judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2377 of 1970.
On appeal by certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 9/10.7.69 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 624 of 1964.
D.K. Sen, V.C. Mahajan and R.N. Poddar for the appellants.
K.K. Venugopal, D.N Misra, T M Ansari and P.K. Rana for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
This appeal by certificate under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution is filed against the judgment and order dated July 9/10,1969 in Special Civil Application No. 624 of 1964 on the file of the High Court of Gujarat filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by M/s. The Atul Products Ltd., the respondent in this appeal.
The respondent is the owner of a factory at Atul in the State of Gujarat in which it has been carrying on the business of manufacturing dyes, chemicals and pharmaceuticals from a number of years.
By the Finance Act of 1961`synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) and synthetic organic derivatives used in any dyeing process ' were added as Item 14D in the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act ' with effect from March 1, 1961 and consequently the respondent became liable to pay excise duty imposed by the Act on two of its products known as cibagenes and cibanogenes which were being 837 manufactured by it by virtue of section 3 of the Act which provided that excise duty prescribed by the Act was leviable on all excisable goods specified in the First Schedule to the Act.
Item 14D in the First Schedule during the relevant period read thus: "14D, Synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dye stuffs) and synthetic organic derivatives used in any dyeing Thirty per cent process.
ad valorem.
But on November 23, 1961, the Central Government issued a notification under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules ') exempting the dyes specified in the Schedule annexed thereto from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon if and only if such dyes had been manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid.
The notification read thus: D "Government of India Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) New Delhi, dated the 23rd November 1961 the 2nd Agrahayana, 1813 S.E. NOTIFICATION Central Excise GSR.
In exercise of the powers conferred by sub rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, as in force in India, and as applied to the State of Pondicherry, the Central Government hereby exempts the dyes specified in the schedule annexed hereto, falling under Item No. 14D of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1644 (1 of 1944) from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon if and only if, such dyes are manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty has already been paid.
838 Schedule 1.
Solubilised Vats, 2.
Rapid fast colours, 3.
Rapidogenes, 4.
Fast Colour Salts.
(180/61) sd/ (B.N. Banerji)" It may be stated here that cibagenes and cibanogenes which were being manufactured by the respondent belong to the class of dyes referred to in the Schedule annexed to the above said notification.
After the above notification was issued, the respondent wrote a letter dated December 22, 1961 to the Superintendent of Excise, Bulsar Division, Bulsar which read as follows: "Dear Sir, You are aware that under the Notification No. 180/61 of the 23rd November, 1961 issued by the Government of India, Min. Of Finance (Dept. of Revenue), Rapidogenes/Rapid fasts colour bases are exempted from the excise duty provided dyes are manufactured from other dyes on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty has already been paid.
During the course of discussions we had on the 20th December, 1961 with the Collector of Central Excise and yourself, we pointed that we purchase Fast Colour Bases, required in the production of Rapidogenes/Rapid fasts either from the manufacturer in Bombay or from the open market.
The material which the local manufacturer has offered us was produced before, the imposition of excise duty on dyes.
He is, therefore, willing to sell us the material without the recovery of excise duty.
We now propose to pay the excise duty on the fast colour bases which we will purchase from the local manufacturer so that we do not have to pay 839 excise duty on the final products produced viz. Rapidogenes/ Rapid fasts.
Similarly we propose to purchase some quantity of imported fast colour bases from the open market.
We will present the materials thus purchased to you for the recovery of excise duty @15%.
We have now to request you to advise your Inspector at ATUL to accept the excise duty on the fast colour Bases, which we will purchase either from the local manufacturer or from the open market.
Thanking you in meanwhile, we remain.
Yours faithfully, for the ATUL PRODUCTS LTD.
(section K Soman)" The Superintendent of Central Excise, Bulsar Division, Bulsar sent a reply dated January 4/6, 1962 to the above letter stating that there was no objection to the payment of excise duty on fast colour bases purchased by the respondent and that if evidence of payment of excise duty on fast colour bases was produced the dyes manufactured by using those fast colour bases would not be liable to duty under the notification referred to above.
He also instructed the Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise to receive duty on such fast colour bases which went into the production of cibagenes or cibanogenes (processed dyes) by the respondent.
The respondent accordingly paid the duty and was exempted from payment of duty on cibagenes and cibanogenes manufactured by it.
The departmental audit party later on noticed that the concession shown to the respondent was not in order since it was only when duty had been paid on the basic dyes at the time of their manufacture when they were chargeable to duty and they had been purchased by the respondent would get exemption from the duty payable on the products manufactured by it by employing such basic dyes.
The audit party was of the view that the respondent which had purchased the basic dyes at the time when duty was leviable on them could not claim exemption from payment of excise duty on the final products manufactured by it by using such basic dyes, by voluntarily paying duty on the basic dyes after March 1, 1961 in accordance with law in force then.
The audit party was further of the view that there was short levy of excise duty on account of the above mistake since 840 the respondent had paid excise duty on the basic dyes at 30% ad valorem whereas it was liable to pay duty at 30 % ad valorem on the products manufactured by it which were costlier than the basic dyes.
The Assistant Collector of Central Excise at Surat there fore issued five notices under Rule 10 A of the Rules to the respondent all on May 20, 1964 calling upon it to show cause as to way the deficit amount of excise duty should not be recovered in respect of the excisable goods manufactured by it at different periods before that date.
We reproduce below one of such notices, the contents of which were more or less the same except with regard to the amount claimed and the number of the relevant demand notice: "INTEGRATED DIVISIONAL OFFICE: CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE, SURAT No. VI (RR) 21 13/62/II/(iv) Surat, the 20th May 1964 NOTICE Whereas it has been reported that M/s Atul Products Limited, Atul have manufactured Synthetic Organic Dyes namely Cibagenes and Cibanogenes from basic dyes Lying in stock as on 28 2 61 / 1 3 61 with them purchased from the market and having voluntarily paid duty on all such basic dyes in stock/purchased from the market as referred to above manufactured and cleared from 23 11 61 onwards the processed dyes (final product) without payment of duty at the time of clearance from their factory, 2.
The Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise, Atul has raised demand No 10175 dated 6 1 64 for the amount of Rs. 2,930,22 for the recovery of duty as a result of the assessment of the final processed dyes; because the processed dyes were not eligible for exemption from duty only on the ground that the duty was voluntarily paid on the basic dyes which were in stock/purchased from the market as on 28 2 61 when such payment of duty on the stock of basic dyes as on 28 2 61 was not warranted.
M/s. Atul Products Ltd. Atul have represented this dispute vide their letter No. SL/437/9581 dated 25 3 64 against Demand No. 10175 dated 6 1 64.
841 4.M /s.
Atul Products Ltd. Atul should show cause to the undersigned as to way the demand referred to above issued by the Deputy Superintendent,Central Excise,Atul should not be confirmed.
Atul Products Ltd. Atul are further directed to produce at the time of showing cause all the evidence upon which they intend to rely in support of their defence.
6 M/s. Atul Products Ltd. Atul should also indicate in the written explanation whether they wish to be heard in person before the assessment dispute is finalised.
If no cause is shown against the action proposed to be taken within ten days of the receipt of this notice or they do not appear before the undersigned when the case is posted for hearing the case will be decided ex parte.
sd/ H. H. Dave 20 5 64 Assistant Collector.
" The particulars of the demand notices and the amounts claimed in the said five notices were as follows: Demand Notice No. Date Amount Period of Rs. clearance 1. 10163 24.10.63 18,349,21 1.1.62 to 31 5 63 2.
10166 11.11.63 8,142,06 3.8.63 to 13.11.63 3.
10174 6.1.64 1,80,593.47 30 12 61 to 30 5 62 4.
10175 6.1.64 2,930.22 Supplementary to 10163 and 10166 5.
10179 25.2.64 8,349.00 24.12.64 2,18,363.96 The respondent sent a common reply to the above notices on June 19, 1964.
The respondent contended that it had cleared the 842 products manufactured by it namely cibagenes and cibanogenes in accordance with the Rules.
It pleaded that there was no justification to conclude that it had paid excise duty on fast colour bases used by it in manufacturing the said goods voluntarily as the Superintendent, Central Excise, Bulsar had confirmed that according to Government of India 's notification dated November 23, 1961 it was required to pay excise duty on the fast colour bases before they were used in the production of the said processed dyes and also had written that the Dy.
Superintendent of Central Excise, Atul was being instructed to recover duty on the said fast colour bases.
The respondent also pleaded that Rule 10 A of the Rules was not applicable to the case and hence no demand could be made.
After considering the representations made by the respondent to the above notices, the Assistant Collector overruled the objections of the respondent by his orders dated July 20,1964 and directed it to pay the amounts which had been demanded in the notices by issuing appropriate notices f demand.
Aggrieved by the said orders passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and the notices of demand the respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Gujarat questioning their correctness and praying for an order directing the excise authorities not to recover the amounts claimed in the notices from the respondent.
The High Court held that the respondent was entitled to the exemption under the notification in respect of the goods manufactured by it as excise duty had been paid on the dyes used in the manufacture of the said goods.
The High Court, therefore, allowed the writ petition quashing the orders of the Assistant Collector and the notices of demand impugned in the writ petition and directing the y excise authorities not to recover the sums mentioned therein by its judgment dated July 9/10, 1969.
This appeal is filed by the Union of India against the Judgment of the High Court.
The two principal questions which arise for consideration before us in this appeal are: (i) whether the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification dated November 23, 1961 when the dyes said to have been used by the respondent in the manufacture of other dyes were not liable for payment of excise duty when they were manufactured, that is, before the introduction of Item 14D into the First Schedule to the Act even though duty may have been paid on them after the introduction of item 14D and (ii) whether the demands made in this case fall within the scope of Rule 10 A of the Rules or under Rule 10 thereof.
843 It is not disputed that the dyes in respect of which duty had A been paid in this case had been manufactured at a time when no duty was leviable on them.
This case actually began with the letter written by the respondent on December 22, 1961 within one month after the exemption notification dated November 23, 1961 was issued.
In the said letter the respondent no doubt stated 'the material which the local manufacturer has offered us was produced before the imposition of excise duty on dyes '.
But it was followed by the sentence 'We now propose to pay the excise duty on the Fast Colour bases . . '.
In that letter there was a request made to the superintendent of Central Excise to accept excise duty on the fast colour bases which the respondent would purchase either from the local manufacturer or from the open market.
The letter did not contain any particulars about the quantity of such dyes which the respondent wished to purchase or its value .
The Superintendent of Central excise in his reply stated that there was no objection to the to the payment of excise duty on fast colour bases purchased by the respondent and that if evidence of payment of exercise duty on fast colour bases was produced, the dyes manufactured by using those fast colour bases would not be liable to duty under notification.
The above reply was intended to convey in effect what the notification stated.
It was perhaps assumed that payment of excise duty would arise only when it was payable Under law.
The language of the notification left no room for doubt at all.
It stated that if and only if such dyes were manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid, they would be exempted from duty Payment of excise duty on dyes was possible only if they had been manufactured after the introduction of Item 14D into the First Schedule to the Act.
Admittedly in this case the dyes which were used by the respondent had been manufactured prior to that date.
In reaching its decision the High Court, however, relied on the decision of this Court in Innamuri Gopalan & Ors.
v State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.(1) In that case the Court had to construe a notification issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh granting exemption to textile goods from the levy of sales tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (A P. 6 of 1957).
But it, however, contained a proviso that in the case of any class of such goods in respect of which additional duties are leviable by the Central Government under clause 3 of the Additional Duties (1) 844 of Excise (Levy and Distribution) Bill, 1957 read with Section 4 of the (Central Act XVI of 1931) the exemption would be subject to the dealer proving to the satisfaction of the assessing authority that additional duties of excise had been so levied and collected on such goods by the Central Government.
