judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 16 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated January 14, 1958, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 60 of 1958 arising out of the judgment and order dated January 9, 1958, of the Court of Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay in an application for cancellation of bail in Case No. 608/W of 1957.
1227 Purshottam Tricumdas, Rajni Patel and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
K. J. Khandalwala and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 1. 1958.
February 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.
The appellant, along with( others, has been charged under section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878).
There is no doubt that the offences charged against the appellant are bailable offences.
Under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appellant was released on bail of Rs. 75,000 with one surety for like amount on December 9, 1957, by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay.
On January 4, 1958, an application was made by the complainant before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of the bail; the learned Magistrate, however, dismissed the application on the ground that under section 496 be had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail.
Against this order, the complainant preferred a revisional application before the High Court of Bombay.
Another application was preferred by the complainant before the same Court invoking its inherent power under section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Chagla C. J. and Datar J. who heard these applications took the view that, under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court had inherent power to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a bailable offence and that, in a proper case, such power can and must be exercised in the interests of justice.
The learned Judges then considered the material produced before the Court and came to the conclusion that, in the present case, it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large.
That is why the application made by the complainant invoking the High Court 's inherent power under section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was allowed, the bail bond executed by the appellant was cancelled and an order was passed directing that the appellant be arrested forthwith and committed to 156 1228 custody.
It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court in appeal by special leave.
Special leave granted to the appellant has, however, been limited to the question of the construction of section 496 read with section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Thus the point of law which falls to be considered in the present appeal is whether, in the case of a person accused of a bailable offence where bail has been granted to him under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be cancelled in a proper case by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure? This question is no doubt of considerable importance and its decision would depend upon the construction of the relevant sections of the Code.
The material provisions on the subject of bail are contained in sections 496 to 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 496 deals with persons accused of bailable offences.
It provides that " when a person charged with the commission of a bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or is brought before a court and is prepared at any time, while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such court, to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.
" The section further leaves it to the discretion of the police officer or the court if he or it thinks fit to discharge the accused person on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance and not to take bail from him.
Section 497 deals with the question of granting bail in the case of non bailable offences.
A person accused of a non bailable offence may be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
This is the effect of section 497(1).
Sub section (2) deals with cases where it appears to the officer or the court that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non bailable offence but there are sufficient grounds for further enquiry into his guilt and it lays down that in such cases the accused shall, pending such 1229 enquiry, be released, on bail or at the discretion of the officer or court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.
Sub section (3) requires that, when jurisdiction under sub section
(2) is exercised in favour of an accused person, reasons for exercising such jurisdiction shall be recorded in writing.
Sub section (3A) which has been added in 1955 deals with cases where the ' trial of a person accused of any non bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first day fixed for taking evidence in the case and it provides that such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the aid period, be released on bail unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the magistrate otherwise directs.
The last sub section confers oil the High Court and the Court of Session, and on any other court in the case of a person released by itself, power to direct that a person who hap, been released on bail under any of the provisions of this section should be arrested and committed to custody.
Section 498(1) confers on the High Court or the Court of Session power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail in all cases where bail is admissible under sections 496 and 497 whether in such cases there be an appeal against conviction or not.
Sub section (2) of section 498 empowers the High Court or the Court of Session to cause any person who has been admitted to bail under sub section
(1) to be arrested and committed to custody.
There is one more section to which reference must be made in this connection and that is section 426 of the Code.
This section incidentally deals with the power to grant bail to persons who have been convicted of non bailable offences when such convicted persons satisfy the court that they intend to present appeals against their orders of conviction.
That is the effect of section 426(2A) which has been added in 1955.
A similar power has been conferred on the High Court under sub section
(2B) of section 426 where the High Court is satisfied that the convicted person has been granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any sentence which the High Court has imposed or maintained.
Sub section (3) provides that, if the appellant 1230 who is released on bail under said sub section
(2) or (2B) is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced.
That briefly is the scheme of the Code on the subject of bail.
There is no doubt that under section 496 a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial.
As soon as it appears that the accused person is prepared to give bail, the police officer or the court, before whom he offers to give bail, is bound to release him on such terms as to bail as may appear to the officer or the court to be reasonable.
It would even be open to the officer or the court to discharge such person on executing his bond as provided in the section instead of taking bail from him.
The position of persons accused of non bailable offences is entirely different.
Though the recent amendments made in the provisions of section 497 have made definite improvement in favour of persons accused of non bailable offences, it would nevertheless be correct to say that the grant of bail in such cases is generally a matter in the discretion of the authorities in question.
The classification of offences into the two categories of bailable and non bailable offences may perhaps be explained on the basis that bailable offences are generally regarded as less grave and serious than non bailable offences.
On this basis it may not be easy to explain why, for instance offences under sections 477, 477A, 475 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code should be regarded as bailable whereas offences under section 379 should be non bailable.
ever, it cannot be disputed that section 496 recognizes that a person accused of a bailable offence has a right to be enlarged on bail and that is a consideration on which Shri Purushottam, for the appellant, has very strongly relied.
Shri Purushottam has also emphasized the fact that, whereas legislature has specifically conferred power on the specified courts to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a non bailable offence by the provisions of section 497 (5), no such power has been conferred on any court in regard to persons accused 1231 of bailable offences.
If legislature had intended to confer such a power it would have been very easy for it to add an appropriate sub section under section 496.
The omission to make such a provision is, according to Shri Parushottam, not the result of inadvertence but, is deliberate; and if that is so, it would not be legitimate or reasonable to clothe the High Courts with the power to cancel bails in such cases under section 561 A.
It is this aspect of the matter which needs careful examination in the present case.
Section 561A was added to the Code in 1923 and it purports to save the inherent power of the High Courts.
It provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
It appears that doubts were expressed in some judicial decisions about the existence of such inherent power in the High Courts prior to 1923.
That is why legislature enacted this section to clarify the position that the provisions of the Code were not intended to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Courts as mentioned in section 561A.
It is obvious that this inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the section.
This inherent power cannot naturally be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code.
It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code.
