judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1069 of 1975.
From the Order dated 18.5.1973 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 586 of 1968.
D.N. Mukharjee and G.S. Chatterjee for the Appellant.
D.N. Dwivedi and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
The question raised in these two appeals is 779 whether the assessee Railway in each appeal is a "dealer" within the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 194 1 and therefore liable to assessment under that Act.
In C.A. No. 845 of 1974 the facts are these.
The assessee South Eastern Railway disposes of unclaimed and unconnected goods for money consideration.
On 1 April, 1952 the assessee applied for registration as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act in respect of unconnected or unclaimed goods, and was accordingly registered.
It submitted returns of sales effected by it of unclaimed and unconnected goods year after year and paid sales tax pursu ant to the assessments made by the Sales Tax department.
However, in assessment proceedings for the four quarters ending March, 1959 the assessee applied to the Commercial Tax Officer for cancellation of the registration of the assessee as a "dealer" under the Act.
The Commercial Tax Officer examined the case and did not accept the contention that the assessee was not a "dealer".
On 6 June, 1959 he made an order rejecting the application on the basis that the disposal of unclaimed goods for valuable consideration was a regular feature of the assessee 's activities, and that therefore the assessee fell within the scope of the Act.
The assessee applied in revision before the Assistant Commis sioner of Commercial Taxes.
The only point raised in the revision application was whether the assessee could be treated as a "dealer" within the meaning of the Act.
It was stated on behalf of the assessee that unclaimed or uncon nected goods came into possession of the assessee but not as a result of any activity of purchase or of manufacture for sale.
It was pointed out that when such good came into possession of the assessee it acquired rights over the said goods under Section 56 of the Railways Act enabling it tO sell the goods.
The revision petition was rejected on 27 January, 1960 on the finding that the sales effected by the assessee were sales under the Act and that the assessee was a "dealer".
The assessee proceeded in further revision to the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal and simi lar contentions were raised before him but the revision application was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, who dealt with the case, by order dated 17 June, 1960.
The assessee then proceeded in revision before the Board of Revenue, West Bengal.
The Board held that a transfer of property was involved in the auction held by the assessee and that therefore a sale of goods took place.
The Board further held that the systematic and organised charac ter of business carried on by the assessee clothed him with the status of a "dealer" under the Act.
At the instance of the assessee the Board of Revenue 780 referred the following question to the High Court at Calcut ta for its opinion: "Whether the petitioner Railway in so far as it effects sales of unclaimed and unconnected goods under the provisions of Section 56 of the Indian Railways Act, is a dealer within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941?" The facts and circumstances in the case out of which Civil Appeal No. 1069 of 1975 arises are substantially similar to those narrated in the earlier case, except that the assessee here is the Eastern Railway and it is engaged in selling scrap and unserviceable material.
The question referred at the instance of the assessee to the High Court at Calcutta is as follows: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Controller of Stores, Eastern Railways is a dealer engaged in the business of selling scrap and unserviceable materials within the meaning of cl.
(c) read with C1.
(g) of Section 2 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
" The High Court delivered judgment setting forth detailed reasons therefore in the case relating to the assessee South Eastern Railway.
It held that the disposal of the goods did not indicate that the Railway concerned was carrying on business as a dealer liable to assessment under the Act.
The High Court disposed of the other case on the same basis as found favour with it in the earlier case, and answered the question in favour of the assessee.
In these appeals the question is whether the assessee Railway in each case is a "dealer" for the purpose of as sessment under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
In the case of the assessee South Eastern Railway, what were sold were unclaimed goods.
The Railway was a carrier of the goods and if at the stage of delivery goods remained un claimed for a period the Railway was entitled to dispose them of.
There can be no doubt that the activity of so disposing of the goods was adjunctive to the principal activity of the carriage of goods by the Railway.
It is an activity which may be regarded as necessarily incidental or ancillary to its business as carrier of the goods.
It seems to South Eastern Railway was a "dealer" for the 781 purposes of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
In the other case, the assessee Eastern Railway disposed of scrap and unserviceable material lying with it.
The case is covered directly by the decision of this Court in the District Controller of Stores, Northern Railway, Jodhpur vs The Assistant Commercial Taxation Officer and Another, [1976] 37 S.T.C. 423.
In the circumstances the appeals are allowed, the im pugned judgment of the High Court in each case is set aside and the questions referred to the High Court are answered in each case in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee.
The appellant is entitled to his costs in each case.
T.N.A. Appeals allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The assessee South Eastern Railway, a registered dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, disposing of unclaimed and unconnected goods for money consideration under Section 56 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, applied to the Commercial Tax Officer for cancellation of registra tion as a "dealer".
The Commercial Tax Officer rejected the application on the ground that the disposal of unclaimed goods for valuable consideration was a regular feature of the assessee 's activ ities, and, therefore, the assessee fell within the scope of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
Assessee 's revision application was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on the ground that the sales effected by the assessee were sales under the Act and that the assessee was a "dealer".
A second revision of the assessee was also dismissed by the Additional Commis sioner of Sales Tax.
On a further revision the Board of Revenue also con firmed the status of the assessee as a "dealer", holding that in the systematic and organised character of business of auctioning by the assessee, a transfer of property was involved and therefore a sale of goods took place.
At the instance of the assessee a reference was made to the High Court.
The High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee by holding that the disposal of the goods did not indicate that the 778 Railway was carrying on business as a dealer liable to assessment under the Act.
The assessee in the connected appeal, Eastern Railway, was engaged in selling scrap and unserviceable material, and a similar order was passed by the High Court in its favour.
Hence these appeals by the Revenue.
Allowing the appeals and setting aside the judgments of the High Court, this Court, HELD: 1.
The assessee South Eastern Railway was a carri er of the goods and if at the stage of delivery, goods remained unclaimed for a period, the Railway was entitled to dispose them of.
The activity of so disposing of the goods was adjunctive to the principal activity of the carriage of goods by the Railway.
It is an activity which may be regard ed as necessarily incidental or ancillary to its business as carrier of the goods.
Therefore, the assessee South Eastern Railway was a "dealer" for the purposes of the Bengal Fi nance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
[780G H] 2.
The assessee in the connected appeal, Eastern Rail way, who was disposing scrap and unserviceable material was also a "dealer" for the purposes of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
[780H; 781A] District Controller of Stores, Northern Rly, Jodhpur vs The Assistant Commercial Taxation Officer & Anr., [1976] 37 S.T.C. 423 applied.


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 1442 (NT) of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.3.1974 of the Allahabad High Court in I.T.R. No. 437 of 1971.
E.C. Agarwala for the Appellant.
S.C. Manchanda, Ms. A Subhashini and M.B. Rao for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
This appeal by certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court is directed against a judgment of the High Court answering the following questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in an income tax refer ence: "(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and on a correct interpretation of the leasedeed 799 dated 22.8.1960, the Tribunal was fight in holding the profits of the Glass factory during the relevant accounting year accrued to the assessee company? (2) If the answer to the question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the entire profits and not one half of the profits of the glass factory during the relevant accounting year accrued to the assessee company?" The assessee, Messrs. Vibhuti Glass Works is a public limited company.
It has a glass factory and also carries on other business.
The accounts of the glass factory are closed on 31 March each year, while the assessee closes its ac counts on 30 September each year.
We are concerned with the assessment year 1962 63.
For several years the glass factory business had been suffering losses resulting in increasing debt.
It took heavy loans from the Banaras State Bank, Varanasi, for which purpose its stocks and stores were hypothecated to the Bank.
It also took loans from the Uttar Pradesh Government and the land, buildings and machinery were mortgaged accordingly.
The assessee found it difficult to emerge out of its finan cial embarrassment.
It discovered also that it needed cer tain equipment in order to produce better quality goods and also required funds for its working capital and for repaying loans to other creditors.
It approached the industrial Finance Corporation, New Delhi, and the State Finance Corpo ration for financial assistance and the Industrial Finance Corporation agreed to grant a loan of Rs.20 lakhs on condi tion (a) that the State Government guaranteed repayment and (b) that the State Government postponed their charge under the mortgage deeds and the Industrial Financial Corporation was allowed to have the first charge.
The State Government agreed to those conditions provided the assessee allowed the State Government to take over the running of the glass factory for a period of 20 years.
The State Government also stipulated that if and when the profits of the business exceeded a prescribed limit, a share of those profits would go to the State Government.
The assessee agreed to this arrangement and executed a document dated 22 August, 1960 incorporating the requisite conditions.
