judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 477 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 880 of 1976.
WITH Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.
1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl.
A. No. 670 of 1976.
S.K. Bisaria and J.K. Nayyar for the Appellant in Crl.
Appeal No. 477 of 1978.
R.C. Kohli and R.S. Suri for the Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 1989.
S.K. Mehta, Dhuru Mehta and Atul Handa for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by: NATARAJAN, J.
Appeal No. 477 of 1978 by Special Leave and Appeal No. 288 of 1989 by Special Leave arising out of Special Leave (Crl.) Petition No. 250 of 1980 are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 670 of 1976 616 whereunder a learned single Judge of the High Court had set aside the conviction of respondent Prem Chand and acquitted him of the charge under Section 306 I.P.C.
The former appeal has been filed by the father of the deceased Veena Rani while the latter appeal has been filed by the State of Punjab.
The facts of the case are in brief as under: Deceased Veena Rani who died of burn injuries on 15.9.
1975 was married to the respondent Prem Chand (hereinafter referred to as accused) in the year 1973.
Veena Rani, who had passed the M.A. and B .Ed.
degree examinations was employed in the State Bank of Patiala and was earning about Rs. 600 to 700 per month.
The accused, who had obtained a degree in law was a prosecuting Sub Inspector and soon after marriage he resigned his job and set up practice in his native place Sangrur.
When the accused resigned his job and set up practice in Sangrut, Veena Rani obtained a transfer to Sangrur from Patiala and the couple set up house in a building owned by PW 5 Krishan Dutt.
From the very beginning Veena Rani had an unhappy married life because of the ac cused constantly demanding her to get more money from her parent 's house.
Even though the accused had joined the office of a senior advocate by name Shri O.P. Singhal, his earnings were meager and consequently the house hold ex penses were borne by her from out of her salary.
Besides tormenting Veena Rani to get more money from her parents, the accused was also given to beating her frequently.
Veena Rani complained to her parents, brother and brother in law about the cruel treatment meted out to her by the accused.
PW 4 Shanti Devi and PW 14 Khem Chand, the mother and broth er respectively of Veena Rani and PW 17 Kuldip Rai, her brother in law have deposed about Veena Rani telling them about the accused iII treating her and physically assaulting her.
Apart from them, PW 5 Krishan Dutt, the landlord has also testified that the accused was in the habit of beating Veena Rani and that on hearing her cries he used to inter vene and advise the accused to stop beating her.
Since the accused did not mend his ways and continued his beatings of Veena Rani.
PW 5 Krishan Dutt asked the accused to vacate his house.
Veena Rani conceived and gave birth to a male child.
But even after the child birth, the accused did not stop iII treating her.
Unable to bear the iII treatment, Veena Rani took leave on loss of pay and went away to her parent 's house at Patiala.
The separation had no effect on the ac cused and hence Veena Rani filed an application under Sec tion 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court at Patiala for restitution of conjugal rights.
As a counter move, the accused also filed a 617 similar petition in the Court at Sangrur.
However, the enquiry of that petition was stayed by the Senior Sub Judge, Sangfur till the disposal of the earlier petition filed by Veena Rani at Patiala.
At that stage of matters, Shri O.P. Singhal, who was acting as the counsel for the accused and PW 9 Shri Hari Om, another advocate at Sangrut who was appearing for Veena Rani brought about a compromise between the parties and in terms thereof Veena Rani came back to Sangrur to live with the accused.
The re union, however, took place only after the accused 's counsel Shri O.P. Sing hal had personally assured that their would be no danger to Veena Rani 's life at the hands of the accused.
This time, the parties set up residence in a house belonging to PW 12 Nathu Ram.
Nothing changed, however because the accused started tormenting Veena Rani almost from the day of re union for money and continued beating her.
PW 12 Nathu Ram was a witness to the accused quarrel ling with Veena Rani and beating her.
The immediate provoca tion for the accused stepping up his iII treatment of Veena Rani was his purchase of a scooter for Rs.3,500 from one A.N. Jindal.
The accused was able to obtain only Rs.2,500 from his father for buying the scooter and for the balance amount of Rs. 1,000 he asked Veena Rani to get tile same from her parents.
Veena Rani had no funds of her own because she had been on leave on loss of pay for several months and had joined duty at the Bank only on 13.8.1975.
She was in a fix and therefore she wrote a letter on 10.9.75 to her brother PW 14 Khem Chand as under: "Dear brother, the day I came here he is asking for Rs. one thousand from the same day to repay the loan of the scooter.
He does not pay any expenses which are required by me.
Because I will receive my pay only on 26th September and all things are as they were before.
" Again just one day before her death i.e. 14.9.1975, she wrote to her mother PW 4 Shanti Devi a pathetic letter as follows: "Yesterday I was to come to see Saroj in the evening but there is a quarrel in the house.
I have no money, if I have any require ment I must fulfil myself, otherwise no alter native than to go on weeping and crying.
Because he is saying that I am to repay the loan of Rs. 1,000 and I am to pay Rs. 100 for the house rent.
Dear mother, you know it very well that I have not received my pay.
It is therefore I am unable to pay anything for the household expenses.
It is therefore, I am in a very bad condition at my house.
I do not understand what to do.
Whenever I talk to go to any 618 place, the same day there is an uproar in the house and he does not turn up till 12.00 in the night and unhealthy atmosphere develops in the house.
Dear mother, please send me Rs. 1,000 immediately through Bhupinder.
Dear mother, I am very sad on this account and unhappy.
The whole day I remain weaping.
Manish (the child) is alright.
You do not worry but please send me Rs. 1,000 immediate ly.
" In spite of Veena Rani, writing to her brother and mother for a sum of Rs. 1,000 being sent immediately, the accused did not relent in his insistence for immediate compliance of his demand.
This led to a quarrel between the husband and wife on the 15th morning and thereupon both of them went to the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om at 6.30 a.m. itself.
After PW 9 Shri Hari Om woke up, he made enquiries and Veena Rani told him that the accused was "demanding money from her and annoying her on that account" in spite of her telling him that she had written letters to her brother and mother.
