judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos. 1461 to 1468 of 1 974.
From the Judgment and order dated the 14th April, 1974 of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, New Delhi.
in C. Appeals Nos. 15 to 19, 21, 22 and 25 of 1973 respectively.
H V. section Desai, Vimal Dave and Kailash Mehta, for the appellant (in all the appeals).
309 M. V. Dabolkar, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1461/74).
Z. F. Bootwala and Urmila Sirur, for the respondent (In C. A. Nos. 1462 64/74) .
V. N. Ganpule and V. H. Dixit, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1465/74).
K. G. Mandalia, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 1466/74).
E. Udayarathallam and A. K. Doshi, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 1467/ 74).
D. K. Raisinghani, for the respondent (In C.A. No. 1468/74).
K. K. Sinha and section K. Sinha, for the Bihar State Bar Council.
D. V. Patil and K. Hingorani, for the Bar Council of India.
The Judgment of A. N. RAY, C.J., H. R. KHANNA, K. K. MATHEW, A. C. GUPTA AND section M. FAZAL ALl, was delivered by A. N. RAY, C.J., M. BEG and V. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.
gave separate opinions.
RAY, C.J.
These appeals were placed before this Bench for consideration of the question whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal under section 38 of the hereinafter called the Act.
The Bar Council of Maharashtra on 8 August, 1964 considered a complaint received from the High Court against the respondents and resolved that the complaint received from the High Court against the respondents be referred to the disciplinary committee.
Another resolution was passed by the Bar Council of Maharashtra on the same day whereby Messrs Hotchand Advani, R. W. Adik and section C. Chagla were elected as members of the disciplinary committee to enquire into the complaints.
The aforesaid disciplinary committee met on 19 March, 1965 and heard the advocates for the Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra.
After considering the papers placed before the committee, it directed the Registrar to issue notices under section 35(2) of the Act to the "parties concerned including the Advocate General".
The committee also expressed the opinion that "there is a prima facie case of professional misconduct".
The Bar Council of Maharashtra on 18 May, 1965 issued notices under section 35 of the Act to the respondents.
The notice was described as a suo motu inquiry against the respondents.
The notice proceeded with the recital that it came to the notice of the Bar Council of Maharashtra that the respondents stood at the entrance of the Court House at the Presidency Magistrate 's Court, Esplanade, Fort Bombay and solicited work and generally behaved at that place in an undignified manner and the said acts amounted to professional and/or other misconduct and the Bar Council constituted disciplinary committee and the inquiry was entrusted to the committee consisting of Messrs H. G. Advani, R. W. Adik and section C. Chagla.
310 The said disciplinary committee heard evidence upto 31 August, 1968.
On 14 June, 1969, the Bar Council of Maharashtra passed a resolution requesting the aforesaid disciplinary committee to proceed with the inquiry which was pending before them prior to 31 March, 1969.
The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra on 27 June, 1973 found the respondents guilty of conduct which seriously lowered the reputation of the Bar in the eyes of the public.
The disciplinary committee directed that the respondents would stand suspended from practising as advocates for a period of three years.
The suspension orders were to be operative from 1 August 1973.
The respondents preferred appeals before the Bar Council of India.
In these appeals, the respondents impleaded the Bar Council of Maharashtra as respondents.
The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India on 14 April, 1974 allowed the appeals and set aside the orders of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra.
While setting aside the orders of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra, the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India stated as follows: "The Bar Council of Maharashtra has not appeared even though they started the proceedings suo motu and we do not pass any orders as to costs and we direct each party will bear their costs.
However, we have gone through the evidence ourselves and also the same has been placed in detail by the appellants.
All that we can say is that we expected the Bar Council of Maharashtra to be represented in the ap peal because proceedings were started suo motu" These statements of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India indicate that the Bar Council of Maharashtra should have appeared before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.
The scheme of the in short is as follows: There are State Bar Councils.
There is Bar Council of India Every Bar Council is a body corporate.
The functions of a State Bar Council are inter alia to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll and to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates on its roll.
The functions of the Bar Council of India are inter alia to lay down standards of professional conduct and etiquette, to lay down the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee and the disciplinary committee of State Bar Councils, to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates and to exercise general supervision and control over State Bar Councils Disciplinary committees are constituted by each Bar Council.
A Bar Council is required to constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which shall consist of three persons of whom two shall 311 be persons elected by the Council from amongst its members and the other shall be A person co opted by the Council from amongst advocates who possesss the qualifications specified in the proviso to section 3(2) of the Act and are not members of the Council, and the senior most advocate amongst the members of a disciplinary committee shall be its Chairman.
When the Executive Committees of a State Bar Council and of the Bar Council of India and an Enrolment Committee of a State Bar Council and the legal education committee of the Bar Council of India are to consist of members erected by the Council from amongst its members, it is noticeable that the disciplinary committees of Bar Council of State as well as of Bar Council of India shall consist of three persons of whom two shall be elected by the Council from amongst its members and the other shall be a person co opted by the Council from advocates who are not otherwise members of the Council.
Chapter V of the Act relates to the Conduct of Advocates.
Chap ter V contains sections 35 to 44.
Section 35 states that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct that inquiry to be made by another disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council.
The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice to be given.
to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate General of the State.
The disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council may make any of the following orders namely, (a) dismiss the complaint, or where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed, (b) reprimand the advocate, (c) suspend the advocate for such period as it may deem fit, (d) remove the name of the advocate from the state roll of advocates.
Section 36 speaks of disciplinary powers of the Bar Council of India and provides that where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise the Bar Council of India has reason to believe that any advocate whose name is not entered on any State roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may either of its own motion or on a report by any State Bar Council or on an application made to it by any person interested, withdraw for inquiry before itself any proceeding for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any State Bar Council and dispose of the same.
Section 37 speaks of appeal to the Bar Council of India.
This section states that any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinary 312 committee of a State Bar Council or the Advocate General of the state may, within sixty days of the date of communication of the order, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.
Section 38 provides for appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 38 states that any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 or the Attorney General of India or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 49 of the Act provides that the Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and in particular such rules may prescribe inter alia the standards of professional conduct and etiquette to be observed by advocates.
The Bar Council of India in exercise of the rule making power under section 49(c) of the Act on 10 and l l July, 1954, approved the rules of standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
The standards of professional conduct and etiquette are described in five sections.
The first section deals with duty of advocates to the Court.
The second section speaks of duty of advocates to the clients.
The third section consists of rules regarding duty of advocates to opponent.
The fourth section prescribes duties of advocates to colleagues.
The fifth section lays down restrictions on advocates on other employments.
The present appeals touch on Rule 36 of the Rules of the Bar Council of India.
Rule 36 is in fourth section under the heading "duty to colleagues Rule 36 speaks that "an advocate shall not solicit work or advertise either directly or indirectly, whether by circular, advertisements, touts, personal communications, interviews not warranted by personal relations furnishing newspaper comments or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with cases in which he has been engaged or concerned.
The question for consideration is the meaning of the words any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India" occurring in section 38 of the Act.
It is noticeable that in section 37, the Advocate General of the State and in section 38, the Attorney General or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, have been given specific rights of appeal.
These rights were introduced into the Act by amendments made in the year 1974 by Amending Act 60 of 1973.
In Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs H. M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra, Bombay(1), the question which fell for consideration was whether the appeal filed by the Advocate General of Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India was competent.
The majority view was that the Advocate General of the State was not competent to file an appeal to the Bar Council of India.
In the Maharashtra case (supra), the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council was satisfied that that there was no reason to hold Adi Pherozshah Gandhi guilty of professional misconduct or other misconduct.
The Advocate General (1) 313 of Maharashtra filed an appeal before the Bar Council of India.
The appellant objected to the locus standi of Advocate General before the Bar Council of India.
That objection was overruled and the appeal filed by the Advocate General was accepted by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.
The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India held the advocate, Adi Pherozshah Gandhi guilty of misconduct and suspended him from practice for one year.
The advocate preferred an appeal under section 38 of the Act to this Court.
In view or majority decision, the appeal filed by Adi Pherozshah Gandhi was accepted by this Court on the ground that the Advocate General of Maharashtra was incompetent to file an appeal.
