judgement:
vil Appeal No. 432938 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.5.
1990 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. Nos.
18102, 18036, 22161, 22836 and 22877 of 1989.
Kapil Sibal, Additional Solicitor General, Satish Chan dra, Ms. Shobha Dixit, Pradeep Mishra, R.K. Virmani, Gopal Subramaniam, Harish N. Salve and D.K. Garg for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 898 RANGANATHAN, J.
We have come to the conclusion that the .
High Court 's decision under appeal has to be upheld.
But, as the question raised is one of importance and difficulty, we have heard the counsel at length.
We grant leave in all the petitions and proceed to give the reasons for our conclusion in detail.
Both sets of appeals are the off shoots of a "Residency Scheme" for junior doctors introduced in the State of U.P. and they can be conveniently disposed of by a common order.
In the State of U.P., post graduate courses in medicine were of two types: degree and diploma.
The duration of the degree course was two years and that of the diploma course, one year.
The minimum requirement for admission to a post graduate course (whether degree or diploma) was that the candidate should have passed the M.B.B.S. degree examina tion, then done one year 's internship and then done a house job for one year.
The "Residency Scheme" was notified on 22.8.89.
This was the culmination of a long period of agitation by junior doctors in the State for better emoluments and conditions of service.
This scheme was given retrospective effect from 1.8.1987, for para 8 of the scheme says: "The above residen cy scheme shall be deemed to have been enforced from 1st August, 1987".
Under the scheme, every candidate selected for a post graduate degree course would have a tenure of three years which would also be the tenure of the course itself.
All such candidates were to be called Junior Resi dents 1st year, 2nd year and 3rd year respectively during their tenure.
Each candidate selected for postgraduate diploma course would have a tenure of two years which would also be the tenure of the course and all such candidates were to be called Junior Residents 1st year and 2nd year respectively.
In other words, the duration of the degree course was raised to three years and that of the diploma course to two years.
However, simultaneously, the eligibili ty requirement of one year 's experience in a house job was dispensed with, the net result being that the total period needed, after taking a M.B.B.S. degree, to acquire a post graduate degree/diploma remained the same as before.
The modifications introduced by the new scheme needed certain transitory provisions being made for two purposes.
The first was to devise a formula of equation between the old and the new systems.
This was done by redesignating all students, junior doctors, house officers and others in position in the manner set out in para 5 of the 899 scheme.
The original notification is in Hindi but a free translation of the first part of the above para, as set out in the judgment of the High Court, reads thus: "Upon enforcement of the above Residency Scheme, all the House Officers, Junior Residents 1st year working since 1st August, 1987 and similarly working all Juniors Doctors ("all junior doctors similarly working" is perhaps a better translation) shall stand converted to the following new designation propose in the residency: section No. President designation Designation upon enforcement of residency scheme.
House Officer/Demonstrator, Junior Resident 1st year.
1st year.
Junior Resident/RMO 1st year/ Junior Resident RSO 1st year/RGO 1st year/ 2nd year.
Demonstrator 2nd year/P. G. degree student 1st year/ P.G. Diploma student 1st year.
Senior Resident/RMO 2nd year/ Junior Resident RSO 2nd year/RGO 2nd year/ 3rd year.
Demonstrator 3rd year/ Registrar/P.G. Degree students 2nd year.
The second provision necessary was in regard to their admis sion to the post graduate courses.
This was done by the second sub para or para 5 which ran thus: "At the same time ("Iske sath hi sath") the admis sion and registration of the House Officers, working at the time ("us sumay") to post graduate courses (degree/diploma course) shall be done after completion of their tenure and on the basis of their merit at M.B .B .S. and house job".
[Words in brackets give the original Hindi expressions used; emphasis added by us. ] 900 The provisions of the scheme do not explicitly say that the category of persons dealt with under the second sub para above will be admitted to the second year of the degree course (junior resident 2nd year) of the residency scheme on the basis of inter se merit.
A somewhat different line of thinking seems to have been adopted by the High Court in Dr. Sandeepa Srivastava 's case (to which we will be referring later).
But, so far as the present appeals are concerned, all parties have proceeded on the footing that the scheme is a valid one and that it envisaged that a person who had completed house job for one year could get admission into the second year of the course (whether degree or diploma).
The only controversy is whether this admission is open only to those persons who were in a house job as on 22.8.89 and completed it before 30.10.1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the appellants ') or to all persons who had been in a house job on or after 1.8.87.
The question arose when a number of doctors (hereinafter referred to as 'the writ petitioners) who had done their M.B.B.S., internship and house job by April, 1988 and who (save for one) had even obtained admis sion, in March 1989, into a diploma course sought admission in the Motilal Nehru Medical College at Allahabad ( 'M.L.N. College ', for short) into the second year of a degree course in the same or a different speciality by taking advantage of clause 5 of the residency scheme.
Their applications were rejected on the ground that the relevant clause of the scheme was a transitory provision intended to benefit only persons who were on a house job as on 22.8.1989.
They alone could take advantage of the scheme as soon as they completed the house job; not persons who had completed their house job much earlier to that date.
The writ petitioners went to Court and this time they were successful.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held, interpreting rule 5, that rule 5 extended the privilege of admission to the second year of the degree course to all persons who were working as house officers on or after 1st August, 1987.
The State, as well as certain doctors who were in house jobs as on 22.8.89 and who had been admitted to post graduate degree courses on the basis of the State 's interpretation of the scheme but lost their seats as a result of the High Court 's decision, have preferred these appeals.
Four questions arose for the consideration of the High Court (1) Is the concession contemplated by rule 5 of the scheme limited only to doctors in house jobs as on 22.8.89 or available to all those who were in house jobs as on 1.8.87 and later? (2) Is a candidate who has already been admitted to, and is 901 undergoing a diploma course eligible to seek admission to a degree course under rule 57 (3) Is it open to a candidate who is a student in a post graduate diploma course in one speciality to seek admission to the postgraduate degree course in any particular special ity? (4) Is it permissible for a candidate who is undergoing a diploma course to abandon it in the middle and join a degree course? The High Court expressed no opinion on the latter two ques tions leaving it to the Principal of the College to decide the same in due course but answered the first two questions in favour of the writ petitioners.
We are concerned here only with these two questions.
We may take the second of these questions first.
