judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 630 of 1981.
, From the Judgment and Decree dated 24.8.
1979 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 358 of 1977.
WITH S L .P Nos. 438/79 & 2113/80.
724 T.S. Krishnamurty lyer, G. Narasimhalu, G.S. Narayana, K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. Anjani, Mrs. J. Ramachandran, T.T. Kunhi kannan, section Srinivasan and A.T.M. Sampath for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J.
In the above appeal and Special Leave Petitions question has been raised about the ambit and scope of Sec.
14(1) and 14(2) of the (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act ').
Before adverting to the legal question, it would be proper to narrate in short the facts of each case.
Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1981 Thota Madhav Rao, the plaintiff filed a suit against Thota Manikyamma on the allegation that the plaintiffs father Yellamanda and the defendant 's husband Late Venkata Subbayya were brothers.
As the defendant and her husband had no issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster son from the age of eight years and thereafter the plaintiff continued to live with them and was brought up treating him as their own son.
Venkata Subbayya died on 14.1.1932 and before his death he executed a will bequeathing the suit properties in favour of his wife Smt.
Thota Manikyamma for her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff.
Both the parties lived together with perfect understanding but after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute property.
The defendant also executed a registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing the suit properties in favour of one Ramisetti Koteswar Rao.
The plaintiff in these circumstances claimed absolute right in the suit properties after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties.
The defendant took the plea that her husband died issueless and intestate and did not execute any will at any time.
Neither she nor her husband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate him.
The defendant had brought up Ramisetti Koteswar Rao, who is her nephew, from his child hood and performed his marriage.
On account of love and affection for him and his children, the defendant executed a registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing all her properties in his favour.
The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed the plaintiffs suit.
The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
The defendant preferred a second ' appeal in the High Court.
During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the 725 High Court the plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record.
The High Court by Judgment dated 24.8.1979 allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit with costs throughout.
The legal representatives of the plaintiff have come to this Court by grant of special leave.
The question involved is whether the life interest in the property acquired by Thota Manikyamma under the will execut ed by her husband and continued to be in her possession became her absolute property under Sec.
14(1) of the Act.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 438 of 1979 One Meenammal is the wife of Ovi Reddiar.
Married life between Ovi Reddiar and his wife.
was not happy and cordial.
Ovi Reddiar executed a registered will exhibit A 4 dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all his properties including the suit properties in favour of .his mother and sister for their lifetime and thereafter in favour of Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar, the two sons of his sister and their issues.
In the said will reference was made regarding the ' conduct of Meenammal in deserting him and in any event if she changed her mind and agreed to live under the protection of the legatees she was allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit properties and that she should construct a house in item referred to in the will and to live there during her lifetime and after her death the said Item and the house site .with the house shall go to the above men tioned Ramalinga Reddiar and Dhanush Koti Reddiar.
Ovi Reddiar died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the will entered into possession of all the proper ties.
Meenammal put obstruction to the legatees in getting possession.
There was some criminal litigation between Smt.
Meenam mal and the legatees under Sec.
145 Cr.
P.C. which resulted in favour of the legatees (exhibit A 1).
Meenammal then filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made by her husband was not valid and as such be cancelled and for possession and mesne profits and in the alternative she claimed for maintenance both past and future.
In the said suit the parties entered into a compromise and a com promise decree was passed on 5.3.1924, vide (exhibit A 1).
Under the terms of said compromise the execution of the will was accepted and the same was made subject to the terms of the compromise decree.
Under the compromise .decree it was agreed that Smt.
Meenammal would enjoy items 1 & 2 of the properties mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of land during her lifetime.
She would also have an enjoyment of the 726 house site during her lifetime without any right of aliena tion. ' Dhanush Koti died unmarried in 1930 but during his lifetime he sold his interest in.
the properties in favour of Ramalinga Reddiar.
Ramalinga Reddiar died in 1962.
On his death the petitioners before this Court being the sons and daughters of Ramalinga Reddiar Claimed to have become enti tled for all the properties of Ramalinga Reddiar including the rights in the suit property.
Meenammal during her lifetime executed a settlement deed in favour of the re spendents before this Court giving absolute rights in the suit properties.
The petitioners before this Court filed a suit against Smt.
Meenammal and the respondents for declara tion that the settlement deed (exhibit A 10) executed by Smt.
Meenammal will not enure beyond the lifetime of Smt.
Meenammal.
Meenammal contested the suit and took the plea that the limited interest given to her under the com promise decree had become enlarged into absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.
The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was.
affirmed in first appeal.
Meenam mal having died.
, the respondents in this Court preferred a second appeal in the High Court of Judicature at Madras.
The High Court allowed the Second Appeal and dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners.
The petitioners in these circum stances have filed the S .L.P. under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, S.L.P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980 The suit properties as well as some other properties originally belonged to one Ramalinga Udayar.
He had two wives, namely, Alamolu and Saraswati.
the first wife Alamolu was living away from her husband.
Ramalinga did not have any issue from both the wives.
Ramalinga being attached with one Siva Subramania the petitioner before us executed a will on 2.7.
1945 ,bequeathing his properties in favour of his second wife Saraswati for her lifetime and thereafter, absolutely in favour of Siva Subramania.
A provision was also made for the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to make available 18 kalams of paddy in favour of Alamolu for her lifetime.
In order to ensure the payment of the maintenance and delivery of paddy a charge was also created over the properties to go ultimately in favour of Siva Subramania Udayar.
As Siva Subramania Udayar was a minor at that time the second wife Smt.
Saraswati was appointed as his guard ian.
Ramalinga died on 8.7.45 and subsequently his first wife Alamolu was awarded 50 kalams of paddy and a sum Of Rs.250 in cash perannum 'by way of maintenance.
On appeal the High Court modified the decree of the Trial Court and en hanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum 727 and directed Siva Subramania the legatee under the will to give one building for the residence of Alamolu.
Thereafter in 195 1 Alamolu sought the recovery of possession of one of the buildings and the Executing Court alltted to her the eastern house backyard and the shops.
The second wife saras wati preferred an appeal to the High Court against the above order of the executing court.
A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High Court.
According to the terms of compromise Alamolu was permitted to occupy the eastern house together with the two shops but the backyard portion was not given.
Alamoler however remained in posses sion of that portion as well, where some coconut trees were standing.
Lateron Saraswati was removed from the guardian ship of Siva Subramania Udayar, and natural father was appointed as his guardian.
Alamolu died on 2.2.1966.
The respondents before us are brother 's grandsons of Alamolu.
Alamolu settled the suit properties in favour of one Chan drashekhar Udayar claiming title to the same in pursuance to a compromise in A.A.O. 567 of 1950.
Ramayya Mudaliar another respondent before us initially took on lease the properties from Chandrashekhar and lateron purchased the eastern half of the building and backyard portion.
Siva Subramania Udayar challenged these transactions on the grounds that Alamolu was given a right of residence only in the building and the same lasted till her lifetime and such right could never be enlarged into an absolute right.
The settlement deed made by her in favour of Chandrashekhar Udayar and the sale made by Chandrashekhar in favour of Ramaiah were invalid and no title could be conveyed by Alamolu in their favour.
Siva Subramania Udayar as such filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits.
The Trial Court held that Alamolu was not the absolute owner of the suit properties as contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act.
The suit as such was decreed in favour of the plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar.
Learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal.
On a Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
The plaintiff Siva Subramania Udayar has filed the S.L.P. under Article 136 of the Consti tution of India.
The controversy raised in these cases is almost settled by a number of decisions of this Court.
However, Learned counsel for the appellant in the appeal as well as Learned counsel for the petitioners in the Special Leave Petitions have raised an argument, placing reliance on Mst.
Karrni vs Amru and Ors., that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu succession Act, as 728 such we consider it proper to deal with this case in the light of other cases decided by this Court.
Section 14 of the reads as under: 14"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation In this sub section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person.
Whether a relative or not, before.
at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what soever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commence ment of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order or a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree.
order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property".
The contention raised is that if a female Hindu acquires any property under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such property then provisions of sub section (2) will over ride, the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Act which makes a female Hindu as full owner.
In Badri Prashad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, ; a Bench of three Judges considered the question in detail.
In the above case a Hindu having self acquired properties, died in 1947 leaving five sons and a widow.
On a dispute between the parties an Arbitrator was appointed in 1950.
The Arbitrator gave an award and a decree was passed in terms of award.
Under the award the widow was given widow 's estate.
