judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 937 of 1977.
From the Judgment dated 24.3.1977 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 2746 of 1965.
Shanti Bhushan, J.P. Goyal, Satish Chandra, V.M. Tar kunde.
R.P. Singh, A.K. Shukla, J.M. Khanna, M.R. Bidsar, K.K. Gupta.
Vijay Kumar Verma, Ms. Shefali Khanna, P.K. Chakraborty and R.C. Verma for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN, J.
This appeal by,leave arises from the judg ment.
Of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 2746 of 1965, whereby the High Court, reversing the finding of the courts, below; held that the suit instituted by the present respondent was maintainable under section 180 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939 (the 'Act ').
That is the only question which arises for consideration in this appeal brought by the defendant in the suit.
678 The suit relates to 10 plots of land of Which the plain tiff is the proprietor and situated in District Muzaffarna gar.
The suit was instituted for ejectment of the defendant appellant Lala Raghuraj Swarup .(now represented by his Legal Representatives and hereinafter referred to also as the 'sub tenant '), who was granted a sub lease in the suit properties by the original tenants, Raimal and Bhartu (the 'tenants ') for a period of five years commencing from 1.1.1950 and expiring on 31.12.
However, on 14.9.1954 the tenants surrendered their interest in the holding to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff thereupon issued notice dated 2.11.1954 to the defendant calling upon him to deliver vacant possession of the land to the plaintiff on 31.12.1954 which was the agreed date of expiry of the sub lease.
Since the defendant failed to comply with that de mand, the plaintiff instituted the suit for ejectment under section 180 of the Act.
Various conntentions were, raised by the defendant in answer to the plaint allegations and all of them, except the question whether the suit was maintainable under section 180 of the Act, were rejected by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court.
Holding that the suit was not maintainable, they stated that, in view of the fact that the defendant was holding the land as a sub tenant, he was liable to be ejected only in terms of section 175, and not section 180, and had the suit been brought under section 175, it would have been stayed in terms of the Government Notification dated January 23, 1953 stating that all suits, applications or proceedings under section 175 were stayed.
It is not disputed that had the suit been brought under section 175, it was liable to be stayed for the notification is still in force and has remained in force at all material times.
On the other hand, if the suit was rightly brought under section 180, there was no stay and in that event, all the other issues having been found in favour of the plain tiff, the suit has to be, and ought to have been, decreed.
The High Court has so held by the impugned judgment.
To examine this question, we shall presently refer to sections 175 and 180, but before we do so, it is necessary to refer to the provisions concerning the status of a sub tenant (vis a vix a tenant) whose rights are extinguished by operation of law.
The expression 'tenant ' in sub section (23) of section 3 of the Act includes a 'sub tenant ' as defined in sub section (22) of that section.
These sub sections read: 679 "3(22). 'sub tenant ' means a person who holds land from the tenant thereof other than a permanent tenure holder, or from a grove holder or from a rent free grantee or from a grantee at a favourable rate of rent and by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable; 3(23).
'tenant ' means the person by whom rent is, or .but for a contract express or implied would be, payable and, except when the contrary intention appears, includes a subtenant, but does not include a mortgagee of proprietary or under proprietary rights, a grove holder, a 'rent free grantee, a grantee at a favourable rate of rent or, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Act, an under pro prietor, a permanent lessee or a thekadar;" It is not disputed that the defendant at the material time was a 'sub tenant ' as defined under section 3(22) in terms of the sub lease granted to him by Raimal and Bhartu, who were 'tenants ' within the meaning of section 3(23).
Nor is it disputed that the defendant and Raimal and Bhartu were non occupancy tenants as defined under section 31 which reads: "31.
All tenants other than permanent tenure holders, fixed rate tenants, tenants holding on special terms in Oudh, ex proprietary tenants, occupancy tenants and hereditary tenants are non occupancy tenants.
" Sections 45 to 48 speak of extinction of tenancies.
Section 45, so far as it is materi al to the facts of this case, provides: "45.
The interest of a tenant shall be extin guished (c) . . . by surrender, or by abandonment; It is not disputed that, in respect of the two tenants, their interests had become extinguished in terms of clause (c) by reason of surrender of their interests in the holding on 14.9.1954 in favour of the proprietor 680 plaintiff.
The effect of such surrender on the interest of the sub tenant is dealt with in section 47.
It is with reference to this section that the applicability of section 180 has to be considered.
It iS important to remember that the material portions of section 47, namely, sub sections (1), (4) and (5) dealing with the interests of sub tenants on the extinction of the tenants ' interests, are concerned only with tenants other than permanent tenure holders or fixed rate tenants.
In other words, these sub Sections (unlike sub section (2) concerning a transferee from a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate tenant or sub section (3) dealing with mortgages executed prior to January, 1902) deal with non occupancy tenants, as in the present case, and not with any other class of tenants.
Section 47, so far as it is material, reads: "47.
(1) Except as otherwise provid ed in sub section (3) and sub section (4) the extinction of the interest of a tenant, other than.
a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate tenant, shall operate .to extinguish the interest of any tenant holding under him . . (2) Subject to the provisions of section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the extinction of the interest of a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate tenant shall not of itself affect the rights of any transferee from such tenant under a valid transfer, but after the transfer all covenants binding and enforceable as between the landholder and the tenant shall be binding and enforceable as between the landholder.
and the transferee.
(4) Where, at the time Of the extinc tion by surrender or abandonment, or by death without any heir entitled to inherit such interest, of the interest in a holding of a tenant other than a permanent tenUre holder or fixed rate tenant, there is in existence a valid sub lease of the whole or of a portion of the holding, executed on or after the first day of January, 1902, all covenants, binding and enforceable as between the tenant and the sub tenant shall, subject to the provisions of sub section (5), be binding and enforceable as between the tenant 's landholder and the sub tenant for the remainder of the term of the sub lease or for five years, whichever period may be the shorter. 681 (5).
In the cases referred to in sub section (3) and sub section (4), if the rent payable by the sub tenant is less than that hitherto payable by the tenant, the sub tenant shall have the option of vacating the holding, but shall, if he continues in posses sion, be liable to pay rent at the rate hith erto payable by the tenant . " Section 47(1) shows that in the case of all non occupan cy tenants, (as distinguished from permanent tenure holders or fixed rate tenants with whom we are not concerned) the extinction of their interests as such tenants will, subject to the protection of sub sections (3) and (4), operate to extinguish the interests of tenants holding under them.
The interest of the defendant, being that of a, nonoccupancy sub tenant, is thus liable to be extinguished consequent on the extinction of the interests of the non occupancy tenants Raimal and Bhartu.
This extinction of the defendant 's inter est is, however, subject to the provisions contained is the relevant sub sections, which on the facts of this case, are sub seCtions (4) and (5).
Sub section (4) shows that, in the event of the.
extinction of the interest of a nonoccupancy tenant by reason of his surrender or abandonment of such interest, or his death without any heir to inherit such interest, all covenants binding and enforceable as between the tenant and the subtenant, subject to the provisions of sub section (5), will be binding and enforceable as between ' the tenants ' landholder (proprietor) and the sub tenant for the remainder Of the term of the sub lease or for five years whichever period may be the shorter.
This means that the terms and .conditions under which the defendant held the sub lease under Raimal and Bhartu continued to be binding and enforceable between the plaintiff and the defendant for the period from 14.9.