The writ petitioners say that a direct answer to this question is provided by a notification issued on 13.8.87 by the Governor of the State in pursuance of the provisions of Article 348 of the Constitution read with section 28(5) of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act (Act X of 1973), as amended Act 29 of 1974.
This notification effects an amend ment to an earlier notification dated 15.12.1982 (as subse quently amended) by adding a new para thereto.
The new para provides: "(7A) If any candidate has been admitted in post graduate Diploma or Degree Course in one speciality he shall not be eligible for admission in Post Graduate Diploma or Degree Course in any other speciality.
For removal of doubts it is clarified that if a candidate has been admitted in Post Graduate Diploma Course in one speciality he may be allowed admission in Post Graduate Degree Course in that very spe ciality.
" If this is correct, there can be no doubt that none of the writ petitioners can be denied registration and considera tion for admission to the degree course merely on the ground that he has earlier been admitted to a diploma course in some speciality.
It is urged on behalf of the appellants that this rule has lost its force on the promulgation of the new scheme.
It is difficult to see why this should be so because its principle could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the residency scheme as well.
But even if this is correct and this para is kept out of consideration altogether, there is no rule which prohibits a person (even though he may already be a student in a post graduate course) from seeking 902 admission to the second year of junior residency, the eligi bility clauses for admission to which he fulfills.
The High Court was, therefore right, while expressing no view on the question whether any of the writ petitioners are eligible to be admitted to any particular speciality, in holding that they could not be excluded from consideration for admission to the second year of the degree course merely because they are already students in a diploma course.
The first question, however, is a more difficult one.
We have considered the contentions of both sides carefully and we have come to the conclusion that there is no reason to disturb the High Court 's conclusion.
Prior to the enforce ment of the scheme, all candidates who had completed their M.B.B.S. together with one year of internship and one year of house job were eligible for admission to a postgraduate degree or diploma course and a particular candidate could make repeated attempts for being considered for admission to a particular post graduate speciality, irrespective of the batch to which he belonged or the particular year in which he was admitted to the M.B.B.S. course or the particular year in which he passed the final M.B.B.S. examination.
That liberty is available after the introduction of the new scheme also to all M.B.B.S. graduates who have completed one year of internship.
Irrespective of the year in which they qualified in the M.B.B.S. degree examination, it is open to all such candidates to seek admission to the first year of the new three year degree/two year diploma course.
That is not in dispute.
The question only is whether any of them are entitled to claim admission in the second year of that course on the ground that they had also completed their house job earlier.
The answer to this question must depend on the interpretation of the none too clear para 5 of the Residency Scheme.
In interpreting the scheme, it is first necessary to point out that the preamble to the notification sets out a two fold objective of prescribing a policy/procedure (a) for the conversion of the existing designations in the depart ments to equivalent designations and (b) for specification of the number of seats for various degree/diploma courses and for "eligibility examination for selection thereon".
[sic: apparently, this should read: "eligibility, examina tion or selection thereto". ] One further important factor to be borne in mind is that the scheme was given effect to from 1.8.87.
To ask persons, who had already completed a one year house job, to undergo the three year degree/two year diploma course would be a severe handicap to them as, earlier, they could have got their post graduate degree/diploma after two years/one year.
In order to adjust them into the new scheme 903 the State designated holders of house jobs as "junior resi dents (first year)" under the new scheme.
This enabled the holders of house jobs to get into the second year course under the residency scheme.
It has been stated, in the appellants ' rejoinder, that a large number of candidates who had completed their M.B.B.S. even ten years earlier and some candidates who were even on the verge of completing a post graduate degree course had applied for registration as junior residents (2nd year) along with the appellants and the writ petitioners.
This kind of situation would be im practical.
Obviously, the scheme could not be stretched and converted into a limitless provision making it possible for all persons who had completed their house jobs at some distant past to compete for admission to the second year of the degree course.
That is why para 5 limited the scope of the redesignation and admission.
The first part of it limit ed the equation above referred to only to persons who were working on house jobs since 1.8. 1987.
The High Court was clearly right in saying that the words "1st year" used in column of the table in para 5 against serial No. 1 govern only "demonstrator".
It is clear that the words "House Officer", "Junior Resident" and "Senior Resident" used against serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 redesignate all such officers working since 1.8.87 as "junior residents 1st , 2nd and 3rd year" respectively.
That being so, both the writ petitioners as well as the appellants before us are all "junior resi dents (1st year)" and should be eligible for admission to the second year of the residency scheme course.
But, it is said, this cannot be, for two reasons.
One is that the second sub para of para 5 is restricted only to those who were House Officers on 22.8.89.
We think that this contention has been rightly repelled by the High Court.
To accept this construction would mean a segregation of the two parts of para 5 and the substitution of the words "on 22nd August 1989" for the words "since 1st August 1987" used in the first para of para 5.
The words "us sumay" clearly establish a nexus between the two parts of para 5 and can only refer to the period referred to in the first part viz. "since 1st August 1987".
It is difficult to see how a refer ence to two different periods could have been intended by the two parts of para 5.
That this could not be so is also clear for the scheme, though announced on 22.8.89, was to be effective from 1.8. 1987.
That is why a line is drawn as on that date and all persons who are working as house officers, junior resident doctors or senior resident doctors since that date are all assimilated into the new scheme.
There is no justification to read such assimilation as partial, as contended for by the State.
It was contended that the scheme was the outcome of negotiations with junior doctors in the State who were 904 agitating for better conditions of service and higher emolu ments and that the settlement with them was only that higher emoluments will be paid w.e.f. 1.8.87.
Necessary material to substantiate this plea was not placed before the High Court or before us.
But even assuming that the negotiations and agreement had a limited scope, we have to interpret the scope of para 5 on its language.
The reference to the period since 1.8. 1987 in para 5 fits in with the declaration in para 8 that the scheme should be deemed to have come into force on 1.8.87.
In this context, it is of significance that the scheme notified on 22.8.89 states that the scheme has been introduced in pursuance of proposals submitted to the State Government "for the desired improvement in under graduate/post graduate training" in all colleges and hospi tals but makes no reference to the revision of the scales of pay of the junior doctors.
It is, therefore, difficult to accept the plea that the date 1.8.87 has significance only in the matter of pay scales and nothing else.
This objection is not, therefore, sustainable.
The second point made by the State and the appellants is that the writ petitioners, under the scheme, are already "junior residents 2nd year" as they are already in the first year of a post graduate diploma course and they can not, therefore, be eligible for admission to the second year of the degree course where also they will be designated as "junior residents 2nd year".
