judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 611 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th February, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Crl.
Appeal No. 11478 of 1980.
Dalveer Bhandari, H.M. Singh and Ranbir Singh Yadav for the Appellant.
R.L. Kohli and Girish Chandra for the Respondent.
Ram Jethmalani, Ms. Rani Jethmalani and S.B. Jethmalani for the Intervener.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
Our hard won freedom from British yoke ushered in a new era of progress and prosperity resulting in setting up of a large number of industries of all sorts and kinds in various spheres, some of them being Government controlled and some of them in the private sector.
Labour and industrial laws of the country passed after independence created a sense of new awakening in the labour force which became more and more conscious of the rights and privileges conferred on them by the laws.
Although disputes between the labour and management is now a common feature of the industrial life of the country yet seldom in the history of industrial disputes has it ever happened that a dispute assumed such large proportions as to take the toll of a human life resulting in a cold blooded murder in broad day light and that too in a court premises.
4 Such an extraordinary event is the subject matter of this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court where a Secretary of the labour Union seems to have run amuck and fired several shorts by a country made pistol shots on an officer of the management and killed him at the spot The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court and need not be repeated.
The matter, therefore, lies within a narrow compass and we purpose only to examine the reasons and the inferences drawn by the High Court for acquitting the respondent, Madhu.
M/s. Hindustan Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as the 'company '), had undertaken the construction of Jamuna Hydel Project in Khadar, District Dehradun.
To begin with, it appears that there was some dispute about the dearness allowance claim of the labour from the management which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
The respondent, who was the Secretary of the Union, was looking after the case on behalf of the workers, while PWs 5 and 7 were the officers appearing on behalf of the management before the Tribunal.
The deceased, S.J. Sirgaonkar, was Deputy Personnel Manager of the Bombay Branch of M/s. Hindustan Construction Company.
He was shot dead by the respondent after he (deceased), alongwith the other officers of the management, had come out of the Tribunal 's office at Meerut after filing their written statements.
Thereafter one of the eye witnesses, S.K. Gui (PW 7) asked someone to give a telephone call to the police station, which was nearby, on receipt of which the police arrived at the spot, seized the pistol and took the accused and some of the witnesses to the police station where a form FIR was registered.
The Panchanama was prepared and other formalities were, however, done at the spot.
The learned Sessions Judge, after a careful consideration of the evidence of the three main eye witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) as also the evidence of Durga Das (DW 1), came to a clear conclusion that the prosecution case against the respondent was fully proved and accordingly be convicted the respondent under 5 section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
He also convicted the respondent under section 25(1)(a) of the Indian Arms Act and sentenced him to one year 's R.I. The respondent went up in appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Sessions Judge which was reversed by the High Court and the respondent was acquitted of the charges framed against him.
Normally, this Court does not interfere against the judgment of a High Court purely on appreciation of evidence.
But, in this case, there appears to be very special circumstances which have been either overlooked or not considered by the High Court.
Besides this, the High Court does not appear to have examined the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has proceeded to acquit the respondent on general grounds which, we shall show hereafter, are wholly untenable.
It appears that July 5, 1977 was the date fixed in the Industrial Tribunal, Meerut for the parties to file their written statements and in this connection the deceased alongwith the other eye witnesses (PWs 5, and 7) attended the Tribunal and PWs 5 and 7 filed their written statements.
P.W. 6 was, the standing counsel of the Company and had been representing the same in all labour disputes concerning the Company.
The respondent was holding the post of hydel lineman of the Project and was the Secretary of the labour Union.
DW 1, Durga Das, who was also at the spot was the Vice President of the said Union.
It appears that after filing the written statements at about 11.30 a.m. the witnesses and the respondent came out of the court premises and were talking between themselves.
As soon as the respondent and Sirgaonkar (the deceased) reached the main gate of the Tribunal building, the respondent is alleged to have taken out a country made pistol and fired five shots one after the other in quick succession, with the result that Sirgaonkar fell down and died at the spot.
Thereafter, the respondent threw away the pistol but he was surrounded by the witnesses and later handed over to the police on their arrival.
It is also alleged by the prosecution that while the firing was going on a telephonic message was sent to the police station Civil Lines, Meerut about the firing and it was received by Masroor Ali, PW 9, who made an entry to that effect in the general diary at 11.39 a.m.
The telephonic information merely conveyed the fact that gunshots 6 were being fired on receipt of the information, PW 10.
Ram Datt Gautam, the Sub Inspector of Police, proceeded to the place of occurrence and found the body of Sirgonkar Lying outside the main gate of the Tribunal building and the respondent being apprehended by the witnesses.
The police officer took the accused into custody and proceeded to the police station alongwith PW 7, S.K. Gui, where a regular FIR was registered.
The usual proceedings about the postmortem and inquest the followed and after a thorough investigation the police submitted a charge sheet against the respondent which resulted in his conviction by the Sessions Judge.
This, in short, is the prosecution case.
The main grounds on which the High Court has reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge may be summarised as follows: Durga Das, DW 1 who was admittedly at the scene of the occurrence has stated that as the shooting started, PW 7 had given a telephonic message to the police station.
The High Court by an implied process of reasoning has observed that if PW 7 had given the telephonic message he would have mentioned the name of the assailant because he was a full fledged eye witness but since his name had not been mentioned it is the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the prosecution case.
We are, however, unable to agree with this somewhat involved reasoning of the High Court.
In fact, DW, 1, merely says that Gui telephoned to the police station about the firing and said something in English, The High Court seems to have presumed that from this the irresistible inference to be drawn is that Gui did not mention the name of the assailant of the deceased and on this ground alone the prosecution must fail.
