judgement:
ition (Criminal) No. 529 of 1987.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
V.M. Tarkunde, G. Narsimahullu and Nalin Kumar for the Petitioner.
977 E. Manohar, Advocate General, B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, T.V.S.N. Chari, Ms. V. Grover, G. Ramesh and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA J.
K. Madhava Rao, husband of the petitioner, has been detained under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.
The petitioner filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Andhra Pradesh High Court for a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed on 18.7.1987.
The Special Leave Petition is directed against the said order.
The petitioner has also challenged the detention order by the application under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 529 of 1987.
The grounds served on the detenu for making the detention order dated 15.3.1987 allege that he (the detenu Madhava Rao) undertakes contract works of various types under South Central Railway (SCR) and indulged in clandestine business of diversion of levy cement meant for use in the Masonry Ballast Wall along with the railway track on the suburban section between Kachiguda and Falaknuma Railway Stations, and thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement, an essential commodity.
The facts mentioned are, that on receipt of an information on 18.12.1987 that levy cement was being transferred into non levy cement bags for its diversion to works not intended, the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell with his staff made a surprise visit in presence of witnesses at about 1 p.m. the same day, to the site of a private building under construction, and found the information passed on to him to be correct.
On inquiry it was discovered that a house belonging to one Smt.
Mahati Singh, daughter of Y. Krishna Murthy, Divisional Railway Manager, was under construction under the supervision of the detenu, and the levy cement transferred into non levy cement bags, was being stored in a nearby shed for use in the construction of the said house.
The watchman of Y. Krishna Murthy, named Varala Vollaiah, was kept there as guard.
The detenu was supervising the construction of the house through his employee James George.
The workmen engaged in the work were also examined by the police.
The facts which came to light indicated that two days earlier, that is, on 16.12.1986, 200 bags of levy cement reached the site and were unloaded in the shed.
James George instructed the labourers to transfer the cement into non levy cement bags, and his instruction was carried out on the following day, the 17th of December, 1986 and 978 non levy cement bags were restitched.
Yollaiah, the watchman, further stated that the cement was sent by the detenu through James George who had informed the witness that cement or two other lorries had also been unloaded in the nearby Kakatiyangar and stored in a room belonging to the Nageshwar Rao for similar misuse.
On receiving this information the Police Inspector raided the plot in Kakatiyanagar mentioned by the witness and recovered 400 bags of levy cement.
A criminal case under Clauses 12 and 13 of the A.P. Levy Cement Distribution (Licensing and Regulation) Order, 1982, read with Sections 7 and 8 of the was commenced and further investigation proceeded.
The investigation continued for three months till 18.3.1987.
Mahati Singh and her father Y. Krishna Murthy were also examined by the police and they confirmed that the detenu Madhava Rao was looking after the construction of Smt.
Mahati Singh 's house.
The evidence collected by the police indicated that 1000 bags of levy cement was handed over to the detenu through his employee Babu on 16.12.1986 and out of this stock 600 bags on three lorries were despatched to Habshiguda, which were discovered by the Inspector on the 18th of December 1986.
Both Madhava Rao and his servant James absconded and were ultimately arrested on 18.3.1987, when the detenu is alleged to have confessed before the Inspector of Police.
The detenu was released on bail the following day, that is, 19.3.1987.
All these facts were mentioned in the grounds and it was stated that on a consideration of the entire circumstances the District Magistrate was of the opinion that mere launching of the criminal case against the detenu would not effectively prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement.
The order was later confirmed by the Advisory Board.
The detenu filed his first representation on the 20th of May 1987 which was rejected by the State Government as also the Advisory Board later.
In the meantime a writ application being W.P. No. 6636 of 1987 was filed before the High Court on 1.6.1987 challenging the detention order.
The Writ Petition in this Court was filed on 13.7.1987.
A second representation on behalf of the detenu was filed by his cousin P. Lakshmana Rao on 5.6.1987, in which a prayer was made for revocation of the detention order.
It was been contended on behalf of the petitioner that it was the duty of the Central Government to consider and dispose of this representation promptly which was not 979 done.
It is said that the representation remained unattended, until the State Government reminded the Central Government in this regard after filing of the present writ petition and it was only then that the Central Government rejected the same on 2.9.1987.
The reply is that by this representation the detenu 's cousin merely reiterated the points already taken in the first representation of the detenu which had been after consideration dismissed, and it was, therefore, not necessary to deal with the same points over and over again.
Besides, this representation also was considered and rejected by the Central Government later.
Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the order of detention on the grounds of: (i) delay of about five months in passing the order, (ii) the allegation against the detenu of diverting levy cement for private use being incorrect, (iii) the second representation filed by the detenu 's cousin having remained undisposed of by the Central Government for about three months, (iv) the sponsoring officer 's default in not placing all the relevant facts before the detaining authority before the impugned order was passed, and (v) the order having been passed on the basis of a solitary incident.
During his argument the learned counsel did not press the last point and it is, therefore, not necessary to deal with it except pointing out that having regard to the statement made by the detaining authority, the District Magistrate, that in view of the circumstances of the case including the fact that the detenu was engaged in executing many contract works for the Railways, it was essential for preventing him from indulging in subversive acts similar to the one stated in the grounds, to detain him, there is no merit in the point which was rightly not pressed.
Mr. Tarkunde strenuously urged that in view of the long delay of about five months from the alleged incident on the 18th of December, 1986, in passing of the impugned order, the same is fit to be quashed.
Learned Advocate General, appearing for the State of Andhra Pradesh, pointed out that the detenu was absconding for three months until he was arrested on 18.3.1987.
In reply to the argument that the detenu could not have been absconding, as this fact does not appear to have been mentioned in the orders of the criminal court dealing with the bail applications, the learned Advocate General placed before us the case diary of the criminal case in which the accused Madhava Rao was stated to be absconding on several dates from December 1986 to March 1987.
By way of illustration, the letter of the Inspector of Police dated 26.12.1986 addressed to the Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad may be seen wherein it was stated 980 in paragraph 6 that Madhava Rao and James were absconding since the date of commission of the offence.
In the next letter dated 1.1.1987 they were again described as absconding.
The copy of the diary Part I dated 12.1.1987 states that nobody was supplying the whereabouts of Madhava Rao.
Similarly the diary dated 15.1.1987 mentions that Madhava Rao contractor was absconding and his employees were also not available.
The search for the absconding persons was being continued throughout February and March 1987 till the detenu was arrested as is fully supported by the case diary of later dates.