It is in this background that amendments have been introduced into sections 37 and 38 of the Act conferring right of appeal on the Advocate General of State and the Attorney General of India under sections 37 and 38 respectively.
The respondents contended on the ruling of this Court in Adi Pherozshah Gandhi s case (supra) that the Bar Council of the State is not a person aggrieved to maintain an appeal against a decision of its disciplinary committee for these reasons.
First, the Bar Council of a State is not an aggrieved person because Bar Council has not suffered ally legal grievance, and the decision of the Bar Council of India has not deprived the Bar Council of a State of anything.
Second, the allegation that order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India is wrongfully made does not by itself give any grievance to the Bar Council of a State.
The person must be aggrieved by the order and not by the consequences which ensue.
Third, it is not the duty of the State Bar Council to attempt to set right any alleged error of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.
The reason is that no such duty has been imposed or cast by law on the Bar Council of a State.
Fourth, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form or other.
Fifth, the Bar Council of a State is subordinate to Bar Council of India and is, therefore, not competent to appeal against any orders of the superior body.
Finally, an appeal could have been filed by the Advocate General or the Attorney General of India who have the right to appeal but they have chosen not to do so.
The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicates that the constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India is for one of the principal purposes to see that the standards of professional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Council of India are observed and preserved.
The Bar Councils therefore entertain cases of misconduct against advocates.
The Bar Councils are to safeguard the rights, privilege and interests of advocates.
The Bar Council is a body corporate.
The disciplinary committees are constituted by the Bar Council.
The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinary committee.
One of the principal functions of the Bar Council in regard to standards of professional conduct and etiquette of advocates is to receive complaints against advocates and if the Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
The Bar Coun 314 cil of a State may also of its own motion if it has reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
It is apparent that a State Bar Council not only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mind to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has ben guilty of professional or other misconduct.
The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned belief.
The Bar Council has a very important part to play first, in the reception complaints, second, in forming reasonable belief of guilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in making reference of the case to its disciplinary committee.
The initiation of the proceedings before the disciplinary committee is by the Bar Council of a State.
A most Significant feature is that no litigant and no member of the public can straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings against an advocate.
lt is the Bar Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.
In finding out the meaning of the words "person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India", two features are to be kept in the fore front.
First, there is no lis in proceedings before the disciplinary committee.
When the disciplinary committee exercises the power to reprimand the advocate, or suspend the advocate from practice or remove the name of the advocate, the committee does not decide a suit between the parties.
The Bar Council in placing a matter before the disciplinary committee does not act as prosecutor in a criminal case.
A complainant who prefers a complaint against an advocate is not like a plaintiff in a civil suit.
The complaint is examined by the Bar Council in order to find out whether there is any reason to believe that any advocate has been guilty of misconduct. 'The Bar Council may act on its own initiative on information which has come to its notice in the course of its duties.
Second, there is no party to the disciplinary proceedings.
It is because the Bar Council, the Attorney General, the Advocate General, as the case may be, all act in protecting the interests of advocates, the interests of the public.
In so acting there is no conflict between the advocate and another person.
The reason is that it is professional conduct, professional etiquette, professional ethics, professional morality, which are to be upheld, transgression of which results in reprimanding the advocate of suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll.
With regard to the conduct of the advocates, the State Bar Council plays an important part, vis a vis the disciplinary committee constituted by the State Bar Council.
First, under section 35(1A) of the Act the State Bar Council may either of its own motion or on an application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by ant other disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council.
This indicates the watch that the State Bar Council has to keep.
Its task does not cease on placing a matter before the disciplinary committee.
This provision shows on one hand the abiding interest of the State Bar Council in the matter and on the other the duty of guarding the professional ethics with which it is entrusted.
Second, under section 36(2) of the Act, a 'State Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India to 315 withdraw before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India any proceeding for disciplinary action against any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council.
These provisions indicate that after the State Bar Council has placed the matter before its disciplinary committee, the Bar Council continues its check on the proceedings.
These courses of action are procedural.
These steps do not give the State Bar Council any power to deal with the decisions of the disciplinary committee.
The reason why the State Bar Council is empowered under the Act to withdraw proceedings from one disciplinary committee and give it to another or to have the disciplinary proceedings withdrawn from the State for determination by the disciplinary committee of the Bal Council of India is that the State Bar Council is all the time interested in the task of preserving the profession against impurities in the standards of conduct.
The Bar Council is the collective representative of the lawyers, the public, in regard lo the observance of professional ethics by persons belonging to the noble profession.
The words `person aggrieved" are found in several statutes.
The meaning of the words "person aggrieved" will have to be ascertained with reference to the purpose and the provisions of the statute.
Some times, it is said that the words "person aggrieved" correspond to the requirement of locus standi which arises in relation to judicial remedies.
Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved.
The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the con text of the statute.
One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him.
Normally, one is required to establish that one has been 'denied or deprieved of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved".
Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him.
The meaning of the words a "person aggrieved" is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights.
The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights.
A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality.
The role of the Bar Council under the is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics.
The words "persons aggrieved" in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import add should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests.
The test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests".
It has therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette.
The pre eminent question is: what are the interests of the Bal.
Council? The interests of the Bar Council are the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
The Bar Council has 316 no personal or pecuniary interest.
the Bar Council has the statutory A duty and interest to see that the rules laid down by the Bar Council of India in relation to professional conduct and etiquette are upheld and not violated.
The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession.
The interest of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiquette in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust.
The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession.
The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
If any decision of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India is according to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, the State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar The Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" for these reasons First, the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute.
In disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee there is no lis and there are no parties.
therefore, the word "person" will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State.
Second, the Bar Council is "a person aggrieved" because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession.
Third, the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is whn the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry.
Once an inquiry starts, the Bar Council has no control over its decision.
The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India.
This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession.
Fourth, a decision of a disciplinary committee can only be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act.
When the Bar Council initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to disciplinary committee, the Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper standards an(l etiquette of the profession.
Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council.
The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics.
For these reasons we hold that the Bar Council is an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal under the Act.
The appeals will now be heard on merits by a Division Bench.
317 BEG, J.
I not only concur with the conclusion reached by My Lord the Chief Justice and the reasons given to support it.
but I think that we can and should hold that there was actually a "lis" between tho Bar Council and the allegedly delinquent Advocates who were hauled up before its Disciplinary Committee, on complaints sent by the Executive Committee of the State Bar Council, for what were said to be acts of professional misconduct, The learned Chief Justice has very clearly and succinctly set out the reasons why a State Bar Council is a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal against orders in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar of the State.
It represents the Bar of the State.
It is the "keeper of the conscience" and the guardian of the interests of members of the Bar.
It acts "as the protector of the purity and dignity of the (` profession." Its function in relation to disciplinary proceedings, is to entertain complaints against Advocates, and, when there is a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by sending the complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.
It has an interest in seeing that correct decisions are given upon matters involving allegations of misconduct against members of the Bar of the State.
My learned brother Krishna Iyer has indicated the wide range and the social significance and dimensions of this interest.
A State Bar Council is composed primarily of members elected from amongst Advocates of a State.
Its statutory functions are given in Section 6 of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').
Amongst these, we are especially concerned here with clauses (c) and (d) of Section 6(t) of the Act, which read as follows: (c) to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll; (d) to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests; of advocate on its roll;" Under Section 9 of the Act, the State Bar Council constitutes its Disciplinary Committee consisting of "three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by the.
Council from amongst its members and the other shall be a person elected by the Council from amongst Advocates who possess the qualifications specified. ".
Under Section 10 it elects an Executive Committee of five members and an Enrolment Committee of three members.
Thus, the State Bar Council operates through its Committees.
Each Committee has distinct and separable functions.
Each could, therefore, be said to have a "persona" and an identity of its own which is distinguishable from that of the Bar Council as a whole.
Each Committee, no doubt, acts for the Bar Council, but its members are likely to be different although this is not necessarily so.
In any case, when the State Bar Council has sent a case to its Disciplinary Committee, under Section 35 of the Act, that Committee proceeds as an independent and impartial authority which tries a complaint and either dismisses lt or directs proceedings to be filed, or, upon finding an advocate guilty, punishes him by either reprimanding him, suspending him from practice for a specified period, or orders removal of his name 7 L 839 Sup CI/75 318 from its roll of advocates.
