judgement:
Appeal No. 32 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 5, 1954, of the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh in Regular First Appeal No. 115 of 1953 arising out of the decree dated June 6, 1953, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, in suit No. 26 of 1953.
Dewan Chaman Lal and Ratan Lal Chawla, for the appellant.
M. C. Setalvad Attorney General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.
November 6.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.
The main question for determination in this appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below is whether the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, XXXVIII of 1952 (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Control Act) is applicable to the premises in question.
The courts below have come to the conclusion that in view of the provisions section 3(a) of the Control Act the market called the New Fruit and Vegetable Market, Subzimandi, under the adminis tration the respondent, the Delhi Improvement Trust, (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Trust) is Government property to which the provisions of the Act are not attracted.
This appeal has been brought to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature of the State of Punjab that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the legal status of the respondent vis a vis the Government.
The sequence of events leading up to the institution of the suit by the appellant " The Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union, Su bzimandi " a registered body under the Indian Trade Unions Act, giving rise to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows: By an agreement dated, March 31, 1937, (Exhibit D 5) between the Secretary of State for India in Council and the Delhi Improvement Trust, which will have to be set out in detail hereinafter and the construction of 3 which is the main point in controversy between the parties, a certain area of the land admittedly belonging to Government was placed at the disposal of the Trust for the " orderly expansion of Delhi under the supervision of a single authority.
" The said property was compendiously called " the Nazul Estate.
" By a letter dated May 1/2, 1939 (not exhibited but filed in the High Court at the appellate stage) the Chairman of the Trust forwarded a copy of the resolution No. 551 dated April 24,1939, (Exhibit D 15) to the Chief Commissioner of Delhi.
The resolution sets out the scheme for the construction of the new Subzimandi Fruit Market on a gross area of 10.87 acres including certain lands which till then did not vest in the Trust.
The Chairman asked for administrative sanction of the Government of India to place the additional area at the disposal of the Trust on the same terms as those applicable to the Nazul Estate aforesaid held under the agreement, exhibit D 5.
The resolution aforesaid sets out the object and history of the scheme.
It contains the categorical statement that " Government is the owner of all the land included in the scheme.
The position according to the revenue records is given in the statement on the next page.
" The scheme then sets out in great detail the several structures to be constructed and the, profit and loss figures.
Under the heading " Computation of revenue surplus " occur the following significant statements very much relied upon by the appellant: "The revenue surplus of Rs. 4,530/ is made up as follows; and is based on the recommendation that the Trust shall own and maintain the market.
Under the heading " Future Jurisdiction " the following significant passage occurs: At this stage, if the suggestion is accepted that the, Trust should own and run the market at least until it is firmly established, and in view of the fact that Government are the sole owners of the land, no difficulty is anticipated due to divided territorial jurisdiction of the two local authorities and no change is proposed.
4 The letter enclosing the resolution of the Trust as aforesaid contains a summary of the scheme, a portion of which is as follows: " An estimated capital expenditure of Rs. 4.73 lakhs is involved.
On this capital expenditure there will be a capital deficit of Rs. 4.20 lakhs and a recurring revenue surplus of Rs. 4,530.
This financial result assumes ownership and management of the market by the Trust, and takes into account all charges on maintenance and day to day management which would otherwise fall to a local body.
The scheme involves no acquisition of land, but assumes transfer free of charge of an area of 10.87 acres of Government land, all of which except for 1,510 square yards, falls within the limits of the Civil Lines Notified Area Committee." (Underlined by us).
In answer to this communication from the Trust, the Chief Commissioner sent the letter (exhibit D 8) dated May 13, 1939, sanctioning under section 22 A of the Trust Law the scheme of the " New Fruit and Vegetable Market " as proposed in the resolution aforesaid at a cost not exceeding Rs. 4,73,186.
The sanction is in terms made subject to the remarks (1) that "the whole of the land required for the construction of the new market is the property of the Government ", and (2) that "the trust will administer the new market on its completion.
" It will thus appear that it was clearly understood that the land on which the market was to be constructed would continue to be the property of the Government in modification of the proposal made by the Trust as aforesaid, the Trust only being vested with the power to administer the new market.
On receipt of the letter aforesaid of the Chief Com missioner, the Chairman of the Trust requested the former to obtain the orders of the Government of India to place the additional land required for the market at the disposal of the Trust under section 54 A of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, VIII of 1919, (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Improvement Act) as extended to the Province of Delhi, "on the same terms applicable to other Nazul Estate held under the agreement between the Trust and the Government of India" (exhibit D 7).
By his letter dated 5 August 10, 1939, (exhibit D 6) the Chief Commissioner forwarded the orders dated June 21, 1939, of the Government of India agreeing to the proposal aforesaid of the, Trust placing the additional area at the disposal of the Trust on the original terms aforesaid.
This is the genesis of the New Fruit and Vegetable Market, Subzimandi, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Market, for a period of six years with effect from May 25, 1942, at an annual rent of Rs. 35,000 rising every year by Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 45,000 in respect of the sixth year of the lease.
In anticipation of the termi nation of the lease period aforesaid the Trust advertised the auction of the market for a fresh settlement.
That occasioned the suit for an injunction by the plaintiff against the Trust in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Delhi, instituted on March 18, 1948.
The Court granted the plaintiff an interim injunction restraining the defendant from putting the market to auction.
The said ex parte order of injunction was contested by the Trust with the result that the trial Court dissolved that injunction.
The plaintiff carried an appeal to the High Court of Punjab at Simla.
During the pendency of the appeal a settlement was arrived at between the parties and the plaintiff 's offer of Rs. 1,50,000 as annual rent of the market on the expiry of the lease was accepted by the Trust.
This settlement is evidenced by the resolution of the Trust dated February 24, 1949 (exhibit D 13).
In pursuance of that settlement a fresh lease was executed.
By the indenture(Ex.
D 4)dated April 22, 1949, the plaintiff was granted a fresh lease for the period May 25, 1948, to March 31, 1950, at an annual rent of Rs. 1,50,000.
One of the terms of the ' lease, which is a registered document, was " That the lessee shall on expiry of the lease or on its determination by the lessor, vacate the premises and deliver its peaceful possession to the lessor.
If the lessee fails to do so, he shall be liable to pay double the rent as liquidated damages for the unauthorised period of occupation till such time as he vacates it or he is ejected by process of law.
" Paragraph 22 of the indenture aforesaid contains the following important aidmission: 6 that both the lessor and lessee agree that the premises in dispute are owned by the Government and the provisions of the Delhi Ajmer Merwara Rent.
