judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 18 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 1, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 322 of 1953, arising out of the judgment and order dated November 20, 1953, of the West Bengal First Special Court at Alipore in Case No. 3 of 1953.
N. C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
B. Sen and P. K. Ghosh (for P. K. Bose), for the respondent.
November 26.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J. The High Court of Calcutta certified under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution that the case before us was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
The 127 1000 ground for the granting of the certificate, as stated by the High Court, will be considered in due course.
The appellant was convicted under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (II of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code by a Special Judge who sentenced him under section 161, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month.
No separate sentence was passed under section 5(2) of the Act.
He unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court against his conviction and sentence.
The charge framed against the appellant under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, in substance, stated that on or about May 12, 1952,he had accepted Rs. 100 as illegal gratification from V. section Doraiswamy as a motive or reward for doing an official act and showing in the exercise of his official functions favour to Doraiswamy in seeing that a speedy and favourable settlement of the claim cases preferred by him against the Bengal Nagpur Railway, subsequently the Eastern Railway.
The charge under section 5(2) of the Act which related to the same transaction stated that the appellant had accepted the aforesaid sum of Rs. 100 by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant.
It is unnecessary to set out in any great detail the story of the prosecution as to how Doraiswamy and the appellant came into contact and how the process of giving bribe to the appellant began.
They met in 1950.
Rs. 10 was paid to the appellant in October, 1951, and Rs. 15 in January, 1952, as the result of the appellant asking Doraiswamy for some gratification for speedy and favourable disposal of his claim cases.
The appellant was at that time Assistant Supervisor of Claim Cases of the Bengal Nagpur Railway of the Vizianagram Section.
On some secret information, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment at Puri directed Inspector G. N. Brahma to contact Doraiswamy in connection with a report of alleged dishonesty by railway officials.
Brahma met Doraiswamy and asked him to meet him again at 1001 Calcutta on May 10, 1952, after the latter had filed a complaint along with some letters said to have been written by the appellant.
Permission was obtained from the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta to investigate the case.
Thereafter Doraiswamy met the appellant in Calcutta and it was settled that the former would pay the latter Rs. 100 on May 12, 1952, at 6 p. m. at the India Coffee House.
Doraiswamy informed the police of the arrangement.
Marked tenrupee currency notes were given to Doraiswamy.
The appellant and Doraiswamy met at the India Coffee House as arranged.
There was a talk between them about expediting the claim cases which were being dealt with by the appellant and a list of them was given to him.
This list and the bundle of marked currency notes which Doraiswamy gave him were put in the left upper pocket of his shirt by the appellant.
The Inspectors H. K. Mukherjee and section B. Mitra along with G. N. Gosh, an Assistant Director of Postal Ser vices and Brahma came up to the appellant.
He was accused by the police of having received 10 ten rupee currency notes as bribe from Doraiswamy and was asked to produce them.
After some hesitation the appellant produced the currency notes as well as the list given to him by Doraiswamy.
The number of the currency notes were checked and found to tally with the previously noted numbers of the currency notes given to Doraiswamy for handing them over to the appellant.
The case of the prosecution was found to have been proved by both the courts below and the appellant was convicted and sentenced as stated above.
It may be stated at the outset that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below were not questioned before us.
The only question canvassed before us was whether there had been a valid sanction given under section 6 of the Act without which no court could take cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant.
In order to appreciate the submission made by Mr. Chatterjee in this connection, a few facts have to be stated and some reference to the evidence of 1002 Mr. Bokil, P.W. 5, Chief Commercial Superintendent of the Eastern Railway at Calcutta will be necessary.
The appellant as Assistant Supervisor of Claim Cases of the then Bengal Nagpur Railway (later the Eastern Railway) had the power to deal finally with claims up to Rs. 75 and for claims in excess of that sum to make a recommendation to his superior officer, the Assistant Commercial Superintendent.
Doraiswamy was working on behalf of several persons who had made claims against the Railway.
These cases were numerous.
All these cases had to be dealt with by the appellant either by passing final orders himself, if the value in each case was Rs. 75 or less, or by recommending to his superior officer the cases where the value of the claim, in each case, was more than Rs. 75.
The appellant, therefore, being incharge of all the claim cases played an important part in their disposal either by passing final orders himself or by making recommendations.
When the appellant was paid Rs. 100 at the India Coffee House on May 12, 1952, he was found in possession of the marked currency notes and the list of cases, in which claims had been made, which had been given to him by Doraiswamy.
Sanction for the prosecution of the appellant was sought from the Chief Commercial Superintendent Mr. Bokil, P.W. 5.
There is no dispute that Mr. Bokil was competent to grant the sanction.
He had stated in his evidence that before according the sanction he went through all the relevant papers and was satisfied that in the interests of justice the appellant should be prosecuted.
He, accordingly, gave the sanction in writing and this document was marked as exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6 clearly states that the appellant had demanded on May 12, 1952, as bribe the sum of Rs. 100 from Doraiswamy and had accepted the sum as a motive or reward for speedy and favourable settlement of the claim cases, that Mr. Bokil had applied his mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case and was satisfied that in the interests of justice, the appellant should be put on his trial in a Court of competent jurisdiction for offences under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Act alleged to have been 1003 committed by him.
He, accordingly, under the provisions of section 6 of the Act, accorded his sanction that the appellant be prosecuted in a competent court of law for the offence of having accepted illegal gratification as a motive or reward for showing favour to Doraiswamy in respect of the claim cases filed against the Vizianagram Section of the Railway.
Exhibit 6 on the face of it and the evidence of Mr. Bokil in examination in chief clearly establish that a valid sanction had been accorded by Mr. Bokil.
It was, however, urged before the Special Judge, as it was urged in the High Court, that certain statements made by Mr. Bokil in cross examination clearly showed that he had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and the sanction accorded by him was not a valid one.
The Special Judge rejected this contention and was satisfied that exhibit 6 on the face of it disclosed a valid sanction for the prosecution of the appellant.
The learned Judges of the High Court who heard the appeal were also satisfied that Mr. Bokil had, in fact, applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case.
Regarding the statements made by Mr. Bokil in cross examination they were of the opinion that they did not show that he did not apply his mind to the facts of the case.
These statements merely showed that he did not investigate the truth of the case presented against the appellant.
An application was filed in the High Court under article 134 of the Constitution for the granting of a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
The order granting the certificate shows that the learned Judges who heard the application were of the opinion that the sanction accorded in this case was not a valid sanction.
The learned Judges were of the opinion that the question whether or not there was a proper sanction in the case was a question serious enough to justify the granting of a certificate.
It is necessary therefore to decide whether the sanction accorded in this case was a valid sanction.
The substance of the sanction has already been stated but in order that there may be no misunderstanding we quote the very words of the sanction itself: 1004 " Whereas a complaint was made against Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, Assistant Supervisor, Claims, of the B. N. Railway (now Eastern Railway) Garden Reach, Calcutta, who looked after the claims cases against the Railway of the Vizianagram Section, that the said Indu Bhusan Chatterjee had demanded and on 12th May, 1952, accepted a bribe of Rs. 100 (Rupees one hundred only) from Shri V. section Doraiswamy of the Commercial Claims Bureau, Vizianagram as a motive or reward for speedy and favourable settlement of the claims cases of the Commercial Claims Bureau and thereby having committed an offence punishable under Section 161 1.