This argument is based on a serious error.
In the first place, the telephonic message was an extremely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the term.
Secondly, assuming that Gui had given the telephonic message in utter chaos and confusion when shots after shots were being fired at the deceased, there was no occasion for Gui to have narrated the entire story of the occurrence.
In fact, in his evidence Gui has denied that he personally telephoned the police but he stated that he asked somebody to telephone the police which appears to be both logical and natural.
Moreover such a cryptic information on telephone has been held by this 7 Court to be of no value at all.
In Tapindar Singh vs State of Punjab this Court in identical circumstances observed thus: "The telephone message was received by Hari Singh, A.S.I., Police Station, City Kotwali at 5.35 p.m.
On September 8, 1969.
The person conveying the information did not disclose his identity, nor did he give any other particulars and all that is said to have been conveyed was that firing had taken place at the taxi stand, Ludhiana.
This was, of course, recorded in the daily diary of the police station by the police officer responding to the telephone call.
But prime facie this cryptic and anonymous oral message which did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated as first information report The mere fact that this information was the first in point of time does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report.
" In view of this decision, therefore, the fundamental reasoning of the High Court falls to the ground.
Moreover, Durga Das himself does not appear to be an independent witness but he was highly interested because being the Vice President of the labour Union he was looking after the case in tho Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the workers.
There is clear evidence of prosecution witnesses that even the brief case of the respondent was handled by DW 1 at the time of the occurrence.
Although DW 1 denied this fact, it is amply proved by the evidence of PW 5.
The only comment made against this witness was that he did not state this fact before the investigating officer.
But, as this was a matter of detail it may not have been necessary for him to have stated all possible details in his statement to the police.
This witness is corroborated by PW 6, an independent witness, who says that the brief case of the respondent was being carried by Durga Das.
It, therefore, appears that DW 1 being the Vice President of the Union and a pairvikar of the workers was highly interested and in the face of the evidence of independent witness like PW 6, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW 5 that the brief case of the respondent was being handled by DW 1.
We might state here that the High Court has applied two 8 different standards to assess the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defence.
While the High Court accepts the uncorroborated evidence of DW 1, who is as much interested in the dispute as the deceased, if not more, being Vice President of the Union and also in possession of the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of PWs 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were highly interested.
The relevant finding of the High Court on this point may be extracted thus: "In the first place, it shows that Subrat Kumar Gui and M.R. Bhaumik were mainly responsible for the prosecution of the case, although the deceased had been in general supervision of all labour disputes of the company at all the places.
In the second place, it also points out that these two witnesses were not happy with the appellant who had been representing the cause of the labourers before the Industrial Tribunal and that they were sore about his conduct.
In these circumstances these two witnesses could not be said to be independent " Here, the High Court completely lost sight of two important facts (1) that PWs 5 and 7 were high officers of the Company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter like this, and (2) that PW 6, who was the standing counsel of the Company and other labour cases for more than 3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of PWs 5 and 7.
We have examined the evidence of PWs S and 7 with very great care and caution but we are unable to find any discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to reject the same.
On the other hand, on a consideration of their evidence.
we are satisfied that are throughout consistent and congruous and that their evidence bears a ring of truth; We are indeed surprised how the High Court could disbelieve the evidence of the eye witnesses in the case of a cold blooded murder committed in broad day light where the respondent was caught red handed at the spot.
The High Court also over looked the crying conduct of the respondent who went on firing one shot after the other so as to make sure that Sirgaonkar does not survive at any cost.
Another ground on which the High Court has reversed the 9 judgment of the Sessions Judge is that it is difficult to believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt to escape.
With due respect, this finding of the High Court is also most unrealistic.
There is clear evidence of PWs.
5, 6 and 7 that after the respondent threw down the pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not escape.
The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter.
Moreover, if a person commits a cold blooded murder in the premises of a court which is bound to be full of other litigants also, he cannot think of escaping and is bound to be caught by someone or the other.
The High Court was further of the view that it is extremely doubtful that the witnesses could see the incident from inside the court room as there was no door or window through which the incident could be seen.
To buttress this observation, the High Court seems to have relied on the evidence of DW 1 that the four persons, including DW 1, entered the court room as soon as the first shot was fired.
This statement is obviously wrong because all the three witnesses stated that the shots were fired while they were outside the court room and they actually saw the respondent firing the shots.
It was only after a few shots were fired that they entered the court room and even so they were able to see the whole occurrence from the glass panes of the court room.
There is absolutely no evidence on record to show that there were no glass panes in tho window and that the place of occurrence could not be visible from the court room.
In these circumstances the conclusion of the High Court is purely speculative and against the weight of evidence on the record.
The High Court seems to have placed some reliance on the evidence of D.W.1 but as he was highly interested, his evidence unless corroborated by independent evidence should not have been acted upon in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
Lastly, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the fact that there was no reason for three eye witnesses, one of whom was a standing counsel far about 30 years, to have falsely implicated the respondent merely because he was Secretary of the Union.
The consistent course of conduct of the respondent speaks volumes against his innocence.
He was caught red handed 10 at the spot and was surrounded by the witnesses so that he could not escape, and the police arrived within fifteen minutes of the occurrence and took him to the police station.
Some comment was made by the High Court about the delay in the inquest report but that does not appear to be of any consequence if the evidence of the three eye witnesses is to be believed.
We have given our anxious consideration to the evidence of the three witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) and we find ourselves in complete agreement with the Sessions Judge that these witnesses were both reliable and trustworthy.
In fact, the High Court committed a grave error of law in not going into the intrinsic merits of the evidence of each of the eye witnesses and in discarding the same on general ground which also have no substance.
