judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 3047 of 1992.
From the Judgement and Order dated 30.7.1984 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 373 of 1977.
M.L. Verma and S.K. Sinha for the Appellant.
A.K. Srivastava for the Respondents.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
The question arising in this case is whether a matter, if it comes within the scope of section 40 of the Bihar and Orissa Co operative Societies Act, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has to be excluded from the purview of Section 48 of the Act.
Special leave is granted. 3.
The facts relevant for the decision of this appeal are in a short 894 compass.
The respondent No.1 was Depot Manager under the appellant Marketing Union Limited and during his tenure as such, a shortage of coal was detected.
A claim was accordingly made for the said loss by the appellant and a reference was made to the Assistant Registrar, Co operative Societies respondent No.3, under Section 48 of the Act.
The Assistant Registrar absolved the respondent No.1 from the alleged liability and an appeal was filed by the appellant under Section 48(6) of the Act before the Joint Registrar, Co operative Societies, respondent No.2, who are accepted the appellant 's case, rejected the defence and made an award accordingly.
This was challenged before the Patna High Court by a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The High Court held that since the matter was covered by the provisions of Section 40, Section 48 could not apply.
Consequently the award was held to be illegal.
So far section 40 was concerned, it was pointed out that the claim had to be rejected on the ground of limitation.
Thus without considering the other questions raised by the parties, the High Court allowed the writ petition by the impugned judgement which is under challenge in the present appeal.
It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of Section 48 are wide enough to embrace the dispute which has been the subject matter of the present case and they cannot be given a narrow interpretation so as to exclude their application to cases which may also be covered by Section 40.
In reply reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent No.1 on the decision in Purnea Ministerial Government Officer 's Co operative Society Ltd.v.
Abdul Quddus, (1969) B.L.J.R. Vol.
11 969 which has found favour with the High Court.
Section 40 pertaining to surcharge, provides that if as a result of an audit or inquiry it appears to the Registrar that any person who has taken part in the organisation or management of the society or any past or present officer of the society has either made a payment contrary to law or has been guilty of misappropriation or of having committed similar acts detailed therein, the Registrar may inquire into the matter and make an order requiring him to contribute an appropriate sum by way of compensation to the assets of the society.
The second Proviso to sub section (1) of the said section says that no such order shall be passed in respect of any act or ommission which had occurred more than six years earlier.
The provisions of sub section (1) of Section 48 (omitting the explanations which are not relevant for the present issue) dealing with Disputes are in the 895 following terms: "(1) If any dispute touching the business of a registered society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its managing committee against a paid servant of the society) arises (a) amongst members, past members, persons claiming through members, past members or deceased members, and sureties of members, past members or deceased members, whether such sureties are members or non members; or (b) between a member, past member, persons claiming through a member, past member or deceased member, or sureties of members, past members or deceased members, whether such sureties are members or non members and the society, its managing committee or any officer, agent or servant of the society; or (c) between the society or its managing committee and any past or present officer, agent or servant of the society; or (d) between the society and any other registered society; or (e) between a financing bank authorised under the provisions of sub section (1) of Sec. 16 and a person who is not a member of a registered society; such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar: Provided that no claim against a past member or the estate of a deceased member shall be treated as a dispute if the liability of the past member or of the estate of the deceased member has been extinguished by virtue of Sec. 32 or Sec. 63".
The claim of the appellant against the respondent No.1 is clearly covered by clause (c) of sub section (1) above and, therefore, could have been validly referred to the Registrar under Section 48.
The argument, however, is that since the matter is covered by Section 40, Section 48 should be held to be inapplicable.
The High Court agreed and made the following observations: 896 "It is well known proposition of law that when a matter falls under any specific provision then if must be governed by that provision and not by general provisions (Generalia specialibus non derogant)".
The High Court has in its judgement assumed that whenever a specific remedy is made available in law the other remedy, more general in nature, necessarily gets excluded.
Validity of plural remedies, if available under the law, cannot be doubted.
If any standard book on the subject is examined, it will be found that the debate is directed to the application of the principle of election, where two or more remedies are available to a person.
