judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
1144 48 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal Nos.
3, 4, 5 of 1978 and 79 of 198 1 and 354 of 1984.
Dr. L.M. Singhvi, G.L. Sanghi, V.M. Tarkunde, Dalveer Bhandari, Ms. Rachna Joshi, K.N. Toshi, Lekh Rai Mehta, Gopal Singh, Sushil K. Jain and Sudharshan Atreya for the Appellants.
852 G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General P.S. Poti, Badridas Sharma, R.C. Maheshwari and Manoj Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J.
These appeals have come to this Court against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 29.9.86 wherein the learned Judges disposed of the following appeals by the impugned judgment and against this after grant of leave these appeals are before us: (1) The State of Rajasthan and Anr.
vs Prajapati Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 3 of 1978.
(2) The State of Rajasthan & Anr.
vs Adhunik Grah Nirman Samiti Limited, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 4 of 1978.
(3) The State of Rajasthan and Anr.
vs M/s.
Jai Marwar Company Pvt. Ltd., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 5 of 1978.
(4) Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel Charitable Trust vs The State of Rajasthan and Others, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 79 of 1981.
(5) State of Rajasthan and another vs Maharaja Gaj Singh Ji, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 354 of 1984.
Initially the three writ petitions were filed before the High Court of Rajasthan by i) Prajapati Grah Nirman Samiti Limited, ii) Adhunik Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. and iii) M/s. Jai Marwar Company Private Limited.
It was alleged that these three parties purchased respective areas of land for price by registered sale deeds two dated 4.11.71 and one dated 5.11.71 from Shri Gaj Singh, the erstwhile ruler of the Jodhpur State.
These lands form part of Khasra No. 42 1 in the revenue records.
There is yet another adjacent land which also was in dispute in other matters than these three which was Khasra No. 426.
Facts which are not in dispute are that after attainment of independence on 15th August, 1947 the rulers of the erstwhile princely States of Banswara, Bikaner, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jaipur, Jaisalmer, Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kishangarh, Kota, Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a Covenant with the Government of India 853 integrating these states into one.
Article 12 of the said Covenant provided for the private properties of the rulers of the Covenanting States.
In clause (1) of this article it was prescribed that the ruler of each of the Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties), belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of the State.
In accordance with the aforesaid clause in the Covenant, a list of private proper ties of the ruler of the former State of Jodhpur was pre pared and.it was approved by the Government of India on 24th March, 1949.
In the said list of private properties the immovable properties were divided into three categories.
Category 'A ' consists of properties which were to be regard ed as the family property of the Maharaja of Jodhpur and which will not be transferred.
Category 'B ' consists of properties which were to be regarded as family properties of Maharaja of Jodhpur but which will be disposable by him if he and his heir agree to do so.
Category 'C ' consists of property which is the absolute property of the Maharaja of Jodhpur with full rights of disposal.
In the case in hand we are only concerned with Category 'C ' property and in this category Umaid Bhawan Palace alongwith the area as per plan attached including the Chittar Tank and the Bijolai Tank and buildings was included.
Maharaja Hanwant Singh who was the signatory to the Covenant died in 1952 and after his death he was succeeded by his son Shir Gaj Singh who was minor at that time.
During the minority of Shri Gaj Singh an administrator was appoint ed for the purpose of administration of the estate of the minor Maharaja.
In 1964 the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the Act which received the ascent of the President of India on 6.4.1964 and was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 13.4.1964.
The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi tion of the estates of landowners.
Under Section 7 of the Act a provision was made for issuing a notification by the State Government appointing a date for the vesting in the State Government of the estates or all landowners situated anywhere in Rajasthan.
In exercise of the powers under Section 7 a notification was issued on 11th August, 1964 which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 13.8.1964 and by this notification the State Government appointed 1.9.1964 as the date of vesting of all the estates of land owners situated within the State.
Notice under Section 9A of the said Act were issued on 19.11.1975 to the petitioners by Collector, Jodhpur stating that trans 854 fers of the aforesaid lands are null and void and they shall deliver possession before 29.11.1975 or within 10 days of the receipt of the notice whichever is later, to the Sub Divisional Officer, Jodhpur.
It appears that one more notice dated 8.12.1975 was issued by the Sub Divisional Officer, Jodhpur by which he appears to have taken the possession of the aforesaid lands by affixing a notice as required by Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Rules, 1964.
The petitioner 's case before the Court below was that this land is not liable to acquisition under the said Act and therefore they sought a direction that the said orders and notices be quashed.
It was contended before the Court below that in the definition of 'land ' as defined in Section 2F after sub clause (d) of this Act provide for properties which shall not be included in the definition of 'land ' and as this property fell within the ambit of that property which was excluded from the definition of 'land ' it was contended that it could not be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land owners ' Estate Act.
The learned Judge Justice M.L. Jain, after examining the list of private properties and the material placed on record by both the parties came to the conclusion that these lands failing within Survey No. 421 which fell within the property included in the schedule of private properties in category 'C ' and therefore it being a private property included in the inventory prepared according to the Covenant, the acqui sition under the provisions of this Act was held to be bad.
The learned Judge on the basis of documents also came to the conclusion that on 1.9.64 which was the relevant date noti fied as the date of vesting this property was not agricul tural land and was also included in the private property of the ruler of Jodhpur shown within the boundary of the site plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
Consequently the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the transfer made by the ex ruler in favour of these petitioners was not bad.
The learned Judge considering the submissions came to the conclusion: "Now, Shri Gaj Singh is an Ex Ruler and therefore a landown er.
The Schedule I of the Inventory of his private proper ties also specified the properties which are his absolute property with full rights of disposal.
Item No. 1(a) relat ing to Jodhpur is as follows: 855 (a) Umaid Bhawan Palace as per.
plan attached including the Chittar Tank.
A plan was attached to the inventory which contains the heading "site plan of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
Private property of His Highness and Maharaja Sahib Sahadir, Jodhpur, is shown in the red.
" It is admitted that the land in dispute to which these writ petitions relate fails within the area bounded by the red line in the said site plan.
