judgement:
Appeal No. 541 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in section A. O. No. 86 D of 1962.
A.S. B. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, D. P. Singh and B. K. Garg, for the appellant.
G. section Pathak, F. C. Bedi and D. D. Sharma, for respondents.
December 17.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA, C. J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of a learned single judge of the Punjab High Court summarily dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant, by his order dated May 31, 1962, from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated March 7, 1962, con firming that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dated July 27, 1961, whereby he had directed the appellant to be evicted from the premises in question.
It appears that the respondents are admittedly the landlords of the premises, No. 24, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi.
The appellant claims to have been in occupation of the premises since prior to 1950, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/ .
In 1955, the respondent had instituted a suit for the eviction of the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union, and the appellant was also impleaded as a party to the suit.
The respondents, in 1958, made an application for amendment of the plaint on the ground that they had come to know that the last owner, the father of the first respondent, had let the building to the appellant for his residential purposes and that the case should proceed againt him only.
But the 262 Subordinate judge, before whom the suit was pending, did not permit the amendment of the plaint but granted permission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, by his order dated May 8, 1959.
Thereafter, on February 25, 1960, the respondents made an application before the Rent Controller, Delhi, for the eviction of the appellant alone, without impleading the Union aforesaid as a party: The contention of the appellant was that the premises had been let out by the father of the first plaintiff respondent to the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union for office cum residential purposes and the tenancy of the Union had never been terminated.
The appellant also alleged that he was not a tenant and, therefore, the application for his eviction was not maintainable.
The petition for eviction was founded on the allegation that the appellant as tenant had made persistent default in the payment of rent and, secondly, that the premises were bonafide required by the respondents for their own residence, as the first respondent was about to leave the employment of a certain hospital which had provided him with residential accommodation.
That is to say,the petition for eviction was brought under s.14(1)(a) & (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (LIX of 1958)which will be referred to in the course of the judgment as the Act.
The appellant besides denying his tenancy and asserting the tenancy of the Union aforesaid stated that the respondents had already got suitable accommodation and that their requirement of the premises in question was not bonafide; the notice of demand for payment of rent served on the appellant was neither valid nor proper in law inasmuch as he was not the tenant in respect of the premises, and that the notice of demand should have been served on the Union.
The appellant asserted that he was only a licensee of the Union, and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondents.
On April 2, 1960, the Additional Rent Controller passed an order 263 directing the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent from August 1,1958, up to date, at the rate of Rs. 50/ per month, and future monthly rent, month by month, by the 15th of every following month.
The respondents made an application on May 16, 1961, under section 15(7) of the Act for striking out his defence against eviction on the ground that the tenant had failed to make the payment or deposit, as directed by the order dated April 2, 1960, aforesaid.
The appellant denied that he had made any default in the regular payment of rent, but also asserted that if there was any such default it was not intentional and was the result of a miscalculation.
By his order dated July 26, 1961, the Additional Rent Controller ordered the defence of the appellant to be struck out.
An appeal against the order striking out his defence was made to the Rent Control Tribunal on September 15, 1961, which was late by one day.
The learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as time barred, as also on merits, by its order dated March 6, 1962.
By his order dated July 17 , 1961, the Additional Rent Controller passed an ex parte order of,ejectment against the appellant holding that prima facie the relationship of landlord and tenant had been established, on the basis of certain rent receipts granted by the respondents to the appellant.
He also held that the respondents ' personal bonafide need for accommodation had been established.
Appeal against that order was dismissed on March 7, 1962, by the Rent Control Tribunal.
On May 28, 1962, the appellant filed a second appeal in the High Court of Punjab at Delhi against the order dated March .7, 1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal against the order of eviction.
No second appeal was taken to the High Court in respect of the dismissal of the appeal relating to the order dated March 6, 1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal in respect of the order of the Additional Rent Controller striking out his defence.
The second appeal was dismissed summarily by a 264 Single judge on May 31, 1962.
The appellant moved this Court during the long vacation and obtained an order from the learned Vacation judge granting special leave to appeal, on June 5, 1962.
A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the landlord respondent that no second appeal having been filed againts the order aforesaid of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his appeal in respect of the order of the Additional Rent Controller striking out his defence, that order had become final between the parties, and, therefore, this appeal was incompetent.
As will presently appear, this question is bound up with merits of the appeal and has, therefore, to be determined not as a preliminary objection but as one of the contentions between the parties, on the merits of the appeal itself.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the authorities under the Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings, inasmuch as it was denied that there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
Consequently, it was further contended, the provisions of section 15 (7) of the Act could not be applied against the appellant in the absence of a finding that he was the tenant in respect of the premises in question.
It was also contended that the delay of one day made in preferring the appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal should have been condoned, and the order refusing condonation was vitiated by applying erroneous considerations.
Other contentions raised related to concurrent findings of fact of the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal and we need not, therefore, take notice of these arguments.
The most important question that arises for determination in this case is whether or not the Rent Control authorities had jurisdiction in the matter in controversy in this case.
Ordinarily it is for the Civil Courts to determine whether and, if so, what jural relationship exists between the litigating 265 parties.
But the Act has been enacted to provide for the control of rents and evictions of tenants, avowedly for their benefit and protection.
The Act postulates the relationship of landlord and tenant which must be a preexisting relationship.
The Act is directed to control some of the terms and incidents of that relationship.
Hence, there is no express provision in the Act empowering the controller, or the Tribunal, to determine whether or not there is a relationship of landlord and tenant.
Inmost cases such a question would not arise for determination by the authorities under the Act.
A landlord must be very ill advised to start proceedings under the Act, if there is no such relationship of landlord and tenant.
If a person in possession of the premises is not a tenant, the owner of the premises would be entitled to institute a suit for ejectment in the Civil Courts, untrammelled by the provisions of the Act.
It is only when he happens to be the tenant of premises in an urban area that the provisions of the Act,are attracted.
If a person moves a Controller for eviction of a person on the ground that he is a tenant who had, by his acts or omissions, made himself liable to be evicted on any one of the grounds for eviction, and if the tenant denies that the plaintiff is the landlord, the Controller has to decide the question whether there was a relationship of landlord and tenant.
If the Controller decides that there is no such relationship the proceeding has to be terminated, without deciding the main question in controversy, namely the question of eviction.
If on the other hand, the Controller comes to the opposite conclusion and holds that the person seeking eviction was the landlord and the person in possession was the tenant the proceedings have to go on.
Under section 15 (4) of the Act, the Controller is authorised to decide the question whether the claimant was entitled to an order for payment of rent, and if there is a dispute as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, he may direct the tenant to deposit with him the 266 amount payable until the decision of the question as to who is entitled to that payment. "Landlord" has been defined under the Act as a person who is receiver or is entitled to receive the rent of the premises (omitting the words not necessary for our present purposes).
If the Controller comes to the conclusion that any dispute raised by the tenant as to who was entitled to receive rent had been raised by the tenant for false or frivolous reasons, he may order the defence against eviction to be struck out (section 15 (5)).
Similarly, if a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by section 15 (2), the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application for eviction (section 15 (7)).