In our view, the objection is untenable.
In the first place, it is only a variation of the argument that a person already undergoing a diploma course cannot be admitted to a degree course, which we have reject ed already.
But that apart, there is ' nothing wrong in the writ petitioners being admitted to the second year degree course and being called "junior residents 2nd year" there instead of in the diploma course.
In this context, it is necessary to point out that they have been admitted into the diploma course only in March 1989 and that they are not seeking any credit for the period of education they have undergone in the diploma course.
It is then argued that the words "ussamay" occurring in the second part of para 5 of the scheme is really a mistake for "at this time" or "is sumay" or "vartman mein".
In support of this contention, it is pointed out that the Director of Medical Education had written to the secretary to the Government on 2.11.1989 requesting that the word "vartman" be substituted in place of "us samay" in the notification of 22.8.89 "so that the meaning of the above lines shall be clear".
It is also submitted that the refer ence to such persons being eligible for admission "after the completion of the tenure" in the house job also makes it clear that persons who had already completed 905 their house jobs in 1987 or 1988 are not within contempla tion.
We are unable to agree.
When the notification talks of "us samay", we cannot read it differently.
The letter of Director of Medical Education dated 2.11.
1989 finds a reference only in the appellants ' rejoinder affidavit and the writ petitioners have had no opportunity to meet it.
The State has not referred to this letter, or the action taken on it, anywhere.
These difficulties apart, the letter pat ently seeks to bring about a change in the contents of the notification and is not a simple request for clarification as it purports to be.
At best, it only reflects the Direc tor 's understanding of the notification and cannot bind the writ petitioners or the Court.
Also, no information has been furnished by the appellants or the State as to whether the request of the Director has been accepted and an amendment published by the Government for the amendment suggested can become effective only on such publication.
It may be pointed out a propose this contention that the notification of 22.8.89 itself had been published in the Gazette only on 25.11.89, much subsequent to the Director 's letter.
Even assuming that her suggestion has since been accepted and the words "at that time" stand replaced by the words "at the present time" by a proper notification later, that amendment cannot affect the parties before us.
The date material for the purposes of their admission was 30.9.89, the last date by which the applications had to be sent in.
That being so, the words "us samay" used in the second sub para of para 5 are the operative words.
They clearly embody a reference to an anterior point of time and this can only be a reference to the period since 1.8.87 which finds specific mention in the first sub para and which is the period subsequent to the scheme coming into operation.
Thus, all persons doing house jobs after 1.8.87 are covered by the second sub para of para 5.
The words "after completion of the tenure" had to be used here because the class of persons referred to also included those who were in house jobs as on 22.8.89.
Indeed this was how the scheme was understood by the Principal of the M.L.N. College and, perhaps, by the other principals too.
We find that the terms of the advertisement issued by the Principal, M.L.N. College, to which the writ petitioners had responded said this: "Candidates must have passed M.B.B.S. Degree from a University recognised by M.C.I., should have completed one year compulsory rotatory internship training and should have completed/will be completing one year house manship in the subject concerned by 30th October, 1989 . " 906 This was the understanding of the scheme by the College Principal and, admittedly, the writ petitioners fulfilled these requirements.
There is, therefore, no substance in the second contention either.
Ms. Sobha Dixit, appearing for the State, submitted that the interpretation placed by the High Court creates two types of major difficulties.
The first is that though the High Court 's decision related only to M.L.N. College at Allahabad, similar claims have also been made for admissions into post graduate courses all over the State and, in some cases, the High Court, following the present case, has issued directions to a like effect with the result that a large number of candidates who have secured admissions are now facing the loss of their seats and of the benefit of almost one year of study which they have already undergone by now.
This argument, in our opinion, has no force.
It does not appear to be correct to say that the High Court 's deci sion in the present case will affect admissions all over the State.
The respondents have stated thus in para 13 of their counter affidavit: The admission in other Medical Colleges of U.P. have been done on the basis of old rules i.e. on the basis of Govt.
Notification dated 15.12.
1982 and 13.8.1987 and the students who have completed their house job much earlier prior to 22.8.89 were given admission in 2 year degree and 1 year diploma course according to their respective merits after the introduction of residency scheme dated 22.8.89." (underlining ours) This remains uncontroverted.
Further, the validity of the admissions made to the other colleges would depend on those who had applied for admission there.
If earlier batches of house officers had also applied for admission to those colleges and been refused admission, as in the M.L.N. Col lege, the position may be similar to that in the present case.
If, however, such persons had not at all applied or had been duly considered, no question can arise now for their consideration.
No unjustified revision of completed admissions is, therefore, likely to result.
The plea that the appellants have already completed about a year in the course and should not lose the benefit thereof cannot also be given much weight because, by interim orders passed in the writ petitions, the High Court had made it clear that they were being allowed to continue in the course only on the specific understanding 907 that their admissions will be subject to the result of the writ petitions.
The second point made by the State counsel is that it compels the batch of students working in a house job as on 22.8.89 to face competition from earlier batches and this according to her, is contrary to law.
In support of this contention, she referred to certain observations made by this Court that it would not be correct to compare the merits of candidates in different examinations and different States.
We see no force in this contention.
As pointed out earlier, before and after the introduction of the scheme, admission to the first year of the scheme was and will by open competition between medical graduates who had completed house jobs or internships irrespective of the batch to which they belong.
It is stated in an affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants that, though the writ petitioners, while getting admission to the postgraduate diploma course earlier had to compete with earlier batches of students, they were given some preference.
We do not know on what basis such preference was given and it is too late now to examine that aspect.
But the fact remains that they were considered along with candidates of earlier batches.
We, therefore, see no justification for contending that great injustice will be caused to the appellants because it has become necessary for them to face competition from two earlier batches of stu dents.
On the contrary, as pointed out by the High Court, it is the interpretation pleaded for by the State that may offend article 14 of the Constitution.
We have held earlier that the scheme, though introduced in 1989 is effective from 1.8.87.
If that be so, to place house officers working on 22.8.89 alone in a better position than those who had com pleted house jobs in 1987, 1988 or earlier in 1989 would result in a discrimination in their favour and against the writ petitioners unrelated to indeed, contrary to the very object and purpose of giving the scheme retrospective effect from 1.8.87.
