judgement:
Appeal No. 260 of 1953 and connected appeal (C.A. No. 12 of 1954).
Appeals from the Judgment and Decree dated the 11th day of May 1951 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 253 of 1950 and in appeal from Original Order No. 252 of 1950 arising out of the order dated the 11th day of May 1951 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad in Suit No. 34 of 1949 and in Title Suit No. 27 of 1949 respectively.
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of Bihar (section P. Varma and M. Sinha, with him), for the appellant (In Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953).
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of Bihar (M. M. Sinha for R. C. Prasad, with him), for the appellant (In Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1954).
7 50 C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India (Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, with him), for the respondent (In both the Appeals).
March 24.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J.
This appeal and Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1954, which will also be governed by this judgment, raise the same points though there are some differences in the facts.
We will deal with Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953 first.
The suit there related to an arbitration matter.
The appellant before us, whom it will be convenient to call the contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of India through an Additional Chief Engineer of the C.P.W.D. on 1 11 1945 for the supply of bricks to the C.P.W.D., a department of the Dominion Government.
Disputes arose about a number of matters.
Clause 14 of the agreement provided that all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract should be referred to the Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being.
Accordingly, there was a reference on 21 1 1949 and an award followed on 8 5 1949.
It was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, and the contractor prayed that it be accepted and that a decree be passed in terms of it.
The Dominion of India filed objections under section 30 of the and prayed that the award be set aside and alternatively that it be modified or corrected.
The contractor 's application was registered as a suit under section 20(2) of the Act and a decree was passed in terms of the award on 18 3 1950.
By that time the Constitution had come into force and the Union of India replaced the Dominion of India as a defendant.
The Union of India filed an appeal to the High Court.
The appeal was allowed in part.
The contractor thereupon appealed to this Court.
The dispute that was referred to the arbitrator consisted of 17 heads of claim but only three of them are contested here, namely items 5, 8 and 17.
51 In the 5th head of claim the contractor claimed Rs. 75,900 as the price of 88 lacs of katcha bricks that were destroyed by rain.
These bricks were not the subject matter of the contract but the contractor put his claim in this way.
The contract was for the supply of 2 1/2 crores of pucca bricks which bad to be delivered according to the following schedule 30 lacs by 25 1 46 50 lacs by 25 2 46 55 lacs by 25 3 46 55 lacs by 25 4 46 60 lacs by 25 5 46.
Delivery was to be at the kiln site.
In order to keep to this schedule the contractor bad to think ahead and work to a particular time table.
First, he had to prepare katcha or unbaked bricks and place them in his kilns for baking.
While this lot was baking be had to prepare and stock another lot of katcha bricks ready to take the place of the baked bricks as soon as they were removed.
It was the duty of the C.P.W.D. to remove these bricks as soon as they were ready for delivery,that is to say, as soon as they were fully baked.
At a certain stage of the contract the C.P.W.D. failed to remove the baked bricks which were ready for delivery and removal.
This caused a jam in the kilns and prevented the contractor from placing a fresh stock of unburnt bricks in the kilns, and in the meanwhile his stock pile of katcha bricks ready for baking kept on mounting up.
Had everything been done to time the 2 1/2 crores of bricks would have been delivered before the rains set in.
But owing to the default of the C.P.W.D. in not removing the burnt bricks which were ready for removal, delay occurred in the time table and the rains set in with the result that88 lacs of katcha bricks were destroyed by the rains.
As this loss was occasioned by the default of the C.P.W.D. the contractor claimed that be should be paid their price.
The reply of the Union Government was two fold.
First, it contended that the katcha bricks formed no part of the contract and even if it was at fault in not 52 taking delivery of the burnt bricks in time all that it could be held liable for would be for breach of that contract; and said that the loss that was occasioned by the damage caused to the katcha bricks which formed no part of the contract was too remote.
Secondly, that compensation for this loss could not in any event be claimed because this kind of situation was envisaged by the parties when the contract was made and they expressly stipulated that the Dominion Government would not be responsible.
The Union Government relied on additional clause 6 of the agreement which is in these terms: "The department will not entertain any claim for idle labour or for damage to unburnt bricks due to any cause whatsoever".
The arbitrator held that this clause was not meant "to absolve the department from carrying out their part of the contract" and so he awarded the contractor Rs. 64,075 under this head.
We are clear that the arbitrator went wrong in law.
Government departments have their difficulties no less than contractors.
There is trouble with labour, there is the likelihood of machinery breaking down in out of the way places and so forth; there was also the danger of thunder storms and heavy showers of rain in the month of May: it will be remembered that the last date of delivery was 25 5 46 if, with that in view, Government expressly stipulated, and the contractor expressly agreed, that Government was not to be liable for any loss occasioned by a consequence as remote as this, then that is an express term of the contract and the contractor must be tied down to it.
If he chose to contract in absolute terms that was his affair.
But having contracted he cannot go back on his agreement simply because it does not suit him to abide by it.
This is not to say that Government is absolved from all liability, but all it can be held responsible for is for damages occasioned by the breach of its contract to remove the pucca bricks which it had undertaken to remove.
But what would such a breach entail? 53 The contractor had a duty under section 73 of the Contract Act to minimise the loss, accordingly he would have had the right to remove the bricks himself and stack them elsewhere and claim compensation for the loss so occasioned; and indeed two of his heads of claim (not in dispute here) relate to that.
He has been awarded Rs. 11,744 11 0 under claim No. 4 for the extra load in connection with the stacking of I crore 7 lacs of bricks due to the accumulation at the kiln site owing to the department 's failure to work to its part of the time table, and in addition, he has been given Rs. 15,500 under claim 13 for the cost of levelling and dressing land to enable him to stack these extra bricks.
