judgement:
N: Criminal Appeals Nos.
45 to 49 of 1951.
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated 20th August, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at Simla (Bhandari and Soni 33.) in Criminal Writ 'Cases Nos. 46 to 50 of 1951.
Jai Gopal Sethi (R. L. Kohli and Sri Ramkumar, with him) for the appellants in Cr.
Appeals Nos. 45 and 49. 20 N.C. Chatterjoe (Hardyal Hardy and R.L. Kohli with him) for the appellant in Cr. Appeal No. 46.
Hardyal Hardy for the appellant in Cr.
Appeal No. 48.
S.M. S.M. Sikri, Advocate General of the Punjab (N. section Doabia.
with him) for the respondent in all the appeals.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (G. N. Joshi, with him) for the Intervener in Cr.
Appeal No. 45.
October 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C.J.
These are five companion appeals from the judgments of the High Court of East Punjab and the principal point argued before us is as to the legality of the deten tion of the appellants under the Preventive Detention Act on the ground that they are engaged in black marketing in cotton piecegoods.
The Jullundur Wholesale Cloth Syndicate was formed to work out the distribution of cloth under the Government of Punjab Control (Cloth) Order passed under the Essential Supplies Act.
Certain persons who held licences as whole sale dealers in cloth formed themselves into a corporation and all cloth controlled by the Government was distributed in the district to the retail quota holders through them.
The Government allotted quotas to the retailers and orders were issued by the Government for giving each retailer certain bales under the distribution control.
If some of the retail licence holders did not take delivery of the quotas allotted to them under the Notification of the 4th of October, 1950, issued by the Government of India, Department of Industries and Supplies, it was, inter alia, provided that the wholesale syndicate may give the bales not so lifted to another retail dealer.
It may be noted that all along the price for the cloth to be sold wholesale and retail had been fixed under Government orders.
The Syndi cate was suspected to be dealing in black market and had been warned against its activities by the District Magis trate of Jullundur several times.
On the 7th of June, 1951, 21 an order was issued by the District Organiser, Civil Sup plies and Rationing, Jullundur, to the managing agents of the wholesale cloth corporation, Jullundur City, intimating that they were strictly forbidden to dispose of any uplifted stock against unexpired terms without his prior permission in writing.
They were further directed that thenceforth no such stock would be allowed to be sold to an individual retailer, but permission would be granted to sell the same to associations of retailers only.
It was stated that this letter was not in accordance with clause 5 of the Notifica tion of the Government of India dated the 4th October, 1950, which authorized the wholesale syndicate to be at liberty to sell uplifted cloth to any other retailer or an association of retail dealers of the same district.
It may be further noted that the Cotton Cloth Control Order was in operation even prior to 1950.
For some time control on the distribu tion of cloth was lifted but the price remained under the control of the Government.
During that time it has been alleged that the appellants and several others sold cloth at rates higher than those fixed by the Government.
Even when the distribution and price were both controlled, the manu facturing mills were allowed to sell at prices fixed by the Government a certain percentage of cloth which was not taken by the Government under its control.
This was described as free sale cloth and it was alleged that the appellants and several others were doing black marketing in this free sale cloth.
By an order passed by the District Magistrate on 19th June, 1951, he directed that the appellants be detained under section 3 (2) of the Preventive Detention Act to prevent them from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of cloth, essential to the communi ty.
On the 2nd July, 1951, the District Magistrate, Jullun dur, directed that the appellants be committed to District Jail, Jullundur, from the 2nd July until the 1st October, 1951.
The appellants were detained accordingly.
The grounds for their detention were given to them on the morn ing of the 6th July.
The grounds set out the activities of 22 the appellants as managing agents or partners in different firms or employees of the said firms or corporations.
It was stated ,that they had been disposing of most of the stocks of cloth received for the Jullundur District in the black market at exhorbitant rates from June, 1949, to Octo ber, 1950, during the period when control on distribution was removed and that even after the reimposition of that control in October, 1950, they disposed of cloth which has been frozen under the directions of Director of Civil Sup plies in the short interval between the passing of the order and its service on them.
The second ground was in respect of their individual activities as members of the firm in which they were partners in disposing of stocks of cloth in black market at rates higher than the controlled ones, to various dealers, through agents.
The particulars were speci fied in Appendix 'A '.
They refer to the free sale cloth.
In the third ground it was alleged that ' by illegal means they deprived the rightful claimants of the various stocks of cloth with a view to pass the same into black market at exorbitant rates.
We do not think it necessary to go into greater details of these grounds or refer to the other grounds.
On the 9th of July, 1951, petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India were filed in the East Punjab High Court asking for writs of habeas corpus against the State on the ground that the detention of the appellants under the Preventive Detention Act was illegal.