He advised the accused not to torment Veena Rani for money but in spite of it the accused said he wanted immediate payment of the sum of Rs. 1,000.
The accused went to the extent of saying that Veena Rani can go to hell but he should get his sum of Rs. 1,000 forthwith.
Veena Rani reacted by saying that because of the accused quarrelling with her every day over the payment of money, she preferred death to life in this world.
The accused, far from express ing regret for his conduct, drove her to despair by further saying that she can provide him relief quicker by dying on the very same day and that she need not postpone her death to the next day.
PW 9 Shri Hari Om then sent the parties home saying that the matter can be talked over in the evening.
After things had gone to such a pitch the accused and Veena Rani left the house of PW 9 Hari Om at about 9.00 a.m. and went back to their house.
After leaving Veena Rani in the house, the accused went to the Court.
At about 10.15 a.m. PW 12 Nathu Ram was informed by one Keemat Rai, advo cate that shrieks were heard coming from the house occupied by the accused and .Veena Rani.
Both of them rushed to the house and saw Veena Rani lying on the ground with extensive burn injuries on her body.
At once PW 12 Nathu Ram rushed on his bicycle to the Court and informed the accused and 11 D.K. Jindal, about Veena Rani having sustained burn injuries Thereupon all of them came to the house and the accused with the help of PW 11 D.K. Jindal removed Veena Rani to the Civil Hospital at Sangrut.
FW 9 Hari Om on coming to know of Veena Rani having 619 sustained burn injuries, had information sent to PW 17 Kuldip Rai and also made arrangements for a phone message being given to the parents of Veena Rani at Patiala.
There after he went to the hospital but by then Veena Rani had died.
Veena Rani was seen by Dr. B.R. Dular at the hospital at 10.45 a.m. and the doctor found her to have sustained severe burns and to be in a state of shock.
Veena Rani who was given treatment by PW 19 Dr. J.K. Sharma told him that she had been tortured at home and that she wanted to die as early as possible.
At 11.30 a.m. Veena Rani died.
At the autopsy, it was noticed that she had sustained 19 burn injuries.
Her death was certified to be due to shock result ing from the burn injuries.
On receipt of an intimation from the hospital entries were made in the general diary and subsequently a case was registered on the basis of representations made to PW 18, the Deputy Superintendent of Police by PW 16 Kuldip Rai and another relation.
Investigation of the case resulted in a chargesheet being laid against the accused under Section 306 I.P.C.
In his statement under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. the accused denied having iII treated Veena Rani but admitted that he had asked her to give him a sum of Rs. 1,000 for payment of the balance money for the scooter purchased by him.
He however stated that he had offered to repay the amount as soon as he received his G.P.F., amount.
He denied having told Veena Rani at the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om that she may go to hell and that she can put at an end to her life the same day without waiting for the morrow.
He has also stated that Veena Rani was of an irritable nature and would get agitated for no reason whatever.
Lastly, he has stated that on coming to know of her having sustained burn in juries, he had rushed home and taken her to the hospital to save her life but unfortunately she could not be saved.
After a detailed consideration of the prosecution evi dence and the statement of the accused, the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur, found the accused guilty under Section 306 I.P.C. and sentenced him undergo R.I. for four years.
The learned Addl.
Sessions Judge held that the ac cused had been tormenting and also physically assaulting Veena Rani and that Veena Rani had committed suicide by reason of the accused 's instigation.
The accused preferred an appeal to the High Court and a learned 620 single judge of the High Court has acquitted the accused holding that even though Veena Rani had committed suicide on account of her unhappy married life "there is nothing on the record to show that the appellant in any manner instigated the deceased to commit suicide.
" Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the father of Veena ' Rani and the State have preferred the two appeals under consideration.
Shri R.S. Suri, learned counsel for the State and Mr. S.K. Bisaria, learned counsel for the father of Veena Rani took us through the evidence in the case and the judgments of the Addl.
Sessions Judge and the High Court and argued that the High Court has completely erred in its appreciation of the evidence and in its application of the law and there fore the appeals should be allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused should be restored.
Shri S.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the accused contended that even if the prosecution evidence is accepted in full, there is no material to show that the suicidal death of Veena Rani was abetted in any manner by the accused and hence the judgment of the High Court does not call for any interfer ence.
We have considered the evidence and the arguments of the counsel in great detail.
The evidence brings out with tell ing effect the distressed life that Veena Rani was leading almost from the day of her marriage with the accused.
Since the accused had resigned his job and set up practice as an advocate at Sangrur, she got herself transferred from Patia la to a branch of the Bank at Sangrur.
The parties lived as tenants in a portion of the house of PW 5 Krishan Dutt and Veena Rani was meeting the household expenses from out of her salary because the accused had no income as a lawyer.
In spite of Veena Rani spending her entire salary on the house hold, the accused was constantly demanding her for money and made her life miserable by frequently beating her.
These matters have been spoken to by PW 4 Shanti Devi, PW 14 Khem Chand and PW 17 Kuldip Rai.
Besides them, independent wit nesses viz.
PW 5 Krishan Dutt, PW 9 Shri Hari Om and PW 12 Nathu Ram have also spoken about the iII treatment of Veena Rani and their evidence has gone unchallenged.
There is thus overwhelming evidence in the case to establish that Veena Rani 's life was made intolerable by the accused by constant ly demanding her to get him money and also beating her frequently.
Before considering the question whether the accused had abetted Veena Rani in her committing suicide, we must point out that 621 Veena Rani 's death was undoubtedly due to suicide and not due to any accident or homicide.
When Veena Rani had set fire to herself no one else except her one and half year old son was in the house.
Hearing her shouts PW 12 Nathu Ram and Keemet Rai rushed to the house and found her lying on the ground with burn injuries.
The accused was at once informed in the court and he removed her to the hospital along with others.
Despite treatment, she succumbed to her injuries by about 11.30 a.m.
The autopsy revealed that her death was due to severe shock resulting from the burn injuries sustained by her.
In such circumstance, the suicidal death of Veena Rani is an incontrovertible factor.
