judgement:
Appeal No. 507 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1959 of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc.
Case No. 10 of 1959.
section K. Kapur and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant.
The respondent did not appear.
February 26, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SIKRI J.
This is an appeal directed against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, which granted a certificate under article 133(1)(c).
One Mukanchand, respondent No. 1 in this appeal (hereinafter referred to as the decree holder) obtained a mortgage decree on February 12, 1954, for Rs. 1,14,581 14 6, with future interest at 6 per cent per annum, against one Rao Raja Inder Singh (hereinafter referred to as the judgment debtor).
The mortgage money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaged properties consisted of 2 Jagirs and some non jagir immovable property.
The latter property was sold in execution and Rs. 33,750/ paid to the decree holder in partial satisfaction of the decree.
On December 14, 1956, the decree holder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, for Rs. 99,965 3 6, praying for attachment of the amount of compensation and rehabili tation grant which would be paid to the judgment debtor on account of resumption of his jagir.
This case was registered 906 as Execution Case No. 12/57.
On July 29, 1957, the judg ment debtor made an application before the District Judge, Jodhpur, to the effect that the decretal amount should be reduced in accordance with section 5 of the Rajasthan Jagirdars ' Debt Reduction Act (Rajasthan Act IX of 1957).
On July 31, 1957, the judgment debtor submitted another application claiming that only half of his total jagir compensation and rehabilitation grant money was liable to attachment under section 7 of the said Act.
The decree holder, in his reply to those petitions, urged that the provisions relied on were ultra vires the Constitution of India being in contravention of articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
On December 3, 1957, the decree holder filed a petition under article 228 of the Constitution, praying that the execution case No. 12 of 1957, pending in the Court of the District Judge, Jodhpur, be withdrawn from that Court to the Rajasthan High Court.
The High Court transferred the case to its file, and thereafter issued notice to the State of Rajasthan, as the constitutionality of the said Act had been challenged.
By its judgment, the High Court held that apart from the latter part of section 2(e) excluding certain debts hereinafter referred to as the impugned part and section 7(2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid.
The State applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and so did the decree holder.
On the certificates being granted, two appeals were filed in this Court.
The appeal of Mukhanchand (Civil Appeal No. 508/61) was, by order dated April 23, 1962, of this Court, held to have abated.
Therefore, we are not concerned with the validity of the other provisions of the Act.
Although the validity of the other provisions is not now in question, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act, because they have a bearing on the question of the validity of the impugned part of section 2 (e) and section 7 (2) of the Act; and these are reproduced below: "Preamble To provide for the scaling down of debts of jagirdars whose jagir lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. . 907 section 2(e) "debt" means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first day of January.
1949 or a debt due to: (i) the Central Government or Government of any State; (ii) a local authority; (iii) a scheduled bank; (iv) a co operative society; and (v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose only; or (vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards. section 3.
Reduction of secured debt at the time of passing of decree. (1) Nothwithstanding anything in any law, agreement or document, in any suit to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt, the court shall, after the amount due has been ascertained, but before passing a decree, proceed as hereinafter stated.
(2)(a) Where the mortgaged property consists exclusively of jagir lands and such lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Act, the court shall first ascertain whether the mortgagor had the right, under the jagir law in force at the time the mortgage deed was executed, to mortgage the jagir lands, or failing that, whether specific permission for effecting the mortgage was obtained from the competent authority, and whether the mortgage was validly subsisting on the date of resumption of the jagir lands.
(b) if the mortgage was legally and properly made and was validly subsisting on the aforesaid date, the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the formula given in Schedule 1. 908 (3) Where the mortgaged property consists partly of jagir lands as aforesaid and partly of property other than such lands, the court shall after taking action in accordance with the provisions of subclause (a) of sub section (2), proceed to distribute.
the amount due on the two properties separately in accordance with the principles contained in section 82 of the (IV of 1882) as if they had been properties belonging separately to two persons with separate: and distinct rights of ownership; and after the amount due has been so distributed, reduce the amount due on the jagir lands in accordance with the formula given in Schedule 1.
section 4 Powers to reduce secured debt after passing of decree. (1) Nothwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) or any other law, the court which passed a decree to which this Act applies relating to a secured debt shall, on the application either of the decree holder or judgment debtor, proceed as hereinafter stated.
(2) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists exclusively of jagir lands and such lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Act, the court shall reduce the amount due in accordance with the formula given in Schedule 1.
(3) Where the mortgaged property charged under the decree consists partly of jagir lands and partly of property other than jagir lands, the court shall determine the amount due on the first day of January, 1949, and distribute the same on the two properties separately in accordance with the principles contained in section 82 of the (IV of 1882), as if they had been properties belonging to two persons with separate and distinct rights of ownership and after the 909 amount due as respect the jagir lands has been so calculated.
reduce it in accordance with the formula given in Schedule 1.
section 6 Satisfaction of the decree after the amount due has been reduced under and in accordance with the provisions of section 4, the decree shall, to the extent of the reduction so effected, be deemed, for all purposes and on all occasions, to have been duly satisfied.
section 7(2) Notwithstanding anything in any law, the reduced amount found in the case of a mortgagor or judgment debtor as the case may be, under section 3 or section 4 as respects mortgaged jagir lands shall not be legally recoverable otherwise than out of the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to such mortgagor or judgment debtor in respect of such jagir lands.
" We may mention that respondent No. 1 has not entered appearance in this Court.
The learned counsel for the State, Mr. section K. Kapur, has urged that the High Court erred in holding that these two provisions, i.e. impugned part of section 2(e) and section 7(2), were void.
Regarding the impugned part of section 2(e), he contended that the debts mentioned in sub cls.
(i) to (vi) of section 2(e) have been placed on a different footing from debts due to other creditors, because the bodies and the authorities mentioned therein serve a public purpose or a public cause.
He urged that this provided a reasonable basis for differentiating between private creditors and creditors mentioned in cls.
(i) to (vi) above.
Regarding section 7(2), he urged that it imposed reasonable restrictions, in the interest of general public, on the creditors.
Before examining the validity of the impugned provisions, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.
As the preamble states in plain terms, the object of the Act is to scale down debts of Jagirdars whose jagir lands have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act.
