judgement:
Appeal Nos. 887 and 888 of 1963.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 23, 1961, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos.
483 and 484 of 1961.
section K. Kapur, B. L. Khanna, section Murty and K. K. Jain, for the appellants.
C. B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.
July 27, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by : RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.
The appellant, Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., hereinafter called the company, a joint stock company, and section P. Bhasin.
a shareholder of the company, filed writ petition No. 1003 of 1961 in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the validity of the U.P. Sales Tax Validation Act, 1958 (Act XV of 1958), hereinafter called the Validation Act, and praying for the quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, 1960 and the order dated February 1, 1961, of the Sales Tax Judge (Appeals), Meerut, in connection with the assessment of tax on the sale of vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the sales tax was assessed at a higher rate than was permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of 1 anna and not at 6 naye paise per rupee.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition as the Validation Act validating the relevant provision of the U. P. Sales Tax Act and the notification enhancing the rate of tax had been held valid by this Court in J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh( ) and as the contention about the calculation of tax to be at the rate of 6 naye paise per rupee and not at the rate of 1 anna had been repelled in earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court, one such decision being Ram Kishan Sunder Lal vs State of Uttar Pradesh(1).
A special appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed (1) ; (2) 13 S.T. C. 92 316 in view of the decision of this Court in the Jute Mills ' Case(1).
It appears that the second question about the alleged error in calculating the tax at the rate of I anna instead of 6 naye paise per rupee, was not raised before the Division Bench.
Civil Appeal No. 887 of 1963 has been filed by special leave against this order of the High Court.
The other appeal No. 888 of 1963 is filed against the order of the Division Bench confirming the order of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition by the appellant company against the assessment order for the years 1955 56, 1956 57 and 1957 58.
The only point urged for the appellant in this writ petition had been that the Validation Act was invalid.
The orders of the two Courts below repelled the contention, in view of the decision of this Court.
in the Jute Mills Case(1).
We did not allow the apellant to urge the grounds attacking the validity of the Validation Act in view of the decision of this Court in the lute Mills ' Case(1).
The ,only point which is urged before us now is that the tax should have been calculated at the rate of 6 naye paise per rupee and not at the rate of 1 anna per rupee, as laid down in the relevant provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the notification issued under its provisions.
The contention is based on the provisions of the Indian (Act III of 1906), hereinafter called the .
as amended by Act XXXI of 1955.
It is urged that in view of the provisions of sub sections
(2) and (3) of section 14 of the Coin age Act, as amended reference to 1 anna in the relevant Act and notification issued thereunder should be construed to be reference to 6 naye paise and that the wrong calculation by the Sales Tax Authority has resulted in over assessment of tax.
To appreciate the real contention urged.
it is neces sary to refer to the relevant provisions of the .
Section 13 ' provides the extent up to which the tender ,of the various coins would be considered legal tender.
Its relevant portions read: "13.
(1) The coins issued under the authority of section 6 shall be a legal tender in payment or (1) ; 317 on account. (a) in the case of a rupee coin, for any sum.
(b) in the case of a half rupee coin, for any sum not exceeding ten rupees: (c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum R not exceeding one rupee: Porvided that the coin has not been defaced and has not lost weight so as to be less than such weight as may be pres cribed in its case.
(3) All nickel, copper and bronze coins which may have been issued under this Act before the 24th day of January, 1942 shall continue as before to be a legal tender in payment or on account for any sum not exceeding one rupee.
" Section 14, after the amendment introducing the decimal system of coinage, reads: "14.
(1) The rupee shall be divided into one hundred units and the new coin representing such unit may be designated by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, under such name as it thinks fit, and the rupee, half rupee and quarter rupee shall be respectively equivalent to one hundred, fifty and twenty five such new coins and shall, subject to, the provisions of sub section (1 ) andsub section (2) of section 13 and to theextent specified therein.
be a legal tender inpayment or on account accordingly.
(2) All coins issued under the authority of this Act in denominations of annas, pice and pies shall, to the extent specified in section 13, be a legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty four pice or one hundred and ninety two pies to one hundred new coins.
referred to in sub section (1), calculated in respect of any such single coin or number of such coins, tendered at one transaction, to the 318 nearest new coin, or where the new coin above and the new coin below are equally near, to the new coin below.
(3) All references in any enactment or in any notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or other instrument to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins referred to in sub section (1) converted theret o at the rate specified in subsection (2).
" The various factors determining the application of the provisions of sub section
(2) for the purposes of calculating the equivalent value of annas, pice and pies tendered at one transaction are several.
The first requisite is that the amount taken into consideration is the amount which is ten dered at one transaction.
The other is that the amount tendered in any of those coins should be within the extent of legal tender mentioned in section 13.
When these two condi tions are present, those coins would be legal tender in pay ment or on account at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice or 192 pies to 100 naye paise which is the new coin referred to in sub section
(1) of section 14.
This means that the number of annas, or pice or pies tendered have to be multiplied by 100/, 100/64 and 100/192 respectively, to get the equivalent number of new coins.
In such arithmetical calculation there is the possibility that the equivalent number of naye paise be not an exact number and be a mixed number consisting of a whole number and a fraction.
There is no coin of the equivalent to a fraction of a naya paisa in value.
In such cases, there is not going to be payment of the amount due in full, if for the amount tendered in payment or on account there is no full equivalent of naye paises at the rate specified in sub section
It is for such contingency of a payment being not a full payment that sub section
(2) further provides that the coins tendered will be legal payment at the specified rate calculated to the nearest new coin or where the new coin above or new coin below are equally near, to the new coin below.
The significance of this specified mode of calculation would be apparent from a concrete example.
319 7 annas, 6 annas and 5 annas, calculated at the specified rate, would be equal to 43 3/4, 37 1/2 and 31 1/2 naye paise.
According to the artificial calculation, they will however be ,,deemed to be legal tender for 44, 37 and 31 naye paise s respectively, as 44 and 31 naye paise are nearest to the calculated equivalent of 7 annas and 5 annas and 37 naye paise is the next coin below 37 1/2 naye paise which are equally 'below 38 naye paise and above 37 naye paise and the artificial mode of calculation directs the equivalents to be fixed, in such circumstances, to the new coins below.
It is to be noted that each coin of one kind, tendered, is not considered as a unit for the purposes of calculation, but all the Coins of the denomination are to be treated as one unit for this purpose.
This is to ensure payment of the amounts due as fully as possible.
This will again be clear on a concrete example.
Seven one anna pieces are tendered, say, at one payment.
If each separate piece be taken to be valid payment for 6 naye paise, the seven one anna pieces will be good payment for 42 naye paise only, but if taken as a whole, they would be good payment for 44 naye paise.
Similarly, five one pice pieces will be good payment for 8 naye paise only and not for 10 naye paise which would be the case if each one pice piece was treated as good payment for 2 naye paise, its equivalent, if it be converted singly to naye poise.
It is therefore clear that the provisions of sub s.(2) provide for the conversion of old coins into new at the time of payment or of accounting, and then too for the conversion of the old coins within the limit of the extent to which they are legal tender, which means that one cannot insist on paying a total sum of several rupees in naye paise calcula ted in the manner laid down in sub section
(2) of section 14 and that two factors affect the determination of the number of nave paise equivalent in value to the value of the old coin of annas, pice or pies tendered, the two factors being the rate specified and the artificial way of calculation.
The result of the artificial way of calculation is that sometimes equivalent number of naye paise is less than the actual value of the old coins at the specified rate and sometimes it is higher, the difference being, however, very small.
320 Sub section (3), however, deals with a different matter.
It has nothing to do with the actual payment of any amount.
It provides a rule for construing values expressed in old coins as values expressed in new coins or naye paise, and to achieve this object, the only factor necessary to specify is the rate at which the value of the old coins is to be converted into the value of the new coins.
The object of the provision is to provide a measure for arriving at the equivalent value in terms of new coins and not to provide how any amount due in terms of old coins is to be paid in terms.
of new coins.
Sub section (3) therefore simply provide& that references, in any of the documents referred to in that sub section, to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins converted thereto at the rate specified in sub section
Sub section
(2) specifies the rate.
The rate specified in sub section
(2) is 16 annas, 64 pice or 192 pies to 100 new coins or naye paise.
It is this rate which is referred to in sub section
There is nothing in sub section
(3) which can be taken to refer o that part of sub s.(2) which relates to the actual calculation for arriving at the number of new coins deemed equivalent in value to a certain number of annas, pice or pies, coins tendered within the limits of legal tender.
The provisions of sub section
(3) of section 14 provide for the conversion of the value of old coins into that of new coins at the rate specified in sub section
(2) and do not provide for conversion to be in accordance with the provisions of sub section
The other expression would have been preferable if the legislature had intended that the references of values expressed in old coins be construed as references to values in new coins according to the mode of artificial calculation mentioned in sub s.(2).