P. C. and also the offence of criminal misconduct by the illegal and corrupt use of his official position as a public servant to obtain a pecuniary advantage for himself punishable under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1), clause (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947, 1, R. K. Bokil, Chief Commercial Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Calcutta, having applied my mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, am satisfied, and am of the opinion that in the interests of justice, Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, Assistant Supervisor, Claims, Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Calcutta, be put on his trial in a Court of competent jurisdiction for the offences alleged against him.
That as Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee, Assistant Supervisor, Claims, Eastern Railway, Garden Reach, Calcutta, is removable from his office by me; I therefore by virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947, do hereby accord sanction that Shri Indu Bhusan Chatterjee be prosecuted in a competent Court of law for the offence of having accepted an illegal gratification as a motive or reward for showing favour to Shri V.S. Doraiswamy, in his official functions viz., the settlement of the cases of the Vizianagram Section of Eastern Railway, punishable under Section 161 I.P.C. and for the offence of criminal misconduct for the corrupt and illegal use of his official position to obtain a pecuniary advantage for himself punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947)." 1005 In our opinion, this sanction clearly states all the facts which concern the prosecution case alleged against the the appellant with reference to his acceptance of Rs. 100 from Doraiswamy on May 12,1952, in circumstances which, if established, would constitute offences under section 161, Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Act.
The sanction also clearly states that Mr. Bokil had applied his mind and was of the opinion that in the interests of justice the appellant should be prosecuted.
The charge framed against the appellant at his trial was with reference to this very incident and none other.
What more facts were required to be stated in the sanction itself we are unable to understand.
Mr. Bokil in his examination in chief stated " On the prayer of the police, I accorded sanction to the prosecution of one Shri I. B. Chatterjee who was the Assistant Supervisor of Claims.
Before according sanction I went through all relevant papers and was satisfied that in the interest of justice, Sri I.B. Chatterjee should be prosecuted.
This is the sanction marked exhibit 6 ".
In cross examination, however, he made the following statement: " This sanction exhibit 6 was prepared by the police and it was put before me by the personnel branch of my office.
I did not call for any record in connection with this matter from my office.
I did not call for the connected claim cases nor did I enquire about the position of those claim cases.
" The learned Judges in granting the certificate, apparently, were impressed by the statement of Mr. Bokil that exhibit 6 was prepared by the police and put before him by the personnel branch of his office, because the learned Chief Justice observed, "I can hardly imagine the duty of granting the proper sanction being properly discharged by merely putting one 's signature on a ready made sanction presented by the police.
" It seems to us that Mr. Bokil 's statement does not prove that he merely put his signature on a readymade sanction presented by the police.
It is true that he did not himself dictate or draft the sanction, but Mr. Bokil has stated in the clearest terms, in his examination in chief, that before be accorded sanction he went through all the relevant papers.
There is no 1006 reason to distrust this statement of Mr. Bokil, nor has the High Court, while granting the certificate of fitness, done so.
He was an officer of high rank in the Railway and must have been fully aware that the responsibility of according the sanction against an official of the Railway subordinate to him lay upon him.
It is inconceivable that an officer of the rank of Mr. Bokil would blindly sign a ready made sanc tion prepared by the police.
Apparently, the sanction already drafted contained all the material facts upon which the prosecution was to be launched, if at all, concerning the acceptance of the bribe by the appellant on May 12, 1952.
When exhibit 6 was placed before Mr. Bokil other relevant papers were also placed before him.
It is significant that Mr. Bokil was not crossexamined as to what the other relevant papers were and in the absence of any question being put to Mr. Bokil we must accept his statement that the papers placed before him were relevant to the only question before him whether he should or should not accord his sanction to the prosecution of the appellant.
Mr. Bokil said, and we see no reason to distrust his statement, that before he accorded his sanction lie went through all these papers and after being satisfied that sanction should be given he accorded his sanction.
It is true that he did not call for any record in connection with the matter from his office nor did he call for the connected claim cases or find out as to how they stood.
It was not for Mr. Bokil to judge the truth of the allegations made against the appellant by calling for the records of the connected claim cases or other records in connection with the matter from his office.
The papers which were placed before him apparently gave him the necessary material upon which he decided that it was necessary in the ends of justice to accord his sanction.
Reliance was placed on the case of Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka vs The King(1) and other cases, to which it is unnecessary to refer, in support of the submission on behalf of the appellant that the sanction accorded was not a valid sanction.
A careful reading, (1) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30. 1007 however, of Morarka 's case (1) satisfies us that the sanction accorded in this case in no way conflicts with the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee.
On the contrary, in our opinion, it is in keeping with them.
None of the other cases cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant assist us in the matter.
When the sanction itself and the evidence of Mr. Bokil are carefully scrutinized and read together there can be little doubt that the sanction accorded was a valid sanction.
The only point which had been argued before us and which was the expressed reason for the granting of the certificate having failed, the appeal must be dismissed and the decision of the High Court in upholding the conviction and sentence of the appellant must be upheld.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant, a public servant, was convicted under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code on a charge of accepting a sum of Rs. 100 as illegal gratification.
It was contended for the appellant that the conviction was bad on the ground that the sanction for his prosecution was not valid because the officer competent to sanction the prosecution (1) had not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case but merely perused the draft prepared by the Police and (2) did not investigate the truth of the offence ' The evidence, however, showed that he went through all the papers placed before him which gave him the necessary material upon which he decided that it was necessary in the ends of justice to accord his sanction : Held, that the essentials of a valid sanction were present in the case and that the conviction was valid.
Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka vs The King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 30, referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1686 of 1978.
From the Judgment and order dated 27.4.1978 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 59 of 1969.
Tapas Ray and S.K. Jain for the Appellants.
S.K. Bagga for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 27th April, 1978.
In order to appreciate the controversy it is relevant to refer the few facts.
Prior to 1943 Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehri was having life interest in the properties mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the Plaint in Civil Case No. 159 dated 19.7.63.
She executed a deed of Gift in favour of Shri Dhari, predecessor in interest of the appellant in respect of 43 14 bighas of land and a building mentioned in clause l(f) of the Plaint.
On 26.11.48 Shri Hari Ram filed a Civil Suit No. 63 of 1948 in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge, Mandi for possession of the property in terms of the alleged compromise pursuant to which the gift was made to Shri Dhari or in the alternative to get a declaration that the deed of 380 gift should be cancelled on the ground of non fulfilment of the condition of the compromise deed.
Shri Hari Ram, since deceased.
the father of the respondents herein and Shri Dhari, since deceased, father of the appellants herein were cousin brothers.
Late Rattan and Late Keshav had another brother, Shri Thalia, since deceased.
Sheru @ Bhushehari, since deceased, was the widow of Shri Thalia who had no issue.
On 31.5.50 the Senior Subordinate Judge, Mandi, decreed the suit in favour of the respondents herein, and ordered that the gift is not binding on the respondents plaintiff and made a declaration that the gift of the land in suit in favour of Shri Dhari made by Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari shall be ineffective against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) after the life time Mst.
