judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 679 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.
1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 63 of 1976.
S.K. Agnihotri for the Appellants.
Nemo for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 265 SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ.
This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, dated 30th September, 1976 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 63 of 1976.
The respondent was the owner of a truck which was seized by the Police Sorwa on 10th December, 1974 for alleged con travention of the provisions of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ') in connection with Crime No. 42 of 1972.
The respondent made applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to the High Court to quash the orders of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Alirajpur and the Sessions Judge, Jhabua re spectively rejecting.
his request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and to quash the order of the District Collector and restrain him from proceeding further in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section 68 of the Act for confiscation of the vehicle and ask for return of the vehicle, or in the alternative to direct the District Judicial Magistrate to dispose of the application in accord ance with law The High Court after setting out the facts addressed itself to three questions, namely, (1) whether Section 6A of the as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974 was prospective or retrospective? (2) whether in the facts and circumstances, the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 523 read with section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code for the return of the vehicle seized by the Police pending final decision of the criminal case? and (3) whether the respondent was entitled on the merits for the return of the vehicle as prayed for? On the first question, the High Court was of the view that it was a fundamental rule of law that no Statute should be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appeared very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arose by necessary implication, direct or indirect.
The High Court referred to several decisions which it is not necessary for us to refer to.
It is well settled that the normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective, however, in the case of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evidence, it may have retro spective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such.
On an examination of the statute and the provisions referred to herein, the High Court found that there was no retroactivity.
We are 266 of the opinion that for the reasons given by the High Court, it is difficult to accept the position that there was no retroactivity.
Indeed, Mr Deshpande appearing for the appel lant did not seriously challenge this finding of the High Court.
There is no dispute in this case that the contraven tion of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken place in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972.
The vehicle was seized on 10th December, 1974.
The High Court examined Section 4 of the Amendment Act, along with Section 6A of the Principal Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective effect.
We are of the opin ion that the High Court was right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and not retrospective.
Not only that there were no specific words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub section (2) of section 1 were to the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date, is a pointer and that puts the matter beyond doubt.
The provisions of section 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 could not, therefore, be applied as the Act was not in force on the date of offence.
The challenge to the High Court order on this aspect cannot, therefore, be entertained.
It was next contended by the respondent before the High Court that the Criminal Court was empowered under section 7 of the Act to confiscate the vehicle after due and proper inquiry and therefore the proceedings by the District Col lector under section 6A and Section 6B of the Act should be quashed.
Reliance was placed on several decisions and au thorities.
Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Mysore High Court in the case of The State vs Abdul Rasheed, AIR ; Sri Bharat Mahey & Ors.
vs The State of U. P. & Ors., as well as the decision of the learned Single Judge in State of M.P. vs Basant Kumar, [1972] JLJ Short Note No. 99.
On a consideration of the relevant authorities, the High Court came to the conclu sion that the criminal Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
Mr. Deshpande sought to argue that in view of the enactment of the provisions of Section 6A as well as section 7 of the Act, it cannot be held that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdiction.
He submitted that in view of the enactment of these provisions, it would be useless to hold that the criminal Court continued to retain jurisdiction, otherwise the very purpose of enacting section 6A read with section 7 would be defeated.
We are, however, unable to accept this contention because normally under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of 267 the ordinary criminal Court in respect of a crime can only be inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of the new Act., In view of the language used and in the context in which this language has been used, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction.
In that view of the matter, the High Court was therefore right in passing the order under consideration and in the facts and circumstances of the case to return the vehicle to the respondent on furnishing the security In the premise the appeal must fail and is dismissed.
There win, however, be no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The respondent 's truck was seized by the police on 10th December, 1974 for alleged contravention of the provisions of the on the night of 15th March, 1972.
The respondent fried applications before the High Court for quashing the orders of the Judicial Magis trate First Class and the Sessions Judge rejecting his request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and also for quashing the order of the Collector and re straining him from proceeding further in pursuance of notice issued by him under Section 6B of the Act for confiscation of the vehicle or directing the District Judicial Magistrate to dispose of his application in accordance with law.
Allowing the applications and directing the return of the vehicle, the High Court held that Section 6A of the Act, as amended by Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and that the Criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 523 read with 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the return of the vehicle seized by the police pending final decision of the criminal case.
Dismissing the appeal by the State, this Court, HELD: 1.1 The normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective.
However, in the case of statutes which are merely declarato ry or which relate to only matters of 264 procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such.
[265G H] 1.2 The High Court examined Section 4 of the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974 alongwith Section 6A of the Principal Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective effect.
Not only that there were no specif ic words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub section (2) of Section 1 were to the effect that the amendment must he deemed to have come into effect on a particular date.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and not retrospective.
[266B C] In the instant case, the contravention of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have occured on 15th March, 1972, whereas the vehicle was seized on th December, 1974.
There fore, the provisions of Section 6A of the Essential Commodi ties Act, 1955 as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and Section 4 of the Amend ment Act, 1974 could not he applied as the Act was not in force on the date of offence.
[266D] 2.
Normally, under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Criminal Courts of the country have the jurisdiction and the ouster of the ordinary criminal court in respect of a crime can only he inferred if that is the irresistible conclusion flowing from necessary implication of the new Act.
In view of the language used and in the context in which this lan guage has been used, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the Criminal Court retained jurisdiction and was not completely ousted of the jurisdiction.
[266H; 267A B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1899 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.2.87 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in T.A. No. T 322/ 85 (CW 293/77).