Indeed, Section 42(1) of the Act gives the Disciplinary Committee the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code; and, Section 42(2) enacts that its proceedings shall be "deemed" to be judicial proceedings for the purposes mentioned there.
At the trial of a complaint, opportunities to be heard must be given to the Advocate General and to the Advocate who is tried by it.
This has to be done because there are disputes and conflicting interests and points of view on which the Disciplinary Committee has to give its decisions.
Tho Advocate General can appear either personally or through an Advocate representing him.
He presumably represents public interest as well as the interests of the legal profession of which he is the formal head in the State.
It is true that there is no provision in Section 35 of the Act for impleading the State Bar Council which, on its executive side, initiates the proceedings by sending the case to its Disciplinary Committee.
But, if the Bar Council has a separable interest, as a guardian of the rights and privileges of the members of the Bar specifically mentioned by Section 6(1)(d) of the Act, there is no reason why I right to represent this interest before its on Disciplinary Committee well as before the Bar Council of India, on an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, or, on the further appeal to this Court under Section 38 of the Act, should be denied to it.
Neither Section 37 nor Section 38 of the Act mention the State Bar Council as a separate entity.
Nevertheless if, as we are holding, it can have the locus standi and rights of "person aggrieved", affected by the results of such proceedings, I see no reason why we should not say that in tho position of a party to a "lis" or a dispute between itself and the allegedly delinquent Advocate towards the decision of which the proceedings are directed.
The term "lis" is not confined to litigation by means of a suit in a Court of law.
In Butler vs Mountgarret it was held that a "suit is not necessary to constitute lis".
It was pointed out there that "a family . controversy capable of being litigated is a lis mota '.
In B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) vs Minister of Health(2), Lord Greene, M.R. said: `"Lis implies the conception of an issue joined between two parties, The decision of a lis. is the decision of that issue".
If the State Bar Council, acting through its through it Executive Committee, has found a prima facie case to be send and tried by its Disciplinary Committee, it performs the functions of a prosecuting agency.
lt does so i the discharge of its duty to safeguard '`the rights, privileges and interests ' of advocates as a whole on its roll which are affected by the misconduct of an advocate.
There arc, therefore, triable issues between it and the; (, individual Advocate accused of misconduct.
lt seems to mc that we could and should, therefore, hold that the State Bar Council, in its executive capacity, act as the prosecutor through its Executive Committee There is no incongruity in its Disciplinary Committee, representing is judicial want" functioning as an impartial Judge whose decisions ar. binding upon the State Bar Council.
If are were holding that Bar Council, dissatisfied with a decision of its Disciplinary Committee, can appeal against it, we her to, I think, as its logical corollary, also hold that it is (1) 7 H. L. Ca. 641.
(2) ; At 399. 319 a party to a "lis".
Our` opinion that it is a 'person aggrieved", within the meaning of that expression as used in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, necessarily implies that.
The point of view stated above rests upon the distinction between the two different capacities of the State Bar Council; an executive capacity, in which it acts as the prosecutor through its Executive Committee, and a quasi judicial function, which it performs through s Disciplinary Committee.
If we can make this distinction, as I think we can, there is no merger between the prosecutor and the Judge here.
If one may illustrate from another sphere, when the State itself gets through it executive agencies to prosecute and then though its judicial wing to decide a case there is no breach of a rule of natural justice.
The prosecutor and the Judge could not be said to have the some personality or approach just because both of them represents different aspects or functions of the same State.
For the reasons given above, I do not see any objection to a participation of State Bar Council in its executive capacity, in a disciplinary proceeding against an Advocate on its roll, either at the initial or the appellate stages.
Before it can become a person aggrieved" by an order against which it could appeal, there must have been a "lis" or a dispute to be decided which gives rise to the order complained of.
To such a "lis" the State Bar Council, in its executive capacity must be deemed to be a party.
Apparently, its interests are presumed to be sufficiently represented by the Advocate General.
Hence, it was not considered necessary to provide for its separate representation by a notice to be given by its Disciplinary Committee; is provided for in the case of the Advocate General But, their seems to me to be no legal obstacle in the way of its separate representation, if.
it so desires, even before its own Disciplinary Committee.
It certainly has notice of every complaint whenever it send it to its Disciplinary Committee.
Its right to appeal in any event, as a "person aggrieved", seems squarely covered by the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act.
It may be mentioned here that the respondents themselves treated the Bar Council as a party interested in a "list", so that it could become a "person" aggrieved" by the setting aside of the orders against respondents, when they impleaded the State Bar Council as a respondent in their appeals to the Bar Council India.
Its statutory right to appeal to this Court under Section 38 is not affected by the mere fact that it did not put in appearance before the Bar Council of India.
KRISHNA IYER, J.
My concurrence the opinion which has been handed down by the learned Chief Justice is ordinarily dissuasive of a separated long note, save when a fresh perspective is to be presented or new frontiers are to be drawn by doing so.
Partially, my supplementary has this apology.
The tow day long arguments in this case have been devoted to a construction of two simple words in common use forming the 320 expression 'person aggrieved '.
Precedential erudition and traditional approaches not withstanding, the key to tho meaning of the expression in question lies in plain English plus the social fell of the Status and the public commitment of the legal profession, the regulation on which has been achieved by the (for short, the Act) wherein the above words occur.
Legal scholarship, to be fruitful, must focus on the life style of the law without getting lost in mere logomachy.
The short question is as to whether the State Bar Council is a person aggrieved ' within the meaning of section 38 so that it has locus standi to appeal to this Court against a decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Bar Council of India which, it claims, is embarrassingly erroneous and, if left unchallenged, may frustrate the high obligation of maintaining standards of probity and purity and canons of correct professional conduct among the members of the Bar on its rolls.
I skip the facts as they have been 5 out in the judgment of the armed Chief Justice, except to state.
that a number of advocates, who are ranged as respondents, had been found guilty by the Disciplinary Tribunal of the State Bar Council of unseemly soliciting but,.
On appeal.
the disciplinary body of the National Bar Council, exonerated them on certain view of 'professional conduct ' which disturbed the State Bar Council and even the All India Bar Council, with the result that the former came upto this Court in appeal and.
the latter activity supported this stand.
The hackneyed phrase, 'person aggrieved is not merely of frequent occurrence m statutes and in the writ jurisdiction but has come up for judicial consideration in Anglo American and India courts in a variety of situations and legislative settings.
Notwithstanding the slippery semantics of such legalese, the Indian legislative draftsmen have continued to use them, out of linguistic allegiance to the British art, and Indian Judges have frequently sought interpretative light from English authorities of ancient vintage.
These 'borrowed ' drafting and interpretative exercises arc sometimes inept when time and country change and the context and text of the statute vary.
I stress this aspect since much of the time of the Courts in India is consumed by massive, and sometimes mechanical, reliance on exotic constructions and default in evolving legislative simplicity and avoiding interpretative complexity.
At a time when our Courts are on trial for delayed disposals and mystifying processes, this desideratum becomes all the more urgent.
Otherwise, why should decoding a single expression 'person aggrieved ' take two days of learned length ? Even.
in England, so well known a Parliamentary draftsman as Francis Bennion has recently pleaded in the Manchester Guardian against incomprensible law forgetting 'that it is fundamentally important in a free society that the law should be readily ascertainable and reasonably clear, and that otherwise it is oppressive and deprives 321 the citizen of one of his basic rights '.
It is also needlessly expensive and wasteful.
Reed Dickerson, the famous American Draftsman. said: 'lt cost the Government and the public many millions of dollars annually '.
The Renton Committee, in England, has reported on drafting reform but it is unfortunate that India is unaware of this problem and in a post Independence statute like the legislators should still get entangled in these drafting mystiques and judges forced lo play a linguistic game when the country has an illiterate laity as consumers of law and the rule of law is basic to our constitutional order.
Back to the issue.
Is the State Bar Council a 'person aggrieved '? No narrow.
pedantic, technical or centenarian construction can be blindly applied.
On the other hand, a spacious construction, functionally informed by the social conscience and the salutary purpose of the enactment must illumine the judicial effort.
So viewed, the ample.
import and breath of meaning of the words 'person aggrieved ' will .
embrace the State Bar Council,for reasons which 1 shall presently set out.