Such an order was, as already indicated, passed by the Rent Controller in this case.
Now, proceedings under section 15 are primarily meant for the benefit of the tenant, and the section authorises the Controller after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, to make an order directing the tenant to pay the amount found on calculation to be due to the landlord or to deposit it with the Controller, within one month of the date of the order.
Such an order can be passed by the Controller for the benefit of the tenant, only if the Controller decides that the person against whom the proceedings for eviction had been initiated was in the position of a tenant.
Thus, any order passed by the Controller, either under section 15 or other sections of the Act, assumes that the Controller has the jurisdiction to make the order, i. e., to determine the issue of relation ship.
In this case, when the Controller made the order for deposit of the arrears of rent due, under section 15 (1), and on default of that made the order under sub section
(7) of section 15, striking out the defence, the Controller must be deemed to have decided that the appellant was a tenant.
Such a decision may not be res judicata in a regular suit in which a similar issue may directly arise for decision.
Hence, 267 any orders made by a Controller under the Act proceed on the assumption that he has the necessary power to do so under the provisions of the Act, which apply and which are meant to Control rents and evictions of tenants.
An order under section 15 (1) is meant primarily for the protection and benefit of the tenant.
If the appellant took his stand upon the plea that he was not a tenant he should have simply denied the relationship and walked out of the proceedings.
Instead of that, he took active steps to get the protection against eviction afforded by Act, by having an order passed by the Controller, giving him a locus poenitentiae by allowing further time to make the deposit of rent outstanding against him.
The Controller, therefore, must be taken to have decided that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and secondly, that the tenant was entitled to the protection under the Act.
It is true that the Act does not in terms authorise the authorities under the Act to determine finally the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant.
The Act proceeds on the assumption that there is such a relationship.
If the relationship is denied, the authorities under the Act have to determine that question also, because a simple denial of the relationship cannot oust the jurisdiction of the tribunals under the Act.
True, they are tribunals of the limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power and authority being limited by the provisions of the Statute.
But a simple denial of the relationship either by the alleged landlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act, because the simplest thing in the world would be for the party interested to block the proceedings under the Act to deny the relationship of landlord and tenant.
The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute have limited jurisdiction and have to function within the four corners of the Statute creating them.
But within the provisions 268 of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders are final and not liable to be questioned in collateral proceedings like a separate suit or application in execution proceedings.
In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention that as soon as the appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant; the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act was completely ousted.
Nor is there any jurisdiction in the contention that the provisions of sub section
(7) of section 15 of the Act had been erroneously applied to the appellant.
The orders under those provisions were for his benefit and he must be deemed to have invited the Controller to pass those orders in his favour.
Otherwise, he should have walked out of the proceedings after intimating to the Controller that he was not interested to contest the proceedings in as much as he was not a tenant, and that a third party was the tenant.
This order, of course, will bind only the appellant and no one else, and as he failed to take advantage of the order passed in his favour under section 15 (7), he cannot make a grievance of it.
Whether or not a delay of one day should have been condoned was a matter of discretion with the appellate authority, and it is not for this Court to say that this discretion should have been exercised in one way and not in another.
The crucial question is not whether the delay is of one day or more, but whether or not there was any justification for the delay.
It is for the appellate authority to determine whether or not the appellant had satisfied it as to the sufficiency of the ground for condoning the delay.
This question of condonation of delay is more or less of academic interest only, because the Tribunal not only considered the question of delay but also the appeal on its merits, and on merits also it came to the conclusion that there was no ground for interference with the orders passed by the Rent Controller.
Hence, the question of condonation of delay is of no importance in this case.
What is of greater importance is the 269 merit of the decision awarding possession to the landlord.
In this connection, it may be added that it was a little inconsistent on the part of the appellant to have taken all the advantages the Act affords to a tenant and then to turn round and to assert that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter, because he was not.
the tenant.
The Rent Controller had to determine the controversy as between the parties for the purposes of disposing of the case under the Act.
If the appellant really was a tenant, he has had the benefit of the provision of the Act, including the six months ' time as a period of grace after an order of the Rent Controller granting the landlord 's prayer for eviction.
If he was not the tenant, he has nothing to lose by the order of the Rent Controller.
These proceedings cannot affect the interest of one who is not a party to the present case.
Furthermore, a second appeal lay from the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing the appellant 's appeal against the order striking out his defence.
No such second appeal was taken to the High Court, though as already stated a second appeal was preferred against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the order of eviction.
The position is that the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dated March 6, 1962, dismissing the appeal against the order striking out his defence became final between the parties and is no more open to challenge.
Hence, it is no more open to the appellant to challenge the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act.
In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit in his appeal.
It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant was sought to be evicted by the landlord on the ground that he had habitually defaulted in the payment of rent as well as on the ground of the bonafide requirement of the land lord for his own occupation.
He resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the premises had been let to the 260 All India Postal R. M. section Union for office cum residential purposes and that the tenancy of the Union had not been terminated and that the rent had not been demanded from the Union.
The appellant was directed to deposit the arrears of rent up to date as also to go on depositing the future rent accruing due month by month.
The respondent applied under section 15(7) of the Act for striking out the defence of the appellant on the ground that he had failed to comply with the orders directing him to deposit the rent.
Rejecting the explanation of the appellant the Additional Rent Controller ordered the defence of the appellant to be struck out on July 26, 1961, and proceeded to pass an ex parte decree for eviction.
The appellant went in appeal against the order striking out the defence which was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal both on the ground that it was barred by time as also on merits on March 6, 1961.
The appellant did not take the matter in further appeal to the High Court.
Against the decree for eviction the appellant went to the Rent Control Tribunal which dismissed the appeal.
The appellant went in further appeal to the High Court which also dismissed the appeal summarily.
On special leave, it was contended that the appellant having denied the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter.
Held, that under the Rent Control Law, the special tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant existing between the parties but a mere denial by the tenant of the tenancy would not suffice to oust the jurisdiction of the special tribunal.
It is only when the tribunal comes to the conclusion that such a relationship did not exist that it will have no jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the provisions of section 15 read with the definition of "landlord" enable the Rent Controller to determine the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant for the benefit of the tenant and when a party has invited the Rent Controller to apply the provisions of section 15 for his benefit and the Rent Controller does so, he is deemed to have decided such a person is a tenant.
The proper course for a person pleading that he was not a tenant would be to raise the plea and walk out of the proceedings and not to submit to jurisdiction.
Held, further, that the appellant not having taken the matter of striking out his defence under section 15 (7) in appeal to the High Court the question of his being a tenant or otherwise had become final and could not be reagitated.


judgement:
No. 142 of 1962.
PetitioN under article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
B.Chhangani and B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners.
222 C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, Kan Singh, section K. Kapoor and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
December 14.
The judgment of ' the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
This petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenges the constitutionality of a scheme finalised under section 68D (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, No. IV of 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the State of Rajasthan.
The petitioners are holders of stage carriage permits on Jodhpur Bilara and Bilara Beawar routes.
A draft scheme was published under section 68C of the Act by the Rajasthan Roadways, which is a State Transport Undertaking, (hereinafter referred to as the Roadways), on January 26, 1961.