Shankar Vaidyalingam and Ms. Seita Vaidyalingam for the Appellant.
B. Dutta, Govind Das, Mrs. Sushma Suri and Ms. Indra Sawhney for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J.
The question for our consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is governed by Funda mental Rule 56(c)(i) and as such entitled to superannuation at the age of 60 years.
Fundamental Rule 56(c)(i) is reproduced as under: "(c) A ministerial Government servant who entered Government service on or before the 31st March, 1958 and held on that date: (i) a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post, or . shall retire from service on the afternoon of the 1st day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years.
" The appellant joined service as paid apprentice in the Collectorate of Etawah, Government of Uttar Pradesh on 1st July, 1937.
On the same day he was asked to officiate in the post of Arranger.
He was sent back to the post of paid apprentice on 24th December, 1937 but was again appointed as Arranger in officiating capacity on 3rd of January 1938.
While holding the post of paid apprentice he had been ap pointed in various posts on officiating basis.
He was final ly promoted and appointed to a permanent post of Copyist in a substantive capacity on 1st of August, 1941.
He came to the Government of India on deputa 412 tion in March 1943 and thereafter retired from service on attaining the age of 58 years in February 1976.
The appellant claimed that having entered Government service on permanent basis before 31st March, 1938 he was entitled to continue in service till the age of 60 years under Fundamental Rule 56 (c)(i) and his retirement on attaining the age of 58 years was illegal.
The Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi dis missed the application of the appellant holding that the appellant was only an apprentice under training prior to 1st of August, 1941 and as such was not holding any employment under the State on permanent basis.
According to the Tribu nal the appellant was appointed to the Government service on permanent basis to the post of Copyist on 1st of August, 1941 and as such he did not come within the purview of Fundamental Rule 56(c)(i).
We have examined the admitted entries in the service book of the appellant which are on the record.
These entries show that the appellant joined service as paid apprentice on substantive permanent basis on 1st of July, 1937.
It is correct that from 1st of July, 1937 upto 1st of August, 1941 he has been shown in the service book to be appointed in officiating capacity to various posts but the fact remains that his basic appointment as paid apprentice was permanent.
The finding of the Tribunal that the appellant was made permanent for the first time as Copyist on 1st August, 1941 cannot be accepted in the face of clear entries in the service book showing that he joined as paid apprentice on permanent basis on 1st of July, 1937.
Joining as paid ap prentice on permanent basis cannot be anything else but entering Government service on permanent basis and since the entry was before 31st March, 1938 Fundamental Rule 56(c)(i) is attracted and the appellant is entitled to remain in Government service till the age of 60 years.
In the reply affidavit on behalf of the respondents in the court below it is stated as under: "The petitioner joined Government Service under the provincial Government of Uttar Pradesh on 1.7. 1937 against a post of paid apprentice.
It appears there were a few permanent posts of paid apprentice under the State Government.
Petitioner was appointed against one of them in Collectorate, Etawah.
" 413 The respondents repeated their stand in the counter filed by them in this Court in the following terms: "It is submitted that the petitioner joined Govern ment service under the Provincial Government of Uttar Pra desh on 1.7.1937 against a post of "Paid Apprentice".
It appear that there were a few permanent posts of paid appren tice under the State Government.
The petitioner was appoint ed against one of them in the Collectorate, Etawah.
" We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal erred in denying the benefit of Fundamental Rule 56 (c)(i) to the appellant.
We allow the appeal with costs and set aside the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal under appeal and we hold that the appellant was entitled to continue in Government service till he attained the age of 60 years.
The appellant has already completed 60 years and as such he be paid two years emoluments with all consequential benefits including any enhancement in the fixation of pension and other post retirement benefits.
We quantify the costs as Rs.3,000.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Appellant joined State Government service, as paid apprentice on 1.7.1937.
He held various posts and was pro moted to the permanent post of Copyist on 1.8.1941.
In March, 1943 he came to Government of india service on depu tation, and retired in 1976 on attaining the age of 58 years.
Thereafter he moved the Central Administrative Tribu nal claiming that since he entered Government service on permanent basis before 31.3.1938, he was entitled to contin ue in service till the age of 60 years, as per Fundamental Rule 56(c)(i).
Dismissing the application, the Central Administrative Tribunal held that since the appellant was appointed on permanent basis to the post of Copyist on 1.8.41, he did not come within the purview of Fundamental Right 56(c)(i).
Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: It is correct that from 1st of July, 1937 upto 1st of August, 1941 the appellant has been shown in the service book to be appointed in officiating capacity to various posts but the fact remains that his basic appointment as paid apprentice was permanent.
The finding of the Tribunal that the appellant was made permanent for the first time as Copyist on 1st August, 1941 cannot be accepted in the face of clear entries in the service book showing that he joined as paid apprentice on permanent basis on 1st of July, 1937.
Joining as paid apprentice on permanent basis cannot be anything else but entering Government service on permanent basis and since the entry was before 31st March, 1938, Fundamental Rule 56(c)(i) is attracted and the appellant is entitled to remain in Government service fill the age of 60 years.
[412D F] 411 [ This court observed that since the appellant has already completed 60 years, he be paid two years emoluments with all consequential benefits including any enhancement in the fixation of pension and other post retirement benefits.] [413D]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1248 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.1977 of the Madras High Court in T.C. Petition No. 362 of 1975.
