judgement:
Appeal No. 141 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 7, 1963 of 'the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench in Second Appeal No. 378 of 1961.
B.P. Jhandharia, P.C. Bhartari, J.B. Dadachanji and O.C. Mathur, for the appellant.
W.S. Barlingay, V.G. Tambvekar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4 to 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Second Appeal No. 378 of 1961.
The respondents as trustees of a charitable trust are the owners of certain houses situate in Indore City.
Prior to January 26, 1954 the Indore Municipality was governed by the Indore City Municipal Act, 4 of 1909.
By virtue of the power conferred on it by that Act the Municipality used to levy and collect house tax 127 at the rate of 7% of the gross annual letting value of these houses and the trustees duly paid such tax.
After the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat, the legislature of that State passed the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954 which came into force on January 26, 1954.
The 1954 Act repealed amongst other Acts the Indore City Municipal Act, 1909.
The Indore Municipality however purported to levy the house tax on the basis of the gross annual letting value at the rate of 7% of such value for the financial years 1953 54 and 1954 55.
This was objected to by the respondents on the ground that under the 1954 Act the tax could be assessed on the basis of gross annual letting value less 10% statutory allowance in.
lieu of costs of repairs or on any other account whatsoever.
The difference came to Rs. 1,461, and of this the trustees claimed refund on the ground that the Municipality had collected the excess from them under pain of distress The Municipality having refused to refund the excess the respondents filed the suit to recover it on the ground that the excess amount was illegally recovered.
The Trial Court decreed the suit and the appeals filed by the Corporation in the District Court and the High Court were dismissed.
To appreciate the stand taken by the appellant Corporation it is necessary to examine some of the provisions of the two Acts Sec.
21 of the Indore City Municipal Act authorised the Municipal Council to impose tax on houses, buildings or lands within the municipal limits at a rate not exceeding 12 1/2% of the gross annual letting value.
As aforesaid, this Act amongst other Acts was repealed by the Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act, 1954.
2 of the 1954 Act which contains both a repealing and saving provisions repealed the several Acts set out therein.
Clause (a) however provides that such repeal shall not affect the validity or invalidity of anything already done under any of the said enactments.
Clause (c) of sec.
2 provides that all rules, orders, byelaws, notifications and notices, taxes and rates, made, passed, framed, issued or imposed or deemed to have been made, passed, framed, issued or imposed, shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, be deemed to have been made, passed, framed, issued or imposed, as the case may be, under this Act.
69 authorises a Municipality to impose the several taxes set out therein including the tax on houses, buildings or lands or both.
70 lays down the procedure which the municipality would have to follow before it imposes any one of those taxes.
73 provides that when a tax on buildings or lands or both is imposed, the Chief Executive Officer shall cause an assessment list of all buildings or lands in the municipality to be prepared containing the particulars therein set out.
Amongst such particulars are the valuation based on capital or annual letting value as the case may be on which the property is assessed.
Sub sec.
2 provides that in 128 assessing the tax on buildings or lands, where the valuation determined under clause (d) of sub section 1 is the annual letting value, a sum equal to 10% of such valuation shall be deducted therefrom in lieu of allowance for costs of repairs or on any account whatsoever.
75 provides for the publication of the assessment list and the.
right of the owner or occupier of properties included in the list to take inspection thereof and to make extracts therefrom.
76 provides for a public notice of time fixed for lodging objections to such assessment list and the hearing of such objections.
Sub sec.
4 of sec.
76 provides for the authentication of the list.
Sub section 6 lays down that subject to such alterations as may be made therein under sec.
77 and to the result of any appeal or revision made under sec.
190 in the case of City Municipality and.
under sec.
90 in the case of other municipalities, the entries in the assessment list so authenticated shall be accepted as conclusive evidence for the purposes of all municipal taxes of the valuation or annual letting value of buildings.
and lands to which such entries respectively refer and for the purposes of the tax for which such assessment list has been prepared of the amount of tax leviable on such buildings or lands "in any official year in which such list is in force.
" Sec.
79(1) provides that it would not be necessary for a Municipality to prepare a new assessment list for every year.
It further provides that subject to the condition that such assessment list shall be completely revised not less than once in every 4 years the Municipality may adopt the valuation and assessment contained in the list for any year with such alterations as may be necessary for the year immediately following.
But sub section 2 lays down that the provisions of section 75 and section 76 shall be applicable every year as if a new assessment list has been completed at the commencement of the official year.
These provisions show that though by sec.
2 the new Act repealed the Indore City Municipal Act, 1909 along with other Acts, the legislature by sec.
2(c) saved certain things done under the repealed Acts, viz., rules bye laws, orders, notifications and notices, taxes and rates made, framed, passed, or imposed or deemed to have been made, framed, passed or imposed under the repealed Acts and added a fiction that so far as they are not inconsistent with the new Act they shall be deemed as if they were made, framed, passed or imposed as the case may be under this Act.
We are informed by Counsel that under the rules made under the repealed Indore City Municipal Act, 1909 the Municipality had imposed the tax on houses at the rate of 7% of their gross annual letting value, that an assessment list on that basis was prepared for the year 1952 53 and that the Municipality has been levying tax at the said rate on the basis of the said assessment list for the two subsequent years.
129 Counsel for the appellant Corporation argued that the Corporation was entitled to levy the house tax at the rate of 7% of the gross annual letting value and that it was not bound to deduct the 10% allowance provided by sec.
73(2) from such gross annual letting value.
The argument was, firstly, that the appellant Corporation could do so because the rules made under the Indore Act are saved by sec.
2(c) and therefore the rate of 7% of the gross annual letting value at which the tax was levied also has been saved and secondly, that under sec.
79(1) of the 1954 Act the Corporation need not prepare a fresh assessment list every year, that it has to prepare a fresh assessment list only once in every 4 years, that the Corporation therefore can and in fact has adopted the said list for the two years in question and that being so, the list so adopted was.
in force during the years in question and has to be accepted under section 76(6) as conclusive evidence of the annual letting value as also for the amount of tax leviable on the buildings or lands or both.
He contended that being ' the position the respondents were debarred from objecting to the annual letting value and the quantum of tax based on it as entered against the respondents ' properties in the said assessment list.
We are not impressed with these contentions as in our view they are not warranted on the true construction of the provisions of the Act.
The Indore Municipal Act being no longer in force as from January 26, 1954, obviously no tax could be levied or imposed thereunder after that date.
The rules made and the taxes imposed under the repealed Act are no doubt amongst other things saved and are deemed to have been made, framed, passed or imposed under the new Act but cl.
(c) of sec.
2, it must not be forgotten, lays down an important qualification that they are to be deemed to have been made, or imposed etc., under the new Act to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of the Act.
73 read with sec.
69 provides that a tax on houses or buildings shall be levied on the annual letting value and that in assessing such tax a sum equal to 10% of such letting value shall be deducted therefrom.
The tax levied under the old Act and the rules framed thereunder on the basis of the gross annual letting value is obviously inconsistent with the provisions of section 73 of the Act.
The saving and the deeming provisions in section 2(c) can only apply if the tax is assessed in the manner consistent with the provisions of section 73, that is, if it is assessed on the net and not the gross annual letting value after deducting 10% statutory allowance in lieu of the costs of repairs or any other account whatsoever.