One further contention raised on behalf of the state and the appellants is based on a decision of the High Court in the case of one Dr. Sandeepa Srivastava (Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13419/89), a petition for special leave against which was dismissed by this Court (SLP 1380/89 dismissed on 6.4.90).
Dr. Srivastava had completed M.B.B.S. in 1987 and one year internship in June 1988 and had applied for admission to a house job but before the admission could be decided upon, the Residency Scheme had been introduced.
She challenged the admission to the first year of the degree course granted by the M.L.N. College, in preference to her, to one Dr. Surabhi Rai who 908 had completed her M.B.B.S. in 1987, completed her internship in 1988 and was in a house job as on 22.8.89.
A very pecul iar situation seems to have arisen in that case.
Dr. Surabhi Rai had applied for admission to the first year and not the second year of the new residency course though she was on a house job as on 22.8.89.
It appears she could not apply for the 2nd year like the writ petitioners here as her house job could not be completed by 30.10.89, the date mentioned in the advertisement with which we are concerned.
Dr. Srivasta va contended before the High Court (a) that only the 1983 batch of students who had passed M.B.B.S. in 1988 were eligible for admission to the degree course and not those who had passed out earlier; and (b) that Dr. Surabhi Rai should have sought admission to the second, and not the first, year of the Junior Residency course.
The court re jected the first contention which was patently untenable and this was sufficient to dispose of the writ petition.
The court, however, also proceeded to consider the second con tention and dealt with it as follows: "The second contention of the petitioner has also no force.
For this proposition, the petitioner has relied on the last part of para 5 of the Government order dated 22.8.89.
Para 5 of the Government Order has laid down that house officers and Junior doctors working since August 1, 1987 will be converted into Junior Residents of First Year.
Second year etc.
in accordance with the chart given in this para.
Last part of this para lays down about these house officers, who were working since 1.8.87.
This para does not provide for the criteria or deal with the admission of those candidates, who have joined the First Year House Job and have not yet completed even first year.
The cases of those, who have joined the course of house job but could not complete till the introduction of the new scheme of the residency, has been considered in the meeting of the Principals of all the Medical Colleges of U.P. and Director of Medical Education and Training on 16.9.1989.
Para 6 of this resolution laid down that as the course of house job has been abolished after the enforcement of the residency scheme and the candi dates, who are undergoing training of house job cannot pursue their studies and training any more and as such.
all those candidates, who are undergoing training of house job should be admitted in the first year course of Junior Resi dency on the basis of merit.
This resolution of the Princi pals of all the Medical Colleges appears to be fair and 909 most reasonable. ' As the course of house job has been abol ished and the candidates undergoing this course cannot possibly pursue their studies and if they are not admitted in the first year of the Junior Residency, they will suffer great hardship and irreparable loss, because they have been deprived of their right to persue their course of house job in the middle of the session.
When the course of house job has been abolished, it is impossible for the persons undergoing the course of house job to persue their studies any more.
In fact respondent No. 3 would have been happy, if she was permitted to continue and conclude the one year course of house job, because in that case after few months she would have got admission in the second year of Junior Residency and would have become senior to the petitioner and all others, who will be joining the first year of Junior Residency course now, but on ac count of the abolition of the system of house job it became impossible for the Respondent No. 3 to continue with the course and as such, she had to be contended with the admis sion in the first year of Junior Residency course.
" We do not wish to say anything about this part of the judgment as we are not aware whether any appeal has been sought therefrom.
It is sufficient to point out that all the appellants before us are persons who were in a house job on 22.8.89 and are claiming admission to the second year of the degree course.
We shall, therefore, simply content ourselves by saying that, since all the parties before us have pro ceeded on the footing that persons in the position of the appellants are eligible for admission as Junior Residents 2nd year, we are not called upon to consider the correctness of the judgment in Dr. Sandeep Srivastava 's case on this point.
That was a case which dealt with an admission to the first year of the degree course and, since there is nothing in the scheme which prohibits any person in the position of the appellants or Dr. Surabhi Rai from applying for admission as junior resident 1st year, the decision of the High Court was clearly correct.
The dismissal of the SLP in that case does not, therefore, affect our present discus sion.
The Judgment of the High Court in appeal before us, the judgment in Dr. Sandeepa Srivastava 's case and the other judgments to which Ms. Sobha Dixit made a reference, howev er, make it clear that the interpretation of the clauses of the scheme is, by no means, an easy 910 task.
In practice also, the basis on which the principals at least the principal of the M.L.N. College proceeded does not appear consistent with the letter of the Director of Medical Education dated 2.11.89.
In this state of affairs, we think that it is upto the State to find out a practical solution to ensure that the student community is not prejudiced by the ambiguities in the scheme.
In this context, our attention was drawn to the directions of this Court in the case of Mridula Avasthi and Others vs University of Delhi and Others, ; "In this background we are of the view that the impasse created on account of the rival claims advanced by the freshers and the seniors has to have a rough and ready solution yet not arbitrary and as acceptable and satisfying as possible.
We find that the two year degree course spe ciality wise has 149 seats while the three year degree course has 139 seats.
For convenience we extract the partic ulars made available at page 4 of the Bulletin of Informa tion.
It may be pointed out that there are 1003 candidates as against total 270 vacancies (degree and diploma courses together) for the seniors; and there are 33 1 candidates as against 205 vacancies for the two courses for the freshers.
With a view to providing some more seats for seniors we suggested to Mr. Rao appearing for the University that the number of seats may be increased and he has on instructions agreed, provided the Union of India provides funds and the Medical Council agrees to accommodate.
There are 21 special ities as indicated above.
We direct that the University shall create one seat in every speciality and thus 21 addi tional seats will be available over and above the 149 seats fixed by the University representing the 75% quota.
To this enhanced number of seats the 25% reservation of All India Selection shall not apply.
From the reserved seats made for the freshers, 21 seats being one from every speciality shall be taken away and made available to the seniors.
Thus 42 seats in all will be available for the seniors in the Post Graduate course to be filled up on the basis of inter se merit keeping the senior group apart.
The creation of the 21 seats will involve addi tional funds to be provided by the Union of India.
It will also require approval of the Medical Council of India and there 911 will perhaps also be necessity for permitting the variation of guide student ratio.
Since it is for one year and there would be no scope for recurrence and this has arisen in peculiar circumstances explained above, we direct the Gov ernment of India to take our order made without hearing it with a sense of understanding and make the necessary provi sions.