B.B. Ahuja and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
A.T.M. Sampath and P.N. Ramalingam for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ.
This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Madras High Court dated 9th March, 1977.
The appeal involves the assessment of income tax under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') for the assessment year 1966 67.
The assessee is an individual who carried on business in distribution of films for the assessment year 1966 67.
The assessee filed a return of income on 12th July, 1968 declar ing "No loss".
Subsequently, the assessee filed a revised return on 4th January, 1969 declaring a net loss of Rs.9,490.
The Income Tax Officer called for wealth state ments from the assessee The wealth statements did not reveal that the assessee had invested any amount in the plot of land in T. Nagar.
However, a raid made in the premises of E.V. Saroja and K.R. Sadayappan revealed the information that the assessee along with Smt.
P.S.S. Ekammai Achi and A.L.N. Perianna Chettiar had purchased a plot of land in T. Nagar on 13.4.1965 from Smt.
K.V. Saroja.
The plot was purchased in the name of the assessee 's son Sri Ramakrish nan.
In the assessment, it was stated that the total consid eration was Rs.80,000 out of which Rs.25,000 was the payment in respect of the portion purchased in the name of Sri Ramakrishnan.
The examination of all the materials including the document revealed that the total 258 consideration was Rs. 1,40,000.
The on money payment made by the assessee on behalf of his son was Rs. 18,750 for which the assessee could not adduce evidence to prove the nature and source of investment.
This sum of Rs. 18,750 was treated by the Income Tax Officer as the undisclosed income of the assessee and he initiated penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of income and referred the case to the I.A.C. for disposal as the minimum penalty leviable exceeded Rs. 1,000.
The I.A.C. imposed a penalty of Rs. 18,750 being equal to the income concealed holding that the assessee had not discharged the burden cast upon him by the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Act in not adducing any evidence that the plot was purchased by the assessee 's son out of his own funds and against the asses see 's own.
statement recorded on 9.10.1972 that the on money payment was made by him.
The assessee filed an appeal to the Tribunal and contended that in case of rejection of asses see 's explanation for the source, the addition could not be held to be the concealed income of the assessee, and relied on certain principles laid down by the courts.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal.
It is necessary to refer to relevant portions of the Tribunal 's order in respect of which certain contentions were urged before us.
The Tribunal in its order observed, inter alia, as follows: "We have considered the rival submissions.
At first we were impressed by the argument of the Departmental Representative that it is a fit case for the levy of penalty.
However, when we find that the assessee had at no time given any false or different particulars about this property in his return of income or at any time during the assessment proceedings, there cannot be any question of his having filed any incor rect particulars and more so of the income.
The Departmental Representative was unable to point out any occasion when the assessee has stated before the Income Tax Officer during the assessment proceedings that he had purchased the property only for Rs.80,000.
On the other hand, when he was asked to state the consideration of the property during the examina tion, he accepted that there were two agreements but the real consideration was Rs. 1,40,000.
That being so, we are unable to accept that the assessee had been wilfully negli gent or fraudulent in this regard.
Then the question arises as to any concealment in the addition made by the Department as income from undisclosed sources.
Here, the assessee 's case was that he had prepared a sort of cash statements to show that there 259 was some cash available for this purpose.
The Department 's case was that this was only a cash statement and this state ment sufferred from certain defects, viz., the absence of drawings for personal expenses and even the so called sur plus followed by utilisation for other expenses.
No doubt, the Income Tax Officer may be justified to say that not only the explanation is not convincing but false, because there was no cash available to the assessee for payment towards the extra money paid.
However, rejection of explanation even on the ground of falsity will not mean that the addition represented the assessee 's income and more so of the con cealed income of the assessee.
In fact, the assessee has not accepted the addition before the Income Tax Officer though he has not gone on appeal for reasons best known to him.
Whatever it is, there was no acceptance that the addition represented the concealed income.
Having regard to all these, we are of the view that the assessee 's case falls within the ratio of the decisions in C.I.T. vs Anwar Ali, and C.I.T. vs Khoday Ramarao & Sons, In view of what we have expressed above, we find no reasons to sustain the penalty.
Accordingly, we cancel the penalty.
" The penalty was set aside.
Aggrieved by the said order the revenue moved the Tribunal under section 256(1) of the Act to refer the following questions of law to the High Court: "(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Tribunal was right in canceling the penalty levied u/s 271(i)(c) in the assessee 's case? (ii) Whether having regard to the provisions of Explanation to Section 27 1(1)(c) the Appellate Tribunal 's cancellation of penalty is sustainable in law and on the materials on record? (iii) Whether the Appellate Tribunal 's view that the addi tion of Rs. 18,750 did not represent the concealed income of the assessee is based on valid and relevant consideration and is reasonable view to take on the facts of this case?" The Tribunal refused to refer the questions stated hereinbefore.
The respondent moved the High Court u/s 256(2) of the Act.
The High 260 Court was of the opinion that no question of law arose and ob served, inter alia, as follows: "It appears that the consideration mentioned in the said deed was Rs.80,000.
Finally, as a result of a search con ducted in the premises of R.V. Saroja as well as the asses see himself certain documents were seized, which showed that the actual consideration was Rs.1,40,000 and not Rs.80,000.
In this regard, it was explained that even if it was consid ered that the purchase consideration admitted by the asses see was not adequate, surplus cash balance and the addition al payment, if any, should be deemed to have been come out of such surplus fund and not out of any undisclosed fund.