In the above said case certain dealers who had sold textile goods which were not subject to additional duties of excise claimed that they were entitled to the exemption even though they had not paid such additional excise duty.
The State Government pleaded that the dealers would be entitled to claim exemption if and only if such additional excise duty had been levied and collected and since the goods in question were not liable to such additional excise duty, they were not entitled to claim the exemption.
This Court rejected the contention of the State Government and held that on a plain reading of the notification relied on in that case all varieties of textile goods had been generally exempted from payment of sales tax but where any additional excise duty had been levied in respect of any kind of textile goods then the dealer had to show proof of levy and payment of such duty.
Accordingly the case of the dealers was upheld.
In the case before us, the notification relied on by the respondent is couched in a different language.
It specifically states that if and only if the dyes are manufactured from any other on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty has already been paid, the exemption can be availed of by the manufacturer of such dyes.
The above decision of this Court is, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the present case.
With great respect to the High Court it should be stated that the distinction pointed out above was not noticed by it.
The decision in Hansraj Gordhandas vs H. H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat & two Ors (1) does not also have any bearing on this case.
There the Court was concerned with the meaning of the notification in question which had granted exemption from payment of excise duty on cotton fabrics manufactured on powerlooms owned by cooperative societies registered prior to March 31 1961.
The appellant had produced with his own hired labour cotton fabrics on the powerlooms owned by a cooperative society under a contract.
Still the Court found that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of exemption since he had manufactured the goods on the powerlooms owned by a cooperative (1) 845 society as per the notification.
The crucial question in all such A cases is whether the case falls within the scope of the law granting exemption or not and there can be no dispute about that principle.
The difficulty arises only when the said principle is to be applied to the facts of a given case.
As mentioned earlier, in this case of the respondent did not fall under the notification granting exemption since the basic dyes used by it in producing other processed dyes were not subject to levy of excise duty when they were manufactured and cleared.
We do not agree that in this case the principle of promissory estoppel can be pleaded as a bar against the contention of the Department.
The respondent had not done anything prejudicial to its interest relying upon any representation made on behalf of the Department.
It is not the case of the respondent that it would not have manufactured the dyes but for the advice given by the Department.
On the other hand it is obvious that the respondent had before it the exemption notification which alone could be the basis for its actions.
The Department was not also expected to tender legal advice to the respondent on a matter of this nature.
After giving our earnest consideration to the case before us we are of the view that under the notification exemption could be claimed only where the dyes used in the manufacture of other dyes were liable to, payment of excise duty when they were manufactured and such duty had been paid.
A voluntary payment of excise duty on dyes which were not liable for such payment would not earn any exemption under the notification.
The finding re p73 corded by the High Court on the above question is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
The next question relates to the appropriate provision of law under which action could have been taken in this case by the Central Excise authorities.
This question was not decided by the High Court in view of its finding on the liability of the respondent to pay excise duty on the products manufactured by it.
Since we have not agreed with the decision of the High Court on this point, it has become necessary for us to decide this question in this appeal.
While the Department asserts that it was open to it to proceed under Rule 10 A of the Rules, the respondent contends that even if there was any short levy, the proper Rule applicable to its case was Role 10 and not Rule 10 A. Rule 10 and Rule 10 A of the Rules during the relevant period ran as follows: 846 10 Recovery of duties or charges short levied, or erroneously refunded When duties or charges have been short levied through inadvertence, error, collusion or misconstruction on the part of an officer, or through mis statement as to the quantity, description or value of such goods on the part of the owner, or when any such duty or Charge, after having been levied, has been owing to any such cause, erroneously refunded, the person chargeable with the duty or charge, so short levied, or to whom such refund has been erroneously made, shall pay the deficiency or pay the amount paid to him in excess, as the case may be, on written demand by the proper officer, being made within three months from the date on which the duty or charge was paid or adjusted in the owners account current, if any or from the date of making the refund.
10 A. Residuary powers for recovery of sums due to Government Where these Rules do not make any specific provision for the collection of any duty, or of any deficiency in duty if the duty has for any reason been short levied, or of any other sum of any kind payable to the Central Government under the Act or these Rules, such duty, deficiency in duty or sum shall, on a written demand made by the proper officer, be paid to such person and at such time and place, as the proper officer may specify.
" The points of difference between the above two Rules were that (i) whereas Rule 10 applied to cases of short levy through inadvertence, error, collusion or mis construction on the part of an officer, or through mis statement as to the quantity, description or value of the excisable goods on the part of the owner, Rule 10 A which was a residuary clause applied to those cases which were not covered by Rule 10 and that (ii) whereas under Rule 10, the deficit amount could not be collected after the expiry of three months from the date on which the duty or charge was paid or adjusted in the owners account current or from the date of making the refund, Rule 10 A did not contain any such period of limitation.
The scope of these two Rules has been considered by this Court in two decisions i.e. N. B. Sanjana.
Assistant Collector 847 Of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors.
vs Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.(1) and Assistant Collector of Central Excise, CALCUTTA Division vs National Tobacco Co.
Of India Ltd.(2) In addition to the above two points of distinction between Rule 10 and 10 A of the Rules, this Court further held in Sanjana 's case (supra) following the decision in Gursahai Saigal vs Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab(3) that in calculating the period of limitation, the expression 'paid ' in Rule 10 should not be literally construed as 'actually paid ' but as 'ought to have been paid ' in order to prevent a person, who had not paid any excise duty at all which he should have paid from escaping, from the net of Rule 10 of the Rules.
In National Tobacco Co ' section case (supra) this Court observed at pages 836 837 thus: Rules 10 and 10A, placed side by side, do raise difficulties of interpretation.
Rule 10 seems to be widely worded as to cover any" inadvertence, error, collusion or mis construction on the part of an Officer", as well as any" mis statement as to the quantity, description or value of such goods on the part of the owner" as causes of short levy.
Rule 10 A would appear to cover any "deficiency in duty if the duty has for any reason been short levied" except that it would be outside the purview of Rule 10 A if its collection is expressly provided for by any Rule.
Both the rules, as they stood at the relevant time dealt with collection and not with assessment.