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that this is not a case in which it could be said by any stretch of imagination that another reasonable view may be possible on the evidence and circumstances of the case, viz. that the accused was innocent.
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appellant is convicted under s.302 of the Indian Panel Code to imprisonment for life as also under s.25(1)(a) of the Indian Arms Act to one year 's R.I. because he was undoubtedly found using a country made pistol which was recovered from the place of occurrence.
H.S.K. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The respondent, Secretary of the workers union of a construction company, D.W. 1, Vice President of the Union, the deceased and P.Ws.
5 and 7, officers of the company and P.W. 6, standing counsel of the company were all coming out of the office of an industrial tribunal after filing their written statements in a dispute raised by the workers.
The prosecution case was that at the main gate of the tribunal 's building the respondent suddenly star ted firing from a pistol and shot dead the deceased.
As firing was going on, a telephonic message conveying the fact that gunshots were being fired was sent to the nearby police station on receipt of the telephonic message the police arrived at the spot, seized the pistol and took the respondent and some of the witnesses to the police station where a formal FIR was registered.
The Session Judge convicted the accused under section 302 IPC and section 25 (1) (a) of Indian Arms Act and sentenced him to life imprisonment and one years ' rigorous imprisonment respectively.
On appeal the High Court reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge.
The High Court observed that if P.W. 7 had given the telephonic message, as stated by D.W. 1. he would have mentioned the name of the assailant because he was a full fledged eye witness but since his name had not been mentioned it was the strongest Possible circumstance to discredit the prosecution case.
Hence this appeal.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: Normally this Court does not interfere against the judgment of 2 the High Court purely on appreciation of evidence.
But this Court would interfere with the decision of the High Court if there appear to be very special circumstances which have been either overlooked or not considered by the High Court or the High Court does not appear to have examined the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has proceeded to acquit the accused on general grounds which are wholly untenable.
[5B C] A cryptic information on telephone has been held by this Court to be of no value at all.
The mere fact that the information was the first in point of time does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report.
Tapinder Singh vs State of Punjab, ; , referred to In the instant case the telephonic message was an extremely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the term.
The High Court has applied two different standards to assess the evidence of the prosecution and that of the defence.
While the High Court accepts the uncorroborated evidence of D.W. 1, who is as much interested in the dispute as the deceased, if not more, being Vice President of the Union and also in possession of the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were highly interested.
[7H, 8A B] The High Court completely lost sight of two important facts (1) that P.Ws.
5 and 7 were high officers of the company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter like this, and (2) that r.
W. 6, who was the standing counsel of the company and other labour cases for more than 3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7.
We have examined the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 with very great care and caution but we are unable to find any discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to reject the same.
[8E F] The finding of the High Court that it is difficult to believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt to escape is also most unrealistic.
There is clear evidence of P.Ws. 5, 6 and 7 that after the respondent threw down the pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not escape.
The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter.
Moreover, if a person commits a cold blooded murder in the premises of a court which is bound to be full of other litigants also, he cannot think of escaping and is bound to be caught by some one or the other.
[9A C] Relying on the evidence of D.W. 1, the conclusion reached by the High Court that it is extremely doubtful that the witnesses could see the incident from inside the court room as there was no door or window through which 3 the incident could be seen is purely speculative and against the weight of evidence on record.
The evidence of D.W. 1, who was a highly interested witness, should not have been acted upon in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case unless corroborated by independent evidence.
[9D; F G] The High Court seems to have completely overlooked the fact that there was no reason for the three eye witnesses, one of whom was a standing counsel for about 30 years, to have falsely implicated the respondent merely because he was Secretary of the Union.
The consistent course of conduct of the respondent speaks volumes against his innocence.
He was caught red handed at the spot and was surrounded by the witnesses so that he could not escape, and the police arrived within fifteen minutes of the occurrence and took him to the police station.
[9H; 10A]


judgement:
r Petition (Civil) No. 344 of 1983.
Under article 139A of the Constitution of India for transfer of Writ Petition No. 475 of 1983 pending before the Rajasthan High Court.
D. Bhandari for the Petitioner (Not Present) B. D. Sharma for the Respondent.
The Order of the court was delivered by 200 CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
This petition is totally bereft of any statement of facts.
It has been drafted and filed in a most casual and careless manner.
All that is stated in the petition is that the Writ Petition pending in the Rajasthan High Court raises exactly the same questions as those raised in SLP (Civil) No. 7561/83 pending in this Court and the writ petition may, therefore, be transferred to this Court.
Nothing else is mentioned.
No facts relating to either case are mentioned.
Even the alleged common questions are not stated.
We can only say that it is most discourteous and disrespectful to the highest court in the country to file such indifferent petitions.
The advocate is not discharging his duty either to the court or to the client.
Transfer petition is dismissed.
H.S.K. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
A petition for withdrawing a writ petition pending in the High Court to the Supreme Court under Article 139A (1) of the Constitution mentioned nothing else except that the writ petition pending in the High Court raised exactly the same questions as those raised in a special leave petition pending in the Supreme Court.
What the questions were and what the facts of the cases were was not disclosed.
Dismissing the petition, ^ HELD: It is most discourteous and disrespectful to the highest court in the country to file such indifferent petitions.
The advocate; is not discharging his duty either to the court or to the client.
[200 C]


judgement:
Petition (Civil) Nos.
12820, 12592,12714, 12736, 12747,12821,13035 and 13022 of 1984.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Dr. Y. section Chitale, Vimal Dave, Randhir Singh O. Swamy, Vineet Kumar, N. K. Sharma, Ms. Deepika Saxena.
section M. Ashri and M. Veerappa for the Petitioners.