1954, which was the date of surrender by the tenants, till 31.12.1954, which was the date on which the defendants ' sub lease expired.
This is, however, subject to sub section (5) which provides that, if the rent payable by the sub tenant is less than the rent that was payable by the tenant, the sub tenant has the Option of vacating the holding or continuing in possession for the period permitted by the statute on payment of rent at the higher rate which was applicable to the tenant.
These provisions show that, notwithstanding the extinc tion of the interest of the tenant by reason of his surren der or any other reason mentioned under sub section (4), a sub tenant whose subtenancy has not expired, is protected for the remainder of the term of the sub lease or for 5 years, whichever period be the shorter, but subject to the requirement of sub section (5) about rent.
The statutory 682 right vested in the defendant thus remained in force only for the statutorily limited period, and not any further.
The limited right of the sub tenant thereafter for the purpose of removal of standing crops and other products of the earth, and his obligation to vacate the holding are stated in section 48: "48.
When the interest of a sub tenant is extinguished he shall vacate his holding but shall have in respect of the removal of stand ing crops and other products of the earth the same rights as the tenant would have upon ejectment in accordance with the provisions of this Act".
This section further emphasises the need to vacate the holding upon extinguishment of the interest, but without prejudice to the right of removal of the standing Crops etc.
We shall now consider the two provisions under which a suit can be brought.
Section 175 (the operation of which now remains stayed) deals with the ejectment of a non occupancy tenant, while section 180 deals with ejectment of a person in occupation of land without consent.
We shall first read section 175, and then section 180, so far as they are .material: "175 . . a non occupancy tenant shall also be liable to ejectment on the application of the landholder on any of the following grounds, namely: (a) that he is a tenant holding from year to year; (b) that he is a tenant holding under ,a lease for a period which has expired or will expire before the end of the current agricultural year.
" Significantly, this section, dealing with a non occupan cy tenant, refers to a tenant falling under clause (a) or clause (b), i.e., a tenant having a present interest in terms of an unexpired lease or an expired lease under which he holds over.
The section has no application to past ten ants whose interests have become extinguished for the rea sons stated in section 45 or section 47 or whose lease has been duly determined.
On the other hand, persons who are not, or, ' who are no longer, tenants at the time of the suit, and liable to ejectment, have to be proceeded against under section 180: 683 "180.
(1) A person taking or retaining posses sion of a plot of land without the consent of the person entitled to admit him to occupy such plot and otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force, shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, and also to pay damages which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants.
Section 180 has no application to a present tenant.
This section provides for ejectment of a person in occupation of land without a valid consent.
He is a person who has taken or retained possession of land without the consent of the landlord and contrary to law.
He may have taken possession by trespass, or after being in lawful occupation, retained possession contrary to the will of the person entitled to admit him to occupy the land and without the support of law; in either event he is a person liable to be ejected under section 180.
It makes no difference.
for the purpose of this section that a person was in unauthorised occupation at all material times, or, the occupation was authorised at its commencement, but became unauthorised by reason of the authority to occupy having been extinguished by operation of law, or duly determined by the person entitled to give such authority.
Unlike section 175, which is, as seen above, confined to a person who is a tenant either in terms of an unexpired lease or by reason of .his being allowed to continue in possession after the expiry of the period of the lease, section 180 concerns a person who was never, or who is no longer, a tenant.
Apart from a mere trespasser, a person remaining in possession of the land, notwithstanding the extinguishment of his interestor determination of his lease, and without the consent of andcontrary to the will of the landlord, and otherwise than as permitted by law, equally falls within the ambit of section 180.
Any such person does not hold under a lease and is not a 'tenant" within the meaning of section 175.
He has no present right of 'holding ' or 'retaining possession ' of the land.
The expression 'hol ding ' is defined under section 3(7) as :.
"a parcel or parcels of land held under one lease, engagement or grant, or in the absence of such lease, engagement or grant under one tenure and in the case of a thekadar includes the theka area".
684 This shows that there must be an existing or continuing legal relationship between the owner and ' the person in possession of the land.
In the absence of any such relation ship, either 'because no lease or anyother interest or right was ever granted or because it was duly determined or extin guished, a person retaining possession of the land without the consent and contrary to the will of the landlord does not come within.
the purview of section 175.
While the legislature provides for the ejectment of a nonoccupancy tenant on the grounds specified under section 175, section 180 is meant for ejectment of a person who has no present right to retain possession of land either because his occupation commenced without any such right or the right by which he commenced the occupation has since been duly extinguished or terminated in accordance with the law in force.
Speaking of section 180, K. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in Bhinka & Ors vs Charan Singh, [1959] Supp.
2 SCR 798 at 808, observes: " . .
The word "taking" applies to a person taking possession of a land.
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law; while the word "retaining" to a person taking possession in accordance with the provisions of the law but subsequently retain ing the same illegally So construed, it is section 180, and not section 175, which should apply 'to a person who is in unlawful or unauthorised occupation of land.
Mr. V.M. Tarkunde, counsel for the the appellant defendant,however, submits that the defendant is not in unlawful or unauthorised or illegal occupation of the land, but he is inoccupation by reason of his being a lessee, although the term of the lease has since expired.
In the Case Of such a person, it is section 175 that applies.
Mr. Tarkunde says that the interest of the defendant in the land continues eveni.after termination of the period of his sub lease and notwithstanding the plaintiffs notice calling upon ' him to quit.
His interest in the land, counsel says, is not extinguished by reason of the extinction of the interests of the tenants.
The defendant ceased to be a sub tenant and was elevated ' to the position of a tenant upon the extinction of the interests of the tenants by reason of their surrender of the holding, This argument is urged by counsel on the basis of his construction of 685 section 47 which, in our view, is not correct.
Section 47(1), as seen above, specifically says that, except as otherwise provided in sub section (3) and sub section (4), the extinguishment of the interest of a non ocCupancy tenant will, extinguish the interest of his sub tenant.
Once the interest Of the person under whom the defendant held the land was extinguished, the defendant was no longer a sub tenant, but a person enjoying a legal right for a limited period in terms of the statute.
As stated by this Court in Birendra Pratap Singh & Anr.
vs Gulwant Singh & Ors., ; , 878 879: " .
The subsequent possession was, however, under a legal right and that right accrued to the appellants under sub section (4) of section 47 . .
This sub section does not lay down that the original sub lease executed by the chief, tenant, who surrenders his1 rights, is to continue in force.
What this provision does is to create a new right in the sub tenant and that is the limited right to continue in possession for the re mainder of the term of the sub lease or for five years whichever period may be shorter . . ".
This shows that the sub tenant was no longer a holder ' of.
any parcel of land once his right to hold was extinguished and his statutory right for the limited.
period had also expired in terms of section 47.
When that event has oc curred, he has no further interest in the land and his continued occupation is, as pointed out by this Court in Bhinka (supra), only an unauthorised or illegal occupation.
Referring to sub section (4) of section.
47, this Court, in Birendra Pratap Singh (supra) stated: " .
So far as the right granted by section 47(4) is concerned, it is granted by the statute itself for 'a limited period and, once that period expires, it cannot be held that the right continues thereafter.
There is no requirement in law that, after the expiry of that period.
there must be eviction from .the land in order to extinguish the right granted by section 47(4).