It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that section 561A can come into operation, subject further to the requirement that the exercise of such power must serve either of the three purposes mentioned in the said section.
In prescribing rules of procedure legislature undoubtedly attempts to provide for all cases that are likely to arise; but it is not possible that any legislative enactment dealing with procedure, however carefully it may be drafted, would succeed in providing for all cases that may possibly 1232 arise in future.
Lacunae are sometimes discovered in procedural law and it is to cover such lacunae and to deal with cases where such lacunae are discovered that procedural law invariably recognizes the existence of inherent power in courts.
It would be noticed that it is only the High Courts whose inherent power is recognized by section 561A; and even in regard to the High Courts ' inherent power definite salutary safeguards have been laid down as to its exercise.
It is only where the High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code would be rendered ineffective or that the process of any court would be abused or that the ends of justice would riot be secured that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent power under section 561A.
There can thus be no dispute about the scope and nature of the inherent power of the High Courts and the extent of its exercise.
Now it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons.
Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused ; and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption ; but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution.
The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view.
It is therefore of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat either from the prosecution or the defence.
A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender.
The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial and so there can be no possible doubt that, if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent 1233 power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice.
There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial; and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial.
Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country.
In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked.
In regard to non bailable offences there is no need to invoke such power because section 497 (5) specifically deals with such cases.
The question which we have to decide in this case is whether exercise of inherent power under section 561A against persons accused of bailable offences, who have been released on bail, is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Shri Purushottam contends that the provisions of section 496 are plainly inconsistent with the exercise of inherent power under section 561A against the appellant in the present case and; he argues that, despite the order which has been passed by the High (Court, he would be entitled to move the trial court for bail again and the trial court would be bound to release him on bail because the right to be released on bail recognized by section 496 is an absolute and an indefeasible right; and despite the order of the High Court, that right would still be available to the appellant.
If that be the true position, the order passed under 1234 section 561A would be rendered ineffective and that itself would show that there is a conflict between the exercise of the said power and the provisions of section 496.
Thus presented, the argument no doubt is prima facie attractive; but a close examination of the provisions of section 496 would show that there is no conflict between its provisions and the exercise of the jurisdiction under section 561A.
In dealing with this argument it is necessary to remember that, if the power under section 561 A is exercised by the High Court, the bail offered by the accused and accepted by the trial court would be cancelled and the accused would be ordered to be arrested forthwith and committed to custody.
In other words, the effect of the order passed under section 561A, just like the effect of an order passed under section 497 (5) and section 498 (2), would be not only that the bail is cancelled but that the accused is ordered to be arrested and committed to custody.
The order committing the accused to custody is a judicial order passed by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction.
His commitment to custody thereafter is not by reason of the fact that he is alleged to have committed a bailable offence at all; his commitment to custody is the result of a judicial order passed on the ground that he has forfeited his bail and that his subsequent conduct showed that, pending the trial, he cannot be allowed to be at large.
Now, where a person is committed to custody under such an order, it would not be open to him to fall back upon his rights under section 496, for section 496 would in such circumstances be inapplicable to his case.
It may be that there is no specific provision for the cancellation of the bond and the re arrest of a person accused of a bailable offence; but that does not mean that section 496 entitles such an accused person to be released on bail, even though it may be shown that he is guilty of conduct entirely subversive of a fair trial in the court.
We do not read section 496 as conferring on a person accused of a bailable offence such an unqualified, absolute and an indefeasible right to be released on bail, 1235 In this connection, it would be relevant to consider the effect of the provisions of section 498.
Under section 498(1), the High Court or the Court of Sessions may, even in the case of persons accused of bailable offences, admit such accused persons to bail or reduce the amount of A bail demanded by the prescribed authorities under section 496.
Shri Purushottam no doubt ' attempted to, argue that the operative part of the provisions of section 498(1) does not apply to persons accused of bailable offences; but in our opinion, there can be no doubt that this sub section deals with cases of persons accused of bailable as well as non bailable offences.
We have no doubt that, even in regard to persons accused of bailable offences, if the amount of bail fixed under section 496 is unreasonably high the accused person can move the High Court or the Court of Sessions for reduction of that amount.
Similarly, a person accused of a bailable offence may move the High Court or the Court of Sessions to be released on bail and the High Court or the Court of Sessions may direct either that the amount should be reduced or that the person may be admitted to bail.
If a person accused of a bailable offence is admitted to bail by an order passed by the High Court or the Court of Sessions, the provisions of sub section
(2) become applicable to his case; and under these provisions the High Court or the Court of Sessions is expressly empowered to cancel the bail granted by it and to arrest the accused and commit him to custody.
This sub section, as we have already pointed out, has been added in 1955 and now there is no doubt that legislature has conferred upon the High Court or the Court of Sessions power to cancel bail in regard to cases of persons accused of bailable offences where such persons have been admitted to bail by the High Court or the Court of Sessions under section 498(1).
The result is that with regard to a class of cases of bailable offences failing under section 498(1), even after the accused persons are admitted to bail, express power has been conferred on the High Court or the Court of Sessions to arrest them and commit them to custody.
Clearly then it cannot be said that the right of a 157 1236 person accused of a bailable offence to be released on bail cannot be forfeited even if his conduct subsequent to the grant of bail is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial.
It would also be interesting to notice that, even before section 498(2) was enacted, there was consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that, if accused persons were released on bail under section 498(1), their bail bond could be cancelled and they could be ordered to be arrested and committed to custody under the provisions of section 561 A of the Code [Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim vs Emperor (1), Seoti vs Rex (2 ), Bachchu Lal vs State (3), Muunshi Singh vs State (4) and The Crown Prosecutor, Madras vs Krishnan (5) ].
These decisions would show that the exercise of inherent power to cancel bail under section 561A was not regarded as inconsistent with the provisions of section 498(1) of the Code.
It is true that all these decisions referred to cases of persons charged with non bailable offences; but it is significant that the provisions of section 497(5) did not apply to these cases and the appropriate orders were passed under the purported exercise of inherent power under section 561A.