Control Act (1947) do not apply to the same.
" The effect of this admission is also one of the controversies between the parties and shall have to be adverted to later.
It appears that during the pendency of the second lease aforesaid, negotiations had started between the parties for extension of the period of the lease.
The plaintiff made an offer of a fresh lease for a further period of five years at an annual rent of rupees two lakhs.
But the Trust by its resolution dated May 25, 1950, (exhibit D 12) aoreed only to extend the period by two years " on the existing conditions, subject to enhancement of rent to Rs. 2 lakhs per year.
" The plaintiff 's case in the plaint is that these onerous terms successively enhancing the rent to Rs. 2 lakhs per year were agreed to by it as it had no other alternative in view of the plaintiff 's need.
The plaintiff has been paying the enhanced rent of Rs. 2 lakhs per year in view of the resolution aforesaid of the Trust but has all the same started proceedings under section 8.
of the Control Act, for fixation of standard rent in respect of the market.
The Trust got an advertisement inserted in the Hindustan Times, New Delhi, dated March 5, 1953, inviting tenders for the lease of the market for a period of three years from April 1, 1953.
The plaintiff 's case in the plaint is that the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff still subsisted and had not been terminated in accordance with law.
That was the cause of action for the plaintiff to institute the present suit on March 9, 1953.
The plaintiff 's prayer in the plaint is that a decree for a permanent injunction may be passed in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendant from evicting the plaintiff from the market.
The suit was contested by the Trust on the allegations that the market had been constructed on Nazul land under the authority of the Delhi State Government with Government funds, that the market was Government property and was only being managed by the defendant on behalf of the Government, that the 7 Control Act by virtue of section 3 (a) thereof was not applicable to the premises in question and that therefore the plaintiff was liable to be ejected as the term of its lease had expired.
Reliance was also placed on behalf of the defendant on the provisions of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act, XXVII of 1950, read with the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, XXX of 1952.
On those pleadings a number of issues were joined between the parties of which the most important is issue No. 1 " Whether the property in dispute belongs to the Government within the meaning of section 3 (a) of the Rent Control Act, 1952 ?" Both the courts below have answered that issue in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the defendant.
The plaintiff prayed for and obtained the necessary certificate from the High Court that the case involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the relevant statute and the agreement (exhibit D 5) between the Government of India and the Delhi Improvement Trust.
Hence this appeal.
It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that on a true construction of the provisions, particularly section 54A of the Improvement Act as applied to the Province of Delhi and the agreement (exhibit D 5) between the Government of India and the Trust, as also of the correspondence that passed between the Chief Commissioner of Delhi and the Trust, the land on which the market was constructed and the structure itself belonged to the Trust and that therefore the provisions of the Control Act were applicable to the tenancy created by the Trust in favour of the plaintiff; and that being so, the plaintiff could not be ejected by the defendant on the expiry of the term or the extended term of the lease.
On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the defendant respondent that the Trust is the statutory agent of the Government and has to function in accordance with the provisions of the statute aforesaid, namely, the Improvement Act.
The agency was created under the provisions of section 54A (1) 8 of the Improvement Act, the terms of the agreement being incorporated in the indenture, exhibit D 5, dated ;March 31 1937.
The argument further is that in accordance with the scheme as embodied in the agreement the Government was to hand over to its agent, the Trust, Government property which vests in possession of the agent who has to manage and develop the property with funds made available to it by Government.
Proper accounts have to be kept by the Trust of the monies thus advanced by Government in a separate account.
The Trust has also to pay a certain fixed sum by way of revenue on the property placed at its disposal.
The income from the property in the hands of the Trust has to be applied to payment of interest on money advanced by Government at a specified rate, as also to expenses for the management and improvement of the property and any surplus left over out of the income of the property in the hands of the Trust after meeting all the outgoing has to be placed at the disposal of Government to be spent according to its directions.
Thus the case of the respondent is that no legal title was created in favour of the Trust and the land, as also the structures constructed by the Trust with the monies thus advanced by Government are the property of the Government.
The Trust as the statutory agent has only to manage and develop the property in accordance with schemes sanctioned by Government.
Consequently, it was argued that the market in question belongs to Government and is not governed by the Control Act.
The question as to in whom the title to the market in question vests may be discussed in two parts, (1) title to the land on which the market is situate, and (2) title to the buildings admittedly constructed by the Trust.
Adverting first to the question of title in respect of the land, it is common ground that before it was placed at the disposal of the Trust it was Government property.
The question, therefore, naturally arises whether either by the provisions of section 54A relied upon by both the parties in this connection, or by virtue of the terms of the indenture aforesaid or by the combined operation of the two, title to the land has become vested in 9 the Trust.
The appellant contends it is so vested.
The respondent contests this proposition and contends that there are no words in the statute or in the agreement which either separately or together can be said to have transferred the pre existing title of the Government to the Trust.
It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that section 54A only authorises Government to place the land in question " at the disposal of the Trust" which has to hold it in accordance with the terms agreed upon between them, as evidenced by the indenture exhibit D 5.
Let us examine those terms.
The agreement provides, inter alia, that with a view to the orderly expansion of Delhi under the supervision of a single authority the Government agreed to place at its disposal " the Nazul Estate " (described in Schedule 1), with effect from April 1, 1937.
One of the conditions stipulated was that the "Trust shall hold and manage the said Nazul Estate on behalf of the Government.
" These words cannot be construed as transferring title to the Nazul Estate from Government to the Trust.
They amount to constituting the Trust as an agent of the Government to hold possession of the property and to manage the same for the purpose for which the Trust had been created.
The Trust is enjoined to use its best endeavours for the improvement and development of the said Nazul Estate in accordance with the provisions of the Improvement Act, " provided that no expenditure shall be incurred upon the purchase of land to be added to the said Nazul Estate unless the proposal to make the purchase has been specifically included in an Improvement Scheme sanctioned under section 42 of the said Act.
" Particular reliance was placed on behalf of the appel lant on the following terms in the indenture to show that the title to the Nazul Estate vested in the Trust: " The Trust may sell or lease any land included in the said Nazul Estate in pursuance of the provisions of an Improvement Scheme sanctioned under section 42 of the said Act.
2 10 The Trust may, otherwise than in pursuance of an Improvement Scheme sanctioned under section 42 of the said Act, sell any land included in the said Nazul Estate." In order to appreciate the true legal position it is necessary here to examine some of the provisions of the Improvement Act bearing on this aspect of the case.