The possession subsequent to 30th June, 1951 cannot, therefore, be held to be in pursuance of a right .conferred on a sub tenant referred to in section 47(4) Of the Tenancy Act 686 and, consequently, the land was not held by the appellants thereafter in the capacity mentioned in section 19(vii) of the Act. .",, This observation regarding section 47(4) of the Act was made by this Court with reference to section 19(vii) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 195 1).
The ' construction placed on section 47(4) of the Act in that decision supports the view we have indicated on the point in issue, and that .decision was rightly relied on by the High Court in coming to the conclusion which it did.
Mr. J.P. Goyal, supplementing the arguments of Mr. Tarkunde, places reliance on certain observations of this Court in Biswabani (P) Ltd. vs Santosh Kumar Dutta & Ors., [ ; That decision refers to the protection of a statutory tenant in terms of the West Bengal Premises Tenacy Act, 1956.
This Court stated that, even after the expiry of the contractual tenancy, the tenant would continue as a statutory tenant, except where he has surrendered possession or has been evicted under the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act.
That decision has no rele vance to the facts of this case where the question relates to the construction of the relevant provisions of the Act under Which separate and special provisions have been made to regulate the rights and liabilities of different catego ries of tenants, including non occupancy tenants with whom alone we are concerned.
Their liability to ejectment, 'fo llowing the extinction of their interests and rights in the land, is regulated by statute.
The views expressed by the Full Bench of the High Court are correct.
The learned Judges have rightly held that insofar as the defendant has continued to remain in occupa tion of the land even after the expiry of the .period of his lease, and despite the landlord 's notice to quit the prem ises, he can no longer be regarded as a tenant referred to in clause (a) or (b) of section 175 and, therefore, that section has no application to him.
The right section in terms of which a suit has to be brought against him, as the plaintiff has done in the present case, is section 180.
Accordingly there is no merit in this appeal.
R.M. SAHAI, J.
While joining ' in the opinion of brother Thommen, J., few words are being added, on nature of inter est created 687 under sub section (4) of Section 47 of the U.P. Tenancy Act of 1939 (referred hereinafter as the Act).
Sub tenant, literally or statutorily either in the Rent Control legislations or agricultural tenancies, normally, is a ,person in possession holding from the tenant.
His right or interest depends on provi sions in the Statute.
Under U.P. Tenancy Act, sub;tenant according toclause (22) of section 3 holds land from a tenant.
Even though he isinclud ed in the definition of tenant in clause (23) and is non occupationally under Section 31 of the Act, yet, he is inferior class of tenant a she is specifically precluded by Section 39 from subletting and has nosecurity of tenure as he can be evicted under Section 175 of the Actand his inter est in the holding extinguishes, statutorily, under Section47 on extinction of interest of his tenant under Section 45 of the Act.
Similar provision for extinction .of tenancy existed in Agra TenancyAct of 1926.
Sub section 3 .and 4 are, in fact, identical with sub section.2 and 3 of the 1926 Act.
Even Section 28 of N.W.P. Tenancy Act 1901(Act II of. 1901) provided for extinction of interest of sub tenant onejectment of his tenant under Section 57 of that Act.
And on extinc tion, for other reasons, the covenant binding and enforceable as bet ween tenant and the sub tenant became binding between tenants land holder and the sub tenant .and he was permitted, at his option, tocontinue, in possession for the remainder period of lease, on paymen tof the rent which was being paid by the tenant, Therefore, continuanceof sub tenant under the covenant between tenant and sub tenant exis ted in Tenancy legislations right from 1901.
But there existed a vitaldifference between 1901 Act on one hand and 1926 and 1939 Act on the other.
In 1901 Act the sub lessee could continue . 'for the remainderperiod of the term of the sub lease ' whereas under 1926 and 1939 Actsthe period was fixed depending on if the sub tenancy was createdbefore or after 1st January 1902.
In the former case the sub lesseecould continue for, 'the remainder term of the sub lease or for the lifetime of the tenant or for ten years ', whichever period was the shortest and in latter 'for the remainder period of the lease or five years ' whichever Was shorter.
Reason for fixation of period by latter enact ments, namely 1926 and 1939 was to remove uncertainty about landholders interest as the tenants, particularly widows, who had.lmited .interest, only, at times created permanent sub tenancy or subtenancies for long durations under 1901 Act.
This resulted in mass of litigation and at times there was sharp divergence of.
opinion between Board of Revenue, the highest.
authority in the hierarchy of revenue courts dealing with agricultural holdings and the High Court.
It was to.
put this controversy at end and reationalise the law, ineeping with the.
688 spirit of those times when tiller of the soil concept was still far, that the Legislature altered the law and provided for durational or limited interest.
To appreciate its nature during subsistance of the covenant and thereafter it is necessary to extract relevant sub sections of Section 47: "47.
(1)Except as otherwise provided in sub section (3) and sub section (4) the extinction of the interest of a tenant, other than a permanent tenure holder or a fixed rate ten ant, shall operate to extinguish the interest of any tenant holding under him.
(2) . . . (3) . . . . . (4) Where, at the time of the extinction by surrender or abandonment, or by death without any heir entitled to inherit such interest, of the interest in a holding of a tenant other than a permanent tenure holder or fixed rate tenant, there is in existence a valid sub lease of the whole or of a portion of the holding, executed on or after the first day of January 1902, all covenants.
binding and enforceable as between the tenant and the sub tenant shall, subject to the provisions of sub section (5), be binding and enforceable as between the tenant 's landholder and the sub tenant for the remainder of the term of the sub lease or for.five years, whichever period may be the shorter.
(5) In the cases referred to in sub section (3) and subsection (4), if the rent payable by the sub tenant is less than that hitherto payable by the tenant, the sub tenant shall have the option of vacating the holding, but shall, if he Continues in possession, be liable to pay rent a.t the rate hitherto payable by the tenant.
What is apparent, from a bare perusal of sub section (1) of Section 47 is that it is Wider in application and immedi ate in operation.
689 It extends to every tenant holding under a tenant other than permanent tenure holder or fixed rate tenant.
The interest of such tenant extinguishes, automatically and immediately by operation of law on extinction of interest of his chief tenant.
No further requirement is contemplated.
He becomes liable to ejectment.
If he .continues in possession he is a trespasser unless he holds With consent of the landholder/landlord expressly or impliedly.
For sub tenants it has been made more explicit by Section 48 of the Act as he is required to vacate the holding except for the standing crops and produce which he is permitted to remove as any other tenant ejected in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Thus a tenants more so a Sub tenant, continuing in possession after extinction, of his interest as provided by Section 47, cannot be considered to be in possession in any other capacity but as retaining possession otherwise than in accordance with the law for the time being in force.
Is the result! any different for a sub tenant who is permitted to continue for the remainder period of sub lease by sub section (4) of Section 47? Tenancy extinguishes under section 45 for various reasons.
Consequence of it on right of a tenant holding under him is mentioned in Section 47.
Since sub tenant, is tenant and holds from the tenant his interest, too, extinguishes by operation of law.
But the Legislature made an exception in favour of those sub tenants whose interest came to an end either because the tenant surrendered or.
abandoned his holding or died without any heir to inherit his interest, obviously, to avoid any preju dice to a weaker class of tenant due to conduct of his tenant or for reasons beyond control of anyone.