They have to be harmonised.
In N. B. Sanjana 's case (supra) this Court harmonised them by indicating that Rule 10 A which was residuary in character, would be inapplicable if a case fell within a specified category of case mentioned in Rule 10.
It was pointed out in Sanjana s case (supra) that the reason for the addition of the new Rule 10 A was a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel vs Union of India (A. I R so that a fresh demand may be made on a basis altered by law.
The Excise authorities had then made a fresh demand, under (1) ; (2) [1973] I S.C.R. 822.
(3) ; 848 the provisions of Rule 10 A, after the addition of that Rule, the validity of which challenged but upheld by Full Bench of the High Court of Nagpur.
This Court in Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. vs Union of India [1962] Supp.
2 section C R. 1. also rejected the assessee 's claim that Rule 10 A was inapplicable after pointing out that the new rule had been specifically designed "for the enforcement of the demand like the one arising in the circumstances of the case.
" We think that Rule 10 should be confined to cases where he demand is being made for a short levy caused wholly by one of the reasons given in that Rule so that an assessment has to be reopened." This Court further observed at page 840: "Although Rule 52 makes an assessment obligatory before goods are removed by a manufacturer, yet, neither that rule nor any other rule, as already indicated above, has specified the detailed procedure for an assessment.
There is no express prohibition anywhere against an assessment at any other time in the circumstances of a case like the one before us whore no "assessment.
" as it is understood in law; took place at all.
On the other hand, Rule 10A indicates that there are residuary powers of making a demand in special circumstances not foreseen by the framers of the Act or the rules.
If the assessee disputes the correctness of the demand an assessment becomes necessary to protect the interests of the assessee.
A case like the one before us falls more properly within the residuary class of unforeseen cases.
We think that, from the provisions of section 4 of the Act read with Rule 10A, an implied power to carry out or complete an assessment, not specifically provided for by the rules, can be inferred.
" In the instant case there has been no assessment of the manufactured goods at all as contemplated by Rule 52 of the Rules and the delivery of the goods has taken place contrary to Rule 52 A of the Rules.
Rule 52 and Rule 52 A as they stood at the relevant period are set out below: "52.
Clearance on payment duty 849 When the manufacturer desires to remove goods on A payment of duty, either from the place or a premises specified under rule 9 or from a store room or other place of storage approved by the Collector under rule 47, he shall make application in triplicate unless otherwise by rule or order required to the proper officer in the proper form and shall deliver it to the officer at last twelve hours or such other period as may be elsewhere prescribed or as the Collector may in any particular case require or allow before it is intended to remove the goods.
The officer, shall, thereupon, assess the amount of duty due on the goods and on production of evidence that this sum has been paid into the Treasury or paid in the account of the Collector in the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of India, or has been despatched to the Treasury by money order shall allow the goods to be cleared.
52 A (1) Goods to be delivered on a Gate pass No excisable goods shall be delivered from a factory except under a gatepass in the proper form or in such other form as the Collector may in any particular case or class of cases prescribe signed by the owner of the factory and countersigned by the proper officer. ." The facts of this case indicate that the Department was virtually inveigled into a trap by the respondent suggesting that it was too eager to pay excise duty on certain goods which to the knowledge of the respondent were not liable for excise duty with the object of getting the benefit of the right to clear its products which were liable for higher excise duty because of their increased value without paying any duty at all.
Rule 10 of the Rules deals with four kinds of mistakes on the part of an officer which bring a case within its sweep.
Of them 'inadvertence ' 'error ' and ' mis construction ' are mistakes which can be committed unilaterally by the officer himself.
`Collusion ' involves a pact between two or more persons to defraud the Government This case does not involve any such unilateral mistake on the part of an officer or collusion as explained above.
Nor is this a case where through mis statement as to the quantity, description or value of such goods on the part of the owner short levy has occasioned.
Further the error in this case has not taken place at the time of the assessment or at the time 850 when assessment ought to have been made under Rule 52.
The discussion and correspondence between the assessee and the officers concerned had taken place on December 20, 1961 and January 416, 1962 was in the nature of an advice and not an assessment as contemplated under Rule 52.
Hence this case is not covered by Rule 10 of the Rules at all.
Rule 10 A of the Rules which is a residuary provision is, therefore, necessarily attracted.
Hence the plea of limitation raised on the basis of Rule 10 of the Rules does not survive.
In the result we set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent.
The Department may now proceed to recover the sums demanded under the impugned notices issued to the respondent.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is accordingly allowed with costs.
N. V. K. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The respondent was the owner of a factory carrying on the business of manufacturing dyes, chemicals and pharmaceuticals from a number of years.
By the Finance Act of 1961 'synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) and synthetic organic derivatives used in any dyeing pro 833 cess ' were added as Item 14D in the First schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 with effect from March 1,1961, and consequently the respondent became liable to pay excise duty imposed by the Act on two of its products known as cibanogenes which were being manufactured.
On November 23, 1961, the Central Government issued a notification under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 exempting the dyes specified in the Schedule annexed thereto from the whole of the excise duty leviable thereon if and only if such dyes had been manufactured from any other dye on which excise duty or countervailing customs duty had already been paid.
Cibagenes and cibanogenes which were being manufactured by the respondent belonged to the class of dyes referred to in the Schedule annexed to the said notification.
In pursuance to the correspondence exchanged between the respondent and the Superintendent of Central Excise, the Deputy Superintendent was instructed to receive duty on such fast colour bases which went into the production of Cibagenes or cibanogenes (processed dyes) by the respondent, and the respondent accordingly paid the duty and was exempted from payment of duty on cibanogenes manufactured by it.
The departmental audit party, later on noticed that the concession shown to the respondent was not in order, since it was only when duty had been paid on the basic dyes at the time of their manufacture when they were chargeable to duty and they had been purchased by the respondent there after, the respondent would get exemption from the duty payable on the products manufactured by it by employing such basic dyes.
