judgement:
"Appeals Nos. 10481050 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and debreedated September 1958 of the Bombay High Court iii special Civil Applications Nos. 1100, 1161 and 1162 of 1958.
D. B. Padhya, J. B. Nagar and.
A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants (in all the appeals).
section G. Patwardhan, and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (in all the three appeals).
414 The following Judgments were delivered Sarkar, J. These three appeals concern compensation payable under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 to the appellants for abolition of their inams.
Some of the appellants held shares in the inam village of Wanz and some in that of Dindoli.
The appellants had moved the High Court at Bombay by several petitions under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the decision of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal regarding the compensation.
The petitions were disposed of by the High Court by a common judgment.
These appeals are against that judgment under a certificate granted by the High Court.
The appellants had claimed compensation under several heads based on different grounds but two of them survive.
The first is that the appellants are entitled to compensation for loss of assessment payable to them by inferior holders, a special class, of tenants holding lands from them.
The Act does not expressly provide for compensation in respect of such lands.
Sub section (1) of section 17 of the Act however provides that if any person is aggrieved by the provisions of the Act abolishing any of his rights to or interest in property and if compensation for such abolition has not been provided for, such person may apply to the Collector for compensation.
The appellants, base their claim on this section.
Sub on (5) of this section makes the right under sub section
(1) unavailable in a certain case and the question is whether the appellant 's claim fell within it.
Now the sub section is in these terms: section 17(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to compensation on the ground that any inam village or inam land which has (sic.) wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue has been under the provisions of this Act made subject to the payment of full assessment in accordance with the provisions of the Code.
Clearly this sub section applies only to a certain kind of claim for compensation in respect of an inam village exempt from payment of land revenue.
The appellants say that their inams were not of this kind and so the subsection does not affect their claim.
According to them, their inams consisted of a grant of land re.
venue only.
The nature of an inam depends on the sanad or the terms of the grant.
The High Court held on a construction of the sanads that the inams were grants of the villages with exemption from land revenue, because the words of the grant conveyed the soil and rights over trees, water, mines etc.
This view is obviously correct.
The appellants then said that notwithstanding that the soil had been granted, their inams were none the less of land revenue only.
Their contention is that before the grants the tenants in 415 occupation paid revenue to the Government and thereafter to the inamdars and the latter being exempt from the liability to pay it over to the Government, the net result was that the inamdars retained the land revenue and were, therefore, the grantees thereof This contention is idle.
There is nothing to show that there were tenants holding lands in the villages before the grants which were made in 1794 and 1803 respectively and whether they paid anything and if so, what ? Furthermore, what the tenants paid to the inamdars (holders of the inams) after the grants was rent and not revenue; it was for the inamdars to fix the amount of it or forego it altogether if they so liked.
What the tenants paid to the inamdars.
was not something which was due to the Government which the inamdars kept to themselves having been exempted from the liability to pay it over to the Government; it was rent due to the inamdars.
It was next said that whatever might have been the position earlier, after the introduction of the survey in the villages in 1900 under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 what a tenant paid to, an inamdar was land revenue.
There is no justification for this.
contention either.
No doubt since the introduction of the survey the amounts payable by the tenants to the inamdars were all assessed under the Code.
The nature of the assessment payable was not however altered thereby nor did it become land revenue.
The survey fixed the amount payable by, a tenant to the inamdar and gave him certain rights.
It also conferred certain benefits on the inamdar in the matter of the realisation of his dues.
The fact that the assessment was made in the same way as land revenue.
made no difference.
It did not change the right to the assessment.
Notwithstanding all this the inamdar remained the grantee of the soil and a person who was not liable to pay revenue in respect of it and likewise the tenant remained liable as before to pay rent to the inamdar.
Furthermore, the distinction between the two kinds of grants, is well recognised and has been maintained by the Act by specifying in section 2 (1)(e) that an inam means a grant of a village with exemption from liability to pay land revenue and also a grant of land revenue only.
The appellants ' contention would in effect wipe out this distinction and cannot therefore be accepted.
The appellants then contended that even if their inams were grants of villages exempt from payment of land revenue, sub section (5) of section 17 did not bar their claim because they were not claiming compensation on the ground that the inam villages previously exempted from land revenue had under the Act been made subject to it.
They say that they have not been made liable to pay land revenue themselves and are only claiming the loss of the money that they used to collect from the inferior holders, the right to 416 which collection was abolished by the Act.
This contention is based on section 5 of the Act which is set out below: section 5.
(1) All inam villages or inam lands are and shall be liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder and the provisions of the Code and the rules relating to unalienated land shall apply to such lands.
(2)(a) An inamdar in respect of the inam land in his actual possession or in possession of a person holding from him other than an inferior holder, referred to in clause(b) below, or (b) an inferior, holder holding inam land on payment of annual assessment only shall primarily be liable to the State Government for the payment of land Revenue, due in respect of such land held by him and shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all obligations in respect of such land as an occupant under the Code or the rules made thereunder or any other law, for the time being in force.
It seems to 'me that this contention is also without any foundation.
The inamdar 's right to appropriate to himself the assessment Axed by the survey and collected from the inferior holders existed on because ' be was exempt from the liability to pay land 'revenue.
If he was not so exempt, then what he collected from the inferior holders would have to be paid over to the Government. 'It would.
follow that the loss for ' Which the appellants claim compensation was really occasioned by the lands being subjected to revenue by section 5(2)(b).
The fact that the inamdar has not himself been made liable for the revenue in respect of the lands held by inferior holders makes no difference.
The substance of the matter is th the inamdar has been deprived of his right to the assessment from the inferior holders and the inferior holders have been made liable to pay that assessment to the Government.
So in actual result the inamdar has been deprived of his right to the assessment because the land has been made subject to payment of land revenue.
His claim for the loss of assessment is,, therefore, in reality based on the ground that the lands which were free from revenue have been made subject to it.
Sub section (5) of section 17 does provide that the bar mentioned in it operates only when land revenue is made payable the inamdar.
It also seems to me that any other interpretation would lead to a result which could not have been intended.
It is not in dispute that for the loss.
of rights in respect of lands in his own possession excepting those mentioned in section 7 or any lands in possession of persons holding from him other than as inferior holders an inamdar is 'not entitled to compensation.
It is admitted that 417 such compensation could not be allowed in view of section 17 (5).