If the construction of sec.
2(c) as suggested by Counsel were to.be accepted it would render sec.
73 (2) nugatory, for, the Municipal Corporation in that case can go on imposing the tax on the basis of the gross annual letting value for ever despite the express provision for levying tax on the basis of net annual 130 letting value, i.e., the value arrived at after deducting 10% of the gross annual letting value.
The second part of the contention is equally unacceptable because, if accepted, it will be contrary to the provisions of sections 75,76 and 79 of the Act.
After going through the procedure laid down in sections 70, 71 and 72 sec.
enjoins upon the Chief Executive Officer to have an assessment list made containing inter alia valuation or annual letting value at which the property is assessed and the amount of tax assessed on the basis of such valuation or annual letting value.
Under sections 75 and 76 when the assessment list is prepared in accordance with the provisions of sec.
73 it has to be published and time has to be fixed for lodging objections against the entries therein.
After such objections are heard and disposed of the assessment list has to be authenticated as provided by sec.
76(6).
Sub sec.
6 of sec.
76 lays down that such assessment list when authenticated becomes conclusive evidence for purposes of all taxes.
of the valuation or annual letting value and of the amount of tax leviable on such buildings or lands or both in any official year in which such list is in force.
The Municipal tax is an annual tax leviable for a particular official year and the assessment list on the basis of which the tax is assessed is for each such official year.
This is supported by the words "such assessment list" and "of the amount of tax leviable in any official year in which such list is in force" in sec.
76(6).
Ordinarily therefore the Municipal Corporation has to prepare a fresh assessment list every year.
The legislature however has empowered by sec.
79, as other State legislatures have similarly done in several Municipal Acts, to adopt the valuation and assessment contained in the assessment list prepared in an earlier year provided, however, that it prepares a fresh list once:in every 4 years.
But sub sec.
2 of sec.
79 provides expressly that when such a previous list is adopted for a particular official year it can be done subject to the provisions of sections 75 and 76.
In other words, an assessment list being for a particular official year even when an assessment list prepared in an earlier year is adopted it becomes the list for such subsequent year subject to the procedure laid down in secs.
75 and 76.
The list so adopted has therefore to be published, has to invite objections and has to be authenticated in the manner prescribed by sec.
76 (6) after disposing of the objections if any and it is then only that it becomes conclusive evidence of the valuation and the tax assessed thereon for that particular official year.
If it were otherwise, the annual letting value or the value estimated on a particular building or house would be static for 4 years during which the Corporation can go on adopting the assessment list prepared in an earlier year and the owner or the occupier of the building would 131 be deprived of the right to object to the valuation or the annual letting value or the tax assessed thereon for at least 4 years even though the valuation or the annual letting value thereof may have decreased for one reason or the other.
In order to prevent such a result the legislature has provided by sub section 2 of sec.
79 that where a municipality adopts a previously prepared list for any subsequent year the provisions of sections 75 and 76 shall be applicable as if a new assessment list has been completed at the commencement of that particular official year.
The word, "if" appearing in sub sec. 2 of sec.
79 is obviously a mistake and must be read as "as if" because the word "if" standing by itself makes no sense at all.
79 therefore has to be construed to mean that though a Municipality need not prepare a fresh assessment list every year and need prepare such list once in every 4 years and can adopt an earlier assessment list such an adopted list becomes the assessment list for that particular year as if it was a new list and 'to which sections 75 and 76 apply.
The result of the foregoing discussion is that the appellant Corporation was entitled to adopt the assessment list prepared for the year 1952 53 for the two assessment years, 1953 54 and 1954 55, under sec.
79 and therefore that list became the assessment list for each of the 2 years in question.
That fact however does not entitle the appellant Corporation to impose the house tax on the basis of the gross annual letting value as such imposition is inconsistent with sec.
73 under which the annual letting value would be the gross annual letting value less 10% statutory allowance.
But the contention was that the tax imposed on the basis of ' the gross annual letting value was saved by sec.
2(c) and that saving coupled with the fact that the assessment list prepared for 1952 53 was adopted for the years in question made the entries in the assessment list so adopted conclusive evidence of the annual letting value and the amount of tax assessed thereon and entitled the Corporation to collect the tax assessed on the gross annual letting value.
Therefore, it ' was argued, both the annual letting value and the amount of tax shown in that list were conclusive evidence and could not be assailed.
Counsel however forgets that even on the footing that the resolution passed by the Indore Municipality to levy the tax at 7% of the gross annual letting value and on the strength of which the list for 1952 53 was prepared was saved and was deemed to have been made under the 1954 Act it can be deemed to have been so made in so far as it is consistent with the provisions of the Act.
Therefore, to the extent that it is inconsistent with sec.
73 it is neither saved nor deemed to have been made under the Act and has to be adjusted in the light of the provisions of sec.
73(2).
It follows that the appellant Corporation was not entitled to demand the tax assessed 132 on the gross annual letting value.
The High Court therefore was right in decreeing the suit and to order refund of the.
said excess amount against the appellant Corporation.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
The costs of this appeal as also those in the next appeal No. 383 of 1965 are to be taxed on the footing of one hearing fee.
G.C. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The Madhya Bharat Municipalities Act 1954 came into force January 26, 1954.
The Indore City Municipal Act, 1909 which had till then governed the Indore Municipality was thereby repealed.
Under the repealed Act the Indore Municipality used to levy and collect house tax at the rate of 7% of the gross annual letting value.
Under section 73(2) of the 1954 Act house tax was to be assessed on the basis of the gross annual letting value less 10% statutory allowance for repairs etc.
However, even for the period after the passing of the new Act, the Municipal Corporation, purporting to act under section 79 '(1) of the 1954 Act.
adopted ,the latest assessment list prepared under the old Act and levied house tax at the old rate of 7% of the gross.
annual letting value.
The respondents who were trustees of certain house property filed a suit challenging the levy on the basis of the gross annual letting value when section 73(2) of the 1954 Act required the tax to be assessed on the net value after deduction of the statutory allowance.
The suit was decreed by the 'Trial Court and the appeals filed by the Corporation before the District judge and the High Court were dismissed.
The Corporation by special leave, came to this Court and urged: (i) that the levy at 7% of the gross annual letting value prescribed under the rules of the Indore Act was saved by section 2(c) of the 1954 Act; (ii) that under section 79(1) the Corporation was required to prepare a fresh assessment list only once in four years, that it was therefore entitled to adopt for the years in question the latest assessment list prepared under the old Act.
and the said assessment list having been so adopted was conclusive evidence as to the annual rental value of houses and the house tax imposed thereon.
HELD: (i) While section 2(c) saves the rules and taxes.
imposed under the old Act it saves them only to the extent that they are consistent with the new Act.
The saving and deeming provisions of section 2(c) can only apply if the tax is assessed in the manner consistent with the provisions of section 73, that is, if it is assessed on the net and not the gross annual letting value after deducting 10% statutory allowance.
The Corporation could not be allowed to go on imposing the tax on the basis of the gross annual letting value for ever despite the express provision in section 73.
The tax imposed by the Corporation at the rate of 7% of the gross annual letting value was not therefore saved by section 2(c).
[129E H] (ii) Ordinarily the Municipal Corporation has to prepare a fresh assessment list every year.
