judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1274 of 1988.
From the Judgment and order dated 7.10.1986 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 1143 of 1985.
Masodkar and A.K. Gupta for the Appellant.
V.S. Desai and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J.
1.
We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal after hearing both counsel 2.
The point raised in the appeal is a very short one.
The lands, belonging to the petitioners were among those sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') by means of a notification under Section 4 issued on 22nd June, 1982.
This was followed up by a declaration under Section 6 dated 15th March, 1983.
The petitioners challenged both the notification and the 443 declaration in writ petition No 947 of 1983 before the High Court The notification under Section 4 was challenged on the ground of mala fides and the declaration under Section 6 on the short ground that the petitioners ' objections had not been heard before the making of the declaration.
When this writ petition came up for hearing, a statement was made on behalf of the Government that the notification under Section 6 was being withdrawn.
On this statement being made, the writ petition was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly.
Thereafter the petitioners were heard under Section 5 A of the Act and a fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 4th April, 1985.
The petitioners again filed a writ petition in the High Court, being writ petition No. 1143 of 1985, the judgment in which forms the subject matter of the present appeal.
In this writ petition they again challenged the notification under Section 4 as vitiated by mala fides and non application of mind.
The High Court has found no merit in this contention and rejected the same.
We see no reason to interfere with this conclusion of the High Court.
However, another question was also raised by the petitioners, namely, that the withdrawal of the earlier declaration dated 15.3.1983 had the automatic effect of also rendering the notification under Section 4 dated 22.6.1982 ineffective and infructuous.
On the strength of the decision of this Court in State vs Vishnu Prasad Sharma, ; , it was contended that, once a declaration under section 6 was issued, the notification under Section 4 exhausted itself.
It made no difference, it was said, that the notification issued under section 6 had been withdrawn.
Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ajit Singh vs State, AIR 1972 Bombay 177 in support of this proposition.
This contention, however, was rejected by the High Court and hence the present appeal.
We are of opinion that the decision of the High Court is correct and should be upheld.
The Bench has rightly pointed out that Ajit Singh 's case (supra) had failed to take note of the decisions of this Court in Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal vs State, ; State vs Haider Bux, ; and State vs Bhogilal Keshavlal, ; and therefore, does not represent the correct law.
In Vishnu Prasad Sharma 's case (supra) the question for consideration of this Court was whether there could be successive declarations in respect of various parcels of land covered by a notification under Section 4(1).
Considering the scheme of the Act as it then stood, 444 the Court held that the Act envisaged a single declaration under Section 6 in respect of a notification under Section 4 and that, when once a declaration under Section 6 particularising the area in the locality specified in the notification under Section 4(1) is issued, the remaining non particularised area stands automatically released.
The Court also referred to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act in this context.
The following observations appear in the judgment of Sarkar J. ". .
It seems to me that if the correct interpretation is that only one declaration can be made under section 6, that also would exhaust the notification under section 4; that notification would no longer remain in force to justify successive declarations under section 6 in respect of different areas included in it.
There is nothing in the Act to support the view that it is only a withdrawal under section 48 that puts a notification under section 4 completely out of the way.
The effect of section 48 is to withdraw the acquisition proceedings.
including the notification under section 4 with which it started We are concerned not with a withdrawal but with the force of a notification under section 4 having become exhausted " 7.
The High Court was correct in pointing out that the above observations were made in the context of a valid declaration under S 6 The Court held that once there is a valid declaration under section 6, the scope of the notification under S 4 will got exhausted This principle cannot clearly apply to a case where the declaration under S 6 proves to be invalid.
ineffective or infructuous for some reason.
It has been so held by this Court in a number of decisions.
In Girdhari Lal Amrir Lal 's case (supra) which was decided about a week earlier to Vishnu Prasad Sharma 's case, this Court held that.
where a notification under section 6 is invalid, the Government may treat it as ineffective and issue in its place a fresh notification under S 6 and that there is nothing in S 48 of the Act to preclude the Government from doing so This view has been repeated in State vs Haider Bux, ; and State vs Bhogilal Keshavlal, ; These decisions have clearly pointed out the distinction between a case where there is an effective declaration under section 6 (which precludes the issue of further declarations in respect of other parts of the land covered by the notification under section 4 not covered by the declaration issued under S 6) and a case where? for some reason, the declaration under S 6 is invalid.
It is true that in the present case there was no occasion for the High Court in the earlier writ petition to pronounce the declaration 445 dated 15.3.1983 to be invalid.
But the validity of the declaration had been challenged on the ground that the petitioners had not been heard under section 5A, an irregularity, which ex facie rendered the declaration invalid.
The State Government obviously acknowledged this and withdrew the declaration on its own instead of obtaining a judgment to that effect from the Court.
In principle, there is no distinction between a case where a declaration under section 6 is declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the Government itself withdraws the declaration under section 6 when some obvious illegality is pointed out.
The point in issue in this appeal is thus directly governed by the three earlier decisions of this Court and the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition on this ground.
Before concluding we must refer to one circumstance which was brought to our notice by learned counsel for the petitioners and which has also been noticed in the judgment of the High Court.
It appears that, between the date of withdrawal of the earlier writ petition (namely, 23rd August, 1983) and the issue of the second declaration under section 6 (namely, 4.4.1985), the Government had issued a fresh notification under section 4 for the acquisition of certain lands.
The lands in the two notifications under section 4 do not completely overlap but it appears that some fields are common in both.
No declaration under section 6 appears to have been issued in furtherance of the second notification under section 4 when the High Court heard the matter.
Learned counsel for the petitioners points out that, at least in respect of such of the lands comprised in the section 4 notification dated 22.6.1982 as are also covered by the subsequent notification under section 4, it is legitimate to infer that the State Government has superseded the earlier notification by the latter one.
This contention is clearly well founded.
We would, therefore, like to make it clear that in respect of the lands covered by the first notification under section 4 which are also covered by or comprised in, the second notification under section 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition should be taken, in accordance with law, only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated in respect of such lands by the first notification dated 22.6.1982 should be deemed to have been superseded.
With the above clarification, we affirm the order of the High Court had dismiss this appeal.
In the circumstances, however, we make no order to costs.
G.N. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
% The appellants ' lands were among those sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by means of a notification under section 4, followed by a declaration under section 6.
The Notification and the declaration were challenged by way of a Writ Petition on the short ground that the appellants had not been heard before making the declaration.
When the Writ Petition was heard, a statement on behalf of the Government was made, to the effect that the notification under section 6 was being withdrawn.
On the basis of this statement the Writ Petition was disposed of as withdrawn.
Thereafter the appellants were heard under section 5A and a fresh declaration under section 6 was issued.
The appellants filed a Writ Petition and again challenged the Notification under section 4 as vitiated by mala fides and non application of mind.
The High Court rejected the same.
Another question raised before the High Court was that the withdrawal of the earlier declaration had the automatic effect of rendering the Notification under section 4 ineffective and infructuous.
The High Court rejected that contention as well.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
Once there is a valid declaration under section 6, the scope of the notification under section 4 will get exhausted.
This principle cannot clearly apply to a case where the declaration under section 6 proves to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason.
There is no distinction between a case where a declaration under section 6 is declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the Government itself withdraws the declaration under section 6 when some obvious illegality is pointed out.
[444E, 445B] 442 Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal vs State, ; ; State vs Haider Bux, ; and State vs Bhogilal Keshavlal, ; followed.
