judgement:
Petition No. 13688 of 1983 etc.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) T.U. Mehta and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, V.C. Mahajan, R.B. Datar, Miss Bina Tamta, S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua, Aman Vachhar, H.S. Parihar, Vipin Chandra, G.D. Gupta, M.L. Kaicker and V.B. Saharya for the Respondents.
Bye law No. 3(1) reads as follows: "3(1).
No person shall keep or ply for the hire a cycle rickshaw in Delhi unless he himself is the owner thereof and holds a licence granted in that behalf by the Commissioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to time, be fixed under sub section (2) of section 430.
Provided that no person will be granted more than one such licence.
No person shall drive a cycle rickshaw for hire unless he holds a driving licence granted in that behalf by the Com missioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to time be fixed under sub section (2) of section 430.
" The petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws.
Some of them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out by them to rickshaw pullers under a contract under which the rickshaw pullers have to pay some amount to the owners of the cycle rickshaws at the end of the day out of their earnings during the day.
In order to eliminate the exploita tion of rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rick shaws the Delhi Municipal Corporation amended the Cycle Rickshaw Bye laws, 1960 by introducing bye law No.3.
Under that bye law only the owner of the cycle rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply 908 for hire and only one such licence would be issued to a person.
By necessary implication it excludes persons who own a number of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences and prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the owner in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera tion.
The contention of the petitioners is mainly dependent upon section 48 1(I)L(5) of the Act which reads thus: "481(1).
Subject to the provisions of this Act the Corpora tion may, in addition to any bye laws which it is empowered to make by any other provision of this Act, make bye laws to provide for all or any of the following matters.
namely: . . . . . . . . .
L. Bye laws relating to miscellaneous matters . . . . . . . . . . (5).
the rendering necessary of licences (a) for the proprietors or drivers of hackney carriages; cycle rickshaws, thelas and rehires kept or plying for hire or used for hawking articles; . . . . . . . . . " It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the above provision in the Act does not permit the Corporation to make a bye law which prohibits the issue of licences to the owners of cycle rickshaws who are not themselves rickshaw pullers.
It is also urged that the bye law is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
The respondentCorpora tion contends that the impugned bye law No. 3 is within the scope of the authority conferred on it by the Act to make the bye law in question and that it is not opposed to Arti cle 19(1)(g).
The constitutional validity of a similar provision in the Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 (Punjab Act 41 of 1975) came up for consideration before this Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd) Ch, Town Hail, Amritsar & Ors., etc.
vs State of Punjab & Others, ; In the course of its judgment the Court approved a scheme flamed for providing financial assistance to the richshaw pullers for acquiring cycle rickshaws.
The 909 provision of the Act which was impugned in that petition was, however, left untouched.
On the same date this Court pronounced another judgment in Nanhu & Ors., etc.
vs Delhi Administration & Ors., ; in which the very same bye law with which we are concerned in these cases came up for consideration.
That case was disposed of by this Court by a short order which reads thus: "We have disposed of today applications from cycle rickshaw pliers of Amritsar Municipality where a scheme has been worked out to help them become owners of cycle rickshaws.
A similar scheme, says the Solicitor General appearing for the Delhi Administration, will be extended to the Delhi territo ry.
We, therefore, annex a copy of the judgment in Writ Petitions Nos.
839 of 1979 and 563 of 1979 Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union, Amritsar and others vs State of Punjab & Others and Nanak Chand and Others vs State of Punjab and Others, respectively to this judgment.
There is another problem which arises in these two cases and that is that the Delhi Administration has put a ceiling on the total number of cycle rickshaws permissible to be plied within its territory perhaps we do not know for certain this number may not accommodate all the applicants for cycle rickshaws plying licencees.
We are told that apart from the applicants in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, there are numerous petitioners who have ap proached the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution and yet others who have filed suits in civil courts for the same relief.
All that we can do is to accept the suggestion made by the learned Solicitor General that the Delhi Administration will effectively publicize and notify applications for licencees for plying of cycle rick shaws and all those who apply will be considered on their merits including length of service as cycle rickshaw pliers.
The criteria that the Delhi Administration will adopt must be reasonable and relevant; otherwise it will be open to the aggrieved parties to challenge the selection.
Likewise we do not want to fetter the rights of parties aggrieved if the ceiling upon the total number of rickshaws permissible within the Delhi territory is arbitrary.
On the basis of reasOnable criteria the Delhi Administra 910 tion will direct the concerned Municipal authorities to grant licences for plying rickshaws and if the applicants so chosen are not owners themselves all the facilities we have indicated in the Amritsar order will be extended to such cycle rickshaw pliers fixing reasonable time limits.
With these directions we dispose of the applications.
Until fresh licences are issued by the Delhi Administration and the Municipal authorities the present petitioners will be al lowed to ply their cycle rickshaws.
" It is clear from the above order that this Court did not say anything about the constitutional validity of bye law No. 3.
We, however, find on a consideration of the language of clause (5) in section 481(1)L of the Act that the bye law falls within the scope of the power conferred on the Corpo ration to frame bye laws for the issue of licences in re spect of cycle rickshaws which are kept or used for plying in the Delhi Municipal Corporation area.
While framing bye laws under the above statutory provision it is permissible for the Corporation to restrict the issue of licences only to the owners of the rickshaws who themselves act as rick shaw pullers.
This is apparently done to prevent exploita tion of the rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rickshaws.
A licensing authority may impose any condition while issuing a licence which is in the interest of the general public unless it is either expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the law which confers the power of licensing.
The restriction imposed by the Corporation in the present case is according to us in the interest of the general public.
In Man Singh and Others vs State of Punjab and Others, the petitioners contended that the provision in the Punjab Cycle Rickshaw (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 was viola tive of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
This Court negativ ing the said contention observed thus: "In the instant case, section 3 of the Punjab Act has the effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply the rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the full owner of the income earned by him.
No longer will he be obliged to part with an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another who owns the vehicle.
The Punjab Act is beneficial legislation bringing directly home to the rick shaw puller the entire fruit of his dally toil.
The enact ment is intended as a social welfare measure against the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious 911 cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior finan cial resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil of rickshaw pullers.
Even if we look at the impugned legisla tion from the point of view of its impact on the fundamental right of rickshaw owners who give them on hire to rickshaw pullers for plying, it is plain that the legislation consti tutes a reasonable restriction on the right of such rickshaw owners to carry on the business of hiring out cycle rick shaws inasmuch as the exercise of the right is excluded by legislation designed for the economic and social welfare of rickshaw pullers, who constitute a significant sector of the people, a sector so pressed by poverty and straightened by the economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of their full day 's wages to them seems amply justified.
" We do not, therefore, find any ground to set aside the bye law in question either on the ground that it is outside the scope of section 48 1 of the Act or on the ground that it is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution.
The above contentions, therefore, fail.
During the pendency of these proceedings the Court issued notices to the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India and also the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) to ascertain whether the banks are willing to extend financial assistance to the rickshaw pullers to acquire the ownership of cycle rickshaws and to ply them within the Corporation area and also to ascertain whether the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Small (Loans) would guarantee the loans advanced to the rickshaw pullers.
The learned counsel for these banks and the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) have submitted that the banks are willing to advance upto Rs.2,000 by way of loan at reasonable rate of interest to the rickshaw pullers on the security of the cycle rickshaws owned by them in order to assist the rickshaw pullers to acquire the cycle rickshaws.
The banks have put forward before the Court two schemes: (1) the scheme for finance to cycle rickshaw pullers, and (2) Self employment programme for urban poor (SEPUP) under which it is possible for them to give financial assistance to the rickshaw pullers.
The Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) is agreeable to guarantee the repayment of loans advanced to the rickshaw pullers.
The Corporation authorities are agree able to issue necessary eligibility certificates to the rickshaw pullers to obtain the loan.
912 In view of the above submissions, we direct the several branches of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India operating in Delhi to give financial assistance to rickshaw pullers who wish to own cycle rick shaws and ply them under licences issued by the Corporation subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif icate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other terms of the Schemes referred to above.
We also direct the Delhi Administration to comply with the directions issued by this Court in Nanhu & Others (supra).
In the course of the argument the learned counsel for the petitioners incidentally made a complaint about the seizure of cycle rickshaws by the Corporation officers without issuing an acknowledgment to the owners whenever they found that the cycle rickshaws were being used on the roads contrary to the rules.