The District Magis trate filed his affidavit in reply challenging the allega tion of mala fides and setting out in some detail instances of the activities of the appellants and contended that on the reports received by him he was satisfied that the deten tion of the appellants was necessary.
Early in August, 1951, the executive authorities cancelled the licence of the appellants as cloth dealers.
The High Court dismissed the petitions and the petitioners have come on appeal to us.
Section 3 of the , pro vides that the Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that 23 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
The power to act in accordance with the terms of this provision was given by section 3 (2) to a District Magistrate.
Such Magistrate however was required to make a report to the State Govern ment to which he was subordinate about the order and also to send the grounds on which the order had been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, had a bearing on the necessity of the order.
It is not disputed that an order under section 3 (2) of the to prevent black marketing can be passed by the District Magistrate.
On behalf of the appellants it is contended that in the grounds for their detention reference is made to their activities prior to June, 1951, only.
This cannot be considered objectionable because having regard to those activities it is alleged that the satisfaction required under the section had arisen.
It was next argued that such loophole as existed in the total control of distribution and ' sale and price of piecegoods in the district was sealed by the order of the District Orga niser dated the 7th June, 1951.
By virtue of that order the syndicate or corporation could not sell any cloth without an express order in writing from the District Organiser, and therefore there could be no black marketing after that date by any of the appellants and the order was therefore unjus tified.
It was next contended that in any event now as their licences are cancelled they cannot deal in cloth and the order of detention now maintained against them is more in the nature of punishment than prevention.
It was argued that orders under the were for the purpose of preventing a person from acting in future in the objectionable way contemplated by the Act and it was beyond the scope of the Act to pass orders in respect of their alleged activities anterior to June, 1951.
In our opinion the High Court approached the matter quite correctly.
Instances of past activities are relevant 24 to be considered in giving rise to the subjective mental conviction of the District Magistrate that the appellants were likely to indulge in objectionable activities.
The grounds which were given for the detention are relevant and the question whether they are sufficient or not is not for the decision of the Court.
The Legislature has made only the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order essential for passing the order.
The contention that because in the Amending Act of 1951 an Advisory Board is constitut ed, which can supervise and override the decision taken by the executive authority, and therefore the question whether the grounds are sufficient to give rise to the satisfaction has become a justifiable issue in Court, is clearly unsound.
The satisfaction for making the initial order is and has always been under the , that of the authority making the order.
Because the Amending Act of 1951 establishes a supervisory authority, that discretion and subjective test is not taken away and by the establish ment of the Advisory Board, in our opinion, the Court is not given the jurisdiction to decide whether the subjective decision of the authority making the order was right or not.
Proceeding on the footing, therefore, that the jurisdiction to decide whether the appellants should be detained under the on the grounds conveyed to the appellants is of the District Magistrate.
In the present cases, two arguments were advanced on behalf of the appel lants.
It was strenuously urged that by reason of the order of the District Organiser of the 7th June, 1951, the only loophole which remained in the scheme of distribution and sale of cloth under control of the Government was sealed and it was impossible after that order to do any blackmarketing by any of the appellants.
We are unable to accept this contention.
In the first place, this order appears to be an administrative order and is in the nature of a warning.
It is at variance with the provisions of clause 5 of the Order of the Central Government of the 4th October, 1950.
Moreover this order does not bring about the result claimed for it.
A lot 25 of cloth which the manufacturers are permitted to distribute through persons outside the Government agencies can still be secured and sold at exhorbitant rates, i.e., at rates higher than those fixed by the Government.
The second argument was that as the licences of the appellants are now cancelled they cannot deal in textile cloth at all and therefore there can be no apprehension of their indulging in black market activities.
We are unable to accept this argument also because it is common knowledge that licences can be obtained in the name of nominees.
Again while these people may not have their licences in Jullundur District they may have or may obtain licences in other districts.
From the fact that their licences have been cancelled a month after the order of detention was passed we are unable to hold that it is impossible on that ground for the appellants to indulge in black market activities.
In this connection an extract from the further affidavit of the District Magistrate of Jullun dur dated 1st August, 1951, may be usefully noticed.
He stated: "There have been orders for the release of certain stocks of cloth in respect of other mills, as free sale cloth after the 9th June, 1951.
Any quantity of cloth not paid for and lifted by the owners ' nominees will revert to the Mills for free sale: vide letter No. CYC 2/ SLM, dated the 31st May, 1951, from the Textile Commissioner, Bombay, to all selected Mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad.
This cloth can be purchased by any wholesale dealer of cloth of India, without any restriction.
Not only this, free sale cloth can be transported from one district to another without a per mit: vide Memo No. 28894 CS (C) 50/48791, dated 2nd January, 1951, from the Joint Director, Civil Supplies, and Under Secretary to Government Punjab to the District Organiser, Civil Supplies and Rationing, Ludhiana.
