judgement:
Appeal No. 642 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 21, 1962 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Original No. 11 D of 1960 read with judgment and order dated October 26, 1964 of the said High Court in R.S.A. No. 245 D of 1964.
N. section Bindra and D. D. Sharma, for the appellant.
G. R. Rajagopaul, section P. Nayyar for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, C. J.
The appellant obtained a decree for over Rs. 41,000 against Modern Electric Iron and Brass Works, Delhi, which was the property of two partners, namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
in January 1950.
He also obtained an other decree for over Rs. 95.000 against the same two persons and ,one more to which proceeding the Custodian of Evacuee Property (hereinafter referred to as the Custodian) had also been made a party.
Before.
however, the first decree was obtained by the appellant.
Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt had in April 1947 executed two deeds of release with respect to their property in favour of their wives.
Later Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt and their wives migrated to Pakistan and their properties were declared evacuee properties under the , No. 31 of 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the 499 1950 Act).
Under section 10 of the 1950 Act the Custodian had the power to pay any debt due from the evacuee to any person subject to rules framed thereunder.
Further under the Rules a person to whom an evacuee owed money could apply for registration of his claim and the Custodian could register such claim; but mere registration of a claim did not entitle the claimant to payment, and the Custodian could refuse payment for reasons to be recorded.
The claim of the appellant, based on the first decree passed in his favour, was registered by the Custodian.
But in June 1950 the Custodian held that the evacuee property in question in the present case belonged to the wives of the judgment debtors (namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt).
He further directed the appellant to go to the civil court to Yet the release deeds set aside.
On November 28. 1955.
the appellant filed the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen in the court of the subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi, claiming that the release deeds in question were of no effect a being in fraud of the creditors.
He claimed a declaration that the building in suit belonged to Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt and not to their wives and that the release deeds of April 1947 were fictitious and fraudulent and intended to defeat and delay the creditors and were not binding on the appellant.
He also claimed that the Custodian was bound to open the account of the income of the said building in the names of Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt and the proceeds of the said building were bound to be adjusted against the claims of the appellant.
The suit was resisted by the Custodian and the Union of India.
Their case firstly was that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Secondly, it was pleaded that the property in dispute which was a building in the city of Delhi had been acquired by the Central Government in pursuance of a notification issued on June 3, 1955, under section 12 of the .
No. 44 of 1954.
(hereinafter referred to as the 1954 Act) and therefore the appellant could not get a declaration to the effect that the proceeds of the suit building should be adjusted against his claim.
The appellant had also pleaded in his plaint that the acquisition of the building by the notification of June 3. 1955 was subject to his rights and that in any case the notification and section 12 of the 1954 Act were ultra vires.
Originally, the trial Court dismissed the suit holding that as the property in suit had been acquired by the Central Government by the notification dated June 3, 1955, the appellant could not claim to proceed against the property or its income.
The appellant went in appeal and the appellate court remanded the suit on the ground that the appellants plea that the notification 500 and section 12 of the 1954 Act were ultra vires had, not been decided.
When the suit went back for re trial on this issue, the appellant applied for transfer under article of the Constitution to the High Court praying that the constitutional issue be first determined by the High Court.
This application was allowed and finally the constitutional question relating to the validity of section 12 of the 1954 Act was considered by a Division Bench of the High Court.
It may be mentioned here that it had been decided by the Subordinate Judge that the civil, court had jurisdiction and that matter is not in dispute before us.
When the matter came to the High Court, the appellant further challenged the amendment made to the 1950 Act by which cl.
(m) of section 10(2) was amended as ultra vires.
Reliance in this connection was placed on article 19 of the Constitution and also on article 14.
The High Court held against the appellant on both points and sent the case back to the trial court for further consideration in the light of its judgment on the constitutional issues that were raised.
The appellant then applied to the High Court for grant of a certificate to appeal to this Court, which was refused.
Thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave from this Court , and that is how the matter has come up before us.
The same two points which were urged before the High Court have been raised before us on behalf of the appellant.
So far as the first point relating to the invalidity of the amendment to section 10(2)(m) is concerned, the matter is now of academic interest in view of the decision of this Court in Raja Bhanupratap Singh vs Assistant Custodian Evacuee Property U.P.(1).
It was held by the Court that "the power to pay the evacuee 's debts was derived both under cls.
(m) and (n) of section 10(2).
Therefore the deletion from cl.
(m) of the Custodian 's power to pay the debts, by the Amending Act of 1956, and the consequential deletion of r. 22 of the Rules framed under the Act.
by which 'a machinery was provided for exercising that power did not affect the power which is conferred by section 10(2) (n) and by section 10(1).
The power to administer, under section 10(1) is not merely a power to manage on behalf of the evacuee so as to authorise the Custodian only to recover and collect the assets of the evacuee; it includes power to discharge his obligations as well, to pay such debts which, in the opinion of the Cus todian, are binding upon the evacuee".
This Court further held that the decree of the civil court was not decisive of the question whether a person making a claim was entitled to the money claimed by him; it was for the Custodian to determine whether he was so entitled.
In view of this decision it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to the invalidity of the amendment of cl.(m) of section 10(2) for the amendment made no difference to the legal (1) ; 501 position as the power of the Custodian to pay the debts of the evacuee still remained, unimpaired.
If be was of opinion that the debts were genuine, he could pay them.
This brings us to the main question that has been argued in the present appeal, namely, that section 12 of the 1954 Act is invalid because it is an infringement of the right to hold property which the appellant has under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved as a reasonable restriction thereon.
The argument is put thus.
The appellant had advanced money to the two evacuees, namely.
Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
On the basis of the loan, be had obtained a decree in January 1950.
He had the power to execute that decree against the property of his judgment debtors.