In the meantime two applications for anticipatory bail were filed one after the other on behalf of Madhava Rao before the the criminal Court and it is true that the orders passed thereon did not state that the accused was absconding, but for that reason the diary of various dates mentioning the fact cannot be ignored and it is not legitimate to claim that Madhava Rao was not absconding.
We repeatedly asked learned counsel for the petitioner to show any material indicating that the detenu was present on any date before the criminal Court or was available to the police but it was conceded that there was no such document.
In the second application for anticipatory bail reliance was placed on a medical certificate issued by a doctor.
The diary indicates that the police inquired from the doctor on the 3rd of March 1987 about the same pointing out that the accused was an absconder.
There was, therefore, no doubt at all that in the police records the detenu was considered to be an absconder throughout till his arrest on the 18th of March, 1987.
The affidavit of the District Magistrate filed before the High Court indicates that the further investigation in the case continued even after the arrest of Madhava Rao and the details of the ownership of the house in construction and the neighbouring shed and other similar relevant information could be collected only later and thus the investigation was complete on 13.5.1987.
The matter was placed before the District Magistrate on 14.5.1987 and he passed the impugned order on the following day, that is, 15.5.1987.
Having regard to the circumstances, there is no doubt that the respondents have satisfactorily explained the delay in passing the order.
The delay cannot by itself vitiate the decision to detain a person and this is fully demonstrated by the cases of Rajendra Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another, wherein the order was passed after seven months, Smt.
Hemlata Kantilal Shah vs State of Maharashtra, ; and Malwa Shaw vs The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 SC 957 wherein the orders of detention were passed five months later.
The first point urged on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, is rejected.
981 8.
In support of his second point Mr. Tarkunde contended that it is open to the petitioner to show that the levy cement which was being transferred into non levy cement bags did not belong to Madhava Rao, and the impugned order having been passed on that assumption is, therefore, fit to be quashed.
In other words, the learned counsel said, that the ground mentioned for the detention being non existent the application must succeed.
Reliance was placed on a certificate dated 23.6.1987 of the office of the Divisional Railway Manager (Works), Hyderabad in reply to a letter by one K. Eswara Rao that 1000 bags of cement issued to him on 16.12.1986 was Puzzolon Portland Cement, Pyramid Brand of Pariyan Company and it was urged that as the 5 empty bags having the marks of "Ajanta Brand Kesoram, Basant Nagar (A.P.) Portland Pozzolana Cement" as stated in the Panchnama (page 82 of the paperbook of the Writ Petition) was found by the police, it must be assumed that the levy cement which was being transferred to empty bags was not the same which was issued to the detenu.
Learned Advocate General, appearing for the respondent State, replied that there was sufficient material on the records of the case on the basis of which the detaining authority could have legitimately assumed that the cement in question was part of the cement issued to Madhava Rao.
Before examining the point urged on behalf of the petitioner on merits, it must be pointed out that this Court while considering petitioner 's writ application is not sitting in appeal over the detention order, and it is not for us to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority.
Of course, a detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be quashed, but that is not the position here.
There was clearly sufficient material before the District Magistrate to justify the forming of his opinion as stated earlier.
The question was not raised in the writ petition filed before the High Court, and the plea based upon the brand of cement was belatedly taken in the case and has been dealt with at same length in the judgment of the High Court which is under challenge in the Special Leave Petition.
We do not consider it necessary to repeat them but we would mention briefly the argument of the learned Advocate General which appears to be well founded.
Our attention was drawn to the Gatepass (page 154 of the paperbook of the writ petition) showing the issuance of the levy cement "to the contractor", that is, Madhava Rao, which was signed by Mohammad Chand on behalf of the Railways and Babu, Madhava Rao 's employees.
This does not mention the name of Eashwar Rao, the other employee of the contractor.
It is not denied on behalf of the detenu that he has been executing many contract works for the Railways, and therefore it cannot be presumed that the same consignment was the 982 subject matter of the Gate pass as well as the certificate relied upon on behalf of the petitioner.
The point now urged on the basis of the brand of cement was taken on behalf of the petitioner belatedly as mentioned earlier.
Besides, the detenu accepted the allegations against himself in his statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It is true that it may not be a legally recorded confession which can be used as substantive evidence against the accused in the criminal case, but it cannot be completely brushed aside on that ground for the purpose of his preventive detention.
The records further show that the oral evidence of the watchman and the labourer engaged in the house construction proved that it was the levy cement issued to the detenu which was being diverted at his instance.
Before closing this chapter it may be re stated that the sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority is not to be examined by the Court.
So far as the second representation filed by Madhava Rao 's cousin Lakshmana Rao is concerned, it has, in fact, been disposed of by the Central Government but about 3 months later after its filing.
It was argued that Section 14 of the Act clothes the authority with the power of revoking the detention order, and such a power carries with it the duty to exercise it whenever and as soon as changed or new factors call for the exercise of that power.
Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court at page 786 in Haradhan Saha and another vs The State of West Bangal and others; , and those in paragraph 9 of the Judgment in Sat Pal vs The State of Punjab, It is true that such a power coupled with the duty exists but the duty to exercise it arises only where new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light.
This was not so here, and as observed in para 13 of the Judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Zavad Zama Khan, [1984] 3 SCC 505, there is no right in favour of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be formally disposed of again.
In any event no period of limitation is fixed for disposal of an application under Section 14 and as we have seen earlier the second representation filed by Lakshamana Rao indeed, was considered and rejected.
On behalf of the petitioner it was next contended that the fact that both Krishna Murthy and Smt.
Mahati Singh had retracted their alleged statements before the police implicating Madhava Rao and the order in the criminal case granting bail to the detenu conditionally, were not placed before the detaining authority which has vitiated the detention order.
It is claimed that as a matter of fact the 983 aforesaid two persons never made any statement before the police or anybody else connecting Madhava Rao with the construction of Smt.
Mahati Singh 's house and it is incorrect to say that they were ever questioned by the police as alleged.
Reference was made to the order passed in the criminal case on the anticipatory bail application of the detenu in which there is no such statement.
The learned counsel argued that the absence of such a reference in the order leads to the conclusion that the police never examined them.
The High Court has rightly repelled a similar argument, pointing out that in the application for anticipatory bail of Smt.
Mahati Singh it was categorically stated that the vigilance police had gone to the residence of her father and thoroughly interrogated her and her father.
Krishna Murthy also made a similar statement in his application for anticipatory bail.
It will, therefore be idle to suggest otherwise merely for the reason that the criminal court did not choose in its order to mention these facts.
Besides, it has long been established that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the factual existence of the condition on which the order of detention can be made, namely, the grounds of detention constitute the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the Court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining authority is based.