Sheru Bhushehari.
On 9.6.1950 Shri Hari Ram and Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari, both since deceased, filed Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1950 against the judgment and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Mandi in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1974.
On 27.7.1950 the appeal was compromised in terms of a Compromise Deed, a compromise decree was passed allowing the appeal of the appellants (Shri Dhari and Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari, both since deceased) and modified the judgment of the trial court to the extent that the gift deed made in respect of the land measuring 21 15 17 bighas comprising Khata Khatani No. 3/16 27 and Rauda Kheratar Khata Khatani 13/46 17 measuring 21 15 17 bighas situated in village Barsu Ballah was rejected and declared ineffective.
It was declared that the aforesaid land would be divided in equal shares after the death of Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari and Shri Dhari would himself give due share to Shri Hari Ram in accordance with the aforementioned order.
The one storeyed slate roof house was to remain with Shri Dhari.
In 1956, the came into force w.e.f.
17.6.56.
With the coming into force of the said Act Mst.
Sheru Bhushehari became absolute owner in respect of all her properties including those which were the subject matter of the said Civil Suit No. 63 of 1948.
On 9.3.59 Mst.
Sheru @Bhushehari executed a will in respect of all her properties in favour of Shri Gopal Singh, Shri Jagdish, Shri Bhup Singh and Shri Kirat Ram all sons of Shri Dhari.
Shri Hari Ram died during the life time of Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari.
Sheru died on 20.3.60.
Shri Dhari died on 26.6.63.
The plaintiffs filed the present suit on 8.7.63 (respondents herein).
On 21.7.67 the suit was dismissed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Mandi.
On 3.5.69 the District 381 Judge, Mandi, dismissed the first appeal against the judgment and decree in the suit.
On 27.4.78 the High Court allowed the appeal and altered the decree passed by the learned District Judge holding that the plaintiffs (respondents herein) were found entitled to claim the possession of half of the share in 43.14 bighas of land situated at village Barsu Ballah and gifted away by Mst.
Sheru @ Bhushehari to Shri Dhari in the year 1943.
It is pertinent to note that the compromise decree reads as follows: "I allow the appeal of the appellants and modify the judgment of the Trial Court to the extent that Gift Deed in respect of the land measuring 21 15 17 bighas comprising Khata Khatauni No. 3/16 to 27 bighas situated in village Barsu Ballah is hereby rejected and declared ineffective.
The aforesaid land alongwith the other land shall be divided in equal shares after the death of Sheru Bhushehari and Dhari shall himself give due share to Hari Ram in accordance with the aforementioned order.
" The effect of the aforesaid was that the gift was ineffective and Smt.
Bhushehari continued to enjoy the right and benefit she had during her limited ownership until 1956.
In the premises and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was not justified in construing or interpreting the compromise decree in Suit No. 63 of 1948 in the manner it did and in holding that the suit was one in which Hariram did not challenge the gift till the lifetime of Bushehari and that he filed the said suit only for the purpose of avoiding operation of the gift after the lifetime of Bushehari.
The compromise decree should be construed as that the parties agreed that the properties would be enjoyed by Bushehari till her lifetime and the gift made by her in favour of Dhari would remain operative till the lifetime of Bushehari but not beyond that.
When Bushehari inherited the properties from her husband in 1942 she had only life interest in the said properties.
She was a limited owner upto 1956 thereafter in 1956 when the came into operation by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act her limited estate became absolute estate.
The position therefore was that if she had gifted away her properties when she was limited owner Smt.
Bushehari would not have become absolute owner after coming into operatin of the 1956 Act and would not have been competent to bequeath the properties by Will.
In the instant case, however, by the Compromise Decree it was declared that the gift was 382 ineffective.
The effect of that declaration was that she continued to be the limited owner of the properties there after until 1956.
The effect of the , was that a female Hindu can transfer her property by Will.
Since the Will was subsequent to this period she had absolute estate and full capacity to make the Will.
lt has been held by the Courts of facts that the Will was genuine and properly executed.
If that is so, then the claim of the appellants who are the legatees under the Will cannot be disputed.
We are, therefore, unable to sustain the views of the High Court.
Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Lachhman vs Thunia, A.I.R. 1972 H.P. 69 where it was held that where a Hindu widow makes a gift of the property belonging to her deceased husband before the passing of the and the reversioners obtain a declaratory decree that their rights are intact despite the alienation by the widow, the declaratory decree does recognise the rights of the reversioners to the property after the death of the limited owner though the right to enjoy for a limited period remains in the donee.
Section 14(1) of the , had no application to the property.
It was held that it was not in the possession of the widow at the time of the death.
We are of the opinion that the ratio of the said decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case.
Since in this case after the purported gift, it was held that the gift was legally valid, Mst.
Bushehari remained the owner of the property in question, therefore, was competent to dispose it of when she made the Will.
In that view of the matter and in the facts and circumstances of this case the appeal must be allowed.
The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside.
In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will pay their own costs.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The predecessors in interest of the parties were co reversioners of the testator, a Hindu widow.
Prior to 1943 she executed a deed of gift in favour of the father of the appellants of certain properties in which she had life interest.
Decreeing the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiffs the trial court made a declaration that the gift of the land in favour of the defendant/appellants was ineffective against reversionary rights of the plaintiffs after the death of the donor.
Allowing the appeal, the appellate court passed a compromise decree declaring the gift deed ineffective in respect of the land.
Subsequent after the enactment of the , the widow executed a will in respect of all her properties in favour of the appellants.
The suit and the appeal against it were dismissed.
But the High Court found the resondents entitled to claim possession of half of the share of the land earlier gifted away.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, ^ HELD: 1.
The effect of the is that a female Hindu can transfer her property by will.
Since in the instant case, the will was subsequent to this period she had absolute estate and full capacity to make the will.
[382B] 2.1 When the widow inherited the properties from her husband in 1942 she had only life interest in the said properties.
She was a limited owner upto 1956 when the Act came into force.
If she had gifted away her properties during that period she would not have become absolute owner after coming into operation of the Act and would not have been competent to bequeath the properties by will.
However, by the compromise decree it was declared that the purported gift deed was legally invalid.
The effect of that declaration was that she continued to 379 be the limited owner of the properties thereafter until 1956 when by virtue section 14 of Act her limited estate became absolute estate.
She was,therefore,competent to dispose it of when she made the will.
[381G H;382E] 2.2 It cannot be said that the father of the respondents did not challenge the gift till the life time of the widow, and that he filed the said suit only for the purpose of avoiding operation of the gift after her lifetime.
The compromise decree should be construed as that the parties agreed that the properties would be enjoyed by the widow till her lifetime and the gift made by her in favour of the apellant 's father would remain operative till the lifetime of the widow but not beyond that.
[381E F] 2.3 The lower courts on facts have held that the will was genuine and properly executed.
If that is so, then the claim of the appellants, who are the legatees under the will, cannot be disputed.
[382B]


judgement:
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1324 of 1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 15.4.1987 of the Karnataka High Court in C.R.P. No. 3030 of 1985.
R.B. Datar and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant.