Even if the two remedies happen to be inconsistent,they continue for the person concerned to choose from, until he elects one of them, commencing an action accordingly.
In the present case there is no such problem as no steps under Section 40 were ever taken by the appellant.
The provisions of Section 48 must, therefore, be held to be available to the appellant for recovery of the loss.
7.Our view that a matter which may attract Section 40 of the Act will continue to be governed by Section 48 also if the necessary conditions are fulfilled, is consistent with the decision of this Court in Prem Jeet Kumar V. Surender Gandotra and others, [1991] Supp. 2 S.C.C. 215, arising under the Delhi Co operative Societies Act, 1972.
The two Acts are similar and Sections 40 and 48 of the Bihar Act and Sections 59 and 60 of the Delhi Act are in pari materia.
The reported judgement followed an earlier decision of this Court in Pentakota Srirakulu vs Co operative Marketing Society Ltd.; , We accordingly hold that the High Court was in error in assuming that the application of provisions of Section 48 of the Bihar Act could not be applied to the present case for the reason that Section 40 was attracted.
So far the question of limitation is concerned it is true that as in the Delhi Act, a period of six years was fixed under the Bihar Act also by second Proviso under Section 40 (1), which reads thus: "Provided further that no order shall be passed under this sub section in respect of any act or omission mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) except within six years of the date on which such act or omission 897 occurred.
" It will be observed that the six years rule of limitation, however, is limited for the purpose of section 40, and cannot govern the reference under section 48.
The relevant provision of section 48 is to be found in the Proviso to section 48(1) which has been quoted above.
For determining its impact on the present case it is necessary to examine the Proviso closely.
Firstly, both the Proviso and section 63 of the Act are concerned only where the claim is against a member.
Even if the Proviso be assumed to govern a dispute between the society and its past or present officer or servant it cannot come to the aid of the present respondent No.1 because he was dismissed from service on 15.10.1966 and he was directed to deposit the disputed amount within 30 days therefrom.
The dispute was referred for adjudication under section 48 on 12.12.1966 and the reference was registered as Award Case No. 25 of 1968 on 03.08.1968.
Thus all these steps were taken within a period of two years.
No reliance, therefore, can be placed on either section 32 or 63.
The case of Putnea Ministerial government Officers ' Co operative Society Ltd. (Supra) is clearly distinguishable.
The respondent there was a member of the Society in question and had taken a loan which was the subject matter of the dispute.
As was pointed out by the High Court the claim had stood barred by limitation and, therefore, it was held that the reference was incompetent in view of the Proviso to section 48(1).
The High Court in the present case was, in the circumstances, not entitled to rely on this decision and its conclusions must be set aside as being erroneous in law.
However, since in the judgement it is stated that several other questions were also raised on behalf of the respondent No.1 (who was the writ petitioner) which remained undecided, the case requires reconsideration by the High Court on the remaining points.
Accordingly the impugned judgement is set aside and the writ petition is remitted to the High Court for fresh decision in accordance with the observations in the present judgement.
The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without costs.
U.R. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
During the tenure of respondent 1 as Depot Manager of the Bihar State Cooperative marketing Union Ltd., a shortage of coal was detected.
The appellant Cooperative Union made a claim for the loss, and a reference was made to the Assistant Registrar, cooperative societies under section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act 1935.
section 48(1)(c) deals with disputes between the Society.
and a past or present officer or agent of the Society.
Section 40 provides for investigation by the Registrar where upon an audit or enquiry such officer has been found guilty of misappropriation or similar acts.
The Assistant Registrar in an enquiry under Section 48 absolved respondent 1.
This was reversed by the Joint Registrar and an award made accordingly.
The Patna High Court in a writ application under Article 226 by respondent 1 held that since the matter was covered by Section 40, Section 48 could not apply and set aside the award.
The High Court relied on the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant.
The claim under section 40 was rejected on the ground of limitation under second proviso to Section 40 which prescribe a period of six years.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD : 1.
Validity of plural remedies, if available under the law, cannot be doubted.
Even if the two remedies are inconsistent, they continue for the person concerned to choose from, until he elects one of them, commencing an action accordingly.