The legislature has however by section 79(1) empowered the Corporation to adopt the valuation and assessment contained in the assessment list prepared in an earlier year provided, however, that it prepares a fresh list once in every 4 years.
But sub section
(2) 126 of section 79 provides expressly that when such a previous list is adopted for a particular official year it can be done subject to the provisions sections 75 and 76.
The list so adopted has therefore to be published, has to invite objections and has to be authenticated in the manner prescribed by section 76(6) after disposing of the objections if any and it is then only that it becomes conclusive evidence of the valuation and the tax assessed thereon for that particular official year.
If it were otherwise a house owner would have no opportunity to object to the assessment for four years even though the value of his house may have decreased for some reason or the other.
Section 79 has therefore to be construed to mean that though a Municipality need not prepare a fresh assessment list every year and need prepare such list once in every 4 ),ears and can adopt an earlier assessment list such an adopted list becomes the assessment list for that particular year as if it was a new list and to which sections 75 and 76 apply.
[130E 131C] Accordingly, the Corporation was entitled to adopt for the official years in question the latest list prepared under the old Act, and under section 79 that list would become the assessment list for the said years provided that the provisions of sections 75 and 76 are followed.
Even then the appellant Corporation would not be.
entitled to impose house tax on the basis of the gross annual letting value as such imposition would be inconsistent with section 73 under which the annual letting value would be the gross annual letting value less 10% statutory allowance.
[131D] Even on the footing that the resolution passed by the Indore Municipality to levy the tax at 7% of the gross annual letting value and on the basis of which the last list under the ,old Act was prepared was saved and was deemed to have been made under the 1954 Act it could be deemed to have been so made in so far as it was consistent with the provisions of the Act.
Therefore to the extent that it was inconsistent with section 73 it was neither saved nor deemed to have been made under the Act and had to be adjusted in the light of the provisions of section 73(2).
[131G H]


judgement:
ion No. 1 of 1967.
Election Petition under Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Act, 1952.
R.V.S. Mani, for the petitioners.
M.C. Setalvad, J.M. Mukhi and A.S. Nambiar, for respondent No. 1.
E. Udayaratnam, for respondent No. 6.
Janardan Sharma, for respondent NO. 10.
O.P. Varma, for respondent No. 12.
C.C. Patel and M.V. Goswami, for respondent No. 14.
Bhimsena Rao and R.A. Gupta, for respondent No. 17.
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney General, R.H. Dhebar and S.P. Nayar, for Election Petition of India and Returning Officer.
Presidential Election, New Delhi.
C.K. Daphtary, Attorney General, N.S. Bindra and R.H. Dhebar, for Attorney General for India.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, C.J.
The presidential election in India was held in May 1967.
In that election, 17 candidates were nominated.
The result of the election was declared on May 9, 1967, and Dr. Zakir Husain was declared elected.
The present petition is against 137 The election of Dr. Zakir Husain as President and has been filed under article 71 of the Constitution read with the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Act, No. 31, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by 13 members of Parliament.
The attack on he validity of the election of Dr. Zakir Husain has been made on two grounds.
The first ground is that no oath was taken by Dr. zakir Husain before his nomination as required by article 84 read with article 58 of the Constitution.
In consequence he was not eligible for election as President and his election is liable to be set aside.
Curiously enough, however, the petitioners pray for a declaration that Sri Subba Rao, who received the second highest number of votes should be declared elected, though he (like Dr. Zakir Husain) also did not take the oath before his nomination.
The second ground on which the election of Dr. Zakir Husain s challenged is that the result of the election has been materially affected by reason of undue influence, thereat and in this connection reliance is placed on four matters to which reference will be made later.
The petition has been opposed on behalf of Dr. Zakir Husain.
It has been urged in reply that no oath was necessary under article 84 read with article 58 of the Constitution, and as such he was eligible to stand.
It has also been said on behalf of Dr. Zakir Husain that in case his nomination is invalid on that ground, Sri Subba Rao 's nomination is equally invalid as he also did not take the oath.
As to undue influence it is urged that no undue influence was exercised, nor was the result of the election materially affected by any exercise of undue influence.
Of the four matters urged in support of the attack on the ground of undue influence, the truth of one of them was not accepted.
But it is urged in the alternative that even accepting all that has been said by the petitioners in support of their case of undue influence, the allegations made by the petitioners do not in law amount to.
undue influence and therefore there could be no question of the result of the election being materially affected by the exercise of any undue influence.
On the pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed : 1.
Whether the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondents Nos. 1 to 17 by the Returning Officer was illegal and contrary to law for the reason that Respondents Nos. 1 to 17 did not subscribe to the oath required under Article 84(a) of the Constitution read with Article 58(1)(c) thereof; 2.
Whether the result of the election has been materially affected; L10Sup.(CI)/168 10 138 3.
Whether the acts and conduct alleged in para 12 of the petition and set out under heads A, B, C and D thereof amount to undue influence within the meaning of section 18(1)(b) of the Act.
Whether the allegations made under heads A, B, C and D in para 12 of the petition in so far as they are not admitted arc true; 5.
Whether the petition is entitled to any relief, and if so, to what relief.
It will be seen that issues Nos. 1 and 3 raise pure questions of law.
We made it clear to learned counsel that we would try this petition in two parts.
We shall first deal with the two issues of law, and then, if necessary, set the petition down for further hearing on evidence.
We also indicated that if issue No. 1 is decided in favour of the petitioners, the election would have to be set aside and then there would be no question of any further hearing on evidence.
We further indicated that if issue No. 3 is decided in favour of 1he petitioners, the petition would have to be set down for further hearing on evidence on matters of fact which were in dispute.
Lastly, we indicated that if both these issues were decided against the petitioners, the petition would fail and it would not be necessary then to set it down for further hearing on evidence.
We propose now to consider the two issues of law.
Issue No. 1.
In order to decide this issue, we have to see what the Constitution provided, before the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act).
This Act was passed on October 5.
Before that amendment article 58 (1) with which we are concerned in the present petition was in these terms : "(1) No person shall be eligible for election as President ', unless he (a) is a citizen of India, (b) has completed the age of thirty five years, and (c) is qualified for election as a member of the House of the People.
" Article 84, which is also relevant read thus "A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless he (a) is a citizen of India; (b) is, in/he case of d seat in the Council of States, not less than thirty years of age and, in the ease 139 of the House of the People, not less than twenty five years of age; (c) possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament.
" The Representation of the People Act, No. 43 of 1951 provided some qualifications for membership of the House of the People, by section 4.
Besides that article 102 of the Constitution provided for certain disqualifications for membership of either House of Parliament and thus indirectly provided for qualifications necessary for being a member of either House of Parliament, and these were (1) that the person should not hold any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holders; (2) the person should not be of unsound mind and should not have been so declared by a competent court; (3) the person should not be an undischarged insolvent; (4) the person should not have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or be under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State; and (5) the person should not be disqualified by or trader any law made by Parliament.
A perusal of these provisions show that there was no requirement of taking an oath at the time of nomination by the presidential candidate in article 58.
Nor was there any requirement of taking any oath at the time of nomination by a candidate for election to the House of the People under article 84.
There were however provisions in the Constitution for taking an oath after election.
