judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2126 of 1968.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 14 8 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No 430 of 1967 In person (C.K. Babbar) for the Appellant.
Harbans Singh for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.
This appeal by special leave in directed against the order of the.
Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 14 August, 1968 upholding an order of the trial court dated 23 May, 1967 striking out the defence of the defendant under order XI, rule 21 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and directing that the defendant cannot be permitted to cross examine the plaintiff 's witnesses.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent Trilok Nath Mahajan, as plaintiff, against the appellant defendant M/s. Babbar Sewing Machine Co., on 9th March, 1966 for recovery of a certain sum alleged to be due to M/s. Chitra Multipurpose Co operative Society (Jogyana) Ltd., Ludhiana which remained unpaid towards the price of sewing machines sold on credit from time to time, claiming to be an assignee under a deed dated 27 April, 1965.
The transaction sued upon was of the year 1959, and the suit was obviously barred by limitation.
The plaintiff however, pleaded that the defendant had acknowledged his liability by his letter dated 8 March, 1963 for Forwarding cheque No. 01194 dated 7 March, 1963 for Rs. 50 drawn on the Punjab National Bank Ltd., Yamunanagar.
The defendant disputed the plaintiff 's claim and pleaded, inter alia, that he does not owe anything to the said society and as such the suit was not maintainable, that there was no privity of contract between the parties nor does any relationship of a creditor and debtor exists between them.
He further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
He also pleaded that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
On 11 November, 1966, the plaintiff moved an application under order XI, rules 14 and 18 for production and inspection of the following documents: (a) Cash book, day book and ledger for the year 1 4 1959 to 31 3 1960 and 1 4 1960 to 31 3 1961.
H (b) Cash book and ledger for the years 1 4 1961 to 31 3 1966 60 (c) All the original bills issued in favour of the defendant by M/s. Chitra Multipurpose Cooperative Society Jogyana Ltd., including Bill No. 22 dated 13 5 1960, Bill No. 43 dated 2 8 19607 Bill No. 49 dated 14 9 1960, Bill No. 53 dated 26 9 1960.
(d) Original letters written by the plaintiff to the defendant and letters addressed by M/s. Chitra Multipurpose Cooperative Society Jogyana Ltd., to defendant.
(e) Counterfoils of cheque book in use on 7 3 1963.
(f) The original cheque No. 01194 dated 7 3 1963.
(g) Bank pass book from 1 4 1962 to 31 3 1964 with counterfoils of the cheque books with which the respondent (T.N. Mahajan) firm had an account.
Despite objection by the defendant, the trial court by its order dated 11 January, 1967, directed their production on 30 January, 1967 holding that they were relevant for the determination of the controversy between the parties.
On 30 January, 1967, when the suit came up for hearing, the court adjourned the suit to 7 February, 1967, for production of the documents.
In compliance with the court 's order, on 7 February, 1967, the defendant produced all the documents in his possession viz., account books for the years 1959 60 to 1965 65 but he was permitted by the trial court to ' take back the account books as they were required to be produced before the Income Tax officer, Yamunanagar on that day, with the direction that he should produce the same on '23 February, 1967.
On 23 February, 1967 the defendant appeared in the court with his books but the trial judge directed him to produce them on 16 March, 1967 and in the meanwhile allow their inspection to the plaintiff with three days ' notice.
The defendant accordingly sent a letter dated 25 February, 1967 asking the plaintiff to take inspection of the account books on 27 February, 1967.
On 28 February, 1967, the plaintiff made an application that the defendant had not produced the documents for inspection but this was apparently wrong, as is evident from the registered notice dated 1 March, 1967, sent by the defendant to the following effect: "After the last date of hearing on 23.2.1967 I wrote you a letter from Yamuna Nagar on 25.2.1967 informing you that I shall be present in the office of my counsel Sh.
H. L. Soni on 27th February, 1967 at 6 p.m. for affording you the inspection of the documents.
I reached at my counsel 's office at the scheduled informed time but you did not turn up.
I 61 kept waiting for you uptil 8.30 p.m.
On that day.
Later A I contacted your lawyer Shri section R. Wadhera but he expressed his inability to contact you.
Now I would be reaching Ludhiana again on the 9th March, 1967 and shall be available in my lawyer 's Shri H. L. Soni 's office from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. and you will be free to inspect the documents at the afore mentioned venue and during the above noted time.
Three days ' clear notice is being given to you.
Please be noted to this effect " Admittedly, the plaintiff never sent any reply to the notice.
Nor did he avail of the opportunity of inspecting the account books at the office of the defendant 's lawyer on 9 March, 1967.
On 16 March, 1967 the trial court passed an order saying that the defendant should produce the books within four days in the court to enable the plaintiff 's counsel to inspect them before 29 March, 1967 i.e. the date fixed for evidence, failing which the defence of the defendant would be struck off.
On 29 March, 1967 three witnesses of the plaintiff were examined.
After the examination of these witnesses, the trial court asked the plaintiff 's counsel that he should apply under order XI, rule 21 to strike out the defence of the defendant.
On 31 March, 1967, the plaintiff accordingly made an application under C`order XI, rule 21 read with section 151 of the Code asserting that the defendant had failed to comply with the order of the court as regards production of documents inasmuch as he had not produced them for inspection.
The defendant opposed the application stating, that there was no failure on his part to produce the documents ordered.
It was stated that all the documents as were capable of identification had been produced in the court.
It was alleged that the plaintiff had already inspected the documents that were specifically set out in the application.
It was also alleged that the plaintiff had not once but thrice or even four times inspected the documents to his entire satisfaction except that he was prevented from making fishing, roving and searching enquiries into the entries which had no relevance to the suit transaction.
It was, therefore, urged that the striking out of the defence would not he warranted by law.
Feeling apprehensive that he would not get a fair trial at the hands of the trial Judge, the defendant applied to the District Judge, Ludhiana for the transfer of the suit on 10 April, 1967.
While the District Judge was seized of the transfer application, the defendant moved the 62 High Court for transfer of the suit to some other court of competent jurisdiction.
The High Court by its order dated 15 May, 1967 declined to interfere.
On 23 May, 1967, the trial court passed an order under order XI, rule 21 striking out the defence of the defendant stating that he was placed in the same position as if he had not defended the suit and adjourned the suit to 21 June, 1967, for examination of the remaining witnesses of the plaintiff.
On 21 June, 1967, the court did not allow the defendant 's counsel to cross examine plaintiff 's witnesses holding that in view of the fact that his defence has been struck off, he had no right to participate and, therefore, could not cross examine the witnesses produced in the court.
The defendant filed a revision before the High Court which was rejected on 14 August, 1968.
In this appeal, two questions are involved: firstly, whether the trial court was justified in striking out the defence of the defendant under order XI, rule 21 of the C.P.C., 1908, and secondly, whether the High Court was right in observing that in view of the clear language are of order XI, rule 21 the defendant cannot be permitted to cross examine the plaintiff 's witnesses.
It is a travesty of justice that the trial court should have, in the facts and circumstances of the case, passed an order striking out the defence of the defendant under order XI, rule ' '1 and that the High Court should have declined to set it aside.
The penalty imposed by order XI.
rule 21 is of highly penal nature, and ought only to be used in extreme cases, and should in no way be imposed unless there is a clear failure to comply with the obligations laid down in the rule.
Order XI, rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "21.
Where any party fails to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery of inspection of documents, he shall, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his suit dismissed for want of prosecution, and, if a defendant, to have his defence; if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended.
and the party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection may apply to the Court for an order to that effect, and an order may be made accordingly.
" Section 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, corresponding to order XI, rule 21 of the C.P.C. 1908, was based upon order XXXI, rule 20, now replaced by order XXIV, rule 16 framed under the Judi 63 cature Act.
The practice of the English Courts is, and it has always A been, to make the order a conditional one, and to grant a little further time for compliance.
In practice this provision is virtually obsolete(l).
Even assuming that in certain circumstances the provisions of order Xl, rule 21 must be strictly enforced, it does not follow that a Suit can be lightly thrown out or a defence struck out, without adequate reasons.
The test laid down is whether the default is wilful.
In the case of a plaintiff, it entails in the dismissal of the suit and, therefore, an order for dismissal ought not be made under order XT, rule 21, unless the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was willfully withholding information by refusing to answer interrogatories or by withholding the documents which he sought to discover.
In such an event, the plaintiff must take the consequence of having his claim dismissed due to his default, i.e. by suppression of information which he was bound to give: Denvillier vs Myers.(2) In the case of the defendant, he is visited with the penalty that his defence is liable to be struck out and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the suit.
The power for dismissal of a suit or striking out of the defence under order XI, rule 21, should be exercised only where the defaulting party fails to attend the hearing or is guilty of prolonged or inordinate and inexcusable delay which may cause substantial or serious prejudice to the opposite party.
It is well settled that the stringent provisions of order XI, rule 21 should be applied only in extreme cases, where there is contumacy on the part of the defendant or a wilful attempt to disregard the order of the court is established.
An order striking out the defence under order XI, rule 21 of the Code should, therefore, not be made unless there has been obstinacy or contumacy on the part of the defendant or wilful attempt to disregard the order of the court.