By taking away the property of the judgment debtors, ,After they bad become evacuees and by vesting that property free from all encumbrances in the Central Government under section 12 of the 1954 Act the appellant 's right to proceed against that property had disappeared.
Therefore section 12 of the 1954 Act was violative of article 19(1)(f).
as the appellant 's holding of the decree had been rendered illusory.
Reliance in this connection is placed on four decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America.
namely, (i) Von Hoffman vs The City of Quincy(1), (ii) Ranger vs City of New Orleans,(2) (iii) Peirce Coombes vs Milton E. Getz(3) and (iv) W. B. Worthen Co. vs Mrs. W. D. Thomas(4) Before we consider the argument raised before us we may say at once that the four cases on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant are entirely beside the point and of no assistance.
These cases were based on a provision in article 1, section 10 of the American Constitution which inter alia lays down that "no State shall. pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. .
There is no such provision in our Constitution and.therefore the appellant cannot be beard to say that as section 12 of the 1954 Act impairs the obligation of the contract between him and the two evacuees, the section is bad.
Now let us turn to the argument based on article 19 (1)(f).
It is clear to us that the argument as put forward on behalf of the appellant is fallacious and untenable.
Section 12 of the 1954 Act does not in any manner affect the decree held by the appellant against Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
All that it provides is that the property, which upto the time the Act of 1954 was passed, was in law the property of the evacuees, though it was under the administration of the Custodian and vested in him for that purpose under the 1950 Act, would on a notification issued under section 12 of the 1954 Act become the property of the Central (1) 18 L.Ed.
Wallace 403.
(2) (3) ; (4) ; 502 Government and the right, title, interest of the evacuee in such property would thereupon be extinguished and the property shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
At no time did the appellant have any right whatsoever in the property which vested in the Central Government on the issue of the notification under section 12.
It may be that if the owners had not become evacuees and if the property had not been declared evacuee property, the appellant might have proceeded against that property in execution of his decree.
It may also be that he cannot do so now after the said notification under section 12.
But section 12 does not in our opinion interfere with the appellant 's right to acquire, hold and dispose of his property, namely the decrees against Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
As the appellant had no interest in the property in suit, the fact that it was acquired by the Central Government by a notification under section 12 of the 1954 Act did not in any way affect the appellant 's right to acquire, hold and dispose of his property.
In the circumstances, the appellant cannot claim protection under article 19(1)(f) at all with respect to the property in suit and it is not necessary to consider whether section 12 could be saved under article 19(5).
We therefore agree with the High Court that the appellant cannot claim that section 12 is ultra vires article 19(1)(f) and therefore the notification made thereunder affects his fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
Further the argument that section 12 is bad under article 14 has also no force.
The contention under this head is that the creditors who have decrees against non evacuees can execute their decrees against the properties of non evacuees, but the creditors having decrees against evacuees cannot execute them against their properties after they had vested in the Central Government by a notification under section 12 of the 1954 Act; and this amounts to discrimination under article 14.
But it is well settled that the Constitution does not contemplate equality of all laws or application of all laws equally to every person.
There is a clear classification between evacuee property and non evacuee property.
There is a clear nexus between the object to be achieved by the enactment of the 1954 Act, namely, rehabilitation of evacuees from Pakistan and the provision in section 12 by which the property of evacuees in India is to be utilised for such rehabilitation.
There is therefore.
no infringement of article 14 in the circumstances.
Lastly it is urged on behalf of the appellant on the basis of the decision of this Court in Raja Bhanupratap Singh(1) that the appellant was entitled to ask the Custodian to consider his case under section 10(2) (n) read with section 10(1) of the 1950 Act, and for that purpose it is necessary to decide the main question raised in the suit, namely, that the release deeds of 1947 in favour of the wives (1) ; 503 were of no effect and therefore the property, though evacuee property, was the property of the judgment debtors of the appellant, namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
It is also pointed out that the notification of June 3, 1955 was only with respect to immovable property and there was nothing to show that the Central Government had issued a notification under section 14(1)(b) of the 1954 Act relating to cash balance, if any, lying with the Custodian on the date the property was acquired.
It is urged that all that the notification of June 3, 1955 means is that as from that date no action could be taken against the property in suit or its income.
But if there was any money with the Custodian on the date of vesting and if no order had been passed in respect thereof under section 14(1)(b), the appellant would be entitled to ask the Custodian to consider whether he should be paid anything out of the moneys lying with the Custodian provided he could establish that the property was the property of his judgment debtors, namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt and not of their wives.
The declaration that the appellant sought was wide in terms in as much as he claimed that he was entitled to have his claim adjusted against the proceeds of the said building and these proceeds will include any income of a period before the date of vesting under the notification under section 12.
It is urged that as such it is necessary to decide the issue whether the release deeds of April 1947 were fictitious and fraudulent intended to defeat and delay the creditors and therefore the property belonged to Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt.
If that is held in his favour by the civil courts he would be entitled to go to the Custodian and ask him to pass an order in his favour under section 10(2)(n) read with section 10(1) and pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date the property vested in the Central Government under the notification under section 12.
We are.
of opinion that there is force in this contention.
Though the appellant cannot claim to proceed against the property in suit or its income after the date on which it vested in the Central Government by virtue of the notification under section 12, he can ask the Custodian to pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date of such vesting if he can satisfy him in the manner provided in section 10(2)(n) read with section 10(1) of the 1950 Act.
We therefore direct that when the case goes back to the trial court as ordered by the High Court, the trial court will decide the issue whether the deeds of release of April, 1947 are fictitious and fraudulent intended to defeat and delay the creditors and not binding on the appellant.