For the relevant accounting period the glass factory business disclosed a profit of Rs.92,960 while the assessee suffered a loss of Rs.3,47,656 according to its separate profit and loss account.
During 800 assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1962 63 it was contended by the assessee before the Income Tax Officer that the profit of Rs.92,960 earned by the glass factory business was not assessable in the hands of the assessee but in the hands of the Uttar Pradesh Government which had taken over the factory and was running the business.
It was con tended that in any event only half of the profits could be included in the assessment of the assessee, the remaining profit being assessable in the hands of the State Government which was entitled to 50 per cent of the profits under the Deed dated 22 August, 1960.
Both contentions were rejected by the Income Tax Officer, who held that the assessee was liable to be assessed in respect of the entire profits earned by the glass factory.
He set off the profit against the loss declared by the assessee and computed a net loss of Rs.2,54,785.
The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner of Income Tax, but without success.
A second appeal by the assessee filed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribu nal was also dismissed.
At the instance of the assessee the Appellate Tribunal referred the two questions of law set forth earlier to the High Court of Allahabad.
The High Court considered the various provisions of the Deed dated 22 August, 1960 and answered both the questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
It is apparent that this appeal must be disposed of on a consideration of the terms of the Deed dated 22 August, 1960.
A perusal of the conditions set forth in that document discloses that the State Government was given the power to manage the glass factory business for a period of 20 years from the date it assumed possession.
Although the Deed is described as a lease deed and it provides that the glass factory is demised to the State Government, in substance possession of the glass factory was transferred to the State Government only for the purpose of enabling it to manage and run the business.
The High Court has given good reason for reaching that conclusion.
Clause (c) of paragraph 7 of the Deed provides "that if upon the expiration or sooner determination of this demise it is found that the working of the factory has shown prof its after meeting the entire liabilities of the company the balance profits, after accounting for all charges and ex penses incurred by the State Government, shall be divided between the company and the Governor in equal proportion.
" It was contended by the assessee before the High Court that the 801 income was diverted through an overriding title before it reached the assessee.
The High Court.
in our opinion, has rightly rejected the contention, holding that there was no overriding title and in fact it was a case of mere applica tion of the income.
The proper test to be applied in such a case has been laid down by this Court in Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City H vs Sitaldas Tirathdas, and we are satisfied that the present case is one where the income accrued to the assessee directly and was merely applied upon such accrual to discharge an obligation of the assessee.
The entire income earned during the year under consideration was the income of the assessee and was merely applied by the managing State Government for the payment of the assessee 's debts.
We are also in agreement with the High Court that the profits earned during the year under consideration were not sufficient for the State Government to enjoy a share in the profits in accordance with the terms of the Deed, and no question, therefore, arises of any part of the profits being regarded as assessable in the hands of the State Government.
In point of fact, it appears that no part of the profits was actually taken by the State Government.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The assessee Company had a glass factory besides other business.
Since the glass factory business had been suffer ing losses for several years, resulting in increasing debt, the assessee took loans from the State Government and mort gaged the land, buildings and machinery.
Later, under a deed executed by it the assessee allowed the State Government to take over running of the glass factory for a period of 20 years and permitted it to have a share of the business, if and when they exceeded a prescribed limit, as conditions for guaranteeing repayment of a loan of Rs.20 lakhs granted by the Industrial Finance Corporation.
During assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1962 63, the assessee contended that the profits earned by the glass factory business during that period were not assessable in its hands, but in the hands of the State Government, which had taken over the factory and was running the business, and that, in any event, only half of the profit could be included in its assessment as the State Government was entitled to 50 per cent of profits under the deed.
Rejecting the contentions, the Income tax officer held that the assessee was liable to be assessed in respect of the entire profits earned by the glass factory.
The assessee 's appeals were dismissed by both the Appel late Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal.
On a reference made at assessee 's instance, the High Court af firmed the Tribunal 's finding that the entire profits of the factory, and not half of them accrued to the assessee.
It also rejected assessee 's contention that the income was diverted through an overriding title before it reached the assessee.
Dismissing the appeal of the assessee, this Court, 798 HELD: The present case is one where the income accrued to the assessee directly and was merely, upon such accrual, applied to discharge an obligation of the assessee.
[.801B] Although the Deed executed by the assessee is described as a lease deed and provides that the glass factory is demised to the State Government, in substance possession of the factory was transferred to the State Government only for the purpose of enabling it to manage and run the business.
[800F] The entire income earned during the year under consider ation was the income of the assesee and was merely applied by the managing State Government for the payment of the assessee 's debt, and there was no over riding title.
The profits earned during the year under consideration were not sufficient for the State Government to enjoy a share in the profits in accordance with the terms of the Deed, and there fore, no part of the profits could be regarded as assessable in the hands of the State Government.
In point of fact, no part of the profits was actually taken by the State Govern ment.
[801C D] Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City H vs Sitaldas Tirathdas, , relied on.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3342 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Civil Appeal No. 300 of 1975.
O.P. Rana and Raju Ramachandran for the Appellant.
Vivek Ghambir and Praveen Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
This is a landlord 's appeal by special leave arising out of a suit for ejectment.
The respondent 's father B.M. Paul, was the tenant of the premises in question.
On his death he left behind the re spondent, his mother, brothers and sisters who in herited the tenancy.
A notice under section 106 of the terminating the tenancy was addressed to the respondent and was served on him.
It was not addressed and served on the other tenants.
A suit for ejectment was filed by the appellant against the respondent.
The validity of the notice to quit was challenged by the respondent.
It was contended that notice should have been addressed to all the members of the family and served on them, and in the absence of notice to all the suit was incompetent.
The trial court upheld the validity of the notice relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Shrimati Vishnawati vs Bhag wat Vithu Chowdhry, on the footing that the defendants were joint tenants and constituted a single unit and therefore notice to one of the defendants was sufficient to determine the tenancy.
The view proceeded on the basis that the heirs of the original tenant held the tenancy as joint tenants.
When the matter ultimately came to the High Court in second appeal, the High Court took the view that as heirs of the deceased tenant they held the tenancy as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.
Accordingly, the High Court said, notice to quit should have been served on each one of the successor tenants.
In that view, the High Court allowed the appeal and 771 dismissed the suit.
The High Court relied on Ramesh Chand Bose vs Gopeshwar Prasad Sharrna, AIR 1977 'Allahabad 38 where it was held that a tenancy was a heritable property right and the heirs of the deceased tenant became tenants themselves.
In this appeal the entire question is whether the notice addressed to the respondent alone is a valid notice.
It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant.
The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant.
It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs.
There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor.
That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant.
In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants.
In the present case it appears that the respondent acted on behalf of the ten ants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all.
In the circumstances, the notice served on the respondent was sufficient.
It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bose (supra) is erroneous where the High Court lays down that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common.
In our opinion, the notice under section 106 of the served by the appellant on the respondent is a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are restored.
There is no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The respondent inherited tenancy of the demised premises alongwith his mother, brothers and sisters from their fa ther.
A notice under section 106 of the terminating the tenancy was served on him.
It was followed by a suit for ejectment against him.
Upholding the validity of the said notice, the trial court took the view that the heirs of the original tenant held the tenancy as joint tenants and, therefore, notice to one of the defendants was sufficient to determine the tenan cy.
Allowing the appeal therefrom, the 'High Court took the view that as heirs of the deceased tenant they held the tenancy as tenants incommon and not as joint tenants.
There fore, the notice to quit should have been served on each one of the successor tenants.
Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court, HELD: The notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Proper ty Act served by the appellant on the respondent was a valid notice.
[771E] On the death of the original tenant, subject to any provi sion to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant.
The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant.
It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs.
There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor.
The heirs thus succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants.
[771C] In the instant case, the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, he paid rent on behalf of all and accepted notice also on behalf of all.
In the circumstances, the notice served on the respondent was sufficient.
The suit must, therefore, succeed.
[771D] 770 Shrimati Vishnawati vs Bhagwat.
Vithu Chowdhry, , affirmed.
Ramesh Chand Bose vs Gopeshwar Prasad Sharma, AIR 1977 Allahabad 38, overruled.


judgement:
(Civil) No. 1050 of 1986.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
A.C. Gulati, S.K. Goel, S.K. Bansal and L.C. Goyal for the Petitioner.
T.S.K. Iyer, Mariarputham, Ms. A. Mathut, M. Veerappa, Pramod Swarup, K. Ramkumar, R. Bana, A. Subba Rao, S.K. Bhattacharya, Ms Urmila Kapoor and Ms. Janki for the Re spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
On 31 July, 1987, we allowed this writ petition and directed the respondents to admit the petition er, Meenakshi Malik, in one of the three Delhi Medical Colleges in the first year course prescribed for the M.B.B.S. Degree.