It provided for taking over of the transport service on the Jodhpur BilaraBeawar Ajmer route by the Roadways.
Further it provided for taking over three overlapping routes or portions thereof which were entirely on Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmerroad, namely, Jodhpur Bilara, Bilara Beawar, and Beawar Ajmer, and as required by r. 3 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the names of the permitholders on these three overlapping routes with their permits were also specified for cancellation, and no transport vehicles other than the vehicles of the Road ways were to ply on the route to be taken over.
The usual time was also given for filing objections to all those whose interests were affected by the draftscheme.
The petitioners filed objections under s.68D of the Act, which were heard by the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Rajasthan, he being the person appointed to hear and decide the objec tions, The objectors wanted to lead evidence and did produce some witnesses but some witnesses to whom summonses were issued did not turn up and 223 the objectors wanted the issue of coercive processes against them.
The Legal Remembrancer however refused this on the ground that lie had no power to issue coercive process.
As the objectors did not produce any further witnesses, the arguments were heard and the Legal Remembrancer gave his decisions on May 31, 1962.
One of the main points then raised before the Legal Remembrancer was that there were a dozen other overlapping routes which were not touched by the scheme, and therefore the scheme was bad on the ground of discrimination.
It may be mentioned that these overlapping routes were not completely overlapping the route to be nationalised, though the vehicles paying on those twelve routes had to pass over part of the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer road.
It was urged on behalf of the Roadways before the Legal Remembrancer that the intention was to render ineffective the permits on these twelve routes also insofar as they overlapped the route to be taken over, though these, routes were not mentioned in the draft scheme like the three routes which were completely covered by the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer route and no notice was apparently given to the seventy two permit holders on these twelve partially over lapping routes.
The Legal Remembrancer held that even though these routes were not specified in the draft scheme and no notice had been given to the permit holders thereof, it was open to him to render the permits ineffective with respect to these routesalso and proceeded to pass orders accordingly.
Thereupon five writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Rajasthan by the permit holders on the three routes which had been notified in the draftscheme as well as by some of the permit holders of the twelve partially overlapping routes which had not been notified but which had been 224 affected by the order of the Legal Remembrancer.
Two main points were urged before the High Court in support of the cbchallenge to the validity of the scheme as finally published on June 16, 1962.
In the first place, it was urged that the State Government when publishing the scheme as required by section 68D(3) of the Act had made certain changes in it beyond the decision of the Legal Remembrancer and therefore the final scheme as published was invalid as it was not open to the State Government to make any changes in the scheme as approved by the Legal Remembrancer.
Secondly, it was urged on behalf of the operators on the twelve partially overlapping routes which had not been notified in the draft scheme that it was not open to the Legal Remembrancer to affect their interests when their routes were not specified in the draft scheme and they had been given no notice thereof.
The High Court accepted both these contentions.
It was of the opinion that it was not open to the State Government to make any modification in the decision of the Legal Remembrancer and inasmuch as that had been done the final scheme as published was invalid.
It also held that as the twelve partially overlapping routes were not notified in the draftscheme and no notice had been given to the permitholders thereof, it was not open to the Legal Remembrancer to pass any orders with respect to them.
It therefore set aside the scheme as published under section 68D (3) of the Act.
Finally, the High Court observed that as the scheme as published was not the scheme as approved by the Legal Remembrancer and as the decision of the Legal Remembrancer becomes final when it is published, it was open to the Legal Remembrancer to modify his decision, even though he may have signed and pronounced it.
The Legal Remembrancer was thus directed to go into the matter again and leave the question of the twelve partially overlapping routes for a subsequent scheme.
The final scheme as published under section 68D (3) of the Act was set aside and the Regional Transport 225 Authority was directed not to implement it until it was regularised in accordance with law.
The matter then went back to the Legal Remembrancer who considered the draft scheme in the light of the decision of the High Court and after hearing further agruments disposed of the objections.
The main effect of his decision was that all the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme and only the three routes notified in the draft scheme which were completely covered by the route Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer, were affected.
The decision of the Legal Remembrancer approving the scheme as modified by him was published on August 31, 1962, and the present petition is directed against that decision.
The decision of the Legal Remembrancer is being challenged before us on the following grounds: (1)A draft scheme under the Act has to be approved as a whole and the procedure of approving a part of the scheme once and another part later is illegal, and therefore, the approval given to the draft scheme by the Legal Remembrancer does not result in approving the scheme, as required by law.
(2)It was not open to the Legal Remembracer to review his order dated May 31, 1962 even after the decision of the High Court, and insofar as the Legal Remembrancer did so in obedience to the order of the High Court he abdicated his own judgment, and the approval therefore after such abdication of his own judgment, is no approval in law.
(3)As the scheme as published on June 16, 1962 was set aside by the High Court, it was the duty of the Legal Remembrancer to give a fresh hearing ab initio to the objectors which he did not do, and therefore the approval accorded by him to the draft scheme 226 after the judgment of the High Court is no approval in law.
(4)Hearing requires taking of evidence; but as the Legal Remembrancer expressed his inability to compel attendance of witnesses, there was no hearing as contemplated by law, and therefore the approval of the draft scheme without a proper hearing is no approval in law.
(5) There was discrimination inasmuch as the operatorsof the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme.
(1) &(2).
There is no doubt that a draft scheme has to be considered as a whole and all objections to it have to be decided before it can be approved by the State Government or by the officer appointed in that behalf, and the Act does not envisage approving of a part of the scheme once and putting it into effect and leaving another part unapproved and left over for enforcement later.
It is also true that the Act does not provide for review of an approval once given by the Legal Remembrancer, though he may be entitled to correct any clerical mistakes or inadvertent slips that may have crept in his order.
It is also true that the Legal Remembrancer when considering the objections has to exercise his own judgment subject to any directions that the High Court.
might give on questions of law relating to a particular draftscheme.
But we do not think that this is a case where the draft scheme has been approved in part and another part of it has been left unapproved to be taken up later; nor is this a case where the Legal Remembrancer abdicated his own judgment or reviewed his earlier decision when he proceeded to reconsider the matter after the High Court had set aside the scheme as published under section 68D (3) of the Act on June 16, 1962.
227 Let us see what the draft scheme was meant to provide in this case.
As we have already indicated, the draft scheme was published in order to take over the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer route.
It also provided for taking over all the three completely overlapping routes, namely, Jodhpur Bilara, Bilara Beawar, and Beawar Ajmer routes, and also portions thereof falling entirely on this road from Jodhpur Ajmer.
There was no indication in the draft scheme for taking over what are called partially overlapping routes, only parts of which overlapped on the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer road.
These partially overlapping routes were of two kinds.
In some cases one terminus was on Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer road while the other terminus was not on this road.
In other cases, both the termini of the overlapping routes were not on this road, though a part of the route fell on this road.
Rule 3 of the Rules provides for indi cating all such overlapping routes as are intended to be affected and the draft scheme in the present case only indicated three routes which were completely on this road namely, Jodhpur Bilara, Bilara Beawar, and Beawar Ajmer, and was not concerned at all with the other overlapping routes, where overlapping was only partial.
