these decisions is that the function of the Government either under section 10(l) of the Central Act or a similar provision in a State Act being administrative, principles such as res judicata applicable to judicial Acts do not apply and such a principle cannot be imported for consideration when the Government first refuses to refer and later changes its mind.
In fact, when the Government refuses to make a reference it does not exercise its power; on the other hand it refuses to exercise its power and it is only when it decides to refer that it exercises its power.
Consequently, the power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when it has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage.
There is thus a considerable body of judicial opinion according to which so long as an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that is so, the fact that it had earlier refused to exercise its power does not preclude it from exercising it at a later stage.
In this view, the mere fact that there has been a lapse of time or that a party to the dispute was, by the earlier refusal, led to believe that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference.
It appears that there was a controversy before the High Court whether there was at all any espousal of the dispute by the respon (1) [19681 , 839.
(2) (3) (4) [19641 (5) (6) (7) A.I.R. [19691 M.P. 174.
379 dent union, and if there was, at what stage.
The High Court, therefore, got produced before it the record before the conciliation officer.
Strictly speaking, in a proceeding for certiorari under article 226, the record which would be produced before the High Court would be that of the Tribunal whose order is under challenge.
But if the High Court got produced in the interests of justice the file of the conciliation officer which alone could show whether there was espousal by the union or not, no one could reasonably object to the High Court calling for that record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the stand of the union that it had taken up the cause of respondent 3 was correct or not.
As the High Court has said, that file showed that on July 2, 1957 one Har Sahai Singh, the then President of the union, had complained to the Regional Conciliation Officer against the termination of service of respondent 3 and following that complaint, respondent 3 had filed a written statement dated September 4, 1957 which was counter signed by the said Har Sahai Singh in his capacity as the President and presumably, therefore, on behalf of the union.
The record also indicated that on that very day, i.e., September 4, 1957, the Conciliation Officer recorded an order that the conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with as "no authorised agent" of the union appeared before him.
Presumably, the Conciliation Officer in course of time must have made his failure report.
From these facts the following conclusions must emerge : (1) that the Conciliation Officer had taken cognisance of the dispute, (2) that he took that dispute as having been espoused by the union through its president, (3) that thereupon he fixed September 4, 1957 as the date for holding the conciliation proceedings and informed the parties to attend before him, and (4) that as "no authorised agent" on behalf of the union appeared before him, he recorded that the conciliation proceedings could not go on.
These facts clearly go to show that the then president of the union had not made the said complaint in his personal capacity but as the president representing the union.
This is borne out to a certain extent by a subsequent resolution of the executive body of the union dated February 28, 1.963 which recites that the executive committee of the union will continue to take up the cause of respondent 3 as it had been so far doing.
But Mr. Daphtary emphasised that even this resolution did not mean that the union had taken up the cause of respondent 3 as its own since the resolution uses the word 'pairavi ' and not espousing or sponsoring the workman 's cause.
Pairavi, according to him, means acting as the agent of a party to a proceeding and not being a party to the proceeding which would be the position had the union taken up the Complaint as its own.
In our view we need not look at the said .resolution in so narrow a manner, for, the facts taken as a whole indicate that the union had in fact taken up the cause of the workman.
The President evidently could not have countersigned the 380 written statement of the concerned workman and the Conciliation Officer could not have given a notice to the union to appear before him and could not have recorded that he did not proceed with the conciliation proceedings as no authorised agent of the union appeared before him unless every one understood that the union had taken up the cause of the workman.
The notice dated August 2, 1957 issued by the Conciliation Officer after the union President had lodged his said complaint is on record and shows that it was issued to the management and the union calling upon both of them to appoint their respective representatives on the conciliation board as required by the Government Order dated July 14, 1954.
It also shows that the Officer treated the dispute as having been espoused by the union as the notice recites the dispute as an industrial dispute.
The subsequent facts would seem to indicate that the Govern ment declined to make the reference presumably because of the report of the Conciliation Officer that in spite of the said notice no authorised agent of the union had appeared before him and therefore no conciliation had been possible.
As already stated, a writ petition to compel the Government to make the reference proved unsuccessful.
It may be that the respondent union may have decided to press for the reference after the concerned workman became its member.
That fact, however, is irrelevant for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the Government under section 4(k).
One fact, however, is clear that the respondent union carried on correspondence with the Labour Ministry and also passed the said resolution dated February 28, 1963.
The correspondence which was carried on from about November 1962 shows that the union pressed the Government to make the reference and the Government ultimately made the reference in August 1963.