It was further of the view that there was short levy of excise duty on account of the above mistake since the respondent had paid excise duty on the basic dyes at 30 % ad valorem whereas it was liable to pay duty at 30% ad valorem on the products manufactured by it which were costlier than the basic dyes.
In pursuance to the aforesaid objection, the Assistant Collector issued five notices under Rule 10 A of the Central Excise Rules to the respondent calling upon it to show cause as to why the deficit amount of excise duty should not be recovered The respondent, denied its liability and contended that it had cleared the products manufactured by it in accordance with the Rules and pleaded that there was no justification to conclude that it was required to pay excise duty on the fast colour bases used by it in manufacturing the said goods voluntarily and that Rule 10 A of the Rules was not applicable to the case and so demand could be made.
The Assistant Collector overruled the 834 objections or the respondent and directed it to pay the amount which had been demanded in the notices by issuing appropriate notices of demand.
Aggrieved by the demand notices, the respondent filed a writ petition questioning their correctness, and for an order directing the excise authorities not to recover the amounts.
The High Court, allowed the writ petition and held that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the exemption under the notification in respect of the goods manufactured by it, as excise duty had been paid on the dyes used in the manufacture of the said goods, and directed the excise authorities not to recover the sums mentioned in the Demand notices.
In the appeals to this Court, on the questions (i) Whether the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification dated November 23, 1961 when the dyes said to have been used by the respondent in the manufacture of other dyes were not liable for payment of excise duty when they were manufactured and (ii) Whether the demands fell within the scope of Rule 10 A or under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules 1944.
Allowing the Appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
(i) The exemption notification dated November 23.
1961 specifically states that if and only if the dyes are manufactured from any other dye on Which excise duty or counter vailing customs duty has already been paid, the exemption can be availed of by the manufacturer of such dyes.
[ 843B; E] (ii) Payment of excise duty on dyes was possible only if they had been manufactured after the introduction of Item 14D into the First Schedule to the Act.
[843F] In the instant case, the dyes which were used by the respondent had been manufactured prior to that date.
[843F] Innamuri Gopalan & Ors.
vs State of Andhra Pradesh, , distinguished.
Hansraj Gordhandas vs H. H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat & two Ors. , inapplicable.
(iii) A voluntary payment of excise duty on dyes which were not liable for such payment would not earn any exemption under the notification.
[845F] IN the instant case, the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be pleaded.
The respondent had not done anything prejudicial to its interest relying upon any representation made on behalf of the department.
It is 835 not the case of the respondent, that it would not have manufactured the dyes but for the advice given by the Department.
The respondent, had before it the exemption notification which alone could be the basis for its actions The Department was not expected to tender legal advice to the respondent on a matter of this nature.
[845C D.] 2.
(a) The points of difference between Rule 10 and 10 A of the Rules are that: (i) Rule 10 applies to cases of short levy through inadvertence, error, collusion or mis construction on the part of an officer, or through mis statement as to the quantity, description or value of the excisable goods on the part of the owner.
Rule 10 A a residuary clause applies to those cases not covered by Rule 10, and (ii) Under Rule 10, the deficit amount could not be collected after the expiry of three months from the date on which the duty or charge was paid or adjusted in the owners account current or from the date of making the refund, Rule 10 A does not contain any such period of limitation.
[846P H] (b) In calculating the period of limitation, the expression `paid ' in Rule 10 should not be literally construed as `actually paid ' but as `ought to have been paid ' in order to prevent a person who had not paid any excise duty at all which be should have paid from escaping, from the act of Rule 10 of the Rules.
[847B C] N.B. Sanjana Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors.
vs Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. ; , Assistant Collector of Central Excise, CALCUTTA Division vs National Tobacco Co.
Of India Ltd., and Gursahai Saigal vs Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab; , referred to.
In the instant case, there has been no assessment of the manufactured goods at all as contemplated by Rule 52 of the Rules and the delivery of the goods has taken place contrary to Rule 52A of the Rules.
The Department was virtually inveigled into a trap by the respondent suggesting that it was too eager to pay excise duty on certain goods which to the knowledge of the respondent were hot liable for excise duty with the object of getting the benefit of the right to clear its products which were liable for higher excise duty because of their increased value without paying any duty at all.
Rule 10 of the Rules deals with four kinds of mistakes on the part of an officer which bring a case within its sweep.
Of them `inadvertence ', `error ' and `mis construction ' are mistakes which can be committed unilaterally by the officer himself.
`Collusion ' involves pact between two or more persons to defraud the Government.
This case does not involve any unilateral mistake on the part of an officer or collusion nor where through mis statement as to quantity, description or value of goods on the part of the owner short levy has occasioned.
Further, the error in this case has not taken place at the time of the assessment or at the time when assessment ought to have been made under Rule 52.
[848H; 849F H] 836 In the instant case, the discussion and correspondence between the assessee and the officers had taken place on December 20, 1961, December 22, 1961 and January 4/6, 1962 without reference to the actual goods.
The goods were actually manufactured and cleared afterwards.
The reply of the Superintendent of Central Excise dated January 4/6, 1962 was in the nature of advice and not an assessment as contemplated under Rule 52.
This case is not therefore covered by Rule 10 at all.
Rule 10 A which is a residuary provision is, therefore, necessarily attracted.
The plea of limitation raised on the basis of Rule 10 of the Rules does not therefor survive.
[850A B]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 21 38 Of 1980 From the Judgment and Order dated the 16th November, 1979 of Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 544 of 1978.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.
A.S. Nambiar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALKRISHNA ERADI, J.
With the obvious intent of falling in line with the rest of the country in the matter of achieving the social goal of equitable distribution of cultivable lands by the imposition of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and distribution of surplus lands among landless persons, the Legislature of the Union Territory of Pondicherry enacted 'The Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973 ' (hereinafter called 'the Act '), The questions arising for determination of some of the provisions of the 1) Act Before we proceed to refer to the relevant sections of the Act, we shall set out in brief the material facts, which have given rise to the controversy before us.
The appellant Vengdasalam Pillai is married to Smt.
Senbagevalli Ammal.
Five children three daughters and two sons were born to this couple.