B. Krishna Prasad and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order made by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
The High Court relied upon the ratio of its Full Bench decision in M.M. Yaragatti vs Vasant, ILR and dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable.
The short question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether a revision application is maintainable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made an order in his revisional jurisdiction under section 50(2) of the Act.
This very question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the 343 Karnataka High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Ors., ILR Venkataramiah, J., as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held: "The second for consideration is whether the declaration made in section 50(2) that the order of the District Judge shall be final takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its powers of revision under section 115 CPC.
A doubt about the above question arose in view of some observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Diwakar Hegde vs Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd., to the effect that when a statute declares that the decision of an authority shall be final, it cannot be questioned either in appeal or revision under the statute.
The doubt however stands resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [ ; In that case section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which provided that the decision of the district court in an appeal filed against an order of the Municipal Commissioner was final came up for consideration.
Rejecting the contention that the said provision debarred the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 CPC over the order of the district court passed in appeal, the Supreme Court observed 'The second contention is based on section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
It provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the district court when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment.
Sub section (i) of section 149 provides that the decision of the district court shall be final.
It was submitted that the decision of the district court was therefore final and that the High Court was in error in entertaining a revision petition.
This plea cannot be accepted for, under section 115 of the CPC the High Court has got power to revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it.
It cannot be disputed that the district court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court . . ' " 344 The Full Bench also relied upon a brief decision of this Court in Krisnadas Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty (dead) by Lrs., (Special Leave Petition No. 913 of 1978 dated 13th of February, 1978) where referring to the very provision, this Court observed: "The petitioner contends that the order of the High Court.
is without jurisdiction because under section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a revision does not lie to the High Court.
We do not agree.
Section 115 CPC gives powers to the High Court to revise any order from the district court, subject of course to the limitations set out therein.
The narrow point then is as to whether the District Judge can be equated with a district court.
The High Court, following its own earlier decisions, has held so.
We agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the District Judge and the district court are interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the section uses the expression 'District Judge '.
Section 115 CPC therefore applies and the revisional jurisdiction is vested in the High Court.
" The Full Bench thereafter stated: "In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court it has to be held that the fact that the order of the District Judge under section SO(2) is made final, does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court under section 115 of the CPC to revise the orders of the District Judge made under section SO(2) in the absence of any express words in the statute taking away such jurisdiction.
" As we have mentioned earlier the learned Single Judge has relied upon a later Full Bench decision of the High Court in the case of M.M. Yaragatti (supra).
Two questions had been referred to the Full Bench for opinion, namely: (I) Whether a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court from a revisional order made by a District Judge under sub section (2) of section SO of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1967, as substituted by Karnataka Act 3 1 of 1975? and (2) Whether the ruling of the Full Bench of that Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivaram Kavelekar, (supra) requires reconsideration in view of the ruling of the 345 Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad?, ; The learned Chief Justice of the High Court who spoke for the Full Bench noticed the decision in Krishnaji 's case as also the view expressed by this Court while disposing of the special leave petition and stated: If the matter had rested here, there would not have been any controversy, but after the decision of the Full Bench in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar 's case, two decisions of the Supreme Court have been rendered, i.e., one in Vishesh Kumar 's case and the other in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, ; It was on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar 's case that the questions posed by the Division Bench had to be referred for decision to a larger Bench.
After the reference, the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal 's case has also been rendered.
It is in the wake of these two judgments that we are required to decide whether the law laid down in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar 's case still survives" The Full Bench on the authority of those two decisions came to the conclusion that the decision in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar 's case (supra) did not survive and a second revision to the High Court was not maintainable.
A two Judge Bench of this Court in Vishesh Kumar 's case was considering whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under Section 115 disposing of a revision petition and whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 against an order of District Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as amended by the Uttar Pradesh Amendment Act 1978.
The amendment shows that the District Court had also revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 and the revisional jurisdiction under that Section was shared between the High Court and the District Court by providing that the High Court has exclusive revisional jurisdiction in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rs.20,000 and above and the District Court alone had such jurisdiction in any other case.
This Court after discussing this provision and some authorities of the Allahabad High Court 346 reached the conclusion that the High Court was not vested with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of a revisional order may by the District Court under that Section.
This conclusion was obviously reached and in our view very rightly on account of the fact that the power under Section 115 of the Code had clearly indicated the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court and the High Court and vested that jurisdiction exclusively in either the District Court or the High Court depending upon the pecuniary valuation of the dispute.
This Court then proceeded in Vishesh Kumar 's case to examine the second question.
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act vested revisional jurisdiction in the High Court and that provision was amended in its application of Uttar Pradesh from time to time.
By amendment it vested revisional jurisdiction in the District Judge and by a later amendment provided that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes, the power of revision under Section 25 would vest in the High Court.
In that case the District Judge had exercised revisional power under Section 25 and the question arose as to whether the High Court could entertain a further revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This Court took the view by analysing Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act that it was a self contained Code and Section 25 provided the whole revisional jurisdiction and, therefore, the question of invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not at all arise.
The answer to the second question was in the negative.
The two conclusions reached in Vishesh Kumar 's case on the facts thereof were certainly correct but we are concerned with a different set of facts and law.
The ratio of the decision in Vishesh Kumar 's case is not directly applicable to the present facts.
The other case of this Court upon which reliance has been placed by the Full Bench is that of Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, (supra).
A two Judge Bench in that case was considering the tenability of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the High Court in view of the provision of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965).
That Section provides: "(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered 347 under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit . . " With reference to that provision a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had held that a second revision lay.
This Court stated in its judgment: "It was contended by Shri Poti, learned counsel for the appellant, that no revision lay to the High Court.
He submitted that Section 185 read with Section 20 of the Act has completely ousted the High Court 's jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure" That contention was examined by this Court.
It may be relevant to briefly refer Section 18 which provided for appeal against the order of the Rent Control Court.
Sub section (5) thereof provides: "The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 20." In construing the meaning and effect of the word final, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in South Asia Industries Private Ltd. vs S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors., In that case the question arose as to whether in view of the provision in Section 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act attaching finality to the judgment in Second Appeal by the High Court, a Letters Patent Appeal could be entertained.
Several authorities were referred to and the conclusion in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. vs James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., []953] SCR 1028 was approved.
Relying upon that decision as also the decision in Vishesh Kumar 's case, this Court held that jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded.
On the analysis presented above, the two cases upon which the Full Bench has placed reliance are really not direct authorities on the 348 point.
We have already noticed that in Krishnaji`s case the earlier Full A Bench had re1ied upon the decision of this Court in Chhagan Lal 's case.
A three Judge Bench in that case broadly dealt with a similar contention as arising here.
At page 875 of the Reports it is stated that: "The second contention is based on Section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
It provides that any appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court, when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment.
Sub section (1) of Section 149 provides that the decision of the District Court shall be final.
It was submitted that the decision of the District Court was there fore final and that the High Court was in error in entertain in a Revision Petition.
This plea cannot be accepted for, under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the High Court has got a power to revise the order passed by courts subordinate to it.
It cannot be disputed that the District Court is a subordinate court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court . " It is this observation in that judgment which had been followed in Krishnaji 's case.