Again free sale cloth is also procurable from individual firms who conspired to make profit by black marketing.
The only information which is supplied by a purchaser of wholesale cloth to the District Magistrate is as to what quantity of such cloth has been imported 4 26 into the district.
According to the report of the District Organiser no such cloth was imported into Jullundur by the corporation but there are reasons to believe that the Corpo ration had been making their purchases in free sale cloth from the Mills and using those bales to make up the defi ciency in the bales of quota cloth of superior quality which they used to dispose of in the black market in collusion with the Mills.
Besides, the firm Rattan Chand Mathra Dass, as would be evident from the attached lists signed by the District Organiser, had been dealing in free sale cloth and had also been importing cloth as Reserve of Kangra and also Provincial Reserve.
Most of this quota also found its way into the black market.
Similarly the firm Madan Gopal Nand Lall and Company had been dealing in free sale cloth on a large scale.
It would be evident from the attached list.
Santi Sarup, the Secretary of the Corporation, is believed to be a partner in the firm Hari Chand Bindra Ban and this firm also had been dealing in free sale cloth.
The free sale cloth acquired by them used to be invariably sold in the black market as reported by the District Organiser in his Memo No. 6306/6734 M/CT/Do.
7 dated 1st August, 1950, in reply to my Memo.
No. nil dated 30th July, 1951.
There is absolutely no bar for the wholesale cloth corporation, Jullundur, to its getting free sale cloth from the Mills or other wholesale dealers nor is there any bar for the firms Rattan Chand Mathra Dass and Madan Gopal Nand Lal and Co. to the acquiring of free sale cloth.
" It was next argued on behalf of the appellants that the only order of detention made against them was the order of the 2nd July and that did not refer to any section of the and did not suggest that there was any satisfaction of the detaining authority.
It was argued that no order of the 19th of June was ever shown to any of the appellants or served on them and therefore their deten tion was illegal.
It should be pointed out that these con tentionsare raised in the affidavits not of the detained persons, but of their relations.
Their affidavits do not show that they have any personal knowledge.
The affidavits 27 on this point are based only on their belief and information and the source of the information is not even disclosed.
As against this, there is the affidavit of the District Magis trate which expressly states that the terms of the Order of the 19th of June were fully explained to each of the dete nus.
The petitions for the writs of habeas corpus were filed within a week after the service of the detention order and we do not think there is any reason to doubt the cor rectness of the statements of the District Magistrate.
In our opinion this ground of attack on the order of detention has no substance and the detention cannot be held illegal on that ground.
The judgment of the High Court was attacked on these grounds and as we are unable to accept any of these contentions the appeals must fail.
One of the appellants is the secretary of one corpora tion and another is a salesman and clerk in one of the firms.
On their behalf it was urged that they could not indulge in black market activities.
We are unable to accept this contention in view of what is stated in the affidavits of the District Magistrate.
It is there pointed out that in addition to being a secretary or a clerk and in those capac ities actively participating in the black market activities of their principals, they were themselves indulging in black market activities in cloth.
If these and other facts in respect of the appellants are disputed the matter will be considered by the Advisory Board.
The question of the truth of those statements however is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide.
As all the grounds urged against the judgment of the High Court fail, all the five appeals are dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
Agent for the appellants in all the appeals: R.S. Naru la.
Agent for the respondent and Intervener: P.A. Mehta.

summary/full:
An order of detention to prevent black marketing cannot be held to be illegal merely because in the grounds for such detention the detaining authority has referred only to the past activities of the person detained, inasmuch as in stances of past activities may give rise to a subjective mental conviction that it is necessary to detain such person to prevent him from indulging in black marketing in the future.
Under the Preventive Detention.
Act, 1950, the test as to whether an order of detention should be made is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority; the Court has no power to consider whether the grounds supplied by the authority are sufficient to give rise to such satis faction.
The establishment of the Advisory Board by the Amending Act of 1951 has not made the matter a justiciable one, and even after the Amending Act the Court has no power to consider whether the grounds supplied ' are sufficient for making an order of detention.


judgement:
Appeals Nos. 279 and 280 of 1955.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated July 7 1953, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rules Nos. 147 and 148 of 1952, 47 360 C. K. Dophtary, Solicitor General of India, P. K. Goswami, section N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants in both appeals.
Purshottam Tricumdas and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2 in C.A. No. 280/56.
Naunit Lal, for respondent No. I in both Appeals.
December 21.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.