We said that the reasons would be pro nounced later.
We proceed to do so now.
The petitioner was born in Delhi on 8 September, 1967.
Her father, Shri O.P. Malik, was employed in the National Council of Educational Research and Training, Sri Aurobindo Marg, New Delhi 860 and her mother, Smt.
Kanta Devi Malik was employed in the Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Mehrauli, New Delhi.
The petitioner attended the Junior Public School, Shakti Nagar, upto Class II and the Cambridge School, Siri niwaspuri, New Delhi, upto Class IX until 19 January, 1982.
The petitioner 's father was placed on deputation in January 1982 with the Government of Nigeria to serve in its Ministry of Education through the Ministry of Home Affairs, Depart ment of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Government of India, New Delhi.
The petitioner, who was a minor at the time, had to accompany her parents along with her minor brother.
In Nigeria, the petitioner continued her education as an overseas candidate and appeared for the examination conducted by the University of London in Kanduna, Nigeria, and she passed the General Certificate of Education Ordinary level (GCE 'O ' level) which is recognised by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, as equivalent to Class XI in India.
On completing the period of his deputation on 8 April, 1984 the petitioner 's father returned to India with his family.
The petitioner was admitted to Class XII in the Delhi Public School, Mathura Road, New Delhi.
The Central Board of Secondary Education permitted her admission to that Class.
The petitioner appeared in the All India Senior School Certificate Examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi, in March, 1985 and passed the examination.
The petitioner then sat for the Entrance Examination for admission to one of the three Medical Colleges in Delhi, and she obtained 750 marks.
The candidates who obtained an equal number of the marks or even less were granted admission, but the petitioner was denied admission.
She fell for consideration in the quota of seven ty per cent of the seats reserved for candidates who had passed the qualifying examination from the University of Delhi or the Central Board of Secondary Education or the Council for the Indian School Certificate Examination from recognised schools conducting regular classes in the Union Territory of Delhi.
But she was denied admission because she had not satisfied the further condition that the last two years of education should be had in a school in Delhi.
Aggrieved by the denial of admission, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.
It seems to us that the qualifying condition that a candidate appearing for the Entrance Examination for admis sion to a Medical College in Delhi should have received the last two years of education in a school in Delhi is unrea sonable when applied in the case of those candidates who were compelled to leave India for a foreign country by 861 reason of the posting of the parent by the Government to such foreign country.
There is no real choice in the matter for such a student, and in many cases the circumstances of the student do not permit her to continue schooling in India.
It is, of course, theoretically possible for a stu dent to be put into a hostel to continue her schooling in Delhi.
But in many cases this may not be feasible and the student must accompany a parent to the foreign country.
It appears to us that the rigour of the condition prescribing that the last two years of education should be received in a school in Delhi should be relaxed, and there should be no insistence on the fulfilment of that condition, in the case of students of parents who are transferred to a foreign country by the Government and who are therefore required to leave India along with them.
Rules are intended to be rea sonable, and should take into account the variety of circum stances in which those whom the rules seek to govern find themselves.
We are of opinion that the condition in the prescription of qualifications for admission to a medical college in Delhi providing that the last two years of educa tion should be in a school in Delhi should be construed as not applicable to students who have to leave India with their parents on the parent being posted to a foreign coun try by the Government.
Accordingly, the denial of admission to the petitioner to a seat in one of the Medical Colleges in Delhi must be held to be unreasonable.
It is not disputed that if the condition of schooling for the last two years in a school in Delhi is removed from the way, the petitioner would be entitled to admission in a Medical College in Delhi.
In the circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to an order di recting the respondents to admit her to one of the Medical Colleges in Delhi.
T.N.A. Petition Allowed.

summary/full:
The petitioner was born and studied upto class IX in Delhi.
In 1982 she left for Nigeria, along with her parents, where her father went on deputation.
There she passed the General Certificate of Education Ordinary Level, conducted by University of London, which was recognised by the Central Board of Secondary Education, New Delhi as equivalent to Class XI in India.
She returned to India along with her family in 1984.
After passing the All India Senior School Certificate Examination in 1985, she appeared for entrance examination for admission to one of the three Medical Colleges in Delhi and passed the test.
But she was denied admission because she had not satisfied the further condition that the last two years of education should be had in a school in Delhi.
Aggrieved by the denial of admission, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court.
By an order dated 31st July, 1987 this Court allowed the Writ Petition and directed the respondents to admit her in one of the three Delhi Medical Colleges in the first year course prescribed for the M.B.B.S. Degree.
Giving reasons for the said order, this Court, HELD: 1.
Rules are intended to be reasonable, and should take into account the variety of circumstances in which those whom the rules seek to govern find themselves.
[861C] 2.
The qualifying condition that a candidate appearing for the 859 entrance examination for admission to a Medical College in Delhi should have received the last two years of education in a school in Delhi is unreasonable when applied in the case of those candidates who were compelled to leave India for a foreign country by reason of the posting of the parent by the Government to such foreign country.
There is no real choice in the matter for such a student, and in many cases the circumstances of the student do not permit her to con tinue schooling in India.
Theoretically it is possible for a student to be put into a hostel to continue her schooling in Delhi but in many cases this may not be feasible and the student must accompany the parent to the foreign country.
[860H, 861A] 3.
The rigour of the condition prescribing that the last two years of education should be, received in a school in Delhi should be relaxed, and there should be no insistence on the fulfilment of that condition, in the case of students of parents who are transferred to a foreign country by the Government and who are therefore required to leave India along with them.
Therefore, the denial of admission to the petitioner to a seat in one of the Medical Colleges in Delhi was unreasonable.
[861B, 861E]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2534 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.1.1988 of the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1852 of 1987.
G.B. Pai, S.K. Sinha for the Appellants.
Shanti Bhushan, section Sukumaran, D.N. Misra, S.B. Upadhyay and B.B. Singh for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
Special leave is granted.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
The appellants, Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, Jamshedpur, and another, have preferred this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellants challenging the order of the State of Bihar refusing to make a reference of the disputes raised by the appellants to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the , hereinafter referred to as "the Act".
The appellant Sangh represents about 900 convoy drivers.
By a 805 letter of demand dated October 16, 1986 addressed to the General Manager of the Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd., Jamshedpur (for short "TELCO"), the Sangh demanded that permanent status should be given by the management to all the convoy drivers, and that they should also be given all the facilities as are available to the permanent employ ees of TELCO on the dates of their appointment.
The said demand proceeds on the basis that the convoy drivers are all workmen of TELCO.
The dispute that has been raised in the said letter of demand is principally whether the convoy drivers are workmen and/or employees of TELCO or not.
In other words, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers.
The Deputy Labour Commissioner by his letter dated February 26, 1979 informed the appellant Sangh that in view of the opinion of the Law Department of the year 1973 to the effect that there was no relationship of master and servant between TELCO and the convoy drivers, the demands of the convoy drivers did not come within the purview of the Act and, accordingly, it was not possible to take any action in regard to the dispute of convoy drivers under the Act.
The appellant Sangh being aggrieved by the said refusal to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act, moved before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court a writ petition praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the State of Bihar to refer the dispute under section 10(1) of the Act.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the writ petition, took the view that the letter of the Deputy Labour Commis sioner only referred to the Law Department 's opinion of the year 1973 without indicating in what context and under what circumstances, he rejected the demand for a reference.
In that view of the matter, the learned Judge granted liberty to the Sangh to reagitate the mater before the appropriate Government and expressed the hope that the appropriate Government would consider the matter in a proper perspective in the light of the documents and the materials that would be placed by the Sangh, in accordance with law.
The writ petition was dismissed subject, however, to the observation and direction mentioned above.
Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court, the Sangh made a representation to the Government for a refer ence of the dispute under section 10(1) of the Act.
The Deputy Labour Commissioner, Jamshedpur, by his letter dated November 6, 1986 gave the same reply and refused to make a reference.
806 Again, the appellant Sangh moved a writ petition before the High Court and, as stated already, the High Court sum marily dismissed the same holding that the appellants had failed to prima facie satisfy that they were employed either by TELCO or by the Telco Contractors ' Association.
Hence this appeal.
It has been urged by Mr. Pai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the Government exceeded its jurisdiction in purporting to decide the dispute raised by the appellant Sangh in the said letter of demand.
Counsel submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government should have made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10(1) of the Act for the adjudication of the dispute of the convoy drivers and should not have embarked upon the task of deciding the dispute on its merits through the Deputy Labour Commissioner.
