judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1931 of 1969.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3 6 1969 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 2924/68.
Sukumar Ghosh for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C. J.
On November 27, 1962 respondents filed a suit for eviction against the appellant under the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956 ("The Act") on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent, that he had sublet the premises and that the respondents required the premises for their personal use.
The summons of the suit was served on the appellant on January 9, 1963 and he deposited the arrears of rent within a period of thirty days thereafter i.e. on February 5, 1963.
On July 10, respondents filed an application under section 17(3) of the Act for striking off the defence of the appellant on the ground that though the appellant had deposited the arrears of rent, he had not deposited the interest due on the arrears, as required by section 17(1) of the Act.
By an order dated July 25, 1963 the trial court accepted the respondents ' contention and struck off the appellant 's defence.
On August 26, 1963 the 947 appellant filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order but it was dismissed by the High Court on April 4, 1968.
Between August 26, 1963 when the appellant filed the revision application in the High Court and April 4, 1968 when the revision application was dismissed, certain important events happened.
On August 26, 1967 an Ordinance was passed by the West Bengal Government by which a new section, namely, Section 17B was introduced into the Act.
By that section, tenants were given the right, if the proceeding for eviction was not yet disposed of, to apply within thirty days of the commencement of the Ordinance, for setting aside the order striking off the defence.
On the expiry of that Ordinance, another Ordinance containing identical provisions was passed on January 8, 1968.This Ordinance was replaced on March 26, 1968 by President 's Act 4 of 1968.
Section 17 B which was inserted in the Act by the two Ordinances was numbered as section 17 A under the President 's Act, the provisions of the section remaining unaltered.
Section 1(2) of the President 's Act provided that the said Act shall be deemed to have come into force on August 26, 1967 which was the date on which the first Ordinance had come into force.
After the dismissal of the revision application on April 4, 1968,the appellant filed an application on May 3, 1968 in the Trial Court under section 17 A praying that the order dated July 25, 1963 passed by it, striking off his defence be set aside.
It ought to be mentioned that though the Trial Court had passed the order striking off the appellant 's defence as long back as in 1963, the eviction suit filed by the respondents continued to remain on the file because, on September 16, 1963 the High Court in the revision application filed by the appellant had issued an order staying all further proceedings in the suit.
Along with the application under section 17 A, the appellant filed an application under section 5 of the Indian praying that the delay caused in filing the application may for reasons stated therein be condoned.
Both the applications were dismissed by the Trial Court by an order dated August 17, 1968 which was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court in revision on June 3, 1969.
Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court in Civil Rule No. 2924 of 1968, the tenant has preferred this appeal by special leave of this Court.
The High Court has dismissed the application filed by the appellant under section 17 A of the Act on the ground that it was not filed within 30 days of August 26, 1967 when the first Ordinance 948 came into force and further on the ground that since Section 5 of the had no application to the proceeding, the Court had no power to condone the delay.
It is patent that the application under section 17 A was not filed within the prescribed period of thirty days.
The sole question for decision, therefore, is whether the provisions of section 5 of the can apply to an application under section 17 A of the Act.
Section 5 of the provides, to the extent relevant, that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.
On the applicability of section 5 to the proceedings under section 17 A of the Act, the provisions of section 39 of the Act have a material bearing and must be noticed.
Section 39 of the Act provides: "Subject to the provisions in this Act relating to limitation, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under this Act." This provision, which is clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, subject to the condition that if there is a provision in the West Bengal Act relating to limitation, that provision would prevail over the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act relating to limitation.
Since the West Bengal Act prescribes a specific period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an order striking out the defence, namely, a period of 30 days commencing on August 26, 1967 when the first Ordinance came into force, that period would undoubtedly apply to the making of the application under section 17A of the Act.
And since the appellant did not file his application under section 17 A before the due date, that is to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred by limitation.
But, by reason of section 39 of the Act, all other provisions of the Limitation Act would be attracted, including section 5 of the latter Act.
Whether the appellant has made out sufficient ground for the condonation of delay is another matter but, in view of the provisions of section 39 of the Act, it seems to us clear that the application filed by the appellant under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable and has to be decided on merits.
The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta Court has referred in his judgment of June 3, 1969 to the provisions of section 39 but he took the view that since section 17A lays down a special period of 949 limitation for filing a petition to set aside an order striking out the defence, that period could not be extended by invoking the provisions of the Limitation Act.