Section 22 A occurring in Chap 111 A vests the Trust with the power to undertake any works and incur any expenditure for the improvement or development of the area to which the Act may have been extended.
Section 23 in Chap.
IV sets out in detail what is meant by "An improvement Scheme.
" It lays down that the acquisition by purchase, exchange or otherwise of any property necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme, the construction or reconstruction of buildings.
the sale, letting or exchange of any property comprised in the scheme and doing of all incidental acts necessary for the execution of the scheme may be undertaken by the Trust.
Section 24 sets out the different types of improvement schemes including a general improvement scheme, a re building scheme, a re housing scheme, a development scheme etc., and the sections following section 24 lay down in detail the scope of the different types of improvement schemes enumerated in section 24.
Section 42 requires the Chief Commissioner to announce an improvement scheme sanctioned by him by notification and thereupon the Trust embarks upon the execution of the scheme.
Then comes Chap.
V dealing with the powers and duties of the Trust when a scheme has been sanctioned.
In this chapter occur sections 45 to 48 which provide for the vesting of certain properties in the Trust.
Section 45 lays down the conditions and the procedure according to which any building, street, square or other land vested in the Municipality or Notified Area Committee may become vested in a Trust.
Similarly, section 46 deals with the vesting in the Trust of properties like a street or a square as are not vested in a Municipality or Notified Area Committee.
These sections, as also sections 47 and 48 make provision for compensation and for empowering the Trust to deal with such property 11 vested in it.
The vesting of such property is only for the purpose of executing any improvement scheme which it has undertaken and riot with a view to clothing it with complete title.
As will presently appear, the term "vesting" has a variety of meaning which has to be gathered from the context in which it has been used.
It may mean full ownership, or only possession for a particular purpose, or clothing the authority with power to deal with the property as the agent of another person or authority.
Coming back to the terms of the indenture with reference to the power of the Trust to sell or lease any land included in the Nazul Estate, certain conditions are laid down for the exercise of the aforesaid power to transfer.
The Trust is empowered to sell any land included in the Nazul Estate on its own authority only in cases where the sale is for full market value and which does not exceed Rs. 25,000/ .
In other cases the transaction has to be sanctioned either by the Chief Commissioner or by Government and in every case the forms of conveyances and leases by the Trust have to be approved by Government.
It would thus appear that the power to transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise, vested in the Trust is not an unlimited or an unqualified power but a power circumscribed by such conditions as the Government or the Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, thought fit to impose.
The imposition of those conditions is not consistent with the title to the property vesting absolutely in the Trust.
On the other hand, the imposition of those conditions is more consistent with the proposition contended for by the learned Attorney General on behalf of the res pondent that the Trust was only constituted a statutory agent on behalf of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Improvement Act and the terms of the indenture, exhibit D 5.
It is noteworthy that there are no provisions either in the Improvement Act or in the indenture, exhibit D 5, to the effect that the title to the Nazul Estate vested in the Trust.
It must, therefore, be held that no grounds have been made out for holding that title to the land on which the market stands was conveyed by Government to the Trust.
12 We turn now to the question whether apart from title to the land, title to the building standing upon the land is vested in the Trust.
In order to examine the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to set out the remaining portion of the terms of the indenture aforesaid.
The Trust was to assume full liability for all expenditure to be incurred upon works of improvement and to arrange for the completion of those works to the satisfaction of Government.
The Trust is also enjoined to maintain in accordance with the statutory rules separate accounts of all revenue realised from, and all expenditure incurred upon, the said Nazul Estate and to pay to Government the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs being the equivalent of the net annual revenue in respect thereof subject to certain conditions, not material to this case.
Then follows the.
most important clause in these terms: Any surplus funds in the Nazul Development Account remaining at the end of each financial year when the said sum has been paid shall be put at the disposal of Government and shall be applied until further orders of Government to the further improvement and development of the said Nazul Estate and/or to the repayment of loans made to the Trust as Government may direct.
" Government on its part undertook to finance either in part or in whole such schemes as may be agreed between the parties and also to advance loans at interest equal to Government rates for the time being for loans to Local Authorities.
It was in pursuance of the terms aforesaid that the scheme of the building of the market in question was put through at an estimate.
cost of a little less than five lakhs of rupees.
It is clear upon the terms of the agreement shortly set out above that the market was constructed by the Trust on Government land with Government funds advanced by way of loan at interest.
On those facts what is the legal position of the Trust vis a vis the Government in respect of the ownership of the property ? It is important, therefore, to determine the true nature of the initial relationship between the Government and the Trust.
The learned counsel for 13 the appellant conceded that relationship could not be described in terms of ordinary legal import, that is to say, in, terms of mortgagor and mortgagee, or lessor and lessee, or licensor and licensee.
He contended that it was a peculiar relationship which could not be defined in exact legal phraseology, but all the same, that the Trust was the owner of the market, especially in view of the fact that, as admitted by the defendants counsel at the trial, the Trust had repaid the entire amount of five lakhs odd advanced by Government for the construction of the market.
This result, it was further contended, follows from the terms of section 54A of the Improvement Act.
The Attorney General appearing on behalf of the respondent also strongly relied upon the terms of that section for his contention that the relationship between the Trust and the Government was that of agent and principal.
It is therefore necessary to examine closely the provisions of that section which is in these terms: " (1) The Government may, upon such terms as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Trust, place at the disposal of the Trust any properties, or any funds or dues, of the Government and thereupon the Trust shall hold or realise such properties, funds and dues in accordance with such terms.
(2) If any immovable property, held by the Trust under sub section (1) is required by the Government for administrative purposes, the Trust shall transfer the same to the Chief Commissioner upon payment of all costs incurred by the Trust in acquiring, reclaiming or developing the same, together with interest thereon at such rate as may be fixed by the Chief Commissioner calculated from the day on which this Act comes into force or from the date on which such costs were incurred, whichever is the later.
The transfer of any such immovable property shall be notified in the gazette and such property shall thereupon vest in the Chief Commissioner from the date of the notification.
" The section quoted above finds place in Chap.
VA, headed " Government Property Held by Trust.
" It is 14 manifest upon a reading of the entire section that there are no express words of conveyance whereby title is transferred by Government to the Trust either absolutely or upon certain conditions.
As applied to the present case, sub section
(1) only provides that the Government would place the property in question at the disposal of the Trust which shall hold the same in accordance with the terms as may be agreed between them, that is to say, in accordance with the terms of the agreement aforesaid, (exhibit D 5).