On the other hand, it has been vehemently urged by Mr. Shanti Bhusan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of TELCO, that the Government has the jurisdiction to consider whether any industrial dispute exists or not and, in considering the same, as the Government found that the convoy drivers were not even workmen of TELCO or, in other words, there had been no relationship of master and servants between TELCO and the convoy drivers, the Government refused to make a reference of the dispute under section 10(1) of the Act.
It is submit ted that the refusal by the Government to make a reference was perfectly within its jurisdiction inasmuch as, in the opinion of the Government, there was no existence of any industrial dispute.
After conclusion of the hearing, we took the view that the Government should be given one more chance to consider the question of making a reference and, accordingly, we by our order dated March 30, 1989 directed the Government to reconsider the question of referring the dispute raised by the convoy drivers to the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Act, keeping the appeal pending before us.
The learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the Govern ment, has produced before us an order dated April 13, 1989 of the Government whereby the Government has, upon a recon sideration of the matter, refused to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act.
In refusing to make a reference, the Government has adjudicated the dispute on its merits.
807 It is true that in considering the question of making a reference under section 10(1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended", as urged by Mr. Shanti Bhusan.
The formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended" is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its merits.
In the instant case, as already stated, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are employees or workmen of TELCO, that is to say, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers.
In considering the question whether a refer, should be made or not, the Deputy Labour Commissioner and/or the Government have held that the convoy drivers are not workmen and, accordingly, no refer ence can be made.
Thus, the dispute has been decided by the Government which is undoubtedly, not permissible.
It is, however, submitted on behalf of TELCO that unless there is relationship of employer and employees or, in other words, unless those who are raising the disputes are work men, there cannot be any existence of industrial dispute within the meaning of the term as defined in section 2(k) of the Act.
It is urged that in order to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, one of the factors that has to be considered by the Government is whether the persons who are raising the disputes are workmen or not within the meaning of the definition as contained in section 2(k) of the Act.
Attractive though the contention is, we regret, we are unable to accept the same.
It is now well settled that, while exercising power under section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasijudicial function, and that in performing this administrative function the Govern ment cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would cer tainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by section 10 of the Act.
See Ram Avtar Sharma vs State of Haryana, ; ; M.P. Irrigation Kararnchari Sangh vs The State of M.P., ; and Shambhu Nath Goyal vs Bank of Baroda, Jullundur; , Applying the principle laid down by this Court in the above decisions, there can be no doubt that the Government was not justified in deciding the dispute.
Where, as in the instant case, the dispute is 808 whether the person raising the dispute are workmen or not, the same cannot be decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative function under section 10(1) of the Act.
As has been held in M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh 's case (supra), there may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may, on a proper examination of the demand, come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference.
Further, the Govern ment should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand with a view to declining reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudication of valid dis putes, and that to allow the Government to do so would be to render section 10 and section 12(5) of the Act nugatory.
We are, therefore, of the view that the State Govern ment, which is the appropriate Government, was not justified in adjudicating the dispute, namely, whether the convoy drivers are workmen or employees of TELCO or not and, ac cordingly, the impugned orders of the Deputy Labour Commis sioner acting on behalf of the Government and that of the Government itself cannot be sustained.
It has been already stated that we had given one more chance to the Government to reconsider the matter ,red the Government after reconsideration has come to the same con clusion that the convoy drivers are not workmen of TELCO thereby adjudicating the dispute itself.
After having con sidered the facts and circumstances of the case and having given our best consideration in the matter, we are of the view that the dispute should be adjudicated by the Industri al Tribunal and, as the Government has persistently declined to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act, we think we should direct the Government to make such a reference.
In several instances this Court had to direct the Government to make a reference under section 10(1) when the Government had declined to make such a reference and this Court was of the view that such a reference should have been made.
See Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam vs Govern ment of Tamil Nnadu, ; Ram Avtar Sharma vs State of Haryana; , ; M.P. Irrigation Karam chari Sangh vs The State of M.P. ; and Nirmal Singh vs State of Punjab, [1984] 2 LLJ396.
In the circumstances, we direct the State of Bihar to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act of the dispute raised by the 809 Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh by its letter dated October 16, 1986 addressed to the General Manager TELCO (Annexure R 4/1 to the Special Leave Petition), to an appro priate Industrial Tribunal within one month from today.
The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court and the impugned orders are set aside.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The appellant Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh, repre sented to the Tara Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) demanding that all convoy drivers should be given permanent status and facilities that are available to the permanent employees of TELCO.
The Deputy Labour Commissioner refused to make a reference under section 10(1) of the because of the opinion of the Law Depart ment that there was no relationship of master and servant between TELCO and the convoy drivers.
The appellant Sangh flied a writ petition in the High Court praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the State of Bihar to refer the dispute under section 10(1) of the Act.
The High Court dismissed the petition but granted liberty to the appellant Sangh to reagitate the matter before the appropriate Government.
On a further representation also the Deputy Labour Commissioner refused to make a reference under section 10(1) of the Act.
Again, the appellant Sangh moved a writ petition in the High Court which summarily dismissed the petition holding that the appellants had failed to satisfy that they were employed by the TELCO.
Hence this appeal by Special leave.
After the conclusion of the hearing, the Court being of the view that the Government should be given one more chance to consider the question of making a reference, kept the appeal pending and directed the Government to reconsider the question of referring the dispute.
Upon reconsideration also the Government refused to make a reference under sec tion 10(1) of the Act.
On the question: whether an appropri ate Government exercising power to make a reference under section 10(1) of the can delve into the 803 merits of the dispute and adjudicate upon the dispute it self.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, HELD: 1.
In considering the question of making a refer ence under section 10(1), the Government is entitled to form an opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended".
The formation of opinion as to whether an industrial dispute "exists or is apprehended" is not the same thing as to adjudicate the dispute itself on its mer its.
[807A] 2.
While exercising power under section 10(1) of the Act, the function of the appropriate Government is an admin istrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function, and in performing this administrative function the Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of the lis, which would certainly be in excess of the power conferred on it by section 10 of the Act.
[807F] Ram Avtar Sharma vs State of Haryana, [1985] 3 S.C.R. 686; M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh vs The State of M.P., ; and Shambhu Nath Goyal vs Bank of Baroda, Jullundhur, ; applied.
2.1 In the instant case, the dispute is as to whether the convoy drivers are employees or workmen, of TELCO, that is to say, whether there is relationship of employer and employees between TELCO and the convoy drivers, the same cannot be decided by the Government in exercise of its administrative function under section 10(1) of the Act.
Therefore, the State Government was not justified in adjudi cating the said dispute.
[807B, 807H, 808A] 3.
There may be exceptional cases in which the State Government may come to a conclusion that the demands are either perverse or frivolous and do not merit a reference.
But the Government should be very slow to attempt an exami nation of the demand with a view to declining reference and Courts will always be vigilant whenever the Government attempts to usurp the powers of the Tribunal for adjudica tion of valid disputes, and that to allow the Government to do so would be to render section 10 and section 12(5) of the Act nugatory.
[808A C] 804 M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh vs The State of M.P., ; applied.
In the instant case, in view of the fact that the Government has persistently declined to make a reference and even after reconsideration has adjudicated the dispute itself, the dispute should be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal.
[808E] The State of Bihar is directed to make a reference of the dispute raised by the Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal under section 10(1) of the Act.
[808H, 809A] Sankari Cement Alai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam vs Government of Tamilnadu, ; Ram Avtar Sharma vs State of Haryana, ; ; M.P. Irri gation Karamchari Sangh vs The State of M.P., ; and Nirmal Singh vs State of Punjab, ; applied.


judgement:
SDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No.248 of 1988.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
WITH Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1492 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.88 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 886 of 1986.
U.R. Lalit, M.G. Karmali, J.B. Patel and K.M.M. Khan for the petitioner in W.P. Crl.
No. 248/88 and S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1492/88.
T.U. Mehta, Mrs. Hemantika Wahi and M.N. Shroff for the State of Gujarat in W.P. Crl.
No. 248/88 and S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1492/ 88.
869 Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General C.V.S. Rao and A. Subba Rao for the Respondents in W.P. Crl.
No. 248/88 and S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1492/88.
The following Orders of the Court were delivered: PATHAK, CJ.
This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and the Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings for pre ventive detention taken under the .
One of the substantial points which arises in these cases is whether the period of detention is a fixed period running from the date specified in the detention order and ending with the expiry of that period or the period is automatical ly extended by any period of parole granted to the detenu.
