judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1553 of 977, Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 5 4 1977 of the Gujarat High.
Court in Civil Revision Application No. 847 of 1975.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Addl.
General and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant.
D. V. Patel, Badri Das Sharma and M. N. Shroff for Respondent No. 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
This appeal by special leave raises a narrow but interesting question on the nature of proceedings under section 31 and 2 of the ( 'Act ' for short) which has a direct impact on the question of court fees tc be paid on an application that may be made under section 31 of the .
The question arose in the context of the following facts: The state of Gujarat set up the Gujarat state Financial corporation ( 'Corporation ' for short), the appellant herein, under section 3 of the .
The Corporation was set up inter alia for granting or guaranteeing tile loans to be raised by industrial concerns either from scheduled banks or state co operative banks or those floated in the public market.
The Corporation guaranteed numerous such loans, advanced to the industrial concerns in the state of Gujarat on certain terms and conditions agreed between the parties.
When the industrial concern defaults in repayment of loan or fails to comply with the terms of the agreement the Corporation is entitled to make an application to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or substantial part of its business for one or more of the reliefs set out in section 31(1) of the .
The Corporation appears to have, made applications purporting to be under section 31(1) of the in various District Courts in the State of Gujarat against different industrial concerns.
A question was raised in the District Courts about the proper court fee payable on such applications.
The Corporation contended that the application would be governed by Article 1 (of Schedule II o the Bombay Court) Fee Act, 1959, and a fixed court fee in the amount of 65 paise would be payable in respect of the application.
On the other hand, the State contended that application would be governed either by 375 Article I Schedule I or at any rate by Article 7 of Schedule I and the court fee payable would be ad valorem on the amount of value of the subject matter in dispute or on the amount of the monetary gain or loss to be prevented according to the scale prescribed under Article I of Schedule I.
It appears that except for the Distt.
Judge, Broach, all other District Judges accepted the contention on behalf of the State.
The Distt.
Judge, Broach was of the opinion that the application under section 31(1) was in the nature of an execution application and it would be governed by Article l(c) of Schedule II.
The Corporation preferred revision applications to the High Court questioning the correctness of the decisions directing levy of ad valorem court fee.
The State of Gujarat also preferred a revision application against the decision of the Distt.
Judge, Broach holding that the application under section 31 (1) of the Act was in the nature of an execution application.
The High Court by a common judgment held that the application under section 31 (1) should bear ad valorem court fee.
In reaching this conclusion the High Court treated the application under section 31(1) of the Act on par with a suit by a mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debtor sale of the mortgaged property which is being treated as a money suit falling within the purview or Article I of Schedule I. Alternatively, it was held that even if the application under section 31 (1) is not a plaint within the meaning of Article 1 of Schedule I, it would fall within the purview of Article 7 of Schedule I which provides an ad valorem court fee on an application made for obtaining substantive relief which is capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss because to all intents and purposes the application is one for recovery of the outstanding claim of the Corporation.
In accordance with these findings the revision applications preferred by the Corporation were dismissed and the one preferred by the State was allowed.
Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant Corporation contended that the view taken by the learned Judge of the High Court that on an analogy the application under section 31(1) by the Corporation is akin to a suit by a mortgagee to enforce his mortgage debt by sale of mortgaged property and, therefore, money suit, falling within the purview of Article 1 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fee Act, 1959, or the observation that the substantive relief claimed in the application is one which is capable of being value in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss and would attract Article 7 of Schedule I, is not correct.
The , was enacted by the Parliament with a view to enabling the State Governments to establish a Financial Corporation for enhancing the pace of industrialisa 376 tion by providing credit on easy terms for setting up industrial concerns and/or for expanding the activities of the existing industrial concerns.
Section 25 enables the Financial Corporation to carry on and transact any of the business set out therein which includes guaranteeing on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon (i) loans raised by industrial concerns which are repayable within a period not exceeding 20 years and are floated in the public market or (ii) loans raised by industrial concerns from scheduled banks or State Co operative Banks.
It can also underwrite the issue of stock, shares, bonds or debentures by an industrial concern.
The Corporation can either guarantee the loan raised by the industrial concern or may even grant itself a loan on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Corporation and the industrial concern.
Section 29 confers upon Financial Corporation, in case of default by industrial concern, the right to take over the management of possession or both of the industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation, and any transfer of property made by the Corporation in exercise of the power conferred by section 29 shall vest in it all rights in or to the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property.
The relevant two sections with which we are concerned In this appeal are sections 31 and 32.
Section 31 provides as under: "31.
(1) Where an industrial concern, in breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation or where the Financial Corporation requires an industrial concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under section 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment, then, without prejudice to the provisions of section 29 of this Act and of section 69 of the , any officer of the Financial Corporation, generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf may apply to the district judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of it business for one or more of the following reliefs, namely: (a) for an order for the sale of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the 377 Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance; or (b) for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation; or (c) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board, where such removal is apprehended.
(2) An application under sub section (1) shall state the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, the ground on which it is made and such other particulars as may be prescribed." Section 32(1) provides that when an application is made seeking reliefs mentioned in clauses (a) and (c) of sub section
(1) of section 31, it is obligatory upon the District Judge to pass an ad interim order attaching the security or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise an amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation together with the costs of the proceedings with or without an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment.
If the applicant seeks relief mentioned in clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 31, the District Judge shall pass an order of ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment.
A notice accompanied by copies of the interim order and the application is required to be served upon the industrial concern calling upon it to show cause why ad interim order of attachment should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed or the management transferred to the Corporation.
If no cause is shown on or before the specified date, the order is to be made absolute.
Sub section (6) of section 32 provides that if the industrial concern shows cause, the Distt.
Judge is required to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto.
On completing the investigation the District Judge may either confirm the order or vary the order or release the property from attachment.
An order of attachment or sale of property has to be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree holder.
378 Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court fees Act provides for ad valorem court fee on plaint or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in the Act) or of cross objections presented to any civil or revenue court, to be levied according to the scale set out in the Schedule on the value of the subject matter in dispute.
Article 7 provides for court fees on a plaint or application or petition other than those provided in the earlier Articles to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss including cases where an application or petition is treated either as a plaint or a described as the mode of obtaining the relief as aforesaid, the fee to be calculated on the amount of the monetary gain or monetary loss to be prevented according to the scale prescribed under Article 1.
Section 31(1) prescribes a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporation The Corporation is to make an application for the reliefs set out in section 31 (1) .
The reliefs that a Court can grant under section 31(1) are the sale of the property mortgaged, etc.
to a Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance; transfer of the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board of the Financial Corporation.
An application for such a relief is certainly not a plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
On a breach of an agreement by an industrial concern the Corporation can seek one or more of the three reliefs set out in section 31(1).
If the Corporation seeks the relief of transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation it could hardly be said that the application purports to be a plaint for recovering the mortgage money by sale of mortgaged properly.
It would be inappropriate to say that on an analogy an application under section 31(1) is something akin to a suit by a mortgagee to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
At any rate, in an application under section 31 (1) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding dues.
It can make an application for one of the three reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money decree, or decree for recovery of outstanding loan or advance.
Section 31(1) of the Act, in the circumstances therein set out, permits the Corporation to seek one or more of the three reliefs therein stated.
It is difficult to comprehend that merely the form of relief would attract one or the other Article of Court fees Act.
