judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3584 of 1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 8.12.1986 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta in T.A. No. 1143 of 1986.
Mrs. C. Markandeya for the Petitioners.
(Not present) B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, C.V. Subba Rao and A.K. Srivastava for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an application for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, directed against the judgment and order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench (Justice Ashamukul Pal and Mr B. Mukhopadhyay) dated 8th December, 1986.
The Tribunal had dismissed the challenge made by the petitioners herein to the memorandum of 1979 declaring that the posts in Production Control Organisation (for short PCO) in Kharagpur would be treated as ex cadre.
There are 75 applicants in this case.
At the relevant time they all were employees of the PCO at Kharagpur Railway Workshop of South Eastern Railway.
The petitioners contend that these posts could not be declared as ex cadre posts because vested rights of the petitioners could not have been affected.
Secondly, it was contended that they were treated differently from the employees of the Integral Coach Factory on the Southern Railway and those of PCO there continued to hold the cadre posts.
This is hostile discrimination and amounts to violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners.
The Tribunal by its impugned order rejected both the contentions.
428 The PCO was in existence from the time of the B.N. Railway.
The staff of the PCO were either directly recruited or drafted from different shops of the workshop.
In 1958 the PCO was considerably expanded.
After considering the question the Railway Board brought out a Circular dated 22.4.1963 laying down the rules for determination of seniority of workshop staff employed in the PCO.
It was laid down in the Circular that all posts in the PCO should be treated as ex cadre posts.
This is Annexure 'B ' to the writ application which was ultimately disposed of by the Tribunal.
The Circular, however, could not be implemented in the Kharagpur workshop on account of the stiff opposition of organised labour.
In the premises the local authorities could not implement the Circular of 1963.
The question was discussed with the organised labour in a meeting held on 4th June, 1973 and in pursuance of the decision taken in that meeting the memorandum dated 21st July, 1973 which is also Annexure 'B ' was issued by the Superintendent.
It was evidently stated that all posts in PCO would be cadre posts.
It may, however, be reiterated that this was in violation of the order of 1963.
Another memorandum was issued by the same authority on 15th December, 1973 which not only declared all posts in PCO to be cadre posts but also laid down that an option would be given to the persons already working in the PCO to revert to the shops.
It appears that the question of having incentive schemes for the staff of the PCO was under consideration of the Railway Board and by a Circular dated 9.7.1978 the Railway Board declared that the staff from shop floors posted in the PCO would receive special pay of 10% of their pay but this would not be available to the staff who were permanently absorbed in the PCO or directly recruited in the PCO.
It appears that this brought a change in the attitude of the labour and representations were made to the Railway Board for implementing its Circular dated 22.4.1963 so that the staff of the Pco would be eligible for the special pay.
Joint meetings were held with the labour on 4th and 22nd September, 1979 and in pursuance of the decisions taken in these meetings the memorandum dated 4 5/10/79 at Annexure (I) was issued which declared that the Railway Board 's Circular of 1963 would be implemented in the PCO and that all posts would be treated as ex cadre posts.
This was impugned before the Tribunal.
It was contended that the vested rights which accrued in favour of the petitioners by the operation of the memoranda dated 21st July and 15th December, 1973 were affected by declaring that the posts in PCO would be on cadre basis.
These were issued, it appears, in viola 429 tion of the clear directives of 1963 of the Railway Board.
Hence, these Circulars were in violation of Rule l58 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol.
I, which lays down that the General Managers of the Indian Railways have full powers to make rules with regard to non gazetted railway servants under their control provided they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the President or the Railway Board.
It, however, appears that the memorandum dated 21st July, 1973 was clearly inconsistent with the Circular issued by the Railway Board in 1963 for the former stipulated that all posts in the PCO would be cadre posts.
Both these memoranda were issued as a result of the meeting with the workers.
In that view of the matter, in our opinion, it cannot be contended that vested rights have been affected.
Administrative re organisation is permissible and as a result of the same rights may be affected but the vested rights could not be taken away.
See in this connection the observations of this Court in T. R. Kapur & Ors.
vs State of Haryana & Ors.
, ; Here, however, in as much as the memorandum dated 21st July, 1973 was inconsistent with the Circular issued by the Railway Board, no right vested in the petitioners and, hence, no question of affecting vested rights arises.
The second ground was that there was discrimination against the petitioners referred to the Railway Board 's Circular dated 13th September, 1984 which made an exception for the Integral Coach Factory at the Southern Railway and allowed the PCO to continue on cadre basis.