The rule must be worked with caution, and may be made use of as a last resort: Mulla 's C.P.C. 13th Ed.
I, p. 581, Khajah Assenoolla Joo vs Khajah Abdool Aziz(3), Banshi Singh vs Palit Singh(4), Allahabad Bank Ltd. vs Ganpat Rai(5), Haigh vs Haigh(6) and Twycroft vs Grant(7).
(1) Halsbury 's Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 13.
p. 32.
(2) (3) I.L.R. (4) 7 C.L.J. 29S. (5) I.L.R. (6) (7) 64 In Haigh v Haigh (supra) Pearson J. observed: "I have no hesitation in saying that I have the strongest disinclination, as I believe every other Judge has, that any case should be decided otherwise than upon its merits.
But this order was introduced to prevent plaintiffs and defendants from delaying causes by their negligence or willfulness.
So great was my anxiety to relieve this lady from the consequence of her wrong headedness if, by any possibility, I could on proper terms, that I hesitated to refuse to make the order asked for, and I have looked into all the cases I could find on the subject to see that the practice of the Court has been on this order.
And I can find no case in the books where it has been applied, where a man knowingly and wilfully has allowed judgment to go by default.
" In Twycroft vs Grant (supra) Lush J. interpreting corresponding order XXXI, rule 20 of the Judicature Act, held that he would only exercise the powers conferred by the rule in the last resort.
In England, the party against whom such an order is made would, it seems, be entitled to come in and ask that the order might be set aside on showing sufficient grounds for such an application.
In Khajah Assenoolla Joo vs Khajah Abdool Aziz (supra), Pigot J. therefore made an order striking out the defence of the defendant under section 136 of the C.P.C. 1882 in consequence of non compliance with the earlier order for production of certain documents, and at the same time mentioned that the party against whom the order was made might come in and seek to set it aside on showing sufficient grounds for the application.
It is settled law that the provisions of order XI, rule 21, should be applied only in extreme cases where obstinacy or contumacy on the part of the defendant or a wilful attempt to disregard the order of the court is established.
As pointed out by Lord Russel C.J. in Reg.
vs Senior (1) and affirmed by Cave L. C. in Tamboli vs G.l.
P. Rail way(2), "wilfully" means that: "the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it." In this case, there was no default, much less any wilful default, on the part of the defendant, to comply with any order of the court under order XI, rule 18(2).
In obedience of the order of the court dated (1) (2) I.L.R. 65 11 January, 1967, the defendant came all the way from Yamunanagar to Ludhiana on 27 February, 1967 and was waiting at his lawyer 's office from 6.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. when the plaintiff or his counsel did not turn up.
Thereafter the defendant sent a registered notice dated I March, 1967 offering inspection of the documents at his lawyer 's office on 9 March, 1967, but the plaintiff did not avail of the opportunity of inspecting the documents.
The defendant had filed an affidavit that the rest of the documents were not in his possession and could not be produced.
The account books for the years 1961. 62, 1962 63 and 1963 64 had to be produced by the defendant before the Income Tax officer, Yamunanagar on 31 January, 1967, then 7 February, 1967 and 16 March, 1967.
An affidavit to this effect was also filed.
It is somewhat strange that the trial court should have fixed the dates which were the dates fixed by the Income Tax officer In view of the notice dated 1 March, 1967, there can be no doubt that the defendant had tried to comply with the order of the court by offering inspection on 27 February, 1967.
There is no dispute that 27 February, 1967 was the date mutually agreed upon between the counsel for the parties.
The only controversy is about the scheduled time.
The time fixed according to the plaintiff 's application dated 28 February, 1967 was 2.30 p.m. at his lawyer 's office while that according to the defendant 's notice dated 1 March, 1967 it was 6.3() p.m. in his lawyer 's office.
The plaintiff has not examined his counsel, S.R. Wadhera, nor is there any affidavit by Wadhera.
From the material on record it is amply clear that the appointed scheduled time and place for inspection of the defendant 's account books was 6.30 p.m. at his lawyer 's office.
The plaintiff was afforded another opportunity of inspection of the account books on 9 March, 1967 at the office of the defendant 's lawyer from 7.0 p.m. to 9.0 p.m.
In the circumstances, the trial court was not justified in holding that there WAS any non compliance of its order under order XI, rule 18(2).
It is common ground that the account books for the years 195960 and 1960 61 were Lying in court.
The suit transactions are of the year 1959.
Nothing prevented the plaintiff from inspecting these books.
As regards the account books for the years 1961 62 to 1964 65, they were required to be produced before the Income Tax Authorities at Yamunanagar on 20 March, 1967 and on subsequent dates.
It is not clear what relevance these books could have to the controversy between the parties unless the plaintiff wanted to find some entries to show that there was carry forward of the entries relating to the suit transaction in the account books for the years 1959 60 to the subsequent years So as to bring his claim within time.
Apparently, there were no such entries in the account books for the years 1959 60 66 and 1960 61.
As regards the bank pass book of the defendant 's account with the Punjab National Bank Ltd., for the period 1 April, 1962 to 31 March, 1963 and 1 April, 1963 to 31 March, 1964 and the counterfoil of cheque No. 01194 dated 7 March, 1963, alleged to be drawn by the defendant in plaintiff 's favour, the defendant has sworn an affidavit that he had no account with Punjab National Bank Ltd., Yamunanagar during that period nor he had issued any such cheque as alleged.
In view of this, the order of the trial court dated 23 May, 1967, striking out the defence of the defendant was wholly unjustified .
The principle governing the court 's exercise of its discretion under Order XI, rule 21, as already stated, is that it is only when the default is wilful and as a last resort that the court should dismiss the suit or strike out the defence, when the party is guilty of such contumacious conduct or there is a wilful attempt to disregard the order of the court that the trial of the suit is arrested.
Applying this test, it is quite clear that there was no wilful default on the part of the defendant of the courts order under order XI, rule 18(2) for the production of documents for inspection, and consequently, the order passed by the trial court on 23 May, 1967, striking out the defence of the defendant must be vacated, and the trial must proceed afresh from the stage where the defendant was not permitted to participate.
It was further contended that the High Court was in error in observing that 'in view of the clear language of order X[, rule 21 ' the defendant has no right to cross examine the plaintiff 's witness.
A persual of order XI, rule ,?1 shows that where a defence is to be struck off in the circumstances mentioned therein, the order would be that the defendant 'be placed in the same position as if he has not defended '.
This indicates that once the defence is struck of under Order XI, rule 21, the position would be as if the defendant had not defendant and accordingly the suit would proceed ex parte.
In Sangram Singh vs Election Tribunal(l) it was held that if the court proceeds ex parte against the defendant under order IX, rule 6(a), the defendant is still entitled to cross examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case the court may pass a decree for the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, the court may dismiss the plaintiff s suit.
Every Judge in dealing with an ex parte case has to take care that the plaintiff 's case is, at least, prima facie proved.
But, as we set aside the order under order XI, rule 21, this contention does not survive for our consideration.
We, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion on the question.
(1) ; 67 For the reasons given, the order passed by the trial court dated A 23 May, 1967 striking out the defence of the defendant under order XI, rule read with section 151 of the C.P.C., and its subsequent order dated 21 July, 1967 are both set aside and it is directed to proceed with the trial according to law.
There shall be no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The plaintiff respondent claiming to be an assignee of a debt under a deed dated 27th April, 1965, filed a suit against the defendant appellant for recovery of a certain sum alleged to be due to M /s Chitra Multipurpose Cooperative Society, the assignor.
On an interlocutory application moved by the respondent under order XI rules 14 and 18 C.P.C. for the production of certain documents, despite the objection by the appellant the Trial Court directed their production.
The appellant produced all the documents in his possession on 7 2 67, but he was permitted to take back The account books as they were required to Be produced before the Income Tax officer on that day with the direction that he should produce them on 23 2 67.
On 23 2 67, when the appellant appeared in the Court with his books the trial judge directed him to produce them on 16 3 67 and in the meanwhile allow their inspection to the respondent with three days ' notice.
The appellant accordingly sent a. letter dt.
25 2 67 asking the respondent to take inspection of the account books on 27 2 67 at 6 p.m. in the office d his Counsel.
On his failure to do so, the appellant sent once again a registered letter dt.
1 3 1967 asking the respondent to inspect the records on 9 3 67 in his lawyer 's office between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.
The respondent never sent any reply to the notice.
Nor, did he avail of the opportunity of inspecting the account books at the office of the appellant 's lawyer on 9 3 67.
On 16 3 67 the Trial Court passed an order saying that the appellant should produce the books within four days in the Court to enable the respondent 's counsel to inspect them before 29 3 67 i.e. the date fixed for evidence.
After the examination of three witnesses of the respondent, the trial Court asked the respondent 's Counsel to apply under order XI rule 21 to strike out the defence of the appellant.
On 31 3 67 the respondent filed an application accordingly which was vehemently opposed by the appellant.
The appellant also moved both the District Court and the High Court for transfer of the suit to some other Court of competent jurisdiction.
The High Court declined to interfere.