We may point that the judgment of the Full Bench in Krishnaji 's case was delivered by our learned Brother Venkataramiah, J. as a member of the Full Bench then and incidentally he was one of the members of the two Judge Bench in Aundal Ammal 's case where a contrary view has been taken.
If this Court really intended to reverse the effect of the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji 's case to which our learned Brother was a party, one would have expected reference to Chhagan Lal as also Krishnaji.
As against the two authorities of this Court, namely, the cases of Vishesh Kumar and Aundal Ammal dealing with provisions of different statutes, there is a direct decision of this Court in the case of Krishnadas Bhatija which has already been quoted.
This Court was dealing with the very provision after its amendment in 1975 and the very question which now falls for consideration was before this Court.
In Krishnaji 's case the decision of this Court had been relied upon as a binding authority and it was concluded that the High Court has powers to entertain a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the revisional order of a District Court.
It is conceded that the impugned provision which was being considered by this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija 's case continues to be the same.
Though the deci 349 sion rendered in Bhatija 's case (supra) by this Court is not a detailed one, the conclusion on the point is clear and admits of no ambiguity.
The Full Bench in the impugned judgment clearly went wrong in holding that the two Judge Bench of this Court referred to by it had brought about a total change in the position and on the basis of those two judgments.
Krishnaji 's case would be no more good law.
The decision of a Full Bench consisting of three Judges rendered in Krishnaji 's case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that decision had directly been overruled by this Court or by necessary implication became unsustainable.
Admittedly there is no overruling of Krishnaji 's decision by this Court and on the analysis indicated above it cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by the direct authority of this Court stood superseded.
Judicial propriety warrarants that decisions of this Court must be taken as wholly binding on the High Courts.
That is the necessary outcome of the tier system.
We may briefly refer to the observations of the Lord Chancellor in Broom vs Cassell & Co., ; where the Lord Chancellor administered a warning by saying: "I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers".
This has been approved by this Court on more than one occasion.
Added to the above is the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution which unequivocally states that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court should not have taken into itself, the responsibility of saying that its earlier Full Bench judgment based upon a decision of this Court in the circumstances indicated above had lost its binding authority in view of two other judgments rendered in different situations and setting.
We are really not in a position to appreciate the manner in which a coordinate Bench of the High Court has chosen to overrule an earlier judgment of that Court.
On the view we have taken, it must follow that we too are bound by the decision taken by this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija 's case.
Krishnaji 's case was rendered under the Karnataka Rent control (Amendment) Act, 1975 and has held the field for over a decade.
No justification has been pointed out by the High Court why that should be discarded.
It is one of the essential requirements of the administration of justice that judgments rendered by superior courts and particularly with the approval of the apex court should not be frequently changed so as to unsettle settled positions.
The fact that the State Legislature 350 has not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at naught Krishnaji or Bhatija is indicative of the position that this Court had not taken a wrong view of the legislative intention.
In these circumstance we feel advised not to enter into an analysis of the provisions of the Act for a fresh look at the matter and prefer to follow Bhatija.
We make it clear that we have not felt it necessary to examine whether the ratio of Aundal Ammal is binding or requires reconsideration in the presence of Bhatija in the field as a direct authority.
For the reasons we have indicated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and declare that the earlier Full Bench decision in Krishnaji 's case holds the field.
This appeal became necessary on account of the wrong view taken by the High Court.
We do nat think it is proper to saddle the respondent with costs of the appeal.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Sub section (1) of section SO of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court in respect of orders passed or proceedings taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge under the Act while sub section
(2) empowers the District Judge to revise the orders passed or proceedings taken by the Court of Munsif and makes his order final.
A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shriodkar vs Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar & ORS.
, (ILR , following the decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation.
Indore, ; and Krishnadas Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, (SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th Feb., 1978) held that the fact that the order of the District Judge under section SO(2) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 is made final, does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to revise such orders of the District Judge, in the absence of any express words in the statute taking away such jurisdiction.
Later this Court, in Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; while interpreting section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, as amended by the U.P. Amendment Act, 1978, under which the revisional jurisdiction was shared between the District Court and the High Court, took the view that the High Court was not vested with revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC in respect of a revisional order made by the District Court under that section.
A similar view was also 341 taken in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, ; while construing section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 .
Relying on the aforesaid two decision a Full Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in M.M. Yaragatti vs Vasant, (ILR took a contrary view to Krishnaji 's case.
The appellant 's revision petition having been dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court following the Full Bench decision in Yaragatti 's case, he preferred an appeal to this Court by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
A revision application is maintainable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made an order in his revisional jurisdiction under section 50(2) of the Act.
Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, ; and Krishnadas Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, (S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th of February, 1978, referred to.
Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; ; Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, ; ; South Asia Industries Private Ltd. vs S.B. Sarup Singh & ors.
J and National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. vs James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., ; distinguished.
Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivaram Kavalekar & ors.
ILR approved.
M.M. Yaragatti vs Vasant, ILR overruled.
The decision of a Full Bench of the High Court consisting of three Judges rendered in Krishnaji 's Case was binding on a bench of equal strength unless that decision had directly been overruled by this Court or by necessary implication became unsustainable.
There is no such overruling of Krishnaji 's decision by this Court.
It cannot also be said that by necessary implication the ratio therein supported by the direct authority of this Court stood superseded.
[349B C] 3.
Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of the Supreme 342 Court must be taken wholly binding on the High Courts.
That is the necessary outcome of the tier system.
Article 141 of the Costitution unequivocally states that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
A coordinate Bench of the High Court, therefore, should not have chosen to overrule an earlier judgment of that Court based upon a decision of this Court.[349C F] Broom vs Cassell & Co., [19721 1 AER 801, referred to.
It is one of the essential requirements of the administration of justice that judgments rendered by superior courts and particularly with the approval of the apex court should not be frequently changed so as to unsettle settled positions.
The fact that the State Legislature has not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at naught the decisions in Krishnaji 's case or Bhatija 's case is indicative or the position that this Court had not taken a wrong view of the legislative intention [349H: 350A]


judgement:
ivil Appeals Nos.
Z37 to 239 of 1974.
From the Judgment and order dated 13.3.1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal Nos. 394 and 418 of 1970 and Writ Petition Nos. 613 and 910 of 1971.
R.R. Agarwal, Manoj Saxena and R.D. Upadhyaya for the Petitioners.
330 A.K. Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
These appeals are directed against the judgment of a Special Bench comprising two learned Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 394 of 1970 along with Special Appeal No. 418 of 1970, Writ Petition No. 613 of 1971 and Writ Petition No. 9 l0 of 1971.
The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows: Hari Shanker, the appellant before us, is a "land holder" within the meaning of said expression in the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (referred to hereinafter as "the said Act").
On 1st February, 1961, Hari Shanker filed a suit as contemplated under Section 171 of the said Act against one Habib Ahmad, who was his tenant in respect of the land in suit on the ground that in 1943 Habib had sub let the suit land to his "sub tenant", Ida, and the said sub lease was for more than five years and hence illegal and in contravention of Section 40 of the said Act.
The said suit was contested by Habib but a decree was passed in favour of Hari Shanker in that suit on 18th November, 1961.