It was therefore in our opinion unnecessary to bring in the question of the twelve partially overlapping routes when objections to this draft scheme were being considered.
There is no doubt that the Roadways was also responsible for the introduction of this confusion for it seems to have been urged on its behalf, when the objections were considered on the first occasion, that these partially overlapping routes were also meant to be covered by the draft scheme, even though they were not mentioned in the draft scheme as required by r. 3 of the Rules and no notice had been issued to the permitholders of those routes.
The petitioners also raised a point with respect to these overlapping routes, and that is how on the first occasion, the Legal Remembrancer held that even though these routes had 228 not been included in the draft scheme and no notice had been given to the permit holders thereof, it was open to him to pass orders with respect thereto and he proceeded to render the overlapping part of these routes ineffective.
It is obvious from a perusal of the draft scheme that these twelve partially overlapping routes were not included in it at all and they were brought in only because of the objection raised by the petitioners and the reply of the Roadways that they were meant to be included.
That is why when the writ petitions were decided by the High Court, it pointed out that the scheme did not intially include the partially overlapping routes.
The High Court then went on to observe that if the Legal Remembrancer thought fit to include these routes in the scheme also, he should have given notice to all concerned to file their objections.
With respect, it seems to us that this observation of the High Court is not correct.
If the scheme did not include the partially overlapping routes as it undoubtedly did not, in spite of what the objectors might have said and what the Roadways might have maintained before the Legal Remembrancer on the first occasion it was not open to the Legal Remembrancer to include these overlapping routes in the scheme at all and he could not do so even if he had given notice to the permit holders on these overlapping routes.
The question therefore whether the final approval of the draft scheme as published on August 31,1962 is an approval of a part of the scheme only, leaving another part of the scheme unapproved and therefore liable to enforcement later, can only admit of one answer, namely, that the approval was of the scheme as a whole.
The contention therefore on behalf of the petitioners that part of the scheme has been approved and the rest of it has been left unapproved, can have no force on the facts of the present case.
The twelve overlapping routes were never meant to be affected by the scheme which left them untouched.
The contention that only part of the scheme has been 229 approved appears to have been based on the fact that these routes have not been rendered ineffective as to the overlapping part.
But as these routes were never included in the draft scheme, the approval given to the draft scheme without touching these routes cannot in the circumstances be called an approval of a part of the scheme.
Nor do we think that there is any force in the contention that the Legal Remembrancer abdicated his judgment when going into the question on the second occasion after the judgment of the High Court.
The order of the Legal Remembrancer dated August 17, 1962 shows that he reconsidered the entire matter after hearing further arguments and there can be no doubt that he was exercising his own judgment when he finally decided to approve the draft scheme with certain modification.
What the Legal Remembrancer has done in this case is to reappraise the evidence in the light of the legal position indicated by the High Court.
Nor do we think that there is any substance in the argument that the order of the Legal Remembrancer dated August 17, 1962, is a review of his earlier order dated May 31, 1962.
No question of review of that order arises for that order was in effect set aside when the High Court set aside the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962.
It is true that publication made certain further modifications into the scheme as approved by the Legal Remembrancer but that in our opinion makes no difference to the fact that the order of the High Court setting aside the final scheme as published on.
June 16, 1962 put an end to the order of the Legal Remembrancer dated May 31, 1962 also.
This argument as to review has been raised because of the observation in the Judgment of the High Court that the scheme as finally published on June 16, 1962 was not the decision of the Legal Remembrancer because of the changes made in it by the State Government and 230 therefore it was open to him to modify it, though he might have signed his decision and pronounced it.
With respect, we consider that this observation is not correct.
It may be that the State Government had no authority to modify the decision of the Legal Remembrancer but when the High Court set aside the finally approved scheme as published on June 16, 1962, it meant the decision of the Legal Remembrancer dated May 31, 1962, also came to an end, for the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962 was undoubtedly based on it, even though there were further changes in that decision at the time of publication.
In the present case the order of the High Court was analogous to a remand as understood in courts of law.
What the Legal Remembrancer did on the second occasion was to reappraise the evidence in the light of the law laid down by the High Court.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the decision of the Legal Remembrancer on August 17, 1962, is a review of his earlier decision dated May 31, 1962.
It must be treated as a fresh decision, after the High Court had set aside the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962.
Though therefore the proposition put forward on behalf of the petitioners may be accepted as correct, there is no scope for applying the principles contained in these propositions to the facts of this case.
The contention therefore that the scheme as finally published on August 31, 1962 is bad because it militates against these principles must be rejected.
(3) & (4).
It is urged that after the High Court set aside the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962, the Legal Remembrancer should have given a fresh hearing ab initio and that he did not do so.
It is further urged that in as much as there is no provision in the Rules for compelling the attendance of witnesses whom an objector might like to produce, there 231 can be no effective hearing of the objection, and therefore the scheme as finally published on August 31, 1962, is invalid.
It is not disputed that the Legal Remembrancer did give a hearing to the objectors after the order of the High Court.
What is urged however is that the objectors should have been allowed to give evidence afresh before the Legal Remembrancer finally disposed of the objections.
We are of opinion that though the result of the order of the High Court was to set aside the order of the Legal Remembracer dated May 31, 1962, it cannot be said that the order of the High Court wiped out the evidence which the objectors had given before the Legal Remembrancer on the first occasion.
We have already mentioned the two grounds on which the High Court set aside the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962, and those grounds had nothing to do with the evidence which was already produced.
In our opinion, it was open to the Legal Remembrancer to take that evidence into account and it was not necessary that evidence should be given again, particularly when no fresh issues arose; nor was the Legal Remembrancer bound to take fresh evidence simply because the final scheme as published on June 16, 1962 had been set aside on account of certain technical and Legal defects.
When the objectors had been given full opportunity to lead evidence on the previous occasion which was still there for the Legal Remembrancer to take into account, it was sufficient for the Legal Remembrancer to hear the objectors ' arguments in full after the order of the High Court in the light of the observations made by it, and the petitioners therefore cannot have any grievance on the score that they were not given any hearing after the order of the High Court.
If it is borne in mind that the order passed by the High Court in the proceedings was in the nature of a remand order, all these objections will plainly be untenable.
232 As to the contention that the Rules do not provide for compelling the attendance of witnesses and all that the Legal Remembrancer can do is to summon witnesses who may or may not appear in answer to the summonses, it is enough to say that the proceedings before the Legal Remembrancer though quasi judicial are not exactly like proceedings in court.
In proceedings of this kind, it may very well be concluded when a witness is summoned and does not appear, that he does not wish to give evidence, and that may be the reason why no provision is made in the Rules for any coercive process.
We think in the circumstances of the hearing to be given by the Legal Remembrancer, it is enough if he takes evidence of the witnesses whom the objectors bring before him themselves and if he helps them to secure their attendance by issue of summonses.
But the fact that the Rules do not provide for coercive processes does not mean in the special circumstances of the hearing before the Legal Remembrancer that there can be no proper hearing without such coercive processes.