It would be difficult to imagine a reason for the legislature to have made a distinction between such lands and lands in the possession of inferior holders.
The other part of the claim concerns the right to forfeit the ,inferior holders ' tenancies for nonpayment of rent and the right of reversion in respect of them.
These the appellants, have no doubt lost.
The Collector asked the appellants to produce evidence in support of their claims under this head.
They failed to do so.
They could not even cite one instance of the exercise of any such right.
It would be impossible to 'value the loss in respect of them as no material for doing so, is on the record nor was furnished by, the appellants.
No compensation can,.
therefore, be assessed or awarded for the loss of these rights.
The result is that the appeals fail and they are dismissed.
There will be no ' order as to costs.
Mudholkar, J.
These appeals are from a judgment of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petitions preferred by the ;appellants before it.
The appellants art co sharers either in the former Inam village Wanz or in the former Inam village Dindoli, both of which are situate in Surat District.
Under the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition.
Act, 1952 all personal Inams were extinguished and all Inam villages as well as all Inam lands were ,made liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Code.
The Act did not provide for compensation to the Inamdars with respect to the loss of their rights to hold their villages or lands free from payment of land revenue.
Under section 10 of the Act, however, compensation to the Inmadars was provided for the extinguishment of certain rights possessed by them in their Inam villages.
Those rights vest, by virtue of the provisions of section 7 of the Act, in the Government. "Section 17(1) of the Act provides for payment of compensation to a person aggrieved by the provisions of the Act which abolished, extinguished or modified any of his rights or interests in property .provided that compensation for such abolition, extinguishbment or modification of those rights had not ,been provided for in any of the provisions of the Act.
To this provision the following exception has been made in sub section (5): "Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to compensation on the ground that any main village or inam land which has wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue has been under the provisions of this Act made subject to the payment of full assessment in accordance with the provisions of the Code.
" 418 It is common ground that in both the villages there were holders of land called inferior holders.
These were persons claiming through tillers in cultivating possession of different pieces of land in the Inam villages at the time of the grant of the Inams.
It is common ground that their rights to continue to be in possession of those lands and cultivate them were left in tact by the Inamdars and the grantees of the Inams were only entitled to claim rents from them.
It is common ground that under section 216 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 settlement was introduced both in Wanz and Dindoli villages though at different points of time.
It is also the common case of the parties that after the introduction of the survey, land revenue was assessed on the lands held by the inferior holders and in place of their liability to pay such rent as may be fixed from time to time by the Inamdars they thenceforward were rendered liable to pay to the Inamdar only the land revenue assessed at the settlement.
So far as the Government was concerned the grantees of the villages Wanz and Dindoli were exempt from paying land revenue not only in respect of lands held by the inferior holders but also in respect of lands held by the Inamdars themselves or held by persons holding through the Inamdars.
Now, in consequence of the extinguishment of the right of the Inamdars to hold the villages revenue free they have been rendered liable to pay land revenue, to the Government in respect of the lands in their possession or in the possession of persons holding through them.
No liability is, however, cast upon them to pay to the Government land revenue in respect of lands in the possession of inferior holders.
This follows clearly from section 5 of the Act and is not disputed by either set of parties to the appeal.
No compensation is expressely provided for the loss of the right of the Inamdar to recover from the inferior holders land revenue assessed on the lands in their possession.
Mr. Padhya contends that the appellants would, therefore, be entitled to claim compensation in respect of this loss under section 17(1).
He points out that the loss of this right to the Inamdars is not occasioned because of the fact that the Ina= villages were made liable to pay full assessment but because the inferior holders have now been required to pay land revenue to the Government instead of to the bamdars.
It is difficult to accept this argument.
The relevant provision of the Act for consideration s.5 which runs thus: "5(1) AR inam villages or main lands are and shall be liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made thereunder and the provisions of the Code and the rules relating to unalienated land shall apply to such lands.
(2)(a) An inamdar in respect of the inam land in his actual possession or in possession of a person holding from 419 him other than an inferior holder, referred to in clause (b) below, or (b) an inferior holder holding inam land on payment of annual assessment onlv shall primarily be liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue due in respect of such land held by him ano shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all obligations in respect of such land as an occupant under the Code or the rules made thereunder or any other law for 'the time being in force." .lm0
It is sub section (1) of this section which creates liability to pay land revenue.
Sub section (2) then proceeds to say as to who is made liable to pay land revenue: the Inamdar or holder from the Inamdar or an inferior holder.
Clause (b) of sub section
(2) which deals with the liability placed on inferior holders has, therefore, to be read with sub section
(1) and when they are so read it would be clear that the loss resulting to the Inamdar is the direct consequence of the operation of these provisions.
In other words it is the direct consequence of the provisions of the Act that lands in possession of inferior holders are made liable to pay full assessment "in accordance with the provisions of the Code".
This in the context means, liable to pay full assessment to the Government.
It is true that by making this provision the Inamdars have sustained loss of one of their rights in property.
it is also true that if section 17(1) does not apply as in my view it does not applyno compensation is payable to the Inamdars.
However, as no argument has been raised before us that the aforesaid provision of the Act infringes the guarantee incorporated in article 31(1) of the Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional the provisions of section 5 of the Act must be held to be fully operative.
It was faintly urged by learned counsel that the Inamdar 's right of reversion and right of escheat have also been taken away by the Act and no compensation is provided foe it.
No provision was, however, brought to our notice by virtue of which it could be said that these rights of the Inamdars have at all been touched by the Act.
Even assuming that these rights have been taken away it seems to me that the grounds given by the High Court for rejecting the appellants claim are cogent and adequate In the 'result, therefore, I agree that the appeals be dismissed.
I would make no order as to costs.
Bachawat, J.
The appellants were holders of shares in inam villages; some held shares in the inam village of Wanz, others held shares in the inam village of Dindoli.
The inams were abolished by the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952.
By section 4 of the Act, save as expressly provided by or under the Act, all rights in the inams were extinguished Sections 10 and 17(1) provided for payment of compensation.
In view of sub section (5) of s.17, no compensation can be claimed under sub section
(1) of section 17 on the ground that any inam village or inam land which was wholly or partially exempt from payment of land revenue has been under the Act made subject to the payment of full assessment.
The appellants filed claims for compensation under sections 10 and 17 (1) of the Act before the Collector of Surat.