Placing the property " at the disposal of the Trust " does not signify that Government had divested itself of its title to the property and transferred the same to the Trust.
Clause 12 of the agreement (exhibit D 5) to the effect that "Government may at any time on giving six months ' notice terminate this agreement " clearly indicates that the Government had created this agency not on a permanent basis.
but as a convenient mode of having its schemes of improvement implemented by a single agency with wide powers of management and expenditure of funds placed at its disposal, either by way of income from the property or by way of advance from Government funds.
Sub section
therefore, does not in express terms or by necessary implication confer any title on the Trust in respect of the market.
The Trust only holds the market and realizes the income therefrom which is disbursed in accordance with the terms of the agreement and the rules framed by the Chief Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him by cl.
(e) of sub section
(1) of section 72.
Our attention was called to some of those statutory rules, particularly rules, 21, 36, 38 and 156 read along with the forms and the Appendix.
It is not necessary to discuss those rules in detail because on a consideration of those rules we are satisfied that they are more consistent with the Trust being a statutory agent of the Government, which has to maintain separate accounts in.
respect of nazul property.
Any reappropriation from nazul to non nazul or vice versa could not be made by the Trust without the prior sanction of the Chief Commissioner.
The method of keeping accounts in respect of the nazul estate would show that the Trust had to function as 15 the statutory agent of the Government in the matter of the administration of the Trust funds with particular reference to the nazul estate with which we are immediately concerned.
But it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that sub section (2) of section 54A quoted above postulates that the Trust is the owner of the property ' otherwise the sub section would not speak of the Trust having to transfer immovable property held by it to the Chief Commissioner in certain contingen cies, upon payment of all costs incurred by the ' Trust in acquiring, reclaiming or developing that property together with interest calculated in the way set out in that sub section.
It should be noted in this connection that what the Government was required to pay was not the market value of the property but only the cost incurred by the Trust.
That provision apparently was made for the purpose of accounting between the different branches of the Trust activities.
If title really vested in the Trust, it would be entitled to receive from Government the price of the property and not merely required to be reimbursed in respect of the actual expenditure on the scheme.
Particular reliance was placed upon the words " and such property shall thereupon vest in the Chief Commissioner.
" It was argued that unless the property previously vested in the Trust it could not upon the transfer contemplated by sub section
(2) vest in the Chief Commissioner.
This argument assumes that the word " vest " necessarily signifies that title to the property resides in the Trust.
But the word "vest" has several meanings with reference to the context in which it is used.
In this connection reference may be made to the following observations of Lord Cranworth in Richardson vs Robertson (1) : " .
The word 'vest ' is a word, at least of ambiguous import.
Prima facie 'vesting ' in possession is the more natural meaning.
The, expressions 'investiture ' 'clothing ' and whatever else be the explanation as to the origin of the word, point prima facie rather to the enjoyment than to the obtaining of a right.
But (1) , at P. 78.
16 I am willing to accede to the argument that was pressed at the bar, that by long usage ' vesting ' ordinarily means the having obtained an absolute and indefeasible right, as contra distinguished from the not having so obtained it.
But it cannot be disputed that the word ' vesting ' may mean, and often does mean, that which is its primary etymological signification, namely, vesting in possession.
" Similarly with reference to the provisions of a local Act (5 Geo. 4, c. Ixiv), it was held that the word "vest" did not convey a freehold title but only a right in the nature of an easement.
The following words of Willes, J. in Hinde vs Charlton(1) are relevant: words, which in terms vested the freehold in persons appointed to perform some public duties, such as canal companies and boards of health, have been held satisfied by giving to such persons the control over the soil which was necessary to the carrying out the objects of the Act without giving them the freehold ' " In the case of Coverdale vs Charlton (2), the Court of Appeal on a consideration of the provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 55) with particular reference to section 149, has made the following observations at p. 116: What then is the meaning of the word 'vest ' in this section ? The legislature might have used the expression transferred ' or 'conveyed ', but they have used the word 'vest '.
The meaning I should like to put upon it is, that the street vests in the local board qua street; not that any soil or any right to the soil or surface vests, but that it vests qua street." Referring to the provisions of section 134 of the Lunacy Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 5) in the case of In re Brown (a lunatic)(3) it has been laid down by Lindley, L. J., that the word "vested" in that section included the right to obtain and deal with; without being actual owner of the lunatic 's personal estate.
(1) (1866 67) C.P. Cases 104 at 116.
(2) (3) 17 In the case of Finchley Electric Light Company vs Finchley Urban District Council(1), adverting to the provisions of section 149 of the Public Health Act, 1875, (supra) Romer, L.J., has made the following observations at pp.
443 and 444: "Now, that section has received by this time an authoritative interpretation by a long series of cases.
It was not by that section intended to vest in the urban authority what I may call the full rights in fee over the street, as if that street was owned by an ordinary owner in fee having the fullest rights both as to the soil below and as to the air above.
It is settled that the section in question was only intended to vest in the urban authority so much of the actual soil of the street as might be necessary for the control, protection, and maintenance of the street as a highway for public use.
For that proposition it is sufficient to refer to what was said by Lord Halsbury, L. C., and by Lord Herschell in Tunbridge Wells Corporation vs Baird(2) I. .
That section has nothing 'to do with title; it is not considering a question of title.
No matter what the title is of the person who owns the street, the section is only considering how much of the street shall vest in the urban authority. .
That the word "vest" is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also.
For example, section 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (V of 1920) empowers the court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that " such property shall thereupon vest in the receiver.
" The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realising his assets.
The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property.
On the other hand, sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act.
(Act I of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of (1)[1903] 1 Ch.
437. 3 (2) 18 certain events, shall " vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances '.
In the cases contemplated by sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes.
the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession.
The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration.
It would thus appear that the word "vest" has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the autho rity in whom it vests.
It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation.
The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.
The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view.
We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust.
In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may be at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body.
Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily lead to the,legal inference that the structure was the property of the Trust.
In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Bhatia Co operative Housing Society Ltd. vs D. C. Patel(1).
The case is not on all fours with the facts of the present case.
But the following observations of Das J. (as he then was) at p. 195 of the report are pertinent: " It is true that the lessee erected the building at his own cost but he did so for the lessor and on the (1) ; 19 lessor 's land on agreed terms.