N. H. Gursahani and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
This order is virtually a postscript to our judgment in H. Anraj and Ors.
vs State of Maharashtra What was in question in H. Anraj and Ors.
vs State of Maharashtra was the ban imposed by the Government of Maharashtra on the sale of tickets of lotteries conducted by the Government of other States in the State of Maharashtra.
What is presently in question in the writ petitions before us is the ban on the sale of tickets of lotteries authorised but not organized by the Governments of other States.
Specifically, we are concerned with the ban on sale, within the State of Maharashtra, of tickets of lotteries organised by the Indian Red Cross Society, Dadra and Nagar Haveli branch and authorised by the administration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.
In Anraj and Ors.
vs State of Maharashtra we held that the subject" 203 "Lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Government of a State" had been taken out from the legislative field, comprised by the expression "Betting and Gambling" in Entry 34 of List II of Schedule VII and was reserved to be dealt with by Parliament under Entry 40 of List I of Schedule VII.
Even so, we held, article 298 of the Constitution left the Government of a State free to carry on any trade or business in respect of which it may not have the power to make laws, but that the power to carry on such trade or business shall be subject to legislation by Parliament.
Therefore, we said, in the absence of Parliamentary legislation, the Government of every State had the unrestricted right to organise lotteries and this right was not subject to the executive power of the Government of India or the executive and legislative powers of other States.
Consequently, we held that the Government of Maharashtra did not have the right to impose a ban on the sale and distribution of tickets of lotteries organised by other States in the State of Maharashtra.
In the instant cases, we are concerned not with the ban on lotteries organised by the Governments of other States but with the ban on lotteries authorised by such Governments and organised by institutions and persons other than the Governments.
The source of power is not in question.
It is to be found in Entry 34 of List II of Schedule VII which empowers the State legislature to make laws in respect of "Betting and Gambling", which expression has always been held to include the conduct of lotteries.
While lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Government of a State have been taken out of Entry 34 of List II of Schedule VII by Entry 40 of List I, there is no question about the competence of the Legislature of Maharashtra to legislate in respect of the sale or distribution, in the State of Maharashtra, of tickets of all lotteries organised by any agency whatsoever other than the Government of India or the Government of a State.
The Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competition (Tax) Act, 1958 is an Act to control and tax lotteries and prize competition in the State of Maharashtra.
Section 3 of the Act declares: "Save as provided by the Act, all lotteries are unlawful." The Act contains detailed provisions for the licensing, regulation and control of lotteries within State of Maharashtra.
By Sec.
32 (c), it is provided that nothing in the Act shall apply to "a lottery specially authorised by the State Government.
" The submission of Dr. Chitale, learned counsel for the petitioners, was that the exemption from the applicability of the Act granted to lotteries "especially authorised by the State Government", that is, by the 204 Government of Maharashtra, was discriminatory; the exemption should be extended to all lotteries authorised by the Government of any State whatsoever.
Article 14 of the Constitution is invoked in aid of the submission; the reason for exempting lotteries authorised by the Government of Maharashtra from the applicability of the Act and not lotteries authorised by the Governments of other States is patent.
In the case of lotteries authorised by the Government of Maharashtra, the Government of Maharashtra may retain to itself all necessary powers for the regulation and control and the prevention of misuse of funds and exploitation of guileless members of the public.
In the case of lotteries authorised by the Governments of other States it may be difficult and even impossible for the Government of Maharashtra to take adequate regulatory steps to prevent abuse of the authority given by Governments of other States to non Governmental agencies to organise lotteries.
It may be equally difficult for the Governments of other States to take adequate measures for prevention of abuse of such authority within the State of Maharashtra.
We are, therefore, satisfied that no hostile discrimination whatever is involved in not extending the exemption from the applicability of the Act to lotteries authorised but not organised by the Governments of other States.
The Writ Petitions are accordingly, dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
The petitioner in their writ petitions to this Court contested the ban on sale within the State of Maharashtra, of tickets of lottories organised by the Indian Red Cross Society, Dadra and Nagar Haveli branch and authorised by the administration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli.
Dismissing the writ petitions, ^ HELD: (1) (i) The Bombay Lotteries (Control and tax) and Prize Competition (Tax) Act, 1958 is an Act to control and tax lotteries and prize competition in the State of Maharashtra.
The Act contains detailed provisions for the licensing, regulation and control of lottery within the State of Maharashtra.
Section 32(c), provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to "a lottery specially authorised by the State Government." [203G H] (ii) In the case of lotteries authorised by the Government of Maharashtra, the Government of Maharashtra may retain to itself all necessary powers for the regulation and control and the prevention of misuse of fund and exploitation of guileless members of the public.
In the case of lotteries authorised by the Government of other States it may be difficult and even impossible for the Government of Maharashtra to take adequate regulatory steps to prevent abuse of the authority given by Governments of other States to non Governmental agencies to organize lotteries.
It may be equally difficult for the Governments of other States to take 202 adequate measures for prevention of abuse of such authority within the State of Maharashtra.
[204C D] 2.
No hostile discrimination whatever is involved in not extending the exemption from the applicability of the Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competition (Tax) Act, 1958 'to lotteries authorised but not organized by the Government of other States '.
[204D] 3.
Lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Government of the State have been taken out from Entry 34 of List II of Schedule VII by Entry 40 of List 1.
There is, therefore no question about the competence of the Legislature of Maharashtra to legislate in respect of the sale or distribution, in the State of Maharashtra, of tickets of all lotteries organized by any agency whatsoever other than the Government of India or the Government of a State.