If relief of sale of mortgaged property is sought which permits an argument that the application is nothing but a suit for realising mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and, therefore, 379 ad valorem court fees is payable, then what would be the nature of the application when instead of sale of mortgaged property the relief asked for is transfer of the management of the industrial concern or an interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment from the premises cf the industrial concern without the permission of the Board? In the last mentioned two cases the relief is incapable of any monetary evaluation.
The High Court got over this difficult question by merely observing that this need not be answered in the petitions before the High Court.
Frankly speaking, they shed some light on the nature of the proceedings contemplated by section 31, and section 32 of the Act clearly points to, the conclusion that the proceedings are not in the nature of a money recovery proceedings.
Article 1 of Schedule I would, therefore, not be attracted and we must say in fairness to Mr. D.V. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent State of Gujarat who specifically stated that the application would not fall under Article I of Schedule I but it would be governed by Article of Schedule.
I. Developing the contention, Mr. Patel urged that the substance of the matter is that even if the Corporation applies for an order of sale of mortgaged property, the substantive relief is one of sale of mortgaged property so that the Corporation may reimburse itself of the loan advanced to the industrial concern thereby acquiring monetary gain or at any rate preventing monetary loss.
The outward form, it was said may be different but the substance of the matter is that the Corporation seeks to recover its loan by sale of mortgaged property.
It was said that at any rate either the Corporation by the substantive relief seeks to make a monetary gain of reimbursing itself in respect of the loan advanced by it or prevents the loss that it may suffer if the loan is not repaid, by bringing the mortgaged property to court auction and appropriate the sale price towards its loan.
Section 31(1) enables the Corporation in the event of breach of agreement or default in payment of loan or advance or an Instalment thereof to make an application not merely for sale of mortgaged property but even for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or merely injunct the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equivalent from the premises of the concern without the permission of the Board.
An application for transfer of management of the industrial concern could by no stretch of imagination, be said to be an application for repayment of the loan though Mr. Patel did say that the management can only be retained till such time as the Corporation reimburses itself.
Further, if an application under section 31(1) is merely for an injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment with 380 out the permission of the Board, it could hardly, or even remotely.
be said that such a relief substantively provides for repayment of the loan or it is a relief to prevent an anticipatory loss.
Let it he recalled at this stage that if the Court fees Act is a taxing statute its provisions have to be construed strictly in favour of the subject litigant (vide State of Maharashtra vs Mishrilal Tarachand Lodha & ors.,) In a taxing statute the strict legal position as disclosed by the form and not the substance of the transaction is determinative of its taxability (vide Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Harbour Div.
II, Madras vs Young Men 's Indian Association (Regd.), Madras & ors.
If it is a fee, the enormity of the exaction will be more difficult to sustain.
While we do not pronounce, we indicate the implication of the High Court 's untenable view.
What then is the nature of proceedings contemplated by section 31(1) if it is not a suit by the mortgagee for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
Section 31 would to some extent provide a clue to this question.
On an application under section 31(1) being made it is obligatory upon the Court to make an interim order attaching the security with or without interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its plant.
machinery or equipment without the permission of the Board of the Corporation.
If the relief claimed in the application is transfer of the management of the industrial concern to the Corporation it is obligatory upon the Distt.
Judge to grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment.
In either event a notice notifying the industrial concern to show cause why the order should not be made absolute is required to be served upon the industrial concern.
It was said that if cause is shown by the industrial concern it is obligatory upon the Distt.
Judge to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto.
The contention is that once an industrial concern shows cause and contests the application of the Corporation there arises a lis between the parties which would include the investigation of the monetary claim of the Corporation and per se it would be a suit between the mortgagee and the mortgagor in which the ultimate relief is sale of mortgaged property for repayment of the mortgage money.
Sub section
(6) of section 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed.
The claim of the Corporation is not the monetary claim to be investigated though it may become necessary to 381 specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold.
But the investigation of the claim does not involve all the contentions that can be raised in a suit.
The claim of the Corporation is that there is a breach of agreement or default in making repayment of loan or advance or instalment thereof and, therefore, the mortgaged property should be sold.
It is not a money claim.
The contest can be that the jurisdictional fact which enables the Corporation to seek the relief of sale of property is not available to it or no case is made out for transfer of management of the industrial concern.
Sub section
(7) of section 32 prescribes what reliefs can be given after investigation under sub section
(6) is made, and it clearly gives a clue to the nature of contest under Sub section
Sub section
(8) of section 32 only prescribes the mode and method for executing the order of attachment or sale of property as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Sub sections
(6), (7) and (8) of section 32 read together would give an opportunity to the industrial concern to appear and satisfy the District Judge what the situation envisaged by section 31(13 has not arisen and the relief should not be granted.
In the absence of a provision giving such an opportunity to the industrial concern to whose detriment the order is required to be made, a serious question may arise about the constitutional validity of the procedure prescribed under section 31(1) inasmuch as it would be violative of principles of natural justice and that too in a proceeding in a Court of Law.
The provision contained in sub section
(6) does not expand the contest in the application made under section 31(1) as to render the application to be a suit between a mortgagee, and the mortgagor for sale of mortgaged property.
If that were so, the Corporation would not be limited to specified reliefs only and if the contract permits it may seek to enforce personal liability of mortgage which it cannot enforce in an application under Sec. 31 ( 1).
It may be, as contended by Mr. Patel, that in the ultimate analysis the result would be that the property will be sold for repayment of the loan or advance taken by the, industrial concern from the Corporation but it could not be said that it is a substantive relief claimed by the Corporation which can be valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss as envisaged by Article 7 of Schedule I of Court fees Act.
The substantive relief in an application under section 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree.
We are unable to appreciate the view taken by the High Court that the proceeding is not in the nature of execution of a decree because the question of enforcement of the order of attachment or sale would only arise after the same is made absolute under Sub section
One has to look at the whole conspectus of provisions in section 32 coupled with the nature of relief sought under section 31(1) 382 and it becomes clear that special provision is made for certain types of reliefs that can be obtained by a Corporation by an application under section 31(1) which could not be styled as substantive relief for repayment of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
Nor can it be said to be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss.
The form of the application, the nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry contemplated by Sub section 6 of section 32 and the nature of relief that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly show that the application under section 31(1) is neither a plaint as contemplated by Article 1 of Schedule I nor an application in a nature of a plaint as contemplated by Article 7 of Schedule I of Court fees Act.
Once Article 7 of Schedule I of the Court fees Act is excluded there was (and could be) no dispute that an application under section 31(1) of the Act would be covered by the residuary Article l(c) of Schedule II of the Court fees Act and it should bear a fixed court fee in the sum of 65 paise.
Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the application should bear ad valorem court fee.
When dealing with a question of court fee, the perspective should be informed by the spirit of the magna carta and of equal access to justice which suggests that a heavy price tag on relief in Court should be regarded as unpalatable.
In this view of the matter this appeal is allowed and the order made by the High Court as well as the orders made by the various District Judges except the District Judge, Broach, are set aside.
On the question of costs, we looked at the specimen applications filed by the Corporation disclosing a clear lack of wisdom on the part of the Corporation in asking for a decree for certain amount which could not be granted under section 31 (1).