A matter which may attract Section 40 will continue to be governed by Section 48 also if the necessary conditions 893 are fulfilled.
In the present case no steps under Section 40 were ever taken by the appellant.
The provisions of Section 48 are available to the appellant for the recovery of the loss.
[896C D] Prem Jeet Kumar vs Surender Gandotra & Ors., [1991] Supp.
2 SCC 215 and Pentakota Srirakulu vs Co operative Marketing Society Ltd., ; , followed.
The claim of the appellant against respondent 1 is clearly covered by Section 48(1)(c) and therefore was validly referred to the Registrar under Section 48.
[895G] 3.
The six year rule of limitation in Proviso under Section 40(1) is limited for the purpose of Section 40, and cannot govern a reference under Section 48.
Even otherwise, on facts the claim is not barred by limitation.
[897B] Purnea Ministerial Government Officers ' Co operative Society Ltd. vs Abdul Quddus, , distinguished.
Matter remitted to the High Court for decision on the remaining issues.
[897F]


judgement:
Civil Appeal Nos.
2593 2599 of 1980.
From the Judgements and Orders dated 23.5.79, 30.5.79, 25.6.79, 26.6.79 and 9.7.1979 of the Kerala High Court in M.F.A. Nos. 69, 76, 80, 81, 83, 89 and 75 of 1977.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant in C.A. No. 2593/80.
V.A. Bobde, O.C. Mathur, Ms. Meera and D.N. Mishra for the Appellant in C.A. No. 2594 99/80.
V.A. Bobde, O.C. Mathur, Ms. Meera and D.N> Mishra for the Respondent in C.A. No. 2593/80.
N.N. Goswamy, V.C. Mahajan, Hemant Sharma and Mrs. Anil Katiyar for the Respondent.
The Judgements of the Court were delivered by SHARMA, J.
The learned counsel for the respondent has, in support of his stand, placed reliance on several decisions of this Court and the High 912 courts in which the notification in identical terms has been construed in the way as is suggested on behalf of the Corporation.
Although Mr. Bobde, learned counsel for the appellant has advanced an argument, which on the face of it, appears to be attractive, I think that in view of the consistent interpretation of the notification which has been followed in the country, the question should not be reopened for fresh consideration.
Accordingly, I agree that all these appeals should be dismissed but without costs.
MOHAN, J. These appeals can be dealt with by a common judgement since the question of law to be decided is one and the same.
It is enough if we note the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2599 of 1980.
The appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act.
It has its registered office at Jew Town in Mattancherry.
It is engaged in the business of clearing and forwarding at the Port of Cochin situated in Willingdon Island.
It is authorised to transact its business at the Cochin Custom House under the terms of Section 202 of the Sea Customs Act read with the Rules made thereunder and a licence was issued under the said provisions.
The appellant received a notice dated 3.1.75 enclosing certain notification whereby the Employees State Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was extended to certain classes of establishments specified in the Schedule wherein 20 or more persons are employees or were employed during that period.
The appellant replied that it did not fall under the purview of the said notification.
Therefore, the appellant was not liable to comply with any of the provisions of the Act.
Another letter dated 8.9.75 was received by the appellant calling it upon to furnish certain details.
This was replied to by a letter dated 20.9.75 whereunder the details were furnished.
Thereafter a notice dated 7.11.75 with which were enclosed certain printed forms, was received by the appellant.
The appellant replied on 18.11.75 denying liability to pay any contribution under the Act.
The stand of the appellant was that the company does not come within the notification dated 18.9.74 as the appellant was not a shop and was carrying on business of clearing and forwarding at the Cochin Port.
In reply to the said letter the appellant received a letter dated 9.12.75 stating that the Insurance Inspector who visited the appellant found 20 persons employed in the shop.
It was functioning as shipping, clearing and forwarding agents.
The appellant served the customers.
Therefore, it was a shop within the 913 dictionary meaning of the term and called upon the appellant to submit the returns.
Contending that the appellant does not render any service to customers at its office, it was merely carrying on clearing and forwarding business by processing the documents at Custom House, no service being rendered at the appellant 's office establishment, it was urged that it could not be called a shop within the dictionary meaning.