The Income Tax Officer found himself unable to accept the said explanation for the reason that the statements of receipts and payment filed by the assessee only enabled him to reasonably connect some of the payments, but the said statement could not serve the purpose of a regular cash book disclosing such cash balance, under the assessee 's personal expenses were not shown in the statement.
If these were taken note of, the surplus, if any, would be wiped off.
In the end, he came to the conclusion that the assessee had not accounted for the full consideration for the plot purchased by him in the name of his son and that the balance of the consideration should have been met out of income from undis closed sources." According to the High Court, no question of law arose.
Aggrieved thereby, the revenue moved this Court and obtained leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The short point is: In the facts and circumstances of this case and in the light of law as it stood at the relevant time, has the assessee been able to discharge his onus to prove the question which arose in view of the Explanation intro duced by the Finance Act, 1964, section 271 of the Act.
The said Explanation provides as follows: "Explanation where the total income returned by any person is less than 80% of the total income (hereinafter in this Explanation referred to as the correct income) as assessed u/s 143 or 144 or section 147 '(reduced by the expenditure in curred bona fide by him for the purpose of making or 261 earning any income included in the total income but which has been disallowed as a deduction), such person shaH, unless he proves that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part, be deemed to have concealed the partic ulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income for the purposes of cl.
(c) of this subsection .
" It was explained by this Court in CIT vs Mussadilal Ram Bharose, that under the law as it stood prior to the amendment of 1964, the onus was on the revenue to prove that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars or had concealed the income.
Mr. Ahuja, appearing for the revenue, urged before us that difficulties were found in proving the positive element required for concealment under the law prior to the amendment and this had to be estab lished by the revenue.
He drew our attention to the observa tion of this Court at p. 20 of the report where this Court reiterated that the effect of the Explanation was that where the total income returned by any person was less than 30% of the total income assessed, the onus was on such person to prove that the failure to file the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part and unless he did so he should be deemed to have con cealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars for the purpose of section 271(1) of the Act.
The position, therefore, is that the moment the stipulated difference was there, the onus to prove that it was not the failure of the assessee or fraud of the assessee or neglect of the assessee that caused the difference shifted to the assessee, but it has to be borne in mind that though the onus shifted, the onus that was shifted was rebuttable.
This Court has explained the position at page 22 of the report as follows: "The position, therefore, in law is clear.
If the returned income is less than 80% of the assessed income, the presump tion is raised against the assessee that the assessee is guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect as a result of which he has concealed the income but this presumption can be rebutted.
The rebuttal must be on materials relevant and cogent.
It is for the fact finding body to judge the rele vancy and sufficiency of the materials If such a fact finding body, bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, comes to the conclusion that the assessee has discharged the onus, it becomes a conclusion of fact.
" 262 Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Sampath both relied on this decision to contend what was the position in law.
Relying on this decision, Mr. Sampath appearing for the assessee sought to urge that in the instant case, the Tribunal had found that there was explanation for the excess and that was the end of the matter.
No question of law arose thereafter, according to him.
It is true that the presumption that arose was rebuttable presumption that there was concealment of income and if there was cogent material to rebut the evidence that was acceptable then presumption would not stand.
In the instant case, the falsity of the explanation given by the assessee has been accepted by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal stated that in the instant case no doubt the Income Tax Officer was justified to say that not only the explanation was not convincing, but false because there was no cash available to the assessee for payment of the extra money paid.
Therefore, no explanation was forwarded as to where from the extra money came.
If that was the position and the presumption was further that the assessee was guilty of fraud, then the subsequent presumption followed that the assessee concealed the income and that can be only rebutted by cogent and reliable evidence.
No such attempt in this case was made.
In that view of the matter, in our opinion, it cannot be said that in this case the Tribunal was justi fied in rejecting the claim and penalty may be imposed.
The presumption raised as aforesaid, that is to say that the assessee was guilty of fraud or wilful neglect as a result of which the assessee has concealed the income, would be there.
This presumption could have been rebutted by cogent, reliable and relevant materials.
There was none, at least neither the tribunal nor the High Court has indicated any.
If that is the position, the High Court, in our opinion, was in error in not correctly applying the principles laid down by this Court in C.I.T. vs Mussadilal Ram Bharose, (supra) and the principles of law applicable in a situation of this type to the facts of this case and, therefore, the decision is not sustainable.
In the instant case there was no contro versy that the amount was not the income of the year in question.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and direct reference on the aforesaid question of law to the High Court.
Let a statement of the case on the aforesaid question be forwarded by the Tribunal within four months from this date, and the High Court dispose of the reference as quickly as possible.
The appeal is allowed and is disposed of in those terms.
The cost of this appeal will be the cost in the reference.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Under the Explanation added to section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act 1961 by the Finance Act, 1964, the assessee, in a case where the total income returned was less than 80 per cent of the total income assessed, was to he deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income unless he proved that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or gross or wilful neglect on his part.
In his return of income for the assessment year 1966 67 the assessee respondent declared certain loss.
The wealth statements called for did not disclose investment in lands.
Later it was found that he had purchased a plot in his son 's name.
In the assessment it was stated that the total consid eration was Rs.80,000 out of which Rs.25,000 was the payment in respect of the portion purchased for his son.
The exami nation of the material and the document revealed that the total consideration was Rs. 1,40,000.
The on money payment made by him on behalf of his son was Rs. 18,750.