We are therefore of opinion that the Legal Remembrancer did give a hearing to the objectors after the order of the High Court and that in the circumstances that hearing was a proper and sufficient hearing.
The challenge therefore to the validity of the scheme as published on June 16, 1962, on this ground must be rejected.
Lastly we come to the question of discrimination.
The argument is based on the fact that the twelve partially overlapping routes to which we have already alluded have not been touched by the scheme.
That is undoubtedly so.
We have already pointed out that in the case of some of these routes one terminus is on the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer road while the other is not on this road.
In some cases neither termini is on this road and only a part of 233 the route overlaps this road.
The argument is that as the permit holders on these partially overlapping routes have not been touched by the scheme, there is discrimination inasmuch as the permit holders on the three routes which were totally overlapping the route which was being taken over, have been completely excluded.
We do not think that this amounts to discrimination.
It may be pointed out that under section 68C it is open to take over any area or route to the complete or partial exclusion of other persons.
Therefore, it was open to the State Government to take over this route only and exclude those who may be plying completely on this route or parts thereof and unless it can be shown that others who are similarly situated have not been excluded from the scheme there can be no question of discrimination.
In our opinion it cannot be said that those permit holders whose routes were completely covered by the route taken over stand on the same footing as those whose routes were only partially covered by the route taken over.
It may very well have been considered that in the first instance only those permit holders will be excluded whose routes are completely covered by the routes taken over, and if that is permissible under the law it cannot be said that that would amount to discrimination when there is an obvious distinction between routes completely covered by the route to be taken over and the routes partially covered by the route to be taken over.
We have been informed that since this scheme was approved steps have been taken even to exclude those permit holders whose routes are partially covered by making their permits ineffective over the overlapping part of the route.
But that apart, we can see no ground to uphold the plea of discrimination in the present case, for routes completely covered by the route taken over stand on a different footing from the routes only partially covered.
The contention therefore that the final scheme as published on August 31, 1962 is bad because it discriminates in this manner, must be rejected.
234 We therefore dismiss the petition but in the circumstances of this case pass no order asto costs.
Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The petitioners were holders of Stage carriage permits on Jodhpur Bilara arid Bilara Beawar routes.
The Rajasthan Roadways published a draft scheme which provided for taking over the transport service on the Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Aj mer route by the Roadways and also for taking over three overlapping routes or portions thereof which were entirely on Jodhpur Bilara Beawar Ajmer road and the names of the permit holders on these three overlapping routes with their permits were also specified for cancellation and no other transport vehicles were to ply on the route to be taken over.
The petitioners filed objection and challenged the scheme on the ground of discrimination before the Legal Remembrancer as some overlapping routes were not notified.
He held that even though these routes were not specified in the draft scheme and no notice had been given to the permit holders thereof, it was open to him to render the permits ineffective with respect to these routes also and passed orders accordingly.
The permitholders affected by the order of the Legal Remembrance filed writ petitions in the High Court.
The High Court directed the Legal Remembrancer to go into the matter again and to leave the question of the twelve partially overlapping routes for a subsequent scheme.
The effect of the decision of the Legal Remembrancer considered in tile light of the decision of the High Court was that all the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme and only the three routes notified in the draft scheme were affected.
The present petition is directed against his decision approving the scheme as modified by him and published on August 31, 1962.
In this Court it was urged (1) that the procedure of approving a part of the scheme once and another part later was illegal; 221 (ii)that the approval of the scheme by the Legal Rem embrancer after abdication of his own judgment was not a valid approval ; (iii) that the Legal Remembrancer ought to have given a fresh hearing ab initio to the objectors ; (iv) that there was no proper hearing and (v) that there was discrimination, as the, operators of the twelve partially overlapping routes were left out of the scheme.
Held, that as the twelve overlapping routes were never included in the draft scheme, the approval given to the craft scheme without touching these routes cannot be called 0an approval of a part of the scheme.
Held, further that in the present case the order of the High Court was analogous to a remand order and therefore, the decision of the Legal Remembrancer must be treated as a fresh decision and not a review of his earlier decision and there was no abdication by him of his functions.
Held, further, that when the objectors had been given full opportunity to lead evidence on the previous occasion which was still there for the Legal Remembrancer to take into account, it was sufficient for him to hear the objector 's arguments.
If it is borne in mind that the order passed by the High Court in the proceedings was in the nature of a remand order, this objection must fail.
Held, further, that the fact that the rules did not provide for a coercive process to secure attendance of witnesses did not mean that there could be no proper hearing without it.
Held, further, that under section 68C it was open to the State Government to take over any area or route to the complete or partial exclusion of other persons and there was no discrimination in the present case, for routes completely covered, by the route taken over stand on a different footing from the routes only partially covered.


judgement:
Appeal No. 414 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 25, 1958, of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal (B) No. 256 of 1956.
Naraindas C. Malkani and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain and section P. Verma, for the respondent No. 1. 1962.
December 12.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J.
This appeal on certificate relates to an internal dispute of the members of a 4 Masonic Lodge called the "Lodge Victoria No. 363 S.C." at Belgaum.
There is a Scotish institution known as "Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of Scotland" at Edinburgh, hereinafter called the "Grand Lodge of Scotland".
Under its supervision there arc Provincial or District Grand Lodges spread throughout the world.
There are Daughter Lodges under the superintendence of the District Grand Lodges.
The Grand Lodge of Scotland is governed by its own written Constitution and Laws.
There is also a separate Constitution and Laws for every District Grand Lodge.
One such District Grand Lodge known as "The Grand Lodge of All Scotish Freemasonary in India and Pakistan" has its headquarters at Bombay.
The aforesaid daughter Lodge at Belgaum is directly under the said District Grand Lodge and is governed by the Constitution and Laws of the latter.
The appellant was a member of the lodge Victoria, having joined it in the year 1948.
On October 16, 1952, the second respondent made a complaint against the appellant to the Master, Lodge Victoria, alleging that the appellant was guilty of 12 masonic offences.
It was alleged therein that, as the appellant had committed masonic offences, he should be tried by the Lodge for the charges levelled against him under Law 198 of the Constitution.
On October 20, 1952, notice of the said complaint was issued to the appellant and he was required to send to the Secretary of the Lodge his answers to the charges within 14 days from the date of the notice.
He was also informed that he was entitled to be present and to state his defence at the special meeting to be held on November 8, 1952.
On the same day, the Secretary of the Lodge sent notices to all the members of the Lodge asking them to attend the said special meeting convened for considering and 5 passing judgment on the said complaint.
On October 27, 1952, the appellant submitted his answer in extenso to the various charges levelled against him in the complaint; in that answer he requested that "my complete replies be read in toto to the brethren assembled to decide this matter and I be informed of the total number of brethren present and the number of votes cast one way or the other.
" A perusal of that reply also shows that the appellant under stood the charges levelled against him as relating to certain offences alleged to have been committed by him and his reply proceeded on that basis.
On November 8, 1952, the special meeting of the Lodge was held and the minutes show that 18 members attended the meeting, that each charge was read at the meeting, that comments of the members were invited and that decision was taken on each of the charges.
Each of the charge was put to vote and the members present unanimously held that every one of the charges levelled against the appellant was established.