The crucial question for consideration is whether Veena Rani put an end to her life of her own will and volition or whether her committing suicide had been abetted in any manner by the accused.
To determine this question, we must see the plight of Veena Rani during the few days preceding her death and the events which had taken place on the morning of 15.9.75 itself.
It is an admitted fact that the accused was wanting a sum of Rs. 1,000 for paying the balance of sale price for the scooter purchased by him and that he was demanding Veena Rani to get him the amount from her parents.
The accused has himself admitted in his statement under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. this fact but has stated that he wanted it only as a loan and not as a gift.
Besides the letter, (annexure 3) written by Veena Rani to her brother and mother respectively throw considerable light on the matter.
In the letter to the brother dated 10.9.75, Veena Rani has stated that even on the day she came to Sangrur the accused began demanding a sum of Rs. 1,000 for being paid for the scooter purchased by him.
The accused would not wait and hence she had again to write a letter to her mother on 14.9.75.
Therein she has stated that she was in a very bad condition and that her mother should send her Rs. 1,000 immediately.
These two letters written in quick succession reveal fully the amount of pressure the accused must have been applying on Veena Rani to get him a sum of Rs. 1,000.
So constant should have been his demand for money that on the morning of 15 9 75 even at about 6.30 or 7 a.m. the accused and Veena Rani had to go to the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om to seek a solution.
Even in front of PW 9 Shri Hari Om, the accused had insisted that Veena Rani should get him a sum of Rs. 1,000 forthwith.
When Veena Rani pleaded inability to make immediate payment, the accused told her that he did not care even if she went to hell but he wanted immediate payment.
When Veena Rani stated in despair that she had enough of torment and that she preferred death to living, the 622 accused added fuel to fire by saying that she may put an end to her life the very same day and she need not wait till the next day to quit this world.
Such an utterance by the ac cused would have certainly been seen by Veena Rani as an.
instigation to her to commit suicide.
Otherwise, she would not have set fire to herself within a short time after she reached home.
One significant factor to be noticed is that but for being spurred to action, Veena Rani would not have ,easily reconciled herself to forsaking her one and a half year old son and commit suicide.
No mother, however dis tressed and frustrated.
would easily make up her mind to leave her young child in the lurch and commit suicide unless she had been goaded to do so by someone close to her.
Yet another factor to be borne in mind is that there is no evidence as to what transpired between the accused and Veena Rani after they had left the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om.
The only two persons who could speak about it are the accused and Veena Rani and since she is dead it is only the accused who can throw some light on the matter.
Strangely enough, the accused has not said anything about it in his statement under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. He has not said a word that he had assuaged the wounded feelings of Veena Rani before he left for Court.
His silence on this aspect of the matter would therefore mean that he had not changed his stand subsequently.
We may now look to the relevant provisions of the law.
Section 306 I.P.C. under which the accused was charged reads as under: "306 I.P.C.
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
" Section 107 I.P.C. sets out as to what constitutes abetment.
The Section reads as follows: "107.
A person abets the doing of a thing, who First.
Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.
Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.
Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
623 Explanation I. A person who, by wilful mis representation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration (omitted) Explanation Il Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
" The learned Additional Sessions Judge has in the course of his judgment observed that Explanation II to Section 107 I.P.C. would also be attracted to the facts of the case.
The relevant portion in the judgment reads as under: "Thus when the circumstances attending this case are read alongwith the aforesaid Explana tion No. II given under Section 107 I.P.C., it is clear that the accused prior to the commis sion of the suicide by Veena Rani, had con stantly committed certain acts and that has facilitated the commission of suicide and thus he had aided in the committing of that said act by Veena Rani.
" A few lines below the Sessions Judge has given his finding as under: "The question of abetment actually depends upon the nature of the act abetted and the manner in which the abetment was made.
The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor has instigated another to commit the offence.
It is not necessary for the offence of abetment that the offence must be committed.
It is only, in the case of a person abetting an offence by intentionally aiding another to commit that offence and the uttering of hot words by the accused to his wife in the presence of Shri Hari Om PW 9 clearly indicates that the accused had abetted an act complained of." From the portion extracted above, it may be seen that though the Addl.
Sessions Judge has observed that Explana tion II would have 624 relevance to the case, he has in fact awarded conviction to the accused on the basis that the accused had instigated Veena Rani to commit suicide and had thereby abetted the commission of suicide by Veena Rani.
Having regard to the evidence in the case, there can be no doubt whatever that the Addl.
Sessions Judge was perfect ly right in holding that the accused had instigated Veena Rani to commit suicide and therefore he would be guilty under Section 306 I.P.C. A person can abet the commission of an offence in any one of the three ways set out in Section 107.
The case of the accused would squarely fall under the first category, viz. instigating a person to do a thing.
In such circumstances, the need to invoke Explanation I1 does not arise.
Mr. Mehta contended that since Explanation II to Section 107 I.P.C. has no application to the facts of the case and since the Addl.
Sessions Judge has convicted the accused on the premise that Explanation H is attracted, the High Court was right in setting aside the conviction of the accused.
We are unable to accept this argument because the Addl.
Sessions Judge: though he has referred to Explanation II, has actually found the accused guilty only on the ground he had abetted the commission of the offence by instigation.
When the evidence is of so compulsive and telling a nature against the accused, the High Court, we regret to say, has dealt with the matter in a somewhat superficial manner and acquitted the accused on the basis of imaginary premises.
The High Court has failed to comprehend the evi dence in its full conspectus and instead it has whittled down the evidence by specious reasoning.
To mention a few, the High Court has failed to give due weight to the letter Veena Rani wrote to her brother on 10.9.1975 merely because in the last line she has written "in any way there is noth ing to worry.
This time everything will be alright.
" This one sentence in the letter cannot efface the frantic nature of Veena Rani 's appeal for money to satisfy the demand of the accused.
As regards the last letter dated 14.9.75, the High Court has totally lost sight of it.
The High Court has failed to see that unless Veena Rani was very desperate, she would not have written to her mother for money within four days of the letter to her brother.
As regards the happenings on the morning of 15.9.75, the High Court has failed to grasp their gravity.