It was held that the widow inherited the property under Section 3 (1) of the Hindu Women 's Right to Property Act, 1937 and was in possession of it within the meaning of the word possession in Scetion 14(1) of the Act and when by an award her share was separetaed by metes and bounds, she also acquired the property within 729 the meaning of that section.
It was held that she had become full owner of the property in her possession under Section 14(i) on the coming into force of the , even though previously she was a limited owner.
It was clearly held in the above case that Section 14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an excep tion to Section 14(1) and comes into operation only if acquisitiOn in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre existing right in the female Hindu to the property.
The Bench con sisted of Hon.
J.C. Shah, V. Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.
The case of Mst.
Karmi vs Amru and Others, (supra) on which reliance has now been placed by Learned Counsel for the appellant and petitioners was also decided by a Bench of three Judges Hon.
J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N. Grover, JJ.
It may be noted that two Hon 'ble Judges, namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover were common to both the cases.
In Mst.
Karmi vs Arnru and Others, one Jaimal died in 1938 leaving his wife Nihali.
His son Ditta pre deceased him.
Appellant in the above case was the daughter of Ditta and the respondents were collaterals of Jaimal.
Jaimal first executed a will dated 18.12.1935 and by a subsequent will dated 13.11.1937 revoked the first will.
By the second will a life estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the property was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Armu collaterals.
On the death of Jaimal in 1938, properties were mutuated in the name of Nihali Nihali died in 1960/61.
The appellant Mst.
Karmi claimed right on the basis of a will dated 25.4.1958 execut ed by Nihali in her favour.
It was held that the life estate given to a widow under the will of her husband cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succes sion Act.
Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim the to the properties on the basis of the will executed by the widow Nihali in her favour.
It is a short Judgment without advert ing to any provisions of Sections 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act.
The Judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earli er decision in Badri Pershad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, (supra).
The decision in Mst.
Karmi & Anr.
cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the Act.
The controversy regarding sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act again came up for consideration in V. Tulsamrna & Ors.
vs V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs.
; , This case was also, decided by a Bench of three Judges.
In this case the controversy now raised before us was considered in detail.
All the earlier cases were 730 considered including Badri Prasad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, (supra) and the ratio of this case was followed and approved in V. Tulsamma 's case.
Hon 'ble Bhagwati, J. who wrote the leading judgment dealt with the question in detail and after applying the mind to the controversy decided the same in a well considered manner.
V. Tulsamma 's case again was dis cussed in extenso and followed in Bai Vajia (dead) by L. Rs. vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai & On., ; , by a Bench of three Judges.
The same view has been consistently adopted in long series of cases of this Court and to mention a few of them are Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors.
, [ ; ; Gopal Singh & Anr.
vs Dill Ram (dead) by L.Rs.
& Ors.
; , ; Gulwant Kaur and Others vs Mohinder Singh and Others, [ ; and Jaswant Kaur vs Major Harpal Singh, [ A mention of all the above cases shows that this Court in a long series 'of cases has taken a consistent view that Sec.
14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec.
14 and comes into operation only if acqui sition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre existing right in the female Hindu to the property.
If the case falls under the provisions of Sec.
14(1)of the ACt then the female Hindu shall be held to be full owner of the property and sub section (2) of Section 14 will only apply where the property is acquired without there being and pre exisitingisting right of the female Hindu in such property.
Thus we a firm and reiterate that sub section (2) of Sec.
14 will be con strued more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub section
(1) of Sec. 1 of the Act.
This view lends support to the object of the section which was to remove the disability on women imposed by law and to achive a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society.
In the result we find no force in all the above cases and are dismissed with cost.
K. RAMASWAMY, J. 'I have had the advantage to read the draft judgment of my learned brother.
I fully agree with the resoning and conclusions.
The repeated attempts to reopen the ratio in Tulasamma 's case, in particular, from its proponent i.e. Sri Krishna Murthy lyar made me to tread the route through which I reached the same result thus: Sir Main Henry in his "Earlier History of Institutions" at p. 339 stated that, "the degree in which personal immuni ty and proprietory 731 capacity of women are recognised in a particular state or community is a test of the degree of the advance of its civilisation.
It is, therefore, clear that the esteem in which woman is held, the status occupied by her in society and the treatment meted out to her are regarded as index to the degree of civilisation and culture attained in a coun try.
Manu in his Smriti, Chapter III Verses 55 to 57 stated that where women are honoured and adorned there Gods are pleased, but where women are not honoured no sacred fire yields rewards.
What is the status held by women in the Hindu society is a matter of history reflected from Vedic culture, Smrities, the Shastric law, the statutory privision and ultimately converged and recognised in the supreme law of the land, i.e. egalitarian socialist Indian Constitution.
Shivaswamy lyer in his "Revolution of Hindu Women, " 1935 ,Edn.
p. 64 stated that the ideals of the society as to womanhood includes not merely the relations of husband and wife or mother and children or the other intimate rela tionship of family life, but also the notions we find about her capacity, her character, her claim to equality, inde pendence and freedom for developing, her rights to personal ownership and control of property, to the choice of her vocation and other rights as well as duties as member of the society.
Status and rights of Hindu woman fluctuated and swung like a pendulum with ups and downs from period to period starting from 4000 B.C. uptodate.
However esteem for women remained constantly high in the society.
In Vedic society woman enjoyed equal status economical ly, socially and culturally with men, vide p. 335,339 and 409 of The Position of Woman in Hindu Civilization, 1955 Edn.
by Altakar.
He stated that initiation to education upanayanam was performed in Vedic period to the girls as well as boys.
Women studied the Vedas, even composed Vedic rhymes.
They participated in public life freely.
Vishvavara, Apala, Lopamudra and Shashayasi are only few examples in the initial Vedic period.
Thereafter Ghosha, Maitrai and Gargi occupied price of place for equality in intellectual excel lence and equal status with men.
Selfishness and male chau vanism made woman to gradually degrade and were given no voice even in the settlement of their marriages or so on.
She was denied participation in public affairs.
Though Yajnavalkya was a proponent to her economic status but ultimately Manu Smriti took firm hold and in Chapter IX Verse 18, Manu stated that woman had no right to study the Vedas.
Thereby, denied the right to education, fundamental human right to acquire knowledge and cultural and intellec tual excellence.
In Chapter IX Verse 149, he stated that woman must not seek.
separation from father, husband or 732 son and bondaged her for ever.
In Chapter IX Verse 45, the husband was declared to be one with the wife that the wife can seek no divorce but allowed immunity to a male to dis card an unwanted wife.
All through the ages till Hindu Marriage Act was made a male was allowed polyandry.
In Chapter IX Verse 4 16, he stated that a wife, a son and a slave are declared to have no property and if they happened to acquire it would belong to male under whom she is in protection.
Thus she was denuded or her right to property or incentive to decent and independent living and made her a dependent only to rare children and bear the burdens.
When she becomes a widow, she was declared to have only mainte nance and if in possession of her husband 's property or coparcenery, to be a widow 's estate with reversionery right to the heirs of last male holder.
Fidality was a condition precedent to receive maintenance.
In Chapter IX Verse 299, he prescribed corporeal punishment to a wife who commits faults, should be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo.
If she was murdered it was declared to be an Upapattaka that is a minor offence vide Chapter XI Verse 67.
I did not adhere to literal translation but attempted to portray their sweep and deep incursion on social order.
Thus laid firm founda tion to deny a Hindu female of equality of status.
opportu nity and dignity of person with no independent right to property and made her a subservient, socially, educationally and culturally.
Widows were murdered by inhuman Sati and now by bride burnings.
Gautam Budha gave her equality of status and opportuni ty.
Efforts of social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Rai, Kandukuri Veeresalingam and a host of other enlightened made the British Rulers gradually to make statute law, given her right to separate residence and maintenance and a right over property of her husband or joint family for maintenance and a charge by a decree of court.
Mahatma Gandhiji, the father of the nation, in Young India on October 17, 1929 had writ ten thus: "I am uncompromising in the matters of women 's rights.
In my opinion she should live under no legal disa bility, no suffering by men, we should treat the daughters and sons on the footing of perfect equality".
Shri Ravindra Nath Tagore, the Noble laureate in his speech in 1913 re printed in "To the Women" at page 18 stated "that women is the champion of man, gifted with equal mental capacity.
She has a right to participate in any minutest activity of men and she has equal right of freedom and liberty with him".
The Constitution of India accords socio economic and political justice, equality of status and of opportunity assuring the dignity of person with stated freedoms.
Article 14 guarantees equality.
In other 733 words frowns upon discrimination on any ground.
Article 15(1) abolishes discrimination and removed disability, liability or restriction on grounds of sex and ensures equality of status.