On principle then these decisions proceed on the assumption, and we think rightly, that the exercise of inherent power in that behalf was not inconsistent with the provisions of section 498 as it then stood.
It would now be relevant to enquire whether, on principle, a distinction can be made between bailable and non bailable offences in regard to the effect of the prejudicial conduct of accused persons subsequent to their release on bail.
As we have already observed, if a fair trial is the main objective of the criminal procedure, any threat to the continuance of a fair trial must be immediately arrested and the smooth progress of a fair trial must be ensured; and this can be done, if necessary, by the exercise of inherent power.
The classification of offences into bailable and non bailable on which are based the different provisions as to the grant of bail would not, in our opinion, have any (1) A.I.R. 1932All.534.
(2) A.I. R. 1948 All.
(3) A.I.R. 1951 All.
(4) A.I.R. 1952 All. 39.
(5)I.L.R. 1237 material bearing in dealing with the effect of the sub sequent conduct of accused persons on the continuance of a fair trial itself.
If an accused person, by his conduct, puts the fair trial into jeopardy, it would be the primary and paramount duty of criminal courts to ensure that the risk to the fair trial is removed and criminal courts are allowed to proceed with the trial, smoothly and without any interruption or obstruction ; and this would be equally true in cases of both bailable as well as non bailable offences.
We, therefore, feel no difficulty in holding that, if, by his subsequent conduct, a person accused of a bailable offence forfeits his right to be released on bail, that forfeiture must be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A. Omission of legislature to make a specific provision in that behalf is clearly due to oversight or inadvertence and cannot be regarded as deliberate.
If the appellant 's contention is sound, it would lead to fantastic results.
The argument is that a person accused of a bailable offence has such an unqualified right to be released on bail that even if he does his worst to obstruct or to defeat a fair trial, his bail bond cannot be cancelled and a threat to a fair trial cannot be arrested or prevented.
Indeed Shree Purushottam went the length of suggesting that in such a case the impugned subsequent conduct of the accused may give rise to some other charges under the Indian Penal Code, but it cannot justify his re arrest.
Fortunately that does not appear to be the true legal position if the relevant provisions of the Code in regard to the grant of bail are considered as a whole along with the provisions of section 561A of the Code.
It now remains to consider the decision of the Privy Council in Lala Jairam Das & Others vs King Emperor (1), because Shri Purushottam ' has very strongly relied on some of the observations made in that case.
According to that decision, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure confer no power on High Courts to grant bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and to whom His Majesty (1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120,132.
1238 in Council has given special leave to appeal against his sentence and conviction.
Divergent views had been expressed by the High Courts in this country on the question as to the High Courts ' power to grant bail to convicted persons who had been given special leave to appeal to the Privy Council; these views and the scheme of the Code in regard to the grant of bail were examined by Lord Russel of Killowen who delivered the judgment of the Board in Lala Jairam Das 's case (1).
The decision has thus no application to the facts before us; but Shri Purushottam relies on certain observations made in the judgment.
It has been observed in that judgment that " their Lordships take the view that Ch.
XXXIX of the Code together with section 426 is, and was intend to contain, a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of a High Court in India to grant bail, and excludes the existence of any additional inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail ".
The judgment further shows their Lordships ' opinion, like the High Court of Justice in England, High Courts in India would not have inherent power to grant bail to a convicted person.
It would be clear from the judgment that their Lordships were not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the High Courts to cancel bail under section 561A.
That point did not obviously arise in the case before them.
Even so, in dealing with the question as to whether inherent power could be exercised for granting bail to a convicted person, their Lordships did refer to section 561A of the Code and they pointed out that such a power ,,cannot be properly Attributed to the High Courts because it would, if exercised, interrupt the serving of the sentence; and, besides it would, in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful, result in defeating the ends of justice.
It was also pointed out that if the bail was allowed in such a case, the exercise of the inherent power would result in an alteration by the High Court of its judgment which is prohibited by section 369 of the Code.
In other words, their Lordships examined the provisions of section 561A and came to the (1) (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120, 132, 1239 conclusion that the power to grant bail to a convicted person would not fit in :with the scheme of Chapter XXXIX of the Code read with section 561A.
In our opinion, neither this decision nor even the observations on which Shri Purushottam relied can afford any assistance in deciding the point which this appeal has raised before us.
Incidentally we may add that it was as a result of the observations made by the Privy Council in that case that section 426 of the Code was amended in 1945 and power has been conferred on appropriate courts either to suspend the sentence or to grant bail as mentioned in the several subsections of section 426.
That is how section 426(2A) and (2B) now deal with the subject of bail even though the main section is a part of Chapter XXXI which deals with appeals, references and revisions.
We must accordingly hold that the view taken by the Bombay High Court about its inherent power to act in this case under section 561 A is right and must be confirmed.
It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts under section 561A has to be exercised sparingly., carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified "by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
After all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justice; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accused that the inherent power can and should be exercised in cases like the present.
The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant was charged under section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and section 167(8i) of the Sea Customs Act, i878, which were bailable offences, and was released on bail by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
An application made subsequently by the complainant for cancellation of the bail was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that under section 496 he had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail.
The complainant invoked the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A of the Code and the High Court took the view that under that section it had inherent power to cancel the bail,and finding that on the material produced before the Court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large, it cancelled the bail.
On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, that though under section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial, if his conduct subsequent to his release is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial, he forfeits his right to be released on bail and such forfeiture can be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under section 561A of the Code.
But the inherent power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
Lala jairam Das & Others vs King Emperor, (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120, distinguished.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 626 of 1981 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.1980 of the Kerala High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2939 of 1978.
P.S. Poti, G. Viswanatha Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, E.M.S. Anam.
R. Sathish, M.A. Firoz, N. Sudhakar, Miss Nalini Poduval and section Balakrishnan for the appearing parties.
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered: NATARAJAN, J.
These appeals by special leave and the special leave petition have been clubbed together and listed for consideration of a common question of law involved in them, viz. whether against an order of a District Court in revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965 (for short the Kerala Act), a further revision would lie to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
877 Though the question is not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, ; [1987] 1 SCC 133: , the appeals have been listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there is any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hedge vs G. Venkatesha Bhat & Ors., ; and whether the view taken in the earlier case requires reconsideration.
Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be mentioned that Aundal Ammal 's case arose under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge 's case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act.
Since there are essential differences between the two Acts, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act came to be rendered by this Court.
As per section 20(5) of the Kerala Act "a Rent Control Court" means a Court constituted under Section 3.
Under Section 3(1) "the Government may, by Notification in the Gazette appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsif to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein.
" Section 11 of the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant only by making an application to the Rent Control Court and it also sets out the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of his tenant.
Section 18 of the Act provides for an Appeal being preferred by an aggrieved person to the Appellate Authority.
The relevant portions of Section 18 are as under: "18.
Appeal:(1)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.
(b) . . (2) . . (3) . . Explanation . . 878 (4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears or rent.
(5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in section 20." (Emphasis supplied).
Then comes Section 20 which provides for Revisions and it reads as follows: "20.
Revision:(1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under section 18 is a subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub section (1) shall be in it discretion.
20A. Power to remand: In disposing of an appeal or application for revision under this Act, the appellate authority, or the revising authority, as the case may be, may remand the case for fresh disposal according to such directions as it may give.
" The scope and effect of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary, AIR 1969 Kerala 103.
The Full Bench held that since the District Court exercising revisional powers under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act functions as a Court and not as a persona designata, the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that Court including any right of appeal or revision will be inhered to the decision rendered by the District Court.
In that view of the matter the Full Bench held that a decision of a District Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction 879 of the High Court especially when there is no provision in the Act providing for an appeal against an order of the District Court under Section 20 or in the alternative any express provision declaring the finality of the said order.
The decision of the Full Bench held the field for a number of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases where the competence of the High Court to entertain a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. against an order of a District Court passed under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act was challenged the contention was repelled by reference to the judgment of the Full Bench.
One such case in point is Balagangadhara Menon vs T.V. Peter, [1984]KLT 845.
The question decided by the Full Bench, however, came to be raised before this Court, in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra).
A Bench consisting of E.S. Venkataramiah, J. and one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed 's case (supra) cannot be approved because the High Court had not properly construed Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act.
The relevant passage in the judgment is in the following terms: "In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of sub section (5) of Section 18 of the Act.
Sub section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act.
There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question.
When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law" except in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Produce could revise an order once again after revision under Section 20 of the Act.
That would mean there would be a trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question.
Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law 's delay and justice demands finality with quick disposal of case.
The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision.
The courts must so construe.
" 880 The Bench drew support for its conclusion from an earlier decision of this Court in Veshesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; 1980(2) SCC 378: ; In that case the two questions that case the two questions that fell for consideration were: "(1) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under section 115 disposing of a revision petition? (2) Whether the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction under section 115 against an order of the District Court under section 25, Provisional Small Cause Courts Act disposing of a revision petition?" Answering both the questions in the negative, it was held in so far as question No. 1 is concerned, as follows: ". .
In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.
It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme.
The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court would be frustrated.
The scheme would, in large measure, lose its meaning.
If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than Rs.20,000, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below Rs.20,000.
That was never intended at all.
" The second question was answered as under: "The question before us arises in those cases only where the District Judge has exercised revisional power under section 881 25.
Is an order so made open to revision by the High Court under section 115.
Code of Civil Procedure? An examination of the several provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act indicates that it is a self sufficient code so far as the present enquiry is concerned.
For the purpose of correcting decrees or orders made by a Court of Small Causes the Act provides for an appeal and a revision in cases falling under section 24 and section 25 respectively.
Cases in which the District Judge and High Court respectively exercise revisional power, revisional powers are specifically mentioned.
A complete set of superior remedies has been incorporated in the Act.
Moreover, section 27 of the Act provides: "27.
Finality of decrees and orders.
Save as provided by this Act, a decree or order made under the foregoing provisions of this Act by a Court of Small Causes shall be final.
" The Legislature clearly intended that a decree or order made by a Court of Small Causes should be final subject only to correction by the remedies provided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
It is a point for consideration that had section 25, in its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh continued in its original form the High Court would have exercised the revisional power under section 25, and no question could have arisen of invoking the revisional power of the High Court under section 115 of the Code.
All the indications point to the conclusion that a case falling within the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was never intended to be subject to the remedies provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
By way of abundant caution section 7 of the Code made express provision barring the application of sections 96 to 112 and 115 of the Code to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
Section 7 of the Code merely embodies the general principle against resort to remedies outside the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
Although the court of the District Judge is not a court constituted under the Act the general principle continues to take effect.
No change in the principle was brought about merely because revisional power under section 25, before the proviso was added, was now entrusted to the District Judge.
It must be remembered that the legislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the 882 burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in section 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute.
" Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) that "the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC.
" Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of the High Court and of this Court pertaining to Section 50 read with Section 48(6) of the said Act, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood before and after the amendments effected by the Amendment Act 31 of 1975.
The relevant portions of Section 48 and 50, as they stood before the amendment and after the amendment are as under: Before the Amendment After the Amendment 48.
Appeals: (1)Notwithstanding Appeals: (1) omitted.
anything contained in any law for the time being in force, every person aggrieved by an order under section 14, Section 16, Section 17 or section 21, passed by the Controller or the Court may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal in writing to the District Judge having jurisd iction over the area in which the premises are situate.
2. . 2. . . 3. . 3. . . 4. . 4. . . 5.
The appellate authority 5.
The appllate authority shall send for the records shall send for the records of 883 of the case from the Courtthe case from the Controller and or the Controller, as the caseafter giving the parties an oppor may be, and after giving thetunity of being heard and if parties an opportunity of beingnecessary after making such further heard and if necessary afterenquiry as it thinks fit either itself making such further enquiry asor through the Controller shall it thinks fit, either itself ordecide the appeal.
through the Court or the Contro ller, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal.
Explanation . . . 6.
Subject to any decision of the6.