The provisions deal with the method of construction of the expression of the value in documents, be the private documents or be they enactments or notifications, or rules or orders.
The object was to determine the equivalent value which may be taken to replace the value as expressed in old coins.
If the contention urged for the appellant be accepted, the values expressed in annas, pice or pies will not, on conversion, be precisely equivalent but could be very much divergent and would adversely, affect 321 the interests of the persons to whom money be due or in certain circumstances, the interests of the person from whom it be due.
This could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
The futility of the appellants ' contention that the provisions of sub section
(3) not only refer to the rate specified in sub section
(2) but also to the method of calculation mentioned in that sub section, is apparent from the anomalies which would arise if it be accepted.
This can be illustrated from the various facts of these appeals.
It is the appellants ' contention in writ petition No. 1003 of 1961 that the sales tax calculated at the rate of 6 naye paise and not at I anna per rupee on the whole turnover of Rs. 1,40,18,170.84 would reduce the tax demanded by the Sales Tax Officer by Rs. 34,355.
This means that if the tax is calculated at the rate of 1 anna per rupee, as expressed in the relevant provision of law or at 6.25 naye paise per rupee, the amount of tax due from the appellant would be Rs. 34,355 more than the amount of of the same tax on the same turnover calculated at an equivalent value of 6 naye paise per rupee.
In the other writ petition, no reference was made by the appellants to the manner of calculating the tax, the manner of calculation adopted by the taxing authority being the same as in the other writ petition, as the appellants ' claim for refund, if determined at the values of one anna and nine pies calculated in accordance with sub section (2) of section 14, would have been much reduced.
It will be sufficient to state that in clause (e) of para 16 of the writ petition, the figures for the years 1956 57 for the amount paid at one anna per rupee and the amount payable at 9 pies per rupee would then vary the amount refundable to the appellant in a way as to make it much less.
The figures would stand thus : RS.a.
P. Total amount paid at I anna per rupee 8,05,726106 Amount payable at 9 pies 6,03,16753 Amount refundable, and therefore which the petitioner company could detain 2,00,559 53 If the amount payable be calculated at the rate of five naye poise in place of 9 pies, the amount refundable would be 51 S.C. 21.
322 much less as shown below Rs.
Total amount paid at anna per rupee 8,05,726 65 Amount payable at 5 naya paise 6,44,661 32 Amount refundable 1,61,065 33 The appellant stood to lose by calculating the tax payable in terms of naye paise and therefore made up an account at the old coin rates.
The legislature could not have intended, by the provisions of sub section (3), that a mere provision for working out the value in old coins into values in new coins should provide scope for such huge variations in the actual amounts to be paid or received.
The process of conversion is not meant or designed to be a process for gaining more or less than what is rightfully due under a provision of law or under any contractual term.
The conversion is a simple process necessitated by the exigency of payment to be in currency different from the one in which the payment was to be.
We are therefore of opinion that what sub section (2) of section 14 requires is that references to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies will be construed to such values ,expressed in new coins which would be absolutely equivalent to the value of the old coins when their value is converted at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice and 192 pies to 100 naye paise.
Great reliance is placed for the appellants on the decisions of this Court in M. G. Beedi Works vs State of Mysore(1).
Apparently some observations of this Court in that case support the appellants ' contention.
But, when they are considered in the context of that case, they do not support the contention as the Court had not to deal in that case with the actual contention now raised before us.
In the Beedi Works Case the sales tax was to be levied at the rate of 3 pies for every rupee of turnover.
The (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R., 275.
323 amount of tax calculated at 3 pies per rupee worked out to Rs. 91,690 and, calculated at the rate of two naye paise the equivalent value of 3 pies, when calculated in the manner laid down in sub section (2) of section 14, worked out to a figure higher by Rs. 25,038.
The tax was assessed at two naye paise per rupee in view of the provisions of.
, the Mysore Existing Laws (Construction of References to Values) Act, 1957 (Mysore Act XII of 1957).
Section 3 of that Act said : "3.
Construction of references to certain values in existing laws.
In every existing law, all references to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies, shall be construed at references to that value ex pressed in new coins referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of the Indian (Central Act III of 1906), converted thereto at the rate specified in sub section (2) of section 14 of the said Act.
" The assessee, by his writ petition, questioned the validity of the enactment which led to such a result in the amount of tax assessed.
The contention raised was not that the rate of calculation was wrong, but was that the law providing for the assessing of tax at the rate of 2 naye paise instead of 3 pies per rupee was invalid as it amounted to enhancing the tax by an Act which was not enacted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution.
This is clear from what was stated at p. 277, it being "The grievance of the appellant was that according to the Mysore Sales Tax Act he was liable to sales tax at the rate of 3 pies for every rupee on the turnover and calculated on that basis the amount of tax would be Rs. 91,690, but after the amendment of the Indian (Act 3 of 1906) by the Amending Act 31 of 1955 the rate of sales tax which was levied on the appellant 's Bee" was 02 nPs.
per rupee 324 and thus the appellant was called upon to pay Rs. 25,038, more than he would have paid if he had been charged at the rate, of 3 pi Is per rupee.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant in the High Court and before us that this amounted to enhancement of tax which was illegal because the tax had not been increased in the manner provided under the Constitution and thus it was a breach of Article 265 of the Constitution and was therefore void and ille gal.
" This Court further said, at p. 279: "Two objections were, taken to the validity of the tax : Firstly it was argued that by the substitution of 2 naye paise in place 3 pies there was a change in the tax exigible by the Mysore Sales Tax Act and this could only be done if that enactment had been passed according to the procedure for Money Bills in the manner provided by Articles 198, 199 and 207 of the Constitution and as no such Money Bill was introduced or passed for the enhancement of the tax, the tax was illegal and invalid.".
It is clear that the contention was not that the tax should be calculated at a rate equivalent to 300/192 naye paise i.e., 19/16 naye paise and not at 2 naye paise.
It was not urged that the assessment could not have been at 2 naye paise in view of the provisions of section 3 of the Mysore Act of 1957.
What was contended was that the assessment at the rate of 2 naye paise per rupee, instead of 3 pies per rupee, amounted to assessment of tax at an enhanced rate and that the Mysore Act, due to procedural defect, was not valid law.
This Court dealt with these two objections and simply said with respect to the contention about the provision of law amounting to a provision enhancing the rate to tax (p. 279) : "In our opinion by substitution of new coinage i.e., naye paise in place of annas, pice and pies no enhancement of tax was enacted but it was 325 merely a substitution of one coinage by another of equivalent value.
" This Court expressed the opinion that a law providing for substitution of new coinage in place of old coinage in the expression of values does not amount to a provision of enhancing the tax.
The pith and substance of the Act was substitution in terms of new coinage and not varying the rate of tax.
On p. 278, however, this Court, after referring to the provisions of sub sections (1) and (2) of section 14 of the Indian about the division of a rupee into 100 naye paise and the old legal tender in annas, Vice and pies remaining legal tender in naye paise and referring to the mode of calculation specified in sub section (2) of section 14, said: "Sub section (3) provides that all references under any enactment to annas, pice or pies have to be construed as references to the new coin referred to in sub section (1).
In other wards wherever the old legal tender, i.e., annas, pice and pies is mentioned in an enactment it is to be converted into naya paisas and the naya paisas are to be substituted in place of the old legal tender calculated in the manner laid down in sub section (2).
" Stress is placed on the last sentence but this cannot be taken as the decision of the Court on the question that sub section (3) of section 14 made reference not only to the rate of conversion but also to the mode of calculation, as that question had not been considered in any manner.
The last sentence was a sort of a paraphrase of what had been said earlier in the quotation with respect to the provisions of sub section (3).
This is clear from the facts that the provisions of subsection (3) have not been stated in full, and have been referred to upto the stage of reference to the new coin referred to in subsection (1) and that the last portion of the provisions of sub section (3), i.e., 'converted thereto at the rate specified in sub section (2) has not been mentioned.
It is thus that the latter part of the observa 326 tions happened to refer to the method of calculation and not to the rate specified in subsection (2).
The Court was, at the time, thinking of the value of 3 pies in terms of naye paise as calculated according to the provisions of sub section (2), there being no contest before it that the value substituted to the equivalent of 3 pies for assessing the tax was not a correct value for substitution in place of 3 pies.
We therefore do not construe the expression relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant to be a decision of the Court on the construction of the provisions of sub section (3) of section 14 and are therefore of opinion that the observations in that case cannot be taken to be a decision of this Court on the actual point for determination now before us.
We therefore hold that the High Court is right in construing the provisions of sub section (13) of section 14 of the Indian to mean that references to values in any enactment, notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or instrument, expressed in old coins should be construed to be references to values expres sed in new coins by converting, the old values at the rate of 16 annas, 64 pice and 192 pies to 1 00 naye paise.
We accordingly dismiss the appeals with costs.