Arti cle 29(2) gives equal right to education.
In the earliest decision this Court upheld it in State of Madras vs Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, ; Article 16(1) accords equality of opportunity in public service for an appointment or employment to an office or post under the State and prohibits gender discrimination.
Marriage as a disability for appointment to Indian foreign service was declared unconstitutional in C.S. Muthammav.
Union of India & Ors., ; Pregnancy as a disqualification to contin ue in public employment was held to be an affront to equali ty of status, dignity of person and equal opportunity vio lating Articles 14 and 16(1) in Air India vs Nergesh Meerza & Ors., ; It abhors or is loathe to civili ty.
These are few classic illustrations.
Article 15(3) treats women as a class, mitigates the rigour of absolute equality enshrined in article 14 and its species article 15(1) & 16(1) and enjoins the State to make any special provision to remedy past injustice and to advance their status, soeio econmic and political.
Article 21 assures protection of life which includes right to livelihood.
Article 38(1) obligates the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing social order in which socio economic and political justice shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
Subarticle (2) thereof further enjoins the State to minimise the inequalities in income and to eliminate inequalities ,in status by providing facilities and opportunities to all individuals.
Women should have adequate means of livelihood on par with men, article 39(a); should have equal pay for equal work, article 39(d); health and strength of working women are not abused.
Economic necessity is not a sanctuary to abuse her person or she should not be forced to an unsuited avoca tion, article 39(e); State shall provide just and human condi tions of work and maternity relief [article 42].
Article 46 mandates the State to promote with special care the economic and educational conditions of the weaker sections of the people.
It also enjoins to protect them from social injus tice and all forms of exploitation.
To enliven and alongate this constitutional goal to render socioeconomic justice, to relieve Hindu female from degradation, disabilities, disadvantages and restrictions under which Hindu females have been languishing over cen turies and to integrate them in national and international life, Bharat Ratna Dr. Baba Saheb Ambedkar, the first Law Minister and rounding father of the Constitution drafted Hindu Code Bill.
The Hindu, Marriage Act, Adoption and Maintenance Act; Minority and Guardianship Act and Succes sion Act 1956, for short 734 'the Act ' became a part of this package.
They ensue equal status and socio economic justice to Hindu female.
In a socialist democracy governed by rule of law, law as a social engineering should bring about transformation in the social structure.
Whenever a socio economic legislation or the rule or instruments touching the implementation of welfare meas ures arise for consideration, this historical evidence furnishes as the foundation and all other relevant material would be kept at the back of the court 's mind.
Section 14(1) of the Act declares that any property, movable or immovable, possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner irrespective of the time when the acquisition was made, i.e., whether it was before or after the Act.
Undoubtedly as contended by Sri Krishna Murty Iyer, a Hindu male has free dom of testamentary disposition of his property or by con tract and section 14(1) stand an impediment in his way.
Freedom of contract would yield place to public policy envisaged above.
Its effect must be tested on the envil of socio economic justice, equality of status and to oversee whether it would subserve the constitutional animation or frus trates.
article 15(3) relieves from the rigour of article 15(1) and charges the State to make special provision to accord to women socioeconomic equality.
The court would, therefore, endeavour to find whether terms of the disposition or clauses in the instruments, will etc. enumerated in section 14 would permeate the aforestated constitutional conscience to relieve the Hindu female from the Shastric bondage of limit ed estate.
Both sub sections (1) and (2) of section 14 attract the conferment of restricted estate had by a Hindu female under an instrument, i.e. gift, will, decree or order of a Civil Court or an award.
Section 14 and the impugned docu ment must be read harmoniously as an integral scheme.
The disability attached to Hindu female by Shastric Law was removed by statutory provisons in .
Section 14(1) thereof was thought to be a tool to remove disabilities or restrictions imposed by Customary or Shas tric Law on Hindu women.
section 14(1) declares in unequivocal terms that the property whether movable or immovable held by a Hindu female acquired either before or after the Act shall be her absolute property, abolishing the limited estate known to Shastric law.
Hindu women as a class are declared as class I heirs entitling to intestate succession to a 0Hindu Male.
This Court in Pratap Singh vs Union of India, [1985] Suppl.
2 SCR 773 held that section 14 of the Act does not discriminate on grounds of sex and is intra vires of article 15(3).
The preferential treatment accorded, thereby, was held to be not .violative of articles 14 and 15(1).
Sub section (2) of section 14 of the Act attempts to denude the object of sub section (1) and 735 emasculates its efficacy.
It should, therefore, be ' read as an exception or a proviso to sub section (1) of section 14.
The interpretation of the ' proviso or an exception should not be to allow.
to 'eat away the vital veins of full ownership accorded by sub section (1) of section 14 when this Court upheld the validity of section 14(1) on the envil of Art; 15(3)what should be the message thus intended to convey? It would mean that the court would endeavour to give full effect tO legis lative and constitutional vision of socio economic equality to female 'citizen by granting full ownership of property to a Hindu female.
As a fact article 15(3) as a fore runner to common code does animate 'to 'make law to accord socio economic equality to every female citizen of India, irre spective of religion, race cast or region.
In Seth Badri Preasad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, [.1969] 2 SCC :586 in an injunction suit against the respondent, the appellant ,contended that the respondent was given limited estate in a decree passed in an award and that, therefore, section 14(2) applies.
Negating that contention, this court held that sub sec.
(2) of section 14 is more in the nature of a provi so or an exception to sub sec.
It can come into opera tion only if the acquisition is in any of the methods indi cated in sUb sec.
(2).without there being any pre existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property.
I Section 14(1) removes the disability of the woman. 'It was accordingly held that though she came into possession by virtue of decree passed in an award as limited estate, she acquired the absolute ownership under sub sec.
(1) of section 14.
Section 14 was subject of critical consideration in V. Tulasamma vs
V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs.; , and its ratio has become a Tulsidalam to Hindu.
women as locus classicus giving forward thrust.
to constitutional goal according full ownership in the property, movable or immovable,.
held by: her as full owner thereof; redeemed her from the shackles of women estate known to Shastric law.
Fazal Ali, J. undertook extensive survey into sources of Hindu Law and found 'that Hindu widow 's right to maintenance is a personal obligation of the husband and he has a duty to maintain her even if he has no property.
Her right to maintenance would become an eqUitable charge on her hus band 's property though no charge was created by a decree of civil court as "jus ad rem", i.e. right over property though not right to property "jus in rem" and any person who suc ceeds to the property carries with it a legal obligation to maintain the wife from her husband 's estate.
Only .bona fide purchaser for value without notice alone was relieved of this Obligation; The right to maintenance is a pre existing right preceding Hindu Women 's Right to Property and 736 Separate Residence Act, 1946.
Section 14(1) recognises her preexisting right.
Any property acquired by Hindu female by inheritence or device or at a partition or.
in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person Whether relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or,exertion, or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, and also suCh property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act, movable or immovable property shall be held by her as full owner thereto and not as a limited owner.
Subsection (2) thereto shall be construed as an exception or a proviso which cannot be read to ,emascu late the purpose enunciated under sub section (1).
There fore, the property held by her or property given to her at a partition, or under a compromise decree, gift, or in lieu of maintenance .and held by her,on the date when the ACt.came into force, namely, June 17, 1956 shall be her absolute property as full owner.
Bhagwati J. (as he then was) speak ing for himself and Gupta, J. while pointing out the faulty drafting of section 14, held that section 14(1) seeks to do away with the traditional limitation of her power of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent all her es tate.
The words "possessed of" means as the state of owning or having in one 's hand or power which need not be actual or physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female.
It may be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law.
Sub section (1) of section 14cannot be interpreted in a manner which would deprive the Hindu woman of the protection sought to be given to her by sub section (1).
The social purpose of the law would be frus trated and reformist zeal underlying the statutory provison would be chilled.
It was not the intention of the legisla ture in enacting sub section (2) which must be construed as an exception or a proviso to sub section (1).
No provision should be construed in isolation and be read in the context so as to .
make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
Sub section (2) must be read in the context of sub section (1) of section 14 and if so read sub section (2) must be confined to cases where the Hindu female acquires the property for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right to the property under a will or by way of gift.
or in any other instruments or a decree or order of the civil court or an award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property.
Subsection (2) must be read as an exception or proviso to sub section (1) so as to leave aS large a scope for operation as possible to sub section (1) of section 14.
It was, therefore, held that the property given to Tulasmma in a compromise decree in lieu of her maintenance with re stricted estate known as widow 's estate in Hindu law was enlarged and she became an absolute owner under the Act.