It was submitted that this was a case of discrimination.
It appears that the impugned Circular of 1984 of the Railway Board was issued pursuant to the negotiations with the staff in the Departmental Council of Ministry of Railways.
The existing arrangement in the PCO of Integral Coach Factory was not disturbed because the recognised Unions there did not want it to be so disturbed; whereas in the PCO of Kharagpur the recognised Unions had already agreed, as appears from the impugned memorandum at Annexure 'I ' that the Railway Board 's Circular dated 22.4.1963 would be implemented in the Kharagpur, PCO and that all posts in the PCO would be treated as ex cadre posts.
The Railway Board is fully competent to bring about unnecessary changes in the staff pattern of the various units under its control for the purpose of streamlining the organisation and improving the efficiency of the administration.
Hence, there was a good ground for this differentiation which has a rational nexus with the object of streamlining the organisation.
This differentiation cannot be condemned as violative of the rule of equality.
It does not amount to hostile discrimina 430 tion.
Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class disposition but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of disposition which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the disposition.
See D. section Nakara & others vs Union of India, ; at 179.
Further, the Tribunal modified certain portions of the impugned memorandum and directed that the provisions should be made for those who opt to continue in the PCO at Kharagpur after the issue of the Circular dated 13.9.1984 so that they may be given an opportunity to exercise their option in this regard and be provided with avenue for promotion within the PCO.
Previously, in 1963 such option was provided and it was stipulated that employees permanently absorbed in the PCO or directly recruited in the PCO who did not exercise option in favour of transfer, they would be considered for promotion along with others to higher grade posts in the PCO only.
In our opinion, it was done to help the petitioners.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners.
The challenge to the Tribunal 's order, therefore, cannot be entertained.
Before concluding it is worthwhile to note that none appeared for the petitioners when the matter was called on.
The matter was called twice.
We have disposed of the matter on perusing the order of the Tribunal and also upon considering the submissions made by the respondents.
The application, therefore, fails and dismissed.
No order as to cost P.S.S. Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
Rule 158 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol.
I, empowers the General Managers to make rules with regard to the non gazetted railway servants provided they are not inconsistent with any rules made by the President or the Railway Board.
The Railway Board brought out a circular dated 22.4.1963 laying down the rules for determination of seniority of workshop staff employed in the Production Control organisation and declaring all posts therein as ex cadre.
Due to the stiff opposition of organised labour the said circular could not be implemented in the Kharagpur workshop.
The Superintendent, however, after discussing the question with the organised labour issued a memorandum on 21.7.1973 stating that all posts in the PCO would be cadre posts.
Subsequently, by a circular dated 9.7.1978 the Railway Board declared that the staff from shop floors posted in the PCO would receive special pay of 10% of their pay but this would not be available to the staff who were permanently absorbed in the PCO or directly recruited in the PCO.
Upon this, representations were made by the labour to the Railway Board for implementing its circular dated 22.4.1963 so that the staff of the Pco would be eligible for the special pay.
In pursuance of the meetings held with the labour, the memorandum dated 4 5/l0/1979 was issued which declared that the Railway Board 's circular of 1963 would be implemented in the PCO and that all posts would be treated as ex cadre posts.
By another circular issued on 426 13.9.1984 the Railway Board allowed the PCO at the Integral Coach Factory, Southern Railway, to continue on cadre basis.
Aggrieved by the said circular, the petitioners, who at the relet time were all employees of PCO at Kharagpur, carried the matter before the Central Administrative Tribunal and contended; (i) that their posts could not be declared as ex cadre because vested rights which had accrued in their favour could not be affected, and (ii) they could not be treated differently from those of the Integral Coach Factory.
This was hostile discrimination and amounted to violation of their rights.
The Tribunal rejected both the contentions.
Dismissing the special leave petition, ^ HELD: 1.
Administrative re organisation is permissible and as a result of the same rights may be affected but the vested rights could not be taken away.
In the instant case inasmuch as the memorandum dated 21st July, 1973 inconsistent with the circular issued by the Railway Board in 1963 no right vested in the petitioners and hence no question of affecting vested rights arise.
[429C D] T.R. Kapur & Ors.
vs State of Haryana & Ors.
; referred to.
2.1 Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class disposition but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of disposition which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the disposition.
[430A B] D.S. Nakara & Ors.
vs Union of India, ; , referred to.