The learned counsel for the Corporation stated that whenever the cycle rickshaws are seized written acknowledgments will be issued to the owner if he is found near the cycle rickshaw at the time of its seizure.
We record the above statement made on behalf of the Corporation.
These petitions are accordingly disposed of.
No costs.
S.R. Petitions disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Section 481(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 empowers the Corporation to make additional bye laws to the existing ones.
Under the power so conferred the Corpora tion introduced Byelaw No.3(i) in the Cycle Rickshaw Bye laws, 1960, under which only an owner of the cycle rickshaw can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply for hire and only one such licence would be issued to a person.
By necessary implication it excludes persons who own a number of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences and prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the owner in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera tion.
The Writ Petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws.
Some of them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out by them to rickshaw pullen under a contract under which the rickshaw pullen have to pay some amount to the owners of the cycle rickshaws at the end of the day out of their earnings during the day.
Being aggrieved by the introduction of Bye law No.3(i), they have moved the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution that the said Bye law is opposed to Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and also outside the scope of section 481 (1)L(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corpora tion Act, 1957.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court, 906 HELD: 1.1 On a consideration of the language of clause (5) in section 481(1) L of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, it is clear that Bye law 3(1) falls within the scope of the power conferred on the Corporation to frame bye laws for the issue of licences in respect of cycle rickshaws which are kept or used for plying in the Delhi Municipal Corporation area.
While framing bye laws under the above statutory provision it is permissible for the Corpora tion to restrict the issue of licences only to the owners of the rickshaws who themselves act as rickshaw pullers.
This is apparently done to prevent exploitation of the rickshaw pullen by the owners of the cycle rickshaws.
A licensing authority may impose any condition while issuing a licence which is in the interest of the general public unless it is either expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the law which confers the power of licensing.
The restriction imposed by the Corporation in the present case is in the interest of the general public.
[910C E] 1.2 The Bye law No.3(1) cannot therefore be said to be either outside the scope of section 481 of the Corporation Act or opposed to the provisions of the Constitution.
[911D] Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd) Ch.
Town Hall, Amrit sar & Ors.
vs State of Punjab & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR366 and Nanhu & Ors. etc.
vs Delhi Administration & Ors., ; , referred to.
Man Singh & Ors.
vs State of Punjab & Ors., , followed.
(The Court approved the two schemes of financial assist ance, put forward, at its instance, by the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India and the willingness of the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small LOans) to guarantee the repayment of the loans advanced to the rick shaw pullers and directed, accordingly, the several branches of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the State Bank of India operating in Delhi to give financial assistance to rickshaw pullers who wish to oWn cycle rick shaws and ply them under licences issued by the Corporation subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif icate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other terms of the Schemes, namely (i) the scheme for financial to cycle rickshaw pullers; and (ii) self employment programme for urban poor (SEPUP).
The court also directed the Delhi Administration to comply with the directions issued in Nanhu


judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No.49 of 1983.
694 From the Judgment and Order dated May 14, 1981 of the Orissa High Court in Crl.
R. No. 21 of 1981.
V.J. Francis for the Appellant.
Anil B. Divan, D.P. Singh, G.S. Chatterjee, R.K. Mehta, Salaman Khurshid, L.R. Singh and Vinoo Bhagat for the Re spondents.
I am of the view that the decision in The State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, interpreting section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the decision in R.K. Jain etc.
vs State through Special Police Establishment and Others, ; interpreting section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not call for any reconsideration.
I am in full agreement with the views expressed in these decisions.
I am satisfied that the Public Prosecutor had applied his mind to the case before applying for withdrawal and the Chief Judicial Magis trate has not committed any error in giving his consent to such withdrawal.
Such consent can be given at any time before the judgment is pronounced.
The framing of the charge cannot be an impediment to give consent to such withdrawal as it is evident from section 321(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
KHALID, J: I have just received (at 3.45 p.m. on 19th December, 1986) a draft Judgment by Oza.
J. in the above case.
I agree with the conclusion that the appeal has to be dismissed, but not, with respect, with the reasoning con tained in the Judgment.
Since the case is listed for Judg ment on 20th December, 1986, I do not have time to write a detailed Judgment.
The question to be decided in this appeal is the scope of Section 321 of Criminal Procedure Code.
Oza, J. has set aside the permission granted by the Court to withdraw the prosecution under Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code, but allowed the appeal quashing the charge framed against re spondent No. 1 under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
I regret to state that I cannot re concile myself with this approach.
A cursory.
glance at Section 32 1 will satisfy anyone that consent can be given for withdrawal from the prosecution of a case, 695 not only when the charge is not flamed, but even after the charge is framed and at any time before the Judgment.
This appeal along with Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 1983 were directed to be posted before a Constitution Bench to consider the scope of Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code.
That being so, I do not think it proper to abandon that pursuit and take refuge under Section 239 of Criminal Proce dure Code.
In a separate Judgment to be pronounced by me in Crimi nal Appeal No. 241 of 1983, I have outlined the scope of Section 321 of Criminal Procedure Code.
What is to be decid ed in this case is whether the order passed by the MagiS trate under Section 32 1, Criminal Procedure Code, is proper or not.
We are not called upon to consider the propriety of the charge framed and then examine the evidence and see whether the accused should be discharged or the charge framed should be upheld.
I adopt the reasons given by me in Criminal Appeal No. 241 of 1983, relying upon the decision reported in of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey) and in ; Jain vs State) and uphold the order of withdrawal passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magis trate, Bhubaneswar, and upheld by the High Court in revi sion, and dismiss the appeal.
OZA, J: [For himself and on behalf of Bhagwati CJ.] The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 14th May 1981 in Criminal Revision No. 21 of 1981 arising out of an order dated 20th September, 1980 passed by Additional Chief Judi cial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar allowing an application filed by the Special Public Prosecutor wherein he prayed for withdrawal from the prosecution of the Vigilance Case No. 33 of 1977 against Respondent No. 1 By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed Criminal Revision filed by the appellant petitioner and confirmed the order passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate.
The Vigilance Department submitted a charge sheet against respondent No. 1 on the allegation that All India Congress Party some time before the General Election of the Parliament in the year 1971 set out a programme to raise funds for publication of Souvenir on behalf of the said party by each of the District Congress Committees under different provincial Congress Committees to educate people about the policy and programme of the Congress Party and the achievements in 696 the context of 1971 Elections.
It was alleged that the Souvenir Committee was formed and huge amount was collected from different companies at Delhi and Bombay for publication of advertisements in the Souvenirs.
It is further alleged that Smt.
Nandini Satpathy respondent No. 1 misappropriated a sum of Rs. 1,02,200 out of this amount collected from the companies and did not take steps for asking the Companies ' advertisements for publication in the Souvenirs.
It is alleged that forgery was committed and Shri Ramanath Panda, respondent No. 2 was also alleged to have participated with respondent No. 1 in misappropriation of the aforesaid amount.
On the information of Shri Shyamsunder Mohapatra, Ex Member of Parliament, a case was registered by the Vigi lance Department and ultimately a charge sheet was submitted against respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
Shri B.M. Patnaik the then Advocate General of Orissa was appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the case.
By order dated 27.9.
1979, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate framed charges under Sections 406, 467, 471 and 120 of the I.P.C. against respondent No. 1 and under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. against respondent No. 2.
After the General Elections of May/June, 1980, Shri Patnaik resigned from the office.
Of Advocate General and also informed the State Government that he was not inclined to continue as Special Public Prosecutor in the case against Smt.
Nandini Satpathy.
In fact, though the case had been fixed on a number of dates between July and November, 1980 Shri Patnaik did 'not appear in the case on any one of these dates.
Thereafter respondent No. 4 who had been appointed as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the cases of the Vigi lance Department under Section 24(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was instructed by the Government in the Vigilance Department to take charge of this case.
On 5.11.80, Shri P.K. Mohanty, Advocate sent a letter to the then Advocate General Shri Gobind Das requesting him for withdrawal of this .case and by letter dated 6.11.
1980 the learned Advo cate General Shri Gobind Das forwarded this letter of Shri P.K. Mohanty, Advocate to the Chief Secretary who endorsed the letter to Inspector General (Vigilance) asking him for his comments.
I.G. of Police (Vigilance) suggested that it would be proper to obtain the views of the Law Department, and after receipt of the comments of I.G. of Police (Vigi lance) the Chief Secretary referred the matter to the Law Department for advice and the Legal Remembrancer after considering the legal position regarding the withdrawal of the prosecution observed as under: 697 "As it sometimes happens, Political leaders are subjected to victimisation.