Clause (e) of section 2 defines 'debt ' to mean an advance in cash or in kind.
The definition ,does not embrace dues of Government or a local authority 910 in respect of taxes, land revenue, etc.
The definition then excludes from the purview of the Act debts due to Central Government and other authorities and bodies mentioned in the clause.
We shall advert to them later when discussing the validity of this exclusion.
Section 3 provides for reduction of secured debts in accordance with the formula given in Schedule 1 at the time of passing a decree, and their apportionment where necessary, between jagir and non jagir property.
Section 4 provides for reduction of secured debts after a decree has been passed.
Section 5 directs a court to pass a fresh decree after reduction of the secured debts.
Section 6 provides that after reduction of the secured debt in accordance with the provisions of section 4, the decree shall, to the extent of the reduction so effected, be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions to have been duly satisfied.
Clause (1) of section 7 provides for the execution of the decree against the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable in respect of the jagir lands of the judgment debtor.
Clause (2) of section 7, which has been struck down by the High Court, prohibits the recovery of the reduced amount with respect to jagir property from any property other than the compensation and rehabilitation grant payable to a jagirdar.
The effect of this provision is that the other properties of the jagirdar, existing or which 'he may acquire hereafter, are immune from being proceeded against in execution or otherwise.
We think that the High Court was right in holding that the impugned part of section 2(e) infringes article 14 of the Consti tution.
It is now well settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
In our opinion, condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case.
The object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of the 'Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of 911 Jagirs Act.
The Jagirdar 's capacity to pay debts had been reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the Act was to ameliorate his condition.
The fact that the debts are owed to a government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of section 2(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories of debts.
The reason why a debt advanced on behalf of a person by the Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled bank and why a debt due to a non scheduled bank is not excluded from the purview of the Act is not discernible.
In this connection, Mr. Kapur has relied on the decision of this Court in Manna Lal vs Collector of Jhalwar (1).
This case is clearly distinguishable because there a law giving special facility for the recovery of dues to a bank owned by the Government was held not to offend article 14 of the Con stitution.
It is clear that the government can be legitimately put in a separate category for the purpose of laying down the procedure for the recovery of its dues.
Mr. Kapur further relied on Nand Ram Chhotey Lal vs Kishore Raman Singh (2).
The judgment of the High Court undoubtedly supports him, but, with respect, we are unable to agree with the ratio of the case.
The High Court was concerned with.
the U.P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act (U.P. Act XV of 1953), which is substantially similar to the impugned Act The ratio of the High Court is: "It appears to us that the legislature had to make a distinction between debts due from the ex zamindars to private individuals and the debts due to scheduled banks or to Government or semi Government authorities.
The obvious reason appears to be that the private money lenders were considered to be a bane to rural economy and perpetrating agricultural indebtedness.
It was to save the cultivators from such unscrupulous moneylenders that such laws had to be enacted, the last in series being the Zamindars Debt Reduction Act.
" We consider there is no force in these observations.
No such reason is apparent from the terms of the Act.
Non scheduled banks (1) ; (2) AIR (1962) All.
912 and all other private creditors cannot be said to be a bane to rural economy.
The third case relied on by Mr. Kapur Jamnalal Ramlal Kimtee vs Kishendas and State of Hyderabad(1) does not contain any discussion.
The High Court supported the exclusion on the ground that "exclusion of certain class of debts under section 3 of the impugned Act also is not without substantial justification for public demands do not stand in the same position as ordinary demands." Apart from the fact that all the exempted categories are not public demands, the High Court does not seem to have considered whether the differentia had any rational relationship sought to be achieved by the Act.
In conclusion, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the purpose of sustaining the impugned part of section 2(e).
Now, coming to the question of the validity of section 7(2), we consider that this sub section is valid as it imposes reasonable restrictions, in the interest of general public, on the rights of a secured creditor.
A secured creditor, when he advanced money on the security of jagir property, primarily looked to that property for the realisation of his dues.
Further, this sub section has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a jagirdar whose jagir properties have been taken over by the State for a public purpose at a low valuation.
If this provision was not made, the jagirdar would find it difficult to start life afresh and look to other avocations, for not only his existing non jagir property but his future income and acquired properties would be liable to attachment and sale for the purpose of satisfying the demands of such secured creditors.
Accordingly, we hold that section 7(2) imposes reasonable restrictions in the interest of general public.
The appeal is accordingly partly accepted, the decision of the High Court in regard to section 2(e) is confirmed and that in regard to section 7(2) is reversed.
As the respondent was not represented and that appeal has only partly succeeded, we order the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
Appeal partly allowed.
(1)AIR (1955) Hyd. 194.

summary/full:
Respondent No. 1 obtained a mortgage decree for Rs. 1,14,581/14/6 against one Rao Raja Inder Singh (the judgment debtor).
The mortgage money was advanced under three mortgages, and the mortgaged properties consisted of Jagirs and some non Jagir immovable property.
The latter property was sold in execution and Rs. 33,750/ paid to the decree holder in partial satisfaction of the decree.
Then the decree holder filed an execution petition in the Court of the District Judge for the balance amount i.e. Rs. 99,965/3/6, praying for attachment of the amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant which would be paid to the judgment debtor on account of resumption of his Jagir.
The judgmment debtor submitted two applications in which he claimed relief under sections 5 and 7 of the Rajasthan Jagirdars ' Debt Reduction Act.
The decree holder, in his reply, to those petitions urged that the provisions relied in were ultra vires the Constitution of India, being in contravention of articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Thereafter the decree holder moved a petition under article 228 of the Constitution before the High Court, praying that the execution case pending in the Court of the District Judge, be withdrawn from that court to the High Court.
The High Court transferred the case to its file.
By its judgment the High Court could held that apart from the later part of section 2(e) excluding certain debts and section 7 (2) of the Act, the rest of the Act was valid.
The High Court granted a certificate under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution to the State of Rajasthan to file an appeal to this Court.
Hence the appeal: Held: (i) That the impugned part of section 2(e) infringes article 14 of the Constitution for the reason that no reasonable classification is disclosed for the purpose of sustaining the impugned part of section 2(e).