State vs Vishnu Prasad Sharma, ; distinguished.
Ajit Singh vs State, AIR 1972 Bombay 177 disapproved.
Between the date of withdrawal of the earlier Writ Petition and the issue of the second declaration under section 6, the Government had issued a fresh Notification under section 4 for the acquisition of certain lands.
The lands in the two Notifications under section 4 do not completely overlap, but some fields are common in both.
No declaration under section 6 had been issued in furtherance of the second notification under section 4 when the High Court heard the matter.
In respect of the lands covered by the first notification under section 4 which are also covered by or comprised in the second notification under section 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition shall be taken in accordance with law only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated by the first notification should be deemed to have been superseded.
[445C F]


judgement:
ION: Civil Appeal No.1014 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.1.1988 of the Madras High Court in C.P.P. No. 215 of 1986.
Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, Ms. Setia Vaidalingam, N. Thiagarajan and Ms. Radha for the Appellant.
section Srinivasan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The question which arises for consideration in this case is whether a landlord who seeks eviction of a tenant from a non residential building (other than a non residential building which is used for keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use) under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') is required to prove that he requires the said building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family bona fide in the proceedings instituted before the Controller.
The appellant is a partnership firm represented by its partner, 5.
Peer Mohammed.
The respondent 's brother was carrying on business in hardware in the front portion of the ground floor of the premises bearing No. 157, Kutcheri Road, Mylapore, Madras 4.
The appellant purchased the said running business from the brother of the respon dent on 5.7.1974.
The said building, however, belonged to the father 389 of the respondent.
After purchasing the business, the appellant became a tenant under the father of the respondent by paying an advance of Rs.1,500 and agreeing to pay a rent at the rate of Rs.450 per month for the portion in which it commenced to carry on the business.
In the rear portion of the ground floor of the premises one Mrs. Janaki Ammal was residing as a tenant.
Mrs. Janaki Ammal vacated the said residential portion in October, 1974.
With effect from 5.10.1974 the appellant took the portion vacated by Mrs. Janaki Ammal also on rent from the father of the respondent by paying Rs.525 as advance and agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs.175.
The rent of this portion was increased subsequently to Rs.315 per month.
On 25.11.1980 the appellant received a notice from an advocate, who was acting on behalf of the father of the respondent terminating the tenancy of the appellant in respect of both the portions with effect from 31.12.1980 and requiring the appellant to deliver possession of the two portions of the ground floor of the premises in question to the father of the respondent on the ground that he needed the premises for the occupation of his son.
The appellant sent a reply denying the right of the respondent 's father to evict the appellant from the premises.
Thereafter it is stated that the ownership of the premises in question was transferred in favour of the respondent by his father.
Thereafter the respondent asked the appellant to increase the rent payable for the premises.
In order to avoid litigation, the appellant agreed to pay a consolidated amount of Rs.1,000 per month by way of rent for both the portions in the year 1981 and also paid a sum of Rs.7,500 as advance.
On 9.6.1982 an agreement was entered into in respect of both the portions specifying that the lease should remain in force till 8.5.1983.
After the expiry of the said period, it is stated, the respondent again demanded enhanced rent.
On the appellant not complying with the said demand the respondent instituted a petition for eviction of the appellant in the Court of the Controller at Madras under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act on the ground that the premises in question were needed by his wife for carrying on pawn broker business which she was carrying on elsewhere.
The appellant resisted the petition.
It was inter alia contended by the appellant that the requirement of the wife of the respondent was not bona fide and the petition was liable to be dismissed.
After trial, the Controller dismissed the petition holding that the tenancy in question was in respect of both the residential and non residential portions and that the respondent could not seek eviction of the appellant as the major portion of the demised premises was of residential character.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Controller the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.
Thereupon the respon 390 dent preferred a revision petition before the High Court of Madras inCivil Revision Petition No. 215 of 1986.
That petition was allowed by the High Court holding that it was not necessary for the respondent to establish that his requirement was bona fide as the question of bona fides of a landlord 's requirement did not arise for consideration at all in case falling under secti10 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
It, however, held that the claim of the respondent was bona fide.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the revision petition and directed the appellant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondent.
This appeal by special leave is filed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras.
The crucial question which arises for consideration in this case is whether it is necessary for a landlord, who institutes a petition under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, to establish that his requirement is bona fide or not.
As can be seen from the long title of the Act it was enacted by the State Legislature to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non residential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu.
Section 10 of the Act provides that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of section 10 or sections 14 to 16 of the Act.
The material portion of sub section 3(a) of section 10 of the Act, which is relevant for purposes of this case reads thus: "10(3)(a).
A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.
(i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord required it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned; (ii) in case it is a non residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; 391 (iii) in case it is any other non residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; . . . . . . . . (e) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application.
" For purposes of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act the buildings are classified into two categories by the Act, namely, residential buildings and non residential buildings.
Sub clause (i) of clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act provides that a landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of a residential building, if the landlord required it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned.
Sub clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act relates to eviction from a non residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use.
If the landlord required such a building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own he can apply for the eviction of the tenant therefrom.
Sub clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act deals with other kinds of non residential buildings.
If the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own, a landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of such a building.
It may be stated here that the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family ' are not to be found in sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act.
Clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act, however, provides that the Controller shall, if he is 392 satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application.
Clause (e) of section 10(3) applies to all cases of eviction falling under section 10(3) of the Act.
The decision in this case depends upon the effect of the omission of the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family ' in sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act.
It is argued on behalf of the appellant that reading sub clause (ii) and (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act together, which relate to the eviction from non residential buildings, the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family ' which are found in sub clause (ii) of section 10(3)(a) should be read into sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) also and that a landlord should establish in order to succeed in a petition for eviction filed under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act that his requirement or the requirement of a member of his family is bona fide.
It is also argued in the alternative that the word 'claim ' in the words 'that the claim of the landlord is bona fide ' in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act refers only to the requirement of the landlord and to nothing else.
On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the respondent relying upon three decisions of the High Court of Madras in (i) M/s. Mahalakshmi Metal Industries vs K. Suseeladevi, ; (ii) M. Abdul Rahman vs section Sadasivam, and (iii) A. Khan Mohammed vs P. Narayanan Nambiar & Others, 99 Law Weekly 966 that there was no need for a landlord to establish the bona fides of his requirement or the requirement of a member of his family when a petition is filed under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and it is enough if his claim is proved to be bona fide.
The High Court has upheld the said plea of the respondent relying upon the said three decisions.
The correctness of these three decisions is questioned before us by the appellant.
We have already noticed that the object of the Act was to prevent unreasonable evictions of tenants from buildings.
The Act is an ameliorating piece of legislation.
Similar acts are in force in almost all the States in India.
The provision in question has to be construed against this background.
The Act has been in force from 1960.
In Moti Ram vs Suraj Bhan & Other, ; this Court was required to construe section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which at the relevant time provided that a landlord might apply to the Controller for directing a tenant to 393 put the landlord in possession of the building in question if he required it for the re construction of that building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings.
In that case the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had rejected the claim of the landlord on the ground that the landlord had not established that the premises in question were required by him bona fide.
The High Court while accepting that the requirement in question must be shown to be bona fide held that on the evidence the findings of the Courts below that the landlord 's requirement was not bona fide were not correct.
The High Court accordingly directed the eviction of the tenant in question.