But the expression, 'Except as provided ' in sub section (1) does not carve out an exception to extinction of interest of sub tenant but to its immediate operation.
That is interest in the holding is extinguished but from a future date namely expiry of the period of leases or five years whichever is shorter.
This benefit or .concession cannot be stretched to vest any fresh tenancy right.in ' him after expiry of the period.
On a combined reading of sub section (1) of Section 47 with sub section (4) the plain and simple meaning that emerges is that the interest of .a sub tenant extinguishes on surrender by his tenant but this, is deferred for the period mentioned in this sub section.
The right created by sub section (4) being limited in operation it cannot extend beyond the ,period mentioned in it,.
Otherwise the sub section (4) and sub section (1) of the Act would be on cross purpose with each other.
Interpreting the Sub section in any other manner would be against principle of construction, as sub section (4).
cannot be read in isolation.
That is the consequence provided for in sub section (1) do take place but in the 690 manner provided by sub section (4).
To put it, simply, the extinction is complete but its operation is postponed to a later date.
Effort was made to distort the otherwise plain and simple construction by urging that since sub section (5) enjoins paying of same rent, as the tenant who had surren dered, the right and interest of the sub tenant stands enhanced, by operation of law and he stands substituted in.place of his tenant with higher rights than he held.
Natural follow up of it, added the .learned counsel, is that new right or interest created under Section 47(4) cannot extinguish after expiry of the period except as provided under section 45 of the Act.
The argument suffers from inherent fallacy, Section 47(4) does not arrest extinction.
It only postpones it.
In Birendra Pratap vs Gulwant Singh and Others, ; this Court while construing sub section (4)of Section 47 observed as under: "So far as the right granted by Section 47(4) is concerned, it is granted by the statute itself for a limited period and, once that period expires, it cannot be held that the right continues thereafter.
" No new tenancy is created.
What is made binding and enforce able is the old covenant existing between the tenant and sub tenant for the remainder period of the sub lease.
Thus whatever right a sub tenant acquires under sub section (4) it ceases to operate after the expiry of period of lease or the period mentioned in the sub section.
No second extinc tion is visualised.
That would be not.
only doing violence to the language of the sub sections but would also result in nullifying the .
effect of sub section '(1) completely.
Status of a person in possession after expiry of the remainder period of lease or five years as provided in Section 47(4) can neither be .of statutory tenant nor a tenant holding over as understood is common parlance.
He is a person in possession without authority of law.
A sub tenant whose extinction is postponed as a matter of conces sion because of the tenant 's prejudicial acts cannot be placed any higher than other sub tenants who are required 'to vacate their holding immediately under Section 48.
Therefore retention of possession by such person cannot be except ,otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act for the time being in force.
691 The Full Bench therefore did not commit any error of law in applying the ratio laid down by this Court in Birendra Pratap Singh vs Gulwant Singh and Others, (supra) that the effect of extinction of sub tenant 's interest under Section 47(1) of the Act was not only that, 'he could no longer be .held to be in the capacity of sub tenant ' but even the 'new right ' of continuance for the remainder period of lease which was created under Section 47(4) was limited and did not vest any right in such person to continue after that date nor any fresh right of sub tenancy could be deemed to accrue consequently possession of Such person after expiry of the extended period, was Otherwise that in accordance with the provision of taw against whom a suit for ejectment under Section 180 of the Act was maintanable.
The appeal thus as held by brother Thommen, J., is devoid of any merit.
ORDER For the reasons stated by us in our separate but concurring judgments dated August 21, 1991, we see no merit in fids appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs throughout.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The defendant appellant was a sub tenant in terms of a sub lease granted to him by the non occupancy tenants for a period of five years from 1.1.1950 expiring on 31.12.1954 in respect of the land in dispute of which the plaintiff re spondent was the proprietor.
On 14.9.1954 the original tenants surrendered their interests in the holding to the proprietor who .issued a notice dated 2.11.1954 to the sub tenant demanding vacant possession of the land by 31.12.1954, the agreed date of expiry of the sub lease, and, since the latter failed to comply with the notice, the propriter filed a suit fro, ejectment under section 180 of the nited Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939.
The Trial Court as well as the first appellate court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff, but dismissed the suit as not maintainable holding that the defendant being a sub tenant was liable to be ejected only in terms of section 175 and not under section 180 of the Act, and had the suit been brought under section 175 it would have been stayed in terms of the Government Notification dated 23.1.1953.
In the second appeal by the plaintiff the High Court held that the suit was rightly brought under section I80 and, finding the other issues in favour of the plaintiff, it decreed the suit.
Aggrieved, the defendant filed the appeal by special leave to this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the defendant appellant that his interest in the land was not extinguished on the extinction of the 673 tenants ' interest but continued even after termination of the period of his sub lease notwithstanding the plaintiffs ' notice; that although the term of lease had expired, he was not in unlawful or unauthorised occupation but was in pos session of the land by reason of his being a lessee, and, therefore, section 175of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, was applicable; and that he ceased to be a sub tenant and was elevated to the position of a tenant on the extinction of the interests of the tenants on their surrender of the holding.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (By the Court Dr.
T.K. Thommen & R.M. Sahai, JJ.) (1) The interest of a non occupancy sub tenant, is liable to be extinguished consequent on the extinction of the inter ests of the nonoccupancy tenant, and he enjoys a legal right for a limited period in terms of the statute.
(2) A person who continues to remain in occupation of the land even after the expiry of the period of his lease, and despite the landlords ' notice to quit the permises, can no longer be regarded as a tenant as referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of section 175 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939.
(3) The persons who axe not, or are no longer, tenants at the time of the suit, and liable to ejectment, have to be proceeded against under section 180 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939.
Per Dr. Thommen, J. 1.1 The extinguishment of the interest of a non occupan cy tenant would, as envisaged by section 47(1) of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, extinguish the interest of his sub tenant except as otherwise proVided in sub sections
(3) and (4).
[685A B] 1.2 Notwithstanding the extinction of the interest of the the by reason of his surrender or any other reason mentioned under subsection (4) of section 47, a sub tenant whose sub tenancy had not expired, was protected for the remainder of the term of the sub lease or for 5 years, whichever period be the shorter, but subject to the requirement of sub section (5) about rent.
[681G H] 2.1 In the instant case, the interests of the tenants had become extinguished in terms of clause (c) of section 45 of the United Provinces 674 Tenancy Act by reason of surrender of their interests in the holding on 14.9.54 in favour of the proprietor plaintiff.
[679G H] Once the interest of the person under whom the defendant held the land was extinguished, the defendant was no longer a sub tenant, but a person enjoying a legal right for a limited period in terms of the statute.
[685B] Birendra Pratap Singh & Anr.
vs Gulwant Singh & Ors., ; , referred to.
Biswabani (P) Ltd. vs Santosh Kumar Dutta & Ors.
, ; , held inapplicable.
The interest of the defendant, being that of a nan occupancy subtenant, was, subject to the provisions of sub ss.(4)and (5) of section 47, liable to be extinguished consequent on the extinction of the interests of the non occupancy tenants.
[681 B C] 2.2 The statutory right vested in the defendant remained in force only for the statutority limited period, for the purpose of removal of standing crops and other products of the earth, and he had an obligation to vacate the holding, as envisaged by section 48.