Thereupon the trial Court passed an order on 23 5 67 striking out the defence of the appellant and on 21 6 67 refused permission to the appellant 's counsel to cross examine the respondent 's witnesses.
The revision filed by the appellant in the High Court was rejected on 14 8 1968.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
The penalty imposed by order XI, rule 21 is of a highly penal nature and ought only to be used in extreme cases and should in no way be imposed unless there is a clear failure to comply with the obligations laid 5 520SCI/78 58 down therein.
The stringent provisions of order XI, rule 21 should be applied only in extreme eases where there is contumacy on the part of the defendant or a wilful attempt to disregard the order of the Court is established.
[62E, 63E] 2.
The test laid down is whether the default is wilful.
In the case of the plaintiff, it entails in the dismissal of the suit and, therefore, an order of dismissal ought not to be made under order XI, rule 21, unless the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff was wilfully withholding the documents which the defendant sought to discover.
In such an event, the plaintiff must take the consequence of having his claim dismissed due to his default i.e. by suppression of information which he was bound to give.
In the case of defendant, he is visited with the penalty that his defence is liable to be struck out and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the suit.
[63 B D] 3.
The power for dismissal of a suit or striking out of the defence under order XI, rule 21, should be exercised only where the defaulting party fails to attend the hearing or is guilty of prolonged or inordinate and inexcusable delay which any cause substantial or serious prejudice to the opposite party.
The rule must be worked with caution and may be made use of as a last resort.
[63D,E] Denvillier vs Myers, , Banshi Singh vs Palit Singh, 7 C.I.J. 295, Haigh, , Twycroft vs Grant, , Reg vs Senior, [1889](1) QBD 283; quoted with approval.
Khajah.
Assenoolla Joo vs Khajah Abdool Aziz, I.L.R. and Allahabad Bank Ltd. vs Ganpat Rai, T.L.R. ; approved.
It is travesty of justice that the trial Court should have, in the facts and circumstances of the case, passed an order striking out the defence of the defendant under order XI, rule 21 and that the High Court should have declined to set it aside.
[62D E] 5.
Applying the principle governing the Court 's exercise of its discretion under order XI, rule 21, in the instant case, there was no wilful default on the part of the defendant of the Court 's order under Order XI, rule 18(2) for the production of documents for inspection, and consequently, the order passed by the trial court on 23 May, 1967, striking out the defence of the defendant must be vacated and the trial must proceed afresh from the stage where the defendant was not permitted to participate.
[66C E] 6.
A perusal of order XI, rule 21 shows that where a defence is to be struck off in the circumstances mentioned therein, the order would be that the defendant 'be placed in the same position as if the has not defended '.
This indicates that once the defence is struck off under order XI, rule 21, the position would be as if the defendant had not defended and accordingly the suit would proceeds ex parte.
If the Court proceeds ex parte against the defendant under order IX, rule 6(a), the defendant is still entitled to cross examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie ease the court unable pass a decree for the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, the Court may dismiss the plaintiff 's suit.
Every Judge in dealing with an ex parte case has to take care that the plaintiff 's case is, at least, prima facie proved.
[66E G] Santram Singh vs Election Tribunal, ; referred to.


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 261 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated 2 12 1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Misc.
Petition No. 2064/75.
D. V. Patel, Naunitlal and Miss Kiran Singh for the Appellants.
P. P. Rao, K. Narayan Rao and G. N. Rao for the Respondent.
93 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J.
The appellants who are Directors of Tandur and Navandgi Stone Quarries Private Limited and holders of a mining lease for extraction of lime stones (Shahabad Stones) are being prosecuted in the Court of Munsif, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Tandur, for the alleged violation of Rule 21 (1)(ii) of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1958 which is made punishable under Rule 27 of the said Rules in that they failed to employ a qualified geologist or a mining engineer.
they made an application before the trial Magistrate urging by way of preliminary objection that the complaint against them was not maintainable in view of the fact that the 'Shahabad Stones ' Which were being extracted by them were used fol.
building and construction purposes and as such were minor minerals which were specifically excluded from the purview of the Rules.
The Magistrate dismissed the application holding that what was being operated by the appellants was 'a mine for the purpose of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, D, 1958 '.
The appellants thereupon moved the High Court for quashing the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending against them reiterating that as the Shahabad Stones which they were extracting were used for building purposes and were described as minor minerals in Item 15 of Schedule I to the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as M.M.C. Rules, 1966), the complaint against them was not tenable. 'The High Court dismissed the application holding that the inherent powers possessed by it under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 could be invoked and exercised only when the facts alleged in the complaint if they are accepted to be correct at their face value, do not make out an offence with which the accused is charged.
The High Court further held that merely because the 'Shahabad Stones ' were included in Schedule I to Rule 10 of the M.M.C. Rules, it could not be said straightway that the Stones which were being extracted by the appellants were minor minerals and that some evidence regarding their user was necessary for determination of the question as to whether the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the provision of Rule 2 of the M.M.C. & D. Rules which Provided that the M.M.C. Rules do not apply to the minor minerals.
It is this refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings which has given rise to the present appeal.
It is now well settled that the High Court does not ordinarily interfere at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceedings pending in a subordinate Court.
Bearing in mind the well recognised principles of law governing the matter and taking into consideration the nature of 94 the impugned order, we think the High Court was right in declining to grant relief to the appellants.
It is also not a matter in which we may legitimately interfere in exercise of our extraordinary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution specially when the case is at its threshold and evidence has still to be adduced as to whether the minerals extracted could or could not be used as a major mineral for certain purposes.
It must be realised that it is not possible to determine difficult question of the kind involved in the instant case purely in abstract without relevant evidence bearing on the matter in issue.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Our order will not, however, be interpreted as barring the appellants from raising any defence or contention that may be open to them before the trial court which will dispose of the same in accordance with law uninhibited by any observations made by it earlier or by the High Court in the course of its Order dismissing the application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
"Shahabad Stones" are included under Item 15 in Schedule I to Rule 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1966.
The appellants, who are directors of Tandur and Navandgi Stone Quarries (Pvt.) Ltd. and holders of mining lease for extraction of lime stones (Shahabad Stones when being prosecuted, for the alleged violation of Rule 21(1)(ii) of the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1958 which is made punishable under Rules 27 of the said rules in that they failed to employ a qualified geologist or a mining engineer, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the complaint in view of the specific exclusion of the "Shahabad Stones" from the purview of the 1958 Rules, being a minor mineral being used for building and construction purposes.
The trial magistrate dismissed the application and the High Court declined to interfere under Section 48 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court, ^ HELD: As the High Court does not ordinarily interfere at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceedings pending in a subordinate Court, the A.P. High Court was right in declining to grant relief to the appellants, bearing in mind the well recognised principles of law governing the matter and taking into consideration the nature of the impugned order.
It is also not a matter in which Supreme Court may legitimately interfere in exercise of their extra ordinary powers under article 136 of the Constitution especially when the case at its threshold and evidence has still to be adduced as to whether the minerals extracted could or could not be used as a major mineral for certain purposes.
It is not possible to determine difficult question of the kind involved in the instant case, purely in abstract without relevant evidence bearing on the matter in issue.
[93G H, 94A B]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 1975.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated 17 10 1974 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr. A. No. 1013 of 1974 and Reference No. 18/74.
Badri Das Sharma (amicus curiae) for the appellant.
O. P. Rana for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM J.
This appeal is preferred by Deena alias Din Dayal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court convicting and sentencing him.
The case for the prosecution is that on the night of the 20th and 21st June, 1971 the deceased Nainsukh, his brother Hari Singh, his distant uncle Tika Ram, Chandra Pal, daughter 's son of Tika Ram and Chokhey slept on a platform of the Chaupal in village Jar.
According to the prosecution a lantern was hanging on the platform from the branch of a Neem tree.
In the morning at about 4 a.m. the appellant Deena and four other came to the Chaupal of Nainsukh.
The dogs began to bark as a result of which Hari Singh (P.W. 1 ) and others were 108 awakened.
Deena and his associates carried pistol and electric torches Deena challenged Nainsukh saying that he would be taught a lesson for appearing as a witness and fired his pistol striking Nainsukh on his head.
Hari Singh and Chandra Pal shouted for help.
They were also injured.
After hearing the alarm Nihal Singh, Panna Lal and others reached the place of the incident but before their arrival the accused had made good their escape.
The First Information Report was written by Bharat Singh on the dictation of Hari Singh.
The injured witness Hari Singh and Chandra Pal then went to Etah Police Station where the report exhibit Ka 4 was handed over at Police Station Kotwali at 2.05 a.m.
On 21st June, 1971.
The Police officer took up the investigation and reached the scene at about 1.30 p.m.
He found the dead body of Nainsukh and held the inquest, prepared the site plan and recovered the material objects.
Nihal Singh, P.W. 2, produced the lantern before the Investigating officer which was burning at the time the occurrence took place.
shell of used cartridge was also recovered from the scene.
Dr. N. K. Mittal (P.W. 13), the Medical officer of Etah.
found two injuries caused by fire arm on Chandra Pal and one injury on Hari Singh.