If the trial court decides in favour of the appellant it will then be open to him to approach the Custodian under section 10(2)(n) read with section 10(1) for such orders as the Custodian thinks fit to pass with respect to moneys, if any, lying with him on the date of vesting.
It may be mentioned that learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this property in fact 504 vested in the Central Government by some notification in 1958 and not by the notification dated June 3, 1955, as mentioned in the plaint.
On the other side it has been submitted that some orders have been passed by the Central Government under section 14 (1)(b).
These are matters which may require to be gone into by the trial court and for that purpose it may be necessary to amend the plaint and the written statement, and this we permit.
We therefore dismiss the appeal subject to the observations made above.
In the circumstances we order parties to bear their ,own costs of this Court as also of the High Court.
Costs of other courts will abide the final result.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant obtained a decree against two persons who, along with their wives, migrated to Pakistan.
Before the decree was passed, the two judgment debtors had executed two deeds releasing their property, which was a building in favour of the wives.
The property was declared evacuee property under the and on the appellant 's application, his claim based on the decree was registered by the Custodian.
Later, the Custodian held that the evacuee property belonged to the wives of the judgment debtors.
The appellant filed a suit for setting aside the release deeds on the ground that they were of no effect as being in fraud of the creditors.
But, before the suit was filed, the Central Government, in pursuance of a notification issued under section 12 of the , acquired the property.
As a result of the notification, the property which was in law the property of the evacuees though it was under the administration of and vested in, the Custodian under the 1950 Act became the pro perty of the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
So, in addition to the main plea in the suit the appellant also contended that section 12 of the 1954 Act and the notification issued thereunder violated articles 19(1)(f) and 14 of the Constitution.
He further contended that the amendment by Act 91 of 1956 of section 10(2)(m) of the 1950 Act, as a result of which the Custodian 's power to pay the eva cuee 's debts was deleted from the clause, was ultra vires.
On an application under article 228, the High Court tried the two constitutional issues and decided them against the appellant and remanded the suit to the trial court.
In appeal to this Court, HELD: (1)(a) Section 12 of 1954 Act did not interfere with the appellant 's right to acquire, hold and dispose of his property, namely, the decree against the evacuees.
At no time did the appellant have any right whatsoever in the property which vested in the Central Government on the issue of the notification.
Its only effect was that the appellant could not proceed against the property in execution of his decree.
Therefore the appellant could not claim the protection under article 19(1)(f).
[501A: 502A D] (b) It could not be said that there was violation of article 14 on the ground that decree holders against non evacuee property could execute their decrees while decree holders against evacuee property could not.
There is a reasonable classification between evacuee property and non evacuee property, and there is a clear nexus between the object to be achieved by the 1954 Act, namely, rehabilitation of evacuees from Pakistan, and the provision in section 12, by which 498 the property of evacuees in India is to be utilized for such rehabilitation.
[502E G] (c) The appellant cannot also be heard to say that section 12 impairs the obligation of the judgment debtors under contract between them and himself because, there is no prohibition against such a law in the Indian Constitution.
[501F] (2) The amendment of section 10(2)(m) made no difference to the legal position, for the power of the Custodian to pay the debts of the evacuee still remained unimpaired under section 10(2)(n) read with 10(1).
Therefore, it was unnecessary to consider the invalidity of the amendment of section 10(2)(m).
[500F H] Raja Bhanupratap, Singh vs Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, U.P. ; , followed.
(3) Though the appellant could not claim to proceed against the property in suit or its income, after the date on which it became vested in the Central Government by virtue of the notification under section 12, he could ask the Custodian to pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date of such vesting if he can satisfy him in the manner provided in section 10(2)(n) read with section 10(1) of the 1950 Act. 'The trial court would therefore have to decide the issue whether the release deeds were fictitious and fraudulent, and, if it found in favour of the appellant it would then be open to him to approach the Custodian for such orders as the Custodian thinks fit to pass with respect to the moneys, if any, lying with him on the date of vesting.
[503F H]


judgement:
Appeal No. 49 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated January 14, 1964 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent No. 11 of 1964.
section Y. Gupte, Solicitor General and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
Hardev Singh, section P. Nayar for R. N. Sachthey, for the res pondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.
The appellant Vidya Vati who is the owner of 56.10 1/4 standard acres of agricultural land in the village Bishanpura, tahsil Jind, District Sangrur, in the State of Punjab, was ousted from the land sometime in 1954 by certain persons who had no tide to the land.
A civil suit filed by her for it declaration of titleand for possession of the land from the trespassers was decreed and she was restored to possession of the land on October 15, 1960.
The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 13 of 1955 was brought into force during the pendency of the civil suit with effect from March 4, 1955.
Under section 5 of the Pepsu Act 13 of 1955 every landowner owning land exceeding thirty standard acres was entitled to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him in the State as a landowner any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in aggregate area the permissible limit and reserve such land for personal cultivation by intimating his selection in the prescribed form and manner to the Collector.
Since the land was in the occupation of the trespassers, the appellant 648 did not make any selection of land for personal cultivation.
The, Act was amended with effect from October 30, 1956 by the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act 15 of 1956 and thereby, amongst other provisions, Ch.
IV A was added.
The provisions contained in that Chapter were designed to impose a ceiling on the holding of owners and tenants of agricultural land held for personal cultivation within the State and for imposing restrictions on acquisition of land and disposal of surplus ' area.
In respect of the land owned by her the appellant submitted a return in Form VII A prescribed under the Rules framed under the Act.
The Collector of the District after considering the objections of the appellant, declared that she held 21.14 3/4 standard acres in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act.
The order of the Collector was confirmed in appeal to the Commissioner, Patiala Division.
A petition moved by the appellant under articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ quashing that order was rejected by Gurdev Singh, J., and an appeal against the order was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court.