[681H; 682A] 2.3 The terms and conditions under which the defendant held the sub lease under the tenants continued to be binding and enforceable between the plaintiff and the defendant for the period from 14.9.1954, which was the date of surrender by the tenants, till 31.12.1954, which was the date on which the defendant 's sub lease expired.
This was, however, sub ject to sub section
(5) of section 47 which provided that, if the rent payable by the sub tenant was less than the rent that was payable by the tenant, the sub tenant had the option of vacating the holding or continuing in possession for the period permitted by the statute on payment of rent at the higher rate which was applicable to the tenant.
[681E F] 3.1 Section 175 of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, dealing with a non occupancy tenant, is confined to a person who is a tenant either in terms of an unexpired lease or by reason of his being allowed to continue in possession, after the expiry of the period of the lease.
The section has no application to past tenants whose interests have become extinguished for the reasons stated in section 45 or section 47 or whose lease has been duly determined.
[682F G; 683E] 675 675 3.2 There must be an existing or continuing legal rela tionship between the owner and the person in possession of the land.
In the absence of any such relationship, either because no lease or any other interest or right was ever granted or because it was duly determined or extinguished, a person retaining possession of the land without the consent and contrary to the will of the landlord does not come within the purview ors.
[684A B] 3.3 Persons who are not, or, who are no longer, tenants at the time of suit, and liable to ejectment, have to be proceeded against under section 180.
[682G H] 3.4 section 180 has no application to a present tenant.
It is meant for ejectment of a person who has no present right to retain possession of land either because his occupation commenced without any such right or the right by which he commenced the occupation has since been duly extinguished or terminated in accordance with the law in force.
[683B; 684B C] Bhinka & Ors.
vs Charan Singh, [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 798, referred to.
The learned Judges of the High Court were correct in holding that insofar as the defendant continued to remain in occupation of the land even after the expiry of the period of his lease, and despite the landlord 's notice to quit the premises, he could no longer be regarded as a tenant re ferred to in clause (a) or (b) of section 175 and, therefore, that section had no application to him.
The right section in terms of which a suit had to be brought against him, as the plaintiff did in the instant case, was section 180.
[686G H; 687A] Per Sahai.
J.: 1.1 Sub tenant, literally or statutorily either in the Rent Control legislations or agricultural tenancies, normal ly is a person in possession holding from the tenant.
His right or interest depends on provisions in the statute.
[687C] 1.2 Under U.P. Tenancy Act, sub tenant according to clause (22) of section 3 holds land from a tenant, and even though he is included in the definition of tenant in clause (23) and is non occupancy tenant under section 31 of the Act, yet, he is inferior class of tenant as he is specifically precluded by section 39 from subletting and has no security of tenure as he can be evicted under section 175 of the Act and his interest in the holding 676 extinguishes, statutorily, under section 47 on extinction of interest of his tenant under section 45 of the Act.
[687C D] 2.1 A combined reading of sub sections (1) and (4) of section 47 shows that the interest of a sub tenant extinguishes on surrender by his tenant but this is deferred for the period mentioned in sub section (4).
The extinction is complete but its operation is postponed to a later date.
The right creat ed by sub section (4) being limited in operation it cannot extend beyond the period mentioned in it.
[689G H; 690A B] 2.2 Section 47 is wider in application and immediate in operation.
It extends to every tenant holding under a tenant other than permanent tenure holder or fixed rate tenant.
The interest of such tenant extinguishes, automatically and immediately by operation of law on extinction of interest of his chief tenant.
No further requirement is contemplated.
He becomes liable to ejectment.
If he continues in possession he is a trespasser unless he holds with consent of the landholder/landlord expressly or impliedly, and, as envis aged by section 48, he is required to vacate the holding .except for the standing crops and produce which he is permitted to remove as any other tenant ejected in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
[689A C] ' Section 47(4) does not arrest extinction.
It only postpones it.
[690C D] Birendra Pratap vs Gulwant Singh and Others, ; referred to.
2.3 The expression, 'Except as provided ' in sub section (1) of section 47 does not carve out an exception to extinction of interest of Subtenant but to its immediate operation.
That is interest in the holding is extinguished but form a future date namely expiry of the period of leases or five years whichever is shorter.
This benefit or concession cannot be stretched to vest any fresh tenancy right in him after expiry of the period.
[689F G] 2.4 No new tenancy is created by sub section
(4) of section 47.
What is made binding and enforceable is the old covenant existing between the tenant and sub tenant for the remainder period of the sub lease.
Whatever right a sub tenant ac quires it ceases to operate after the expiry of period of lease or the period mentioned in the sub section.
No second extinction is visualised.
[690E F] 3.1 Status of a person in possession after expiry of the remainder 677 period of lease or five years as provided in section 47(4) can neither be of statutory tenant nor a tenant holding over as understood in common parlance.
He is a person in possession without authority of law.
[690G] 3.2 A sub tenant whose extinction is postponed as a matter of concession because of the tenant 's prejudicial acts cannot be placed any higher than other sub tenants who are required to vacate their holding immediately under section 48.
Therefore, retention of possession by such person cannot he except otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act for the time being in force.
[690G H; 691A] 4.
The full Bench of the High Court was right in holding that the effect of extinction of sub tenant 's interest under section 47(1) of the Act was not only that 'he could no longer be held to he in the capacity of subtenant ' but even the 'new right ' of continuance for the remainder period of lease which was created under section 47(4) was limited and did not vest any right in such person to continue after that date nor any fresh right of sub tenancy could be deemed to ac crue; consequently, possession of such person after expiry of the extended period, was otherwise than in accordance with the provision of law against whom a suit for ejectment under section 180 of the Act was maintainable.
[691A C]


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
2266 69 of 1979.
705 From the Judgment dated 9.8.1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos.
576 to 579 of 1975.
Harbans Lal and M.V. Goswami for the Appellants.
Iqbal Singh for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: These appeals by special Leave are directed against the common judgment and decree of the Punjab and Haryana High Court passed in L.P.A. Nos.
576 79 of 1975.
Three brothers, by means of four sale deeds executed on June 25, 1968, sold some parcels of land to Harbhajan Singh respondent herein.
The 4th brother by the name of Ujagar Singh, whose legal representatives are the appellants herein,.
filed four suits of preemption ,against the vendee and those were decreed on July 15, 1970, on terms of payment of pre emption money on or before August 30, 1970.
Four appeals were filed by the plaintiff pre emptors before the District Judge for the reduction of the pre emption money.
On an application moved by the pre emptors the time for deposit of the amount fixed under the decree by the Trial Court was extended till further orders.
The appeals finally were rejected under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as being insufficiently stamped and hence not properly presented.
Before hand, however, 'the laintiff pre emptors all the same, deposited the pre emption amount in the Trial Court, on their own, on October 26, 1970.
After the rejection of their appeals, the pre emptors sought execution of the pre emption decrees which attracted objections by the vendee judgment debtor.
The primary objec tion raised was that the suits stood automatically dismissed for non deposit of the preemption money within the time identically stipulated under the questioned decrees.
The plea of the vendee was based on the mandate of Order 20 Rule 14, Civil Procedure 'Code whereunder the Court when decree ing the claim to pre emption is required to specify in the decree on or before which the pre emption money shall be paid, if not already paid, and further if it is not so paid, the suit shall stand dismissed with costs.
(Whatever is relevant in Order 21 Rule 14 alone has been taken note of).