She had the right to 737 alienate the property in favour of the others.
An attempt to reopen the ratio was thwarted by this Court in Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs, vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai &.Ors., ; while reaffirming the ratio of Tulasamma 's case as correct law, this Court further held that limited ownership is sine quo non for the applicability of sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act.
When a widow holds a property for her enjoyment, as long as she lives, no body is entitled to deprive her or to deal with the property in any manner, to her detriment.
The property is for the time being beneficially Vested in her and she has the occupation, control and usufruct of it to the exclusion of all others.
SUch relationship to property falls squarely within the meaning of expression of "limited owner" as under section 14(1) of the Act.
In that context approved the dictum of Bhagwati, J. that section 14(1) aimed to achieve a social purpose.
to bring about change "in the social and economic position of women 'in Hindu Society", It was a step to accord equality of sex, elevating women from subservient position in the economic field to higher pedestal with full ownership untrammelled by artificial limitation of Women 's estate created by male dominence to subjugate her. ' .
In Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunithapadam Pillai & Ors., ; this Court held that if, the question arises as to what was the .nature of the widow 's interest in the property and a challenge was made during her life time or after her death, all that has to be shown by the con cerned Hindu female was that she had acquired the property and that She was possessed of the property at the point of time when her title was called into question.
The 'question then was whether she became full owner? In that case the widow as a limited owner sold the property but later on re purchased the self same property and was in possession at the date when the question of holding the property and" ' the nature of the right held by her had arisen.
It was held that she was in possession as limited owner and after the Act she became full owner, and not limited owner of the property.
It was further held that ' the legislative intent is abundantly 'loud and clear.
To erase the injustice .and remove the legal shackles by abolishing the concept of limited estate, or the women 's or widow 's estate once and for all.
To obvi ate hair splitting, the legislature 'has made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property possessed by a Hindu female, it will 'be, Of her absolute ownership and not of limited ownership, notwithstanding the position obtaining under the traditional Hindu law.
In Gulwant Kaur & Anr.
vs Mohinder Singh & Anr., [1987] 3 738 SCR 576 construing a letter written by the husband giving the property for wife 's maintenance, this court laid that section 14 is aimed at removing restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title.
It makes no difference whether the property was acquired ' by inheritance or 'devise, etc.
The right to main tenance is not a grant made for the first time without any pre existing right.
Even if the instruments are silent as to the nature of the interest given to the widow in the proper ty and did not, in so many terms, prescribe that she has a limited interest 'in the property, she would have no more than a limited interest in the property under the Hindu law as it stood 'prior to the ' enactment of the Act.
Hence a provision in the instrument prescribing that she would have only a limited interest in the property, would be merely recording the true legal position and would not attract the applicability of sub sec.
(2), but would be governed by sub sec.
(1) of section 14.
The conclusion was, therefore, held inescapable that where the property is allotted to a widow under an instrument, decree, etc.for her maintenance, sub sec.
(2) of section 14 had no application.
In Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai Thilanayakom Pillai & Anr., [19881 1 SCR 780 under a parti tion deed, limited .
estate in lieu of maintenance was created and this court held that the deed or any other ar rangement by which the husband gives property to his wife for maintenance need not specifically say thatit was given in lieu of maintenance.
The right to maintenance is a per sonal obligation of the husband.
If the wife is put in possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property was given to her in lieu of maintenance attracting section 14(I) and the ' limited ownership ripened into full ownership.
Accordingly it was 'held that section 14(1) attracted to the facts in that case.
In Jaswant Kaur vs MajOr Harpal Singh, under a will executed by the husband the widow was given a life estate which was held to be enlarged into an absolute estate attracting section 14(1),but not section 14(2) as Hindu female acquired property under the instrument.
Her title was trace able to her antecedent over her widow 's estate by gift deed of 1954 to the appellant, one of her daughters.
The widow died in 1968.The appellant filed a suit for injunction, based on gift deed, against the respondent, another Sister claiming exclusive right, title and interest in the property and also pleaded adverse possession.
The respondent filed a cross suit for partition into two shares and claimed half share pleading that their mother was not in possession of 739 property on the date when the Act came into force.
The appellant.
acquired only limited ownership of their mother and on her death as a reversioner of her father she was entitled to partition.
The High Court ultimately upheld the respondent 's contention and held ' that the widow did not acquire absolute estate under section 14(1).
Being a limited owner, what was conveyed by her to the appellant was only a limited estate and the appellant would not get the benefit of full ownership as she herself was not the limited owner under sec.
14(1).
On demise of the .mother as reversioner, the respondent was entitled to file the. suit for partition.
The appellant did not acquire title by adverse possession as she was a co owner and there .was no right.
Therefore, sub sec.
(2) of section 14 would not attract.
Munshi Singh vs Smt.
Sohan Bai (dead)by L.Rs., was a case where limited owner gifted away the property, and was parted with possession and the plea of repurchase was negatived by all the courts.
So this court held that section 14( 1) ' does not apply.
In Pearey Lal vs Ra meshwar Das, [1963] Suppl.
2 SCR 834 in construing a will vis a vis sections 75, 82, 86 of the this Court held that the limited estate is not enlarged into an absolute 'estate.
In Karme vs Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745 the attention of this Court to section 14(1) was not drawn nor had an occasion to angulate in this perspective.
Therefore, the ratio therein is of little assistance to the appellant.
In Kalawatibai vs Soiryabai & Ors., ; the mother of the parties, a Hindu widow gifted adverse posses sion as against the other co owner unless it was so asserted and acquiesced by the respondent.
Therefore, the decree for partition was upheld and the suit for injunction was dis missed.
The ratio therein does not assist the appellant.
Thus I hold that ' the Act revolutionised the status of a 'Hindu female; used section 14(1) as a tool to undo past injus tice to elevate her to equal status with dignity of person on par with man; extinguished pre existing limitation of woman 's estate, or widow 's estate known to Shastric law removed all the fetters to blossom the same into full Owner ship.
The discrimination sufferred by Hindu female under Shastric law was: exterminated by legislative fiat.
The social change thus envisaged must be endeavoured to be given full vigour, thrust and efficacy.
Section 14(1) enlarges the restricted estate into full ownership when the Hindu female has pre existing right to maintenance etc.
Sub sec.
(2) operates when the grant was made for.the first time Under the document with no pre existing right.
Sub sec (2), therefore, must be .
, 740 read as an exception or a proviso to sub sec.
Both the sub sections read with the explanation to be pragmaticably considered as a constituent integral scheme.
The Court would sit in the armed chair of the testator, or its maker and summon to its aid the attending circumstances to execute the instrument; the relationship of the parties and to see whether the Hindu female acquired the property with vestige of pre existing right and the will, gift deed, order, decree or an award of the civil court or in any of the forms ' known to law was executed in recognition thereof or entitled under the existing law.
If the finding is positive her limited estate, though created with restrictive covenants in instru ment or an omission to expressly so mentioned in full par ticulars thereof in the instrument in that regard are of little consequence.
Her limited estate gets blossomed into full ownership under sec.
14(1) with a right to bequeath, gift over, alienation or to deal in any manner.
recognised by law.
If on the other hand the Hindu female acquires for the first time the tittle therein as a grant with restric tive estate under the instrument with no pre existing title or right, sub section (2) of section '14 gets attracted and the restrictive.
covenants.
contained in the instrument would bind her.
She remains to be a limited owner in terms there of.
The subsequent alienee or transferee acquires no higher right thereunder than the legatee etc.
The reversioner to the last male holder is not bound by such transfer and is entitled to succeed the estate, on her demise, in terms of the instrument.
It is too late in the 'day to take retro grade step to reopen Tulasamma 's ratio.
In Civil Appeal No. 630 of 1981 of Thota Madhav Rao, Sri Narsimhalu, his learned counsel contended that Thota Mani kyamma, the respondent, having come into posses 'sion and in enjoyment of the lands bequeathed under a will with a vested reminder in the appellant, her rights are circumscribed.
by the restrictions contained in the 'will and section 14(1) does not apply.
He also contended that by application of section 14(1) to the instruments executed anterior to the Act amounts to giving retrospective operation of section 14(1).
We find no substance in either contention.
It is settled law that a legatee under a testamentary disposition is bound by the restrictive convenants contained therein.
But distinction should be maintained between an ordinary legatee and a legatee/Hindu female coupled with vistage of pre existing title to the property but with a limited estate known to Shastric law as reflected in the impugned deed etc.
Undoubt edly section 14 is not retroactive in its operation.
Devolution of the property under the will would take effect after the demise of the testator and the legatee would be bound by the terms of gift over etc.