,These two appeals with certificates under article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution are directed against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature in Assam dismissing the appellants ' application under article 226 challenging the orders of the first respondent Shri B. L. Sen, Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, whereby he allowed the applications filed on behalf of the labourers employed in the Teok Tea Estate and the Dalim Tea Estate under section 20 of the (Act XI of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
On March 11, 1952, the Government of Assam, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 read with sub section
(2) of section 5 of the Act issued the following notification: " No. GLR.
352/51/56.
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 read with sub section (2) of section 5 of the (XI of 1948), as amended, the Governor of Assam, having considered the advice of the committee appointed under clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 5 of the said Act, is pleased to fix minimum wages, which will come into force with effect from the 30th March, 1952, consisting of basic wages and dearness allowance in terms of clause (1) of sub section 1 of section 4 of the said Act, at the rates as specified in the schedule hereto annexed payable to employees employed in tea plantations in the different districts of Assam.
These rates are exclusive of concessions enjoyed by the workers in respect of supplies of foodstuffs and other essential commodities and other amenities which will continue unaffected.
The existing 361 tasks and hours of work may continue until further orders.
SCHEDULE.
ORDINARY UNSKILLED LABOUR Adult male.
Adult female.
(16 years & above) (16 years & above) Basic D.A. Total.
BasicD.A.Total.
(p.d.) (p.d.) (p.d.)(p.d.)(p.d.)(p.d.
Rest Rs. Rs. of Assam As.12/ As.6/ 1 /21 As.
11/ As.
5 Valley.
By notification No. GLR. 44/51, dated the 16th April, 1952, the said Government introduced the Minimum Wages Rules which, inter alia, provided: "Rule 24.
Number of hours of work which shall constitute a normal working day. (1) The number of hours which shall constitute normal working day shall be (a)in the case of an adult, 9 hours; subject to a maximum of 48 hours in a week; . . . . . . . . . " By another notification No. GLR. 352/51 dated May 12, 1952, the said Government explained that the word " may " mentioned in the notification dated March 11, 1952, will have the force of " shall ".
The result was that in cl.
(2) of the said notification, the last sentence ran as: "The existing tasks and hours of work shall continue until further orders.
Prior to the fixation of the minimum wages (consisting of basic wages and dearness allowance as aforesaid, the labourers engaged in plucking tea leave,% in these tea estates used to be paid basic wages for male labourers at as.
8/ per day for plucking 16 seers of green leaves and for female labourers at as.
6/ per day for plucking 12 seers of green leaves.
This was the work load or task in respect of which the basic wages of as.
8/ and as.
6/ respectively were paid to these labourers apart from the dearness allowance in addition to such basic wages.
If the labourers plucked larger quantities of green leaves they used to be 362 paid by way of ticca extra wages at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer in excess of 16 seers and 12 seers respectively.
It may be noted that the payment of basic wages on the above computation also worked out at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer of green leaves plucked by the labourers.
Even after the fixation of the minimum wages by the said notification, the managers of these tea estates continued to pay to the labourers wages at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer of green leaves plucked by them.
They, however, in view of the fact that as.
12/ per day were fixed as the basic wages for the male labourers and as.
II / per day as the basic wages for the female labourers, refused to make any extra payment to them on the basis of 6 ps.
per seer unless the green leaves plucked by them exceeded 24 seers and 22 seers respectively, thus maintaining their old standard of payment on the basis of 6 ps.
per seer.
The labourers contended that the existing work load or task at the date of the said notification was 16 seers for male labourers and 12 seers for female labourers and they were entitled to such extra payment at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer for leaves plucked by them in excess of the 16 seers and 12 seers respectively.
There was a difference thus in payment, of as.
4/ per day in the case of male labourers and as.
51 per day in the case of female labourers and they claimed that the managers of the tea estates should pay them the basic wages of as.
12/per day and as.
I I/ per day respectively for the work load or task of 16 seers for male labourers and 12 seers for female labourers and extra wages at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer of leaves plucked by them in excess of those quantities.
This claim of theirs was the subject matter of the applications filed on their behalf before the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, under section 20(2) of the Act.
The applicants asked for directions under a. 20(3) to the managers, of the tea estates for payment of the difference between the minimum wages fixed by the Government and the wages actually paid to them from March 30, 1952, which was the date from which the notification came into force.
The managers of the 363 estates contested these applications mainly on two grounds; viz., (1) that the applications were not maintainable under section 20 of the Act, and (2) that there was no fixed workload or task in respect of plucking for earning daily basic wages before the introduction of the minimum wages.
The Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, who was the authority appointed under the Act to hear the claims arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages to these labourers, entertained the applications, recorded evidence and heard arguments addressed to him by both the parties.
As regards the first objection, he held that, if the applicants ' version was true there was a clear case of payment of less than the minimum wages fixed by the Government and the applications were maintainable under section 20 of the Act.