Each statute has a personality and a message.
Judicial interpretation is not bloodless and sterile exercise in spinning subtle webs sometimes cobwebs, out of words and phrases otherwise simples.
but to unfold the scheme of the Legislation insightfully, sense its social setting and read the plain intendment.
This living approach can do justice to law, We arc here concerned with a legislative outfit for a national Bar, organising and prescribing its statutory autonomy, elective structure, public functions, internal regulation and ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court where canons of good conduct have been allegedly breached by delinquent lawyers.
This conspectus will show what a vibrant and responsible role the Bar Council has to play at the State and national levels and any interpretation which will detract from this supervisory status of the Bar Council will be incongruous with the founding creed of the institution.
The paramount concern of the Bar Councils is the lawyer, the public and professional responsibility.
Anything that hurts the health of this system is a social trauma, a legal grievance, a special injury, for them.
After all, 'lawyer power ' lasts not through peak incomes of a few and security of statutory monopoly, but by the high comport and ethics of the many, screening and weeding deviants and delinquents.
Let us get a glimpse of the great expectations about The legal profession in society.
Long ago, De Toqueville trenchantly remarked that the profession of law.
"is the only aristrocratic element which can be amalgamated without violence with natural elements of democracy.
I cannot believe that a Republic could subsist if the influence of lawyers in public business did not increase in proportion to the power of the people.
" He rightly stressed that 'lawyers belong to the people by birth an.
interest, to the aristocracy by habit and taste '.
Thus the profession is 322 the connecting link between the community and the Administration given an enlightened, goal oriented group outgrowing its elitist mores indeed today lawyers are recruited also from the lower brackets.
India has huge number of law men who can be a force.
What Prof. Brabanti observed about the Pakistan Bar has some, only some though, relevance to India, and I quote: "The sheer size of the legal community, strongly organised into bar associations and closely allied with equally strong courts has not only been a major source for the diffusion and regeneration of norms generally, but by weight of numbers has enabled the courts to remain strong and has prevented the rise of administrative lawlessness.
There is s curious anomaly here.
The legal community, while often antagonistic to government and constraining executive action, is nevertheless closely identified normatively and culturally with the bureaucratic elite.
This identification curiously coupled with health antagonism actually enhances the strength of the legal community.
It derives popular support from its ostensible opposition to Government and at the same time elicits bureaucratic support in the community at large.
It has a net work of relationships in rural areas and the cities.
In short, the legal community is a force to be, reckoned with.
It has challenged the executive during and after martial law, it has defined efforts to restrict court jurisdiction, it has compelled justiciability of fundamental rights, it has forced abrogation of several restrictive enactments.
Is this law as an impendiment to political development ? Is this misallocation of scarce resources in the system? Is this unproductive use of non productive man power ? On the contrary, it seems to us that this is the Very genius of political development." Michael Hager, after quoting Prof. Brabanti, comments (in his article in the American Bar Association Journal, January 1972, Vol. 58, on .The Role of Lawyers in Developing Countries ') "The legal profession has a unique opportunity to effect change from within the political elite, to exert pressure from without and to win over the general public to development policies.
And as Mihaly and Nelson observed with respect to legal education, 'law graduates usually fan out not only into legal practice but also into responsible positions in business, government and politics '.
" The Bar is not a private guild, like that of 'barbers butchers and candlestick makers ' but, by bold contrast, a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service.
The grant of monoply licence to practice law is based on three assumptions There is a socially useful function for The lawyer to perform.
(2) The lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function, and (3) His performance as a professional person is regulated by himself and more normally, by the profession as a whole.
The central function 323 That the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice ( 'The Practice of Law is, a Public Utility ' `The Lawyer, The Public and Professional Responsibility ' by F. Raymond Marks et al Chicago American Bar Foundation, 1972, p.288 289).
A glance at The functions of the Bar Council, and it will be apparent that a rainbow of public utility duties, including legal aid to the pour, is cast on these bodies in the national hope that the members of this monopoly will serve society and keep to canons of ethics befitting an honourable order.
If pathological cases of member misbehaviour occur, the reputation and credibility of the Bar suffer a mayhem and who, out the Bar Council, is more concerned with and sensitive to this potential disrepute The few black sheep bring about? The official heads of the Bar i.e., the Attorney General and the Advocates General too are distressed if a lawyer 'stoops to conquer ' by resort to soliciting, touting and other corrupt practices.
I may now refer to A. P. Gandhi vs H. M. Seervai (1) where diver gent opinions were delivered but all concurred in treating the Bar Council as an 'aggrieved person '.
The earlier decision in Bhataraju (2) strikes a note in consonance with this view.
No hesitancy inhibits me from hazarding the opinion that the social canvas must be spread wide when making out the profile of a statute like the for the good reason that the Bar has a share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the legal dykes of Right and justice are breached by authoritarianism or citizen wrong doing.
Nor do I conceal my halfhorror at any professional tribunal glossing over 'snatching briefs ' and 'dragging clients ' provided they are proved as less than gross misconduct.
If the salt lose their savour, wherewith shall they be salted ? However, I hasten to make it plain, to avoid prejudice to the parties.
that I totally desist from pronouncing on the merits of tho evidence in this case.
One more point.
A case of professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American meaning.
It is a public investigation about misconduct by one belonging to public profession where every member of the Bar with a reputation to lose has a stake and every one concerned with the justice administration is interested.
Traditionally used to the adversary system, we search for individual persons aggrieved.
But a new class of litigation public interest litigation where a section or whole of the community is involved (such as consumers ' organisations or NAACP National Association for Advancement of Coloured People in America), emerges.
In a developing country like ours, this pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of life.
The Bar Council clearly comes within this category of organisations When a lawyer is involved.
I derive support for this philosophy of approach from academic and judicial opinion in England and America.
A question arose whether a railroad company BAR (Bangor and Aroostook Railroad) could bring an action against the stockholders for having drained BAR (1) [197] I S C. R. 863.
(2) [1955] 1 section C. R. 1055,1064.
324 improperly.
Although an academic critic took the view that the District Court was incorrect in its view that BAR was the 'sole beneficiary ', he went on to state that the public 's interest in the financial health of BAR provided a separate interest in bringing the action.
The learned author wrote: "It would seem to be incontestable that the public has a very n real interest in rail roads.
Railroads have been found vital to a healthy national economy; any such factor must.
a priori, be deemed a potent component of the public welfare.
As such, it is evident that a financially healthy railroad is of concern not only to its stockholders, but to the public as well Finding that the management of a railroad has obligations running to the public as well as fiduciary duties owing to the corporation 's stockholders, the Court concluded that, of these two responsibilities, tho public interest is paramount.
"It must be remembered," the Court cautioned, "that railways are public corporations organized for public purposes.
They all primarily owe duties to the public of a higher nature even than that of earning large dividends for their shareholders." (Review by James 1;.
Simon of Bangor & Aroostook R. R vs Bangor Punta operations, Inc (Bangor & Aroostook), ; Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, 94 S.Ct.
863 (1974) Columbia Law Review Vol.
74 No. 3, April 197 p. 528 at pp.
531 532).
Similarly, the American Supreme Court relaxed from the restrictive attitude towards 'standing ' in public action in Baker vs Carr ; (1962), vide Maryland Law Review, Vol.
XXXIII 1973 p.506: "In Baker, voters challenged the failure of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself since 1901; the plaintiffs lived l. in countries which had become under represented under the old law.
The Supreme Court held that these voters had the requisite standing to challenge the inaction of the legislature The Court expanded the notion cf direct injury to include mere 'debasement ' of a vote, rather than the total deprivation which had previously been required." American jurisprudence has recognised, for instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of 'locus standi ', such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807 New York University Law Review.
46. 1971).
In fact, citizen organisations have recently been Campaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, broadening the scope of 'standing ' in legal proceedings (see p.403 Boston University Law Review, Vol.
51, 1971).
325 In the well known case of Attorney,General of the Gambia vs Pierr sarr N. 'Jie(l), Lord Denning observed about the Attorney General 's standing thus: ".
The words 'person aggrieved ' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation.
They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering.
in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.
Has the Attorney General a sufficient interest for this purpose ? Their Lordships think that he has.