In case where the High Court allows a habeas corpus petition and directs the detenu to be released and in consequence the detenu is set free, and thereafter an appeal filed in this Court results in the setting aside of the order of the High Court, is it open to this Court to direct the arrest and detention of the detenu if meanwhile the original period of detention intended in the detention order has expired? Four decisions of this Court have been placed before us in sup port of the contention that the period of detention intended by the detention order is not,a fixed period but can be correspondingly extended if the detenu absconds before he can be apprehended and detained or the period of detention is interrupted by an erroneous judgment of a High Court and the detenu is set free.
Those cases are State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya; , ; State of Gujarat vs Ismail Juma & Ors., ; ; Smt.
Poonam Lata vs M.L. Wadhawan and others, A.I.R. 1987 SC 1383 and Pushpa devi M. Jatia vs M.L. Wadhavan, ; We find some difficulty in accepting the view taken by the learned Judges of this Court who decided those cases.
It seems to us prima facie that what is important is that we are concerned with cases of preventive detention, cases where the detain ing authority is required to apply its mind and decide whether, and if so for how long.
, a person should be de tained.
It is preventive detention and not putative deten tion.
Preventive detention invariably runs from the date specified in the detention order.
In the case of punitive detention, no date is ordinarily specified from which the detention will commence, and all that is mentioned is the period of detention.
In case of preventive detention the detaining authority applies it subjective judgment to the material before it and determines what should be the period for which the detenu should be detained, that is to say, the period during which he should be denied his liberty in order to prevent him from 870 engaging in mischief.
It seems to us prima facie that one possible view can be that if parole is granted the period of parole should be counted within the total period of deten tion and not outside it.
As regards the problem raised by the release of a detenu pursuant to an erroneous decision of the High Court, and the subsequent reversal of that decision by this Court, the remedy probably lies in the enactment of legislation analogous to section 5(1) and section 15(4) of the Admin istration of Justice Act, 1960 in the United Kingdom.
The question is an important one affecting as it does on the one hand the need for effective measures of preventive detention and on the other the liberty of the subject and his fight to freedom from detention beyond the period intended by the statute.
As the matter is of great public importance, and most cases of preventive detention are bound to be affected, we refer these cases to a Bench of five Hon 'ble Judges for reconsideration of the law on the point.
ORDER Although I agree with the view expressed in the State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya, ; and the other cases mentioned in the order of the learned Chief Justice, I agree that in view of the great public importance of the point involved, these cases may be heard by a Bench of five Hon 'ble Judges.

summary/full:
The petitioner filed a writ petition and a special leave petition challenging the detention order passed under the .
It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the period of detention intended by the detention order was not a fixed one but could be correspond ingly extended if the detenu absconded before he could be apprehended and detained or the period of detention was interrupted by an erroneous judgment of a High Court and the detenu was set free.
Referring the cases to a larger Bench, this Court, HELD: By the Court. ' As the matter is of great public importance, these cases are referred to a Bench of five Judges of this Court.
[870C] Per Pathak, C J: Preventive detention invariably, runs from the date specified in the detention order, and the period of deten tion is determined by the detaining authority, applying its subjective judgment to material before it.
[869G H] In the case of grant of parole, one possible view can be that the period of parole should be counted within the total period of detention and not outside it.
As regards the problem raised by release of a detenu pursuant to an errone ous decision of the High Court, and the subsequent reversal of the decision by the Supreme Court the remedy probably lies in the enactment of legislation analogous to section 5(1) and section 15(4) of the 868 Administration of Justice Act, 1960 in the United Kingdom.
[870A B] As the question is of great public importance affecting, on the one hand, the need for affective measures of preven tive detention and, on the other, the liberty of the subject and his right to freedom from detention beyond the period intended by the statute, and since most cases of preventive detention are bound to be affected, these cases are referred to a five Judge Bench for reconsideration of the law on the point.
[870B C] State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya, ; ; State of Gujarat vs Ismail Juma & Ors., ; ; Smt.
Poonam Lata vs M.L. Wadhawan and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1383 and Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs M.L. Wadhavan, ; ; dissented from.
Per Sharma, J (Concurring): In view of the great public importance involved, these cases may be heard by a five Judge Bench.
[870E] State of Gujarat vs Adam Kasam Bhaya, ; ; State of Gujarat vs Ismail Juma & Ors., ; ; Smt.
Poonam Lata vs M.L. Wadhawan and Others, AIR 1987 SC 1383 and Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs M.L. Wadhavan, ; ; affirmed.


judgement:
Appeal No.130 of 1958.
Appeal by certificate granted by the Madras High Court against its judgment and order dated November 1, 1957, in W. P. Nos. 623 and 624 of 1957.
April 30.
May 1.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, T. R. Venkatarama Iyer, K. R. Sharma and K. R. Choudhri, for the appellant.
The petition is liable to be dismissed for non joinder of Muthu and Meganathan who were candidates as defined in section 79(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The allegation is that Meganathan accepted a gift of Rs. 10,000 and in pursuance thereof withdrew his candidature, and also that Muthu accepted a gratification of Rs. 5,000 and in pursuance thereof, he retired from 869 the contest.
On the language of section 123(1) of the Act, such acceptance constitutes a corrupt practice '.
The words I by a candidate or his agent or by any other person ' in the section are to be read with the words offer or promise ' and not with gift '.
In view of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, a I gift ' is a bilateral Act and it includes both the giving of the gift and the acceptance of that gift.
Section 99 of the Act shows that a receipt of a bribe is a corrupt practice.
See sections 82 (b), 98 and 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Under section 99 the Tribunal has to record a finding whether a corrupt practice has been committed with the consent of any candidate.
When a candidate accepts a gift with the object of inducing him to withdraw his candidature, he consents to the corrupt practice of bribery being committed and such a candidate is liable to be named under the section.
Alternatively, the term gratification in section 123 is very wide and includes the withdrawal of candidature by a candidate to induce another candidate to stand at an election.
Affording of such gratification amounts to a corrupt practice within section 123.
Section 82(b) talks of I allegations of any corrupt practice ' and it, therefore, contemplates any allegation relating to or concerning, a corrupt practice.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, A. N. Sinha and N. H. Hingorani for respondent No. 1.
A candidate who accepts a gift from a returned candidate does not commit corrupt practice ' within the meaning of section 123(1) and therefore is not necessary party to the election petition under section 82(b) of the Act.
The section defines the corrupt practice of bribery and the words I gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person ' clearly contemplates the making of a gift.
Further, section 123(1) does not include the acceptance of a gift as a corrupt practice.
This is also apparent from consideration of section 124(3) of the Act which was deleted by the amending Act XXVII of 1956.
Section 124(3) made receipt of gratification by candidate or intending candidate a minor corrupt practice and section 123 (1) made bribery by a candidate or his agent, a major 870 corrupt practice.
The amending Act has done away with the classification of major and minor corrupt practices.
Some of the minor corrupt practices have been retained as corrupt practices and the rest dropped altogether.
The amending Act has dropped the provision making acceptance and agreement to accept a bribe, a corrupt practice with no material change in section 123(1) to bring within it these cases.
By omitting section 124(3) from the Act Parliament, therefore, intended that acceptance of a bribe was no longer to be treated as a corrupt practice.
Section 99 does not purport to define a corrupt practice mentioned in section 82(b) ; section 99 read in the light of definition section does not support the appellant.
May 20.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J.
In the 1957 general elections, nine persons filed nomination papers for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly from the Sathankulam constituency all of which were found on scrutiny to be valid.
Among these persons were the appellant, the respondent Kandaswami and two others called M. R. Meganathan and G. E. Muthu.
Meganathan, Muthu and three others whom it is not necessary to name as they are not concerned with this appeal, did not go to the poll and dropped out of the election earlier.
At the end the election was actually contested by the appellant, the respondent Kandaswami and two other candidates with whom also this appeal is not concerned.
The appellant was successful at the poll and was on March 6,1957, declared elected.
On April 15, 1957, the respondent Kandaswami whom we will hereafter refer to as the respondent, preferred an election petition under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for a declaration that the election of the appellant was void.
The appellant was made the first respondent to the petition but Meganathan and Muthu were not made parties to it at all.
Some of the other candidates at the election were also made parties to the petition but 871 it is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to them.
The petition was referred to an Election Tribunal for trial.
The appellant then made an application to the Election Tribunal which was marked I. A. No. 1 of 1957 for the dismissal of the petition under section 90(3) of the Act.
That section provides that, " The Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81, section 82 or section 117 ".
The appellant 's case was that the petition had not complied with the provisions of section 82.