In the result they passed a resolution excluding the appellant from the Lodge until the exclusion was confirmed by the District Grand Lodge under Law 199 of the Constitution.
On November 15, 1952, the said decision was communicated to the appellant.
On November 24, 1952, the appellant preferred an appeal against that order to the District Grand Lodge.
On October 5, 1953, a meeting of the District Grand Lodge was convened to consider the appeal and the appeal was dismissed.
It was noted in the proceedings of the District Grand Lodge that though earlier an adjournment was given to enable the appellant to appear in person at the meeting, he remained absent.
On a further appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland, the said Lodge considered the sentence imposed on the appellant as one of "suspension sine die" and recommended to the Lodge Victoria to review the suspension after a period of 12 months if the appellant applied for reinstatement.
It does not  appear that the appellant filed any application for review.
On September 7, 1954, the appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Belgaum, for a declaration that the resolution of the Victoria Lodge dated November 8, 1952, was illegal and void and that he continued to be a member of the Lodge despite the resolution, for an injunction to restrain the officers and servants of the said Lodge from preventing him from exercising his rights therein, and for recovery of damages.
To that suit he made the Victoria Lodge, the first defendant ; the complainant, the second defendant ; the Secretary of the Lodge, the third defendant ; and the District Grand Lodge, Bombay, the fourth defendant.
The defendants contested the suit.
The learned Civil judge dismissed the suit.
The appeal filed by the appellant to the High Court of Mysore was also dismissed.
The present appeal has been filed on a certificate issued by the said High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant raised before us all the contentions which his client had unsuccessfully raised in the courts below.
Before we advert to the said contentions it would be convenient to notice briefly the law on the subject relevant to the present enquiry.
The source of the power of associations like clubs and lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis of which they become members.
This principle has been restated by Lord Morton in Bonsor vs Musicians ' Union, (1).
There, one Bonsor, who became a member of a trade union, was expelled.
In that context Lord Morton observed : "When Mr. Bonsor applied to join the respon dent union, and his application was accepted, a contract came into existence between Mr. Bonsor and the respondent, whereby Mr. Bonsor agreed to abide by the rules of the (1) ,127.7 respondent union, and the union impliedly agreed that Mr. Bonsor would not be excluded by the union or its officers otherwise than in accordance with the rules".
This contractual origin of the rule of expulsion has its corollary in the cognate rule that in expelling a member the conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied with.
In Maclean vs The Workers ' Union, (1), the contractual foundation of the power is described thus : "In such a case as the present, where the tribunal is the result of rules adopted by persons who have formed the association known as a trade union, it seems to me reasonably clear that the rights of the plaintiff against the defendants must depend simply on the contract, and that the material terms of the contract must be found in the rules".
Proceeding on that basis,the learned Judge observed: "It is certain, therefore, that a domestic tribunal is bound to act strictly according to its rules and is under an obligation to act honestly and in good faith." The same idea was expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Ezra vs Mahendra Nath Banerji (1) thus : ". .
Where the rule provides in any particular respect that some condition must be fulfilled, then that condition must be strictly complied with, since the power of expulsion is itself dependent on the terms of the rule."
The next question is whether the doctrine of strict compliance with the rules implies that every minute deviation from the rules, whether substantial or not, would render the act of such a body void.
The answer to this question will depend upon the (1) , 623.(2) I.L.R. , 109, 8 nature of the rule infringed ; whether a rule is mandatory or directory depends upon each rule, the purpose for which it is made and the setting in which it appears.
We shall consider this aspect of the doctrine when we deal with the argument of the learned counsel that in the present case the rules have not been complied with.
The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court vis a vis the decisions of tribunals is also well settled.
In Maclean vs The Workers ' Union Maugham,J., observed: "It appears to me that we have no power to review the evidence any more than have a power to say whether the tribunal came to a right conclusion."
Much to the same effect the judicial Committee observed in L.A.P.0 ' Beilly vs C.C. Gittens, (2). ". . .
It is important to bear in mind that neither the learned.
Judge nor their Lordships ' Board is " entitled to sit as a Court of appeal from the decisions of a domestic tribunal such as the Stewards of the Trinidad Turf Club".
Later on the Privy Council stated: "All these matters, however, are essentially matters for the domestic tribunal to decide as it thinks right.
Provided that the tribunal does not exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly and in good faith, the Court cannot intervene even if it thinks that the penalty is severe or that a very strict standard has been applied".
Another aspect which may also be noticed is how far and to what extent the doctrine of bias may be (1) , 628.(2) A.I.R. (1949) P.C. 313, 316, 317. 9 invoked in the case of domestic tribunals like those of clubs.
The observations of Maugham J. in Maclean 's case(1) in this context may be noticed.
The learned judge observed in that case thus: "A person who joins an association governed by rules under which he may be expelled . . . . has in my judgment no legal right of redress if he be expelled according to the rules however unfair and unjust the rules or the action of the expelling tribunal may be provided that it acts in good faith . . . . .
The phrase, "the principles of natural justice," can only mean in this connection the principles of fair play so deeply rooted in the minds of modern Englishmen that a provision for an inquiry necessarily imports that the accused should be given his chance of defence and explanation.
On that point there is no difficulty.
Nor do I doubt that in most cases it is a reasonable inference from the rules that if there is anything of the nature of a lis between two persons, neither of them should sit on the tribunal."
Another difficulty that one is confronted with in proceedings held by committees constituted by clubs is to demarcate precisely the line between the prosecutor and the,Judge.
Maugham, J. noticed this difficulty and observed in Maclean 's case (1) at p. 626 thus : "In many cases the tribunal is necessarily entrusted with the duty of appearing to act as prosecutors as well as that of judges; for there is no one else to prosecute.
For example, in a case where a council is charged with the duty of considering the conduct of any member whose conduct is disgracefull and of expelling him if found guilty of such an offence, it constantly occurs that the matter is brought to the (1) , 628.
10 attention of the council by a report of legal proceedings in the press.
The member is summoned to appear before the council.
The council 's duty is to cause him to appear and to explain his conduct.
It may be that in so acting the council are the prosecutors.
In one sense they are; but if the regulations show that the council is bound to act as I have mentioned and to that extent to act as prosecutors, it seems to be clear that the council is not disqualified from taking the further steps which the rules require."
Though it is advisable for a club to frame rules to avoid conflict of duties, if the rules sanction such a procedure, the party, who has bound himself by those rules, cannot complain, unless the enquiry held pursuant to such rules discloses malafides or unfair treatment.
The following principles may be gathered from the above discussion.
(1) A member of a masonic lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.
(2) The lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules, whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard.
(3) The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice as explained in the decisions cited supra.
Bearing the said principles in mind, we shall now proceed to consider the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant.
11 The first contention is that Lodge Victoria has no jurisdiction to decide on the question whether a member committed a masonic offence, for, it is said, such offences are within the jurisdiction of a District Grand Lodge, Bombay.
The question falls to be decided on a construction of the relevant Laws of the Lodge : The said Laws read: Law 198.
Every Daughter Lodge shall be entitled to try any member accused of any offence.