We are now concerned with the following.
two claims for compensation.
under section 17(1) of the Act: (1) loss for the abolition of the right of the appellants to recover assessment from the inferior: holders in respect of the lands in their possession; (2) loss for the extinction of the right of reversion and forfeiture in respect of those lands.
The Collect or of surat and the Bombay Revenue Tribunal concurrently held that the claim for compensation, in respect of the first item was barred by section 17(5) of the Act and in respect of the claim under the second head, the appellants failed to prove that they sustained any loss.
The appellants filed applications under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court at Bombay challenging the: Correctness of these findings.
The High Court dismissed the 'applications.
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, classifies personal inams into two categories. ' The appellants Content that their inams were grants of land revenue and therefore personal inams of the second category specified in section 2(1)(e)(ii).
In respect of the personal inam ' of the second category, the bar of s .
17(5) is not attracted.
On the other ' hand, the respondents contend that the inams in question were grants of villages partially exempt from payment of the land revenue, and therefore personal, inams of the first category specified in s ' 2(1)(e)(i).
In respect of personal inams of the first category, the. bar of section 17(5) is attracted.
The High Court held and, in my opinion, rightly that the grants of the villages, on their true construction were grants of the soil.
The inamdars were not required to pay any land revenue except the quit rent and some small haqs.
Consequently, the grants were grants of villages with) partial exemption from payment of, the land revenue and were Personal inams, of the first category specified in section l(1)(e)(i).
The survey and settlement of the villages under section 216 of the Land Revenue Code, 1879 made no difference in the character of the inams.
The introduction of the survey settlement did not confer on the inferior holders the status, of occupants, nor render them liable to pay land revenue to the Government,, they continued to, be inferior holders under the inamdar and liable to Day the assessments to him.
In spite of the survey settlement, the villages continued to be alienated villages and the inams continued to be personal inams of the first category referred to in section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act.
The High Court rightly held that the appellants are not en.; titled to claim compensation in, respect of the abolition of their 421 421 right to recover assessment from the inferior holders.
The inam lands ' no longer enjoyed either total or partial exemption from, payment of land revenue.
By section 5(1) of the Act, all inam lands are now liable to payment of full land revenue.
By section 5(2)(b), in respect of lands held by inferior holders on payment of assessment only, the inferior holders now enjoy the status of occupants, and are liable to pay the land revenue directly to the State Government.
In respect of those lands, the inamdars are neither entitled to collect the assessment from the inferior holders nor liable to.
pay land, revenue to the State Government.
Had the appellants ' right to recover assessment from the inferior holders not been abolished, they would have been entitled to recover the, amounts.
of assessments from the inferior holders and at the same time would have been liable to pay the identical amounts to the Government on account of land revenue.
The loss consequential on the abolition of the right to recover assessment is, therefore, nil.
The claim under this head is really on the ground that the.
inam lands which were formerly exempt from payment of land revenue have been subjected by the Act to payment of full assessment.
Such a claim is barred by section 17(5) of the Act.
With regard to the claim for compensation under the second head, the High Court rightly held that the appellants could not establish any loss under this head.
They failed to show that they exercised any right of forfeiture or claimed any right of reversion at any time.
I see no reason for disturbing the finding of the High Court and the Tribunals below on this point.
The appellants submit that in view of the ephemeral nature of their rights of reversion and forfeiture in respect of the lands held by the inferior holders, the grants of villages, as far as they relate to those lands, are assimilated to grants of land revenue.
They submit that the High Court and the Tribunals below while holding that the only right of the appellants in respect of those lands was to recover the assessments from the inferior holders, have inconsistently and unjustly held that the grants were grants of inam villages and not of land revenue so as to attract the bar of section 17(5).
This submission is not well founded.
A grant of a village or land with total or partial exemption from payment of land revenue is essentially different from a grant of land revenue, and the distinction has been preserved by the Act.
On the extinction of the grant of land revenue, the inamdar loses all rights in respect of the grant, and he is therefore entitled to full compensation under section section 17(1).
On the other hand, on abolition of the grant of an inam village or land, the inamdar is allowed to retain and enjoy various rights and benefits arising out of the grant.
Section 5(2)(a) gives him the rights of an occupant in respect of lands in his actual possession or in possession of persons holding from him other than 422 inferior holders.
The grants of inam lands, on their true construction, may include the right to mines or mineral products see Secretary of State for India vs Shantaram Naravan(1), and this right of the inamdar, if any, is preserved by section 9 'of the Act.
By section 10 of the Act the inamdar holding inam villages or lands is entitled to compensation in respect of any right or interest in any property referred to in section 7.
He is also entitled to compensation under section 17(1), but this right is subject to the provisions of section 17(5).
It will appear, therefore, that the Act treats the inams of the two ,categories very differently.
While the holder of the inam of the first category referred to in section 2(1)(e)(i) suffers from the disadvantage of the bar of section 17 (5) in respect of compensation, he enjoys numerous advantages which are denied to the holder of the inam of the second category referred to in section 2(i)(e)(ii).
The appeals fail, and are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Appeals dismissed.
(1) (1925) 1.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellants were holders of shares in Inam villages.
on the, Inams being abolished by Bombay Personal In Abolition ACt, 1953 they claimed compensation for their Inam under section 17(1) of the Act.
By a. 17(5).
"Nothing is this section shall entitle any person to compensation on the ground that any inam village, or inam land which has (sic.) wholly or partially exempt from the payment of land revenue has been under the provision of this Act made subject to the payment of full assessment in accordance with the ;provisions of the Code ." section 5 of the Act provide, "(i) All inam villages or inam, lands are and shall be liable to the Payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and rules made thereunder and the provisions the Code and the rules relating to unalienated land shall apply to such lands.
(12) (a) An inamdar in respect of the inam land in his actual Possession or in possession of a person holding from him other than 'an inferior holder, referred to in clause (b) below or (b) an inferior holder holding inam land on payment of annual assessment only shall Primarily be liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue, due in respect of such land held by him and shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all obligations in respect of such land as An ocupant under the Code or the rules made thereunder or, any other law for the time being in force.
" HELD (Per Sarkar J.) (1).
On a construction of the Sanad by which the inams were granted, the,grants were of villages and exemption from land revenue as mentioned, 14 section 17(5).
Mat the tenants paid to the Inamdars was not something which was due to the Government which, the Inamdars kept to themselves but was Tent due to the Inamdars.
