judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3071 of 1988.
? 199 From the Judgment and Order dated 8.4.1988 of the Karna taka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 563 of 1988.
Narayana B. Shetye, D.N. Misra and O.C. Mathur for the Appellant.
S.R. Bhatt for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J.
The short question which arises in this appeal by special leave is whether the departmental enquiry entrusted to and conducted by a Bank official stands vitiat ed if the said official proceeds with the enquiry and con cludes the same after his superannuation.
during the penden cy of the enquiry? The High Court of Karnataka has held that such an enquiry is incompetent and without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void.
The facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly stated, are as under: The respondent C. Bernard while serving as a Relieving Head Cashier in the K.G. Road Branch of the Bank in Banga lore city availed of 15 days leave from April 17, 1978 to May 1, 1978 and was allowed an advance of Rs.2,500 on April, 1978 under LFC to be adjusted later on his submitting the LFC Bill.
He submitted a bill for Rs.2,800 on May 5, 1978 along with a stamped cash receipt purported to have been issued by M/s. Shri Manju Travels of Bangalore and claimed reimbursement for the same.
The said bill was passed by the bank on May 15, 1978 but subsequent investigations revealed that the firm of M/s. Shri Manju Travels was a spurious one which indulged in issuing fake travel receipts.
Thereupon the respondent was served with a Memo dated August 1, 1978 by the Divisional office of the Bank calling for his expla nation.
A letter was also addressed on the same day to M/s. Shri Manju Travels, Bangalore requesting them to furnish the details of the persons who traveled and the amounts received by the said firm.
No reply was received from the said firm but the respondent sent a reply on August 10, 1978 which was not found to be satisfactory.
Some correspondence ensued between the respondent and the appellant in this connection but finally the respondent was served with the charge sheet dated October 12, 1978 which was followed by a departmental enquiry.
It is not necessary to go into the details in regard to proceedings at the departmental enquiry but it would be sufficient to state that the respondent participat ed in the departmental enquiry till it was completed by the enquiry officer Shri U.B. Menon.
200 Paragraph 9.14 of the Memorandum of Bi partite Settle ment dated October 19, 1966 empowers the Chief Executive Officer, etc., of he Bank to decide which officer(s) would be empowered to hold enquiry and take disciplinary action in the case of each office or establishment.
Accordingly Shri U.B. Menon, Special Officer, was appointed an Enquiry Offi cer under the Chief Executive Officer 's Order dated January 9, 1979, which reads as under: "Pursuant to the powers vested in the Executive Director by the Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank, as per his office Order dated 20th December, 1978, authorising him to appoint Enquiry Officers and Appellate Authorities under the provisions of Chapter 19 of the Bi partite Settlement dated 19th October, 1966, the undersigned is pleased to appoint Shri U.B. Menon, Special Officer, to work as an Enquiry Officer, to hold and conduct departmental enquiries against the members of the staff governed by the provisions of the Award and Bi partite Settlement, and to pass necessary orders under the provisions of Chapter 19 of the Bi partite Settlement dated 19th October, 1966.
" By a subsequent circular dated January 17, 1979 all offices of the Bank were informed about the appointment.
Shri U.B. Menon was intimated about the same by the Assistant General Manager 's letter dated January 23, 1979.
The said Enquiry Officer conducted the departmental enquiry against the respondent.
However, during the pendency of the departmental enquiry he retired from service on January 31, 1979.
Not withstanding his retirement he continued to function as an Enquiry Officer and concluded the enquiry against the re spondent by the end of 1979.
He then gave an opportunity to the respondent to be heard on the question of punishment and then passed the impugned order of discharge on January 14, 1980.
The respondent 's departmental appeal was also dis missed on June 17, 1980.
The respondent did not raise any objection against the continuance of the enquiry by the said Shri U.B. Menon at any time during the pendency and till the disposal of the departmental appeal preferred by him.
Suf fice it to say that he raised this objection for the first time in Writ Petition No. 18 140 of 1980 filed against the impugned order of discharge in the High Court.
A learned Single judge of the High Court by his order dated January 18, 1988 came to the conclusion that on the retirement of Shri U.B. Menon 'he was nobody in the hierarchy of authorities ' to impose 201 punishment on the respondent and hence the order imposing punishment was clearly incompetent and without jurisdiction.
The argument that since the impugned order of discharge got merged in the appellate order, the initial defect, if any, stood removed, was repelled by the learned Judge on the ground that 'as the original order was without jurisdiction or competence, there was nothing for the Appellate Authority to confirm '.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, allowed the writ petition, quashed the impugned order of punishment and directed that the respondent be paid all consequential benefits.
The appellant preferred a Letters Patent Appeal against the said order of the learned Single Judge.
The Division Bench of the High Court which heard the appeal dismissed it by a one line order: 'no ground for interfer ence is made out '.
It is against this order that the appel lant has approached this Court under article 136 of the Consti tution.
Shri Narain Shetye, the learned counsel for the appel lant strongly urged that the High, Court ought not to have permitted the respondent to question the competence or jurisdiction of Shri U.B. Menon to act as an Enquiry Officer as well as a Disciplinary Authority after his superannuation since he had participated in the enquiry throughout without a demur.
According to him, by conduct the respondent was estopped from raising such a contention for the first time in a writ petition, more so because he had submitted to the jurisdiction of Shri U.B. Menon and there was no prejudice caused on him on that account.
Lastly, he submitted that even otherwise the appellant could have appointed a non official as an Enquiry Officer and therefore his decision could be saved on the de facto doctrine.
Taking the last submission first we think that in the facts and circumstances of this case the de facto doctrine can have no application.
Under paragraph 19.14 of the by parties agreement the Chief Executive Officer was entitled to decide which officer should be empowered to hold an enquiry and take disciplinary action in the case of each office or establishment.
Under this paragraph only an offi cer of the bank could be empowered to hold an enquiry and take disciplinary action against a delinquent.
The names of officers so empowered were required to be published on the bank 's notice board.
Accordingly, Shri U.B. Menon was ap pointed an Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority under paragraph 19.14 of the bi partite agreement while he was still in service.
It is indeed surprising that an officer who was due to retire within a few days only was chosen to act as an Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority by the order dated January 9, 1979.
Shri U.B. Menon was intimated about his appoint 202 ment by the letter of January 23, r979, i.e., hardly a week before his superannuation on January 31, 1979.
After his retirement from service he proceeded with the enquiry and concluded it by the end of 1979.
The respondent was then served with a second show cause notice on the question of punishment and thereafter the impugned order of discharge was passed on January 14, 1980.
There is nothing on the record to show that any formal decision was taken by the appellant to continue the services of Shri U.B. Menon as an official of the bank.
Shri Shetty is right when he contends that an Enquiry Officer need not be an officer of the bank; even a third party can be appointed as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the conduct of an employee.
See: Saran Motors (P) Ltd. vs Vishwanath & Anr., But there can be no doubt that a non official cannot act as a Disci plinary Authority and pass an order of punishment against the delinquent employee.
It is for this reason that the learned Single Judge of the High Court observed that on retirement Shri U.B. Menon was nobody in the hierarchy of authorities to impose punishment on the delinquent.
He therefore, held that the order of punishment was clearly incompetent and without jurisdiction.
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the initial appoint ment of Shri U.B. Menon was valid, his actions and decisions could not be invalidated by his subsequent retirement.
According to him he continued to function as an Enquiry Officer de facto and hence his actions and decisions were saved.
The de facto doctrine has two requisites, namely, (i) the possession of the office and the performance of the duties attached thereto, and (ii) colour of title, that is, apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the posses sion thereof by the public.
According to this doctrine the acts of officers de facto performed within the sphere of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third parties and not for their own interest, are generally held valid and binding as if they were performed by de jure officers.
This doctrine dates back to the case of Abbe de Fontaine decided way back in 1431 to which reference was made by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, 3.
in Pulin Behari Das vs King Emperor, [1911 12] 16 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1105 at 1120.
Mookerjee, J. held that as the complaint was made after complying with section 196, Criminal Procedure Code, by the order of or under authority from Local Government which was de facto, the proceedings were valid.
On the same principle it was further held that the Court of Sessions, assuming it was not the holder of a de jure office, was actually in possession of it under the colour of title which indicated the acquiescence of the public in its actions and hence its authority could not be collaterally impeached in the proceedings arising from the conviction of Pulin and his co accused.
Again, in Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons 203 vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 A.P. 193, the Govern ment nominated nine persons on a Market Committee which nomination was later set aside by the High Court.
However, before the High Court pronounced its judgment, the Market Committee had functioned as if it had been properly consti tuted.
Between the date of its constitution and the date of the High Court decision it had taken several decisions, issued notifications, etc., which were the subject matter of challenge on the ground that its constitution was ab initio bad in law.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. relying on the observations of Mookerjee, J., in Pulin 's case concluded that the acts of the Market Committee de facto performed within the scope of its assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for his own benefit are generally as valid and binding as if they were performed by a de jure Committee.