A complaint, in writing, shall be served on the accused brother, by registered letter posted to his last known address, specifying the offence of which he is charged, which he shall be entitled to answer in writing within fourteen days of the date of posting of the complaint, or within such longer time as may be specified in the complaint.
On the answer being lodged, or on the expiry of the time for doing so, the matter of the complaint shall be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment, either at a special meeting called for that purpose, or at a regular meeting of the Lodge.
The meeting at which it is to be considered must be called by circular sent by the Secretary, which shall state the fact that the complaint, and answer, if any, are to be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment.
In the case of a Lodge which does not convene its meetings by circular, the meeting shall be called in such manner as may be ordered by Grand Committee, or by Grand Secretary on its behalf.
Notice of the meeting shall be sent to the accused brother by registered letter posted to his last known address at least fourteen clear days prior to the day of the meeting and that whether he has lodged a written answer or not, and he shall be entitled 12 to appear at the.
meeting and any adjournment thereof and state his defence.
After the case has been considered, the Lodge shall give its decision.
Such decision shall be by votes of a majority of the qualified members voting thereon and only those present throughout the hearing of the case shall be entitled to vote.
If the complaint be sustained, the Lodge shall pronounce such admonition or sentence as shall be decided by the majority of votes as aforesaid.
A Daughter Lodge may not, however, pronounce a sentence of expulsion as power to expel is vested in Grand Lodge alone; but, if the circumstances are deemed of sufficient gravity, a Daughter Lodge may recommend to Grand Lodge that a brother be expelled from the craft.
The judgment pronounced shall be intimated forthwith in writing by registered letter to the said brother, who shall therein be apprised that it shall 'be final unless appealed against to the Provincial or District Grand Lodge, or to Grand Lodge in the case of a Daughter Lodge not within the jurisdiction of a Province or District within one month after the date of posting the said intimation.
In special circumstances, Grand Committee, through Grand Secretary, may extend the period within which an appeal may be made.
Law 128: A Provincial or District Grand Lodge shall hear and determine all subjects of maso nic complaint, dispute, or difference initiated before or appealed or remitted to it respecting Daughter Lodges or brethren of the Scotish Craft within the Province or District, and may admonish, or pronounce a sentence of suspension, and, in the case of a Lodge, may suspend its Charter.
The procedure in all such subjects of complaint, dispute, or difference shall be re 13 gulated mutatis mutandis by Laws 104 to III inclusive.
Law 56: The Grand Lodge shall hear and de termine, through its Grand Committee as here inbefore provided, all subjects of Masonic complaint or irregularity respecting Lodges or Brethren within the jurisdiction, and may proceed to admonish, or fine, or suspend, or expel.
Under Law 198, every Daughter Lodge will be entitled to try any member accused of an offence; under Law 128, a Provincial or District Grand Lodge shall hear and determine all subjects of masonic dispute or difference initiated before it respecting the brethren of the Scotish Craft; and Law 56 provides that the Grand Lodge shall hear such complaints and inflict suitable punishments in respect thereof It will be seen that two different expressions are used: the expression " 'offence" is used in Law 198, while the expression "masonic complaint" is used in Law 128.
It is, therefore, said that, as in the complaint the appellant is alleged to have committed masonic offences, the proper forum is the District Grand Lodge and not the Daughter Lodge.
It is common case that the expressions "offence" and "masonic complaint" have not been defined in the Laws.
In its legal significance an offence means an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.
The expression "masonic complaint" is a comprehensive term; it may mean any complaint pertaining to masonic matters.
It is not necessary to decide whether the expression "masonic complaint" is wide enough to take in an "offence".
But Law 198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to try a member if he commits an offence; the jurisdiction conferred on it cannot be excluded by law 128, which is a general law.
The question therefore is whether the allegations made against the appellant constituted "offences" within the meaning of law 198.
14 The word " 'offence" in the context of that Law can only mean the infringement of the Laws of the Daughter Lodge.
As all the Laws have not been placed before us, we are not in a position to hold whether the allegations amounted to "offence" or not in the aforesaid sense.
But the complainant, the appellant and the members of the Lodge, including its officebearers, proceeded on the basis that the appellant committed " 'offences".
The complaint discloses as many as 12 charges.
The appellant answered them seriatim.
Indeed, in his answer he specifically stated: "Further if my accuser and others of his mind have thought this alleged "offence" serious enough to be included in this complaint, why did they not take any action in the matter immediately instead of taking it up after sleeping over it for no less than 3 4 years ?" This shows that even the appellant proceeded on the basis that the allegations, if established, would amount to "offences" within the meaning of the said law.
In the special meeting of the Lodge it was held that the charges have been established; and on that basis punishment was imposed on the appellant.
The appellant did not take any objection either that the allegations did not amount to "offences" within the meaning of law 198 or that the Lodge had no jurisdiction to decide whether he committed the offences.
It is, therefore, manifest that all the parties concerned in the matter accepted the position that if the acts alleged to have been committed by tile appellant were established, he would have committed "offences" under the laws.
If the allegations against the appellant amounted to ""offences" Law 198 is immediately attracted.
If that be so, neither Law 128 nor Law 56, which deal with the jurisdiction of a District Grand Lodge in respect of "masonic complaints", can just the jurisdiction expressly conferred on the 15 Daughter Lodge.
We, therefore, hold that the Daughter Lodge had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the 2nd respondent against the appellant and decide it on merits.
The next question is, whether Law 198 has been strictly complied with.
Relevant part of Law 198 reads : "On the answer being lodged, or on the expiry of the time for doing so, the matter of the complaint shall be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment, either at a special meeting called for that purpose, or at a regular meeting of the Lodge.
The meeting at which it is to be considered must be called by circular sent by the Secretary, which shall state the fact that the complaint, and answer, if any, are to be brought before the lodge for consideration and judgment.
" As we have already indicated in the narration of facts, notice was issued to the members fixing the date of the special meeting along with the notice issued to the appellant i.e., the notice was issued to the members before the appellant filed his answer in respect of the allegations made against him in the complaint.
It is, therefore, contended that the notice of the special meeting issued to the members was not in strict compliance with the said Law.
We do not see any contravention of the Law.
The Law does not say that notice to the members should be issued only after the answer was lodged by the person against whom a complaint was made.
But what it says is that the matter of the complaint shall be brought before the Lodge for consideration after the answer was lodged or on the expiry of the time for doing so.
It also does not prescribe that the answer should be communicated to the members, but only indicates that the notice shall state the fact that 16 the complaint and the answer, if any, will be brought before the Lodge for consideration and judgment.
To put it in other words, the gist of the relevant part of the law is that in the special meeting convened for the purpose or at a regular meeting of the Lodge, the matter of the complaint shall be brought for consideration and judgment.
In the present case it is not disputed that the prescribed notice was given to the members and at the meeting all of them had considered the complaint as well as the answer lodged by the appellant.
Therefore, the law in this regard has been strictly complied with.
The next contention relates to the following part of Law 198 : "Notice of the meeting shall be sent to the accused brother by registered letter posted to his last known address at least fourteen clear days prior to the day of the meeting and that whether he has lodged a written answer or not, and he shall be entitled to appear at the meeting and any adjournment thereof and state his defence.