Therefore, there was a misconception on either side and the proper order should be that the parties shall bear their own costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant Corporation, which grants or guarantees the loan to be raised By industrial concerns either from the scheduled banks or state Cooperative Banks or those floated in public market, is entitled to make, for one or more of the reliefs set out in Section 31 ( 1 ) of the state Financial Cooperation Act, an application to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or substantial part of its business, when any such concern defaults in repayment of loan or fails to comply with the terms of the agreement.
The Corporation made several applications purporting to be under Section 31(1) of the Act in various district courts in the State of Gujarat.
question was raised in the District Courts about the proper court fee payable on sch applications. ' The Corporation contended that the application would be governed k Article 1 (c) of Schedule II of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 and a fixed court fee in the amount of 65 paise would be payable in respect of the application.
But the state contended that the application could be governed either by Article I of Schedule I or at any rate Article 7 of Schedule I and the court fee payable would be ad valorem on the amount of value o the subject matter in dispute or on the amount of the monetary gain or loss to be prevented according to the scales prescribed under Article 1 of Schedule I.
All the district courts except Broach accepted the contention of the state; but the Broach district court opined that the application under Section 31(1) was in the nature of an execution application and it would be governed by Article I (c) of Schedule II.
Both the Corporation and state of Gujarat went in revision before the High Court.
The High Court by a common judgment held that an appellation under Section 31(1) should bear an ad valorem court fee.
In reaching this conclusion, the High Court treated the application under Section 31(1) of the Act on par with a suit by a mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property which is being treated as a money suit falling within the purview of Article I of Schedule I. Alternatively, it was held the even if the application under Section 31(1) is not plaint within the meaning of Article I of Schedule I it would fall within the purview o Article 7 of Schedule I.
Allowing the appeal, by special leave the Court ^ HELD: 1.
The form of the application, the nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry contemplated by sub section (6) of Section 32 and the nature of relief that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly show that the application under Section 31 (1) is neither a plaint as contemplated by Article 1 of Schedule I nor an application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by Article 7 of the Court Fees Act.
182 B C] 373 Once Article 7 of the Schedule I of the Court Fees Act is excluded there A was (and could be) no dispute that an application under Section 31(1) of trill Act would be covered by the residuary Article 1 (c) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act and it should bear a fixed court fee in the sum of 65 paise.
[382 D] 2.
Section 31(1) of the Act prescribes a special procedure for enrichment of the claims of the Financial Corporation.
The Corporation is to make an application for the reliefs set out Indecision 31(1).
The reliefs that a Court can gram are the sale of the property mortgaged etc.
to a Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance; transfer of the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation; or restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the industrial concern without the permission of the Board of the Financial Corporation.
An application for such a relief is certainly not a plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage loan.
It is not even something akin to a suit by a mortgage to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
The distinguishing features noticeable between a suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and an application under section 31 for one or more of the relief specified therein lares that even if the Corporation as applicant so chooses, it cannot in the application, pray for a preliminary decree for accounts or a final decree for payment of money nor can it seek to enforce any personal liability even if such one is incurred under the contract of mortgage.
At any rate in an application under Section 31 ( 1 ) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding dues.
It can make an application for one of the three reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money decree or decree for recovery of outstanding loans or advance.
The foreign of the relief by itself would not attract one or the other Article of Court Fees Act.
Section 32 of the Act clearly points to the conclusion that the proceedings under Section 31(1) of the Act are not in the nature of a money recovery proceedings.
Article 1 of Schedule I would, therefore not be attracted.
attracted 3.
The whole conspectus of provisions in Section 32 coupled with the nature relief sought under section 31(1) makes it clear that special provision is made for certain types of reliefs that can be obtained by a Corporation by an application under Section 31 ( I ) which could not be styled as substantive relief for repayment of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property.
Nor can it be said to be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss.
The substantive myself in an application under Section 31(1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree.
It may be that in the ultimate analysis the result would be that the property will be sold for repayment of the loan or advance taken by the industrial concern from the Corporation but it could not be said that it is substantive relief claimed by the Corporation which can be valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss as envisaged by Article 7 of Schedule I of Court Fees Act.
[382 A C & 381G H] Sub section (6) of Section 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed.
It does not expand the contest in the application as if it is suit between a mortgagee and the mortgagor for sale of mortgaged property.
[38 I E] 374 Observation: [When dealing With a question o court fee, the perspective should be informed by the spirit of the magna carta and of equal access to justice which suggests that a heavy price tag on relief in Court should be regarded as unplayable.] [382E]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal Nos.
59 and 60 of 1972.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 23 9 1971 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr1.
A. 512 of 1970.
R. L. Kohli and U. P. Singh for the Appellants.
A. section Sohal, Hardev Singh and R. section Sodhi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J.
The two criminal appeals Nos. 59 and 60 of 1972 are by special leave.
Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972 is, preferred by Sarwan Singh, Karnail Singh, Zora Singh and Malkiat Singh, while Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1972 is by Bachan Singh against their conviction and sentence imposed on them by the trial court and confirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 512 of 1970.
This Court granted special leave in both cases limited to the question as to whether the offence committed by the appellants is one punishable under section 300 I.P.C. or under any part of section 304 I.P.C. The facts necessary for determining what offence the accused were guilty of may be stated.
Sant Singh is the father of Sarwan Singh, Bachan Singh and Mewa Singh.
Sarwan Singh is the first appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972 and Bachan Singh is the sole appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1972.
The deceased Mewa Singh is their brother.
Sarwan Singh had two sons, Zora Singh and Karnail Singh who are appellants Nos. 3 and 2 in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972.
Sarwan Singh 's daughter was married to Malkiat Singh who is the fourth appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972.
Pending appeal, Sarwan Singh and Bachan Singh have died and their appeals have abated.
We are therefore concerned only with Karnail Singh, Zora Singh and Malkiat Singh who are appellants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal No. 59 of 1972.
The deceased is the brother of the two accused and paternal uncle of the two other accused.
The dispute was over a common Khal of the land and a pahi.
The deceased Mewa Singh put an application before the Revenue authority against the accused and the matter was pending when the occurrence took place.
On the date of the occurrence, 8 9 1969, at about 3 P.M., PW. 3, Mohinder Singh, went to Amar Singh, P.W. 5, who is Lambardar of his village in connection with the mutation of his land.
Amar Singh was grazing his cattle near the minor canal just opposite to the well 386 of the accused and the deceased Mewa Singh.
When P.W. 3 was 20 Kadams away from the place where Amar Singh was grazing his cattle, he heard a Raula coming from the side of tube well of Mewa Singh.
Hearing the noise, P.W. 3 ran towards their place of the occurrence.
He also saw P.W. 5, Amar Singh and Mohinder Singh, son of Thakar Singh, P.W. 4 also running towards the place of occurrence.
The three witnesses and Ujagar Singh, P.W. 9 who are eye witnesses spoke to the actual incident as follows: "When they reached near the place of occurrence they heard Zora Singh shouting to Mewa Singh.
Zora Singh was armed with a Gandasi, Karnail Singh was holding a Takwa, Malkait Singh was armed with a Gandasi and Sarwan Singh and Bachan Singh were having a Lathi each.
Zora Singh gave a Gandasi blow to Mewa Singh who raised his hands to ward off the blow and sustained injury.
Karhail Singh then gave a Takwa blow to Mewa Singh which he warded off by raising his hands and got an injury on his hand.