[414 G;415 C] Even after the survey in the Inam villages in 1900 under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 the Inamdars remained the grantees of the soil exempt from payment of revenue and the tenants remained liable, as before, to pay rent to the Inamdars.
[415 E F] (2) Section 5 of the Act does not show that the Inamdars were claiming compensation for the loss of money that they used to collect from the inferior holders, the right to which collection was abolished by the Act and, therefore section 17(5) did not apply to them.
The fact that under a. 5 the Inamdar has not himself been made liable for 'the revenue in respect of the land held by the inferior holders, made no differentce.
By section 5 an 7 413 Inamdar has been deprived of his right to the assessment from the inferior holders and the inferior holders have been made liable to pay that assesment to the Government.
Therefore, in actual result, the Inamdar has been deprived of his right to the assessment because the land has, been made subject to the payment of land revenue and he was, therefore covered by section 17 (5.).
[416 E G] Per Mudholkar, J. : Section 5 (1) of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1953, creates liability to pay and revenue to the Government with respect to inam laads, in accordance with the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.
Where lands were in possession inferior holders section 5(2) (b) places the liability, on the inferior holders.
The loss resulting to the inamdars is the.
direct consequence of the operation of these provisions.
Therefore section 17(5) of the Act bars the claim for compensation for loss of the right of the appellants to recover from the inferior holders land revenue, assessed 'on the lands in their posmsion.
[419 C E] Per Bachawat, I The grants of the villages,.
on the construction of the deeds were grants of villages Partial exetmption from payment of land revenue and were personal of the category specified in section 2(1) (e) (i).
The introduction of, the survey settlement made no difference in the character pi the inams.
After the Abolition .Act,; the lands no longer enjoyed either total or Spartial exemption from payment of land revenue.
By section 5 (.1) of the Act, all inam lands are now liable to payment of full land revenus By section 5 (2) (b), in respect of lands held by inferior holders the inferior holders now enjoy the status of occupants, and are liable to pay the land revenue directly to the State Government.
The appellants were not entitl ed to claim compensation in respect of the abolition of their right to recover assessment from the inferior hoders, because such a claim is really on the ground that the inam lands which were formerly exempt from payment of land I revenue have been subjected by the Act to payment of full assessment.
Such a claim is based by section 17(5).
A grant of village or land with total or partial exemption of land revenue is essentially different from a grant of land revenue and the distinction has been Preserved by the Act, On the extension of the, grant of land revenue, the "namdar lows all right in respect of the grant and he is therefore entitled to full compensation order section 17(1).
On the other hand, on.
abolition of the grant of an. in= village or land the inamdar is allowed to retain and enjoy various rights and benefits, but at the 6 ' .Me time the right to compensation under section 17(1) is subject to the bar of [420 H 421 H]


judgement:
Appeal No. 354 of 1965 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 18, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) in Second Appeal No.77 of 1960.
B R. L. lyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A. ' G. Ratnaparkhi for the appellants.
MIC Sup.
C.I./66 14 424 section N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent.
B. R. L. Iyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for intervener No. 1.
J. B. Dadachanji, 0.
C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for intervener No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.
In 1936 certain home farm land in Mouza Belam Bujurg, Paragana Burwaha, of the estate of the respondent were leased for cultivation to one Mangtya by the Court of Wards which was in management of the estate.
The Court of Wards released the estate on June 14, 1951.
The respondent thereafter terminated the tenancy and instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class 11, Burwaha, against Mangtya for a decree in ejectment and for mesne profits.
The Trial Court decreed the suit for possession and awarded mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 300/per annum from the date of the decree till delivery of possession.
The decree passed by the Trial Court was confirmed in appeal by the District Court, Nimar, and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
Sons of Mangtya, who died after the judgment of this High Court have preferred this appeal with special leave.
The land in dispute is ryotwari land and Mangtya was a ryot wari sub lessee of the land.
It was contended before the High Court in Rao Nihalkaran vs Ramchandra & Others ' that even though a ryotwari sub lessee of land in the Madhya Bharat region may ordinarily acquire under section 185 (1)(ii)(b) on the commencement of the Code the status of an occupancy tenant, the tenant Mangtya was disentitled to that status since at the commencement of the tenancy the respondent was subject to a disability of the character set out in section 168(2).
The High Court upheld the plea of the respondent; they held that the expression "holds the land from a Bumiswami who belongs to any one or mor of the classes" pre dicates two conditions that the land is held by a tenant under a Bhumiswami, and that at the co ormmencement of the tenancy the landlord who subsequently acqured the status of a Bhumiswami belonged to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub section
(2) of section 168 of the Code.
The only question which falls to be determined in this appeal is whether under section 185 (3) of the, Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code the tenant Mangtya was disqualified from claiming the status of an occupancy tenant.
By section 151 of the Code there was to be in the State of Madhya Pradesh a single class of tenure holders of land held from the State to be known as Bhumiswami.
The (1) L. P. A. No. 14 of 1961 decided on Sgt.
24, 1962.
425 respondent may be by virtue of section 158(b) deemed to be a Bhumiswami.
The rights of a Bhumiswami under the Code are heritable, but in the matter of transfer inter vivos they are subject to restrictions prescribed by sections 165 & 168.
Land comprised in the holding of a Bhumiswami may not by virtue of section 168(1) be transferred by way of a lease, except in the conditions mentioned in sub sections
(2) & (3) of section 168.
A Bhumiswanii subject to one or more of the disabilities mentioned in sub section
(2) may grant a lease of his holding.
It has to be noticed that the provisions which create the tenure of a Bhumiswami and the restrictions thereon are prospective.
We have held in Appeal No. 365 of 1965 Rao Nihalkaran vs Ramgopal(1) that a person whose tenancy rights were determined before the commencement of the Code will be invested with the status of an occupancy tenant provided he.
holds land of the nature described in sub section
(1) of section 185.
But upon this rule is engrafted an exception by sub section
(3) of section 185 that nothing in sub section
(1) shall apply to a person who at the commencement of the Code holds the land from a disabled Bhumiswami.
At the commencement of the Code the respondent acquired the tenure of a Bhumiswami under section 158(b) of the Code, but it cannot be said that the respondent "belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub section (2) of section 168".
For the exemption from the operation of section 185(i) it had to be established that the respondent at the commencement of the Code "belongs" to the disabled class.