SHAH, J.I am unable to agree with the view expressed by my learned brother Raghubar Dayal, J., about the interpretation of section 14 which was incorporated by Act 31 of 1955 in the III of 1906.
For the assessment years 1956 57 and 1957 58 the appellant was assessed to sales tax in respect of "Vanaspati" and "oil" under the U.P. Sales Tax Act XV of 1948, as amended by the U.P. Act XXV of 1948.
By a notification issued on March 31, 1956 under section 3 A(2) the rate of tax an "Vanaspati" was fixed at one anna per rupee, at the point of sale by the manufacturer.
Validity of that imposition was challenged by the appellant, but the question is not now open to be canvassed in view of the decision of this Court in J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh(1).
The only question which survives is about the (1) ; 327 quantum of liability of the appellant under the notification, in terms of the new decimal coinage introduced by Act 31 of 1955.
The appellant has claimed that its liability computed in the light of section 14(3) of the would be Rs. 34,385, less than the amount demanded by the Taxing Authorities.
Section 13 of the III of 1906 (which was substituted by Act 28 of 1947 for the original sections 13 and 14) in so far as it is material provides: "(1) The coins issued under the authority of section 6 shall be a legal tender in payment or on account, (a) in the case of a rupee coin, for any sum; (b) in the case of a half rupee coin, for any sum not exceeding ten rupees; (c) in the case of any other coin, for any sum not exceeding one rupee: (2) * * *" Section 14 which added by Act 31 of 1955 provides: "(1) The rupee shall be divided into one hundred units and the new coin representing such unit may be designated by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, under such name as it thinks fit, and the rupee, halfrupee and quarter rupee shall be respectively equivalent to one hundred, fifty and twenty five such new coins and shall, subject to the provisions of sub section (1) and sub section (2) of section 13 and to the extent specified the rein, be a legal tender in payment or on account accordingly.
(2) All coins issued under the authority of the Act in any denominations of annas, pice and pies shall to the "tent specified in section 13, be 328 a legal tender in payment or on account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty four pice or one hundred and ninety two pies to one hundred new coins referred to in sub section (1) cal culated in respect of any such single coin or number of such coins, tendered at one transac tion, to the nearest new coin, or where the new coin above and the new coin below are equally near to the new coin below.
(3) All references in any enactment or in any notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or other instrument to any value expressed in annas, pice and pies shall be construed as references to that value expressed in new coins referred to in sub section (1) converted thereto at the rate specified in sub section (2).
" Sub section (1) of section 14 declares a rupee as equivalent to a hundred new coins, and a half rupee and a quarterrupee as equivalent to fifty new coins and twenty five new coins respectively.
These new coins are made legal tender in payment or on account as provided in section 13 of the Act.
By sub section (2) all coins issued under the authority of the Act in denominations of annas, pice and pies also remain legal tender in payment or oil account at the rate of sixteen annas, sixty four pice or one hundred and ninetytwo pies to one hundred new coins.
An anna is therefore made legal tender for 2514, a pice for 25116, and a pie for 25148 new coins.
But this involves adjustment of fractions of new coins, and the Legislature has, instead of issuing fractions of new coins a step which would have involved the issue of coins of insignificant value provided for rounding off fractions of new coins, when to discharge an ascertained liability in a single transaction payment is made in annas, pice or pies.
This table of equivalence prescribed by sub section (2), however, applies only when payment is made in old coins to discharge liability under a single transaction.
Sub section (3) is an interpretation clause.
Where under any law, contract or instrument, reference is made 329 to annas, pice or pies, liability arising in any transaction governed thereby will be construed in terms of new coins converted at the rate specified in sub section (2).
This conversion involves two steps: substitution of the value in terms of new coins by the application of rates mentioned in sub section (2), and rounding off the fractions, if any, resulting from such application.
When there is in any law, ,contract or instrument a reference to any value expressed in terms of annas, pice or pies, by sub section (3) the reference has to be construed as if the value is expressed in terms of new coins at the rates specified in sub section (2).
Liability to pay an amount in one transaction ascertained in terms of new coins may be discharged under subsection (2) by tender of annas, pice or pies according to the table of equivalence and the fractions may be rounded off.
But in the ascertainment of liability under a transaction, sub section (2) does not come into play.
Liability under a transaction is ascertained under the general law, and sub section (3) comes in aid as an interpretation clause when the value is expressed in some law, contract or instrument governing a transaction not in terms of new coins, but of annas, pice or pies.
Sub section (3) does not attract the rule of rounding off at the stage of discharge of liability under any concrete transaction: it merely prescribes the value which shall be deemed to be substituted in any law, contract or instrument when the value is specified therein in terms of annas, pice or pies.
It is attracted when liability declared in annas, pice or pies is to be ascertained in terms of new coins whereas sub section (2) operates in considering whether a certain payment in annas, pice or pices discharges an ascertained liability.
There is nothing in the statute which supports the view that what the Legislature intended by enacting sub section (3) was computation of liability in terms of old coins and then conversion and rounding off of the total liability in terms of new coins.
To interpret clause (3) in that manner would be to denude it of its true purpose as an interpretation clause, and to render it practically nugatory.
If sub section (3) is merely intended to serve as determinative of 330 total liability under a transaction, the purpose is amply served by sub section (2).
The view I have expressed also finds support from a judgment of this Court in M/s. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works vs The State of Mysore and another(1).
In that case, sales tax was imposed under the Mysore Sales Tax Act 6 of 1948 at the rate of three pies for every rupee of the turnover ' On the application of section 14 of the Indian , sales tax leviable under the Mysore Sales Tax Act was computed at the rate of two new coins per rupee of the turnover, and a demand for RS.
1,16,72 44 was made.
The tax payer contended that he was liable to pay Rs. 91,690 only being the amount of total tax liability computed at the rate of 3 pies per rupee of turnover.
He challenged the additional demand by a petition in the High Court of Mysore on the plea that the Act which altered the incidence was a taxing measure and could only be enacted after complying with the provisions of articles 198, 199 and 207 of the Constitution relating to money bills, and the Mysore Existing Laws (Construction of Reference to Values) Act 12 of 1957 which gave effect to the amendment made by Act 31 of 1955.
dealt with "coinage and legal tender", and was not within the competence of the State Legislature.
In dealing with these contentions, this Court summarised the scheme of clauses (1),(2) and (3) of section 14 and observed: "Sub section (3) provides that all references under any enactment to annas, pice or pies have to be construed as reference to the new coin referred to in sub section (1).
In other words, wherever the old legal tender, i.e., annas, pice and pies is mentioned in an enactment it is to be converted into naya Paisas and the naya Paisas are to be substituted in place of the old legal tender calculated in the manner laid down in sub section (2).
" The Court rejected the claim of the tax payer that he was liable to pay tax computed at the rate of three pies per (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R 275.
331 rupee only.
If sub section (3) of section 14 was susceptible of the interpretation submitted on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, it was wholly unnecessary to enter upon the question of the vires of the provisions, because between the computation of sales tax on a total turnover of Rs. 58,36,422.25 nPs at 2 naye Paise, and at the rate of 3 pies per rupee in the manner suggested, there would have resulted no discrepancy at all, and the contention of the tax payer that he was liable to pay Rs. 91,690 had to be accepted.
But this Court upheld the claim of the Sales Tax Department that the computation had to be made by substituting two naye Paise in the section of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, which imposed liability for payment of tax, and the total demand for tax computed on the footing of that substitution was properly made.
If the interpretation which is now suggested on behalf of the State be accepted, the assessee in Mangalore Ganesh Beddi Works ' Case(1) was bound to succeed.
In the present case by the notification issued on March 31, 1956, the liability for payment of sales tax was to be computed at the rate of one anna in a rupee of the turnover.
By virtue of section 14(3) of the Indian , for an anna mentioned in the notification 61 now coins will be substituted.
But as the substituted rate involved a frac tion by the process of rounding off at the rate specified in sub section (2), the fraction of new coins will be omitted and the nearest new coins i.e., six new coins will be deemed to be substituted in the statute.
Liability for sales tax after the amendment of the will, therefore, be at the rate of 6 new coins for every rupee of sale price.
ORDER BY COURT In view of the judgment of the majority, the appeals we dismissed with costs.
(1) [1963] SUPP.
1 S.C.R. 275.

summary/full:
For the assessment years 1956 57 and 1957 58, the appellant was, assessed to sales tax in respect of Vanaspati and oil under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
By a notification issued on March 31, 1956 under section 3 A(2), the rate of tax on Vanaspati was fixed at one anna per rupee at the point of sale by the manufacturer.
The appellant and section P. Bhasin, a shareholder of the company, filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the U.P. Sales Tax Validation Act, 1958 and also prayed for the quashing of the assessment order dated October 15, 1960 and the order dated February 1, 1961, of the Sales Tax Judge (Appeals), Meerut, in connection with the assessment of tax on the sale of Vanaspati and other articles both on the ground that the sale tax was assessed at a higher rate than was permissible under a valid law and that the tax had been assessed at the rate of one anna and not at 6 Naya Paisa per rupee.