Zora Singh and Karnail Singh gave more injuries with their respective weapons.
Therefore, all the accused started causing injuries to Mewa Singh with their respective weapons while he was Lying on the ground.
" On the evening at about 8.30 P.M., P.W. 14 saw Mewa Singh and enquired from the doctor whether he was in a fit condition to, make a statement.
The doctor gave his opinion that Mewa Singh was not fit to make a statement.
Mewa Singh 's condition was found to be not satisfactory and therefore he was moved to Civil Hospital, Ludhiana.
He died at 5.40 p.m.
On 9 9 1969.
The doctor noted 27 injuries on the person of Mewa Singh.
According to the doctor, the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage and the injuries were ante mortem and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Dr. Jagjit Singh, P.W. 5, examined Mewa Singh on admission to the hospital at 6.45 p.m.
On 8 9 1969 and found 27 injuries on Mewa Singh, of which injuries 2 and 3 were grievous.
Injuries at 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 17 were caused by sharp edged weapons.
All the injuries, except 2 and 3 were simple in nature.
The trial court was of the view that the question for consideration was whether the accused intended to inflict the injuries in question and if once the existence of injuries sufficient to cause death is proved, the intention to cause death will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
In this view, the trial court found all the accused guilty under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
The High Court found that 387 the common object was clearly to kill the deceased and the offence fall under section 300.
Thirdly, read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.
The facts of the case disclose that five accused armed with various weapons caused the injuries to the deceased which resulted in his death.
If a person causes an injury with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and when the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence would fall under clause (iii) of section 300 and would be punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The five accused were convicted by the trial court for an offence under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C.
In order to find the person guilty of offence under section 302 read with section 149, the prosecution must establish that the offence was, committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.
It is, therefore necessary for the prosecution to establish that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit an offence under section 300 or that the members of the assembly knew it to.
be likely that an offence under section 300 would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
The cumulative effect of the injuries was no doubt found to have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
If the injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death are traced to a particular accused, he will be guilty of an offence punishable under section 302 without the aid of section 149, when the injuries caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, it is necessary before holding each of the accused guilty under section 302 read with Section 149 to find that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death or that the members of the unlawful assembly knew it to be likely that an offence punishable under section 302 I.P.C. would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
In order to determine this question, it is necessary to refer to the injuries caused in some detail: Two grievous injuries are injuries 2 and 3 described in exhibit PD.
Injury No. 2 is an incised wound 3/4" x 1/4" bone deep on the right little finger at its middle and injury No. 3 is incised wound 1/3" distal to injury No. 2 at the right little finger cutting the bone underneath.
The grievous injury is the fracture and cutting of the Light little finger caused by a sharp edged weapon.
All the other injuries are simple in nature.
The injuries Nos. 1 to 3, 5 to 9, 11 to 17 were caused by sharp edged weapon.
Injury No. 1 is incised wound 1/2 " x 1/6" muscle deep on the left palm in between the left thumb and index 388 finger.
Injury No. 2 is incised wound 3/4" x 1/4" bone deep on the right little finger at its middle.
Injury No. 3 is incised wound 1/3" distal to Injury No. 2 at the right little finger cutting the bone underneath.
Injury No. 5 is incised wound 2" x 1/4" muscle deep on the left shin at its middle areas.
Injury No. 6 is incised wound 1/2" x 1/4" on the left shin.
Injury No. 7 is incised wound 1/3" x 1/4" muscle deep on the left shin.
Injury No. 8 is incised wound 1/3"x 1/4" muscle deep on the left shin.
Injury No. 9 is incised wound 3/4" x 1/3" muscle deep on the left shin.
While Injury No. 1 is on The left palm in between the left thumb and index finger, injuries Nos. 2 and 3 on the right little finger at its middle, injuries Nos. 5 to 9 are in the area of the left shin.
Most of the injuries are only 1/4" deep while injury No. 9 is 1/3" deep, and injury No. 1 is 1/6" in depth.
The other injuries Nos. 11 to 17 are on the right shin and are incised wounds, most of which are of the size of 1 3/4" x 1/4".
The other injuries are contusions in the chest area on the right and the left side, the with not exceeding 3/4 of an inch.
Injury No. 26 is on the head of the dimension of 1 3/4" X 1/4" muscle deep on the left side of the head 3" above the left ear.
All the injuries are described by the do tor as simple.
The depth of the incised injuries is not more than of an inch and the width of the contusions is not more than 3/4".
The area of the injury cannot be said to be a vital part of the body.
The injury on the head is only 1" in depth and has not caused any damage.
On an analysis of the injuries it cannot be said that any of the persons that inflicted injuries intended to cause death or such injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
If the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder and in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly any member caused an injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the members of the assembly would be liable for an offence under section 302 I.P.C. read with 149 I.P.C. but on a consideration of the injuries we are not satisfied that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death.
Taking the circumstance that the unexpected quarrel was between the members of the same family over a dispute as to water rights, we are unable to held that offence under section 302 read with section 149 is made out.
On a consideration of the circumstances and the nature of the injuries, it is not possible to hold that the common object of the assembly was to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
It can be said that the common object of the assembly was to cause bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Though the doctor has stated that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, we find it difficult to hold that the injuries, cumulatively, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature 389 to cause death.
The common object of the assembly in the circumstances can only be said to cause injuries which are likely to cause death which will be an offence punishable under section 304(1) of the Indian Penal Code.
In the circumstances we set aside the conviction under section 350 read with section 34 I.P.C. but find the appellants are guilty of an offence punishable under section 304(1) read with section 149 I.P.C. and sentence them to five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,500/ each.
In this case, the death was caused by the brothers in a quarrel regarding water rights.
From the records we are satisfied that the accused are possessed with sufficient funds to compensate, at least to some extent, the loss that has been suffered by the dependants of the deceased.
The law which enables the Court to direct compensation to be paid to the dependants is found in section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 1974).
The corresponding provision in the 1898 Code was section 545.
Section 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898) was amended by Act 18 of 1923 and by Act 26 of 1955.
The amendment which is relevant for the purpose of our discussion is 525(1)(bb) which, for the first time was inserted by Act 26 of 1955.
By this amendment the court is enabled to direct the accused, who caused the death of another person, to pay compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, entitled to recover damages from the persons sentenced, for the loss resulting to them from such death.
In introducing the amendment, the Joint Select Committee stated "when death has been caused to a person, it is but proper that his heirs and dependants should be compensated, in suitable cases, for the loss resulting to them from such death, by the person who was responsible for it.
The Committee proceeded to state that though section 545 of the Code as amended in 1923 was intended to cover such cases, the intention was not however very clearly brought out and therefore in order to focus the attention of the courts on this aspect of the question, the Committee have amended section 545 and it has been made clear that a fine may form a part of any sentence including a sentence of death and it has also been provided that the persons who are entitled under the , to recover damages from the person sentenced may be compensated out of the fine imposed.
It also expressed its full agreement with the suggestion that at the time of awarding judgment in a case where death has resulted from homicide, the court should award compensation to the heirs of the deceased.
The Committee felt that this will result in settling the claim once for all by doing away with the need for a further claim to a civil Court, and avoid needless worry and expense 390 to both sides.
The Committee further agreed that in cases where the death is the result of negligence of the offender, appropriate compensation should be awarded to the heirs.