An order of the court or the High Court under section 50 theController shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge shalldecision of the District Judge or th e be final, and an order of the CourtHigh Court under section 50 or of or the Controller shall, subject tothe relevant appellate authority the decision of the relevant appel under this Act be final and shall late authority under this Act or ofnot be liable to be called in questio n the High Court under section 50,in any court of law whether in a be final and shall not be liable tosuit or other proceeding or by way be called in question in any courtof appeal or revision.
of law whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision.
Revision by the High Court50.
Revision.
The High Court may, at any(1).The High Court may,at any time, call for and examine time,call for examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the (i) the records relating to anycourt of Civil Judge under this Act decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con taken by the District Judge.troller under sections 14,15 16,or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself (ii) any order passed or proceed as to the legality or correctness of ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference Controller under section 14,thereto as it thinks fit.
section 15 or section 16.
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision, order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit; 2.
The costs of, and incidental2.
The District Judge may, at any all proceedings before the Hightime, call for and examine any order Court shall be in its distretion.passed or proceeding taken by the 884 Court of Munsiff referred to in sub clause(iii)of clause (d) of section(3)for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit.
the order of the District Judge shall be final.
The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be.
" On a reading of the provisions it may be seen that under Section 48 as it stood prior to the amendment, an appeal lay to the District Judge against an order passed under Sections 14, 16, 17 or 21 by the Rent Controller or the Court and thereafter a revision lay to the High Court under Section 50 of the Act.
Sub section (6) of Section 48 further provided that the decision of the District Judge shall, subject to the decision of the High Court under Section 50, be final and the order of the Court or the Controller shall subject to the decision of the relevant Appellate Authoirty under the Act or of the High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other proceedings or by way of appeal or revision.
One of the changes effected by the Amending Act was to confer jurisdiction on Civil Judges in the place of District Munsifs in respect of house rent control cases arising in the city of Mangalore.
Another change effected was to take away the right of appeal to the District Judge against a decision of a Rent Control Court by deleting sub section (1) of Section 48.
The third change effected is of a two fold nature.
The first is to restrict the High Court 's powers of revision under Section 50 to only those cases decided by the city Civil Judges and the second is to confer revisional powers on District Judges in respect of cases decided by the Munsifs exercising jurisdiction in areas outside the city of Bangalore.
Thus what the legislature had done was to do away with the remedy of an appeal so as to save the litigants from "a large segment of time and much expenses".
The resultant position is that as against the orders of District Munsifs acting as Rent Controllers a right of appeal to the District Judge and a further revision to the High Court has been taken away and instead only a right of revision to the District Court is provided.
In so far as the cases disposed of by the Civil Judges in the city of Bangalore are concerned, a right of revision is provided to the High Court.
Notwithstanding the changes effected, 885 Section 48(6) inter alia provided that an order of the Court or the Controller shall, subject to the decision of the District Judge or the High Court under Section 50 be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision.
In the background of the changes made by the legislature, a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court went into the question in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Others, ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 whether by reason of Section 48(6) a further revision against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to the High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Full Bench held that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, ; and Krishnadass Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th February 1978 the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. to revise an order of the District Judge passed under Section 50(2) will stand unaffected.
The correctness of this view was questioned before another Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in M.M. Yaragatti vs Vasant & Others, AIR 1987 Karnataka 186.
The Full Bench took the view that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases, viz. Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and Vishesh Kumar 's case (supra), the law laid down in Krishnaji 's case (supra) cannot be considered good law any longer and as such a further revision to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. will not lie against an order passed by a District Judge in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act.
The correctness of the view taken by the Full Bench in Yaragatti 's case (supra) fell for consideration by this Court in Shyamaraju 's case (supra).
A Bench of this Court held that in so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned, the relevant provisions warranted invoking the ratio in Chhaganlal 's case (supra) and Krishna Das Bahtija (supra) and therefore the view taken by the earlier Full Bench in Krishnaji 's case (supra) is the correct one and not the view taken in Yaragatti 's case (supra).
The position, therefore, is that so far as the Karnataka Act is concerned an order of a District Judge under Section 50(2), though conferred finality under the Act is nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by means of a further revision under Section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
886 What now falls for consideration is whether there is any conflict between the decision in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde 's case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case requires reconsideration.
Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different.
However, to clarify matters further we may point out the differences between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity.
Under the Kerala Act, against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided over by a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal under Section 18.
The Appellate Authority has to be a judicial officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge.
The Appellate Authority has been conferred powers co extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having over riding effect.
Having these factors in mind, the Legislature has declared that in so far as an order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority; and in so far as an Appellate Authority is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20.
As regards Section 20, a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and the District Court.
In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18, the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority.
It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, the High Court has been constituted the Revisional authority.
The revisional powers conferred under Section 20, whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders sought to be revised.
Not only that, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have been expressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20A of the Act.
Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case before the Rent Control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge.
The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before 887 three courts, viz. the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court, there was no need to make the revisional order of the District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code.
It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion.
According to the Full Bench, a revisional order of a District Court under Section 20 laid itself open for further challenge to the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. because of two factors viz. (1) there was no mention in the Act that the order would be final and (2) there was no provision in the Act for an appeal being filed against a revisional order under Section 20.
The Full Bench failed to notice certain crucial factors.
In the first place, Section 20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revision exercisable under that Section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court.
Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under Section 20 will not have finality because the Section does not specifically say so, then it will follow that a revisional order passed by the High Court under Section 20(1) also will not have finality.
Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of its powers of revision under Section 20(1) can be subjected to further revision because Section 20(1) has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that Section.
Secondly, the terms of Section 20(1) have to be read in conjunction with Section 18(5).
Section 18(5), as already seen, declares that an order of a Rent Control Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20.
When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective states unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality.
The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20.
These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 C.P.C. to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court 888 under Section 20 of the Act.
This position has been succinctly set out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra).
As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar 's case, the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court and for determining the legislative intent, the Court must as far as possible construe a statute in such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.
A thought may occur to some whether by a rigid construction of Section 20(1) read with Section 18(5), the High Court 's power of superintendence over the District Court, even when it functions as a revisional court under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act, will not stand forfeited.