The .stranger legatee cannot take shelter under subsequent change of law to enlarge the opera tion of restrictive covenant to claim absolute ownership in the property bequeathed to her.
741 But socio economic amelioration under the Act engulfs an instrument under the sweep of section 14(1) thereof, it extin guishes the pre existing limited estate or restrictive condition and confer absolute and full ownership of the property possessed by a Hindu female as on the date when the Act had come into force, namely, June 17, 1956.
The courts are 'not giving retrospective operation to section 14(1) or to the instrument.
The courts only would be applying the law to the facts round as on the date when the question arose to find whether legatee has pre existing vistage of title under law; and the nature of possession of the property held by her and 'whether the legatee would get the benefit of section 14(1) of the Act.
There need be no express recital even in the will of the enjoyment of the property devised under the will in lieu of maintenance as a limited owner for her life.
Even if so mentioned, it would be a reflection or restate ment of the law existing as in 1932 when the will was exe cuted.
The respondent, admittedly, being a widow of the testator who.
under Shastric law, was obligated to provide maintenance to his wife, and it being personal obligation, the property bequeathed was in lieu of maintenance for her life.
She was in enjoyment of the property and the benefi cial interest therein stood vested in her.
As per existing law as in 1932 the widow as a legatee was entitled to wid ow 's estate and she remained in possession on the date of the Act came into force and was in enjoyment of the income derived therefrom for her life.
No one had a right to inter dict it.
The restrictive covenant, therefore, does not stand an impediment to section 14(1) to have full play to extinguish the same and enlarge the limited estate of widow into an absolute ownership.
The restrictions contained in the will, though falls both under sub sec.
(2) as well as sub sec.
(1), of section 14, the right to maintenance being a pre existing right over property "red ad rem" section 14(1) would apply.
The testamentary succession with a restrictive conditions in the will was obliterated.
She became an absolute owner on or after June 17, 1956.
Accordingly I have no hesitation to hold that, though the will created a restrictive covenant, section 14(2) does not apply.
Section 14(1) enlarged the widow 's limited estate held by Manikyamma into an absolute ownership as full owner with a right to disposition by testamentary instrument or otherwise.
As regards the claim in S.L.P. No. 2113 of 1980 is concerned, admittedly the decree was granted with restrictive covenant to remain in possession of a portion of the house and enjoyment for life and by operation of the ratio in Tulasiamrna 's case the restrictive covenant has enlarged into absolute estate.
The appeal and special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.
V.P.R. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.

summary/full:
Plaintiff 's case was that as the defendant and her husband had no issue they brought up the plaintiff as their foster son from the age of eight years and thereafter the plaintiff continued to live with them and was brought up treating him as their own son.
Defendant 's husband 'died on 14.1.1932 and before his death he executed a will bequeathing the suit properties in favour of his wife, for her life with a vested remainder in favour of the plaintiff.
Both the parties lived together with perfect ' under standing 'but after some time there was misunderstanding and the defendant assumed hostile attitude towards the plaintiff and began to claim the suit property as her absolute proper ty.
The plaintiff claimed absolute right in the suit proper ties after the lifetime of the defendant and challenged the right of the defendant to execute any will in respect of the suit properties.
The defendant took the plea that her husband died issueless and 718 intestate and did not exeCute any will at any time.
Neither she nor her husband brought up the plaintiff as their foster son nor did they educate him.
The defendant had brought up her nephew from his childhood and performed his marriage.
On account of love and affection for him and his children, the defendant executed a registered will on 26.10.69 bequeathing all her properties in his favour.
The Trial Court held the will dated 14.1.1932 proved and decreed the plaintiff 's suit.
The First Appellate Court upheld the Judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
The defendant preferred a second appeal in the High Court.
During the pendency of the Second Appeal in the High Court the plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record.
The High Court allowed the second appeal.
The legal representatives of the plaintiff came to this Court by grant of Special Leave.
S.L.P. (C) No. 438/1979.
Married life between '0 ' and his wife, 'M ' was not happy and cordial. 'o ' executed a registered will dated 21.3.1921 bequeathing all his properties including the suit properties in favour of his mother and sister for their lifetime and thereafter in favour of 'R ' and 'D ' two sons of his sister and their issues.
In the said will reference was made re garding the conduct of 'M ' in deserting him and in any event if she changed her mind and agreed to live under the protec tion of the legatees she was allowed to enjoy the income from item I of the suit properties and that she should construct a house in item referred to in the will and to live there during her lifetime and after her death the said Item I and the house site with the house shall go to his sister 's sons. '0 ' died in 1922 and thereafter the legatees under the will entered into possession of all the properties. 'M ' put obstruction to the legatees in getting possession. 'M ' filed a suit in 1923 praying for a declaration that the will made by her husband was not valid and as such be cancelled and for possession and mesne profits and in the alternative she claimed for maintenance both past and fu ture.
719 In the said suit the parties entered into a compromise and a compromise decree was passed on 5.3.1924.
Uuder the terms of the said compromise the execution of the will was accepted and the same was made subject to the terms of the compromise decree.
Under the compromise decree it was agreed that 'M ' would enjoy items 1 & 2 of the properties mentioned in the will and also 50 cents of land during her lifetime.
She would also have an enjoyment of the house site during her lifetime without any right of aliena tion. 'D ' died unmarried in 1930 but during his lifetime he sold his interest in the properties in favour of 'R ', his brother, who died in 1962.
On his death the petitioners being his sons and daughters claimed to have become.
enti tled for all their father 's properties including the rights in the suit property. 'M ' during her life time executed a settlement deed in favour of the respondents giving absolute rights in the suit properties.
The petitioners filed a suit against M and the respond ents for declaration that the settlement deed executed by 'M ' will not enure beyond the lifetime of 'M '. 'M ' took,the plea that the limited interest given to her under the com promise decree had become enlarged into absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act.
The Trial Court decreed the suit and it was affirmed in first appeal. 'M ' having died, the respondents preferred a second appeal in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the second appeal against which.
the petitioners filed the S.L.P. S.L.P. (C) No. 2113 of 1980 'R 'did not have any issue from 'A ' and 'S ', his wives.
He being attached with the petitioner, executed a will on 2.7.1945 bequeathing his properties in favour of his second wife 'S ' for her lifetime and thereafter, absolutely in favour of the petitioner.
A provision was also made for the payment of Rs.68 and a direction to make available 18 kalams of paddy in favour of 'A ' for her lifetime.
In order to ensure the payment of the maintenance and delivery of paddy a charge was also created over the properties to go ulti mately in favour of the petitioner.
As the petitioner was a minor at that time the second wife was 720 appointed as his guardian. 'R ' died on 8.7.45 and subse quently his first wife 'A ' was awarded 50 kalams of paddy and a sum of Rs.250 in cash per annum by way of maintenance.
On appeal the High Court modified the decree of the Trial Court and enhanced the maintenance to Rs.480 per annum and directed the petitioner, the legatee under the will to give one building for the residence of 'A '.
Thereafter in 1951 'A ' sought the recovery of possession of one of the buildings.
The Executing Court allotted to her the eastern house backyard and the shops, against which the second wife preferred an appeal to the High Court.
A compromise was entered into between the parties in the High Court.
According to the terms of compromise 'A ' was permitted to occupy the eastern house together with the two shops but the backyard portion was not given.
Later on 'S ' was removed from the guardianship of the petitioner, and natural father was appointed as his guardian.
The respondents were brother 's grandsons of 'A ' who died on 2.2.1966, had settled the suit properties in favour of one 'C ' claiming title to the same in pursuance to a compro mise in A.A.O. 567 of 1950. 'R ' another respondent initially took on lease the properties from 'C ' and later on purchased the eastern half of the building and backyard portion.
The petitioner, challenging the transactions on the grounds that 'A ' was given a right of residence only in the building and the same lasted till her lifetime and such right could never be enlarged into an absolute right; that the settlement deed made by her in favour of 'C ' and the sale made by 'C ' in favour of 'R ', a respondent were invalid and no title could be conveyed by 'A ' in their favour, filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits.
The Trial ' Court held that 'A ' was not the absolute owner of the suit properties as contemplated under Section 14(2) of the Act and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal.
On a Letters Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
The plaintiff petitioner has filed the S.L.P. under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
721 Whether, the life estate given to a widow under the will of her Hindu husband beome san absolute estate under the provi sions of the Succession Act was the controversy raised in these cases.
The contention raised was that if a female Hindu acquires any property under a will which gives her a restricted estate in such pro perty then provisions of sub section (2) will override, the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 14 of the Act which makes a female Hindu as full owner.
