judgement:
Appeals Nos. 2116, 2217, 2218, 2126 to 2128 of 1970 , 33, 144 ,157, 159 to 163 and 164 to 166 of 1971.
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated the September 5, 1970 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.
2720 of 1970 etc.
section V. Gupte and G. Narayana Rao for the appellants (in 2116 of 1970).
C.A. No. M. Natesan and G. Narayana Rao for the appellants (in C.A. No. 2217 of 1970).
G. Narayana Rao for the appellants (in C. As.
2218 of 1970, 144, 157, 159 to 163 and 164 to 166 of 1971).
M. C. Setalvad and W. C. Chopra, for the appellants (in C.As.
No. 2126, of 1970).
Polesseti Ramachandra Rao and W. C. Chopra for the appel lants (in C.As.
2127 and 2128 of 1970).
section T. Desai and K. Rajendra Chowdhary, for the appellants, (in C.A. No. 33 of 1971).
P. Ram Reddy and P. Parameshwara Rao, for the respon dents (in all the appeals).
369 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by p. Jaganmohan Reddy, J.
This batch of Appeals is by Cer tificate against a common Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the Writ Petitions filed by several dealers in jaggery who challenged the vires and constitutionality of Sections 2, 5, 8 and 9 of the Andhra Pradesh, General Sales Tax Amendment Act 9 of 1970 (hereinafter called the "Amendment Act").
The Appellants are Commission Agents carrying on trade in jaggery.
Agriculturists who prepare jaggery out of surplus sugarcane which they are unable to sell to the Sugar factories employ the Appellants as their Commission Agents to sell that jaggery.
We will take the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2116 of 1970 as typical of the common question arising in all these Appeals.
The Appellants carry on business of Commission Agent in jaggery in Anakapalli, Visakhapatnam and at varies places in West Godavari.
In the course of their business the Appellants arrange, for the sale of jaggery charging a small commission for their services and renders an account to the respective principals in respect of these sales.
In the pattis issued to the Agriculture the name of the persons to whom jaggery is sold is specifically mentioned.
The baskets of each principal are separately marked.
The stock register also indicates the number of baskets of jaggery held in the name of the Commission Agents.
Every buyer is fully ap prised of the fact that he is purchasing the jaggery of specified agriculturist principals and not that of the Appellants.
This procedure it is said has been in vogue for a long time.
Till about 1963 under Section 11 of Madras General Sales Tax Act as well as under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 1957 (hereinafter called the "Principal Act") Commission Agents were required to obtain and were being issued licences and if they conformed to the conditions of those licences they were not subjected to tax.
In 1963 the Principal Act was amended by Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Amendment Act 16 of 1963 which substituted a new Section II for that which was in force fill then.
The new Section II changed the preexisting structure of assessment in that, the Agents of Resident Principals were made liable for assessment and collection of Tax through the liability of the Agent was made co extensive with that of the Principal.
The Sales Tax authorities however were making assessments of the turn over of the Agents in respect of the purchase and sales of jaggery of several principals notwithstanding the fact that the turnover upto Rs. 10000/ of each was not exigible to tax.
These assessments were challenged in a batch of writ petitions in Irri Raju & Ors.
vs The Commercial Tax Officer, Tedeplalligudem & Anr.(1) in which the, High Court of Andhra Pradesh hold that the (1) Sales Tax Cases Vol.
XX (1967) p. 501.
24 1 SC India/71 370 provisions of the principal Act indicated that the Agent is a dealer in respect of each of the principals, that he is deemed to be as many dealers as there are principals and therefore the total turn over of the Agent in respect of the several principals could not be computed for assessing him when in fact the turnover of each of the principals was below the limit i.e. Rs. 10.000/ .
As a consequence of this.
decision, the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Amendment Act 5 of 1968 was enacted and a new Section 1 1 was substituted for the then existing Section.
This Section II was given retrospective effect from the 1st August 1963.
The object of this Amendment was to enable the 'Taxing authorities to assess, levy and collect tax or penalty under the Sales Tax Act from the Agent irrespective of the fact that such principal is not liable to pay the tax or penalty in respect of that transaction on account of the turn over of the principal being less than the minimum turnover specified in sub section of section 5.
The proviso to the new Section II however authorised the Tax or penalty assessed or levied on or due from the Agent to, be, recovered by the Assessing authorities from the Principals instead of from the Agents, only if the principal is liable to pay tax or penalty.
This new Section was also challenged on various grounds in a batch of writ petitions in Sri Konathala Venkata Ramana & Budha Apparao vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.(1).
The High Court held that even after the amendment the liability of the Agent continues to be based on the principal of representation and whether he is a dealer in respect of an the principals or only one principal, his liability is co extensive with that of the principal.
It also held that while there is no conflict between Section 5 and Section II of the Act, Section II which authorises the imposition of a tax independently of the liability of the principal or which takes away or limits the rights of the Agent to reimburse himself or withhold moneys due to the principal only where the principal is liable is discriminatory and is hit by Article 14.
In view of this Judgment, which in fact restored the legal position to that prevailing prior to the Amendment, large sums of money in which assessments had been made and tax collected became refundable To meet this situation the Legislature enacted the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Amendment Act 9 of 1970.
The effect of the.
Amendments made by Sec.
2. 5, 8 and 9 of the Amendment Act is that a proviso was added to Section 5(1), a new Section II was substituted for the old Section II with retrospective effect from 1 8 63.
The, amended Section 11 it may be noticed (1) Sales Tax Cases Vol.
371 was identical with Section 1 1 as it stood on 1 8 1963.
The first schedule to the principal Act was also amended by adding jaggery as item 77 which was made taxable at the point of first sale at 5 paise in the Rupee.
It was further provided that as soon as this entry came into force on the date fixed by a Notification the proviso to Section 5 (A) added by Section 2 of the Amending Act would cease to have effect.
Section 8 of the Amending Act purported to validate the assessments already made while Section 9 granted exemption from liability to pay tax in certain cases.