That correspondence further shows that the Government at one stage pointed out that the union had in 1957 failed to appear before the Conciliation Officer although it had espoused the dispute and that that fact had influenced the Government 's refusal then to refer the dispute for adjudication.
The union pointed out (1) that at the time when the said complaint was lodged in 1957 before the Conciliation Officer the union 's 'president was one Varma, (2) that in the meantime elections for the union 's office bearers took place when the said Har Sahai Choudhury and one Girish Chandra Bharati were elected president and working president respectively ' (3) that the above mentioned individuals appeared before the conciliation officer, but the said Varma did not, as he had failed in the elections, (4) that dispute arose about the said elections and the Registrar of the Trade Union , refused to recognise the new office bearers, and ( I) that the conciliation officer also refused to recognise the said Har Sahai Choudhary and Bharati a,; the duly elected president and working president, and therefore, although both of 381 them attended the meeting fixed by that officer, the latter recorded that no authorised agent of the union had appeared before him and no conciliation, therefore, could be arrived at.
It thus appears from the correspondence that following the espousal of the said dispute by the union, two of the office bearers of the union did appear before the conciliation officer but were not recognised as the authorised agents of the union on account of the said disputes about the elections.
If the Government, therefore, had refused then to make the reference on the ground that though the union had espoused the workman 's cause it had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings, the Government 's decision refusing to make the reference was clearly on misapprehension.
If the Government subsequently found that its earlier decision was based on such a misapprehension and on facts brought to its notice it reconsiders the matter and decides to make the reference it is difficult to say that it exercised the discretion conferred on it by section 4 (k) in any inappropriate manner.
But that does not mean that if section 4(k) is construed to mean that the Government can reconsider its earlier decision.
such a construction would result in unions inducing workmen to join them as members or to shift their membership from one to the other rival union on promises by such union to revive disputes which are already dead or forgotten and then press the Government to make a reference in relation to them .
There is no reason to think that the Government would not consider the matter properly or allow itself to be stampeded into making references in cases of old or stale disputes or reviving such disputes on the pressure of unions.
It is true that where a Government reconsiders its previous decision and decides to make the reference, such a decision might cause inconvenience to the employer because the employer in the meantime might have acted on the belief that there would be no proceedings by way of adjudication of the dispute between him and his workmen.
Such a consideration would, we should think.
be taken into account by the Government whenever, in exercise of its discretion, it decides to reopen its previous decision as also the time which has lapsed between its earlier decision and the date when it decides to reconsider it.
These are matters which the Government would have to take into account while deciding whether it should reopen its former decision in the interest of justice and industrial peace but have nothing to do with its juris diction under section 4(k) of the Act.
Whether the intervening period may be short or long would necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and therefore, in construing the expression "at any time" in section 4(k) it would be impossible to lay down any limits to it.
In the present case though nearly four years had gone by since the earlier decision not to make the reference, if the Government 382 was satisfied that its earlier decision had been arrived at on a mis apprehension of facts, and therefore, required its reconsideration, neither its decision to do so nor its determination to make the reference can be challenged on the ground of want of power.
The fact that the dispute between the concerned workman and the management had become an industrial dispute by its having been espoused by the union since 1957 cannot be disputed.
The fact that the workman was then not a member of the union does not preclude or negative the existence of the community of interest nor can it disable the, other workmen through their union from making that dispute their own.
The fact that the Government refused then to exercise its power cannot mean that the dispute had ended or was in any manner resolved.
In the absence of any material it Is not possible to say that with the refusal of the Government then and the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court in March 1959 the dispute, which was already an industrial dispute, had ceased to subsist or that on respondent 3 joining the union in July 1962 the union revived a dispute which was already dead and not in existence.
His becoming a member in July 1962 was as immaterial to the power of the Government under section 4(k) as the fact of his not being a member at the time when his cause was espoused in 1957 by the union and the dispute becoming thereupon an industrial dispute.
The question of his membership, therefore, haS to be kept apart from the right of the other workmen to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under section 4(k).
It may be that his becoming a member in 1962 may have been the cause of the union 's subsequent efforts to persuade the Government to reconsider its decision and make a reference on proper facts being placed before it and its earlier misapprehensions re moved.
But that again has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Government under section 4(k) of the Act.
In our view, the appellant company fails on both the points and its appeal against the High Court 's decision becomes unsustainable.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant terminated the service of a workman in 1957.
At that time he was not a member of the respondent union.
The respondent however, espoused the cause of the workman and took up the matter before the Conciliation Officer.
Two of the union 's office bearers appeared before the Conciliation Officer but the Conciliation Officer did not recognise them as authorised agents of the union, because, there were some disputes regarding their election.