It is, there fore futile on the part of the State Government to contend that the land though covered by the site plan, is not part of the palace as specified in the inventory.
The State maintains that the Umaid Bhawan Palace has its own walled enclosure and further a long line of hills separates the land in dispute from the main palace.
The learned Dy.
Gov ernment Advocate urged that what the law excludes is the palace and not all the lands which are shown in the site plan.
The Word 'palace ' should be constructed only to in clude the area of the palace which is bounded by walls.
I do not see any force in this argument because the definition of land excludes the palace as specified in the inventory and the inventory specifies the area of the Umaid Bhawan Palace as per plan attached and the attached plan includes the land in dispute.
I am, therefore unable to give the word "palace" a restricted meaning as convassed by the learned Dy.
Govern ment Advocate.
That being so, the disputed land fails out side the estate and has consequently not vested in the State Government.
" The learned Judge after considering various documents which were filed and which were the records of the Government as regards the nature of the land as to whether it is agricul tural land or not came to the conclusion that: "The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi land.
In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted not only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to Banjar land and to Abadi land as well.
The copies of the Jamabandi and Girdwari filed by the State shows that the land is Padat and does not carry and land revenue.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi land is not covered by the provisions of the Act.
It appears 856 as has been contended that the land in order that it vests in the State Government, should be an agricultural land.
The amended long title of the Act states that it is an Act to provide for the acquisition of the Estates of landowners and for other measures of agrarian reforms removal of intermedi aries allotment of land to landless person, development of agriculture.
If the acquired land is meant for allotment to agriculturist then the land must be an agricultural land as indicated above.
The land in question was not an agricultur al land and if at all it was so at any time in the past, it long ago ceased to be so at least as early as in 1948, when according to the private property settlement, it was includ ed in the Umaid Bhawan Palace premises.
" Trustees of Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel Charitable Trust also filed a petition before the Rajasthan High Court.
This pertains to Survey No. 426 and this came up for heating before Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri K.D. Sharma who while considering the matter observed: "At the outset, I may observe that it is not disputed before me that Umaid Bhawan Palace situated in Jodhpur is the absolute property of Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur, who has full rights of disposal thereof.
This fact is borne out by the inventory marked Annexure 1 which was prepared and approved by the Government of India in pursuance of Article 12 of the Covenant entered into by late Maharaja Hanwant Singh with the Government of India at the time of accession of the former Jodhpur State to the Union of India.
It will not be out of place to mention that the term 'land ' defined in section 2 of the Act as amended by the amendment Act, 1975, does not include forts, palaces, buildings and build ing plots specified in the inventory.
Hence, Umaid Bhawan Palace of which Maharaja Gaj Singh is the absolute owner, does not fall within the purview of the definition of the word 'land ' given in the section 2 of the Act as amended upto date." In Misc.
Petition No. 1872/75 filed by Maharaja Shri Gai Singh came up for consideration before Hon 'ble the Chief Justice of Rajasthan Shri Justice Banerjee and by order dated 20.12.
1983 relying on the judgment passed by Justice M.L. Jain in the case of Prajapati 857 Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. vs State of Rajasthan allowed the petition of Maharaja Gaj Singh and quashed the notices which were issued.
It is thereafter that the State Government in the mat ters decided by Justice M.L. Jain and by Justice Banerjee and the trust, in the case decided by Justice K.D. Sharma went up in appeal under Letters Patent and by the impugned judgment, the Division Bench disposed of all these appeals and hence these appeals have come before us after grant of leave.
Learned counsel for the appellants contended that this Act i.e. Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land owners Estate Act, 1963 was brought into force in 1964.
According to the definition of 'Estate ' it could refer to either land or right, title or interest in land held by landowner.
The land, according to the learned counsel, is defined in section 2 sub clause (f).
This definition is an inclusive definition and it first refers to land held for the purpose of agriculture.
Thereafter it has been further stated that it does not include forts, palaces, buildings, building plots specified in the inventory and the inventory has also been defined in Section 2 sub clause (g) which refers to the inventory of the private properties made in pursuance of the Covenant and finally approved by the Cen tral Government.
Learned Counsel for the appellants mainly raised two questions: i) that as these lands were not agri cultural lands they do not fall within the ambit of this definition of 'land '.
It was also contended that in any event as it fails within the boundaries of Umaid Bhawan Palace which is a property included in the inventory as the private property of the rulers of Jodhpur approved by the Government of India, this will not fall within the ambit of the definition of 'land ' in Section 2F.
Consequently it could not be said to be an estate as defined in Sec.
2b and as such by application of this Act this could not vest in the State Government and in this view it was contended that the judgment delivered by the Division Bench has omitted to decide this question and for no reason felt that let a reference under Section 12 be decided.
It was also contended that the Division Bench could not come to a different con clusion then one which was reached by Justice M.L. Jain and Hon 'ble Chief Justice Shri Banerjee.
Learned counsel appearing for the State of Rajasthan attempted to contended that this property falls within the boundary of the Umaid Bhawan Palace according to the site plan could not be conclusively held as an attempt was also made to suggest that the original plan should have been summoned from the Central Government but the 858 learned counsel could not explain the admissions made at the various stages in these proceedings about the plan which was filed in these petitions and also could not give any expla nation as to why when these proceedings have been going on since 1975, the State Government could not obtain an offi cial copy of the site plan from the Government of India and produce it before the High Court.
In fact the admission in the documents and affidavits filed before the High Court and the orders passed by the revenue authorities which have been at length dealt with by the learned counsel and relied upon by the High Court could not be explained by the learned counsel appearing for the State.
Similarly the question as to whether this land was agricultural or not also was dis puted by the learned counsel on the basis that the revenue record entry showed that this has been agricultural land although the record referred to by the counsel for the appellants also indicated that this area during the State times was included in the development plan of the Jodhpur town.
Counsel for parties frankly conceded that if the lands in dispute fail within the boundaries of the Umaid Bhawan Palace as shown in the site plan which was part of the inventory prepared at the time of the Covenant and approved by Government of India, it is clear that these lands will not fall within the definition of 'land ' as described in Sec.