The Allahabad High Court in Jai Kumar vs State, [1968] All.
L.J. 877 upheld the judgments of the District Judges whose appointments were later struck down by this Court on the principle that the acts of officers defac to are not to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by someone claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or benefit by reason of being the officer which he claims to be.
In all other cases, the acts of an officer de facto are valid and effec tual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of the third parties.
This Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju vs State of A.P., ; 1981 SC 1473 was required to consider the question of the effect of the declaration of this Court holding the appointment of an Additional Sessions Judge invalid on judgments pronounced by him prior to such declaration.
This Court observed that the defacto doctrine is rounded on good sense, sound policy and practical experi ence.
It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest.
It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos.
It, there fore, seems clear to us that the de facto doctrine can be invoked in cases where there is an appointment to office which is defective; but notwithstanding the defect to the title of the office, the decisions made by such a de facto officer clothed with the powers and functions of the office would be as efficacious as those made by a de jure officer.
The same would, however, not be true of a total intruder or usurper of office.
In our view, the submission of Shri Shetty based on the defacto doctrine is clearly misconceived.
Shri U.B. Menon can hardly be described as a person occupying or being in possession of an office to 204 which certain duties affecting the members of the general public can be said to be attached.
The de facto doctrine, as explained earlier, envisages that acts performed de facto by officers within the scope of their assumed official authori ty are to be regarded as binding as if they were performed by officers de jure.
While the de facto doctrine saves official acts done by an officer whose appointment is found to be defective the private parties to a litigation are precluded from challenging the appointment in any collateral proceedings.
But the doctrine does not come to the rescue of an intruder or usurper or a total stranger to the office.
Obviously the doctrine can have no application to the case of a person who is not the holder of an office but is merely a bank employee, for that matter an ex employee.
We, there fore, see no merit in this contention '.
True it is that the respondent did not attribute any bias or mala fides to the Enquiry Officer nor did he com plain that he was in any manner prejudiced on account of the said Enquiry Officer conducting he domestic enquiry but that will not cure the defect as to his compensence.
Where pun ishment is imposed by a person who has no authority do so the very foundation on which the edifice is built collapses and with and it fails the entire edifice.
It is a case more or less akin to a case tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
We, are, therefore, of he opinion that absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides, is of no consequence so far as the question of competence is con cerned.
The cases which were cited at the bar (i) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. vs Labour Court, Tis Hazari & Ors., and (ii) Saran Motors, (supra) also have no application to the special facts and circumstances of this case.
Shri Shetye next submitted that if a third party non official can validly be appointed an Enquiry Officer, though not Disciplinary Authority, his report upto the stage pre ceding the issuance of a second ,how cause notice could be saved because both sides to the proceedings had not raised any objection to the continuance of the enquiry by the said Enquiry Officer and therefore the High Court ought to have remitted the matter to the competent Disciplinary Authority to take a fresh decision based on the report of the Enquiry Officer.
To put it differently, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High Court should have re manded the matter with a direction that the competent Disci plinary Authority will proceed to dispose of the departmen tal enquiry from the stage of the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer.
We would have considered it necessary to examine this submission had the delinquent not retired in the meantime on August 21, 1986.
The High Court pronounced its Judgment thereafter 205 on January 18, 1988.
No useful purpose, therefore, can be served by adopting the procedure suggested by Shri Shetye as the respondent had admittedly retired from service in 1986 and if the order imposing punishment is quashed he would ordinarily have to be paid his wages etc., upto the date of his retirement.
We, therefore, do not think that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the course suggested by Shri Shetye can be usefully adopted.
Lastly, Shri Shetye submitted that in any event the respondent succeeded in getting the order of punishment quashed on a mere technicality and that too on the conten tion belatedly raised before the High Court for the first time and, therefore, the High Court was in error in direct ing payment of all consequential benefits.
We think there is merit in this contention.
If the objection was raised at the earliest possible opportunity before the Enquiry Officer the appellant could have taken steps to remedy the situation by appointing a competent officer to enquire into the charges before the respondent 's retirement from service.
It is equally true that the penalty has not been quashed on mer its.
On the contrary, if one were to go by the charge le velled against the respondent and the reply thereto one may carry the impression that the respondent had made the claim on the basis of the fake receipt; whether the respondent himself was duped or not would be a different matter.
The fact, however, remains that the impugned order of punishment has to be quashed not because the merits of the case so demand but because the technical plea of incompetence suc ceeds.
In the circumstances, we think that the ends of justice would be met if instead of directing 'all consequen tial benefits ' the appellant is ordered to pay '50% of the consequential benefits ' to which the respondent would be entitled on superannuation.
For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in quashing the impugned order of punishment but we think having regard to the special facts and circumstances pointed out earlier, it should not have ordered payment of 'all consequential bene fits ' flowing from the declaration that the impugned order was bad in law.
We, therefore, modify this part of the order by substituting the words fifty percent ' in place of the word 'all ' in the penultimate paragraph of the learned Single Judge 's order.
To put the matter beyond the pale of doubt we clarify that the respondent will be paid 50% of the consequential benefits and not all the consequential bene fits.
Except for this modification, the rest of the order of the High Court will stand.
The appeal will stand allowed to the above extent but, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we think the parties should be directed to bear their own costs.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed partly.

summary/full:
The respondent, a bank employee, was chargesheeted for claiming L.F.C. on the basis of fake travel receipts.
The Bank appointed one of its officers as Enquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority who conducted the departmen tal enquiry against the respondent.
However, during the pendency of the enquiry the Enquiry Officer retired from service.
Notwithstanding his retirement from service he proceeded with the enquiry and concluded the same against the respondent.
The respondent participated in the enquiry without raising any objection against the continuance of the said Enquiry by the said Enquiry Officer.
After giving an opportunity to the respondent to be heard on the question of punishment the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority im posed the punishment of discharge.
The respondent fried a departmental appeal which was dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court challeng ing the order of discharge on the ground that the order passed by the Enquiry Officer was without jurisdiction.
A single judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Peti tion, quashed the order of punishment with all consequential benefits to the respondent on the ground that after retire ment the Enquiry Officer was nobody in the hierarchy of authorities to impose punishment on the delinquent employee and hence his order imposing punishment was incompetent and without jurisdiction.
Against the order of the single judge the Bank preferred a Letter Patent Appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court which was dismissed.
197 In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant Bank; (i) that the decision of the Enquiry Officer could be saved on the basis of de facto doctrine because (a) his initial appointment being valid his actions and decisions could not be invalidated by his subsequent retirement since he continued to function as a de facto Enquiry Officer; (b) even otherwise the Bank could have appointed a non official as Enquiry Officer; (ii) that since the High Court quashed the punishment not on merits but on a mere technicality, it erred in directing payment of all consequential benefits to the respondent; and (iii) since the respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer and there was no prejudice caused to him he was estopped from raising the contention as to the competence or jurisdiction of the Enquiry Officer for the first time in the Writ Petition.
Allowing the appeal in part, this Court, HELD: 1.
The de facto doctrine has to requisites, name ly, (i) the possession of the office and the performance of the duties attached thereto, and (ii) colour of title, that is, apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the possession thereof by the public.
According to this doctrine the acts of officers de facto performed within the sphere of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third parties and not for their own interest, are generally held valid and binding as if they were performed by de jure officers.
This doctrine can be invoked in cases where there is an appointment to office which is defective; but notwithstanding the defect to the title of the office, the decisions made by such a de facto officer clothed with the powers and functions of the office would be as effica cious as those made by a de jure officer.
The same would, however, not be true of a total intruder or usurper of office.
The doctrine envisages that acts performed de facto by officers within the scope of their assumed official authority are to be regarded.
as binding as if they were performed by officers de jure.
While the de facto doctrine saves official acts done by an officer whose appointment is found to be defective the private parties to a litigation are precluded from challenging the appointment in any col lateral proceedings.
But the doctrine does not come to the rescue of an intruder or usurper or a total stranger to the office.
Obviously the doctrine can have no application to the case of a person who is not the holder of an office but is merely a bank employee, for that matter an ex employee.
[202E F; 203BF G; 204A C] 1.1 In the instant case, the Enquiry Officer can hardly be described as a person occupying or being in possession of an office to which certain duties affecting the members of the general public can be 198 said to be attached.
Therefore in the facts and circum stances of this case the de facto doctrine can have no application.
[203H; 204A; 201G] Pulin Behari Das vs King Emperor, [1911 12] 16 Cal.
Weekly Notes 1105; Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons vs State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1976 A.P. 193; Jai Kumar vs State, [1968] All.
L.J. 877; Gokaraju Rangaraju vs State of A.P., ; ; referred to.
Abbe de Fountaine decided in 143 1; cited.
1.2 An Enquiry Officer need not be an officer of the bank: even a third party can be appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the conduct of an employee.