An application was moved under Section 75 of the Act before the Employees, Insurance Court, Calicut to decide the dispute and to hold that the appellant was not a shop within the purview of the Act and, therefore, the Act itself was inapplicable.
Objections were preferred on behalf of the Regional Director, Employees State Corporation that in view of the notification dated 18.9.74 supplemented by the other notifications dated 2.12.74 and 22.3.75, the appellant 's business would fall within the ambit of the said notifications.
The Government of Kerala issued those notifications with a view to extend benefits to the employees working in other sections of organized labour such as shops and establishments.
The Employees Insurance Court by a judgement dated 29.1.77 in E.I.C. No. 1/76 held that the appellant would be covered with effect from six months after 21.12.74.
In the result, the appellant was brought within the notification.
Against this order, M.F.A. No. 75 of 1977 was preferred to the High Court of Kerala.
A Division Bench by its judgement dated 25.6.79, following its earlier judgement held that the term "shop" as understood in the scheme of the Act is not merely a place where the business of purchase and sale takes place but it is a place where there is commercial activity arising from customer service.
In that sense, the establishment of the appellant has to be understood to fall within the purview of the term "shop".
Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.
Hence, the civil appeals, leave having been granted by an order dated 3.11.80.
Mr. Bobde, learned counsel for the appellants would raise the following submissions.
The Act primarily applies to factories.
Of course, the Act could be extended to other establishments by means of a notification.
In the instant case, a notification dated 16.9.74 catalogues six establishments one of which 914 is shop.
Though "shop" would take within it other establishments like hotels or restaurants yet they have come to be specifically mentioned.
In view of that enumeration of other establishment in contradiction to shops the word "shop" must be held to relate to a place where commercial activity of buying and selling merchandise takes place otherwise the enumeration of other establishment becomes meaningless.
As to what is the meaning of "shop" could be gathered from Wharton 's Law Lexicon 14th Ed. 929 and Words and Phrases Legally Defined 2nd Ed. 73.
The next submission of the learned counsel is in view of the fact that the notification specifically enumerates the other establishments, the intention has been clearly brought out not to give a wider meaning of the term "shop" as otherwise the term "shop" itself would be enough to cover other establishments like hotels, restaurants, cinema etc.
From this point of view, the activity carried on by the appellant merely processing the document at the customs clearing house without rendering any service to the customers at the appellant 's office or establishment cannot be said to fall within the meaning of "shop".
Therefore, the approach of the High Court and the authorities would require to be set aside.
It must be held that the notification has no application to the appellant 's business.
In opposition to this, Mr. Goswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Employees, State Insurance Corporation would submit that the word "shop" is wide in its amplitude.
It means a place where any kind of commercial activity is pursued and where services are rendered to the customers.
In so far as the appellant is carrying on the business of clearing and forwarding and rendering service which are part of carrier 's job certainly it will be a shop.
It caters to the needs of exporters and importers.
It is a systematic commercial activity or an economic activity.
Hence, it would be a shop within the meaning of the notification.
Merely because every establishment may fall within the scope of the term "shop" as enumerated, it does not, in any way, restrict the meaning of the word "shop".
The object of enumeration is to envelop as many establishments as possible without leaving room for any doubt, where, therefore, the word "shop" alone would be enough to cover the activities of the appellant, it is not necessary to further enumerate and specifically bring within the scope of the notification the activities of the appellant.
Regard must be had in 915 this connection that this is a social welfare legislation.
This Court had always taken the view that as far as permissible the endeavour of the Court must to be cover those employees than to deny the benefit of these provisions.
In support of these submissions the cases in Hindu Jea Band Jaipur vs Regional Director, Employees ' State Insurance Corporation, Jaipur etc.
; , and M/s. International Ore & Fertilizers (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs Employees ' State Insurance Corporation; , are cited.
Thus it is submitted that no exception could be taken to the impugned judgement.
Mr. A.T.M. Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant adopts the arguments of Mr. Bobde while the respondent opposes in the same vein.
The Employees State Insurance Act is an Act to provide certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.