2.2 The circular of 1984 of the Railway Board was issued pursuant to the negotiations with the staff in the Departmental Council of Ministry of Railways.
The existing arrangement in the PCO of Integral Coach Factory was not disturbed because the recognised Unions there did not want it to be so disturbed; whereas in the PCO of Kharagpur the recognised Unions had already agreed that the Railway Board 's circular dated 22.4.1963 would be implemented and that all posts in that PCO would be treated as ex cadre.
[429F G] 427 2.3 The Railway Board is fully competent to bring about necessary changes in the staff pattern of the various units under its control for the purpose of steamlining the organisation and improving the efficiency of the administration.
There was, therefore, a good ground for this differentiation which has a rational nexus with the object of streamlining the organisation.
This differentiation cannot be condemned as violative of the rule of equality.
It does not amount to hostile discrimination.
[429G H]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 811 of 1988.
399 From the Judgment and order dated 9.12.1986 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 2213 of 1986 and C.M.P. No 1519 of 1986.
P.P. Rao, K.K. Patel, P.S. Pradhan and Rajiv Dutta for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, S.C. Mahanta, section Ramachandran, Mahabir Singh and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J.
Special Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 9.12.1986 dismissing the appellant 's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 30.
12.1986 dispensing with the appellant 's services as Addl.
District and Sessions Judge in terms of Rule 10(3) of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963.
Initially, the appellant was an advocate practising law in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
He was selected for appointment to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service by the High Court.
On the recommendation of the High Court the State Government by its order dated 14.4.1983 appointed the appellant as Addl.
District and Sessions Judge on probation for a period of two years in accordance with Rule 10(1) of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules 1963, as adopted by the State of Haryana (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).
The High Court by its order dated 27.4.1983 posted the appellant to Hissar as Addl.
District and Sessions Judge where he joined his duties on 2.5.
While he was posted at Hissar certain incidents took place as a result of which the Bar Association of Hissar passed a resolution against the appellant and as a result of which he was transferred from Hissar to Narnaul as Addl.
District & Sessions Judge where he assumed charge of his office on 5.5.1984.
While the appellant was posted at Narnaul inquiry into certain complaints against him was held by a Judge of the High Court.
After the inquiry the High Court at its meeting held on 21.3.1985 resolved that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary period and as such his services deserved to be dispensed with forthwith.
The High Court forwarded its recommendation for terminating the appellant 's services to the State Government by its letter dated 28.3.1985.
Before the State 400 Government could issue any orders, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court challenging the High Court 's decision.
On 14.4.1985 this court permitted the appellant to withdraw the petition with liberty to file the same before the High Court.
The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the resolution of the High Court as well as certain other consequential orders to which reference shall be made at a later stage.
A Division Bench of the High Court by its elaborate order dated 9.12.1986 dismissed the writ petition on the findings that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory and as he was on probation his services were rightly terminated without giving any opportunity to the appellant.
Thereafter, the State Government pursuant to the recommendation of the High Court issued orders on 30.12.1986 terminating the appellant 's services in accordance with Rule 10(3).
Aggrieved, the appellant has challenged the order of the High Court under appeal as well as the order of the State Government terminating his services.
Before the High Court the appellant laid main stress on the question that the order of termination which had been passed without holding an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to him to defend himself was violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as the same was based on a number of complaints and allegations as well as the report of a Judge of the High Court who had made inquiries into the complaints against the appellant.
The High Court considered the question in detail and recorded its finding that since the appellant was a probationer his services could be discharged without giving any opportunity to him in accordance with the Rules.
The High Court further held that the inquiry which was held by a judge of the High Court was not for the purpose of taking any disciplinary proceedings or imposing any punishment on the appellant instead the inquiry was held to find out the appellant 's suitability to the service.
Shri P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, challenged the findings of the High Court and urged that since the High Court resolved to terminate the appellant 's services on the basis of the inquiry report submitted by a learned Judge of the High Court, the constitutional protection available to the appellant under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and the principles of natural justice had been violated.
On the other hand, Dr. Y.S. Chitale appearing for the High Court submitted that the resolution of the High Court did not cause any stigma to the appellant and the inquiry held by the High Court was merely to judge his suitability for the service.
The appellant was not entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution nor he was entitled to 401 any opportunity of hearing before taking the decision for terminating the appellant 's probationary period.