He undoubtedly did belong to the disabled class when the lease was granted, but not at the commencement of the Code, and what is decisive for the operation of the exemption under sub section
(3) is the status of Bhumiswami at the commencement of the Code.
By section 168(2) the prohibition against a Bhumiswami against transfer by way of a lease of the land comprised in his holding is inoperative, where the Bhumiswami is subject to any one of the disabilities mentioned in cls.
(i) to (ix) of sub section
That provision is undoubtedly prospective.
The Legislature has by sub section
(3) of section 185 prohibited the acquisition of occupancy tenancy rights by a tenant of 'a Bhumiswami who was when the Code came into force subject to any of the disabilities mentioned in section 168 (2).
It is clear from the terms of sub section (2) of section 168 proviso 2 that a lease made by a Bhumiswami who is subject to a disability remains valid only during the disability and one year after the determination of that disability, by death or otherwise.
Therefore a lease created by a Bhumiswanii, even if he was at the date when he created the lease subject to a disability would become invalid on the termination of the disability and a period of one year thereafter.
By sub section
(4) of section 168 it is provided that a lease granted in pursuance of sub sections
(2) or (3) shall be held on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the lessee and the Bhumiswami and it is further (1) ; 426 provided by sub section
(5) that on the coming into force of the Code where any land is held on lease from a Bhumiswami who belongs to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub section (2) such lease shall, on the coming inito force of the Code, be deemed to be a lease granted in.
pursuance of sub section (2).
The lease granted by a person who on the commencement of the Code acquires the status of a Bhumiswami is therefore deemed to be a lease granted in pursuance of sub section
(2) of section 168, if the Bhumiswami "belongs" to the class mentioned in sub (2).
Reading section 185(3) with section 168 (2) and section 168 (5) it is clear that to attract exclusion from the operation of section 185 (1) the Bhumiswami must, at the commencement of the Code, be subject to the disability mentioned in sub section
(2) of section 168.
What is determinative is not the existence of disability at the date of the grant of the lease before the commencement of the Code, but the disability of the Bhumiswami at the commencement of the Code.
On the date on which the Code was brought into force, the respondent was not a Bhumiswami belonging to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub section
(2) of section 168, and the exception provided by section 185 (3) will not apply.
It is true that the respondent was a minor at the time when the lease was granted by the Court ,of Wards.
But he ceased to be a minor in 1951.
By virtue of section 185 (1) the tenant, notwithstanding the institution of the suit, became an occupancy tenant of the land when the Code was brought into operation and the mere fact that the respondent was a minor at the date of the lease did not prevent the statutory acquisition of the status of an occupancy tenant by Mangtya under section 185(1).
The appeal must therefore be allowed and the decree passed by the High Court set aside.
The suit filed by the respondent will :stand dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs throughout.

summary/full:
In 1936, certain ryotwari lands belonging to the estate of the respondent in Madhya Bharat were leased for cultivation to the appellants ' father M by the Court of Wards which was in management of the estate.
After the Court of Wards released the estate in 1951 the respondent terminated the tenancy and instituted a suit for a decree in ejectment and for mesne profits.
The trial Court passed a decree in the respondent 's favour and this was confirmed in appeal by the District Court as well as by the High Court.
It was contended on, behalf of the appellants that on the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, M acquired the status of an occupancy tenant as he held land of the nature described by section 185(1).
On the other hand it was the respondent 's contention that even though a ryotwari sub lessee might acquire the status of an occupancy tenant; the tenant M was disentitled to that status since at the commencement of the tenancy the respondent, was subject to a disability of the character set out in section 168(2).
Accordingly, the case fell within the exception to section 185(1) provided in sub section
(3) of that section.
By virtue of section 185(1), M became an occupancy tenant of the land when the Code was brought into operation; the appeal must therefore be allowed and the respondent 's suit dismissed.
[426 E] For the exemption from the operation of section 185(1) to apply, it had to be established that the respondent at the commencement of the code belonged to the disabled class.
Although being a minor he belonged to the disabled class at the time when the lease w ; granted, he did not belong to the disabled class at the commencement of the Code.
What is decisive for the operation of the exemption under section 185(3) read with section 168(2) is the status at the commencement of the code.
[425 E] Rao Nihalkaran vs Ramgopal ; , referred to.


judgement:
Appeal No. 365 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated February 18, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore F Bench) in Second Appeals Nos.
68 and 70 of 1961.
C. B. Agarwala, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0.
C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
K. B. Chaudhry, for the respondent.
B. R. L. lyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for Intervener No. 1.
J. B. Dadachanji, 0.
C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for interveiier No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.
Ramgopal respondent in this appeal was a tenant F of certain Inam land situate in village Nanda Panth in Indore Tahsil.
the appellant Rao Nihalkaran holder of the Inam 429 served a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground that he needed the land for personal cultivation, and commenced an action in the Court of the civil Judge, Class 11, Indore, on July 21, 1950, against Ramgopal for a decree in ejectment.
The Trial Court decreed the suit.
During the pendency of the appeal to the District Court, Indore, by Ramgopal against the decree, Madhya Bharat Muafi & Inam Tenants and Sub tenants Protection Act 32 of 1954 was enacted, and pursuant to the provisions thereof hearing of the appeal remained stayed till 1960.
in the mean time the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Act 20 of 1959) was brought into force.
Ramgopal urged before the District Court that he had by virtue of section 185 of the Code acquired rights of an occupancy tenant and the appellant 's right to obtain an order in ejectment on the ground set up must be refused.
The District Judge accepted the contention of the respondent and allowed the appeal.
Against the decree passed by the District Court, Indore, the appellant appealed to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench.
Following their judgment in Rao Nihalkaran vs Ramchandra and Others (1), the High Court confirmed the decree of.
the District Judge, and dismissed the appeal.
With special leave granted by this Court, this appeal has been preferred.
The dispute in the appeal centres round the meaning of the expression "tenant" used in section 185(i) cl.
(ii) (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
The material part of the clause reads: "Every person who at the coming into force of this Code holds (i) (ii) in the Madhya Bharat region (a) any Inam land as a tenant, or as a sub tenant or as an ordinary tenant, shall be called an occupancy tenant, and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon an occupancy tenant by or under this Code.
" It is common ground that the tenancy of ran occupancy tenant may be determined under section 193 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code by an order of the Sub Divisional Officer on the grounds specified in that section, and personal requirement of the land lord is not one of such grounds.