The appellant appeals to this Court with special leave.
Counsel for the appellant contends that the provisions of Ch.
IV A have no application to the case of the appellant, since she was not in "cultivatory possessions of the land on the appointed date i.e. October 30, 1956; that the appellant has not acquired the land by transfer, exchange, lease, agreement or settlement, or by inheritance, bequest or gift front a person to whom she is an heir, and on that account sections 32 L & 32 M of the Act have no application to her case and that in any event the appellant should have been permitted to reserve out of her holding ten acres of land for an orchard under section 32 K of the Act.
Before considering the merit of these contentions it is necessary to notice the relevant provisions in Ch.
IV A of the Act which imposed a ceiling on holding of agricultural land under personal cultivation.
Section 32 A(1) of the Act provides: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law custom, usage or agreement, no person shall be entitled to own or hold as landowner or tenant land under his presonal cultivation within the State which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit.
" Counsel for the appellant contends that section 32 A(1) operates only at the point of time when the Act comes into force i.e. October 30, 1956, and not thereafter.
If on that date, says counsel, a person owns or holds within the State land under his personal cultivation as landowner or tenant in excess ' of the permissible limit, the State is entitled to take away the surplus land, and that if the holder or tenant after the commencement of Act 15 of 1956 acquires or possesses land by transfer, exchange, lease, agreement 649 or settlement, or acquires it by inheritance, bequest or gift from a person to whom he is an heir, and his total holding exceeds the permissible limit, by express provisions contained in sections 32 L and 32 M the ceiling on holding will be enforced, but where an owner of land for whatever reasons brings under cultivation land of his ownership.
after the commencement of the Act, the provision imposing a ceiling does not operate.
The entire argument is raised on an assumption that section 32A(1) operates only at the date on which the Act was brought into operation; that argument, in our judgment, is contrary to the plain terms of section 32 A(1).
It is true that sections 32 L and 32 M expressly deal with certain classes of acquisitions after the date of the commencement of the Act, but on that account no restriction may be imposed upon the connotation of the expression "no person shall be entitled to own or hold" occurring in section 32 A, that it is limited in its operation to the point of commencement and has no operation in the future.
It may be noticed that section 32 L renders all subsequent acquisitions as a result of which the holding of a person of land under his personal cultivation exceeds thirty acres "null and void", and section 32 M which deals substantially with involuntary acquisitions (such as acquisitions by inheritance or bequest) sets out the machinery for making declarations and the manner in which the land in personal cultivation in excess of the ceiling will be dealt with.
By an appropriate drafting device, it may have been possible to dovetail these provisions into the other sections, but if in the interest of clarity certain specific cases are separately dealt with, an intention to restrict the operation of the general provision contained in section 32 A(1) cannot be implied.
The scheme of Act 13 of 1955 as originally enacted was that by section 5 every landowner owning land exceeding thirty standard acres was required to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him as a landowner any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in aggregate area the permissible limit and reserve such land for personal cultivation.
The selection could be made in respect of land under personal occupation as well as in respect of land in the occupation of tenants.
After making the selection, the landowner could take appropriate steps to evict the tenants from that land.
But in the land in the possession of the tenants and not included in the land selected and reserved under section 5 for personal cultivation, the tenant of the land could acquire proprietary rights in the manner and subject to the conditions provided under section 22.
This right was exercisable by the tenant in respect of land which was not selected for personal cultivation by the owner and in respect of which he was not liable to be evicted.
The scheme of the Act, therefore, was that the landowner was entitled to select for personal cultivation from the land held by him within the State any parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible limit.
If the land so 650 selected was in the possession of a tenant he could.
subject to the. restrictions contained in section 7 A, evict the tenant.
The lands which were not selected for personal cultivation by the landowner could be purchased by the tenant in the manner and subject to the conditions provided in section 22.
The Legislature thereafter modified the scheme of the Act and, incorporated Ch.
IV A under which no person could own or hold land either as landowner or, as tenant in excess of the permissible limit.
The excess was to be treated as surplus land and appropriated to the State.
Whereas under the scheme of Chapters 11, III and IV as they originally stood the tenants were given the right to purchase the lands not selected by the landowner for personal cultivation, but the landowner was otherwise subject to no further restrictions; by Ch.
, V A it was intended to place a ceiling upon the owning or holding of land for personal cultivation by a landowner or a tenant in excess of the permissible limit.
Viewed in the light of that scheme, also, it is impossible to construe section 32 A as being operative only at the point of time at which the Amending Act incorporating Ch.
IV A was brought into force, for the words of the section contain no limitation, and the scheme of the Act indicates no such implication.
It is true that under section 32 B every person who owns or holds as landowner or tenant land under his personal cultivation exceeding the permissible limit at the commencement of the Act is required to make a return in respect of his holding.
But that is enacted with a view to provide machinery for effectuating the provisions imposing the ceiling on land held at the date of commencement: it does not even indirectly suggest that section 32 A is limited in its operation to the point of time at which the Act is brought into force and is spent thereafter.
Failure on the part of the Legislature to deal with cases in which it the date on which the Act was brought into force, the owner or holder of land was not cultivating the land because he was not in cultivatory possession thereof but was restored to his possession during the subsistence of the Act, cannot also be used to limit the operation of section 32 A(1) only to the point of time at which the Act was brought into force.
In our judgment the ban imposed by section 32 A operates whenever he is found to own or told land in personal cultivation exceeding the permissible limit.
Section 32 K provides for exemption of lands used or intend ed to be used for certain specified purposes to the extent indicated from the ceiling imposed by section 32 A(1).
By cl.