The date specified by the Trial Court as said before was August 30, 1970 and under the interim orders of the Appel late Court the time for depositing the said money was ex tended till 706 further orders.
Undeniably the Court never passed any fur ther orders in that regard and thus the time for depositing the said money stood extended without any limit.
objec tion was sustained by the Trial/ Executing Court.
On appeal to the Appellate Court at the instance of the pre emptors, the District Judge took .a contrary view permitting the execution to proceed.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal upheld the view of the District Judge, but a Division Bench of the High Court.
In Letters Patent Appeals, reversed the District Judge as also the Single Judge uphold ing the objection by the vendee that there were no decrees which could be executed.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellant for he alonewas present.
There has been a sea change in the law of pre emption in the States of Punjab and Haryana where from these appeals have arisen.
Whereas in Punjab the Punjab Pre emption Act itself has been repealed, in Haryana it has substantially been chopped down by justicing.
This Court in Atam Parkash vs State of Haryana & Ors., ; declared ultra vires section 15(1) of the Punjab Pre emption Act, as ap plicable to Haryana, whereunder certain relatives of the vendor had been given the right to pre empt a sale of immov able.
property.
The view of this Court and the present state of law is not by any means insignificant or irrelevant for judging the present matter and for resolving the controversy in hand.
Rather its pervasive thought permeats the mind.
Learned counsel for the appellants would have the con troversy determined on the anvil of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pleading for time to be extended by the Court, as it is extendable when any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Court, even though the period originally fixed or granted has already expired.
He has brought to our notice that in the main matter when the appeal was rejected by the District Judge as being insufficiently stamped time was asked from the District Judge to make good the deficien cy in the stamp duty but that was rejected and though he concedes that the matter was not taken up in revision before the High Court, it is still contended that this Court should exercise its plenary power to extend the time in the inter ests of justice and have the Court fee made good.
He also concedes that when the District Judge was asked to extend and specify the time for deposit of the pre emption money, he had declined to exercise his discretion, so as to regula rise payment, when the appellants had by themselves 707 deposited the pre emption money on October 26, 1970 before hand,leaving the matter to be agitated before the executing Court.
Likewise it is contended that this Court can and should specify the time for deposit so as to regularise it in exercise of powers under Section 148 C.P.C. He also high lights that the mistake herein was that of the Courtand for both the propositions he takes aid of Jogdhayan vs Babu Ram & Ors., ; and Jagat Dhish Bhargava vs Jawahar Lal Bhargava and Others, ; In any event he concedes that for the later wrongful non exercise of discre tion of the District Judge, the matter was not taken in Second Appeal or Revision, as the case may be, before the High Court.
We have pondered over, the matter.
Our view may appear some what slanting but we cannot disassociate ourselves from the canvass now spread, showing there is no law of pre emp tion permitting a decree to be drawn in terms of Section 15(1) of the Punjab Pre emption Act.
Were we to exercise at all the discretions on the subject afore mentioned we would in any event be completing the process of decreeing the suits; the suits which have been held to fall down under Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tantamount ing to their dismissal, and that too on present day when such decrees cannot be passed.
The High Court however, took the controversy in a different light.
It took the view that the insufficiently stamped appeals be/ore the District Judge were no appeals in the eye of law, as was contende don behalf of the vendee, and the view of the District Judge in not extending time was right as it was rightly considered that the appeals had not been entertained at all.
Support was also taken for its view by the High Court from the circumstance of the order of the Court extending time ex parte, which conferred no obligation on the vendee to treat the decree operative against him as and when the pre emptors chose to deposit the pre emption money.
The High COurt on this reasoning restored the judg ment of the Trial/Executing Court,upholding the objections of the vendee.
Where the High Court arrived by following one way, we have been led to arrive by another.
The end result, however, is the same that the objections of the vendee mustremain sustained and the pre emptor appellants must fail in the event,not getting their suits for pre emption de creed.
The appeals must thus inevitably fail and are hereby dismissed.
Decreetal money deposited by the appellants may be permitted to be withdrawn by them, ii not already with drawn.
No costs for there is no opposition.
V.P.R. Appeals dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Three brothers executed four sale deeds on June 25, 1968, to respondent.
The 4th brother, whose legal represen tatives are the appellants, filed four suits of pre emption against the vendee respondent and those were decreed on terms of payment of pre emption money on or before August 30, 1970.
The plaintiff pre emptors appellants filed four appeals before the District Judge for the reduction of the pre emption money.
On an application moved by the pre emptors the time for deposit of the amount fixed under the decree by the Trial Court was extended till further orders.
The appeals were rejected under Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as being insufficiently stamped and not properly presented.
Before hand, however on 26.10.1970, the plaintiff pre emptors, deposited the pre emption amount in the Trial Court.
The pre emptors sought execution of the pre emption decrees.
The vendee judgment debtor raised objections stat ing that the suits stood automatically dismissed for non deposit of the pre emption money within the time identically stipulated under the decrees.
The objection was sustained by the Trial/Executing Court.
704 The appeal to the Appellate Court at the instance of the preemptors, was allowed, permitting the execution to pro ceed.
A Single Judge of the High Court in further appeal upheld the view of the District Judge, but the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Letters Patent Appeals, upholding the objection made by the vendee respondent, that there were no decrees which could be executed, against which these appeals by special leave to this Court .were filed.
The appellants contended that the controversy could be determined on the anvil of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure by extending time by the Court, as it was extend able when any period was fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Court, even though the period originally fixed or granted had already expired; that this Court should exercise its plenary power in the interests of justice to extend the time.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
There is no law of pre emption permitting a decree to be drawn in terms of Section 15(1) of the Punjab Pre emption Act.
Were the Court to exercise at all the discretions on the subject, the Court would in any event be completing the process of decreeing the suits; the suits which have been held to fall down under Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tantamounting to their dismiss al, and that too on present day when such decrees cannot be passed.
[707C D] 2.
The objections of the vendee must remain sustained and the pre emptor appellants must fail in the event, not getting their suits for pre emption decreed.
Decretal money deposited by the appellants may be permitted to be withdrawn by them, if not already withdrawn.
[707F G] Atarn Parkash vs State of Haryana & Ors., ; , followed.
Jogdhayan vs Babu Ram & Ors., ; and Jagar Dhish Bhargava vs Jawahar Lal Bhargava and Others, ; , referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 902 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.7.1976 of the Madras High Court in S.A. No. 1575 of 1973.
, K. Ram Kumar and Ms. Janki Ramachandran for the Appellant.
M. Raghuraman for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J.
This appeal by Special Leave is.
directed against the Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 29.7.1976.
The short controversy in the case is regarding the ambit and scape of a will dated 22.6.
executed by one Padmanabha Chettiar.
The construction of the will is in question in the present case.
A translation of the will as supplied by the appellant in this Court reads as under: "On the 2nd day of June, 1924, i.e. Tamil 9th day of Ani of Raktakshi.
year, this will executed by me, Padmanabha Chettiar, son of Sami Chettiar, Vysya caste, cultivation, resident of New Street, Sultanpettai, Koppam, Palakkadu Taluq, Kallikottai District, presently at Aniaimalai, is to the effect.