By the introduction of clause (bb) to section 545(1), the intention of the legislature was made clear that, in suitable cases, the heirs and dependents should be compensated for the loss that resulted to them from the death, from a person who was responsible for it.
The view was also expressed that the court should award compensation to the heir of the decease so that their claims would be settled finally.
This object is sought to be given effect to by section 357 of the new Code (Act 2 of 1974).
Section 357(3) provides that when a court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount, as may be specified in the order, to the person who has sufered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced.
The object of the section therefore, is to provide compensation payable to the persons who are entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced even though fine does not form part of the sentence.
Though section 545 of 1898 Code enabled the court only to pay compensation out of the fine that would be imposed under the law, by section 357(3) when a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may direct the accused to pay compensation.
In awarding compensation it is necessary for the court to decide whether the case is a fit one in which compensation has to be awarded.
If it is found that compensation should be paid, then the capacity of the accused to pay a compensation has to be determined.
In directing compensation, the object is to collect the fine and pay it to the person who has suffered the loss.
The purpose will not be served if the accused is not able to pay the fine or compensation for, imposing a default sentence for non payment of fine would not achieve the object.
If the accused is in a position to pay the compensation to the injured or his dependents to which they are entitled to, there could be no reason for the Court not directing such compensation.
When a person, who causing injury due to negligence or is made vicariously liable is bound to pay compensation it is only appropriate to direct payment by the accused who is guilty of causing an injury with the necessary Mens Rea to pay compensation for the person who has suffered injury.
In awarding compensation as cautioned by this Court in a decision reported in Palaniappa Gounder vs State of Tamil Nadu, the Court should not first consider what compensation ought to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased and then impose a fine which is higher than the compensation.
It is the duty of the Court to take into account the 391 nature of the crime, the injury suffered, the justness of the claim for compensation, the capacity of the accused to pay and order relevant circumstances in fixing the amount of fine or compensation.
After consideration of all the facts of the case, we feel that in addition to the sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 3,500/ on each of the accused under section 304(1) I.P.C. should be imposed.
The fine will be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased, Mewa Singh.
Tn default of payment of fine, the accused will undergo further Simple imprisonment for 6 months.
S.R. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The deceased Mewa Singh is the brother of the two accused Sarwan Singh and Bachan Singh and the paternal uncle of two other accused Karnail Singh and Zora Singh sons of Sarwan Singh, Malkait Singh the other accused is the son in law of Sarwan Singh.
They are thus close relatives and there was dispute over a common khal of the land and pahi.
The deceased had put an application before the Revenue Authority against the accused and the matter was pending when the occurrence took place on 8 9 1969.
The deceased was attacked by the accused with deadly weapons resulting in as many as 27 injuries of which injuries 2 and 3 were grievous.
The deceased died the next day in the civil hospital.
The cause of death was shock and haemorrhage and the injuries were ante mortem and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The trial court found all the five accused guilty under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. and punished them taking the view that once the existence of injuries sufficient to cause death is proved, the intention to cause death will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
The High Court in appeal from that the common object was clearly to kill the deceased and that the offence fell under section 300.
Thirdly read with section 34 IPC and accepted the trial court 's Judgment.
Dismissing the appeals by special leave the Court, ^ HELD: (1) If a person causes an injury with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and when the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence would fall under clause (iii) of section 300 and would be punishable under section 302 I.P.C. [387 B] (2) In order to find the person guilty of offence under section 300 read with section 149, the prosecution must establish that the offence was committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew it to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.
It is, therefore, necessary for the prosecution to establish that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit an offence under section 300 or that the members of the assembly knew it to be likely that an offence under section 300 punishable under section 302 IPC would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
[387 B D] (3) If the injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death are traced to a particular accused, he will be guilty of an offence under section 300 punishable under section 302 without the aid of section 149, when the injuries caused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death, it is necessary before holding 384 each of the accused guilty under section 300 read with section 149 to find that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to cause death or that the members of the unlawful assembly knew it to be likely that an offence punishable under section 302 IPC would be committed in prosecution of the common object.
[387 D F] In the instant case, on an analysis of the injuries (a) it cannot be said that any of the persons that inflicted injuries intended to cause death or such injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
(b) The circumstance that unexpected quarrel was between the members of the same family over a dispute as to water rights shows that no offence under section 300 read with sec.
149 IPC punishable under section 302 IPC has been made out.
(c) the common object of the assembly was to cause bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Though the doctor has stated that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, it is difficult to hold that the injuries, cumulatively, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The common object of the assembly in the circumstances can only be said to cause injuries which are likely to cause death which will be an offence punishable under section 304(1) of the Indian Penal Code.
[388 E H 389 A] (4) (a) The object of section 357(3) is to provide compensation payable to the persons who are entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced even though fine does not form part of the sentence.
Though section 545 of 1898 Code enabled the court only to pay compensation out of the fine that would be imposed under the law, by section 357 (3) when a court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may direct the accused to pay compensation.
[390 D E] (b) In awarding compensation it is necessary for the court to decide whether the case is a fit one in which compensation has to be awarded.
If it is found that compensation should be paid, then the capacity of the accused to pay a compensation has to be determined.
In directing compensation, the object is to collect the fine and pay it to the person who has suffered the loss.
The purpose will not be served if the accused is not able to pay the fine or compensation for, imposing a default sentence for non payment of fine would not achieve the object.
If the accused is in a position to pay the compensation to the injured or his dependent to which they are entitled to, there could be no reason for the court not directing such compensation When a person, who caused injury due to negligence or is made vicariously liable is bound to pay compensation it is only appropriate to direct payment by the accused who is guilty of causing an injury with the necessary mens rea to pay compensation for the person who has suffered injury.
[390 E G] (c) The court should not first consider what compensation sought to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased and then impose a fine which is higher than the compensation.
It is the duty of the court to take into account the nature of the crime, the injury suffered, the justness of the claim for compensation.
the capacity of the accused to pay the other relevant circumstances in fixing the amount of fine or compensation.
[390 G H, 391 A] Palaniappa Gounder vs State of Tamil Nadu, ; applied.
[The Court altered this conviction of offence punishable under section 304(1) read 385 with section 149 and sentenced to 5 years R I and a fine of Rs. 3500/ each, the fine to be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 29 11 1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 378 of 1974.
G. B. Pai and O. P. Rana for the Appellant.
R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis) , Madan Mohan, K.P. Aggarwal and Mrs. Manju Gupta, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
The case is primarily concerned with the age of retirement of two obscure workmen but it raises question of general importance concerning workmen employed by most statutory bodies and corporations.
It is on such chances that the development of our law depends.
The two workmen were originally employed by Messrs Seth Ram Gopal and Partners who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the .
There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of M/s. Seth Ram Gopal and partners.
The certified Standing orders did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees.
I ht, according to the workmen meant that they could continue to work as long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties.
The electricity undertaking of Ms. Seth Ram Gopal and Partners was purchased br The U.P. State Electricity Board, with effect from 15 12 1964, under The provisions of the .
The employees of Seth Ram Gopal and Partners became the employees of the U.P. the Electricity Board.
The U.P. State Electricity Board which it is no longer disputed is an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies, neither made nor got certified any Standing orders as it was bound so to do under that Act.