The oath of the President and its form was provided in article 60 while the oath for a member of the House of the People after 'election was provided in Schedule III to the Constitution.
which a member of Parliament had to take before taking his scat in the House of the People or the Council of States, as the case may be.
It is not disputed on behalf of the petitioners that this was the undoubted position in law before the Amendment Act.
Then came the Amendment Act, which came into force from October 5, 1963.
By that amendment, no change was made in article 58.
which stood as it was: a change was however made in Cl.
(a) of article 84, which after the Amendment Act read thus: "84.
Qualification for membership of Parliament A person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in Parliament unless he (a) is a citizen of India, and makes and subscribes before some person authorised in that behalf by the Elec 140 tion Commission an oath or affirmation according to the form set out for the purposes in the Third Schedule;" The Third Schedule was also amended and provided the following form of oath to be taken by a member of Parliament who stands for election to Parliament, namely "I, A. B, having been nominated as a candidate to fill a seat in the Council of States do House of the People swear in the name of God that I will bear true solemnly affirm faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established and that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
" At the same time amendment was made in the form of oath to be taken after election, the change being that the words "I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India" were added to the already existing oath to be taken by a member of Parliament after his election before he took his seat in the House of the People or the Council of States.
The contention on behalf of the petitioners is that because of this change in cl.
(a) of article 84 by which it became necessary to take.
oath for a person standing for election to either House of Parliament in the form prescribed in the Third SChedule, a person standing for election as President had also to take a similar oath because article 58(1)(c) requires that a person to be eligible for election as President must be qualified for election as a member of the House of the People.
It is urged that no one is qualified, after the amendment of cl.
(a) of article 84, for election as a member of the House of the People unless he makes and subscribes an oath in the form set out for the purpose in the Third Schedule, and therefore this provision applied to a person standing for election as President, for without such oath he would not be qualified to stand for election to the House of the People.
The argument looks attractive prima facie but must in our opinion be rejected.
The qualifications for eligibility to stand for election as President are to be found in article 58(1).
The main reliance on behalf of the petitioners is placed on cl.
(c) of article 58 (1), which lays down that a candidate standing for election as President has to be qualified for election as member of the House of the People.
A comparison however of article 58 with article 84 as it stood before amendment shows that el.
(a) of article corresponded to cl.
(a) of article 58(1), as both provided that the respective candidates should be citizens of India.
It was therefore not necessary to go to cI. (a) of article 84 for the purpose of finding out whether a person was eligible for election as President for 141 the purpose of citizenship for that part of cl.
(a) of article 84 was specifically provided for in cl.
(a) of article 58 (i).
Similarly, cl.
(b) of article 84 corresponded to cl.
(b) of article 58(1), with this difference that it provided a special qualification as to age and therefore one would not have to go to cl.
(b) of article 84 for the purpose of finding out the qualification as to age Cl.
(c) of article 38 (1) clearly corresponded to cl.
(c) of article 84 and reading them together it would follow that a person standing for election as President would require such qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament.
Further as cl.
(c) of article 58(1) lays down that a person standing for presidential election has to be qualified for membership of the House of the People, article 102 (which lays down disqualifications for members of Parliament) would also be attracted except in so far as there is a special provision contained in article 58(2).
Thus cl.
(c) of article 58(1) would bring in such qualifications for members of the House of the People as may be prescribed by law by Parliament, as required by article 84(c).
It will by its own force bring in article 102 of the Constitution, for that Article lays down certain disqualifications which a presidential candidate must not have for he has to be eligible for election as a member of the House of the People.
But it is clear to us that, what is provided in clause (a) and (b) of article 58(1) must be taken from there and we need not travel to cls.
(a) and (b) of article 84 in the matter of citizenship and of age of the presidential candidate.
Clauses (a) and (b) of article 58(1) having made a specific provision in that behalf in our opinion exclude cls.
(a) and (b) of article 84.
This exclusion was there before the Amendment Act and we are of opinion that there is nothing in the Amendment Act which makes.
any difference to that position.
The Sixteenth Amendment was introduced on the recommendation of the Committee on National Integration and Regionalism, which was greatly concerned over the preservation and maintenance of the integrity and sovereignty of the Union.
It therefore recommended that every candidate for the membership of a State legislature or Parliament, should pledge himself to uphold the Constitution and to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the Union and for that forms of oath in the Third Schedule to the Constitution should be suitably amended.
It also recommended that every candidate for the membership of Parliament or State Legislature, Union and State Ministers, Members of Parliament and State Legislatures, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India should take oath to.
uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
In consequence of these recommendations, the sixteenth amendment was made and article 84 (a) as well as article 173 which provides for qualifications for membership of State legislature were suitably 142 amended.
Further two new forms were added in the Third Schedule, one relating to oath to be taken by candidates for elector to Parliament and the other relating to oath to be taken by candidates for election to State legislatures.
Further other forms of oath in the Third Schedule were also amended by adding therein the words "I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
" Now if the intention of Parliament was that an oath similar in form to the oath to be taken by persons standing for election 10 Parliament had to be taken by persons standing for election to the office of the President there is no reason why a similar amendment was not made in article 58(1)(a).
Further if the intention of Parliament was that a presidential candidate should also take an oath before standing for election, the form of oath should also have been prescribed either in the Third Schedule or by amendment of article 60, which provides for oath by a person elected as President before he takes his office.
But we find that no change was made either in article 58(1)(a) or in article 60 or in the Third Schedule prescribing the form of oath to be taken by the presidential candidate before he could stand for election.
This to our mind is the clearest indication that Parliament did not intend, when making the Amendment Act, that an oath similar to the oath taken by a candidate standing for election to Parliament had to be taken by a candidate standing for election to the office of the President.
So there is no reason to import the provision of article 84(a) as it stood after the Amendment Act into article 58(1)(a), which stood unamended.
That is one reason why we are of opinion that so far as the election to the office of the President is concerned, the candidate standing for the same has not to take any oath before becoming eligible for election as President.
Another reason which leads to the same conclusion is this.
We have already indicated that no change was made in article 60 by introducing the form of oath 'to be taken by a person standing for election as President; nor was there any change made m the Third Schedule by the introduction of a form of oath to be taken by a person standing for election as President.
In the absence of such a form, we fail to see how an oath would be necessary before a person could stand for election.
as President.
It is not as if a person standing for election as a member of Parliament can take any oath that he likes or that may be administered to him.
The particular oath which a person standing for election as a member of Parliament has to take has been prescribed in the Third Schedule to the Constitution, and it is only that oath which such a person has to take.
However no form of oath is prescribed for a person standing for election as President anywhere in the Constitution and in the absence of such form, it is impossible to hold that taking of oath before standing for election as President is a 143 necessary ingredient of eligibility for such election.
Further a comparison of the form of oath under article 60 for the President with form III B of the Third Schedule which prescribes the oath for a member of Parliament before he takes his seat shows that even after election the President is not required to swear that he will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
The oath he takes is to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and that he will devote himself to the service and well being of the people of India.
Clearly therefore the form of oath introduced by the sixteenth amendment for persons standing for election to Parliament and even after election was not considered suitable for a person standing for election as President or elected as President and that is why we find no form prescribed by Parliament.