Under the decree Habib was given an option to apply for the ejectment of Ida within one month and resume occupation of land in dispute in terms of the proviso to Section 171.
On an appeal filed by Ida, the "subtenant", the aforesaid decree was set aside by the Additional Commissioner on 18th April, 1962 and the suit of Hari Shanker was dismissed.
Hari Shanker filed a second appeal which was allowed by the Board of Revenue by its judgment dated 13th March, 1963/17th April, 1964 and the decree of the Additional Commissioner was set aside and that of the Trial Court was restored.
Ida challenged the aforesaid decision of the Board of Revenue by way of Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 2386 of 1964.
That writ petition was dismissed on 26th March, 1970 by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court and Special Appeals Nos. 394 and 418 of 1970 were filed in the said High Court against the said judgment of the learned Single Judge.
After his suit was decreed by the Board of Revenue, Hari Shanker filed an application for execution of the decree in which an objection was filed by the "sub tenant", Ida, which was dismissed by the Revenue authorities but, we are informed, the said application itself has not been finally disposed of.
Habib also filed an application dated 16th August, 1964 against Ida as contemplated under Section 171 to the proviso of the said Act.
According to Habib, the said application has not so far been 331 decided on merits.
Writ Petitions Nos. 613 of 1970 and 910 of 1971 A were filed by Habib and Ida respectively against the orders passed by the Revenue authorities in execution.
The said Special Appeals and Writ Petitions were heard together and decided by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the impugned judgment.
It may be mentioned here that it is common ground that Habib is an "ex proprietary tenant" for the purposes of Sec. 40 of the said Act and Ida is his "sub tenant" in respect of the said land within the meaning of the said term in the said Act.
The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allowed the Special Appeals as well as the Writ Petitions.
They set aside the order of the Board of Revenue decreeing the suit of Hari Shanker for ejectment of Habib & Ida under Section 171 of the said Act and dismissed the said suit.
It is against this judgment that the present appeals are directed.
As the facts are common and the appeals are against a common judgment, we propose to dispose them of by a common judgment.
We may, at this stage, take note of the relevant provisions of the said Act and certain notifications issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh which are material for our purposes.
The relevant portions of the said Act run as follows: "Section 40: ( 1) No occupancy tenant in Agra, or exproprietary tenant or hereditary tenant shall sub let the whole or any portion of his holding for a term exceeding five years, or within three years or any portion of such holding being held by a sub tenant." "Section 47: Except as otherwise provided in sub section 1 (3) and sub section (4) the extinction of the interest of a tenant, other than a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate tenant, shall operate to extinguish the interest of any tenant holding under him." "Section 171: (1) If a tenant transfers, or sub lets, the whole or any portion of his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the transferee or sub lessee has entered into possession in pursuance of such transfer of sub lease both the tenant and any person who may have thus obtained possession of the whole or any part of the holding shall on the suit of land 332 holder be liable to ejectment from the area so transferred or sublet at the date of the institution of the suit.
Provided that, in the case of a voidable sub lease, if the suit succeeds, the court shall pass a decree permitting the tenant to apply in the same proceedings within a time not exceeding one month from the date of the decree, for the ejectment of the person in whose favour the voidable sub lease has been made, and directing that if the tenant so applies and if he ejects such person and resumes occupation of the land within such further time as the court, either in the decree itself or by means of a subsequent order, may fix having regard to the provisions of section 181, the decree shall not be executed against the tenant except in respect of costs.
In such a case, the decree shall direct that if the tenant either fails to apply for the ejectment of such person within the time fixed in this behalf or fails to resume occupation within the further time allowed by the court for that purpose, the tenant as also the sub lessee shall be ejected from the area sub let at the date of the institution of the suit.
" "Section 295 A: Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary or anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force every person who on the date of the commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, is a sub tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the proviso to sub section (3) of Section (7) of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, been titled to retain possession of his holding for a period of five years from that date, and for this period nothing in sub section 92) of Section 44 or Section 171 shall render the landholder of such tenant liable to ejectment under the pro visions of section 171.
" Section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) (Amendment) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1950 inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, all suits, applications or proceedings of the categories specified in the Schedule to the said Amendment Act of 1950 under Section 10, pending on the date of the commencement of that Act or which might thereafter be instituted, presented or commenced shall be and remain stayed for so long as the said Amendment 333 Act of 1950 remains in force.
The said Amendment Act came into force in 1950.
There is a proviso to the said Section which empowers the State Government by notifications to declare that such categories of suits, applications proceedings and in such local area as the State Government might specify which are stayed under Section 10 shall cease to remain stayed.
The State Government was also empowered to reimpose the stay under a second proviso to the said Section.
A perusal of Category III of the said Schedule shows that the suits, applications and proceedings under Sections 63, 114, 117, 175 and under Sections 180 and 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 to the extent set out in the Schedule were stayed under Section 10.
The rest of the provisions in the said Schedule are not material for our purposes.
The stay in respect of suits, applications and proceedings in respect of categories I, II & III in the said Schedule to the said Amending Act VII of 1950 was lifted by a notification dated June 30, 1953.
The stay was, however, reimposed by a notification dated January 23, 1953 in respect of suits, applications and proceedings under Section 175 and 181 to the extent provided therein.
In our view, these appeals can be very shortly disposed of.
It is common ground that Habib was a "sub tenant" of Hari Shanker in respect of the suit land.
He granted a "sub tenancy" to Ida which was from year to year.
The "sub tenancy" was created in 1943 and it admittedly continued for a period of more than 5 years.
It is not disputed that the said "sub tenancy" was not terminated by Habib inspite of the provisions of Section 40 of the said Act, namely, the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939.
It may be true that even if the sub tenancy had been terminated Habib might not have been able to recover possession of the suit land from Ida but that does not affect the question of the continuance of the "sub tenancy".
As we have pointed out that "sub tenancy" was from year to year and on the expiry of the period of sub lease, Ida continued to hold over as "sub tenant" on the same terms & conditions from year to year.
The "sub tenancy" was, therefore, continued in excess of five years and thus was in violation of the provisions of Section 40 of the said Act.
As the said "sub tenancy" contravened the provisions of Section 40, Hari Shanker was clearly entitled to file a suit as contemplated by Section 171 of the said Act against Habib as well as Ida on the ground that the tenant Habib has sub let the suit land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, namely, in excess of 5 years.
There is, on the record, no defence to that suit which was rightly decreed by the Board of Revenue.
The question whether Habib was in a position to evict Ida and obtain possession of the suit land is a question which will have to 334 be decided in the application filed by Habib against Ida for the eviction of Ida from the suit land and recovery of possession thereof.
Similarly, the question as to whether the appellant, Hari Shanker, has become entitled to execute the decree in the suit to which he is entitled will have to be disposed of in the application filed by Hari Shanker against Habib as well as Ida.
All those applications, we understand, are pending before the relevant authorities and they will have to be decided according to law.
However, in our opinion, there is no doubt that in the circumstances set out above, Hari Shanker is entitled to the decree which the Board of Revenue passed in his favour and which was upheld by the learned Single Judge.