Section 82 states: " A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.
" The appellant contended that allegations of corrupt practice were made in the petition against Meganathan and Muthu and they should, therefore, have been made parties to the petition under section 82 and as that had not been done, that section had not been complied with and so the petition had to be dismissed under section 90(3).
It is not in dispute that non compliance with the provisions of section 82 entails the dismissal of an election petition.
The respondent 's answer to the application was that no allegation of corrupt practice had been made in the petition against Meganathan or Muthu.
The Tribunal accepted the contention of the respondent and dismissed the application of the appellant.
The appellant then moved the High Court at Madras by two applications, one for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the, order of ' the Tribunal dismissing his application and the other for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing the Tribunal not to proceed with the hearing of the election petition.
The High Court by its judgment dated November 1, 1957, dismissed both the applications, taking the same view as the Tribunal.
Hence this appeal.
872 It is not in dispute that Meganath an and Muthu were candidates.
A candidate has been defined in section 79 of the Act as meaning among others, a person who has been duly nominated as a candidate at any election and both Meganthan and Muthu had been so nominated.
The only question that arises in this appeal is whether allegations of corrupt practice are made against them in the election petition.
The statements in the petition which are said to constitute such allegations are in these terms: " IV A.
The returned candidate has committed the following act,% of bribery corrupt practices according to section 123(1) of Act 43 of 1951 : (2) Sri M. R. Meganathan was candidate for Sattankulam and Tiruchandur Assembly Constituencies at the election.
The first respondent and his election Agent paid him a gift of Rs. 10,000 to induce him to withdraw from being a candidate at the election from Sattankulam Constituency and in pursuance thereof Sri M. R. Meganathan withdrew his candidature at the election from Sattankulam Constituency,. . . . . . . . (4) One Sri G. E. Muthu, candidate at the election in this Constituency was paid a gratification of Rs. 5,000 by the first respondent and his Election Agent for the purpose of making him retire from contest and in pursuance thereof he retired on the contest Putting it shortly, the allegations in the petition are that the appellant and his election agent paid Meganathan Rs. 10,000 and Muthu Rs. 5,000 to induce them to drop out of the election and they accordingly abandoned the election contest.
So all that is said here against Meganathan and Muthu and we are concerned only with allegations against them is that they accepted money paid to them to induce them 873 to abandon the contest and actually abandoned the contest.
Is an allegation then, that a candidate accepted money paid to him to induce him to drop out of the election test and actually so dropped out, an allegation of corrupt practice against such a candidate ? The High Court field that it was not and that only the giving of a bribe was a corrupt practice and not an acceptance of it.
We are in agreement with this view.
T he Act contemplates various kinds of corrupt practices and defines them in section 123.
We are concerned with the corrupt practice of bribery which is the corrupt practice alleged in the petition.
Bribery again is of several varieties.
We are concerned with a gift to a candidate for inducing him to abandon his candidature.
This form of the corrupt practice of bribery is thus defined in the Act: "Section 123 The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act: (1) Bribery, that is to say, any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, of any gratification to any person whomsoever, with the object directly or indirectly of inducing (a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a candidate, or to retire from contest, at an election; Explanation.
For the purposes of this clause the term " gratification " is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of employment for reward; but it does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for he purpose of, any election and duly entered in the account of election expenses referred to in section 78.
" is an acceptance of a bribe, by which word we mean a gift made with the intention specified, a corrupt practice within this definition ? We do not think it is.
What this definition makes the corrupt practice of bribery is a " gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, of any gratification" made with the object mentioned.
The words " gift, 874 offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person " clearly show that what is contemplated is the making of a gift.
These words are wholly inappropriate to describe the acceptance of a gift.
The words " with the object, directly or indirectly, of inducing" also indicate that only the making of a gift is contemplated, for the object is of the person making the gift, and clearly not of the person accepting it.
Mr. Sastri who appeared for the appellant contended that the words " by a candidate or his agent or by any other person " are not to be read with the word " gift " but only with the words " offer or promise ".
It seems to us that this is an impossible reading of the section as it is framed.
Even on this reading, the section would still contemplate a gift " to any person " and therefore only the giving and not an acceptance, of it.
That section 123(1) does not contemplate the acceptance of a gift to be a corrupt practice is also apparent from a consideration of section 124 of the Act which was deleted by an amendment made by Act XXVII of 1956.
Under el.
(3) of that section the receipt of or an agreement to receive a gift with substantially the same object as mentioned in section 123 was a corrupt practice.
As legislative provisions are not duplicated, such a receipt of or an agreement to receive a gratification was clearly not a corrupt practice within section 123(1) as it stood before the amendment.
The amending Act has dropped the provision making acceptance and an agreement to accept a bribe, a corrupt practice but has made no change in section 123(1) to bring within it these cases.
Section 123(1) cannot therefore be read as including within the definition of a bribe contained in it an acceptance of it.
By omitting section 124(3) from the Act therefore the legislature intended that acceptance of a bribe was no longer to be treated as a corrupt practice.
In view of this clear indication of intention, it would be idle to enquire why the legislature thought fit to exclude the acceptance of a bribe from the definition of corrupt practice.
If the omission is accidental, then it is for the legislature to take the necessary action in that behalf.
We cannot allow any 875 consideration of the reason for the omission to affect the plain meaning of the language used in section 123(1).
Mr. Sastri then contended that in view of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, there can be no gift without an acceptance of it by the donee, and therefore whenever a gift is mentioned both the giving and the acceptance of the thing given are necessarily simultaneously contemplated.
He said that, it followed from this that the corrupt practice of bribery by a gift mentioned in section 123(1) included the acceptance of the gift.
It is true that a gift contemplates both a giving and an acceptance; but these are none the less different acts and it is open to the legislature to attach certain consequences to one of them only.
It was therefore open to the legislature in enacting section 123(1) to provide that the making, that is to say, the giving of a gift alone should be a corrupt practice.
This is what it has done: it has not made the receipt of a gift a corrupt practice.
It has deliberately omitted the acceptance of a gift from corrupt practices described in the Act.
Though a gift cannot be mad(,, without an acceptance of it, such acceptance has not been made a corrupt practice.
Mr. Sastri also contended that section 99 of the Act showed that the receipt of a bribe was a corrupt practice.
Section 98 states that at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make one or other of the orders therein mentioned.
Then comes section 99 which states that in certain circumstances besides these orders, certain other orders have also to be made by the Tribunal.
The material portion of this section is in these terms: " section 99 (1) At the time of making an order under section 98 the Tribunal shall also make an order (a) Where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt practice having been committed at the election, recording (i) a finding whether any corrupt practice has or has not been proved to have been committed by, or with the consent of, any candidate or his agent at the election, and the nature of that corrupt practice; and 876 (ii) the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt practice and the ture of that practice;and.
Mr. Sastri contended that under this section the Tribunal has to record a finding whether a corrupt practice has been committed with the consent of any candidate.
He said that when a candidate accepts a gift made to him with the object of inducing him to withdraw his candidature, he consents to the corrupt practice of bribery being committed and such a candidate is liable to be named under the section.
He added that in order that such a candidate can be Bo named a charge of the corrupt practice has to be made against him in the election petition.
The result, therefore, according to Mr. Sastri, is that a candidate who consents to a bribe being paid to him to withdraw his candidature is guilty of a corrupt practice and therefore an allegation of such a corrupt practice can be made in the petition if it is intended to have him named under section 99 and once such an allegation is made in the petition, section 82(b) would be attracted and the candidate has to be made a party to the petition.
He says such allegations were made against Meganathan and Muthu.
This contention seems to us to be clearly fallacious.
Section 99 does not purport to define a corrupt practice.
The definition of corrupt practice occurs in section 123 and the corrupt practice mentioned in section 99 has to be a corrupt practice as so defined.
A corrupt practice committed with the consent of a candidate is not in itself a new kind of corrupt practice.
When section 99 talks of a corrupt practice having been committed with the consent of a candidate it means a corrupt practice as defined in section 123 having been committed and a candidate having consented to its commission.
The consent by a candidate to the commission of a corrupt practice by some one else whatever its con sequences under the Act may be, is not itself a corrupt practice.
Therefore, to say that a candidate consented to a corrupt practice being committed by accepting a gift made to him to induce him to withdraw his 877 candidature, is not to say that he himself committed a corrupt practice.
Such a statement in an election petition is not an allegation of corrupt practice against the consenting candidate.
Hence section 82(b) does not require that he should be made a party to the petition.