[203E F] H. Anraj and others vs State of Maharashtra, explained.


judgement:
: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1481 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd January, 1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl.
Appeal No. 45 of 1983.
Harbans Lal and Balmokand Goyal for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
We are not inclined to grant special leave, but we make this short speaking order in order to keep the record straight that the dismissal of the special leave petition does not tentamount to affirmance of the order of the learned Judge of the High Court who for reasons utterly untenable interfered with teh 215 sentence imposed by the trial court and reduced it to sentence already undergone which in the facts and circumstances of the case was wholly impermissible.
In Meet Singh vs State of Punjab,(1) this Court pointed out that Sec.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act prescribes a minimum sentence and discretion is conferred on the court to give less than the minimum for any special reasons to be recorded in writing.
This Court examined what constitute special reasons for the purpose of Sec.
5(2) and pointed out that the reasons which weighed with the learned Judge in reducing the sentence to the sentence undergone could not be special reasons.
Therefore, in our view, the learned Judge was entirely in error in showing a misplaced sympathy unsustainable in law.
With these observations we reject the special leave petition.
N.V.K. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 prescribes a minimum sentence and discretion is conferred on the Court to give less than the minimum for any 'special reasons ' to be recorded in writing.
[109B] What constitute 'special reasons ' for the purpose of Section 5 (2) was laid down in Meet Singh vs State of Punjab, ; [109B] In the instant case, the High Court for reasons utterly untenable interfered with the sentence imposed by the trial court and reduced it to the sentence already undergone.
It erred in showing a misplaced sympathy unsustainable in law.
[214H; 215A] ^


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1487 of 1984.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc, Writ Petition No. 9820 of 1981 Harbans Singh for the appellant.
Abdul Kader and G.S. Narayanan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.
This is an appeal by Special Leave directed against an order of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellants claiming refund of a sum of Rs. 22681.88 from the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund under Section 6, sub section (1) of the (hereinafter referred to as the Equalisation Fund Act).
The facts of the case are few and may be briefly stated as follows: The appellants carry on business of manufacture of syrups, squashes, jams and jellies, preservation of vegetables and other food products.
One of the essential raw materials for these products manufactured by the appellants is sugar.
There was at the material time Sugar Control Order 1966 issued under section 3 of the , clause 4 of which provided that no purchaser shall sell or agree to sell or otherwise dispose of sugar or deliver or agree to deliver sugar or remove any sugar from the bonded godown of the factory in which it is stored, except under and in 209 accordance with the directions issued in writing by the Central Government or the Chief Director.
Pursuant to this Order the Central Government introduced the policy of partial decontrol of sugar in August, 1967 and under this policy, the Central Government adopted a scheme of acquiring levy sugar from the factory.
The price of levy sugar acquired by the Central Govt.
was fixed every year in accordance with the principles set out in Section 3 (3c) of the and during the period in question the price of levy sugar was determined under the sugar (Price Determination) Order 1972.
This order was however challenged by factories manufacturing sugar and an interim order was passed by the High Court of Allahabad permitting them to charge a price higher than that fixed under the order, on condition that they furnished bank guarantee for the difference in price in favour of the Registrar of the High Court.
Now, different prices were fixed under the sugar (Price Determination) order, 1972 for different zones and so far as the East U.P. Zone was concerned, the price fixed was Rs. 175 per quintal exclusive of excise duty, sales tax etc.
with the result that the price inclusive of these taxes and duties amounted to Rs. 190 per quintal.
The appellants purchased from K.M. Sugar Mills Limited, Motinagar, Faizabad a certain quantity of sugar under a release order issued by the Central Government under the Levy Sugar Supply (Control) order 1972 and they lifted an aggregate quantity of 400 quintals of sugar on 12 8 1972 and 16 8 1972.
Now, under the sugar (Price Determination) order, 1972 K.M. Sugar Mills Limited were not entitled to recover from the appellants price at a rate exceeding Rs. 190 per quintal but by virtue of the stay order granted by the High Court of Allahabad they recovered from the appellants price at the rate of Rs. 234.89 per quintal and the total excess amount charged by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited from the appellants thus came to Rs 22681.88 for which bank guarantee was given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited in favour of the Registrar of the High Court.
The writ petition filed by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited against the Sugar (Price Determination) Order, 1972 along with other similar writ petitions filed by other manufacturers of sugar was however, ultimately dismissed by the Allahbad High Court in November, 1974 with the result that the Registrar of the High Court became entitled to encash the bank guarantee given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited and a sun of Rs. 22,681.88 was accordingly recovered by the Registrar under the bank guarantee.
Since the excess amount recovered by the various manufactu 210 rers of sugar, including K.M. Sugar Mills Limited really belonged to the consumers to whom sugar had been sold by these manufacturers, Parliament enacted with effect from 1 4 1976 for the purpose of ensuring that the excess amount so recovered should not remain in the hands of manufacturers of sugar so as to unjustly enrich them but should be paid to the consumers of sugar from whom it had been unlawfully recovered by the manufacturers.
Section 3(1) of the Equalisation Fund Act established a Fund known as the Levy Sugar Price Equlisation Fund.
Sub Section (2) of Section 3 provided that there shall be credited to the Fund amounts representing all excess realisations made by the manufacturers, irrespective of whether such realisations were made before or after the commencement of the Equalisation Fund Act.
Pursuant to this provision, the Registrar of the High Court deposited a sum of Rs. 22681.88 to the Credit of the Fund.
Section 6 of the Equalisation Fund Act then proceeded to enact that where any amount of excess realisation is credited to the Fund, the buyer of Levy sugar from whom such excess realisation was made by the manufacturer shall be entitled to the refund of such excess realisation from the Fund.