The Attorney General in a colony represents the Crown as the guardian of the public interest.
It is his duty to bring before the judge any mis conduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action.
" Ray, J (as he then was) crystallised this ratio in A.P. Gandhi (supra) thus: "The Judicial Committee construed the words 'person aggrieved ' to include the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest." (p.927) "The profession touches the public on the one hand and the courts on the other.
On no other basis could the presence of J., the Advocate General be explained." (p.928) Although not strictly confined to 'standing ' with reference to suits jurists have thrown some light on this subject.
Professor S.A de Smith has observed: "All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him." (Quoted ill 'Standing Justifiability ' by V. section Deshpande Journal of the Indian Law Institute April June 1971 Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 174) Professor H.W.R. Wade has observed: "In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow conception of locus standi.
It contains an element of the actio (1) 326 popularis.
This is because it looks beyond the personal rights A of tho applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper working order by presenting inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers." (Standing and Justiciability bid, p. 175) The possible apprehension that widening legal standing With a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.
In this very case, to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards.
I have been long on a short point, but brevity, where there is some thing to speak, is not the soul of wit but a sign of something different.

summary/full:
The State Bar Councils created by the have been entrusted with the functions inter alia of entertaining and determining cases of misconduct against advocates on their rolls and to safeguard their rights, privileges and interests.
The Bar Council of India which is a national body created by the Act is entrusted with the work of laying down standards of professional conduct and etiquette and overseeing the functioning of the State Bar Councils.
Under section 35 of the Act, if a State Bar Council, either on receipt of a complaint or otherwise has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case to its Disciplinary Committee which, after due inquiry may impose certain penalties.
An appeal from the decision of the State Bar Council lies to the Bar Council of India.
Any "person aggrieved" by an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India may, under section 38, appeal to the Supreme Court.
In exercise of the Powers conferred by the Act the Bar Council of India framed rules relating to professional conduct and etiquette, r. 36 of which says that advocates shall not solicit work or advertise themselves.
The State Bar Council, in the present case, issued notices to the respondents suo motu alleging that they stood at the entrance of the court house at the Presidency Magistrate 's Court, Fort Bombay and solicited work etc., and that the said act amounted to professional and/or other misconduct. 'the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council found the respondents guilty of conduct which absolutely lowered the reputation of the Bar in the eyes of the public and suspended them from practising as advocates.
The respondents ' appeal to the Bar Council of India having been allowed, the State Bar Council has come up in appeal to this Court under section 38.
Before the Bar Council of India the State Bar Council had not appeared.
F On the question whether the State Bar Council is a "person aggrieved," Allowing the appeals, Held: ^ [By the full Court], The State Bar Council is an "aggrieved person" to maintain an appeal under the Act.
per Ray, C.J., Khanna, Mathew, Gupta and Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ): (1) The Bar Council is a "person aggrieved" because (i) the words "person aggrieved" in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests.
In disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee there is no lis and there are no parties.
The word 'person ' will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State; (ii) the Bar Council represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession; (iii) the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates indicates that the Bar Council is interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline.
dignity and decorum of the profession; (iv) when the Bar Council ini 307 tiates proceedings by referring eases of misconduct to the Disciplinary Committee, the Bar Council, in the performance of its function under the Act, is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain proper standards and etiquette of the profession and (v) the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision, in the context of its functions.
The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics.
[315G: 316D G] (2) (a) The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of professional code of conduct and is vitally interested in the rights and privileges of the advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the profession.
[316A B] (b) The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette.
If any decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India is according to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession the State Bar Council is an "aggrieved person" to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar.
[316B C] (3) The most significant feature in the matter of initiation of proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee is that no litigant and no member of the public can straightaway commence disciplinary proceedings against an advocate It is the Bar Council of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.
There is no lis in proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee The Bar Council, in placing a matteu.
before the Disciplinary Committee, does not act as a prosecutor in a criminal case.
A complainant who prefers a complaint against an advocate is not like a plaintiff in a civil suit.
The Bar Council may act on its own initiative on information which has come to its notice in the course of its duties.
There is no party to the disciplinary proceedings because the Bar Council, the Attorney General, the Advocate General act in protecting the interests of advocates and the interests of ' the public.
In so acting there is no conflict between the advocate and any other person because it is professional conduct, professional etiquette, professional ethics, professional morality, which are to be upheld.
transgression of which results in reprimanding the advocate or suspending him from practice or removing his name from the roll.
[314B F] Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs H. M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharashtra.
Bombay [1971] I S.C.R. 863, referred to Beg J. (concurring): (1) There is no objection to a participation of a State Bar Council in its executive capacity in a disciplinary proceeding against an advocate on its roll either at the initial or at the appellate stages.
Before it can become a "person aggrieved" by an order against which it could appeal, there must have been a lis or a dispute to be decided which gives rise to the order complained of.
To such a "lis" the State Bar Council, in its executive capacity, must be deemed to be a party.
There seems to be no legal obstacles in the way of its separate representation even before its own Disciplinary Committee.
Its right to appeal as a "person aggrieved" is squarely covered by the provisions of sections 37 and 38 of the Act.
In the present case the respondents themselves treated the Bar Council as a party interested in the lis when they impleaded the State Bar Council as a respondent in their appeals to the Bar Council of India.
Its statutory right to appeal under section 38 is not affected by the mere fact that it did not put in appearance before the Bar Council of India.
[319D G] (2) The State Bar Council operates through its committees.
Each committee has distinct and separable functions.
Each could be said to have a "persona" and an identity of its own, which is distinguishable from that of the Bar Council as a whole [317G] 3 (a) If the Bar Council has a separable interest as a guardian of the rights and privileges of the members of the Bar, specifically mentioned by section 6(1)(d) of the Act.
there is no reason why a right to represent this interest before its 308 own Disciplinary Committee as well as before the Bar Council of India, on an A appeal under section 37 of the Act, or., on further appeal to this Court under section 38 of the Act should be denied to it.
[318C D] 4(a) When the State Bar Council can have locus standi and rights of a "person aggrieved" affected by the results of such proceedings there is no reason why it should not be in the position of a party lo a lis or dispute ' between itself and the allegedly delinquent advocate.
[318D E] (b) The term 'lis ' is not confined to litigation by means of a suit in a court of law.
[318E] Butler vs Mountgarret 7 H.L. Ca.
641 and B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) vs Minister of Health 399, referred to.
The State Bar Council in its executive capacity acts as the prosecutor through its Executive Committee.
There is no incongruity in its Disciplinary Committee representing its judicial wing, functioning as an impartial judge whose decisions are binding upon the State Bar Council.
It is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of that expression used in sections 37 and 38 of the Act.
[318G H] Krishna Iyer, J. (concurring): (1) The Bar is not a private guild, like that of 'barbers, butchers and candlestick makers ' but, a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service.
The grant of a monopoly licence to practice law is based on three assumptions; (i) there is a socially useful function for the lawyer to perform; (ii ) the lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function; and (iii) his performance as a professional person is regulated by himself and more formally, by the profession as a whole.
The central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice.
[322G H] (2) In a developing country the pattern of public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to rule close to the rule of life.
The Bar Council clearly comes within this category of organisations when a lawyer is involved.
(3) A case of professional misconduct is not a lis in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American meaning.
It is a public investigation about misconduct by one belonging to a public profession where every member of the Bar with a reputation to lose has a stake and everyone concerned with the justice administration is interested. 'the Bar has a share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the legal dykes of right and justice are breached by authoritarianism or citizen wrongdoing.
[323F Gl (4) The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.
In this case to grant an exclusionary windfall on the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards.
[326B] G A. P. Gandhi vs H. M. Seeravai, [1971] 1 S.C.R. refered to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 254 (N) of 1974.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1972 of the High Court of Orissa in O.J.C. No. 129 of 1970.
Gobind Das and B. Parthasarathi, for the appellant.
B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi, for respondent No. 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J.
The State of Orissa has preferred this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court passed in Writ Petition filed by respondent No. 1.
Respondent No. 2 was appointed by promotion to the post of Joint Director of Industries, Government of Orissa in supersession of the claim of respondent No. 1.
The High Court has quashed the said order and directed the appellant to consider the case of respondent No. 1 for promotion to the post of Joint Director according to his seniority in the combined cadre formed by Resolution dated 2 10 1967.
