judgement:
Appeal No. 301 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 10, 1960, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Special Appeal No. 40 of 1959.
K. section Hajela, and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
K. L. Gosain and Naunit Lal, for the respondent.
March 4.
The short point of law which arises in this appeal relates to the construction of Rule 4 (2) of the Uttar Pradesh Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947 (hereinafter called the Rules).
That question arises in this way.
The respondent Jogendra Singh was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under the appellant, the State of U. P. in the year 1937.
On August 4, 1952, he was suspended as complaints had been received against him and an enquiry into the said complaints was contemplated.
Accordingly, charges were framed against him and his case was referred for investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appointed under the Rules.
The Tribunal held an enquiry and exonerated the respondent from the charges framed against him, in August 1953.
While the proceedings before the Tribunal were pending, additional complaints were received by the 199 appellant against the respondent 's conduct, and they were communicated by the appellant to the Tribunal with an intimation that the appellant proposed to send those further charges against the respondent for enquiry.
The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said additional charges because it was asked by the government to proceed with the charge already with it and concluded its enquiry.
That is why on October 28, 1955, the respondent was again suspended and charges framed on the additional complaints received against him were delivered to him on October 29, 1956.
On November 12, 1956, the respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that in case the appellant wanted to pursue the enquiry against him, it might be entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the Rules.
On June 28, 1958, the Deputy Secretary, Board of Revenue, U. P., informed the respondent that in accordance with the orders passed by the appellant his case had been entrusted to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, with directions to take disciplinary proceedings against him, and his request that the charges against him, should be entrusted for investigation to the Administrative Tribunal had been rejected.
Thereupon, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of judicature at Allahabad on July 14, 1958, and prayed that a writ, or a direction or an appropriate order should be passed against the appellant quashing the proceedings intended to be taken against him before the enquiring officer appointed by the appellant under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.
The learned single judge who heard the writ petition held that the respondent being a gazetted officer, the appellant was bound to grant his request that the enquiry against him should be 200 held by the Administrative Tribunal appointed Under the Rules.
That is why the writ petition was allowed and the order directing the enquiry to be held by the appointed authority under Rule 55 of the said Civil Services Rules was quashed.
This order was challenged by the appellant by an appeal under the Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the said High Court.
The Division Bench agreed with the view taken by the learned single judge and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the said High Court and it is with the said certificate that it has come to this Court.
Mr. Hajela for the appellant contends that the conclusion reached by the Courts below is not supported on a fair and reasonable construction of Rule 4 (2) of the Rules.
The appellant 's case is that in the State of U. P. it is competent to the Governor to direct that disciplinary proceedings against the officers specified in Rule 4 of the Rules should be tried before /an Administrative officer, but there is no obligation on the Governor in that behalf.
The Governor may, if he so decides direct that the said enquiry may be held under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and conducted by an appropriate authority appointed in that behalf.
Whether the enquiry should be held by the Administrative Tribunal, or by an appropriate authority, is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Governor.
On the other hand, the High Court has held that so far as cases of gazetted government servants arc concerned, they are covered by Rule 4 (2) of the Rules and on a fair construction of the said Rule, it is clear that if @ gazetted government servant requests that the enquiry against him should be held by the Administrative Tribunal, the Governor is bound to grant his request.
So, the narrow point which arises 201 for our decision is which of the two views can be said to represent correctly the effect of Rule 4 (2) of the Rules.
Rule 4 reads as follows: "4.
(1) The Governor may refer to the tribunal cases relating to an individual government servant or class of government servants or government servants in a particular area only in respect of matters involving : (a) corruption; (b) failure to discharge duties properly .
(c) irremediable general inefficiency in a public servant of more than ten years ' standing; and (d) personal immorality.
(2) The Governor may, in respect of a gazetted government servant on his own request, refer his case to the Tribunal in respect of matters referred to in sub rule (1).
" It would be noticed that Rule 4 (1) confers discretion on the Governor to refer to the Tribunal cases failing under clauses (a) to (d) in respect of servants specified by the first part of sub rule (1).
In regard to these cases, the government servant concerned cannot claim that the enquiry against him should not be held by a Tribunal and the matter falls to be decided solely in the discretion of the Governor.
It is also clear that amongst the classes of servants to whom sub rule (1) applies, gazetted government servants are included, so that if Rule 4 (1) had stood by itself, even gazetted government servants would have no right to claim that the enquiry against them should not be held by a Tribunal.
202 It is in the light of this provision that rule 4 (2) has to be considered.
Rule 4 (2) deals with the class of gazetted government servants and gives them the right to make a request to the Governor that their cases should be ' referred to the Tribunal in respect of matters specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub rule (1).
The question for our decision is whether like the word " may" in rule 4 (1) which confers the discretion on the Governor, the word ",may" in subrule (2) confers discretion on him, or does the word ,(may" in sub rule (2) really mean "shall" or " 'must" ? There is no doubt that the word " 'may" generally does not mean "must" or "shall".
But it is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or " 'shall" in the light of the context.
It is also clear that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean a command.
Sometimes, the legislature uses the word "may" out of deference to the high status of the authority on whom the power and the obligation are intended to be conferred and imposed.
In the present case, it is the context which is decisive.
The whole purpose of rule 4 (2) would be frustrated if the word "may" in the said rule receives the same construction as in sub rule (1).
It is because in regard to gazetted government servants the discretion had already been given to the Governor to refer their cases to the tribunal that the rule making authority wanted to make a special provision in respect of them as distinguished from other government servants falling under rule 4 (1) and rule 4 (2) has been prescribed, otherwise rule 4 (2) would be wholly redundant.
In other words, the plain and unambiguous object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the gazetted government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and 203 not otherwise.
The rule making authority presumably thought that having regard to the status of the gazetted government servants, it would be legitimate to give such an opinion to them.
Therefore, we feel no difficulty in accepting the view taken by the High Court that rule 4(2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made by the gazetted government servant that ' his case should be referred to the Tribunal under the Rules.
Such a request was admittedly made by the respondent and has not been granted.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was right in quashing the proceedings proposed to be taken by the appellant against the respondent otherwise than by referring his case to the Tribunal under the Rules.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The respondent was appointed a Naib Tehsildar under the appellant, in the year 1937.