We do not consider it necessary to deal with these rival submissions as in our opinion the High Court had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary period.
It appears to us as we shall presently show that the material which was taken into account was non existent, while the other material was not relevant and further the allegations which were taken into consideration remained unsubstantiated.
Having perused the entire material placed before us we are of the opinion that the High Court committed error in holding that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory and that his services were liable to be terminated.
We would now consider the facts and circumstances which persuaded the High Court on its administrative side in taking the decision to dispense with the appellant 's services.
On his selection the appellant was firstly posted at Hissar where he joined his duties on 2.5.1983.
While at Hissar the appellant decided a criminal case under Sections 363/366 IPC (State vs Ram Niwas) on l0.9.1983.
The appellant acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 366 IPC but convicted him under Section 363 IPC and released him on one year 's probation.
The accused preferred appeal against his conviction to the High Court.
Justice A.S. Bains by his order dated 5.4.1984 allowed the appeal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and therefore it was not safe to maintain his conviction.
In the course of his judgment Justice Bains made the following observations against the appellant: "I am constrained to remark that the judgment recorded by the trial court is extremely poor and is not based on the evidence on the record.
The trial court seems to have wrongly convicted the appellant.
" The appellant made representation against the aforesaid remarks but the High Court refused to grant any relief to the appellant on the ground that the remarks awarded to him had been made in judicial proceedings.
The appellant made a representation for placing his representation before the learned Judge who had awarded remarks against him but that too was not accepted.
The appellant, thereafter, approached the High Court in the judicial side by means of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expunging the aforesaid remarks but he could not get any relief.
Ultimately, the appellant approached this court by means of Criminal Misc.
Peti 402 tion No. 1377 of 1987 for expunging the aforesaid remarks.
This Court A by its order dated 7th September 1987 held that from the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that the order and judgment of the Addl.
District & Sessions Judge was not based on the evidence on record and the remarks made by Justice Bains were unwarranted.
This Court directed that the aforesaid remarks should be expunged from the judgment in appeal.
These facts show that the remarks made by Justice Bains against the appellant were unjustified, unwarranted and they ceased to be in force.
On 26.9.1983 while the petitioner was recording the statement of an Assistant Sub inspector of police in a sessions case, an advocate of Hissar Sh.
Nar Singh Bishnoi, came into the appellant 's court and made a request to the appellant that Thakur Dass, the Assistant Sub inspector of police whose statement was being recorded as a witness in a sessions case should be directed to appear in a complaint case against him (the Assistant Sub inspector of police) pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar.
The appellant told the Advocate Sh.
Nar Singh Bishnoi that the Chief Judicial Magistrate should direct Thakur Dass the witness to appear in his court and Shri Bishnoi might himself bring summons and serve the same on Thakur Dass.
Bishnoi went to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for bringing summons meanwhile the statement of Thakur Dass was recorded and on being discharged from the witness box he became free.
The appellant waited for more than half an hour but Shri Bishnoi did not turn up with the summons.
Thereupon he discharged Thakur Dass.
It was not strictly his duty as a Judge to detain the witness after his evidence was recorded for the purpose of serving summons in a complaint case on him.
Shortly, thereafter Sh.
Bishnoi, advocate, came to the appellant 's court and finding that the witness had already left the court he expressed his anger towards the appellant who was still presiding over his court and threatened him saying that he would see that no judicial officer would dare to act in such a manner.
Nar Singh Bishnoi, advocate, thereupon addressed a letter to the President of Bar Association requesting that a meeting of the Bar Association should be held which read as follows: "To The President, Distt.
Bar Association Hissar, Subject: To consider the behaviour of Sh.
I.C. Jain, Additional Sessions Judge.
403 Sir, It is submitted that today i.e. On 26.9.1983, I had presented an application in the court of Sh.
I.C. Jain, Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar in the presence and on behalf of my client, Sh.
Punam Chand, for effecting the service of summons on accused Thakur Dass S.I.
At that time Thakur Dass S.I. was appearing as witness in the witness box in the court of Sh.
I.C. Jain, and I.C. Jain refused to pass any order on my application and I was asked to bring the summons.
When after obtaining the Dasti summons from the court of Sh.
L.N. Mittal, C.J.M. Hissar, in whose court complaint was pending, I went to the court of Sh.
I.C. Jain, by that time Thakur Dass had already fled away and he was seen going on Motor Cycle by my client.