The Act is an outcome of a policy to provide remedy for the widespread evils arising from the consequences of national poverty.
Indeed, it is a piece of social security.
Under Section 1 (4), in the first instance, it is made applicable to all factories.
The Act envisages the extension of benefit to the employees in other establishments or class of establishments , industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise.
The extension of benefit is to be done by means of a notification by the appropriate Government.
Thus the benefits conferred by the Act cover a large area of employees than what the Factories Act and the akin legislations intended.
The conclusion is inescapable that it is a welfare legislation.
The endeavour of the Court should be to place a liberal construction so as to promote its objects to which a reference has been made.
In the instant case, the impugned notification runs as follows: "GOVERNMENT OF KERALA No. 22877/E2/73/LBR LABOUR (E) DEPARTMENT TRIVANDRUM, DT.
18.9.74 916 NOTIFICATION S.R.O.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (5) of Section 1 of the (Central Act 84 of 1948), the Government of Kerala, in consultation with the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation and with the approval of the Central Govt.
hereby given notice of its intention to extend the provisions of the said Act to the clauses of the Establishments specified in the Schedule annexed hereto, on or after 29.3.1975.
____________________________________________________________ Description of establishments Areas in which the establis hment are situated ____________________________________________________________ The following establishments 1.
Trivandrum, Navaikulam where on twenty or more persons and Pazhayakunnumel (Kil are employed for wages on any day imanoor) in Trivandrum of the preceding twelve months, District.
namely.
Quilon, Kundara, Chatha nnur, Kottaraka, Punalur an Sast hamcotta in Quilon District.
(i) Hotels; 3.
Alleppey, Kayamkulam and Shertailai in Alleppey District.
(ii) Restaurants; 4.
Kottayam town in kottayam District.
(iii) Shops 5.
Ernakulam and Cochin in Ernakulam District.
(iv)Road Motor Transport 6.
Trichur town in Trichur establishment; (v) Cinema including preview 7.
Palghat town in Palghat theatres; District.
(iv)Newspaper establishments 8.
Kozhikode town in as defined in Section 2 Kozhikode District and (d) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) 9.
Cannanore town, Tellich and Miscellaneous Provisions erry and Baliapatam in Act, 1955 (5 of 1955).
Cannanore District in the State of Kerala.
By order of the Governor, Sd/ U. Mahabala Rao, Secretary to Government" 917 As it could be seen, six kinds of establishments wherein 20 or more employees are or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 would months fall within the scope of the notification.
Item 3 says "shops".
Therefore, the argument is while "shop" could cover the other establishments like hotels or restaurants in view of the specific enumeration the activities of clearing and forwarding carried on by the appellant unless specifically enumerated cannot be brought within the word "shop".
This argument takes us to the meaning of "shop".
Wharton 's Law lexicon 14th Ed.
Page 929: "Shop a place where things are kept for sale, usually in small quantities, to the actual consumers.
By Shops Act, 1912, s.19, "shop" includes any premises where any retail trade or business is carried on: retail trade or business ' includes the business of a barber or hairdresser, but not the sale of programmes, etc., at places of amusement.
" Words and Phrases Legally Defines 2nd Ed. 73: "Shop" includes dwelling house and warehouse, or other place of business, or place where business is transacted.
"Shop" includes any premises, and any vehicle, stall or place other than premises.
on or in which any retail trade or business is carried on " It has also come up for consideration in the rulings of this Court while interpreting a similar notification.
In Hindu Jea Band, Jaipur (supra) it was held thus: "The first contention urged in support of the petition is that since the petitioner was not selling any goods in the place of its business but was only engaged in arranging for musical performances on occasions such as marriages etc.
its business premises cannot be called a "shop".
We do not agree with the narrow construction placed by the petitioner on the expression "shop" which appears in the notification issued under section 1(5) of the Act which is a beneficent legislation.
The word shop has not been defined in the Act.
A shop is no doubt an 918 establishment (other than a factory) to which the Act can be extended under section 1(5) of the Act provided other requirement are satisfied.
In Collins English Dictionary the meaning of the word shop is given thus: "(i) a place esp.
a small building for the retail sale of goods and service and (ii) a place for the performance of a specified type of work; workshop.