On August 4, 1952, he was suspended on complaints received against him and his case was referred for investigation to the Administrative Tribunal appointed under the Rules.
While the proceedings were pending, additional complaints were received by the appellant against his conduct and they were communicated to the Tribunal with an intimation that the appellant proposed to send those further charges against the respondent for enquiry.
The Tribunal did not wait for receipt of the said additional charges and on enquiry exonerated him from the charges framed against him, in August, 1952.
On October 28, 1956, the respondent was again suspended and the charges framed on the additional complaints were delivered to him.
The respondent submitted his explanation and pleaded that the enquiry might be entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the Rules; but his request was rejected and the case was entrusted to the Commissioner with directions to take disciplinary proceeding , against him.
The High Court allowed the writ petition of the respondent and the order directing the enquiry to be held by the appointed authority under r. 55 of the said Civil Services Rules was quashed.
The question for decision in this Court was, whether like the word "may" in r. 4 (1) which confers the discretion on the Governor, the word "may" in sub r.
(2) confers discretion on him, or does the word "may" in sub r.(2) really mean "shall" or "must".
Held, that the whole purpose of r. 4 (2) would be frustrated if the word ,may" in the said rule receives the same construction as in sub r.
The plain and unambiguous object of enacting rule 4 (2) is to provide an option to the 198 .
Gazetted Government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise.
Thus r. 4 (2) imposes an obligation on the Governor to grant a request made by the Gazetted Government Servant and such a request not having been granted in the present case, the appeal must fail.


judgement:
Appeals Nos. 104 to 107 of 1961.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated July 5, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Appeal against order No. 480, 454, 478 and 479 of 1954 respectively.
A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
K.N. Rajagopal Sastri and M. section Narasimhan, for respondent No. 1. 1963.
March 7.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J.
This appeal and civil appeals Nos. 104, 106 and 107 of 1961 arise out of execution proceedings in four different suits but as they involve a common question they were heard together by the High Court and by us.
That ques tion is whether the execution applications out of which these appeals arise are within time.
We propose to treat C. A. No. 105 of 1961 as a typical case.
The relevant facts thereof are briefly these : In O. section 46 of 1943 one Ramanathan Chettiar instituted a suit against one Venkatachalam Chettiar in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,285/ due on promisory note dated November 20, 1942 with interest thereon.
He eventually obtained a decree for the full claim.
In so far as the second defendant 244 is concerned, he was made liable for the decrctal amount to the extent of this interest in the joint family property of himself and his father.
The plaintiff assigned the decree in favour of Chidambaram Chettiar, who is the appellant in C. A. 105 of 1961.
He filed an execution application but the execution proceedings commenced by him proved infructuous because the first defendant was adjudicated an insolvent on February 27, 1945.
On September 9, 1946 a composition of the debts due from the insolvent and his son, the second defendant.
was arrived at.
To the deed of composition the second defendant was also a party though he was not adjudicated an insolvent.
Under that deed the creditors, including the four appellants before us, agreed to take 40% of the dues, except one creditor who was to be paid a little more.
The defendants, it may be mentioned, bad extensive money lending business in Burma and the bulk of their property was situate in that country.
Under the composition arrangement the entire property of the defendants, both in India and in Burma was to vest in four trustees, one of whom was the insolvent, that is, the first defendant to the suit.
Two of the trustees were the present appellants, Chidambaram Chettiar and Krishnappa Chettiar, appellant in C. A. 104 of 1961.
The fourth trustee was an outsider.
The total indebtedness of the defendants, as ascertained on the date on which the composition was effected, was Rs. 2,16,077/4/8/ but it was reduced under the arrangement to Rs. 86,430 13 3.
There are four schedules to the composition deed.
Schedule A sets out the names of the creditors and the amounts due to them, Schedule B sets out the properties of the defendants and Schedules C and D set out the properties at Leiwo and Meola respectively in Burma.
The deed provides for the payment of the reduced amount by the trustees to different creditors from the income of the properties or by sale, or mortgage of those properties within four 245 years from April 14, 1947.
The deed further provides for the extension of this time limit "according to exigencies and necessity at the discretion of the first two trustees" i.e., the first defendant and the appellant Chidambaram Chettiar.
The arrangement also provides for payment of interest at 5 annas per mensem in respect of the amounts due on the decrees and 4 annas per mensem in respect of other outstandings as from April 14, 1947.
The composition contemplated the realisation of the dues of the creditors from the income or sale or mortgage of the Burma property, in the first instance.
Clause to which deals with this matter runs as follow "In case the properties of Burma firm are not sufficient to pay the amounts set apart as payable to the creditors at 40 per cent the individuals Nos. 1 and 2 Trustees shall sell the properties in British India and set out in the B schedule herein and from out of the sale proceeds distribute the amount to the creditors.
Similarly, after the 40 per cent amounts have been paid and if there should be any amount of deficiency for the payment of the 60 per cent amount payable to Krishnappa Chettiar as described in para 6 supra, even for that also, the individual Nos. 1 and 2 Trustees shall sell the aforesaid British India properties and pay the aforesaid Krishnappa Chettiar the entire balance amount.
" The composition deed contains various other terms out of which it would be relevant to set out only the following two : "Clause 8 : Until 40 per cent of the amount is paid to the creditors as aforesaid, the said Trustees, shall at the time of disbursement of the dividend, pay from the 1st Chitirai of the year Sarvajith for the annual expenses of the 246 family, a sum of Rs. 600 per annum to indivi dual No. 4 Trustees Venkatachalam Chettiar and a sum of Rs. 300 per annum to his son Nachiappa Chettiar for the aforesaid expenses.
Clause 16 : After the annulment of the order of adjudication herein, the aforesaid Venkata chalam Chettiar shall, in respect of transfer etc., of management of the properties mentioned in C and D schedules, execute a general power of attorney in the favour of individual Nos. 1 and 2 trustees and have the same registered.
" The composition scheme was accepted by the insolvency Court and the adjudication of the first defendant as insolvent was annulled by the court on December 19, 1946.