Dismissing the appeal and the S.L.Ps.
this Court, HELD: PER N.M. KASLIWAL, J. on his behalf and on behalf of K. RAMASWAMY, J. of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception to Sec.
14 and comes into operation only if acqui sition in any of themethods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre existing right in the female Hindu to the property.
If the case falls under the provisions of Sec.
14(1) of the Act then the female Hindu shall he held to he full owner of the property and sub section (2) of Section 14 will only apply where the property is acquired without there being any pre existing right of the female Hindu in such property.
[730D E] 2.
Sub section (2) of Sec.
14 will he construed more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub section
(1) of Sec.
14 of the Act.
This view lends support to the object of the section which was to remove the disability on women imposed by law and to achieve a social purpose by bringing about change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society.
[730E F] Mst.
Karmi vs Arnru and Ors.
, ; Badri Pershad vs
Kanso Devi; , ; V. Tulsamma & Ors.
vs Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs.; , ; Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs.
vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., ; ; ' Jagannath Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., ; ; Gopal Singh & Ant.
vs Dill Ram (dead) by L.Rs.
& Ors.
; , ; Gulwant Kaur and Others vs Mohinder Singh and Others, ; and Jaswant Kaur vs Major Harpal Singh, , referred to.
PER K. RAMASWAMY.
The Act revolutionised the status of a Hindu female; used 722 s.14(1) as a tool to undo past injustice to elevate her to equal status with dignity of person on par with man; extin guished pre existing limitation of woman 's estate, or wid ow 's estate known to Shastric law removed all the fetters to blossom the same into full ownersip.
The discrimination suffered by Hindu female under Shastric law was exterminated by legislative fiat.
The social change thus envisaged must be endeavoured to be given full vigour,thrust and efficacy.
[739F G] 2.
Section 14(1) enlarges the restricted estate into full ownersip when the Hindu female has pre existing right to maintenance etc.
Subsec.
(2) operates When the grant was made for the first time under the document with no pre existing right.
Sub sec.
(2) therefore, must be read as an exception or a proviso to sub sec.
Both the sub sec tions read with the explanation to be pragmaticably consid ered as a constituent integral scheme.
[739G 740A] 3. section 14 is not retroactive in its operation.
Devolution of the property under the will would take effect after the demise of the testator and the legatee would be bound by the terms of gift over etc.
The stranger legatee cannot take shelter under subsequent change of law to enlarge the opera tion of restrictive covenant to claim absolute ownership in the property bequeathed to her.
But socio economic amellora tion under the Act engulfs an instrument under the sweep of section 14(1) thereof, it extinguishes the pre existing limited estate or restrictive condition and confer absolute and full ownership of the property possessed by a Hindu female as on the date when the Act had come into force, namely, June 17, 1956.
The courts are not giving retrospective operation to section 14(1) or to the instrument.
The courts only would be applying the law to the facts found as on the date when the question arose to find whether legatee has pre existing vistage of title under law; and the nature of possession of the property held by her and whether the legatee would get the benefit of section 14(1) of the Act.
There need be no express recital even in the will of the enjoyment of the property devised under the will in lieu.
or maintenance ass limited owner for her life.
Even if 'so mentioned, it would be a reflection or restatment of the law existing as in 1932 when the will was executed.
[740G 741C] 4.
A legatee under a testamentary disposition is bound by the restrictive covenants contained therein.
But distinc tion should be maintained between an ordinary legatee and a legatee/Hindu female coupled with vistage of pre existing title to the property but with a limited estate known to Shastric law.
[740F G] 723 5.
As per existing law as in 1932 the widow as a legatee was entitled to widow 's estate and she remained in posses sion of the date of the Act came into force and was in enjoyment of the income derived therefrom for her life.
No one had a right to interdict it.
The restrictive covenant, therefore, does not stand an impediment to section 14(1) to have full play to extinguish the same and enlarge the limited estate of widow into an absolute ownership.
[741D E] 6.
The restrictions contained in the will, though fails both under sub sec.
(2) as well as sub sec.
(1) of section 14, the right to maintenance being a pre existing right over property "res ad rem" section 14(1) would apply ' The testamentary succession with a restrictive conditon in the will was obliterated.
She became absolute owner on or after June 17, 1956.
[ 741E F] Sir Main Henry: Earlier History of Institutions, at P. 339; E.S. Shivaswamy lyer: Revolution of Hindu Women, [1935] Edn.
P. 64; Manu Smriti, Chapter III verses 55 57, Chapter IX verses 18, 149, 45, 416, 299, Chapter XI verse 67; Mahat ma Gandhiji 'S (article) Young India, dated October 17.
1929; Ravindra Nath Tagore, (his speech in 1913 reprinted in) To the women, P. 18.
The Position of Woman in Hindu civilisa tion, 1955 Edn.
By Altaken, referred to.
State of Madras vs Srimati Charnpakam Doraira/an, ; ; C.B. Muthatmma vs Union of India & Ors., ; ; Air India vs Nergesh Meerza & Ors., ; ; Pratap Singh vs Union of India, |19851 Suppl.
2 SCR 773; Seth Badri Prasad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, ; V. Tulasamma vs Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs.; , ; Bai Vajia (dead) by L.Rs.
vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., ; ; Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunithapadam Pillai & Ors., ; ; Gulwant Kaur & Anr.
vs Mohinder Singh & Anr., ; ; Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillal Thillanayakom Pillai & Anr., ; Jaswant Kaur vs Major Harpal Singh, ; Munshi Singh vs Smt.
Sohan Bai (dead) by L.Rs., '[1989] 2 SCR 1012; Pearey Lal vs Rameshwar Das, [1963] Suppl.
2 SCR 834; Karmi vs Amru, AIR 1971 SC 745 and Kalawatibai vs Soiryabai & Ors.
, ; , referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3237 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.1990 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 3204 of 1990.
Soli J. Sorabjee, S.V. Deshpande and C.L. Sahu, Advs.
for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, and S.K. Sinha for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
Leave is granted.
Respondent No. 6, Jupiter Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited, was formed in 1979 for providing houses to its 130 members including the appellant Prem Jeer Kumar.
The appellant was earlier the Secretary and then the President of the Society till 1985, by which time substantial con struction had been completed.
The members were allotted three room flat for a sum of Rs. 1, 10,000.
In August, 1985, Respondent No. 3, Registrar, Delhi Cooperative Societies, appointed 784 an Administrator to look into the affairs of the Society since the appel.
lant and other office bearers had held the office for more than two terms.
The controversy giving rise to this proceeding relates to the alleged discrepancy re garding purchase of some building material in January, 1984, for the construction of flats for members of the Society in Vikas Puri at New Delhi.
The New Managing Committee of the Society formed in September, 1986, complained to the Regis trar, COoperative Societies alleging irregularities by the previous Managing Committee of which the appellant was the President.
This matter was referred to arbitration by order dated 12.10.1989 passed by the Joint Registrar (Arbitration) Cooperative Societies, Delhi Administration.
Respondent No, 1, Surender Gandotra was appointed the Arbitrator, who gave his AWard on 1.5. 1990.
The relevant portion of the Award is as under: "It is also interesting to discuss the conduct of these two respondents of this case, Shri Poonam Dhand and Shri P.J. Kumar as they have been moving applications after applications in this court raising vicious and frivolous grounds just to delay the delivery of justice in this case.
The miscellaneous applications relating to the dispute of juris diction of this court and then that since criminal proceedings are pending with the Delhi Police, proceedings in this Court should be kept pending till final decision in the criminal proceedings.
All these applications were properly attended, scrutinized and dis posed of legally.
It is also interesting that despite number of chances/opportunities having been given to the respondent to file reply to the main points of the claimant society, the defendants S/Shri Poonam Dhand and Shri P.J. Kumar did not file any reply and followed delaying and dilatory tactics and to defeat the ends of justice.
Even today 30th April, 1990, fixed for hearing none came from the side of S/Shir Poonam Dhand, P.J. Kumar either presonally or through Advocate.
The advocate of the claimant society Shri Tomar argued that ex parte proceedings may be initiated against the respondents who have absented from these proceedings.
In view of these cricumstances, and the conduct of 'respondents in this case 0right from the very inception of this case, there is no other alternative left for me but to proceed ex parte against the respondents S/Shri Poonam Dhand and P.J. Kumar.
Ex parte award is announced with the following details; .
785 Principal amount to be paid by the respon dents to the Jupiter Cooperative Societies Limited, Vikas Puri, New Delhi.
Rs 1,46,2 10.20 Interest at the rate of 18% from 17.4.1985 till all the dues are cleared by the respond ents.