" It is obvious from the above meaning that a place where services are sold on retail basis is also a shop.
It is not disputed that the petitioner has been making available on payment of the stipulated price the services of the members of the group of musicians employed by it on wages.
We, therefore, hold that the place where the petitioner has been carrying business is a shop to which the Act is applicable by virtue of the notification referred to above.
The first contention, therefore, fails" Again, in M/s. International Ore & Fertilizers (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs Employees ' State Insurance Corporation ; at 206 the following useful observations are found: "The word "shop" is not defined in the Act or in the notification issued by the State Government.
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression "shop" means "a house or building where goods are made or prepared for sale and sold".
It also means a "place of business" or place where one 's ordinary occupation is carried on".
In ordinary parlance a "shop" is a place where the activities connected with the buying and selling of goods are carried on.
The evidence produced in the case shows that the petitioner is carrying on its business at its business premises in Secunderabad.
At that place the petitioner carries on the commercial activity facilitating the emergence of contracts of sale of goods between its foreign principals and the State Trading Corporation/Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India.
It arranges for the unloading of the goods under its supervision and for the survey of the goods despatched by its foreign principals at the ports on behalf of its foreign principals and on the goods being delivered to the Central Government it collects the price payable by the government and remits it to its foreign principals.
All these activities are directed and controlled from its. 919 premises at Secunderabad.
It is thus clear that the activities carried on by the petitioner constitute trading activities although the goods imported from abroad are not actually brought to the said premises and delivered to the purchaser there.
In our opinion it is not actually necessary that the delivery of the goods to the purchaser should take place at the premises in which the business of buying or selling is carried on to constitute the said premises into a "shop".
The delivery of the goods sold to the purchaser is only one aspect of trading activities.
Negotiation of the terms of sale, carrying on of the survey of the goods imported, arranging for the delivery of the goods, sold, collection of the price of the goods sold etc.
are all trading activities.
The premises where the business is carried out by the petitioner is undoubtly a shop as the activities that are carried on there relate only to the sale of goods which are imported to India.
The petitioner acts as the agent of its foreign principals who are the sellers.
The petitioner directs and controls all the activities from the premises in question.
If orders are received at a place which ultimately fructify into sale and the resulting trading activity is directed from there that place comes to be known as a "shop".
In our view the Employees ' Insurance Court placed a very narrow interpretation on the expression "shop" while upholding the contention of the petitioner by confining "shop" to a place where goods are actually stored and delivered pursuant to a sale.
We agree with the decision of the High court that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the notification issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legislation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frustrated or stultified.
" In this case, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is slightly different, namely, other kinds of establishments which can easily fall within the definition of "shop" have been enumerated.
Hence, a specific enumeration, so as to include the appellant 's business activity, is to be insisted upon.
In our considered view, this argument cannot be accepted.
First of all, merely because other establishments which are akin to shop are enumerated, it does not, in any manner, oblige us to give a narrow meaning to the word "shop" nor does it any way dilute the meaning of 920 "shop".
As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the object is to envelope as many establishments as possible without leaving any room for doubt.
That is precisely what the notification intends to do.
The appellant is carrying on stevedoring, clearing and forwarding operations.
Clearing the documents, even it be in the custom house, is the carrier 's job.
It cannot be gainsaid that the appellant is rendering service to cater the needs of exporters and importers and others who want to carry the goods further.
Therefore, it is a shop carrying on a systematic economic or a commercial activity.
This would be enough to bring the appellant without specifically enumerating the specific activities carried on by the appellant.
Merely because shop has been enumerated along with other similar establishment we do not think any further specific enumeration is necessary to cover the appellant.
Thus we reject the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant.
The appeals stand dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The Government of Kerala issued a Notification dated 18.9.1974 under Section 1 (5) of the extending the provisions of the Act to six kinds of establishments viz. Hotels, Restaurants, Shops, Road Transport Motor Establishments, Cinemas and Newspaper Establishments.
The appellant Company, carrying on the business of clearing and forwarding at the port of Cochin, received notice for payment of its contribution under the Act.