It is now well settled that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differential must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The said condition No. 2 above has clearly not been satisfied in this case.
The object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act was to reduce the debts secured on the Jagir lands which had been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act.
The fact that the debts are owed to a Government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of section (2) (e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further, no intelligible principle underlies the exempted categories of debts.
The reason why a debt advanced on behalf of a person by the Court of Wards is clubbed with a debt due to a State or a scheduled bank and why a debt due to a non scheduled bank is not excluded from the purview of the Act is not discernible.
Manna Lal vs Collector of Jhalwar.
; , Nand Ram Chhotey Lai vs Kishore Raman Singh, A.I.R. (1962) All 521 and 905 Jamnalal Ramlal Kimtee vs Kishendas and State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. (1955) Hyd. 194, distinguished.
(ii) Section 7(2) is valid as it imposes reasonable restrictions, in the interests of general public.
on the rights of a secured creditor.
This sub section has been designed with the object of rehabilitating a Jagirdar whose Jagir properties have been taken over by the State for a public purpose at a low valuation.
If this provision was not made, the Jagirdar would find it diffcult to start life afresh because his future income and acquired properties would be liable to attachment and sale for the purpose of satisfying the demands of such creditors.


judgement:
Appeal No. 73 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 23, 1961, of the Bombay High Court, in Appeal No. 5 of 1960.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, Purshottam Tricumdas, F. section Nariman, Suresh D. Parekh and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
M. K. Nambiar, K. section Cooper, Anil Dewan, RaMesh A. Shroff, section N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.
February 27.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J.
This is an appeal (with certificate) by Messrs. Dhanrajamal Gobindram against a judgment of the Divisional Bench of the High Court of Bombay, by which a petition under section 20 of the Indian was held to be maintainable and the decision of the learned Judge (Original Side) who held otherwise, was reversed.
The respondents are Messrs. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (a registered firm), who were the petitioners in the High Court.
The facts of the case are as follows: On October 24, 1957, Messrs. Dhanrajamal Gobindram (referred to as buyers, hereafter) entered into an agreement with Messrs. Shamji Kalidas & Co. (referred to as sellers, hereafter), for purchase of 500 bales of African raw cotton.
The contract was in the form of a letter 1023 written by the sellers and confirmed by the buyers.
The material portions of the letter, which bears No. SK/Bom/13/2014 and was stamped as an agreement, ' are as follows: "We confirm having sold to you African raw cotton on the following terms and conditions subject to the usual Force Majeure Clause: Description: ARBP 52 F. A. Q. Crop/58. Quality : 500 (Five Hundred) bales.
Price : at Rs. 1,401 nett per candy CIF Bombay.
Payment : Against shipping documents in Bombay.
Packing : 420 lbs.
approximately per bale.
Shipment : February/March 1958.
Remarks: The terms and conditions on the reverse form part of the contract.
This contract is subject to the Bye laws of East India Cotton Association, Ltd., Bombay, other than the bye law 35 for arbitration on Quality in case of East African cotton.
Terms and Conditions.
The shipment is subject to any cause beyond seller 's or seller 's shipper 's control and is also subject to availability of freight.
This contract is subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay.
It will be the duty of the buyers to obtain the import licence and to communicate the number thereof to the sellers immediately on the same being obtained but in any event, not later than 20th February, 1958, and in the event of their failure to do so for any reasons whatsoever including the reason that the Government of India may not allow the imports of the contracted goods, the sellers shall be entitled at their discretion either to carry over the goods, in which event the buyers shall pay to the seller all carry over charges in addition to the contracted price or to call upon the buyers to pay for the contracted goods and take immediate delivery thereof in.
British East Africa and upon 1024 the buyers failing to do so, to sell the contracted goods at Kampala or Mombasa at the rates prevalent there in convenient lots and as and when it may be practicable to do so at the risk and account of the buyers and to claim from them any deficit that arise between the contracted price and such resale price and also all expense incidental thereto.
Even if the Government of India may announce the import policy of the contracted goods in such manner that only the consumers would be entitled to obtain the licences, it will be the duty of the buyers to see that necessary import licences for the contracted goods are obtained in the consumers ' name or in the joint names of themselves and those of the consumers the intention being that in all eventualities it is the duty of the buyers to obtain licences under any policy that may be followed by the Government of India for the import of the contracted goods and to communicate the number thereof to the sellers within the time as specified hereinabove and on the buyer 's failure to do so all the eventualities contemplated under clause 6 shall operate.
" By a letter dated November 30, 1957, the contract was later amended by the parties as follows : " With reference to the above mentioned contracts we hereby confirm that, if necessary, we shall carry over the contracted goods for two months, namely, March and April and you will pay as the carry over charges for the same.
The interest payable under such carry over charges will be at the rate prevalent in Mombasa.
The other terms and conditions remain unaltered. " The contract was not performed.
The sellers wrote as many as five letters between March 1, 1958, and May 26, 1958, before they received a reply from the buyers dated June 3, 1958.
By that time, the sellers had carried forward the contract, and also invoked their right of resale after giving notice, and claimed Rs. 34,103.
15 nP. for which a debit note had been issued.
This note was returned by the buyers with a letter of June 3, 1958, stating that the contract was 1025 void and/or illegal", that they were not obliged to perform it, that there was no right of any sale on their., account and/or on their behalf, and that the alleged" sale was not binding upon them.
[exhibit " D " (Colly) No. 6.] The sellers then invoked the arbitration clause of the agreement and Bye law 38 A of the Bye laws of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., Bombay, and moved the Bombay High Court, on the Original Side, under section 20 of the Indian , requesting that the agreement be filed in Court and the dispute referred to arbitration.
The buyers appeared, and resisted the petition on grounds which they set forth in affidavits filed from time to time.
By their first affidavit dated July 31, 1958, the buyers contended that cls.
6 and 7, quoted above, were unlawful, as the liability created under them amounted to a contravention " of the import policy of Government of India " and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and the Rules made thereunder.
They contended that, in view of the invalidity of the contract as a whole, the arbitration clause in the agreement was not binding, and that the agreement could not be filed.