Nor can the Court, on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority.
In the instant case the ground of detention is only one, viz. the detenu was acting prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity, that is, levy cement, essential to the community by diverting it to the open market.
The grounds of detention served along with the order are nothing but a narration of facts.
The question whether the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community is a matter of inference to be drawn from facts.
The learned Advocate General was fair enough to accept before us that the applications for grant of anticipatory bail moved before the criminal Court were not placed before the detaining authority.
Even so, it could not be said that there was no material upon which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could be based.
It appears from the grounds, i.e., the facts set out that the detenu had made a statement admitting that he had diverted 600 bags of levy cement issued to him for use in the masonry ballast wall along the railway track and therefore the District Magistrate was justified in coming to the conclusion that he (the detenu) was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of the commodity essential to the community.
The three decisions in Asha Devi vs K. 984 Shiveraj, Addl.
Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat and another; , ; Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmed vs State of Maharashtra and others; , and Kurjibhai Dhanjibhai Patel vs State of Gujarat, were cases where there was failure on the part of the sponsoring authority in not furnishing the relevant material to the detaining authority which was a vitiating factor.
This Court had occasion to deal with them in Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs M.L. Wadhawan, Additional Secretary, Government of India and others; , in para 12 of its judgment.
These decisions proceed on the well settled principle that if 'material and vital facts ' which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal.
That is not so in the present case.
There was ample material before the District Magistrate for him to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing impugned order as stated by him in his affidavit.
We do not find any merit in the case for quashing the impugned detention order and accordingly both the writ petition and the special leave application are dismissed.
N.V.K. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
% The husband of the petitioner had been detained by an order dated 15th May, 1987 under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.
The grounds served on the detenu for making the detention order alleged that the detenu had undertaken contract works of various types under the South Central Railway, and indulged in clandestine business of diversion of levy cement meant for use in the Masonary Ballast Wall alongwith the railway track, and had thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement, an essential commodity.
The facts mentioned, that on the receipt of information that levy cement was being transferred into non levy bags for its diversion to works not intended, the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell made a surprise visit, and found that the information passed on to him was correct.
He conducted a raid and recovered 400 bags of levy cement.
A criminal case under Clauses 12 and 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Levy Cement Distribution (Licensing and Regulation) Order, 1982 read with 974 Section 7 and 8 of the was commenced and further investigation proceeded.
Both the detenu and his servant absconded and were ultimately arrested on 18th March, 1987 when the detenu confessed before the Inspector of Police.
The detenu was released on bail the following day, i.e. 19th March, 1987.
On the consideration of the aforesaid circumstances, the District Magistrate was of the opinion that the mere launching of a criminal case against the detenu would not effectively prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cement, and therefore, ordered detention, which order was later confirmed by the Advisory Board The detenu filed his first representation on 20th May, 1987 which was rejected by the State Government as also the Advisory Board later.
writ petition was filed before the High Court on 18th June, 1987 challenging the detention order, while the writ petition in this Court was filed on 13th June, 1987.
second representation on behalf of the detenu was filed by his cousin on 5th June, 1987 for revocation of the detention order.
This representation remained unattended, until the State Government reminded the Central Government in this regard after filing of the writ petition in this Court, and it was only then that the Central Government rejected the same on 2nd September, 1987.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition on 18th July, 1987.
In the Special Leave Petition as also the writ petition under article 32 the order of detention was challenged on the grounds of (1) delay of about 5 months in passing the order, (2) the allegation against the detenu of diverting levy cement for private use was incorrect, (3) the second representation filed by the detenu 's cousin remained undisposed by the Central Government for about 3 months, (4) the sponsoring officer 's default in not placing relevant facts before the detaining authority before the impugned order was passed, and (5) the detention order was passed on the basis of a solitary incident.
Dismissing the Writ Petition and Special Leave Petition, ^ HELD: 1.
Delay cannot by itself vitiate the decision to detain a person.
[980G] 975 Rajendra Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh and another, ; Smt.
Hemlata Kantilal Shah vs State of Maharashtra, ; and Malwa Shaw vs The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 SC 957 referred to.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that in the police records the detenu was considered to be an absconder throughout till his arrest on 18th March, 1987.
The affidavit of the District Magistrate filed before the High Court indicates that further investigation in the case continued even after the arrest of the detenu and that other relevant information could be collected only after and thus the investigation was complete on 13th May, 1987.
The matter was placed before the District Magistrate on 14th May, 1987 who passed the impugned order in these circumstances, here is no doubt that the respondents have satisfactorily explained the delay in passing the detention order.
[980E F] 2.
The sufficiency of the materials available to the detaining authority is not to be examined by the Court.
This Court while considering the petitioner 's writ application is not sitting in appeal over the detention order, and it is not to go into and assess the probative value of the evidence available to the detaining authority.
A detention order not supported by any evidence may have to be quashed, but that is not so in the present case.
[982C, 981E] 3.
Section 14 of the Act clothes the authority with the power of revoking the detention order but the duty to exercise it arises only where new and relevant facts and circumstances come to light.
There is no right in favour of the detenu to get his successive representations based on the same grounds rejected earlier to be formally disposed of again.
No period of limitation is fixed for disposal of an application under Section 14.
[982D F] Haradhan Saha and another vs The State of West Bengal and others; , ; Sat Pal vs The State of Punjab, [1982] 1 SSC 12 and State of Uttar Pradesh vs Zavad Zama Khan, [1984] 3 SSC 505, referred to. 4.
It has long been established that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as regards the factual existence of the condition on which the order of the detention can be made, namely, the grounds of detention constitute the foundation for the exercise of the power of detention and the court cannot be invited to consider the propriety or sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction of the detaining 976 authority is based.
Nor can the court on a review of the grounds, substitute its own opinion for that of the authority.
[983D] In the instant case, the ground of detention is only one, namely, that the detenu was acting prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity, i.e., levy cement, essential to the community, by diverting it to the open market.
The grounds of detention served alongwith the order are nothing but a narration of facts.
The question wheher the detentu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community is a matter of inference to be drawn from facts.
It could not be said that there was no material upon which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could be based.
It appears from the grounds i.e. the facts set out that the detenu had made a statement admitting that he had diverted 600 bags of levy cement issued to him for use in the masonary ballast wall along the railway track, and therefore, the District Magistrate was justified in coming to the conclusion that he (the detenu) was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of the commodity essential to the community.
[983E H] 5.
If `materials and vital facts ' which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order, are not placed, it would vitiate the subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal.
That is not so, in the instant case.
There was ample material before the District Magistrate for him to base his subjective satisfaction as to the necessity for passing the detention order.