2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State nor it could be acquired under the provisions of this Act and in that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and the question whether the lands are agricultural or not is not very material.
Learned counsel for the respondent State distinguished the case of Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti on a different footing as they claimed to be the transferees from Jai Marwar Compa ny Private Limited and this transfer Was at a time when the transfer was prohibited and that question has not been gone into by the High Court as these petitioners have chosen to come to this Court when in fact they were not parties in the judgment before the High Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner in the petition by Naveen Grah Nirman Samiti in view of the objections raised by learned counsel for the respondent State frankly conceded that this petition was not before the High Court and in view of this he submitted that he may be permitted to withdraw this petition.
Learned counsel for the respondent also raised an objec tion about the transfer of these lands in view of Section 3(2) of Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Act, 1973.
Section 3(2) of 859 this Act provided that after the 16th day of August, 1971 if any person has transferred any urban property owned by such person such transfer shall be deemed to be a transfer made to defeat the provisions of this Act and the property so transferred shall for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be owned by such person.
On this basis it was contended that as the transfers have been effected by Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh after 16th August, 1971 they will be void whereas learned counsel for the appellants contended that this Act was enacted in contemplation of the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act which was to be enacted and it was for the purpose of that Act that Sec.
3(2) of this Act was enacted to restrict transfer of urban property but it did not de clare transfer to be void but said that in spite of the transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such person i.e. transferor.
The idea was that while applying the law of ceiling the holder of the property may not defeat the provisions of that Act by these transfers and ultimately this Act was repealed and the repeal was by Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978 and that Act did not protect anyone of these provisions.
In fact this question was raised before the Division Bench and the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the impugned judg ment observed: "In view of the repeal of 1973 Act the cloud which has been cast on the title of the petitioners in the writ petitions giving rise to these.
appeals by section 3(2) of the 1973 Act, was removed, and, therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Government Advocate.
" It is apparent that this Section prohibiting transfers was enacted keeping in view the Act on ceiling in contemplation and that is why as indicated earlier Section 3(2) did not provide that the transfer will be invalid but it only pro vided that in spite of the transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning the trans feror so that when the ceiling Act is brought into force the transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act.
In fact after the Ceiling Act was brought into force a prohibition was again imposed on the transfer and admittedly the transfers with which we are concerned are not after that as it is clear that the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act, 1972 when was enacted provided by Section 5 of that Act that the transfers which were made after the commencement of the Act was declared null and void.
In fact the learned Judges of the Division Bench considered this aspect of the matter and negatived the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the respond ents in the words indicated above and in our opinion that conclusion could not be assailed.
860 As regards the question as to whether the lands in dispute i.e which fail within Khasra Nos. 421 and 426 fall within the purview of the definition of 'land ' as contained in Section 2F of the Act is concerned it is consistently held by the High Court that as the land fell within the exception of Section 2F it would not fail within the defini tion of 'land ' (Section 2(f) reads: "land" means and land held or let for purposes of agricul ture or for purposes ancilliary thereto including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agri cultural labourers and village artisans and includes (a) tanks, lakes, ponds, river and water channels held for purposes of irrigation.
(b) surface of hills, (c) landing grounds or strips, and (d) shikargah but does not include forts, palace buildings and building plots, specified in the inventory.
" The last part of this provisions "but does not include forts, palace buildings, building plots specified in the inventory" is the relevant portion of the definition which was considered by the Court below and is the question which deserves to be considered.
The Inventory has also been defined in Section 2(d) which means inventory of the private property of the ruler prepared in pursuance of Article 12 of the Convenant and finally approved by the Government of India.
In the High Court in all these petitions the plea raised was that the inventory of the private property of the ex ruler of the Jodhpur State Maharaj Shri Gaj Singh contained an item of property shown as Umaid Bhawan Place and the boundaries therein were indicated to be in red in the site plan attached alongwith it.
So far as the inventory and inclusion of this property in the .inventory of the private property is concerned it is not disputed even before us.
In the High Court the site plan and the properties included in the red boundary forming part of the property Umaid Bhawan Palace was also not disputed.
All the judgments in the High Court are based on this admission and appa 861 rently the affidavits filed on behalf of the State before the High Court clearly and categorically admitted this position and even went to the extent of saying that this was verified and found to be correct and the plan filed with the petition having a red boundary was admitted and therefore it was not disputed that Khasra Nos.
42 1 and 426 fell within the boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace which in accordance with the definition of 'land ' quoted above will be excluded from the definition and what is excluded from the definition of 'land ' in Section 2F could not vest in the State in view of language of Section 7.
Section 7 reads: Acquisition of estates (1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the Government may for the purpose of carrying out agrarian reform in accordance with the provisions of this Act, by notification in the Official Gazette,appoint a date for the acquisition of landowner 's estates in the State and for their vesting in the State Government.
(2) The date appointed under this Section in relation to the acquisition of landowners ' estates in the State in this Act referred to as the date of vesting of such estates." This talks of the vesting of the estate and the estate itself has been defined in Sec.
2B which reads: "estate" means land or right, title or interest in land held by a landowner;" This clearly talks of land or right, title or interest in land held by landowner and land as already discussed above is defined in Section 2F it is therefore clear that if this property did not fall within the ambit of the definition of land it could not be said to be estate under Section 2B and therefore could not vest in the State under Section 7.
It was in this view that counsel for both the parties frankly conceded that if this falls within the exception to the definition of 'land ' provided in Section 2F the further question about the land being agricultural or not is of no consequence.
An attempt was made by the learned counsel during the course of arguments to suggest that it is no doubt true that all through the State Government and on behalf of the State Government the affidavits that were filed in the High Court this was admitted that these lands in 862 dispute fell within the red boundary of the site plan and the site plan is the site plan of the Umaid Bhawan Palace which is included in the inventory of the private property of the ruler finally approved by the Government of India.
It is also not seriously disputed that there are orders passed by some revenue officers in respect of these matters where it has been held that these lands fell within the red bound ary which is the correct boundary of Umaid Bhawan Palace in the inventory approved by the Government of India as the private properties of the ex ruler.