Alternatively, he could have sold the bricks in the market and claimed the difference in price, but ordinarily he could not have claimed compensation for damage done to the katcha bricks unless he could have shown that that kind of damage, ordinarily too remote, was expressly contemplated by the parties when the contract was made: section 73 of the Contract Act.
Here it is clear that this was in their express contemplation and they chose to provide against such a contingency by making clause 6 an express clause in their contract.
There can therefore be no doubt that the arbitrator was wrong in his law.
His construction of the terms of the contract was at fault.
The question now arises whether his decision on this point is final despite it being wrong in law.
In India this question is governed by section 16(1) (c) of the of 1940 which empowers a Court to remit an award for reconsideration "where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it".
This covers cases in which an error of law appears on the face of the award.
But in determining what such an error is, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision on a question of law is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred.
If a question of law is specifically referred and it is evident that the 54 parties desire to have a decision from the arbitrator about that rather than one from the Courts, then the Courts will not interfere, though even there, there is authority for the view that the Courts will interfere if it is apparent that the arbitrator has acted illegally in reaching his decision, that is to say, if he has decided on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction that the law does not countenance or something of that nature.
See the speech of Viscount Cave in Kelantan Government vs Duff Development Co.(1) at page 409.
But that is not a matter which arises in this case.
The law about this is, in our opinion, the same in England as here and the principles that govern this class of case have been reviewed at length and set out with clarity by the House of Lords in F. B. Absalom Ltd. vs Great Western (London) Garden Village Society(1) and in Kelantan Government vs Duff Development Co.(1).
In Durga Prasad vs Sewkishendas (3) the Privy Council applied the law expounded in Absalom 's case(2) to India: see also Champsey Bhara & Co. vs Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co.(4) and Saleh Mahomed Umer Dossal vs Nathoomal kessamal (5).
The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghulam Jilani vs Muhammad Hassan(1) bad reference to the revisional powers of the High Court under the Civil Procedure Code and must be confined to the facts of that case where the question of law involved there, namely limitation, was specifically referred.
An arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or misapply it in order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable.
He is a tribunal selected by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is bound to follow and apply the law, and if he does not, he can be set right by the Courts provided his error appears on the face of the award The single exception to this is when the parties choose specifically to refer a question of law as a separate and distinct matter.
(1) (2) (3) , 79.
(4) 50 I.A. 324, 330 & 331.
(5) 54 I.A. 427, 430.
(6) 29 I.A. 51, 60.
55 Reference was made to a decision of this Court in A. M. Mair & Co. vs Gordhandass Sagarmull(1) where Fazl Ali, J. quoted a passage from Viscount Simon 's speech in Heyman vs Darwins Ltd.") where the learned Lord Chancellor (Viscount Simon) in turn, quoted from Lord Dunedin in another case.
It was argued on the basis of this that if you have to have recourse to the contract to establish your case, then the dispute must fall within the arbitration clause.
That is undeniable but it is not enough that the dispute should fall within the clause.
It is also necessary that the parties should define what the dispute is and agree to refer the dispute so set out and defined to arbitration, or, if they do not, that the Court should compel them to do so: (see Lord Macmillan in Heyman 's case(1) just cited at pages 369 and 370).
If, therefore, no specific question of law is referred, either by agreement or by compulsion, the decision of the arbitrator on that is not final however much it may be within his jurisdiction, and indeed essential, for him to decide the question incidentally.
Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Wright were both in the earlier case, F. R. Absalom Ltd. vs Great Western (London) Garden Village Society(1), as well as in Heyman 's case(2) and they would have pointed to any distinction had there been a likelihood of conflict; but in fact there is none and we do not read Fazl Ali J. 's judgment as a decision to the contrary.
We have next to see whether the arbitrator was specifically asked to construe clause 6 of the contract or any part of the contract, or whether any question of law was specifically referred.
We stress the word "specifically" because parties who make a reference to arbitration have the right to insist that the tribunal of their choice shall decide their dispute according to law, so before the right can be denied to them in any particular matter, the Court must be very sure that both sides wanted the decision of the arbitrator on a point of law rather than that of the Courts and that they wanted his decision oil that point to be final.
(1) ; at 798.
(2) at 368.
(3) 56 The clause in the contract that requires disputes about the contract to be referred to arbitration is clause 14 and is in the following terms: "Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specification and instructions here in before mentioned and as to quality of materials or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract, specification, instructions, orders or these conditions, or otherwise concerning the supplies whether arising during the progress of delivery or after the completion of abandonment thereof shall be referred to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being in the manner provided by law relating to arbitration for the time being in force who after such investigation as he may think proper shall deliver his award which shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the contract".
The dispute sprang out of a series of claims made in a number of letters written by the contractor to the Additional Chief Engineer, C.P.W.D. and culminated in a petition, exhibit B(1), in which the contractor summarised his claims.
The document is not dated.
On receipt of this, someone on behalf of the C.P.W.D. invoked the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
That letter has not been filed.
The arbitrator then wrote to the contractor and asked him to submit a statement of claim.
That letter has not been filed either but reference is made to it in exhibit C(1), the statement claim which the contractor filed in response to that letter.
As the material documents setting out the terms of reference are not here, we were asked by both sides to infer what the terms were from this statement of claim and the recitals in the award.
The learned counsel for the contractor relied on the following: In the statement of claim "Item 5.
Loss of katcha bricks. .
Rs. 75,900.
The chief reason of the destruction of these bricks was the failure of the department to lift the 57 monthly quota of bricks The argument of the department that they are not liable to compensate us on this account because of clause 6 of the agreement is not correct.
Clause 6 refers to only such cases over which the department has no control.