We have already noticed that jaggery was being taxed at the point of the first purchase of its sale between 1 2 6o and 31 7 63 but by reason of the Amendment introduced by Act 16 of ' 1963 a multiple point tax on safe subject to an exemption of a turn over of Rs. 10000/ became leviable at 2 paise pet Rupee from 1 8 63 which rate was enhanced to 3 paise from 1 4 1966 by Amendment Act 7 of 1966.
A single point taxation was however levied on items in Schedule 1 and 2 of the Act which became chargeable as such under Section 5(2).
We are not concerned with schedule 3 which deals with declared goods but schedule 4 specified the goods which are exempt in terms of Section 8.
All other sales which do not fall within the schedules are as earlier stated exigible to multiple point tax under Section 5(1) of the Act subject to the minimum of Rs. 10,000/ .
The Appellants had before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh raised several contentions but the principal attack was confined to 3 aspects of the Amendment Act.
Firstly that Section II read with the new proviso to Section 5 (1) makes an invidious distinction between dealers in jaggery on the one hand and dealers in other commodities on the other by perpetuating an unreasonable classification which is based on no intelligible differentia nor can any reasonable nexus be discerned with the object that the Amendment seeks to achieve.
Secondly that Section 9 has to be read as part of Section 2 of the Amendment Act by which a new proviso is added to Section 5(1) of the Principal Act and is a part of Section 11 substituted by the Amendment Act.
If so read the new proviso to Section 5(1) and the new Section II would be violative of article 14 inasmuch as the dealers in jaggery similarly situated have been invidiously discriminated by levying tax from those, dealers who have collected the tax and the dealers who have not collected the tax.
Thirdly that the basis of the amendment is an imposition of a tax not on the transaction of sale or purchase of jaggery but on the, collection or non collection of the tax by the dealers, as such it is also bit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
The High Court rejected all these contentions except the one relating, to the validity of Section, 9.
the State of Andhra Pradesh as well as the Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1971 had 372 contended that that provision which granted an, exemption from.
payment of tax to, dealers who bad not, in fact collected the tax from their principal was, valid and did, not suffer from the vice of discrimination under article 14 because not only was the classification reasonable but that it was based on an intelligible differentia having a nexus with the object of the impugned Act.
We shall however deal with last mentioned aspect presently but before we do so on the threshold of the argument of them Appellants there is a valid objection to the maintainability of the Writ Petitions filed by the dealers who as Agents of the Principals had collected tax from the purchasers which as a consequence of the two decisions, of the High Court referred to earlier was illegal.
After the, amendment Act the levy and collection by the dealers became prima facie legal.
In so, far as jaggery is concerned there was also no question of any, exemption of the minimum turnover of the principal of Rs. 10,000, so That the hardship which a Corn mission Agent dealer had to undergo in trying to determine whether the, turn over of each of his principals was below Rs. 10,000 before he could collect Sales Tax was no longer there.
After the Amendment by removing the exemption of Rs 10,000 on sale of jaggery which was given retrospective effect, the dealer agents could not now complain, which complaint had been held by the High Court to be justified, that while the principals were exempted from tax upto Rs. 10,000 the tax is being levied on the agents turn over irrespective of that exemption.
In any case whatever objections the principals may have to the constitutional validity of the provisions introduced by the amending Act under Article 14 the Agent dealers certainly have no locus standi to complain about discrimination between Principals inter se.
That apart the dealers are not expected to and in fact do not pay any money of their own towards the tax which is levied.
The tax so levied and paid to the assessing authorities by the dealer agent is, under the provisions of the Act, not returnable nor can the principal under the provisions of the Act make any claim against such dealer Agents.
Shiri Gupte on behalf of the Appellants was unable to tell us that there were among the Appellants any principals who had a direct interest in challenging the validity of the provisions on the ground of discrimination.
Shri Motilal Setalvad on behalf of the Appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.
2126 to 2128 of 1970 strenuously contended that the Appellants have an interest and can maintain the Writ Petitions because they were dealers within the meaning of Section 2(e) and are persons who are aggrieved because of the assessment made or likely to be made and tax recovered from them.
He has further contended that this Court has in several cases hold that even a notice issued to any person under the provisions of an impugned Act which is likely to cause prejudice will 373 entitle him to challenge the Constitutional Validity of the law under which the notice is given.
If so, where an assessment has been made the assessee has a right to challenge the provisions of the Amendment Act under which the levy and Collection of tax have been given retrospective validity.
Apart from the question that 'this argument does not take into account the distinction between an at tack under article 14 and an attack under article 19 it overlooks the fact that what is sought to be recovered from the Appellant is in respect of a tax collected on the past dealings and not with respect to the future transactions.
We had pointed ' out that tax had already been collected no doubt at first illegally but due to the amendment Act that collection has become legal and has also dealer be is liable to pay that amount to the State la. respect of the Asses sments made.
As there is nothing to show that what is sought to be recovered from the dealer is more than what he hits collected, he 'has not suffered any loss nor any disadvantage which would entitle him to seek a remedy under article 226 of the Constitution.
Shri P. RamchandraTao in Civil Appeal No. 2127 of 1970 had nothing now to add to the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates for the Appellants.
On this short ground alone we dismiss all the Appeals except Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1971 but in the circumstances without costs.
Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1971: In this Appeal Shri section T. Desai contends that the High Court had erroneously struck down Sec. 9 of the Amendment Act.
of the Amendment Act is as follows: "9(1) where any sale of jaggery has been effected during the period between the 1st August 1963 and the commencement of Section 5 of this Act in so far as it relates to item 77, and the dealer effecting such sale has not collected ally amount by way of tax under the principal Act ,on the ground that no such tax could have been levied or collected in respect of such sale, or any portion of the turnover relating to such sale, and where no such tax could also have been levied or collected if the amendments made in the principal Act by this Act had not been made, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 8 or the said amendments, the dealer shall not be liable to pay any tax under the principal Act, as amended by this Act, in respect of such sale or such part of the turnover relating to such sale.
(2)For the purposes of sub section (1), the burden of proving that no amount by way of tax was collected under the principal Act in respect of any sale referred to in sub section (1) or in respect of any portion of the 374 turnover relating to such sale, shall be on the dealer effecting such sale".
This Section is enacted by the legislature with the object of removing short comings in the principal Act which were found wanting by judicial interpretation.