Behaviour meted out to me by Shri I.C Jain is in fact wrong and mishehaviour with the lawyers community at large.
I pray to all the members of Bar Association, Hissar that matter may be considered by calling for urgent meeting.
Sd/ Nar Singh Bishnoi, Advocate Hissar" On the aforesaid letter a meeting of the Bar was convened on 27.9.1983 and the following resolution was passed: "Resolved that the attitude and the behaviour of Shri I.C. Jain, Additional District & Sessions Judge, Hissar towards the members of the Bar is most deplorable, verges (sic) and condemnable for being rude un cooperative and insulting." The Bar Association forwarded a copy of the resolution to the High Court and also to the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar.
The appellant on getting information about the resolution addressed a letter to the Registrar of the High Court on 8.10.1983 giving his version about the incident and he further sought advice of the High Court as to whether in the circumstances the witness (Thakur Dass) should have been detained on the request of the counsel for a party to enable him to bring summons for effecting service on him and further whether it was the duty of the appellant as an Addl.
District & Sessions Judge to get the service effected without their being any requisition from the 404 court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
It appears that the High Court did not give any reply to the appellant and the guidance sought for by the appellant remained unattended.
These facts clearly show how the members of the Bar Association passed the resolution condemning a judicial officer on trifling matter without applying their mind to the question.
The appellant being an Additional Sessions Judge was not bound by law to detain the witness to enable counsel of a private party to bring Dasti summons for effecting service on the said witness.
The members of the Bar practising before the court should be aware of the legal position and they should not have indulged in passing a resolution condemning the appellant without there being any justifiable cause for the same.
If the members of the Bar Association pass resolution against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts without there being any justifiable cause it would be difficult for judicial officers to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities in an objective and unbiased manner.
We are distressed to find that the High Court instead of protecting the appellant took this incident into consideration in assessing the appellant 's work and conduct.
In May 1984 the appellant was transferred to Narnaul and it appears that some incidents took place there also and complaints were made to the High Court against the appellant.
On 14.9.1984 Ram Nath Mehlawat, an advocate cum journalist publishing a local weekly newspaper named 'Jan Hirdey 'and who was also connected with a social organisation 'Janata Kalyan Samiti ' was assaulted by certain persons.
On a complaint made by Sh.
Mehlawat, a criminal case was registered and it was committed to sessions for trial.
The appellant convicted the accused persons except one under Sections 325/324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The appellant rejected the plea of the complainant Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat that he was a public servant that the injuries were caused to him while performing public duty.
The appellant held that no offence under Sections 332/353 IPC was made out.
Ram Nath Mehlawat made a complaint to the High Court against the appellant alleging that the appellant had adjourned the case on several dates and he had acquitted the accused of offence punishable under Sections 332/353 IPC on extraneous consideration.
He further alleged that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification in acquitting the accused and further releasing the convicting accused persons on probation.
The allegations contained in the complaint of Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat were enquired into by Justice Surinder Singh.
As regards correctness of the judgment is concerned it is relevant to note that Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat filed appeal before the High Court 405 against the appellant 's order releasing accused persons on probation and also a criminal revision against the order of acquittal on the charges under Sections 332/353/149 and 148 of Indian Penal Code and also against the order of releasing the convicted accused persons on probation.
The appeal was dismissed on merits by Justice Tiwana, who observed that he found no infirmity in the conclusion recorded by the trial judge.
The learned Judge held that Ram Nath Mehlawat, Advocate, was not a public servant though he may have been a Project Director of Adult Education Project run by a social organisation.
The learned Judge further held that the conclusion of the trial judge (appellant) was correct and there was no merit in the appeal.
In this view both appeal and revision filed by Sh.
Ram Nath Mehlawat were dismissed and the order passed by the appellant was upheld.
These facts show that Ram Nath Mehlawat failed in his attempt to get the appellant 's order set aside by the High Court.
Having failed to do so on the judicial side he made several complaints against the appellant making wild allegations against him about the aforesaid cases.
It appears he was instrumental in getting complaints made about other matters also.
These complaints were referred to the vigilance judge, who enquired into those matters and the report of the vigilance judge was placed before the full court of the High Court on 27.7.1985.
After considering the appellant 's confidential roll the High Court resolved to dispense with the appellant 's services.
It is asserted on behalf of the High Court that since the appellant 's work and conduct were not found satisfactory during the period of probation of two years the court decided to dispense with his services forthwith.
Consequently it made recommendation to the State Government for issuing necessary orders.