Unless a serious quarrel had taken place, the accused and Veena Rani would not have gone to the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om in the early hours of the morning itself to seek a solution to the problem.
Despite PW 9 Shri Hari Om counselling patience, the accused refused to relent and insisted upon immediate payment of 625 Rs. 1,000 and made it clear that the money was more impor tant to him than Veena Rani 's life and that if Veena Rani wanted to die, she may put an end to her life the very same day and give him relief forthwith.
The High Court has viewed the accused 's conduct and utterances as of no consequence because PW. 9 Shri Hari Om has stated in crossexamination that he thought it was "an ordinary quarrel between the husband and wife as they had been doing so previously also.
" The High Court has failed to realise that the effect of the accused 's utterances on Veena Rani 's mind should be assessed in the context of the overall evidence in the case and not on the basis of the opinion of PW 9 Shri Hari Om about the nature of the quarrel.
PW 9 Shri Hari Om despite his having been the counsel for Veena Rani, could not have realised the effect of the utterances of the accused on the mind of Veena Rani.
Furthermore the High Court has failed to notice that the accused has not thrown any light as to what transpired between him and Veena Rani after they had left the house of PW 9 Shri Hari Om.
The fact that Veena Rani had forsaken her young son and had set fire to herself within a short time after reaching home will go to show that she would not have acted in that manner unless she had felt instigated to commit suicide by the utterances of the accused.
The High Court, besides unfortunately failing to give due weight to the evidence in the case, has drawn certain inferences which are not at all warranted.
For example, the High Court has stated that since Veena Rani was an earning member, the accused would not have stood to gain by instigating her to commit suicide.
This inference is totally wrong because the clear evidence in the case is that the accused had placed greater value on the payment of the money demanded by him than upon the life of his wife.
Then again, the High Court has remarked that Veena Rani was suffering from depression and a diseased mind and hence she would have committed suicide.
We are at a loss to know wherefrom the High Court derived material to draw this conclusion.
Far from there being any evidence, to show that Veena Rani was having a diseased mind, PW 5 Krishan Dutt and PW 12 Nathu Ram, have stated that Veena Rani was a woman of gentle and amiable disposition.
She was working in the Bank without any com plaint whatever about her mental condition.
Even the accused has not stated that she was of diseased mind.
We are, there fore, more than satisfied that the judgment of the High Court suffers from serious errors and infirmities and is therefore manifestly unsustainable.
Mr. Mehta relied upon the observations in Sri Ram vs
U.P. State, to contend that even if the accused had told Veena Rani that money was more important to him than her life and that she 626 can put an end to her life the very same day instead of waiting for the morrow, it cannot be construed that the accused had done anything to facilitate the commission of suicide by Veena Rani as would attract Explanation II to Section 107 I.P.C.
We do not find any merit in the conten tion.
The facts in Shri Ram 's case were entirely different.
The question in that case was whether by shouting that "the Vakil has come", Violet, one of the accused, had abetted the commission of the offence of murder of one Kunwar Singh by the other accused persons who were hiding behind a shisham tree and coming out of their place of concealment and one of them shooting Kunwar Singh with a gun carried by him.
Though the Sessions Judge and the High Court had held that Violet 's act would amount to abetment of the commission of the of fence of murder in terms of Explanation II to Section 107 I.P.C., this Court held that "apart from the words attribut ed to Violet, there is nothing at all to show that she was aware of the nefarious design of Sia Ram and his associates.
" It was in that context this Court observed as follows. "Thus in order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown to have "intentionally" aided the commission of the crime.
Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough compliance with the requirements of Section 107.
" In the instant case, we have already seen that the committing of suicide by Veena Rani was due to the accused 's instigation.
It is not a case where Veena Rani had wanted to commit suicide for reasons of her own and the accused had facilitated her in the commission of suicide.
It was then urged by Mr. Mehta that since two views could be taken of the evidence we should not allow the appeals and set aside the acquittal of the accused solely on the ground that the view taken by the High Court does not commend itself for our acceptance.
We are fully alive to the position in law that where two views could reasonably be taken of the prosecution evidence in a case, the Appellate Court should not interfere with the acquittal of an accused merely because the view taken by the Trial Court and/or the High Court was less acceptable than the other view which could have been taken on the evidence.
This principle will however have no application where the evidence does not afford scope for two plausible views being taken but still the Trial Court or the High Court acquits an accused for reasons 627 which are patently wrong and the error leads to an element of perversity pervading the judgment.
As to what would constitute instigation for the commis sion of an offence would depend upon the facts of each case.
Therefore in order to decide whether a person has abetted by instigation the commission of an offence or not, the act of abetment has to be judged in the conspectus of the entire evidence in the case.
The act of abetment attributed to an accused is not to be viewed or tested in isolation.
Such being the case, the instigative effect of the words used by the accused must be judged on the basis of the distraught condition to which the accused had driven Veena Rani.
Full well knowing her helpless state and frustration, if the accused had told her that he set greater store on the sum of Rs. 1,000 required by him than her life and that she can die the very same day and afford him early relief, it is not surprising that Veena Rani committed suicide a little later on account of the accused 's instigation.
It would not be out of place for us to refer here to the addition of Sections 113A and 113B to the Indian Evidence Act and Sections 498A and 304B to the Indian Penal Code by subsequent amendments.
Section 113A Evidence Act and 498A Indian Penal Code have been introduced in the respective enactments by the Criminal Law (Second amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) and Section 113B of the Evidence Act and 304B Indian Penal Code have been introduced by Act No. 43 of 1986.
The degradation of society due to the pernicious system of dowry and the unconscionable demands made by greedy and unscrupulous husbands and their parents and relatives resulting in an alarming number of suicidal and dowry deaths by women has shocked the Legislative conscience to such an extent that the Legislature has deemed it neces sary to provide additional provisions of law, procedural as well as substantive, to combat the evil and has consequently introduced Sections 113A and 113B in the Indian Evidence Act and Sections 498A and 304B in the Indian Penal Code.