Denying its liability to pay, it filed an application before the Employees ' Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Act, contending that the Notification was not applicable to it because its establishment was not a shop, but the same was dismissed.
On appeal a Division Bench of the High Court held that the establishment of the appellant falls within the purview of the term `shop '.
In appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (1) though `shop ' would take within it other establishments like hotels or restaurants yet they have come to be specifically mentioned.
In view of that enumeration of other establishment in contradistinction to shops the 910 word `shop ' must be held to relate to a place where commercial activity of buying and selling merchandise takes place otherwise the enumeration of other establishment becomes meaningless; (2) in view of the fact that the notification specifically enumerates the other establishments, the intention has been clearly brought out not to give a wider meaning of the term `shop ' as otherwise the term `shop ' itself would be enough to cover other establishments like hotels, restaurants, cinema etc.
From this point of view, the activity carried on by the appellant merely processing the document at the customs clearing house without rendering any service to the customers at the appellant 's office of establishment cannot be said to fall within the meaning of `shop '.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD: Per Sharma, J.
In view of the consistent interpretation of the notification which has been followed in the country, the question should not be reopened for fresh consideration.
[912 B] Per Mohan, J. (For Himself and Venkatachala, J.) Concurring: 1.
The Employee 's State Insurance Act is an Act to provide certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and makes provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.
Under Section 1(4), in the first instance, it is made applicable to all factories.
But the Act envisages the extension of benefit to the employees in other establishments or class of establishments, industrial commercial, agricultural or otherwise.
The extension of benefit is to be done by means of a notification by the Appropriate Government.
Thus the benefits conferred by the Act cover a large area of employees than what the Factories Act and the akin legislations intended.
The conclusion is inescapable that it is a welfare legislation.
The endeavour of Court should be to place a liberal construction so as to promote its object.
The object is to envelop as many establishments as possible without leaving any room for doubt.
That is precisely what the Notification intends to do.
[915D, E,F,920 A] 2.
The Notification catalogues six establishments one of which is `shop '.
Merely because other establishments which are akin to shop are enumerated, it does not, in any manner, oblige the Court to give a narrow 911 meaning to the word `shop ' nor does it any way dilute the meaning of `shop '.
The appellant is carrying on stevedoring, clearing and forwarding operations.
Clearing the documents, even it be in the custom house, is necessary for the export or import of goods.
These services form part of the carriers job.
It cannot be gainsaid that the appellant is rendering service to cater the needs of exporters and importers and others who want to carry the goods further.
Therefore, it is a shop carrying on a systematic economic or a commercial activity.
This would be enough to bring the appellant without specifically enumerating the specific activities carried on by the appellant.
[913H, 919H, 920A B] Hindu Jea Band, Jaipur.
vs Regional Director Employees ' State Insurance Corporation, Jaipur, ; and M/s International Ore & Fertilizers (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs Employees ' State Insurance Corporation; , , relied on.
Wharton 's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. 929 and Words and Phrases Legally defined, 2nd Edn. 73, referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3284 of 1992 From the Judgement and Order dated 18.2.1992 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2259 of 1991.
R.K. Garg, K.L. Vohra, Rajeev Sharma and D.K. Garg for the Appellants.
Arun Jaitley, V.B. Saharya, Ashok Bhan and B.K. Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by SHARMA,J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Special leave is granted.
The respondents in this appeal have successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of a private right to immovable property against the appellants who are two brothers and who are resisting the claim.
The question is as to whether the writ jurisdiction in the High Court is available for the enforcement of such a right claimed by and against private individuals.
906 3.
The dispute relates to a house property in Delhi.
A suit for eviction of the appellants from the building is pending in the trial court.
According to the case of the respondent No. 1, who is the owner of the property, she had let out the same to one Shri B.K. Pandey who later illegally handed over the possession thereof to the appellant no.1.
According to the further case of the respondent, the portion of the said house property which is subject matter of the present case is beyond the purview of the pending suit.
The occasion for initiating the present proceeding with respect to this portion arose, it is said, on account of the high handedness of the appellants who illegally trespassed beyond the area which is the subject matter of the pending suit, and indulged in several illegal activities.