As I do not have male progeny and I have attained old age, the movable and immovable properties mentioned hereunder in my possession and enjoyment, both ancestral and also self ac quired, shall be enjoyed by me absolutely till my life time, after my lifetime my wife Dhana lakshmi Ammal shall enjoy likewise till her lifetime; after her lifetime as described hereunder A Schedule properties shall be enjoyed absolutely by my daughter and wife of Anaimalai Subramania Chettiar, Rajalakshmi Ammal, and after her it should go to her male children".
The question which arises on the basis of the contents of the above will is whether Rajalakshmi Ammal had acquired a life estate 716 under the will or an absolute estate.
The High Court took the view that it was one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that so far as legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents such effect being given to it.
The High Court held that the fact that the testator directed that after Rajalakshmi Ammal it shall go to her male chil dren clearly showed an intention that Rajalakshmi Ammal 's interest in the properties should not be absolute.
The High Court thus arrived to the conclusion that Rajalakshmi Ammal should be deemed to have held only a life estate in the properties and after her death, her 'male children got the properties absolutely.
After going through the contents of the will we agree with the view taken by the High Court.
We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant raised before us that Padmanabha Chettiar, the testator, of the will wanted to give absolute right in the property to his wife Dhanalakshmi Ammal and thereafter absolute right in favour of his daughter Rajalakshmi Ammal.
The above inten tion is negatived by a clear mention in the will that after Rajalakshmi Ammal the property shall ultimately go to her male children.
In case the intention of the testator was to give the properties absolutely in favour of Rajalakshmi and not merely life interest then there was no question of mentioning that after her it should go to her male children.
Learned counsel for the appellant also raised a conten tion that even if it may be considered that only life inter est was given to Rajalakshmi Ammal under the will, such right became absolute under Section 14 (1) of the .
This contention was neither raised in any of the courts below nor before the High Court nor in the petition for special leave and we cannot permit this ground to be raised for the first time before us during the course of arguments.
In the result we find no force in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dis missed.

summary/full:
'P ' executed a will on 22.6.1924.
The terms of the will provided that after the death of testator his wife shall enjoy the properties till her lifetime; after her wife 's lifetime the properties shall be enjoyed absolutely by his daughter and after her daughter the properties should go to her male children.
A question arose as to whether on the basis of the will the daughter acquired a fife estate or an absolute estate.
The High Court held that the fact that the testator directed that after her daughter the properties shall go to her male children clearly showed an intention that daughter 's inter est in the properties was not absolute.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the daughter acquired only a life estate in the properties.
Hence this appeal against the judgment of the High Court.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
It cannot be held that the,testator of the will wanted to give absolute right in the property to his daugh ter.
The intention of the testator to give absolute right in the property to his daughter is negatived by a clear mention in the will that after his daughter the property shah ulti mately go to her male children.
In case the intention of the testator was to give the properties absolutely in favour of his daughter and not merely life interest then there was no question of mentioning .that after her it should go to her male children.
Accordingly, the view taken by the High Court was correct.
[716C E] 715 2.
A contention neither raised in any of the courts below nor before the High Court nor in the petition for special leave cannot he permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court during the course of arguments.
[716F]


judgement:
(Crl.) No. 116 of 1990.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
R.K. Garg, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Kr.
Garg and P.C. Choudhary for the Petitioner.
U.R. Lalit and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
The short question arising for decision by us is the true meaning of Sub section (2) of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and its effect.
For an Offence of murder committed on 17.9.1978 the petitioner, Ranjit Singh, was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C. by the Sessions Judge on 6. 3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment which was confirmed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.
While the petitioner was on parole after his conviction and sentence for first murder, he was tried for the second murder committed On October 25, 1980 and convicted under Section 303 I.P.C.
This conviction was altered to one under Section 302 I.P.C. and for the second murder, also the petitioner was sentenced by this Court on 30.9.
1983 to life imprisonment instead of death sentence.
This Court while disposing of the.
petitioner 's appeal, in this manner, directed as under: 746 "We feel that life imprisonment would be the proper sentence that should be imposed upon the appellant.
We accordingly reduce the sentence of death imposed upon him and, sen tence him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.
However, since the present murder was committed by him within a span of one year of his earlier conviction and that too when he was released .on parole we are clearly of the view that the instant sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to him should not run concur rently with his earlier sentence Of life imprisonment.
We therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him the present sentence should .commence thereafter.
" The petitioner has now filed this Writ Petition under Arti cle 32 of the Constitution for issuance of a suitable writ or direction to correct,the above direction given in the 0order dated September 30, 1983 to bring it in consonance with Section 427(2) Cr. P.C. and consequently for his re lease on the ground that both life sentences had to run concurrently in accordance with Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. and he is entitled to relief because he has undergone fourteen years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time of filing the Writ Petition on February 19, 1990.
This is how the question of construction of Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. arises in the present case.
Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is as under: "427.
Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of im prisonment is sentenced on a subsequent con viction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment ' or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person, who has, been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sen tence shall commence immediately.
747 (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sen tenced on a subsequent conviction to.
impris onment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous Sentence . ' ' Shri R.K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner strenu ously urged that this Court 's above quoted direction in the judgment dated 30.9.1983 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 while affirming the conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. for the second murder and imposing the punishment of life imprisonment for it 'also amounts to directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment are tO run consecutively and not concurrently which is in direct conflict with Sub section (2) of Section 427 Cr.
P.C. He ,urged that the life 'span of a person Could be only one and therefore ,any subsequent life sentence must run concurrently and not consecutively which is the clear mandate :of Section 427(2).
On this basis, it was, urged that this Court 's direction in the above manner on the petitioner 'S conviction for the second offence of murder is contrary to Section 427(2) of the Code 01 Criminal Procedure, 1973.
This is the basis of the reliefs claimed on behalf of the .petitioner.
In reply, Shri U.R. Lalit.
appearing.
on behalf of respondents, con tended that the direction of this Court properly construed is not contrary to Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. and, therefore, the question of issuing any writ or directions claimed by the petitioner does not arise.
We may straightaway mention that the question of grant of relief under Article 32 of the Constitution does not arise on the above facts.
The petitioner 's incarceration is the result of a valid judicial order and, therefore, ' there can be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which alone can be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the COnstitution.
The only question, it ap pears, therefore, is about the correct construction of the direction given by this Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 in the fight of the true meaning of Section427(2) Cr.
The meaning of a sentence of imprisonment for life is no longer res integra; It was held by a Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The State of Maharashtra and Others, ; that a sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation Or imprisonment for the whole of the remain ing period of the convicted person 's natural life.
It was further held: 748 "Unless the said sentence is commut ed or remitted by appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to serve the life term in prison.
" The contention that a sentence of life imprisonment was to be treated as a sentence of imprisonment for a fixed term was expressly rejected.
This view was followed and reiterat ed in Maru Ram vs Union of India & Ant., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 1196 while considering the effect of Section 433A introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with effect from 18.12.1978.
The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised one of its conclusions as under: "We follow Godse 's case (supra) to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath, and whatever the length of remissions earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Govern ment.
" Another conclusion in Maru Ram was that the mandatory mini mum of 14 years ' actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and short sentencing statutes made by the various States will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th December, 1978 when Section 433A came 'into force but Section 433A would apply to those sentenced 'by the trial court after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior to that date.
From these decisions it is obvious that the mandatory minimum of 14 years '.
actual imprisonment prescribed by Section 433A is applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprisonment since the conviction by the trial court even for the first murder was after 18.12.1.978, the second offence itself being committed after '18.12.1978.