Only an attempt was made by Additional Solicitor General who appeared for the State to suggest that the Central Government alone may have the original and therefore wanted this Court to summon the original but learned counsel had no explanation why this could not be done in all these years to which he had no answer and therefore it is plain that so far as these facts are concerned the State could not now be permitted to raise any objection in respect of the site plan and the boundary in red of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
After the hearing was concluded an attempt has been made on behalf of the State and certain papers have been filed which pertains to some returns filed in connection with the assessment in respect of the building Umaid Bhawan Palace which has been described as Hotel Marudhar and on that basis probably a suggestion is made that in this the ex ruler has submitted a plan for assessment of the property tax wherein he has not showed this part of the property which is the subject matter of the dispute.
Apparently these papers pertain to some proceedings of assessment of property per taining to Marudhar Hotel with which we are not concerned and on that basis it could not be said that what has been admitted all through as the boundary of the Umaid Bhawan Palace is not correct.
No reliance could be placed on these additional papers.
Before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1924/75 Additional Collector Jodhpur who is also described as the Officer Incharge of the case has filed a counter in return and in this it is stated: That the Photostat copy and the true copy of the Covenant and the site plan submitted by the petitioner alongwith the aforesaid application have been got verified to be the true and exact copies of the original covenant and the plan attached with the inventory of the private properties of the Ex ruler of Jodhpur.
The duly verified copy of the plan is being submitted for your perusal.
" 863 and the same reply filed by the said Additional Collector has been verified on affidavit by the same officer who in his affidavit states: "That the photostat copy of the convenant as also the true copy of the plan referred in the Schedule of the inventory of the private properties of Ex ruler.
Ex ruler Jodhpur supplied to the respondents have been got verified from the Chief Engineer P.W.D. B & R Rajasthan, Jaipur and the office of the General Administration Department, Rajasthan, Secre tariat, Jaipur.
" In view of these circumstances therefore so far as the land in dispute i.e. Khasra Nos. 421 and 426 is concerned the admission made by the State and which was also clear from various documents which have been considered by the High Court in their judgments in these petitions clearly show that these lands were within the boundaries of the Umaid Bhawan Palace which is the private property in accordance with the inventory preparted and approved by Government of India and therefore which will not fall within the ambit of the definition of the 'land ' as defined in Section 2F and thus will not fall within the ambit of the 'estate ' which could vest under the provisions of this Section and in this view of the matter even without going into the the question about whether land being agricultural or not the view taken by Justice M.L. Jain is the only view which could be sus tained.
Even as regards the question as to whether this land is agricultural or not it will be relevant to note.
Learned counsel for the State has relied on some Khasra, Girdwari and Jamabandi of Sam vat 2030to 2032 relating to Khasra No. 421.
It is described as Padat and it is contended that this land will be agricultural land as it also includes waste land.
Even on the basis of the record on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the State that no land revenue is assessed on this land.
On the contrary counsel for the appellant referred to a notification published in the Jodhpur Government Gazette dated February 10, 1934 and this notification states that the Development Department shall have control over the disposal of land for building sites and the building regulation shall operate over the area within a radius of three miles from the Sojati Gate and it is not disputed that these lands fell within three miles radius from Sojati Gate.
Learned counsel also referred to a letter written to Urban Improvement Trust.
The Settlement Officer is alleged to have stated that the plan was careful ly perused, checked and tallied with the corresponding old settlement record of Samvat 1979 together with the site plan of Umaid 864 Bhawan Palace which indicates the private property of His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur Jodhpur duly verified on 12.11.1958 by the then Deputy Secretary, G.A.D. and the Commissioner, Jodhpur Division, Jodhpur wherein the said land is included in the premises of Umaid Bhawan Palace.
The Settlement Officer further added that the fact that this land had never been assessed to rents, that it never has been cultivated and that it is included within the Umaid Bhawan Palace is sufficient to show that it is "abadi land" within the meaning and definition under Section 158 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956.
The view expressed by the Government that this land does not appear to be agricultural land is fully established and it was on the basis of these documents that the learned Judge Shri M.L. Jain came to the conclusion that: "The documents clearly demonstrate that the land in dispute is not an agricultural and rather it forms part of the Abadi land.
In the revenue records, Khasra Nos. are allotted not only to agricultural plot but they are also allotted to Banjar land and to Abadi land as well.
The copies of the Jamabandi and Girdwari filed by the State shows that the land is Padat and does not carry any land revenue.
It is, therefore, clear that the land in question being an Abadi land is not covered by the provisions of the Act.
" It is clear that the contention raised by the learned coun sel for the respondent that this land is an agricultural land also cannot be accepted and in view of our conclusions reached above it is clear that the view taken by learned Judge Shit M.L. Jain is the only view which could be taken.
Consequently the appeals filed by the appellants including Prajapati Grah Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. vs State of Rajasthan & Ors. are allowed.
The judgment passed by the Division Bench of High Court of Rajasthan in the appeals is set aside and it is held that no action under the provisions of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Landowners ' Estate Act, 1963 could be taken against the appellants and all notices or actions taken are hereby quashed.
The appel lants shall be entitled to costs of these appeals.
Costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.
So far as Civil Appeal No. 1145/87 Naveen Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs State of Rajasthan is concerned we see no reason not to permit him to withdraw.
The petition and appeal is therefore permitted to be withdrawn.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.

summary/full:
After attainment of Independence, the rulers of the erstwhile princely States of Rajasthan entered into a Cove nant with the Government of India for integrating their States into one.
Article 12 of the said Covenant provided for the private properties of the rulers of the Covenanting States, and clause (i) thereof prescribed that the ruler of each of the Covenanting States; shall be entitled to full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties.
The immovable properties of the rulers were divided into three categories, Category 'A ', 'B ' and 'C '.
The Maharaja of Jodhpur was one such ruler who integrat ed his State in the Union.