(vi) of section 32 K(1) it is provided that the provisions of section 32 A shall not apply where a landowner gives an undertaking in writing to the, Collector that he shall, within a period of two years from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, plant an orchard in any area of his land not exceeding ten standard acres, such area of land.
651 Sub section (2) of section 32 K provides that where a landowner has, by an undertaking given to the Collector, retained any area of land with him for planting an orchard, and fails to plant the orchard within a period of two years referred to in cl.
(iv) of sub section
(1), the land so retained by him shall on the expiry of that period vest in the State Government under section 32 E.
It is also provided by sub section
(3) which was added by Punjab Act 27 of 1962 with retrospective effect from October 30, 1956, that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the exemption specified in cl.
(vi) of sub section
(1) shall not be allowed unless the land planted within the period specified therein is found to be an orchard also at the time of granting the exemption.
In order to qualify for exemption from the ceiling to the extent of ten acres for the purpose of planting an orchard, the landowner has to give an undertaking that he will bring the land within two years from the commencement of the Amending Act under an orchard, and has to plant the orchard within that period and to maintain it as an orchard till the date of the grant of exemption.
A person who is not in possession of the land at the date when the Amending Act is brought into force may not ordinarily be in a position to give an undertaking under cl.
(vi) of section 32 K(1) to bring the land under an orchard, since such a person may not be able to say whether he will be able to obtain possession of the land so as to carry out the undertaking.
The Legislature has failed to make a provision enabling reservation to be made by persons belonging to the ex ceptional class to which the appellant belongs.
But on that account the Court is not competent to refuse to give effect to the plain words of the Act.
A lacuna undoubtedly exists in the Act, but it is for the Legislature to rectify it and not for the Courts to give a strained meaning to the words used by the Legislature which they do not bear.
The expression "within a period of two years from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956" cannot be read as "within two years from the date on which the holder or tenant is restored to possession".
The Legislature has not made any provision for extending the time in respect of certain special cases like the one before us, or extending the time for planting an orchard.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the appellant could not claim an additional area of ten acres of land for planting an orchard.
The appeal therefore fails.
There will be no order as to costs.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant was the owner of 56 standard acres of agricultural land in Punjab from which she was ousted in 1954 by certain persons who had no title to the land and was restored to possession in 1960 after a suit filed by her was decreed in her favour.
The Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 13 of 1955 was brought into force in March, 1955.
Under section 5 of that Act any land owner owning land exceeding 30 standard acres was entitled to select for personal cultivation a maximum area of land within the permissible limit and to inform the collector of his selection.
Since the appellant 's land was in the occupation of the trespassers at the time, she did not make any selection under section 5.
The Act was amended with effect from October 30, 1956 by the Fast Punjab Act 15 of 1956 which introduced Chapter IV A and the new section 32 A(1) provided that no person shall be entitled to hold land under his personal cultivation which exceeds in the, aggregate the permissible limit.
The appellant submitted a return in the prescribed form in respect of her land and the collector, after considering her objections, declared that she held 21 standard acres in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the Act.
This order was confirmed in appeal by the Commissioner and a writ petition to quash the order was rejected by the High Court.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant (i) that section 32 A(1) operates only at the point of time when the Act comes into force i.e. October 30.
1956; the ceiling could be enforced only if a person owned or held land in excess of the permissible limit on that day or if he acquired or possessed it after the commencement of Act 15 of 1956 by transfer, exchange, inheritance or any of the other ways expressly covered by sections 32 L and 32 M; and (ii) the appellant should in any event have been permitted to reserve 10 acres out of her holding under section 32 K for an orchard.
HELD: Dismissing the appeal.
(i) The ban imposed by section 32 A(1) operates whenever a person is found to own or hold land in personal cultivation exceeding, the permissible limit.
[650G] Although sections 32 L and 32 M deal expressly with certain classes of acquisitions after the date of commencement of the Act.
on that account no restriction can be imposed upon the connotation of the expression "no person shall be entitled to own or held" occurring in section 32 A. that it is limited in its operation to the point of commencement of the Act.
[649B D] 647 Such an interpretation is also contrary to the scheme of the Act.
Under the scheme of Chapters II, III and IV as they originally stood the tenants were given the right to purchase the lands not selected by the landowner for personal cultivation, but the landowner was otherwise subject to no further restrictions; by Ch.
IV A it was in tended to place a ceiling upon the owning or holding of land for personal cultivation by a landowner or a tenant in excess of the permissible limit and to provide that the excess land be appropriated to the State.
[650B, C] (ii) In order to qualify for the exemption for land upto 10 acres under section 32 K for planting an orchard, the landowner has to give an undertaking that he will bring the land within two years from the commencement of the Amending Act under an orchard, has to plant the orchard within that period, and to maintain it as such till the date of the grant of exemption.
A person like the appellant who is not in possession of the land at the date when the Amending Act is brought into force may not be in a position to give and fulfill the undertaking.
The legislature has not made any provision for extending the time in respect of special cases like the present or for extending the time for planting an orchard; it is for the legislature to rectify this lacuna and not for the Court to give a strained meaning to the words used by the legislature which they do not bear.
[651C F]


judgement:
Appeal No. 82 of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 11/ 12, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 259 of 1962.
O. P. Malhotra, P. C. Bhartari and O. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court at Bombay dated 11 / 12 12 1962 in Writ Petition 259 of 1962.
The appellant is the mahant of a public and religious trust called Kabir Nirnay Mandir.
The trust is being administered at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh and the bulk of its properties is situate 'there, except three pieces of land at Vadjai, a village in Dhulia District.
Respondent 1 is the tenant of two out of these three pieces of land situate at Vadjai.
The question in this appeal is whether the appellant can apply and obtain an exemption certificate under sec.
88B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the( Act).