The fact that the lessee incurred expenses in putting up the building is precisely the consideration for the lessor granting him a lease, for 999 years not only of the building but of the land as well at what may, for all we know, be a cheap rent which the lessor may not have otherwise agreed to do.
By the agreement the building became the property of the lessor and the lessor demised the land and the building which, in the circumstances, in law and in fact belonged to the lessor.
The law.
of fixtures under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act may be different from the English law, but section 108 is subject to any agreement that the parties may choose to make.
Here, by the agreement the building became part of the land and the property of the lessor and the lessee took a lease on that footing.
" In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that either under the provisions of the Improvement Act or in accordance with the terms of the agreement (exhibit D 5) or the two taken together, the market became the property of the Trust.
We have already noticed the relevant portions of the correspondence that passed between Government and the Trust to show that though at the initial stages the Trust proposed that the ownership of the market should vest in the Trust, the final terms agreed between the parties in accordance with the provisions of section 54A left the ownership with Government.
We have come to this conclusion without reference to the admission of the plaintiff contained in para.
22 of the indenture (exhibit D 4) quoted above.
It is therefore not necessary for us to consider the question raised by the learned Attorney General that the plaintiff was bound by that admission or whether that admission is vitiated by any pressure of circumstances or duress as pleaded by the plaintiff.
Certainly that admission is a piece of evidence which could be considered on its merits even apart from the question of estopped which had not been specifically pleaded or formed the subject matter of a separate issue.
In view of our finding that the market, as also the land on which it stands, is the property of Government, the conclusion follows that the operative provisions of 20 the Control Act do not apply to the premises in question.
That being so, it must be held that there is no merit in this appeal.
It is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
Under an agreement the Government placed certain lands belonging to it at the disposal of the Improvement Trust for the construction of a market.
The Trust constructed the market with funds advanced by the Government by way of loan at interest.
Under the agreement the Trust had to pay a certain fixed sum by way of revenue on the property; the income from the market had to be applied to the payment of interest on the money advanced by Government, and to the payment of expenses for the management of the market and the surplus had to be placed at the disposal of, Government to be spent according to its directions.
The lessee of the market from the Trust filed a suit for a declaration that it was protected from ejectment by the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act.
It was contended by the lessee that the market was the property of the Trust to which the Act applied.
It was further contended by the lessee relying upon the language of section 54A(2) of the U. P. Town Improvement Act, that the market vested in the Trust for otherwise it could not upon transfer by the Trust vest in the Chief Commissioner as provided by this section.
Held, that upon a proper construction of the terms of the agreement between the Trust and the Government, the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of the Government and that the market was Government premises to which the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act were not applicable by virtue Of section 3(a).thereof, and consequently the lessee was liable to ejectment upon termination.
of the period of the lease.
The word 'vest ' has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or authority in whom it vests.
It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession or it may vest in a limited sense.


judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1981.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 16th January, 1980 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 185 of 1979.
J. L. Nain and R. N. Poddar for the Appellant.
O. P. Rana, A. C. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BAHARUL ISLAM, J.
This appeal by special leave is by the State of Gujarat and is directed against the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court quashing the order of detention passed by the H appellant against respondent, Ismail Juma.
The respondent was detained by the appellant in exercise of powers conferred on it by 1016 Sub section (I) of Section 3 of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ').
The grounds of detention inter alia were that the respondent, Hasan Malabari and Abdul Latif Fakirmohmed were the members of the crew of a vessel that was engaged in smuggling of wrist watches and some other contraband articles worth Rs. 33,70,819,00.
The respondent moved the High Court of Gujarat.
A Division Bench ofthe High Court by its impugned order dated January 16, 1980 quashed the order of detention.
The High Court found: ". the order of detention made against him (detenu) clearly shows that the detaining authority had not applied his mind to the facts of the case .
The impugned order nowhere states that the detaining authority on having received a proposal from the customs authorities, had applied his mind to all materials on record and had reached satisfaction that the facts of the case warranted the detention of the petitioner.
In absence of anything to show that the detaining authority was satisfied with the material on record so as to enable him to detain the petitioner, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
It suffers from a fatal infirmity.
The impugned order of the High Court is liable to be set aside as factually the above observations are incorrect.
Presumably the attention of the High Court was drawn only to the order of the appellant made under Section S of the Act by which the Government directed the detenu to be detained in Ahmedabad Central Prison.
This order was dated August 1, 1979 (Annexure 'B ').
There was another order of the same date passed under sub section (I) of Section 3 of the Act which in fact was the order of detention which ran as follows: "Whereas the Government of Gujarat is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Ismail Juma Tangan alias Bando residing at Balapar, Beyt (Okha), Distt.
Jamnagar that, with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods, it is necessary so to do; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of Section 3 of the , 1017 the Government of Gujarat hereby directs that the said A Shri lsmail Jumma Tangan Bando (be detained.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat, Sd/ P.M. Shah Deputy Secretary to the Government (Annexure 'A ')" 3.
Both these orders were taken in the name of the Governor of Gujarat and were authenticated by Shri P. M. Shah, Deputy Secretary to Government of Gujarat, Home Department (Special).
These two orders were accompanied by the grounds of detention, a which have been filed before us as Annexure 'C '.
Annexure 'C ' is also dated August 1, 1979 and was taken in the name of the Governor of Gujarat, and authenticated by the same Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat, Shri Shah.
A perusal of these three documents do not justify the finding of the High Court that the detaining authority had not applied its mind to the materials before it and that it had not "reached satisfaction that the facts of the case warranted the detention of the petitioner.
" The finding of the High Court has been based on a presumption which is unjustified.
This Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya(1) held:. "The High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is to see whether the order of detention has been passed on the materials before it.
If it is found that the order has been based by the detaining athority on materials on record, then the court cannot go further and examine whether the material was adequate or not which is the function of ail appellate authority or Court.
It can examine the material on record only for the purpose of seeing whether the order of detention has been based on no material.
The satisfaction mentioned in Section 3 of the Act is the satisfaction of the detaining authority and not of the Court. ' The reason is that the satisfaction of the detaining authority is subjective.
Additionally it appears from the affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary (referred to in greater detail herein below) that the entire record was carefully considered by the Home Minister concerned before the order of detention was passed.
1018 5.
Mr. Rana appearing as Amicus Curiae for the respondent raised a preliminary objection before us.
The same preliminary objection was raised in State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya (supra), namely, that in view of the fact that the maximum period of detention mentioned in Section 10 of the Act had expired, the appeal had become infructuous The objection is covered by our aforesaid judgment.