On March 17, 1970, the appellant effected a partition of all his properties as between himself and his two sons both of whom were minors at that time.
This partition was evidenced by a registered document.
Under that document the appellant retained in his name an extent of 1.85.63.
hectares of land.
The first son, Shanmugasundaram (minor) was allotted 7.10.24.
hectares and the younger son Trinivasan was allotted an extent of 3.54.82.
hectares of land.
An area of 5.74.87 hectares stood registered in the name of the appellant 's wife Senbagevalli, the said land having been purchased by her in 1958 by utilising her Sridhanam money.
The Act was passed by the legislative assembly on October 5, 1974 and after it received the assent of the President on September 22, 1974, it was published in the Gazette of Pondicherry on October 14, 1974.
929 Since the appellant did not voluntarily file a return under A section 7(1) of the Act, a notice in Form 4 was issued to him by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Karaikal under section 8(1) of the Act.
In compliance therewith the appellant filed a return on December 12,1975 stating that he and his wife were holding only 7,67.91 hectares of land.
Thereafter separate notices were issued by the Authorised Officer to the appellant and his wife to file further representations, if any, and to appear before him for enquiry on the dates specified therein.
In response to these notices, the appellant and his wife filed separate representations reiterating their original stand that the lands allotted to the minor sons under the partition as also the lands acquired by the appellant 's wife with the Sridhanam amounts could not be taken into account while computing the extent of the appellant 's holding.
The Authorised Officer rejected these contentions and held that the appellant was holding an extent of 18.26.28 ordinary hectares equivalent to 11.48.55 standard hectares of land and since the appellant 's family consisted of himself, his wife two minor sons and three unmarried daughters, he was eligible to retain only 8.40.00 standard hectares D Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Authorised Officer, the appellant preferred an appeal in the Court of the Land Tribunal, Karaikal.
That appeal was allowed by the Land Tribunal which took the view that since the sons of the appellant had become divided from him by THE deed of partition executed in 1970, long prior to the appointed day specified in the Act, and since the Lands standing in the name of the appellant 's wife belonged to her independently in her own separate right, there was no justification for clubbing together the lands of the appellant and those belonging to his wife and the two minor sons.
The Land Tribunal held that since the two minor sons of the appellant and the wife of the appellant were holding their lands as independent owners, the definition of "family" under section 2(1()) of the Act was not attracted in this case and that the Authorised Officer ought to have excluded the lands belonging to the sons and the wife of the appellant while computing the extent of the holding of the appellant and fixed his ceiling on the said basis.
It was further held that on such computation the total area of land held by the appellant was well within the ceiling limit and hence there was no liability on his part to surrender any surplus land.
The correctness of the said decision of the Land Tribunal was called in question before the High Court of Madras by the Govern 930 ment of the Union Territory of Pondicherry by filing a Civil Revision Petition under section 50 of the Act.
By the judgment now impugned before us, the High Court allowed that revision petition, set aside the decision of the Land Tribunal and restored the Order passed by the Authorised Officer.
The High Court held that on a combined reading of the definition of "family" contained in section 2(10) of the Act with the further provision contained in section 4(2), it was clear that notwithstanding any transaction of partition entered into prior to the appointed day, the minor sons of a person will, for the purposes of the Act, be treated as members of the family of such person together with his wife and unmarried daughters.
It was further held that in computing the extent of the holding of the "family" as defined in the Act, the separate properties of the minor sons as well as the separate property of the wife had all to be included by reason of the express provision contained in section 4(2) of the Act.
In this view, the High Court held that the Authorised Officer had acted fully in accordance with law in clubbing together the properties of the appellant, his wife and the two sons, who were minors on the appointed day.
Aggrieved by the said decision of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal in this Court by Special leave.
We may now proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 2 is the definition section.
Clause (4) thereof states that the expression "appointed day ' means the 24th day of January, 1971.
The definition of ' 'family ' ' which is very important for the purposes of this case is contained in clause (10) and it is in the following terms: (10) "family", in relation to a person, means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters. 'The only other definition to which we need refer is that contained in clause (24), which states that " 'notified date ' means the date specified in the notification issued by the Government under sub section (1) of section 7.
" It is common ground before us that the date so specified under section 7(1) is 3.1.1974.
It is under section 4 that the ceiling limits of land holdings have been specified and it is necessary to reproduce the section in it full.
It reads; 931 "4(1)(a) Subjects to the provisions of Chapter VI, the A ceiling area in the case of every person and in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 6 standard hectares.
(b) The ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of more than five members shall, subject to the pro vision of Chapter VI, be 6 standard hectares together with an additional 1.2 standard hectares for every member of the family in excess of five: Provided that the total extent of land held by any family shall in no case exceed twice the ceiling area referred to in clause (a) (2) For the purpose of this section, all the lands held Individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family.
(3)(a) In calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family shall be taken into account.
(b) In calculating the extent of land held by a family or by an individual person, the share of the family or of the individual person in the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals of individuals (whether incorporated or not) or by a company (other than a non agricultural company) shall be taken into account.
Explanation For the purposes of this section (a) the share of a member of a family or of an individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family, and (b) the share of a family or of an individual person the land held by a firm, society or association of individuals (whether incorporated or not), or by a company (other than a non agricultural Company, shall be deemed to be the extent of land 932 (i) which, in case such share is held on the appointed day would have been allotted to such member, person or family had such land been partitioned, or divided in proportion to the share held by such member, person or family, as the case may be, no such day; or (ii) which, in case such share is acquired in any manner whatsoever after the appointed day would be allotted to such member, person or family if a partition, or division, in proportion to the share held by such member, person or family, were to take place on the date of the preparation of the draft statement under sub section (1) of section 9.
(4) In calculating the extent of land held by any person, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or other wise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement of this Act, shall be taken into account as if such land had not been transferred or Partitioned as the case may be.
(5)(a) The land held by the public trust referred to in the proviso to clause (30) of section 2 shall be deemed to be held by the founder of the trust or his heirs or the family of the founder of his heirs.