The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge of the High Court and the Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed by High Court.
The appellant came to this Court by special leave.
The only point urged before this Court was that the tax should have been calculated at the rate of 6 Naya Paisa per rupee and not at the rate of one anna per rupee as laid down in the relevant provisions of the U.P. Sales Tax Act and the notice issued under its provisions.
Dismissing the appeal, Held (per P, B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.): The High Court was right in construing the provisions of sub section
(3) of section 14 of Indian to mean that references to values in any enactment, notification, rule or order under any enactment or in any contract, deed or instrument, expressed in old coins should be construed to be references to values expressed in new coins by converting the old values at the rate of16 annas, 64 pice and 192 pies to 100 Naya Paisa.
The values expressed in new coins must be absolutely equivalent to the value of the, old coins.
Per Shah, J.
The liability for sales tax after the amendment of the will be at the rate of 6 new coins for every rupee of sale price and not one anna.
By the notification issued on March 31, 1956, the liability for payment of sales tax was to be computed at the rate of one anna in a rupee of the turnover.
By virtue of section 14(3), for an anna mentioned in the notification, 6 1/4 new coins are to be substituted.
As the substituted rate involves a fraction, by the process of rounding off at the rate specified in section 14(2), the fraction of new coins has to be omitted and the nearest new coins, i.e., 6 new coins are to be deemed to be substituted in the statute.
J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs State of Uttar Pradesh, ; , Ram Kishan Sunder Lal vs State of Uttar Pradesh, 13 S.T.C. 923, 315 M/s. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works vs State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 275, referred to.


judgement:
Appeal No. 646 652 of 1960.
349 Appeals from the judgment and decree dated November 28, 1962 of the Madras High Court in 385, 259, 260, 385 of 1947 respectively.
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in C.A. Nos.
648, 649 and 650 of 1960) and for the respondents (in C.A. Nos. 651 and 652 of 1960).
T.V. R. Tatachari, for respondents Nos.
1. 2. 5 and 6 (in C.A. No. 648 of 1960) and appellants (in C.A. No. 652 of 1960).
S.T. Desai, K. Jayaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondents No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 8 to 11, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 21 (in C.A. No. 649 of 1960) respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 8 (in C.A. No. 650 of 1960) and the appellants (in C.A. No. 651 of 1960).
July 31, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J.
These five appeals by certificate arise out of Original Suits Nos. 183, 184 and 185 of 1945 filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbator, Madras State.
O.S. No. 183 of 1945 relates to properties claimed on behalf of Sri Chowleswaraswami temple.
Periaswami Goundar and Samana Goundar, the plaintiffs in the said suit, are the trustees of the said temple.
They filed the suit for the recovery of the plaint scheduled properties from the defendants who are the archakas and the alienees from them on the ground that the said properties were the properties of the deity and that the defendants had no right therein.
They also claimed mesne profits for a period of 3 years prior to the suit.
The defendants filed a written statement admitting the claim of the deity to the melvaram interest in the properties but claimed that the archakas owned the kudivaram therein and that some of the said properties were validly transferred to the alienees.
O.S. No. 184 of 1945 was filed in the said Court by the trustees of Sri Pongali Amman temple situated in the village of Vengambur for the recovery of the properties 350 mentioned in the schedule attached to the plaint.
The defendants, who are the archakas and alienees from them, inter alia, pleaded that only melvaram in the said properties was granted to the deity and that the archakas owned the kudivaram therein and that they had validly alienated their interest in the said properties in favour of the alienees.
O.S. No. 185 of 1945 was filed in the same Court by the trustees of Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple situated in Vengambur village .
The plaintiffs sought to recover the properties mentioned in the schedule annexed to the plaint from the archakas and the alienees from them on the same grounds and the defendants raised similar pleas.
It is not necessary to mention other defences raised in the written statements filed in the three suits as nothing turns upon them in these appeals.
The main issue in O.S. No. 183 of 1945, O.S. No. 184 of 1945 and O.S. No. 185 of 1945 was whether the inam grants made to the three temples consisted of both varams or melvaram alone.
The learned Subordinate Judge tried the said suits along with two other suits and delivered a common judgment therein.
On the said issue he held in all the three suits that the grants to the three deities comprised both the varams.
He further held that the alienations made by the archakas prior to May 16, 1931, were binding on the trustees of the respective temples and that the alienations made subsequent to that date were liable to be set aside.
In the result the learned Subordinate Judge gave a decree in each of the suits for possession of the plaint schedule properties except those covered by the alienations effected before May 16, 1931.
He also decreed mesne profits to the plaintiffs for a period of 3 years prior to the suits and also subsequent profits from the date of the suits to the date of delivery of possession at the rate fixed by him.
The defendants in the said suits preferred appeals to the High Court of Madras, being Appeals Nos. 259, 260 and 385 of 1947.
The said appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the said High Court, consisting of Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan, JJ.
The High Court agreed with the 351 trial court on the finding relating to the nature of the grants to the temples, that is to say it held that the grants to the temples comprised both the varams, namely, melvaram and kudivaram.
The learned Judges, for the first time, though there was no pleading, no issue and no contention in the trial Court, held that the archakas were entitled to have a portion of the said properties allotted to them towards their remuneration for the services to the temples and gave a decree directing the division of the said properties into two halves and putting the archakas in possession of one half.
They did not disturb the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in regard to the alienations, that is they maintained the alienations made before May 16, 1931.
Against the decree of the High Court in A.S. No. 259 of 1947 and A.S. No. 385 of 1947 both the archakas and the trustees preferred appeals to this Court questioning the correctness of the decree of the High Court in so far as it went against them.
Against the decree in A.S. No. 260 of 1947 no appeal was filed by the archakas, but the trustees preferred an appeal questioning that part of the decree directing a part of the properties to be put in possession of the archakas.
Mr. Desai and Mr. Tatachari, appearing for the archakas in the different appeals, contended that the Courts below, having regard to the consistent and continuous conduct of enjoyment as absolute owners of the properties by the archakas spread over a long period of time, should have invoked the doctrine of lost grant particularly when there was no clear and convincing evidence of the terms of the grant.
Alternatively, they argued that the Courts should have held, on a fair construction of the recitals found in the inam statements and the inam register, that only melvaram was granted to the deity.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the trustees, contested this position.
He would say that there is no scope for invoking the doctrine of lost grant as the recitals in the inam register and the inam statement, which are of great evidentiary value, conclusively establish that both the 352 varams were granted to the deity and that all the documents, or most of them, disclosing the conduct of the archakas would support the conclusion that both the varams were so granted to the deity.
At the outset it would be convenient to notice briefly the scope of the doctrine of lost grant, as the learned counsel for the appellants have strongly relied upon it.
The doctrine of lost grant with its limitations has been succinctly explained by the Judicial Committee in Sankara narayana Pillayan vs H.R.E. Board, Madras(1).
The temple in that case had 4 kattalais.
Though the temple had a general trustee, each of the kattalais was in the charge of a special trustee or trustees.
In regard to one of the kattalais after meeting all the expenses there remained a surplus which the trustees claimed for their own benefit and in fact they were utilizing the surplus for the benefit of their families.
It was contended by the appellants that they were the owners of the suit properties, which were subject only to a charge in favour of the kattalai for the performance of the worship according to the prescribed scale.
The Judicial Committee, after noticing the earlier decisions, observed: "The presumption, it was stated, of an origin in some lawful title which the Courts have so often readily made in order to support pos sessory rights long and quietly enjoyed, arises where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, and the rule has to be resorted to because of the failure of actual evidence.
In the present case, where there is ample and convincing proof of the nature of the grant, the object of the endowment and the capacity of the persons claiming the user and enjoyment, the rule can hardly have any application.
" In the result the Judicial Committee held that the proper ties were granted only to the deity and that the trustees had no claim to any surplus income.
The said principle has been accepted by this Court in Buddu Satyanarayana V. Konduru Venkatapayya(2).
There a question similar to (1) I.L.R. ,605 606.
(2) ; , 1003.
353 that now raised was considered.
The archakas claimed, relying upon the doctrine of lost grant, that under the original inam grant only the melvaram interest was given to the deity.
Rejecting that contention, Das, J., speaking for the Court, observed: "There is no doubt, on the authorities, that a presumption of an origin in some lawful title may in certain circumstances be made to support possessory rights long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forthcoming but it is equally well established that that presumption cannot 'be made where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of the grant an the persons to whom it was made.
" The basis of this doctrine is clearly brought out by two judgments of the Judicial Committee.