Resort is had to law courts to harass politi cal rivals.
In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court Government may take a policy decision to curb such political victimisation through law Courts and direct with drawal irrespective of the question whether or not there is sufficient evidence in support of the prosecution.
The instant case is one instituted against Smt.
Nandini Satpathy, Ex Chief Minister of Orissa. ' It is possi ble for Government to take notice of the intense political rivalry between Smt.
Nandini Satpathy, on the one hand and the erstwhile leaders of Janta Party on the other hand that motive behind institution of such cases was political vic timisation rather than vindication of the law.
Government may suggest withdrawal of such cases to the concerned Public Prosecutor." On the receipt of this opinion from the law Department, the file was endorsed by the Chief Secretary to the Law Minister and the Law Minister endorsed the file to the Chief Minister.
After considering the matter from all angles, the Chief Minister passed an order dated 13.11.1980 that the case be withdrawn.
By letter dated 15.11.1980, the I.G. (Vigilance) communicated the decision of the Government to withdraw the prosecution to the Special Public Prosecutor Shri Dibakar Bhuyan and requested him to take necessary action in the matter.
After respondent No. 4 was put in charge of the case, he examined the case diary and the connected papers and on being satisfied that the charge of criminal breach of trust would fail against Smt.
Nandini Satpathy, he filed an application under Section 32 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for withdrawal from the prosecu tion on, having found that the charged amounts in this case are contributions to Souvenir Committee of the All India Congress Committee and that none of the members of the Central Souvenir Committee has complained of any dishonest use or fraud or injury or wrongful loss to the Committee or AICC for such non utilisation of the funds and that the offences charged would ultimately depend upon the proof of dishonest intention or fraud or wrongfUl loss to the ' Cen tral Souvenir Committee or to the AICC.
On 16.12.
1980 the Special Public Prosecutor made an application for additional ground to be added in the application for withdrawal and the additional ground alleged was that in public interest and in the changed circumstances, the State Government desired to withdraw from the prosecution.
698 After consideration of the case, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 20th December, 1980 recorded his consent and permitted the Special Public Prose cutor to withdraw from the prosecution.
Thereafter one Mohd. Mumtaz, the present appellant who was not a party to these proceedings filed a revision petition in the High Court of Orissa challenging the order of the Additional Chief Judi cial Magistrate permitting withdrawal of the case.
But by an order dated 14.5.81 the High Court dismissed the revision petition.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
The F.I.R. in this case was lodged by one Shyamsunder Mohapatra against respondents Nos. 1 and 2 alleging that in January and February 1971 certain companies had issued 49 cheques in the names of Presidents of the District Congress Committees of Orissa totalling Rs.1,08,200 for advertise ments to be published in Souvenirs to be brought out in each district by the respective District Congress Committee.
These cheques were deposited in the account of Chairman, Souvenir Committee in Canara Bank, Bhubaneswar.
It is al leged that respondent No. 1 misappropriated the amount by drawing.
in favour of self bearer 9 cheques aggregating to Rs.95,000 and two bearer cheques aggregating to Rs.32,854 in the name of respondent No. 2.
It was alleged that neither advertisements were published nor the amounts returned to the companies.
It is significant to note that Shri Shyamsun der Mohapatra was neither an office bearer of the U.P.C.C. nor of the A.I.C.C.
Admittedly he was neither a member of the Central Souvenir Committee to which the money was en trusted for transmission to the State or the District Con gress Committee nor was he in any manner connected with any of the companies which paid the money for publication of the advertisements.
Shri Shyamsunder Mohapatra lodged the com plaint when respondent No. 1 was not the Chief Minister of the State.
He had been suspended from the Congress Party for his anti party activities when respondent No. 1 was the President of the U.P.C.C. and the Chief Minister of Orissa.
It is significant that these monies were paid by various companies in the name of All India Souvenir Committee and there is no material to indicate how the All India Souvenir Committee transferred these cheques to the respective State Congress Committees or the District Congress Committees.
There is no complaint also from any one of the companies that the monies paid by them were not utilised for the purpose for which they were given or were utilised for a different purpose without their consent.
Now it is difficult to appreciate how the learned Special Public 699 Prosecutor could make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate gave his consent to such withdrawal on the ground that there is no evidence to sustain the prosecution when a charge was already framed against respondent No. 1 on the basis that in the opinion of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate who framed the charge there was ground for presuming that re spondent No. 1 had committed the offences charged against her.
There can therefore be no doubt that the withdrawal from the prosecution could not be permitted on the ground that there was insufficient ' or no evidence to sustain the prosecution.
But since entire record is before us and the matter has been argued at great length on :he basis of the material on record we propose to consider whether the charge was rightly framed and if we take the view that on the basis of the material on record no charge could be framed we must quash the charge against respondent No. 1.
It is clear from the material on record that various companies all over India gave monies by way of cheques to the Souvenir Committee of the All India Congress Committee.
We will assume for the purpose.
of argument that these amounts were given by the companies for the purpose of publication of advertisements in the souvenir which were entitled to be brought out by each District Congress Commit tee, but there is no material on record at all to show that when these amounts were distributed by the All India Con gress Committee to the respective provincial Congress Com mittees and by the provincial Congress Committees in their turn to the respective District Congress Committees, the entrustment of these amounts by the All India Congress Committee was expressed to be for the specific purpose of publication of advertisements in the souvenirs.
When there is nothing to indicate that the entrustment of these amounts to respondent No. 1 was for the specific purpose of being utilised only for the purpose of publication of advertise ments in the souvenirs, it is difficult to see how any charge of criminal breach of trust can be sustained against respondent No. 1.
It is not the case of the prosecution that any of these amounts were handedover by any of the companies to respondent No. 1.
The entrustment of these amounts, if at all, was to the Souvenir Committee of the All India Congress Committee and respondent No. 1 could not therefore possibly be charged for utilising any of these amounts for a purpose other than that for which it was entrusted to her.
We are therefore of the view that the charge framed against re spondent No. 1 was totally groundless and we would therefore quash it.
We accordingly dismiss the appeal but instead of permitting the 700 prosecution to be withdrawn under Section 321 we quash the charge framed against respondent No. 1 under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
NATARAJAN, J: This is a case where the Special Public Prosecutor (Vig.) C.D. Cuttack had filed a petition under Section 321 Cr.
P.C. and sought the permission of the Court for withdrawal of the case against the first respondent when the case was posted for consideration of charge.
Under Section 321 Cr.
P.C. a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of a case may, with the consent of the court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, with draw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried.
In this case the Special Public Prosecutor had set out in paras 5 and 6 of his application the relevant materials which had prevailed upon him to seek withdrawal of prosecu tion of the case, after obtaining the consent of the Court, to subserve the interests of justice better.
There is no material in the case to show that the Special Public Prose cutor was influenced by any improper motives for filing the application for withdrawal of the prosecution or that he had acted against his will at the behest of any one else.
The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has bestowed judicial consideration over the matter and has thereafter passed a reasoned order.
While giving his consent for the withdrawal of the prosecution the learned Magistrate has borne in mind the principles laid down by this Court in R.K. Jain vs State, ; which has followed the earlier decision of this Court in State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, Before passing the order, the learned Magistrate has been fully alive to the responsibili ty of the Court before it grants consent to an application made under Section 321 Cr.
P.C. The portion extracted below from the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate fully reveals this position : "While mentioning the facts in the petition, I have already indicated the reasons for which the prosecutor does not want to prosecute.
Now the Court has to consider whether consent should be given or not.
The discretion as to whether consent should be given to withdraw is with the court but it should be exercised judiciously and on correct legal principles.
It is not to be given as a matter of course nor the court shall surrender its own inde pendence of judgment." 701 After making an objective assessment of the merit of the application, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magis trate held that the withdrawal of the prosecution "would in no way affect any public interest or improve any public confidence" and concluded as follows: "Considering all these circumstances if the public prosecutor most judiciously thought it proper to withdraw from the case in my opin ion, the court should be not a stumbling block by disallowing its consent.
I feel it just and proper to allow the petition".
The order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was affirmed, after a careful scrutiny by a learned Judge of the Orissa High Court in Crl.
Rev. No. 21 of 1981 filed in the High Court.
The learned Judge observed that the ratio laid down in R.K. Jain vs State (supra) "would not justify entertaining this application when a public prosecutor in his application had indicated that the evidence already collected did not support the prosecution and there was no prospect of a conviction and the appropri ate authority had taken the view that the prosecution in the broad ends of justice need not continue".