[984C] Asha Devi vs K. Shiveraj, Addl.
Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat and another; , ; Mohd. Shakeel Wahid Ahmed vs State of Maharashtra and others; , ; Kurjibhai Dhanjibhai Patel vs State of Gujarat, and Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs M.L. Wadhawan, Additional Secretary, Government of India and others; , , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2976 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.3.1987 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 4397 of 1986.
S.N. Singh and T.N. Singh for the Appellant.
L.N. Sinha and L.R. Singh for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: O R R Special leave granted.
Appellant passed Bachelor 's examination in law from the Banaras Hindu University securing 54.4% marks and was placed in the second division.
He applied for admission in the Master 's Course in Law in the academic session 1979/80.
The University had prescribed a minimum of 55% marks on the average of three years of the degree course as the qualifying requirement.
Appellant claimed weightage on the basis that members of his family had donated lands and houses to the University and cited the case of Shri Anant Narain Singh as a precedent.
As he failed to secure admission, he again applied for taking admission in the academic session 1983 84 but was not granted admission.
Ultimately he filed a writ petition before the Allahabad 943 High Court.
On 28.7.1986 the said writ petition was taken up for hearing by a Division Bench and when hearing was concluded, judgment was dictated in open Court allowing the writ petition and direction to the University to admit the petitioner was ordered.
The appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment but was told that the matter was again in the hearing list and would be heard afresh.
The matter continued to appear in the hearing list from September 1986 till 5.2.1987 when the particular Division Bench which had heard the matter released the case to be taken up by another Bench.
On 23rd of March, 1987, the writ petition was dismissed by the new Division Bench.
Two contentions have been raised before us.
It is maintained that once the judgment was delivered in open Court it became operative and could not be changed.
The dismissal of the writ petition after it had been once allowed was, therefore, without jurisdiction; it was also contended that on the facts of the case the appellant should have been given admission.
There is no dispute that on 28.7.1986, a Division Bench heard the writ petition and disposed it of.
The order sheet of that day reads thus: "Sri Aditya Narain for the petitioner Sri Siddheshwar Pd.
for the respondents Petition heard finally.
Writ Petition disposed of".
Subsequently there is an endorsement without anybody 's signature to the following effect: Under signature (illegible) Listed for further hearing".
On February 5, 1987, the same learned Judges who had allowed the writ petition gave the following directions: "We release this case but we direct that this case be placed before the Hon 'ble the Chief Justice for getting it listed before the appropriate bench as the matter was once heard by us and judgment dictated but later on was not signed and was ordered to be listed for further hearing." "As prayed by counsel for University the petition.
may be listed, if possible on 25th February, 1987".
944 There is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed by judgment pronounced in open Court on 28.7.1986 after hearing was concluded.
According to the appellant the judgment once pronounced in open Court became operative even without signature of the learned Judges and could not be altered.
Reliance is placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Surendra Singh & Ors.
vs The State of Uttar Pradesh, The facts of that case show that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court sitting at Lucknow consisting of Kidwai and Bhargava JJ.
heard a criminal appeal and on 11th of December, 1952, judgment was reserved.
Before it could be delivered Bhargava J. was shifted to Allahabad.
While there, he dictated a judgment treating it to be a judgment of both.
He signed every page of the judgment as well as at the end but did not put the date.
He sent it to Kidwai J. at Lucknow.
On the 24th of December, 1962, before the judgment was delivered Bhargava J. passed away.
On the 5th of January, 1953, Kidwai J. delivered the judgment of the Court.
He signed it had dated it.
The question as to whether the judgment was a valid one came up for consideration.
While dealing with such a question, Bose J. spoke for the Court thus: "In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in the open court.
It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way.
Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there: that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague.
All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainity about its content and matter can be cured; but not the hard core, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its content formely declared in a judicial way in open court.
The exact way in which this is done does not matter.
In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection." "An important point, therefore, arises.
It is evident that the decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a 945 declaration of the mind of the court as it is at the time of pronouncement.
We lay no stress on the mode or manner of delivery, as that is not of the essence, except to say that it must be done in a judicial way in open court.
But, however, it is done, it must be an expression of the mind of the court at the time of delivery.
We say this because that is the first judicial act touching the judgment which the court performs after the hearing.
Everything else uptil then is done out of court and is not intended to be the operative act which sets all the consequences which follow on the judgment in motion.
Judges may, not often do, discuss the matter among themselves and reach a tentative conclusion.
That is not their judgment.
They may write and exchange drafts.
Those are not the judgment either, however, heavily and often they may have been signed.
The final operative act is that which is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision of the court.
That is what constitutes the judgment. . " Bose J. continued to say: "As soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court.
The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authtenticated and made certain.
The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable.
Thus if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication". "After the judgment has been delivered provision is made for review.
One provision is that it can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality, except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed.
Another is that after signature a review properly so called would lie in civil cases but none in criminal; but the review, when it lies, is only permitted on very narrow grounds. . " 946 The above observations were made, as already mentioned, in a case where the judgment had been signed but not pronounced in the open court.
In the present case, we are concerned with a judgment that had been pronounced but not signed.
The provision in order 20, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates the position in such cases.
It permits alterations or additions to a judgment so long as it is not signed.
This is also apparently what has been referred to in the last paragraph of the extract from the judgment of Bose, J. quoted above, where it has been pointed out that a judgment which has been delivered "can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality, except notice to the parties and re hearing on the point of change, should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed.
" It is only after the judgment is both pronounced and signed that alterations or additions are not permissible, except under the provisions of section 152 or section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure or, in very exceptional, cases, under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But, while the Court has undoubted power to alter or modify a judgment, delivered but not signed, such power should be exercised judicially, sparingly and for adequate reasons.
When a judgment is pronounced in open court, parties act on the basis that it is the judgment of the Court and that the signing is a formality to follow.
We have extensively extracted from what Bose J. spoke in this judgment to impresss upon everyone that pronouncement of a judgment in court whether immediately after the hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of the court with reference to the case.
Bose J. emphasised the feature that as soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court.
That would mean that the judgment to be operative does not await signing thereof by the court.
There may be exceptions to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgment is dictated in open court, a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts from the record.
In such a case the court may give direction that the judgment which has just been delivered would not be effective and the case shall be further heard.
There may also be cases though their number would be few and far between where when the judgment is placed for signature the court notices a feature which should have been taken into account.
In such a situation the matter may be placed for further consideration upon notice to the parties.
If the judgment delivered is intended not to 947 be operative, good reasons should be given.
Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is complete by listening to submissions of counsel and perusal of records and a definite view is reached by the court in regard to the conclusion.
Once that stage is reached and the court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or a review is asked for and is granted.
When the judgment is pronounced, parties present in the court know the conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement, they proceed to conduct their affairs.
If what is pronounced in court is not acted upon, certainly litigants would be prejudiced.
Confidence of the litigants in the judicial process would be shaken.
A judgment pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if there be any such, the same should apear from the record of the case.
in the instant matter, we find that there is no material at all to show as to what let the Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment in open court not to authenticate the same by signing it.
In such a situation the judgment delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition should not have been placed for fresh hearing.
The subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not available to be made once it is held that the writ petition stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on 28.7.1986.
The record of the proceedings of the High Court which is before us does not contain the judgment delivered in court on 28.7.1986 but there is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed.
On the conceded position that the appellant 's writ petition was allowed by the High Court, the University is directed to admit the appellant to the Master 's Course in Law in the current session.
We understand that the University 's courses of study have now been changed.
The University shall take such steps as are practicable to give effect to this decision.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
There will be no order for costs.
S.L Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
% The appellant passed the Bachelor 's examination in law with 54.5 per cent marks.
He applied for admission to the Master 's Course in law.
The university had prescribed a minimum of 55 per cent marks for admission to the course.
The appellant claimed weightage on certain grounds on the strength of a precedent.
The admission was, however, refused.
The appellant filed a writ petition.
A Division Bench of the High Court heard the writ petition and dictated the judgment in the open court, allowing the petition and directing the university to admit the appellant, but soon thereafter, before the judgment was signed, the appellant 's matter was again put in the hearing list to be heard afresh.
The Division Bench, which had allowed the writ petition, released the case from its list and directed the same to be listed before another Division Bench.
On the matter being so listed, the Second Division Bench dismissed the petition.
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave against the order of dismissal passed by the High Court.
Allowing the appeal and directing the university to admit the appellant, the Court, ^ HELD: The provisions of Order 20, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure give power to the Court to make alterations/additions in a judgment so long as the judgment has not been signed, but that power should be exercised judicially, sparingly and for adequate reasons.
When a judgment is pronounced in the open court, the parties act upon it and conduct their affairs on the basis that it is in judgment of the court and that the signing of the judgment is a formality to follow.
A judgment to be operative does not await the signing thereof by the court.
If what is pronounced in the court is not acted upon, the litigants would be prejudiced; their confidence in the judicial process would be shaken.
A judgment pronounced in the open court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature, like, soon after the judgment 942 is declared in the open court, a feature, not placed for consideration before the court earlier, is brought to its notice by either party to the cause, or the court discovers some new facts from the record or the court notices a feature, which should be taken into account, or a review is asked for, which is granted.
In such a situation the court may take up the matter again for further consideration, and it has to give good reasons if the judgment delivered by it is not to be operative.
[946B, D H; 947A] Since the writ petition of the appellant had first been allowed by pronouncement of the judgment in the open court, and there is nothing on record to justify why it was not acted upon, the appeal succeeds.
[947E F] Surender Singh and others vs The State of Uttar Pradesh, , relied upon.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2981 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.1.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 155 of 1984.
Anil Dev Singh and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants.
Anil Kumar Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN,J.
Special leave granted.
This is an appeal to this Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in a civil revision petition filed by 952 the appellant (C.R.P. 155 of 1984).
The result of the judgment was to restore a decree passed against the appellant by the trial court in a suit for eviction instituted by the respondent in 1980.
The main ground on which the appellant had resisted the suit was that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Public Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (which we shall hereinafter briefly refer to as 'the Rent Act ').
It is the correctness of this ground of defence that it in issue in this appeal.
The appellant, the State of Uttar Pradesh, took on lease a premises at Barabanki belonging to the respondent for the purpose of running a Laprosy Training Centre.
The respondent was thus the landlord, and the appellant the tenant, in respect of the premises within the meaning of section 3(a) of the Rent Act.
This Act has been enacted "to provide, in the interests of the general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith.
" Section 20 of the Act bars the institution of a suit for the eviction of a tenant, notwithstanding the termination of his tenancy, except on the grounds specified in sub section (2) of that section but none of these grounds were pleaded by the respondent.
section 21 of the Act enables a prescribed authority to order the eviction of a tenant in two situations, subject to certain conditions and limitations.
These situations are: (a) where the landlord requires the premises for his own use and (b) where, the building being in a dilapidated condition, he desires to demolish the same and put up a new construction.
These situations also do not prevail here.
The Landlord, however, gave a notice of termination of tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and filed a suit for recovery of possession.
The appellant claimed that the suit was not maintainable and that the respondent 's remedy, if any, was only to seek eviction in the circumstances and in the manner outlined in the Act.
The respondent sought to overcome this hurdle by contending that the premises in question are not one of the classes of buildings covered by the Rent Act.
In support of this contention, he relied upon an exclustion clause incorporated in section 2(1)(a) of the Act.
Since the whole case turns on a proper interpretation of this clause and since the clause has undergone changes from time to time, it is necessary to refer to these in some detail to facilitate a proper appreciation of the stands of the parties.
(a) In the Rent Act, as originally enacted and brought into force 953 on 15.7.1972, this sub section ran thus: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to (a) any building belonging to, or vested in, the Government of any State or any local authority; or (b) any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government." (b) U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 amended section 2(1) to substitute new clauses in place of the above clauses.
The amended sub section, insofar as is relevant for our present purposes, reads thus: "Nothing in this Act shall apply to (a) any public building; or (b) any building belonging to or vested in a recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution; (c)x x x x (d)x x x x (e)x x x x (f)x x x x A definition of 'public building ' was inserted in section 3 which reads: "(o) 'public building ' means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State) and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation".
These amendments were made effective from 5.7.1976.
954 (c) It appears that the above provisions were sought to be amended by U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 (promulgated on 27.4.1977) with retrospective effect from 5.7.1976 by substituting the following as clause (a) of section 2(1) of the Rent Act: "2(1)(a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector Corporation is the landlord." section 3(0) was left unamended.
However, the above Ordinance was allowed to lapse.
Thus the amendment had become inoperative by the time the suit in the present case was instituted.
(d) The next amendment of the Rent Act was by U.P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 promulgated on 18.5.1983.
This revived the amendment made by the 1977 Ordinance which had been allowed to lapse.
This time this amendment was not allowed to lapse on the expiry of the ordinance but was kept alive by five successive Ordinances: No. 43 of 1983 dated 12.10.83, No. 6 of 1984 dated 24.3.84, No. 8 of 1984 dated 7.5.84, No. 20 of 1984 dated 22.10.84, and finally No. 9 of 1985 dated 26.4.85.