We also suggest to the Indian Medical Council to provide the necessary accommodation by relaxing the require ments.
These may be done quickly so that the time schedule may not be affected.
" Based on the above observations, an application has been filed before us praying that directions may be issued to the State of create, with the approval of the Medical Council of India, an adequate number of additional seats to accommodate all the applicants in the second year of the degree course in some speciality subject to the other rules in force in the State in this behalf.
We do not know how far this will be feasible having regard to the position prevalent not only in the M.L.N. Medical College but also elsewhere in the State.
We do not know how many additional seats will have to be created on this footing and whether it is at all possible to do so.
We, therefore, give no specific directions but leave it to the State Government to review the situation in the entire State and see if any solution that will accommo date all the contestants, who qualify on merit, can be found out.
However, any such review should not stand in the way of the immediate consideration subject to other rules in force of the writ petitioners for admission as "junior residents 2nd year".
They have already lost almost one year of the degree course though, presumably, (except perhaps for one) they have been continuing their studies in the post graduate courses where they had been earlier admitted.
This should be set right and such of those as are admitted should be enabled to make up for lost time and to complete their post graduate course, if possible, by the end of 1991.
With the above observations, these appeals are dis missed.
We, however, make no order as to costs.
R.S.S. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellants are junior doctors who were in a house job on 22.8.1989.
They had been admitted to post graduate degree course (second year) in the M.L.N. Medical COllege under the "Residency Scheme" for junior doctors, which was notified on 22.8.1989 but was given retrospective effect from 1.8.1987.
They, however, lost their seats as a result of the High Court 's decision allowing the writ petitions flied by the respondent doctors whose applications for admission to the same course had been rejected.
The modifications introduced by the Residency Scheme needed certain transitory provisions being made for two purposes.
The first was to devise a formula of equating between the old and the new systems.
This was done by redes ignating all students, junior doctors, house officers and others in position in the manner set out in para 5 of the scheme.
The second provision necessary was in regard to their admission to the post graduate courses.
This was done by the second sub para of para 5.
The respondent doctors who had done their M.B.B.S., internship and house job by April 1988 and who had even obtained admission, in March 1989, into a diploma course, sought admission in the M.L.N. College into the second year of a degree course by taking advantage of clause 5 of the Residency Scheme.
Their applications were rejected on the ground that the clause 5 of the scheme was a transitory provision intended to benefit only persons who were on a house job as on 22.8.1989; they alone could take advantage of the scheme as soon as they completed the house job; and not persons who had completed their house job much earlier to that date.
Thereupon, these doctors filed writ petitions in the High Court.
A Division Bench of the High Court al lowed the petitions and held that clause 5 extended the privilege of admission to 896 the second year of the degree course to all persons who were working as house officers on or after 1st August, 1987.
The State as well as certain doctors who were in house jobs as on 22.8.1989 and who had been admitted to post graduate degree courses on the basis of the State 's inter pretation of the scheme but lost their seats as a result of the High Court 's decision, have preferred these appeals.
So far as the present appeals are concerned, all parties have proceeded on the footing that the residency scheme is a valid one and that it envisaged that a person who had com pleted house job for one year could get admission into the second year of the course (whether degree or diploma).
The only controversy is whether this admission was open only to those persons who were in a house job as on 22.8.1989 and had completed it before 30.10.1989.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court, HELD: (1) There is no rule which prohibits a person (even though he may already be a student in a post graduate course) from seeking admission to the second year of junior residency, the eligibility clauses for admission to which he fulfills.
The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that they could not be excluded from consideration for admission to the second year of the degree course merely because they were already students in a diploma course.
[901H; 902A B] (2) To ask persons, who had already completed a one year house job, to undergo the three year degree/two year diploma course would be a severe handicap to them as, earlier, they could have got their postgraduate degree/diploma course after two years/one year.
In order to adjust them into the new scheme the State designated holders of house jobs as "junior residents (first year)" under the new scheme.
This enabled the holders of house jobs to get into the second year course under the residency scheme.
[902H; 903A] (3) The scheme, however, could not be stretched and converted into a limitless provision making it possible for all persons who had completed their house jobs at some distant past to compete for admission to the second year of the degree course.
That is why para 5 limited the scope of the redesignation and admission.
The first part of it limit ed the equation only to persons who were working on house jobs since 1.8.1987.
[903B C] 897 (4) The date material for the purpose of their admission was 30.9.1989, the last date by which the applications had to be sent in.
That being so, the words "ussamay" used in the second sub para of para 5 are the operative words.
They clearly embody a reference to an anterior point of time and this can only be a reference to the period since 1.8.1987 which finds specific mention in the first sub para and which is the period subsequent to the scheme coming into opera tion.
[905D E] (5) All persons doing house jobs after 1.8.1987 are covered by the second sub para of para 5.
The words "after completion of the tenure" had to be used here because the class of persons referred to also included those who were in house jobs as on 22.8.1989.
[905F] (6) It is clear that the words "House Officer", "Junior Residents" and "Senior Residents" used against serial Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in para 5 of the scheme redesignate all such officers working since 1.8.1987 as "junior residents 1st, 2nd and 3rd year" respectively.
That being so, both the writ petitioners as well as the appellants are all "junior resi dents (1st year)" and should be eligible for admission to the second year of the residency scheme course.
[903D E] (7) It is clear from the judgments of the High Court on the subject that the interpretation of the clauses on the scheme is by no means an easy task.
In this state of af fairs, it is upto the State to find out a practical solution to ensure that the student community is not prejudiced by the ambiguities in the scheme.
[909H; 910A] Mridula Avasthi and Others vs University of Delhi and Others, ; , referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4380 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4th October, 1985 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 4065 of 1985.
R.K. Garg and A. Sharan for the Appellant.
K.K. Venugopal, P. Chidambaram, section Sukumaran, K.K. Lahiri, D. Partha Sarthy and S.N. Jha (N.P.) for the Re spondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: Special leave granted.
We have heard Mr. Garg for the appellant, Mr. Chidamba ram for the Principal Employer and Mr. Venugopal for the respondent Union.
A reference was made by the State Government of Bihar under section 10 of the to the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi, on 9.7.81 referring to the following disputes for adjudication: (1) Whether the contract workers engaged by the management of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur in the following permanent and regular nature of work before 11.2.