The autopsy on the body of Nainsukh was conducted by Dr. Prasad on 21st June, ]971.
He found two gun shot injuries, one on the right side of head above the right ear and the other was non traumatic swelling on the back surface of the right hand.
On internal examination it was found that the surface of the scalp of the right side was congested under injury No. 1.
The doctor found a fissured fracture of the right parietal bone, vertically placed from the suture line to eye brow.
The doctor was of the opinion that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Apart from the eye witness P.W. 1 the prosecution examined P W. 2 Nihal Singh, P.W. 3 Panna Lal who saw the accused running away after the incident.
Reliance was not placed by the courts below on the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3.
The conviction therefore solely rests on the testimony of eye witness Hari Singh, P.W. ].
Hari Singh P.W. 1 has spoken of the motive.
About 4 or 6 years prior to the occurrence one Ram Chandra was murdered.
Deena was one of the accused in the case.
Deena was found guilty of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
In that case the deceased Nainsukh gave evidence against Deena as an eye witness.
About two months before the murder of Nainsukh, Deena was released on hail and it was rumoured that Deena was saying that now when he had 109 come out of jail he would teach a lesson to Nainsukh.
Nainsukh, Hari Singh and their relations took the threat seriously and were living cautiously.
On the date of the occurrence, according to P.W. 1, a lantern was burning and at about 4 o 'clock in the morning he was awakened by the barking of the dogs.
Four or five other persons came along with Deena.
Deena and one of his companions had torches in their hands and they came flashing their torches.
Deena and the other accused came at the Chaupal from the staircase on the eastern side.
After coming over the Chabutra of the Chaupal the accused stated "Nainsukh, beware, now I will teach you the lesson for giving the evidence".
While flashing the torches on the deceased Deena fired at Nainsukh aiming towards his head.
The shot hit Nainsukh on the head.
The other shot fired by Deena injured Chandra Pal and the third shot hit the prosecution witness Hari Singh.
Hari Singh received an injury on his right shoulder.
The plea that was made by the defence on the evidence of P.W. 1 was that it cannot be safely relied on.
It was submitted that the other injured witness Chandra Pal who was examined as a court witness did not fully support the evidence of the prosecution.
We have gone through the testimony of P.W. 1 and witness Chandra Pal and we do not see any material contradiction.
The enmity between Deena on the one side and the deceased and his family on the other side is not seriously contested.
The deceased Nainsukh gave evidence against Deena in the murder case in which Ram Chandra was killed.
When Deena was released on bail he wanted to teach a lesson to the witness Nainsukh who had appeared against him.
This resulted in Deena shooting the deceased to death.
The motive as alleged by the prosecution stands amply proved.
So far as the scene of the offence is concerned it was not seriously disputed before the High Court.
It was submitted before us that no blood stains were scrapped from the scene which circumstance would show that the occurrence took place at some other place.
It is seen that there was a bundle of straw and a cot at the scene.
The strings of the cot and as well as the straws were stained with blood.
The Serologist had found human blood on the straws.
We do not find any difficultly in accepting the finding of the High Court that the occurrence took place at the site alleged by the prosecution.
The only question that requires consideration is whether there was sufficient light at the scene of occurrence to enable the witness to recognise the accused.
Because of the motive, it is highly probable that Nainsukh, Hari Singh and the family slept with the light burning on the platform which was the scene of offence.
Three shots were 110 fired and there could have been no difficulty in P.W. 1 identifying the appellant Deena.
It is common ground that the witness knew Deena very well.
The lantern that was burning was produced by P.W. 2, Nihal Singh, as soon as the Investigating officer came to the scene of occurrence.
The witness was sleeping to the south of the deceased person at a distance of few feet and we do not think there could have been any difficulty in identifying the assailant.
The High Court has fully considered the question as to whether P.W. 1 would have identified the assailant and has come to the conclusion that the prosecution has established that the lantern was burning and the assailants used torches which enabled the recognition of the accused at the time of the incident.
P.W. 1 Hari Singh is a natural witness and his presence cannot be disputed as he had sustained a gun shot injury.
He had no particular motive for falsely implicating Deena the accused.
The court witness Chandra Pal did not fully support the prosecution except that the incident took place at the chaupal as alleged by the prosecution.
But we do not feel any justification for rejecting the testimony of P.W. 1 because of the contradiction in the testimony of C.W. 1 Chandra Pal.
We are inclined to agree with the High Court that Chandra Pal was won over by the defence.
We also agree with the High Court and find that the appellant Deena was guilty of an offence under section 302 I.P.C. in causing the death of Nainsukh.
The High Court confirmed the extreme penalty of law imposed by the Sessions Court.
The Sessions Court in imposing the death sentence found that the appellant is a desperate character and that while he was on bail in Rare, Chandra murder case he committed the murder of Nainsukh one of the prosecution witnesses in Ram Chandra murder case.
As the offence was committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment for life for an offence under section 302 I.P.C. the Sessions Court inflicted the extreme penalty.
As a charge under section 303 I.P.C. was not framed and as the parties are not able to tell us the result of the appeal filed by Deena in Ram Chandra 's case, we refrain from invoking the provisions of section 303 I.P.C.
Regarding the sentence after giving our serious and anxious consideration, we find ourselves unable to come to any different conclusion from that arrived at by the trial Judge and the High Court.
The offence was committed after deliberate planning in the night when the victim was sleeping.
It was for the purpose of teaching a lesson to a witness who gave evidence against the accused.
We do not see any extenuating circumstance.
We confirm the sentence of death and dismiss this appeal.
M.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant was convicted for having committed an offence u/s 302 I.P.C., and was serving a sentence of imprisonment for life.
He was released on bail.
and during that period.
committed the murder of a prosecution witness in the earlier murder case.
The Sessions Court found him guilty and imposed the sentence of death on him.
The sentence was confirmed by the High Court in appeal .
Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: The murder was committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment for life for an offence under section 302 I.P.C. while he was on bail.
The offence was committed for the purpose of teaching a lesson to a witness who gave evidence against him in the earlier murder case and was committed after deliberate planning, in the night when the victim was sleeping.
We confirm the sentence of death.
[110F H]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1969.
From the Judgment and order dated 13 3 1968 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 205 of 1965.
Dr. L. M. Singhvi and U. P. Singh for the Appellant.
R. K. Garg, B. P. Agarwal, V. J. Francis and Madan Mohan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL, J.
The State of Rajasthan has filed this appeal by certificate against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court dated March 13, 1968, by which its writ petition for quashing the order of the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, dated January 13, 1964, in case No. 1/1962/Tonk "to enable the petitioner" to recover Rs. 5,94,215.30, "according to law" was dismissed.
It was stated in the writ petition that the lands of the Uniara jagir, Aligarh tehsil of Tonk district.
vested in the Rajasthan State on their resumption under the provision of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The Jagir Commissioner therefrom took up the question of determining the compensation which was payable to Rao Raja Sardar Singh who was then the jagirdar of Uniara.
In that connection a certificate was filed before the Jagir Commissioner in Form 10 under rule 37 C of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Rules, 1954, certifying that a sum of Rs. 5,49,234/12/3 should be recovered from the jagirdar 's compensation and rehabilitation grant on account of "revenue dues".
The jagirdar raised several objections before the Jagir Commissioner, but it was urged on behalf of the State that the sum of Rs. 5,49,234/12/3 was the unpaid amount of the liability of Rs. 5,54,226/13/6, which was payable under a resolution of the Jaipur State Council dated July 1, 1936.
After adding the sum of Rs. 44,980.53 on account of arrears of tribute, the total realisable amount was stated to be Rs. 5,94,215.30.
As the State was not able to give a proper account of the dues, the Jagir Commissioner made an order dated February 14, 1961, that the amount mentioned in the aforesaid certificate (in Form 10) could not be deducted.
An appeal was filed against that order of the Jagir Commissioner, to the Board 98 of Revenue, but it was dismissed on October 15, 1963.
The State contended that it was challenging the decisions of the Jagir Commissioner and the Board of Revenue "in separate proceedings", but that was not done and it is not in dispute before us that the Jagir Commissioner 's order dated February 14, 1961, which was upheld by the Board 's decision dated October IS, 1963, became final.
In the meantime, the Tehsildar of Aligarh issued a demand notice on November 3, 1961, which was revised on December 22, 1961, for the recovery of Rs. 594,215.30 under section 229 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956.
The jagirdar raised an objection that the Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to issue the demand notice because of the Jagir Commissioner 's earlier order dated February 14, 1961 (which had become final and binding on the parties after the Board 's judgment dated October 15, 1963), but the Tehsildar rejected it by his order dated December 22, 1961.
As the jagirdar did not pay the amount which was claimed under the demand notice proceedings were started for attachment and sale of his property, and the jagirdar made an application to the Board of Revenue for a revision of the Tehsildar ' order.
It was allowed by the order of the Board dated January 13, 1964.