By reason of Section 113A, the Courts can presume that the commission of suicide by a woman has been abetted by her husband or relation if two factors are present viz. (1) that the woman had committed suicide within a period of seven years from her marriage, and (2) that the husband or rela tion had subjected her to cruelty.
We are referring to these provisions only to show that the Legislature has realised the need to provide for additional provisions in the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Evidence Act to check the growing menace of dowry deaths.
In the present case, however, the abetment of the commission of suicide by Veena Rani is 628 clearly due to instigation and would therefore fail under the first clause of Section 107 I.P.C.
In the light of our conclusions, the appeals have to be allowed and the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 I.P.C. has to be restored.
The question however arises as to whether the sentence of 4 years R.I. awarded by the Sessions Judge should also be restored.
Mr. Mehta, learned counsel made a fervent plea for leniency on the ground that more than 11 years have elapsed since the High Court acquit ted the accused and the accused is now leading a settled life and that he and his family members would be ruined if he is to be sent back to prison to serve any further term of sentence.
Learned counsel also stated that the accused has undergone imprisonment in connection with the case for a period of about 10 months and, therefore, even if we are to restore the conviction, we may reduce the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone.
Shri Suri.
learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the State was only anxious that the error committed by the High Court in acquitting the accused should be set right.
He also added that in the event of the substantive sentence being reduced, the accused should be called upon to pay a heavy fine.
Taking all factors into consideration, we think that the ends of justice would be met if we substitute the sentence awarded to the accused with the sentence of imprisonment for the period already undergone by him and enhance the sentence of fine from Rs.500 to Rs.20,000 with a direction that out of the fine amount, if paid, a sum of Rs. 18,000 should be paid to the father of Veena Rani for bringing up Veena Rani 's minor son Manish.
The High Court judgment is accordingly set aside and the appeals are allowed and the conviction of the accused under Section 306 I.P.C. is restored but the sentence is modified to the period of imprisonment already undergone and fine of Rs.20,000 in default thereof to suffer R.I. for two years.
Out of the fine amount if paid, Rs. 18,000 will be given to the appellant in Crl.
Appeal No. 477 of 1978 for being utilised for the maintenance of Veena Rani 's son, Manish.
One month 's time from today is given to the accused to pay the fine.
R.S.S. Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
Prem Chand, accused respondent, had married Veena Rani, deceased, in the year 1973.
Veena Rani was then employed in the State Bank of Patiala.
Soon after their marriage the accused resigned his job as Prosecuting Sub inspector and started his practice at Sangrut.
Veena Rani got herself transferred to Sangrur and the couple set up house there.
From the very beginning Veena Rani had an unhappy married life because the accused constantly tormented her to get more money from her parents.
The accused was also given to heating her frequently.
Veena Rani gave birth to a male child.
Even after child birth the accused did not stop iII treating her.
Unable to bear the iII treatment, Veena Rani took leave on loss of pay and went away to her parents.
She later filed an application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court at Patiala for restitution of conjugal rights.
At this stage, a compromise was brought about between the parties and Veena Rani came back to live with the accused at San grur.
But nothing changed, and the accused continued to torment her for money.
The immediate provocation for the accused stepping up his illtreatment of Veena Rani was his demand of Rs. 1,000 to pay the balance amount of the scooter price which he had purchased.
Veena Rani had no funds of her own.
She, there fore, wrote to her brother and mother narrating her woes and requesting them to send Rs. 1,000.
In spite of Veena Rani writing to her brother and mother, the accused did not relent in the immediate compliance of his demand.
On 15.9.1975, the day of the tragedy, the accused and Veena Rani had a quarrel and thereupon both of them went to the house of Shri Hari Om, Advocate, who advised the accused not to torment Veena Rani.
613 There, in the presence of Hari Om, the accused went to the extent of saying that Veena Rani may go to hell but he should get the money forthwith.
Veena Rani reacted by saying that she preferred death to such life.
The accused, far from expressing regret for his conduct, drove her to despair by further saying that she can provide him relief quicker by dying on the very day.
Thereafter, the accused left Veena Rani at their house and went to court at about 9.00 a.m.
At 10.15 a.m. shrieks were heard from their house, and when people rushed in, they found Veena Rani lying on the ground with extensive burn injuries.
Before her death in the hospi tal, Veena Rani told the doctor that she had been tortured at home and that she wanted to die as early as possible.
The Additional Sessions Judge found the accused guilty under section 306, I.P.C., and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for four years.
The Judge held that the accused had been tormenting and also physically assaulting Veena Rani, and that Veena Rani had committed suicide by reason of the accused 's instigation.
The High Court, on appeal, acquitted the accused holding that even though Veena Rani had committed suicide on account of her unhappy married life, there was nothing on the record to show that the appellant in any manner instigated the deceased to commit suicide.
In this Court, two special leave petitions have been filed, one by the father of Veena Rani and the other by the State of Punjab.
On behalf of the appellants it was contend ed that the High Court had completely erred in its apprecia tion of the evidence and in its application of the law.
On behalf of the accused it was contended that even if the prosecution evidence was accepted in full, there was no material to show that the suicidal death of Veena Rani was abetted in any manner by the accused.
Allowing the appeals and restoring the conviction of the accused under section 306, this Court, HELD: (1) Veena Rani 's death was undoubtedly due to suicide and not due to any accident or homicide.
[621A] (2) There is overwhelming evidence in the case to estab lish that Veena Rani 's life was made intolerable by the accused by constantly demanding her to get him money and also beating her frequently.
[620G] 614 (3) Viewed in the background of Veena Rani 's plight during the few days preceding her death and the events that took place on the morning of the tragedy, the utterances by the accused to the effect that she can provide him relief quicker by dying on the very same day would have certainly been seen by Veena Rani as an instigation to her to commit suicide.
[621D; 622B] (4) No mother, however distressed and frustrated, would easily make up her mind to leave her young child in the lurch and commit suicide unless she had been goaded to do so by someone close to her [622B C] (5) When the evidence is of so compulsive and telling in nature against the accused, the High Court, it is regretted to say, has dealt with the matter in a somewhat superficial manner and acquitted the accused on the basis of imaginary premises.