The decision to dispense with the appellant 's services was taken at the full court meeting of the High Court held on 21st March, 1980.
Along with agenda a note was circulated to the Hon 'ble Judges, referring to five complaints out of which four complaints had been inquired into by Justice Surinder Singh and the fifth complaint remained without any inquiry.
The report of Justice Surinder Singh was considered by the High Court along with appellant 's service record.
The High Court formed opinion that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory.
Since the report of Justice Surinder Singh vigilance judge formed foundation for taking action against the appellant, we consider it necessary to refer to the same in detail.
A copy of the report is on file on perusal of the same we find that in all four complaints were referred to Justice Surinder Singh who was Vigilance Judge for inquiry.
The first complaint was by R.N. 406 Mehlawat, Project Director, Adult Education.
He raised a grievance A that on July 25, 1984 the appellant convicted the four accused but he went out of the way to institute an inquiry against Ranjit Singh accused and also against the defence witness for forging a document.
He further released all the convicted accused persons on probation.
Shri Mehlawat was aggrieved that though he was a public servant the accused were not convicted under Section 332 of the Indian Penal Code.
He alleged that he had received information that the appellant had received illegal gratification to the tune of Rs.25,000 from the accused for taking lenient view in the matter.
The vigilance judge recorded the statement of the appellant and other relevant persons in his report he stated that it was difficult for him to come to a definite finding although the allegations contained in the complaint filed by Shri Mehlawat could not be said without any basis but he recommended that the complaint required further investigation.
We have earlier noted that Mehlawat had filed appeal and revision against the appellant 's order but he failed.
Justice Tiwana found no merit in the appeal and revision and he upheld the order of the appellant.
Justice Tiwana expressly held that Mehlawat was not a public servant even though he was a project Director of the Adult Education Project, and the conclusion of the trial court was correct and there was no merit in the appeal and revision.
We are distressed to notice that even though the High Court had upheld the appellant 's order on the judicial side it took exception to the appellant 's conduct in passing the orders against Sh.
Mehlawat.
Mehlawat had also made allegations that the appellant had accepted illegal gratification in instalments in giving judgment in his case but during the enquiry by the vigilance judge he could not produce any evidence to that effect.
It is a matter of common knowledge that many a time when a litigant is unsuccessful he makes allegations against the presiding officer stating that he had received illegal gratification.
Mehlawat was an unsuccessful litigant and he was highly prejudiced and biased against the appellant.
Any complaint made by him against the appellant could not be taken at its face value specially so when the appellant 's order had been upheld by the High Court.
The vigilance judge did not record any finding against the appellant.
He observed that the complaint required further investigation.
The second matter in respect of which the vigilance judge held inquiry was on the basis of an annonymous complaint pertaining to a civil appeal entitled Sher Singh & ors vs Mahender Singh in which it was alleged that the appellant had during the course of arguments tried to persuade the respondent to compromise the matter.
It was alleged 407 that after the arguments were concluded the case was adjourned for several dates for judgment.
There was no allegation of any corruption or dishonest motive.
The vigilance judge came to the conclusion that the adjournment of the case was unnecessary as the case was a very old one.
However the vigilance judge, further held that the complaint being annoymous it required further probe.
The third complaint was made by Mukut Bihari Sanghi, an advocate, practising at Narnaul.
He alleged that the appellant heard civil appeal entitled Mohan Lal vs Honda Ram on 20th September 1984 and fixed the same for orders for 22nd September, 1984 but the judgment was pronounced on 10th october, 1984.
We have perused the copy of the complaint made by Shri Sanghi but there is no allegation that the appellant committed any misconduct or that he acted on any extraneous reasons in granting adjournment.
The appellant stated before the vigilance judge that after arguments were completed he had fixed a date for order but as the parties wanted to compromise, he postponed the delivery of judgment for few days in order to enable the parties to settle the dispute but since no settlement was communicated to the court he pronounced the judgment on 10th october, 1984.
The vigilance judge, however, made an observation that the case was glaring example of the manner of working of the appellant in judicial cases.
In the absence of any extraneous circumstances, we do not find any impropriety in a judicial officer postponing the pronouncement of the order to enable the parties to settle the dispute.
It is interesting to note that Sh.
Mukut Bihari Singhi, advocate, was twice held guilty for contempt of court.
He was convicted for contempt of court by the High Court.
He wanted to browbeat the appellant.