The Board took the view that although the certificate for recovery had been sent to the Jagir Commissioner in Form 10, the required particulars were not furnished in spite of several opportunities, and that as the State Government 's claim for the recovery of the money had been completely rejected on an earlier occasion by the Jagir Commissioner 's order dated February 14, 1961, and the Jagir Commissioner had refused to deduct that amount from the compensation with reference to the provisions of sections 22(1)(e), 32(1)(b) and 34 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court in respect of the same dues was barred by section 46 of the Act and the proceedings which had been taken under section 257A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act were without jurisdiction.
As the Board quashed the order of the Tehsildar dated December 22, 1961, the State Government filed the writ petition, which has given rise to this appeal, in the High Court, for the recovery of the "revenue dues" mentioned in the certificate in Form 10, and feels aggrieved because of its dismissal by the impugned judgment dated March 13, 1968.
It may be mentioned that the jagirdar traversed the State Government 's claim in the writ petition altogether.
He contended that he never agreed to the Jaipur State Council resolution of July 1, 1936, and he was never informed of the dues claimed by the State.
He denied that any amount was due on account of land revenue or tribute, and averred that no loan had been taken by the Uniara jagir 99 from the State Government.
It was contended further that the Jagir Commissioner wanted to make an inquiry into the State Government 's claim for the recovery of the amount stated in the certificate in Form 10, but the State did not produce the account or proof of the dues so that the claim remained unexplained.
That, according to the jagirdar, was the reason why the Jagir Commissioner held in his order dated February 14, 1961, that the amount could not be deducted from the compensation.
As the appellate order of the Board of Revenue dated October 15, 1963, upheld the Jagir Commissioner 's order, it was pleaded that it became final and conclusive and could not be challenged by taking up the proceedings under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which were in fact barred by section 46 of the Act.
In its impugned judgment in the writ petition the High Court has taken the view that the determination of the State 's dues was a matter which was required to be settled! decided or dealt with by the Jagir Commissioner and that, by virtue of section 46 of the Act, a Civil or Revenue Court had no jurisdiction in respect of it.
Reference has been made to section 47 of the Act which provides that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything therein contained being inconsistent with any existing Jagir law or any other law for the time being in force.
The High Court has taken note of the provisions of section 34(2) of the Act also and has held that "no other authority, be it the civil or the revenue court, can go behind" the Jagir Commissioner 's decision in that respect and make a recovery from the jagirdar by setting at naught that Jagir Commissioner 's order in that respect.
The High Court has thus upheld the Board 's decision dated January 13, 1964, against the State of Rajasthan, by which the proceedings which were taken for the recovery of the money under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act were quashed.
We find from the High Court 's impugned judgement that the point of controversy there was whether the machinery provided under The Rajasthan Land Revenue Act could not be resorted to in face of the provisions of sections 46 and 47 of the Act.
The High Court examined that question only, and we shall confine ourselves to it.
The controversy thus is whether it was permissible for the State to recover the aforesaid arrears of "revenue dues" even after the Jagir Commissioner 's order dated February 14, 1961, under section 32(2) of the Act by which he clearly determined that the money was not recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (t) of section 22 of the Act and ordered that it may not be deducted from H the final amount of the jagirdar 's compensation.
In other words the question is whether that order was final and no Civil or Revenue Court 100 had jurisdiction to reopen it as it related to a matter which was required to be settled or decided or dealt with by the Jagir Commissioner, or whether this was not so and the proceedings under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act were competent? In order to arrive at a decision, it will be necessary for us to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act so that its scheme and scope may be understood and applied to the controversy.
The Act (No. VI of 1952) came into force with effect from February 18, ]952.
It provides for the resumption of jagir lands and other measures o land reforms, and extends to the whole of The State of Rajasthan.
Section 2(g) of the Act defines "Jagirdar", and it is not in controversy that Rao Raja Sardar Singh was the jagirdar of the Uniara jagir at the relevant time.
Clause (h) of section 2 defines "Jagir land".
Here again, it is not in dispute that the Uniara jagir formed such land.
Section 21 of the Act provides for the resumption of jagir lands on the appointed date, and once again there is no 13 controversy that the jagir lands of Uniara were so resumed.
Section 22 of the Act states the consequences of resumption Clause (e) of sub section (1) of that section provides as follows: "(e) all arrears of revenue, ceases or other dues in respect of any jagir land due from the jagirdar for any period prior to the date of resumption including any sum due from him under clause (d) and all loans advanced by the Government or the Court of Wards to the jagirdar shall continue to be recoverable from such jagirdar.
" The clause thus expressly provides for the jagirdar 's liability to pay, inter alia, all arrears of revenue, ceases or other dues in respect of his jagir land.
Section 30 deals with the recovery of such arrears and we shall revert to it after making a reference to section 26 which deals with the State Government 's liability to pay compensation to every jagirdar for the resumption of his jagir land.
That is the subject matter of Chapter VI and section 30 thereof reads as follows: "30.
Dues and Debts.
The amounts due from a jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 shall be recoverable out of the compensation payable to him under section 26.
" Chapter VII deals with the payment of compensation.
Section 31 of that chapter requires every jagirdar to file a statement of claim for compensation before the Jagir Commissioner.
Item (v) of sub section 101 (2) of that section provides that the statement of claim shall contain the following particulars also: "(v) the amount of dues and debts recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of subsection (1) of section 22;" These provisions, read together, thus provide for the continuance of the jagirdar 's liability to the payment of the arrears of revenue, cesses and other dues, in respect of the jagir land, which were due from him for any period prior to the date of resumption of the jagir, out of the compensation payable to him for the loss of the jagir lands, and a duty has been cast on him to make a specific mention on the amount of the dues and debts recoverable from him under section 22(1) (e), in the statement of his claim for compensation.
Then comes section 32 which deals with the determination of the compensation after making such inquiry as the Jagir Commissioner may deem necessary.
Here again sub section (1) of that section makes it obligatory for the Jagir Commissioner to provisionally determine: "(b) the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22. ".
Sub section (2) requires that a copy of the provisional order shall be served on the Government, the jagirdar and every other interested person, and the Jagir Commissioner shall, after giving all of them a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, "make a final order".
That order would therefore be a final order in respect of the aforesaid item (b) of the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 also.
In other words, the Act provides that the order under sub section (2) of section 32 would be final in respect of the items mentioned in it, including the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22.
Section 33 requires the Jagir Commissioner to, communicate the "final order" under section 32(2) to the Government, the jagirdar and every other interested person.
Next is section 34, which provides the mode for the recovery of the aforesaid dues.
Sub section (1) of that section is to the following effect: "34.
Dues and deductions how payable.
(1) The amounts recoverable from a jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 and those determined in an order made under sub section (2) of section 32 shall be deducted from the compensation payable to him under section 26." 102 Sub section (2) of that section provides that the amount so finally determined, namely, the amount recoverable, inter alia, under clause (c) of sub section (1) of section 22 shall be payable in instalments.
The sub sections make clear reference to clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 and section 32 in providing for the deduction of the amounts determined thereunder from the compensation payable to the jagirdar under section 26.
Section 35 deals with the payment of compensation.
It will be sufficient for us to refer to the first two sub sections which read as follows: "35.
Payment of compensation. (1) After the amount of compensation payable to a jagirdar under section 26 is finally determined under sub section (2) of section 32 and the amounts specified in clauses (b), (c) and (e) of that section as finally determined are deducted therefrom, the balance shall be divided into fifteen equal annual instalments or at the option of the jagirdar into thirty equal half yearly instalments.
(2) The amounts finally determined under each of the clauses (b), (c) and (e) of sub section (1) of section 32 shall be deducted and paid to each of the persons entitled thereto from every instalment referred to in sub section (1) and the remaining amount of the instalment shall be payable by the Government to the jagirdar." Thus sub section (2) of section 32, section 33, sub section (2) of section 34 and sub sections (1) and (2) of section 35 taken together categorically provide that the Jagir Commissioner 's order determining, inter alia, the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 shall be final, and that it shall be deducted from the compensation payable to the jagirdar under section 26.
The Act thus contains a comprehensive scheme for the determination of the amount of dues and debts recoverable by the State from the jagirdar ill respect of the jagir lands and their deduction from the amount of compensation payable to him.
The question of appeal has been dealt with in section 39.
Sub section (1) of that section specifically provides for an appeal against "any decision" of the Jagir Commissioner, inter alia, under sub section (2) of section 32, to the Board of Revenue, and sub section (4) declares that the decision of the Board in an appeal under the section shall be final.
Then comes section 46 which raises the bar of jurisdiction.
It provides as follows: 103 "46.
Bar of jurisdiction. (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any officer or authority under this Act.
(2) No order made by any such officer or authority under this Act shall be called in question in any Court.
" So where it is shown that any "matter" which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any officer or any authority under the Act, e.g., the Jagir Commissioner or the Board of Revenue, has been so settled? decided or dealt with, it shall not be permissible for any Civil or Revenue Court to settle, decide, or deal with it, except where there is, a contrary provision in that behalf in the Act itself.
It is also the mandate of sub section (2) that no order of any such officer or authority shall be open to challenge in any Court.
These provisions of the Act are quite adequate and comprehensive and, read with the relevant Rules, they provide for the determination and recovery of the amounts due from the jagirdar on account of the jagir lands.