198 1 are entitled for permanent employment? (2) Transportation of materials within the plant which is not dependent on outside supply; (3) All processes connected with the manufacturing process; 979 (4) Removal and handling of waste product; and (5) Sweeping and cleaning the machines, conveyors, shops and offices.
The Tribunal by its Award dated 18.12.1984 , came to hold that the workmen constituted the contract labour and, there fore, the reference was not maintainable.
If further held that action, if any, had to be taken only under section 10 of the and the power to take steps under that statutory provision vested in the State Government and not in the Tribunal.
It may be pointed out that prior to the reference being made to the Tribunal, the matter had been taken before the Patna High Court and by judgment dated 4.9.1981 the writ petition was disposed of holding that a reference had al ready been made to the Industrial Tribunal and the Award was awaited and it was open to the State Government to take steps under section 10(1) of the .
The High Court in its ultimate conclusion indicated: "When the Award was finally made by the Industrial Tribunal, to the State Government, as the learned Advocate General assures us, shall determine the matter in accordance with law.
If after such an Award is made and no decision is taken by the State Government within a reasonable time, the peti tioners shall be at liberty to move this Court again . " The subsequent events have exposed the fallacy of the con clusion of the High Court.
In fact if the provisions of the had been properly kept in view; no reliance could have been placed on the fact that the Award was awaited.
When the Award was made challenge was raised before the High Court but it refused to entertain the writ petition.
The appeal by special leave is against the in limine dis missal of the writ petition.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and it has been brought to our notice by Mr. Chidam baram that in regard to Items 1, 2 and 4 of the heads of dispute as indicated in the reference, the contract labour system is no more vogue and contract labour is now 980 confined to Item 3 only.
In view of the changed situation and taking into consideration the background of the dispute as also the fact that the litigation has been pending for almost a decade now, we do not think it would be appropriate to take a technical view of the situation and endorse the decision of the Tribunal.
We are, therefore, inclined to substitute the terms of the reference to the Tribunal by indicating that the reference shall now read thus: "Whether the contract workers engaged by the Management of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur in the permanent and regular nature of work before 11.2.
198 1 are entitled to permanent employment in regard to Items 1, 2 and 4 under the Principal Employer.
" In regard to Item No. 3 it shall be for the State Gov ernment to take its own decision under the provisions of the as to whether the contract labour employment should be terminated, and since the State Government had already been considering this matter for some time, we direct the State Government to take its decision in terms of the assurances held out by its learned Advocate General to the Patna High Court several years back within three months from now.
To regulate the matter in a more effective way before the Tribunal and keeping in view the submissions made by Mr. Venugopal we direct that 'the Tribunal shall initially devote attention to identify the workmen who are desirous of being permanently absorbed under the Principal Employer and after such identification is made, the matter should be proceeded with in accordance with law.
All parties should be given full opportunity to raise their contentions and sub stantiate the same with such evidence as they like to lead but the Tribunal shall ensure that the dispute is disposed of within six months from today.
If necessary, full atten tion should be given to this case so as to comply with the direction regarding disposal within the time limit set by us.
There would be no order for costs.
P.S.S. Appeal disposed of.

summary/full:
The contract workers engaged by the management of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur in the perma nent and regular nature of work before February 11, 1981 in (1) transportation of materials within the plant which was not dependent on outside supply, (2) processes connected with manufacturing process, (3) removal and handling of waste products, and (4) sweeping and cleaning of machines etc., sought permanent employment under the principal em ployer.
The dispute was referred by the State Government under section 10 of the to the Industrial Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the workmen constituted the contract labour and, therefore, the reference was not main tainable.
It further held that action, if any, had to be taken under section 10 of the , power to take steps for which vested in the State Government and not in the Tribunal.
The writ petition challenging the award was dismissed by the High Court in limine.
In the appeal by special leave it was brought to the notice of the Court on behalf of the management that con tract labour was now confined to item 3 only.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court ordered: 1.
The reference to the Tribunal shall now read: "Wheth er the contract workers engaged by the management of the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd., Jamshedpur in the perma nent and regular nature of work before 11.2.1981 are enti tled to permanent employment in 978 regard to items 1, 2 and 4 under the principal employer".
[980B C] 2.
The State Government to take its own decision within three months under the provisions of the in regard to item No. 3 as to whether the contract labour employment should be terminated.
[980D] 3.
The Tribunal to dispose of the dispute within six months.
[980F]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3951 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.1990 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 12 of 1990.
V.A. Bobde, A.K.Sanghi and section Mudaliar for the Appellants.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Mrs. Sadhna Ramachandran and Jagan Mohan Rao for the Respondent.
Respondent, Raj Kumar Thakur, was a student in the Postgraduate Doctoral Programme as a Ph.D. scholar with his subject for doctoral study "Breeding of Honey Bees A Mellif era for Honey production through Artificial Insemination" which is a subject under the Department of Agriculture of Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry and is a course of study available in several other institutions in the country.
The respondent was registered for this course in 1985 and was required to complete the same in six semes ters with entitlement for extension by two more semesters by the Dean on the recommendation of the Adviser and for a further extension of two more semesters by the Vice Chancel lor of the Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry on the recommendation of the Dean.
The respondent completed seven semesters as a student and registered for the eighth semester on 24.7.1989 as a student of the Univer sity.
However, during this period respondent was appointed as Assistant Scientist in the pay scale of Rs.2200 4000 vide letter of appointment dated 26.7.1989.
The Dean by order dated 774 27.7.1989 permitted the respondent to register for the eighth semester.
This permission of the Dean was granted without the knowledge of the respondent having become an employee of the University as a result of the appointment letter dated 26.7.1989.
The respondent joined the post of Assistant Scientist pursuant to this appointment on 29.7.1989.
The respondent thereafter applied for a further extension of his registration for the course for the ninth semester.
The Vice Chancellor vide his order dated 22.11.1989 refused the permission on the ground that the respondent having become an employee of the University, was not entitled to that benefit in accordance with the provi sions applicable.
The restrictions in regard to an employee/teacher of the University for the purpose are as under: "(a) An employee/teacher of the University is permitted to undertake doctoral programme only in subjects for which facilities in other Universities in the country are not available.
Forestry being one such subject in the petitioner University.
The course of study of the respondent viz. Agriculture, is however, available in numerous other insti tutions and Universities in the country.
(b) An employee/teacher is required to take study leave and the same is admissible for pursuing approved courses outside the University only.