This Section is material for the purpose of determination of the controversy arising in the present appeal and we would, therefore, reproduce it as follows: (1) Where any amount is credited to the Fund a refund shall be made from the Fund to the buyer of Levy Sugar from whom any excess realisation was made by the producer or dealer, Provided that no buyer shall be entitled to claim as refund under this sub section if he (a) being the wholesale dealer, had passed on the incidence of such excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to the retail dealer by whom the price of such sugar was paid or (b) being a retail dealer, had passed on the incidence of such excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to the consumer by whom the price of such sugar was paid.
" Since a sum of Rs. 22681.88 represented excess realisation 211 made by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited from the appellants and this amount was credited to the Fund by the Registrar of the High Court, the appellants filed an application in form IV making a claim for refund of this amount from the Fund.
This application was filed by the appellants, on 30th April, 1979, admittedly within the prescribed period of six months.
The Central Government, however, rejected the claim made by the appellants on the ground that they had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on by them to the consumers of the end products.
The appellants thereupon preferred a Writ Petition in the High Court but the High Court also rejected the Writ Petition on the same ground, namely, that according to the finding recorded by the Central Government the appellants had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on to the consumers of the end products and since this was a finding of fact base on evaluation of the material and evidence produced by the appellants before the competent authority, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of the Central Government.
The appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.
The main point of controversy between the parties centres round the true interpretation of section 6 Sub section (1) of the Equalisation Fund Act.
This provision lays down as a condition precedent to its applicability that the excess realisation made by the manufacturer of sugar should have been credited to the Fund.
Now, the application made by the appellants in from IV stated in so many terms that the amount in question had been deposited by the Registrar of the High Court in terms of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Rules, 1972, through the Chief Pay & Accounts Officer, Govt.
Of India, Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation, Department of Food, New Delhi.
This statement was not at any time disputed on behalf of the Central Government either in the order made by the Central Government rejecting the claim of the appellants or in the proceedings before the High Court.
It is indisputable that a sum of Rs. 22681.88 representing the excess realisation made from the appellants by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited was credited to the Fund by the Registrar of the High Court.
And in any event, this must be 212 presumed to have been done because the Equalisation Fund Act having been enacted for this purpose, the Registrar of the High Court would naturally be expected to carry out his obligation under the statute by depositing the amount of excess realisation recovered by him under the bank guarantee given by K.M. Sugar Mills Limited.
There can, therefore, be no doubt that in terms of Section 6, Sub section (1) the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the sum of Rs. 22681.88 from the Fund.
The only question is whether the proviso to section 6, Sub section (1) precluded the appellants from claiming refund of that amount.
The proviso on its plain terms applied only where the party claiming refund of the amount of excess realisation is a wholesale or a retail dealer who has passed on the incidence of the excess over the controlled price of levy sugar to the retail dealer or to the consumer, as the case may be.
The proviso obviously cannot apply to a case where a claim for refund has been made by a consumer of sugar from whom excess realisation has been made by the manufacturer of sugar.
The appellants were admittedly consumers of sugar and not dealers in sugar and since they were not dealers in sugar, there could be no question of any incidence of excess being passed by them to the retail dealer or to the consumer.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that the excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar must have been passed on by the appellants to the consumer when they sold the manufactured products to them, because the higher price paid by them for the sugar purchased from K.M. Sugar Mills Limited must have been taken into account by them in fixing the price of the manufactured products.
This may be so or may not be so.
It is not necessary for us to examine this question because it is irrelevant on the terms of the proviso to Section 6, Sub section (1).
That proviso deals with a situation where a wholesale or retail dealer passes on the incidence of excess over the controlled or fair price of levy sugar to a retail dealer or consumer, who purchases such sugar.
It contemplates a case where a dealer whether whole sale or retail sells sugar to a retail dealer or consumer as the case may be and not where a person sells a manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredients, we have, therefore, no doubt that the proviso to Section 6, Sub section (1) was not attracted in the case of the appellants and, consequently, the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the sum of the Rs. 22681.88 from the sum of Fund.
213 We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and issue a Writ directing the respondent to pay to the appellants a sum of Rs. 22681.88 together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from today until payment.
The respondent will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellants.
H.S.K. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
Section 3 (1) of the established a fund known as the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund.
Sub sec.
(2) of section 3 provided that there shall be credited to the Fund amounts representing all excess realisations made by the manufacturers.
Section 6 (1) provided that where any amount of excess realisation was credited to the fund, the buyer of levy sugar from whom such excess realisation as made by the manufacturers shall be entitled to the refund of such excess realisation from the Fund.
There was a proviso to section 6 (1) which inter alia precluded buyers of levy sugar to claim refund of excess realisation in certain cases.
The appellants, who carried on the business of manufacture of syrups, squashes, jams and jellies, preservation of vegetables and other food products and from whom excess realisation was made and credited to the Fund, applied for refund of such realisation.
The Central Government rejected the appellants ' application for refund on the ground that they had not been able to establish fully and clearly that the incidence of higher sugar price was not passed on by them to the consumers of the end products.
The appellants preferred a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court on the same ground.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: The proviso on its plain terms applies only where the party claiming refund of the amount of excess realisation is a wholesale or a retail dealer who has passed on the incidence of the excess over the controlled price of levy sugar to the retail dealer or to the consumer, as the case may be.
The proviso obviously cannot apply to a case where a claim for refund has been made, by a consumer of sugar from whom excess realisation has been made by the manufacturer of sugar.