It may be thus seen that not only the learned Magistrate but also the High Court has found, after a careful scrutiny of relevant factors and circumstances, that the application for withdrawal of the prosecution made by the Special Public Prosecutor fully satisfied the tests laid down by this Court in State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey (supra) reiterated in R.K. Jain vs State (supra) for its being allowed viz. that the executive function of the public prosecutor in applying for withdrawal of the prosecution has not been improperly exercised and that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.
The appellant has failed to establish in this appeal that the consent given by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to the Special Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution suffers from any error of law, patent or latent.
Consequently, the appeal fails and has, therefore, to be dismissed.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
Section 321 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers a Public Prosecutor incharge of a case to withdraw with the consent of the court from the prosecution of any person in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried, at any time before the judgment is pronounced.
Respondent No.1 Ex Chief Minister of Orissa, was alleged to have misappropriated a huge sum, said to have been col lected by District Congress Committees from various compa nies for publication of their advertisements in party 's souvenirs before the 1971 General Elections.
A case was registered by the Vigilance Department against her and a charge sheet submitted.
The Addl.
Chief Judicial Magistrate framed charges under ss.406,467,471 and 120 of the IPC.
After the 1980 General Election, the State Government took a policy decision to withdraw cases against political leaders who were subjected to victimisation.
The Special Public Prosecutor on being satisfied that the charge of criminal breach of trust would fail against respondent No.1 filed a petition under s.321 Cr.
P.C. and sought the permis sion of the court in public interest for withdrawal of the case, when the case was posted for consideration of charge.
After making an objective assessment of the merits of the application and being satisfied that the withdrawal of the prosecution would in no way affect any public interest or improve any public confidence the Addl.
Chief Judicial Magistrate granted consent to withdraw from the prosecution.
The appellant 's revision petition having been dismissed by the High Court he appealed by special leave to this Court.
Dismissing the appeal the Court, 692 HELD: Per Oza, J. (Bhagwati C.J.I. and Oza, J.) I. Once a charge has been framed against the accused on the basis that there was ground for presuming that he had committed the offence charged against him, the Public Prose cutor cannot make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution and the Magistrate cannot give his consent to such withdrawal on the ground that there was insufficient or no evidence to sustain the prosecution.
[698H 699B] 2.
The charge of criminal breach of trust framed against respondent No. 1, however, was totally groundless.
There was nothing on record to indicate that the entrustment of funds to her was for the specific purpose of being utilised only for the purpose of publication of advertisements in the souvenirs.
It was not the case of the prosecution that any of these amounts were handed over by any of the companies to her.
The entrustment of these amounts, if at all, was to the souvenir committee of the All India Congress Committee and respondent No. 1 could not be charged for utilising any of these amounts for the purpose other than that for which it was entrusted to her.
The charge against her, therefore, could not he sustained.
[699E G] Instead of permitting the prosecution to he withdrawn under s.321 the charge framed against respondent No. 1 is quashed under s.239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[699H 700A] Per Venkataramiah, J. I.I. Consent can he given under s.321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for withdrawal from the prosecution of a case at any time before the judgment is pronounced.
The framing of the charge cannot be an impediment to give con sent to such withdrawal.
In the instant case, the Public Prosecutor had applied his mind to the case before applying for withdrawal and the Chief Judicial Magistrate had not committed any error in giving his consent to such withdrawal.
The order was, therefore, fully justified.
The decision in State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, , interpreting s.494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the decision in R.K. Jain vs State through Special Police Establishment & Ors., ; , interpreting s.321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not call for any reconsideration.[694C E] 693 Per Khalid, J. I. Order of withdrawal passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is upheld.
[695D] 2.
Consent can be given under s.321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for withdrawal from the prosecution of a case, not only when the charge is not framed but even after the charge is framed and at any time before the judgment.
[694H 695A] 3.
Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is not attracted to the facts of the case for the propriety of the charge framed was not at issue.
[695B, C] Sheo Nandan Paswan vs State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 241 of 1983 decided on 20th December 1986, applied.
State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, and R.K. Jain vs State, ; , referred to.
Per Natarajan, J. 1.
The consent given by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to the Special Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution suffers from no error of law, patent or latent.
[701G] 2.
There is no material in the case to show that the Special Public Prosecutor was influenced by any improper motives for filing the application for withdrawal of the prosecution or that he had acted against his will at the behest of anyone else.
The Additional Chief Judicial Magis trate had bestowed judicial consideration over the matter and had thereafter passed a reasoned order.
Not only he but also the High Court had found after a careful scrutiny of relevant factors and circumstances, that the application for withdrawal of the prosecution made by the Special Public Prosecutor fully satisfied the tests laid down by the Su preme Court inasmuch as the Public Prosecutor had not exer cised his executive function improperly and also had not attempted to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.
[700D E, 701.E F] State of Bihar vs Ram Naresh Pandey, and R.K. Jain vs State, ; , referred to.


judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 57 of 1957 and Criminal Misc.
Petition No. 294 of 1957.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 28, 1956, of the former Andhra High Court at Guntur in Criminal Revision Case No. 241 of 1956.
398 T. V. Sarma, K. Ramaseshayya Chaudhury and T. section Venkataraman, for the appellants.
T. V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India).
September 17.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.
The only question that arises for determination in this appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, is the constitutionality of the provisions of sections 207 and 207A, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), which, read together, were introduced into the Code by Act XXVI of 1955.
The 26 appellants have been committed to the Court of Session, Guntur Division, to take their trial for offences punishable under sections 147, 148, 323, 324 and 302, read with sections 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code.
They impleaded the State of Andhra Pradesh as the sole respondent.
The Union of India has been allowed to intervene on an application made in that behalf in view of the fact that the provisions of the Central Act have been impugned as unconstitutional.
For the purposes of this appeal, it is only necessary to state the following relevant facts.
The local police took cognizance of a serious occurrence of rioting with murder on December 22, 1955.
The local police investigated the case, and after recording such evidence as it could collect in respect of the occurrence, submitted a charge sheet under the aforesaid sections of the Indian Penal Code, to the magistrate having jurisdiction to entertain the case.
The magistrate, following the procedure laid down in section 207 A of the Code committed the persons shown in the chargesheet as the accused persons, to take their trial before the Court of Session.
A number of applications in revision, under sections 435 and 439 of the Code, were made on behalf of the accused persons, to the High Court of 399 Andhra Pradesh, to quash the order of commitment, chiefly on the ground that the said order having been passed under the provisions of section 207A of the Code( was void, as those provisions were unconstitutional for the reason that they introduced discrimination as against accused persons in respect of whom a police charge sheet had been submitted.
The revisional applications were heard by Krishna Rao J. who dismissed them, holding that the provisions impugned were not unconstitutional and that, therefore, the order of commitment was valid in law.
The appellants applied for and obtained the necessary certificate under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
The arguments addressed to the High Court have been repeated in this Court and are to the effect that sections 207 and 207A, as they now stand, provide for two separate procedures in the committing court, namely, (1) in respect of a case instituted on a police report for which the procedure specified in section 207 A is prescribed, and (2) in respect of any other proceeding, the procedure laid down in other provisions of Chapter XV111 is prescribed.
The argument is that a comparison and contrast of the two different procedures prescribed in respect of the two classes of cases, when examined in their details, show that the procedure in respect of a case instituted on a police report is less advantageous to the accused than the other procedure.
Thus, it is further argued, in the sections following section 207A in Chapter XVIII of the Code, the accused have been granted facilities which are not available to them in the procedure laid down in section 207A.
By way of illustration, it was urged that under section 208(3), it is open to an accused person to apply to the magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document, but sub section
(2) of section 207A, which corresponds to the provisions of section 208(3), speaks only of the prosecution and not of the accused.
Again, it is pointed out that sub section
(4) of section 207A, makes reference only to the prosecution evidence, whereas the corresponding section 208(1) makes reference to the evidence that may be produced in 200 support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accused.
Similarly, it has been pointed out that there are no 'provisions in section 207A corresponding to those of section 209(2), and section 213(2), empowering the magistrate to discharge the accused; nor is there any provision in the impugned section 207A corresponding to section 215 relating to quashing of commitments.
Further, it was pointed out that whereas section 209(1) contains the words " not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person", sub section
(6) of section 207A has the words " no grounds for committing the accused".