The High Court has failed to comprehend the evi dence in its full conspectus and instead has whittled down the evidence by specious reasoning.
[624E F] (6) As to what constitutes instigation would depend upon the facts of each case.
Therefore, in order to decide wheth er a person has abetted by instigation the commission of an offence or not, the act of abetment has to be judged in the conspectus of the entire evidence in the case.
The act of abetment attributed to an accused is not to be viewed or tested in isolation.
[627A B] (7) Such being the case, the instigative effect of the words used by the accused must be judged on the basis of the distraught condition to which the accused had driven Veena Rani.
[627B C] (8) In the instant case, the abetment of the commission of suicide by Veena Rani is clearly due to instigation and would therefore fail under the first clause of section 107, IPC.
[626E F] (9) The degradation of society due to the pernicious system of dowry and the unconscionable demands made by greedy and unscrupulous husbands and their parents and relatives resulting in an alarming number of suicidal and dowry deaths of women has shocked the Legislative conscience to such an extent that the Legislature has deemed it neces sary to provide additional provisions of law, procedural as well as substantive, to combat the evil and has consequently introduced Sections 113A and 113B in the Indian Evidence Act, and section 498A and 304B in the Indian Penal Code.
[627E G] 615 (10) It is not a case where Veena Rani had wanted to commit suicide for reasons of her own and the accused had facilitated her in the commission of suicide, as would attract Explanation II to Section 107 IPC.
[626A] Sri Ram vs State of U.P., ; distin guished.
(11) Taking all factors into consideration including the fact that more than 11 years have elapsed since the High Court acquitted the accused and the accused is now leading a settled life, the Court considered the plea of leniency, and while restoring the conviction of the accused under section 306 modified the sentence to the period already undergone and enhanced the fine to Rs.20,000, out of which Rs. 18,000 were to be given to the father of the deceased for being utilised for the maintenance of Veena Rani 's son.
[628E]


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
2704 06 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.5.1979 of the Guja rat High Court in Special Civil Appln.
Nos. 133 of 1976, 325 and 384 of 1976.
A.B. Rohatagi, Harish N. Salve, Ms. Palavi Shroff, S.S. Shroff, P.S. Shroff and R. Sasiprabhu for the Appellants.
Kapil Sibbal, Suresh Shelat, P.H. Parekh and Ms. Gitan jali for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
These appeals, by certificate, are from a common judgment of the Gujarat High Court giving some monetary benefits to the respondents.
The facts of the case cane be quite shortly stated: The appellant No. 1 is a public trust and other appel lants are its trustees.
The trust was running a science college at Ahmedabad.
The college initially had temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University under the Gujarat University Act, 1949.
From June 15, 1973 onwards, the col lege had permanent affiliation under the said Act as amended by Gujarat Act No. VI of 1973.
The University teachers and those employed in the affiliated colleges were paid in the pay scale recommended by the University Grants Commission.
At one stage, there was some dispute between the University Area Teachers Association and the University about the implementation of certain pay scales.
That dispute, by agreement of parties, was referred to the Chancellor of the University for decision.
On June 12, 1970, the Chancellor gave his award in the following terms: "(1) That the revised pay scales as applicable to teachers who joined before April 1, 1966, should similarly be applicable to those who joined after April 1, 1966.
and they be continued even after April 1, 1971.
(2) That these pay scales be exclu sive of dearness allowance.
Therefore, fixing the pay of the teachers who joined after April 1, 1966, no petition of existing dearness 701 allowance would be merged.
However, with effect from April 1, 1971 in respect of both the categories of teachers i.e. Pre 1966 and Post 1966 teachers, dearness allowance was to be merged with the salary.
(3) That arrears for the period from April 1, 1966 to March 31, 1970 accruing due under the award were to be paid (without interest) in ten equal instalments beginning from April 1, 1971.
(4) The award was to be given effect to from April 1, 1970.
There are other provi sions also.
But we are not concerned with those provisions for our purpose.
" This award of the Chancellor was accepted by the State Government as well as by the University.
The latter issued direction to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms thereof.
The appellants instead of implementing the award served notice of termination upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were surplus and approached the University for permission to remove them.
But the Vice Chancellor did not accede to their request.
He refused the permission sought for.
There then the management we mean the trust took a suicidal decision.
The decision was to close down the college to the detriment of teachers and students.
The affiliation of the college was surrendered and the University was informed that the management did not propose to admit any student from the academic year 1975 76.
It was again a unilateral decision without approval of the Univer sity.
The college was closed with effect from June 15, 1975 with the termination of services of all the academic staff.
The academic staff under law were entitled to terminal benefits.
In fairness, that ought to have been paid simulta neously while being removed.
But the management did not do that.
The teachers waited with repeated representations only to get a negative reply and ultimately, they moved the High Court with writ petitions for the following reliefs: "To issue a writ of mandamus or writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appro priate writ or direction or order directing the respondent Trust and its trustees respond ents to pay to the petitioners their due salary and allowances, the provident fund and gratuity dues in accordance with the Rules framed by the University and pay them 702 compensation that would be payable to them under Ordinance 120 E and they may be further directed to pay the difference of pay payable to them on the implementation of the U.G.C. pay scales in accordance with Government Resolution as clarified by the Award passed by the Chancellor.
" As is obvious from these reliefs, the retrenched persons were not agitating for their continuance in the service.
They seem to have made a tryst with the destiny and accepted the closure of the college.
They demanded only the arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and the closure compen sation which were legitimately due to them.
The trust, however, resisted the writ petitions on every conceivable ground.
The objections raised by the trust may be summarised as follows: (i) The trust is not a statutory body and is not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court; (ii) the Resolution of the University directing payment to teachers in the revised pay scales is not binding on the trust; (iii) The University has no power to burden the trust with additional financial liability by retrospec tively revising the pay scales; (iv) the claim for gratuity by retrenched teachers is untenable.
It is payable only to teachers retiring, resigning, or dying and not to those removed on account of closure of the college; and (v) Ordi nance 120E prescribing closure compensation is ultra vires of the powers of the syndicate.