This view is unsupportable.
The true meaning and effect of section 39 is that if any special period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceeding under the Act in perference to the period, if any, prescribed by the Limitation Act.
But, apart from such an over riding effect of the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, not only that the other provisions of the Limitation Act do not stand excluded or superseded, but they are expressly made applicable by section 39 of the Act.
When a Court condones the delay caused in filing a proceeding, it does not extend the period of limitation prescribed by law for filing it.
It treats the proceeding as if it is filed within limitation, which it has the power to do if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the proceeding within the prescribed period.
In M/s. Pakarmal Gurudayal vs Sagarmal Bengani(1) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply even to an application made for setting aside the decree passed after and following upon an order striking out of the defence.
We endorse the view of the High Court which, ex hypothesi, would justify the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application for setting aside an order striking out the defence.
That leaves for consideration the question whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for not preferring his application within a period of thirty days after August 26, 1967.
On this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to bear in mind that in the revision application filed by the appellant against the order striking out his defence, the High Court on September 16, 1963 had stayed all further proceedings in the suit.
If the, appellant were to succeed in that revision application, the suit would have been required to be heard on merits and there would have been no reason or occasion for him to resort to the provision newly inserted by the Ordinance, under which an application could be made for setting aside the order striking out the defence.
The appellant was evidently advised wrongly as regards the true legal position, as a result of which he awaited the disposal of his revision application.
He filed the application under section 17A within 30 days of the date on which the revision application was dismissed.
The appellant acted bona fide in pursuing his remedy by way of a revision application which he had already filed and which, if successful, could have given him effective relief.
We are satisfied that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application under 950 section 17A within the prescribed period.
Accordingly, the delay caused in filing that application must be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act and the application under section 17A must be allowed.
For these reasons, we allow the application filed by the appellant under section 17A of the Act, set aside the order dated July 25, 1963 striking out his defence and remit the matter back to the Trial Court for deciding the respondents ' suit for eviction in accordance with law The suit has been pending since September 1962 and we direct that it shall be disposed of expeditiously.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the High Court 's Judgment is set aside but without an order of costs.
V. D. K. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
In the eviction suit filed by the respondents against the appellant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent, that he had sub let the premises and that the respondents required the premises for their personal use, the appellant deposited the arrears of rent within a period of 30 days i.e. within the time but did not deposit the interest due on the arrears as required by section 17(i) of the Act.
The respondents therefore, filed an application under section 17(3) of the Act to strike off the appellant 's defence for failure to deposit the interest.
The said application was accepted by the Trial Court and, therefore, the respondents filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court against that order which was dismissed on April 4, 1968.
During the pendency of the said revision application, section 17A was newly introduced in the 1956 Act with retrospective from 26 8 1967.
By that section tenants were given the right, if the proceedings for eviction was not disposed of, to apply within 30 days of the said date for setting aside the order for striking off the defence.
In view of the challenge by way of revision application in the High Court against the order striking off his defence the appellant did not take recourse to the provisions of the newly introduced section 17A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
After the dismissal of the revision petition, the appellant filed an application under the new section 17A of the Act praying that the order dated July 25, 1963 passed by the Trial Court, striking off his defence be set aside.
Along with the said application, an application to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed.
The Trial Court dismissed both the applications and the High Court confirmed that order in revision.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
The true meaning and effect of section 39 is that if any special period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceeding under the Act in preference to the period, if any, prescribed by the Limitation Act.
But apart from such an over riding effect of the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, not only that the other provisions of the Limitation Act do not stand excluded or superseded, but they are expressly made applicable by section 39 of the Act.
[949 A B] 2.
Section 39 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which is clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act 946 would apply to proceedings under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, subject to the condition that if there is a provision in the West Bengal Act relating to limitation, that provision would prevail over the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act relating to limitation.
Since the West Bengal Act prescribed a specific period of limitation for filing an application for setting aside an order striking out the defence, namely a period of 30 days commencing on August 26.
1967 when the first Ordinance came into force, that period would undoubtedly apply to the making of the application under section 17A of the Act.
Since the appellant did not file his application under section 17A before the due date, that is to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must be held to be barred by limitation.
But, by reason of section 39 of the Act, all other provisions of the Limitation Act would be attracted including section 5 of the latter Act.