But if the department would have lifted the bricks (this was entirely under their control) then no such loss would have occurred.
Also be it noted that clause 6 refers only to 'damage ' and not to 'destruction. .
Damage means only partial loss. . .it cannot mean total destruction.
: The award states "The statement of claims submitted by the contractor contains seventeen items in respect of which the contractor claimed a total payment of Rs. 4,76,138 12 0 plus interest i.e., approximate total amount claimed: Rs. 5,03,803 12 0 as detailed below".
Then follow the seventeen items of which item 5 is "Payment for katcha bricks destroyed by rain: Rs. 75,900".
The body of the award deals with this as follows: " Claim No. 5.
Payment for 88.
lacs of katcha bricks destroyed by rain.
The contractor argued etc The Executive Engineer stated . .
The C.P.W.D. moreover were safeguarded by clause 6 of the contract. .
The contractor maintained that clause 6 of the contract could not be invoked when the department was at fault as in this case.
Clause 6 was meant to cover contingencies which were not of the department 's own making.
I hold that the removal of the bricks in such a manner or to prevent accumulation in excess of 60 lacs was an implied contractual obligation on the part of the C.P.W.D. .
I further hold that the C.P.W.D. cannot take shelter behind clause 6 of the contract.
This clause is not, in my opinion, meant 8 58 to absolve the department from carrying out their part of the contract.
It is impossible not to admit this without offending the rudiments of common sense reasoning".
We are of opinion that this is not the kind of specific reference on a point of law that the law of arbitration requires.
In the first place, what was shown to us is no reference at all.
It is only an incidental matter introduced by the Dominion Government to repel the claim made by the contractor in general terms under claim No. 5.
In the next place, this was the submission of the contractor alone.
A reference requires the assent of both sides.
If one side is not prepared to submit a given matter to arbitration when there is an agreement between them that it should be referred, then recourse must be had to the Court under section 20 of the Act and the recalcitrant party can then be compelled to submit the matter under sub section (4).
In the absence of either, agreement by both sides about the terms of reference, or an order of the Court under section 20(4) compelling a reference, the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, when a question of law is the point at issue, unless both sides specifically agree to refer it and agree to be bound by the arbitrator 's decision, the jurisdiction of the Courts to set an arbitration right when the error is apparent on the face of the award is not ousted.
The mere fact that both parties submit incidental arguments about a point of law in the course of the proceedings is not enough.
The language of Lord Wright in F. R. Absalom Ltd. vs Great Western (London ) Garden Village Society(1), a case similar to this so far as this point is concerned, is apposite here "There is here no submission of any specific question of law as such and as a specific question of law; no doubt incidentally, and indeed necessarily, the arbitrator will have to decide some questions on the construction of the building contract, but the two matters submitted are both composite questions of law and fact; there is no express submission of the (1) , 616.59 true effect of the contract on the basis of undisputed facts, as in the Kelantan case(1) or as a separate and distinct matter on facts to be separately assumed or found, as in In re King and Duveen(2). .
The arbitrator was not being asked simply and specifically to decide, upon some agreed or assumed basis of fact, the true interpretation of either clause 26 or clause 30 of the conditions or of both together; he was being required to make an award on the two matters submitted on whatever questions of fact and law might emerge".
Clause 32 of the contract in the House of Lords case was the equivalent of clause 14 in ours.
It ran "Provided always that in case any dispute or difference shall arise . . . as to the construction of the contract or as to any matter or thing arising thereunder. . such dispute shall be and is hereby referred to the arbitration and final decision of etc.
" The arbitrator relied on that to invest him with juris diction to determine,, as a matter of law, the construction of clauses 26 30 of that contract.
The House of Lords held that in the absence of a specific reference about the construction of the contract the jurisdiction of the Courts was not taken away.
Lord Russell of Killowen put it this way at page 610 "No specific question of construction or of law was submitted.
The parties had, however, been ordered to deliver pleadings, and by their statement of claim the contractor had claimed that the arbitrator should under his powers revise the last certificate issued etc.
It is at this point that the question of the construction of condition 30 arose as a question of law, not specifically submitted, but material in the decision of the matters which bad been submitted.
This question of law the arbitrator has decided; but if upon the face of the award he has decided it wrongly his decision is, in my opinion, open to review by the Court".
That is exactly the position here.
Simply because the matter was referred to incidentally in the pleadings (1) (2) , 36.60  and arguments in support of, or against, the general issue about liability for damages, that is not enough to clothe the arbitrator with exclusive jurisdiction on a point of law.
The next question is whether the error is apparent on the face of the award.
That; in our opinion, is clear from the passages we have quoted from the award.
We hold that clause 6 expressly relieves the Union Government of all liability under this head of claim and that the arbitrator was wrong in awarding any sum on that account.
The next head in dispute is item No. 8 in the statement of claim: "Cost of additional wages paid to the coolies on account of non supply of ration and cloth Rs.
51,495".
Here again no specific question of law was referred, so all we have to see is whether there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award.
The contractor put his case as follows in the statement of claim: "At the time when this work was allotted to us there was rationing system in the locality.
As per conditions of contract we were bound not to employ local labour and we had to import coolies from far off places.
We had in our employ about 1800 coolies and it was an impossibility to arrange their ration from open market.
This difficulty was brought to the notice of the authorities concerned, and they promised us to supply ration.
It was only after this promise that we signed the agreement. .
From a perusal of these letters it is clear that the department promised us to supply ration. . .
These circumstantial evidences are sufficient enough to show that there was a mutual understanding between the parties that ration will be supplied.
In the eyes of law even circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove that such a promise was made.
Any breach of that promise makes the department legally liable to compensate for that loss. .