But it is evident, though no admitted from two letters, one from the Superintending Engineer in reply to a letter dated 31 12 166 from the Executive Engineer and the other from the Certifying officer for Standing orders and Labour Commissioner to the General Secretary of the Employees ' Union that the Board and the workmen considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment of Seth Ran 359 Gopal and Partners as applicable to them even after the purchase of the undertaking by the Board.
This, however, is not very material.
The Board, as we said earlier, made and not certified no standing orders either in regard to age or superannuation or in regard to any other matter Mentioned in the schedule to the Standing orders Act.
We may mention here that by reason of a notification dated 17 1 1959 "age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or ally other facility which the employers may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties ' is one of` the matters in respect of which an employer to whom the Standing orders Act applies is bound to make Standing orders and get them certified.
However, on May 28, 1970.
the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified.
under Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
a regulation made by the U.P. State: Electricity Board under Section 7(c) of the , ]948.
The notification was as Follows. "No. 3822 2/70/XXIII PB 15EH 67 May 28, 1970.
In pursuance of the provision of Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 (Act No. 20 of 1946), the Governor is pleased to notify in the official Gazette that the U.P. State Electricity Board has made the following Regulations under sub section (c) of Section 79 of the ) (Act No. 54 of 1948) ``Notwithstanding any rule if one order or practice hitherto followed, the date of compulsory retirement of an employee of the Board will be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that (i) in the case of the inferior servants of the Board, whose counterparts under State Government are at present entitled to serve upto the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the date on Which they attain the age of 60 years.
(ii) the Board or its subordinate appointing authority may require an employee to retire after he attains or has attained the age of 55 years on three months ' ' notice or three months ' salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason".
Acting in pursuance of this regulation as notified by the Governor, the Board sought to retire the two respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7, 1972 respectively on their attaining the age of 58 years.
The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the regulation mad by the Board and its notification by 360 the Governor.
Their contention was that the Board was not competent to make a regulation in respect of a matter covered by the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
The writ petition as dismissed by a learned Single Judge.
The respondents preferred a special appeal and the Division Bench which heard the Special Appeal in the first instance referred the following three questions tc a Full Bench: " (1) Whether the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 applies to the Industrial establishments of the State Electricity Board ? (2) Whether the standing orders framed for an Industrial establishment of an electrical undertaking cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on the framing of regulations under section 79(c) of the ? (3) Whether section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies only to industrial establishments of the Government or also to other industrial establishments ? The Full Bench answered the questions as follows: "l.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946 applies to the industrial establishments of the Ste Electricity Board.
The Standing Orders framed in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease to b operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on framing of the regulations under section 79(c) of the . 3.
Section 13 B of the , applies only to the industrial establishments of the government and to no other establishments".
Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the Special Appeal and issued a Writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 1970 and directing the U.P. State Electricity Board not to enforce the regulation against the appellants before them.
The U.P. State Electricity Board, having obtained a Certificate from the High Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, has preferred this appeal.
361 Shri G. B. Pai learned Counsel for the appellant did not canvass A the correctness of the answer of the Full Bench to the first question referred to it.
He confined his attack to the answers to the second and third questions.
Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagat Ram(1), and Rajasthan Electricity Board vs Mohan Lal(2), Shri Pai argued that the U.P. State Electricity Board was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that the regulations made b the Board under Section 79(c) of the Act had the 'full force and effect of the statute and the force of law" so as to displace, over ride or supersede Standing Orders made and certified under the Industrial Employment (Stanching orders) Act.
which, he submitted wee mere contractual conditions of service subjected to a quasi judicial process and which, therefore, could not take precedence over legislative processed regulations.
The learned Counsel further submitted that Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act was a special law and that it prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act.
Alternately, he submitted, the notifying of the regulation regarding age of superannuation under Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act excluded the applicability of that Act in regard to the subject of age of superannuation.
He urged that Section 13 B was no confined in its application to Government undertakings only or to cases where there were comprehensive sets of rules, as was thought by the High Court.
Shri R. K. Garg, for the Workmen contended that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act was an act specially designed to define and secure reasonable conditions of service for workmen in industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen and to that end to compel employers to make Standing orders and to et them certified by a quasi judicial authority.
It was, therefore, a special Act with reference to its subject matter.
The Electricity Supply Act, on the other hand, was intended "to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development. ' ' It was not specially designed to define the conditions of service of employees of Electricity Board or to displace the Standing orders Act.
The power given to an Electricity Board under Section 79(c) to make regulations providing for "the duties of officers and servants of the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service" was no more than the usual, general power possessed by every (1) ; (2) ; 362 employer.
Shri Garg argued that the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act was a special Act which dealt with the special subject of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments and, therefore, in the matter of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments, it prevailed over the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act.
He urged that under Section 13 B of the Standing orders Act, Government undertakings which had a comprehensive set of rules alone could be excluded from the applicability of the Act.
He submitted that to permit a single rule or regulation made for limited purpose to be notified under Sec.
13 B would have the disastrous effect of excluding the applicability of the whole of the Standing Orders Act.
Before examining the rival contentions, we remind ourselves that the Constitution has expressed a deep concern for the welfare of workers and has provided in Art, 42 that the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and in article 43 that the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment or leisure etc.
These are among the "Directive Principles of State Policy".
The mandate of Article 37 of the Constitution is that while the Directive Principles of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the principles are `nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country ' and `it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws '.
Addressed to Courts, what the injunction means is that while Courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goal set out in the Directive Principle of St Policy.
This command or the Constitution must be over present n the minds of judges when interpreting statutes which council them selves directly or indirectly with matters et out in the Directive principles of State Policy Let us now examine the various provisions their proper contact with a view to resolve the problem before us.
l the , 194(.
Before the passing of the Act conditions or service of industrial employees s were invariably ill defined and were hardly over know with even a slight Degree of precision to the employees.
There was no uniformity of conditions of service f(hr employees discharging identical duties in fl the same establishment.
Conditions of service were generally e and the result of oral arrangements which left the employees t Te mercy of the employer.
With the growth of the trade union move 363 ment and the right of collective bargaining, employees started putting A forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs.
Recognising the rough deal that was being given to workers 1 employers who would not define their conditions of service and he inevitability f industrial strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act.
It was stated in the statement of objects and reasons; "Experience has shown that "Standing orders" defining the conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action, holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards minimising, friction between the management and workers ill industrial undertakings.
Discussion on the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of legislation.
The Bill accordingly seeks to pr vide for the framing of "Standing orders" in all industrial establishments employing one hundred and more workers".
It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble "expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them".
The scheme or the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every employer of an industrial establishment as defined in the Act to submit to the Certifying officer draft Standing orders, that is, "Rules relating to matters set out in the schedule", proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment.
This is mandatory.
It has to be done within six months after the commencement of the Act. 'Failure to do so is punishable and is further made a continuing offence.
The draft Standing orders are required to cover every matter set out in the schedule.
The schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the Standing orders and they include classification of workmen, Shift working, attendance and late coming.
Leave and holidays, termination of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of redress for wronged workmen etc.
Item No. 11 of the Schedule IS "Any other matter which may be prescribed".
By a notification dated 17 1959 the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed "Age o superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other facility which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties" as a matter requiring to be provided in the Standing orders.
On receipt o the draft Standing Orders from the employee, the Certifying officer is required to forward a copy of the same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to prefer objections, if any.