[948 D F] In the instant case since the appellant did not file his application under section 17A of the Act, before the due date, that is to say, before September 25, 1967, the application under section 17A is barred by limitations.
However, the application filed by him under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable.
[948 A B, G] M/s. Pakarmal Gurudayal vs Sagarmal Bengani approved.
When a Court condones the delay caused in filing a proceeding, it does not extend the period of limitation prescribed by law for filing it.
It treats the proceeding as if it is filed within limitation, which it has the power to do if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the proceeding within the prescribed period.
[949 B C]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12 2 1973 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 774/72.
U. P. Singh for the Appellant.
H. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
In this appeal by special leave the appellant has been convicted under section 27 (a) (i) of the Drugs and Cosmeties and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 200/ as modified by the High Court.
The trial court also convicted the appellant under section 27 (a) (ii) and section 28 of the Act but no separate sentence was awarded under these counts.
The trial court had, in fact, imposed a sentence of imprisonment only till the rising of the Court but the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction enhanced the sentence to one year 's rigourus imprisonment, and hence this appeal by sepcial leave.
According to the prosecution, on 5.5.1970 at about 11.30 a.m. the complainant Drugs Inspector, Jalagaon received a telephonic meassage from the Senior Railway Sub Inspector Bhusawal to the effect that the appellant had been caught at the Bhusawal railway station with 17 plastic containers containing 17,000 white coloured tablets.
On receiving this message the complainant went to Bhusawal railway station on the next day and after taking permission from the magistrate he took the sample of the tablets and sent it to the public analyst and after receiving his report, he filed a complaint against the appellant under the various sections of the .
The learned trial magistrate framed two charges against the appellant.
One charge was under section 27 (a) (i) and 27 (a) (ii) of the (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") and the other charge related to section 28 read with section 18A of the Act.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and admitted all the facts contained in the charge.
The appellant, however, stated that as this was his first offence, he promised not to commit any offence again and as he was an agriculturist and a young man, he pleaded for mercy.
The prosecution in support of the case examined the complainant to prove the facts leading to the prosecution of the appellant.
The learned magistrate acccpted the plea of guilty and convicted the appellant as indicated in the judgment.
The High Court, however, enhanced the sentence as mentioned above.
Mr. U. P. Singh appearing in support of the appeal has raised a short point before us.
He has submitted that taking the prosecution case at its face value, no offence can be said to have been committed under section 27 (a) (i) or (ii) of the Act.
It was submitted that the ingredients required by section 27 have not been proved in this case and therefore, even if, the accused pleaded guilty, that will not enable the prosecution to convict him on his plea of guilty.
Section 18 (c) runs thus : "manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose under this Chapter.
" 999 Section 27 is the penal section under which the offence is punishable and this section runs thus: "Whoever himself or by any other person on his behalf manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for sale or distributes (a) any drug (i) deemed to be misbranded under clause (a), clause (b), clause (e), clause (d), clause (f) or clause (g) of secton 17 or adulterated under section 17B; or (ii) without a valid licence as required under caluse (c) of section 18." shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; Provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to be recorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year;" It was contended by Mr. Singh that in order to fall within the, ambit of this section the accused must manufacture the drugs for sale or stock or exhibit for sale or distribute the same.
There is no evidence in this case to show that the appellant had any shop or that he was a distributing agent.
All that has been shown is that the tablets concerned were recovered from his possession.
It was urged that possession simpliciter of the tablets of any quantity whatsoever would not fall within the mischief of section 27 of the Act.
On an interpretation of section 27, it seems to us that the arguments of Mr. Singh is well founded and must prevail.
The words used in section 27, nameely, "manufacture for sale", sells, have a comma after each clause but there is no comma after the clause "stocks or exhibits for sale".
Thus the section postulate three separate categories of cases and no other.
(1) manufacture for sale; (2) actual sale; (3) stocking or exhibiting for sale or distribution of any drugs.
The absence of any comma after the word "stocks" clearly indicates that the clause "stocks or exhibits for sale" is one indivisible whole and it contemplates not merely stocking the drugs but stocking the drugs for the purpose of sale and unless all the ingredients of this category are satisfied, section 27 of the Act would not be attracted.
In the present case there is no evidence to show that the appellant had either got these tablets for sale or was selling them or had stocked them for sale.