Apart from the legal responsibility it was also a moral responsibility for the department to supply ration".
61 This claim, therefore, was not grounded on any clause of the contract, nor was it said to be implied in the contract.
What was relied on was a collateral promise evidenced, not by the contract, but by two letters written by "the department" and a promise by "the authorities concerned"; and later this promise is turned into a "mutual understanding" and to a "moral responsibility" in addition to a legal one.
The arbitrator dealt with this as follows.
He began by saying "The contractor stated that when he submitted his tender on 25 9 45 he did so in the bona fide belief that the department would make the necessary arrangements, etc.
" Then he sets out the following dates.
On 1 11 45 the contractor was told that his tender had been accepted.
On 9 11 45 the contractor "warned" the Executive Engineer about his "immediate requirements in respect of rations".
The contract was finally accepted and signed on 22 11 45.
Now it is admitted that the contract contains no clause about rations and it is also evident that the question was not raised when the tender was accepted on behalf of the Dominion Government.
The question was raised in a letter to the Executive Engineer, and the contractor signed the contract without waiting for a reply.
It is well settled that governments can only be bound by contracts that are entered into in a particular way and which are signed by the proper authority.
A reference to the agreement, exhibit A(1), will show that it was accepted on behalf of the Dominion Government by the Additional Chief Engineer and not by an Executive Engineer.
A letter written to the Executive Engineer would therefore have no effect and even if it be assumed that the letter was forwarded to the Additional Chief Engineer for consideration, what does it amount to? A tender embodying certain terms is submitted and is accepted on 1 11 45.
Both sides are agreed on all matters contained in it and their conduct shows that both sides indicated that the contract should be reduced to writing.
Be 62 fore the agreement is signed, one party wants to include a further condition in the contract.
We will assume that the request was made to the other contracting party.
But without waiting for the assent of the other side, both sides accept and sign the contract as it existed before the fresh suggestion was made.
It is an error in law to deduce from this that there was acceptance of the fresh proposal.
On the contrary, the legal conclusion is that the new suggestion was dropped and that the contractor was content to accept the contract as it was without ' this condition.
In any case, a person cannot be bound by a one sided offer which is never accepted, particularly when the parties intend that the contract should be reduced to writing.
That is the whole point of insisting on a document.
It excludes speculation as to what was and what was not agreed to however much the matter might have been raised by one of the parties during the stage of negotiation.
The arbitrator continues that the contractor stated that "it was a well known and established fact that Sindri was a rationed area; that the C.P.W.D. were giving rations at controlled rates to their employees and contractors through arrangements with the local Civil Supply Authorities; that nobody working under the C.P.W.D. was allowed to make independent arrangements or approach the Civil Supply Authorities direct" and the contractor contended that the very fact that he tendered such low rates showed that he expected to supply his labourers with rations at controlled rates.
The arbitrator then sets out some more of the contractor 's contentions and from them concludes that "there was an implied contractual obligation for the C.P.W.D. to make available controlled rations to the contractor and that this obligation was not fulfilled with due diligence and care".
He accordingly awarded Rs. 40,000 as compensation under this head.
The error is apparent.
Facts must be based either on evidence or on admissions; they cannot be found to 63 exist from a mere contention by one side especially when they are expressly denied by the other.
The inference from the facts stated above is that the contractor entered into the agreement with his eyes open and whatever his one sided hopes may have been he was content to enter into the agreement as it stood without binding the other side to the new conditions and without even waiting to ascertain the reaction of the other side to his further proposals.
It has to be remembered that rationing was not a matter that was under the direction and control of the Dominion Government.
It was a local matter handled by the then Provincial authorities and under their direction and contract.
The C.P.W.D., as a department of the Dominion Government, was not concerned with rationing except that its employees had to submit to rationing like everybody else in the Sindri area.
This confusion between the Dominion Government and the Provincial Government occurs in the arbitrator 's opening sentence under this head where he sets out the contractor 's contention that "commodities such as rations and cloth which were absolutely essential for the maintenance of his labourers and which were under Government control".
As the arbitrator bases solely on the contractor 's contentions it is evident that he failed to appreciate the fact that the Dominion Government and the Provincial rationing authorities were separate entities distinct from one another.
The position accordingly reduces itself to this: two persons, neither of which is a part of the Provincial Government or has any control over rationing, chose to enter into an agreement for work in a rationed area.
They insisted that their contract should be reduced to writing, and that indeed was essential, this being a contract with the Dominion Government which was incapable of contracting in any other way; they agreed upon and concluded all their terms; then, at the last minute, one side raised a point about rationing but without waiting for a reply and without having the term entered in the contract, he signed the contract as it stood before the point was raised even during the negotiation.
It is 64 an error in law to hold that any contractual obligation can be inferred or implied from these circumstances.
Then there is still another error.
If this implied agreement about rations and cloth does not spring out of the written contract but is to be inferred collaterally as a distinct and subsidiary contract, and we gather that that is the finding, especially as reference was made to section 9 of the Contract Act, then that is not a contract to which the arbitration clause can apply.
Wide though it is, clause 14 is confined to any matter relating to the written con tract and if ration and cloth are not covered by the written contract, they are not matters that relate to it.
If parties choose to add a fresh contract in addition to or in substitution for the old, then the arbitration clause cannot cover the new contract.
See Lord Macmillan in Heyman vs Darwins Ltd.(1).
The last item in dispute in this appeal is claim No. 17 about interest.
The statement of claims sets out "Item 17 Interest on the amount of money involved in this claim at the rate of Rs. 6 percent.
27,665.
This work was finished in May 1946 and it was proper for the department to have decided all our claims at least by 31st December 1947. . . .
But this was not done.