It is at any rate not bind ing on the trust, since it was enacted prior to affiliation of the college.
The High Court rejected all these submissions, and accepted the writ petitions by delivering a lengthy judg ment.
The High Court thus directed the trust to make pay ments in the following terms: "(1) Amount of the remaining six instalments as per Chancellor 's Award in respect of arrears from 1.4.
1966 to 31.3.
1970 as detailed category No. 1 above, (2) Salary for the period from 1.4.1975 to 14.6.1975 as per revised payscales, (3) Com pensation as per sub clause (a) and (b) of clause (vii) of Ordinance 120 E, (4) Provident Fund dues as per the approved scheme.
" The trust by obtaining certificate has ap pealed to this Court.
Counsel for the appellants mercifully concedes the just right of the teachers to get salary for the period of two and a half months from 703 April 1, 1974 to June 14, 1974.
He has also no objection to pay provident fund dues.
He, however, says that the trust is entitled to get reimbursement from the Government and that question must be determined in these appeals.
As regards the arrears of salary payable under the Chancellor 's Award, the counsel contends that it is the liability of the Government and not of the management of the college.
As regards the closure compensation payable under the Ordinance, he repeats the contention taken before the High Court.
He also main tains that the trust is a private body and is not subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
Having heard the counsel for both parties, we are left with an impression that the appellants are really trying to side track the issue and needlessly delaying the legitimate payments due to the respondents.
The question whether the State is liable to recompense the appellants in respect of the amount payable to the respondents was not considered by the High Court and indeed could not have been examined since the State was not a party to the proceedings.
However, by the persuasive powers of the counsel in this Court, the State has been impleaded as a party in these appeals.
Per haps, this Court wanted to find out the reaction of the State on the appellants ' assertion for reimbursement.
We heard counsel for the State.
He disputes the appellants ' claim.
In fact, he challenged the claim on a number of grounds.
He says that the State is under no obligation to pay the appellants as against the sum due to the respond ents.
We do not think that we need rule to day on this controversy.
It is indeed wholly outside the scope of these appeals.
We are only concerned with the liability of the management of the college towards the employees.
Under the relationship of master and servant, the management is pri marily responsible to pay salary and other benefits to the employees.
The management cannot say that unless and until the State compensates, it will not make full payment to the staff.
We cannot accept such a contention.
Two questions,however, remain for consideration: (i) The liability of the appellants to pay compensation under Ordi nance 120E and (ii) The maintainability of the writ petition for mandamus as against the management of the college.
The first question presents no problem since we do not find any sustainable argument.
The power of the Syndicate to enact the Ordinance is not in doubt or dispute.
What is, however, argued is that the Ordinance is not binding on the manage ment since it was enacted before the college was affiliated to the University.
This appears to be a desperate contention overlooking the 704 antecedent event.
The 'counsel overlooks the fact that the college had temporary affiliation even earlier to the Ordi nance.
That apart, the benefits under the Ordinance shall be given when the college is closed.
The college in the instant case was closed admittedly after the Ordinance was enacted.
The appellants cannot, therefore, be heard to contend that they are not liable to pay compensation under the Ordinance.
The essence of the attack on the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 may now be examined.
It is argued that the management of the college being a trust registered under the Public Trust Act is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
The contention in other words, is that the: trust is a private institution against which no writ of mandamus can be issued.
In support of the contention, the counsel relied upon two decisions of this Court: (a) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Others vs Lakshmi Narain & Ors., ; and (b) Deepak Kumar Biswas vs Director of Public Instructions, the first of the two cases, the respondent institution was a Degree College managed by a registered co operative society.
A suit was filed against the college by the dismissed principal for reinstatement.
It was contended that the Executive Committee of the college which was registered under the Co operative Societies Act and affiliated to the Agra University (and subsequently to Meerut University) was a statutory body.
The importance of this contention lies in the fact that in such a case, reinstatement could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation of statutory obligation.
But this Court refused to accept the contention.
It was observed that the manage ment of the college was not a statutory body since not created by or under a statute.
It was emphasised that an institution which adopts ,certain statutory provisions will not become a statutory body and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a contract of personal service against a non statutory body.
The decision in Vaish Degree College was followed in Deepak Kumar Biswas case.
There again a dismissed lecturer of a private college was seeking reinstatement in service.
The Court refused to grant the relief although it was found that the dismissal was wrongful.
This Court instead granted substantial monetary benefits to the lecturer.
This appears to be the preponderant judicial opinion because of the common law principle that a service contract cannot be specifically enforced.
But here the facts are quite different and, therefore, we need not 705 go thus far.
There is no plea for specific performance of contractual service.
The respondents are not seeking a declaration that they be continued in service.
They are not asking for mandamus to put them back into the college.
They are claiming only the terminal benefits and arrears of salary 'payable to them.
The question is whether the trust can be compelled to pay by a writ of mandamus? If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue.
If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie.
These are two exceptions to Mandamus.
But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally conven ient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied.
It has to be appre ciated that the appellants trust was managing the affiliat ed college to which public money is paid as Government aid.
Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institu tions.
The aided institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students.
They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University.
Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities.
Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public charac ter.
(See The Evolving Indian Administration Law by M.P. Jain [1983] p. 266).
So are the service conditions of the academic staff.
When the University takes a decision regard ing their pay scales, it will be binding on the management.
The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character.
It has super added pro tection by University decisions creating a legal right duty relationship between the staff and the management.
When there is existence of this relationship, mandamus can not be refused to the aggrieved party.
The Law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacu lar advance.
It may be recalled that the remedy by preroga tive writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages.
To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursu ance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission "to review the existing reme dies for the judicial control of administrative acts and omission with a view to evolving a simpler and more effec tive procedure.
" The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Com No. 73).
It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of to Supreme Court Act 1981.
It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial Review.
Lord Denning explains the scope of this "judicial review": 706 "At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate.
Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also declaration and injunc tion.
Even damages.
The procedure was much more simple and expeditious.
Just a summons instead of a writ.
No formal pleadings.
The evidence was given by affidavit.