All these amendments were made effective from 18.5.1983 in so far as the provision presently under consideration is concerned.
The last of these, it may be noted, was promulgated subsequent to the judgment of the High Court presently under appeal.
(e) Finally, the U.P. Legislature enacted Act No. 17 of 1985 on 20.8.85 "regularising" the spate of legislation by ordinances.
By sections 1 and 2 of this Act, the amendment made to section 2(1)(a) by the 1977 Ordinance and kept alive by the Ordinance of 1983 and 1984 was made effective from 18.5.1983.
In this legislative background, the appellant contended, successfully before the Additional District Judge but unsuccessfully before the trial court and High Court, that the premises in question was not a 'public building ' within the meaning of section 3(o) read with section 2(1)(a) of the Rent Act, as amended from 5.7.76 and, hence, the respondent 's remedy for eviction of the appellant was not by way of suit in a civil court.
What is the correct interpretation of this clause? This is the question before us.
We have set out above the definition of 'public building ' in section 3(o) after the 1976 amendment.
The language of this definition is very wide.
It takes in three categories of buildings: (i) buildings belonging to (that is, owned by) the Central or State Government; (ii) 955 buildings (not belonging to the Government) but taken on lease or requisitioned by it or on its behalf and (iii) buildings belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation.
In the present case, the building in question is one taken on lease by the State Government and so it falls squarely within the definition of 'public building '.
It is, therefore, exempt from the application of the Act by reason of section 2(1) as it stood at the relevant time.
It would follow, therefore, that the respondent 's remedy to recover possession lay under the general law and had to be enforced by a suit for recovery of possession which is exactly what he has done.
Prima facie, therefore, the trial Judge and the High Court were right in decreeing his suit.
It is, however, contended on behalf of the appellant that section 3(o) should not be given such a wide meaning.
The argument runs thus: The intention of the Legislature was to exclude from the purview of the Rent Act only buildings in respect of which the Government was either the owner or the landlord.
This is clear from the previous history as well as the subsequent legislations.
U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (which preceded the 1972 Act) was amended by Ordinance No. 5 of 1949 with effect from 26.9.49 to exclude from its purview "any premises belonging to the Central or State Government and any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the Government in respect of premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the Government".
The language section 2(1)(a) of the Rent Act, as it stood before its amendment in 1976, left no doubt in any one 's mind that the legislature intended only to exclude buildings belonging to the Government or any local authority and those taken on lease or requisitioned by Government and rented out by it to others.
The only object of the 1976 amendment was to extend the above exclusion also in buildings owned or let out by local authorities and public sector corporations.
This was sought to be done by providing that the Act would not apply to 'public buildings ' and inserting a definition of that expression in section 3(o).
That definition was, no doubt, phrased somewhat broadly.
But, having regard to the previous history as well as the language of the subsequent legislation already referred to above, there can be no doubt that the legislature never intended to exclude the operation of the Rent Act vis a vis premises of which the Government (and, hereinafter, this expression will take in also a reference to local authorities and public corporations) was neither the owner nor the landlord but merely a tenant.
Support of the above restricted construction is also sought from 956 the phraseology of section 21(8) of the Rent Act.
As has been mentioned earlier.
section 21 empowers the prescribed authority, on an application from a landlord, to evict a tenant on two grounds: (a) need of the premises by him for his self occupation; and (b) need to demolish the building and reconstruct it.
Sub section (8) enacts a restriction in respect of the first of these grounds.
It reads: "(8) Nothing in clause (a) of sub section (a) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub section (1) is applicable.
" It is submitted that this sub section places it beyond doubt that the Act does apply also to buildings in which a State Government, local authority, public sector Corporation or recognised educational institution is a tenant and proceeds to restrict the scope of an application under section 21 of the Act in such cases.
It is pointed out that, if the definition in section 3(o) is given a wide meaning so as to exclude from the application of the Act even buildings in which these bodies are mere tenants, the result would be to render section 21(8) redundant and otiose.
Such a construction of the statute, it is submitted, should not be favoured.
The above line of argument found favour with a Full Bench of the Allabahad High Court dealing with a batch of petitions filed by a number of public sector corporations resisting suits for eviction instituted against them: Punjab National Bank vs Suganchand, This Full Bench decision was rendered on 29.11.84 but was apparently not available to the learned Judge who decided the present case on 23.1.85.
Learned counsel for the appellant urges that we should approve of the Full Bench decision and reverse the judgment under appeal.
We are unable to accept the appellant 's contention.
The interpretation placed by the Full Bench of the High Court on section 3(o) equates the position under the statute after the amendment of 1976 to the position both as it stood prior to the 1976 amendment and also as it 957 stood after the 1983 Ordinance.
Such an approach fails to give any effect at all to the change in language deliberately introduced by the 1976 amendment.
No doubt, prior to the amendment, only buildings of which the Government was owner or landlord were excluded from the Act.
But the Legislature clearly intended a departure from the earlier position.
If the intention was merely to extend the benefit to premises owned or let out by public corporations, it could have been achieved by simply adding a reference to such corporations in section 2(1)(a) and (b) as they stood earlier.
Reading section 2(1)(a) & (b) as they stood before amendment and the definition in section 3(o) side by side, the departure in language is so wide and clear that it is impossible to ignore the same and hold that the new definition was just a reenactment of the old exemption.
The exclusion was earlier restricted to buildings owned by the Government and buildings taken on lease or requisitioned by Government and granted by it by creating a tenancy in favour of some one.
The amendment significantly omitted the crucial words present in the earlier legislation which had the effect of restricting the exclusion to tenancies created by the Government, either as owner or as landlord.
Full effect must be given to the new definition in section 3(o) and to the conscious departure in language in reframing the exclusion.
The subsequent legislation also reinforces the same conclusion.
The 1976 amendment had come up for judicial interpretation and certain decisions referred to in the Full Bench decision as well as the judgment presently under appeal had given the above literal interpretation to section 3(o).
If they had run counter to the rule legislative intent, one would have expected the repeated Ordinances since 1983 and the ultimate Amendment Act of 1985 to have placed the position beyond doubt by a retrospective amendment.
Though the Ordinance of 1977 made its amendment retrospective from 5.7.76, these later amendments are all specifically given effect to from 18.5.1983.
The effect of the decisions rendered remained untouched till then.
The fact that the the 1976 amendment marked a departure from the more restricted exclusion available earlier and the fact that the said restriction exclusion was again restored with effect only from 18.5.1983 militate against the correctness of adhering to this narrow interpretation even during the interregnum from 5.5.1976 to 18.5.1983.