The additional argument advanced by Mr. Rana in this behalf was that once the maximum period prescribed by law was over, the order of detention was non est and there was no order by which the detenu could be put under fresh detention.
The answer is once the order quashing the order of detention of the detenu is set aside by this Court, the order of the High Court rendering the order of detention non est itself becomes non est and the order of detention gets life.
We do not find any valid reason to differ from our earlier judgment (supra) on this point.
The only other submission made by Mr. Rana in this appeal was that the order of detention was not passed by a competent authority mentioned in the Act.
This point is new and does not appear to have been urged before the High Court.
Even so we heard Mr. Rana on the point and proceed to give our decision.
The relevant authorities that can pass order of detention are mentioned in Sub section (I) of Section 3 of the Act.
The authorities are the Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government.
The argument was that the order was signed by the Deputy Secretary (Shri P. M. Shah) and he was not one of the authorities mentioned in Sub section (I) of Section 3 of the Act.
This appeal came up for hearing on an earlier occasion but after being heard in part was adjourned to enable the counsel of the appellant to satisfy the Court as to who actually passed the order of detention.
In pursuance of that order of this Court, an affidavit has been filed by Shri P. M. Shah aforesaid.
It has been stated in the affidavit that the entire record was placed before the Home Minister who "after careful consideration of the entire record has passed the impugned order of detention" and that he (Mr. Shah) "only authenticated the impugned order of detention in accordance with sub clause (2) of 1019 Article 166 of the Constitution of India.
" As the order has been A taken in the name of the Governor of Gujarat and validly authenticated by the Deputy Secretary concerned, the order tentamounts to an order by the State Government of Gujarat.
It therefore cannot be said that the order of detention was not passed by the competent authority.
In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The impugned order of the High Court is set aside.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The respondent was detained by the appellant under sub section (I) of section 3 of the .
The grounds for detention were that the respondent along with two others were members of the crew of a vessel that was engaged in smuggling of wrist watches and other contraband articles worth about Rs. 33 lakhs.
The respondent moved the High Court which quashed the order of detention, holding that the order of detention clearly showed that the detaining athority had not applied his mind to the facts of the case and that the impugned order nowhere stated that the detaining authority on having received a proposal from the customs authorities, had applied his mind tc all the materials on record and had reached satisfaction that the facts of the case warranted detention.
Allowing the State 's appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: 1, The order dated August 1, 1979 made under section S of the Act by the Government directed the detenu to be detained.
On the same date another order was passed under sub section (1) of section 3 which in fact was the order of detention.
It provided that the Government was satisfied that with a view to preventing the respondent from smuggling goods it was necessary to detain him.
These two orders were accompanied by the grounds of detention which was also dated August 1,1979.
A perusal of these three documents do not justify the finding of the High Court that the detaining authority had not applied its mind to the materials before it and that it had not "reached satisfaction that the facts of the case warranted the detention of the petitioner.
" The finding of the High Court has been based on a presumption which is unjustified.
[1016 F 1017 E] 1015 2.
The High Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is to see whether the order of detention has been passed on the materials before it.
If it is found that the order has been based by the detaining authority on materials on record, then the court cannot go further n examine whether the material was adequate or not which is the function of an appellate authority or Court.
It can examine the material on record only for the purpose of seeing whether the order of detention has been based on no material.
The satisfaction mentioned in section 3 of the Act is the satisfaction of the detaining authority and not of the Court.
[1017 F] State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 740, referred to.
Once the order quashing the order of detention of the detenu is set aside by this Court rendering the order of detention non est itself becomes non es and the order of detention gets life.
[1018 C] 4.
The relevant authorities that can pass order of detention are mentioned in sub section (1) of section 3 of the Act.
The authorities are the Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government.
[1018 E F] In the instant case the order having been taken in the name of the Governor and validly authenticated by the Deputy Secretary concerned, the order tentamounts to an order by the State Government.
It, therefore, cannot be said that the order of detention was not passed by the competent authority.
[1019 A]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2132 of 1977.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd September, 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No. 76 of 1963 D.V. Patel, R. Shroff, Gopal Subramaniam and D.P. Mohanty for the Appellant.
M.N. Phadke, S.C. Patel and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA J.
The present appeal by special leave is directed against the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 23rd of September, 1976.
The sole question for consideration in this appeal is whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit giving rise to the present appeal.
There is an old institution known as Edroos Dargah of Hazrat Sayedina Mohomed Bin Abdulla El Edroos at Surat.
Village Orma is an inam village held by the said institution.
The dispute in the present case relates to the property of the said village orma comprising its soil, trees, lanes, roads together with cultivated lands of about 1093 acres with land revenue alienated Rs. 2,747.10.5.
Pursuant to the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Act 42 of 1953) hereinafter referred to as 'the 1952 Act ', the State of Bombay and after the reorganization of States, the State of Gujarat, declared that the said Act was applicable to village Orma from I st of August, 1955 and, therefore, the exemption from the payment of land revenue was extinguished from the 1st of August, 1955.
Accordingly the State of Bombay through its Mamlatdar of Olpad sent a notice to the Sajjadanashin of the institution to that effect and also demanded the village records from his possession.
He also proceeded to take further and consequential action and declared that the rights of the institution in public roads, lanes, village site and land etc. are extinguished.
In the circumstances the Sajjadanashin was obliged to file the suit which was later on numbered as suit No. 9 of 1956.
The stand of the plaintiff is that village Orma was an inam village held by the religious institution of Edroos Dargah and the 885 provisions of section 4 of the 1952 Act have no application in view of clause (2) of section 3 of the said Act.
The defendant State contested the suit on grounds inter alia that the village in question was a personal inam within the meaning of section 2 (1) (a) of the 1952 Act and the State Government alone is competent to decide the question whether the grant is a personal inam or not and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question.
B The pleadings of the parties gave rise to fourteen Issues and the Trial Court decided all the substantial issues against the plaintiff.
Consequently it dismissed the suit holding that the inam in question was personal inam.
Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff went up in appeal to the High Court.
The appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge.
He took up the question of jurisdiction first.
The stand of the plaintiff appellant was that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and in support of his contention he placed reliance on Sayed Mohmed Baquir El Edroos vs The State of Bombay.(1) The learned Single Judge, however, doubted the correctness of the proposition laid down in that case and referred the case to a larger Bench and it was eventually decided by a Full Bench of that Court.