(b) In calculating the extent of land held by such founder or his heirs of such family, the extent of the land held by the public trust shall be taken into account.
(6) In calculating the extent of land held by any person, the extent of land which may revert to such person immediately after the death of any limited owner shall, during the lifetime of limited owner, be excluded.
" Section 6 lays down that on from the appointed day, no person shall.
except as otherwise provided in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VI, be entitled to hold land in excess of the exiling area.
The proviso to the said section is not material for the purposes of this case, 933 Sub section (1) of Section 7 requires every person, who, on the A appointed day, held land in excess of the ceiling area to furnish to the Authorised Officer within whose jurisdiction the holding of such person or the major part thereof is situated, a return containing the particulars specified in clauses (i) to (viii) thereof within thirty days from such date as may be specified in the Notification issued by the Government in that behalf.
Clause (ii) reads: "(ii) particulars of the members of the family and of the land held by each member of the family." (underlining ours) Explanation IV to sub section (1) of section 7 is in the following terms: "Where in a family both husband and wife hold land separately and the aggregate of such land exceeds the ceiling area.
the extent of land to be declared surplus by each of them shall bear the same proportion to the extent of land held by them.
(2) The notification referred to in sub section (1) shall contain such particulars and shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed.
" These are the only provisions of the Act which have a direct relevance for deciding the questions raised in this case.
However, since the Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant sought to derive some assistance from the provisions contained in section 22(1) of the Act, we may extract the said Sub section also: Section 22(1): "Except where a person is permitted, in writing, by the authorised officer, a person, holding land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under section 4, shall not, after the commencement of this Act, transfer by sale, gift or otherwise or make any partition of any land held by him or any part thereof until the excess land, which is to be acquired by the Govt.
under section 17, has been determined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the Government.
" The main argument advanced before us on behalf of the appellant was that since the two minor sons of the appellant had become divided from their father as a result of the partition effected under the document of March 17, 1970, they could not be regarded as member 934 of the family of the appellant as on the 'appointed day ' namely, January 24, 1971.
On this basis it WAS urged that the lands, the ownership in respect of which had become vested individually in the two minor sons by virtue of the allotments in their favour at the partition could not legally be included in the holding of the appellant for the purpose of fixation of his ceiling under the Act.
Relying on the provisions contained in sub section (4) of section 4 Counsel for the appellant contended that the framers of the Act did .
not intend to nullify transactions by way of partition entered into before the 'appointed day ' and it is only post appointed day partitions and transfers that are to be ignored under that sub section.
Support was also sought to be derived from the provisions contained in subsection (1) of section 22, which prohibits partition and transfers by sale, gift etc.
Of any land held by a person having land in excess of ceiling area prescribed under section 4 until the excess land to be acquired by the Govt.
under section 17 of the Act has been determined and taken possession of by or on behalf of the Government.
Another point pressed on behalf of the appellant was that the properties separately owned by his wife in her own right by virtue of purchase effected by her by utilising her Sridhanam amounts ought not have been clubbed along with the lands belonging to the appellant in computing the appellant 's holding.
We see no force in any of the contentions aforementioned.
The fallacy underlying the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant is that they proceed on the erroneous assumption that the "family" referred to in the Act must conform to the concept of the joint family as known to Hindu Law.
The provisions of the Act are applicable to all holders of land in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of religion, community etc.
The lands may be held by Hindus, Christians, Muslims or by persons belonging to other religious faiths.
All of them are equally governed by the provisions of the Act.
The concept of a joint family is totally foreign to the personal laws of some of these communities.
It is, therefore, manifestly wrong to approach the interpretation of the sections of the Act with the preconceived notion that in using the expression "family", the legislature had intended to connote an undivided family as known to the Hindu Law and that after a partition had taken place in a Hindu joint family there cannot be a 'family ' consisting of the father and his divided minor sons for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under the Act.
The fact that the definition of ' family" contained in section 2(10) does not treat the 935 major sons of a person as members of his family is a clearly pointer A that an undivided Hindu family was not in the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted that said definition section.
Similarly, the provision contained i n sub section (3)(a) of section 4 that in calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family shall be taken into account furnishes a conclusive indication that the "family" mentioned in the Act is wholly distinct and different from an 'undivided Hindu family. ' The circumstance that a partition had taken place disrupting the joint family consisting of the appellant and his minor sons is, therefore, of no relevance in determining the total extent of the holding of the appellant in accordance with the provisions of Election 2(10) read with section 4 of the Act.
That is because, the Act has created a special statutory unit consisting of the persons satisfying the description contained in clause (10) of section 2 as constituting a "family" for the purpose of fixation of ceiling.
The stress is only on the existence of the relationship mentioned in the section and unity of title or jointness of holding in relation to property are not essential elements for attracting the applicability of the definition.
Under the definition contained in section 2(10), a person, the wife or husband of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters together constitute a "family".
Section 4(2) expressly provides that for the purpose of fixation of ceiling on the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the "family".
The result is that the separate properties of the members constituting the statutory family are all to be treated as forming part of the holding of the 'family ' for the purpose of determination of the ceiling area.
Such being the position emerging from the provisions of section 2(10) and section 4(1)(2), the properties held by the minor sons of the appellant individually as well as the lands separately owned by Smt.
Senbagevalli, wife of the the appellant by virtue of the purchase effected by her with her Sridhanam amounts were all liable to be taken into account while computing the total extent of holding of the family of the appellant.
Counsel for the appellant sought to rely on the provision contained in Explanation IV to section 7 for contending that there was no justification for including the separate properties of Smt.
Senbagevalli in the holding of the appellant 's 'family '.
We see nothing in 936 the said provision which lends support to the contention of the appellant. 'The Explanation itself clearly proceeds on the footing that for purposes of computing the ceiling and determining the area of surplus land to be surrendered, the lands held separately by the husband and wife are to be pooled together.
All that the Explanation lays down is that when the aggregate of such lands exceeds the ceiling area, the extent of the land to be declared surplus by each of the spouses shall be fixed in proportion to the respective areas of land separately held by each of them.