Due to political changes in Burma only very little was realised out of the Burma assets within the period of four years prescribed in the composition deed.
The trustees who were empowered to extend the time did not extend it.
The appellants, therefore, turned to the Indian assets and sought execution of their decrees against them.
Two contentions were raised on behalf of the defendants.
One was that the Indian assets could not be sold until the assets in Burma were completely exhausted and the other was that the execution applications were barred by time.
In O. section No. 46 of 1943 the last execution application was dismissed on September 19, 1946 (E. P. No. 109 of 1946).
No execution petition was filed thereafter till the present petition (E. P. No. 117 of 1952).
This was filed on June 13, 1952.
Similarly in the remaining three appeals also execu.
tion applications with which we are concerned were filed more than three years after the dismissal of the previous execution applications.
It may be mentioned that originally the appellant as well as appellants in the other appeals had sought the execution of their 247 respective decrees for the fall amount.
But they amended their petitions later on pursuant to the orders of the court and restricted their claims to 40 per cent of the amounts due under their decrees.
The appellant Chidambaram filed an affidavit along with the execution petition and set out the following grounds in support of his contention that the execution application was within time.
"The trustees were able to realise some of the assets of the defendants in Burma and to pay a dividend of 10 per cent to the creditors.
I was paid a sum of Rs. 562 4 0 by way of dividend for this decree on August 10, 1949.
As the rest of the Burma assets of the defendant could not be realised by the trustees on account of the civil war in Burma and the land legislations passed there and as there was no prospect of their being realised in the near future myself and A. section K. Krishnappa Chettiar aforesaid as managing trustees under the said composition offered to extend the period of management by one year provided the defendants would consent to their Indian assets being realised and distributed among the creditors.
But the defendants were not willing thereto and hence we thought fit to extend the period of our management.
We have filed a petition in I. A. No. 87 of 1951 in the suit I. P. No. 1 of 1945 to have the said composition scheme set aside and the 1st defendant re adjudged as insolvent.
The said petition is pending.
I am advised that as the said composition arrangement has failed on account of the assets of the defendants not being realised and the debts discharged within the four year period mentioned therein I am in law and in equity entitled to recover the entire amount due to me under this decree by executing it.
248 8.
The said composition provides for a maintenance allowance of Rs. 600 and Rs. 30 annually being given to the 1st and 2nd defendant respectively at the time of distribution of the dividends.
In respect thereof a notice was issued by the 2nd defendant on April 19, 1949 to myself and A. section K. Krishnappa Chettiar aforesaid wherein there is an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the several debts mentioned in the said composition.
Further the trustees have, acting under the authority given to them by the defendants under the said composition, paid me Rs. 562 4 0 on August 10, 1949 by way of dividend for this decree and have duly entered the same in the accounts maintained by them.
Moreover I could not execute the decree during the four years from April 14, 1947 or any extended period during which the trustees had to manage, realise and distribute the assets of the defendants.
There is therefore no question of limitation.".
Similar grounds were set out in the affidavits filed by the other appellants also.
It may be mentioned that in each of the excution applications relief was claimed only against the second defendant because in insolvency petition No. 87 of 1951 filed by some of the creditors the first defendant, was readjudicated an insolvent by the court on August 3, 1954.
The execution application was, as already stated, opposed by the second defendant firstly on the ground that the composi tion arrived at between him and his father on the one hand and the creditors on the other was still in force, that the arrangement was irrevocable and operated as a complete discharge of the liability of the defendants for all time.
The second ground was that the execution application was barred by time.
249 The precise pleas of the second defendant regarding limitation were as follows : (a) that the adjudication of his father as an insolvent and the pendency of insolvency proceedings against him would not affect limitation in so far as he was concerned; (b) that the receipt by the appellant and other creditors of certain amounts as dividends in August, 1949 would not extend the period of limitation for execution proceedings; (c) that the acknowledgment relied upon is " 'wholly wrong, misconceived and untenable.
" According to him there was no acknowledgement of liability of any kind in the notice referred to in the affidavit much less the liability of the second defendant to discharge the decree which had in fact become extinguished and effaced by reason of the composition arrived at on September 9, 1946.
In the course of the arguments before the executing court it was urged on behalf of the appellants in those appeals that the four years within which the trustees were required to realise the Burma properties and pay off the debts of the creditors must be regarded as a period during which the execution of the decrees was stayed and that consequently on the principles underlying section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, that period should be deducted from computing the period of limitation for preferring execution applications.
The Subordinate judge, before whom the execution applica tions were filed, upheld this contention and held that the execution applications were within time.
He also held that the execution applications arrived at between the parties operated as an adjustment 250 of the decree on the date on which that composition was effected or from the date on which the adjudication was arrived at and that though the composition could not be certified to the executing court under 0.
XXI, r. 2, C. P. C. within the time permitted by law, it could be certified even now at the instance of the decree holder because it was open to the decree holder to certify an adjustment at any time he liked.
According to the learned Subordinate judge, the adjustment precluded each of the appellants from ex cuting his decree for a period of four years from April 14, 1947 and, therefore, the execution applications were within time.
The High Court, however, disagreed with the Subordinate judge on both the grounds and holding that the execution petitions were barred by time allowed the appeals.
It may be mentioned that neither of the two courts below has considered the contention of the appellants in these appeals that the letter dated April 19, 1949 sent by the second defendant to two of the trustees operated as an acknowledgment of their liability or that dividends paid to the appellants by the trustees in August, 1949 operated to extend the time of limitation.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, who appears for the appellants in these appeals, has raised only two contentions.
The first is that the principle underlying section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act is applicable to a case of this kind and that, therefore, the execution applications are within time.
The second is that at any rate the letter dated April 19, 1949, written by the second defendant to the trustees operates as an acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, saves the limitation in respect of all the execution applications except the one out of which C. A. No. 104 of 1961 arises.
According to Mr. Sastri the composition of a decretal debt does not amount to an adjustment or satisfaction of a decree until the acts required to be 251 done thereunder have been performed.
Here the composition scheme required payment of 40 per cent of the decretal debts by the trustees to the craditors.