As regards the second objection, he came to the conclusion on the evidence recorded before him that there was a work load or task of 16 seers for male labourers and 12 seers for female labourers in respect of the daily basic wages of as.
8/ and as.
6/ respectively earned by them before the fixation of the minimum wages by the said notification, that such work load or task was the basis of the fixation of the minimum wages consisting, inter alia, of the basic wages of as.
12/ per day for male labourers and as.
II/ per day for female labourers and that the labourers were, therefore, entitled to extra payment for green leaves plucked by them in excess of 16 seers and 12 seers respectively at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer.
He accordingly ordered that the managers must pay the labourers engaged in plucking tea leaves the minimum basic wages at the rate of as.
12/ per day to the male labourers for 16 seers of green leaves and as.
11/ per day to the female labourers for 12 seers of green leaves and extra wages at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer for green leaves plucked in excess of those quantities.
The managers of the estates thereupon filed applications under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature in Assam raising the same contentions which had been negatived by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar.
The High Court dismissed 364 these applications and granted the certificates under article 133(1)(c) and that is how these appeals come before us.
It is urged in the first instance that the notification dated March 11, 1952, fixed only I a minimum time rate ' and no more.
Under section 3 (2) of the Act it was competent to the Government to fix (a) a minimum rate of wages for time work (called " a minimum time rate"), (b) a minimum rate of wages for piece work (called " a minimum piece rate ") or (c) a minimum rate to be applied in the case of employees employed on piece work for the purpose of securing to such, employees a minimum rate of wages on a time work basis (called " a guaranteed time rate ") and what was done by the Government was to fix " a minimum time rate" within the meaning of section 3 (2) (a) so that the labourers were to be paid the basic wages mentioned in the Schedule regardless of their out turn of work.
If this contention is correct, the labourers would not be entitled to any extra wages for the quantities of green leaves plucked by them in excess of the 16 seers or 12 seers per day which was alleged to be the existing work load or task at the date of the notification.
It is, therefore ', urged that prior to such fixation of minimum wages there was no work load or task for the labourers engaged in plucking tea leaves.
This contention is obviously unsound.
Both the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court found as a fact that before the fixation of the minimum 'wages as above, there was a basic work load or task of 16 seers of leaves for the male labourers and 12 seers of leaves for the female labourers.
This was proved by the evidence of the Hazira Moharers of these estates and this was recognized by the Government itself when it stated in the notification that " the existing tasks and hours of work shall continue until further orders.
" If the minimum basic wages were fixed irrespective of existing work load or task and what was fixed was " a minimum time rate " as contended by the appellants there was no need whatever to mention this in the notification.
The direction that the existing workload or task was to continue until further orders on the 365 contrary goes to show that the basic wages mentioned in the Schedule were correlated to the existing workload or task and as.
12/ for the male labourers and as.
11/ for the female labourers were fixed in regard to the existing work load or task of 16 seers of tea leaves to be plucked by the male labourers and 12 seers of tea leaves to be plucked by the female labourers.
It is argued that the continuance of the existing work load or task which was thus provided for had no relation to the basic wages which were fixed for the male and female labourers respectively but was only intended to prevent the employers from increasing the existing work load or task with a view to make up for the increase in basic wages.
This argument, however, does not take count of the fact that there was existing at the date of the notification a work load or task which was the basis of the payments used to be made to the labourers, the basic wages paid to them being calculated at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer of tea leaves plucked by them.
The labourers were thus being paid the basic wages of as.
8/ for male labourers and as.
6/for female labourers for the work load or task of plucking 16 seers and 12 seers of tea leaves respectively and the sole intention of the Government in issuing the notification was to increase these basic wages of as. 8/and as.
6/ to as.
12/ and as.
II/ respectively while maintaining the same basic work load or task assigned to the male and female labourers.
If the intention was not to correlate these basic wages to the basic work load or task which already existed and if the same state of affairs was to continue, viz., that the labourers would continue to be paid the basic wages on the computation of 6 ps.
per seer of green leaves plucked by them, there was no sense whatever in increasing the basic wages from as.
8/ to as.
12/ for male labourers and from as.
6/ to as.
II/ for female labourers as was sought to be done by issuing the notification in question.
The acceptance of the contention of the appellants would mean that no advantage whatever was sought to be conferred by the Government on the labourers engaged in plucking leaves in these tea estates which intention can scarcely be 366 attributed to the Government.
We are, therefore, of opinion that what was fixed by the notification was not merely " a minimum time rate" irrespective of the existing work load or task which used to be performed by the labourers but was a ' minimum wage which, though fixed for time work, was necessarily correlated to the work load or task then being performed by these labourers so that whatever extra work was done by the labourers in excess of the existing work load or task of plucking 16 seers of tea leaves in the case of male labourers and 12 seers of tea leaves in the case of female labourers had to be paid for in accordance with the practice then prevailing, whether it was based on agreement or ticca or custom, at the rate of 6 ps.
per seer.