But there can be no doubt that a non official cannot act as a Disciplinary Authority and pass an order of punishment against the delin quent employee.
Therefore, where punishment is imposed by a person who has no authority to do so the very foundation on which the edifice is built collapses and with and it fails the entire edifice.
It is a case more or less akin to a case tried by court lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
Absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides, is of no consequence so far as the question of competence of the Enquiry Officer is concerned.
[202B; 204D E] Saran Motors (P.) Ltd. vs Vishwanath & Anr., ; referred to.
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. vs Labour Court, Tis Hazari & Ors., ; Held inapplicable.
In the instant case, the impugned order of punishment was quashed not because the merits of the case so demanded but because the technical plea of incompetence succeeded.
Therefore, the High Court was right in quashing the impugned order of punishment but having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case, it should not have ordered payment of 'all consequential benefits ' flowing from the declaration that the impugned order was bad in law.
The order of the High Court is modified to the extent that the respondent will be paid 50% of the consequential benefits and not all the consequential benefits.
Except for this modification, the rest of the order of the High Court will stand.
[205E G]


judgement:
s (Nos. 513, 566, 568, 570, 591,595, 596, 601, 616, 617, 623, 625, 631 and 632 of 1951) under article 32 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus.
The facts are stated in the judg ment.
Raghbir Singh (amicus curiae) for the petitioners in Petitions Nos.
513, 566, 568, 570.
595, 596, 609, 616, 617, 623,625 and 631.
A.S.R. Chari (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No. 591.
Shiv Charan Singh (amicus curiae) for the petitioner in Petition No. 632.
section M Sikri, Advocate General of the Punjab (Jindra Lal, with him) for the State of the Punjab.
January 25.
The Judgment of the Court was deliv ered by PATANJALI SASTRI C.J.
This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution submitted through the Super intendent, Central Jail, Ambala, for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of the petitioner from custo dy.
On 5th July, 1950, the petitioner was arrested and detained under an order of the District Magistrate of Amrit sar in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 3 of the , and the grounds of his detention were served on him as required by section 7 of the Act on 10th July, 1950.
The Act having been amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, with effect from 22nd February, 1951, a fresh order No. 7853 ADSB, dated 17th May, 1951, was issued in the following terms : "Whereas the Governor of Punjab is satisfied with re spect to the person known as Naranjan Singh Nathawan, s/o Lehna Singh of village Chak Sikandar, 397 P.S. Ramdas, Amritsar District, that with a view to prevent ing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State, it is necessary to make the following order: Now, therefore.
in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 3 and section 4 of the Preven tive Detention Act, 1950, as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Naranjan Singh Nathawan be committed to the custody of the Inspector General of Pris ons, Punjab, and detained in any jail of the State till 31st March, 1952, subject to such conditions as to maintenance, discipline and punishment for breaches of discipline as have been specified by general order or as contained in the Punjab Detenu Rules, 1950.
" This order was served on the petitioner on 23rd May, 1951, but no grounds in support of this order were served on him.
The petitioner thereupon presented this petition for his release contending that the aforesaid order was illegal inasmuch as (1) the grounds of detention communicated to him on 10th July, 1950, were "quite vague, false and imaginary" and (2) he was not furnished with the grounds on which the order dated 17th May, 1951, was based.
The petition was heard ex parte on 12th November, 1951, when this Court issued a rule nisi calling upon the respondent to show cause why the petitioner should not be released, and it was posted for final hearing on 23rd November, 1951.
Meanwhile, the State Government issued an order on 18th November, 1951.
revoking the order of detention dated 17th May, 1951, and on the same date the District Magistrate, Amritsar, issued yet another order for the detention of the petitioner under sections a and 4 of the amended Act; this last order along with the grounds on which it was based was served on the petitioner on 19th November, 1951.
Thereupon the petitioner submitted a supplemental peti tion to this Court on 28th November, 1951, challenging the validity of the last order on the ground 398 that "it was only a device to defeat the habeas corpus petition of the petitioner in which a rule had already been issued , and he put forward an additional ground of attack on the legality of the earlier order dated 17th may, 1951, namely, that it fixed the term of detention till 31st March, 1952, before obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board as required by section 11 of the amended Act.
This ground was evidently based on the view expressed by this Court that the specification of the period of detention in the initial order of detention under section 3 of the amended Act before obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board rendered the order illegal.
In the return to the rule showing cause filed on behalf of the respondent, the Under Secretary (Home) to the Govern ment explained the circumstances which led to the issue of the fresh order of detention dated 18th November, 1951.
After stating that the petitioner 's case was referred to and considered by the Advisory Board constituted under section 8 of the amended Act and that the Board reported on 30th May, 1951, that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner, the affidavit proceeded as follows: "That the Government was advised that the orders made under section 11 of the , as amended by the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951, but carried out in the form of orders under section 3 of the said Act, should be followed by grounds of detention and, as this had not been done in most cases, the detentions were likely to be called in question.
The Government was further advised there were other technical defects which might render the detention of various detenus untenable.
In view of this, the Government decided that the cases of all dete nus should be reviewed by the District Magistrates con cerned.
Accordingly, the Punjab Government instructed the District Magistrates to review the cases and apply their minds afresh and emphasised that there must exist rational grounds with the detaining authority to justify the deten tion of a person and they were asked to report clearly in each case if the District 399 Magistrate concerned wanted the detenus to be detained.
The Punjab Government also reviewed some cases.
Accordingly all cases including the case of the petitioner were reviewed and in this case the District Magistrate was again satisfied that it was necessary that the detenu be detained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order." And it concluded by stating "that the petitioner is detained now under the orders of the District Magistrate, Amritsar.
" The original and supplementary petitions came on in due course for hearing before Fazl Ali and Vivian Bose JJ.
on 17th December, 1951, when reliance was placed on behalf of t he petitioner on certain observations in an unreported decision of this Court in Petition No. 334 of 1951 (Naranjan Singh vs The State of Punjab) and it was claimed that in view of those observations and of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, the decision in Basant Chandra Ghose vs King Emperor(1), on which the respondent relied.
was no longer good law.
The learned Judges thought that the matter should be considered by a Constitution bench and the case was accordingly placed before us.
It will be seen from the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that the case of the petitioner, along with his representation against the detention order of 17th May, 1951, was placed before the Advisory Board for its consider ation, and the Board reported on 30th May, 1951, that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner.
It is said that, on the basis of that report, the Government decided that the petitioner should be de tained till 31st March, 1952, but while a properly framed order under section 11 should "confirm" the detention order and "continue" the detention for a specified period, the order of 17th May, 1951, was issued under a misapprehension in the form of an initial order under section 3 of the amended Act.
on the same grounds as before without any fresh communication thereof to the petitioner.
To (1) 52 400 avoid arguments based on possible defects of a technical and formal character, the said order was revoked under section 13, and on a review of the case by the District Magistrate, a fresh order of detention was issued under section 3 on 18th November, 1951, and this was followed by a formal communication of the same grounds as before as there could be no fresh grounds, the petitioner having throughout been under detention.
It is contended by the Advocate General of the Punjab that the decision reported in is clear authority in support of the validity of the aforesaid order.
On essentially similar facts the court laid down two propo sitions both of which have application here.
(1) Where an earlier order of detention is defective merely on formal grounds, there is nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being based on the pre existing grounds them selves, especially in cases in which the sufficiency of the grounds is not examinable by the courts, and (2) if at any time before the court directs the release of the detenu, a valid order directing his detention is produced, the court cannot direct his release merely on the ground that at some prior stage there was no valid cause for detention.
The question is not whether the later order validates the earli er detention but whether in the face of the later valid order the court can direct the release of the petitioner.
The learned Judges point out that the analogy of civil proceedings in which the rights of parties have ordinarily to be ascertained as on the date of the institution of the proceedings has no application to proceedings in the nature of habeas corpus where the court is concerned solely with the question whether the applicant is being lawfully de tained or not.
The petitioner 's learned counsel conceded that he could not challenge the correctness of the second proposition, but took exception to the first as being no longer tenable after the Indian Constitution came into force.
It was urged that article 22 lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of preventive detention and the said procedure must be strictly observed 401 as the only prospect of release by a court must be on the basis of technical or formal defects, a long line of deci sions having held that the scope of judicial review in matters of preventive detention is practically limited to an enquiry as to whether there has been strict compliance with the requirements of the law.
This is undoubtedly true and this Court had occasion in the recent case of Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs The State of Punjab (Petition No. 308 of 1951)(1) to observe "it cannot too often be emphasised that before a person is deprived of his personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected".
This proposition, however, applied with equal force to cases of preventive detention before the commence ment of the Constitution, and it is difficult to see what difference the Constitution makes in regard to the position.
Indeed, the position is now made more clear by the express provisions of section 13 of the Act which provides that a detention order may at any time be revoked or modified and that such revocation shall not bar the making of a fresh detention order under section 3 against the same person.