Category 'C ' of the Covenant listed the properties of the Maharaja as his absolute property over which he had full rights of disposal, and the property known as 'Umaid Bhavan Palace ' was included in this category.
The Maharaja who was the signatory to the Covenant died in 1952, and after his death he was succeeded by his son who was a minor at that time.
Because the successor was a minor an administrator was appointed for the purpose of adminis tration of the estate.
In 1964, the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly enacted the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 which received the assent of the President on 6th April, 1964.
The Act was enacted to provide for the acquisi tion of the estates of land owners.
Section 7 thereof pro vided for the issuance of a Notification by the State Gov ernment appointing a date for the vesting in the State Government 849 of the estates of all land owners situated anywhere in the State.
Exercising powers under the aforesaid section, a Notification was issued on 11th August, 1964 by which the State Government appointed 1st September, 1964 as the date of vesting of all the estates of land owners.
The three petitioners in the writ petitions were parties who had purchased respective areas of land for price by registered sale deeds, two dated 4.11.71 and one dated 5.11.71 from the erstwhile ruler of Jodhpur state.
Notices under section 9A of the Act were issued on 19.11.1975 to these parties by the Collector stating that the transfers of the lands were null and void and they shall deliver possession before 28th September, 1975 or within 10 days of the receipt of the notice whichever is later to the Sub Divisional Officer.
This was followed by another notice on 8th December, 1975 by which possession of the lands were taken by affixing a notice as required by Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners ' Estate Rules 1964.
The petitioners contended in the courts below that their land was not liable to acquisition under the Act and sought a direction that the orders and notices be quashed.
It was contended that in the definition of 'land ' as defined in section 2F, provide for properties which shall not be in cluded within the definition of 'land ' and as the property in the instant case was excluded from the definition of 'land ' the properties of the petitioners could not be ac quired under section 7 of the Land Reforms Act.
A Single Judge of the High Court on an examination of the list of Category 'C ' to the Covenant, and the material on the record came to the conclusion that the lands fell within the property included in the Schedule of private properties in Category 'C ' and therefore it being a private property included in the Inventory according to the Covenant the acquisition under the provision of the Act was bad.
It was further held that the transfer made by the ex ruler in favour of the petitioners was not bad.
The trustees of the Major Maharaja Hari Singh Benefit of Defence Service Personnel and Charitable Trust, the appel lants in one of the appeals also filed a Writ petition which came up before the High Court.
The High Court relying on its earlier decision allowed the petition and quashed the noti fication.
850 Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the State Govern ment and the Trust and the Division Bench disposed of all the appeals and came to a different conclusion than the Single Judge 's who decided the writ petitions.
The Division Bench held that the repeal of the Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Act, 1973 by the Rajasthan Urban Property (Restrictions of Transfers) Repeal Act, 1978, the cloud that had been cast on the title of the purchases had been removed.
In the appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acqui sition of Land Owners ' Estate Act, 1963 was brought into force in 1964 and that according to the definition of 'e state ', in section 2B it could refer to either land or right, title or interest in land held by a land owner, and 'land ' was defined in section 2F which was an inclusive definition, and that it first refers to land held for the purpose of agriculture and that the lands in the instant case, were not agricultural lands they do not fail within the ambit of the definition of 'land '.
It was also contended that the Division Bench could not come to a different con clusion than that which was reached by the Single Judge.
On behalf of the State, it was contended that the suit property fails within the boundary of the Umaid Bhavan Palace according to the site plan and that it could not be conclusively held that the properties were not agricultural lands.
Allowing the appeals, and setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, this Court, HELD: 1.
No action under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 could be taken against the appellant and all notices or actions taken are thus quashed.
[864F G] 2.
It is clear that the lands in the instant case will not fall within the definition of 'land ' as described in sec.
2(g) and therefore it could not vest in the State not it would be acquired under the provisions of the Act and in that event these appellants are entitled to hold their lands and the question whether the lands are agricultural or not is not very material.
[858D E] 3.
Section 2B clearly talks of land or right, title or interest in land held by land owner and land is defined in Section 2F.
It is therefore 851 clear that if this property did not fail within the ambit of the definition of 'land ' it could not be said to be 'estate ' under Section 2B and therefore could not vest in the State under Section 7.
[861F] 4.
The lands were within the boundaries of the Umaid Bhavan Palace which is the private property in accordance with the inventory prepared and approved by Government of India, and therefore will not fail within the ambit of the definition of 'land ' as defined in Section 2F and thus will not fail within the ambit of the 'estate ' which could vest under the provisions of this Section.
[863D] 5.
Section 3(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Property (Re strictions of Transfers) Act, 1973 was enacted keeping in view the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act.
Section 3(2) did not provide that the transfer will be invalid but it only provided that in spite of the transfer the property will be deemed to be owned by such person thereby meaning the transferor so that when the Ceiling Act is brought into force the transferor may not take advantage of the transfer to defeat the provisions of the Ceiling Act.
[859C] 6.
In fact, after the Ceiling Act was brought into force a prohibition was again imposed on the transfer and admit tedly the transfers in the instant case are not after the Rajasthan Urban Property Ceiling Act 1972 which provided by section 5 that the transfers made after the commencement of the Act was null and void.
It could not, therefore, be said that the transfers in the instant case after August 16, 1971 were void.
[859G] (C.A. No. 1145/87 Naveen Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs State of Rajasthan was permitted to be withdrawn, as the appellants had chosen to come to this Court when in fact they were not parties in the judgment before the High Court.).
[864G H]


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 1945 and 1946 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.R. No. 1794 and 1795 of 1985.
Dr. L.M. Singhvi and Y.P. Rao for the Appellant.
G.L. Sanghi, J.P. Gupta and S.K. Agarwal for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Special leave granted.
882 This appeal arises from the decision of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, dated 11th December, 1984 dismissing the Civil Revision filed by the appellant.
It appears that there was a contract entered into by the parties on or about 15th May, 1979 which provided that the appellant would give to the respondent paddy to convert these into rice after lifting paddy from the godown of the appellant.