This Court while affirming the decision of the High Court held that the landlord had, in fact, made out that he required the premises bona fide for purposes of re construction.
Thus it is seen that in the context of a law enacted for preventing unreasonable evictions this Court read into a ground on which a landlord could seek the eviction of his tenant that the landlord should establish that his requirement was bona fide.
A mere desire on the part of the landlord to re construct a building was not sufficient to evict a tenant from the premises.
He had to establish that he needed the premises bona fide for re construction it.
In a later case, i.e., Neta Ram vs Jiwan Lal, [1962] 2 Supp.
S.C.R. 623 which arose under the provisions of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, one of the grounds on which the landlord sought the eviction of the tenants in occupation of the premises involved in that case was that the premises were in a state of disrepair and were dilapidated and, therefore, the landlord wished to rebuild on the premises after dismantling the structure.
On the said issue the Rent Controller held that in deciding whether the tenant should be ordered to hand over the possession to the landlord the Courts must have regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord which meant that the desire to rebuild the premises should be honestly held by the landlord but that the condition of the building also played an important part in determining whether the landlord had the intention genuinely and the landlord was not using the said excuse as a device to get rid of the tenants.
In that connection the Rent Controller observed that the state of the building, the means of the landlord and the possibility of the better yield by way of rent should be kept in mind.
The Controller, holding that the claim of the landlord was not bona fide, decided the said issue against him.
On appeal the Appellate Authority held that the shops and chobaras were in good condition and that the landlord was not, in good faith, wanting to replace the building, when he had no means to build it.
The High Court, however, allowed the revision petition filed before it holding that upon the evidence on record it had been established 394 beyond doubt that the landlord genuinely and bona fide required the premises for re building.
On appeal by special leave to this Court, this Court observed that the very purpose of the Rent Restriction Act would be defeated if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they wanted to reconstruct the house without first establishing, that the plea was bona fide with regard to all circumstances, viz. that the houses needed reconstruction or that they had means to reconstruct them.
Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court was reversed and the petitions for eviction were dismissed.
Following the observations made in the above decisions in Nathella Sampathu Chetty vs Sha Vajingjee Bapulal, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras construed section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act thus: "Section 10 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, provides for eviction of tenants in certain circumstances.
Sub section 3(a)(iii) of the section allows a landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing a tenant to put him in possession of the building if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of business which he is carrying on, a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own.
The second proviso to this clause is to the effect that where a landlord has already obtained possession of a building under this provision, he shall not be entitled to apply again for possession of another non residential building of his own.
If the conditions of these provisions are satisfied, the Controller may make an order as asked for by the landlord provided he is further satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide.
(underlining by us) In the Madras District Central Co operative Bank Limited, Mylapore Branch, Madras 4 vs A. Venkatesh, 99 Law weekly 714 a single Judge of the High Court disagreed with the views expressed by another single Judge in Abdul Rahman 's case (supra) and observed thus: "The question now is whether an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession should be made.
It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent landlord following a ruling of this Court in Abdul Rahman vs section Sadasivam, that there is no jurisdiction for the Rent Controller to go into the question of bona fide requirement 395 in a claim under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
Ramanujam, J. took the view that a distinction has to be made between the two sections, section 10(3)(a)(i) and section 10(3)(a)(iii) in view of the word 'require ', occurring in section 10(3)(a)(i) and in the absence of that word, in section 10(3)(a)(iii) in other words, what the learned Judge points out is that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, as the Rent Controller has to pass an order of eviction in case the landlord is not occupying for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, any non residential building in the city which is his own.
The learned Judge further pointed out that when the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(i) and section 10(3)(a)(iii) use different expressions, it should be taken that the Legislature intended these provisions to have different operations.
With respect to the learned Judge, I may point out that the mere absence of the word 'require ' in section 10(3)(a)(iii) would not necessarily lead to the inference that the Legislature did not intend that the Rent Controller should go into the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord in respect of the requirement of a non residential premises under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
My reasons for holding so are as follows: section 10 enumerates certain grounds for the eviction of the tenant.
In other words eviction under the Rent Control Act can be effected only on the grounds mentioned in section 10.
The landlord may have a right to evict the tenant under the general law.
section 10(3)(a) says that the landlord may, subject to the provisions of Cl.
(d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the buildings.
section 10(3)(a)(i) deals with residential buildings.
section 10(3)(a)(ii) deals with non residential buildings used for purpose of keeping vehicles.
section 10(3)(a)(iii) is in respect of non residential buildings.
section 10(3)(b) gives a right to religious, charitable, educational or other public institutions, to institute proceedings before the Controller if the institution requires the building.
section 10(3)(c) is for additional accommodation.
section 10(3)(d) speaks of tenancy for specified period agreed between the landlord and the tenant and it prohibits the landlord from applying, before the expiry of such period.
Now after these sections, section 10(3)(e) runs thus: 'The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim 396 of the landlord is bona fide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. ' I find in the judgment of Ramanujam, J. this section 10(3)(e) has not been adverted to.
section 10(3)(e) applies to Ss. 10(3)(a)(i), 10(3)(a)(ii) and 10(3)(a)(iii) and also to Ss. 10(3)(b) and 10(3)(c).
If the Legislature intended that the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(i) and section 10(3)(a)(iii) to have different operations, the Legislature would not have stated in section 10(3)(e) that the Controller should be satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, before he makes an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, and the further words 'if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application ' very clearly show that the Controller should, before passing an order for eviction, be satisfied with the bona fide of the claim, or else he should dismiss it.
" The main ground on which the learned Judge who decided the above case disagreed with the decision in Abdul Rahman 's case (supra) is that in Abdul Rahman 's case (supra) section 10(3)(e) of the Act, which applied to all the three sub clauses, namely (i), (ii) and (iii) in section 10(3)(a) of the Act had not been adverted to.
The learned Judge also held that the mere absence of the word 'require ' in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act did not necessarily lead to the inference that the Legislature did not intend that the Controller should not go into the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord in a petition for eviction filed under that provision.
Another learned Judge of the Madras High Court has taken the same view in M/s. Thilagaraj Match Works, through its partner section Chidambaram vs C. Sundaresan, [1985] 1 Mad.
Law J. 106.
It is observed in that case thus: "In the present case, the Appellate Authority has not adverted to these features at all and in one place he observes that the bona fide of the claim of the landlord is extraneous and it should not be tested too severely.
This exposes his wrong approach to the question of bona fide which is a relevant one.
The very ingredient of section 10(3)(e) of the Act requires that the question of bona fide has got to be tested and it has got a due place while 397 adjudicating a petition for eviction by the landlord under the concerned provisions.
It is not the desire of the landlord, but there must be an element of need for the landlord before it could be stated that he requires the premises for his own occupation.
The features referred to above, cannot be eschewed as irrelevant, for after all bona fide will have to be proved in an ordinary manner like any other fact in issue, and the entire gamut of facts and circumstances has to be adverted to on this question.
As already stated, I am not expressing any opinion over these features on merits, and it is for the Appellate Authority to advert to them and adjudicate upon the question afresh one way or the other.
The discussions above oblige me to interfere in revision and accordingly the revision is allowed and the matter stands remitted to the Appellate Authority for him to consider it afresh taking note of all the relevant features and factors of the case on the question of bona fides, and pass appropriate orders.
Both the counsel represent that for the purpose of comprehensive adjudication of the matter, further evidence has to be adduced.