It appears that during the pendency of the appeal another Act was passed known as the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 (Act 16 of 1969) hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Act '.
It came into force on I 5th of November, 1969.
By this Act devasthan inams or inams held by religious and charitable institutions were also abolished.
The inevitable result of the 1969 Act is that whether the inam in question is a personal inam or a devasthan inam it cannot subsist.
The plea of the plaintiff, on the basis of which he filed the suit, was no more available to him after the passing of the latter Act.
But the question was still to be enquired into because if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the inam in question was a religious or charitable inam, it would be abolished only by the 1969 Act and, therefore, the plaintiff will be entitled to all the benefits of devasthan inam open to him till the enforcement of that Act.
The High Court, therefore, proceeded to hear the appeal despite the passing of the 1969 Act and by its judgment dated 2nd of September, 1976 came to the conclusion that the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question was with the State 886 Government and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
In view of its finding on the question of jurisdiction, the High Court did not think it necessary to enter into other issues involved in the case.
The plaintiff has now come to challenge the judgment of the Full Bench on obtaining special leave of this Court to appeal.
In the present appeal the plaintiff again reiterates that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
In order to appreciate the contentions, of the counsel of the parties on the question of jurisdiction, it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the 1952 Act Section 2 (1) (e) defines personal inams.
Insofar as it is material, it reads: "2.
(1) In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (e) "personal inam" means (i) a grant of a village, portion of a village, land or total partial exemption from the payment of land revenue entered as personal inam in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the Code.
(ii) . .
Explanation 1: If any question arises whether any grant is a personal inam such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final and the entry, if any, in respect of such grant in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the Code shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly.
Explanation II. . " The expression 'Code ' has been defined in section 2 (1) (b) of the Act as the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 (Bombay V of 1879).
Section 3 of the Act insofar as it is material, reads: "3.
Act not to apply to certain inams and grants Nothing in this Act shall apply to (1) . . (2) devasthan inams or inams held by religious or charitable institutions.
887 (3) . (4) . (5) .
Explanation: For the purposes of this section inams held by religious or charitable institutions means Devasthan or Dharmadaya inams granted or recognised by the ruling authority for the time being for a religious or charitable institution and entered as such in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the Code or in the records kept under the rules made under the (XXIII of 1871).
" Section 4 of the Act reads: "4.
Abolition of personal inams and rights in respect of such inams.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any usage, settlement, grant, sanad or order or a decree or order of a Court or any law for the time being in force, with effect from and on the appointed date .
(i) all personal inams shall be deemed to have been extinguished, (ii) save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of this Act, all rights legally subsisting on the said date in respect of such personal inams shall be deemed to have been extinguished: Provided that in the case of a personal inam consisting of exemption from the payment of land revenue only, either wholly or in part, such exemption shall be deemed to have been extinguished: (a) if the amount of such exemption is or exceeds Rs. 5,000 with effect from the 1st day of August, 1953, and (b) in all other cases, with effect from the 1st day of August, 1955." Mr. D.V. Patel, senior counsel for the appellant, assisted by Mr. G. Subramaniam, has contended that the High Court has gravely erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the suit.
According to the learned counsel unless the 888 jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred specifically or by necessary implication the Civil Court would have jurisdiction.
Admittedly there is no specific bar under the 1952 Act.
No provision has been brought to our notice specifically excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Now the question is whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been excluded by necessary implication.
The only bar is provided by Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e).
Explanation r provides that if any question arises whether any grant is personal inam, such question shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of the State Government shall be final.
Whether Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by necessary implication is the question for consideration.
The finality of the decision of the State Government contemplated by the explanation, says the learned counsel, is only for the purpose of the Act, namely, the 1952 Act, and this finality cannot stand in the way of the Civil Court to entertain the suit.
In support of his contention the learned counsel has strongly relied upon two decisions: Secretary of State, Represented by the Collector n of South Arcot vs Mask and Company,(1) and Dhulabhai and Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.(2) In the first case the Privy Council dealing with the jurisdiction of the Civil Court observed as follows (at page 236): "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied.
It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
" In Dulabhai 's case (supra) Hidayatullah C.J., speaking for the Court, on an analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court expressing diverse views, laid down the following propositions: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court 's jurisdiction must he held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to 889 do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit.
A Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
B (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
C Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme or the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive.
In the latter case lt is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra views cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act.
Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open.
A writ of Certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
G (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the 890 authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act.
In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.
" If we consider the present case, in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted case, in our opinion the finality of the decision of the Government as contemplated by Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Except for the Explanation, there is no other provision in the Act touching upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and none has been referred to before us by either party.
The Act does not give any details about the reference to and the enquiry by the Government.
No appeal has been provided for and it cannot be said that the case of the plaintiff has been considered by the Government in the same way as it would have been considered if the case had been filed before a Civil Court.
The very first principle laid down in the case of Dhulabhai postulates that where a statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil Court 's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit.
From a perusal of the provisions of the Act it cannot be said that there is adequate remedy available to the plaintiffs on reference made to the Government.
Even according p to the second principle laid down by the Supreme Court where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find out the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant.
The Act does not give any details about the reference to be made to the Government, the procedure to be followed by the Government, the opportunity to be afforded to the aggrieved party.
In the absence of any such details in the Act it is not possible to hold that the use of the expression 'finality of the decision of the Government ' in Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act was meant to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
The High Court in our opinion has committed a manifest error in travelling beyond the 1952 Act and referring to the provi 891 sions of the 1969 Act.
The High Court referred to section 4 of the 1969 Act, which exclusively vests the power to decide whether any village, portion of a village, or land is held in devasthan inam, in the authorised officer, and the State Government is empowered to authorise any officer under the proviso to section 4 (l) to decide questions arising under clauses (a) (b) or (c) of section 4.
Subsection (2) of section 4 of the said Act enables the person aggrieved by the decision of the authorised officer to go up in appeal to the State Government within sixty days from the date of the decision.
The High Court also referred to section 20 of the 1969 Act which specifically bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
It reads: "20.
No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with, by the officer authorised under the proviso to sub section (I) of section 4 or section 25 or the Collector, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in appeal, or the State Government in appeal or revision or in exercise of their power of control.
" On the basis of the provisions of the 1969 Act the High Court came to the conclusion that Explanation 1 to section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act and section 20 or the 1969 Act put beyond the pale of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away by the legislature to determine the question whether a particular inam is a personal or a devasthan inam.
We are concerned in the present case with the provisions of the 1952 Act.