[106C D] In the instant case the appellants were admittedly consumers of sugar 208 and not dealers in sugar and since they were not dealers in sugar, there could be no question of any incidence of excess being passed on by them to the retail dealer or to the consumer.
[106D] The proviso to section 6 (1) contemplates a case where a dealer whether wholesale or retail sells sugar to a retail dealer or consumer as the case may be and not where a person sells a manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredients.
[106G] In the instant case the appellants sold manufactured product containing sugar as one of its ingredient.
Therefore, the proviso to section 6 (1) was not attracted and the appellants were entitled to claim refund of the excess realisation from the Fund.
[106H]


judgement:
: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1543 of 1984.
From the Judgment and order dated the 3rd day of May, 1984 of the Delhi High Court in Crl.
M(M) No. 421 of 1984 995 R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner.
Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B VENKATARAMIAH, J.
Four persons Maj.
General (Retd.) F.D. Larkins, Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) K.H. Larkins, Lt. Col.
(Retd.) Jasbir Singh and Jaspal Singh Gill alias Jassi Gill, the respondent herein, were accused of having committed offences punishable under sections 3, 5 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and of them F.D. Larkins and Jasbir Singh were also accused of having committed the offence punishable under section 6 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 in a complaint filed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Special Branch, Delhi with the authorisation of the Government of India before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House, New Delhi.
The prosecution case appears to rest inter alia on the following facts: On March 24, 1983, Group Captain Jasjit Singh informed the Air Vice Marshal (now Air Marshal) Shri section Raghavendran that for some days immediately prior to that date AVM (Retd.) K.H. Larkins then resident of Azad Apartments, Mehrauli Road, New Delhi, under whom he had served earlier was inducing him to pass on secret manuals of aircrafts used by the Indian Air Force for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/ per document.
AVM Raghavendran brought this to the notice of his superiors.
Thereafter further information was collected and the movements of AVM (Retd.) K.H. Larkins were kept under observation.
The links of the said K.H. Larkins and his brother Major General (Retd.) F.D. Larkins were discovered.
A First Information Report was registered at Police Station, Tughlak Road, New Delhi.
On November 11, 1983 raids were conducted at the residence of K.H. Larkins as well as that of F.D. Larkins.
Certain incriminating items are stated to have been recovered from the latter 's 996 house.
It is alleged that on interrogation after arrest F.D. Larkins and K.H. Larkins confessed that they had been passing on classified information relating to the defence of the country to a foreign agency.
It is further alleged that Major General (Retd).
F.D. Larkins stated that he had engaged Lt. Col. (Retd.) Jasbir Singh as his sub agent for procuring secret/restricted documents and manuals relating to armament.
On this disclosure the search of the house of Jasbir Singh was conducted on November 13 1983 and he was arrested and remanded to police custody.
It is stated that on interrogation he disclosed that he had been passing on secret/classified information to Major General (Retd.) F.D. Larkins and Jaspal Singh Gill, the respondent, for monetary consideration.
He appears to have further disclosed that many secret/restricted manuals and documents were unauthorisedly got issued to him from D.G.I. and EME libraries to which he gained access through the good offices of certain Army Officers and by impersonating himself as a serving officer when actually he was retired and that the information contained in these documents and manuals was passed on by him to Major General (Retd.) F.D. Larkins and Jaspal Singh Gill alias Jassi Gill resident of 82, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi, the respondent, who represented a private firm namely, M/s EMGEE International Pvt. Ltd, and with whom he, Lt. Col (Retd.) Jasbir Singh, was also working as consultant.
On the basis of the said disclosure made by the said Jasbir Singh the search of the house of Jaspal Singh Gill alias Jassi Gill, the respondent herein was conducted at 82, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi.
Some secret/restricted documents alongwith a Defence telephone directory connected with the Army are stated to have been recovered from his possession and he was arrested on November 19, 1983.
It is alleged that the respondent herein had obtained classified information on defence matters through the aforesaid Jasbir Singh for monetary consideration and had passed on the information to the U.S. Intelligence Operator.
During the search of the house of Jaspal Singh as many as 13 invitation cards from the U.S. Officials for cocktail and dinner parties are alleged to have been recovered showing the association of the respondent 997 with foreign agents as defined in section 4 of the Official Secrets Act.
It is alleged that the respondent was paying Rs. 1,000/ per month to the Jasbir Singh and Rs. 1,000/ per month to the wife of Jasbir Singh.
It is further alleged that the copy of the Defence telephone directory was a restricted document, the disclosure of the contents of which to unauthorised persons is prejudicial to the interest and security of the country.
All the accused persons including the respondent have been committed to the Court of Sessions for the various offences which are really of a serious nature.
During the investigation, the respondent made an application for bail before the Addl.
Sessions Judge, New Delhi and it was rejected in January, 1984.
Then again he made another application for bail before the Sessions Court.
Before the said application could be taken up, he made an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court of Delhi for bail.
The learned Judge of the High Court who heard the bail application went into the merits of the case and after holding that the material before the Court was insufficient to sustain the conviction of the respondent proceeded to enlarge him on bail subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/ with one surety in the like amount.
It may be stated here that the very same learned Judge had dismissed earlier the bail application of Jasbir Singh who was the employee of the respondent.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court enlarging the respondent on bail, the prosecution has filed this Special Leave Petition for revoking the said order of bail.
The offence punishable under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 with which the respondent is charged relates to military affairs and it is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years.
This Court in The State vs Captain Jagjit Singh has indicated that the Court should exercise a 998 greater degree of care in enlarging on bail an accused who is charged with the offence punishable under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act when it relates to military affairs.
I have also gone through the decisions of this Court in Gurcharan Singh & Ors.
vs State (Delhi Administration) and Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors.
vs Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh which deal with the principles governing the grant of bail.