The interregnum between the declaration by the High Court of certain provision of the Act as being unconstitutional and the attempt of the legislature to remedy the defects and to give retrospective effect thereto created two distinct categories between the same class of dealers namely those who had collected the tax whether they were assessed or not and those who had not collected the tax.
This classification is certainly reasonable and is related to the object which the Amendment Act seeks to achieve.
The dealers who had not collected the tax could not have collected it as the law stood and therefore the legislature did not think it just or proper to collect tax from those who were not liable.
Even this exemption as can be seen is given to only those persons who can establish that they have not in fact collected it, the burden of which is upon those who claim the exemption.
It is unnecessary to deal with hypothetical cases.
The mere fact that in many cases it was not collected because the assessment could not be completed cannot be a valid ground nor can it even now be made in regard to those assessments which are now pending (a matter upon which we do not pronounce) cannot be valid grounds to declare the classification as arbitrary or unreasonable, which reason seems to have weighed with the High Court.
We think not only the classification reasonable but there is an intelligible differentia furnishing a nexus with the object the Amendment Act seeks to achieve.
In this view we set aside the Judgment of the High Court declaring Section 9 as unconstitutional and allow the appeal, but in the circumstances without costs.
G. C. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellants carried on the business of Commission Agents in Jaggery in Andhra Pradesh.
They arranged for the sale of jaggery charging a small commission for their service and rendering an account to their Principals in respect of those sales.
Every buyer was fully apprised of the fact that he was purchasing jaggery of specified agriculturist Principals and not that of the appellants.
Till about 1963 under section II of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, commission agents were required to obtain and were being issued licences and if they conformed to the conditions of those licences, they were not subjected to tax.
In 1963 the principal Act was amended by Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Amendment Act 16of 1963.
By the new section I I introduced by the Amending Act the Agentsof resident Principals were made liable for assessment and collection of tax though the liability of the Agent was made co extensive with that of the principal.
The High Court held that in assessing the Agent the turnover of those Principals whose turnover was below the taxable limit of Rs. 10,000 could not be taken into account.
As a consequence of this decision the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Amendment Act 5 of 1968 was enacted and a new section I 1 substituted for the existing section.
This section II was given retrospective effect from 1st August 1963.
The object of this amendment was to enable the taxing authorities to assess levy and collect tax or penalty under the Sales Tax Act from the Agent irrespective of the fact that the Principal was not liable to tax.
This new section was also struck down by the High Court, on the ground that it was violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
In view of this judgment which restored the legal position to that prevailing before the Amendment, large sums of money which bad been collected as tax from the Agents became refundable.
To meet this situation the Andhra Pradesh Legislature enacted the Andhra Pradesh General gales Tax Amendment Act 9 of 1970, Section 8 of which validated the assessments already made.
Under section 9 Agents who had not collected the tax from their Principals were exempted from tax.
Under section I I Agents who had collected the tax were made liable to pay the same.
In writ petitions under article 226 filed by Agents it was contended that section II as amended and section 9 of the Amending Act were violative of article 14.
The High Court held that section 1 1 was valid but section 9 violated article 14.
In appeal filed against the High Court 's judgment by certificate, HELD:(i) The appeals filed by the agents were not maintainable.
What was sought to be recovered from the appellants was in respect of a tax collected on past dealings and not with respect to the future transactions.
The tax had already been collected, no doubt at first illegally, but 368 due to the Amendment Act, that collection had become legal and as dealers, the appellants were liable to pay that amount to the State.
As there was nothing to show that what was sought to be recovered from the dealer was more than what he had collected he had not suffered any loss nor any disadvantage which would entitle him to seek a remedy under article 226 of the Constitution [373B C] (ii) Section 9 had been wrongly struck down by the High Court as invalid.
This section was enacted by the legislature with the object of removing shortcomings in the principal Act which were found wanting by judicial interpretation.
The interregnum between the declaration by the High Court of certain provisions of the Act as being unconstitutional and the attempt of the legislature to remedy the defects and to give retrospective effect thereto created two distinct categories between the same class of dealers namely those who had collected the tax whether they were assessed or not and those who had not collected the tax.
This classification was certainly reasonable and was related to the object which the Amendment Act sought to achieve.
The dealers who had not collected the tax could not have collected it as the law stood and therefore the legislature thought it just or proper to collect the tax from those who were not liable.
Even this exemption was given to those who could establish that they had not in fact collected it, the burden of which was upon those who claimed the exemption.
[374D E],


judgement:
No. 606 of 1970.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for en forcement of fundamental rights.
R. B. Datar, for the petitioner.
Niren De, Attorney General and section P. Nayar, for the respon dents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J.
The only question raised in this writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution relates to the constitutional validity of r. 3 of the Rules for Selection of candidates for admission to the Pre Professional/B.Sc.
Part 1 Course leading to M.B.B.S. in the Government Medical Colleges and for certain seats in the private Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore framed by that State on July 4, 1970 (hereinafter called "the Selection Rules").
The petitioner Kumari N. Vasundara claims to have passed the Pre University Examination of the Bangalore University with physics, chemistry and biology as optional subjects securing 78% marks in these subjects.
She applied for admission to the Pre Professional Course leading to the M.B.B.S. in the Government Medical Colleges, but the Selection Committee, after interviewing her on September 14, 1970, rejected her application on the ground that she bad not resided in the State of Mysore for a period of ten years prior to the date of her application as required by r. 3 of the Selection Rules.
It is not disputed that but for the condition requiring residence in Mysore State for a period of ten years prior to the date of her application she was otherwise eligible for admission under the Selection Rules in another respects.
Rule 3 reads as under: domiciled and resident in the,State of Mysore for not 383 less than ten years at any, time prior to the date of the application for a seat, shall be eligible to apply Provided that this provision shall not apply (a) in the case of persons applying for seats referred to in clauses (a), (b) (c) (d) and (e) of sub rule (1) of rule 4, (b) in the case of children of Central Government employees.
serving on duty in the State on the date of making the application and (c) in the case of children of Mysore Government employees including children of members of all India Services borne on the Mysore State Cadre who (i)are serving or have, served outside the State of Mysore on deputation during the relevant period, and (ii)are in the service of the State on the date of making the application or have retired from service not more than four years prior to the date of making the application." Shri Datar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the constitutional validity of r. 3 on two grounds.