In the second affidavit which was filed on February 4, 1959, they added the reason that the words " subject to the usual Force Majeure Clause " were vague and uncertain, and made the contract ' void ab initio, as there was no consensus ad item between the parties.
They contended that the con.
tract being void, the arbitration clause was also void.
By yet another affidavit filed on February 27, 1959, they averred that the letter dated November 30, 1957, was void, being in contravention of the Import Trade Control Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Rules made under the two Acts, inasmuch as the consideration was one forbidden by law and was likely to defeat the provisions of law.
They also stated that the words " if necessary " in that letter rendered the contract void ab initio for vagueness and uncertainty.
The case was heard by K. T. Desai, J. (as he then war,).
On March 3, 1959, the learned Judge dismissed 1026 the petition as not maintainable on the ground that ,the dispute was about the legality or validity of the contract including the agreement about arbitration, and that such a dispute could only be considered under sections 32 and 33 of the by the Court and not by the arbitrator in a reference under section 20 of the Act.
He declined to consider the question under the former sections, because the petition had not asked for that relief, observing that if by a proper petition the question were raised, it would be decided.
Against the order of the learned Judge (0. section), an appeal was filed by the sellers.
This appeal was heard by Chainani, C. J. and section T. Desai, J. on April 28, 1959.
The learned Judges held that a claim was made by the sellers and was denied by the buyers; that there was thus a dispute arising out of or in relation to a contract as contemplated by Bye law 38 A; that in showing cause against the petition under section 20, the buyers had averred that the contract was illegal and void; and that such a question could be decided by the Court before making the reference.
The learned Judges pointed out that a petition under sections 32 and 33 of the Indian questioning the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement was not to be expected from one making a claim under a contract, that the plea was always likely to be raised by one resisting the petition, and that when such a plea was raised, the Court must decide it, even though the proceedings be under section 20 of the Act for making a reference.
The case was, therefore, remanded with the following direction: " As the respondents have challenged the validity of this agreement, the Court will have to decide this question before passing further orders in the matter.
Accordingly we set aside the order passed by Mr. Justice K. T. Desai, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioners, and remand the matter to the trial court for deciding the objections, raised by the respondent under sub section (3) of section 20 of the Act, to the arbitration agreement being filed in Court, and then disposing of the matter in accordance with law." 1027 When the case went back for retrial, the buyers filed their fourth affidavit on November 16, 1959.
They stated in that affidavit that Bye law 38 A was a statutory Bye law of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., Bombay, a recognised Institution under the Forward Contracts Regulation Act, No. 74 of 1952, and that section 46 of the was ap plicable.
They contended that inasmuch as the Bye laws of the Association prescribed a different machinery inconsistent with and repugnant to section 20 of the , the latter section was inapplicable, and that the petition was incompetent.
By his order dated November 26 and 27,1959, K. T. Desai, J. hold that the petition did not disclose sufficient materials, and that the sellers were not entitled to have the agreement of reference filed, or to have an order of reference made.
Though be held that the Bye laws of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd. were statutory, and that sections 46 and 47 of the applied, he was of opinion that section 20 could not be invoked, because no action under sub section
(4) of a. 20 could be taken.
The reason given by the learned Judge was that under that sub section the Court had to appoint an arbitrator, if the parties failed to agree, and that sub section was not applicable, because the machinery of Bye law 38 A left no power of action to the Court.
He also felt that there was no averment in the petition that the parties had not agreed.
On the rest of the points raised by the buyers in their affidavits, the learned Judge held against them.
He held that, in view of sections 21(2) and 21(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, there was no infringement of that Act by the agreement entered into, though he expressed a doubt if the words " legal proceedings " in section 21(3) were wide enough to include an arbitration.
He also held that cl. 7 of the conditions under which the contract was to be performed was, at least in part and under certain circumstances, not a contravention of the Import and Export Control Act, 1947, or the Import Trade Control Order issued Under sections 3 and 4 A of that Act, and thus not wholly void.
He held lastly that the contract was not void for vagueness or 1028 uncertainty either on account of the reference to " the usual Force Majeure Clause ", or because of the words if necessary " in the letter of November 30, 1957.
The sellers appealed against the dismissal of the petition, and the buyers cross objected against the adverse findings and the disallowance of costs.
The appeal was heard by Tarkunde and Chitale, JJ., and by separate but concurring judgments, the appeal was allowed and the cross objection dismissed, and the buyers were ordered to pay costs throughout.
The Divisional Bench agreed with K. T. Desai, J. on all the points decided by him against the buyers.
They left open the question whether " legal proceedings " in section 21(3) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act were wide enough to include an arbitration for the decision of the arbitrators to be appointed, and addressing themselves to the question raised about section 20, held that the petition was maintainable.
They were of opinion that the Court could order the arbitration agreement to be filed and also to refer the dispute to arbitrators to be chosen in accordance with Bye law 38 A, though they felt that if the latter action could not be taken, at least the first could be, because the procedural part could not destroy the power conferred to file the agreement.
In this appeal, all the arguments which had failed before the High Court were urged before us.
Shortly stated, they are: that the contract was void (a) for illegality and (b) for uncertainty and vagueness on two grounds; that the petition under section 20 of the Indian was incompetent, as that section was inapplicable; and that the law governing the parties was not the Indian law but the law of British East Africa.
We shall now deal with these contentions.
The first contention is that cl. 7 of the agreement involves a breach of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
Reliance is placed upon section 5 of the Act, which reads as follows: " (5) Restrictions on payment8. (1) Save as may be provided in and in accordance with any general or special exemption from the provisions of this subsection which may be granted conditionally or 1029 unconditionally by the Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in, British India shall (e) make any payment to or for the credit of any person as consideration for or in association with(1) the receipt by any person of a payment or the acquisition by any person of property outside India; (ii) the creation or transfer in favour of any person of a right whether actual or contingent to receive a payment or acquire property outside India: " It is contended that the agreement envisaged (a) payments for goods in Africa against shipping documents, (b) payment in Africa of carrying over charges, and (c) in the event of resale, payment of deficit also in Africa.
It is also contended that the two clauses (6 and 7) contemplate acquisition of property in Africa.