Once it is conceded that in habeas corpus proceedings the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceeding, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of proof of bad faith, that the detaining authority cannot supersede an earlier order of detention challenged as illegal and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in that behalf.
As regards the observations in Naranjan Singh 's case, we do not understand them as laying down any general proposi tion to the effect that no fresh order of detention could be made when once a petition challenging the validity of an earlier order has been filed in court.
The learned Judges appear to have inferred from the facts of that case that the later order was (1) Since reported as ; 402 not made bona fide on being satisfied that the petitioner 's detention was still necessary but it was "obviously to defeat the present petition".
The question of bad faith, if raised would certainly have to be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case, but the observations in one case cannot be regarded as a precedent in dealing with other cases.
We accordingly remit the case for further hearing.
This order will govern the other petitions where the same ques tion was raised.
Petitions remitted.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
In the absence of bad faith the detaining authority can supersede an earlier order of detention which has been challenged as defective on merely formal grounds and make a fresh order wherever possible which is free from defects and duly complies with the requirements of the law in that behalf.
The question of bad faith, if raised, must be decided with reference to the circumstances of each case.
In habeas corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceedings.
396 Basanta Chandra Ghose vs King Emperor ([1945] F.C.R. 81) followed.
Naranjan Singh vs The State of Punjab unreported) explained.
Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs The State of Punjab ([1952] S.C.R. 368) referred to.


judgement:
establishment of the Judge of Small Causes Court, Delhi, the name of Respondent No. 1 appears at Serial No. 9 whereas that of the appellant appears at Serial No. 19.
Both of hem satisfy the test of integrity.
The only claim the appellant can have 135 is on the principle of rotation as he is a graduate.
As that principle does apply to an appointment by promotion to the post in question, the claim of the appellant cannot be upheld.
[140F G] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 592 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.8.198 1 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1003 of 1974.
Prithvi Raj and T.C. Sharma for the Appellant.
Dr. Arun Kumar and V.B. Saharya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
On the retirement of one Jagan Nath Kohli, who was holding the post of Clerk of Court (Upper Division Clerk) in the grade of Rs. 130 300 (old Scale Rs.75 5 125), one post of Upper Division Clerk (U.D.C.)/English Clerk fell vacant in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi.
Five officials of that court, namely, the appellant and respondents nos.
1, 5, 6 & 7 asserted their claim to the said post.
The appellant, Chander Bhan, made his claim on the footing that he was a graduate and on the basis of the rule of rotation as embodied in Rule VI in Chapter XVIII A of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I referred to more particularly hereinafter.
Respondent No. 1, Hotilal Gupta, claimed the said post on the basis of his seniority.
We are not concerned with the claims of the other claimants because the contest before us is between the claims of the appellant and respondent No. 1.
The Judge, Small Causes Court in his order dated August 10, 1971, took the view that the appellant who is a graduate and has got 2 1/2 years office experience as Lower Division Clerk (L.D.C.), was an honest and efficient worker and was entitled to promotion in preference to respondent No. 1 because of the rule of rota tion.
The aggrieved parties filed an Administrative Appeal before the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi who passed his order dated July 17, 1973 and held that the rule of rotation did not apply to the establishment of the Judge, Small Causes Court.
He held that respondent No. 1 being the senior most official as Lower Division Clerk was entitled to the post of Upper Division Clerk and accordingly appointed respondent No. 1 as Upper Division Clerk against the said vacancy.
Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a departmental appeal against the said order to the High Court of Delhi which was heard by a learned 136 Judge on the Administrative Side of that Court who, by his order dated August 7. 1974.
accepted the appeal of the appellant and set aside the appointment of respondent No. 1.
He took the view that promotion in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi could only be made by the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi and that the vacancy should be filled in accordance with rule VI of the Rules framed by the erstwhile Punjab High Court, under section 35(3) of the punjab Courts Act, 1918, for subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court (hereinafter referred to as 'the said rules ').
Respondent No. 1, Hotilal Gupta challenged the correct ness of the view taken by the learned Judge on the Adminis trative side by filing a writ petition being C.W. No. 1003 of 1974 in the Delhi High Court.
By an order dated 7th August, 198 1, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed the said writ petition, quashed the order dated 7th August, 1974, passed by the learned Single Judge and upheld the order of the District and Sessions Judge, Delhi appoint ing respondent No. 1 to the said post.
The Division Bench took the view that not only the initial appointments but also the appointments by promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court were to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court and not by the District and Sessions Judge, and held that the rule of rotation on the basis of which the appellant had been appointed to the said post by the order of the Single Judge on the Administrative Side was not applicable to the said appointment.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Division Bench of the High Court was in error in coming to the said conclusion.
It was submitted by him that although the first appointment to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the office of the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi is to be made by a Judge of Small Causes Court, promotion to that post could only be made by the District & Sessions Judge and the rule of rotation contained in the first proviso to Rule VI of the said Rules was applicable to the appointment by promotion.
order to consider the merit of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions of law.
The relevant portion of section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act.
191S reads as follows: "(1) The ministerial officers of the District Courts and 137 Courts of Small Causes shall be appointed and may be sus pended or removed by the Judges of those Courts respective ly.
(2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (3) Every appointment under this section shall be subject to such rules as the High Court may prescribed in this behalf, and in dealing with any matter under this section, a Judge of a Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the control of the District Court.
" The rules for subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court were framed by the erst while Punjab High Court under section 35(4) of the Punjab Courts Act.
A perusal of Rule II of the said Rules dealing with classification, shows inter alia that Clerks of Court to Senior Subordinate Judges and Judges of Courts of Small Causes and English and Vernacular Clerks form a joint cadre.
Subrule (b) of Rule II of the said Rules inter alia provides that there shall be a separate cadre for each Revenue Dis trict and a separate cadre for each Court of Small Causes.
Rule III deals with qualifications and sub rule (2) of that Rule provides that no person shall be appointed to, or accepted as a candidate for, any clerical ministerial post, unless he has passed the Matriculation Examination of the Punjab University or an equivalent examination.
The material part of Rule 'IV runs as follows: "IV.
First appointments.
First appointment shall be made as follows: (1) By the District Judge: (a) Ministerial officers in his own court and in all courts controlled by the District Court other than Courts of Small Causes; .
(b) x x x (2) x x x (3) By the Judge of a Court of Small Causes: Ministerial Officers and menials in his own Court." . 138 Rule V deals with appointment and sub rule (1) of that Rule thereof runs as follows: "(1) Appointment to ministerial posts shall ordi narily be made either by open competition or by selection from a list of qualified candidates or apprentices accept ed by the District Judge.
Judge of a Small Causes Court,.
or Sub Judge to whom powers of appointment have been delegat ed, as the case may be.
Any departure from either of these methods should be reported to the High Court for confirma tion." Rule VI. which is of central importance in this appeal runs as follows: "VI.
Promotion (1) Appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishment should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades, provided that the official who would thus receive promotion possesses the prescribed educational qualifications and is otherwise fit to perform the duties to which he will be promoted, for which purpose tests may be imposed.
This rule does not apply to such posts as that of stenographer, for which special qualifications are needed; but preference should be given to officers with such qualifications who are already working in the lower grades: Provided that permanent vacancies in the 75 5 125 grade shall be filled by the District and Sessions Judges in the following rotation: (i) By selection on merit out of graduates who have at least two years ' experience in the work of the office, if there is no suitable graduate who fulfils this condition an 'outsider ' graduate may be appointed, but he must be one who normally resides within the jurisdiction of the District and Sessions Judge.
(ii) & (iii) By normal promotion in the office, i.e. the appointment of the next senior man whether graduate or non graduate subject to his fitness: Provided further that the rotation may be modified in 139 very exceptional cases when the direct appointment of a graduate would mean the ousting of a man who had been officiating quasi permanently in the post concerned for an appreciable period.
What is an appreciable period will depend on the circumstances of each case.
After such a modification.
the rotation should be restored as soon as possible.
(2) In making promotions preference may invariably be shown to officials who are known to be strictly honest.
No promotion should be given and no recommendation for promotion made in the case of an official who does not possess and maintain a reputation for strict integrity.
Effi ciency without honesty is not to be regarded as constitut ing a claim to promotion. ' A Notification dated October 28, 1953 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and in supersession of the Notifica tion issued earlier on February 17, 1941.
The said Notifica tion sets out that subject to such general rules as may be made by the Hon 'ble Judges of the Punjab High Court in that behalf appointments to the posts on the establishment of the Civil Courts at Delhi specified in Column (1) of the Sched ule thereto shall be made by the Authority specified in the corresponding entry in Column (2) of the said Schedule.
A perusal of the Schedule shows that appointments to the posts on establishments other than process serving and menial establishments in the Small Causes Court at Delhi are ' to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Delhi.
It has been pointed out in the impugned judgment that the establishment of the District and Sessions Court and that of the Court of the Small Causes constitute separate cadres.