Lord Buck master, delivering the judgment in Maginiram Sitaram vs Kasturbhai Manibhai(1), observed : "At the lapse of 100 years, when every party to the original transaction has passed away, and it becomes completely impossible to ascertain what were the circumstances which caused the original grant to be made, it is only following the policy which the Courts always adopt, of securing as far as possible quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, to assume that the grant was lawfully and not unlawfully made." Viscount Sumner in Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi vs Jabeda Khatun(2) said much to the same effect thus "The presumption of an origin in some lawful title, which the Courts have so often readily made in order to support possessory rights, long and quietly enjoyed, where no actual proof of title is forthcoming, is one which is not a mere (1) [1921] L.R.49 I.A. 54.
51 Sup.
Court. 23 (2) [1930] L.R. 57 I.A. 125.
354 branch of the law of evidence.
It is resorted to because of the failure of actual evidence.
" It is, therefore, clear that the said principle can only be invoked where there is no acceptable evidence of the terms of the grant.
In these appeals the trustees filed copies of the relevant extracts of the inam register and the statements filed by the ancestors of the archakas during the inam enquiry in support of the contention that both the varams were granted to the deity.
The evidentiary value of the recitals in the inam register has been emphasized by the Judicial Committee in more than one decision.
In Arunachalam Chetti vs Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamigal(1), the Judicial Committee expressed its view on the evidentiary value of the recitals in inam register thus: "It is true that the making of this register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax free.
But it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this register was a great act of state and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes.
It is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioners, through their officials, made enquiry on the spot, heard evidence and examined documents, and, with regard to each individual property, the Government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the land was tax free, but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself.
While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases, yet the Board when such is not available, cannot fail to attach the utmost importance, as part of the history of the property, to the information set forth in the inam register.
" (1) Mad.
355 In the latest decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Sankaranayana Pillayan 's case(1), it reiterated the same position when it said: "The question arose in a recent case before this Board with reference to a Madras inam [see Secretary of State for India vs Vidhya Thirta Swamigal(2)], where it was held that the title deeds and the entries in the inam register are evidence of the true intent and effect of the transaction and of the character of the right which was being recognized and continued.
The entries in the inam register and the description of the inamdar therein were accepted as indications of the nature and quantum of the right and the interest created in the land.
"This view of the Judicial Committee has been accepted and applied by the Madras High Court in many decisions when it was called upon to decide on the conflicting claims of a trustee and a archaka to the properties dealt with in the inam registers.
The documents relating to Sri Pongali Amman temple are Exs.
P 2 and P 3.
exhibit P 2 is the statement filed by an ancestor of the present archakas before the Inam Commissioner.
It is of the year is an extract of ,the inam register.
As observed by the Judicial Committee, the entries made in the said register are the result of an elaborate enquiry based upon oral evidence, on the spot enquiry and scrutiny of available accounts and records.
The inam statement is only one of the pieces of evidence which the Inam Commissioner might have taken into consideration in compiling the inam register.
The recitals in the statement must, therefore, give Place to the recitals in the inam register, though an attempt shall be made to harmonize them, if possible.
Before considering the recitals in exhibit P 3 it is necessary to bear in mind the common case i.e., that it is the case of both the archakas and the trustees that exhibit P 3 deals only with the property that was given to the deity.
But the dispute is as regards the extent of the (1) I.L.R. (2) 1.L.R , 908 (P.C.).
356 interest in the property that was given to the deity.
WaS it only the Melvaram in the said property that was granted to the deity or was it that both the varams therein were granted to the deity.
Now let us give a close look to the recitals under the various columns in exhibit P 3.
The first major head is "class, extent and value of inam".
The said major head is divided into 7 sub heads.
in col. 2 under the sub head "General class to which the inam belongs", the entry is "religious".
In col. 3 under the head "the survey number and the name of the field or fields comprised in the grant dry, wet or garden", the particulars of the lands are given.
This entry shows that except a small extent which is a garden the rest is dry land.
These details are more consistent with the grant being of both the varams than being of mere melvaram.
If it is of melvaram alone, the quality of the field is quite irrelevant.
Sub heads 4, 5 and 6 show that the extent is about 18 acres and 99 cents and the assessment is Rs. 24 14. 5.
These recitals leave the impression that the lane, was a dry land bearing a small assessment of Rs. 24 14 5 and the, income therefrom could not have been appreciable in those days.
The second main head is "description, tenure and documents in support of the inam".
The entries under the various columns under this head establish that the dry lands bearing an assessment of Rs. 24 14 5 described in cols.
3. 4, 5 and 6 were granted as Devadayam to the deity Pongali Amman permanently by Madurayar Paligar of Midura.
The of the grant is not known; but even in the accounts of 1209 F. the name of the deity was entered the grantee .
The third major head is "name and relationship of the original grantee and of subsequent and present heirs length of possession".
In Col. 13 and 15 the, name of the deity alone is given.
In Col. 16 under the heading "name and age" and in Col. 17 under the heading "place of residence" only the name of the deity is given.
Below the name of the deity the name of the Pujari "Pujari Muttandi, age 45" is given.
In Cols.
18 and 1 9 under the heading "relation to orginal grantee or subsequent registered holders" and "surviving heirs of the present incumbent" no entry is made.
Obviously no entries are made under these sub heads, as the deity cannot have relations.
The mention of Pujari Muttandi in the 357 context of other entries indicates that he was in charge of the temple.
If his name was mentioned because he had some interest in the land the other suitable entries in regard to his relations would have been made under the relevant sub heads.
Indeed it is not the case of the archakas that they have some interest in the melvaram.
If the document was concerned only with the melvaram interest, strictly there was no place for the archaka in the document, for he had no interest therein.
His name was mentioned only as he was the person who was in de facto management of the properties of the deity.
In Col. 21 under the heading "Deputy Collector 's opinion and recommendation", the entry is "To be confirmed permanently to the Pagoda so long as it is well kept up, subject to the existing jodi of Rs. 3 1 7".
Under Col. 22 the inam is confirmed to the Pagoda.
A reasonable interpretation of the recitals in this document leads to the only conclusion that the Inam Commissioner was dealing with the entire interest in the land, the particulars whereof were given therein.
There is no evidence that at the time the grant was made the archakas or any others were kudivaramdars.
But it is said that exhibit P 2, the inam statement, filed by the then archakas would establish that what was ranted was only the melvaram.
There, in Col. 2 under the head "Name of the inamdar entered in dowle and names of the present enjoyer" the following entry is found: Pongaliamman poosari Kuppaiyandi Muthuveeran as per paimash entry.
For fields Nos. 595 and 597 no poosari 's name is mentioned.
Present (enjoyer) Pongaliamman poosari Muthandi.
" It is said that pujari is shown as the enjoyer and, therefore, the deity has no interest in the enjoyment of the land.
The deity was obviously represented by the pujari who was the de facto trustee.
He was in possession of the property in his capacity as the de facto trustee.
In those circumstances if the pujari of the temple is described as an enjoyer, it can only mean that he was in possession of the land on behalf of the temple.
Whatever ambiguity there might be in the said recital it is dispelled by the entry in Col. 12 under the head "Particulars of present enjoyment", namely 358 "By directly cultivating this land selling the produce derived therefrom and applying the sale proceed to the service of the deity.
and my agnates have been performing pooja and enjoying the said land according to the conditions of the grant".
This entry is couched in clear and unambiguous terms.
It describes the nature of the enjoyment of the land by the archaka; it clearly says that he was cultivating the land, selling the produce and from the sale proceeds he was doing the services to the deity in accordance with the terms of the grant.
If the deity was entitled only to the melvaram, this recital is inconsistent with it.
The recital indicates that the entire land was the subject matter of the grant in favour of the deity and that the produce from that land was utilized for the services to the deity.
Strong reliance is placed upon the entry in col. 13 under the head "Income derived from the manibam; whether sarvadambla or jodigai, if jodigai, how much".
The entry is, "Income Rs. 24 14 5; Jodigai Rs. 3 1 7." Basing upon the said entries the argument is that exhibit P 3 shows that the assessment on the land was Rs. 24 14 5 and exhibit P 2 indicates that the same amount was the income derived from the inam and, therefore, what was granted in inam could have been only the assessment i.e., Rs. 24 14 5.
This argument is farfetched and based on a slender foundation.
One of the main objects of the inam enquiry was to ascertain whether the alienated lands were free of tax or not.
The archaka who was in possession of the land on behalf of the deity had to give information as regards the tax payable in respect of the land in his possession.
In that context the expression "income derived from the manibam" can only mean the assessment fixed on the land.
After stating that full assessment was only Rs. 24 14 5 the archaka stated that he was not paying the entire amount, but was paying only the jodigai of Rs. 3 1 7.
So understood the said recitals fit into the scheme of other recitals in the said statement and those found in exhibit P 3.
A similar argument was advanced before this Court in Buddu Satyanarayan 's case(1) and was rejected.
Das, J., observed at p. 1006 thus: (1) ; 359 "Apart from these points of distinction the decision relied on by the learned Attorney General appears to us to be of doubtful authority.