There was an agreement between ' the parties for shelling of paddy into rice, after lifting the paddy from the godown of the appel lant, at the rate of 70% of the paddy.
The shelling charge was Rs.2.20 per quintal.
The learned Subordinate Judge, First Class, directed on or about 17th March, 1980 appoint ment of an arbitrator on an application by the respondent.
On 22nd January, 1982, the arbitrator gave his award.
The arbitrator did not allow the claims of the appellant as claimed as per the terms of the agreement.
The arbitrator allowed certain claims.
It is necessary, in view of the contentions that have been raised, to refer to the award of the arbitrator.
After setting out the history the arbitrator dealt with the various contentions.
It is not necessary to refer to all the contentions and points urged before the arbitrator and upon which he has made his award.
It is sufficient if the relevant portions are dealt with.
The arbitrator, inter alia, dealt with a claim of Rs. 55,060.29 which had claimed as penalty at Rs.2 per qtl.
for not lift ing the balance of the paddy weighing 2765 3093 mts.
The arbitrator noted that he had held that there was justifica tion for the millers, millers being respondent herein, not to lift the paddy.
Assuming, however, the arbitrator noted, that if it was decided that the millers were at fault in not lifting this paddy, the arbitrator expressed the opinion that the appellant could not recover the amount claimed by way of penalty.
He expressed the view that in order to enable the appellant to claim the amount, it had to be shown that the actual losses were suffered by the Corporation.
Otherwise, it could not be claimed as pre estimated damages.
Otherwise, it would only be penalty which could not be recovered.
No evidence had been led for how many days the bags of the paddy remained in the godowns of the Corpora tion, the arbitrator noted, and what losses were incurred for getting it shelled from other quarters.
The arbitrator referred to the affidavit of one Mr. M.S. Rawat, Asstt.
Manager, that the Corporation had to get the unlifted paddy shelled by transporting to other centre as well as getting the same shelled at heavy additional expenditure.
The arbi trator noted that there was not an iota of evidence on that point.
So no actual losses stated to have been suffered by the Corporation and no proof thereof was there.
The arbitra tor further noted that an amount by way of penalty could be permitted if some losses were proved.
He, accordingly, dismissed the claim of the appellant for Rs. 55,090.19.
883 The next claim dealt with by the arbitrator was the claim of Rs.3,23,856.08 claimed by the Corporation as the cost of non delivery of 137 39549 tonnes of rice at the rate of Rs. 165 per qtl.
of paddy.
The claim of the appellant was based on the basis that the appellant had converted the undelivered rice into paddy by multiplying it with 100/70 and it came to 123,87.11 tonnes.
The arbitrator dealt with this question as follows: "At the rate of Rs. 165 per qtl.
its price works at Rs.3,23,856.08.
According to provi sions of clause g(i) of the Contract, in the event of failure to supply rice within pre scribed specification, the millers are liable to pay to the Corporation for the quantities of rice short supplied at the penal rate of 11/2 times the economic cost of the concerned variety of the paddy equivalent to the short ages.
In the contract no definition of 'Eco nomic Cost ' is furnished nor is the expression any where defined in any law.
However, Shri Pritam Singh in the statement attached to the affidavit work it out at Rs. 110 per qtl.
The procurement price of paddy is Rs.85 per qtl.
as shown therein.
He has added to it market fee and other charges including cost of gunny Rs.2 and interest charges at Re. 1.
Under the above clause of the contract, the Corporation has added 50% penalty and thus has claimed the price at Rs. 165 per qtl.
I do not think that the Corporation is enti tled to such a fantastic rate particularly when the expression 'economic rate ' has not been defined.
Even if the statement of Shri Pritam Singh is accepted the maximum price of the rice at that time should be Rs. 100 per qtl.
exclusive of gunny bag and interest charges to which in my opinion the Corporation is not entitled.
The market rate did not exceed that amount at that time.
So the calcu lated at this rate the price of the undeliv ered rice will come to Rs.1,96,277.00.
to which the Corporation is entitled.
I may add here that the above amount has been allowed to the Corporation besides from the evidence on the record I believe that the rice was short delivered.
When the paddy had been accepted by the millers unconditionally and without any reservation, they were bound to give to the Corporation 70% of the yield.
As they did not do it, so they are liable to pay the price of the undelivered rice.
884 I have already stated above that the rice after shelling to be , delivered to the Corpo ration under clause g(i)of the contract had to conform to the specification laid down by the Punjab Government under the Punjab Rice Pro curement Price Control Order, 1968 issued on the 22nd October, 1968, as amended from time to time.
The Corporation states that the rice accepted by them was done subject to the quality rice which was permissible under clause g(ii) of the contract.
This has been duly proved from the evidence placed on the record by the Corporation.
Even Shri Anil Kumar, a partner of the millers firm admitted that they received an analysis report in respect of the rice which was accepted by the Corporation to continue that the Corporation was mentioned and that they did not appeal against the cut, though there was a provision in the said order to do so.
It, therefore, means that the quality cut was admitted to have been correctly assessed under the said Punjab Rice Order and to that the millers submitted.
This item is, therefore, allowed.
" The respondent filed an application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') for filing of the award and prayed for making the award the rule of the court.
The appellant on 25th May, 1982 filed objections under sections 30 and 33 of the Act.
The learned Subordinate Judge, First ClasS, on 2nd December, 1982 found that the award was liable to be set aside and modified the award and passed a decree in favour of the appellant for the amount.
On 2nd March, 1984, the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal by respondent and reversed the Subordinate Judge 's order.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant went in revision before the High Court.
The High Court on 11th December, 1984 dis missed the revision petition.
Aggrieved thereby, the appel lant has come up before this Court.
It is, therefore, neces sary to decide whether the High Court was right.
As mentioned hereinbefore, the learned Subordinate Judge had modified the award and passed a decree in favour of the appellant for the amount.
The learned Additional District Judge, however, allowed the appeal of the respondent and reversed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge.
The High Court did not interfere with that decision because the High Court did not find any ground to interfere.
The 885 question therefore is, whether the learned Additional Dis trict Judge in the first appeal was right in holding that the award was not liable to be corrected in the manner done by the learned Subordinate Judge.