The first challenge is founded on the ground of violation of the right to equality guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
According to his argument the impugned rule has, by imposing the condition of residence for a minimum period of ten years in the State of Mysore in addition to the condition of being domiciled in that State, created an artificial classification which suffers from unconstitutional discrimination, between the Indian citizens domiciled in the State of Mysore who have resided there for ten years or more and those who have resided there for less than ten ' years.
The period of ten years of residence selected in this rule is not only arbitrary but is highly unreasonable, based on no rational or intelligible principle, said the counsel.
Its unreasonableness was illustrated by submitting that students normally pass the Pre University Examination at the age of 16 or 17 years.
To expect such students to have resided in the State of Mysore for ten years in order to, be eligible for admission to the Pre Professional/B.Sc.
Part 1 Course leading to M.B.B.S. would mean that the children of those Indian citizens having their domicile in the State of Mysore who happen, for compelling reasons, to reside in other States in the Indian Union before their children have completed ten years of residence in the State of Mysore would be deprived of the opportunity of having medical education in their own State of domicile.
This argument was elaborated by submitting that if all other States in the Union were also to frame similar rules 384 insisting on residence for ten or more years then the children of ' those citizens, who are compelled by the necessity of earning their livelihood, to shift their residence from one State to another at short intervals, without completing ten years of residence in any one State, would never be able to get admission in any State.
Fixing a period of ten years of residence in the State ' according to Mr. Datar, is arbitrary and fanciful having no rational relationship or nexus with the object or purpose of framing the rules, namely, of selecting the best talent or the most meritorious students for admission to the Medical Colleges.
The Attorney General on behalf of the respondents sub that by the impugned rule the State Ms attempted to select those students who are more likely to serve as doctors in the State after they pass out.
In this connection our attentions was drawn to the counter affidavit filed by the State.
The Attorney General further contended that it was for the State to determine the sources from which to select candidate and the selection so made deserves to be, upheld.
in support of the validity of the rule he drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Chitra Ghosh & Another vs `Union of India and Others(1) and to a decision of the Mysore High Court in K. Shivashankar vs University of Mysore & Others(2).
This Court in Minor P. Rajendran vs State of Madras & Ors.(3) while dealing with the rules made by the State of Madras for the selection of candidates for admission to the First Year integrated M.B.B.S. course, struck down, as violative of article 14, the rule which allocated seats on district wise basis.
A bench of five judges observed in that case: "The question whether district wise allocation is violative of article 14 will depend on what is the object to be achieved in the matter of admission to medical colleges.
Considering the fact that there is a larger number of can didates than seats available selection has got to be made.
The object of selection can only be to secure the best possible material for admission to colleges subject to the provision for socially and educationally backward classes.
Further whether selection is from the socially and educationally backward classes or from the general pool, the object.
of selection must be to secure the best (1) ; (2) (3)[1968] 2 section C. R. 786.
385 possible talent from the two sources.
If that is the object it must necessary follow that that object would be defeated if seats are allocated district by district.
it cannot be and has not been denied that the object of selection is to secure the WA possible, talent from .the two sources so that the country may have the "best possible doctors".
If that is the object, the argument on behalf of the petitioners/appellant is that that object cannot possibly be served by allocating seats district wise ' It is true that article 14 does not forbid classification, but the classification has to be justified on the basis of the nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved, even assuming that territorial classification may be a reasonable classification.
The fact however that the classification by itself is reasonable is not enough to support it unless there is nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved.
Therefore, as the, object to be achieved in a case of the kind with which we are concerned is to get the best talent for admission to professional colleges, the allocation of seats districtwise, hat no reasonable relation with the object to be achieved.
If anything, such allocation will result in many cases in the object being destroyed, and if that is so, the classification.
even if reasonable, would result in discrimination, inasmuch as better qualified candidates from one district may be X X rejected while less qualified candidates from other districts may be admitted from either of the two sources.
The argument that candidates coming from various districts would settle down in those districts to serve the people there was not accepted, because there was no material on the record giving facts and figures suggesting that candidates from a particular district would generally settle down in that district.
It was not even so stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Mysore, in that case.
The Court, however, took care to clarify the legal, position by adding: "We may add that we do not mean to say that territorial classification is always bad under all circumstances.
But there is no doubt that district wise classification which is being justified on a territorial basis in these cases is violative of article 14, for no justification worth the name in support of the classification has been made out.
" In Chitra Ghosh 's case (1) this Court said: "TThe main purpose of admission to a medical college is to impart education in the theory and practice of me (1) ; 25 1 S.C. India/71 386 dicine.
As noticed before the sources from which students have to be drawn are primarily determined by the authorities who maintain and run the institution, e.g., the Central Government in the present case.
In Minor P. Rajendran vs State of Madras (1968) 2 S.C.R. 786it has been stated that the object of selection for admission is to secure the best possible material.
This can surely be achieved by making proper rules in the matter of selection but there can be no doubt that such selection has to be confined to the sources that are intended to supply the material.
If the sources have been classified in the manner done in the present case it is difficult to see how that classification has no rational nexus with the object of imparting medical education and also of selection for the purpose" The decision in Minor P. Rajendran 's case C) was distinguished on the ground that in that case the classification made district wise had been considered to possess no reasonable relation with the object sought to be achieved.
It was also observed in Chitra Ghosh 's case (2).
"It is the Central Government which bears the financial burden of running the medical college.
It is for it to lay down the criteria for eligibility.
From the very nature of things it is not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country.
The Government cannot be denied the right to decide from what sources the admission will be made.
That essentially is a question of policy and depends inter alia on an overall assessment and survey of the requirements of residents of particular territories and other categories of persons for whom it is essential to provide facilities for medical education.
If the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis it is not for the courts to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification." According to this observation which merely re affirms the settled law, if the sources are properly classified on reasonable basis, then courts are not expected to interfere with the manner and method of making the classification.
Reasonable basis of course must mean that the basis is not arbitrary or fanciful, but bears a just, rational and intelligible relation with the object sought to be achieved by the classification.