Since the assessee could not adduce evidence to prove the nature and source of investment the ITO treated the sum as the undisclosed income and initiated penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of income and referred the case to IAC.
The IAC imposed a penalty equal to the income concealed holding that the assessee had not discharged the burden cast upon him by the Explanation.
In appeal, the Tribunal set aside the penalty on the ground that the assessee had at no time given any false or different particulars about this property in his return of income or at any time during the assessment proceedings and, therefore, there could not he any question of his having filed any incorrect particulars; that since the assessee had not stated in the assessment proceedings that he had pur chased the pro 256 perty only for Rs.80,000, and during the examination and accepted that though there were two agreements but the real consideration was Rs. 1,40,000, it could not be said that he had been wilfully negligent or fraudulent in this regard; that as regards concealment, his explanation was that there was some cash available for purchase of the plot, and that no doubt the Income Tax Officer might be justified to say that not only this explanation was not convincing but false the rejection of explanation even on the ground of falsity would not mean that the addition represented the assessee 's income and more so of the concealed income.
It also refused to refer to the High Court the questions of law preferred by the revenue.
In the appeal by the Revenue under section 256(2) of the Act the High Court found that there was no proof to show that the said sum of Rs. 18,750 represented the income of the relevant year and accordingly held that no question of law arose.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court, HELD: 1.
The High Court was in error in not correctly applying the principles of law laid down by this Court in C.I.T. vs Mussadilal Ram Bharose, to the facts of the case.
The decision, therefore, was not sustainable.
[262F] 2.1.
The presumption that could be raised against the assessee under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, that he was guilty of fraud or gross or wilful neglect resulting in concealment of income was a rebuttable presumption and if there was cogent material to rebut the evidence that was acceptable, the said presumption would not stand.
1261E; 262B] 2.2.
In the instant case, the falsity of the explanation given by the assessee had been accepted by the Tribunal in as much as it had stated that the Income Tax Officer was justified to say that not only the explanation was not convincing but false because there was no cash available to the assessee for payment of the extra money paid.
Therefore, no explanation was forwarded as to where from the extra money came.
If that was the position and the presumption was further that the assessee was guilty of fraud, then the subsequent presumption followed that he had concealed the income.
[262B D] 2.3.
The presumption thus raised against the assessee that he was guilty of fraud or wilful neglect as a result of which he had concealed the 257 income, would be there.
This presumption could have been rebutted By cogent, reliable and relevant materials.
No such attempt was made in the case.
It could not, therefore, be said that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim.
[262E F] [Statement of the case to be forwarded by the Tribunal within four months and the High Court to dispose of the reference as quickly as possible.] [262G]


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
93031 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.1989 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 1770 of 1987.
Hardev Singh, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani and Jitender Sharma for the Appellant.
V.N. Koura and Ashok Grover for the Respondents.
285 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J.
These two appeals by two different Trade Unions of Barauni Refinery are directed against the decision of the High Court of Delhi which set aside the modification of Clause 20 of the Standing Orders certified under Section 5 of the (hereinafter called 'the Standing Orders Act ').
The brief facts giving rise to these two appeals are as under: Two companies, namely, the Indian Refinery, Limited and Indian Oil Company, Limited amalgamated in 1964 and a new Company known as Indian Oil Corporation, Limited (IOCL) was incorporated.
This newly formed company comprised essential ly of two divisions, namely, (1) Marketing Division, repre senting the staff, assets and business of Indian Oil Compa ny, Limited and (2) Refinery and Pipe Lines Division, repre senting the staff, assets and oil refinery manufacturing of petroleum products of Indian Refinery, Limited.
The age of superannuation of the staff in the Marketing Division was 60 years whereas the age of superannuation for the Refinery and Pipe Lines Division was fixed at 58 years under Clause 20 of the Standing Orders concerning Barauni Refinery.
The IOCL has refineries in different parts of the country including one at Barauni.
The Standing Orders concerning the Barauni Refinery came into force on 5th December, 1964 as provided by Section 7 of the Standing Orders Act and apply to all workmen employed in the said industrial establishment.
Clause 20 of the Standing Orders reads as under: "Every employee shall retire from service on completing the age of 58 years.
Extension for a maximum period of 5 years but not for more than one year at a time may be given at the discretion of the company provided the employee is certified to be fit by the Company 's Medical Officer and provided further that the employee concerned also consents to such extension.
" By a Joint letter dated 15th December, 1981, 14 recognised Unions representing the employees of the IOCL working in different refineries and pipe lines divisions submitted a charter of demands in terms of clause 2.1.3 of the long term settlement dated 3rd December, 1979.
By clause 18 of this charter of demands the superannuation age was sought to be enhanced to 60 years.
A similar charter of demands was ' forwarded by the Barauni Telshodhak Mazdoor Union to the General 286 Manager, IOCL, Barauni Refinery, on 23rd December, 1981.
Pursuant to the presentation of this charter of demands, meetings were held between the Management of IOCL (R & P Division) and the recognised Unions of the said Division from time to time.
As a result of discussions held at the said meetings as settlement was mutually arrived at by and between the parties on May 24, 1983.
Clauses 19 and 21 of this general settlement concerning all the Refineries and Pipe Lines Divisions, inter alia provided as under: "19.
The Corporation agrees that such terms and conditions of service as well as amenities and allowances as are not changed under this settlement shall remain unchanged and operative during the period of the settlement." "21.