The jurisdiction to inter fere by the Court of law of an award made by the arbitrator chosen by the parties is circumscribed.
In India, there is a long history of arbitration.
Arbitration is a mode of set tlement of disputes evolved by the society for adjudication and settlement of the disputes and the differences between the parties apart from the courts of law.
Arbitration has a tradition; it has a purpose.
Arbitration, that is a refer ence of any particular dispute by consent of the parties to one or more persons chosen by the parties with or without an umpire and an award enforceable by the sovereign power were generally unknown to ancient India.
Hindus recognised deci sions of Panchayats or bodies consisting of wealthy, influ ential and elderly men of the Community and entrusted them with the power of management of their religions and social functions.
The sanction against disobedience to their deci sion was excommunication, or ostracism and exclusion from all religions and social functions of the community.
An agreement to abide by the decision of a Panchayat and its decision with regard to the line of boundary was held not to be conclusive, since a reference to arbitration and award properly so called did not exist.
See the observations in Mukkudduns of Kimkunwady vs Inamdar Brahmins of Soorpai, See also Bachawat 's Law of Arbitration at page 1.
When power came to the East India Company, they framed Regulations in exercise of the power vested in them by the British Government Some of these Regulations were touching arbitration.
Bachawat gives description of the evolution of the .
Therefore, arbitration as a mode for settlement of disputes between the parties, has a tradi tion in India.
It has a social purpose to fulfil today.
It has great urgency today when there has been an explosion of litigations in the courts of law established by the sover eign power.
New rights created, or awareness of these rights, the erosion of faith in the intrinsic sense of fairness of men, intolerant and uncompromising attitudes are all the factors which block our courts.
The courts are full of litigations, which are pending for long time.
Therefore, it should be the endeavour of those who are interested in the administration of justice to help settlement by arbitra tion, if possible.
It has also a social efficacy being the decision by the consent of the parties.
It has greater scope of acceptance today when there is a certain erosion of faith in view of the failure to appreciating the functions of the courts of law.
It has also the advantage of not only quick ness of decision but of simplicity of procedure.
But in proceedings of arbitra 886 lion there must be adherence to justice, equity, law and fair play in actions.
However, the proceedings of arbitra tion must adhere to the principles of natural justice and must be in consonance with such practice and procedure which will lead to a proper resolution of the dispute and create confidence of the people for whose benefit these processes are resorted to.
It is, therefore, the function of courts of law to oversee that the arbitrators act within the norms of justice.
Once they do so and the award is clear, just and fair, the courts should, as far as possible, give effect to the award of the parties and make the parties compel to adhere to and obey the decision of their chosen adjudicator.
It is in this perspective that one should view the scope and limit of correction by the court of an award made by the arbitrator.
We should make the law of arbitration simple, less technical and more responsible to the actual realities of the situation, but must be responsive to the cannons of justice and fair play and make the arbitrator adhere to such process and norms which will create confidence, not only by doing justice between the parties, but by creating a sense that justice appears to have been done.
Sections 30 and 33 of the Act provide for the grounds on which an award of the arbitrator can be set aside.
These were mainly, until recent changes made by statutory laws in England, in consonance with the English principles of Common Law as adopted in India.
So far as the material of the present purpose is concerned, an award of the arbitrator can only be interfered with or set aside or modified within the four corners of the procedure provided by the Act.
It is necessary to find whether the arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings legally in the sense whether the arbitrator has gone contrary to the terms of reference between the parties or whether the arbitrator has committed any error of law apparent on the face of the award.
It is necessary to empha sise that these are grounds for setting aside the award but these are separate and distinct grounds.
Halsbury 's Laws of England, Vol.
2 4th Edn., para 623 reiterates that an arbi trator 's award may be set aside for error of law appearing on the face of it.
Though this jurisdiction is not to be lightly exercised.
The award can also be set aside if, inter alia, the arbitrator has misconducted himself or the pro ceedings.
It is difficult to give an exhaustive definition what may amount to a misconduct on the part of the arbitra tor.
This is discussed in Halsbury 's Laws of England (supra).
It is not misconduct on the part of an arbitrator to come to an erroneous decision, whether his error is one of fact or law, and whether or not his findings of fact are supported by evidence.
See the observations of Russell on Arbitration, 20th Edn., page 422.
In the instant case, the arbitrator has chosen to make a speaking 887 award, that is to say, he has given reasons for his conclu sion.
Whether he is obliged to give such reasons or not is another matter but since the arbitrator has chosen to give the reasons, unless it is demonstrated to this Court that such reasons are erroneous as such as propositions of law or a view which the arbitrator has taken is a view which it could not possibly be sustained on any view of the matter, then the challenge to the award of the arbitrator cannot be sustained.
As has been emphasised in M/s Sudarsan Trading Co. vs The Government of Kerala & Anr., [1989] 1 Jt.
Today SC 339 that an award could be set aside if the arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings or has proceeded beyond jurisdiction.
It could also be set aside where there are errors apparent on the face of the award.
But these are separate and distinct grounds.
In case of errors apparent on the face of the award, it can only be set aside if in the award there is any proposition of law which is apparent on the face of the award, namely, in the award itself or any document incorporated in the award.
See the observations of the Judicial Committee in Champsey Bhara & Co. vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., L 1922 IA 324.
Dr. L.M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the appellant, urged before us that the arbitrator was wrong in not award ing 50% of the added penalty as claimed by the appellant, as mentioned hereinabove.
The appellant had claimed the price of Rs. 165 per qtl.
The arbitrator was of the view that the expression 'Economic Rate ' had not been defined.
It is true that the expression 'Economic Rate ' has not been used, but the expression 'Economic Cost ' has been used.
The arbitrator has noted that the market rate did not exceed that amount at the time.
The amount of Rs. 100 per qtl.
is mentioned of such a rate as the arbitrator had noted, could only be pre estimated damages but this was not so according to the arbitrator.
The arbitrator had construed the effect of clause g(i) of the contract as mentioned hereinbefore.