Thereafter the Certifying officer is required to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen as the case may be 7 526SCI/78 364 and to decide "whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft Standing orders certifiable under the Act '.
Standing orders are certifiable under the Act only if provision i made therein for every matter set out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and if the Certifying officer adjudicates them as fair and reason 3 able.
The Certifying officer is invested with the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc.
The order of the Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed appellate authority.
The Standing orders as finally certified are required to be entered in a Register maintained by the Certifying officer.
The employer is required to prominently post the Certified Standing orders on special boards in.
maintained for that purpose.
This is the broad scheme of the Act.
The Act also provides for exemptions.
About that, later.
The Act, as originally enacted, precluded the Certifying officer from adjudicating upon the fairness or reasonableness of the draft Standing orders submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now casts a duty upon the Certifying officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing orders.
The Scheme of the Act has ben sufficiently explained by this Court in Associated Cement t Co. LTD.
vs f. D. Vyas(l), Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd '.
vs State of U.P. & Ors.(2), and Western dia Match Co. Ltd. vs Workmen.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is thus seen he an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workman in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness.
It is ar Act giving recognition and form to hard won and precious rights of workman.
We have no hesitation in saying that it is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule enumerated conditions (hf service of workmen in industrial establishments.
Turning net to the Electricity Supply Act, it is, as its preamble says.
An Act to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development".
The statement of objects and reasons and a lance at the various provisions of the Act show that the primary object (1) ; (2) ; (3) [1974] I SCR 434 365 Of the Act is to provide for the coordinated, efficient and economic development of electricity in India on a regional basis consistent with the needs of the entire region including semi urban and rural areas.
Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of the Central Electricity Authority and Chapter III for the constitution of state Electricity Boards.
Chapter IV prescribes the powers and duties of state Electricity Boards, and Chapter V the Boards ' works and trading procedure.
n Chapter VI deals with the Board 's finance, Accounts and Audit.
Chapter VII (from S, 70 to section 83) which is headed "Miscellaneous" contains various miscellaneous provisions amongst Which are section 78 which empowers the Government to make rules and section 79 which empowers the Board to make regulations in respect of matters specific in clauses (a) to (k) of that Section.
Clause (c) of section 79 is "the duties of officers and servants of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of` service".
This, of course is no more than the ordinary general power, with which every employer is invested in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees.
It is an ancillary or incidental power of every employer, The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of state Electricity Boards.
It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity.
It is a special Act in reread to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special Act in regard to the subject of Conditions of Service of workmen in industrial establishments.
If Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making of regulations providing for the conditions of service of tile employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provides which must yield to the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter Act.
The maim "Generalia specialibus non derogant" is quite well known.
The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary Seward vs The owner of the "Vera Cruz"(l) as follows: "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general worlds without any indication of a particular intention to do so".
(1) at 68.
366 The question in Seward vs Vera Cruz was whether Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that Court over "any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction over claims for loss of life which would otherwise come under the Fatal Accidents Act.
It was held that the general words o Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act and therefore, the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages for loss of life.
The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject.
When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament.
Vide London and Blackwall Railway vs Lighthouse District board o Works(l) and Thorpe vs Adams(2).
In J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs state f Uttar Pradesh(3), this Court observed (at p. 1174): "The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and an other to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards us the rest the earlier direction should have effect".
We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments.
It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying as they do hard won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed by Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must prevail over section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.
(1) = ; (2) (1871) L. R. (3) A. r. R.
367 Shri G. B. Pai, relying on what was said in the Rajasthan state A Electricity Board case and Sukhdev Singh & Ors 's case argued that the regulations made under Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act being statutory in nature stood on so high a pedestal as to override, by their very nature, the Standing orders made under the Standing orders Act.
The observations on which he relied are, in the Rajasthan State Electricity Bard case: "The state, as defined in article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people.
The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under article 298 to carry on any trade or business.
The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word "state" as used in article 12.
On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly Show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence.
In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government.
The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions o Part III of the Constitution were applicable".
and in Sukhdev Singh 's case (at p. 627): "Rules, regulations, schemes, Bye laws, orders made under statutory powers are all comprised in delegated legislation" at p. 628) "Subordinate legislation has, if validly made, the full force and effect of a. statute" and (at p. 684 685) "Rules and Regulations of the oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law.
The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to a declaration o being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions.
368 These statutory bodies are authorities within the meaning of article 12 o the Constitution".
The proposition that statutory Bodies are 'authorities ' within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution, that the employees of these bodies have a statutory status and that regulations made under the statutes creating these bodies have the force of law are not in dispute before us.
The question is not whether the employees and the Board have a statutory status; they undoubtedly have.
The question is not whether the regulations made under Sec.
79 have the force of law; again, they undoubtedly have.
The question is whether Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act is a general law and therfore regulations cannot be made under it in respect of matters covered by the Industrial employment (Standing order) Act, a special law.
That question we have answered and the answer to that question makes irrelevant the submissions based on the statutory status of the employees and the statutory force of the regulations.
Next, we turn to the submission based on the notification made under Sec.
13 B of the Standing orders Act.
Section 13 B reads as follows: "13B. Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence, Service (Classiffication, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the official Gazette, apply".
The notification made by the Government has already been extracted by us.
Some doubts were expressed whether the U.P. state electricity Board had in fact made the regulation and whether the Government merely notified the relation without applying its mind.
The learned counsel appearing for the Board and the Government placed before us the relevant records and note files and we are satisfied that the Board did make the regulation and the Government did apply its mind.
The High Court expressed the views that the expression any other rules or regulations" should be read ejusdem generis with the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules", "Civil Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules" etc.
So read, it was said, the provisions of Section 13 B could only be applied to industrial establish 369 ments in which the workmen employed could properly be described as Government servants.
We are unable to agree that the application of the ejusdem generis rule leads to any such result.
The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified.
But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far".
It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or unnecessarily limit general and comprehensive words.
If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size.
If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.
It is true that in Sec.
13 B the specie specie spacifically mentioned happen to be Government servants.
But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status, and governed by statutory rules and regulations.
If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Sec.
13 B to industrial undertakings employing Government servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specifically and following it up with a general expression like the one before us.
The words 'rules and regulations ' have come to acquire a special meaning when used in statutes.
They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function.
Te words can have no other meaning in Sec.
1 3 B. Therefore, the expression "workmen . t whom. any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec.
13 B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of, service the relevant statute authorities the making of rules or regulations.
The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor can it be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long a their conditions of service are notified by the Government under Sec.
13 B. Shri Garg relied on certain observations of the Madras High Court in Raman Nambissan vs State Electricity Board(l), and Thiruvenkataswami vs Coimbatore Municipality().
In Raman Nambissan 's case it was held that the mere fact that the Electricity Board had adopted the rules and regulations if the Government of Madras a its transitory rules and regulations did not bring the workmen employed in industrial establishments under the Board within the mischief of Sec.
1 3 P. Of the Industrial Establishment 's (Standing order) ct.
In Thiru Venkataswami 's '.
ca it was held that rules made by the Government fl (1) [1967] I L.L.J. 252.
(2) [1968] I L.L.J. 361 370 under the District Municipalities Act could not be considered to he rules notified under Se.
13 B of the Standing orders Act merely because the rules were made by the Government and published in the Government Gazette.
We agree with the conclusion in.
both case.