We wish to make it clear that we are not to be understood as holding that a candidate accepting a gift made to him to induce him to withdraw his candidature is one who consents to a corrupt practice being committed.
We do not think it necessary to say anything on that question in this case.
Mr. Sastri then said that the term gratification in section 123 was very wide and would include the withdrawal of his candidature by a candidate to induce another candidate to stand at an election.
He contended that the affording of such a gratification would amount to a corrupt practice within section 123.
He submitted that such corrupt practices had been alleged in the petition against Meganathan and Muthu and they should therefore have been made parties to the petition under section 82(b).
We are wholly unable to agree that the withdrawal of his candidature by a candidate to induce another candidate to stand at an election would be gratification within section 123.
But assume it is so.
That does not help the appellant at all.
Here, there is no allegation in the petition that Meganathan and Muthu with drew their candidature in order to induce the appellant to stand at the election, so there is no allegation in the petition of corrupt practices having been committed by them by so withdrawing their candidature.
It was therefore not necessary to make Meganathan and Muthu parties to the petition under section 82(b).
Lastly, Mr. Sastri contended that section 82(b) talked of allegations of any corrupt practice " and it therefore contemplated any allegation relating to or concerning, a corrupt practice.
He said that the election petition contained allegations against Meganathan and Muthu, relating to a corrupt practice inasmuch as it stated that they accepted the gratifications paid to them to withdraw their candidature and actually withdrew 878 such candidature.
Hence, he said, section 82(b) required that they should have been made parties to the petition.
We are of opinion that when section 82(b) talks of allegations of corrupt practice against a candidate it means allegations that a candidate has committed a corrupt practice.
Allegations can hardly be said to be " against " one unless they impute some default to him.
So allegations of corrupt practice against a candidate must mean that the candidate was guilty of corrupt practice.
We are also unable to appreciate how an allegation that a candidate accepted a gratification paid to him to withdraw his candidature is all allegation relating to a corrupt practice.
The acceptance of the gratification does not relate to any corrupt practice, for we have earlier shown that the corrupt practice consists in the giving of the gift and riot in the acceptance of it.
In the result this appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
After the poll the appellant was declared elected to the Madras Legislative Assembly.
Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition praying that it be declared that the election of the appellant was void.
In the petition it was alleged that two of the candidates at the election accepted money paid to them by the appellant and his election agent to induce them to abandon the contest and they actually abandoned the contest.
These two candidates were not made parties to the petition.
The appellant applied to the Election Tribunal to dismiss the petition under section 90(3) Of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for non compliance with the provisions of section 82 of the Act on the ground that allegations of a corrupt practice were made against the two candidates and Respondent No. 1 had failed to make them parties to the petition as required by section 82: Held, that the acceptance of gratification is not a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(1) Of the Act and consequently it could not be said that allegations of corrupt practice had been made against the two candidates.
There was thus no non compliance with the provisions of section 82 and the election petition was not liable to be dismissed under section 90(3).


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2591 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.3.1986 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in F.A.O. No. 986 of 1985.
Rajinder Sachar, E.S. Agarwala, H.D. Bhardwaj, J.S. Manhas and R.K. Kapoor for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, K.B. Rohatgi and Baldev Atreya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 851 PATHAK, CJ.
Special leave granted.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana setting aside an arbitration award.
The Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (referred to shortly as the "Marketing Board") entered into a contract with the appellant for the construction of their office building at Panchkula near Chandigarh.
It was stipulated that the work would be completed within six months.
It was also stipulated that in case of a dispute between the par ties, the Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board would be appointed as sole Arbitrator.
A dispute arose between the parties in regard to comple tion of the construction, and it was decided to refer the matter to arbitration.
On 11 March, 1983 the respondent appointed Shri D.P. Gupta, Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board as Arbitrator.
While the Arbitrator was seized of the dispute between the parties, the Chairman of the Marketing Board purported to revert him to his parent Department.
On 6 April, 1984 the Arbitrator made his Award.
Under the Award the appellant was held entitled to Rs.55,242.66 with interest.
On 2 May, 1984 the appellant applied before the learned Subordinate Judge, Ist Class, Chandigarh, for making the Award a rule of the Court.
Meanwhile, on 24 May, 1984 the State Government passed an order confirming that Shri D.P. Gupta continued in his post as Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board.
On 28 February, 1985 the Marketing Board passed a resolution, giving effect to the direction of the Government extending the deputation tenure of Shri D .P.
Gupta to 3 September, 1985.
On 30 July 1985 the Trial Court made the Award a rule of the Court.
In appeal to the High Court, it was urged that on 6 April, 1984, the date on which the Arbitrator made his award, the Arbitrator had lost jurisdiction since he had been transferred out on 4 April, 1984 from the post of Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board to his parent Department in the Haryana Government.
The High Court accept ed the plea and reversed the order of the Trial Court and set aside the Award.
The sole question before us is whether the Arbitrator, Shri D.P. Gupta, had jurisdiction to make the Award on 6 April, 1984 or had lost jurisdiction because of the order dated 4 April, 1984 reverting him to his parent Department.
The material before us shows that Shri D.P. 852 Gupta was on deputation with the Marketing Board up to September 4, 1984 and that he was prematurely required by the Chairman of the Marketing Board by order dated 4 April, 1984 to revert to his parent Department.
The State Govern ment, however, ordered on 24 May, 1984 that Shri D.P. Gupta would continue on deputation with the Board, and it is not disputed that Shri Gupta rejoined the Board.
He did not in fact ever resume a post in his parent Department.
The neces sary consequence of the order of the State Government con tinuing him on deputation with the Marketing Board was to nullify the order dated 4 April, 1984 passed by the Chairman purporting to revert Shri Gupta to his parent Department.
It appears from the record that Shri Gupta was paid his salary by the Marketing Board for the entire month of April 1984, a circumstances which establishes that the Board itself con sidered him as continuing on deputation when he made the Award.
That being so, he must be deemed to have enjoyed jurisdiction as Arbitrator on 6 April, 1984 when he made the Award.
The deputation of Shri Gupta with the Marketing Board did never terminate.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court are restored.
No Order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The respondent Marketing Board, entered into a contract with the appellant for the construction of their office building.
The agreement stipulated that the Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board would be appointed as the sole Arbitrator in case of a dispute.
A dispute arose in regard to the completion of the construction, and it was decided to refer the matter to arbitration.
On 11th March, 1983 the respondent appointed Shri Gupta, Superintending Engineer of the Marketing Board as Arbitrator.
While the Arbitrator was seized of the dis pute, the Chairman of the Marketing Board purported to revert him to his parent department.
On 6th April, 1984, the Arbitrator made his award which was in favour of the appellant.
On 2nd May, 1984 the appel lant applied to the Sub Judge for making the award a rule of the Court.
In the meanwhile, on 24th May, 1984, the State Government passed an order confirming that Shri Gupta con tinued in the post as Superintending Engineer.
On 28th February, 1985, the Marketing Board passed a resolution giving effect to the said direction of the Government and extending the deputation tenure of Shri Gupta to 3rd Septem ber, 1985.
On 30th July 1985, the Trial Court made the award a rule of the Court.
In the appeal to the High Court it was urged that on 6th April, 1984 the date on which the Arbitrator made his Award, the Arbitrator had lost jurisdiction since he had been transfered on 4th April, 1984 from the post of Superintend ing Engineer of the Marketing Board to his 850 parent department in the State Government.
The High Court accepted this plea and reversed the order of the Trial Court and set aside the Award.
In the appeal by the contractor to this Court, the question was; whether the Arbitrator, Shri Gupta had juris diction to make the award on 6th April, 1984 or had lost jurisdiction because of the order dated 4th April, 1984 reverting him to his parent department.
Allowing the appeal, HELD: 1.
Shri Gupta was on deputation with the Marketing Board up to September 4, 1984.
He was prematurely required by the Chairman of the Marketing Board by order dated 4th April, 1984 to revert to his parent department.
The State Government, however, ordered on 24th May, 1984 that Shri Gupta would continue on deputation with the Board.
In fact, Shri Gupta did not even resume a post in his parent depart ment.
[852A B] 2.
The necessary consequences of the order of the State Government continuing Shri Gupta on deputation with the Marketing Board was to nullify the order dated 4th April, 1984 passed by the Chairman purporting to revert him to his parent department.
It is clear from the records that Shri Gupta was paid his salary by the Marketing Board for the entire month of April 1984, a circumstance which establishes that he was continuing with the Board when he made the Award.
Shri Gupta must, therefore, he deemed to have enjoyed jurisdiction as Arbitrator on 6th April, 1984 when he made the Award.
The deputation of Shri.