In our opinion, the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court who decided the aforesaid Special Appeals and Writ Petitions have mixed up the question of termination of the sub tenancy with the question of recovery of possession.
In the result, the aforesaid Civil Appeals are allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dated 26th March, 1970 is restored.
We may clarify that the decree passed by the Board of Revenue in favour of Hari Shanker is restored.
Looking, however, to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
H.L.C. Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
Under section 171 read with section 40 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, if a tenant sub lets the land to a 'sub tenant ' and the sub lease continues for more than five years, the 'land holder ' is entitled to eject both the tenant and the sub tanant from the land held by them.
How ever, tenants are entitled to retain possession of land for certain periods in terms of provisions of section 295 A of the Act and certain notifications issued by the State Government under section 10 of the Uttar Pradesh Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) (Amendment) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1950, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force.
The appellant, Hari Shanker, the 'land holder ' of the land in question, filed a suit under section 171 of the United Provinces Tenants Act, 1939 against his 'exproprietory tanant '.
Habib, on the ground that he had sub let the land for more than five years to a 'sub tenant ', Ida, in contravention of section 40 of the said Act.
The suit was decreed in favour of Hari Shanker and Habib was given the option to apply for ejectment of Ida and resume occupation of the land in terms of the proviso to section 171.
on an appeal filed by Ida, the Additional Commissioner set aside the decree and dismissed the suit.
Allowing the second appeal filed by Hari Shanker, the Board of Revenue restored the decree of the Trial Court.
Ida 's writ petition against that order was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court.
Meanwhile, Hari Shanker had applied for execution of the decree and the objection filed thereto by Ida was dismissed, though the application for execution itself was still pending.
Habib also filed an application against Ida as contemplated by the proviso to section 171 of the Act.
Ida 's appeal against the order aforesaid of the Single Judge and the writ petitions filed by Habib and Ida against orders passed in execution proceedings were heard together by the Division Bench of the High Court which allowed them and dismissed the suit of Hari Shanker.
329 Allowing the appeals, ^ HELD: The Division Bench of the High Court mixed up the question of termination of the sub tenancy with the question of recovery of possession.
It is common ground that Habib was a "sub tenant" of Hari Shanker in respect of the suit land.
He granted a "sub tenancy" to Ida which was from year to year.
The "sub tenancy" was created in 1943 and it admittedly continued for a period of more than 5 years.
It is not disputed that the said "sub tenancy" was not terminated by Habib in spite of the provisions of section 40 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939.
It may be true that even if the sub tenancy had been terminated Habib might not have been able to recover possession of the suit land from Ida but that does not affect the question of the continuance of the "sub tenancy".
As the said "sub tenancy" contravened the provisions of section 40, Hari Shanker was clearly entitled to file a suit as contemplated by section 171 of the said act against Habib as well as Ida on the ground that the tenant Habib has sub let the suit land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, namely, in excess of 5 years.
There is, on the record, no defence to that suit which was rightly decreed by the Board of Revenue.
[333D H I The question whether Habib is in a position to evict Ida and obtain possession of the suit land is a question which will have to be decided in the application filed by Habib against Ida for the eviction of Ida from the suit land and recovery of possession thereof.
Similarly, the question as to whether the appellant, Hari Shanker, has become entitled to execute the decree in the suit to which he is entitled will have to be disposed of in the application filed by Hari Shanker against Habib as well as Ida.
All these applications, we understand, are pending before the relevant authorities and they will have to be decided according to law.
However, in our opinion, there is no doubt that in the circumstances set out above.
Hari Shanker is entitled to the decree which the Board of Revenue passed in his favour and which was upheld by the learned Single Judge.
[333H; 334A C]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 1984.
From the judgment and order dated 29.5.1984 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 128 of 1984.
U.R. Lalit, Vivek Gambhir, Sanjay Sareen and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.
Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, Mrs. Indra Sawhney and N.S. Das Bahl for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an appeal by special leave from the order of the High Court of Delhi dated 29th May, 1984.
By the aforesaid order the appellant was refused the prayer of being joined as a party in the proceedings in execution and the order of eviction against the tenant was passed under section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
In order to appreciate the question it should be noted on 16.1.67 there was a lease in favour of respondent No. 2 of a monthly rent of 365 Rs.350 p.m. in respect of the premises in question in Greater Kailash, New Delhi.
The tenant was a company called M/s Bharat Carbons & Ribbons Manufacturing Company.
The husband of the appellant Late T.R. Narula was an employee of the said Company.
He retired in 1973.
The rent in respect of the premises had been deposited.
It is, however, not certain as to on whose account the rent was deposited.
On the one hand, the appellant contends that the rent was deposited on account of the appellant 's husband, and after the death of Shri T.R. Narula on account of heirs of said T.R. Narula, deceased individually and not on account of or on behalf of the erstwhile tenant of the premises in question.
It appears from the record that respondent No. 1 was in England at the relevant time.
The respondent No. 1 described himself as a permanent settlee in England.
The said respondent was at all relevant times represented by her attorney.
The respondent No. 1 is the landlady of the premises in question is still in England.
Their case is that both the husband and wife are fairly well advanced in age and wish to come back and settle down in India and want to live their last days of life in their own house.
They bonafide, require the premises in question.
This question of bonafide need has been held in their favour and appropriate proceedings instituted by the landlady against the tenant Company to which the appellant was not a party.
lndeed, the tenant did not really oppose the eviction petition because as, according to their version, the tenant had left the premises and Shri T.R. Narula had become the tenant, in his own right.
The respondents did not accept that position.
There was an application made by the widow of Late T.R. Narula to be joined as a party in the suit.
This was refused by learned Judge for which reasons have been given.
The learned Judge of the High Court has noted that it was the admitted position that M/s Bharat Carbons & Ribbons Manufacturing Company was the tenant and the appellant 's husband was an employee of the said company.
He retired in 1973.
The rent has been paid since then.
However, the landlady was residing out of India and she closed her account when she came back to India and in respect of that the rent was being deposited according to the appellant which appears at page 126 of the Paper Book.
The landlady protested by a letter written to the Bank.
The High Court has noted that admittedly there was no receipt in possession of the appellant regarding payment of rent.
Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a document which is described as a receipt for the rent for the month July 1973.
Counsel states that this was filed in the High Court.
Counsel further states that there are subsequent receipts.
As against these versions of the appellants herein it is asserted that these receipts were not genuine documents put in.
Subsequent receipts that had not been, according to the respondents, 366 produced before the High Court and at least relied before the High Court, were not there.
The learned Judge of the High Court proceeded on the basis that there was no evidence that there was receipt in possession of the appellant regarding payment of rent.
A strong point was made before us that if money was received from the appellant or on behalf of the appellant, it must be presumed that there was surrender of tenancy by M/s Bharat Carbons & Ribbons Manufacturing Company and there was tenancy agreement between Late T.R. Narula or his wife and the landlady.
No such evidence of the acceptance of rent was advanced before the High Court or before us to sustain that ground.
The tenancy was originally entered into between the landlady or on her behalf and the company of which T.R. Narula, since deceased, was an employee.
There was no evidence adduced and no averment made that the tenancy was for the then tenant.