Cost allowed Rs.5,000.00 With the above observations, ex parte award is given against the respondents S/Shri Poonam Dhand, P.3, Kumar who are jointly and severally responsible to pay the Jupiter Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited, Vikas Puri, New Delhi, principal amount of Rs. 1,46,210.00 NPS plus 18% interest from 17.4.1985 till all the dues are cleared and costs of Rs.5,000.
" , The appellant then filed an appeal under section 76 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Delhi Act ') in the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal (Respondent No. 2) challenging the Award dated 1.5.1990.
The Tribunal held that the Arbitrator 's act of proceeding ex parte against the appellant is justified and taking the view that the appeal had no merit, dismissed the same.
The appellant then filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the Award and dismissal of his appeal by the Tribunal on 3.7.1990.
The said writ petition has been dismissed by the High Court on 10.10.1990.
It is in these circumstances that the appellant assails the Award, dismiss al of the appeal and then the .writ petition.
The argument of Shri Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant, is that it is section 59 and not section 60 of the Delhi Act which applies to the present case.
In reply, Dr. Chitale on behalf of the contesting respondents contended that section 60 relating to arbitration and not section 59 pertaining to surcharge applies to the present case.
Sections59 and 60 of the Delhi Act, insofar as relevant, are quoted hereinbelow: "59.
Surcharge (1) If in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the wind ing up of a cooperative society, it is found that any person, who is or was entrusted with the organisation or management of such society or who is or has at any time been an officer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to this Act, the rules or the bye laWs or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust or wilful negligence or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money 786 or other property belonging to such society, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him, by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire 'into the conduct of such person; Provided that no such inquiry shall be held after the expiry of six years from the date of any act or omission referred to in this sub section.
(2) Where an inquiry is made under sub section (1), the Registrar may, after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard, make an order, requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate, or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent, as the Registrar may consider just and equitable." "60.
Disputes which may be referred to arbitration(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitu tion, management or the business of a coopera tive society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid employee of the society arises (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its com mittee or any officer, agent or employee of the society or liquidator, past or present, or (c) between the society or its commit tee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society, or (d) between the society and any other cooperative society, between a society and liquidator of another society 787 or between the liquidator of another society.
such disputes shall be referred to the Regis trar for decisior and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit other proceedings in re spect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub section (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputed touching the constitution management or the business of a cooperative society namely (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal rep resentatives of a deceased member, whether such debt of demand is admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recov ered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the princi pal debtor as a result Of the default of the principal debtor, whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; (c) any dispute arising in connection with the elec tion of any officer of a society other than a society mentioned in sub section (1) of section 31.
(3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is or is not a dispute touching the consitution, management or the business of cooperative society, the decision thereon of the Registra shall be final and shall not be called in question in an court.
i (4) . . . ." In substance the contention of the learned counsel for the appeal lant is that the proper action to take in such a case is to resort to section 59 dealing with surcharge and not to settlement of dispute by arbitration since it is not one of the disputes which may be referred to arbitration in terms of section 60 of the Delhi Act.
It was argued that sub section (2) of section 60 is exhaustive and not merely illustrative, which shows that the present dispute does not fall within the ambit 0 section 60.
Dr. Chitale, on the other hand, asserted that it is sub 788 section (1) of section 60 which indicates the true scope of section 60 while sub section (2) is merely illustrative and no exhaustive.
It was urged that clause (c) of sub section (1) of section 60 expressly provides that if any dispute touching the constitution, ' management or the business of the cooperative society arises between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee or any past officer of the society, the dispute shall be refered to arbitration.
Reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on Chander Nagar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and Anr.
vs Ashok Ohri, A. 1.
R. 1976 63 Delhi 299 wherein the learned Single Judge took the view that sub section (2) of section 60 of the Delhi Act is exhaustive and not merely illustra tive.
That decision overlooks the decision of this Court in Srirakulu referred hereafter and conflicts with it.
Further consideration of the same is, therefore, not necessary.
Dr. Chitale placed reliance in Pentakota Srirakulu vs The Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd.; , to contend that this point was concluded against the appellant.
In our opinion, the contention of Dr. Chitale has to be accepted.
The decision of this Court in Srirakulu was ren dered 'with reference to the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Madras Act ') wherein section 51 relating to settlement of disputes by arbitration was the provision corresponding to section 60 of the Delhi Act Clause (c) of sub section (L) of section 51 of the Madras Act was substantially the same as clause (c) of sub section (1)of section 60 of the Delhi Act.
The explana tion in sub section (1) of section 51 of the Madras Act was substantially similar to clause (a)of sub section (2) of section 60 of the Delhi Act.
The material part of section 51 of the Madras Act, on the basis of which the decision was endered in Srirakulu quoted therein is as under " section 51 Arbitration: Disputes: 51.
(1) If any dispute touching the business of a registered society (other than a dispute regarding disciplinary action taken by the society or its committee against a paid servant of the society) arises (a) . . . . . . . (b) . . . . . . 789 (c) between the society or its com mittee and any past committee, any officer, agent or servant, or any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant, of the society, or (d) . . . . . .
Explanation A claim by a registered society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not, is a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of this sub sec tion.
" In the Madras Act, section 49 was the provision correspond ing to section 59 of the Delhi Act.
It was, therefore, on the basis of similar corresponding provisions that the question arose for decision of this Court in Srirakulu.
In Srirakulu also the facts disclosed in the inquiry that certain loss was caused to the society by the acts of past Managing Committee and, therefore, a special officer ap pointed to look into the affairs of the society made a claim under section 51 of the Madras Act before the Registrar against the past President of the Society: It was held that the Registrar 's order under section 51 of the Madras Act could not be challenged.
We do not find any significant difference between the provisions of the Madras Act which form the basis .of this Court 's decision in Srirakulu and sections 59 and 60 of the Delhi Act with which we are con cerned to justify taking a different view as suggested by learned.
counsel for the appellant.
Following the view taken in Srirakulu, this appeal must fail.
Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.5,000.
N.P.V. Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
On a complaint made by the Managing Committee of the 6th respondent Cooperative Housing Society, the third respond ent, Registrar, Cooperative Societies, referred the dispute relating to irregularities in the purchase of building material for construction of flats for members of society by the past Managing Committee, of which the appellant was the President at the relevant time, to arbitration.
The first respondent Arbitrator, gave his ex parte award, on the failure of the appellant and another person to file their reply to the claim of the claimant society, and directed the appellant and the other person to pay the society certain sum with interest thereon.
The appellant challenged the award before second re spondent, the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal, which dismissed the same holding that the Arbitrator 's act of proceeding ex parte was justified and that the appeal had no merit.
The appellant 's writ petition was also dismissed by the High Court.
In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appel lant it was contended that it was Sec.
59 dealing with surchage which was applicable to the instant case and not Section 60, which pertained to settlement of disputes by arbitration since the dispute in question was one which could not be referred to arbitration in terms of Section 60 of the Act.
On behalf of the contesting respondents it was submitted that it was Section 60, which was applicable and not Section 59.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 Sub Section (1) of Section 60 of the Delhi Co operative 783 Societies Act, 1972 indicates the true scope of the Section 60, while sub section (2) is merely illustrative, and not exhaustive.
Clause (c) of sub section (1) expressly provides that if any dispute touching the constitution/management or the business of the cooperative society arises between the society or its committee and any past committee.
any offi cer, agent or employee or any past officer of the society, the dispute should be referred to the arbitration.
[787H, 788A B, D] 1.2 In the instant case, the dispute, viz. irregulari ties in the purchase of building material for construction of flats for the members of the Society by the previous Managing Committee, touches the management of the Society and fails within the ambit of Section 60 of the Act.
The third respondent, Registrar, Cooperative, Societies was, therefore, right in referring the dispute to arbitration.
[789D F] Pentakota Srirakulu vs The Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. ; , followed.
Change Nagar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and Anr.
Ashok Ohri, AIR 1976 63 Delhi 239, disapproved.


judgement:
Appeal No. 191 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 31, 1953, of the Calcutta High Court in First Appeal No. 88 of 1950, arising out of the judgment and decree dated May 18, 1950, of the Arbitrator, 24 Parganas, Alipore, in L. A. Case No. 71 of 1944.
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
B.Sen, P. K. Ghose for P. K. Bose, for the respondent.
December 16.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J.
This is an appeal pursuant to special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta varying the order of the arbitrator in regard to compensation for compulsory requisitioning of the premises in dispute.