It is only in cases where facilities for the course of study which is not available elsewhere in the country, an in service teacher is permitted to undertake the same in the petitioner University.
(c) Study leave is not granted as a matter of fight and can be granted only after the employee/teacher has completed five years of continuous service in the University.
(d) Considering the number of employees aspiring to do doctoral programme the permission to do the same is given according to seniority.
" An employee of the University would be required to complete the Ph.D. within eight years of recruitment failing which increments are not admissible till completion of the course.
An employee who is Assistant Professor or holds an equivalent post, the respondent being in that category, normally becomes entitled to the senior scale of Rs.3000 5000 after completion of eight years of service.
However, in case of an employee obtaining the Ph.D. degree the senior scale be 775 comes applicable after five years instead of eight years.
On completion of eight years in the senior scale an employee/teacher is promoted to the next higher rank of reader.
Thus, a person getting a Ph.D. degree gets the senior scale ,earlier and consequently he is also promoted earlier to the post of reader.
There are 24 other employees who are senior to the respondent and are awaiting completion of their five years service for doing the doctoral programme and there are eight other employees who joined initially with the Ph.D. degree and are awaiting completion of five years for getting the senior scale.
The consequence of granting permission to the respondent for registration to the ninth semester would be to confer on the respondent the benefit which is not available to an employee of the Univer sity because of the aforesaid restrictions and this would result in giving a benefit to the respondent contrary to the provisions applicable while denying the same to others who are senior to the respondent in employment.
According to the appellants this was the reason for refusal by the Vice Chancellor of the permission sought by the respondent.
The respondent challenged this refusal of the permission to him by the Vice Chancellor by order dated 22.11.89 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in C.W.P. No. 12 of 1990.
By the impugned judgment dated 10.4.1990, the Full Bench of the High Court by majority allowed the writ petition and direct ed the Vice Chancellor to register the respondent for the remaining two semesters, namely, the ninth and the tenth semesters.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
The grievance of the appellants is that the result of the impugned majority judgment of the High Court Would be that though the respondent is an employee/teacher of the University he would be doing research in a subject in which otherwise employees of the University are not permitted; the respondent would get the senior scale earlier and also be promoted to the post of Reader much before 24 persons senior to him who are awaiting their turn in the order of seniority to undertake the doctoral programme after completion of the requisite five years service which is contrary to the statu tory provisions; and the 24 other employees senior to the respondent would be adversely affected even without being parties in the writ petition.
The statutory provisions applicable to the case and their meaning is not in controversy.
The only controversy is whether the respondent can be treated as an employee or in service candidate for the Ph.D. course on these facts so as to attract the restrictions which are relied on by the University for refusing the permission for registration to the 776 ninth and tenth semesters sought by the respondent.
The majority opinion in the impugned judgment takes the view that the respondent is not an in service candidate for this purpose as he has already completed eight semesters and requires only two or three months to complete the Ph.D. course.
The majority has also been influenced by the fact that refusal of permission for completing the course at this stage would be hard on the respondent.
The minority view of Bhawani Singh, J., is that on appointment to a teaching post in the University, the respondent incurred the disability and attracted the restrictions which are applicable to all employees of the University irrespective of the consequence flowing from it.
In our opinion, the minority judgment of Bhawani Singh, J., on this point and the conclusion reached by him that the respondent attracted the restrictions at taching to all employees of the University on his appoint ment as a teacher of the University is the correct view and the respondent cannot escape from the statutory restrictions which became applicable to him as soon as he became an in service candidate for the remaining part of the Ph.D. course on his taking up of the appointment in the University.
The further fact that the benefit claimed by the respondent, if granted, would result in the respondent getting consequen tial benefits much before his several seniors as a result of this permission alone cannot also be overlooked.
It is not a case of merely giving some benefit to the respondent even by relaxation of some statutory provisions without causing any prejudice to anyone else but a case where such a benefit granted to the respondent alone from amongst a large number of employees of the University would also seriously preju dice their claim and amount to an act of discrimination.
Obviously, such a course is impermissible.
This is the consequence of the High Court judgment and, therefore, it must be set aside.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 10.4.1990 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in C.W.P. No. 12 of 1990 is set aside.
No costs.
R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The grant of permission to an in service teacher of the appellant University to undertake doctoral programme is subject to the statutory restrictions; (a), that the course of study is not available in other institutions and univer sities, (b) that the study leave would be admissible for pursuing approved courses outside the University only, (c) that the study leave would be granted after the teacher has completed five years of continuous service in the Universi ty, and (d) that the permission to do the same would be given according to seniority.
An Assistant Professor becomes entitled to the senior scale after completion of eight years of service.
However, the senior scale becomes applicable to a person getting Ph.D. degree after five years instead of eight years.
The respondent was a Ph.D. student under the Department of Agriculture of the appellant University for a course of study available in several other institutions, which he was required to complete in six semesters, with entitlement for extension by two semesters each on the recommendation of the Adviser and the Dean respectively.
Subsequently, he was appointed Assistant Professor in the said University.
He had by then completed seven semesters.
He was permitted by the Dean to register for the eighth semester without the knowl edge that he had become an employee of the University.
However, thereafter he was refused permission by the Vice Chancellor to register for the ninth semester on the ground that having become an employee of the University he was not entitled to that benefit.
In the writ petition challenging the said refusal the High Court by majority found that the respondent was not an in service candidate as he had already completed eight semesters and directed the Vice Chancellor to register him for the ninth and the tenth semesters.
773 Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court, HELD: The respondent could not escape from the statutory restrictions which became applicable to him as soon as he became an in service candidate for the remaining part of the Ph.D. course on his taking up of the appointment in the University The benefit claimed if granted to him alone would result in his getting consequential benefits much before his several seniors and would seriously prejudice their claim and amount to an act of discrimination.
Such a course is impermissible.
[776D E]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2483 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.
1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 1744 of 1982.
Gobind Mukhoty and U.S. Prasad for the Appellants.
Ms. Rachna Gupta, Ms. Rani Chhabra and M.C. Dhingra for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by Appellant is a Society registered under the , 21 of 1860.
Five persons of whom some are respondents before us instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Varanasi challenging the election of the Manag ing Committee and other elected officers of the appellant and asked for rendition of accounts.
This suit of 1981 is still pending.
We are now concerned with the correctness of the finding on the preliminary issue as to whether such a suit is maintainable in the Civil Court.