The Act was originally passed in 1948 but was drastically amended by Amendment Act, XIII of 1956 which came into force on August 1, 1956.
The Amendment Act inducted into the Act inter alia sees.
32 to 32R and sees.
88A to88D. Sees.
32 to 32R deal with purchase of land by tenants.
Sub section 1 of sec.
32 provides that on the first day of April 1957, i.e., the tillers ' day, every tenant shall, subject to the other pro visions of this section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from, his landlord the land held by him as a tenant.
In certain cases the said date, viz., April 1, 1957 has been postponed but we are not concerned in this appeal with 643 those provisions nor with any such postponed date.
88A to 88C exclude the operation of sees.
32 to 32R to land specified therein.
Section 88B inter alia provides: "Nothing in the foregoing provisions except sections 3, 4B, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 10, 10A, 11 13, and 27 and the provisions of Chapters VI land VIII in so far as the provisions of the said Chapters are applicable to any of the matters referred to in the sections mentioned above, shall apply (b)to lands which are the property of a trust or an institution for public religious worship.
" The proviso to the sub section reads as follows: "Provided that (i)such trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, and (ii) the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purpose of such trust.
" Sub section 2 of section 88B provides that "for the purpose of this section, a certificate granted by the Collector, after holding an inquiry, that the conditions in the proviso to sub section (1) are satisfied by any trust shall be conclusive evidence in that behalf." Thus for eligibility for an exemption certificate three conditions have to be satisfied: (i) that the land in question is the property of a trust or an institution for public religious worship, (2) that the trust is or is deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950; and (3) that the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the purposes of such trust.
There is no dispute with regard to conditions (1) and (3) and the only controversy is whether condition 2 is satisfied.
If all the three conditions are satisfied and a certificate is obtained by the trust under sub section 2 of sec.
88B, sees.
32 to 32R would not apply to the land belonging to such trust and the tenant of such land cannot be regarded a deemed purchaser under the Act.
The contention of respondent 1, the tenant is that though conditions 1 and 3 are satisfied, the Trust situate as it is at Burhanpur outside the Maharashtra State cannot be deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act.
The Bombay Public Trusts Act was passed in 1950 by the legislature of the then State of Bombay and its object as stated in its preamble is to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Bombay.
1(3) provides that the Act shall come into force at once; but the provisions thereof shall apply to a public trust or any class of public trusts on the date specified in the notification under sub section (4).
Sub section 4 provides that the State Government may by notification specify the date on which the provisions of the Act shall apply to any public trust or any class of public trusts and different 644 dates may be specified for such trusts in different areas.
Under sections 18 and 19 a trustee of a public trust, to which the Act has been applied, is obliged to make an application for registration of the public trust giving in such application the information specified therein.
Under sec.
19, the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under the Act has to make an inquiry in the prescribed manner for ascertaining the various matters set out therein.
On completion of such inquiry and on its findings being recorded the Deputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner has under sec.
21 to make entries in the register kept under sec.
17 in accordance with the findings recorded by him under sec.
20 or if appeals are preferred in accordance with the final decision of the competent authority provided by the Act, and such entries are made conclusive subject to the provisions of the Act or to any change recorded under the provisions therein after following.
Before its amendment in 1960 sec.
28 provided that all public trusts registered under any of the enactments specified in Schedule A thereto shall be deemed to have been registered under the Act from the date on which the Act is applied to them.
Schedule A sets out those Acts which are not relevant for the purpose of this appeal: As a result of reorganisation of the then Bombay State and the territorial changes made in 1956 and 1960 certain areas were excluded and certain other areas were brought into the new State of Maharashtra.
The legislature of that State therefore amended sec.
28 by sec.
15 of the Bombay Public Trusts (Unification and Amendment) Act, 6 of 1960.
A new Schedule amongst other things viz.
, Schedule AA, was added after Schedule A which included amongst other Acts the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 '.
The effect of sec.
28 and the insertion of Schedule AA in the Act was that the trusts registered under the Madhya Pradesh 'Public Trusts Act, 1951, were deemed to have been registered under the Bombay Act.
The amendment became necessary as new areas which originally formed part of the Madhya Pradesh State were brought into the Maharashtra State and the policy of the legislature was to save trusts already registered under the Madhya Pradesh Trusts Act, 1951 from having to be once again registered under the Bombay Act.
The Amendment Act 1960 was brought into force as from January 1, 1961.
By a notification dated January 31, 1961 issued under sec.
1(4) the Act was made applicable to certain kinds of trusts.
It is not in dispute that the present trust is one of the kinds of trusts to which the Act was made applicable as from February 1, 1961.
The said notification runs as follows: "In exercise of.
the powers conferred by sub section (4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 the Government of Maharashtra specifies the 1st day of February 1961 to be the date on which the provisions of the said Act shall, apply to the following classes of public trusts in the State, to which the Act does not already apply.
" 645 The question is whether sec.
28 can be said to apply to the present Trust.
Though sec.
28 is couched in general terms it cannot mean that all trusts registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act are to be deemed to be registered under the Bombay Act irrespective of whether they are still situate in Madhya Pradesh and are liable to be administered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951.
The aforesaid notification itself makes this clear by using the words "shall apply to the following classes of public trusts in the State to which the Act does not already apply. ".
These words indicate clearly that the Act is to apply to those trusts which as a result of the re organisation of the State have come within the new State of Maharashtra and to which the Bombay Act did not apply.
Therefore, the Act cannot apply and is not intended to apply to trusts which are still outside the State and within the Madhya Pradesh State.
There can therefore be no doubt that such trusts in spite of the general language of sec.
28 would still be governed by and administered under the Madhya Pradesh Act.
If sec.