(1) ; (2) ; 387 in D. P. Joshi vs The State of Madhya Bharat and Another this Court had while upholding by majority the rules, made by the State of Madhya Bharat, for admission to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore, charging capitation fee from non Madhya Bharat students laid down that in those ,rules the word "domicile" was used in its popular sense conveying the idea of residence.
Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking for the majority said: "It was also urged on behalf of the respondent that the word "domicile" in the rule might be.
construed not in its technical legal sense, but in a popular sense as meaning "residence and the following passage in Wharton 's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, page 344 was quoted as supporting such a construction: "By the term 'domicile ', in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives or has his home .
In this sense the place where a person has his actual resi dence, inhabitancy, or commorancy, is some times called is domicile".
In Mcmullen vs Wadsworth was observed by the Judicial Committee that "the word 'domicil ' in article 63 (of the Civil Code of Lower Canada) was used in the sense of residence, and did not refer to international domicile".
What has to be considered is whether in the present context "domicile" was used in the sense of residence.
The rule requiring the payment of a capitation fee and providing for exemption therefrom refers only to bona fide residents within the State.
There is no reference to domicile in the rule itself, but in the Explanation which follows, clauses (a) and (b) refer to domicile, and they occur as part of the definition of "bona fide resident".
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 28, page 5, it is stated: "The term 'bona fide residence ' means the residence with, domiciliary intent.
" There is therefore considerable force in the contention of the respondent that when the rule making authorities referred to domicile in clauses (a) and (b) they were thinking really of ;residence.
In this view also, the contention that the rule is repugnant to article 15(1) must fail." (1) ; 388 Under the impugned rule in that case no capitation fee was to charged from the students who ,were bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat, and the, expression "bona #de resident" for the purpose of the rule '.
was defined as (to quote the relevant portion): "one who is (a) a citizen of India whose original domicile is in Madhya Bharat, provided he has not acquired a domicile elsewhere, or (b) a citizen of India, whose original domicile is not in: Madhya Bharat but who has acquired a domicile in Madhya Bharat and has resided there for not less than 5 years at the date .
on which he applies for admission, or (c) a person who migrated from Pakistan before September 30, 1948 and intends to reside in Madhya Bharat permanently, or (d). . . .
In our view the word "domicile 'a used in r. 3, in the present case is also used to convey the idea of intention to reside or remain in the State of Mysore.
If classification based on residence does not impigne upon the principle of equality enshrined in article 14 as held by this Court in the decision already cited which is binding upon us, then the further condition of the residence in the State being there for at least ten years would also seem to be equally valid unless it is shown by the petitioner that selection of the period of ten years makes the classification so unreasonable as to render it arbitrary and without any substantial basis or intelligible differentia.
The object of framing the impugned rule seems to be to attempt to impart medical education to the best talent available out of the class of persons who are likely, so far as it can reasonably be foreseen, to serve as doctors, the inhabitants of the State of Mysore.
It is true that it is not possible to say with absolute certainty that all those admitted to the medical colleges would necessarily stay in Mysore State after qualifying as doctors: they have indeed a fundamental right as citizens to settle anywhere in India and they are also free, if they so desire and can manage, to go out of India for further studies or even otherwise.
But these possibilities are permissible and inherent in our constitu tional set up and these considerations cannot adversely affect the constitutionality of the otherwise valid rule.
The problem as noticed in Minor P. Rajendran 's case (1) and as revealed by a large number of cases which have recently come to this Court Is that the number of candidates desirous of having medical educa (1) ; 389 tion is very much Luger than the number 'of seats available in medical colleges.
The need and demand for doctors in our country is so great that young boys and girls feel, that in medical profession they can both get gainful employment and serve the people.
The State has therefore to formulate with reasonable foresight a just scheme of classification for imparting medical ,education to the available candidates which would serve the object and purpose of providing broad based medical aid to the people of the State and to provide medical education to those who are best suited for such education.
Proper classification inspired by this consideration and selection on merit from such classified groups therefore cannot be challenged on the ground of inequality violating article 14.
The impugned rule has not been shown by the petitioner to suffer from the vice of unreasonableness.
The counter affidavit filed by the State on the other hand discloses the purpose to be that of serving the interests of the residents of the State by providing medical aid for them.
The petitioner 's argument that candidates whose parents have ,of necessity to remain out of Mysore State and who have also by ,compelling reasons to shift their residence frequently from one State to another without completing ten years in any one State, would suffer because their parents cannot afford to arrange for their children 's residence in Mysore State for ten years during the first 17 years of their age, merely suggests that there is a likelihood of some cases of hardship under the impugned rule.
But ,cases of hardship are likely to arise in the working of almost any rule which may be framed for selecting a limited number of candidates for admission out of a long list.
This, however, would not render the rule unconstitutional.
For relief against hardship in the working of a valid rule, the petitioner has to approach elseWhere because it relates to the policy underlying the rule.
Redress for the grievance against the wide.
gap between the number of ,seats in the medical colleges and the number of candidates aspiring to become doctors for earning their own livelihood and for serving the needs of the country, is also to be sought elsewhere and not in this Court, which is only concerned with the constitutionality of the rule.
For the aforesaid reasons this petition fails and is dismissed but without costs.
K. B. N. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Rule 3 of the rules for selection of candidates for admission to the pre professional course leading to M.B.B.S. in the Government Medical Colleges in the State of Mysore provided that "no person who is not a citizen of India and who is not domiciled and resident in the State of Mysore for not less than ten years at any time prior to the date of the application for a seat, shall be eligible to apply".
The petitioner 's application for admission was rejected on the ground that she had not resided in the State for a period of ten years as required by r. 3.
She challenged the constitutional validity of r. 3 on the ground of violation of right to equality guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
It was contended that the impugned rule, by imposing the condition of residence in addition to the condition of being domiciled in the State created an artificial classification which suffered from, unconstitutional discrimination.
In support of the validity of the rule it was urged that by the rule the State only attempted to select those students who were more likely to serve as doctors in the State and it was for the State to determine the sources from which to select candidates.
Dismissing the petition, HELD:The word "domicile" in r. 3 is used to convey the idea of intention to reside or remain in the State of Mysore.