His complaint, however, did not contain any allegation of corruption.
The High Court failed to appreciate that no appeal was preferred against the appellant 's judgment in the case of Mohan Lal vs Honda Ram as the parties were satisfied with the judgment.
In our opinion the complaint deserved no consideration it should have been rejected out right.
The fourth complaint had been made by one Khem Chand, his grievance had been that his Rent Control Appeal had been dismissed by the appellant on 24th November 1984 and he had allowed him two months time to vacate the premises.
He applied for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment but he could not get the same.
Instead he got the same, after inordinate delay.
The appellant 's explanation was that the copying section was not under his control or supervision therefore he could not be blamed for the delay caused in supplying certified copy of the judgment to Khem Chand.
The vigilance judge did not express any opinion on this matter.
The above analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge would 408 show that out of four complaints the vigilance judge expressed opinion that matter relating to item No. 1 and 2 needed further investigation and enquiry as he was not in a position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those complaints.
As regards the third complaint of Mukut Bihari Sanghi there was nothing wrong in postponing the pronouncement of the order with a view to give time to the parties to compromise the matter.
Finally, as regards Khem Chand 's complaint the vigilance judge did not express am, opinion on the matter.
The report of the vigilance judge does not show that the appellant 's work and conduct were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a Judicial officer.
While considering this question it must be kept in mind that complaints, in respect of which the learned Judge observed that the same needed further inquiry into the matter, could not at all be considered against the appellant.
If the inquiry had been held and the appellant had been given opportunity to place his version before the inquiry officer, correct facts would have emerged.
But in the absence of any further inquiry as suggested by the vigilance judge, the High Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory.
As regards the confidential roll of the appellant is concerned it is noteworthy that when the High Court considered the matter on 2 1.3.1985 the appellant 's annual report was available only for the first year of his service namely 1983 84.
The report for that year was satisfactory.
Entry for the year 1984 85 was awarded by Justice S.P. Goyal who was Inspecting Judge on 15.4.1985.
He awarded Grade 'B ' plus to the appellant which means that appellant 's work was good.
But this entry could not be taken into consideration by the High Court as it had already taken the decision on 21.3.1985 to dispense with the appellant 's services.
We are distressed to find that when the aforesaid entry for 1984 85 came up for consideration before the full court of the High Court it modified the same and down graded the entry from 'B ' plus to 'C ' which means appellant 's work was unsatisfactory.
During the hearing we asked the learned counsel appearing for the High Court to produce material on the basis of which the High Court modified the entry given by Justice S.P. Goyal for the year 1984 85 but he was unable to place any material before us to support the decision of the High Court in modifing the entry.
The modification of the entry is therefore without any material and is not sustainable in law.
It is thus clear that so far as annual entry on the appellant 's confidential roll is concerned there was no material against him which could show that the appellant 's work and conduct was unsatisfactory.
The facts and circumstances discussed earlier clearly show that the appellant 's 409 services were terminated merely on the basis of the report made by the vigilance judge which we have discussed in detail earlier.
The note appended to the agenda of the meeting referred only to the inquiry report and it did not refer to any other matter.
The Vigilance Judge failed to express any positive opinion against the appellant instead he observed that the complaints required further investigation.
If the High Court wanted to take action against the appellant on the basis of the complaints which were the subject of enquiry by the vigilance judge, it should have initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, then the appellant could get opportunity to prove his innocense.
We have already discussed in detail that the facts stated in the complaints and the report submitted by the vigilance judge did not show any defect in appellant 's work as a judicial officer.
While considering complaints of irregularities against a judicial officer on probation the High Court should have kept in mind that the incidents which were subject matter of enquiry related to the very first year of appellant 's service.
Every judicial officer is likely to commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service which a mature judicial offficer would not do.
However, if the orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be over looked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him.
If after warning and guidance the officer on probation is not able to improve, his services should be terminated.
Under the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary.
While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers.
An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts.
If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner.
An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law.
If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages annonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner.
It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
Having regard to facts and circumstances of the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Sh.
Mehalawat and 410 others were motivated which did not deserve any credit.
Even the vigilance judge after holding enquiry did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially.
All that was said against him was that he had acted improperly in granting adjournments.
In view of our discussion we allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 9.12.1986 and order of the State Government dated 30.12.1986.
We direct that appellant shall be reinstated in service, with continuity of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other benefits.