But counsel, for the appellant urged that the rights of an occupancy tenant arise in favour of a person under section 185 (1) cl.
(ii) (a) only if there is between him and the claimant to the land a subsisting relation under which he holds land (1) L. P. A. No. 14 of 1961 decided on Sept. 24, 1962.
430 as a tenant at the date when the Code came into force.
The Code has, it is said, no retrospective operation, and the person who under the law in force before the commencement of the Code had ceased to be a tenant because, of termination of the contract between, him and the landlord is not invested with the rights of an occupancy tenant under section 185 (1) (ii) (a).
In the alternative it is contended that by virtue of section 261 and section 262(2), operation of section 185 is expressly excluded, when a person against whom proceedings have been instituted prior to the commencement of the Code for ' a decree in ejectment in enforcement of a right acquired under the law then in force, claims the states of an occupancy tenant.
The District Court held that the expression "tenant" within the meaning of section 185 (1)(ii)(a) of the Code includes a person whose tenancy stood determined before the commencement of the Code, and with that view the High Court agreed.
Counsel for the appellant complained that in reaching this conclusion, the Courts below ignored the definition in section 2(y) of the Code that the expression "tenant" means a person holding land from a Bhumiswami as an occupancy tenant under Ch.
XIV, and said that a person qua whom the contractual relation under which he was inducted as a tenant was determied prior to the commencement of the Code is not a tenant within the meaning of section 185(i)(ii)(a).
To appreciate this argument it is necessary to examine the relevant legislative history culminating in the enactment of the Code in 1959.
In 1948 twenty Indian States including the States of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa formed themselves into a Union.
Five more States were later incorporated into this Union.
Under the Constitution, Madhya Bharat was formed as a Part B State out of the territories of the United States of Gwalior, Indore & Malwa and certain enclaves merged therein and the Chief Commissioner 's Province of Panth Piploda.
Under the a new State of Madhya Pradesh was formed as from November 1, 1956 consisting of the Part B State of Madhya Bharat, parts of the former State of 'Madhya Pradesh, the territories of the States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh and Sironj sub division of Kotah in the former State of Rajasthan.
Apparently the diverse land tenures prevalent in the covenanting States and the laws governing them remained in operation in their respective territories, even after the formation if the Part B State of Madhya Bharat.
Attempts were made to evolve a uniform pattern of revenue administration in conformity with the directive principles of State Policy in the Constitution to bring the tiller of the soil into direct relation with the State.
The Legislature of the Part B State of Madhya Bharat enacted Act 66 of 1950 to consolidate and declare the law relating to revenue administration in the United States of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa and land revenue, land tenure 431 and other matters connected with the land in the Ryotwari tracts or villages of the United States.
Section 54 of Act 66 of 1950 defined "Pakka tenant", "ordinary tenant", "sub tenant" and prescribed the duties of a tenant by section 55.
By section 73 a "Pakka tenant" was prohibited from sub letting for any period any land comprised in his holding, unless he belonged to any of the classes mentioned in section 74.
By section 74 certain classes of disabled persons were permitted to sub let the whole or any part of their holding.
But such a sub lease made in pursuance of the provisions of the Act was to cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise.
By section 75 it was provided that a sub lease of the whole or any part of the holding of a "Pakka tenant" effected "properly and legally" prior to the commencement of the Act was to terminate after the expiry of the period of sub lease or expiry of four years after the commencement of the Act, whichever period was less.
By section 76 a sub lessee failing to hand over pos session after expiry of his right was to be deemed a tresspasser and liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The Legislature with the object of improving the conditions of agriculturists and with a view to remove the middleman between the State and the tiller of the soil also enacted the Zamindari Abolition Act and the Abolition of Jagirs Act.
Another statute which has a bearing on the dispute in this appeal the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub tenants Protection Act 32 of 1954 was enacted to provide, for the duration of the Act, for the protection of tenants or ordinary tenants and sub tenants of Muafidars, Inamdars and Istumurardars in Madhya Bharat against eviction by such Muafidars or Inamdars of their tenants, as the case may be, and for stay of suits and other proceedings relating to such eviction.
By section 2(ii) the terms "tenant", "sub tenant", "ordinary tenant" and "rent" were given the same meaning as was assigned to them in sub sections
(1) (7), (8) & (9) of section 54 of Act 66 of 1950.
By section 1 a restriction was placed, upon eviction of any tenant, sub tenant.
or ordinary tenant of Inam land during the continuance Act and it was declared that the tenant, sub tenant or ordinary tenant shall not pay rent higher than what he was 'paying in the agricultural year ending June 30, 1948.
By section 4 all suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings for the eviction of Inam land tenants, sub tenants or ordinary tenants from Inam lands, or in which a claim for such eviction was involved, pending in the Court at the commencement of the Act or which may be instituted after such commencement, were to be stayed subject to the provisions contained in the Act.
By sub section
(II) of section 4 it was provided that if the Inamdar, Muafidar or Istumurardar had taken possession of the land illegally from a tenant, sub tenant or an ordinary tenant after August 15, 1947 such a tenant, sub tenant or an ordinary 432 tenant may apply to the Tahsildar to be restored to possession of such land and on such application the Tahsildar shall cause the land to be returned to such tenant, sub tenant or ordinary tenant from the Inamdar, Muafidar, or Istumurardar, as the ease may be.
By section 6 it was provided that all suits and proceedings shall, after the expiration of the Act, be proceeded with subject to the provisions of any law which may then be in force from the stage which had been reached when the suit or proceeding was stayed.
Act 32 of 1954 was intended initially to remain in force for a period of two years, but its life was extended by later enactments.
Protection against eviction during the continuance of Act 32 of 1954 by enforcement of a decree passed in a suit or a proceeding either before or after the date on which the Act was brought into force was conferred upon tenants, sub tenants and ordinary tenants.
It is clear from the terms of sections 3 & 4 of the Act that the Legislature did not seek to grant protection only to persons between whom and the claimants for protection there was a subsisting contractual relation.
A person who was inducted into the land as a tenant, sub tenant or ordinary tenant and who continued to hold the land at the commencement of the Act was entitled to protection, notwithstanding that under the law in force prior to the Commencement of the Act the contractual relation was determined.
The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was enacted in 1959.