Rule 3(1) (ii) of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1971 has been struck down as being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
Respondent No. 1 was appointed as a lecturer in Mining in the Orissa School of Mining Engineering? Keonjhargarh on 6 2 1960.
The said School was brought under the administrative control of the Industries Department of the Government of Orissa in pursuance of a Resolution dated 18 2 1960.
The service of respondent No. 1 thereupon stood transferred under the administrative control of the Industries Department with effect from 21 3 1960.
The post of the lecturer in the Mining Engineering School was upgraded by order of the State Government made in August, 1960.
The petitioner was brought into the common cadre of the Industries Department of Government of Orissa and while he was so continuing, he was appointed as Principal of the Mining Engineering School.
The provisional appointment made was regularized by the Industries Department by a notification dated 19 12 1962, a copy of which was Annexure D/2 to the Writ application.
This notification clearly shows that at that time respondent No. l was treated as an officer of the Industries Department.
Then came a Resolution of the Government dated 21 4 1964.
The common cadre of the Industries department was bifurcated into two.
A separate cadre was created for teaching posts of Engineering Schools in Orissa including the Mining Engineering School.
Respondent No. 1 exercised his option to remain in the teaching cadre of the Industries Department.
As per Resolution of the Government dated 2 10 1967 the two separate cadres in the Industries Department were again amalgamated and merged into one.
Consequently the cadre of the teaching staff of the Engineering Schools including the Mining Engineering School and that of the administrative state became a single combined cadre.
6 L 839 Sup Cl/75 302 Even then respondent No. I was not considered for promotion to the post of Joint Director when respondent No. 2 who was junior to him was promoted to the post.
Feeling aggrieved by the non consideration of his case for promotion, respondent No. 1 filed the writ application in the year 1970.
During the pendency of the writ application, the Governor of Orissa framed the orissa Industries Service Rules, 1971 hereinafter called the Rules, under proviso to Article 3()9 of The Constitution.
Respondent No. 1 amended his writ application, 1 made out a case of discrimination in the framing of the Rules and attacked them as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
In paragraph S of the counter filed by the appellant the formatio of a combined cadre by Resolution dated 2 10 1967 was admitted.
But it was asserted that in spite of the merger of the two cadres into one the intention of the Government was to treat the post of the Principal cf a Mining Engineering School as an ex cadre post under the Industries Department.
The Mining Engineers were excluded from the junior grade of service under the Industries Department in accordance with the Rules of 1971.
Earlier also, respondent No. 1 got class I post out of turn treating him as belonging to ex cadre post.
The High Court has come to the conclusion that before 21 4 1964 there were no separate cadres for the teaching and the administrative staff of the Industries Department.
The cadre was one.
It was bifurcated in 1964 and the two bifurcated cadres were again united and merged into one on and from 2 10 1967.
There was, therefore, no justification at all in not considering the case of respondent No. 1 for promotion to the post of Joint Director as all persons in the combined cadre eligible for promotion had to be considered.
Respondent No. 1 was senior to respondent No. 2 in the combined cadre and yet his claim was ignored on a ground which was not substantiated.
The relevant rule was discriminatory and had no reasonable nexus with the object of the Rules.
The judgment of the High Court was handed down on the 30th November, 1972 long before the issuance of the notification dated 27th June, 1975 by the President of India under Article 359(1) of the Constitution.
The rule was declared ultra vires on the ground of J violation of Articles 14 and 16.
The State of orissa was the appellant before us.
It was, therefore, agreed on all hands that this appeal was not a proceeding pending in this Court for the enforcement of the right under Article 14 of the Constitution and was, therefore, not suspended.
The enforcement of the right was made by the delivery of the High Court judgment and the State merely wanted in this appeal a deletion of that enforcement.
Mr. Gobind Das, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the posts of the teachers in the Mining Engineering School in Orissa including the posts of the Principal have always been treated as ex cadre posts in the Industries Department.
The teachers and the Principal of the Mining Engineering School were not considered for promotion to the posts of Administrative Department because few persons 303 were available to man the posts in the Mining Engineering School.
It was because of this reason that the case of respondent No. 1 was not considered and the Rules were also framed with that object in view.
In any view of the matter, counsel submitted, that the whole of Rule 3(1) (ii) ought not to have been declared as void and only the offending portion ought to have been struck down.
The main part of the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant does not stand scrutiny and must be rejected.
It could not be seriously disputed that respondent No. 1 was an officer of the Industries Department and appointed to the post of the Principal of the Mining Engineering School in that Department.
There is nothing to indicate that the post of the Principal or of the teacher of any Engineering School or of the Mining Engineering School was an ex cadre post.
Then came the Resolution date(l 21st April, 1964.
The new scales of pay were fixed for the teachers in Engineering in The Engineering Schools including the Mining Engineering School in the State of Orissa The contention of Mr Das that this fixation of scales was only for the Engineering Schools and not for Mining Engineering School is not correct.
Clearly all Engineering Schools were placed on the same looting and paragraph 3 of` this Resolution runs as follows: "The teaching posts in Engineering Schools which till now were included in common cadre with other posts in the Directorate of Industries will be placed in a separate cadre to which the above scale of pay will apply.
Then came the merger resolution after about three years on the 2nd October, 1967 a copy of which was Annexure I to the writ application.
The subject of the notification, Annexure l, is ' 'formation of a combined cadre for the officers of the Industries Department".
It was clearly mentioned hl This notification that after the teaching posts were placed in a separate cadre "it was felt that the promotion prospects would be bleak due to the formation of a separate cadre for teachers in view of the limited posts available for promotion".
Hence formation of separate cadre for teachers was considered not to be beneficial to them.
So the combined cadre was brought into force with effect from the date of the issue of the Resolution dated 2nd October, 1967 in supersession of the earlier decision to have a separate cadre for teachers.
Lastly it was stated in this Resolution "The conditions of service of all the officers will be governed by a set of cadre rules to be framed later on".
No rules were framed until the framing of the Rules in 1971.
As against a categorical statement in the Resolution dated 2 10 1967 there was nothing whatever to show that the post of a teacher or the Principal in the Mining Engineering School was treated as an ex cadre post and on a separate footing for the purpose of promotion to the administrative posts.
The non consideration of the case of respondent No. 1 at the time respondent No. 2 was promoted to the post of Joint Director in or about the year 1969 was wholly arbitrary, unjustified and illegal.
The High Court was right in making the order which it did on the writ application of respondent 304 As against the purpose and object of the merger of the cadre mentioned in the Resolution dated 2 10 1967 we find Rule 3 of the Rules going contrary to them.
Rule 9(1) of the Rules says: "Promotions to the posts of Senior grade in Class I shall be made from among the members of the Junior grade in Class I :" Constitution of the service is provided in Rule 3.
We are concerned with Rule 3(1).
It reads as follows: "3 ( 1 ) The cadre of the service shall consist of two branches, viz., Class I and Class ii, the former comprising two grades, viz., the Senior grade and the Junior grade, as indicated below: (i) The Senior grade shall include posts of Joint Directors and officers of equivalent status as may be declared by Government from time to time.
(ii) The Junior grade shall include the posts of Deputy Directors, Senior Lecturers in Engineering Schools and such other posts as may be declared by Government from time to time to be of equivalent status, besides the posts of Principal.
Engineering Schools (except Mining Engineering) and Polytechnics which carry a special scale of pay.
Clause (ii) of the Rules when it says in the first part that the "junior grade shall include the posts of Deputy Directors, Senior Lecturers in Engineering Schools" it means clearly Senior Lecturers in Engineering Schools not excluding Mining Engineering School.
But in the last part when in the junior ;grade were included the posts of Principals, Engineering Schools by the words "except Mining Engineering" given in the parenthesis, the post of the Principal of the Mining Engineering School was excluded.
It was so done during the pendency of the writ application of respondent No. 1 and without any reasonable and sound basis for making a discrimination a propos the post of the Principal of the Mining Engineering School.
We find no justification for making the distinction in the junior grade of Class I service in the case of the Principal of Mining Engineering School.
The rule in that regard has rightly been held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by the High Court.
But striking down of the whole of clause (ii) of Rule 3(1) of the Rules was not necessary.