It may be mentioned here that in the last of the above cases, the accused had been acquitted by the trial court but convicted by the High Court on appeal.
On a consideration of the above three decisions, I am of the view that the Court before granting bail in cases involving non bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced should take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State and similar other considerations.
On going through the order passed by the High Court, I feel that its decision that the material collected by the prosecutions and the evidence to be adduced at the trial would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction appears to be a premature one in the circumstances of this case.
Since the trial is yet to begin, I do not propose to say anything more at this stage lest it should prejudice either the accused or the prosecution than observing that on a perusal of the complaint and the other material available in the case, it cannot reasonably be stated that the prosecution case against the respondent is such that it can be thrown out at the threshold.
It appears that a prima facie case is made out against the respondent.
The gravity of the offences is quite obvious.
They relate to the security of the State, Espionage and intelligence are utilised to pass on information regarding military plans, equipment, technical advances etc.
of one country to another.
Naturally passing on of such information from our country to a foreign country is bound to be most harmful to our country.
The 999 persons accused alongwith the respondent are admittedly ex military men well versed in military affairs who are capable of establishing bridges with the sensitive sections of the defence services.
The respondent is also alleged to be having some dealings with the defence department and Jasbir Singh is in the employment of the respondent.
The allegations made by the prosecution which no doubt have still to be established at the trial suggest that the respondent and the persons accused alongwith him are persons of easy conscience in so far as the interests and security of the country are concerned.
The current situation in the country is such that it can be easily be exploited by unscrupulous men to their own or to some foreign power 's advantage.
These aspects of the case do not appear to have been considered by the High Court.
It is seen that while dismissing the bail application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, 1984, the learned Judge of the High Court had relied on the decision of this Court in Captain Jagjit Singh 's case (supra), he has not even referred to that decision while granting bail to the respondent on May 3, 1984.
Some of the observations made by the High Court against the sustainability of the case of criminal conspiracy alleged by the prosecution at this stage were not called for.
The circumstances of this case are such that the question whether the case of criminal conspiracy had been made out or not should have been left to be decided by the trial court at the end of the trial on a consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case.
In the circumstances, I am of the view that the High Court should not have enlarged the respondent on bail in the larger interests of the state.
It is urged that the respondent is a person who has undergone a cardiac operation and needs constant medical attention.
I am sure that the prison authorities will arrange for proper treatment of the respondent whenever the deed for it arises.
I am informed that in a criminal revision petition filed by one of the accused, the High Court has stayed the trial of the case The High Court is requested to dispose of the case early since the accused are all in judicial custody.
The order of bail passed by the High Court was suspended by this Court by an order made on June 4, 1984 and the respon 1000 dent was ordered to be re arrested and kept in judicial custody The respondent is now taken back into judicial custody.
In the result, the order of the High Court enlarging the respondent on bail is set aside and the respondent is directed to remain judicial custody until further orders to be passed by a competent court.
The trial court shall proceed to dispose of the case without feeling itself bound by any of the observations of the High Court.

summary/full:
The respondent along with three others were accused of having committed offences punishable under sections 3,5 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and therefore committed to the Court of Sessions for the said offences which are of a serious nature.
During the investigation, the respondent made an application for bail before the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi and it was rejected in January, 1984.
Then again he made another application for bail before the Sessions Court.
Before the said application could be taken up he made an application under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court of Delhi for bail.
The learned Judge of the High Court who heard the bail application went into the merits of the case and after holding that the material before the Court was insufficient to sustain the conviction of the respondent proceeded to enlarge him on bail subject to his furnishing a Personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/ with one surety in the like amount.
However, the very same Learned Judge had dismissed earlier the bail application of Jasbir Singh who was the employee of the respondent.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court enlarging the respondent on bail, the prosecution has filed this special leave petition for revoking the said order of bail: Allowing the petition, the Court.
^ HELD: 1:1.
The Court before granting bail in cases involving non bailable offences particularly where the trial has not yet commenced should 994 take into consideration various matters such as the nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstance which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger undressed of the public or the State and similar other considerations.
Further, the Court should exercise a greater degree of care in enlarging on bail an accused who is charged with the offence punishable under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act when it relates to military affairs.
Here the offence punishable under section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 with which the respondent is charged relates to military affairs and it is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years.
The State vs Captain Jagjit Singh, ; Gurcharan Singh & Ors vs State (Delhi Admn.), ; ; Gudikanti Narsaimhulu & Ors.
vs Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 361, referred to [998C D; 998A; 997H] 1:2.
The decision of the High Court that the material collected by the prosecution and the evidence to be adduced at the trial would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction appears to be a premature one in the circumstances of this case.
The allegations made by the prosecution which no doubt have still to be established at the trial suggest that the respondent and the persons accused alongwith him are persons of easy conscience in so far as the interests and security of the country is concerned.
The current situation in the country is such that it can easily be exploited by unscrupulous men to their own or to some foreign power 's advantage.
These aspects of the case do not appear to have been considered by the High Court.
Further, while dismissing the bail application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, 1984, the learned Judge of the High Court had relied on the decision of this Court in Captain Jagjit Singh 's case, he has not even referred to that decision while granting bail to the respondent on May 3, 1984.
Some of the observations made by the High Court against the sustainability of the case of criminal conspiracy alleged by the prosecution at this stage were not called for.
The circumstance of this case are such that the question whether the case of criminal conspiracy had been made out or not should have been left to be decided by the trial court at the end of the trial on a consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case.
Therefore, the High Court should not have enlarged the respondent on bail in the larger interest of the State.
[998E; 999B F]