In Thiru Venkataswami case Kailasam J., also observed that the industrial employment (Standing order) Act was a special act relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishments, and, therefore, its provisions prevailed over The provisions of the District Municipalities Act.
We entirely agree.
But, the learned judge went on to say "section 13 B cannot be availed of for purposes of framing rules to govern the relationships in an industrial establishment under private management or in a statutory Corporation.
This rule can apply only to industrial establishments in respect of which the Government is authorised to frame rules and regulations relating to the conditions of employment in industrial establishments".
There we disagree.
Our disagreement is only in regard to industrial establishment in statutory Corporations and not those under private management.
Our reasons are mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Shri Garg suggested that the rules, and regulations specific mention of which has been made in Sec.
13 B were all comprehensive sets of rules.
, and, therefore, "any other rules or regulations" that might be notified by the Government should also satisfy the test of eomprehensiveness.
He argued that a single rule or regulation could not be notified under Sec.
13 B as it would be too much to say, he said, that the notifying of a single rule or regulation would exclude the applicability of all the provisions of the Standing orders Act.
We do not think that the notifying of one or many regulations has the effect that Shri Garg apprehends it has.
The words 'Nothing in this Act shall apply ' are not to be interpreted too literally as to lead to absurd results and to what the legislature never intended.
In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put upon the language of Sec.
13 B is that a rule or regulation, if notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation corse the field.
To that extent and to that extend only 'nothing in the Act shall apply '.
To understand Sec.
13B in by other manner will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results.
For instance, most of the Service Rules and Regulations expressly mentioned in Sec.
13 B do no deal with a large number of the matters enumerated in the schedule such as 'Manner of intimating to workman periods and hour 11 of work, holidays, pay days and wage rates ', 'shift working ', 'Attendance and late coming ', 'conditions o, procedure in applying for, and e authority which may grant leave and holidays '. 'Closing and 371 reopening of Sections of the industrial establishments and temporary stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of he employer and workman arising therefrom ' etc.
To exclude the applicability of Standing orders relating to all these matters because the Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the Civil Services Control, Classification an Appeal Rules provide for a few.
matters like 'Classification of workmen ' or 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct ' would be to reverse the processes of history, apart from leading to unjust and untoward results.
It will place workmen once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so benign and it will certainly promote industrial strife.
We have indicated what according to us is h proper construction of Sec.
13 B. That is the only construction which gives meaning and sense to Sec.
13 B and that is a construction which can legitimately be said to conform to the Directive Principles of state Policy proclaimed in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution.
We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Sec.
13 B or certified by The Certifying officer under Sec.
5 o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect o which n regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act shall continue to apply.
In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age o superannuation having been duly notified by the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact hat it is a matter which could be the subject matter s) Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of is years.
the appeal is, therefore, allowed.
The Writ Petition field in the Light Court is dismissed.
The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents as directed by this Court on 28 9 1977.
The costs are quantified at Rs. 3,500/ .
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Respondents were two workmen originally employed by M/s Seth lam Gopal and Partners, who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Electricity Act, 1910.
There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of the said licensees; but they did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees with the result the workmen could continue to hours long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties Pursuant to The purchase by the appellant with effect from 1 12 1964 of the electricity undertaking of M/s Seth Ram Gopal, the employees in their industrial establishment including the respondents became the employee of the appellant.
I he appellant board which ii admittedly an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act.
1946 applies neither made nor got certified any standing orders as it was bound so to do under hat Act.
The Board however considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment Seth Ram Gopal as applicable to their employees even after the purchase of the undertaking by the Board.
However.
On lay 2. 1970 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified under Section 13 B o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
a regulation made by the U.P. State Electricity Board under Section 79(c) of the electricity Suppl.
Act, 1948 fixing the age of superannuation as S and 60 on a par with the other State Govt.
employees.
Action in pursuance of the regulation as notified by the Governor the appellant sought to retire the respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7. 1972 respectively.
On their attaining the age of 58 years.
The respondents filed a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the regulation male by the Board and its notification by the Governor which was dismissed.
But the Division Bench which heard the special appeal preferred by then.
Referred three questions to a Full Bench The Full Bench answered the questions as follows: ``(l) The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders 1946 applies to the industrial establishment of the State Electricity Board.
(2) The Standing Orders framed, in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking, do not cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on framing of the Regulations under Section 79(c) of the electricity (Supply) Act 1918 and (3) Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act.
applies only to the industrial establishments of the Government and to no other establishments.
356 Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the special Appeal and issued a writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 197) and directing the appellant not to enforce the regulation against the respondents.
he appellant obtained a certificate under article 133(1) of the Constitution and has preferred the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD : 1.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
1946 (Act 20) is a special law in regard to the matters enumerate(l in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to my of those matters are of no effect, unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Section 13 B or certified by the certifying officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders Act shall continue to apply.
In the present case, the regulation made 1.
the Board with retired to the age of superannuation having been duly notified by the government , the regulation shall have effect.
notwithstanding the fact that it is a matter which could be the subject matters of Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.
The respondents were, therefore, properly retired when they attained the are of 58 years.
[371A F] 2.
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishment, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness.
It is an Act giving recognition and hard won and precious right of workmen.
It is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule enumerated conditions of service or workmen in industrial establishment.
[364E G] Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs P. D. Vyas, [196(] 2 S.C.R. 974; Rohtak Hissar district Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs , State of U.P. an(l ors.
; , ; Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs Workmen, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 434; referred to.
The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of State Electricity Board.
It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity.
It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special act in regard to the subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments.
If section 79 of he Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making o regulations providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provision which must yield o the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter.
[365D F] 4.
The reason for the rule "Generalis specialibus non derogant", that a general provision should yield to specific provision is this: In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a. particulars subject.
When a 357 General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has A not repealed or modified the former special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again levied consideration from Parliament [366 D] The provisions of the Standing orders Acts therefore, must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act in regard to matters to which the Standing (Orders Act applies.
It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, embodying as they do hard won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
lt is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act, when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand pr alto repealed by Section 79(c of the Electricity Supply Act.
[366F H] Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagat Ram, ; ; Rajasthan Electricity Board n. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 277; held inapplicable.
The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be so construed as limited t things which are of the same nature as those specified.
But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution aud not pushed too far".
It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive words.
If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size.
If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.
[369 A B] It is true that in Section 1 3 B the specie specifically mentioned happen to be Government servants.
But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status and governed by statutory rules and regulations.
If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Section I 3 B to industrial undertakings employing government servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specially and following it up with a general expression like the one in the instant case.
[369B D] 6.
The words 'rules and regulations ' have come to acquire a. special meaning when used in statutes.
They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function.
The words can have MV other meaning in Sec.
1 3 B. Therefore, the expression "workmen .
whom . any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec.
13 B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of service the relevant statute authorises the making of rules or regulations.
The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor can not be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long as their conditions of service are notified by the Govt.
under Sec.
13 B [369D F] The words 'nothing in this Act shall apply ' are not to be interpreted to literally as to lead to absurd results.
The only reasonable construction that an be put upon the language of Section 13 B is that a rule of regulation, it 358 notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation covers the field.
To that extent and to that extent only "nothing in the Act shall apply".
[307 F G] Raman Nambissan vs State Electricity Board and Thiruvenkataswami vs Coimbatore Municipality, explained.