The defendants ' objection to the maintainability is grounded upon the provi sions contained in Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act.
The Courts below have taken the view that the suit is not barred.
That is why the defendants are here by special leave.
973 A litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statute, a right to institute a suit in the civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
The position is well settled that exclu sion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either expressly or implied.
Reliance has been placed by Mr. Mukhoty before us on the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in K.S. Venkataraman & Company vs State of Madras, ; where reference has been made to the Privy Coun cil case in Raleigh Investment Company Limited vs The Gover nor General in Council.
It has been laid down that the Civil Court 's jurisdiction would be presumed unless the contrary is indicated.
Mr. Mukhoty has also relied upon two other decisions being Ganga Bai vs Vijay Kumar and Others, ; and Dhula bhai and Others, vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, [ ; The legal position thus seems to be clear and it is not necessary to quote further authorities.
What is really in dispute is the application of the rule to the facts of the case.
To ascertain whether the suit would be barred, the effect of the provisions of Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act with the U .P. amendments has to be considered.
These sections provide: "23.
Audit: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub section (2) of Section 4 or of Section 22, where the Regis trar is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, he may, by written order, require any society to furnish its accounts or a copy of a statement of receipts and ex penditure for any particular year duly audited by a Char tered Accountant: Provided that the Registrar may, at the request of society permit it to have such accounts and statement audit ed by any other person by him.
(2) If the society fails to furnish the documents referred to in sub section (1) within the period specified in the order or with such extended period as the Registrar may from time to time allow, the Registrar may cause the accounts of such society audited for the said year and may recover the cost of such audit from that society.
(3) If the society neglects or refuses to make its account or 974 other documents available for audit under sub section (2) or, in the opinion of the Registrar, otherwise fails to provide requisite facilities to have the audit made with due expedition, the Registrar may proceed to take action under Section 24.
Disputes regarding election of office bearers: (1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the elec tion or continuance in office of an office bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit: Provided that the election of an office bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satis fied: (a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office bearer; or (b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected; or (c) that the result of the election in so far as it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
Explanation I. A person shall be deemed to have commit ted a corrupt practice who directly or indirectly, by him self or by any other person (i) induces, or attempts to induce, by fraud, intentional misrepresentation, coercion or threat of injury, any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or any person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election; (ii) with a view to inducing any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or to inducing any 975 person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being, a candidate at the election, offers or gives any money, or valuable consideration, or any place of employment, or holds out any promise of individual advantage or profit to any person; (iii) abets (within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code) the doing of any of the acts specified in clause (i) and (ii); (iv) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine dis pleasure or spiritual censure; (v) canvasses on grounds of caste, community, sect or reli gion; (vi) commits such other practice as the Government may prescribe to be a corrupt practice.
Explanation II A 'promise of individual advantage or profit to a person ' includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself, or of any one in which he is interested.
Explanation III The State Government may prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts or disputes in respect of such elections and make provision in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insuf ficient provisions exists in this Act or in the rules of the society.
(2) Where by an order made under sub section (1), an election is set aside or an office bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office bearers of a society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of that society, he may call meeting of the general body of such society for electing such office bearer or office bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorised by him in this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications.
(3) Where a meeting is called by the Registrar under sub section no other meeting shall be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or any person claiming to be an office bearer of the society.
976 Explanation For the purposes of this section, the expres sion 'prescribed authority ' means an officer or court autho rised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette.
We are of the view that provisions of Section 23 are con fined to audit and have nothing to do with the relief of rendition of accounts.
No more is necessary to be said about that relief.
Section 25 deals with disputes regarding chal lenge to the eviction of office bearers.
The maintainability of dispute within the purview of that Section is hedged with conditions and unless such requirement is fulfilled, a statutory dispute would not be maintainable.
The present action in the Civil Court is by some of the members who perhaps would not satisfy the requirements laid down in Section 25.
It cannot be contended that Section 25 having provided the pre conditions on the satisfaction of which a dispute within the purview of that Section would be main tainable before the Registrar takes away the right of Mem bers of the Society to claim relief otherwise outside the purview of Section 25 on the basis of their right to seek remedy for their grievance.
It is not the contention of Mr. Mukhoty that the relief claimed is not one which would come within the ambit of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Proce dure.
That being so, we are of the view that the bar of Section 25 is not applicable to the facts of the case.
Therefore, the conclusion reached in the Courts below is correct and the suit is maintainable.
We pointed out to Mr. Mukhoty that the relief against election of office bearers must have become infructuous with the passage of time as the election is annual.
It is for the trial Court now to dispose of the suit taking into consider ation the changes in the situations that may be brought before it.
We dismiss the appeal and direct the trial court to expedite the disposal of the suit.
No costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The respondents instituted a civil suit challenging the election of the office bearers ' of the appellant Society and asked for rendition of accounts.
The appellant Society contested the suit on the ground that in view of Sections 23 and 25 of the the suit was barred.
The courts below having held that the suit was not barred, the defendant Society filed appeal in this Court.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
A litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statute, a right to institute a suit in the civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
The exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied.
[973A B] K.S. Venkataraman & Company vs State of Madras, ; ; Ganga Bai vs Vijay Kumar and Ors., ; ; Dhula Bhai and Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., ; ; referred.
Raleigh Investment Company Limited vs The Governor General in Council, [1947] L.R. 74 I.A. 50; cited.
The provisions of Section 23 of the Societies Regis tration Act, 1860 are confined to audit and have nothing to do with the relief of rendition of accounts.
[976B] 972 3.
Section 25 deals with disputes regarding challenge to the eviction of office bearers.
The maintainability of dispute within the purview of that Section is hedged with conditions and unless such requirement is fulfilled, a statutory dispute would not be maintainable.
[976B] 3.1 In the instant case the action in the Civil Court is by some of the members who perhaps would not satisfy the requirement laid down in Section 25.
It cannot be said that Section 25 having provided the pre conditions on the satis faction of which a dispute within the purview of that Sec tion would be maintainable before the Registrar takes away the right of Members of the Society to claim relief other wise outside the purview of Section 25 on the basis of their right to seek remedy for their grievance.
It is not the appellant 's contention that the relief claimed is not one which would come within the ambit of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, the bar of Section 25 is not applicable to the facts of the case, and the conclusion reached in the Courts below is correct and the suit is maintainable.
[976C E]