" It is contended that under the said part of the Law, the accused is entitled to have another 14 days after he filed his answer to enable him to file his case before the Lodge and that in the instant case no such additional period was given to him.
That is so.
The position, therefore, is that the appellant was given notice of the hearing as required by the law, but he was not given the entire period prescribed thereunder.
The question is whether this error in the procedure vitiated the trial.
It is obvious that the appellant wag not prejudiced.
He never made a complaint of it.
Indeed in his answer he made it clear that he would not be present at the inquiry.
The Law itself enabled him to apply for further time, but he did not ask for it, as he did not want to appear at the meeting.
He did not raise this objection either in the appeal before the District Grand Lodge or in the second appeal before the Grand Lodge of Scotland.
Before the said appellate Lodges he took 17 the decision on merits.
Indeed, by his answer and subsequent conduct he clearly waived the said requirement of the Law.
Can he now be allowed to rely upon a breach of the procedural rule to invalidate the proceeding ? In our view, he cannot do so.
There is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a Lodge and the irregular exercise of it in the matter of the taking of procedural steps.
A party to a dispute can certainly waive his objections to some defects in procedure.
In this case, the appellant could have taken objection for his being given a shorter period of notice than prescribed under the Law for his appearance before the meeting of the Lodge.
He did not do so.
The appellant has, by his aforesaid conduct, clearly waived his right under the said Law.
Having waived it, he is now precluded from relying upon the said defect.
We, therefore, hold that it is not open to the appellant to rely upon the said defect for invalidating the proceeding.
The lie argument that the members of the Lodge were both the prosecutors and the judges, and therefore the principles of natural justice have been violated has not much force in the context of the present enquiry.
We are dealing with a case of a Lodge and not with that of a tribunal or a court.
It is true that the earlier resolution, exhibit II 4 , shows that 11 members of the Lodge were not well disposed towards the appellant; but here we are concerned with the complaint filed by the 2nd respondent.
Notice of the complaint was given to all the members of the Lodge.
It may be that some of them did not like the appellant, and one of them is the complainant himself But 22 members of the Lodge met and unanimously held , after considering the complaint and the answer given by the appellant, that he was guilty.
If the appellant had any objection for one or some of the members taking part in the meeting, he could have raised an objection, but he did not do so.
The rules 18 governing tribunals and courts cannot mutatis mutandis be applied to such bodies as Lodges.
We have to see broadly in the circumstances of each case whether the principles of natural justice have been applied.
In the circumstances of this case, particularly when we find that the appellant had not raised any objection, we cannot say that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any principles of natural justice.
Lastly an attempt was made to persuade us to resurvey the entire material to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the Lodge.
As we have pointed out earlier, civil courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by a private association like a Lodge.
Both the courts below have held that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith in the matter of the complaint against the appellant.
That is a concurrent finding of fact; and it is the practice of this Court not to interfere ordinarily with concurrent findings of fact.
There are no exceptional circumstances for our departing from the said practice.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
No costs.

summary/full:
There is a Scotish Masonic institution known as Grand Lodge of Scotland.
Under this institution there are District Grand Lodges.
Under its superintendence there are Daughter Lodges.
These institutions arc governed by their own constitutions and laws.
Under those laws a member against whom disciplinary action has been taken by a Daughter Lodge can appeal to the District Grand Lodge and there is a right of second appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland.
The appellant was a member of one of the Daughter Lodges at Belgaum known as Lodge Victoria.
The second respondent made a complaint against the appellant alleging that he has committed 12 masonic offences.
A notice was issued to the appellant by the Secretary of the Victoria Lodge alleging the commission of these offences and requiring him to reply within 14 days.
The appellant submitted his answer in extenso to the various charges.
A special meeting of the Lodge was held at which each charge was read, members gave their comments and each charge was put to vote and it was unanimously decided that the appellant was guilty of each charge.
By a resolution the appellant was expelled subject to the confirmation of the District Grand Lodge.
The decision was communicated to the appellant who therefore filed an appeal to the District Lodge which body after giving him adjournment to appear in person dismissed the appeal at the next meeting at which the appellant absented himself.
A further appeal was filed to the Grand Lodge which was also dismissed.
Thereafter the appellant filed a suit before the Civil judge, Belgaum for a declaration that the resolution of the 2 Lodge Victoria expelling him was void and that he still continued to be a member of that Lodge.
The Civil Judge dismissed the suit.
Thereupon an appeal was filed before the High Court of Mysore.
The High Court dismissed the appeal.
The present appeal is by way of a certificate granted by the High Court.
The appellant contended that the Lodge Victoria had no jurisdiction to try Masonic offences since such offences were within the jurisdiction of the District Grand Lodge, Bombay.
Secondly, it was contended that the disciplinary proceedings prescribed by law 198 which governs such proceedings were not strictly complied with.
It was further contended that the fourteen days to which he was entitled after he filed his answer were not granted to him.
Lastly, it was argued that the decision to expel him was wrong on merits.
Held, that the source of the power of associations, clubs and Lodges to expel their members is the contract on the basis of which they become members.
Bonsor vs Musicians Union, , followed.
A member of a Masonic Lodge is bound to abide by the rules of the Lodge; and if the rules provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the manner provided by the rules.
Maclean vs The Workers ' Union and Ezra vs Mahendra Nath Banerji, I. L.R. [1946] 2Cal. 88, approved.
The Lodge is bound to act strictly according to the rules; whether a particular rule is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each case, having regard to the well settled rules of construction in that regard.
The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from the decision of such a body, it can set aside the order of such a body if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or act,, in violation of natural justice.
Maclean vs The Workers Union, and L.A.P.0 ' Beilly vs C. C. Gettens, A I.R. , referred to.
The rules governing tribunals cannot mutatis mutandis be applied to such bodies as Lodges.
One has to see broadly in the circumstances of cacti case whether the principles of natural justice has been applied.
In the circumstances of this case, 3 particularly when it is found that the appellant had not raised any objection, it cannot be said that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating any principles of natural justice.
Maclean vs The Workers Union, , referred to.
Law 198 expressly confers a jurisdiction on a Daughter Lodge to try a member if he commits an offence, the jurisdiction conferred on it cannot be excluded by Law 128 which is a general law.
The word offence ' in the context of Law 198 can only mean the infringement of laws of the Daughter Lodge.
In the present case the rules relating to the disciplinary proceedings have been strictly complied with.
With regard to the contention that the additional fourteen days, to which he is entitled to file his case, were not granted to him it is held that there was no prejudice caused to him by this failure and since he never made a complaint of it before any of the two appellate bodies, he has waived the requirement of the rule.
From the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly when it is found that the appellant did not raise any objection, it cannot be said that the resolution passed by the Lodge Victoria is bad for violating natural justice.
Since Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to decide on the merits of a decision given by a domestic tribunal and since both courts below have found concurrently that the Daughter Lodge has acted in good faith and since no exceptional circumstance has been shown, this Court will not examine the merits of the decision.