Only the words in parenthesis had to be deleted and struck down on that account.
That would serve 305 the purpose of making the posts of Principal of all Engineering Schools including the Mining Engineering School being the posts in the junior grade, Class I.
For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this appeal.
It is accordingly dismissed but subject to the clarification made above with costs payable to respondent No. 1.
V.P.S. APPeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1971, provided that the junior grade of the service shall include the posts of Deputy Directors, Senior lecturers in Engineering, Schools etc.
besides the posts of Principal, Engineering Schools (except Mining Engineering) and Polytechnics which carry a special scale of pay.
The 1st respondent was appointed a lecturer in a Mining Engineering School.
In 1960, the School was brought under the administrative Control of the Industries Department of the State Government, and the respondent became an officer of the Industries Department.
Later.
he was appointed Principal of the School.
In 1964, there was a bifurcation of the common cadre of the Department, and a separate cadre for teaching posts of Engineering Schools in the State was created.
In 1967, the two cadres were again merged forming a combined cadre for the officers of the Industries Department.
The reason given for the merger was that the separate cadre for teachers was not beneficial to them because, promotion prospects for them were bleak in view of the limited posts available for promotion.
After the merger, in 1969, even though the 1st respondent was senior to the 2nd respondent, the latter was promoted as Joint Director superseding the former.
The High Court quashed the order and struck down r. 3(1)(ii) as violative of article 16.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: (1) In the resolution of 1967 merging the two cadres it was stated that the conditions of service of all the officers will be governed by a set of cadre rules to be framed later, but no such rules were framed at the time of promotion of the 2nd respondent.
The 1971 rules were framed during the pendency of the writ application, filed by the 1st respondent, in the High Court.
There was, therefore, at the time of promotion of the 2nd respondent, nothing to show that the post of a teacher or the Principal of a Mining Engineering School WAS treated as an ex cadre post and on a separate footing for the purpose of promotion to the administrative posts.
[303G H] (2) Rule 3(1)(ii) when it says in the first part Senior lecturers in Engineering Schools, it includes senior lecturers of Mining Engineering School also.
Even when the two cadres were separated, all Engineering Schools including Mining Engineering Schools were placed on the SAME Footing.
But, in the last part of the rule when referring to the post of Principal, the Principal of a Mining Engineering School is excluded.
The exclusion is without any justification or reasonable basis.
[304E H] Therefore, the rule is violative of articles 14 and 16 and the non consideration of the case of the 1st respondent at the time of promotion of the 2nd respondent was wholly arbitrary and illegal.
[33H; 304H] (3) It is however not necessary to strike down the entire rule 3(1)(ii).
It is sufficient if the words 'except Mining Engineering ' are struck down and deleted.
[304H]


judgement:
In the matter of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 230 of 1953.
Rajinder Narain for the Respondents.
N. C. Chatterjee (Sukumar Ghose with him) for the Appellants.
April 5.
The Order of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEA C.J. This is an application by the respondents in Special Leave Petition No. 230 of 1953, praying for summons to the appellants to show cause why the special leave obtained by the latter should not be rescinded in accordance with the provision of Order XIII, rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules.
The appeal is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court affirming, on appeal, a decision of a single Judge sitting on the Original Side of that Court.
The appellants, having been refused certificate by the High Court, presented before us an application under article 136 of the Constitution and special leave to appeal was granted to them by an order of this Court dated the 25th May 1954.
By that order the appellants were required to furnish security for costs amounting to Rs. 2,500 within six weeks and the enforcement of the award, which was the subject matter of the appeal, was stayed on condition that the appellants deposited in Court a sum of Rs. 28,000 within four weeks from the date of the order.
On the 15th of June 1954 the Registrar of this Court transmitted to the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court certified copies of the order granting special leave and also of the special leave petition with a request that these documents might be included in the printed records of the case.
It is not disputed that in pursuance of the directions given 246 by this Court the appellants did deposit the amount required as security for costs and also the sum of Rs. 28,000 within the time mentioned in the order.
On the 29th November 1954 the respondents ' Solicitors in Calcutta wrote a letter to the Registrar of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court complaining of delay on the part of the appellants in prosecuting the appeal.
It was stated inter alia that although six months had elapsed since special leave was granted by this Court, the respondents were not served with notice of the admission of the appeal and no steps were taken by the appellants to get the records printed or transmitted to this Court.
In reply to this letter the Registrar informed the respondents ' Solicitors that according to the practice of the Calcutta High Court it was incumbent on the appellants to make a formal application to the Appellate Bench of the Court for declaring the appeal finally admitted, and this was to be done on notice to the other parties under Order XLV, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code and on filing in Court a copy of the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave to appeal as well as the application upon which such order was made.
Unless and until an order was made by the High Court declaring the appeal to be admitted, no action could be taken by the office in the matter.
Thereupon on the 11th of January 1955 an application was filed by the appellants praying that leave might be given to them to file the certified copy of the special leave petition and also that of the order passed upon it and that the appeal might be finally admitted.
This application came up for hearing before the learned Chief Justice and Lahiri, J. of the Calcutta High Court and on the 20th of January 1955 the learned Judges made the following order: "In this matter special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted by that Court on the 25th May 1954.
On the 21st June following, the Appellant furnished the necessary security.
It was then the duty of the Appellant to take the necessary steps for the final admission of the appeal in order that the preparation of the Paper Book might thereafter be 247 undertaken.
Under the Rules and practice of this Court the step to be taken is that the Appellant to the Supreme Court should make an application for leave to file the certified copy of the petition for Special Leave and also a certified copy of the order granting Special Leave which have been filed along with the present application. . . . ." When the matter came up for hearing on the last occasion we enquired whether the Appellants had any explanation to give for the delay which bad occurred.
It was said that the certified copy of the application for Special Leave had been obtained only recently.
It was however not explained why when an application for a certified copy of the order was made a similar application for a certified copy of the petition also could not be made.
In all the circumstances we consider it right that the disposal of the present application should stand over for a month in order that the respondents may take such steps as they desire to take before the Supreme Court".
The above facts and order of the High Court were communicated to the Registrar of this Court by Shri Rajinder Narain, Advocate for the respondents, by his letters dated the 17th and 31st of January 1965 and on the basis of the facts stated above, he requested that action should be initiated by the Registrar against the appellants for non prosecution of the appeal.
The Registrar told the learned Advocate that he had not received any report from the High Court regarding any laches on the part of the appellants and without any such report, it was not possible for him to take any action in the matter.
The Advocate himself, it was said, was quite at liberty to make a formal application to the Court in such way as he considered proper.
The views thus expressed by the Registrar of this Court were communicated by him to the Registrar of the High Court, Original Side, Calcutta.
On the 4th March 1955 Shri Rajinder Narain filed a formal petition addressed to the Registrar alleging inordinate delay on the part of the ap pellants in filing in the High Court certified copies of 248 the Special Leave petition and the order made by this Court thereupon and praying that summons might be issued to the appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for non prosecution.
Before the Registrar could take any further steps in the matter, the application of the appellants for final admission of the appeal made in the High Court came up for further consideration before the Appellate Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Lahiri and on the 7th March, 1955 the learned Judges made an order directing, for the reasons given therein, adjournment of the application for admission of the appeal before them, sine die pending orders which this Court might pass on the application of the respondents.
The application of the respondents which purports to have been made under Order XIII, rule 13 of the Supreme Court Rules was referred by the Registrar for orders to the Court and it has now come up for hearing before us.
Shri Rajinder Narain appearing in support of the petition has Contended before us that the appellants were guilty of serious laches inasmuch as they did not file in the High Court, till 8 months after the special leave was granted, copies of the special leave petition as well as of the order passed upon it; nor did they make an application to the Appellate Bench for admission of the appeal without which no further steps could be taken in the matter of printing and transmission of the record.
As the appellants could not give any satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay on their part, the special leave, it is argued, should be rescinded.
Mr. Chatterjee, who appeared for the appellants, has contended @n the other hand that in a case like the one before us where the appeal has come up to this Court by special leave and not by a certificate granted by the High Court, there was no duty cast upon the appellants to make a formal application in the High Court for final admission of the appeal or to file therein certified copies of the special leave petition and the order made thereupon.