We may only state that legislative history would indicate that the superintending and visitorial powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. appear to have been conferred and vested "because the supervisory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition over Subordinate Courts in the mofussil could not be exercised, (and hence) it would be reasonable to hold that it was intended . . to be analogous with the jurisdiction to issue the high prerogative writs and the power of supervision under the Charter Act and its successor provisions in the Constitution Acts." vide para 10 S.S. Khanna vs Dillon, ; Incidentally, we may also point out that the Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution over all courts and tribunals which are within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercise its jurisdiction.
Having said so much it is really not necessary for us to dwell at length about the decision in Shyamaraju 's case restoring the ratio in Krishnaji 's case and disapproving the decision in Yaragatti 's case.
Even so we cannot but refer to the fact that in the Karnataka Act the right of appeal has been completely taken away and the entire proceedings are sought to be limited to a two tier system viz. the Rent Control Court and the Revisional Court, whereas under the Kerala Act there is a three tier system viz. the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court.
Though Section 48(6) of the Karnataka Act (as amended) also speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under Section 50 in more or less the same terms as in Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words "shall be final 889 and shall not be liable to be called in question" etc.
has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspections.
It is in that situation it was found in Shyamaraju 's case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal 's case and Krishnadas Bhatija 's case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar 's case and Aundal Ammal 's case.
In fact, it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji 's case was a party to the judgment in Aundal Ammal 's case and the learned judge, while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji 's case.
There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision rendered in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and Shyamaraju 's case (supra).
As to the question whether a fresh thinking is called for on the scope of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, we do not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in Aundal Ammal 's case and on the contrary our renewed discussion of the matter only calls for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal 's case.
An argument was advanced that since the decision in Vareed vs Mary had been good law for a number of years in Kerala State and since the High Court had been entertaining revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. against the revisional orders of District Courts under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court.
We are unable to countenance this argument in the circumstances of the case and the reason therefore can be set out by refering to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein.
In West Ham Union vs Edmonton Union, 13 at page 4 Lord Loreburn, L.C. spoke as under: "Great importance is to be attached to old authorities, on the strength of which many transactions may have been adjusted and rights determined.
But where they are plainly wrong, and especially where the subsequent course of judicial decisions has disclosed weakness in the reasoning on which they were based, and practical injustice in the consequences that must flow from them, I consider it is the duty of this House to overrule them, if it has not lost the right to do so by itself expressly affirming them." 890 In Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. vs Houghton & Chesteric Street Assessment Committee, 12 1937 2 All E.R. 298, affirmed in , the members of the Court, having concluded that a decision on a question of rating pronounced some forty years previously by a Divisional Court was plainly wrong, overruled it accordingly, although the earlier decision had, without doubt, been frequently acted on in rating matters in the meantime, and although no judicial doubt had previously been cast on its correctness.
These decisions have been referred to and followed in Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd. vs Poole Corporation, All E.R. 1958 1205.
On similar lines this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed vs Mary, (supra) as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the relevant Sections in the Act and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar (supra).
In the light of our conclusion all the appeals must succeed in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. is concerned.
In Civil Appeal Nos.
626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, the High Court allowed the revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. and ordered the eviction of the tenant.
In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order of eviction.
In Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986 the District Court allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court has confirmed the said order in the revision preferred to it.
In Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983 the District Court reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and ordered eviction and order of the District Court has been confirmed by the High Court.
In Special Leave Petition No. 4311 of 1985 the Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Control Court for deciding the question whether the tenant is entitled to resist the claim for eviction on the basis of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.
The order of remand was confirmed by the District Court and the High Court.
In accordance with our pronouncement it follows that the order of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. in each of the appeals concerned, viz., Civil Appeal Nos.
626 of 1981, 624 of 1985, 2079 of 1981, 1619 of 1986 and 7505 of 1983 will stand set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case will stand restored and become operative.
As the appeals are directed only against the order 891 of the High Court passed in revision the appeals will stand disposed of with the said pronouncement on the above lines.
In Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4311 of 1985 also the order of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. is not sustainable but even so we do not find any merit in the petition because the finding of the Appellate Authority and the order of remand passed by it have been confirmed by the District Court and as such, there are no merits in the petition, accordingly it is dismissed.
Interim orders, if any, passed in the appeals and the special leave petition will stand vacated.
The parties in all the cases are directed to bear their respective costs.
section RANGANATHAN, J. 1.
I find on a cursory perusal of various State enactments on rent control that, while a number of them do confer s .
cific jurisdiction on the State High Court, some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments.
Thus, though we are concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these cases, a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other States as well.
It is in view of this importance of the question raised that I have considered it necessary to state my views in a separate order.
The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest a power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders.
The question in these matters is whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) can be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge.
This question has been answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde vs Venkatesha Bhat, ; (a decision under the Karnataka Act) and hence this reference to a larger Bench.
My learned brothers are of the view that there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments are not in pari materia and that, so far as the Kerala Act is concerned, Aundal Ammal should be followed.
With respect, I am unable to agree.
Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court.
The fact that the order may have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contains expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction.
This is the effect 892 of the decisions in Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, ; , a case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act and in Krishandas Bhatija vs Venkatachala Shetty, SLP No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju 's case (supra), which are direct decisions under the Karnataka Act.
In my opinion, there is no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also.
The relevant provisions of the two enactments have been extracted in the order of Natarajan J. and need not be set out again, Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendment in 1975, rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller, according as the case arises outside or inside the city of Bangalore.
There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision.
This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the District Judge.
The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff.
Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final.
The Kerala pattern is the same except that an appeal intervenes before the revision.
Section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank.
Section 20 provides for revision.
The revisional power is to be exercised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the Subordinate Judge and the High Court in other cases.
Section 20 does not provide, as does Section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge shall be final.
It is true that section 18(5) of the Kerala Act lays down that the order of the Rent Control court or, where there is an appeal, the decision of the appellate authority shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court of law except as provided in section 20 but the language of section 48(5) of the Karnataka Act is even stronger.