I take note of the request of both the counsel and I direct that the Appellate Authority will permit the parties to place further evidence and he will decide the matter afresh after such evidence is placed, the Appellate Authority will do well to dispose of the matter expeditiously and in any event within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order." In P. Thanneermalai Chettiar vs S.J. Dhanraj, another learned Judge of the High Court of Madras has construed section 10(3)(e) of the Act thus: "It is not disputed that section 10(3)(e) of Act 18 of 1960 is applicable to the case of residential building as well as non residential building and it is provided therein that if the Controller is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building; otherwise, he has to reject the application.
In the instant case, considering the various circumstances and also the fact that the petitioner was residing in a house of his own at Devakottai where he has got vast extent of properties and was carrying on business along with other members of his family, the 398 claim of the petitioner that he required the premises for his own use and occupation is not proved and in any event there is no bona fide in the same" The main ground on which the learned Judge who decided Abdul Rahman 's case (supra) held that it was not necessary to establish the bona fide equipment of the landlord when he made an application for eviction under section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was that, the word 'require ' was not to be found in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
We are of the view that having regard to the pattern in which clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the words 'if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of his any member of the family ' which are found in sub clause (ii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act have to be read also into sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act.
Sub clause (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non residential buildings.
They could have been enacted as one sub clause by adding a conjunction 'and ' between the said two sub clause, in which event the clause would have read thus: 'in case it is a non residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; and in case it is any other non residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. ' If the two sub clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result.
The non residential building referred to in sub clause (ii) is a building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use and all other non residential buildings fall under sub clause (iii).
The State Legislature cannot be attributed with the intention that it required a more stringent proof by insisting upon proof of bona fides of his requirement or need also when a landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant from a garage than in the case of a non residential building which is occupied by large commercial house for carrying on business.
The learned counsel for the respondent was not able to explain as to why the State Legislature gave greater protection to tenants occupying premises used for keeping vehicles or adapted for such use than to tenants occupying other types of non residential buildings.
It is no doubt true that the Court while construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is 399 enacted the court should construe it in a harmoneous way to make it meaningful.
In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs Asher, [1949] 2 All.
E.R. 155 at 164.
Lord Denning L.J. said: "When a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.
He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament . . and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life ' to the intention of the legislature . .
A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they should have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done.
A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven but he can and should iron out the creases.
" This rule of construction is quoted with approval by this Court in M. Pentiah and Ors.
vs Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors., ; at 314 and it is also referred to by Beg, C.J. in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, etc.
vs R. Rajappa & Ors., ; In the present case by insisting on the proof of the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord, the Court is not doing any violence to the statute nor embarking upon any legislative action.
The Court is only construing the words of the statute in a reasonable way having regard to the context.
We are of the view that by merely proving that the premises in question is a non residential building and that the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for the purpose of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on any residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own, the landlord cannot in the context in which section 10(3)(a)(iii) appears get a tenant evicted.
He must show in view of clause (e) of section 10(3) that his claim is bona fide.
The word 'claim ' means "a demand for something as due" or "to seek or ask or for on the ground of right" etc.
In the context of Rent Control Law which is enacted for the purpose of giving protection to tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of making equitable distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in need of them in order to prove that his claim is bona fide a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in possession of the premises which is in the occupation of a tenant.
Any decision on 400 the question whether a landlord deserves to be put in possession of a premises in the occupation of a tenant should naturally depend upon the bona fides of the landlord 's requirement or need.
The word 'claim ' in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, he construed as 'the requirement ' of the landlord or his deservedness. 'Deserve ' means 'to have a rightful claim ' or 'a just claim '.
Since clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act is also applicable to a petition filed under sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act it becomes necessary to examine whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide.
Otherwise a landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
Take a case where a landlord for some oblique reason wishes to get rid of his tenant from a non residential building of the category mentioned in section 10(3)(a)(iii) and to achieve his aim fakes to start money lending business (for which indeed no specified separate portion in a building may be needed) in a building not belonging to him and to create evidence even actually lends money to some of his friends or relatives and a week thereafter applies for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he is carrying on business and has no non residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned.
Apparently, the conditions prescribed in the aforesaid sub clause (iii) are fulfilled.
If the requirement of "claim" being "bona fide" as contained in section 10(3)(e) is construed to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non residential building is not to be considered and the circumstances that the landlord on the date of making the application is factually carrying on business and has no non residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned is to be construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide, the tenancy of no non residential building will be secure.
It will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature.
Such a contingency should be avoided as it would be against the very object of the Act itself.
The need of the landlord should be genuine.
That is the object of enacting clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act.
When once we reach the above conclusion it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises.
What is necessary is that he should bona fide need them for his own use and occupation or for occupation by any of the members of his family as held by this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., ; and Mattulal vs Radhe Lal, ; The learned Judge who decided the case out of which this appeal arises was, therefore, in error in holding that the landlord need not prove that his requirement was bona fide but that his claim was bona fide as provided in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the 401 Act.
The learned Judge has made a distinction between `requirement ' and `claim ' in the present case without there being a difference.
In the circumstances we are of the view that M/s. Mahalakshmi 's case (supra), M. Abdul Rahman 's case (supra) and A. Khan Mohammed 's case (supra) have been wrongly decided.
They are liable to be overruled.
We accordingly overrule them.
We hold that a landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from a non residential premises under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in order to succeed in his petition should establish that he bona fide requires the premises in addition to proving the other ingredients referred to therein.
The judgment of the High Court which has proceeded on a wrong basis has, therefore, to be set aside.
Since the High Court while allowing the revision petition has approached the case from a wrong angle, it is necessary to direct the High Court to decide it afresh in the light of what we have stated above.
We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand it to the High Court again to decide it afresh.
If the High Court finds that the case should be remanded to the Trial Court to enable any of the parties to lead evidence on the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord it may remit the case to the Trial Court.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
% The respondent 's brother was carrying on his business in the front portion of the ground floor of the premises in question, which belonged to the father of the respondent.
The appellant purchased the said running business from the brother of the respondent.
After purchasing the business, the appellant became a tenant under the father of the respondent.
In the rear portion of the ground floor of the premises, one Mrs. Janaki Ammal was residing as a tenant.
Mrs. Janaki Ammal vacated the said residential portion and the appellant took that portion also on rent from the father of the respondent.
The ownership of the premises in question was transferred in favour of the respondent by his father.
On 9.6.1982, an agreement was entered into in respect of both the portions specifying that the lease should remain in force till 8.5.1983.
After the expiry of the said period, the respondent instituted a petition for eviction of the appellant in the Court of the Controller under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, on the ground that the premises in question were needed by his wife for carrying on her business which she was carrying on somewhere else.
The appellant contended inter alia that the requirement of the wife of the respondent was not bona fide.
The Controller dismissed the petition, holding that the tenancy in question was in respect of both the residential and non residential portions and the respondents could not seek eviction of the appellant as the major portion of the demised premises was of residential character.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Controller, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.
The respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court.
The High Court allowed the revision petition holding that it was not necessary for the respondent to establish that his requirement was bona fide as the question of the bona fides of a landlord 's requirement did not 385 arise in a case under section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
It, however, held the claim of the respondent to be bona fide.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant filed this appeal before this Court for relief by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The crucial question which arose for consideration in this case was whether a landlord, who sought eviction of a tenant from a non residential building (other than a non residential building used for keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use) under section 10 (3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (the Act) was required to prove that he required the said building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family bona fide.