This is not disputed before us.
Hence, whenever a specific mention is made regarding a particular officer of an estab lishment in a rule, that particular rule would normally apply to that establishment alone and the powers conferred by that rule would be conferred on the officer mentioned in the rule.
Rule VI(1) speaks of appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishments and states that these appointments should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades provided that the official to be promoted possess the qualifications prescribed.
The first proviso to that rule goes on to say that the permanent vacancies in the original grade of Rs.75 5 125 shall be filled in by the District and Sessions Court by rotation as set out in the said sub rule (1) of Rule VI.
The first part of Rule VI deals with appointments by promotion to the higher grade of ministerial establishment.
Generally it must be 140 held applicable to the establishment of the District and Sessions Court as well as that of the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
This rule, however, does not deal specifically with the question as to who is the officer competent to promote.
In view of this, the proviso can only be construed as laying down that, where the power of appointment by promotion is vested in the District and Sessions Judge, in making appointments by promotion to fill in.the permanent vacancies in the said original grade of Rs.75 5 124, rule of rotation set out in the first proviso to clause (1) of Rule VI should ordinarily be followed.
It is not disputed that there is a separate Cadre for the Court of Small Causes.
Rule IV(3) shows that the first appointment of the ministe rial officers in the Court of Small Cause is to be made by the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
The notification dated October 28, 1953 referred to earlier provides that the appointments to the posts on establishment other than proc ess serving and menial in the Court of Small Causes are to be made by the Judge, SmaLl Causes Court, Delhi.
A reading of sub section (1) of the Punjab Courts Act and the rules and Notification discussed earlier makes it clear that appointments by promotion to the posts in the entire ministerial cadre other than in the process serving and menial establishments in the Court of Small Causes have to be made by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and the first proviso to Rule VI(1) prescribing the rule of rotation has no application to such appointments.
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to apply the principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes where there is only one U.D.C.
The principle of rotation can be made applicable to the District & Ses sions Court because there are a number of posts of Upper Division Clerks.
It would be irrational to apply that prin ciple of rotation to the Court of Small Causes in which there is only one Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk.
In the seniority list of the establishment of the Judge of Small Causes Court, Delhi, the name of respondent No. 1 appears at Serial No. 9 whereas that of the appellant ap pears at Serial No. 19.
Both of them satisfy the test of integrity.
The only claim the appellant can have is on the principle of rotation as he is a graduate.
As that principle does not apply to an appointment by promotion to the post in question, the claim of the appellant cannot be upheld.
As we have already observed, none of the other respondents have pressed their claims in the High Court or here.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

summary/full:
One post of Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk fell vacant in the Small Causes Court.
Appellant made his claim to the post on the footing that he was a graduate and on the basis of Rule of Rotation embodied in Rule VI of the High Court Rules and Orders, Volume 1, Respondent No. 1 made his claim on the basis of seniority.
The Judge, Small Causes Court took the view that the appellant was entitled to promotion in preference to Respondent No. 1 because of the rule of rotation.
On an Administrative Appeal, the District applicable to the establishment of Judge, Small Causes Court, and appointed Respondent No. 1 as Upper Division Clerk.
The Appellant preferred a departmental appeal which was heard by a Single Judge on the Administrative side of the High Court.
He took the view that the promotion in question could be made by the District & Sessions Judge, and should be in accordance with the rule of rotation.
Respondent No. 1 challenged the said decision by way of a Writ Petition.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and held that not only initial appointments but also ap pointments by promotion were to be made by the Judge, Small Causes Court and not by the District & Sessions Judge, and that the rule of rotation was not applicable.
Against the High Court 's decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal contending that the promotion in question could only be made by the District & Sessions Judge and that the rule of rotation was applicable even to the appointment by promotion.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
Whenever a specific mention is made regarding a 134 particular officer of an establishment in a rule, that particular rule would normally apply to that establishment alone and the powers conferred by that rule would be con ferred on the officer mentioned in the rule.
Rule VI(1) of the High Court Rules speaks of appointments to the higher grades of the ministerial establishments and states that these appointments should ordinarily be made by seniority from lower grades provided that the officer to be promoted possesses the qualifications prescribed.
The first proviso to that rule goes on to say that the permanent vacancies in the original grade of Rs.75 5 125 shall be filled in by the District & Sessions Court by rotation as set out in the said sub rule (1) of Rule VI.
The 1st part of Rule VI deals with appointments by promotion to the higher grade of ministerial establishment.
Generally it must be held applicable to the establishment of the District & Sessions Court as well as that of the Judge, Small Causes Court.
This part, however, does not deal specifically with the question as to who is the officer competent to promote.
In view of this, the proviso can only be construed as laying down that, where the power of appointment by promotion is vested in the District & Sessions Judge, in making appointments by promotion to fill in the permanent vacancies in the said original grade of Rs.75 5 125, rule of rotation set out in the first provi so to clause (I) of Rule VI should ordinarily be followed.
It is not disputed that there is a separate Cadre for the Court of Small Causes.
Rule IV(3) shows that the first appointment of the ministerial officers in the Court of Small Causes is to be made by the Judge of the Small Causes Court.
[139F H; 140A C] 2.
A reading of sub section (1) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 the High Court Rules, and Notification issued makes it clear that appointments by promotion to the posts in the entire ministerial cadre other than those in the process serving and mental establishments in the Court of Small Causes have to be made by the Judge, Court of Small Causes and the first proviso to Rule VI(1) prescribing the rule of rotation has no application to such appointments.
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to apply the principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes where there is only one U.D.C.
The principle of rotation can be made applicable to the District & Sessions Court because there are a number of posts of Upper Division Clerks.
It would be irrational to apply that principle of rotation to the Court of Small Causes in which there is only one Upper Division Clerk/English Clerk.
[140D E]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 390 of 1979.
From the Order dated 14.2.1978 of the Central Govt.
at New Delhi in Revision Petition No. MB/133/77.
Anil B. Dewan, S.K. Dholakia, P.C. Kapur and P. Nara simhan for the Appellants.
Kapil Sibbal, Additional Solicitor General (NP), Ms. Nisha Bagchi.
Ms. Sushma Suri and C.V.S. Rao for the Re spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J.
All these appeals involve a common ques tion as to whether the goods exported by the appellants are liable to export duty.
There are 67 appeals which relate to various batches of exports made by the appellants during the period from 4.3.76 to 14.2.82.
They will be disposed of by this Common order.
The goods exported by the appellants are blanched, roasted and salted peanuts packed in vacuum containers.
The appellants purchase groundnuts without shell in raw form various parts of Saurashtra in the State of Gujarat.
There after, they are sorted out into different sizes small, medium and big.
The medium and small sizes are separated.
Dust and husk are cleaned out and other foreign material removed.
The commodity then goes to a dry roaster where it is roasted at a 144 temperature of 150 deg.
This results in reduction of the moisture and destruction of enzymes to a considerable ex tent.
It is also stated that by this process any fungus or aflotoxin is removed.
After dry roasting, the product is cooled down with the aid of a blower so that the skin of the groundnuts become loose and the groundnut contracts.
There after, it goes through automatic blanching machines.
This separates the skin of the groundnut and on removal of the skin it becomes white.
Thereafter, the seeds are put on running tables and picked, according to uniform sizes, with the aid of an electric eye sorter.
The commodity thereafter goes to a frying section for being subjected to deep oil bath frying in an automatic fryer.
They are then subjected to anti oxident chemicals and thereafter sent through the blower for being cooled down.
The extra oil is sucked out.
They are then subjected to a glazing process and are given permeated chemicals and salt treatment and are packed in packets and tins.
The goods thus exported by the appellants are charged to duty under item 13 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act 1934 and.
later, under item 20 of the Second Schedule to the .
The entry is the same under both enactments but the rate of duty is differ ent.
The entry reads: Item N0.
The first line of argument of the assessee was that the item 'groundnut kernel ' refers to groundnut seeds, the basic characteristic of which is the quality of germination.
It was submitted that, since the product exported by the assessee, though basically ground nuts, had been so processed and treated that it lost its quality of germination, it could no longer be described as 'groundnut kernel '.
The second line of argument put forward on behalf of the appellant was that the entry in the export tariff referred only to groundnut kernel used for oil ex traction.
It was pointed out that groundnut in shell as well as groundnut kernel can be said to be of two varieties one an edible variety and the other a variety used for oil extraction purposes.
While it is true that it is not a mutually exclusive classification in that perhaps all groundnut is capable of being eaten or of being 145 processed to yield oil, the submission was that these two varieties of groundnut kernels or groundnut in shell were two different trade commodities.
They had different charac teristics; they were meant for different markets.
; their end use was different; and their prices as well as mode of pricing were totally different.
Referring to entries in this regard in the BTN (British Trade Nomenclature), the Indian Import Tariff as well as the Indian Import Export Policy, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the entry should be confined only to groudnut kernel of the oil yield ing variety and not the variety exported by the appellant, which could be more appropriately described as "processed food" rather than as groundnut kernel.