This has to be so because when the Act provides for the resumption of the jagir lands and thereby deducts the jagirdar of his resources, it is fair and reasonable that it should make provision for the determination and recovery of the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under section 32(1) (a) .
The provisions of the Act to which reference has been made and the Rules made thereunder, are therefore a comprehensive code concerning the liability of the jagirdar.
If these provisions are applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would appear that the following facts have been well established.
The State laid a claim for the recovery of Rs. 5,49,234/12/3 in Form 10, exclusively on the ground that they were revenue dues of the jagirdar for a period prior to the resumption of the jagir lands.
The Jagir Commissioner asked for information for the determination of the State Government 's claim, with particular reference to clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 32 as respects the amount recoverable from the jagirdar under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22, and made his final order on February 14, 1961.
It is not controverted before us that he did so after complying with the requirements of the law and communicated his decision to the Government and the jagirdar under section 33.
As the Jagir Commissioner 's order under sub section (2) of section 32 was against the State Government, nothing was deductible on account of the State Government 's claim 104 in Form 10, under section 34 of the Act, on account of the liability claimed under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 and clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 32.
So when the final determination of that claim was 'nil ', inasmuch as it was held that nothing was recoverable from the jagirdar on account of the "revenue dues", it inevitably followed that no deduction was permissible from the compensation payable to him.
The decision was disadvantageous to the State and it preferred all appeal to the Board of Revenue but, as has been stated, it was dismissed on October 15, 1966.
It will be recalled that even though it was stated in the writ petition that the State was challenging the decisions of the Jagir Commissioner and the Board of Revenue "in separate proceedings", no such action was taken.
The fact therefore remains that as the order had been made by the Jagir Commissioner under the provisions of the Act, and as there was no provisions in the Act for challenging it otherwise than by an appeal to the Board of Revenue which was dismissed, the High Court was right in raising the bar of section 46 and in holding that no Civil or Revenue Court had jurisdiction in respect of the controversy as it was a matter which had been finally decided by the Jagir Commissioner and the Board of Revenue under the provisions of the Act.
The belated attempt by the State to get over the bar by instituting proceedings under section 229 or section 257A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, was therefore illegal, and was set aside by the Board 's decision dated January 13, 1964.
The objection against it held no merit, and has rightly been rejected by the impugned judgment of the High Court dated March 13, 1968.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the resolution of the Jaipur State Council dated July 1, 1936, was the final adjudication of the liability of the Uniara Jagir for the payment of the amount mentioned in it, to the State, and was really in the nature of a decree which the Jagir Commissioner had no jurisdiction to examine under section 32 or any other section of the Act and tile Jagir Commissioner 's order dated February 14, 1961 was therefore quite illegal and could well be ignored by the State for the purpose of taking action under section 257A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act.
We find that a similar argument was urged for the consideration of the High J Court, but was rejected for satisfactory reasons.
The State did not even care to produce the Council resolution before the Jagir Commissioner and, as has been stated, the jagirdar took the plea in his reply to the writ petition that he never agreed to the passing of that resolution, he was never informed of the alleged arrears for which the resolution was said to have been passed, and nothing was payable by him on account of "revenue dues".
He therefore asked the Jagir 105 Commissioner to make an inquiry into the matter.
That was undertaken by the Jagir Commissioner under the relevant provisions of the Act, to which reference has been made already.
It will be recalled that the State Government filed an appeal against the adverse decision of the Jagir Commissioner, but it was dismissed, and the appellate decision of the Board became final under sub section (4) of section 39 of the Act.
We have dealt with the consequences which arose from, that decision by virtue of the bar of jurisdiction under section 46 It was further argued on behalf of the appellant that the Jagir Commissioner 's order under section 32 of the Act could possibly relate only to his final order in regard to the amount recoverable from the jagirdar, inter alia, under clause (e) of sub section (1) of section 22 of the Act, for the purpose of enabling its deduction from the jagirdar 's compensation under section 34, but could not possibly bar a civil action for it may well be that, in a given case, the amount of compensation may fall short of the amount recoverable from the jagirdar.
It will be enough to say that such a possibility could not arise in the instant case inasmuch as the net compensation payable to the jagirdar was Rs. 16,00,000/ , which was far in excess of his liability to the State.
Reference in this connection may also be made to rule 37 C(4) of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Rules, 1954, which casts a duty on the Jagir Commissioner not only to effect the deduction of the amount payable by the jagirdar, under section 34, but also for the deduction of the balance from the rehabilitation grant payable to him under section 38C of the Act.
The said rule casts a duty ' on the authority to whom the amount is payable by the jagirdar, to take necessary steps for the adjustment of the recovery so effected, and "further recovery of the balance, if any, that might remain outstanding against the jagirdar.
" There could therefore be no occasion for the recovery of any balance of revenue dues by civil action in the facts and circumstances of this case.
The appellant 's learned counsel made a reference to several cases including Ullel Venkatrava Kini vs Louis Souza (1), G. Venkatachala Odavar vs Ramachandra Odavar and another (2), Kulandaiswami Madurai and Others vs Murunayya Madurai and Others (3), Rameshwar Prasad and Others vs Satya Narain and Others (4), Gurbasappa Mahadevappa vs Neelkanthappa Shivappa (5).
A. R. Sarin vs B. C. (1) A. I. R. (2) A. I. R. 1961 Madras 423.
(3) A. I. R. 1969 Madras 14.
(4) A. I. R. 1954 All. 115.
(5) A. I. R. 1951 Bombay 136.
8 520SCI/78 106 Patil and another(1) and Shivshanker Prasad Shah and others vs Baikunth Nath Singh and others(2) for the purpose of showing that every adjudication of a dispute cannot oust the jurisdiction of a civil court.
But they were different cases where the jurisdiction of Civil Courts could not be said to have been ousted.
As we find no force in this appeal, it is dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 which provide for the resumption of jagir lands and other measures of land reforms, contains a comprehensive scheme for the determination of the amount of dues and debts recoverable by the State from the Jagirdar in respect of the jagir lands and their deduction from the amount of compensation payable to him.
Sections 22 to 31 read together provide for the continuance of the Jagirdar 's liability to the payment of arrears of revenue, ceases and other dues which were due from him in respect of the jagir lands for any period prior to the date of resumption or the jagir, out of the compensation payable to him.
A duty has been cast on the jagirdar to mention, in the statement of his claim for compensation the amount of dues and debts recoverable from him under section 22(1)(e).
Section 32(1) makes it obligatory on The Jagir Commissioner to provisionally determine the amount of compensation unrecoverable from the Jagirdar under section 22(1)(e) and serve a copy of the provisional order on the Government, the Jagirdar and every other interested person.
It is only after giving all or them a reasonable opportunity that the Jagir Commissioner can make a final order.
The order so made under section 32(2) would be final in respect of the amounts mentioned in it.
Section 34 provides for the deduction of the amounts determined by the Commissioner, from the compensation payable to the Jagirdar under section 26.
Section 35 deals with payment of compensation.
Section 39 provides for appeals against and decision of the Jagir Commissioner, to the Board of Revenue according to which the decision of the Board in the appeal shall be final.
Section 46 provides that no order mad by any officer or authority under the Act shall be called in question in any civil or revenue court.
Under the provisions of the Act, the lands belonging to the respondent, who was a. Jagirdar in the State of Rajasthan, vested in the State.
When the Jagir Commissioner took up the question of deciding the compensation payable to the respondent, the State filed a claim that a certain amount was recoverable from the compensation payable to the Jagirdar on account of revenue dues etc.
But since the State was not able to give a proper account of the dues, the Jagir Commissioner made an order that the amount claimed by the State could not be deducted.
The Board of Revenue dismissed the State Government 's appeal any, therefore, the order of the Jagir Commissioner became final.
In the meanwhile, when the Tehsildar sought to recover the dues from the respondent, he raised an objection that since the Jagir Commissioner 's order became final the Government was not competent to claim that amount.
The 96 Tehsildar rejected the objection.
In the respondent 's appeal, the Board of Revenue quashed the order of the Tehsildar on the ground that the State Government did not furnish the required particulars in spite of several opportunities given to it when the matter was before him and that the Jagir Commissioner was light in rejecting the claim of the State.
It also held that since his order became final, proceedings to have the recovery of the dues under the Land Revenue Act, Where without jurisdiction.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the State Government.
It held that The determination of the dues and debts recoverable by the State from the Jagirdar was a matter which was required to be settled by the Jagir Commissioner and that by virtue of section 46 of the Act, a Civil or Revenue Court had no jurisdiction in respect of it.
On the question whether the Jagir Commissioner 's order was final and whether any Civil or Revenue Court had jurisdiction to reopen it, as it related to a matter which was required to be settled or decided or dealt with by the commissioner.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: The High Court was right in raising the bar of section 46 and holding that no Civil or Revenue Court had jurisdiction in respect of the controversy as it was a matter which had in fact been finally decided by the Jagir Commissioner and the Board of Revenue under the provisions of the Act.
The belated attempt by the State to get over.
the bar by instituting proceedings under section 229 or section 257 A of the Rajasthan land Revenue Act was illegal and was rightly set aside by the Board.