[390C D] The Act was enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non residential buildings and the control of the rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of the tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu.
The Act is an ameliorating piece of legislation.
Similar Acts are in force in almost all the States in India.
The provision in question section 10(3)(a)(iii) has to be examined against this background.
[390D;392G] Having regard to the pattern in which clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 10 of the Act is enacted and also the context, the words "if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family", found in sub clause (ii) of section 10 (3)(a) of the Act, have to be read also into sub clause (iii) of section 10 (3)(a) of the Act.
Subclauses (ii) and (iii) both deal with the non residential buildings.
They could have been enacted as one sub clause by adding a conjunction 'and ' between the said two sub clauses, in which event the clause would have read thus: 'in case it is a non residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord required it for his own use or for the use of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own, and in case it is any other non residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own. ' If the two sub clauses are not so read, it would lead to an absurd result.
The non residential building referred to in sub clause (ii) is a building used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, and all other non 386 residential buildings fall under sub clause (iii).
The State legislature cannot be attributed with the intention that it required a more stringent proof by insisting upon proof of bona fides of his requirement or need also when a landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant from a garage than in the case of a non residential building occupied by a large commercial house for carrying on business.
It is no doubt true that the Court, while construing a provision should not easily read into it words not expressly enacted, but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted, the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.
[398C H; 399A] In the present case, by insisting on the proof of the bona fide of the requirement of the landlord, the Court is not doing any violence to the statute nor embarking upon any legislative action.
The Court is only construing the words of the statute in a reasonable way having regard to the context.
[399E] By merely proving that the premises in question is a non residential building and that the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying, for the purpose of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, any residential building in the city,town or village concerned which is his own, the landlord cannot in the context in which section 10 (3)(a)(iii) appears, get a tenant evicted.
He must show in view of clause (e) of section 10 (3) that his claim is bona fide.
The word 'claim ' means "a demand for something as due", or "to seek or ask for on the ground of right", etc.
In the context of the Rent Control Law, which is enacted for the purpose of giving protection to the tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of making equitable distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in need of them, in order to prove that his claim is bona fide, a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in possession of the premises which is in the occupation of a tenant.
Any decision on the question whether a landlord deserves to be put in possession of a premises in the occupation of a tenant should naturally depend upon the bona fides of the landlord 's requirement or need.
The word 'claim ' in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, be construed as 'the requirement ' of the landlord or his deservedness.
Since clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act is also applicable to a petition filed under sub clause (iii) of section 10(3)(a) of the Act, it becomes necessary to examine whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide; otherwise, a landlord will be able to evict a tenant to satisfy his whim by merely proving the ingredients mentioned in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
If the requirement of "claim" being "bona fide" as contained in section 10(3)(e) is construed 387 to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non residential building is not to be considered and the circumstances that the landlord on the date of making the application is factually carrying on business and has no non residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned, is to be construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide, the tenancy of no non residential building will be secure.
It will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature.
The need of the landlord should be genuine.
The landlord should bona fide need the premises for his own use and occupation or for the occupation by any of the members of his family, as held by this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs Chandra Kant M. Patel and Ors., ; and Mattulal vs Radhe Lal; , [399F H; 400A G] The High Court was in error in this case in holding that the landlord need not prove that his requirement was bona fide but that his claim was bona fide as provided in clause (e) of section 10(3) of the Act.
The High Court made a distinction between 'requirement ' and 'claim ' without there being a difference.
[400H; 401A] The Court was of the view that M/s. Mahalakshmi Metal Industries vs K. Suseeladevi, ; M. Abdul Rahman vs section Sadasivam, 'and A. Khan Mohammed vs P. Narayanan Nambiar & Ors., 99 Law Weekly 965, relied upon by the respondent, were wrongly decided and were liable to be over ruled.
The Court overruled them.
A landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from a non residential premises under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act should in order to succeed in his petition, establish that he bona fide requires the premises in addition to proving the other ingredients referred to therein.
The judgment of the High Court set aside.
Since the High Court had approached the case from a wrong angle, the Court directed the High Court to decide the case afresh in the light of what the Court had said in this appeal.
Case remanded to the High Court to decide it afresh.
If the High Court found that the case should be remanded to the Trial Court to enable any of the parties to lead evidence on the question of bona fide requirement of the landlord, it might remit the case to the Trial Court.
[401B D] Mahalakshmi Metal Industries vs K.Suseeladevi, ; M. Abdul Rahman vs section Sadasivam, , and A. Khan Mohammed vs P.Narayanan Nambiar and others, 99 Law Weekly 965, overruled.
388 Moti Ram vs Suraj Bhan and Others, ; ; Neta Ram vs Jiman Lal, [1962] 2 Supp.
S.C.R. 623; Nathala Sampathu Chetty vs Sha Vajingjee Bapulal, [1967] 1 Mad.
L.J. 289; Madras District Central Co operative Bank Limited, Mylapore Branch, Madras 4 vs A. Venkatesh, 99 Law Weekly 714; M/s. Thilagaraj Match Works, through its partner section Chidambaram vs C. Sundresan, [1985] 1 Mad, Law J. 106; P. Thanneer Malai Chettiar vs S.J. Dhanraj and another, ; Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs Asher, at 164; M. Pentiah and Ors.
vs Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors., at 314; Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, etc.
vs R. Rajappa Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., [1974] 3 S.C.R.267 and Mattulal vs Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 S.C.R.127,referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1637 of 1987.
From the Judgement and order dated 3.3.1986 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 1055 of 1986.
S.K. Bagga and Mrs. S.K. Bagga for the Appellant.
R.S. Suri for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dated the 3rd March, 1986 dismissing the Writ Petition in limine under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India filed by the appellant before the High Court.
The appellant states that he is the owner of certain premises in Punjab.
It must, however, be mentioned that the petition is lacking in particulars as to what premises the appellant owned and in respect of which premises the appellant is making the grievances.
On this ground it is not possible to decide the question of vires canvassed before the High Court and repeated before us.
A petition challenging the constitutional validity of certain provisions must be in the context of certain facts and not in abstract or vacuum.
The essential facts necessary to examine the validity of the Act are lacking in this appeal.
On this ground the petition was rightly rejected and we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court on this ground alone.
Be that as it may as the question of vires of Section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter called 'the Act ', was challenged before the High Court and canvassed before us.
It is just as well that we did with that connection.
Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Section 4 of the said Act is ultra vires the Constitution and unreasonable inasmuch as the section provides that rent prevalent in 1938 the basis for the determination of fair rent if unreasonable and unjust.
He urged that pegging the rent prevalent in 1938 the basic rent was inequitable and unjust in the background of the tremendous rise in prices.
But it has to be borne in mind that certain increases have been provided for in section 4 from the rent prevalent in 1938.
In must, however, be remembered that the Act was passed as the preamble of the said Act which states, inter alia, "to restrict the 110 increase of rent".
One of the objects of the Act was to restrict the increase in rent.
With that object the Act has provided certain provisions as to fixation of the fair rent.
Section 4 of the Act which is under challenge may be conveniently set out as under: "Section 4 "Determination of fair rent: (1) The Controller shall on application by the tenant or landlord of a building or rented land fix the fair rent for such building or rented land after holding such enquiry as the Controller thinks fit.