Due to this a heavy amount remained blocked up and we were compelled to take money from our bankers on interest.
We therefore pray for interest for 16 months from 1 1 48 to 31 4 49".
The arbitrator held "The contractor 's contention that his claims should have been settled by January 1948 is, in my opinion, reasonable.
I therefore award interest at 6% for 16 months on the total amount of the awards given i.e., Rs. 17,363".
Then the arbitrator sets out the amounts awarded under each head of claim.
A perusal of them shows that each bead relates to a claim for an unliquidated sum.
The Interest Act, 1839 applies, as interest is (1) at 371.65 not otherwise payable by law in this kind of case (see Bengal Nagpur Ry.Co. vs Ruttanji Ramji(1)), but even if it be assumed that an arbitrator is a "court" within the meaning of that Act, (a fact that by no means appears to be the case), the following among other conditions must be fulfilled before interest can be awarded under the Act: (1) there must be a debt or a sum certain; (2) it must be payable at a certain time or other wise; (3) these debts or sums must be payable by virtue of some written contract at a certain time; (4) There must have been a demand in writing stating that interest will be demanded from the date of the demand.
Not one of these elements is present, so the arbitrator erred in law in thinking that he had the power to allow interest simply because he thought the demand was reasonable.
It was suggested that at least interest from the date of "suit" could be awarded on the analogy of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
But section 34 does not apply because an arbitrator is not a "court" within the meaning of the Code nor does the Code apply to arbitrators, and, but for section 34, even a Court would not have the power to give interest after the suit.
This was, therefore, also rightly struck out from the award.
We pause to note that there was only a delay of five days at the outside in the over all picture.
The last date for removal of the last instalment of bricks was 25 5 46 and the contractor says under this head that the whole contract was completed by the end of May, 1946.
It is difficult to see how 88 lacs of bricks could have been damaged by rain in the last five days of May, and if the damage occurred before it would have occurred anyway, for on the contractor 's case he had to have a large stack of unbaked bricks on hand ready to enter the kilns in order to keep pace with his time table.
However, that was a (1) 65 I.A. 66. 9 66 matter within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and is not a matter in which the Courts can interfere.
That concludes Civil Appeal No. 260 of 1953 and we now turn to the other appeal, Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1954.
Only two items are in dispute here.
Heads 4 and 17 of the claim.
The over all pattern of the claim is the same as in the other case.
There was a contractor and he entered into an agreement containing the same terms and conditions, except about the details of supply.
It was signed on the same day as the other and by the same authority on behalf of the Dominion Government., and the matter went before the same arbitrator and the award in this case was given on 1 5 1949, one week before the other award.
Here also, no specific question of law was referred and we need not cover the same ground.
Our decision is the same here as there.
The fourth head of claim is about cloth and rations.
The claim here.
, and the Dominion Government 's reply, is the same as in the other case, but the award in this case is not based on an implied contractual obligation but on "a moral and implied obligation".
The error here is even greater than before.
The sum claimed was Rs. 51,495 and the amount awarded was Rs. 30,000.
The seventeenth head of claim was about interest.
The contractor claimed Rs. 27,665 and the arbitrator awarded Rs. 9,954.
There is the same error of law apparent on the face of the award.
The High Court was right in dismissing the claims made under the heads in dispute here.
The two appeals fail and each is dismissed with costs in this Court.
Appeals dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant, a contractor, entered into a contract with the Dominion of India for the supply of bricks.
A clause in the contract required all disputes arising out of or relating to the contract to be refered to arbitration.
Disputes arose and the matter was duly referred.
The arbitrator gave an award in the contractor 's favour.
The Union Government, which by then had displaced the Dominion of India, contested the award on a number of grounds.
Held:(1) that it is not enough for the contract to provide for arbitration; more is necessary.
An arbitrator only gets jurisdiction when either, both the parties specifically agree to refer specified matters or, failing that, the court compels them to do so under the arbitration clause if the dispute is covered by it; (2) the legality of an award cannot be challenged on facts, but it can be challenged on questions of law provided the illegality is apparent on the face of the award: section 16(1)(c) of the ; (3) the only exception is when both parties specifically refer a question of law for the decision of the arbitrator.
In that event they are bound by his decision on that particular question as well as by his decision on the facts.
But a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred.
The law about this is the same in India as in England.
and , followed.
at 79, 50 I.A. 324 at 330 49 331, 54 I.A. 427 at 430, 29 I.A. 51 at 60, at 368 referred to and ; at 798, explained; Quaere: Whether the courts will interfere when a question of law is specifically referred if the arbitrator acts illegally in deciding it, such as deciding on inadmissible evidence or on principles of construction which the law does not countenance.
at 409, referred to; (4) a wrong construction of the contract is an error of law and can be challenged provided the error appears on the face of the award; (5) so is the awarding of interest when the contract does not provide for interest and the requirements of the Interest Act are not fulfilled:65 I.A. 66, referred to.
Quaere: whether the Interest Act applies to arbitrations; (6) when a specific type of loss is directly contemplated by the parties to a contract and they expressly stipulate that no damages will be payable in respect of it they must be bound down to their agreement and any claim for damages in respect of such loss must be dismissed; (7) when the agreement on which the suit is based is not to be found in a contract which has been reduced to writing but has to be implied under section 9 of the Contract Act then the matter is not covered by an arbitration clause of the kind referred to above because the dispute in such a case arises out of and relates to the implied agreement and not to the written contract: at 371, referred to.


judgement:
No. 379 of 1974.
Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Govinda Mukhoty, for the petitioner.
P. K. Chatterjee and G. section Chatterjee, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.
The District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, by an order dated 29th December, 1973 made under sub section (1) read with subsection (2) of section 3 of the directed that the petitioner be detained as be was satisfied that with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner pre 998 judicial to the maintenance of public order it was necessary to detain him.