It cannot be said that such a construction is a construction which is not conceivable or possible.
If that is the position assuming even for the argument that there was some mistake in the construction, such a mistake is not amenable to be connected in respect of the award by the court.
This was a fair order after considering all the records.
The conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator is a plausible conclusion.
The court has, in our opinion, no jurisdiction to interfere or modify the award in the manner sought for by the appellant and in the manner done by the learned Subordinate Judge in the first instance in this case.
In that view of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in correcting the 888 order of the learned Subordinate Judge and the High Court was also justified in not interfering with the order of the Additional District Judge.
The award on the aspects can vassed before us by Dr. L.M. Singhvi is a plausible con struction of clause g(i) of the contract.
It cannot, in our opinion, be interfered with either on the ground that there was error apparent on the face of the award or on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted himself in not giving the effect to the penal rate as contemplated under clause g(i) of the contract referred to hereinbefore in the award.
Dr. Singhvi sought to urge that as per the terms of the contract the arbitrator was obliged to award penal rate in terms of clause g(i) of the contract.
The arbitrator has apparently not done so.
He has given reason why he has not done so.
It was submitted that he was wrong in not doing so.
We do not agree.
The arbitrator has discussed the effect of clause g(i).
He has noted that unless there was evidence about which incidentally there was none, this amount could not be treated as a pre estimate of damage.
If that be so then it was penalty.
It was not recoverable.
Reasons may not be apparent, latent was there.
Dr. Singhvi 's objection therefore cannot be accepted.
Dr. Singhvi drew our attention to the observations of this Court in M/s Sudersan Trading Co., (supra) at page 352 of the report where it was stated that if it was apparent from the award that a legal proposition which formed its basis was erroneous, the award was liable to be set aside.
Dr. Singhvi sought to urge that when the arbitrator observed that "Corporation is not entitled to recover such a claim particularly when the 'Economic Rate ' has not been defined", this, according to the statement of Dr. Singhvi, the arbi trator was mistaking the law, such a mistake of law is apparent on the face if it.
It has to be borne in mind, however, that wrong statement or conclusion of law, assuming even that it was a wrong statement of law, was not wrong statement of the proposition of law which was the basis for decision in this award.
Error of law as such is not to be presumed, if there is legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous as observed in Champsey Bhara & Co, (supra), then only the award can be set aside.
There was no proposition of law; there was a legal deduction of law arrived at to say that the provisions of clause g(i) of the contract would be penal rate and such penal rate cannot be sustainable without evidence of the damages suf fered to that extent.
We are of the opinion that the arbi trator had taken a view which is plausible view.
Beyond this, the court has nothing to examine.
It is not necessary for a court to examine the merits of the award with refer ence to the materials produced before the arbitrator.
The Court cannot sit in appeal over the 889 views of the arbitrator by re examining and re assessing the materials.
See the observations of this Court in Puri Con struction Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India, In the aforesaid view of the matter, it appears to us that the learned Additional District Judge was right in the view it took and the High Court, therefore, was justified in dismissing the revision.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Special leave granted.
In view of the fact that the facts of this appeal are more or less identical to the Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3392 of 1985, this appeal is also dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Y.L. Appeals dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The Respondent entered into a contract with the appel lant Food Corporation of India on or about May 1979 whereun der the appellantCorporation was to give to the Respondent Paddy for being shelled/ converted into rice at the rate of 70% of the Paddy.
The Paddy was to be lifted from the go downs of the appellant.
The shelling charge was fixed at Rs.2/20 p. per quintal.
Some dispute having arisen between the parties, the Respondent moved an application before the Subordinate Judge for appointment of an arbitrator and the Sub Judge appointed the arbitrator who gave his award on 22nd January 1982.
In the award the arbitrator did not allow some of the claims made by the appellant, in particular, a claim of Rs.55,060/29 p which was claimed as a penalty Rs.2 per quintal for not lifting the balance of Paddy.
The arbitrator in disallowing the claim on that count, took the view that the appellant has to prove the actual losses suffered by it which the appellant failed to prove.
Another claim not allowed by the arbitrator related to Rs.3,23,856/08.
p. in respect of the cost of non delivery of 137 39548 tonnes of rice @ Rs. 165 per quintal.
The Respondent made an application section 14 of the Arbi tration Act, 1940 to make the award a rule of the Court.
The appellant filed the objections u/s 30 and 33 of the Act.
The Subordinate Judge, First Class, on 2nd December, 1982, found that the award was liable to be set aside and accordingly modified the award and passed a decree in favour of the appellant for the amount.
On 2nd March, 1984, the Addl.
Distt.
Judge, on appeal by the Respondent, reversed the order passed by the Subordinate Judge.
He held that the award was not liable to be corrected/interfered with in the manner done by the Sub Judge.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant went in revision to the High Court.
The High Court on 11.12.84 dismissed the revision petition.
Hence this appeal by the appellant Corporation.
881 Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: That the arbitrator has chosen to make a speaking award in the instant case, that is he has given reasons for his conclusions.
Since the arbitrator has chosen to give reasons, unless it is demonstrated to this Court that such reasons are erroneous as such as propositions of law or a view which the arbitrator has taken is a view which it could not possibly be sustained in any view of the matter, then the challenge to the award of the arbitrator cannot be sustained.
[886H; 887A B] Even assuming that there was some mistake, such a mis take is not amenable to be corrected in respect of the award by the Court.
This was a fair order passed after considering all the records.
The conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator is a plausible conclusion.
The Court has no jurisdiction to interfere or modify the award in the manner sought for by the appellant.
[887G H] The Addl.
Distt.
Judge was justified in correcting the order of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court was also justified in not interfering with the order of the Addl.
Distt.
Judge.
[887H; 888A] Mukkudduns of Kimkunwady vs Inamdar Brahmins of Soorpai, ; M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. vs The Government of Kerala & Anr., [1989] 1 Jt.
Today SC 339; Champsey Bhara & Co. vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., L 1922 IA 324, followed.
Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India, , referred to.