It has further been argued that in the new procedure adopted in the impugned section 207A, the accused person has been deprived of the benefits under sections 162 and 215 of the Code, and under sections 27, 101 to 106 and 114 1ll.
(g) of the Evidence Act.
It has, thus, been sought to be made out that the procedure laid down in section 207A in the matter of commitment is less advantageous to the accused persons than the one prescribed in the succeeding sections of Chapter XVIII.
We shall assume for the purpose of examining the constitutionality of the impugned provisions of the amended Code that there are differences in the two kinds of procedure envisaged in Chapter XVIII of the Code, relating to commitment proceedings, but it is by no means clear that the changes introduced by the amending Act XXVI of 1955 are always to the disadvantage or prejudice of an accused person.
It is a well known fact that the amending Act aforesaid introduced changes into the old Code with a view to simplifying and expediting procedure relating to trial of offences and to inquiries preceding such trials.
It has also to be remembered that the Code has always prescribed different procedures for trial of offences varying with the gravity of the offences charged, or with the power of the court before which an accused person is placed on trial.
Generally speaking, minor offences have been made triable summarily, or the same accused person in respect of an offence triable summarily, may be so tried by a magistrate specially empowered in that behalf, or may be tried according to the ordinary procedure by a magistrate not so 401 empowered.
Less serious offences are triable by magistrates and more serious offences are triable by a Court of Session or by a High Court after there has been a preliminary in quiry and investigation by a police officer, or an inquiry by a magistrate, commonly described as commitment proceed ings, or, after inquiry by a Civil or Revenue Court, in connection with certain specified offences committed in the course of or in relation to judicial proceedings or in ' respect of proceedings affecting the administration of justice.
The Code has further classified offences triable by magistrates of any class or by magistrates of higher classes.
There is, again, a cross division of cases into warrant cases and summons cases.
With reference to the powers of police officers, offences have been classified as cognizable offences and non cognizable offences.
Thus, the principle of classification of offences and of different categories of cases relating to the trial of offences is a well establisbed rule of criminal procedure.
It is true that for the first time, the impugned sections have pre scribed two different procedures in respect of commitment proceedings as already indicated, but we have to remember that there is absolutely no difference in the procedure at the trial in contra distinction to the procedure relating to the enquiry leading up to commitment of an accused person to a Court of Session or a High Court in cases triable exclu sively by such a Court.
It must also be remembered that every case involving a serious offence comes under the category of 'cognizable case ' in respect of which a police officer may arrest a person named as an accused person without warrant and investigate the case without any order of a magistrate in that behalf Hence, ordinarily speaking, as soon as information of the commission of a cognizable offence has been laid before a police officer in charge of a police station, it becomes his duty to record the first information; and even in the absence of such a first infor mation if such an officer receives information reading to a suspicion that a cognizable offence has been committed, he has to investigate the case and take all steps necessary for the apprehension and 402 arrest of the persons alleged to have been concerned with the crime.
Even in cases which are not, in the first in stance, of cognizable nature, it becomes the duty of a police officer to investigate such a case if he is so or dered by a competent magistrate, taking cognizance of the offence under section 190 of the Code.
In all such cases, it becomes the duty of a police officer in charge of a police station, or of a superior officer if deputed to investigate a case, to follow the procedure laid down .in
Chapter XIV of the Code.
Under section 169 of the Code, if, as a result of the investigation under Chapter XIV, the police officer making the investigation, comes to the conclusion that there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a magistrate, he has to release the accused person if in custody.
If, on the other hand, on such an investigation, it appears to the investigating officer that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, it becomes his duty to forward the accused to a competent magistrate to try the accused or to commit him for trial.
Section 173 of the Code requires the investigation to be concluded without any unnecessary delay and the submission of a report containing the result of the investigation, to a competent magistrate.
After the submission of the police report, the police offi cer in charge of a police station, before the commencement of the inquiry or trial by a magistrate, has to furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report aforesaid, of the first information report and of all other documents or relevant extracts thereof, on which prosecution proposes to rely, including statements and confessions, if any, recorded under section 164, and the statements recorded under sub section
3 of section 161, of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as witnesses.
On receipt of the police report and the documents aforesaid, under section 173 of the Code, the magistrate concerned has to make up his mind whether the case has to be tried by him or by some other competent magistrate or by a Court of Session or a High Court.
If the magistrate finds that the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a High Court, he has 403 to follow the new procedure laid down in section 207A At the commencement of the inquiry before the magistrate, when the accused appears before him, the magistrate has to satisfy himself that the documents referred to in section 173 have been furnished to the accused and to have them furnished if the police officer has not done his duty.
The magistrate then has to record the evidence of such witnesses as figure as eyewitnesses to the occurrence. and are produced before him. 'He has also the power, in the interest of justice, to record such other evidence of the prosecution as he may think necessary, but he is not obliged to 'record any evi dence.
Without recording any evidence but after considering all the documents referred to in section 173 and after examining the accused person and after hearing the parties, it is open to the magistrate to discharge the accused person after recording his reasons that no ground for committing the accused for trial has been made out, unless he decides to try the accused himself or to send him for trial by another magistrate.
If, on the other hand, he finds that the ac cused should be committed for trial,, he is required to frame a charge disclosing the offence with which the accused is charged.
The accused is then required to submit a list of persons whom he wishes to be summoned, to give evidence at his trial.
After all this, the case is placed before the Court of Session or the High Court for trial in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Code.
But if the investigating police officer, instead of submit ting a charge sheet as required by a. 173, submits what is popularly called the "final report" to the effect that there was no evidence in support of the prosecution case and that it was not a fit case for a trial either by a magistrate or by a Court of Session or High Court, the matter may not end there.
It is open to the first informant or any other person interested in prosecuting the accused person, to make a regular petition of complaint before a competent magis trate under section 190 of the Code.
The magistrate, upon taking cognizance under that section, may start an inquiry of his own, notwithstanding the fact that the police 52 404 has refused to prosecute the case.
The magistrate, in a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session or by a High Court, has to follow the procedure laid down in section 208 and subsequent sections of Chapter XVIII.
The magistrate natu rally has to make a record of the evidence given by the complainant and such other witnesses as may have been pro duced in support of the prosecution or on behalf of the accused if the accused chooses to adduce any evidence at that stage.
Ordinarily, an accused person does not choose to do so for the fear that he might disclose his defence too early.
After recording the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution as also on behalf of the accused, if ad duced, and examining the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the magistrate may either discharge the accused person if he finds that there is no sufficient ground for committing him for trial after recording his reasons, or direct him to be tried by himself or some other magistrate.
The order of discharge may be made by the magistrate even at an earlier stage if he records the reasons for considering the charge to be groundless, or, he may commit the accused for trial after framing a charge declaring the offence with which the accused has been charged.
It is also open to an accused person, if the magistrate in his discretion allows him to do so, to examine more witnesses.
If after examining those additional witnesses, the magistrate is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for committing the accused, he may cancel the charge and discharge the accused.
It will, thus, be seen that where the magistrate conducts commitment proceeding as on a complaint, the accused has the advantage of three stages at which he may be discharged.
It has, therefore,. been contended on behalf of the appellants that the procedure under section 207A is less advantageous to the accused than the other procedure.
The answer to this con tention is that the Legislature, in its wisdom, has proceed ed on the basis that it is primarily the function of the State through its police officers who are charged with the 405 duty of preventing the commission of crime and of bringing offenders to justice, to prosecute criminals or alleged criminals ' in serious cases, that is to say, cases involving not only personal injury to the complainant but also public peace and order.
Such police officers have been enjoined by law to see to it that all persons alleged to have been concerned in a crime of that character, should be speedily brought to justice.
Chapter XIV of the Code, as stated above, lays down the procedure which police officers have to follow.
Hence, the Code has provided that all cases involv ing public peace and order, should be investigated by public servants who are expected to be vigilant in bringing all offenders to justice without any avoidable delay.
If the police have not thought it necessary or feasible to do so after following the procedure laid down in Chapter XIV, the private party may figure before the magistrate as complain ant The magistrate has got, therefore, to be more vigilant in seeing that private vendetta and considerations other than those of vindicating justice, are not allowed to inter fere with the administration of public justice.
Hence, the procedure laid down in section 208 and the sections follow ing that section, naturally gives greater facilities to persons accused of an offence, to vindicate their character.