The clauses, it is submitted, also involved acquisition of foreign exchange, if the goods were resold in Africa and credit for the price was given to the buyers.
This, it is argued, was a breach of section 5, unless there was a general or special exemption granted by the Reserve Bank in connection with this contract, and that no such exemption was in existence when the contract was made.
In this connection, section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act may be read.
It provides: " 21.
Contracts in evasion of this Act. (1) No person shall enter into any contract or agreement which would directly or indirectly evade or avoid in any way the operation of any provision of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder.
(2) Any provision of, or having effect under, this Act that a thing shall not be done without the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, shall not render invalid any agreement by any person to do that thing, if it is a term of the agreement that thing shall not be done unless permission is granted by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be; and it shall be an implied term of every contract governed 1030 by the law of any part of British India that anything agreed to be done by any term of that contract which is prohibited to be done by or under any of the provisions of this Act except.
with the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, shall not be done unless such permission is granted.
(3) Neither the provisions of this Act nor any term (whether expressed or implied) contained in any contract that anything for which the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank is required by the said provisions shall not be done without that permission, shall prevent legal proceedings being brought in British India to recover any sum which, apart from the said provisions and any such term, would be due, whether as a debt, damages or otherwise, but (a) the said provisions shall apply to sums required to be paid by any judgment or order of any Court as they apply in relation to other sums; and (b) no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of any sum to which the said provisions apply except as respects so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case May be, may permit to be paid; and (c) for the purpose of considering whether or not to grant such permission, the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be, may require the person entitled to the benefit of the judgment or order and the debtor under the judgment or order, to produce such documents and to give such information as may be specified in the requirement.
" No doubt, sub section (1) prohibits contracts in contravention or evasion, directly or indirectly, of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, and if there was nothing more, then the argument would be understandable.
But, sub section
(2) provides that the condition that a thing shall not be done without the permission of the Reserve Bank shall not render an agreement 1031 invalid, if it is a term of the agreement that the thing shall not be done unless permission is granted by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank and further that it shall be an implied term of every contract governed by the law of any part of India that anything agreed to be done by any term of that contract, which cannot be done except with the permission of the Reserve Bank, shall not be done, unless permission is granted.
Sub section (3) allows legal proceedings to be brought to recover sum due as a debt, damages or otherwise, but no steps shall be taken to enforce the judgment, etc., except to the extent permitted by the Reserve Bank.
The effect of these provisions is to prevent the very thing which is claimed here, namely, that the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act arms persons against performance of their contracts by setting up the shield of illegality.
An implied term is engrafted upon the contract of parties by the second part of sub section
(2), and by sub section
(3), the responsibility of obtaining the permission of the Reserve Bank before enforcing judgment, decree or order of Court, is transferred to the decree holder.
The section is perfectly plain, though perhaps it might have been worded better for which a model existed in England.
It is contended that section 21 uses the word " permission ", while section 5 speaks of an exemption, and that sections 21(2) and 21(3) do not cover the prohibition in a. 5.
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, no doubt, uses diverse words like, " authorise ", " exempt " and " permission " in different parts.
The word " exempt " shows that a person is put beyond the application of law, while " permission " shows that he is granted leave to act in a particular way.
But the word SC permission " is a word of wide import.
" Permission " in this section means only leave to do some act which but for the leave would be illegal.
In this sense, exemption is just one way of giving leave.
If one went only by the word and searched for those sections where the word " permission " is expressly used, sections 21(2) and (3) are likely to prove a dead letter.
This could not have been intended, and the very 1032 elaborate provisions in those sub sections show that those matters were contemplated which are the subject of prohibition in section 5.
In our opinion, the argument is without foundation.
The contention, that on resale the price would have accrued to the buyers in the first instance, as the sellers would be acting as the agents of the buyers, is also incorrect.
It has been rightly pointed out by K. T. Desai, J. that the right of resale given by sections 54(2) and (4) of the Indian Sale of Goods Act is exercised by the seller for himself and not as an agent of the buyer, when the latter is given a notice of sale.
This is indeed clear from the fact that the buyer is not entitled to the profit on resale in that contingency, though liable for damages.
The position is different when no notice is so sent.
Then the profits go to the buyer.
Perhaps, in that event it may be possible to say that the seller acted as an agent.
But, in the case of resale with prior notice, there is no payment to the buyer and no contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
The contention that the contract involved an actual or, at least, a contingent right to or acquisition of property abroad is not correct.
Even if it were so, the contract is saved by section 21, as already explained.
In our opinion, the contract was not void for illegality.
The agreement is said to be void because of vagueness and uncertainty arising from the use of the phrase " subject to the usual force majeure clause ".
The argument is that there was no consensus ad idem, and that the parties had not specified which force majeure clause they had in mind.
We were taken through the Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents and shown a number of force majeure clauses, which were different.
We were also taken through a number of rulings, in which the expression force majeure " had been expounded, to show that, there is no consistent or definite meaning.
The contention thus is that there being no consensus ad idem, the contract must fail for vagueness or uncertainty.
The argument, on the other side, is that this may be regarded as a surplusage, and, if meaningless, ignored.
It is 1033 contended by the respondents that the addition of the word " usual" shows that there was some clause which used to be included in such agreements.
The ' respondents also refer to section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, which provides: "Agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void, " and emphasise the words " capable of being made certain ", and contend that the clause was capable of being made certain, and ex facie, the agreement was not void.
McCardie J. in Lebeaupin vs Crispin (1) has given an account of what is meant by "force majeure " with reference to its history.
The expression "force majeure " is not a mere French version of the Latin expression" Vis major ".
It is undoubtedly a term of wider import.
Difficulties have arisen in the past as to what could legitimately be included in "force majeure ".
Judges have agreed that strikes, break down of machinery, which, though normally not included in" Vis Major" are included in "force majeure ".
An analysis of rulings on the subject into which it is not necessary in this case to go, shows that where reference is made to "force majeure ", the intention is to save the performing party from the consequences of anything over which he has no control.
This is the widest meaning that can be given to " force majeure ", and even if this be the meaning, it is obvious that the condition about "force majeure, " in the agreement was not vague.
The use of the word " usual " makes all the difference, and the meaning of the condition may be made certain by evidence about a force majeure clause, which was in contemplation of parties.