If classification based on residence does not impinge upon the principle of equality, as held by this Court in D. P. Joshi vs State of Madhya Bharat, then the further condition of residence in the State for at least ten years would also be equally valid unless it is shown that selection of the period of ten years makes the classification so unreasonable as to render it arbitrary and without any substantial basis or intelligible differentia.
The object of framing the impugned rule is to impart medical education to the best talent available, out of the class of persons who are likely, so far as it can reasonably be foreseen, to serve as doctors the inhabitants of the State.
The State has to formulate with reasonable foresight a just scheme of classification for imparting medical education to the available candidates which would serve the object and purpose of providing broad based medical aid to the people of the State and to provide medical education to those who are best suited for such education.
Prover classification inspired by this consideration and selection on merit from such classified groups, therefore, cannot be challenged on the ground of inequality violating article 14.
The petitioner has not shown that they impugned rule suffer from the vice of unreasonableness.
[388 D 389 C] 382 There is likelihood of some casts of hardships under the impugned rule.
But cases of hardships are likely to arise in the working of almost any rule which may be framed for selecting a limited number of candidates for admission out of a long list.
This would not render the rule unconsti tutional.
[389 E] D.p.
Joshi vs The State of Madhya Bharat and Anr., ; , relied on.
Chitra Ghosh & Anr.
vs Union of India and Ors., ; and Minor P. Rajendran vs State of Madras & Ors., ; , referred to.


judgement:
ons Nos. 330 to 333 of 1954.
Under article 132 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
P.B. Das, (B. Sen, Balaprasad Singh and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, and C. A. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India (O. N. Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with them) for the respondents.
October 21.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.
Writ Petitions Nos.
330 to 333 of 1954, though presented by different persons, raise identical questions for consideration and decision and can be conveniently disposed of by one judgment.
789 In April, 1947, Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) (Act, 1947, Act XXX of 1947) was passed by the Central Legislature.
By section 3 of the Act the Central Government was empowered to constitute an Income tax Investigation Commission for investigating matters relating to taxation on income with particular reference to the question whether the existing law was adequate for preventing the evasion thereof.
Section 5(1) of the Act further empowered the Central Government to make a reference by the 30th June, 1948, to the Commission for investigation and report of any cases wherein it had prima facie reason for believing that a person had, to a substantial extent, evaded payment of taxation on income.
The date for making the reference was subsequently extended to 1st of September, 1948.
By an Amendment Act passed in 1948 it was provided that the life of the Commission, in the first instance, would be up to the 31st of March, 1950, but that it could be further extended to 31st of March, 1951.
By subsequent legislations the life of the Commission has been extended to December, 1955.
The procedure prescribed by the Act for making the investigation under its provisions is of a summary and drastic nature.
It constitutes a departure from the ordinary law of procedure and in certain important aspects is detrimental to the persons subjected to it and as such is discriminatory.
The substantial differences in the normal procedure of the Income tax Act for catching escaped income and in the procedure prescribed by Act XXX of 1947, were fully discussed by this Court in Suraj Mal Mohta vs Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri(1) and require no further discussion here.
Sub section (4) of section 5 of the Act provided that the Central Government could refer to the Commission cases of persons other than those whose cases had been referred to it by the 1st of September, 1948, under section 5(1) if, after investigation, the Commission made a report to that effect.
Thus, two categories of oases under Act XXX of 1947 could be referred to the Investigation Commission by the Central Government, (1) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 448.
101 790 namely, those falling under section 5(1) and those falling under section 5(4) of the Act.
In accordance with the provisions of section 5(1) of the Act the Central Government on the 31st of December, 1947, referred to the Investigation Commission the cases of the four petitioners for investigation and report.
It is alleged by each of these petitioners that no action was taken by the Commission on these references during the original period of its life or even during the extended period provided by the Amendment Act of 1948.
If a report had been submitted in these cases during the original period of the life of the Commission, the problems that now arise would not have arisen, because the Act being a pre Constitution Act was good law before the Constitution and acts done thereunder before the commencement of the Constitution could not be impugned on the basis of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution which came into force on the 26th January, 1950.
Those provisions had no retrospective operation and could not affect the validity of this law or the completed proceedings taken thereunder.
Be that as it may, it appears that nothing happened in these cases till January, 1952, when it is alleged an official of the Commission summoned the petitioners for a preliminary discussion which took place in February, 1952, and since then the petitioners have from time to time been called upon to produce a number of statements and books of account, but the investigation has not proceeded beyond the preliminary stages and the Commission itself has admittedly not commenced any proceedings in these cases, though a period of nearly seven years has elapsed since the references were made, with the result that subsequent events have intervened and, in our opinion, have made these references to the Commission abortive.
As already stated, the Constitution of India came into force on the 26th January, 1950, and the pre Constitution laws had then to stand the test for their validity on the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
Article 14 of this Part guarantees to all persons the right of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
This article not 791 only guarantees equal protection as regards substantive laws but procedural laws also come within its ambit.
The implication of the article is that all litigants similarly situated are entitled to avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief, and for defence with like protection and without discrimination.
The procedural provisions of Act XXX of 1947 had therefore to stand the challenge of article 14 and could only be upheld provided they withstood that challenge.
The question was canvassed in this Court in April, 1954, in Suraj Mal Mohta vs Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (supra).
What happened in that case was that the Investigation Commission, while dealing with the case of another assessee referred to it under section 5(1) of the Act, reported to the Central Government that Suraj Mal Mohta and other members of the family had evaded income tax and their cases should be referred to it under the provisions of sub section (4) of section 5.
The reference was accordingly made with the result that Suraj Mal Mohta applied to this Court under article 32 for an appropriate writ restraining the Commission from taking any action against him under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947.
It was there contended that the provisions of sections 5(1), 5(4), 6, 7 and 8 of the Act had become void after the coming into force of the Constitution, being discriminatory in character, and that these provisions contravened the guarantee of article 14 of the Constitution.
This Court upheld this contention and granted an appropriate writ to Suraj Mal Mohta.