As indicated above, there is no doubt that there are materi al differences in the two procedures relating to commitment according as the case has been investigated by a competent police officer who has submitted a charge sheet and a report under section 173 of the Code, or, a competent magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on a complaint.
In the latter case, the procedure before the committing magistrate is more elaborate.
But is it always to the advantage of an accused person that there should be an elaborate procedure before such a magistrate and not a summary one? It is the avowed policy of the Legislature and there can be no doubt that it is in the general interest of administration of justice, that crimes should be investigated and criminals brought to justice as expeditiously as circumstances of the case would 406 permit.
That must also be in the interest of an accused person himself if he claims not to be guilty of any offence.
Generally speaking, therefore, only a real offender would be interested in prolonging the inquiry or trial so as to postpone the day of judgment.
If a person has been falsely or wrongly accused of an offence, it is in his interest that he should get himself declared innocent by a competent court as early as possible.
In view of these considerations, there cannot be the least doubt that the Legislature has been well advised to amend the procedure relating to commit ment proceedings in cases which have been investigated by a competent police officer.
The Legislature has rightly retained the old elaborate .procedure only in those cases which have not been investigated by such a public officer, or, after investigation, have been declared not to be fit to be proceeded with in public interest.
Having found that there are substantial differences intro duced by the impugned provisions, we have to consider the question of the constitutionality of those provisions.
At the threshold, it is pertinent to observe that these provi sions have not in any way affected the procedure at the trial.
After a case has been committed to a Court of Ses sion, the procedure for the trial of offences in either class of cases, remains the same.
Hence, all those cases which came up to this Court in which it was laid down that the law introduced substantial changes in the procedure at the trial, to the disadvantage of an accused person, have absolutely no relevance to the present case.
The main attack on the constitutionality of those provisions is based on article 14 of the Constitution.
This Court had to consider the provisions of that article in a series of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India (1), The State of Bombay vs F. N. Balsara (2), The, State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar (3), Kathi Raning Rawat vs The State of Saurashtra(4), Lachmandas (1) ; (3) ; (2) [1951]S.C.R. 682.
(4) ; 407 Kewalram Ahuja vs The State of Bombay (1), Qasim Razvi vs The State of Hyderabad(2), Habeeb Mohamad vs The State of Hyderabad(3) The State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh(4), which were all referred to in the case of Budhan Choudhry vs The State of Bihar(5), which is the nearest case to the case now before us, with this distinction that in that case, there was a difference at the trial stage itself.
In that case, the same accused person in respect of the same of fence, could be tried under section 30 of the Code by a magistrate empowered under that section, and by a Court of Session, if the offence happened to have taken place in a jurisdiction to which section 30 had not been applied.
In that case, this Court upheld the constitutionality of that section of the Code, and repelled the Contention that the provisions of that section infringed the fundamental right to equality guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.
In the course of his judgment, Das J. (as he then was) made the following observations which apply to the case in hand with full force : ". .
It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classifi cation must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (II) that that differ entia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different basis; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like.
What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under considera tion.
It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns (1) [1952] S.C.R. 710.
(2) [I953] S.C.R. 581.
(3)[1953] S.C.R. 661.
(4) ; (5) ; , 1049.
408 discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
" The later case before this Court dealing with.
the question of discrimination in respect of provisions of the Code is the one reported in Matajog Dobey vs H.C. Bhari(1).
In that case, the constitutionality of section 197 of the Code, was questioned.
The contention raised in that case was that the section vested arbitrary power in the Government to grant or withhold sanction which could be withheld or granted at the sweet will of the Executive.
This Court overruled that contention and held that a discretionary power is not neces sarily discriminatory.
Applying the principles laid down by this Court to the case in hand to judge whether or not there has been objectionable discrimination, there could not be the least doubt that the Legislature has provided for a clear classification between the two kinds of proceedings at the commitment stage based upon a very relevant consideration, namely, whether or not there has been a previous inquiry by a responsible public servant whose duty it is to discover crime and to bring criminals to speedy justice.
This basis of classification is clearly connected with the underlying principle of admin istration of justice that an alleged criminal should be placed on his trial as soon after the commission of the crime as circumstances of the case would permit.
This classification cannot be said to be unreasonable and not to have any relation to the object of the legislation, namely, a more speedy trial of offences without any avoidable delay.
For the reasons given above, it must be held that there is no discrimination and that the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution have not been contravened.
The provisions of the Code, impugned in this case, must, therefore, be held to be constitutional.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The point in controversy in this appeal was whether SS. 207 and 207A inserted into the Code of Criminal Procedure by the amending Act 26 of 1955, violated the provision of article 14 of the Constitution and were, therefore, invalid in law.
The appellants were committed for trial to the Court of Session by the inquiring 397 Magistrate in a proceeding instituted against them on a Police report and he followed the procedure laid down in section 207A of the Code as required by section 207 Of the Code.
The appellants moved the High Court for quashing the order of commitment on the ground that the provisions of section 207A introduced discrimination as against accused persons against whom proceedings were ' instituted on Police report and were unconstitutional in character.
The High Court held against them.
The contention was reiterated in this Court and it was sought to be made out that the provisions Of section 207A of the Code, in comparison and contrast to other provisions of Ch.
XVIII of the Code, prescribed a less advantageous procedure for the accused persons in a proceeding started on Police report than the procedure prescribed for other cases in the succeeding sections of the chapter.
Held, that sections 207 and 207A of the Code were not discriminatory and did not contravene article 14 of the Constitution and their constitutional validity was beyond question.
Although there can be no doubt that the impugned sections introduced substantial difference in the procedure relating to commitment proceedings applicable to the two classes of cases, they did not in any way affect the procedure at the trial, and the true test of the constitutional validity of the classification they made, was whether it was reasonable and pertinent to the object the Legislature had in view, namely, a speedy trial of offences with the least possible delay.
So judged there could be no doubt that the Legislature in prescribing the two different procedures at the commitment stage, one for proceedings instituted on Police report and the other for those that were not, had acted on a consideration that was reasonable and connected with the object it had in view.
Budhan Choudhry vs The State of Bihar, ; , applied.
Matajog Dobey vs H. C. Bhari, ; , Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union of India, ; , The State of Bombay vs F. N. Balsara, ; , The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar, ; , Kathi Raning Rawat vs The State of Saurashtra, (1952) S.C.R. 435, Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja vs The State of Bombay, ; , Qasim Razvi vs The State of Hyderabad, ; , Habeeb Mohamad vs The State of Hyderabad, ; and The State of Punjab vs Ajaib Singh; , , referred to.


judgement:
Appeal No. 886 of 1976.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.5.
1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 3684 of 1966.
S.N. Kacker, R.B. Mehrotra and Miss Abha Jain for the Appellant.
Gobinda Mukhoty, S.K. Verma, R.S. Singh and P.A. Mishra for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of Allahabad setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court and decreeing the landlord 's suit for eviction against the appellant.
The appellant has been tenant of Kothi No. 196 situated in Dholki Mohalla, Sadar Bazar, Meerut Cantt.
ever since 1961 on a rent of Rs. 93 per mensem.
The tenanted premises was let out to the appellant for running a Dal and Oil Mill.
The respondents purchased the building from the erstwhile owners in 1963, a year later, they filed a suit for appel lant 's eviction on a number of grounds including the 972 ground that the appellant had made constructions materially altering the accommodation without their consent causing substantial damages to it.
It is not necessary to refer to other grounds as the sole ground which survived for the decree of eviction relates to the material alterations made in the tenanted premises without obtaining the consent of the landlord.
The disputed constructions include a partition wall in a hail converting the same into two portions and tin sheds shown by letters ABHG and CDGH.
The trial Court held that the partition wall in the hall did not constitute material alteration, it further held that the tin shed marked by letters ABHG had been constructed by the appellant with the consent of the erstwhile landlords predecessor in interest of the respondents but the tin shed marked with letters CDGH had been constructed by the Appellant subse quently without respondents ' consent, which materially altered the accommodation and on that findings the trial court decreed the suit.
On appeal, the Additional Civil Judge set aside the trial Court 's order and dismissed the respondents ' suit on the findings that none of the construc tions constituted material alteration justifying appellant 's eviction under sec.
14(c) of the U.P. Cantonment Rent Con trol Act 10 of 1952.
On a second appeal made by the respond ents a learned Single Judge of the High Court set aside the order of the first appellate court on the findings that the tin shed indicated by the letters CDGH as well as the parti tion wail made in the hall converting the same into two rooms, constituted material alteration as contemplated by the Sec.