The Unions agree that during the period of operation of this settlement, they shall not raise any demand having financial burden on the Corporation other than bonus provid ed that this Clause shall not affect the rights and obliga tions of the parties in regard to matters covered under Section 9A of the .
" This general settlement was to remain in force from 1st May, 1982 to 30th April, 1986.
After this general settlement was signed by the Management and the Union representatives a separate Memorandum of Settlement dated 4th August, 1983 was signed between the IOCL (R & P Division), Barauni Refinery, and their workmen represented by Barauni Telshodhak Mazdoor Union, Barauni Refinery, under sections 12(3) and 18(3) of the , in conciliation proceed ings initiated by the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Begusarai.
This settlement too was to remain in force from 1st May, 1982 to 30th April, 1986.
Clauses 19 and 21 of this settlement were verbatim reproduc tion of those in the general settlement dated 24th May, 1983 extracted hereinabove.
It may here be mentioned that despite the specific demand made in the charter of demands for the upward revision of the age of superannuation, no specific provision was made in that behalf either in the general settlement or in the special settlement concerning Barauni Refinery.
On the contrary clause 19 of both the settlements provides that the terms and conditions of service which are not changed under the Settlement shall remain unchanged and operative during the period of settlement.
The Petroleum and Chemical Mazdoor Union through its General Secretary, Ram Vinod Singh, served notice on the Regional 287 Labour Commissioner (Central) under Section 10(2) of the Standing Orders Act for modification of clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders of Barauni Refinery for raising the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years mainly on the ground that the staff members working in the Market ing Division superannuated on completing the age of 60 years.
It was also contended by the said Union that the demand for the upward revision of the age of superannuation could not be pressed at the time of the settlement arrived at pursuant to the charter of demands because the age of retirement was fixed at 58 years under the relevant certi fied Standing Orders.
It was, therefore, felt necessary that clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders applicable to Barauni Refinery of the IOCL should be got suitably modified to raise the age of retirement to 60 years.
This demand was based on the averment that the nature of work performed by the workmen in the Refinery and Pipe Lines Division was identical to that performed by the staff members of the Marketing Division.
The pay scales of the employees of the Refinery Division and Marketing Division were also identi cal.
It was, therefore, contended that there was no valid reason for fixing different ages for retirement for the staff members working in the said two Divisions of IOCL.
The Regional Labour Commissioner after heating the rival parties allowed the application for modification of clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders.
By his order he direct ed that clause 20 should be modified as under: "Normally the age of retirement of workman of the Corpora tion is fixed at 60 years.
No notice is required to be given by a workman of his intention to retire on superannuation or by the Management to the workman that he is due to reach the age of superannuation on certain date.
The workman should not, however, leave his place of duty without being re lieved.
" Against this order of 11th October, 1984, the IOCL preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority under Section 6 read with Section 10(3) of the Standing Orders Act.
The Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal directed a slight modification in clause 20 of the Standing Orders.
Clause 20 as modified by the Appellate Authority was worded as under: "Every workman shall generally retire on attaining the age of 58 years.
Between the 57th and 58th year Company 's 288 Medical Officer would conduct the medical test and if the workman is found to be medically fit he shall be retained in service for a period of two more years beyond the age of 58 years i.e. upto 60 years.
" Feeling aggrieved by this order of the Appellate Authority the IOCL preferred a writ petition No. CWP No. 1717/87 in the High Court at Delhi for quashing the impugned order of the Certifying Officer dated 11th October, 1984 and the impugned order of the Appellate Authority dated 4th May, 1987.
The Union which had initiated the proceedings for modification of Clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders also felt aggrieved by the said order of the Appellate Authority and preferred a writ petition No. CWP 3417/87 in the High Court of Delhi.
Both these writ petitions were heard by a Division Bench and were disposed of by a common Judgment.
The writ petition filed by the IOCL was allowed while the other writ petition was dismissed.
While hearing these two writ petitions the High Court formulated two points for consideration, namely, (i) "Wheth er the Certifying Authority under the Standing Orders Act has the jurisdiction to entertain an application for amend ment of a Standing Order which fixes the age of retirement of the workmen as 58 years which is in consonance with the model Standing Order and enhances the age of retirement to 60 years without first giving any finding whether it is practicable to give effect to the model Standing Order" and (ii) "Whether the settlement arrived at under Section 18(3) and Section 19(2) of the , between the petitioner and the workmen represented by their recognised majority union and which settlement was in force when impugned orders were made, had put any bar on the rights of the workmen to approach the authorities under the said Act for seeking modification of the Standing Orders with regard to the fixation of the age of superannuation of the workmen".
The High Court answered the first question in the affirmative holding that it was open to the Certifying Authority to entertain an application for modification of the clause fixing the date of superannuation, the provisions in the model Standing Orders, notwithstanding.
On the second point the High Court came to the conclusion that the settle ment arrived at in conciliation proceedings was binding on the workmen and as clause 19 of the settlement kept the service conditions which were not changed in tact and clause 21 of the settlement did not permit raising of any demand throwing an additional financial burden.
on the IOCL, it was not permissible to modify the certified Standing Orders by an amendment as that would alter the service condition and 289 increase the financial burden on the Management.
In this view that the High Court took it quashed the orders passed by the two authorities below and made the rule in CWP No. 1717/87 absolute while dismissing CWP No. 3417/87 with no order as to costs.
It is against this order that the Trade Unions have approached this Court.
The Standing Orders Act was enacted to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment for work ers employed in industrial establishments and to make the same known to them.