The appellant 's contention, initially put forward before the Assistant Collector of Customs in an application for refund, was rejected by the Collector of Customs, on appeal by the Central Board of Excise and Customs and, on further revision, by the Government of India under the then existing procedure.
So far as the subsequent periods of exports were concerned, the contentions of the appellant were considered and rejected by a Full Bench of the Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal.
The appellant preferred a Spe cial Leave Petition from the order of the Central Government in revision dated 14.2.1978, which was admitted and num bered as Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1979.
Against the other orders of the Tribunal, the appellant has preferred appeals to this Court under section 130 E of the .
On behalf of the appellants, a number of circumstances have been relied upon to justify the distinction sought to be made between groundnut kernel simpliciter and blanched and roasted groundnuts exported by the assessee.
It will be convenient to summarise the points made on behalf of the appellant here: (1) In the Indian Trade Classification (I.T.C.), which has been published by the Government of India for purposes of foreign trade, there is a bifurcation in the classification between the oil seeds and roasted nuts.
There are various revisions of this classification.
Upto 1st April, 1972, the I.T.C. classified oil seeds, oilnuts and oil kernels in Division 22.
The various items occurring under this Division were as follows: Code No. Description Unit of Quantity Group 221 Oil seeds, oilnuts and oil kernels 146 221.1 Groundnuts (Peanuts), green.
whether or not shelled (excluding flour and meal) 221.1001 Groundnut kernels.
H.P.S. 221.1002 Groundnut kernels
N.E.S. 221.1003 Groundnut in shell.
H.P.S. TONNE 221.1004 Groundnut in shell.
N.E.S.
As against the above in group No. 053 roasted nuts are specified as below: 053.9009 Others (roasted nuts including groundnuts) In a revised alphabetic index to the commodities, the relevant code numbers for various commodities pertaining to groundnuts are as follows: Commodity Code No. Groundnut in Shell HPS 221.1003 Groundnut in Shell NES 222.1004 Groundnut kernels HPS 222.1001 Groundnut kernels NES 222.1002 Groundnut oil, crude 423.4001 Groundnut oil purified 423.4002 Groundnut oil, deodorized 423.4003 Groundnut oil, hydrogenated 431.2001 Groundnut oil cake and meal 1081.3201 Groundnut roasted 058.9107 In the more recent classification heading No. 12.02 refers to groundnuts, not roasted or otherwise cooked, whether or not shelled 147 or broken.
The unit of quantity in which these goods are sold is tonne.
This chapter deals with various types of oil seeds like soya beans copra, linseed, rape or colza seeds, sunflower seeds, palm nuts and kernels and other oil seeds and oleaginous fruits.
On the other hand edible nuts come under heading 20.08, which reads thus: "Fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, otherwise prepared or preserved, whether or not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter or spirit, not elsewhere speci fied or included Nuts, ground nuts and other seeds, whether or not mixed together: Ground nuts Kg.
Other, including mixtures Cashew nut, roasted Kg.
Nuts, prepared or preserved Kg.
Other roasted nuts and seeds n .e.s.
" (2) A similar classification has also been made under the BTN.
Note i under this Chapter reads thus: 1.
It is to be taken not to apply to coconuts or other products of heading No. 08.01 or to olives (Chapter 7 or Chapter 20).
It does not, however, include olives (Chapter 7), coconuts (heading 08.01) or certain seeds and fruits from which oil may be extracted but which are primarily used for other purposes, e.g. walnuts and almonds (heading 08.05), apricot, peach and plum kernels (heading 12.08) and cocoa beans (heading 18.01)".
148 It is also stated that the heading covers, inter alia, ground nuts (except roasted ground nuts heading 20.06).
As against this heading 20.06, which deals with fruit otherwise prepared or preserved, whether or not containing added sugar or spirit, carries the following sub heading: (3) Almonds, ground nuts, areca (or betel) nuts and other nuts, dry roasted, oil roasted or fat roasted, whether or not containing or coated with vegetable oil, salt, flavours, spices or other additives.
(3) Even under the Customs Tariff, the first Schedule, which deals with import, contains a similar classification.
Chapter 12 and note 1 to the Chapter are the same as in BTN.
Item 12.01 reads oil seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken (1)not elsewhere specified (2) Copra.
Chapter 20 deals with preparations of vegetables, fruit or other parts of plants.
It contains a note that the Chapter covers edible plants.
parts of plants and roots of plants conserved in syrup (for example, ginger) and roasted groundnuts.
This indi cates that the customers for two types of goods are totally different.
(5) 0n 14th July, 1976, the Government of India decided to ban with immediate effect export of HPS (Hand Picked Seeds) groundnuts (both in shell and kernel), which is canalised through Indian Oil and Oil Produce Exporters ' Association.
However, by an export trade notice dated 8.9.76, the Government of India clarified that the item "blanched and roasted groundnut kernels", does not fall within the purview of Exports Control Order, 1968 and its export is allowed without any licensing formalities.
(6) It has been pointed out that the Collector of Cus toms used to levy and recover an agricultural cess on the goods in question until the Government of India, by an order of 1976, held that the roasted and salted peanuts/groundnuts exported by the assessee were not liable to cess under the .
(7) It is pointed out that the packed roasted seeds exported by the appellants are more value added than raw groundnut kernel used 149 for other purposes.
The assessee 's product is packed in vacuum containers and sold in terms of kilograms, whereas other groundnuts are exported in bags or drums and sold in tomes.
It would not be correct to bring both of them under same classification for export purposes.
Relying on the above points of difference, Shri Divan and Dholakia, appearing on behalf of the appellant vehement ly contend that the entry in the export tariff should be given a restrictive interpretation.
Reliance is placed in this context on a judgment of the Madras High Court in Kalaivani Fabrics vs Collector, a direct decision on the present issue.
Reference is made also to the cases cited therein and, in particular, to the ruling of this Court in M/s. Healthways Dairy Products Co. vs Union of India & Ors., ; Shri Divan submits that if there is any ambiguity or doubt it should be re solved in favour of the assessee.
He contends that, while the taxing authorities, on whom the onus lies, have merely rested on the dictionary meaning of the .word 'groundnut kernel ', the assessee has placed a lot of material show that there are two different commercial varieties of groundnut kernel.
He submits that, in matters of export and import, the functional test is slowly replacing other tests, an approach clearly indicated by the classifications under the BTN, ITC and the import tariffs.
Shri Dholakia, appearing on behalf of the appellant in one of the appeals, very strongly urges that the commodity known as groundnut kernel consists of two entirely different varieties or classes particularly in matters of trade.
There is a sea of difference between the groundnut kernel which is exported as an oil producing variety and the roasted peanuts which are exported more or less as a 'processed food ' by the appellant.
The produce exported by the appellants has no oil content; it is incapa ble of being used for germinating purposes; its market, its unit of quantity of sale, itS price and even its exporters are totally different viewed from the commercial point of view, it is impossible to mix up these two varieties under one common heading and this could not have been the inten tion of the export tariff.
He, therefore, submits that the export tariff item should be restricted only to one of these varieties, namely, the oil seed variety or the germinating variety and should not be extended to the roasted items sold by the assessee.
Shri Dholakia also raised a point that the appellant 's factory was located in a free trade zone trod that, having regard to the various notifications of the Government of India, the Government was estopped from levying any export duty on its products.
The necessary facts to 150 found any such promissory estoppel have not been put forward or considered by any of the assessing or appellate authori ties.
We, therefore, decline to permit Shri Dholakia to raise this question at this belated stage.
On the other hand Ms. Nisha Bagchi, who argued the case on behalf of the Union of India very ably, submitted that the expressions 'groundnut kernel ' and 'groundnut shell ' used in the export entry were of the widest connotation.
She referred to the dictionary meanings of the word 'kernel ' and submitted that there is no justification whatsoever for restricting its meaning on the basis of the capacity to germinate or to yield oil.
In fact, she contended, the very fact that the export tariff avoids all these classifications and uses a wide expression, which is capable of taking in both the edible as well as the oil seed varieties of the groundnuts, supports her conten tion that, so far as export tariff is concerned, the legis lature intended no limitations whatsoever.
In support of her contention as to the wide meaning of the expression 'ground nut kernel ', she relied on certain observations of this Court in State vs Shanmagha Vils Cashewnut Factory, [1953] 4 S.T.C. 205 and of the Madras High Court in Binod Cashew Corporation vs Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, [1986] 61 S.T.C. 1.
She submitted that the interpretation sought to be placed on the entries in the export tariff by the appellant will carve away a substantial category of the goods de scribed in the wide tariff entry from its scope.
So far as agricultural cess is concerned, she pointed out, .rightly, that it was leviable only in respect of "seeds", an expres sion that imports a concept of a capacity to germinate, particularly, in an agricultural context.