As will appear from the passages quoted above, the decision rested mainly, if not entirely, on the fact that the amount of assessment and the amount of income were the same and the conclusion was drawn that the Inam grant comprised only of the revenue assessment, i.e., of melvaram rights.
We are unable to follow the reasoning.
" We, therefore, hold that, from the recitals in the said two documents, what was granted to the deity was of both the varams.
Learned counsel for the archakas relied upon the long possession and enjoyment of the suit lands by the archakas and their ancestors in support of their contention that the melvaram alone could have been granted to the deity.
Long enjoyment is also consistent with an arrangement that might have been entered into between the grantor and the then functioning archaka or archakas having regard to the conditions prevailing then.
The lands granted were com paratively of small extent and they were dry lands.
In those days the income from the said lands must have been very insignificant.
There was no trustee for the temple.
In those circumstances it is, more likely that the grantor would have put the land in the possession of the archaka so that he might, from and out of the produce from the land, maintain the temple, perform the puja and meet the expenditure connected with the puja and also pay himself the remuneration for his services to the temple.
That was a convenient arrangement which was adopted in many of the small temples in that part of the country.
This practice was recorded with clarity by the Madras High Court in Narayanamurthi vs Achaya Sastrulu(1).
In dealing with a similar argument the learned Judge observed: The evidence of user and enjoyment, however long uninterrupted and unquestioned, would be evidence of the grant only iN the absence of (1) A.I.R [1925] Mad.411,412 413 360 any reliable or cogent evidence with regard to the terms of the grant itself or in the case of any ambiguity in the grant.
It seems to be clear that almost very recently the suit lands yielded only just what was sufficient for nitya naivedyam or the daily worship.
No doubt in such a state of things not only the persons who established the temples and made the endowments but succeeding generations of worshippers would have allowed the archakas to cultivate the lands and take the income performing the puja as it was obviously the most convenient mode of arranging for the worship of the deities and the payment of remuneration of the archaka service." "But when the income accruing from the lands came to be considerable and the archakas, by reason of old habits and following their fore fathers, claimed the lands and surplus profits therefrom to be their own, it was only natural that the worshippers should take steps to secure the surplus income for the institutions.
" These observations are very apposite and they clearly describe the circumstances under which the archakas of the temples were allowed to be in possession of the temple lands.
If that was the situation under which the archakas came into possession of the lands, they were certainly in the position of de facto trustees and they could not by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the properties claim any rights in derogation of the title of the deity.
Indeed the documents on which the learned counsel relied contain clear and unambiguous admission on the part of the archakas that the land itself was the property of the deity.
P 12, P 13, P 14 and P 15 are copies of mortgages executed by the archakas.
Under these documents the land in their possession was mortgaged and it was described as paditharam Manyam.
They also disclosed hat the paditharam paddy directed to be paid to the temple was more than the kist payable thereon to the Government.
In the prior proceedings i.e., applications preferred by the 361 archakas for declaring the temples as excepted ones, there was no claim that the melvaram alone was granted to the deity.
In other proceedings the archakas claimed that the lands were service inams, but they did not come forward with the present plea that melvaram only was granted to the deity.
Further, pattas for the suit lands were transferred without any objection of the archakas in the name of the deities in 1939 and the archakas also paid contribution to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board on tile basis that both the varams belonged to the deity.
The conduct of the archakas, therefore, is consistent with the recitals in the inam register, namely, that what was granted to the deity was the land i.e., both the varams, and that they had been put in possession and enjoyment of the said land in their capacity as archakas and de facto trustees.
Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon an order made by A.R.C. Westlake, Collector of Coimbatore, on April 14, 1941, wherein he held that only melvaram was granted to the deity.
That order came to be made under the following circumstances.
The trustees appointed by the Coimbatore District Temple Committee filed an application before the Revenue Division Officer under section 44 B11(a) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1934, for a declaration that the alienations of portions of inam land attached to the temple were null and void and for resumption and regrant of the same to the deity.
One of the issues in the application was whether the inam comprised melvaram or both melvaram and Kudivaram.
The Revenue Division Officer held that the inam comprised both the varams.
On appeal, the Collector came to the contrary conclusion.
But a perusal of the order shows that his conclusion was based upon pure surmises.
The Collector did not refer to any document or evidence for his conclusion.
The trustees filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, for a declaration that the inam grant in favour of the plaint temple comprised both the varams The learned Subordinate Judge held that section 44 B of the Act had no application as the grant was to the deity and was not a service inam.
The result of this litigation was that there was no final decision on the 362 question whether the grant was of both the varams or only of the melvaram.
These proceedings cannot, therefore, be of any evidentiary value in this case.
On a consideration of the entire evidence we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the grant to the deity comprised both the varams in the suit lands.
Now coming to the appeals relating to chowleswara swami temple, the factual and legal position is exactly the same as in the case of Pongaliamman temple exhibit P 2 is the statement made before the Inam Commissioner by the then archaka and exhibit P 3 is the extract from the Inam register.
Under the relevant entries in the inam register, survey numbers, extent, quality and the assessment of the subject matter of the grant are given.
The land is described as Devadayam and is stated to have been granted for the support of the pagoda of Chowleswaraswami.
The nature of the grant is described as permanent.
The date of the grant is not known.
The grantor 's name is given as Maduraiyar Paligar of Madura.
The name of the original grantee is given as Chowleswaraswami.
The grant of the land described earlier is confirmed permanently to the pagoda as long as it is well kept subject to the existing jodi of Rs. 24 8 2.
The only mention of archaka is in col. 17 under the head "Particulars regarding present owner" and the entry thereunder is "Chowleswaraswami, stanika Muttaiyan".
The other columns where the relationship of the present owner with the previous owners is expected to be recorded are left blank for the obvious reason that the said columns are irrelevant in the case of a deity.
The archaka 's name in addition to the deity is mentioned as he was in possession of the land in his capacity as de facto trustee.
The deity must necessarily have to be represented by somebody and that he can only be the stanika who was managing the temple and its properties.
The relevant entries in the inam register do not countenance any contention that the melvaram interest only in the land was granted and that was confirmed to the deity.
If the melvaram was granted or confirmed, the recitals would have been different.
The corresponding inam statement is exhibit P 2.
The entries are practically similar to those found in exhibit P 2 relating to 363 Pongaliamman temple with some slight variations.
Col. 2 makes a clear distinction between ownership of the land and enjoyment.
The owner is shown as Chowleswaraswami and the "present" enjoyer is shown as Chowleswaraswami 'section stanika.
The nature of the enjoyment is described in col. 2 thus: "The said lands are leased out for varam cultivation and I cultivate the same myself some times and the income (masul) therefrom is enjoyed by me and co sharers (Pangali) and used for Swami Viniyogam.
" It is manifest from this recital that the land was the subjectmatter of the grant and the income therefrom was derived either by direct cultivation or by leasing out the same, and the said income was enjoyed by the archaka and used for viniyogam.
The point to be noted is that the predecessorin interest to the present archaka admitted that the produce from the land was utilized for the services of the deity.
The said admission is inconsistent with the allegation that the grant was only of melvaram.
The entries in col. 13 are similar to those contained in the corresponding exhibit P 2 relating to Pongaliamman temple, and, for reasons already given, they do not support the contention that the assessment of Rs. 74 1 5 was only granted to the deity.
A combined reading of these two documents leads to the only conclusion that both the varams were granted to the deity.
Just as in the case of Pongaliamman temple so in the case of Chowleswaraswami temple, the subsequent conduct of the archakas belie their assertion that only melvaram interest in the land was granted to the deity.
D 1 of 1867, D 2 of 1868, D 3 of 1870 and D 4 of 1883 are some of the mortgages executed by the archakas ,of Chowleswaraswami temple.
D 5, D 6 and D 7 are sales.
In all these documents the property is described as Chowleswaraswami manyam.
If really the kudivaram belonged to the archakas, they would not have described the land they were alienating as Chowleswaraswami manyam.
The description of the property as that of the deity is consistent with the title of kudivaram also being in the deity.
Further, as in the other case, the pattas were 364 transferred in the name of the deity in 1939, the contri butions were paid to the Hindu Religious Endowments, Board on the basis that the entire interest in the lands belonged to the deity and that in other proceedings the archakas 's case was not that the grant to the deity was only of the melvaram but the lands were service inam lands.
Though the archakas dealt with the properties by mortgaging or otherwise alienating them they never denied the title of the deity.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that even in the case of Chowleswaraswami temple the original grant made to the deity comprised both the varams.
In regard to Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple, no appeal was filed by the archakas and they allowed the judgment of the High Court in regard to the title to become final.
Nothing, therefore, need be said on the question of title of the land in respect of this temple.
Coming to the cross appeals filed by the trustees against that part of the decree of the High Court apportioning the property of the deity between the deity and the archakas, the question raised is whether the High Court, having held that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, had jurisdiction to compel the trustees of the temples to put the archakas in possession of specified extent of property towards their remuneration.