In other words, the appellants are trespassers and are guilty of mischievous conduct.
However, instead of filing a suit in the civil court or making an appropriate prayer for amendment of her plaint in the pending suit, she through respondent no.2 holding power of attorney, approached the High Court directly by a writ petition under Article 226 for issuance of appropriate direction restraining the appellants from disturbing the lawful possession of the respondents.
The Delhi Administration and the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, were also impleaded as parties with a prayer that appropriate order should be issued against them also and they should be directed not to register any further false and vexatious complaint against them at the instance of the appellants.
It is her case that the appellants have been getting undue police help and are being encouraged to commence frivolous criminal cases against respondent no.1 and her agent.
The appellants denied the allegations of fact made against them and also challenged the maintainability of the writ petition.
Although the fact that a suit between the parties was already pending in the civil court was known to the High Court, it proceeded to pass a short order stating: "There is already a civil suit pending between the parties.
Except the prayer in regard to access to the backyard, no other relief can be granted in this writ petition.
We direct respondents 3 and 4 to remove the grill for access 907 to the backyard in the presence of the police and representatives of the petitioners on Sunday, 23rd February 1922 at 11.00 a.m. so that the access of the petitioner to the servants quarters is not stopped." 6.
Mr. Arun Jaitley, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has supported the impugned judgement on the ground that prayer for issuing a direction against Delhi Administration and Commissioner of Police who were respondent nos.
1 and 2 was also made.
It has to be appreciated that the present appellants were respondent nos.
3 and 4 before the High Court; and the High Court has by the impugned order, considered it fit to allow the prayer of the respondents against them for removal of the grills for access to the backyard.
According to the stand of the landlord respondent, since the police were taking a partisan attitude against her, the filing of a writ petition became necessary.
We are unable to follow this argument.
There is no doubt that the dispute is between two private persons with respect to an immovable property.
Further, a suit covering either directly a portion of the house property which is in dispute in the present case or in any event some other parts of the same property is already pending in the civil court.
The respondent justifies the step of her moving the High Court with a writ petition on the ground of some complaint made by the appellants and the action by the police taken thereon.
We do not agree that on account of this development, the respondent was entitled to maintain a writ petition before the High Court.
It has repeatedly been held by this court as also by various High Courts that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of a statutory authority is alleged.
And in such a case, the court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned.
If the grievance of the respondent is against the initiation of criminal proceedings, and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available.
It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant.
908 The jurisdiction is special and extra ordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly.
We, therefore, hold that the High Court was in error in issuing the impugned direction against the appellants by their judgement under appeal.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, the impugned judgement is set aside and the writ petition of the respondents filed in the High Court is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
During the pendency of a suit for eviction of the appellants from the property of Respondent No.1, the appellants were alleged to have trespassed beyond the area which was the subject matter of the suit and indulged in several illegal activities.
Thus according to Respondents, the appellants were guilty of mischievous conduct.
The Respondents instead of filing a suit in the Civil Court or making appropriate prayer for amendment of the plaint in the pending suit field a Writ Petition before the High Court for issuance of appropriate direction retraining the appellants from disturbing the lawful possession of the respondents.
The Administration and Commissioner of Police were also impleaded as parties and a direction sought against them not to register any further false and vexatious complaints against the Respondents since undue Police help to the appellants was apprehended.
The High Court gave certain directions to the appellants as regards Respondents ' access to the backyard.
The present appeal by special leave, is against the said orders of the High Court.
On the question whether the Writ jurisdiction of High Court would be available for enforcement of a private right to immovable property claimed by and against private individuals: Allowing the appeals, this Court HELD: 1.
A regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement 905 of disputes relating to property rights between private persons and that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged.
And in such a case, the Court will issue appropriate direction to the authority concerned.
[907 E, F] 2.
If the real grievance of Respondent No.1 is against the initiation of criminal proceeding and the orders passed and steps taken thereon, she must avail of the remedy under the general law including the Criminal Procedure Code.
The High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal, are available.
It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant.
The jurisdiction is special and extra ordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly, [907 F H]