The object of the Act was to have uni form Standing Orders in respect of the matters enumerated in the schedule to the Act regardless of the time of their appointment.
With this in view the Act was enacted to apply to all industrial establishments wherein 100 or more workmen were employed on any date of the preceding 12 months.
Within six months from the date on which this enactment becomes applicable to an industrial establishment, the employer is obliged by Section 3 to submit to the Certifying Officer draft Standing Orders proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment.
Sub section (2) of Section 3 lays down that in such draft Standing Orders provision shall be made for every matter set out in the schedule which may be applicable to the industrial establishment and where model Standing Orders have been prescribed shall be, so far as practicable, in conformity with such model.
Section 4 pro vides that the Standing Orders shall be certifiable if (a) provision is made therein for every matter set out in the schedule which is applicable to the industrial establishment and (b) the Standing Orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
It further casts a duty on the Certifying Officer or Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the fairness and reasonableness of the provisions of any Standing Orders.
On receipt of the draft Standing Orders, section 5 requires the Certifying Officer to forward a copy thereof to the trade union, if any, of the workmen, or where there is no such trade union, to the workmen in such manner as may be prescribed, together with a notice in the pre scribed form requiring objections, if any, which the workmen desire to make to the draft Standing Orders.
Thereafter the Certifying Officer must hear the concerned authorities and decide whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employers is necessary to render the draft Standing Orders certifiable under the Act.
He is then expected to certify the draft Standing Orders with modifica tions, if any, and send authenticated copies thereof in the prescribed manner to the employer, to the trade union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen within 7 days.
Section 6 provides for an appeal against the order of the Certifying Officer.
The Appellate Authority has to com 290 municate its decision to the Certifying Officer, to the employer and the trade union or other prescribed representa tive of the workmen within 7 days from the date of its order.
Section 7 provides that the Standing Orders shall, unless an appeal is preferred, come into operation on the expiry of 30 days from the date on which authenticated copies thereof are sent under section 5(3) or where an appeal is preferred, on the expiry of 7 days from the date on which copies of the orders of the Appellate Authority are sent under section 6(2).
Standing Orders duly certified as above for the Barauni Refinery came into operation on 5th December, 1964 as provided by section 7.
We then come to Section 10 which provides for modification of certified Standing Orders.
Subsection (1) thereof states that the Standing Orders finally certified shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen or a trade union or other representative body of the workmen be liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which the Standing Orders or the last modification there of came into operation.
Sub section (2) of Section 10 reads as under: "Subject to the provisions of sub section (1), an employer or workman or a trade union or other representative body of the workman may apply to the Certifying Officer to have the standing orders modified, and such application shall be accompanied by five copies of the modifications proposed to be made, and where such modifications are proposed to be made by agreement between the employer and the workmen or a trade union or other representative body of the workmen, a certified copy of that agreement shall be filed along with the application.
" It was under this provision that clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders was sought to be modified.
Since the High Court has answered the first point in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the workmen, we do not consid er it necessary to deal with that aspect of the matter and would confine ourselves to the second aspect which concerns the binding character of the settlement.
Section 2(p) of the defines a settlement as a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceed ings and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate 291 Government and the Conciliation Officer.
Section 4 provides for the appointment of Conciliation Officers by the appro priate Government.
Section 12(1) says that where any indus trial dispute exists or is apprehended the Conciliation Officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utili ty service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.
Sub section (2) of Section 12 casts a duty on the Conciliation Officer to investigate the dispute and all matters connected therewith with a view to inducing the parties to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.
If such a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, sub section (3) requires the Conciliation Officer to send a report thereof to the appro priate Government together with the memorandum of settlement signed by the parties to the dispute.
Section 18(1) says that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the em ployer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of the conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
Sub section (3) of Section 18 next provides as under: "A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub section (3 A) of Section 10 A or award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute: (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause: (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates: (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.
" 292 It may be seen on a plain reading of sub sections (1) and (3) of section 18 that settlements are divided into two categories, namely, (i) those arrived at outside the concil iation proceedings and (ii) those arrived at in the course or ' conciliation proceedings.
A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement be longing to the second category has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dis pute, to all others who were summoned to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all others who joined the establishment thereafter.
Therefore, a settlement arrived at in the course of concili ation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same.
To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract.
The object obviously is to uphold the sanctity of settle ments reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minor ity union from scuttling the settlement.
There is an under lying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the Union signing the settlement but also on others.
That is why a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is put on par with an award made by an adjudicatory authority.
The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the set tlement dated 4th August, 1983 was binding on all the work men of the Barauni Refinery including the members of Petro leum and Chemical Mazdoor Union.
The settlement does not make any specific mention about the age of retirement.
Clause 19 of the settlement, however, provides that such terms and conditions of service as are not changed under this settlement shall remain unchanged and operative for the period of the settlement.
The age of retirement prescribed by clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders was undoubtedly a condition of service which was kept intact by clause 19 of the settlement.
The provisions of the Standing Orders Act to which we have adverted earlier clear ly show that the purpose of the certified Standing Orders is to define with sufficient precision the conditions of em ployment of workman and to acquaint them with the same.
The charter of demands contained several matters touching the conditions of service including the one concerning the upward revision of the age of retirement.
After deli 293 beration certain conditions were altered while in respect of others no change was considered necessary.