The objection against it had no merit and had rightly been rejected by the High Court.
[104D E] The provisions of the Act are quite adequate and comprehensive and read with the relevant rules, provide for the determination and recovery of the amounts due from the Jagirdar on account of the Jagir lands.
This had to be so, because when the Act provides for the resumption of the jagir lands it is fair and reasonable that it should make provision for the determination and recovery of the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar.
The provisions of that Act are a comprehensive code concerning the liability of the Jagirdar.
[103D E] There is no force in the contention that the resolution of the Jaipur State Council was a final adjudication of the liability of the Jagirdar and that, being in the nature of a decree, the Jagir Commissioner 's order was illegal.
The Jagirdar denied any knowledge of the resolution.
When the Jagir Commissioner undertook the enquiry, the State did not produce the resolution and, therefore, he dismissed the claim of the State.
[104F H, 105A B] There is also no force in the contention that section 34 is not a bar to civil action because in a given case the amount of compensation might fall short of the amount recoverable from the Jagirdar.
Such possibility could not arise in this case.
The compensation payable to the Jagirdar was far in excess of his liability to the State.
The Act casts a duty on the Jagir Commissioner to take necessary steps for the adjustment of the recovery and further recovery of the balance, if any, that might remain outstanding against the Jagirdar there could, therefore, be no occasion for the recovery of any balance of revenue does by civil action in this case.
[105C F] 97 Ullal Venkatrava Kini vs Louis Souza AIR ; G. Venkatachala Odavar vs Ramachandra Odavar & Anr., AIR 1961 Mad, 423 Kulandaiswami Madurai & Ors.
vs Murugayya Madurai & Ors., ; Rameshwar Prasad & Ors.
vs Satya Narain & Ors.
AIR 1954 All 115, Gurbasappa Mahadevappa vs Neel Kanthappa Shivappa AIR 1951 Bom.
136; A. R. Sarin vs B. C. Patil & Anr.
AIR 1951 Bom.
423; Shivshankar Prasad Shah & Ors.
vs Baikunth Nath Singh & Ors. ; held inapplicable.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1800 of 1968 From the Judgment and order dated 20 10 1967 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1376 of 1967.
section N. Kacker, Sol.
Genl., section N. Anand and R. N. Sachthey for the Appellant.
V. M. Tarkunde and Gautam Goswami for Respondent No. 1.
Yogeshwar Prasad and (Mrs.) Rani Chhabra for the Interveners.
Ex parte against Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
72 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J.
The facts giving rise to this appeal by the Delhi Administration on certificate granted by the High Court of Delhi against its judgment dated the 20th October 1967 in a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India (Civil Writ Petition No. 1376/ 67) are not in dispute and may be briefly stated.
The Governments of the States of Punjab and Delhi entered into an agreement about 3() years back providing for the running of public service vehicles in routes which covered each of the two States so that every one of such routes had one terminus in one of the States and the other in the other.
In pursuance of the agreement one of the Governments would issue permits under the (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the same would be counter signed by the other State before the former plied its buses on the routes covered by such permits.
One such permit related to the Delhi Karnal route and was countersigned by the State Transport Authority Delhi in the following terms: "Countersigned for the portion of the route Delhi Karnal from 31 7 1967 to 30 11 1967 subject to the condition that tickets will be issued for the destinations bet wen Delhi and Karnal.
Destination board should be exhibited.
Bus will cover the full route and all other conditions applicable under Motor Vehicle Laws.
" Other permits for the Delhi Karnal route and other interstate routes were counter signed in the same terms.
The routes above mentioned were extended by the Punjab State authorities under permits granted by them for intra State routes connecting different towns in the State of Punjab itself.
Thus a permit was issued in favour of the Punjab roadways for the route from Karnal to Chandigarh so that the bus operating on the Delhi Karnal route would carry passengers from Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal.
On the 25th July 1956, officers of the two States came to an agreement whereby the State of Punjab was given the right to extend its services on inter State routes to any town in the State of Punjab.
This agreement was subject to ratification by the Governments of the Two States, which`was, however, never accorded.
In the year 1966, the State of Delhi objected to the exploitation by the State of Punjab of the inter State routes in the manner above stated, that is, by extending them beyond the termini specified in that behalf under the counter signatures made by the State of Delhi and approached the Inter State Transport Commission (hereinafter called the commissions) constituted under sub section (1) of Section 63A of the Act with 73 a request for interference.
After hearing counsel for the two States the Commission passed an order dated 27th August, 1966, in favour of the State of Delhi. 'the operative part of that order alongwith the reasons listed by the Commission in support of it is extracted below: "Section 48(2) of the , prescribes that every stage carriage permit shall be expressed to B. be valid only for a specified route or routes of for a specified area.
It appears, therefore, that if a permit is expressed to be valid only for the one specified inter State route, the same transport vehicle covered by the same inter State permit can not be allowed to proceed further to another route with liberty to pick up passengers in route on a second route, which is C: an intra State route, as this would be in violation of the provisions of the Act.
There is no objection to the same vehicle running on another route under a different permit, but it would be objectionable if passengers who embark on the route covered by the inter State permit are given direct tickets to any town on the second route for which the vehicle holds on intra State permit.
The issue of scull a direct ticket would amount to extending the span to the inter State route, which is not permissible under the .
In other words, there can be no objecting to the linking of the two routes but this linking should not involve boarding of direct passengers, i.e., those holding one ticket for travel over both the routes on either of the two routes.
"On a careful consideration of the provisions of the , the Commission advise under Section 63A(2) (b) of the , that it would not be in order if one vehicle operating on two permits for two routes were to book direct passengers travelling on both the routes on direct tickets for places on both the routes.
Operations which would contravene this advice should be stopped and the services be so regulated to ensure that the provisions of the are not violated " The State of Punjab went up in appeal to the Inter State Trans port Appellant Tribunal (hereinafter called the 'Tribunal) under rule 24 of the Inter State Transport Commission Rules, 1960.
That appeal was dismissed on the 4th July 1967 through an order, paragraph 3 to 7 of which may be re produced for facility of reference: "3.
The learned counsel for the Delhi Administration replied that the issue of tickets was a condition of a permit under Section 48(3) (xiv) of the .
The 6 520SCI/78 74 inter State permit from Delhi to Karnal was, therefore, subject to the condition that tickets bearing specified particulars shall be issued to passengers and shall show the fares actually charged.
This must be construed to mean that the ticket which is issued as a condition attaching to a single permit would be restricted to the route or routes covered by that permit.
As the inter State route alone is covered by the permit which is countersigned by the Delhi Administration, the said permit would require the issue of a ticket only on the Delhi Karnal route but not beyond.
We think that the contention of the Delhi Administration is further supported by Section 42(1) of the under which no owner of a "transport vehicle" (which includes a stage carriage) shall use the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or a State Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used.
The vehicle starting from Delhi on the Delhi Karnal route would be governed by the conditions of the inter State permit countersigned by the Delhi Administration.
The use of the vehicle at Delhi or, for the matter of that, at any place on the inter State route, must be governed by the conditions of the inter State permit alone.
We have already construed session 48(3) (xiv) to mean that the tickets which must be issued as a condition of the permit must relate to the route or routes or area covered by that permit.
It would follow therefore that tickets to be issued from Delhi could not be for any place which was beyond Karnal and, therefore, not covered by the inter State permit.
Learned Counsel for the Government of Punjab submitted that the Delhi Administration has countersigned only the inter State route covered by a permit issued by the Government of Punjab with the knowledge that the same permit was valid floor a further intra State route also.
however, cannot mean that the Delhi Administration are estopped from contending that under the conditions of the inter State permit, a ticket for a place beyond the Inter State route cannot be issued.
From the point of view of the convenience of the passengers, we would have liked the vehicle starting from Delhi to issue a long distance ticket to a place even beyond 75 Karnal so that the passengers starting from Delhi could A be assured of reaching their destination beyond Karnal.
Unfortunately, the attainment of this objective has been fettered by the existing provisions of the referred to above.
For the above reasons, therefore, we are of the view that the advice given by the Inter State Transport Commission was, on the whole, correct, though we have taken the liberty of adding to the reasons on which the advice could be supported.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed." This order of the Tribunal was challenged by the State of Haryana (which had been carved out of the erstwhile State of Punjab in the meantime) in the petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India which we have mentioned above and which has been accepted by a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi.
The High Court took note of the various provisions of the Act and concluded that there was no warrant for the proposition that tickets could not be issued at Delhi for stations beyond Karnal by the Haryana Roadways for a bus operating under a permit in respect of the Delhi Karnal route and that the Commission and the Tribunal had both erred in holding to the contrary.
The High Court observed that under clause (xiv) of sub section (3) of Section 48 of the Act, the Delhi State could impose conditions subject to which its countersignature in relation to a permit covering an inter state route was to be valid, but added that such.
conditions could only be those which were covered by that clause and no others.
It further found that no condition preventing the permit holder from issuing a direct ticket from Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal was ever imposed by the State Transport Authority, Delhi, and also that such a condition could not be imposed inasmuch as (a) the same would not be relatable to the inter State route and (b) it would not be covered by clause (xiv) aforesaid.