The fact of the making of the order of detention was reported by the District Magistrate to the State Government on 2nd January, 1974 and the State Government, by an order dated 8th January, 1974, approved the order of detention.
Pursuant to the order of detention, ,the petitioner was arrested on 18th January, 1974 and immediately ,on his arrest he was served with the grounds on which the order of detention was made.
The grounds of detention referred only to the incident as forming the basis of arriving at the subjective satisfaction ,,as regards the necessity for detention of the petitioner and that incident was in the following terms : "On the night of 25/26 6 73 at about 00.1 hrs.
you along with your associates being armed with lethal.
weapons including fire Arms raided the house of Ananta Keyal of Naitala under Diamond Harbour P.S. and looted away cash, ornaments etc.
At the time of operation you fixed from your fire arms indiscriminately disregarding human lives and their safety.
As a result, the house owner Ananta Kayal and his close door neighbour Ajit Kayal sustained grievous gun shot injuries on their persons, Subsequently both of them ,expired in Diamond Harbour Hospital.
You also brutally assulated some of the inmates of the house of occurrence.
Your action created such panic in the locality and the local people felt a sense of insecurity.
Thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
" The petitioner made a representation against the order of detention on 29th January, 1974 but it was considered and rejected by the State Government on 31st January, 1974.
The State Government thereafter submitted the case of the petitioner to the Advisory Board along ,with his representation and the Advisory Board, after bearing the ,petitioner and taking into account the representation made by him, ,made a report to the State Government on 6th March, 1974 stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner.
The State Government accordingly passed an order dated 14th March, 1974 confirming the detention of the petitioner.
This detention is challenged by the petitioner in the present petition which 'has been submitted from jail.
The first contention urged Mr. Mukhoty, learned counsel appearing amicus curiae on behalf of the petitioner, was that the solitary incident set out in the grounds of detention was so remote from the date of the order of detention in fact there was a time lag about six months that the District Magistrate could not possibly have arrived at his subjective satisfaction on the basis of that incident.
The requirement of proximity, said Mr. Mukhoty, was not satisfied and the subjective satisfaction said to have been reached by the District Magistrate could not be regarded as real or genuine.
Now it is true, as pointed out by this Court in Golam Hussain vs The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Oi .v.(1) that "there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of (1) ; 99 9 detention, namely, inhibition of prejudicial activity of the species specified in the statute.
This credible chain is, snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention.
Such is the ratio of proximity in Lakshman Khatik vs
State of West Bengal(1).
No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil.
To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement.
But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound.
It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious land corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation.
We have to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case".
There is, therefore, no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between the 'offending acts ' and the date of the order of detention, the causal link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the District Magistrate must be regarded as sham or unreal.
Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction are too remote in point of time to induce any reasonable person to reach such subjective satisfaction must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 'The test of proximity is no* a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the 'offending acts ' and the order of detention.
It is a subsidiary test evolved by the court for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu is such tat from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drown it. 'The prejudicial act of the detenu may in a given case of such a character as to suggest that it is a part of an organised operation of a complex of agencies collaborating to clandestinely and secretly carry on such activities and in such a case the detaining authority may reasonably feel satisfied that the prejudicial act of the detenu which has come to light cannot be a solitary 'or isolated act, but must be part of a course of conduct of such or similar activities clandestinely or secretly carried on by the detenu and it is, therefore, necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from indulging in such activities in the future.
Here in the present case, the, act alleged against the petitioner was a daring act of dacoity in a village by a gang consisting of the petitioner and his associates and if this act is judged in its correct setting, grave proportions and clear implications, it would be clear that it cannot be a stray isolated act but must be the work of a habituated and hardened criminal given to commit dacoities and the District Magistrate could, therefore, reasonably arrive at a satisfaction that with a view to preventing the petitioner from carrying on such activities it was necessary to detain him.
Moreover, the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the State Government by the Secretary in the Department of Public Relations and Youth (1) 1000 Services, points out that in connection with the incident set out in the grounds of detention a criminal case was filed in the court of the Sub , Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Diamond Harbour on 26th June, 1973 and he was arrested in connection with that case, but it appeared during investigation that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence in open court against the petitioner and his associates and it was, therefore, felt that it was futile to proceed with the criminal case and it was decided to drop it against the petitioner.
Now, if the criminal case were dropped, the petitioner would have to be released and in that event he would be free to carry on his nefarious activities.
The District Magistrate, therefore, passed the order of detention on 29th December, 1973.
The order of detention was in fact passed in anticipation of the petitioner being released as a result of dropping of the criminal case against him.
The record of the case which was produced before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State showed that the criminal case was actually pending against the petitioner on.
3rd January, 1974.
That means that the criminal case must have been dropped and the petitioner must have been discharged sometime between 3rd January, 1974 and 18th January, 1974, the latter being the date when he was once again arrested pursuant to the order of detention.
It is, therefore, not possible to say that the District Magistrate could not have arrived at a subjective satisfaction or) the basis of the incident set out in the grounds of detention, or that the subjective satisfaction reached by him was sham or unreal.
Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner then urged that even if the incident set out in the grounds of detention were true, it merely affected maintenance of law and order and did not have any impact on public order and hence there was no nexus between the act alleged against the petitioner and the subjective, satisfaction reached by the District Magistrate.
Now, there can be no doubt that the acts of the detenu on which a subjective satisfaction is claimed to have been reached by the detaining authority must have relevance to the formation of such subjective satisfaction.