Gupta with the Marketing Board did never terminate.
[852B D]


judgement:
(Civil) No. 8227 of 1982.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Dr. Abishek Singhvi, A. Subba Rao and A.S. Gauraya for the Petitioners.
Girish Chandra and section Suri for the Respondents.
855 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
This petition under Article 32 of the Con stitution has been filed by two petitioners, the Assam Rifles Multi purpose Co operative Society Limited and Major General A.S. Guraya, AVSM (Retd.), Vice Chairman of the said Co operative Society.
It is stated in this petition that on the north eastern extremity of India, between latitudes 27deg.
N. and 28deg.
N. and on both sides of longitude 97xE., within the former Tirup District in the NEFA area (now in Arunachal Pradesh) lies substantial territory which is a part of India.
It is claimed that Major General Guraya as Inspector General Assam Rifles prepared a programme for settling retired defence personnel, specially of the Assam Rifles, in that region and took preparator steps for effect ing such settlement.
It is asserted that about two hundred retired personnel with their families journeyed to the region and settled there on the basis of a scheme approved by the Government of India.
It is alleged that the scheme assured allotment of land, grant of title deeds in respect of the allotted land, facilities for movement by air to and from Mohanbari, freedom to develop the allotted areas, grant of advance by way of loans, provision of marketing facili ties for disposal of surplus produce, guaranteed supply of essential commodities and provision of the basic require ments of life for the purpose of encouraging the all round economic development of the area.
The Co operative Society was formed with the object of ameliorating the conditions of the settlers and for improving their economic lot.
The petitioners relied on correspondence exchanged between them and the authorities of the State Government and of the Central Government and prayed for directions from this Court to the respondents for grant of the reliefs indicated in the writ petition.
Counter Affidavits have been filed by the Government of India.
Most of the allegations made by the petitioners have been denied.
It is asserted that funds have been set apart and basic facilities have been provided.
It is alleged that land was not allotted to Major Gen. Guraya as he did not belong to the Assam Rifles and the scheme for rehabilitation of retired personnel from that unit did not cover him.
It is alleged that he has engineered this writ petition.
We may mention at the very outset that Major General Guraya, who appears in person before us, has categorically stated that he is not interested any more in any personal allotment.
The case was taken up by us on 20 February, 1987 and after 856 hearing the parties we were satisfied that settlement and habitation in that region should be encouraged.
The region constitutes part of Indian territory and is located on the Indian border with China and Burma.
It is in the public interest and for the benefit of the public that settlement of Indian citizens should be encouraged in this area and the area should be suitably developed.
In that view, on 20 February, 1987 we made an order directing the Central Gov ernment to nominate a competent authority of suitable status to examine the problem and to look into the scheme and, after hearing the petitioners, to report to the Central Government to enable it to make an appropriate order for redress of the grievances of the petitioners.
Pursuant to the order of this Court, a report was submitted by the present Director General, Assam Rifles in which he noted the features of the original scheme set forth in NEFA Adm. letter No. PC 42/63 of 16/17 August, 1963 and the approval with modifications of the Government of India in the Minis try of External Affairs thereto, as well as the points raised by the Assam Rifles Ex servicemen before this Court and before the Director General, Assam Rifles when he visit ed Vijayanagar for the purpose, and in that report, he has made a number of recommendations in support of the scheme to settle Assam Rifles Ex servicemen and to ensure that the various facilities and concessions originally promised to them are provided.
We had directed in our order of 20 Febru ary, 1987 that the final order should be made by the Govern ment of India after consideration of the report.
It seems that the Government considered the recommendations at an inter Ministerial meeting held in the Home Ministry on 6 July, 1987 and thereafter took the decision contained in Annexure III to the affidavit of Shri R.K. Tandon, Deputy Secretary (NE), Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
It appears that the Government has decided that the Assam Rifles Ex servicemen who have been allotted 10 11 acres of prime land per family in a valley should be provided with agricultural input facilities including animal husbandry, fertilizers, insecticides as well as horticultural support under the normal schemes run by the State Government, that the State Government should be requested to issue specific letters in respect of each family to enable it to obtain loans from banks and other financial institutions, that while free air lifts were not possible, the State Government should be asked to find out whether the subsidised rate of Rs.89 per flight per head could be further reduced and that in any event no charges be levied for abortive flights, that while a full time doctor is already posted in Vijaynagar, the State Government should be requested to post a mid wife to the Vijayanagar hospital and to arrange for periodical visits of a Gynaecologist, that the State PWD be requested to undertake the repair of the suspension bridges forthwith, 857 that the Multi purpose Co operative Society should apply to the State Government for recognition, and that a meeting be called to sort out the difficulties in the disbursal of pension by the Department of Posts and that on issues such as grant of citizenship, loans etc.
the position indicated in the minutes of the inter Ministerial meeting held on 6 July, 1987 should be maintained.
The report of the present Director General Assam Rifles and the decisions taken by the Central Government thereupon have been considered by us in the light of the submissions made by the parties.
The decisions of the Central Government placed before us refer to requests to be made to the State Government to provide some of the facilities required by the settlers.
Reference has already been made to those matters earlier.
More than sufficient time has passed, and it is desirable to ascertain what action has been taken by the State Government pursuant to those requests of the Central Government.
Certain supplementary directions are necessary from this Court, and we make them now: 1.
The Central Government and the State Government should decide between them as to which of them will give loans to the settlers and to what extent.
The Central Government should direct that the exist ing Post Office establishment be enlarged to handle dis bursement of pensions.
The State Government should upgrade the existing middle school to the status of a high school and make ade quate provision for additional seats in the student hostel to absorb the corresponding increase in the number of stu dents resulting from such upgradation.
The grant of domicile certificates should be consid ered in relation to the settlers, at least in respect of the members of the petitioner society.
The case will now be listed on 1 August, 1989 before which date the respondent No. 1, the Union of India, and the respondent No. 2, the State of Arunachal Pradesh, will file affidavits indicating the action adopted by them pursuant to the decisions taken at the inter Ministerial meeting men tioned earlier and pursuant to the directions made by this Court in this Order.

summary/full:
The petitioners, the Assam Rifles Multi purpose Co operative Society, and its Vice Chairman a retired Military Officer, filed a writ petition in this Court praying for directions to the respondents for implementing the scheme, approved by the Government of India, for settling retired Defence Personnel, specially of the Assam Rifles, in the North Eastern Region.
The petitioner asserted that in pursu ance of this scheme, which assured the allotment of land, grant of title deeds in respect of the allotted land, facil ities for movement by air, freedom to develop the allotted area, grant of advance by way of loans etc.
and also provi sion of basic requirements of life for encouraging all round economic development of the area, about 200 retired person nel with their families journeyed to the region and settled there.
The respondents, in their counter affidavits contended that funds had been set apart and basic facilities provided.
This Court, by its Order dated February 20, 1987, di rected the Central Government to nominate a competent au thority for examining the problem, and looking into the scheme and submitting a report to the Central Government to enable it to consider the same and take necessary steps for redressal of the petitioners ' grievances.
Accordingly, the Director General of Assam Rifles submitted to the Government his report, making a number of recommendations in support of the scheme to settle Assam Rifles Ex servicemen and to ensure that the various facilities and concessions original ly promised to them were provided.
The Central Government considered the recommendations at an inter Ministerial meet ing and took certain decisions and placed them before the Court.
After considering the report and decisions of the Government 854 thereon and submissions made by the parties, this Court, HELD: The region constitutes part of Indian territory and is located on the Indian border with China and Burma.
It is in the public interest and for the benefit of the public that settlement of Indian citizens should be encouraged in this area and the area should be suitably developed.
[856A B] More than sufficient time has passed and it is desira ble to ascertain what action has been taken by the State Government pursuant to the requests made to it by the Cen tral Government to provide some of the facilities required by the settlers, and it is considered necessary to make the following supplementary directions: [857C D] The Central Government and State Government should decide between them as to which of them will give loans to the settlers and to what extent.
[857D] The Central Government should direct that the existing post office establishment should be enlarged to handle disbursement of pensions.
[857E] The State Government should upgrade the existing middle school to the status of High School and make adequate provi sion for additional seats in the students ' hostel to absorb the increasing number of seats resulting from such upgrada tion and the grant of domicile certificates in relation to settlers, atleast in respect of members of petitioner socie ty should be considered.
[857E F] Respondents No. 1 and 2 will file before the next date of hearing, affidavits indicating the action taken by them pursuant to the decisions taken at the inter Ministeri al meeting and pursuant to the directions made by this Court.
[857G]