His argument is that under Order XXXII, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, a 249 Supreme Court appeal must be deemed to have been admitted by the very order of this Court granting special leave and as soon as the appellants have carried out the directions of the Supreme Court regarding furnishing of security or making of other deposits as the case may be, it is incumbent upon the Registrar to issue a notice of the admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents.
Such notice indeed has got to be served by the appellants ' attorney; but as no notice was at all issued by the Registrar in the present case as is contemplated by rule 9 of Order XXXII of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, no blame could attach to the appellants for not taking further steps in the matter.
The contention of Mr. Chatterjee appears to us to be wellfounded and as it seems to us that doubts have arisen at times regarding the precise procedure to be followed in cases where an appeal comes to this Court by special leave granted under article 136 of the Constitution, it is necessary to examine the provisions bearing upon it as are contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court or of the High Court concerned read along with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.
Ordinarily when a High Court grants a certificate giving leave to a party to appeal to this Court, it is ,that Court which retains full control and jurisdiction over the subsequent proceedings relating to the prosecution of the appeal till the appeal is finally admitted.
It is for the High Court to see that its directions are carried out regarding the furnishing of security or the making of deposit and when these conditions are fulfilled, it has then to declare the appeal finally admitted under Order XLV,rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court begins after the appeal is finally admitted.
When however the appeal comes to this Court on the strength of a special leave ' granted by it, the position is different.
In such cases the order of the Supreme Court granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the order relating to fur 250 nishing of security or making of a deposit are complied with.
That this is the true position will be clear from the procedural provisions contained in the Rules of the Supreme Court as well as of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court.
Order XIII, rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules lays down: "After the grant of special leave to appeal by the Court, the Registrar shall transmit a certified copy of the order to the court or tribunal appealed from".
Rule 9 then says: "On receipt of the said order, the court or tribunal appealed from shall, in the absence of any special directions in the order, act in accordance with the provisions contained in Order XLV of the Code, so far as applicable".
It is to be noted here that although this rule does refer to the provisions of the Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code, these provisions are to be followed only so far as they are applicable.
It is surely the duty of the High Court to see that security is furnished or a deposit is made in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court and these directions are to be found in the order of the Supreme Court which the Registrar is bound to transmit to the High Court under Order XIII, rule 8 of our Rules.
We do not think it is necessary for the appellants to file afresh a copy of the Supreme Court order or the petition upon which it was made in order that they may form part of the record of the Supreme Court appeal.
They would come in the record as soon as they are transmitted by the Registrar in accordance with the rule of our Court mentioned above and would have to be included in the Paper Book when it is printed.
The Registrar of the High Court undoubtedly took these orders as part of the record without the appellants ' filing them afresh, for he accepted the security and deposit of other moneys from the appellants on the basis of these orders.
If there was any failure on the part of the appellants to furnish the security or to make the deposit in the way indicated in the order of the Supreme Court, it would have been the duty of the Registrar of the High Court to intimate these 251 facts to the Registrar of the Supreme Court and the latter thereupon could take steps for revoking the special leave as is contemplated by Order XIII, rule 12 of our Rules.
In our opinion, it is also not necessary for the appellants to make a formal application for admission of the appeal in cases where special leave has been granted by the Supreme Court; and this appears clear from the provision of Order XXXII, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court which runs as follows: "9.
On the admission of an appeal to the Supreme Court whether by the order of this Court under Order XLV, rule 8 of the Code, or by an order of the Supreme Court giving the appellant Special Leave to Appeal, but subject in the latter case to the carrying out of the directions of the Supreme Court as to the security and the deposit of the amount re quired by rule 5, notice of such admission shall be issued by the Registrar for service on the respondent on the record, whether be shall have appeared on the hearing of the application for a certificate under Order XLV, rule 3 of the Code, or not.
Such notice shall be served by the attorney for the appellant and an affidavit of due service thereof shall be filed by such attorney immediately after such service".
The opening words of this rule plainly indicate that there could be admission of appeal either by order of the High Court under Order XLV, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code or by the order of the Supreme Court itself giving special leave to appeal.
(As the order granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by the appellants, the admission will be regarded as final only when the directions are complied with and as soon as this is done it would be the duty of the Registrar to issue a notice of the admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents).
This notice is to be served by the attorney for the appel lants and an affidavit of due service shall be filed by him immediately after the service is effected.
In the present case the Registrar, Original Side of the, Calcutta High Court should have issued a notice of 252.
the admission of the appeal to be served upon the respondents as soon as the security for costs and other deposits of money were made by the appellants.
This was not done as the procedure to be followed was not correctly appreciated.
It is true that the appellants remained idle for a considerable period of time even after they furnished security and did not take any steps towards printing of the record.
But as there was an initial irregularity in the matter of issuing a notice under.
Order XXXII, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to hold that the appellants were guilty of any laches for which the special leave deserves to be rescinded.
The result is that the application of the respondents is dismissed.
The Registrar, Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, will now issue a notice under Order XXXII, rule 9 of the Original Side Rules and prompt steps should be taken by the appellants towards printing and transmission of the record to this Court.
We make no order as to costs of this application.

summary/full:
By an order dated May 25, 1954, the Supreme Court granted the petitioners in the case special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court at Calcutta.
In accordance with the order, the petitioners furnished the security amounts directed to be deposited within the time specified in the order.
The Registrar of the High Court did not issue any notice of admission of 'appeal to be served by the Appellant 's Solicitor on the Respondents as envisaged in rule 9 of Order XIII, S.C.R. Nor did the Appellant following the practice of the High Court, move that Court for It admission" of the appeal until January 11, 1955.
The Respondents first moved the High Court complaining of default on the part of the appellants in due prosecution of the appeal and latter moved the Supreme Court for action under rule 13 of Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules.
The application in the High Court was therefore kept pending.
Held: After the grant of special leave under article 136, the Registrar of the Supreme Court transmits, in accordance with the 244 provisions of rule 8 of Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules, a certified copy of the Supreme Court 's order to the Court or tribunal appealed from, Rule 9 of Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules enjoins upon the Court or tribunal appealed from to act, in the absence of any special directions in the order, in accordance with the provisions contained in Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code, so far as they are applicable.
Accordingly the Court or Tribunal to which the order is transmitted receives deposits on account of security for the Respondents ' costs, printing costs, and any other deposits if so ordered by the Supreme Court, and sets about preparing the record of the appeal for transmission to the Supreme Court.
Therefore, action under rule 13 of Order XIII, S.C.R., for rescinding the order granting special leave cannot be initiated unless the Court or tribunal appealed from reports to the Supreme Court that the appellant has not been diligent in taking steps to enable that Court to carry out the directions, if any, contained in the order of the Supreme Court and to act in accordance with the provisions of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code so far as applicable to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.
In view of rule 9 of Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules, the application of Order XLV of the Code of Civil Procedure to appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution is restricted.
The Court or tribunal appealed from, no doubt, has to carry out the directions contained in the order granting special leave, and to receive the security for the Respondents ' costs and other necessary deposits, but once the security is furnished and the other deposits are made, the formality of "admission" envisaged by rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code is unnecessary, because in such cases the order .granting special leave by itself operates as an admission of the appeal as soon as the conditions in the order relating to the furnishing of security or making of deposits are complied with.
Appeals under Article 136 thus stand on a different footing from appeals on grant of certificate by the High Court itself.
In the letter case, the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter until it admits the appeal under rule 8 of Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code.
Rule 9 of Chapter 32 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court envisages "admission" of appeals to the Supreme Court whether by an order of the Supreme Court or under Order XLV of the Civil Procedure Code.
And when an appeal arising from an order made by the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, has been so "admitted", the said rule enjoins upon the Registrar to issue notice of such admission for service by the appellant on the Respondents.
In cases where special leave has been granted by the Supreme Court, it is not necessary for the appellant to move the High Court appealed from for the formal admission of his appeal.
As the order granting special leave itself lays down the conditions to be fulfilled by the appellants, the admission will be regarded as final only when the directions are complied with and as 245 soon as this is done it would be the duty of the Registrar to issue a notice of the admission of the appeal for service upon the respondents.
In default of the issue of such notice, the appellant cannot be held responsible for laches in the prosecution of his appeal with regard to the steps required to be taken after the admission of his appeal.