If the acts of the detenu relied.
on by the detaining authority are irrelevant, no reasonable person could possibly arrive at a subjective satisfaction on the basis of such irrelevant acts and the subjective satisfaction said to have been reached by the detaining authority would be a mere pretence.
It is, therefore necessary to consider whether the act alleged against the petitioner in the grounds of detention could be said to be relevant to the formation of a subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public Order.
What was the potency or radiation of the act alleged against the petitioner: did it affect maintenance of public order or was its prejudicial effect confined merely to maintenance of law and order? The distinction between law and order, on the one hand, and public order, on the other, has been brought out admirably by Hidayatulla, C.J., in a recent decision in Arun Ghosh vs State of West Bengal.(1) The learned Chief Justice pointed out in that case the difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance in the following words (1) [1970]3 section C. R. 288 1001 "Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order.
Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality.
Disturbance of public, order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity.
It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.
Take for instance, a man stabs another.
People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act.
Take another case of a town where there is communal tension.
A man stabs a different sort.
Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order.
It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the Act upon the society.
The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?" If we ask this question in relation to the facts of the present cases, it is obvious that the act alleged against the petitioner was calculated to disturb "the current of life of the community" in the village.
It was a serious act of dacoity which was alleged against the petitioner and it was perpetrated at dead of night and the petitioner and his associates who participated were armed with lethal weapons including guns and they used these lethal weapons recklessly and indiscriminately in utter disregard of human life and actually caused grievous injuries to at least two persons and beat up several others.
This act of dacoity created a panic in the locality and seriously disturbed the even tempo of life of the community in the village.
There was clearly disturbance of public order and the act alleged against the petitioner had nexus with the object of maintenance of public order.
The subjective satisfaction reached by the District Magistrate could not, therefore, he said to be based on an irrelevant ground.
Then it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the District Magistrate had taken into account other material contained in the history sheet of the petitioner in arriving at his subjective satisfaction and since this material was not disclosed to the petitioner, he had no opportunity of making an effective representation and that the order of detention was, therefore, invalid.
Now, the proposition can no longer be disputed that if any material which has not been disclosed to the 17 L346SupCI75 10 0 2 Petitioner has gone into the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority it would have an invalidating consequence on the order of detention.
But in the pesent case it is not possible to say that any material other than that that set out in the grounds of detention was taken into account by the District Magistrate in reaching his subjective satisfaction We have looked at the history sheet of the petitioner which was produced before us by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government and we do not find any material prejudicial to the petitioner other than that set out in the grounds of detention.
There is, therefore, no factual basis for this contention and it must be rejected.
Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner also tried to persuade us to strike down the order of detention on the ground that though the order of detention was made on 29th December, 1973, the petitioner was not arrested until 18th January, 1974 and there was thus a delay of twenty days in arresting the petitioner pursuant to the order of detention But this is equally unsustainable and for two very good reasons.
In the first., place.
the delay of twenty days between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest cannot be regarded as unreasonable.
Secondly, there is sufficient explanation for the delay.
The petitioner was actually in jail on 29th December, 1973 when the order of detention was made and it was only on some date between 3rd January, 1974 and 18th January, 1974 that lie was released and then once again arrested on 18th January, 1974.
The last contention urged by Mr. Mukhoty on behalf of the petitioner was that though the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate an 29th December, 1973, he did not report the fact of the making of the order of detention to the State Government until 2nd January, 1974 and there was thus a delay of about five days which constituted a violation of the statutory requirement of section 3, sub section (3 ) that the fact of the making of the order of detention must be reported forthwith to the State Government.
This contention raises the question as to what is the true meaning and connotation of the word 'forthwith ' as used in section 3 sub section (3).
The, question is fortunately not res integra.
It is concluded by a decision of this Court in Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar vs The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay.(1) The statutory provision which came up for consideration in that case was section 3, sub section (3) of the which contained an identical provision as section 3.
subsection (3) of the present Act and the question which arose was as to whether Commissioner who made the order of detention on 13th January, 1956 could be said to have reported that fact 'forthwith ' to the State Government under section 3, sub section (3) when he did so as late as 21st January, 1956.
The Court was, therefor ., called upon to construe the word 'forthwith ' in section 3, sub section (3) and after discussing various authorities, English as well as Indian, bearing on the interpretation of this word, the Court, speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. pointed out that : "On these authorities, it may be taken.
an act which is to be done forthwith must be held to (1) ; 1003 have so done, when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay", and proceeded to add : "under section 3(3) it is whether the report has been sent at the earliest point of time possible, and when there, is an interval of time between the date of the order and the date of the report, what has to be considered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided the result then is that the report sent by the Commissioner to the State on 21 1 1956 could be held to have been sent 'forthwith ' as required by section 3(3), only if the authority could satisfy us that, in spite of all diligence, it was not in a position to send the report during the period.
from 13th to 21st January, 1956".
The same test must be applied in the present case and we must inquire whether the District Magistrate sent the report to the State Government "with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay", or, to put it differently, whether in spite of all diligence the District Magistrate was not in a position to send the report until 2nd January, 1974.
Now, the District Magistrate has made an affidavit explaining the reason for the delay in sending the report to the State Government.
He has pointed out that 29th December, 1973, which was the date when the order of detention was made, was a Saturday and on that day he had passed eight other orders of detention and the materials in connection with all these nine cases had to be typed out by the typist which could not possibly be completed in one single day.
30th December, 1973 was a Sunday and, therefore, the earliest when the report could be submitted to the State Government was 31st December, 1973.
But the District Magistrate could not send the report on that day as he was very busy in connection with food procurement work in the district and the next day, namely, 1st January, 1974 being a public holiday, he could send the report only on 2nd January, 1974.