The conclusions reached in this behalf both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court are, therefore, correct and cannot be challenged.
The appellants, however, contend that this is not a case of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages and the claims, if any, of the labourers do not fall within section 20 of the Act.
The tea estates in question have never refused to pay and are in fact paying to the labourers the basic wages of as.
12/ per day for male labourers and as.
II / per day for female labourers and the grievance, if any, of the labourers is that they have not been paid the extra wages calculated on the basis of 6 ps.
per seer for tea leaves plucked by them in excess of the basic work load or task of 16 seers for male labourers and 12 seers for female labourers.
This claim of the labourers, therefore, amounts to a claim for extra wages over and above the basic wages of as.
12/ and as.
II/ per day respectively which are being paid to them and, therefore, is not a claim arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages within the meaning of section 20(1) of the Act and the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, had no jurisdiction to entertain such claim.
Section 20 so far as is material for our purposes provides: " 20.
Claims. (1)The appropriate Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner 367 for Workmen 's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages to employees employed or paid in.
that area.
(2)Where an employee is paid less than the minimum rates of wages fixed for his class of work under this Act, the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub section (1), may apply to such Authority for a direction under sub.
section (3):. . . (3)When any application under sub section (2) is entertained, the Authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further enquiry if any as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid,, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess and the Authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application.
(6) Every direction of the Authority under this section shall be final.
It is argued that the authority appointed under section 20(1) of the Act is invested with the powers of hearing and deciding claims arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages and is authorised to hear the applicant and the employer or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further enquiry, as it may consider necessary, to give directions under section 20(3) of the Act which directions are final and not subject to any appeal or 368 revision by any higher authority.
Such drastic powers could not have been meant to be exercised when there are complicated questions of law or fact but could be exercised only in cases where the, quantum of minimum wages fixed by the notification in question could be determined by the authority on a plain reading of the terms, thereof.
Then and then only would the authority have jurisdiction to entertain such claims and give the necessary direction,% having the attribute of finality.
In the instant cases before us, not only did the matters involve complicated questions of fact which required recording of evidence by the authority but they also involved the construction of the notification which was by no means felicitously worded.
The existing tasks which were to continue until further orders were not at all patent and if the determination thereof had to be made by the authority appointed under section 20(1) of the Act, it would involve, in cases of dispute, recording of considerable evidence and an adjudication of the same after a consideration of the arguments advanced before the authority by both the parties.
There is in the instant cases moreover a further difficulty and it is that there are two rival contentions which can, with equal force, be urged by the respective parties.
The appellants contend that they have all throughout been paying to the laborers, after the date of the notification in question, basic wages at the rate of as.
12/ per day for male labourers and as.
1 1 / per day for the female labourers and there is no instance which has been cited on behalf of the respondents where, anything less then the minimum basic wages thus fixed by the Government has ever been paid.
The claim of the labourers comes to this that they have not been paid the extra wages for plucking green leaves in excess of the basic work load or task of 16 seers and 12 seers respectively.
Such claim for extra wages certainly does not amount to a claim arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages.
It is, on the other hand, contended on behalf of the respondents that the basic wages of as.
12/. per day for male labourers and as.
II/ per 369 day for female labourers fixed under the notification are correlated to the existing work load, or task of plucking green leaves weighing 16 Beers and 12 seers respectively and if they are entitled to the payment of these basic wages on their putting forward that much quantity of work, the non payment by the managers.of these tea ' estates to them of any extra wages on the computation of 6 ps.
per extra seer un less they plucked 24 seers and 22 seers of green leaves respectively is tantamount to nonpayment of the; minimum basic wages of as.
12/ and as.
11/ respectively as fixed in the notification.
"We do not, propose to decide this question of jurisdiction as in the instant cases we have, in addition to the determination of the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, the adjudication of the main disputes between the parties by the High Court itself.
I Whatever infirmities might possibly have attached to the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, on the score of want of jurisdiction, we feel that having regard to the circumstance that the matters have been pending since September, 1952, right up to the end of the year 1956, no useful purpose will be served by our interfering at this stage, as the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court both came to the same conclusion, a conclusion which we also have endorsed above, that the labourers are entitled to be paid the basic wages of as.
12/ per day,for male labourers and as.
11/ per day for female labourers for the work.:load or task of plucking 16 seers and 12 seers of green leaves respectively and they are entitled to extra wages for every seer of green leaves plucked by.
them I over and above these quantities of 16 seers and 12 ,seers respectively, at the.
computation of 6 Ps.
per seer.