(2) In determining the fair rent under this section, the Controller shall first fix a basic rent taking into consideration: (a) The prevailing rates of rent in the locality for the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during the twelve months prior to 1st January, 1939; and (b) the rental value of such building or rented land if entered in property tax assessment register of the municipal, town or notified area committee, cantonment board, as the case may be relating to the period mentioned in clause (a); Provided that, not with standing anything contained in sub sections (3), (4) and (5) the fair rent for any building in the Urban area of Simla shall not exceed the basic rent.
(3) In fixing the fair rent of a residential building the Controller may allow, if the basic rent: i) in the case of a building in existence before the Ist January, 1939 (a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem an increase not exceeding 81 xab per cent on basic rent; (b) exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase but does not exceed RS.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 12 1/2 per cent on such basic rent; (c) exceeds RS.50 per mensem an increase not exceeding 25 per cent on such basic rent; 111 (ii) in the case of building, constructed on or after the Ist January, 1939 (a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 25 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 37 1/2 per cent on such basic rent; (c) exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 50 per cent on such basic rent; (4) in fixing the fair rent of a scheduled building the controller may allow, if the basic rent (i) in the case of a building in existence before the Ist January, 1939 (ii) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 13 1/2 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 17 xab per cent on such basic rent; (c) exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 303 percent on such basic rent; (ii) in the case of a building constructing on or after the Ist January, 1939 (a) does not exceed Rs.25 per mensem an increase not exceeding 30 percent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs.25 but does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 42 xab per cent on such basic rent; (c)exceeds Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 55 per cent on such basic rent; 112 (5) In fixing fair rent of a non residential building or rented land the controller may allow, if the basic rent, (i) in the case of building in existence before the Ist January, 1939 or in the case of rented land; (a) does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 371/2 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding SO per cent on such basic rent; (ii) in case of building constructed after the Ist January 1939: (a) does not exceed Rs.50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 50 per cent on such basic rent; (b) exceeds Rs. 50 per mensem, an increase not exceeding 100 per cent on such basic rent; (6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle the Controller to fix the rent of a building or rented land at an amount less than the rent payable for such building or rented land under a subsisting lease entered into before the first day of the January 1939.
" It was contended that Section 4 of the Act provides the manner for determining the fair rent.
But while laying down the procedure for determining the fair rent it has laid down that the Rent Controller, while determining the fair rent under this section shall take into consideration the prevalent rates of rent in the locality for the same or similar accommodation in similar circumstances during 12 months prior to Ist January, 1939.
In other words, he has first to determine the rent prevalent in the locality in the year 1938 and then fix the rent accordingly.
This it is submitted, was unreasonable and as such arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and would be an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
There has been according to the appellant, a tremendous rise in prices and as such in pegging the rent at the rate of Act of 1938 in an Act of 1949 was unreasonable.
He drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the Rent Act in Assam, Tripura and Haryana where the provisions of fixation of rent 113 according to him were different and were more fair and just and reasonable in comparison and submitted that this provision of the Act in question was unfair and unjust.
We are unable to accept this contention because each legislature in the several States has provided the method of determination of fair rent on the basis of legal conditions, as judged to be, by each such legislature.
It is well settled that the legislative wisdom of such legislation is not a ground for which the validity of the Act can be challenged .
Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory or different.
Nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of two enactments.
The source of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application.
See in this connection the decision of this Court in Prabhakaran Nair and others vs State of Tamil Nadu and others; , Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel drew our attention, we must have hasten to add to the different statutes in different States on this aspect.
We cannot say that there was any better provision in those statutes, there were undoubtedly different provisions and those different provisions were judged by the legislatures of those State to be suited to the needs of those States.
It is not necessary for us to examine in details those very provisions.
Shri S.K. Bagga, learned counsel also drew out attention to the observations of this Court in the case of M/s Raval & Co. vs K.G. Ramachandran and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 818 1197412 S.C.R. 629.
He drew out attention how fair rent should be fixed by relying on the certain observations of Bhagwati, J. as the Chief Justice then was at Page No. 825 of the A.I.R.
In the facts and in the context of this case it is not necessary to refer to these observations.
These were made entirely in a different context.
It must be the function of the legislature of each State to follow the methods considered to be suited for that State, that would be no ground for judging the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a particular legislation in question by compari 114 son.
What may be the problem in Madras may not be the problem inPunjab.
It must however, be borne in mind that the Act in question was passed in 1949 and it pegged the rent prevalent in the similar houses in 1938 and as such is not unreasonable per se.
The rises stated tremendously after the end of the Second World War after the partition of the country.
In that view of the matter, we can not say that per se there is unreasonableness in fixing the prices in 1938 level.
Having regard to the specific preamble of the Act we find nothing unreasonable in the Scheme contemplated under Section 4 of the present Act.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the challenge to Section 4 on the grounds advanced before us must fail and it is accordingly rejected.
The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
% The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court questioning the vires of section 4 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
He did not, however, mention the particulars of the premises of which he claimed to be the owner, and in respect of which he was making a grievance.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.
Hence the appeal.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that section 4 of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution and violative of article 14, and would be an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and was unreasonable, and unjust inasmuch as it provided that rent prevalent in 1938 should be taken as the basis for the determination of higher rent and that pegging the rent prevalent in 1938 as the basic rent, was inequitable and unjust in the background of the tremendous rise in prices, and that the provisions of fixation of rent in other States were different and were more fair and just and reasonable in comparison.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.1 A petition challenging the constitutional validity of certain provisions must be in the context of certain facts and not in abstract or vacuum.
[109E]i 108 In the instant case, the essential facts necessary to examine the validity of the Act are lacking.
On this ground the petition was rightly rejected and this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of the High Court on this ground alone.
[109E F] 2.1 Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory or different.
Nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of two enactments.
The source of authority for the two statutes being different, article 14 can have no application.
[113C D] 2.2 Each legislature in the several States has provided the method of determination of fair rent on the basis of legal conditions, as judged to be, by each such legislature.
The legislative wisdom of such legislation is not a ground on which the validity of the Act can be challenged.
[113B] 2.3 It must be the function of the legislature of each State to follow the methods considered to be suited for that State, that would be no ground for judging the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a particular legislation in question by comparison.
What may be The problem in Madras may not be the problem in Punjab.
[113H; 114A] The Act in question was passed in 1949 and it pegged the rent prevalent in the similar houses in 1938 and as such is not unreasonable per se.
The rises started tremendously after the end of the Second World War after the partition of the country.
It cannot, therefore, be said that per se there is unreasonableness in fixing the prices in 1938 level.
[114A B] One of the objects of the Act was to restrict the increase in rent.
With that object, the Act as provided certain provisions as to fixation of the fair rent.
Therefore, having regard to the specific preamble of the Act there is nothing unreasonable in the Scheme contemplated under section 4 of the Act.
[114B C] Prabhakara Nair and others vs State of Tamil Nadu and others; , and M/s. Raval & Co. vs K.C. Ramachandran and others; , 2 S.C.R. 629, referred to. 109


judgement:
ION: Civil Appeal No. 864 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.5.1986 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 13975 of 1985.
M.K. Ramamurthi and A.K. Sangal for the Appellant.