As a rule no cross examination, no discovery, and so forth.
But there were important safeguards.
In par ticular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave of a judge.
The Statute is phrased in flexible terms.
It gives scope for development.
It uses the words "having regard to".
Those words are very indefinite.
The result is that the courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law.
They are to 'have regard to ' it.
So the previ ous law as to who are and who are not public authorities, is not absolutely binding.
Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted.
This means that the judges can develop the public law as they think best.
That they have done and are doing." (See The Closing Chapter by Rt.
Hon Lord Denning p. 122).
There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty.
The 'public authority ' for them mean every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statue.
So Government departments, local authori ties, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities '.
But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus '.
Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs.
This is a striking departure from the English law.
Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority".
It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose".
Article 226 reads: "226.
Power of High Courts to issue certain writs (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exer cises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories direc tions, orders or writs, includ 707 ing (Writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certi orari, or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part II and for any other purpose.
XXX XXX XXX XXX " The scope of this article has been ex plained by Subba Rao., in Dwarkanath vs Income Tax Officer, ; at (540 41): "This article is couched in compre hensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injus tice wherever it is found.
The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised.
It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the use of the expression "na ture", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them.
That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs.
It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the pecul iar and complicated requirements of this country.
Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to intro duce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government into a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure.
Such a construction defeats the purpose of the arti cle itself.
" The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the con text, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12.
Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under article 32.
Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforce ment of the fundamental rights as well as nonfundamental rights.
The words "Any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
They may cover any other person or body performing public duty.
The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant.
What is relevant is the nature of 708 the duty imposed on the body.
The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation .owed by the person or authori ty to the affected party.
No matter by what means the duty is imposed.
If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.
In Praga Tools Corporation vs Shri C.A. Imanual & Ors., ; , this Court said that a mandamus can issue against a person or body to carry out the duties placed on them by the Statutes even though they are not public offi cials or statutory body.
It was observed (at 778): "It is, however, not necessary that the person or the authority on whom the statu tory duty is imposed need be a public official or an official body.
A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official or a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statutes authorising their under takings.
A mandamus would also lie against a company constituted by a statute for the purpose of fulfilling public responsibilities.
(See Halsbury 's Laws of England (3rd Ed.
II p. 52 and onwards).
" Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute.
Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute.
It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." (Judicial Review of Administrative 'Act 4th Ed.
p. 540).
We share this view.
The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies effecting the rights of the people should not be put into water tight compartment.
It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances.
Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found '.
Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226.
We, therefore, reject the conten tion urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed but with a direction to the appellants to pay all the amounts due to the respondents as 709 per the judgment of the High Court.
The amount shall be paid with 12 per cent interest.
The balance remaining shall be paid within two months from today.
The appellants shall also pay the costs of the respondents teachers which we quantify at Rs. 26,000.
R.S.S. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Appellant No. 1 is a public trust and the other appel lants are its trustees.
The Trust was running a science college at Ahmedabad.
The college initially had temporary affiliation to the Gujarat University.
From June 15, 1973 onwards the college had permanent affiliation.
A dispute between the University Area Teachers Associa tion and the University was referred to the Chancellor of the University who gave his award on June 12, 1970.
The award was accepted by the State Government as well as by the University.
The latter issued direction to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the award.
The appellants instead of implementing the award served notice of termination upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were surplus, and approached the University for permis sion to remove them.
The Vice Chancellor did not accept their request.
Thereupon the Trust decided to close down the college.
The retrenched persons demanded arrears of salary and allowances, provident fund and gratuity dues, and closure compensation.
But the management did not pay these dues.
The employees then moved the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Trust to pay the retrenched employees their legitimate dues.
The High Court accepted the writ petitions.
Before this Court, the appellants while conceding the just right of the employees to get salary for 2 1/2 months and the provident fund dues, contended that the Trust was entitled to get reimbursement from the Government in lieu of these payments.
As regards the arrears of salary.
698 payable under the Chancellor 's aWard, the appellants con tended that it was the liability of the Government and not of the management of the college.
As regards the closure compensation it was contended that Ordinance 120E prescrib ing compensation was ultra vires, and, at any rate, it was not binding on the Trust since it was enacted prior to the affiliation of the college.
It was further contended that the Trust was a private body and was not subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
Dismissing the appeals, it was, Held: (1)The Court is only concerned with the liability of the management of the college towards the employees.
Under the relationship of master and servant, the management is primarily responsible to pay salary and other benefits to the employees.
The management cannot say that unless and until the State compensates, it will not make full payment to the staff.
[703E F] (2) The college had temporary affiliation even earlier to the Ordinance 120E.
That apart, the benefits under the Ordinance are to be given when the college is closed which in this case was admittedly after the Ordinance was enacted.
[704A B] (3) If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue.
If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie.
These are two exceptions to mandamus.
But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally conven ient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied.
[705B C] (4) Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions.
The aided institutions, like Government insti tutions, discharge public function by way of imparting education to students.
They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University.
Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities Em ployment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character.
[705C D] (5) When the University takes a decision regarding the pay scales of the employees of the aided institution, it will be binding on the management.
The service conditions of the academic staff are, therefore, not purely of a private character.
It has super added protection by University decisions creating a legal right duty relationship.
When there 699 is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be re fused to the aggrieved party.
[705E] (6) Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Court to issue writs in he nature of prerogative writs.
Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority".
It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose." [706F G] Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College vs Lakshmi Narain.
, ; ; Deepak Kumar Biswas vs Director of Public Instructions., ; distinguished Dwarkanath vs Income Tax Officer, ; , referred to.
(7) This is a striking departure from the English Law.
Under the English Law, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty, and 'public authority ' there means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute.
[706E F] (8) The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State.
They may cover any other person or body performing public duty.
The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant.
What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body.
The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed.
If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.
[707G H; 708A B] (9) Mandamns cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute.
[708B] Praga Tools Corporation vs Shri C.A. Imanual, ; , referred to.
(10) The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water tight compartment.
It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances.
Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found '.
Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226.
[708F G] 700