According to him, until that condition was fulfilled the original decree cannot be said to have been satisfied.
Since the decrees herein involved could not be regarded as having been satisfied they are still alive.
Then, according to Mr. Sastri, where a composition scheme prescribes the period during which a condition has to be performed, till the expiry of theperiod or performance of the condition the operationof the decrees must be deemed to have been stayed.
For, during this period it would be incompetent to the decree holders to execute their decrees.
Such period could therefore be deducted by applying the principles underlying section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act from computing the period of limitation for filing a fresh execution application.
He concedes that here the composition scheme not having been certified to the execution court, the defendants would not have been able to resist an execution application if made within the period of four years specified in the deed of composition.
But the composition being binding on the appellants, they would have laid themselves open to suits for damages at the instance of the defendants if they had proceeded to execute their decrees within this period.
Section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act runs thus : "15 (1) : In computing the period of limi tation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
" It is clear from its terms that it is restricted in its application to a case where the execution of a decree 252 has been stayed by an injunction or an order.
By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the acceptance by the insolvency court of the composition operated as a stay of execution of the decrees for the period of four years referred to in the deed or as an injunction.
Further, the second defendant was not a party to the insolvency proceedings and could, therefore, not have been entitled to the benefit of the order of the court accepting the scheme of composition.
In support of his contention that the principles underlying section 15 (1) are applicable to a case like the present one, Mr. Sastri has strongly relied on the decision in Govindnaik Gurunathnaik vs Basauannawa Parutappa (1).
There, Beaumont C. J., has observed at P. 437 : "Section 15 of the Act recognizes the princi ple that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an application for the execution of a decree, any period during which the execution of the decree has been stayed must be excluded; and it would certainly seem right to apply a similar principle to applications in a suit which has been stayed; in terms.
, however, the section does not apply.
The only authority on the point, to which we have been referred, and which was referred to in the lower Courts, is Pulin Chandra Sen vs Amin Mia Muzffar Ahmad (2).
" Saying that this decision had stood for some years and had not been dissented from the learned Chief justice observed "I would rather base the appellant 'scase on the ground that the right to appear for a final decree was suspended duringthe period in which the suit was stayed.
Sucha principle was applied by the CalcuttaHigh Court (1) I.L.R, (2) A.I.R. 1933 Cal.
253 in Lakhan Chunder Sen vs Manhusudan Sen (1) affirmed by the Privy Council in Nrityamoni Dassi vs Lakhan Chandra Sen (2).
" It would thus appear that the learned Chief Justice based his decision really on section 14 of the Limitation Act.
In both the cases referred to by the learned Chief Justice the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act were applied.
In Pulin Chandra Sen 's case(3), the facts were these: The next friend of it minor instituted a suit upon a mortgage but died after the preliminary decree was passed.
No new next friend was, however, appointed in his place.
The minor made an application for passing a final decree within 3 years after attaining majority, but three years after the period of grace fixed by the preliminary decree.
The High Court, while holding that though the erstwhile minor was not entitled to claim the benefit of section 6 of the Limitation Act, held that the execution application must be regarded as within time since it had been made within three years from the date when the right to apply accrued to him on his attaining majority.
No doubt, this is a case where in effect the court has applied the principles underlying section 6 though it was clearly of opinion that section 6 in terms did not apply.
There is no discussion of the point at all and, therefore, we do not think that this is a decision which needs to be considered.
The next two decisions relied on are Badruddin Khan vs Mahvar Khan (4) and Managing Committee Sundar Singh Malha Singh Rajput High School, Indora vs Sundar Singh Malha Singh Sanatan Dharma Rajput High School Trust (5).
In both these cases the court applied what according to it were the general principles underlying section 15 of the Limitation Act, though the facts of these cases do not strictly fail within the purview of that section.
The question (1)(1907) 1 (3)A.1 R. (2) Cal.
All Lah.
254 is whether there is any well recognized principle whereunder the period of limitation can be regarded as being suspended because a party is prevented under certain circumstances from taking action in pursuance of his rights.
The Limitation Act is a consolidating and amending statute relating to the limitation of suits, appeals and certain types of applications to courts and must, therefore, be regarded as an exhaustive Code.
It is a piece of adjective or procedural law and not of substantive law.
Rules of procedure, whatever they may be, are to be applied only to matters 'to which they are made applicable by the legislature expressly or by necessary implication.
They cannot be extended by analogy or reference to proceedings to which they do riot expressly apply or could be said to apply by necessary implication.
It would, therefore, not be correct to apply any of the provisions of the Limitation Act to matters which do not strictly fall within the purview of those provisions.
Thus, for instance, period of limitation for various kinds of suits, appeals and applications are prescribed in the First Schedule.
A proceeding which does not fall under any of the articles in that schedule could not be said to be barred by time on the analogy of a matter which is governed by a particular article, For the same reasons the provisions of sections 3 to 28 of Limitation Act cannot be applied to situations which fall outside their purview.
These provisions do not adumbrate any general principles of substantive law nor do they confer any substantive rig, its on litigants and, therefore, cannot be permitted to have greater application than what is explicit or implicit in them.
Suspension of limitation in circumstances of the kind obtaining in these appeals is neither explicit nor implicit in section 15 upon which reliance is placed on behalf of the appellants.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the first argument of Mr. Sastri.
Coming to the second argument of Mr. Sastri it would be useful to reproduce the relevant portion 255 of the letter dated April 1.9, 1949, on which reliance is placed : "The properties of our client 's family and his father, Venkatachalam Chettiar 's share of properties have vested in you in the capacity of Trustees as per the composition scheme of arrangement effected on September 9, 1946 and you are managing the same, and you have to pay Rs. 300 per annum to our client from 1st Chitrai of Sarvajit year (April 14, 1947) for his family expenses as provided in the scheme of composition and you have paid Rs. 300 and for the year Sarvajit and have obtained a receipt therefor from my client.
You have not paid the sum of Rs. 300 due for the year Sarwadhari to our client though he demanded you many times.
As it is learnt that individual No. 2 out of you, are raising non maintainable objections and the sum of Rs. 300 due for the year Virodhi, still remains to be paid, I have been given instructions to demand the total amount of Rs. 600 payable for the aforesaid years.