It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that, though no form of oath may be prescribed it was open to the Election Commission to prescribe an oath by making changes mutatis mutandis in form III A of the Third Schedule relating to candidates for election to Parliament, and that it was the duty of the Election Commission to appoint somebody to administer the oath in the form to be evolved by him by changing form III A in the Third Schedule mutatis mutandis.
Reliance in this connection has been placed on article 324 of the Constitution.
We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention.
Article 324 inter alia provides for "the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and Vice President".
These words do not in our opinion give any power to the Election Commission to introduce a form of oath to be taken by a candidate for election whether it be for election as President or as a member of Parliament or of a State legislature.
If an oath has to be taken by any.such person it has to be provided by law and the form thereof has also to be prescribed by law (we are using the word "law" in its broadest sense, including constitutional provisions) and that is what was done by the Sixteenth Amendment so far as election to Parliament and State legislatures was concerned.
But as already observed, Parliament did not think it fit when it brought in the Amendment Act to make any change in article 58 (1) (a) or to introduce a form in article 60 or in, the Third Schedule to the Constitution with reference to candidates standing for election as President.
If Parliament did not choose to do so, the Election,Commission cannot do so under the power it has been given under article 324 to superintendent, direct and control the preparation of the electoral rolls and the conduct of all elections.
That power is very different from the power to prescribe, an oath before a candidate can stand for election.
Such prescription can only be by law as indicated above.
The Amendment Act having not made any such provision with 144 respect to those standing for election to the office of the President, it cannot be open to the Election Commission to prescribe a form of oath for such persons by changing form III A mutatis mutandis.
Such power cannot be spelt out of article 324 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioners.
It follows therefore that no form whatsoever having been prescribed by Parliament when it made the sixteenth amendment for taking an oath by a presidential candidate, article 84 (a) when it prescribed for taking an oath for candidates for election to the.
House of the People has no application to candidates standing for election to Presidentship.
So far as these candidates are concerned we must look to article 58 (1) (a) only and need not go to article 84(a).
Another reason for coming to the same conclusion is that when article 58 (1) (c) lays down that a person standing for election as President has to be qualified for election as a member of the House of the People it only brings in qualifications other than those= which are specifically mentioned in article 58 (1) itself.
Now specific qualifications provided in article 58 (1) are that a candidate for presidential election has to be a citizen of India and he must have completed the age of 35 years.
So far as these qualifications are concerned, we need not go anywhere else in order to search for eligibility to contest election as President.
For example, the specific qualification in cl.
(b) of article 58.(1) is that the person concerned should have completed the age of 35 years.
On the other Hand, el.
(b) of article 84 lays down the age of 25 years for membership of the House of the People.
Therefore when one has to look for the qualification of age one must only go to article 58 (1) (b) for the purpose of presidential election and need not look elsewhere.
What is specifically provided for by article 58 (1) must be accepted as it stands and no addition can be made to that provision and no subtraction can be made therefrom.
It will be seen therefore that though there may be some qualifications which may be necessary for election to the House of the People, they need not necessarily apply to the election for the office of the President, where there is a specific provision in article 58 (1) itself.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that in view of the specific provision in article 58 (a) and (b) we cannot and should not apply clauses (a) and (b) of article 84, to persons standing for election as President.
This conclusion is reinforced if we look at article 58 (2) and compare it with article 102 (1) (a).
It is clear that when there is a specific provision with respect to an office of profit in article 58 (2); it is that provision which will apply and not article 102 (1) (a).
We therefore hold that the acceptance of the nomination papers of respondents 1 to 17 by the Returning Officer was neither illegal nor contrary to law on the ground that these respondents did not subscribe to an oath under article 84 (a) read with article 58(1)(c).
The issue is decided against the petitioners.
145 ISSUE No. 3.
The petitioners rely on four allegations on the question of undue influence.
Before we deal with those allegations it is necessary to understand what undue influence is in the context of the Act.
Section 18 (1 ) (b) lays down that if the result of the election has been materially affected by reason of undue influence at the election committed by any person other than the returned candidate or a person acting in connivance with the returned candidate, the election will be liable to be declared void.
Sub section (2) of section 18 lays down that undue influence would have the same meaning as in Chapter IX A of the Indian Penal Code.
Section 171 C of the Indian Penal Code defines what "undue influence" is in these terms : "(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub section (1), whoever (a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with injury of any kind, or (b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub section (1).
(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this section.
" It will be seen from the above definition that the gist of undue influence at an election consists in voluntary interference or attempt at interference with the free exercise of any electoral right.
Any voluntary action which interferes with or attempts to interfere with such free exercise of electoral right would amount to undue influence.
But even though the definition in sub section
(1) of section 171 C is wide in terms it cannot take in mere canvassing in favour of a candidate at an election.
If that were so, it would be impossible to run democratic elections.
Further sub section
(2)ors.
171 C shows what the nature of undue influence is though of course it does not cut down the generality of the provisions contained in sub section (1).
Where any threat is.
held out to any candidate or voter or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested and 146 the threat is of injury of any kind, that would amount to voluntary interference or attempt at interference with the free exercise of electoral right and would be undue influence.
Again where a person induces or attempts to induce a candidate, or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, that would also amount to voluntary interference with the free exercise of the electoral right and would be undue influence.
What is contained in sub section
(2) of section 1771 C is merely illustrative.
It is difficult to lay down in general terms where mere canvassing ends and interference or attempt at interference with the free exercise of any electoral right begins.
That is a matter to be determined in each case; but there can be No. doubt that if what is done is merely canvassing: it would not be undue influence.
As sub section (3) of section 171 C shows, the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right would not be undue influence.
We may in this connection refer to section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 which also defines "undue influence".
The definition there is more or less in the same language as in section 171 C of the Indian Penal Code except that the words "direct or indirect" have been added to indicate the nature of interference.
It will be seen that if anything, the definition of "undue influence" in the Representation of the People Act may be wider.
It will therefore be useful to refer to cases under the election law to see how election tribunals have looked at the matter while considering the scope of the words "undue influence".
The earliest case to which reference may be made is R.B. Surendra Narayan Sinha vs Amulyadhone Roy & 43 Others.(1) There the question raised before the Election Tribunal was whether by issuing a whip on the day of election requesting members to cast their preferences in a particular order, the leader of a Party, who was also the Chief Minister, could be said to have exercised undue influence.
The Election Tribunal held that the leader the party was entitled to use his influence as a leader and he could not be deprived of that right because he happened to.
be a minister.
The issue of a whip of that kind was thus held to be no more than canvassing in.
favour of the candidates of the party to which the leader or the Chief Minister belonged.
In Linge Gowda vs Shivananjappa(2), the Election Tribunal held that a leader of a political party was entitled to declare to the public the policy of the party and ask the electorate to vote for his party without interfering with any electoral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undue influence under (1) 1940 Indian Election Cases by Sen and Poddar, Case No. XXX at p. 188.
(2) (1953) VI E.L.R. 288.
147 the Representation of the People Act.
The fact of that such a leader happened to be a Minister or Chief Minister of the State would make no difference.
It was further observed in that case that "the law cannot strike at the root of due influence and under the law of election, only undue influence is forbidden, and the leaders of ' a party will be deemed to exercise their due influence if they ask the electorate to vote for their party candidate, even if they happen to be Ministers." In Amirchand vs Surendra Lal Jha(1) it was held by the Election Tribunal that Ministers were prominent members.
of their party and in that capacity they were entitled to address meetings and to tell people what their party had done, and what its programme was and to ask them to vote for the candidate set up by their party, and such action of the Ministers could not be held amount to exercising undue influence.