Learned counsel for the appellants relies strongly on a, decision of McNair, J. in British Industries vs Patley Pressings(2).
There, the expression used was "subject to force majeure conditions ".
The learned Judge held that by conditions " was meant.
clauses and not contingencies or circumstances, and that there being a variety of force majeure clauses in the trade, there (1) (2) 1034 was no concluded agreement.
The: case is distinguish.
able, because the reference to force majeure clauses was left at large.
The addition of the word " usual " makes it clear that here some specific clause was in the minds of the parties.
Learned counsel also relies upon a decision of the House of Lords in Scammell (G.) and Nephew Ltd. vs Ouston (H.C. and J.G.) (1), where the reference to " on hire purchase terms" was held to be too vague to constitute a concluded contract.
It will appear from the decision of the House of Lords that the clause was held to be vague, because no precise meaning could be attributed to it, there being a variety of hire purchase clauses.
The use of the word "usual" here, enables evidence to be led to make certain which clause was, in fact, meant.
The case of the House of, Lords does not, therefore, apply.
Both the cases to which we have referred were decided after parties had entered on evidence, which is not the case here.
Our case is more analogous to the decision referred to in Bishop & Baxter Ld.
vs Anglo Estern Trading & Industrial Co. Ld.
(2), namely, Shamrock section section Co. vs, Storey (3).
In speaking of the condition there, Lord Goddard observed as follows: " Abbreviated references in a commercial instrument are, in spite of brevity, often self explanatory or susceptible of definite application in the light of the circumstances, as, for instance, where the reference is to a term, clause, or document of a wellknown import like c.i.f. or which prevails in common use in a particular place of performance as may be indicated by the addition of the epithet 'usual ' : see Shamrock section section Co. vs Storey (a), where 'usual colliery guarantee ' was referred to in a charter party in order to define loading obligations.
" The addition of the word " usual " refers to something which is invariably to be found in contracts of a particular type.
Commercial documents are sometimes expressed in language which does not, on its face, bear a clear meaning.
The effort of Courts is to give a meaning, if possible.
This was laid down by the (1) (2) (3) , 1035 House of Lords in Hillas & CO.
vs Arcos Ltd. 1, and the observations of Lord Wright have become classic, and have been quoted with approval both by the Judicial Committee and the House of Lords ever since.
The latest case of the House of Lords is Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. vs Anglo Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd.(2).
There, the clause was " This bill of lading ", whereas the document to which it referred was a charter party.
Viscount Simonds summarised all the rules applicable to construction of commercial documents, and laid down that effort should always be made to construe commercial agreements broadly and one must not be astute to find defects in them, or reject them as meaningless.
Applying these tests to the present case and in the light of the provisions of section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, it is clear that the clause impugned is capable of being made certain and definite by proof that between the parties or in the trade or in dealings with parties in British East Africa, there was invariably included a force majeure clause of a particular kind.
In 'our opinion, the contract was not void for vagueness or uncertainty by reason of the reference in the terms stated, to the force majeure clause.
Mr. Daphtary posed the question as to on whom was the burden of proving the usual force majeure clause.
In our opinion if the agreement is not void for uncertainty, that question would be a matter for the decision of the arbitrators.
It is too early to say by what evidence and by whom the usual force, majeure clause must be established.
The next ground on which it is said that the agreement was void for uncertainty has reference to the employment of the words " if necessary " in the letter of November, 30, 1957.
The effect of that letter is to make an alteration in cl. 6 of the agreement, which has been quoted already.
Under that clause, the buyers were to obtain the import licence and to communicate the number thereof to the sellers not later than February 20, 1958, and in the event of their failure to do so for any reason whatsoever, the sellers (1) ; (2) , 153.
132 1036 were entitled "at their discretion " either to carry over the goods or to ask the buyers to pay for the contracted goods and take delivery in British East Africa.
By that letter, the sellers confirmed that " if necessary " they would carry over the contracted goods for two months, namely, March and April, subject to payment of charges.
It is contended that the words " if necessary " are entirely vague and do not show, necessary for whom, when and why.
In our opinion, this argument has no force whatever.
Under cl. 6, the sellers had an absolute discretion either to carry over the goods or to insist on delivery being taken.
By this letter, they have said that, if necessary, that is to say.
if the buyers find it difficult to supply the number of the import licence, the contract would be carried over to March and April.
By this amendment, the sellers surrendered to a certain extent their absolute discretion.
The clause means that the contract was not extended to March and April, but that the sellers would extend it to that period,.
if occasion demanded.
Since both the parties agreed to this letter and the buyers confirmed it, it cannot be said that there was no consensus ad idem, or that the whole agreement is void for uncertainty.
We shall now consider the next argument, which was very earnestly urged, before us.
It is that section 20 of the cannot be made applicable to this case at all.
We have already quoted extracts from the agreement which include the clause by which the Bye laws of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay, were applied to this contract, except Bye law 35,which deals with arbitration on quality in case of East African cotton.
Bye law 1(B) relates to East African cotton, and it says that Bye laws 1 to 46 inclusive (with certain exceptions) shall apply to contracts in respect of East African cotton.
It was conceded before the High Court and also before us that the Bye laws are statutory.
The buyers were members of the Association but not the sellers; but the Bye laws on arbitration, with which we are concerned, include arbitrations between a member and a 1037 non member.
We are concerned directly with Bye law 38 A. Bye law 38 A in its opening portion, reads: All unpaid claims, whether admitted or not, and all disputes (other than those relating to quality) arising out of or in relation to contracts (whether forward or ready and whether between members or between a, member and a non member) made subject to these Bye laws shall be referred to the arbitration of two disinterested persons one to be chosen by each party.
The arbitrators shall have power to appoint an umpire and shall do so if and when they differ as to their award.
" Then follow certain provisions, which were stressed but which need not be quoted in extension Shortly stated, they are that the arbitrators must make their award in 15 days, unless time be extended by the Chairman.
The umpire is to be appointed within 15 days or such extended period as may be fixed by the Chairman and the umpire is to make his award within 10 days, unless time be extended by the Chairman.