By section 157 of the Code it was declared that there shall be only one class of tenure holders of lands held from the State to be known as Bhumiswami, and by section 158 it was provided that every person, who at the time of coming into force of the Code, belongs to any of the four classes specified shall be called a Bhumiswami, and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under the Code, and among the persons specified is "every person in respect of land held by him in the Madhya Bharat region as a Pakka tenant or as a Muafidar, Inamdar or Concessional holder as defined in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007".
The argument of counsel for the appellant is that the respondent not being a tenant at the commencement of the Code could not acquire the rights of an occupancy tenant, and that any proceeding instituted against the tenant must be heard and disposed of according to the law in force prior to the commencement of the Code.
The definition of the expression "tenant" in section 2(y) postulates a subsisting tenancy, but that definition may be resorted to for interpreting section 185 (1) only if the context or the subject matter of the section does not suggest a different meaning.
A tenant is by the definition a person who holds land as an occupancy tenant from a Bhurmiswami: but the status of a Bhumiswami is recognized 433 for the first time by the Code, and an occupancy tenant from a Bhumiswami would mean only a person belonging to that class who acquires rights of occupancy tenant after the Code comes into force.
The position of a tenant prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force does not appear to have been dealt with in this definition.
The definition which is specially devised for the purpose of the Act throws no light on the nature of the right which invests.
the holder of land with the status of an occupancy tenant at the commencement of the Code.
In the context in which the expression "tenant" occurs in section 185 the defi nition could not be intended to apply in determining the conditions which invest upon a holder of land the status of an occupancy tenant.
If the expression "tenant" in section 185 (1) be released from the artificial definition as given in section 2(y), in view of the context in which it occurs, the expression "tenant" in section 185(1)(ii)(a), having regard to the object of the enactment would be ascribed the meaning that expression had in Act 32 of 1954.
This view is strengthened by certain indications found in cl.
(ii)(b) if section 185 (1) which provides that in the Madhya Bharat region every person who at the commencement of the Code holds any land as ryotwari sub lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub Lessee Protection Act 29 of 1955 shall be called an occupancy tenant.
Unless a ryotwari sub lessee as defined in Act 29 of 1955 included a sub lessee whose tenure was terminated before the commencement of the Code, that clause would not apply to any concrete case.
The Court would not unless compelled by unambiguous language impute to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision which was ineffective.
By section 73 of Act 66 of 1950 a Pakka tenant could not sub let for any period any land comprised in his holding except in the cases provided for in section 74,, and by section 75 it was provided that all sub leases in force at the commencement of the Act were to terminate either on the expiry of the period of sub lease or expiry of four years whichever was earlier.
All sub leases except those which were covered by section 74 i.e. sub leases granted by disabled persons before the commencement of Act 66 of 1950 stood terminated some time before the end of 1954 and by the express terms of section 76 the sublessees were to be deemed trespassers and liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Notwithstanding these provisions, by another Act 29 of 1955, scheme of which was substantially the same as the scheme of Act 32 of 1954, ejectment of ryotwari sub lessees other than a sub lessee under section 74 of Act 66 of 1950 was suspended for the duration of the Act, and all suits and proceedings in execution for ejectment were to be stayed.
By section 2(b) of Act 29 of 1955 "Ryotwari sub lessee" was defined as meaning "a person to whom a Pakka tenant of any ryotwari land has sub let on sub lease any part of his ryotwari land".
By 434 section 3 a ban was imposed against ejectment of all ryotwari sub lessees other than sub lessees under section 74 of Act 66 of 1950.
By section 4 provision was made for ejectment of ryotwari sub lessees and provisions similar to sections 5 & 6 of Act 32 of 1954 were made in this Act also.
A ban was therefore imposed against eviction of ryotwari sub lessees and proceedings for eviction against them were stayed by Act 29 of 1955.
Therefore ryotwari sub lessees who had ceased by determination of the sub leases to have right in the lands were still protected from eviction during the pendency of Act 29 of 1955, and by section 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code upon the ryotwari sub lessees the rights of occupancy tenants were conferred.
If the expression "ryotwari sub lessee" were to be construed to mean a ryotwari sub lessee between whom and his lessor there was a subsisting contract of sub letting, the protection for all purposes would be ineffective, for, by express statutory provision read with section 74 of Act 66 of 1950 all ryotwari sub leases stood determined before Act 29 of 1955 was brought into force, and by virtue of section 185 (3) of the code a holder of land from a disabled Bhumiswami belonging to a class mentioned in section 168(2) of the Code does not qualify for the status of an occupancy tenant.
It may be noticed that in the class of disabled persons in sub s (2) of section 168 of the Code are included all persons who are declared disabled by sub section
(2) of section 74 of Act 66 of 1950.
If ryotwari sub lessees of disabled persons mentioned in subs.
(2) of section 74 of Act 66 of 1950 cannot claim rights of occupancy tenants by virtue of section 185 (3) of the Code and other ryotwari sublessees cannot qualify for those rights because of the determination of their interest as sub lessees by virtue of sections 75 & 76 of Act 66 of 1950 section 185, (1)(ii)(b) of the Code will not apply to any class of ryotwari sub lessees.
This is a strong ground in support of the view taken by the High Court that the expression "ryotwari sublessee" in section 185 (1)(ii)(b) of the Code include persons whose contractual relation has been det ermined either under the terms of contract of sub lease or statutorily under Act 66 of 1950.
If that be the true meaning of the expression "ryotwari sub lessee ' there would be no reason to think that the Legislature sought to make a distinction between tenants, sub tenants and ordinary tenants of Inam land in section 185(1)(ii)(a) of the Code and ryotwari sub lessees of other lands in section 185(1)(ii)(b).
A member belonging, to those classes would therefore be included in the protection provided at some time prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force, if he was in possession of land as a tenant, sub tenant or ordinary tenant and he continued to hold the land till the date of commencement of the Code.
The alternative argument that section 185 of the Code has Po application in respect of pending proceedings for ejectment is without substance.
By section 261 of the Code a large number of 435 statutes specified in Sch.
II were repealed.
By section 261 certain enactments specified in Sch.
11 including the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act 66 of 1950 and the Madhya Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants and Sub tenants Protection Act 32 of 1954 were wholly repealed.
But it is expressly provided in section 261 that the repeat shall not affect(a) the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed or (c ) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any law so repealed; or (d) any invest igation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Act had not been passed.