28 were to be construed, as the appellant desires us to construe, there would be the anomalous position that the authorities under both the Acts can claim the right to supervise and control the administration and management of the trust properties.
The curious result of such a construction would be that though the trust is situate and is administered at Burhanpur in Madhya Pradesh the authorities under the Bombay Act can claim to control its management.
There is no dispute that the trust is administered at Burhanpur and the bulk of its properties, except the three pieces of lands situate in the District of Dhulia, are all situate in the Madhya Pradesh State.
The fact that a part of its property is situate in Maharashtra State, though the trust is within Madhya Pradesh State, would not mean that the trust would be governed partly by the Madhya Pradesh Act and partly by the Bombay Act.
Such a division of the Trust and its administration is not contemplated by either of the two Acts.
It is therefore clear that the present Trust does not fall within the ambit of sec.
28 and is not one of those trusts which can be deemed to 'be registered under the Bombay Act.
That being so, it is obviously not a trust which fulfils the second condition of section 88B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the appellant cannot be said to be entitled to the certificate under that section.
The appeal is dismissed.
There will be, no order as to costs.

summary/full:
Section 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 as amended by, Act XIII of 1956 provides that on the first day, of April 1957 every tenant shall subject to certain provisions and exceptions be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant.
Section 88B provides an exception in favour of trusts which are or are deemed to be registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 when the Collector after enquiry certifies to that effect.
After the territorial changes made by the States Reorganization Act 1956 and the further changes made in 1960 certain territories of the then State of Bombay were excluded and certain other areas were brought into the new State of Maharashtra.
Thereafter the Bombay Public Trusts (Unification and Amendment) Act, 1960 was passed, amending the Act of 1960.
Before this amendment, section 28 of the Act provided that all public trusts registered under any of the enactments specified in Schedule A thereto shall be deemed to have been registered under the Act from the date on which the Act was applied to them.
By the amendment Schedule AA was added to the Act and when read with section 28 the effect thereof was that the trusts registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act 1951 were deemed to have been registered under the Bombay Act.
The appellant in the present case was the mahant of a public and religious trust which was administered at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh.
The bulk of its properties were in Burhanpur but three pieces of land lay in the new State of Maharashtra.
The appellant relying on the amended section 28 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and section 88B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act sought exemption from the operation of section 32 of the latter Act.
The matter having been decided against him by the High Court at Bombay, he appealed by certificate to this Court.
HELD: Though section 28 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is couched in general terms it cannot mean that all trusts registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act are to be deemed to be registered under the Bombay Act irrespective of whether they are still situate in Madhya Pradesh and are liable to be administered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act.
The Act is intended to apply only to those trusts which as a result of the reorganization of the State have come within the State of Maharashtra and to which the Bombay Act did not apply.
[645B D] 642 In the present case there was no dispute that the trust was administered at Burhanpur and the bulk of the properties, except the three pieces of land situate in Maharashtra lay in Madhya Pradesh.
The fact that a part of its property was situate in Maharashtra State, though the trust was within Madhya Pradesh State, would not mean that the trust would be governed partly by the Madhya Pradesh Act and partly by the Bombay Act.
Such a division of the Trust and its administration was not contemplated by either of the two Acts.
The present trust did not therefore fall within the ambit of section 28 and was not one of those trusts which could be deemed to be registered under the Bombay Act.
Con sequently it was also not a trust which fulfilled the conditions of section 88B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and the appellant could not be said to be entitled to the certificate under that section.
[645F H]


judgement:
Appeal No. 636 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment all order dated November 11.
1966 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No. 226 of 1963.
section T. Desai, J. P. Goyal, D. N. Jha and G. section the appellant.
Sarjoo Prashad and O. P. Rana, for the respondents.
Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment, dated November 11, 1966, of the Division Bench of tile Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by tile appellant seeking to quash tile order of the State Transport Authority.
dated March 20/21.
The State Transport Authority had by this order rejected the appellant 's revision petition against the decision of the Regional Transport Authority oil the ground that a mere decision of the Regional Transport Authority limiting the number of stage carriages under section 47(3) of the (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the Act could not form the subject matter of a revision application '.
It was of the view that "when the Regional Transport Authority actually proceeds to fill Lip the vacancies, which it has decided to create, then the persons whose interests would be adversely affected, would have a right of representation before the Regional Transport Authority, and in the case of their representation being rejected by the Regional Transport Authority the will have a right of appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
" The High Court was of the view that an existing operator had no say in the matter of determination of the strength on a route under sub section
(3) of section 47, and, it was in the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to determine the strength on a route, after considering various matters enumerated in cls.
(a) to (f) of sub section
(1) of section 47.
The High Court further observed that is the order passed under section 47(3), to revise which the appellant had filed a revision tinder section 64 A, was a good order and did not call for any interference, it did not consider it necessary to decide whether a revision lay against such an order under section 64 A of the Act.
The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. section T. Desai, con tends that an order under section 47(3) of the Act, whether it is quasijudicial or administrative, does affect the existing operators on the route and their representations must be considered by the Regional Transport Authority before passing an order tinder section 47(3).
He further submits that a revision lay under section 64 A of the Act and the same should not have been dismissed on the ground that no revision lay.
637 The relevant statutory provisions are section 47 and section 64 A, of the Act, and read thus; "47.
Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit: (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely: (a) the interests of the public generally ', (b) the advantages to the public of the set vice to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; (c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served; (d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services.
including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending; (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area; and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passengers transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area.
or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies: Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners.
(2) A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears from any time table furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: 638 provided that before such refusal an opportunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the time table so as to conform to the said provisions.