So you should pay the amount to my client and obtain a receipt therefore within one week after the receipt of this notice.
Further you have till now collected Rs. 17,500 as per the scheme of arrangement and though you have received the amount long time ago, you have not paid to the creditors their dividend amounts, you are bound by law and equity to pay interest to the aforesaid amounts You are hereby informed that as you have not paid to the creditors the dividend amounts my client is put to a heavy loss and that you are bound to bear all the losses that may be caused thereby and make good the losses ; you should immediately pay off the creditors the dividends and in default my client will have to launch 256 proceedings against you and seek reliefs through Court.
" This letter was written by the, vakil of the second defendant to the Trustees demanding payment of the maintenance allowance due to the second defendant.
The second object of this letter was to require the trustees to pay out of the funds in their hands dividends due to the various creditors under the composition scheme.
Mr. Sastri contends that this letter contains a definite admission of the jural relationship between the defendant on the one hand and the creditors on the other i. e., the relationship of creditor and debtor and, therefore, this is an admission of liability under the decrees.
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Khan Bahadur Shapoor Freedom Mazda vs Durga Prosad Chamria (1), he says that the essential requirement for sustaining a plea of acknowledgment under section 19 of the Limitation Act is that the statement on which it is sought to be founded must relate to a subsisting liability, indicate the existence of jural relationship and must be intended, either expressly or implied, to admit that jural relationship.
Where such jural relationship is admitted expressly or impliedly, he contends, that the mere fact that the precise nature of the liability is not mentioned would not prevent the acknowledgment from falling within section 19.
That was a case in which the mortgagor had written to his creditor a letter to the following effect "My dear Durgaprosad.
Chandni Bazar is again advertised for sale on Friday the 11th inst.
I am afraid it will go very cheap.
I had a private offer of Rs. 2,75,000 a few days ago but as soon as they heard it was advertised by the Registrar they withdrew.
As you are interested why do you not take up the whole.
There is only (1) (1962] 1 S.C.R. 140.
257 about 70,000 due to the mortgagee a payment of 10,000 will stop the sale.
Yours sincerely, Sd/ J. C. Galstaun.
" The q qestion to be considered was whether this amounted to an acknowledgment of the mortgagee 's right.
This Court held that it did amount to an acknowledgment and observed thus : "It is thus clear that acknowledgment as prescribed by section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action.
It is a mere acknowledgment of the liability in respect of the right in question ; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication.
The statement on which a plea of acknowledgment is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words.
Words used in the acknowledgment must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship.
Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need not be expressed in words.
If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it.
The admission in question need not be express but must be made in circumstances and in words from which the court can reasonably infer that the person making the admission intended to refer to a subsisting liability as at the date of the statement.
In construing words used in the statements made in 258 writing on which a plea of acknowledgment rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered.
Stated generally courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred.
, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far fetched process of ' reasoning.
Broadly stated that is the effect of the relevant provisions contained in section 19, and there is really no substantial difference between the parties as to the true legal position in this matter. ' In our opinion, this case is not of assistance co the appellants.
In the appeals before us though there was a personal liability on the defendants under the various decrees, their liability which was created by the composition deed was only on properties in which they had, consequent on the creation of a trust under the composition deed, only a beneficial interest.
This new liability had to be discharged by the trustees in whom the legal title to the property vested Thus there were two different sets of persons who were liable, the defendants and the Trustees and their respective liabilities were distinct.
What the defendant No. 2 has referred to is the libility of the Trustees arising under the terms of the deed of composition and could be enforced only against them.
To refer to a liability resting on someone else is not to acknowledge one 's own liability within the meaning of the word in section 19.
The defendant No. 2 has not even indirectly referred to the decree much less to the liability arising under any of them.
In the circumstances we must hold that this letter does not extend the period of limitation.
For these reasons 259 we uphold the decision of the High Court and dismiss each of these appeals with costs.
There will, however, be only one hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.

summary/full:
The plaintiff, Ramanathan Chettiar, obtained a decree in O. section No. 45 of 1943 for the recovery of an amount due on promissory note against one Venkatachalam Chettiar and assigned the decree in favour of the appellant in C. A. 105 of 1961.
The execution application filed by him proved infructuous because the first defendant was adjudicated an insolvent on February 27, 1945.
On September 9, 1946 a composition of the debts due from the insolvent and his son, the second defendant, was arrived at.
To the deed of composition the second defendant was also a party though he was not adjudicated an insolvent.
Under that deed the creditors, including the four appellants in this case, agreed to take 40% of the dues.
Under the composition arrangement, the entire property of the defendants, both in India and in Burma was to vest in four trustees, one of whom was the insolvent that is, the first defendant to the suit.
Two of the trustees were the present appellant in C A. No. 104 of 1961 and the fourth trustee was an outsider.
The deed provided for the payment of the reduced amount by the trustees to different creditors from the income of the properties or by sale or mortgage of those properties within tour years from April 14, 1947.
Tile deed further provided for the extension of this time limit "according to exigencies and necessity it the discretion of the first two trustees" i. e., the first defendant and the appellant Chidambaram Chettiar.
The composition contemplated the realisation of the dues of the creditors front the income or sale or mortgage of the Barma property, in the first instance.
The composition scheme was accepted by the insolvency court and the adjudication of the first defendant as insolvent was annulled by the court on December 19, 1946.
Out of the Burma assets very little was realised within the period of four years prescribed in the composition deed and the trustees did not extend the time.
242 The appellants, therefore, sought execution of their decrees against the Indian assets.
The last execution application in O. section No. 46 of 1943 was dismissed on September 19, 1946, and no petition was filed thereafter till 'June 13, 1952.
Similarly in the other three appeals execution applications were filed more than three years after the dismissal of the previous applications.
In each of the execution applications, relief was claimed only against the second defendant.
The Subordinate Judge, before whom the execution applications were filed, held that the adjustment precluded each of the appellants from executing his decree for a period of four years from April 14, 1947 and, therefore, the execution applications were within time.
The High Court disagreed with the Subordinate Judge and holding that the execution petitions were barred by time allowed the appeals.