14(c).
Since the constructions had been made with out permission of the respondent, the tenant was liable for eviction.
There is no dispute that the demised premises is sub ject to the provisions of the U.P. Cantonment Rent Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
Section 14 of the Act imposes restriction on the landlord 's right to file suit for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds specified therein.
14(c) relevant for the purposes of this case reads as under: "Sec. 14: Restrictions on eviction: No suit shall, without the permission of the district Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) XXXXX (b) xxxxx 973 (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the land lord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value ;" The Act does not permit a landlord to file suit for eviction of a tenant without obtaining permission of the District Magistrate but if the tenant, without the landlords permission made or permitted to make construction which in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommo dation or which is likely to diminish its value substantial ly, the landlord is free to file suit for tenant 's eviction without obtaining permission of the District Magistrate.
If the tenant makes constructions which materially alter the accommodation, without the permission of the landlord the embargo placed on the landlord ' right to file suit is lifted and he is free to file suit for tenant 's eviction without obtaining permission of the District Magistrate.
It is the unauthorised constructions which provides cause of action for tenant 's eviction, but every construction or alteration made by a tenant in the building does not provide a ground for eviction; instead the constructions complained of, must be of such nature and character as to materially alter the accommodation.
Necessary facts which should be established by the landlord for obtaining a decree against the tenant under the said provision are that (1) the tenant has made constructions; (ii) such constructions have been made with out the consent of the landlord; and (iii) constructions so made have materially altered the accommodation.
These three conditions are cumulative in nature, each one of them are necessary to be established before a decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant.
So far as the first and second conditions are concerned, they do not present any difficulty as these are pure questions of fact, but difficulty arises in determining the third condition, namely whether the constructions constitute material alteration.
It is a vexed question which the Courts face very often.
The Act does not define either the word 'materially ' or the word 'altered '.
In the absence of any legislative defi nition of the aforesaid words it would be useful to refer to the meaning given to these words in dictionaries.
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word 'alter ' as change in character, position ' "Materially" as an adverb means 'impor tant ' essentially concerned with matter not with form.
In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) one of the meanings of the word 'alter ' is 'to make change, to modify, to change, change of a thing from one form and set to another.
The expression "alteration" with refer 974 ence to building means 'substantial ' change, varying, change the form or the nature of the building without destroying its identity".
The meaning given to these two words show that the expression 'materially altered ' means "a substan tial change in the character, form and the structure of the building without destroying its identity.
" It means that the nature and character of change or alteration of the building must be of essential and important nature.
In Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors.
vs Bishun Das, ; this Court considering the expression 'material alterations ' occurring in sec.
3(1)(c) of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 observed: "Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean, as such, the question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the alterations in the present case must mean material altera tions as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the front and structure of the prem ises." In determining the question the Court must address itself to the nature, character of the constructions and the extent to which they make changes in the front and structure of the accommodation, having regard to the purpose for which the accommodation may have been let out to the tenant.
The Legislature intended that only those constructions which bring about substantial change in the front and structure of the building should provide a ground for tenant 's eviction, it took care to use the word 'materially altered the accom modation. ' The material alterations contemplate change of substantial nature affecting the form and character of the building.
Many a time tenants make minor constructions and alterations for the convenient use of the tenanted accommo dation.
The Legislature does not provide for their eviction instead the construction so made would furnish ground for eviction only when they bring about substantial change in the front and structure of the building.
Construction of a Chabutra, Almirah, opening a window or closing a verandah by temporary structure or replacing of a damaged roof which may be leaking or placing partition in a room or making similar minor alterations for the convenient use of the accommoda tion do not materially alter 'the building as in spite of such constructions the front and structure of the building may remain unaffected.
The essential element which needs consideration is as to whether the constructions are sub stantial in nature and they alter, the form, front and structure of the accommodation.
It is not possible to give exhaustive list of constructions which do not constitute material 975 alterations, as the determination of this question depends on the facts of each case.
In S.B. Mathur vs K.P. Gupta, construction of temporary wail enclosing verandah and putting up an iron jungala and placing a partition wall, temporary in nature was held not to constitute material alteration of the accommodation.
In Dr. J.G. Gupta vs Bodh Mal. 77 a Division Bench of the High Court held that temporary construction made by a tenant in the shape of kitchen and bathroom did not constitute material alterations as the same were temporary and they could be removed without causing any damage to the accommodation.
In Sita Ram Sharan and Anr.
vs Johri Mal & Anr., a Full Bench held that construction which converted the tenanted premises into double storey structure, materially altered the accommodation.
Another Division Bench of the High Court in Baldev Dass vs Ram Khilawan, [1979] Allahabad Law Reports 44 held that a partition wall in a shop converting the same into two portions for the convenient use of the same did not amount to material alteration.
These decisions were rendered on the facts available on the record of those cases.
In deciding this question the Court has to consider whether the constructions have been made with the consent of the land lord and if so, whether those constructions are of such substantial nature which make material alterations in the accommodation.
The findings of the court regarding construc tions would be finding of fact, but the question whether the constructions materially alter the accommodation is a mixed question of fact and law, which should be determined on the application of the correct principles.
In the instant case the disputed constructions which the High Court has found to be 'material alteration ' consists of a partition wall of 6 feet height in a hall converting the same into two rooms and a tin shed marked by letters CDGH on the Eastern side on the open land adjacent to the accommoda tion.
The trial Court held that the partition wall did not change the front or structure of the accommodation, it being temporary in nature, did not constitute material alterations in the accommodation.
This finding of the trial court was not challenged by the landlord before the Civil Judge.
But the High Court has held that the partition wall constituted 'material alteration '.
The findings recorded by the trial court and the relevant evidence placed before us by the parties clearly show that the partition wall did not actual ly partition the hall converting the same permanently into two rooms.
The partition wall was made without digging any foundation of the floor of the room nor it touched the ceiling, instead; it was a temporary wall of 6 feet height converting the big hall into two portions for its convenient 976 use, it could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building.
The partition wail did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of the accommodation.
The other disputed item relates to the construction of tin shed.
The respondents alleged that the appellant had constructed a tin shed shown by letters ABCD in the site plan attached to the plaint in an unauthorised manner with out obtaining his consent.
All the three courts have record ed concurrent finding that the tin shed shown by the letters ABCD consists of two portions.
One portion is shown by letters AGHB and the other shown by GHCD.
The trial court as well as the first appellate Court both have recorded find ings that the portion of the tin shed shown by letters CDGH had been constructed by the appellant without the consent of the respondent landlords, but the rest of the tin shed shown by the letters ABGH had been constructed by the appellant after obtaining permission of the Cantonment Board and the erstwhile landlord.
The First Appeal Court held that the tin shed shown by letters CDGH did not constitute material alteration as the constructions were temporary in nature which could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the accommodation.
The First Appeal Court further held that the basic stiucture of the accommodation let out to the appellant was not affected at all by the disputed tin shed as it had been constructed on the open land adjoining the accommodation and it was enclosed by Bamboo structure, and Kuchha wail which did not effect any change in the form or the structure of the tenanted building.
In second appeal the High Court held that since two sides of the tin shed were resting on the pucca wall it constituted a material alteration in the accommodation.
We have been taken through the Commissioner 's report filed before the Lower Court and on perusal of the same we find that the wail which had been constructed for the tin shed was kuchha, made of bricks and mud and the bamboo tatters were used for enclosing it.
The findings recorded by the First Appeal Court and the Commis sioner 's report make it evident that the tin shed was con structed on an open land, it was temporary in nature and it could be removed without causing any damage to the building.
One portion of the tin shed was already in existence on the open land adjacent to the accommodation, the appellant merely extended that tin shed which did not make any sub stantial change either in the form or structure of the building.
There is no material on record to sustain the findings of the High Court that the appellant had construct ed pucca wails on three sides of the tin shed; instead the Commissioner 's report is contrary to it.
In the circum 977 stances the construction of tin shed could not be held to have materially altered the accommodation.
Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of the High Court in Sita Ram 's case (supra) where the question as to what constructions could materially alter the accommodation was considered.
The Full Bench held that conversion of a single storey shop into a double storied structure by constructing a pucca super structure on the roof of the shop materially altered the accommodation.
On the facts of that case, there could be no doubt that the tenant had made substantial constructions which changed the form, front and structure of the tenanted shop.
The High Court observed that the fact that a construc tion is permanent or temporary in nature does not affect the question as to whether the constructions materially alter the accommodation or not.