There are moreover special reasons why we should not interfere with the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, in these appeals.
The matters do not come to us by way of appeal directly from the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar.
They were the subject, in the first instance, of proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court 370 of Assam.
Proceedings by way of certiorari are not of course ".
(Vide Halsbury 's Laws of England ', Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, para 1480 and 1481, pp. 877 878).
The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed, against the orders of the High.
Court in applications under article 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the, case requires it.
But we are not so satisfied.
We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently foundint favour of the respondents both by the De Duty Commissioner,, Sibsagar, and the High (Court, we should decline to interfere.
This being the point of substance which has been decided in favour of the respondents, we are of the opinion that the appeals are liable to be dismissed.
We accordingly dismiss them but having regard to the particular circumstances which we have adverted to before, we order that each party will bear and pay its own costs of these appeals.
Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The labourers were being paid the basic wages of as.
8/ for male labourers and as.
6/ for female labourers for the work load or task of plucking 16 seers and 12 seers of green tea leaves respectively each day.
If the labourers plucked larger quantities of leaves they were paid extra wages at the rate of 6 Ps.
per seer in excess of 16 seers and 12 seers respectively.
The Government issued a notification under section 3 read with section 5 (2) of the , increasing the rates of basic wages to as.
I2/and as.
11/ respectively.
The management thereafter refused to make any extra payment to the labourers at the rate of 6 Ps.
per seer unless the leaves plucked by them exceeded 24 seers and 22 seers respectively.
Held, that the sole intention of the Government in issuing the notification was to increase the basic wages while maintaining the same basic work load or task assigned to the labourers, so that whatever extra work was done by the labourers in excess of the existing work load or task of plucking 16 seers and 12 seers of tea leaves by the male and female labourers respectively, bad still to be paid for at the rate of 6 Ps.
per seer.
Quaere: Whether the claim for the extra wages amounts to a claim arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages within the meaning of section 20 (2) of the .
A writ of certiorari cannot be had as a matter of course.
The High Court is entitled to refuse the writ if it is satisfied that there was no failure of justice.
The Supreme Court declines to interfere, in appeal, with the discretion of the High Court unless it is satisfied that the justice of the case requires such interference.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 3952 of 1983 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 6th October, 1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 7029 of 1981.
A.K. Sen and Pramod Swarup for the Appellants.
O.P. Malhotra and Mrs. S.Dikshit for Respondent No.2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
This appeal by special leave seeks to assail the decision of the Allahabad High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution refusing to quash an order of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Kanpur, holding that Ceiling Appeal No. 189 of 1976 under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, had abated for non substitution of the sole appellant 's legal representatives.
The ceiling appeal in question had been carried by one Rameshwar and during its pendency the sole appellant died on January 9, 1980.
Balram, Ram Bahadur and Jugal Kishore who are the three sons of Rameshwar moved the appellate Court for substitution of their names as legal representatives in place of Rameshwar 736 On October 25, 1980.
They applied for setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay.
The Additional Distt.
Judge took the view that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and good reasons had not been shown for vacating abatement.
Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.
An application under article 226 was made before the Allahabad High Court for quashing of the appellate order.
It was contended that there was no period of limitation prescribed in respect of proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 ( 'Act ' for short) for applying for substitution, nor was there any period prescribed in Rule 3 of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 'Code ' for short) which became applicable in view of section 38 of the Act.
Therefore, on the expiry of 90 days from the date of death of Rameshwar no abatement set in and the application for substitution made on October 25, 1980 could not have been rejected as being barred by limitation.
The High Court referred to section 38 (1) of the Act and to Rules 3, 9 and 11 of Order XXII of the Code and held that Article 120 of the First Schedule of the , was applicable and the petition for substitution should have been filed within 90 days from the date of death.
The writ application was, therefore, dismissed.
The decision of the Allahabad High Court is assailed before this Court.
When on the special leave petition notice was given it was indicated that the case would be disposed of on merits.
The respondents have, however, not appeared to contest.
Mr. Sen appearing in support of the appeal says that section 38 (1) of the Act makes it clear that the procedure in the Code has been made applicable for hearing and disposal of appeals.
Under section 42 of the Act, sections 4, 5 and 12 of the , have been made applicable to proceedings including appeals under the Act.
According to Mr. Sen, in view of the provisions in sections 38 and 42 of the Act the appellate authority and the High Court should have accepted the contention of the appellants that the Code was applied only for the disposal of appeals and the provisions of the excepting sections 4, 5 and 12 were not applicable to proceedings under the Act.
Section 38 (1) of the Act provides: "In hearing and deciding an appeal under this Act, the appellate court shall have all the powers and the privileges of a civil court and follow the procedure for the 737 hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908".