The main contention of the appellants in this Court was that the principle underlying section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act applied to the present case and at any rate the letter written by the second defendant to the trustees operated as an acknowledgment of liability under section 19 of the Limitation Act.
Held, that section 15 (1) of the Limitation Act is restricted in its application to a case where the execution of a decree has been stayed by an injunction or an order.
The Limitation Act is a piece of adjective or procedural law and not of substantive law.
Rules of Procedure cannot be extended by analogy or reference to proceedings to which they do not expressly apply or could be said to apply by necessary implication.
Suspension of Limitation in circumstances of the kind obtaining in these appeals is neither explicit nor implicit in section 15 upon which reliance is placed by the appellants.
Govind Naik Gurunathnaik vs Basawannawa Parutappa, 1.
L.R. , Pulin Chandra Sen vs Amin Mia Muzaffar Ahmad, A. I.R.1933 Cal.
508, Lakhan Chunder Sen vs Madhusudan Sen, (1907) 1.
L. R. , Nrityamoni Dassi vs Lakhan Chandra Sen, ( 1916) 1.
L. R. , Badruddin Khan vs Mahyar Khan, I. L. R. 1939 All.
103 and Managing Committee Sunder Singh Malha Singh Rajput High School, Indore vs Sunder Sigh Malha Singh Sanatan Dharma Rajput High School Trust, I. L. R. , distinguished.
Held, further, that in the present appeals two different sets of persons, the defendants and the Trustees were liable and their respective liablities were distinct.
To refer to a liablility resting on some one else was not to acknowledge one 's own liability within the meaning of the word in section 19.
The defendant No. 2 had not even indirectly referred to the 243 decree much less to the liability arising under any of them.
In the circumstances it must be held that the letter dated April 19, 1949, did not extend the period of limitation.
Khan Bahadur Shapoor Freedom Mazda vs Durga Prosad Ckamaria , held inapplicable


judgement:
Appeal No. 45 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 16, 1959, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal No. 30 of 1952.
section P. Verma, for the appellants.
B. P. Maheshwari, for respondent.
March 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO J.
This appeal raises the question whether a suit would lie in a civil Court claiming refund of the terminal tax collected by a municipality under the provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (Punjab Act III of 1911), hereinafter called the Act.
The appellant is alleged to be a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act.
It carries on 276 business within the limits of the Ludhiana Municipality.
It imported Sambhar salt into the octroi limits of the Ludhiana Municipality.
The Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, imposed terminal tax on the said salt and the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 5,893/7/0 towards the said tax between October 24, 1947 and December 8, 1947.
Under the Punjab Government Notification No. 26463, dated July 21, 1932, terminal tax was payable under item 68 of the Schedule attached to the said Notification at the rate of 3 pies per maund in respect of salt common, and under item 69 at the rate of As./10/ per maund in respect of salt of all kinds other than common salt.
The Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, collected terminal tax on the Sambhar salt at the higher rate under item 69 of the Schedule on the ground that it did not fall under item 68 of the Schedule.
The appellant filed a suit against the respondent in the Civil Court, Ludhiana, claiming refund of the said amount with interest.
The respondent, inter alia, contended that Sambhar salt was not common salt and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The Senior Subordinate judge, Ludhiana, held that Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68 of the Schedule, that the imposition of tax on it by the respondent under item 69 of the Schedule was illegal and that, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
On appeal, the High Court of Punjab proceeded on the assumption that Sambhar salt was salt common, but held that, even so, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the Act provided for a remedy by way of appeal against the wrong orders of the authorities thereunder.
It further held that, in any view, the suit was premature as the appellant should have pursued his remedies under the Act before coming to the Civil Court.
In the result, the decree of the Subordinate judge was set aside and the suit was dismissed.
The 277 present appeal has been preferred by the appellant by way of certificate issued by the High Court.
Mr. Varma, learned counsel for the appellant, contends that the respondent has no power to impose terminal tax on salt common under item 69 of the Schedule to the said Notification and therefore the tax having been imposed contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
On the other hand, Mr. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the respondent, argues that the respondent has power to impose terminal tax on common salt under the provisions of the Act, that the imposition of tax under a wrong entry could be rectified only in the manner prescribed by the Act and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the refund of tax collected when a specific remedy is available under the Act.
It would be convenient at the outset to notice the relevant provisions of the Act.
Under section 61 (2) the Municipal Committee has power to impose, with the previous sanction of the State Government, any tax which the State Legislature has power to impose in the State, subject to any general or special orders which the State Government may make in that behalf.
The State Government issued the Notification No. 26463 dated July 24, 1932 to come into force from November 1, 1932 empowering the Municipal Committee to impose terminal tax at the rates shown in Col. 3 of the Schedule attached thereto upon the articles mentioned in Col. 2 thereof which are imported into or exported out of the municipal limits by rail or by road.
The relevant items are items 68 and 69.
Item 63 is "salt common" and the rate prescribed is 3 pies per maund; and item 69 is "salt of all kinds other than common salt" and the rate fixed is As. /10/ per maund.
Section 78 provides for a penalty if any person brings any article liable to the 278 payment of terminal tax into the prescribed limits without paying the said tax.
Section 84 gives a right of appeal.
against any levy or refusal to refund any tax collected under the Act to the Deputy Com missioner or such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in that behalf ; under sub section
(2) thereof, if on hearing of an appeal under the section.
, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of a tax arises, on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable doubt, he may,.
either of his own motion or on the application of any person interested, state the case and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court; and after the High Court gives its opinion on the question referred to it, the appellate authority shall proceed to dispose of the appeal in conformity with the decisions of the High Court.
Under section 86, the liability of any person to be taxed cannot be questioned in any manner or by any authority other than that provided in the Act; under sub section
(2) thereof, no refund of any tax shall be claimed by any person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act and rules thereunder.
It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that the power to impose a terminal tax and the liability to pay the same is conferred or imposed on the municipal com mittee and the assessee respectively by the provisions of the Act.
The Act also gives a remedy to an aggrieved party to challenge the correctness of the leavy or to seek refund of the same.