In the case of the latter clause 19 was introduced making it clear that the conditions of service which have not changed shall remain unchanged i.e. they will continue as they are.
That means that the demand in respect of revision of the age of retire ment was not acceded to.
By clause 21 of the settlement extracted earlier the Union agreed that during the period of the operation of the settlement they shall not raise any demand which would throw an additional financial burden on the management, other than bonus.
Of course the proviso to that clause exempted matters covered under section 9A of the from the application of the said clause.
However, section 9A is not attracted in the present case.
The High Court was, therefore, right,in observing: "when the settlement had been arrived at between the workmen and the company and which is still in force, the parties are to remain bound by the terms of the said settlement.
It is only after the settlement is terminated that the parties can raise any dispute for fresh adjudication".
The argument that the upward revision of the age of superannuation will not entail any financial burden cannot be accepted.
The High Court rightly points out: "workmen who remain in service for a longer period have to be paid a larger amount by way of salary, bonus and gratuity than workmen who may newly join in place of retiring men".
The High Court was, therefore, right in concluding that the upward revision of the age of superannuation would throw an additional financial burden on the management in violation of clause 21 of the settlement.
Therefore, during the opera tion of the settlement it was not open to the workmen to demand a change in clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders because any upward revision of the age of superannua tion would come in conflict with clause 19 and 21 of the settlement.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the High Court is unassailable.
In view of the above we see no merit in these appeals and dismiss them with no order as to costs.
Interim orders in each appeal will stand dissolved.
R.S.S. Appeals dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellants are two different trade unions of Barauni Refinery of the respondent, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL).
The IOCL is comprised essentially of two divisions: (1) Marketing Division, and (2) Refinery and Pipe Lines Division.
The age of superannuation of the staff in the Marketing Division was 60 years whereas for the Refinery and Pipe Lines Division it was fixed at 58 years under Clause 20 of the Standing Orders concerning Barauni Refinery.
In December 1981, 14 recognised Unions representing the employees of the IOCL working in different refineries and pipe lines divisions submitted a charter of demands.
By clause 18 of this charter the superannuation age was sought to be enhanced to 60 years.
A similar charter of demands was separately submitted by the Barauni Telshodhak Mazdoor Union.
As a result of discussions a general settlement was mutually arrived at by and between the parties on May 24, 1983.
Subsequently, a separate Memorandum of Settlement dated 4th August, 1983 concerning Barauni Refinery was signed by the parties under sections 12(3) and 18(3) of the in conciliation proceedings.
Both the general settlement and the special settlement concerning Barauni Refinery were to remain in force till 30th April, 1986.
Despite the specific demand made in the two charters of demand for the upward revision of the age of superannuation, no specific provision was made in that behalf either in the general settlement or in the special settlement.
On the contrary, clause 19 of both the settle ments provided that the 283 terms and conditions of service which were not changed under the settlements shah remain unchanged and operative during the period of settlement, further, clause 21 did not permit raising of any demand throwing an additional burden on the corporation during that period.
Later, the Petroleum and Chemical Mazdoor Union served notice on the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) under section 10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 for modification of clause 20 of the Certified Standing Orders of Barauni Refinery for raising the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years.
This demand was based on the averment that the nature of work performed by the workmen in the Refinery and Pipe Lines Division and their payscales were identical to the staff members of the Marketing Division.
The Regional Labour Commissioner allowed the application for modification of clause 20 of the Certified Standing Orders.
The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal of the Corporation, but at the same time directed a slight modifi cation in clause 20 of the Standing Orders.
The IOCL preferred a writ petition in the High Court for quashing the orders of the Regional Labour Commissioner as well as the Appellate Authority.
On the other hand, the Union, feeling aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, preferred a writ petition against that order.
The High Court inter alia held that the settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings was binding on the workmen, and as clause 19 of the settlement kept the service conditions which were not changed in tact and clause 21 of the settlement did not permit raising of any demand throwing an additional burden on the Corporation, it was not permissible to modify the certified Standing Orders by an amendment, as that would alter the service conditions and increase the financial burden on the management.
Dismissing the appeals by the two trade unions this Court, HELD: (1) The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 was enacted to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment for workers employed in indus trial establishments and to make the same known to them.
[289B] (2) According to sub sections (1) and (3) of section 18 of the , settlements are divided into two categories, namely, (i) those arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings and (ii) 284 those arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings.
A settlement which belongs to the first category has limited application in that it merely binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the second catego ry has extended application since it is binding on all parties to the industrial dispute.
[292A B] (3) A settlement arrived in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognised majority union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same.
To that extent it departs from the ordinary law of contract.
[292C] (4) The object is to uphold the sanctity of settlement reached with the active assistance of the Conciliation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a minor ity union from scuttling the settlement.
There is an under lying assumption that a settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation Officer must be fair and reasonable and can, therefore, safely be made binding not only on the workmen belonging to the union signing the settlement but also on others.
The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the settlement dated 4th August, 1983 was binding on all the workmen of the Barauni Refinery including the members of Petroleum and Chemical Mazdoor Union.
[292D E] (5) The age of retirement prescribed by clause 20 of the Certified Standing Orders was undoubtedly a condition of service which was kept in tact by clause 19 of the settle ment.
[292G] (6) During the operation of the settlement it was not open to the workmen to demand a change in clause 20 of the certified Standing Orders because any upward revision of the age of superannuation would come in conflict with clauses 19 and 21 of the settlement.
[293E F]