Section 262 which deals with transitory provisions by sub section
(2) provides: "Any case pending in Civil Court at the coming into force of this Code, which would under this Code be exclusively triable by a Revenue Court, shall be disposed of by such Civil Court according to the law in force prior to the commencement of this Code." Relying upon these two provisions it was urged that persons who were tenants, sub tenants or ordinary tenants of Inam land prior to the date on which the Code was brought into for , whose rights have consistently with the law in force before that date been terminated, cannot set up rights of occupancy tenants acquired under section 185, for, within the meaning of section 261 the right to eject a tenant has accrued to the landlord before the commencement of the Code and a proceeding for enforcement of that right may be continued and the right enforced as if the Code had not been passed, and the Court in which the proceeding is pending would be bound to dispose of the proceeding according to the law in force prior to the commencement of the Code.
The argument is misconceived.
Act 66 of 1950 did not deal With the right of a landlord to evict a tenant from land.
Act 66 of 1950 was expressly repealed by the Code, but since the right to evict a tenant was governed G by the general law of landlord and 'tenant the proviso to section 261 had no operation.
In terms the proviso to section 261 protects a right, privilege, obligation, or liability which had been acquired, accrued or incurred under the law repealed by the Code.
The right to obtain possession not having been acquired under the law repealed, a legal proceeding pending at the date of the commencement of the Code will be disposed of according to the law "then in force '.
That was expressly provided by section 6 of Act 32 of 1954 and by section 6 of Act 29 of 1955.
If at the date of the trial the tenant had acquired the right of an occupancy tenant, he could not be evicted 436 otherwise than in the manner and for reasons mentioned in section 19 3 of the Code.
Personal requirement for cultivation of land is not, however, a ground on which claim, since the commencement of the Code, for ejectment may be maintained.
Section 262(2) is a transitory provision which enables a Civil Court to hear and dispose of a suit notwithstanding that under the Code such a proceeding would be triable by a Revenue Court.
It is expressly declared that such a proceeding shall be disposed of according to the law in force prior to the commencement of the Code.
That however does not imply that the contract between the parties which was sought to be enforced unaffected by the statutory declaration of occupancy tenants under section 185 in favour of the tenant may be enforced.
In our view sub section
(2) is only procedural: it provides that a Civil Court will continue to have jurisdiction to dispose of a civil suit pending before it at the commencement of the Code, which if it had been instituted after the Code was passed, would have been tried by a Revenue Court, and in the disposal of such a suit the Civil Court will be governed by the procedural law applicable thereto prior to the commencement of the Code.
There is nothing in section 262(2) which seeks to nullify the statutory conferment of occupancy rights upon persons in the position of tenants, sub tenants or ordinary tenants against whom proceedings were taken at the date when the Code was brought into force.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant (holder of an inam in Madhya Pradesh) served a notice an his tenant, the respondent, terminating to tenancy on the ground that he wanted the land for personal cultivation and filed a suit for ejectment.
The trial court decreed the suit.
During the pendency of the appeal in the District Court, article 32 of 1954 was enacted, and pursuant to its provisions the hearing of the appeal was stayed.
After the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code came into force in 1959, the District Court held that by virtue of section 185 of that Code the respondent acquired the rights, of an occupancy tenant and dismissed the suit.
The High Court confirmed the judgment of the District Court.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (i) the rights of an occupancy tenant arise in favour of a personl under section 185(1) (i) (a) only if there was between him and the landlord a subsisting tenancy at the date when the Code came into force and since under the law in force before the commencement of the Code, the respondent had ceased to be a tenant because of the notice terminating the contract of tenancy the respondent was not invested with the rights of an occupany tenant; and (ii) bi virtue of sections 261 and 262(2), the operation of section 185 is expressly excluded when a person, against whom ejectment proceedings have been instituted prior to the commencement of the Code in enforcement of a right then acquired, claims the status of an occupancy tenant.
HELD : (i) The respondent acquired the right of an occupancy tenant under the Code, because the expression "tenant" in section 185 (1) (ii) (a) includes a person whose tenancy was terminated before the commencement of the Code.
The definition of the expression "tenant" in the Code postulates a subsisting tenancy, but the position of a tenant prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force is not dealt with in the definition.
In the context in which the expression "tenant" occurs in section 185(1), that definition could not be intended to apply in deter ining the conditions which invest a holder of land with the status of an occupancy tenant at the commencement of, the Code.
Therefore having regard to the object of the enactment the expression should be ascribed the meaning it 'has in Act 32 of 1954.
Under sections 3 & 4 of that Act a person who was inducted into the land as a tenant and who continued 'to hold the land at the commencement of the Act was entitled to protection against eviction and continue as tenant, notwithstanding that under the law in force prior to the commencement of the Act.
the contractual relationship of landlord and tenant was determined.
[432 D; 432 14 433 C] 428 There is no reason to think that the Legislature sought to make a A distinction between tenants of Inam land in section 185 (1) (ii) (a) and ryotwari sub lessees of other lands in section 185(1)(ii)(b).
Therefore, if the expression "ryotwari sub lessee ' in section 185(1)(ii)(b) includes a sub lessee whose tenaure was terminated before the commencement of the Code, a tenant of inam land, whose tenancy has been terminated would also be included in the protection, provided at some time prior to the date on which the Code was brought into force, he was in possession of the land as a tenant, and he continued to hold the land till the date of the commencement of the Code.
[434 E H] (ii) The provisions of the Code appeal to tenants in proceedings for ejectment pending at the commencement of the Code.
The proviso to section 261 protects a right which had been acquired under a law repeated by the Code and the right could be enforced as if the code had not been passed.
But the right to evict a tenant was governed by the general law of landlord and tenant and was not acquired under any repealed law.
The proviso had no operation and a legal proceeding pending at the date of the commencement of the Code will be disposed of according to the law enacted in the Code.
Therefore, the tenant could not ' be evicted otherwise than in the manner and for reasons mentioned in a. 193 of the Code but, personal requirement for cultivation of land is not a ground on which a claim for ejectment could be maintained.
[435 G436 A] Section 262(2) is only procedural it provides that a civil court will continue to have jurisdiction to dispose of a civil suit pending before it at the commencement of the Code, Which, if it had been instituted after the Code was passed would have been tried by a revenue court; and in the disposal of such a suit, the civil court will be governed by the procedural law applicable there to prior to the commencement of the Code.
It does not nullify the statutory conferment of occupancy right upon persons in the position of tenants against whom proceedings were taken at the date when the Code was brought into force.
[436 B D]