The High Court observed thus: "On these findings, it is no doubt true that the decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession of the properties on behalf of the deity has to be upheld subject to the consideration set forth below.
" Then it proceeded to consider whether any allocation of land should be made between the archakas and the trustees.
After noticing the relevant decisions on the subject, it observed thus: .lm15 "These decisions are practically uniform except for the decisions. . (in) A. section No. 2 3 7 of 1950(1) and. . (in) Venkatadri vs Seshacharlu(2) and have upheld the allocation (1) Brahnyya vs Rajeswarawami temple A.I.R. 1953 Mad.
(2) I.L.R. 365 of lands between the archakas and the trustees, the proportion however varying with the extent of the lands and the amount of the income.
None of the Judges were of the opinion that the arrangement should be a permanent and an unalterable one and it must naturally be subject to revision or alteration according to the circumstances of the case at the instance not only of the trustees but also at the instance of the archakas, if it was found that the allocation was working to the detriment of either the archakas or of the temple.
" It concluded: "We think, therefore, in these cases, the best arrangement would be to allocate half the lands in each of the suits for the remuneration of the archakas, to be divided equally, having regard to the wet and dry extents, and leave the remaining half to the trustees, who have to meet the cost of the daily worship and accumulate the surplus in their hands as it belongs to the deity." On principle, in our view, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges of the High Court is unsupportable.
The suits were based on title and the relief asked for was the eviction of the archakas from the suit property as they, according to the plaintiffs had no title to remain in possession.
The archakas raised the plea that the title of the ,deity was confined only to melvaram in the plaint schedule lands and that they had title to the kudivaram.
Both the courts confirmed the title of the deity to both the interests and negatived the title of the defendant.
In the circumstances the Court has no option but to deliver pos session to the plaintiffs who had established their title to the suit properties.
In a suit for framing a scheme for a temple a court may in an appropriate case put the archaka in possession of a portion of the temple lands towards his remuneration for services to the temple; but these are not suits for framing a scheme.
That apart, there is absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the evidence to 366 make any such apportionment, for the allotment of a parti cular share to the archaka would depend upon the total income from the lands, the value of the articles required for the worship, the amount of reasonable remuneration intended to be provided and other similar circumstances.
An allotment cannot possibly be made on the basis of allocations made in the circumstances and facts peculiar to other cases.
Indeed, this Court has already expressed a clear opinion on this aspect of the case in Buddu Surya narayana 's case(1).
Therein, Das, J., said at p. 1008 thus: In a proceeding for the framing of a scheme relating to a temple it may be permissible to take into account the claims, moral if not legal, of the Archakas and to make some pro vision for protecting their rights, but those considerations appear to us to be entirely out of place in a suit for ejectment on proof of title.
" With respect we entirely agree with the said observations.
It follows that the High Court went wrong in making an allocation of the lands between the trustees and the archakas in a suit for ejectment.
Learned counsel for the archakas made an impassioned appeal that we should give a direction to the authorities concerned to make an apportionment of the properties on the lines suggested by the High Court, having regard to the long enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas.
Long enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas is not a peculiar feature of this case.
The authorities concerned have made suitable arrangements for remuneration in the ,case of other temples and we have no doubt that they would make a reasonable provision for the archakas in the present case also for their remuneration in accordance with law.
In the result, Civil Appeals Nos. 648 and 650 of 1960 filed by the trustees are allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
Civil Appeal No. 649 of 1960 filed by the trustees is also allowed without costs except as against the (1) ; 367 14th respondent.
The said appeal against the 14th respondent is withdrawn on the ground that his interest as a mortgagee is not now subsisting and the said appeal against the 14th respondent is dismissed as withdrawn but, in the circumstances, without costs.
Civil Appeals Nos. 651 and 652 of 1960 filed by the archakas are dismissed with costs.
One hearing tee.
Ordered accordingly.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellants filed suits for the recovery of certain properties from the possession of the respondents.
The plaintiffs were the trustees of the temples and the defendants were the archakas and the alienees of the suit properties.
These suits were based on title and the relief asked for was the eviction of the archakas from the suit property as they, according to the plaintiffs, (appellants) had no title to remain in possession The plaintiff claimed that the suit properties were the properties of the deity and that the defendants had no right therein.
The archakas raised the plea that the title of the deity was confined only to melvaram in the plaint schedule lands and that they had title to the Kudivarani.
Both the Trial Court and the High Court confirmed the title of the deity to both the interests (Varams) and negatived the title of the defendant Archakas.
The High Court also held that the archakas were entitled to have a portion of the said properties allotted to them towards their remuneration for the services to the temples and gave a decree directing the division of the said properties into two halves and putting the archakas in possession of one half.
Against this decree of the High Court both the archakas and the trustees (appellants) preferred cross appeals to this Court.
348 The main point for consideration was whether the High Court, having held that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, had jurisdiction to compel the trustees of the temple to put the archakas in possession of specified extent of property towards their remuneration.
Held:(i) The principle of a Lost Grant can only be invoked where there is no acceptable evidence of the terms of the grant.
In the present case there is no scope for invoking the doctrine of Lost Grant as the terms of the grant are clear from the recitals in the lnam register and the inam statement, which conclusively establish that both the Varams were granted to the deity.
Sankaranarayana Pillayan vs H.R.E. Board, Madras I.L.R. , Buddu Satyanarayana vs Konduru Venkatapayya: ; , Maginiram Sitaram vs Kasturbai Manibhai, (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 54 and Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi V. Jabeda Khatun, (1930) L.R. 57 A. 125, relied on.
(ii)The High Court erred in making an allocation of the lands between the trustees and the archakas in a suit for ejectment because there was absolutely no material either in the pleadings or in the evidence to make any such apportionment. 'Me High Court had De option but to deliver possession to the plaintiffs who had established their title to the suit properties.
In a suit for framing a scheme for temple a court may in an appropriate case put the archaka in possession of a portion of the temple lands towards his remuneration for services of the temple; but such considerations are out of place in a suit for ejectment.
Brahmayya vs Rajaswaraswami Temple, A.I.R. 1953 ',fad.
580 as Venkatadri V. Seshacharlu, I.L.R. referred to.
(iii)On the facts of this case it was held that the conduct of the archakas, was consistent with the recitals in the inam register, namely, that what was granted to the deity was the land i.e. both the Varams and that they had been put in enjoyment the said land in their capacity as archakas and de facto trustees.
They could not by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the property claim any right in derogation of the title of the deity.
They also cannot claim any right because their names are mentioned in addition to deity in the Inam register.
Their names in addition to the deity are mentioned as they were in possession of the land in their capacity as de facto trustees.
Arunachalam Chetti vs Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamligal, Mad. 253 and Secretary of State for India vs Vidhya Thirta Swamiga, I.L.R. , referred to.
Narayanamurthi V. Achaya Sastrulu, A.I.R. 1925 Mad.
411 relied on.


judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 24 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 19, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 337 D of 1962.
R. L. Kohli, for the appellants.
H. R. Khanna and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mudholkar J.
This is an appeal by special leave from the summary dismissal of the appellants ' application for revision by the High Court of Punjab.
Eight persons were tried by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Delhi, for offences under section 148, section 333/149, and section 332/149, Indian Penal Code.
He acquitted five of them but convicted the three appellants before us of all the three offences and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year in respect of the offence under section 148, rigorous imprisonment for two years in respect of the offence under section 332/149, rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under section 333/149 and ordered that all the sentences will run concurrently.
In appeal the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, set aside the convictions and sentences passed on the appellants for offences under section 148 and section 333/149, altered the conviction of each of the appellants from one under section 332/149 to section 322 simpliciter and awarded the same sentence in respect of it as had been awarded by the Assistant Sessions Judge in respect of the offence under section 332/149.
Briefly stated the prosecution case was that on September 16, 1961, Mukhtiar Singh, Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Municipal Corporation organised a raiding party for catching stray cattle within the limits of the Corporation.
The party consisted of Balbir Singh, Enforcement Inspector, H. K. Bhanot, Sanitary Inspector, Kishan Singh, Head Constable, three foot constables and five cattle catchers.
The party reached the neigbourhood of Mori Gate Chowk at about 5 a.m. and rounded up about 25 ,or 30 stray cattle consisting of buffaloes and cows.
While they were taking them to the Nigambodh Ghat cattle pound via Nicholson Road, the three appellants who were carrying lathis with them approached the party and threatened them that unless they released the cattle they would have to face serious consequences.
The members of the party informed them who they were and the cattle catcbers showed them their identity cards.
9 They explained to them that it was their duty to catch stray cattle, to impound them and that the appellants could get them released by taking the steps provided by the rules.
This, however, only enraged the appellants who raised shouts asking their friends to come along with lathis in order to help them to get the cattle released by force.