It merely amounted to canvassing by the Ministers in favour of candidates belonging to their party.
In Mast Ram vs
section Iqbal Singh(2) it was held by the Election Tribunal that the legitimate exercise of influence by a political party or an association should not be confused with "undUe influence".
It was further held that "Ministers in their capacity as members of their party are entitled to address meetings and to tell people what their party had done and what its.
programme was and to ask them to vote for the candidate set up by their party.
Such action of the Ministers cannot be held to amount to 'exercising undue influence ' ".
It was further held ' that "if ' a political ' party passes a resolution of support to a candidate and asks its members to vote for him, it will be only a legitimate exercise of influence".
In Radhakrishna Shukla vs Tara Chand Maheshwar.(3) the Election Tribunal held that even where Ministers conducting an electioneering campaign promised people, who put their grievances before them during the campaign, generally to redress their grievances, it could not be held that there was exercise of undue influence and their promise merely amounted to a promise of public action, which would not be for the benefit of merely those who voted for candidates of their party but for the public as a whole.
The next case to which reference may be made is N. Sankara Reddi vs Yashoda Reddi(4).
In that case the Election Tribunal held that "a political party is entitled to issue a manifesto to the ' voters requesting them to vote only for the candidate, set up by the party.
The fact that the leader of the Congress Legislature Party who was also the Chief Minister of the State had written (1)(1954) X E L R 57.
(2) (1955) XII E.L.R.34 (3)(1956) XII E.L.R. 378.
(4) (1957) XIII E.L.R. 34.
148 letters to the members of the Congress Party to support the candidates set up by the party would not amount to undue influence within section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act.
" It was added that it was only where a Minister abused his position for furthering the prospects of the candidate belonging to his party that undue influence might arise; but where a leader merely used his influence in the form of canvassing for candidates of his party there would be no question of undue influence.
In Dr. Y.S. Parmar vs Hira Singh Pal(1), the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh held that "a leader of a political party is entitled to.
declare to the public the policy of the party, and ask the electorate to vote for his party without interfering with any electoral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undue influence under section 123(2) of the Representation.
of the People Act.
" In Triloki Singh vs Shivrajwati Nehru(2) it was held by the Election Tribunal that "the right to canvass must be conceded to Ministers as leaders of a political party Just as they have a right to vote and to stand as a candidate, they also have a right to canvass for themselves and for the other candidates set up by their party.
" It was further held that though a Minister occupied a high position and commanded great influence, if he only solicited votes and tried to persuade the electors to vote for a candidate of his party and asked them not to vote for any other candidate or to remain neutral and did nothing more, he could not be said to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of the voters.
The last case to which reference may be made is Jayalakshmi Devamma vs Janardhan Reddi(3).
In that case the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that in a democratic set up where candidates contested elections on the basis of their affiliation to a particular political party, there was nothing intrinsically wrong in Ministers canvassing support for their party candidates.
It was further held that a Minister merely by reason of his office did not suffer from any disability in this behalf and had the same rights and obligations as any other citizen in the matter of canvassing.
It was also held that in their capacity as leaders of their party.
they had to explain to the electors the policies and programmes which they sought to enforce and one way of doing that was to ask the electors to vote for those who were pledged to support them and their policies.
It will be seen from the above review of the cases relating to undue influence that it has been consistently held in this country that it is open to Ministers to canvass for candidates of their party (1) (1958) 16 E.L.R.4 (2) (1958) XVI.E.L.R 234.
(3) (1959) XVII E.L.R. 302. 149 standing for election.
Such canvassing does not amount to undue influence but is proper use of the Minister 's right to ask the public to support candidates belonging to the Minister 's party.
It is only where a Minister abuses.
his position as such and goes beyond merely asking for support for candidates belonging to his party that a question of undue influence may arise.
But so long as the Minister only asks the electors to vote for a particular candidate belonging to his party and puts forward before the public the merits of his candidate it cannot be said that by merely making such request to the electorate the Minister.
exercises undue influence.
The fact that the Minister 's request was addressed in the form of what *is called a whip, is also.
immaterial so long as it is clear that there ' is no compulsion on the electorate to vote in the manner indicated.
It is in the light of these principles that we have to see whether the four allegations made in this case, assuming them to be correct, make out a case of undue influence.
The first allegation is that Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, addressed a letter to all the electors in which she commended Dr. Zakir Husain and requested the electors to vote for him.
A copy of that letter has been produced, and we have been taken through it.
In our opinion there is nothing in that letter which may even remotely amount to undue influence.
Most of the letter is concerned with commending the qualities of Dr. Zakir Husain and it ends by saying that Dr, Zakir Husain 's long and meritorious service in the cause of national freedom and national re construction after Independence makes him a candidate richly deserving universal support.
It has been urged that the Prime Minister is a person of great influence and therefore Shrimati Indira Gandhi should not have written this letter because she was Prime Minister and the mere fact that she wrote this letter commending Dr. Zakir Husain 's election amounted to undue influence i.e. interference with the free exercise of the electoral right.
We can not agree with this contention.
Shrimati Indira Gandhi is certainly the Prime Minister, but she is also one of the leaders of the party to which Dr. Zakir Husain belonged.
As a leader of party she was entitled to ask the electors to vote for Dr. Zakir Husain and the fact that she is the Prime Minister makes no difference to her right to make an appeal of this nature.
It is said that the office of the President is a no party office and therefore an appeal of this nature should not have been made and must amount to undue influence.
It is true that the office of the President is not a party office meaning thereby that after his election the President is no longer a party man.
But that cannot take away the fact that in a democratic system, like ours, persons who stand for election are candidates sponsored by parties for without such support no one would have a chance of being elected, for the.
electors are mostly members of one party or other.
We have given 150 our earnest consideration to the letter written by Shrimati Indira Gandhi and have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in that letter which can be said to be improper or which can even remotely amount to interference with the free exercise of the electoral rights.
It cannot therefore be said that Shrimati Indira Gandhi even though she is the Prime Minister exercised any undue influence in this presidential election.
The next allegation is based on two letters written by Sri Ram Subhag Singh.
In these letters.
Sri Ram Subhag Singh signed himself as Chief Whip and they were addressed to all members of the Congress Party in Parliament.
The fact that he signed the letters as Chief Whip is in our opinion of no consequence; even if he had not done so all members of the congress party in Parliament must be knowing that he was the Chief Whip.
Just as a Minister has a right to canvass for support so has in our opinion the Chief Whip.
In the first letter he pointed out that the Presidential and Vice Presidential elections were to be held on May. 6, 1967.
He also pointed out that members of Parliament could vote for the presidential election at New Delhi or at State capitals but they had to come to Delhi in connection with the election of the Vice President.
He therefore added that as the two elections were to be held on the same day and voting for the Vice Presidential election could only be at Delhi, every member of the party must be present in Delhi to participate in the elections.
He finally requested the members of his party to reach New Delhi by May 4, 1967 and contact him on reaching.
New Delhi.