In other words, the liability to surrender excess land is to be fixed in proportion to the extent of land held separately by the two spouses.
Counsel for the appellant also relied on the provision contained in sub section (4) of section 4 of the Act as furnishing an indication that transactions of partition that have taken place before the 'appointed day ' are not to be ignored and that only post appointed day partitions are to be treated as ineffective.
We find no force in this argument.
The purpose of section 4(4) is to peg down the process of determination of ceiling area to the state of things that obtained on the 'appointed day ' and it is in that context and for the said purpose that the sub section provides that in calculating the extent of land held by any person, any land which was transferred, by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement pf the Act, shall be taken into account, as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned.
The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the lands standing in the names of the wife and the two minor sons of the appellant as their separate properties were also liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under Section 4 of the Act.
The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant 's family consisted of himself, his wife, and five children three daughters and two sons.
On March 17, 1970, the appellant affected a partition of all his properties by a registered document between himself and his two minor sons.
The appellant retained 1.85.63 hectors of land for himself.
The first son Was allotted 7.10.24 hectors and the younger son was allotted 3.54.82 hectors.
The appellant 's wife purchased in 1958, 5.74.87 hectors of land by utilising her Sridbanam money.
On the failure of the appellant to file a return under section 7 (1) of the Act voluntarily, the Authorised Officer issued a notice Form 4 under .
8(1) of the Act.
The appellant thereupon filed a return on December 12, 1915 stating that he and his wife were holding Only 7.67.91 hectors.
Thereafter the Authorised Officer issued separate notices to the appellant and his wife to file further representations, if any, and to appear before him for enquiry.
Separate representations were filed reiterating the original stand that the lands allotted to the minor sons under the partition as also the lands acquired by the appellant 's wife with the Sridhanam amounts could not be taken into account while computing the extent of the appellant 's holding.
The Authorised Officer rejected these contentions and held that the appellant was holding an extent of 18.26.28 ordinary hectares equivalent to 11.48.55 standard hectares of land and he was eligible to retain only 8.40.00 standard hectares.
926 Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Land Tribunal, which allowed the appeal taking the view that since the sons of the appellant had become divided from him by the deed of partition executed in 1970, long prior to the appointed day specified in the Act, and the lands standing in the name of the appellant 's wife belonged to her independently in her own separate right, there was no justification for clubbing together the lands of the appellant with those of his wife and sons, and that the definition of ' family" under section (10) of the Act was not attracted to this case, and the appellant was well within the ceiling limit.
The State respondent challenged the decision of the Land Tribunal before the High Court in a Civil Revision Petition under section 50, which set aside the decision and restored the Order passed by the Authorised Officer.
The High Court held: (1) that a combined reading of In definition of ' family" contained in s 2(10) and the provision contained in section 4 (2), makes clear that notwithstanding any transaction of partition entered into prior to the appointed day, the minor sons of a person will I for the purposes of the Act, be Ideated as members of the family of such person together with his wife and unmarried daughters.
and (2) that in computing the extent of the holding of the family" as defined in the Act (he separate property of the wife had to be included by reason of the express provision contained in section 4 (2).
Dismissing the appellant 's appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
The High Court was right in holding that the lands standing in the names of the wife and the two minor sons of the appellant as their separate properties were also liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under section 4 of the Act.
[9 3 6F] 2.
(i) The provisions of the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1973 are applicable to all holders of Land in the Union Territory of Pondicherry irrespective of their religion, community etc.
It is therefore, fallacious to assume that the ' family" referred to in the Act must conform to the concept of the joint family as known to Hindu Law.
The concept OF a joint family is totally foreign to personal laws of some of the communities.
[934F G] 2.
(ii) It is manifestly wrong to approach the interpretation of the sections of the Act with the preconceived notion that in using the expression "family", the Legislature had intended to connote an undivided family as known to the Hindu Law and that after a partition had taken place in a Hindu joint family there cannot be a family ' consisting of the father and his divided minor sons for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under the Act.
[934G] 927 2.
(iii) The fact that the definition of "family" contained in section 2 (10) A does not treat the major sons of a person as members of his family is a clearly pointer that an undivided Hindu family was in the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted the definition section [934H; 936A] 3.
Sub section (3) (a) of section 4 which provides that in calculating the extent of land held by a member of a family or by an individual person, the share of the member of the family or of the individual person in the land held by an undivided Hindu family shall be taken into account, furnishes a conclusive indication that the "family" mentioned in the Act is wholly distinct and different from an 'undivided Hindu family. ' [935B] In the instant case, the circumstance that a partition had taken place disrupting the joint family consisting of the appellant and his minor sons is of no relevance in determining the total extent of the holding of the appellant in accordance with the provisions of section 2 (10) read with s 4 of the Act.
A special statutory unit consisting of the persons satisfying the description contained in clause (10) of section 2 as constituting a "family" for the purpose of fixation of ceiling has been created.
The stress is only on the existence of the relationship, and unity of title or jauntiness of holding in relation to properly are not essential elements.
Under the definition contained in section 2 (10), a person, the wife or husband of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters together constitute a "family".
[935C D] 4.
The position emerging from the provisions of section 2 (10) and section 4(1) (2), is that the properties held by the minor sons of the appellant individually as well as the lands separately owned by his wife, purchased by her with her Sridhanam amounts, are all liable to be taken into account while computing the total extent of holding of the family of the appellant.
[935F] 5.
Explanation IV to section 7 proceeds on the footing that for purposes of computing the ceiling and determining the area of surplus land to be surrendered.
the lands held separately by the husband and wife are to be pooled together.
The liability to surrender excess land is to be fixed in proportion to the extent of land held separately by the two spouses, [936B] 6.
The purpose of section 4(4) is to peg down the process of determination of ceiling area to the state of things that obtained on the 'appointed day ' and it is for the said purpose that the sub section provides that in calculating the extent of land held by and person, any land which was transferred, by sale, gift or otherwise Dr partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement of the Act, shall be taken into account, as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned.
[936D E] 928