It may now be considered whether the above interpretation renders section 21(8) redundant.
As pointed out by the Full Bench of the High Court, not much thought has gone into the framing of this subsection which has failed to notice that clauses (ii) and (iv) of the 958 Explanation to sub section (1) which are referred to in it, had been omitted by an earlier clause of the same section of the same Act.
The Ordinance of 1977 sought to remedy this position by deleting the words "unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied . is applicable" used in the sub section but this Ordinance was allowed to lapse and the subsequent Ordinances and Amendment Act paid no heed to section 21(8).
Nevertheless, despite this clumsy drafting, one would certainly hesitate to give an interpretation to the definition clause in section 3(0) which may have the effect of rendering this sub section otiose.
But luckily that is not the position.
As pointed out by counsel for the respondent, sub sections (1), (1A) and (8) of section 21 have to be read together.
Though section 2(1)(a) excludes public buildings which we have interpreted to include buildings in which the Government is only a tenant section
21(1A) incorporates an exception to this exclusion.
"Nothwithstanding anything contained in section 2", it permits an application for eviction being moved under section 21(1)(a) of the Act by a landlord against any tenant but in the limited circumstance set out in that sub section viz. that the landlord has been in occupation of a public building but had to vacate it as he had ceased to be in the employment of the Government, local authority or Corporation.
In other words, the landlord of a building in which the Government is a tenant could have moved an application under section 21(1)(a) read with section 21(1A).
This is what is prohibited by section 21(8) absolutely in view of clauses (ii) and (iv) of Explanation 1 to sub section (1) being non existent.
section 21(8) makes it clear that while a landlord who is compelled to vacate a public building occupied by him due to cessation of his employment can proceed under the Act to evict any tenant occupying his property so that he may use his own property for his residential purposes, he will not be able to do so where his tenant is the Government, a local authority or a public Corporation.
Thus read,s.
21(8) does not become otiose or redundant by accepting the wider interpretation of section 3(o).
This objection of the appellant is not, therefore, tenable.
The Full Bench of the High Court has referred to one general aspect which appears to have considerably influence it in preferring a narrower interpretation of section 3(o).
It referred to the increasing difficulties faced even by Government and other public bodies in securing proper accommodation for their functioning and the nearimpossibility, even for them, of securing alternative accommodation at comparative and non exorbitant rates once they are compelled to vacate their existing tenancies.
The Court posed to itself the question whether the Legislature can be said to have intended to exclude them from the benefits of the Act and throw them open to eviction by suits 959 following a mere termination of tenancy by notice section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, at the mere whim and caprice of their landlords.
This, the Court thought, was unlikely particularly when, prior to the Amendment Act of 1976, as well as subsequent to 1983, they could have been evicted only on one or other of the grounds available under section 20 or section 21 of the Act and more so because the Amendment manifests an intention to extend to public corporations benefits previously available only to a Government and to a local authority.
The object of the exclusion in section 2(1)(a), it is said, was to remove, in respect of buildings where the government or local authority was the landlord either as a owner or principal lessee or requisitioning authority the shackles imposed on other landlords but not to deprive these bodies, when they are mere tenants, of the protection available to other tenants under Act.
Having regard to these considerations, the Full Bench of the High Court has invoked a line of decisions of this Court and others which advocate that, in certain situations, importance should be attached to the "thrust of the statute" rather than to the literal meaning of the words used to justify their refusal to give the words of section 3(o) full effect.
It is true that there are situations in which Courts are compelled to subordinate the plain meaning of statutory language.
Not unoften, Courts do read down the plain language of a provision or give it a restricted meaning, where, to do otherwise may be clearly opposed the object and scheme of the Act or may lead to an absurd, illogical or unconstitutional result.
But we think that this mode of construction is not appropriate in the context of the present legislation for a number of reasons.
In the first place, such an interpretation does not fit into the legislative history we have traced earlier.
It does not explain why the legislature should have, while enacting the 1976 amendment, omitted certain operative words and used certain wider words instead.
As we have pointed out earlier, if the idea had only been to add to the exclusion buildings owned or let out by public sector corporations, that result could have been achieved by a minor amendment to section 2(1)(a) as it stood earlier.
A conscious and glaring departure from the previous language must be given its due significance.
Secondly, the Rent Act is a piece of legislation which imposes certain restrictions on a landlord and confers certain protections on a tenant.
It could well have been intention of the legislature that the Government, local bodies and public sector corporations should be free not only from the restrictions they may incur as landlords but also that they need not have the protection given to other ordinary tenants.
To say that the legislature considered the Government qua landlord to be in a class of its own and 960 hence entitled to immunity from the restrictions of the Act but that, qua tenant, it should be on the same footing as other tenants will be an interpretation which smacks of discrimination.
The legislature could have certainly intended to say that the Government, whether landlord or tenant, should be outside the Act.
Thirdly, while it is true that the result of the interpretation we favour would be to facilitate easy eviction of Government, local authorities and public corporations, there is nothing per se wrong about it because, with their vast resources or capacity augment their resources, these bodies would not be in as helpless a position as ordinary tenants for whose benefit the legislation is primarily intended.
On the other hand, the ultimate result of the interpretation accepted by the Full Bench will be to practically deny a landlord, who has given his premises on rent to these bodies, any remedy to get back possession of his premises.
The contingencies for which eviction is provided for in section 20 are hardly likely to arise in the case of such tenants; section 21(1)(a) is taken out by s.21(8); and, virtually, the only ground on which eviction can be sought by a landlord of such a building against such a tenant, on the interpretation urged by the petitioner, would be the one contained in section 21(1)(b).
It is debatable whether the legislature could have contemplated such a situation either.
Fourthly, in this case, the legislature has applied its mind to the situation more than once subsequently.
If its intention in carrying out the amendment had been misunderstood by the High Court or found ambiguous, the legislature was expected to rectify the situation by a piece of retrospective or declaratory legislation.
The 1977 Ordinance was, but the later Ordinances and the 1985 Act, are not, of this nature.
They neither are, nor purport to be, declaratory or retrospective from 5.7.76.
At least, if the 1985 Act had been made retrospective from 5.7.76, one could have thought it was a clarificatory piece of legislation.
But the Legislature has advisedly given these enactments effect only from 18.5.1983.
This means that the amendment of 1976 was intended to be effective between 5.7.75 and 18.5.83 and it also means that the amendment of 1983 onwards is not intended to be read back for that period.