Not only an appeal has been provided for against the order of municipal committee levying the tax or refusing to refund the same, but the appellate authority is empowered to get an authoritative opinion of the High Court on any question as to the liability or on the principle of assessment; and on receiving such opinion, the said authority is bound to dispose of the appeal in the light of the said opinion.
It is said that the reference provided to the High Court is in the discretion of the appellate authority and he can 279 with impunity refuse to do so, even if any difficult question is involved in the appeal.
The question is not whether a particular officer abuses his power but whether a remedy is available under the Act or not.
It cannot be assumed that an officer, though he entertains reasonable doubt on the question as to liability or on the principle of assessment, he will deliberately and maliciously refuse to do his duty : if he does, other remedies may be available.
The Act also in specific terms debars any authority other than that prescribed under the Act from deciding the question of liability of any person to tax or his right to get refund of a tax paid.
In short, the Act contains a self contained code conferring a right, impossing a ability and prescribing a remedy for an aggrieved party.
In such a situation, the question arised whether a Civil Court can entertain a suit for a refund of the tax wrongfully collected from an assessee; and if so, what are the limits of its jurisdiction ? We shall now proceed to consider the relevant principles governing the said question.
Willes, J., in Wolverhamton New Waterworks Co. vs Hawkesford (1), describes as follows the three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute : "One is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law : there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy.
The second class of case is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular from of remedy : there, the party (1) ; , 356.
280 can only proceed by action at common law.
But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not.
existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. .
The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.
" It is clear from the said passage that in a case where the liability is created by a statute, a party aggrieved must pursue the special remedy provided by it and he cannot pursue his remedy in a Civil Court.
This principle was approved by the Judical Committee in Secretary of State vs Mask and Co. (1).
The High Courts in India also accepted the principle and applied it to different situations : see Bhaishankar Nanabhai vs The Municipal Corporation of Bombay (2); Zamindar of Ettayapuram vs Sankarappa (3).
But there is also an equally well settled principle governing the scope of the Civil Court 's jurisdiction in a case where a statute created a liability and provided a remedy.
Lord Macnaghten in East Fremantle Corporation vs Annois (4), states the principles thus : "The law has been settled for last hundred years.
If persons in the position of the appellants, acting in the execution of a public trust and for the public benefit, do an act which they are authorised by law to do, and do it in a proper manner, though the act so done works a special injury to a particular individual, the individual injured cannot maintain an action.
In a word, the only question is, 'Has the power been exceeded? ' Abuse is only one form of excess." In Gaekwar Sarkar of Baroda vs Gandhi Kachrabhai(5) the defendants by the negligent construction of railway made in exercise of their powers under the (1) (1940) L.R. 67 I.A 222.
(3) Mad.
(5) Bom.
(2) Bom.
(4) 281 Railways Act had caused the plaintiff 's land to be flooded in the rainy season and consequently damaged.
The Railways Act provided that a suit shall not lie to recover Compensation for damage caused by the exercise of the powers thereby conferred, but that the amount of such compensation shall be determined in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1870.
In spite of this bar the plaintiff brought a suit for damages for injury alleged to have been caused to his field.
It was argued that though the statutory authority of the Act, of 1890 might have been abused or exceeded, the of the aggrieved party was only to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act and not by a civil suit.
Rejecting that plea the judicial Committee observed: "It would be simply a waste of time to deal seriously with such contentions as these.
It has been determined over and over again that if a person or a body of persons having statutory authority for the construction of works. exceeds or abuses the powers conferred by the Legislature, the remedy of a person injured in consequence is by action or suit, and not by a proceedings for compensation under the statute which has been so transgressed." Indian Courts, in the context of Municipal Acts had occasion to apply both the principles.
In Municipal Board, Benaras vs Krishna & Co. (1), it was held that no suit for a refund of an octroi charge, which has been assessed and levied by a municipality, lies in a Civil Court on the ground that the goods were not in fact assessable to octroi duty or that the amount of assessment was excessive.
There, the assessment was made in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Municipalities Act and the rules made thereunder.
In Municipal Committee, Montgomery vs Sant Singh (2), a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court had to consider the question (1) All.
916 (2) A.1.R. 1940 Lah.
(F.B.)377, 380, 282 whether a suit would lie in a Civil Court for an injunction restraining a Municipal Committe from realizing the tax demanded from a person on the ground that he was not the owner of the lorries the subject matter of tax, and consequently the demand made on him was illegal and ultra vires of the Municipal Committee.
Din Mohammad J., speaking for the Court, elaborately considered the case law on the subject and expressed his conclusion in the following words : "Any special piece of legislation may provide special remedies arising therefrom and may debar a subject from having recourse to any other remedies, but that bar will be confined to matters covered by the legislation and not to any extraneous matter.
A corporation is the creature of a statute and is as much bound to act according to law as the constituents thereof, namely, the individuals ruled by the corporation and if the corporation does an act in disregard of its charter and intends to burden any individual with the consequences of its illegal act, an appeal by that individual to the general law of the land can in no cir cumstances be denied.
" This is a case where it may be said that the Municipal Committee acted not under the Act but outside the Act in as much as the tax on vehicles was payable by the owners only but not by those who did not own them.
Another Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, in Administrator, Lahore vs Abdul Majid (1), had to deal with the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain a suit for an injunction restraining a municipal committee from interfering with the construction of the plaintiff 's proposed building on the ground that its order refusing sanction under section 193 (2) of the Punjab Municipal Act was an abuse of its power.
Mahajan J., delivering (1) A. 1.
R. 283 the judgment on behalf of the Full Bench observed at p. 84 : "The provisions of section 225 which make the decision of the Commissioner final can only mean this that that decision is final only so far as the proceedings under the Act are concerned.
But when an order is made which is outside that Act, then the provisions of section 225 can have no application to such an order which itself is outside the Act. . . . . . .
In short the Bench laid down that in two kinds of cases section 225 was no bar to the jurisdiction of a civil court in examining the order of the municipal committee passed under section 193 (2), Punjab Municipal Act.
The first case is where a committee acts ultra vires and the second case is where it acts arbitrarily or capriciously.
In other words, where it abuses its statutory powers.