It provides that the order of the Court or the Rent Controller shall (subject to the decision in appeal or of the District Judge or the High Court in revision under section 50) be final and "shall not be liable to be called into question in any court of law whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision.
" If the much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, as has been held in the two cases referred to above, it is difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act.
893 5.
This poses then the question of a choice between the two views of this court: the one in Shyamaraju and the one in Aundal Ammal.
As has already been pointed out, Shyamaraju follows the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal and Krishnadas Bhatija.
The only other decision of this Court, which has relevance in the present context, is Vihesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; which has been relied upon in Aundal Ammal.
I am in agreement with the view expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally different statutory context.
That decision turned largely on the legislative history of section 115 of the C.P.C. and section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh.
I am therefore inclined to lean in favour of the view that has commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of revision over the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well.
Aundal Ammal has pointed out that such an interpretation would enable parties to have recourse to four courts under the Kerala Rent Control Act viz: the court of the first instance, the appellate court, the district court and then the High Court whereas under the Karnataka Act there are only three courts, viz: the court of the first instance, the district court by way of revision and the High Court by way of further revision.
This is no doubt true but can this alone be a reason why identical statutory language should be given different interpretation under the two enactments? I think not.
That apart, the result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court in rent control matters and this, if I am right in thinking that the two Acts are pari materia, will leave the litigant in Karnataka with only a right of revision to the District Court.
I venture to doubt whether in the absence of clear language the Legislature can be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important branch of the law.
Moreover to exclude the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 would only encourage the recourse, by aggrieved parties, to articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the conclusion may not even result in reducing the spate of litigation under the Rent Control Acts in the High Courts and Supreme Court.
I am, therefore, not inclined to attach muct importance to this circumstance as a guide to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the statute.
The above interpretation will not render the language and scheme of section 18(5) read with section 20 totally redundant as was suggested in arguments before us.
Section 20 is necessary because 894 though, at present, Subordinate Judges have been constituted as the appellate authorities under the Act, the appellate authority need not necessarily be a regular civil court and, but for such a specific statutory provision, there would be no remedy to a party aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority.
Section 18(5) is a provision of a general nature intended to prevent the orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged in the courts.
These provisions, in my opinion, do not and cannot preclude the applicability of section 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District Court, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land.
In this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115.
One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem is this.
In the State of Kerala, as early as in Vareed vs Mary, AIR 1969 Ker. 101, a view was taken that the High Court can entertain a second revision and, though Shri Potti suggested that this view has been often challenged, the above Full Bench decision hold the field till Aundal Ammal was decided.
In Karnataka, the maintainability of a second revision appears to have been taken for granted untill a doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act.
This doubt was dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji 's case (ILR 1978 Kar.
1585) that the High Court could maintain a second revision.
This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in Yaragatti 's case, in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju 's case.
In the result, the position has been that, right through in the State of Karnataka and for atleast for a period of almost twenty years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view has been in favour, of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court.
I think that in a matter of procedure such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication is quite clear to the contrary.
I would, therefore, hold that the revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable and that the matters before us should be disposed of accordingly.
However, the petitions and appeals will stand disposed of in accordance with the majority view of my learned brothers.
S.L. Appeals and petitions disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
% These appeals together with a petition for special leave raised a common question of law whether against an order of a District Court in revision under section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act 2 of 1965, a further revision would lie to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Though the question was not res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, , the matters were listed for consideration, by a Bench of three Judges, of the very same question in order to see whether there was any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal 's case above said and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hegde vs G. Venkatesha Bhatt & Ors., ; , and whether the view taken in the earlier case required reconsideration.
Aundal Ammal 's case arose under the Kerala Act afore mentioned, and the Shyamaraju Hegde 's case was under the karnataka Rent Control Act, and there were essential differences between the two Acts.
The scope and effect of section 20(1) read with section 18(5) of the Kerala Act came to be examined by a full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary, A.I.R. 1969 Kerala 103, which held that a decision of a District Court under section 20 of the Kerala Act was undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The question decided by the full Bench of the Kerala High Court as above mentioned, came to be considered by this Court (a Bench of two Hon. Judges) in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra), and the Court held that the ratio laid down by the Kerala High Court in Vareed 's case (supra) could not be approved because the High Court had not properly construed the sections 18(5) 872 and 20 of the Kerala Act, and was in error.
So far as the Karnataka Act was concerned, this Court held in Shyamaraju Hegde 's case (supra) that an order of a District Judge under section 50(2), though it conferred finality under the Act, was nevertheless open to challenge before the High Court by revision under section 115 C.P.C. by the aggrieved party.
What fell for consideration in the present cases was whether there was any conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde 's case (supra) and whether the ratio in the former case required reconsideration.
Disposing of the Appeals and the Petition for Special Leave, the Court, ^ HELD: Per Sabyasachi Mukharji & section Natarajan, JJ.
After examining the differences between the two Acts in detail, the Court concluded that there was really no conflict between the two decisions of this Court in Aundal Ammal 's case (supra) and Shyamaraju Hegde 's case (supra), because the provisions in the two Acts were materially different.
As to the question whether a fresh thinking was called for on the scope of section 20 read with section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, the Court did not find any grounds for reconsidering the view taken in the Aundal Ammal 's case; on the contrary, the renewed discussion by the Court of the matter called for a reiteration of the view expressed in Aundal Ammal 's case.
[889C D] The Court was unable to conntenance in the circumstances of the case, the argument advanced that since the decision of the Kerala High Court in Vareed vs Mary aforementioned had been a good law for a number of years in the Kerala State and since the High Court had been entertaining revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C. against the revisional orders of the District Courts under sections 20(1) of the Kerala Act, the decision should have been allowed to stand even though the reasoning therein was not commendable for acceptance by this Court, and the reason therefore, the Court observed, could be set out by referring to certain English decisions and the reasoning adopted therein, in West Ham Union vs Edmonten Union, 13 at 4; Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. vs Hongton V. Chester i.e. Street Assessment Committee, 12 , affirmed in These decisions had been followed in Brownsee Haven Proper 873 ties Ltd. vs Poole Corporation, On similar lines, this Court deemed it necessary to overrule the ratio in Vareed vs Mary (supra), as the decision suffered from miscontruction of the relevant sections in the Act, and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; = ; = ; ; 890A C] In the light of the conclusion of the Court, all the appeals succeeded in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under section 115, C.P.C., was concerned.