This letter merely explains to members of his party the situation with respect to the two elections which were to be held simultaneously and requested the members to come to Delhi, as otherwise they could not vote in the Vice Presidential election.
The fact that he asked the members to contact him after reaching Delhi could only be to know who had come and who had not and cannot give rise inference of undue influence from that fact alone.
In the second letter, Sri Ram Subhag Singh pointed out that the election to the office of the President would be in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote.
He also invited the attention of the members of the Congress Party in Parliament to r. 19 of the Election Rules.
He then went on to say that it was their desire, i.e., of the congress party, that Dr. Zakir Husain should be returned with a thumping majority.
He therefore requested the members to place figure '1 ' opposite the name of Dr. Zakir Husain.
He also advised them not to mark the second or any other preference in favour of any other candidate.
As we read this letter we only find in it a request to members of the party to vote for Dr. Zakir Husain There is nothing in that letter to show that undue influence was being exercised thereby.
The two letters read together merely show 151 that Sri Ram Subhag Singh who happened to be the Chief Whip of the congress party was canvassing in favour of Dr. Zakir Husain.
It is however urged that his advice to the members not to mark their second or any other preference in favour of any other candidate amounted to interference with the free exercise of their electoral right.
We cannot agree with this contention.
Sri Ram Subhag Singh asked the members of his party to give the first preference to Dr. Zakir Husain.
He also asked them not to mark their second or any other preference, and that is a method to ensure that the candidate to whom the first preference is given should be in a strong position in case there is not a majority in the first counting.
In the present election there was apparently a majority in the first counting and therefore the marking of the second or any other preference was immaterial.
Apart from it.
we see nothing improper in members of the party being told in the course of canvassing that it would be better if they only marked their first preference and no other preference in a system where voting is by single transferable vote.
Such a request or advice does not in our opinion interfere with the free exercise of their electoral right for the electors still would be free to do what they desired in spite of the advice.
We cannot agree.
after going through the two letters written by Sri Ram Subhag Singh that there was any interference with the exercise of the electoral right by the electors.
The third allegation is that the Prime Minister had deputed certain senior members of her cabinet to the various States to make doubly certain that Dr. Zakir Husain was elected.
In consequence, Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was sent to Assam, Shri Y. B. Chavan to Bombay, Sri Jagjivan Ram to Bihar, Sri I.K. Gujral to Calcutta and Sri Dinesh Singh to Uttar Pradesh.
It is further urged that sending of the Ministers to various States was to influence the members of the electoral college there to vote for Dr. Zakir Husain or attempt to do so.
Such action it is urged.
would amount to undue influence.
We cannot agree with this contention.
Assuming that these Ministers were asked to go to various States it was obviously to canvass support for Dr. Zakir Husain so that he may be certain to be elected.
Even assuming that these Ministers canvassed support for Dr. Zakir Husain in various State capitals, their action cannot be said to amount to undue influence, for all that they can be said to have done was to canvass support for Dr. Zakir Husain and mere canvassing cannot possibly be; held to be undue influence.
There is nothing 'in the allegation in para 12 C of the petition to show that there was any interference with the free exercise of electoral right by the electors.
even if these Ministers were sent to.
the various State capitals to canvass support for Dr. Zakir Husain ,red did so.
Mere canvassing of support for a candidate can never amount to undue 152 influence, and all that para 12C shows is that there was mere.
canvassing in favour of Dr. Zakir Husain.
No case of undue influence can be made out on the basis of the allegations contained in para 12C of the petition.
The last allegation in support of the case of undue influence is that the Chief Minister of Maharashtra had briefed members of the Legislative Assembly on May 5, 1967 on how to vote and whom to vote for.
It is, urged that even if the leader of the party in the Maharashtra legislature could indicate the manner of voting the members of his party, he could not indicate to them whom they were to vote for, as that interfered with the free exercise of their electoral right.
It is said that such a request amounted to a command from a person in authority, like the Chief Minister, and would be exercise of undue influence.
We are of opinion that there is no substance in this contention either.
There can possibly be no objection if the leader of the party indicates to the members of his party how to vote in order to ensure that votes may not become invalid for want of knowledge of the procedure of voting.
Further if the leader of the party indicates to members of his party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing with his own party men to support the candidate of the party.
The mere fact that the person who, canvasses is a Chief Minister does not mean that he is exercising undue influence in the sense of interfering with the free exercise of the electoral right.
Once canvassing is permissible, and we have no doubt that in a democratic set up where ' parties put up candidates for election it is not only permissible but necessary, it follows that if a leader of the party asks members of his party for whom.
to vote he is merely canvassing.
The voting is after all secret and every elector is free to vote for whomsoever he likes, even though he may have been asked by the leader to vote for a particular candidate.
There is nothing in para 12 (D) of the petition to suggest that anything improper was.
done by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, which could give rise to an inference that t.he free exercise of the electoral right was being interfered with.
On a careful consideration of paragraphs 12(A) to 12(D) of the petition we have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in those paragraphs which even remotely suggests that there was any undue influence exercised by anybody in connection with the Presidential election of May 6, 1967.
Our finding on the issue in question is that the acts.
and conduct alleged in paragraph 12 of the petition and set out in sub paras A to D thereof do not amount to undue influence within the meaning of section 18(1 )(b) of the Act.
The issue is decided against the petitioners.
As we have indicated already if both these issues of law are decided against the petitioners as we do decide them the petition 153 must fail and it is unnecessary to set it down for hearing on evidence with respect to other issues.
The petition is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we pass no order as to costs.
Y.P. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
As a result of the Presidential election held in May, 1967, respondent No. 1 was declared elected.
The petitioners challenged the election on the following two grounds, namely (i) article 58(1)(c) required that a person to be eligible for election as President must be qualified for election as a member of the House of People.
After the Sixteenth Amendment, under article 84(a), it was necessary for a person standing for election to either House of Parliament to take an oath in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule.
Therefore, a person standing for election as President had also to take a similar oath; since the respondent had not taken the oath he was not eligible for election.
(ii) As (a) the Prime Minister addressed a letter to all electors commending respondent No. 1 and requesting them to vote for him; '(b) the, Prime.
Minister deputed Ministers 1 various State Capitals to make doubly certain that respondent No. 1 was elected; (c) a Minister who was also the chief whip of the Congress party wrote two letters to all members of his party in Parliament and signed them as Chief Whip, explaining the situation with respect to the election and requesting them to come to Delhi and contact him and also requesting them to give the first preference to respondent No. 1 and not to mark the second or any other preference in favour of the candidates; and (d) the Chief Minister of Maharashtra had briefed members of the Legislative Assembly as to how and for whom to vote, the result of the election has materially been affected by undue influence.
HELD: The petition must be dismissed.
(i) The candidate standing for election to the office of the President had not to take any oath before becoming eligible for election as President.
A comparison of article 58 with article 84 as it stood before the amendment shows that el.
(a) of article 84, corresponded to el.
(a) of article 58(1), as both provided that the respective candidates should be citizens of India.
It was therefore, not necessary to go to cl.
(a) of article 84 for the purpose of finding out whether a person woks eligible for election as President for the purpose of citizenship for that part of el.
(a) of article 84 was specifically provided for in el.
(a) of article 58(1).
Similarly, el.
(b) of article 84 corresponded to el.