Obviously, the groundnut kernel, roasted and salted, could not be described as 'seeds ' and therefore, the Government of India had rightly exempted them from agricultural cess.
According to counsel, the functional test may be attracted where there is a bifurcation or classification as in the tariff entries referred to on behalf of the appel lant but there is no justification to import any such test where the expression, as in this instance, is broad and unrestricted.
Referring to the exemption from export ban, learned counsel submitted that the very fact that it was considered necessary to exempt the blanched and roasted peanuts from the export ban indicates that otherwise they would have been included in the export ban.
Learned counsel took us through the 151 orders of the appellate authorities and the tribunal and submitted that they have taken a correct view in the matter which does not call for any interference.
She submitted that groundnut kernel remains groundnut kerneI even after roasting and frying.
The process, though described elaborately on behalf of the appellant, does not create a different product.
This, she pointed out, was the finding of the appellate authorities.
There is no justification, therefore counsel contended to read any limitation into the export entry.
Having considered the submissions of both parties, we are of opinion that the contention of the Revenue should prevail.
To our mind, there is no difficulty or ambiguity in the interpretation of the tariff entry.
Groundnut is a well known commodity which is available both in shell and as kernel.
In this context, 'kernel ' clearly means the grain, seed or the soft matter inside the shell, whatever the use or purpose to which it is put, eating or crushing for oil or sowing.
On behalf of the appellant, it is emphasised that the goods exported by the assessee and groundnut oil seeds are totally different commercial commod ities.
Even the acceptance of this argument does not carry the appellant 's case to the desired
Assuming that two different commercial commodities fail under the same entry, there is no reason why the entry should be restricted to only one of them.
It can and should cover both unless one can say that the commodity marketed by the appellant is not 'groundnut kernel '.
We are not convinced that the goods exported by the assessee have ceased to be groundnuts in the ordinary accep tation of the term or that they have become a different commodity, say, a processed food (indeed, there is no such classification in the tariff entry).
The decision in Diwan Chand (Chaman Lal, [1977] 39 STC 75 turned on the descrip tion of groundnuts in Schedule C of the Punjab Sales Tax Act as a species of oil seeds and it was held that parched groundnuts constituted a different commodity.
But the fact is that, though the raw groundnut kernel has undergone a drying.
roasting and frying process, its identity as ground nut is not lost.
Even in the market to which it is exported and where it is marketed, it is purchased only as groundnuts (or peanuts, as they are called in the U.S.A.).
May be there are two 152 different commodities but both are known only as 'ground nuts '.
The argument that the scope of the entry should be restricted because of the two fold classification existing elsewhere between groundnuts as "oil seeds" and groundnuts as "fruits, nuts and edible substances" does not appeal to us.
In the first place, it does not meet the argument that basically both items are only varieties of groundnuts and hence not taken out of the relevant entry.
Secondly, there is force in the argument of State counsel that the legisla ture has, deliberately, not adopted, for the purposes of the Second Schedule, the minute multiclassification of the First Schedule and allied classifications.
Unlike the Import Tariff, the BTN and the ITC, there is no sub classification ' attempted in the export entry.
The legislature must be presumed to know that, for import purposes, for instance, groundnuts are classified under different headings with differential rates of duty.
Those entries appear not else where but in the First Schedule of the very enactment which sets out the export tariff.
The First Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act refers to seeds, oil seeds and oil in section II and talk only of canned fruits and vegetables in section IV (dealing with products of food preparing industries).
The entries in the Customs Tariff relating to imports have already been touched upon.
If, in spite of such detailed classification elsewhere, the legislature decided to use a wider expression in the Second Schedule, the intention of the legislature must be given effect to.
Shri Dholakia submitted that while the need to restrict imports necessitated a detailed enumeration and precise classification, the export duty is levied only on a short list of items.
This may be so but this point of distinction is not enough to explain why, when an entry finds a place in the export tariff, it should not receive its normal interpretation but should receive one circumscribed by the entries in the import tariff or other classifications.
A point was also made by Sri Dholakia that, since the export duty is on the basis of tonnes and it is only the groundnut oil seed that is exported in units of tonnes, the entry should be confined to this commodity alone.
This, we are afraid, is a very precarious basis for the interpretation of the body of the entry.
In this context, we should also point out that no difficulty, anomaly or absurdity arising out of the computation of export duty in terms of tonnes on these goods was brought to the notice of the authorities at any stage.
It may perhaps have helped if material had been placed before the authorities as to the nature and magnitude of the exports of the two classes of groundnuts, their relative prices and the duty impact there on.
In the absence of any such material, we find it diffi cult to hold that the commodity in question should be excluded because of the mode of computation of duty 153 prescribed by the tariff entry.
Once it is realised both oil seeds and roasted ground nuts exported by the assessee are capable of being described as 'groundnut kernel ', which is what the entry talks of the various circumstances pointed out that they have different markets, that their end use is different, that one of them has been excepted from the export ban that their export is done under the auspices of different Export Promotion Coun cils all fall into place and reveal no inconsistency with, and have no bearing on, the interpretation to be placed on the entry.
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the stand of the Revenue has to be upheld and the decision of the Madras High Court in Kalaivani Fabrics (supra) overruled.
These appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed.
We, however, make no order as to costs.
R.S.S. Appeals dis missed.

summary/full:
The appellants purchased groundnuts without shell in raw form, and after subjecting them to various processes and treatment, packed them in packets and tins which were then exported.
The goods were charged to duty under item 13 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act 1934 and, later, under item 20 of the Second Schedule to the as 'groundnut kernel '.
The appellant however contended that the product exported by it was "processed peanuts", and since the product exported by the assessee, though basically groundnuts, had been so processed and treated that it lost its quality of germination, it could no longer be described as 'groundnut kernel '.
Another argument of the appellant was that groundnut kernel could be said to be of two varieties one an edible variety, and the other a variety used for oil extraction purposes, and that the tariff entry should be confined only to groundnut kernel of the oil yielding variety and not the variety exported by the assessee, which could be more appropriately described as "processed food" rather than as "groundnut kernel".
The appellant 's contentions were rejected by the Collec tor of Customs, on appeal by the Central Board of Excise and Customs and, on further revision, by the Government of India.
Subsequently, the contentions were rejected by a Full Bench of the Customs, Excise & Gold Control Appellate Tribu nal.
Before this Court, the appellants while reiterating the submissions made before the authorities below, contended that the entry in the export tariff should be given a re strictive interpretation and if there was any ambiguity or doubt it should be resolved in favour of the assessee.
It was further submitted that, in matters of export and import, the func 142 tional test was slowly replacing other tests.
On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that: i) the expressions 'groundnut kernel and 'groundnut shell ' used in the export entry were of widest connotation: (ii) there was no justification whatsoever for restricting the meaning of the word 'kernel ' on the basis of the capaci ty to germinate or to yield oil; (iii) the functional test may be attracted where there was a bifurcation or classifi cation as in the entries, but there was no justification to import any such test where the expression.
as in this in stance, was broad and unrestricted; and (iv) groundnut kernel remains groundnut kernel even after roasting and frying and the processing and treatment did not create a different product.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court.
HELD: (1) There is no difficulty or ambiguity in the interpretation of the tariff entry.
Groundnut is a well known commodity which is available both in shell and as kernel.
In this context, 'kernel ' clearly means the grain, seed or the soft matter inside the shell, whatever the use or purpose to which it is put, eating or crushing for oil or sowing.
The tariff entry covers all groundnut and there is no justification for confining it to the germinating or the oil seed variety alone.
[151C D] M/s Health ways Dairy Products Co. vs Union of India & Ors.,[1976] 2 SCC 887, referred to.
(2) Assuming that two different commercial commodities fall under the same entry, there is no reason why the entry should be restricted to only one of them.
It can and should cover both unless one can say that the commodity marketed by the appellant is not 'groundnut kernel '.
[151E] Diwan Chand Chainart Lal 's Case [1977] 39 STC 75, referred to.
Though the raw groundnut kernel has undergone a dry ing, roasting and frying process, its identity as groundnut is not lost.
Even in the market to which it is exported and where it is marketed, it is purchased as groundnuts.
[I51G] (4) The legislature must be presumed to know that, for import purposes, for instance, groundnuts are classified under different headings with differential rates of duty.
Those entries appear not elsewhere 143 but in the First Schedule of the very enactment which sets out the export tariff.
If, in spite of such detailed classi fication elsewhere, the legislature decided to use a wider expression in the Second Schedule.
the intention of the legislature must be given effect to.
[152C D] (5) Once it is realised that both oil seeds and roasted groundnuts exported by the assessee are capable of being described as 'groundnut kernel ', which is what the entry talks of, the various circumstances pointed out that they have different markets, that their end use is different, that one of them has been excepted from the export ban, that their export is done under the auspices of different Export Promotion Councils all fall into place and reveal no incon sistency with.
and have no bearing on, the interpretation to be placed on the entry.