In Civil Appeals Nos.
626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, the High Court allowed the revision petitions under section 115 C.P.C., and ordered the eviction of the tenants.
In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981, the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order of eviction.
In the Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986, the District Judge allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court confirmed the said order in revisions.
In the Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983, the District Judge reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellant Authority and ordered eviction and the High Court confirmed the order of the District Judge.
In the petition for special leave listed with the appeals, the Appellate Authority sustained the claim of the landlord for eviction under section 11(3) of the Act but remanded the case to the Rent Controller for deciding the question whether the tenant was entitled to resist the claim for eviction.
The District Court and the High Court confirmed the order of remand.[890D G] In accordance with the pronouncement of the Court, the order of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., in each of the appeals above mentioned was set aside and the revisional order of the District Judge in each case, restored to become operative.
The appeals were directed only against the orders of the High Court passed in revision, and they were disposed of with the pronouncement of the Court on the above lines.
[890G H; 891A] In the petition for special leave also, the order of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., was not sustainable, but even so, the Court did not find any merit in the petition, because the finding of the Appellate Authority and the order of remand passed by it had been confirmed by the District Court 'and as such, there were no merits in the petition.
[891B] 874 Per section Ranganathan, J. (dissenting) While a number of enactments of various States on rent control confer specific jurisdiction on the State High Courts, some others are broadly on the same pattern as the Kerala and Karnataka enactments.
Though the Court was concerned only with Kerala and Karnataka enactments in these matters, a similar question might well arise under the corresponding enactments of some other States as well.[891C D] The Kerala and Karnataka Rent Control Acts vest power of revision in the District Judge against certain orders.
The question in these matters was whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 C.P.C., could be invoked to seek a further revision of the revisional order passed by the District Judge.
This question was answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 SCC 133 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde vs Venkatesha Bhat, ; (a decision under the Karnataka Act), and hence this reference to a larger Bench.[891E F] Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court.
The fact that the order might have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contained expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court, had been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction.
This was the effect of the decisions in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, ; and Krishandas Bhatija vs Venkatachala Shetty, S.L.P. No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13.2.1978 and Shyamaraju 's case (supra), which were direct decisions under the Karnataka Act.
In the opinion of his Lordship, there was no vital or material difference between the two enactments in this respect and that the same result should follow under the Kerala Act also.
[891G H; 892A B] Under the Karnataka Act, after its amendments in 1975, the rent control matters are decided, in the first instance, by the District Munsiff or the Civil Judge/Rent Controller.
There is no provision for an appeal from this order but there is one for revision.
This revisional power is bifurcated under section 50 between the High Court and the District Court.
The High Court is empowered to revise the order of the Civil Judge/Rent Controller and the District Judge that of the District Munsiff.
Section 50(2) specifically declares that the order of the District Judge under this provision is final.
The Kerala pattern is the same except that section 18 provides for an appeal from the Rent Controller 875 to an officer or an authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge or of a superior rank.
Section 20 provides for revision.
The revisional power is to be exercised by the District Court where the appellate authority is the subordinate Judge, and the High Court, in other cases.
Section 20 does not provide, as does section 50 of the Karnataka Act, that the decision of the District Judge would be final.
The much wider and more emphatic language of the Karnataka Act does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the C.P.C., as had been held in the two cases referred to above, and it was difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act.
[892C H] This led to the question of a choice between the two views of this Court one in Shyamaraju and the other, in Aundal Ammal.
Shyamaraju followed the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1955 and Krishnadas Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978.
The only other decision of this Court, having relevance in the present context, was Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; , relied upon in Aundal Ammal.
His Lordship was in agreement with the view in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally statutory context.
That decision turned largely on legislative history of section 115 of the C.P.C. and section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh.
His Lordship was, therefore, inclined to lean in favour of the view that had commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act, and to hold that the High Court had a power of revision over the order of the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well.
The result of applying Aundal Ammal would be to completely exclude the High Court in the Rent Control matters, and, this, as the two Acts were in pari materia according to his Lordship 's view, would leave the litigant in Karnataka only a right of revision to the District Court.
It was doubtful whether, in the absence of clear language, the Legislature could be held to have intended to completely exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court in such an important Branch of law.
The provisions did not and could not, in his Lordship 's view, preclude the applicability of section 115 of the C.P.C. to an order passed by the District Court, not as a persona designata, but as a civil court of the land.
Section 18 and 20 had a vital role to pay but their effect was not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115.
[893A F; 894B C] As a result of the various decisions of the Courts, the position had been that right through in the State of Karnataka and for at least a 876 period of 20 years in the State of Kerala, the prevalent view had been in favour of the maintainability of a second revision by the High Court.
In a matter of procedure, such a long standing practice should not be disturbed unless the statutory indication was quite clear to the contrary.
[894F] The revision petitions before the High Court were maintainable.[894G] Aundal Ammal vs Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 133; Shyamaraju Hegde vs G. Venkatesha Bhatt & Ors.
, ; ; Balagangadhara Menon vs T.V. Peter, [1984] K.L.T. 845; Vareed vs Mary, AIR 1969 103; Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, ; Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar & Ors., ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585; Chhaganlal vs The Municipal Corporation, Indore, ; ; Krishnadas Bhatija vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978, decided on February 13, 1978; M.M. Yaragatti vs Vasant & Ors., AIR 1987 Karnataka 186; S.S. Khanna vs F.J. Dillon, AIR 1954 S.C. 497; West Ham Union vs Domonton Union, 13 at 4; Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd. vs Honghton & Chester_ie_Street Assessment Committee, 12 and and Brownsee Haven Properties Ltd. vs Poole Corporation, referred to.