Admittedly that tenancy, as it appears from the records and the evidence, came to an end after the tenant company abandoned the premises, and that it was so done was not seriously disputed and T.R. Narula, since deceased or after his death his heirs could not continue unless there was a fresh agreement of tenancy in their favour or novation of the original agreement of tenancy.
There is no cogent, reliable or dependable evidence of the same.
In view of the categorical finding of the High Court it is difficult to accept the submissions on behalf of the appellant.
Apart from that there are no other cogent or available materials to show that there was actually a new contract entered into between Late T. R. Narula and the landlady.
On the other hand the contention of the landlady and her representative since she was staying away has been to deny any connection with the appellant.
Furthermore, the alleged notice of the termination of surrender of tenancy was sent to the landlady in rather suspicious circumstances.
It is not necessary to dilate in detail on those.
The evidence on record advanced in support of the appellant on this aspect cannot and does not inspire any credence or confidence.
If that is the position than after the surrender of tenancy by the company, late T.R. Narula or his heirs had no locus standi and had no right to be joined as party.
The High Court notes that there was genuine evidence to show that the landlady needed the premises bona fide.
There were concurrent findings of facts of the two courts below and the appellant did not raise any contentions at this belated stage.
In the aforesaid view of the matter and in the facts and circum 367 stances of the case we find no ground under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.
The appeal must, therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed, specially in view of the fact that the landlady needs the premises for her family and for her own bona fide need.
Parties will pay their own costs There is, however, another aspect of the matter.
The appellant and her family have been residing there for quite sometime.
The landlady herself has not yet arrived in India and is awaiting her arrival since arrangements have to be made in India.
The husband is very much in India awaiting vacancy of the house.
In the circumstances we direct that the appellant and her family would be entitled to stay in the premises upto 15.6.88 upon filing the usual undertaking in this court within three weeks from today.
The appeal is dismissed with the aforesaid directions.
Parties will pay their own costs.
They will continue to deposit cheques to the counsel for respondents for the remaining period.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The premises in question was taken on lease at a monthly rent of Rs.350 by the tenant Company.
The rent in respect of the said premises was being deposited in the bank.
Respondent No. 1 The landlady was living abroad and as she and her husband wanted to come back and settle down in India they required the said premises.
The landlady instituted proceedings against the tenant Company to which the appellant was not a party.
The husband of the appellant was an employee of the tenant Company and he retired in 1973.
The appellant filed an application for being impleaded as a party, contending that the rent was deposited on account of the appellant 's husband, and after his death on account of his heirs individually and not on account of or on behalf of the erstwhile tenant of the premises and the tenant did not oppose the eviction petition because the tenant had left the premises, and the appellant 's husband had become the tenant in his own right.
The application was rejected, and the order of eviction was passed against the tenant under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
The appeal against the above decision was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: After the surrender of the tenancy by the Company, the appellant 's husband, or his heirs, after his death, had no locus standi, and had no right to be joined as party.
[366G ] The tenancy was originally entered into between the landlady or on her behalf and the Company of which the appellant 's husband was an employee.
Admittedly, the tenancy came to an end after the tenant 364 Company abondoned the premises.
The husband of the appellant or after his death his heirs could not continue unless there was a fresh agreement of tenancy in their favour or novation of the original agreement of tenancy.
There are no cogent or available materials to show that there was actually a new contract entered into between the husband of the appellant and the landlady, or novation of the original agreement.
[366C D] The High Court has found that there was no receipt in possession of the appellant regarding the payment of rent, and that there was genuine evidence to show that the landlady needed the premises bona fide.
There were concurrent findings of facts of the two courts below.
[366H] The appellant and her family have been residing in the premises for quite sometime.
The landlady herself has not yet arrived in India.
The husband is very much in India awaiting the vacancy of the house.
In the circumstances, the appellant and her family would be entitled to stay in the premises upto 15.6.1988.
[367C]


judgement:
ition (Civil) No. 849 of 1987.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Petitioner in person and M.S.Ganesh for the petitioner.
442 K. Parasaran, Attorney General and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The following order of the Court was delivered: O R D E R This application has been filed by an Advocate of this Court by way of a public interest litigation.
It had been listed earlier and learned Attorney General had entered appearance on behalf of the Union of India.
We have heard the petition.
It has been couched in unsavoury language and the petitioner seems to have made an intentional attempt to indulge in mud slinging against the advocates, this Court in particu lar as also other constitutional institutions.
Many of the allegations in his writ petition are likely to lower the prestige of this Court as the apex judicial institution.
At one place in the writ petition, he has alleged: "Thus the working of the Judges are cocktail based on Western Common Laws and American techniques, as such unproductive and out dated according to socio economic conditions of the country.
" At one another place, the petitioner has stated that: "This Court has become a constitutional liability without having control over the illegal acts of the Government .
Thus the people for whom the Constitution is meant have now turned down their faces against it which is a did illusionment for fear that justice is a will of the Wisp." Yet at another place the petitioner has stated that this Court is sleeping over the issues like 'Kumbhkarna. ' The reading of the writ petition gives the impression that it is clearly intended to denigrate this Court in the esteem of the people of India.
We are of the priam facie view that the petition has been drawn up with a designed purpose of bringing the Court into contempt and the petitioner is, therefore, prima facie guilty of contempt.
The writ petition has been drafted in a careless manner.
At several places the pleadings are meaningless.
At several other places 443 they are contradictory.
The allegations are clumsy and several irrelevant facts have been put into the petition to inflate its size.
The petitioner has left out no institution from his attempt of mud slinging.
We have a feeling that while drawing up the petition the petitioner has considered himself to be the only blemishless person and everyone else including social institutions to be blame worthy.
We are surprised that an advocate practising in this Court with considerable experience has choosen to act in such an irresponsible manner.
The writ petition, in our opinion, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition.
We direct the Registry to draw up an appropriate proceeding for contempt and issue notice to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause in person on 9.11.1987 as to why he may not be proceeded under the Contempt of Court Act.
At page 41 of his petition, the petitioner has stated. "This is a public interest litigation in the interest of independence of judiciary and social justice . " We are of the view that the petition is an act against public interest.
The petitioner has certainly over stepped the limit of self restraint, so much necessary in a public interest litigation.
We direct the Registry not to entertain any application by way of public interest litigation by the petitioner in future.

summary/full:
The petitioner, an advocate, filed the application by way of a public interest litigation alleging that the working of the Judges of the apex Court was cocktail, based on Western Common Law and American techniques; that the Court had become a constitutional liability without having control over the illegal acts of Government, and that the Court was sleeping over the issues.
Dismissing the writ petition, ^ HELD: The petitioner is prima facie guilty of contempt.
The petition is clearly intended to denigrate the Court in.
the esteem of the people of India.
The allegations are clumsy.
It is an intentional attempt at lowering the prestige of the Court as the apex Judicial Institution.
[442G, D; 443A] The Registry to draw up an appropriate proceeding for contempt of court and issue notice to the petitioner.
[443C] The petition is an act against public interest.
The petitioner has certainly overstepped the limit of self restraint so much necessary in such litigation.
The Registry directed not to entertain any public interest litigation application filed by the petitioner in future.
[443E]