We do not agree with this view.
The nature of constructions, whether they are permanent or temporary, is a relevant consideration in determining the question of 'material alteration '.
A permanent construction tends to make changes in the accommodation on a permanent basis, while a temporary construction is on temporary basis which does not ordinarily affects the form or structure of the building, as it can easily be removed without causing any damage to the building.
The Full Bench referred to the observation of this Court made in Babu Manmohan Das Shah 's case (supra) that the alteration in a given case might not cause damage to the premises or its value or might not amount to an unreasonable use of leased premises, yet con struction may fall within the expression 'material altera tions '.
In our opinion the observations made in Babu Manmo han Das Shah 's case (supra) do not justify inference that the nature of the construction whether permanent or tempo rary is not relevant for the purpose of determining the 'material alterations ' made by a tenant.
Learned counsel then urged that this Court should not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the High Court.
We find no merit in the submission.
The question whether disputed constructions constitute material altera tions is a mixed question of fact and law.
The High Court in second appeal interfered with the findings of fact recorded by the lower courts on the question whether tin shed and the partition wail constituted material alterations.
The learned Single Judge placing reliance on the observations of the Full Bench decision in Sita Ram 's case (supra) held that the disputed construction even though temporary in nature, which could be removed without causing any damage to the accommo dation, would fail within the mischief of material altera 978 tions.
The High Court committed error in interfering with the findings of the First Appeal Court.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and re store the judgment and decree of the First Appeal Court.
In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.
A.P.J. Appeal al lowed.

summary/full:
The tenanted premises was let out to the appellant for running a Dal and Oil Mill.
The respondents purchased the building and a year later filed a suit for eviction, inter alia, alleging that the appellant had made material altera tions in the tenanted premises without their consent causing substantial damages to it.
The disputed construction includ ed a partition wall in a hall converting the same into two portions and tin sheds shown by letters ABHG and CDGH.
The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the parti tion wail in the hail did not constitute mateial alteration and that the tin shed marked by letters ABHG had been con structed with the consent of the erstwhile landlords but the tin shed marked with letters CDGH had been constructed subsequently without respondents ' consent, which materially altered the accommodation.
On appeal, the Additional Civil Judge found that none of the constructions constituted material alterations.
But on second appeal, the High Court held that the tin shed indicated by letters CDGH as well as the partition wall made in the hail converting the same into two rooms, consti tuted material alteration as contemplated by s.14(c) of the U.P. Cantonment Rent Control Act, 1952, justifying the eviction of the tenant.
Allowing the Appeal, HELD: (1) The order of the High Court is set aside and the Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are restored.
[978A] 969 (2) The U.P. Cantonment Rent Control Act, 1952 does not permit a landlord to file suit for eviction of a tenant without obtaining permission of the District Magistrate but if the tenant, without the landlord 's permission made or permitted to make construction which in the opinion of the Court has materially altered the accommodation or which is likely to diminish its value substantially, the landlord is free to file suit for tenant 's eviction without obtaining permission of the District Magistrate.
[973B C] (3) Necessary facts which should be established by the landlord for obtaining a decree against the tenant under the said provision are that (i) the tenant has made construc tion; (ii) such constructions have been made without the consent of the landlord; and (iii) constructions, so made have materially altered the accommodation.
These three conditions are cumulative in nature, each one of them is necessary to be established before a decree for eviction can be passed against the tenant.
[973D F] (4) The Act does not define either the word 'materially ' or the word 'altered '.
The expression 'materially altered ' means "a substantial change in the character form and the structure of the building without destroying its identity".
It means that the nature and the character of change or alteration of the building must be of essential and substan tial nature.
[973F; 974A B] Concise Oxford Dictionary; Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) and Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors.
vs Bishun Das, ; , referred to.
(5) In determining the question the Court must address itself to the nature, character of the constructions and the extent to which the changes in the front and structure of the accommodation are made having regard to the purpose for which the accommodation may have been let out to the tenant.
[974D E] (6) The material alterations contemplate change of substantial nature affecting the form and character of the building.
Many a time tenants make minor constructions and alterations for the convenient use of the tenanted accommo dation.
The Legislature does not provide for their eviction, for such alterations.
[974E F] (7) Construction of a Chabutra, Almirah, opening of a window or closing a verandah by temporary structure or replacing of a damaged 970 roof which may be leaking or placing partition in a room or making similar minor alterations for the convenient use of the accommodation do not materially alter the building as in spite of such constructions the front and structure of the building may remain unaffected.
It is not possible to give exhaustive list of constructions which do not constitute material alterations, as the determination of this question would depend an the facts of each case.
[974F; 975A] S.B. Mathur vs K.P. Gupta, , Dr. J.G. Gupta vs Bodh Mal, [1969] Allahabad Law Jour nal 477, Sita Ram Sharan and Anr.
vs Johri Mal & Anr., & Baldev Das vs Ram Khila wan, [1979] Allahabad Law Reports 44, referred to.
(8) The findings regarding constructions would be find ing of fact, but the question whether the constructions materially alter the accommodation is a mixed question of fact and law, which should be determined on the application of the correct principles.
[975D E] (9) The nature of constructions, whether they 'are permanent or temporary, is a relevant consideration in determining the question of 'material alteration '.
A perma nent construction tends to make changes in the accommodation on a permanent basis, while a temporary construction is on temporary basis which do not ordinarily affect the form or structure of the buildings, as it can easily be removed without causing any damage to the building.
[977C E] Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors.
vs Bishun Das, ; , explained.
10(i) In the instant case, the findings recorded by the trial Court and the relevant evidence clearly show that the partition wall did not actually partition the hall convert ing the same permanently into two rooms.
The partition wall was made without digging any foundation of the floor of the room nor it touched the ceiling, instead it was a temporary wail Of 6 feet height converting the big hall into two portions for its convenient use, it could be removed at any time without causing any damage to the building.
The parti tion wail did not make any structural change of substantial character either in the form or structure of the accommoda tion.
[975G; 976A] 10(ii) The wail which had been constructed for the tin shed was kuchha, made of bricks and mud and the bamboo tatters were used for 971 enclosing it.
The findings recorded by the First Appellate Court and the Commissioner 's report make it evident that the tin shed was constructed on an open land, it was temporary in nature and it could be removed without causing any damage to the building.
One portion of the tin shed was already in existence on the open land adjacent to the accommodation, the appellant merely extended that in shed which did not make any substantial change either in the form or structure of the building.
There is no material on record to sustain the findings of the High Court that the appellant had con structed pucca walls on three sides of the tin shed; instead the Commissioner 's report is contrary to it [976F; 977A] (11) The Single Judge placing reliance on the observa tion of the Full Bench decision in Sita Ram 's case (supra) held that the disputed construction even though temporary in nature, which could be removed without causing any damage to accommodation, would fall within the mischief of material alterations.
The High Court committed error in interfering with the findings of the First Appellate Court.
[977G; 978A]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in Crl.
M.B.A. No. 1395/86 Gopal Subramaniam, A.M. Garg and R. Venkataramani for the Petitioner.
Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
980 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J.
The widespread belief that dowry deaths are even now treated with some casualness at all levels seems to be well grounded.
The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in such a matter.
We are of the opinion that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to release the accused on anticipatory bail in disregard of the magni tude and seriousness of the matter.
The matter regarding the unnatural death of the daughter in law at the house of her father in law was still under investigation and the appro priate course to adopt was to allow the concerned Magistrate to deal with the same on the basis of the material before the Court at the point of time of their arrest in case they were arrested.
It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing.
We therefore consider it essential to sound a seri ous note of caution for future.
The High Court is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipato ry bail in a matter of this nature.
So far as the present matter is concerned, since it has become infructuous, we do not propose to pass any order.
Subject to these observa tions, the appeal is dismissed.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
While the matter regarding the unnatural death of the daughter in law at the house of her father in law was still under investigation the High Court grunted anticipatory bail to the accused in disregard of the magnitude and seriousness of the matter.
Subsequent to the filing of the appeal by special leave by the father of the deceased the investigation had been concluded by the police and challan filed, and the accused were released on bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
Dismissing the appeal as infructuous, the Court, HELD: The High Court was under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in a matter of this nature.
[980D] The appropriate course to adopt was to allow the con cerned Magistrate to deal with the case on the basis of the material before him at the point of time of accused 's arrest in case they were arrested.
It was, therefore, neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted antic ipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion preju dice by its very nature and timing.
[980B D]