Mr. Khanna appearing for the State, however, contended that the word "stock" used in section is wide enough to include the possession 1000 of a person with the tablets and where such a person is in the possession of tablets of a very huge quantity, a presumption should be drawn that they were meant for sale or for distribution.
In our opinion, the contenton is wholly untenable and must be rejected.
The inter pretation sought to be placed by Shri Khanna does not flow from a true and proper interpretation of section 27.
We, therefore, hold that before a person can be liable for prosecution or conviction under section 27 (a) (i) (ii) read with section 18 (c) of the Act, it must be proved by the prosecution affirmatively that he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling the same or had stocked them or exhibited the articles for sale.
The possession simpliciter of the articles does not appear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act.
If, therefore, the essential ingredients of section 27 are not satisfied the plea of guilty cannot lead the Court to convict the appellant.
As regards the second charge, it seems to us that the case of the appellant is clearly covered by the language contained in section 18A read with section 28.
Section 18A runs thus: "Every person, not being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic or his agent for the distribution thereof, shall, if so required, disclose to the Inspector the same, address and other particulars of the person from whom he acquired the drug or cosmetic.
" Section 28 which makes no disclosure of 18A punishable reads thus: "Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 18A shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both." In this case, there is unchallengable evidence of the complainant that after recovering tablets from the possession of the appellant, he had served a registered notice to him to disclose the source from which he had acquired the tablets and despite this notice the appellant refused to disclose the source.
Thus the act of the appellant clearly falls within the ambit of section 28 of the Act.
The trial court further did not impose any separate sentence under this section.
But that will not be a bar to imposing a proper sentence by this Court provided the sentence does not exceed the sentence already imposed under section 27 (a) (i).
When the High Court was moved for enhancing the sentence, it was moved only under section 27 (a) (ii) of the Act because under that 1001 section the minimum sentence to be given was one year.
As the High Court was not satisfied with the reasons given by the trial court for giving sentence less than one year it appears to have enhanced the sentence to one year.
In view of our finding that section 27 (a) (i) have no application to this case, the charge on this count against the appellant must fail and the appellant must be acquitted of this charge.
So far as section 28 is concerned the maximum punishment which can be imposed is only one year.
The appellant is a young man and comes from a respectable family and had made a very candid confession before the Court in pleading guilty.
In these circumstances, we therefore do not think that any deterrent sentence is called for.
We would, therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellant under section 28 but give the sentence till the rising of the Court which he has already undergone.
The appellant will now be released forthwith.
The sentence of a fine of Rs. 200 will be maintained under section 28 and not under section 27 (a) (i).
The fine if not paid shall be paid within a month from today.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.
M.R. Appeal allowed in part.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The apellant was apperhended at the Bhuysawal railway station, and 17 containers with 17,000 white tablets were recovered from him.
The tablets were tested by the public analyst, and found to be not in accordance with the standard specified under section 18(a) of the Drugs and Cosmeties Act.
The appelant was duly tried and convicted by the Trial Magistrate, under Sections 27(a)(ii) and 28 of the Act.
The appellant pleaded guilty, and in view of his young age, and that it was his first offence, the Magistrate sentenced him only till the rising of the Court.
But in revision, the High Court enhanced the sentence to one year 's R.I.
It was contended that as there was no evidence to show that the tablets were "for sale", their possession simpliciter, of any quantity whatsoever, would not constitute an offence under section 27.
Allowing the appeal as regards the conviction under section 27, the Court, ^ HELD:1.
The absence of any cmma after the word "stocks" clearly indicates that the clause "stocks or exhibits for sale" is one indivisible whole and it contemplates not mere stocking the drugs, but stocking the drugs for the purpose of sale, and unless all the ingredients of this category are satisfied, section 27 of the Act would not be satisfied.
[999 F G] 2.
There is no evidence to show that the appellant had either got these tablets for sale, or was selling them or had stocked them for sale.
Before a person can be liable for prosecution or conviction under section 27(a)(i)(ii) read with section 18(c) of the Act, it must be proved by the prosecution affirmatively that he was manufacturing the drugs for sale or was selling the same, or had stocked them or exhibited the articles for sale.
The possession simpliciter of the articles does not appear to be punishable under any of the provisions of the Act.
[999 G. 1000 B C]