It there expressed the opinion that sub section (4) of section 5, on its plain reading, was not limited to cases of persons who, to a substantial extent, had evaded taxation but that it dealt with all those persons whose cases fell within the ambit of section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act, and that being so, there was no justification for discriminating them in matters of procedure from those dealt with under the Indian Income tax Act, and thus sub section (4) of section 5 was hit by article 14 of the Constitution and was void and unenforceable.
The result of this decision was that the Commission was restrained from dealing with Mohta 's case.
The provisions of section 5(1) 792 of the Act were also attacked in that case as contravening article 14 of the Constitution, but the Court refrained from expressing any opinion about their constitutionality as that question had no relevancy then.
The consequence of that decision was that a certain provision of Act XXX of 1947 was declared void and unenforceable to the extent of its repugnancy to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution under article 13(1) thereof Its validity however during the pre Constitution period was beyond question.
What this Court said in its judgment in Suraj Mal Mohta vs Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (supra) has perhaps resulted in the filing of these petitions which were presented to this Court on the 16th of July, 1954, after the decision in that case had been pronounced.
In the petitions, as originally drafted, the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 were impugned on the ground that they contravened the guarantee of equal protection of the laws enacted in article 14 of the Constitution and for that reason the Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the cases of the petitioners by applying the discriminatory and drastic procedure of the impugned Act.
It was alleged that the petitioners belonged to the same class of persons as were dealt with under the ordinary law enacted in section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act.
Before these petitions could come to a hearing and a day after they were presented to this Court, the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Ordinance VIII of 1954 was promulgated by the President and this was subsequently made into an Act on the 25th of September, 1954.
The Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act, XXXIII of 1954, though assented to by the President on the 25th of September, 1954, came into force with effect from the 17th of July, 1954.
The provisions of this Act furnished an additional ground of attack to the petitioners on the continuance of proceedings by the Commission in these cases under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947.
An application was therefore made seeking permission to, urge additional grounds.
This was not opposed by the learned Attorney General and was allowed.
In the additional grounds it was urged that the relevant 793 sections of Act XXX of 1947, which affected the petitioners, had been impliedly repealed by the amended Act of 1954 and ceased to have any legal force and that the Commission could no longer proceed under those provisions against the petitioners.
It was further contended that the amended section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act was comprehensive in its scope, and all persons that were dealt with under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 had been brought within its ambit, and that being so, there was no basis left for giving them discriminatory or special treatment different from those similarly situated, and who were to be dealt with under section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act as amended.
It was said that assuming but without admitting that section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was based on a rational classification and was not hit by article 14 of the Constitution because of that circumstance, it had now, because of the amendment in section 34 of the Income tax Act, become void, as the classification which saved it from the mischief of article 14 if at all, had become ineffective, its distinctive characteristics having disappeared, and that the persons falling within the class defined in section 5(1) now belong to the same class as is dealt with by section 34 as amended.
Two questions were thus canvassed before us: (1) Whether section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 infringes article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it is not based on a rational classification ? (2)Whether, after the coming into force of the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act, 1954, which operates on the same field as section 5.(1) of Act XXX of 1947, the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947, assuming they were based on a rational classification, have not become void and unenforceable, as being discriminatory in character.? In our opinion, for the purpose of deciding these petitions, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the first question because we think the second contention is well founded and is sufficient to determine the case in favour of the petitioners.
The provisions of section 15(1) of Act XXX of 1947 could only be supported, if at all, for a differential 794 treatment of persons dealt with in that section in matters of procedure, on the ground that these persons constituted a separate class, and the classification was rational.
Parliament has, however, by amending section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act, now provided that cases of those very persons who originally fell within the ambit of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947, and who it was alleged formed a distinct class, can be dealt with under the amended section 34 and under the procedure provided in the Income tax Act.
Both categories of persons, namely, those who came within the scope of section 5(1) as well as those who came within the ambit of section 34, now form one class.
In other words, substantial tax dodgers or war profiteers who were alleged to have formed a definite class according to the contention of the learned AttorneyGeneral under section 5(1), and whose cases needed special treatment at the hands of the Investigation Commission, now clearly fall within the ambit of amended section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act.
That being so, the only basis for giving them differential treatment, namely, that they formed a distinct class by themselves, has completely disappeared, with the result that continuance of discriminatory treatment to them comes within the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution and has thus to be relieved against.
All these persons can now well ask the question, why are we now being dealt with by the discriminatory and drastic procedure of Act XXX of 1947 when those similarly situated as ourselves can be dealt with by the Income tax Officer under the amended provisions of section 34 of the Act.
Even if we once bore a distinctive label that distinction no longer subsists and the label now borne by us is the same as is borne by persons who can be dealt with under section 34 of the Act as amended; in other words, there is nothing uncommon either in properties or in characteristics between us and those evaders of income tax who are to be discovered by the Income tax Officer under the provisions of amended section 34.
In our judgment, no satisfactory answer can be returned to this query because the field on which amended section 34 operates 795 now includes the strip of territory which previously was occupied by section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 and two substantially different laws of procedure, one being more prejudicial to the assessee than the other, cannot be allowed to operate on the same field in view of the guarantee of article 14 of the Constitution.
The learned Attorney General attempted to combat this contention on a two fold ground: (1) That the class of persons dealt with under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 was not only the class of substantial taxdodgers but it was a class of persons whose cases the Central Government, by 1st of September, 1948, had referred to the Commission and that class had thus become determined finally on that date, and that that class of persons could be dealt with by the Investigation Commission under the drastic procedure of Act XXX of 1947, while section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act as amended empowered the Incometax Officer to deal with cases other than those whose cases had been referred under section 5(1) to the Investigation Commission : (2) That in any case the proceedings having started before the Commission in pursuance of the reference under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 those proceedings cannot be affected by the amendment, it having no retrospective operation.
Both these contentions, in our opinion, are not well founded.
As regards the first contention canvassed by the learned Attorney General it seems to us that it cannot stand scrutiny.
The class of persons alleged to have been dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned Act was comprised of those unsocial elements in society who during recent years prior to the passing of the Act had madesubstantial profits and had evaded payment of tax on those profits those cases were referred to the Investigation Commission before 1st September, 1948.