This explanation given by the District Magistrate it, in our opinion, sufficient to show that he sent the report to the State Government with all reasonable despatch and there was no avoidable delay on his part.
Whilst taking this view on facts, we do not wish to underscore the need for strict compliance with this requirement of section 3, sub section (3).
It is a very important requirement intended to secure that the State Government shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides and this decision has to be made within twelve days of the making of the order of detention whether or not to approve the order of detention and the Court would, therefore, insist on strict compliance with it and not condone avoidable delay, even if it be trivial But in the present case the facts stated by the District Magistrate in his affidavit show that be acted with prompt despatch and was not guilty of any avoidable delay.
The District Magistrate must, therefore, be held to have sent the report 'forthwith ' as required by section 3, sub section (3).
These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in support of the petition and since there is no substance in them, the petition fails and the rule is discharged.
V.P.S. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The petitioner was directed to be detained by an order of the Dist.
Magistrate under the .
with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The order was made on December 29, 1973.
and the fact of making the order was reported to the State Government on January 2, 1974.
He was arrested on Jan. 8. 1974.
The grounds of detention referred to only one incident, namely, that on the night of 25/26 6 73, the petitioner along with his associates being armed with fire arms, raided a house, looted cash and ornaments brutally assaulted some of the inmates and fired indiscriminately a. result of which the house owner and his neighbour sustained grievous injuries and subsequently died.
The petitioner challenged the detention order in a writ petition on the following grounds : (1) There was a time lag of 6 months between the date of the incident and the date of order and hence the Dist.
Magistrate could not have possibly arrived '.It his Subjective satisfaction on the basis of that incident, (2) the incident merely affected law and order and not public order, (3) the District Magistrate had taken into account other material in the history sheet which was not disclosed to the petitioner.
in arriving at his subjective satisfaction, (4) there was a delay of 20 days in arresting the petitioner pursuant to the order of detention, and (5) there was a delay of 5 days in reporting the fact of making the order of detention to the State Government.
Dismissing the writ, petition, HELD '.
(1) (a) There is no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about 6 months between the 'offending acts ' and the date of the order of detention the causal link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the Dist.
Magistrate must be regarded as sham or unreal.
Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis of the subjective satisfaction are too remote in time must depend on the facts of each case.
The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the two dates.
The test is evolved by the court for determining the main question whether the past activity of the detenu is such that from it a reason able prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu.
The prejudicial act of the detenu may be of such a character as to suggest that it is a part of an organised operation, and in such a case, the detaining authority may reasonably feel satisfied that the act which has come to light cannot be a solitary or isolated act but must be part of a course of conduct of similar activities and that therefore, it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from indulging in such activities in the future.
[999 C G] In the present case, the act was a daring act of dacoity in a village by the petitioner 's gang, and judged in its correct setting, it could not be a stray isolated act but must be the work of a habituated and hardened criminal given to commit dacoities.
and therefore, the Dist.
Magistrate could reasonably arrive ,it a satisfaction that with a view to preventing him from carrying on such activities, it was necessary to detain him.
[999 G H] (b) Further, it was stated in the counter affidavit that a criminal case was filed in the Magistrates ' court in connection with the identical incident on June 26, 1973 and the petitioner was arrested but it was found that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence against him.
The Dist, Magistrate, 9 97 therefore.
passed the order of detention in anticipation of the petitioner being released as a result of dropping the criminal case against him.
The petitioner was discharged between January 3, 1974 and Jan. 18, 1974, and on the latter date he was once again arrested pursuant to the order of detention.
[1000 A D] Golam Hussain vs The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Ors. ; and Lakshman Khatik vs State of West Bengal.
[1974] 4 S.C.C. I referred to.
(2)The act alleged against the petitioner was calculated to disturb the current of life of the community in the village.
It was a serious act of dacoity perpetrated at dead of night.
It created panic in the locality and seriously disturbed the even tempo of life of the community in the village.
It was clearly disturbance of public order and the act of the petitioner had nexus with the object of maintenance of public order.
[1001 E G] Arun Ghosh vs State of Bengal followed.
(3) There was no factual basis for the contention that the Dist.
Magistrate had taken into account any other material not disclosed to the petitioner.
[1002 A B] (4) (a) The delay of 20 days between the date of the order of detention and the date of arrest cannot be regarded as unreasonable.
[1002 C D] (b) The petitioner was in jail on Dec. 29, 1973 when the order of detention was made and was once again arrested only after he was released on some date between January 3, 1974 and Jan. 18, 1974.
and hence the delay was explained.
[1002 D E] (5) Section 3(3) of the Act requires that the fact of the making of the order of detention must be reported forthwith to the State Government.
An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done when it is done with all reasonable despatch and without avoidable delay.
It is a very important requirement intended to secure that the State Government shall have sufficient time for consideration before it decides and the decision has to be made within 12 days of the making of the order of detention whether or not to approve the order and the Court.
would, therefore.
insist on strict compliance with it and not condone avoidable delay even if it be trivial.
When them is an interval of time between the date of order and the date of report what has to be considered is whether the delay in sending the report could have been avoided, or to put it differently, whether, in the present case.
in spite of all diligence, the Dist.
Magistrate was not in a position to send the report until Jan. 2, 1974.
[1003 A C] In the present case.
the facts stated by the Dist.
Magistrate in his affidavit show that be acted with prompt despatch and was not guilty of any avoidable delay.
On Dec. 29, 1973 he had passed 9 orders of detention and the typing of the material in connection with the 9 cases took time.
Dec. 30 was a Sunday and he could not send the reports on Dec. 31 as he was very busy in connection with food procurement work.
Jan. 1, 1974 was a public holiday, and hence, he could send the report only on Jan. 2.
[1003 C E]