It turned down a plea that the issuance of tickets from Delhi to Chandigarh by the Haryana Roadways affected the identity of the Delhi karnal route or amounted to its extension.
In the result, therefore, the High Court issued a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Commission and the Tribunal and restrained the Delhi Administration from interfering with the operation of the Stage carriages of the State of Haryana on the Delhi Haryana inter state routes on the plea that the issue of direct tickets beyond the terminal stations in Haryana on those routes was prohibited either by the provisions of the Act or by any condition attached by the State Transport Authority, Delhi.
Before us, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are: (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Delhi, had the power under sub sec.
(2) of Sec. 63 read with clause (xiv) above mentioned to impose, while according its counter signature to a permit relating to an inter State route, a condition to the effect that tickets shall not be issued for any station beyond the two specified termini and such a condition could be spelt out of the counter signature above extracted by necessary implication.
(2) The counter signatures covered only inter State routes having specified termini and the issuance of tickets by the Haryana Roadways for stations beyond the terminus located in the Haryana State and specified in a particular permit (which has been countersigned by the Delhi State authorities) amounted to an extension of the route which the Act did not permit.
We find no force in either of these contentions for the reasons which follow and which are substantially the same as advanced by the High Court in the detailed judgment under appeal.
Sub section (2) of Section 63 of the Act states: "(2) A Regional Transport authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it has granted The 'permit, .
and may likewise vary any condition attached to the permit by the Authority by which the permit was granted.
" The conditions which a Regional Transport Authority may attach to a permit while granting it are contained in clause (xiv) above mentioned which runs thus: (xiv) that tickers bearing specified particulars shall be is sued to passengers and shall show the fares actually charged and that records of tickets, issued shall he kept in a specified manner;" According to this clause, the conditions attached to the grant of a permit may be (a) that the tickets issued to passengers shall bear specified particulars; 77 (b) that the tickets shall show the fares actually charged; A and (c) that records of the tickets issue(l shall be kept in the manner specified.
None of these conditions embraces a restriction on the permit holder that he shall not ply his vehicle beyond the specified inter state route even if that is done under another permit which is valid according to law, and we, therefore, do not see how clause (vix) as above extracted read with sub sec.
(2) of section 63 of the Act helps the case of the appellant.
Nor can we agree with the plea that the counter signature above extracted could be construed as laying down a condition that the permit holder could not ply his vehicle beyond the specified terminus in the State of Haryana.
Learned counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on the words "Tickets will be issued for the destinations between Delhi and Karnal.
Destination boards should be exhibited," and wants us to interpret them as implying a prohibition on the use of the concerned vehicles beyond Karnal.
We are of the opinion, however, that no such interpretation can be placed on them.
They merely lay down positive instructions which the permit holder had to carry out, namely, that he would not refuse the issue of a ticket between the two termini, i.e., Delhi and Karnal, and that he would also exhibit a board stating that the vehicle in question would cover the route from Delhi to Karnal.
Beyond that the words do not go and cannot be construed to mean that the vehicle could not ply beyond p Karnal or that a board saying that it was going to Chandigarh via Karnal cloud not be exhibited, or that tickets could not be issued for any stations except those lying between Delhi and Karnal.
In fact, the authority counter signing the permit had no concern at all with any route beyond Karnal.
The playing J of the vehicle from Karnal to Chandigarh would be governed not by the permit covering the Delhi Karnal route or by the counter signature on it but by another permit issued by the authority competent to deal with the route between Karnal and Chandigarh.
The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant is, therefore, found to be without substance.
We also find no force in the plea that the plying of vehicles by the Haryana Roadways beyond the inter State route under valid permits issued by the competent authority would amount to an 78 "extension" of the route such as is prohibited by the Act.
Reliance in support of the plea was placed on sub section
(8) of section 57 of the Act which lays down: "(8) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of Ba new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier 's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the Permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit: Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route Or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in me number of vehicles.
" As pointed out by the High Court, the language of the sub section applies only to a case where the permit holder applies for the variation of the conditions of his permit by inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum.
In the case before us this situation does not arise at all inasmuch as the Haryana Roadways has not applied for the variation of any permit in any way and has, on the other hand, taken and exploited quite another permit for an entirely different route from another competent authority.
Apart from sub sec.
(8) above mentioned, we have not been referred to any provision of the Act in support of the plea under consideration which, therefore, fails.
Learned Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a Possible unfortunate situation which might result from the conclusions which the High Court has reached and, in our opinion, reached rightly.
His apprehension was that in order to make more money and to avoid inconvenience to itself the Haryana Roadways, while operating under the permit pertaining to the Delhi Karnal route, would perhaps not issue any tickets to passengers bound for stations lying II in between Delhi and Karnal so long as it could find customers travelling directly from Delhi to Chandigarh and that in that event the real purpose of the counter signature would be wholly defeated.
We 79 would certainly not approve of such a situation but then it is nobody 's A case that the Haryana Roadways has been plying its buses on the Delhi Chandigarh route or, for that matter, any other route, in that fashion.
However, we may make it clear that if any long distance passengers are given preference over those leaving Delhi for a station lying between the termini specified in any permit bearing the countersignature of the Delhi State authorities, a peremptory condition attach ed to the counter signature would have been violated, and that State would be entitled to take such action as may be open to it under the law.
subject to this observation, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The Governments of the States of Punjab and Delhi entered into an agreement about 30 years back providing for the running of public service vehicles on routes which covered each of the two States so that every one of such routes had one terminus in one of the States and the other in the other.
In Pursuance of the agreement one of the Governments would issue permits under the and the same would be countersigned by the other State before the former plied its buses on the routes covered by such routes.
One such permit related to the Delhi Karnal route and was countersigned by the State 'Transport Authority, Delhi.
The routes were extend d by the Punjab State authorities under permits granted by them for intra state routes connecting different towns in the State of Punjab itself.
Thus a permit was issued in favour of the Punjab Roadways for the route from Karnal to Chandigarh so that the bus operating on the Delhi Karnal route would carry passengers from Delhi to Chandigarh via Karnal.
In 1966, the appellant objected to the exploitation by the State of Punjab of the inter State routes in the manner above stated, that is, by extending them beyond the termini specified in That behalf under the counter signatures made by the State of Delhi, and approached the Inter State Transport Commission constituted under section 63 A of M.V. Act With a request for interference.
The Commission answered it in favour of the appellant State, and held that it would not be in order that if one vehicle operating of two permits for two routes were to book direct passengers travelling on both the routes.
Operations which would contravene this advice should be stopped and the services be so regulated to ensure that the provisions of the are not violated".
The State of Punjab went up in appellate to the Inter State Transport Appellate Tribunal under rule 24 of the Inter State Transport Commission Rules 1960.
The appeal was dismissed and the respondent State filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court which was allowed by the Division Bench.
Dismissing the appeal by certificate the Court, ^ HELD: (1) According to clause (xiv) of sub section (3) of section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959, the conditions attached to the grant of permit, under section 63(2) ibid, may be; (a) that the tickets issued to passengers, shall bear specified particulars; (b) that the tickets shall show the fares actually charged; and (C) that records of the tickets issued shall be kept in the manner specified.
None of these conditions embraces a restriction on the permit holder that he shall not ply his vehicles beyond the specified inter state route even if that is done under another permit which is valid according to law and, therefore, clause (xiv) of section 48(3) read with section 63(2) of the Act will be of no avail.
[76H, 77A C] 71 (2) 'The words "Tickets will be issued for the destinations between Delhi and Karnal.
Destination boards should be exhibited" merely lay down positive instruction which the permit holder had to carry out, namely, that he would not refuse the issue of a ticket between the two termini, i.e, Delhi and Karnal.
and that he would also exhibit a board stating that the vehicle in question would cover the route from Delhi to Karnal.
Beyond that the words do not go and cannot be construed to mean that the vehicle could not ply beyond Karnal or that a board saying, that it was going to Canceling via Karnal could not be exhibited, or that tickets could not be issued for any stations except those lying between Delhi and Karnal.
In fact, the authority counter signing the permit had no concern at all with any route beyond Karnal.
The plying to the vehicle from Karnal to Chandigarh would be governed not by the permit covering the Delhi Karnal route or by the counter signature on it by another permit issued by the authority competent to deal with the route between Karnal and Chandigarh.
[77D H] (3) The plying of vehicles by the Haryana,.
Roadways beyond the inter state route.
under valid permits issued by the competent authority does not amount to an "extension" of the route such as is prohibited by the Act.
[77H. 78A] The language of sub section (8) of section 57 of the Act applies only to a case Where the permit holder applies for variation of the conditions of his permit by inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum In the instant case, this situation does not arise at all inasmuch as the Haryana.
Roadways has not applied for The vacation of any permit in any way and has, on the other hand, taken and exploited quite another permit for an entirely different rout from another competent authority.
[78E F] OBSERVATlON: [If any long distance passengers arc given preference over those leaving Delhi for a station Lying between the termini; specified in any permit bearing the counter signature of the Delhi state authorities.
a peremptory condition attached to the counter signature would have been violated and that State would l be entitled to take such action as may be open to it under the law].