He therefore recorded that the conciliation proceedings could not be proceeded with on the ground that no authorised agent of the union appeared before him at the proceedings.
The State Government assumed, that though the union had espoused the workman 's cause, it had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings at all, and refused to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication.
In 1962, the workman became a member of the respondent union and the union again took up the matter with the Government.
After some correspondence, in which it was pointed out that in fact two officers of the union did appear at the conciliation proceedings, the State Government, in 1963, referred the dispute for adjudication.
On the question of the validity of reference, HELD : (1) Under section 4(k) of the U.P. , if the State Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may, at any time, refer the dispute for adjudication.
The expression 'of any time ', does not confer an unfettered or arbitrary discretion on the Government.
At whatever time the Govern ment decides to refer a dispute for adjudication, there must, at that time, exist an industrial dispute or such a dispute must be apprehended.
[373 F; 377 F G] (2)Though a dispute may initially be an individual dispute, the other workmen may espouse it on the ground that they have a community of interest and that they are directly and substantially interested in the employment, non employment or conditions of employment of the concerned workman.
Therefore, when the existence of the industrial dispute is challenged, the test is whether the dispute referred to adjudication is one in which the workmen or a substantial section of them have a direct and substantial interest.
The espousal by the other workmen may be at the time when the cause of the dispute occurs or later, because, the workmen may not, at the time when the dispute occurs, be sufficiently organised to espouse his cause or there may not have been a union at that time.
Since no reference is contemplated by section 4(k) when the dispute is not an 371 industrial dispute, or, even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not apprehended, the existence of the community of interest, evidenced by the espousal converting an individual dispute into an industrial dispute, must be at the date when the reference is made and not necessarily at the date when the cause occurs.
Further, the community of interest does not depend on whether theconcerned workman was a member or not of the union at the date whenthe cause occurred.
The question of the work man 's membership has tobe kept apart from the right of the other Work men to espouse his cause and the power of the Government under section 4(k).
In the present case, the reference was competent because the fact that the workman was not a member of the union on the date when the cause of the dispute arose did not preclude or negative the existence of.
the community of interest, nor did it disable the other workmen, through their union, from making that dispute their own.
[375 B E, G H; 376 A B, D; 382 A B, D E) Workmen vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, [1958] S.C.R. 1156, Bombay Union of Journalists vs The Hindu, Bombay,.
; Workmen of Indian Express (P) Ltd. vs The Management, [1969] 1 S.C. Cases 228, and Workmen vs Dharampal Premchand. ; followed.
Muller & Phipps (India) (P) Ltd. vs Their Employees Union and Workmen vs Jamadoba Colliery of Tata, Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. , referred to.
Padarthy Ratnam & Co. vs industrial Tribunal, , Shamsuddin vs State of Kerala, [1961] 1 L.L.J. 77 and Khadi Gramodyog Bhawan Workers ' Union vs E. Krishnamurthy, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 173, overruled.
(3)The Government 's function is to refer a dispute for adjudication so thatindustrial relations may not continue to remain disturbed, and not todecide the merits of the dispute.
Therefore, it cannot be held that once the Government has refused to refer a dispute to adjudication, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter, either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration, and decide to make the reference.
Where, however, it reconsiders its earlier decision and makes a reference it can do so only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended, and the reference must be with regard to only that industrial dispute.
Further, though it does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make a reference, before doing so, the Government should take into account the lapse of time and any inconvenience to the employer, and should not allow itself to be stampeded into making References in cases of old or stale disputes or allow the revival of such disputes on the pressure of outside agencies.
[378 A C; 381 B E] In the present case, the Government 's refusal to make a reference at the earlier stage on the ground that the union had not cared to appear at the conciliation proceedings, was based on a misapprehension.
Therefore, if the Government subsequently found that its earlier decision was based on such a misapprehension, and on facts brought to its notice it reconsidered the matter and decided to make the reference since the dispute was 'still subsisting, it could not be said that the exercise of the discretion was improper, merely because, four years had elapsed since its earlier decision not to make the reference.
[381 F H; 382 B D] 372 State of Madras vs C. P. Sarathy, , 346 and Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal, , 839, followed.
Gurumurthi vs Ramulu, , Vasudeva Rao vs State of Mysore , Rawalpindi Victory Transport Co. (P) Ltd. vs State of Punjab, [1964] 1 L.L.J. 644, Champion Cycle Industries vs State of U.P. , Goodyear (India) Ltd., Jaipur vs Industrial Tribunal, and Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 174, approved.