Anil Dev Singh, G.B. Pai, O.P. Sharma, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, R.C. Gubrela, K.R. Gupta and R.K. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The appellant has questioned in this appeal by special leave the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the U.P. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') and also the validity of the Order dated December 5, 1984 passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh remitting an award passed by the Labour Court, Meerut for reconsideration by it.
The appellant was an employee of the Management, M/s. Electra (India) Ltd., Meerut Respondent No. 5 in the above appeal.
The services of the appellant were terminated by the Management by its Order dated April 4, 1977 and the said termination led to an industrial dispute.
The State Government by its Order dated May 5, 1979 made under section 4 K of the Act referred the said dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Meerut.
The question which was referred to the Labour Court read as follows: "Whether the termination/removal from work of the employee Shri B.P. Rajwanshi by the employers by their Order dated 4.4.1977 is justified and/or legal? If not, to 474 what benefits/damages is the concerned employee entitled to and with what other details?" On the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties, the following issues were framed by the Labour Court: 1.
Was Shri B.B. Rajwanshi not a workman as defined in the U.P. ? If so has this court jurisdiction to try this case? 2.
Did Shri B.B. Rajwanshi not make efforts to minimise the losses due to unemployment? 3.
To what relief, if any, is Shri B.B. Rajwanshi entitled? 4.
Has Shri B.B. Rajwanshi been retrenched? If so, how does it affect the case? After recording the evidence adduced by the parties and hearing the arguments the Labour Court held, (i) that the appellant was a workman as defined in the Act, (ii) that the termination of the services of the appellant was illegal and (iii) that the appellant was entitled to be reinstated in his post with continuity of service and also to the payment of backwages and other benefits.
The Labour Court accordingly passed an award on August 2, 1984 and forwarded it to the State Government.

summary/full:
% In this appeal, the appellant questioned the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the U.P. ( 'The Act ') and also the validity of the order passed by the Govt.
remitting the award passed by the Labour Court for reconsideration by it.
The appellant was an employee of respondent No. 5.
M/s. Electric (India) Ltd., Meerut.
The services of the appellant were terminated by the Management of the said respondent.
The termination of services led to an industrial dispute.
The State Government of Uttar Pradesh under section 4 K of the Act referred the said dispute for adjudication of the Labour Court, Meerut.
The Labour Court passed an award and forwarded it to the State Government.
Instead of publishing the award in the Official Gazette, as required by sub Section (3) of section 6 of the Act, the State Government passed an order under section 6(4) of the Act, remitting the award for reconsideration.
The appellant submitted before the Labour Court that he did not want any re consideration of the award.
On 7.2.1985, the Management filed an application saying that the case might be fixed for hearing after two months.
The appellant opposed the application.
The case was adjourned to 11.3.85 and on 11.3.85 to 26.3.85 at the further request of the management.
In the meanwhile, the management moved the State Government to transfer the case from the Labour Court, Meerut, to another Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal.
The State Government passed an order transferring the case to the Industrial Tribunal Meerut.
Aggrieved by the order, remitting the award to the Labour Court and the subsequent order, transferring the case to the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the above said two orders.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition in respect of the order made under section 6(4) of the Act, but set aside the order of transfer.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, upholding the 470 order passed under section 6(4) of the Act, the appellant filed this appeal in this Court for relief by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: By leave of the Court, the appellant raised an additional ground before the Court, questioning the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act itself, and the Court first took up for consideration the question relating to the constitutional validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act.
[476B C] The questions raised before the Labour Court were very simple ones.
They had no effect on the national economy.
They did not in any way interfere with the principles of social justice.
No grave consequences would have ensued if the award had been published in the Official Gazette and the parties, allowed to question its validity before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The parties had not been given notice by the State Government to show cause why the award should not be remitted to the Labour Court for a fresh consideration.
The order of the State Government also did not state why and on what points the State Government was not satisfied with the award and the questions on which the Labour Court was required to reconsider its award.
[479G H; 480A B] When once a decision is given by a quasi judicial authority, it would not be safe to confer on any executive authority the power of review or remission in respect of the said decision without imposing any limitation on the exercise of such power, Even when a Court is conferred the power of review, such power can be exercised ordinarily under the well known limitations as are found in Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Similarly, under section 16 of the , the power to remit an award to the Arbitrator can be exercised by a Civil Court only under the circumstances specified in that connection.
Sub section (4) of section 6 of the act imposes no such limitations.
[482C D] The argument of the State Government that it was open to the State Government to seek necessary guidance from the object and contents of the Act, and that the State Government could remit the award to the Labour Court only for a reason which was germane to the statute in question, was not of any assistance to the State Government in this case because even though the reason for remitting the award may be a 471 reason connected with industry or labour, it can still be used arbitrarily to favour one party or the other.
The ground for remitting the award should be one corresponding to a ground mentioned in section 16 of the ; otherwise the power is capable of serious mischief.
The facts in this case themselves serve as a good illustration of the above proposition.
There were only two main issues for consideration before the Labour Court: (1) whether the appellant was a workman, and (2) whether his services had been validly terminated.
The Labour Court had recorded its findings on both the issues in favour of the appellant.
From the prayers made before the Labour Court after the case had been remitted to it, it is seen that the Management wanted to adduce additional evidence before the Labour Court in support of its case.
It was not the case of the Management that the Labour Court had unreasonably refused permission to the Management to adduce all its evidence before the award was passed.
It was not even a case where industrial peace was likely to be disturbed if the award had been implemented as it was.
The award would not have also affected prejudicially either national economy or social justice.
In the above circumstances, it would not certainly be proper for the State Government to make an order remitting the award.
The State Government in this case could do so because it had been entrusted with such unguided power under section 6(4) of the Act.
[482E H; 483A C] It was urged by counsel for the State Government that sub section 4 of section 6 of the Act needed not to be struck down but the Court might direct that the State Government should give a hearing to the parties before an order was passed under section 6(4), remitting the award, and also require the State Government to give reasons in support of its order.
The Court did not think that this was an appropriate case where the impugned provision could be upheld by reading into it the requirement of issuing notice to the parties and the requirement of giving reasons for its orders.
The provisions could not be upheld in the absence of necessary statutory guidelines for the exercise of the power conferred by it, having regard to the fact that the proceeding before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is in the nature of quasijudicial proceeding where parties have adequate opportunity to state their respective cases, to lead evidence and make all their submissions.
It is significant that the corresponding Act which is in force in the other parts of India, i.e., the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (Central) Act XIV of 1947) does not contain any provision corresponding to section 6(4) of the Act, and the absence of such a provision in the Central Act has not led to any serious inconvenience to the general public.
[483D F] 472 The Management could not derive much assistance from the decision of this Court in the Sirsilk Ltd. & Ors vs Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.[1964] 2 SCR 448 as in this case there was no settlement arrived at between the appellant and the Management, which made the publication of the award unnecessary.
[484H; 485F] There was one other good reason for taking the view that without any guidelines it will not be appropriate to confer power on the State Government to nullify virtually the effect of an award by exercising its power under section 6(4) of the Act.
applies not merely to disputes arising between private management and labour unions and the workmen employed by them but also to industries owned by the State Government and their workmen.
In the cases where the Government is the owner of the industry, it would be inappropriate to confer uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government itself to remit the award passed on the industrial disputes arising in such industries for there is every chance of the power being exercised arbitrarily in such cases.
The danger of entrusting unguided and uncontrolled power to remit an award for reconsideration of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal can very well be perceived, particularly where the award has gone against the State Government in a dispute arising out of an industry owned by it.
The sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act, which is so widely worded is, therefore, likely to result in grave injustice to a party in whose favour an award is made as the said provisions can be used to reopen the whole case.
The Court did not agree with the view expressed by the High Court of Allahabad in V.E. Thamas & Ors.
vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
, , in which the validity of sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act had been upheld.
[485F H; 486G H; 487C D] Taking into consideration all the aspects of the case, including the object with which the Act was enacted, the Court felt that sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it conferred unguided and uncontrolled powers on the State Government.
The Court declared sub section (4) of section 6 of the Act as unconstitutional and struck it down.
It followed that the order passed by the State Government, remitting the case for reconsideration by the Labour Court was also liable to be set aside.
The State Government was directed to publish the award under section 6(3) of the Act.
On publication of the award, it was open to any of the parties aggrieved by the award to resort to such remedies as might be available to it in law.
[487H; 488A C] 473 Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others; , ; State of Bihar vs D.N. Ganguly & Ors., ; ; Sirsilk Ltd. 448; P. Sambamurthy & Ors.
vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.
, ; and Star Paper Mills Mazdoor Sangh & Ors.
vs Star Paper Mills Ltd., Saharanpur & Ors., , referred to.
V.E. Thamas & Ors.
vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., , disapproved.


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
15054 57 of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in Sales Tax Revision No. 334, 418, 285 and 332 of 1984.
S.C. Manchanda, R.S. Rana and Ashok K. Srivastava for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an application for leave to 448 appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against the Judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad, dated 30th January, 1985.
The respondent carried on the business at the relevant time in Tendu leaves.
The respondent 's case was that there was no inter state sales of Tendu leaves in question.
On the contrary, its case was that the entire sales of Tendu leaves were effected in Uttar Pradesh.
This contention was not accepted by the assessing authority.
Having failed in the first appeal, the assessee went up in second appeal and the Tribunal allowed the appeal and quashed the orders passed by the assessing authority as well as the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial).
The Tribunal exhaustively discussed the facts.
They found that the assessee carried on business in Tendu leaves and for the year 1976 77 the assessee had been assessed under Section 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act on inter state sales of Rs.21,050 to a tax of Rs.2,105 whereas the case of the assessee was that the inter state sales were nil.
It was contended on behalf of the assessee that the assessee had effected the sales in U.P.
According to the assessee, out of the above sales of Rs.21,050, Tendu leaves worth Rs. 10,000 were sold on 24th April, 1976 to Sri Gulam Mohammad of Kanpur and those worth Rs.11,050 were sold in cash at Lalitpur on 5th May, 1976.
It was further contended that the assessee did not know if the purchasers had taken these Tendu leaves to places outside U.P. and even if they had so taken, the assessee could not be assessed to tax under the as the contract between him and the purchaser was to purchase goods in U.P.
The Tribunal took notice of T.P. Form IV which is a transport permit issued by the Forest Department.
The Forest Department had given in writing that this transport permit did not relate to sale but it was a certificate regarding the validity of Nikasi of Tendu leaves from the forest.
It is well settled that even if it is established that the assessee had obtained T.P. Form IV that by itself will not show that the assessee had entered into inter state sales.
Merely because T.P. Form had been issued, it does not follow that there were inter state sales.
The principles of inter state sales were well settled.
In Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, (6 STC 446) Justice Venkatarama Ayyar had held that sale could be said to be in the course of inter state trade only if two conditions concur, namely, (1) a sale of goods and (2) a transport of those goods from one State to another.
Unless both these conditions were satisfied.
there could be no sale in the course of 449 inter state trade.
There must be an evidence that the transportation was occasioned by the contract and as a result goods moved out of the bargain between the parties from one State to another.
It is apparent from the facts found by the Tribunal that the assessee had since the very beginning been contending that he had effected only local sales.
He had also filed an affidavit stating that he had not effected any sales of Tendu leaves during the course of inter state trade and commerce and that the had never applied to the Forest Department for issue of Form T.P. IV and that no such Form was ever issued to him and the Tendu leaves in dispute were not booked by him through railways or trucks for places outside U.P.
The Tribunal found nothing to discredit this version of the assessee.
The onus lies on the Revenue to disprove the contention of the assessee.
The Tribunal found no material to do so.
On these facts the Tribunal rejected the contention of the assessee.
On these contentions the Revenue went up in appeal before the High Court.
The question posed before the High Court was as follows: "Whether on the facts and under the circumstances of the case the Tribunal Sales Tax, Kanpur, was legally justified in knocking off the tax imposed by the assessing authority?" The High Court addressed itself to the question whether the sales effected by the respondent, were inter state sales or not.
On an analysis of the findings of the Tribunal, the High Court found that the goods were not moved out of U.P. in pursuance of an agreement for sale entered into between the assessees and their customers.
The existence of T.P. Form IV was taken note of but that did not conclude the matter.
The condition precedent for imposing sales tax under the , is that the goods must move out of the State in pursuance of some contract entered into between the seller and the purchaser.
If that is a correct principle in law, the Tribunal applied this correct principle of law to the facts of this case taking into cognizance the existence of T.P. Form.
In view of the facts of this case, the High Court found no material to interfere and dismissed assessee 's contention.
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.
In the premises this application for leave must fail and is accordingly dismissed.
N.V.K. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
% The respondent assessee carried on business in Tendu leaves.
He contended before the Assessing Authority that there was no inter state sale of Tendu leaves, that the entire sales of Tendu leaves were effected in Uttar Pradesh, and that he did not know if the purchasers had taken these Tendu leaves to places outside Uttar Pradesh, and even if they have so taken the assessee could not be assessed to tax under the , as the contract between him and the purchaser was to purchase goods in U.P.
This contention was not accepted and the Assessing Authority assessed the respondent.
The Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) having dismissed the appeal against the order of the Assessing Authority, the respondent went in Second Appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal took notice of T.P. Form IV which was a transport permit issued by the Forest department, regarding the validity of Nikasi of Tendu leaves from the forest, and came to the conclusion that merely because T.P. Form had been issued, it does not follow that there were inter state sales.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal and quashed the order passed by the assessing authority as well as First Appellate Authority.
The Revenue went up in appeal to the High Court, which held that the goods were moved out of U.P. in pursuance of an agreement of sale entered into between the assessee and their customers and that the condition precedent for imposing sales tax under the Central Sales Tax 447 Act was not present and dismissed the appeal.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions of the Department, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
Sale could be said to be in the course of inter state trade only if two conditions concur, viz. (1) a sale of goods, and (2) transport of those goods from one State to another.
Unless both these conditions are satisfied, there could be no sale in the course of interstate trade.
There must be evidence that the transportation was occasioned by the contract, and as a result goods moved out of the bargain between the parties from one State to another.
[448H; 449A] Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, 6 STC 446 referred to 2.
The condition precedent for imposing sales tax under the , is that the goods must move out of the State in pursuance of some contract entered into between the seller and the purchaser.
[449F G] 3.
T.P. Form IV is a transport permit issued by the Forest Department.
The Forest Department has given in writing that this permit did not relate to sale but was a certificate regarding the validity of Nikasi of Tendu Leaves from the forest.
Merely because T.P. Form has been issued, it does not follow that there were inter state sales.
[448F G] 4.
The onus lies on the Revenue to disprove the contention of the assessee, that a sale is a local sale and to show that it is an inter state sale.
[449C]