There is no dispute that the mandatory minimum of 14 years ' actual imprisonment, as required by Section 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment, has not been served out by the petitioner and, therefore, irrespective of the points raised in this petition on the basis of Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. the petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the Government.
This alone is sufficient to refuse any relief under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The question now is of the meaning of Section 472(2) Cr. P.C, and its effect, in the present case, in view of the above quoted direc 749 tion Of this Court in its judgment dated 30.9.1983.
Sub section (1) of Section 427Cr.
P.C. provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment.
In other words, Sub section (1) of Section 427 Cr.
P.C. deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is ' subse quently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life.
In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made.
, Sub section (1) says that in ' such a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Court .directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence.
Obviously, in cases ' covered by Sub section (1)where the sentence is for a fixed ' term, the subsequent sentence Can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently.
Sub section (2), on the other hand, pro vides for an offender "alreadly undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life" who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life.
It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayaka Godse and reiterated in Maru Ram that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder or the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remit ted by the appropriate authority.
This being so at the.stage of sentencing by the Court On a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of.
impriosnment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in Sub .
section (1) of Section 427.
As rightly contended 'by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life ' span, the sentence on a subse quent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sen tence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that 'matter anyone is beyond .human might.
It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub section (2) of Section 427 since the general ' rule enunciated in sub section (1) thereof is that without the Court 's direction the subse .
quent sentence will.
not run concurrently, but consecutively.
The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subse quent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is 750 provided for in Sub section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on Sub section.
(1) if there be no express direction of the Court to that effect.
Sub section (2) is in the nature of anexCeption to the general rule enacted in Sub section (1) of Section 427 that 'a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the Court directs it to run concurrently.
The meaning and purpose of Sub sections (1) & (2)of Section 427 and the object of en,acting Sub section ?)is, therefore, Clear.
We are not required to say anything regarding the practical.
effect of remission or commutation of the sentences since that question does not arise in the present case.
The limited controversy before us has been indicated.
The only question now is of 'the meaning and effect of the above quoted direction in this Court 's judgment dated 30.9.1983 It is obvious that the direction .of this Court must be con strued to harmonise with Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. which is the statutory mandate apart from being the obvious truth.
The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life has, there fore, to run concurrently with the read as sentenceof imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner.
Thed exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction which re under: "We, therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation .in respect of his earlier sentence is grant ed to him the present sentence should commence thereafter.
" It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the proceeding portion has to be read.
This last sentence in the direction means that in case, any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the earlier.
sentence.
of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission or .commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the sub.
sequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be unaffected by the remission or commuta tion in respect of the earlier sentence alone.
In other WordS, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sen tence, of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out .merely because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority.
The consequence is that the petitioner would not 'get any practical 'benefit of any remission or commutation respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence.
is also .granted tO the petitioner.
It is in this manner that the direction is given for the, two Sentences of life impri 751 sonment not to run concurrently.
The ultimate direction contained in the last sentence is obviously for this purpose.
So construed the direction of this Court in the judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982 fully harmonises with Section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. This is the clarification we make of this Court 's judgment dated 30.9.
1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 4 18 of 1982.
We have already stated that this petition 'for the issuance of a writ Under Article 32 of the Constitution is untenable.
We have, there ' fore, treated it as a petition for clarification of the judgment dated 30.9.1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 418 of 1982.
Accordingly, the petition is disposed of with this clarifi cation.
R.P. Petition disposed of.

summary/full:
The petitioner who was convicted under section 302 IPC on 6.3.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment; was also tried for a second murder committed while he was on parole after his conviction and sentence for the first murder, and was convicted under section '303 IPC.
Altering the conviction to one under section 302 IPC, for the second murder this Court sentenced him to life imprisonment instead of death sentence and by its judgment dated 30.9.1983 directed that in case any remission and commutation in respect of his earlier sentence 'was granted, the latter sentence should commence thereafter.
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
praying for his release on the ground that both the life sentences had to run concurrently in accord ance with section 1427(2) Cr. P.C., and as he had undergone 14 years sentence of imprisonment with remissions at the time of filing the writ petition on .February 19, 1990, he was entitled to be released. 'It was contended that this Court 's direc, tion dated 30.9.83 was .contrary to section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal 743 Procedure, 1973 since it amounted to directing that the two sentences of life imprisonment were to run consecutively and not concurrently.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the direction of this Court, properly construed, was not contrary to.s.
427(2) Cr.
P.C. and, therefore, the question of issuing any writ or directions as claimed by the peti tioners did not arise.
Disposing of the petition treating it as one for clari fication of the judgment dated 30.9.1983 this Court, HELD: 1.1 A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as trans portation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person 's natural life unless the remaining sentence is 'commuted or remitted by the appropri ate authority.
This being so at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can b no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub s (1) ors.
427, Cr.
P.C. [747G; 749D E] 1.2 The earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being under stood to mean as sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropri ate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life as envisaged by section 427(2) of the Cr.
P.C., can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might.
[749F G] It cannot be said that a sentence of life imprisonment is to b treated asasentence of imprisonment for a fixed term.
[748B] Gopal Vinayak Godse vs The Stateof Maharashtra & Ors., ; and MaruRam vs Union of India & Anr., ; , followed.
2.1 The operation of the superimposed subsequent sen tence of Iife imprisonment should not be wiped out merely because in respect of to correspondingI earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation was granted by the appropriate.authority.
[75lF G] 744 2.2 In the instant case, the last sentence in the direc tion meant that in case, any remission or commutation was granted in.
respect.
of the earlier sentence of life impris onment alone then the benefit of that remission or commuta tion would not ipso facto be available in respect of the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would contin ue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the earlier sentence alone.
The consequence would be that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sen tence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence was also granted to the petitioner.
It was in this manner that the direction 'was given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently.
[750E H; 751A] The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life had, therefore, to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner.
[750C D] 3.
The general rule enunciated in sub,section (1) of section 427 Cr.
P.C. is that without the Court 's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecu tively.
[749G] The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence iS provided for in sub,section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub,section (1) if there being no express direction of the Court to that effect.
[749G H; 750A] Sub,section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted under sub section (1) of section 427 0Cr.
P.C. [T50A] 4.1 The mandatory minimum of 14 years ' actual imprison ment prescribed by section 433A Cr.
P.C. which has supremacy over the Remission Rules and short sentencing statutes made by the various States would not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial court before the 18th Decem ber, 1978 when section 433A Cr.
P.C. 'came into force but the section would apply to those sentenced by the trial court after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior to that date.
[748D E] Maru Ram vs Union of India & Anr., ; , followed.
745 4.2 In the instant case, section 433A Cr.
P.C. was applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprison ment since the conviction by the trial court even for the first murder was after 18.12.1978, the second offence itself being committed after 18.12.1978.
The mandatory minimum of 14years ' actual imprisonment as required by section 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment was not served out by the petitioner, and, therefore, irrespective of the points raised in the instant petition on the basis of section 427(2) Cr.
P.C. the petitioner could not claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the Government.
[748E G] 5.
The petitioner 's incarceration was the result of a valid judicial order and, therefore, there could be no valid claim to the infringement of any fundamental right which alone could be the foundation for a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.
[747E F]