In case of disagreement or failure of a party to appoint an arbitrator, the Chairman may appoint an arbitrator, and similarly the Chairman is to appoint the umpire and he may even appoint himself.
Other powers are conferred on the Chairman, who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association Ltd. The contention is that arbitrations under the , like those under Sch.
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are of three kinds described by Lord Macnaghten in Ghulam Jilani vs Muhammad Hassan (1), and that this belongs to the second category there described, in which " all further proceedings are under the supervision of the Court ".
It is argued that by the application of the Bye laws, the Court is left no powers under section 20 which is being invoked, and that section 20 cannot thus apply.
Section 20 of the , in so far as it is material to this point, is as follows: " 20.
Application to file in Court arbitration agreement. (1) Where any persons have entered into an (1) (1901) L.R. 29 I.A. 51, 56, 57.
1038 arbitration agreement before the, institution of any suit with respect to the subject matter of the agreement or any part of it, and where a difference has arisen to which the agreement applies, they or any of them, instead of proceeding under Chapter II, may apply to a Court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the agreement relates, that the agreement be filed in Court.
(3) On such application being made, the Court shall direct notice thereof to be given to all parties to the agreement other than the applicants, requiring them to show cause within the time specified in the notice why the agreement should not be filed.
(4) Where no sufficient cause is shown, the Court shall order the agreement to be filed and shall make an order of reference to the arbitrator appointed by the parties, whether in the agreement or otherwise, or where the parties cannot agree upon an arbitrator, to an arbitrator appointed by the Court.
(5) Thereafter the arbitration shall proceed in accordance with, and shall be governed by, the other provisions of this Act so far as they can be made applicable.
" The sellers rely upon cl.
(5), which enjoins the application of the provisions of the , so far as they can be made applicable.
Reference is then made to provisions of Chap.
II and the Schedule of the Act laying down the powers of the Court, and they are contrasted with the provisions of the Bye. laws to show that if the latter prevail, no residuum of power is left to the Court, and that after filing the agreement, the Court must abdicate in favour of the Chairman and the Act, in terms, ceases to apply.
Reference is also made to section 47 of the , which provides: "Subject to the provisions of section 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder " ' (Proviso omitted) 1039 The opening words of section 47 takes us to a. 46, which may be read at this stage.
It provides: "The provisions of this Act, except subsection (1) of section 6 and sections 7, 12, 36 and 37, shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder." Section 46 makes the provisions of any other enactment or any rules made thereunder to prevail over the , if inconsistent with the latter.
In view of these several provisions, it is clear that the applies to all arbitrations and Chap.
III makes it applicable also to arbitrations, in which the arbitration agreement is asked to be filed in Court under section 20, subject, however, to this that the provisions of any other enactment or rules made thereunder, if inconsistent with the , are to prevail.
Learned counsel for the buyers contends that nothing is saved of the Act.
This is not correct.
To begin with, questions as to the existence or validity of the agreement are saved from decisions by arbitrators or umpires, however appointed.
Since such a plea can only be raised in bar of an application by persons seeking a reference to arbitration, at least that portion of the Act still applies, and that power can only be exercised by the Court.
Other provisions of Chap.
II, like sections 15 and 16, still remain applicable.
We need not give a list of all the provisions which may be saved, because that will involve an examination side by side, of the sections of the Act and the provisions of the Bye laws.
So long as something is saved, it cannot be said that the Court after receiving the agreement and ordering that it be filed, becomes completely functus officio.
But the crux of the argument is that the provisions of tub.a.
(4) of section 20 read with sub s.(1), ibid., cannot apply, and the Court, after filing the agreement, will have 1040 to do nothing more with it, and this shows that section 20 is not applicable.
This argument overlooks the fact that this is a statutory arbitration governed by its own rules, and that the powers and duties of the Court in sub section
(4) of section 20 are of two distinct kinds.
The first is the judicial function to consider whether the arbitration agreement should be filed in Court or not.
That may involve dealing with objections to the existence and validity of the agreement itself.
Once that is done, and the Court has decided that the agreement must be filed, the first part of its powers and duties is over.
It is significant that an appeal under section 39 lies only against the decision on this part of sub section
Then follows a ministerial act of reference to arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the parties.
That also was perfectly possible in this case, if the parties appointed the arbitrator or arbitrators.
If the parties do not agree, the Court may be required to make a decision as to who should be selected as an arbitrator, and that may be a function either judicial, or procedural, or even ministerial; but it is unnecessary to decide which it is.
In the present case, the parties by their agreement have placed the power of selecting an arbitrator or arbitrators (in which we include also the umpire) in the hands of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., and the Court can certainly perform the ministerial act of sending the agreement to him to be dealt with by him.
Once the agreement filed in Court is sent to the Chairman, the Bye laws lay down the procedure for the Chairman and the appointed arbitrator or arbitrators to follow, and that procedure, if inconsistent with the , prevails.
In our opinion, there is no impediment to action being taken under section 20(4) of the .
We may dispose of here a supplementary argument that the dispute till now is about the legal existence of the agreement including the arbitration clause, and that this is not a dispute arising out of, or in relation to a cotton transaction.
Reference was made to certain observations in Heyman vs Darwins Ltd.(1).
In (1) 1041 our opinion, the words of the Bye law "arising out 'of or in relation to contracts" are sufficiently wide to comprehend matters, which can legitimately arise under section 20.
The argument is that, when a, party questions the very existence of a contract, no dispute can be said to arise out of it.
We think that this is not correct, and even if it were, the further words " in relation to " are sufficiently wide to comprehend even such a case.
In our opinion, this argument must also fail.
It was contended lastly that the law applicable to the case is the lex loci solutionis, that is to say, the law of British East Africa.
Reference was made to a passage from Pollock and Mulla 's Contract Act, Eighth Edn., p. 11, where it is observed as follows: " In ordinary circumstances the proper law of a contract (to use Mr. Dicey 's convenient expression) will be the law of the country where it is made.
But where a contract is made in one country and to be performed wholly or in part in another ', the proper law may be presumed to be the law, of the country where it is to be performed." (Auckland Corporation vs Alliance Assurance Co.) (1) The learned authors observe, on the same page further : "But these rules are only in the nature of presumptions, and subject to the intention of the parties, whether expressly declared or inferred from the terms and nature of the contract and the circumstances of the case.