" The learned judge concluded thus, at p. 85 "The remedies given to the subject by a statute are for relief against the exercise of power conferred by a statute but those remedies are not contemplated for usurpation of power under cover of the provisions of the statute.
The civil Courts are the proper tribunals in those kinds of cases and their jurisdiction cannot be held barred by reason of statutory remedies provided for grievances arising in exercise of statutory powers.
To cases of this kind the rule that where a statute creates a right and provides at the same time a remedy, that remedy and no other is available, has no application.
Further citation is unnecessary.
The law on the subject may be briefly stated thus : 284 Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the jurisdiction of civil Courts in respect of a particular matter.
The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts.
The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil Courts ; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and Particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed.
The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the said remedy could be had.
Even in such cases, the Civil Court 's jurisdiction is not completely ousted.
A suit in a civil Court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions.
Let us now apply the said principles to the facts of the present case.
The liability to pay terminal tax is created by the Act and remedy is given to a party aggrieved in the enforcement of that liability.
As has been already indicated, against the order of the municipal committee levying terminal tax an appeal lies to the Deputy Commis sioner and a reference to the High Court.
Applying one of the principles stated supra, the party aggrieved can only pursue the remedy provided by the Act and he cannnot file a suit in a civil Court in that regard.
Provisions of sections 84 and 86 of the Act exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of the tax levied or the assessment made under the Act.
285 But the learned counsel for the Appellants contends that the impugned levy was not made under the Act but in derogation of the provisions thereof.
There is no force in this contention.
Section 61 (2) of the Act specifically empowers the Municipal Committee to levy any tax other than those specified therein with the previous sanction of the State Government.
The levy of terminal tax was sanctioned by the Punjab Government by Notification No. 26463 dated July 21, 1932, at the rates shown in column 3 of the Schedule to the said Notification.
Under the said Notification, read with section 61 of the Act, the Municipal Committee is empowered to levy terminal tax on salt whether it is common salt or not.
The Committee has, therefore, ample power under the Act and the Notification issued by the State Government to impose the said tax.
The only dispute was as regards the rate of tax payable in respect of the salt brought by the appellant into the limits of the Municipal Committee.
The rate depended upon the character of the salt.
The ascertainment of the said fact is a necessary step for fixing the rate and it is not possible to say that in ascertaining the said fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Act.
The learned counsel contends that if a municipal committee levies terminal tax on an article not liable to tax under the Act, a suit would lie and, therefore, the same legal position should apply even to a case where the municipal committee levies the tax in respect of an article under an entry not applicable to if.
We do not see any analogy between these two illustrations : in the former, the municipal committee does not act under the Act, but in the latter it only commits a mistake or an error in fixing the rate of tax payable in respect of a particular commodity ; one is outside the Act and the other is under the Act ; one raises the question of jurisdiction and the other raises an objection to a Matter of detail.
We, therefore, hold that in the 286 present case the mistake, if any, committed in imposing the terminal tax can only be corrected in the manner prescribed by the Act.
The appellants have misconceived their remedy in filing the suit in the civil Court.
The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant is a firm carrying on business within the octroi limits of Ludhiana Municipality.
On the Sambhar salt imported by it into the limits of the Municipality terminal tax was imposed and the appellant made payment of the said tax.
Under item 68 of the Schedule to the relevant Government Notification the Municipality is entitled to impose a certain rate of tax on common salt and under item 69 it is entitled to impose a higher rate of tax in respect of salt of all kinds other than common salt.
In the present case the higher rate was imposed.
The appellant filed a suit against the respondent in the civil court, Ludhina, for the refund of the amount paid by him.
274 The Civil Court held that Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68, that the imposition of tax on it by the respondent under item 69 was illegal and that there fore the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
On appeal the High Court proceeded on the assumption that Sambhar salt was common salt but held that, even so, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the Act provided a remedy by way of appeal against the wrong orders of the authorities thereunder.
The present appeal is by way of certificate granted by the High Court.
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the respondent had no power to impose terminal tax on common salt under item 69 of the Schedule and therefore the tax having been imposed contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The contention on behalf of the respondent was that the respondent has power to impose terminal tax on common salt under the provisions of the Act, that the imposition of tax under a wrong entry could be rectified only in the manner prescribed by the Act and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for the refund of the tax collected when a specific remedy is available under the Act.
Held, that a statute can expressly or by necessary implica tion bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of a particular matter.
The mere confirment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil Courts.
The statute may specifically provide for vesting the jurisdiction of civil Courts, even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed.
The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the same remedy could be had.
Even in such cases the civil Court 's jurisdiction is not completely ousted.
A suit in a civil Court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does no act under the Act but in violation of its provision.
Wolverhamton New Watterworks Co. vs Hawkesford, (1859) 6 C. B. (N. section) 336, Secretary of State vs Mast & Co., (1940) L. R. 67 1.
A. 222, Bhaishankar Nanabhai vs Municipal Corporation of Bombay.
(1907) 1. L. R. , Zamindar of Ettayapuram vs Sankarappa, 1904) 1.
L. R. East Fremantle Corporation V., Annois, [1902] A. C. "21 275 Gaekwar Sarkar of Baroda vs Gandhi Kachrabhai, (1903) I.L.R. , Municipal Board, Banares vs Krishna & Co., All.
916, Municipal Committee, Montgomery vs Sant Singh, A. I. R. 1940 Lah.
(F. B.) 377 and Ad ministrator, Lahore vs Abdul Majid, A. I. R.
In the present case the liability to pay terminal tax is created by the Act and a remedy is given to a party aggrieved in the enforcement of the liability.
The party aggrieved can only pursue the remedy provided by the Act and he cannot file a suit in a civil court in that regard.
Provisions of sections 84 and 86 of the Act exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the tax levied or the assessment under the Act.
In a case where the Municipal Committee has undoubted power to levy tax under a particular entry in respect of an article but it levies tax under a wrong entry not applicable to that article the said committee only commits a mistake or an error in fixing the rate (of tax payable) in respect of the said article and no question 'of jurisdiction but only a question of detail is involved.
Such a mistake can be corrected only in the manner prescribed by the Act.