Upon hearing the shouts the other accused persons arrived at the spot with lathis, joined the appellants and all of them assaulted the members of the party, caused injuries to them and got the cattle released by force.
As a result of the assault, P.W. 2 Kishan Singh sustained a grievous injury as well as some simple injuries, P.W. 14 Khem, P.W. 20 Padam Singh, P.W. 10 Iqbal Singh, P.W. 19 Nil Bahadur, P.W. 12 Ram Mehar sustained simple injuries.
The incident was seen by a number of persons who happened to come to the spot at that time.
Eventually a report was lodged with the police, investigation was taken up and the appellants and the other accused were placed before a First Class Magistrate, who, after making a preliminary enquiry, committed them for trial by the Court of Sessions.
We are not concerned with the defence of the accused persons who were acquitted.
The defence of the appellants was that they were bringing the cattle after grazing and watering them and that when they approached Mori Gate at about 4.30 a.m. a group of persons under the employment of the Corporation met them, belaboured them and eventually took them in a van to the police station.
The appellants further say that they had acted in the exercise of their right of private defence of their property.
Their defence has been rejected 'by the courts below.
Before us Mr. Kohli who appears for the appellants has raised two points.
The first point is that the raiding party had no authority to seize and impound the cattle and the second point is that the appellants who were the owners of the cattle had a right of private defence of their property, that what they did was in exercise of that right and that, therefore, their conviction under section 332 was bad in law.
The power to impound stray cattle is contained in section 418(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), which runs thus : "If any horses, cattle or other quadruped animals or birds are kept on any premises in contravention of the provisions of section 417, or are found abandoned 10 and roaming or tethered on any street or public place or on any land belonging to the Corporation, the Commissioner or any officer empowered by him may seize them and may cause them to be impounded or removed to such place as may be appointed by the Government or the Corporation for the purpose and the cost of seizure of these animals or birds and Of impounding. or removing them and of feeding and watering them shall be recoverable by sale or by auction Of those animals or birds;" The proviso which would be relevant in connection with another point runs thus: "Provided that any one claiming such animal or bird may, within seven days of the seizure, get them released on his paying all expenses incurred by the Commissioner in seizing, impounding or removing and in feeding and watering such animal or bird, and on his pro ducing a licence for keeping these animals and birds issued under the provisions of section 417.
" The power under this section can be delegated by the Com missioner.
But according to Mr. Kohli delegation of this power has not been established in this case.
It is true that the Order of the Commissioner delegating the power under section 418(1) is not on the record of the case.
It has, however, been placed before us along with the statement of the case.
That order runs thus: "In exercise of the powers conferred on me by section 491 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, 1 hereby direct that the power conferred on me under section 418(1) of the said Act shall subject to my supervision, control and revision be exercised also by the Municipal employees mentioned in column 3 of the schedule given below to the extent stated in column 4 of the schedule.
Sd/ P. R. Nayak, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
SCHEDULE Section Nature of power Designation of Scope Municipal employees 418(1) Seizure of certain Licensing Inspectors In respect of animals Licensing Inspectors stray cattle only do 11 Mr. Kohli, however, said that the delegation of power is in effective because, according to him, it purports to make a general delegation of power and does not specify the names of persons to whom the power is delegated.
A perusal of the schedule below the order shows that the power of seizure of certain animals is specifically delegated and it is clearly indicated in column 4 thereof as follows: "In respect of stray cattle only" In the third column the designation of the municipal employees to whom the power is delegated has also been given.
The section does not require the names of the particular officers in whose favour the delegation is made to be mentioned.
What it requires is to specify the officers to whom the power is delegated.
This only means that the designation of the officers to whom the power has been delegated need only to be mentioned.
That has been done.
We may add that section 491 of the Delhi Corporation Act permits delegation to any municipal officer or employee and, therefore, specific individual authorisation is not necessary.
Then Mr. Kohli says that the words in the order of delegation shall subject to my supervision, control and revision be exercised also by the Municipal employees mentioned in column 3 of the schedule" would show that the Commissioner 's actual presence on the spot was necessary.
It is sufficient to say that "shall subject to my supervision etc.
," does not mean "under my supervision etc.
" All that the order contemplates is that the delegation of power to the municipal employees is not absolute but subject to the overall authority of the Commissioner.
This cannot mean that whenever a delegated power is being exercised by the municipal employees the Commissioner shall be required to be present.
Mr. Kohli strenuously contended that the cattle could not be said to have been "abandoned" because the appellants who are their owners were actually present near the animals when they were rounded up.
But this contention is contrary to the finding of each of the courts below which is to the effect that the rounding up operation took half an hour and that it was after the cattle were rounded up and were being taken to the cattle pound that the appellants appeared on the scene.
This finding cannot be allowed to be challenged.
A more serious contention of Mr. Kohli, however, is that under section 418, cattle, which the Corporation can impound, must be ownerless or tethered on any street or public place or land 12 belonging to the Corporation.
Admittedly the cattle in question were not tethered on any such place and, therefore, Mr. Kohli contends that their seizure was not permissible.
In support of his contention that "abandoned" implies the complete leaving of a thing as a final rejection of one 's responsibilities so that the thing becomes "ownerless", Mr. Kohli has referred us to the Law Lexicon and Oxford Dictionary.
The meanings relied on by him are as follows: "A thing banned or denounced as forfeited or lost, whence to abandon, desert, or forsake as lost and gone." Wharton 's Law Lexicon. "To let go, give up, renounce, leave off ; to cease to hold, use or practise." The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 1.
In the Oxford Dictionary the word is also said to mean "to let loose; to set free; to liberate".
Several other meanings of the word have been given both in that dictionary as well as in Wharton 's Law Lexicon.
In the latter as also in Jowitt 's The Dictionary of English Law under 'abandonment ' are given cases from which it would appear that different meanings have been given to 'abandonment ' in different statutes.
It will thus be seen that the meaning to be attached to the word 'abandoned ' would depend upon the context in which it is used.
in the context in which it occurs in section 418(1), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to the word "abandoned" is 'let loose ' in the sense of being 'left unattended ' and certainly not 'ownerless '.
It is the duty of the court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
If, therefore, giving a literal meaning to a word used by the draftsman, particularly in a penal statute, would defeat the object of the legislature, which is to suppress a mischief, the court can depart from the dictionary meaning or even the popular meaning of the word and instead give it a meaning which will 'advance the remedy and suppress the mischief '.
(see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edn.
221 224 and 266).
In the Act before us when the legislature used the word "abandoned" it did not intend to say that the cattle must be ownerless.
This is implicit in the proviso to sub section (1) of section 418 which says that any one 'claiming ' an animal which has been impounded under that sub section can, within 7 days of seizure, get it released on fulfilling certain conditions.
Such a claim could only be made by 13 a person who is the owner of the animal impounded or who has at least the custody of the animal.
We cannot, therefore, accept the first point raised by Mr. Kohli.
Upon the finding that the raiding party was entitled in law to impound the cattle no question of private defence arises.
For, section 99 of the lndan Penal Code specifically says that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of previous hurt,, if done, or attempted to be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office. 'Me protection extends even to acts which will not be strictly justifiable by law.
But here the act was fully justisiable by the law.
There is thus no substance in the second point either.
The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The members of a raiding party led by the Licensing Inspector of the Delhi Corporation having taken into custody 25 or 30 stray cattle, were, while taking them to the cattle pound, belaboured with lathis by the three appellants and their friends, as a result of which they received injuries.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that (i) there was no proper delegation 'of authority to impound cattle in favour of the persons forming the raiding party, by the Commissioner, whose personal presence to supervise the exercise of the delegated authority was, in any case, required by the very order delegating the authority; (ii) the cattle were not "abandoned" in the sense of being "ownerless", and therefore could not be legally impounded; and (iii) that the injuries were inflicted by the appellants in the lawful exercise of their right of private defence of property.
HELD : (i) The order of the Commissioner placed before the Court along with the statement of case proved that the Commissioner had authorised licensing Inspectors to impound stray cattle.
Section 418(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Central Act 66 of 1957), did not require that the delegation of power must be to particular, named, individuals.
Nor was the personal presence of the Commissioner to supervise the exercise of the delegated power necessary although according to the terms of the order the delegation was "subject to my supervision ', control and revision." [11E F].
(ii) In the context in which the word "abandoned" occurred in section 418(1), the meaning which can reasonably be attached to it is "let loose" in the sense of being "left unattended" and certainly not "ownerless".
It is the duty of the Court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature so as to "advance the remedy and suppress the mischief".
The legislature when it used the word "abandoned" in section 418(1) did not intend to say that the cattle must be "ownerless".
[12E G].
Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edn.) pp.
221 224 and 266, referred to.
(iii) Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code specifically says that there is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith, tinder colour of his office.
The protection extends even to acts which will not be strictly justified by law.
In the present case the act was fully justifiable by the law.
There was thus no right of private defence that could be claimed by the appellants.
[13B C].