" Reliance was also placed on Chitty 's Law of Contract and Rule 148, sub r.
(3), Second Presumption, in Dicey 's Conflict of Laws, Seventh Edn., p. 738, on which the statement of the law in Pollock and Mulla is based.
Whether the proper law is the lex loci contracts or lex loci solutionis is a matter of presumption; but there are accepted rules for determining which of them is applicable.
Where the parties have expressed themselves, the intention so expressed overrides any presumption.
Where there is no expressed intention, (1) ; 1042 then the rule to apply is to infer the intention from the terms and nature of the contract and from the general circumstances of the case.
In the present case, two such circumstances are decisive.
The first is that the parties have agreed that in case of dispute the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction, and an old legal proverb says, " Qui elicit judicem eligit jus" If Courts of a particular country are chosen, it is expected, unless there be either expressed intention or evidence, that they would apply their own law to the case.
See N. V. Kwick Who Tang vs James Finlay & Co. (1).
The second circumstance is that the arbitration clause indicated an arbitration in India.
of such arbitration clauses in agreements, it has been said on more than one occasion that they lead to an inference that the parties have adopted the law of the country in which arbitration is to be made.
See Hamlyn & Co. vs Tallisker Distillery (2), and Spurrier vs La Cloche (3).
This inference, it was said in the last case, can be drawn even in a case where the arbitration clause is void according to the law of the country where the contract is made and to be performed.
In our opinion, in this case, the circumstances clearly establish that the proper law to be applied is the Indian Law.
In the result, the appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent to purchase African raw cotton.
The agreement included a clause that the contract would be subject to the " usual Force Majeure clause ", the Bye laws of East India Cotton Association Ltd., Bombay, except bye law 35, the said Bye laws having statutory force, and to the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.
Clause 6 of the agreement provided that the buyers were to obtain import licence from the Government of India, failing which the seller would be entitled either to carry over the goods at the cost of the buyers or call upon them to take immediate delivery on payment in British East Africa, and in default to sell the goods in British East Africa and claim the deficit, if any between the contractual price and the price obtained on re sale.
Clause 7 further provided that notwithstanding the import policy followed by the Government of India in respect of the import of the contracted goods, the buyers would be bound to obtain the necessary import licences and communicate the numbers thereof to the sellers on specified dates, failing which cl. 6 would operate.
The buyers did not perform the contract and the sellers after notice to them re sold the goods and thereafter claimed the deficit which the,buyers refused to pay.
The sellers invoked the arbitration clause and the rules contained in bye law 38A of the Bye laws and others following it, which conferred on the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association Ltd., the power of selecting the arbitrator or arbitrators, and applied to the High Court under section 20 of the Indian for filing the agreement and referring the dispute to arbitration.
The buyers resisted and the trial judge dismissed the application, but the Court of appeal reversed that decision.
It was urged in this Court on behalf of the buyers that (1) cls.
6 and 7 contemplated acquisition of property or Exchange in Africa and thus involved a breach of section 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, since no general or special exemption had been granted thereunder by the Reserve Bank, (2) that the expression " subject to the usual Force Majeure clause " was vague and uncertain and rendered the agreement void, (3) that the application of bye law 48A et seq left no powers in the Court to act under sub sections
(1) and (4) of section 20n 1021 of the and the section was thus inapplicable and (4) that the law applicable to the case was the law of British East Africa and not that of India.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
The provisions of sub sections
(2) and (3) of section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, properly construed, left no manner of doubt that they contemplated matters which were within the prohibition of section 5 of the Act and had the effect of engrafting on the agreement of parties a term that it would be for the decreeholder before he could enforce the decree or order of the court to obtain the permission of the Reserve Bank and were thus designed to prevent the non performance of the contract under a cover of illegality.
The contract involved no actual or contingent right to acquisition of property abroad, and even assuming it did, it was saved by section 21 of the Act subject to its conditions.
The agreement was thus enforceable.
Nor was the contract void for uncertainty.
It was clear from judicial decisions that a reference to "force majeure " means the saving of the performing party from the consequence of factors beyond his control.
The condition in respect of "force majeure " did not, therefore" make the contract vague.
Further, the use of the word " usual " made it clear that the clause could be made certain by evidence and so it was protected by section 29 of the Contract Act.
Lebeaupin vs CriSpin, , referred to.
British Industries vs Patley Pressing, and Scammell (G) and Nephew Ltd. vs Ouston (H. C. and J. G.) , distinguished.
Bishop & Baxter Ld.
vs Anglo Eastern Trading & Industrial Co. Ld., [1944] I.K.B. 12, Shamrock section section Co. vs Storey, (1899) 5 Corn.
Cas. 21, Hillas & Co. vs Arcos Ltd., ; and Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. vs Anglo Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd., L,959) A.C. 133, relied on.
Although by section 46 of the , the Bye laws, if inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, must prevail, it was not correct to say that their application made the Courtfunctus officio under section 20 of the Act.
It must not be overlooked that although the present was a case of statutory arbitration governed by its own rules, the court under section 20(4) of the had two distinct powers, (1) of judicially considering whether or not the arbitration agreement should be filed in court and (2) whether there should be a reference to the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the parties or selected by it.
Since in the instant case the parties had by their agreement empowered the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the East India Cotton Association, Ltd., to select the arbitrator or arbitrators, the court could send the agreement to him to be dealt with under the pro, cedure laid by the said Bye laws.
1022 Whether the law of the country where the contract is made or of the country where it is to be performed should apply is sometimes a matter of presumption.
But the declared intention of the parties overrides such presumption.
Where there is no such declaration, the intention may be inferred from the terms and nature of the contract and the general circumstances of the case.
In the instant case, since the parties agreed that in case of dispute the Bombay High Court would have jurisdiction and the arbitration clause indicated arbitration in India, there could be no doubt that the Indian law was to apply.
N. V. Kwick Who Tong vs James Finlay & Co., [1927] A.C. 604, Hamlyn & Co. vs Tallisker Distillery, and Spurrier vs La Cloche, , referred to.