[153B C] Kalaivani Fabrics vs Collector, , Over ruled.


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
1894, 1895 & 1896 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.2.1989 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil W.P. Nos.
1778, 1776 & 1777 of 1989.
528 Balbir Singh Wasu, N.S. Das Bahl for the Appellant.
Har Dev Singh and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani for the Re spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J.
Special leave granted.
All these petitions by Special leave are disposed of by one single order as identical questions of law are involved and they are directed against the similar order of the High Court dated 9th February, 1989.
Short controversy raised in these cases is regarding the grant of benefits under amended Sections 23(1 A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act).
The President Land Acquisition Tribu nal, Hoshiarpur (District Court) initially granted solatium at 15% on the compensation and interest at 6% per annum on the additional amount of compensation till the date of payment.
The claimants 'submitted an application for modifi cation of the award as regards solatium and interest in view of the Amending Act which came into force on 24th September, 1984.
The Land Acquisition Tribunal granted benefit of the Amending Act and modified the award by passing the following operative order which is subject matter of challenge in Special Leave Petition No. 9434 of 1989.
Similar orders have been passed in other two cases also.
"Accordingly, I modify the award to the extent that solatium shah be payable at the rate of 30% instead of 15% granted earlier.
Similarly, interest at the rate of 12% per annum is granted from the date of notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, till the date of award of the Collector, the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier.
Further interest is awarded at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of delivery of possession till the expiry of one year.
Thereaf ter interest is awarded at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of expiry of period of one year till payment.
The applicant shall be entitled to recover the solatium and interest as per the modification indicated above ' '.
529 Aggrieved against the above order, the Hoshiarpur Im provement Trust has come before this Court.
In order to decide the controversy, it would be neces sary to mention some important dates in each of the above cases.
In Special Leave Petition No. 9434 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6th January, 1979.
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal, Hoshiarpur on 28th March, 1983.
The award was modified by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal by order dated 29th August, 1988.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust on 9th February, 1989.
In Special Leave Petition No. 9521 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 30th April, 1982.
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal, Hoshiarpur on 29th August, 1985.
The President Land Acquisition Tribunal modified the award by order dated 29th August, 1988.
The Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust was dismissed by the High Court on 9th February, 1989.
In Special Leave Petition No. 10 130 of 1989 the award was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 30th April, 1982.
On a reference the award was given by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal, Hoshiarpur on 29th August, 1985.
The award was modified by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal by order dated 14th September, 1988.
Writ Petition filed by the Improvement Trust was dismissed by the High Court on 9th February, 1989.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Improvement Trust contended that no benefit could have been given under Section 23(1 A) which was inserted by the Amending Act.
It was contended that in a recent decision given by this Court in Union of India & Ors.
vs Mr. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, JT it has been held that the additional amount under Sec.
23(1 A) can only be allowed in those cases where proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act were pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisi tion (Amendment) Bill 1982 in the House of People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date.
If the Collector has made the award before that date then, the additional amount cannot be awarded.
Thus it was contended that the additional benefit of interest 530 at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of notification till the award made by the Collector or the date of taking over possession which ever is earlier, is liable to be set aside.
In order to appreciate the argument advanced by the Learned counsel appearing for the Improvement Trust, it would be necessary to give a background of some important events and decisions having a bearing on the question.
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) was sought to be amended and in this regard on 30th April, 1982, the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 was introduced in Parliament.
On 24th September, 1984 it became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 68 of 1984, when it received assent of the President.
Before the amendment, Section 23(2) of the Principal Act provided for solatium at 15% on the market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.
After amendment by Act 68 of 1984 solatium was raised to 30% on the market value under Section 23(2).
A Constitution Bench in Union of India & Another vs Raghubir Singh (dead) by L.rs.
; , , overruled; Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandi garh; , and State of Punjab vs Mohinder Singh, held that the higher solatium at the rate of 30% would be given in cases of awards made by the Collector or the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1934.
In the cases before us the claimants have been rightly held entitled to solatium at 30% applying the ratio in the case of Union of India & Ors.
vs Raghubir Singh, (supra).
So far as the award of interest at the rate of 9% for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15% for the subsequent years is concerned, the claimants have been rightly held entitled to the same under Section 28 as stood amended by the Amending Act.
Now, the only controversy which remains to be considered is with regard to the additional benefit allowed by way of rate of interest at 12% per annum from the date of notifica tion issued under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, till the date of award of the Collector or the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier.
It is important to note that in the case of Union of India vs Raghubir Singh, (supra) the above question was neither called for consideration nor decided.
In Union of India & Ors.
vs Mr. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (supra) the above question directly came up for considera tion before this Court.
It was held that the above benefit has been provided under the amended Sections 23(i A) & 23(2).
531 The Legislature has given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1 A) for certain cases and it would be deter mined from Section 30(1)(a,) & (b) of the Transitional Provisions which read as follows: Section 30: Transitional Provisions: (1) The provision of Sub section (1 A) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 16 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to: (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amend ment) Bill 1982 in the House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date.
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act".
It was observed in the above case that Section 30(1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Sec.
23(1)(a) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30th April, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date.
If the Collector has made the award before that date then that additional amount cannot be awarded.
We agree with the view taken in the above case.
Thus applying the above principle in the cases in hand before us it would be clear that in Special Leave Petition No. 9434 of 1989 the award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 6th January, 1979 i.e. long before 30th April, 1982 and as such the claimant in the above case is not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1 A) as inserted in the Principle Act by the Amending Act.
So far as the other two Special Leave Petitions, namely, 9521/89 and 10130/89 are concerned, the awards have been made by the Land Acqui sition Collector on 30th April, 1982 itself but not before that date.
Section 30 the Transitional Provisions clearly provide that the provisions of Subsection (1 A) of Section 23 of the Principle Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Sec tion 16 of this Act shall apply to every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principle Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before 532 that date.
In the above two cases the award has not been made by the Collector before 30th day of April, 1982 but made on 30th April, 1982 itself and as such the claimants in these two cases become entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1 A).
As a result of the above discussion the civil appeals in S.L.P. (C) Nos.
952 1 of 1989 & 10 130 of 1989 stand dis missed.
So far as appeal in Special Leave Petition No. 9434 of 1989 is concerned, it is allowed in part and the order of the High Court as well as that of the President Land Acqui sition Tribunal is modified only to the extent that interest shall be allowed at the rate of 6% per annum instead of 12% per annum from the date of Notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, till the date of award of the Collector or the date of possession of the land which ever is earlier.
So far as other additional benefits granted by the President Land Acquisition Tribunal are concerned, the same would remain in tact.
In the facts and circum stances of the case there would be no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed partly.

summary/full:
The lands of the respondents were acquired for a scheme of the Appellant Improvement Trust.
The awards for compensa tion were made by the Collector on 6th January, 1979 and 30th April, 1982 and the reference was disposed of by the Land Acquisition Tribunal by its award dated 28th March, 1983 and 29th August, 1985 by granting solatium @ 15% on compensation and interest @ 6% on excess compensation.
In view of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the landowner claimants made an application to the Tribunal seeking enhanced solatium and interest under the amended provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The Tribunal allowed the application by granting higher solatium, addi tional benefit of interest and interest on excess compensa tion.
The writ petitions filed by the Appellant Improvement Trust against the decision of the Tribunal were dismissed.
Hence these appeals by the Improvement Trust.
Allowing the appeal in part (C.A. No. 1894 of 1990) and dismissing the connected appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
The benefit of higher solatium @ 30% under section 527 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is applicable to cases of awards made by the Collector or the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September, 1984.
In the instant case since the awards were made between the aforesaid dates the claimants have been rightly held entitled to enhanced solatium.
[530E] Union of India vs Raghubir Singh, ; , fol lowed.
Section 30(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 clearly provides that the additional amount of interest provided under Section 23(1 A) of the Land Acquisi tion Act, 1894 shall be applicable to acquisition proceed ings pending before the Collector as on 30th April, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date.
If the Collector has made the award before that date then addition al amount Cannot be awarded.
[531E] 2.1 The claimant in the Appeal (No. 1894 of 1990) is not entitled to additional benefit of interest under Section 23(1 A) because the award in this case was made long before 30th April, 1982.
But the claimant in the connected appeals are entitled to this benefit since in their cases the awards were made on 30th April, 1982 itself.
[531F; 532A] Union of India vs Raghubir Singh, , explained and held inapplicable.
Union of India vs Filip Tiago De Gama, J.T. 1989 4 S.C. 529, followed.
The award of interest on excess compensation is valid since the claimants were entitled to the same under section 28 as it stood amended by the Amending Act.
[530F] 4.
The order of the High Court and the Land Acquisition Tribunal in Civil Appeal No. 1894 of 1990 is therefore modified, only to the extent that interest shah be allowed at the rate of 6% per annum instead of 12% per annum.
The other additional benefits granted by the Tribunal shall remain in tact.
[532B C]