Assuming that evasion of tax to a substantial amount "could form a basis of classification at all for imposing a drastic procedure on that class, the inclusion of only such of them whose cases had been referred before 1st September, 1948, into a class for being dealt with by the drastic procedure, leaving other tax evaders 796 to be dealt with under the ordinary law will be a clear discrimination for the reference of the case within a particular time has no special or rational nexus with the necessity for drastic procedure.
Further it seems that this very class of persons is now included within the ambit of the amended section 34 of Act XXXIII of 1954.
The draftsman of this section has apparently attempted to remedy whatever defects in the classification made under section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 had been pointed out during the discussion in Suraj Mal Mohta 's case in this Court.
The preamble of the Act states that the Act is intended to provide for assessment or reassessment of persons who to a substantial extent had evaded payment of tax during a certain period and for matters connected therewith.
The language employed here bears close likeness to that employed in section 5(1) of the impugned Act.
The Act has inserted the following sub section in section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act : " (I A) If, in the case of any assessee, the Income. tax Officer has reason to believe (i)that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment for any year in respect of which the relevant previous year falls wholly or partly within the period beginning on the 1st day of September, 1939, and ending on the 31st day of March, 1946; and (ii)that the income, profits or gain which have so escaped assessment for any such year or years amount or are likely to amount to one lakh of rupees or more; he may, notwithstanding that the period of eight years or, as the case may be, four years specified in subsection (1) has expired in respect thereof, serve on the assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub section (2) of section 22, and may proceed to assess or reassess the income, profits or gains of the assessee for all or any of the years referred to in clause (1) and thereupon the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly It was argued in Mohta 's case as well as in these petitions that the classification made in section 5(1) of 797 the impugned Act was bad because the word "substantial" used therein was a word which had no fixed meaning and was an unsatisfactory medium for carrying the idea of some ascertainable proportion of the whole, and thus the classification being vague and uncertain, did not save the enactment from the mischief of article 14 of the Constitution.
This alleged defect stands cured in the amended section 34 inasmuch as the Legislature has clearly indicated in the statute what it means when it says that the object of the Act is, to catch persons who to a substantial extent had evaded payment of tax, in other words, what was seemingly indefinite within the meaning of the word "substantial" has been made definite and clear by enacting that no evasion below a sum of one lakh is within the meaning of that expression.
Again, the classification of section 5(1) was criticized on the ground that it did not necessarily deal with persons who during the period of war had made huge profits and evaded payment of tax on them.
The amendment made in section 34 has remedied this defect also.
The amended section clearly states that the amended section will operate on income made between the 1st September, 1939, and the 31st March, 1946, and tax on which has been evaded.
It is thus clear that the new sub section inserted in section 34 by the provisions of Act XXXIII of 1954 is intended to deal with the class of persons who were said to have been classified for special treatment by section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947.
The learned Attorney General frankly conceded that to a certain extent the two sections overlapped, but he urged that the overlapping was not complete and that those remained still outside it whose cases had already been referred to the Investigation Commission.
We are unable to uphold this contention in view of the clear language employed in the amended Act and this contention is therefore negatives.
The second contention raised by the learned Attorney General is, in our opinion, concluded by a number of earlier decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that when an Act is valid in its entirety before the date of the Constitution, the part of the proceedings regulated by the special procedure and 102 798 taken during pre Constitution period cannot be questioned however discriminatory it may have been, but that if the discriminatory procedure is continued after the date of the Constitution, then a person pre judicially affected by it can legitimately ask why he is now being differently treated from others similarly situate vide Kesava Madhaya Menon vs The State of Bombay(1), and Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another vs The State of Bombay(2).
The same propositions were re stated by this Court in Syed Qasim Razvi vs State of Hyderabad(1), and in Habeeb Mohammad vs State of Hyderabad(1).
In the cases of these petitioners, as already pointed out, the proceedings taken by the Investigation Commission against them under the discriminatory procedure of the impugned Act against them have not been com.
pleted and are pending and that being so, no justification remains for continuing these proceedings against them under the procedure of the impugned Act when other persons of their class and having the same common characteristics can be dealt with by the Income tax Officer under the provisions of the amended Act and the procedure of the ordinary law of the land.
For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that assuming the provisions of section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 could be saved from the mischief of Article 14 of the Constitution on the basis of a valid classification, that defence is no longer available in support of it after the introduction of the new sub section in section 34 of the Income tax Act, which sub section is intended to deal with the same class of persons dealt with by section 5(1) of the impugned Act.
The result is that proceedings before the Investigation Commission can no longer be continued under the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act.
We 'therefore direct that an appropriate writ be issued against the Commission prohibiting it from proceeding further with the cases of these petitioners under the provisions of Act XXX of 1947.
In the peculiar circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs in these petitions.
Writ issued.

summary/full:
Parliament by amending section 34 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, by passing the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act (XXXIII of 1954) has now provided that oases of those very persons who originally fell within the ambit of section 5(1) of Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947) and who, it 788 was alleged, formed a distinct class, can be dealt with under the amended section 34 and under the procedure provided in the Indian Income tax Act.
Both categories of persons, namely, those who came within the scope of section 5(1) as well as those who came within the ambit of section 34, now form one class.
Held, that after the coming into force of the Indian Income tax (Amendment) Act, 1954 (XXXIII of 1954) which operates on the same field as section 5(1) of Act XXX of 1947 the provisions of section 5(1) of Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (XXX of 1947), assuming they were based on a rational classification, have become void and unenforceable as being discriminatory in character.
Article 14 of the Constitution not only guarantees equal protection as regards substantive laws but procedural laws as well.
When an Act is valid, in its entire by before the date of the Constitution the part of the proceedings regulated by the special procedure and taken during the pre Constitution period cannot be questioned however discriminatory it may have been but the discriminatory procedure after the coming into force of the Constitution cannot be continued.
Suraj Mal Mohta vs Sri A. V. Viavanatha Sastri (A.I.R. , Keshava Madhava Menon vs The State of Bombay ; , Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja and Another vs The State of Bombay ([1962] S.C.R. 710), Syed Qasim Razvi vs State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 589) and Habeeb Mohammad vs State of Hyderabad ([1953] S.C.R. 661) referred to.