(b) of article 58(1).
with this difference that it provided a special qualification as to age and therefore 134 one would not have to go to cl.
(b) of article 84 for the purpose of finding out the qualification as to age.
Clause (c) of article 58(1) clearly corresponded to el.
(c) of article 84 and reading them together it would follow that a person standing for election as President would require such qualifications as may be prescribed in that behalf by or under any law made by Parliament.
Further as el.
(c) of article 58(1) lays down that a person standing for Presidential election has to be qualified for membership of the House of the People, article 102 (which lays down disqualifications for members of Parliament) would also be attracted except in so far as there is a special provision contained in article 58(2), Thus cI. (c) or article 58(1) would bring in such qualifications for members of the House of the People as may as prescribed by law by Parliament, as required by article 84(c).
It will by its own force bring in article 102 of the Constitution, for that Article lays down certain disqualifications which a presidential candidate must not have for he has to be eligible for election as a member of the House of the People.
But it clear that what is provided in cl.
(a) and (b) of article 58(1) must be taken from there and it is not necessary travel to cls.
(a) and (b) of article 84 in the matter of citizenship and of age of the presidential candidate.
Clauses (a)and (b) of article 58(1) having made a specific provision in that behalf exclude cls.
(a) and (b) of article 84.
There is nothing in the Amendment Act which makes any difference to that position, for.
if the intention of Parliament was that an oath similar in form to the oath for membership of Parliament had to be taken by persons standing for election to the office of the President there is no reason why a similar amendment was not made in article 58(1) (a) and why the form: of oath not also prescribed either in the Third Schedule or by amendment of article 60.
which provides for oath by a person elected as President before he takes his office.
[140H 141E; 142B C] The particular oath which a person standing for election as a member of Parliament has to take has been prescribed in the Third Schedule to the Constitution, and it is only that oath which such a person has to take.
However, no form of oath is prescribed for a person standing for election as President anywhere in the Constitution and in the absence of such form.
it is impossible to hold that taking of oath before standing for election as President is a necessary ingredient of eligibility for such election.
The Amendment Act having not made any such provision with respect to those standing for election to the office of the President, it cannot be open to the Election Commission to prescribe a form of oath for such persons by changing form III A mutatis mutandis.
Such power cannot be spelt out of article 324 under which the Election Commission is conferred power to superintend direct, and control the preparation of the Electoral Rolls and the conduct of elections.
[143G 144B] Further.
a comparison of the form of oath under article 60 for the President with form III B of the Third Schedule which prescribes the oath for a member of Parliament before he takes his seat.
shows that even after election the President is not required to swear that he will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.
The oath he takes is to preserve.
protect and! defend the Constitution and that he will devote himself to the service and well being of the people of India.
the form of oath introduced by the sixteenth amendment for persons standing for election to Parliament and even after election was not considered suitable for a person standing for election as President or elected as President and that is why no form is prescribed by Parliament.
[143A C] (ii) Any voluntary action which interferes with or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of electoral right would amount to undue 135 influence.
It cannot take in mere canvassing in favour of a candidate at an election.
If that were so, it would be impossible to run democratic elections.
It is difficult to lay down in general terms where mere canvassing ends and interference or attempt at interference to with the tree exercise of any electoral right begins.
That is a matter to be determined in each case; but there can be no doubt that if what is done is merely canvassing it would not be undue influence.
[145G 146C] (a) There was nothing in the fetter of the Prime Minister which even remotely amounted to undue influence.
As a leader of the party she was entitled to ask the electors to vote for respondent No. 1 and the fact that she is the Prime Minister makes no difference to her right make an appeal of this nature.
It is.
said that the office of the President is a no party office and therefore an appeal of this nature should not have been made and must amount to undue influence.
It is true that the office of the President is not a party office meaning thereby that after his election the President is no longer a party man.
But that cannot take away the fact that in a democratic system, persons who stand for election are candidates sponsored by parties for without such support no fine would have a chance of being elected.
for the electors are mostly members of one party or other.
[149G 1SOB] (b) Mere canvassing of support for a candidate can never amount to undue influence.
There was no interference with the free exercise of electoral right by the electors, even if the Ministers were sent to the various Sate capitals to canvass support for respondent, No 1.
[148H] (c) The fact that the Minister signed the letters as Chief Whip was of no consequence; even if he had not done so all members of the Congress party in Parliament must be knowing that he was the Chief Whip.
Just as a Minister has a right to canvass for support, so has the Chief Whip.
The fact that he asked the members to contact him after reaching Delhi could only be to know who had come and who had not and could not give rise to any inference of undue influence from the fact alone.
There was nothing in the second letter also to show that undue influence was being exercised thereby.
The two letters read together merely show that the Chief Whip of the Congress party was canvassing in favour of respondent No. 1.
There was nothing improper in members of the party being told in the course of canvassing that it would be better if they only marked their first preference and no other preference in a system where voting is by single transferable vote.
Such a request of advice does not interfere with the free exercise of their electoral for the electors still would be free to do what they desired inspite of the advice.
[150B 151D] (d) There can be no objection if the leader of the party indicates to the members of his party how to vote in order to ensure that votes may not become invalid for, want of knowledge of the procedure of voting.
Further if the leader of the party indicates to members of his party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing with his own party men to support the candidate of the party.
The mere fact that the person who canvasses is a Chief Minister does not mean that he is exercising undue influence in the sense of interfering with the free exercise of the electoral right.
Once canvassing is permissible, and in a democratic set up where parties put up candidates for election it is not only permissible but necessary.
it follows that if a leader of the party asks members of his party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing.
The voting is after all secret and every elector is free to vote for whomsoever he likes, even though he may have been asked by the leader to vote for a particular candidate.
[152C F] 136 It is open to Ministers to canvass for candidates of their party standing for election.
Such canvassing does not amount to undue influence but is proper use of the Minister 's right to ask the public to support candidates belonging to the Minister 's party.
It is only where a Minister abuses his position as such and goes beyond merely asking for support for candidates belonging to his party that a question of undue influence may arise.
But so long as the Minister only asks the electors to vote for a particular candidate belonging to his party and puts forward before the public the merit of his candidate it cannot be said that by merely making such request to the electorate the Minister exercises undue influence.
The fact that the Minister 's request was addressed in the form of what it called a whip is also immaterial so long as it is clear that there is no compulsion on the electorate to vote in the manner indicated [ 149A C] R.B. Surendra Narayan Sinha vs Amulyadhone Ray & 43 Ors. 1940 Indian Election Cases by Sen and Poddar, Case No. XXX at p. 188.
Linge Gowda vs Shivananjappa.
(1953) VI E.L.R. 288, Amirchand vs Surendra Lal Jha, (1954) X E.L.R. 57, Mast Ram vs
section lqbal Singh, (1955) XII E.L.R. 34, Radhakrishna Shukla vs Tara Chand Maheshwar, (1956) XII E.L.R. 378, N. Sankara Reddi vs Yashoda Reddi (1957) XIII E.L.R. 34, Dr. Y.S. Parmar vs Hira Singh Pal.
(1958) XVI E.L.R. 45.
Triloki Singh vs Shtvrajwati Nehru, (1958) XVI E.L.R. 234 and Jayalakshmi Devamma vs Janardhan Reddi, (1959) XVII E.L.R. 302, referred to