There is no corresponding provision like section 20 of the 1969 Act in the 1952 Act nor is there any detailed procedure of appeal and revision in that Act as contemplated by the 1969 Act.
The High Court in our opinion was not justified in invoking the provisions of the 1969 Act while deciding the case under the 1952 Act.
The counsel for the State of Gujarat on the other hand referred to the definition of personal inam as given in section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act and according to the learned counsel the inam in question is a personal inam in view of the definition itself which says: Personal inam means a grant of a village, portion of a village, land or total partial exemption from the payment of land revenue entered as personal inam in the alienation register kept 892 under section 53 of the Code.
" So, entry of the nature of the inam in the alienation register is a decisive factor.
In the instant case the inam in question has been entered as personal inam in the alienation register.
Therefore, perforce it has to be taken as a personal inam and the plaintiff cannot escape the definition of the expression 'personal inam ' as given in section 2 (1) (e).
Likewise, for a devasthan inam also it is necessary to be so entered in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the Code in view of Explanation to section 3 of the 1952 Act.
The counsel for the appellant on the other hand referred to Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act which indicates that the entry in the register is not an essential part of the definition of the personal inam but it is only descriptive.
If the Government decides the case contrary to t he entry in the alienation register, the alienation register shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly.
This part of the Explanation takes away the rigour of the entry in the alienation register.
If the entry in the alienation register will be deemed to have been automatically amended by the decision of the Government on the question whether it is a personal inam or a devasthan inam there is no sanctity attached to such entry which is mainly intended to serve the purpose of realisation of land revenue.
The entry cannot be said to be so sacrosanct that it cannot be changed.
Indeed the explanation itself contemplates a change in view of the decision of the Government on the question.
It was next contended for the State that the Revenue Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to correct the entries in the revenue records and the counsel referred to section 53 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code.
It reads: "53.
A Register shall be kept by the Collector in such form as may from time to time be prescribed by the State Government of all lands, the alienation of which has been established or recognized under the provisions of any law for the time being in force; and when it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Collector that any sanad granted in relation to any such alienated lands has been permanently lost or destroyed, he may, subject to the rules and the payment of the fees prescribed by the State Government under section 213, grant to any person whom he may deem entitled to the same a certified extract from the said Register, which shall be endorsed by the Collector to the effect that it has been issued in lieu of the sanad said to have been lost or destroyed, and shall be deemed to be as valid a proof of title as the said sanad.
" 893 Section 203 of the said Code provides for appeal from any order passed by the Revenue officer to his superior and on the strength of these provisions it is sought to be argued that the plaintiff could have gone up in appeal against the decision of the officer under section 53 of the Code and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely barred.
If we refer to section 212 of the Code, the argument of the counsel for the State cannot be accepted.
Section 212 con templates that whenever in this Code it is declared that a decision or order shall be final such expression shall be deemed to mean that no appeal lies from such decision or order.
If this is what finality means under section 212 it cannot be argued with any force on behalf of the State that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.
C For the foregoing discussion the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained.
We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 23rd September, 1976 and remand the case to the High Court for deciding other points involved in the case.
The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
P.B.R. Appal allowed.

summary/full:
A notice was issued to the Sajjadanashin of the appellant institution stating that consequent on the coming into force of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 exemption from payment of land revenue was extinguished in respect of the inam village and that he should hand over the village records to mamlatdar.
The appellent in a suit filed in the Civil Court claimed that the inam was held by a religious institution and that, therefore, the provisions of the 1952 Act had no application to it.
In replication the State claimed that under the provisions of the 1952 Act the State Government alone was competent to decide the question whether the grant was a personal or a religious inam and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide it.
Holding that it was a personal inam the Trial Court dismissed the appellant 's suit.
When the appellant 's appeal was pending before the High Court the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 was passed abolishing the inams held by religious charitable institutions as well.
On the question of jurisdiction to decide whether an inam was personal or religious the High Court held that it was the State Government and not the Civil Court which had exclusive jurisdiction in this respect.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred specifically or by necessary implication the Civil Court would have jurisdiction and that the finality contemplated by Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) (which provides that if any question arises whether any grant is a personal inam such question shall be referred to the State Government and that the decision of the State Government shall be final) is only for the purposes of the 1952 Act and could not stand in the way of the Civil Court entertaining the suit.
883 Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
The finality of the decision of the Government as contemplated by Explanation I to section 2(1) (e) of the Act cannot exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Except for the Explanation, there is no other provision in the Act touching upon the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
[890 C D] 2.
In Dulabhai vs State of Madhya Pradesh, ; this Court held that where a statute gave finality to the orders of the special tribunal the .
Civil Court 's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit.
Under the provisions of the 1952 Act it cannot be said that an adequate remedy is available to the plaintiffs on reference made to the Government.
[888 G.H] 3.
The second principle laid down in the above case is that where there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the Act to find out the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided there in may be relevant.
In the absence of any details in the enactment about the reference to be made to the Government, the procedure to be followed by the Government, and the opportunity to be afforded to the aggrieved party, it cannot be held that the expression "finality of the decision of the Government" used in the Explanation was meant to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
[890 F G] 4.
The High Court, however, erred in travelling beyond the provisions of the 1952 Act by referring to the provisions of the 1969 Act and coming to the conclusion that Explanation I to section 2(1) (e) of the 1952 Act and section 20 of the 1969 Act put beyond the pale of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away by the legislature to determine the question whether a particular Inam was a personal or devasthan inam.
The High Court was not justified in invoking the provisions of the 1969 Act while deciding a case under the 1952 Act.
[891 E G] 5.
An entry in the alienation register as to whether an inam is personal or religious cannot be said to be so sacrosanct that it cannot be changed.
Explanation 1 to section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act indicates that the entry in the register is not an essential part of the definition of personal inam but is only descriptive.
If the Government decides a case contrary to the entry in the register of alienation the register shall be deemed to have been amended.
If an entry in the register would be deemed to have been automatically amended by the decision of the Government, there is no sanctity to such entry.
The explanation itself contemplates a change in view of the decision of the Government on the question.
An entry in the register is mainly intended to serve the purpose of realisation of land revenue.
[892 C D] 6.
Section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code provides for an appeal to a superior officer from an order passed by the revenue officer.
This section cannot be said to completely bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court because section 212 of the Code contemplates that whenever it is declared that a decision or order shall be final such expression shall be deemed to mean that no appeal lies from such decision or order.
If this is what finality meant under section 212 it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.
[893 A C] 884