Lastly, in any event, the interpretation given by us will create no lasting difficulties for the Government and other organisations which are tenants only, since after 18.5.1983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities available to other tenants under the Act.
For the reasons discussed above, we overrule the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Punjab National Bank vs Sugan Chand, on this point.
In the result, this appeal is dismissed.
We, however, make no order regarding costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
% The appellant State of Uttar Pradesh, took on lease the premises belonging to the respondent for the purpose of running a Training Centre.
The respondent landlord gave a notice of termination of the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and filed a suit for recovery of possession.
The appellant claimed that the suit was not maintainable and that the respondent 's remedy, if any, was only to seek eviction in the circumstances and in the manner outlined in the Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
The respondent sought to overcome this hurdle by contending that the premises in question was not one of the classes of 'building ' covered by the aforesaid Rent Act, and in support thereof relied on the exclusion clause incorporated in Section 2(1)(a) of the Rent Act.
The appellant contended, successfully before the Additional District Judge, but unsuccessfully before the trial court and the High Court, that the premises in question was not a `public building ' with the meaning of section 3(0) read with section 2(1)(a) of the Rent Act, as amended from July 5, 1976 and hence, the respondent 's remedy for eviction of the appellant was not by way of suit in a Civil Court.
Dismissing the Appeal to this Court, 949 ^ HELD: 1.
The building in question is one taken on lease by the State Government and so it falls squarely within the definition of `public building ' in Section 3(0) of the Act.
It is, therefore, exempt from the application of the Act by reasons of section 2(1) as it stood at the relevant time.
It would follow, therefore, that the respondent 's remedy to recover possession lay under the general law and had to be enforced by a suit for recovery of possession which is exactly what he has done.[955B] 2.
Sub sections (1), (1A) and (8) of section 21 have to be read together.
Though section 2(1)(a) excluded `public buildings ' which has to interpreted to include buildings in which the Government is only a tenant s.21(A) incorporates an exception to this exclusion.
"Notwithstanding anything contained in section 2", it permits an application for eviction being moved under section 21(1)(a) of the Act by a landlord against any tenant but in the limited circumstances set out in that sub section viz. that the landlord has been in occupation of a public building but had to vacate it as he had ceased to be in the employment of the Government, Local Authority or Corporation.[958C D] 3.
The landlord of a building in which the Government is a tenant could have moved an application under section 21(1) read with section 21(1A).
This is what is prohibited by section 21(8) absolutely in view of clauses (ii) and (iv) of Explanation 1 to sub section (1) being non existent.
section 21(8) makes it clear that while a landlord who is compelled to vacate a public building occupied by him due to cessation of his employment can proceed under the Act to evict any tenant occupying his property so that he may use his own property for his residential purposes, he will not be able to do so where his tenant is the Government, a local authority or a public Corporation.
Thus read, section 21(8) does not become otiose or redundant by accepting the wider interpretation of section 3(0).[958D F] 4(i) The interpretation placed by the Full Bench of the High Court on section 3(0) in Punjab National Bank vs Suganchand, [1985]1 ARC 214 equates the position under the statute after the amendment of 1976 to the position both as it stood prior to the 1976 amendment and also as it stood after the 1983 Ordinance.
Such an approach fails to give any effect at all to the change in language deliberately introduced by the 1976 amendment.[956H; 957A] (ii) Prior to the amendment, only buildings of which the Government was owner or landlord were excluded from the Act.
But the Legislature clearly intended a departure from the earlier position.
If the 950 intention was merely to extend the benefit to premises owned or let out by public corporation, it could have been achieved by simply adding a reference to such corporations in section 2(1)(a) and (b) as they stood earlier.
[957A B] (iii) Reading section 2(1)(a) & (b) as they stood before amendment and the definition in section 3(0) side by side, the departure in language is so wide and clear that it is impossible to ignore the same and hold that the new definition was just a re enactment of the old exemption.[957B C] (iv) The amendment significantly omitted the crucial words present in the earlier legislation which had the effect of restricting the exclusion to tenancies created by the Government, either as owner or as landlord.
[957D] (v) Though the Ordinance of 1977 made its amendment retrospective from 5.7.76, these later amendments are all specifically given effect to from 18.5.1983.
The effect of the decisions rendered remained untouched till then.
The fact that the 1976 amendment marked a departure from the more restricted exclusion available earlier and the fact that the said restricted exclusion was again restored with effect only from 18.5.1983 militate against the correctness of adhering to a narrow interpretation even during the interregnum from 5.5.1976 to 18.5.1983.
[957F G] (vi) Full effect must therefore be given to the new definition in section 3(0) and to the conscious departure in language in reframing the exclusion.
[959D] 5.
There are situations in which Courts are compelled to subordinate the plain meaning of statutory language.
Not unoften, Courts do read down the plain language of a provision or give it a restricted meaning, where, to do otherwise may be clearly opposed to the object and scheme of the Act or may lead to an absurd, illogical or unconstitutional result.
[959D E] 6.
This mode of construction is not appropriate in the context of the present legislation for a number of reasons.
In the first place, such an interpretation does not fit into the legislative history.
It does not explain why the legislature should have, while enacting the 1976 amendment, omitted certain operative words and used certain wider words instead.
Secondly, the Rent Act is a piece of legislation which imposes certain restrictions on a landlord and confers certain protections on a 951 tenant.
Thirdly, while it is true that the result of the interpretation this Court favours would be to facilitate easy eviction of Government, local authorities and public corporations, there is nothing per se wrong about it because, with their vast resources or capacity to augment their resources, these bodies would not be in as helpless a position as ordinary tenants for whose benefit the legislation is primarily intended.
Fourthly, the legislature has applied its mind to the situation more than once.
If its intention in carrying out the amendment had been misunderstood by the High Court or found ambiguous, the legislature was expected to rectify the situation by a piece of retrospective or declaratory legislation.
The 1977 Ordinances was, but the later Ordinances and the 1985 Act, are not, of this nature.
They neither are, nor purport to be, declaratory or retrospective from 5.7.76.
At least, if the 1985 Act had been made retrospective from 5.7.76, one could have thought it was a clarificatory piece of legislation.
But the Legislature has advisedly given these enactments effect only from 18.5.1983.
This means that the amendment of 1976 was intended to be effective between 5.7.76 and 18.5.83 and it also means that the amendment of 1983 onwards is not intended to be read back for that period.
Lastly, the interpretation this Court favours will create no lasting difficulties for the Government and other organisations which are tenants only, since after 18.5.1983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities available to other tenants under the Act.
[959E G; 960B G] Punjab National Bank vs Sugan Chand, [1985]1 ARC 214 overruled.