The appellant before us is the owner of the premises in dispute which at the relevant time consisted of four storeys, the ground floor and three upper floors and the respondent is the State of West Bengal which was the opposite party before the arbitrator.
This building (No. 9 Chittaranjan Avenue) was constructed before July 28, 1940, and was taken on a registered lease for three years by the Bengal Central Public Works Division on a rental of Rs. 1,950 per mensem inclusive of taxes.
On the termination of the lease the building was requisitioned by the West Bengal Government and taken possession of on July 30, 1943.
The Land 924 Acquisition Officer offered Rs. 2,200 per mensem inclusive of taxes in the form of rent as compensation.
As the appellant did not agree to this compensation the matter was referred under section 19 of the Defence of India Act to an arbitrator Mr. J. De.
He held that Rs. 2,200 per mensem fixed by the Land Acquisition Collector was a fair compensation.
Against this order the appellant took an appeal to the High Court who set aside the order of the arbitrator, remanded the case to the arbitrator and laid down the following principle for the ascertainment of compensation : " therefore, in deciding upon a fair rent, for the purpose of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, it must be a notional fair rent of a hypothetical tenant, and the assessment of such notional fair rent must be based upon a consideration which does not take into account restrictions temporarily imposed by any restrictive executive order or legislation like Rent Control Order, etc.
The assessment in practice should be as if it was of a house of like nature let out for the first time to a tenant who is not compelled to let it out.
The practical method will be to assess rent as if it was a new house for the first time let out on that date ".
On remand the appellant who had previously claimed Rs. 3,998 as compensation plus Rs. 125 for working and maintaining the lift, increased his demand to Rs. 7,700 per mensem exclusive of municipal taxes, and also Rs. 125 for the use of the lift.
He stated in his application that the amount previously claimed by him " was unduly low and was made through mistake and miscalculation and misconception of things and principle and moreover it was due to the want of proper information at the time ".
After the remand he examined further evidence and the respondent also examined some witnesses.
The new arbitrator Mr. J. C. Mazumdar held that the matter must be decided according to the rent prevailing in the locality in 1943 for similar buildings with similar accommodation and amenities and proceeding on this basis he awarded compensation of Rs. 2,581 8 per mensem inclusive of all taxes, cost of normal and essential 925 repair, cost of the upkeep of the lift and potential value of the building in an important commercial locality having regard to the fact that the period of requisition was indefinite.
This sum was to be paid as from August 1, 1943.
This order did not satisfy the appellant and against it he took an appeal to the High Court who fixed the compensation at Rs. 16 per hundred sq.
for the ground floor and Rs. 13 per hundred sq.
for the 1st floor and Rs. 12 per hundred sq.
for the second floor and Rs. 11 per hundred sq.
for the third floor and thus calculating for the total floor area i.e. 5333 sq.
per floor it held the compensation to be Rs. 2,773 per mensem.
It rejected the additional award of 10% on account of potential value but allowed Rs. 77 per mensem on account of the lift and thus it awarded a total compensation of Rs. 2,850 per mensem.
The High Court however observed : " We must make it clear further that in making the above calculation of the monthly compensation at, Rs. 2,850 we have also taken into consideration the additional advantages due to the special adaptability of the disputed premises for the purposes of the Controller of the Army Factory Accounts and his possible willingness to pay a somewhat higher rent for the same (Vide 66 I.A. 104) ".
Against this judgment the appellant has brought this appeal by special leave.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the method adopted by the High Court for arriving at the figure of compensation was erroneous because it proceeded on wrong principles in that it took averages of rent paid for the premises No. 5 Chittaranjan Avenue and for No. 22 Chittaranjan Avenue and ignored the expert opinion of witness U. P. Malik according to which the rent for ground floor should have been Rs. 23 per hundred sq.
and Rs. 17 8 per hundred sq.
for other floors and also that the potentialities of the building had not been taken into consideration.
The High Court found that premises No. 22 Chittaranjan Avenue was a little better than the premises 926 in dispute and they (premises in dispute) were " somewhat better than the premises No. 5 Chittaranjan Avenue ".
In these circumstances it cannot be said that the High Court committed any error of principle in taking an average of the two premises No. 22 and 5 Chittaranjan Avenue.
The evidence of U. P. Malik was merely an opinion unsupported by any reasons and in the circumstances of this base the High Court has rightly not placed any reliance upon it.
It was then urged that the High Court had erred in taking into consideration the rent payable for the premises No. 22 Chittaranjan Avenue, as recitals with regard to premises No. 22 in exhibit D, which was an award for premises No. 31 were inadmissible in evidence.
This document has not been printed and we do not know what its contents are or its language is.
No objection was taken to its admissibility either before the arbitrator or before the High Court.
It was referred to in the evidence of the witness for the respondent, Nanibhushan Sen Gupta who stated that Rs. 2,200 would be a fair rent for the premises and in coming to this conculsion he based his calculation it on the award in L. A. Case No. 61 of 1944 in respect of premises Nos. 22 and 31 Chittaranjan Avenue and exhibit D was the judgment of that case ".
In these circumstances no objection as to the admissibility of this document can be allowed to be raised at this stage.
It was then argued that the High Court in arriving at the amount of compensation had ignored the potential value of the premises in dispute in an important commercial locality which the arbitrator Mr. J. C. Mazumdar had evaluated at 10% of the amount determined by him.
This contention is well founded.
The High Court disallowed this award of 10% without assigning any reason.
It said: " and although we are not wholly accepting his additional award of 10% on account of so called potentialities, etc., including the lift, we 'are inclined to assess this further compensation on account of the lift at Rs. 77 per month 927 The principles on which compensation is to be ascertained under the provisions of section 19 of the Defence of India Act are the same as those given in section 23(1) of ' the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and one of the principles of ascertaining compensation is to evaluate the potentialities of the land or the premises as the case may be which differ under different circumstances.
; The arbitrator in evaluating the potentialities said: " In 1943, when the building was first requisitioned, the Controller of Army Factory Accounts had already his office in the neighbouring house of 5 Chittaranjan Avenue.
This building had, therefore, a special value to the Controller as it would certainly be more advantageous to him if he could locate his office in the premises in question.
This gave greater bargaining power to the landlord and, therefore, the potential value to him was greater.
It has also been conceded that the requisition is for an indefinite period.
The Municipal assessment valuation (exhibit B series) was based purely upon the rental which the building was fetching prior to 1943 and did not take into account the potential value, the value which will be maintained for a long period of lease and the additional burden on the lift.
For all these three factors, I allow an additional 10 p. c. compensation of Rs. 234 12 As per mensem.
" The value of potentialities is to be ascertained by the arbitrator as best as he can from the materials before him.
In Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs The Revenue Divisional Officer (1), Lord Romer said: " The truth of the matter is that the value of the potentiality must be ascertained by the arbitrator on such materials as are available to him and without indulging in feats of the imagination.
" Another objection taken was in regard to compensation for the lift.
The High Court awarded Rs. 77 but on what basis it is not clear.
In our opinion this claim of Rs. 125 per mensem was not excessive considering that two departments of the Government were using this lift, which is clear from the fact that an overhead bridge had been constructed for going from (1)(1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 104, 118.
928 premises No. 9 Chittaranjan Avenue to the other building which the Government had also requisitioned.
This will work out to Rs. 3,175.
In the circumstances Rs. 3,200 per mensem would be a fair compensation and we would therefore enhance the compensation to that figure and the appeal would be allowed to that extent.
Although the appellant has not succeeded in getting the whole of his claim decreed, there is no reason for depriving him of his costs proportionate to his success.
We accordingly allow proportionate costs.
Appeal partly allowed.

summary/full:
The four storied premises in suit belonging to the appellant were requisitioned by the respondent for the purposes of the Controller of Army Factory Accounts who already had his office in a neighbouring house.
The arbitrator, to whom the question of compensation was referred, awarded compensation of Rs. 2,581, 8 0 according to the rent prevailing in the locality for similar buildings with similar accommodation and amenities.
This included an additional award of 10%` for the potentialities of the premises consisting of the special value of the premises for the Controller, the indefinite period of the requisition and additional burden on the lift.
On appeal by the appellant the 923 High Court held the compensation to be Rs. 2,773/ per mensem.
It rejected the additional award of 10% for potential value.
Held, that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the poten tial value of the premises which had been evaluated at 10% by the arbitrator.
The principles for the award of compensation are the same under section 19 Defence of India Act as under section 23 Land Acquisition Act, and one of them is to evaluate the potentialities of the premises which differ under different circumstances.
Such value is to be ascertained by the arbitrator as best as he can from the materials before him.
Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs The Revenue Divisional Officer, (1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 104, followed.