(3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters, mentioned in sub section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region." "64 A. Revision The State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit: Provided that the State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
" It would be noticed that sub section
(3) of section 47 does not expressly say whether any representations can be made by persons already providing transport facilities or by associations representing persons interested in the provision of the transport facilities or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction the route or area lies.
This is expressly mentioned in section 47(1).
The learned counsel contends that the expression "matters mentioned in sub section (1)" occurring in sub section (3) refers back not only to matters mentioned in sub cls.
(a) to (f) to sub section
(1) in section 47 but also the right of representation mentioned in sub section
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning as being sound.
Even under section 47(1), the Regional Transport Authority can only have regard to the matters mentioned in sub cls.
(a) to (f), and those matters may be brought to the notice of the Regional Transport Authority by representations.
It could not have been the intention that representations would contain matters which the Regional Transport Authority could not take into consideration under section 47(1).
This is not to say that the matters mentioned in 639 sub cls.
(a) to (f) are exhaustive, but this point does not arise and we need not say anything as to this.
Therefore, this line of reasoning does not assist the appellant.
This Court in Abdul Mateen vs Ram Kailash Pandey(1) held that "where a limit has been fixed under section 47(3) by the Regional Transport Authority, and thereafter the said authority proceeds to consider applications for permits under section 48 read with section 57, the Regional Transport Authority must confine the number of permits issued by it to those limits and on an appeal or revision by an aggrieved person, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within the limits fixed under section 47(3)".
But this Court did not feel it necessary to decide whether under section 64 A, inserted by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act No. 100 of 1956, it was open to the State Transport Authority to vary a general order passed under section 47(3).
If we look at the section, it would be noticed that section 64 A is very wide in terms; the only condition necessary for filing a revision is that it should be against an order made by the Regional Transport Authority and against which no appeal lies.
The word "order" is wide, and there is no doubt that an order made under section 47(3) is an order within section 64 A because, as held by this Court in Abdul Mateen vs Ram Kailash Pandey (1) it binds the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority in dealing with applications under section 48.
read with section 57, of the Act.
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, the learned counsel for the State, con tends that no revision lies at the instance of an existing operator because he cannot be called an aggrieved person, and secondly, that even if a revision lies, the appellant is not entitled to any relief on the facts of this case, under article 136 of the Constitution, because the appellant never approached the Regional Transport Authority in the first instance.
We are unable to say that no existing operator can be aggrieved by an order made under section 47(3), increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages; it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
In a particular case it may be to his advantage and he then would not file a revision against it, but if he files a revision when an order made under section 47(3) is prejudicial to his interests, there is no ground for denying him the right to approach the revisional authority and seeking its order.
An order under section 47(3) affects the future working on a route and we are of the view that such an order would have repercussion on the working of the existing operators, whether for their good or not.
The High Court, as stated above, was of the view that at the stage of section 47(3) existing operators would not be entitled to be heard by the Regional (1) ; 640 Transport Authority.
But assuming that it is so, this does no affect the right of revision conferred by section 64 A.
We need not in this case decide whether it is implied that existing operators would be entitled to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority before an order under section 47(3) is made.
The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that a decision under section 47(3) is a tentative decision and can be revised.
But assuming that it can be revised by the Regional Transport Authority, till the order is in operation it is binding on everybody and if a revision can be filed against the order under section 64 A, the aggrieved operator cannot be compelled to approach the Regional Transport Authority first to revise its order. 'This argument, in a way, concedes that an operator can be a person aggrieved by an order under section 47(3).
The learned counsel for the appellant contends that if it is held that a revision lies under section 64 A against an order passed under section 47(3) of the Act, the State Transport Authority should be directed to hear the revision on merits.
He says that the High Court had no right to go into the merits of the order itself.
Ordinarily what Mr. Desai contends is correct, but here the facts are that the order under section 47(3) was passed as long ago as November.
During the last five years demand for stage carriages on this route would have, in the ordinary course, increased by now.
and further it has not been shown that the Regional Transport Authority has made any glaring mistake.
For the aforesaid reasons.
in exercising our discretion under article 136 of the Constitution we consider that we should not interfere with the order passed by the High Court.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The Regional Transport Authority, by an order under section 47(3) of the , fixed the number of stage carriages, by increasing their number on a particular route.
The appellant, an existing operator, filed a revision against that order to the State Transport Authority, under section 64A, but the State Transport Authority held that a revision did not lie.
The appellant then filed a writ petition in the High Court and the High Court dismissed it, holding that: (1) at the stage of section 47(3), existing operators were not entitled to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority, and (2) since the order of the Regional Transport Authority was good on merits, it was not necessary to decide whether a revision lay to the State Transport Authority.
In appeal to this Court, HELD: (1) Unlike section 47(1), section 47(3) does not say expressly that representations could be made by existing operators and others.
The expression in section 47(3) that 'the Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub section
(1) ', only means that the Authority shall have regard to the matters mentioned in sub cls.
(a) to (f) of section 47(1) and has nothing to do the right of making representations.
[638F H] (2) But whether or not an existing operator has an implied right to be heard before an order under section 47(3) is made he can be aggrieved by an order made under that section increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages depending on the circumstances of the case, and has therefore a right of revision under section 64A, the only condition for filing a revision being that it should be against an order made by the Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies.
[639C D, F H] Abdul Mateen vs Ram Kailash Pandey, ; , re ferred to.
(3) Since a revision could be filed under section 64A against the order under section 47(3) the aggrieved operator need not approach the Regional Transport Authority first to review its order.
[640B C] (4) The High Court should have directed the State Transport Authority to dispose of on merits the revision petition against the order under section 47(3), and not gone into its merits itself, but, in view of the time that lapsed since the order was passed (five years, during which the demand for stage carriages must have increased), this Court would not interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 136.
[640C E] 636