Under the Code when death occurs at an appellate stage, substitution is effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Order XXII.
In terms of sub section
(1) of section 38 of the Act, if death occurred of one of the parties at the appellate stage of a Ceiling Appeal, substitution had also to be made according to the procedure laid down in Order XXII of the Code.
Rule 3 of order XXII of the Code provides: "(1) where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit".
Rule 11 of order XXII of the Code indicates that the provisions of that Order do apply to appeals.
There is another aspect which militates against Mr. Sen 's argument.
Sub rule (2) of rule 3 of that order provides: "where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff".(Emphasis is added by us by underlining the words in the provision).
Obviously, time has been limited by law in Article 120 of the First Schedule of the to which we shall presently refer.
Article 120 of First Schedule of the provides that an application under the Code to have the legal representatives of the deceased appellant made a party has to be made within 90 days from the date of death of the appellant and Article 121 provides 60 days ' period for the application for an order to set aside abatement from the date of abatement.
It is not disputed that the application for substitution of the legal representatives of Rameshwar when made was beyond 150 days from the date of his death.
If the Code and the applied at the time when the application for substitution was made, the legal representatives had to ask for substitution, setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay in terms of rule 9 (3) of order XXII of the Code.
Whether there was sufficient cause for the delay to be condoned and for abatement 738 to be vacated were matters for the appellate court and Mr. Sen has rightly not canvassed before us that discretion which vested in the appellate court had not been properly exercised.
The sole ground pressed before us, as we have already stated, is as to whether to an appeal under the Act the provisions of the Code and the referred to above would apply.
There is little room to dispute that if Order XXII of the Code applies necessarily Articles 120 and 121 of the First Schedule of the would also apply.
The contention that only three sections of the have been specially extended to proceedings under the Act by section 42 thereof is of no consequence once it is held that order XXII of the Code is applicable to appeals under the Act.
Section 38 (1) of the Act in our view clearly extends the procedure applicable to appeals under the Code to appeals under the Act.
The extension of the procedure available under the Code to appeals under the Act attracts the entire procedure of the Code relevant for the purpose of disposing of an appeal under the Act.
There is no scope to reckon an exception unless the statute indicates any.
We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the submission advanced before us by Mr. Sen that the principles of abatement and delay were not applicable to the case in question and the appellate judge as also the High Court had gone wrong in applying the provisions of the Code and the to deal with the application for substitution.
The appeal fails and is dismissed without any direction for costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
During the pendency of the ceiling appeal under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, the sole appellant died on January 9, 1980, On October 25, 1980, his three sons applied for setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay and for substitution of their names as legal representatives of their deceased father.
The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on the view that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and for vacating the abatement.
The High Court dismissed the appellants ' Writ Petition holding that Article 120 of the First Schedule of the was applicable and that therefore the petition for substitution should have been filed within 90 days from the date of death.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended that in view of the provisions of sections 38 and 42 of Act, the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 applied only for the disposal of appeals and the provisions of the , excepting sections 4, 5 and 12, were not applicable to proceedings under the Act.
Dismissing the appeal.
^ HELD: Section 38(1) of the Act clearly extends the procedure applicable to appeals under the Code to appeals under the Act.
The extension of the procedure available under the Code to appeals under the Act attracts the entire procedure of the Code relevant for the purpose of disposing of an appeal under the Act.
There is no substance in the contention that the principles of abatement and delay were not applicable to the instant case.
[738 C D] Under the Code.
when death occurs at an appellate stage, substitution is effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Order XXII.
In terms of section 34(1) of the Act, if death occurred of one of the parties at the appellate stage of a ceiling appeal, substitution had also to be made according to the procedure laid down in O. XXII of the Code.
Rule 11 of Order XXII indicates that the provisions of the Code do apply to appeals.
[737 B] 735 Again under Rule 3(2) of Order XXII if no application is made under sub rule (1) within the time limited by law the suit shall abate.
Time has been limited by law in Article 120 of the First Schedule of the which provides that an application under the Code to have the legal representatives of the deceased appellant made a party has to be within 90 days from the date of death of the appellant and Article 121 provides 60 days period for the application for an order to set aside abatement from the date of abatement.[737 E G] If the Code and the applied at the time when the application for substitution was made, the legal representatives had to ask for substitution, setting aside of abatement and condonation of delay in term of rule 9(3) of Order XXII of the Code.
There is little room to dispute that if order XXII of the Code applies necessarily Articles 120 and 121 of the First Schedule of the would also apply.
[737 A] In the instant case the application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased appellant when made, was beyond 150 days from the date of his death and the High Court had rightly rejected the appellants ' application.