The appellant is entitled to the costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
This appeal by special leave was directed against the Judgment of the High Court, dismissing the appellant 's writ petition challenging the order dispensing with his services.
The appellant was appointed as Addl.
District and Sessions Judge on probation for two years.
While he was on probation, there were certain complaints against him, and an inquiry was held by a Judge of the High Court, as a result whereof the High Court by its resolution recommended the termination of the appellant 's services to the State Government.
The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, challenging the said resolution of the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition whereupon the State Government issued orders terminating the appellant 's services.
Aggrieved, the appellant moved this Court, challenging the orders of the High Court and the State government above said.
The appellant contended that since the High Court had resolved that his services should be terminated on the basis of the inquiry report, the constitutional protection available to him under Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice had been violated.
Counsel for the High Court submitted that the inquiry held was merely to judge the appellant 's suitability for service, and the appellant was not entitled to the constitutional protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, or to any opportunity of hearing before taking the decision regarding the termination of his probationary period.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, 397 ^ HELD: The High Court had no relevant material in coming to the conclusion that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory during his probationary period.
The material taken into consideration was non existent, while the other material was not relevant, and the allegations taken into consideration against him remained unsubstantiated.
The High Court erred in holding the appellant 's work and conduct to be unsatisfactory, and in terminating his services.
[401 A C] In one case, adverse remarks made against the appellant by the High Court (Bains, J.) had been directed by this Court in appeal to be expunged as they were found to be unjustified and unwarranted.
In another case, members of the Bar Association had passed a resolution condemning the appellant on a trifling matter without applying their mind to the question involved.
The members of the Bar practising before the Court should be aware of the legal position and they should not have passed the resolution condemning the appellant without there being any justifiable cause.
If the members of the Bar Association pass resolutions against the presiding officers working in subordinate courts without any justifiable cause, it would be difficult for the judicial officers to perform their judicial functions and discharge their responsibilities in an objective and unbiased manner.
The High Court, instead of protecting the appellant, distressingly took the Bar resolution into consideration in assessing the appellant 's work and conduct.
[402B; 404B D] The complaints against the appellant were enquired into by Justice Surinder Singh, Vigilance Judge, and his report had formed the foundation for the action taken by the High Court against the appellant.
An analysis of the report of the Vigilance Judge showed that out of four complaints, in respect of two of them the Vigilance Judge had expressed the opinion that the matter needed further investigation and enquiry and he was not in a position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those complaints.
As regards the third complaint, officers had committed no wrong in postponing the pronouncement of the order, with a view to give time to the parties to compromise.
As regards the fourth matter Khem Chand 's complaint the Vigilance Judge had not expressed any opinion.
The report of the Vigilance Judge did not show that the work and conduct of the appellant were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a judicial officer.
The complaints in respect of which the Vigilance Judge had observed that the same needed further inquiry, could not at all be considered against the appellant.
The High Court was not justified in considering those matters in concluding that the appellant 's work and conduct was not satisfactory.
[407H; 408A D] 398 So far as the annual entry on the appellant 's confidential roll was A concerned, there was no material against him to show that his work and conduct was unsatisfactory.
[408G H] While considering complaints of irregularities against the judicial officer on probation, the High Court should have kept in mind that the incidents related to the very first year of appellant 's service.
Every Judicial officer is likely to commit mistakes of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service, which a mature judicial officer would not do.
If the orders are passed without any corrupt motive, the same should be overlooked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him.
If after the warning and guidance, the officer on probation is not able to improve, his services may be terminated.
[409C E] While exercising control over the subordinate judiciary under the Constitution, the High Court is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers.
An honest, strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries.
If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side, and if the judicial officers are under constant threat of complaints and enquiry on trifling matters, and if the High Court encourages anonymous complaints, no judicial officer would feel, secure, and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner.
An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for the Rule of law.
It is imperative that the High Court should take steps to protect its honest judicial officers by ignoring ill conceived or motivated complaints made by unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.
[409E G] In this case, the resolution passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was wholly unjustified and the complaints made by others were motivated which did not deserve credit.
Even the Vigilance Judge did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially.
[409H; 410A] The orders of the High Court and the State Government were set aside.
The appellant was directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and arrears of salary and allowances and other benefits.
[410B C]


judgement:
249 of 1956.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. Ramamurthi Aiyar and B. K. B. Naidu, for the petitioners.
Purshottam Tricumdas, P. Ramaswamy, Advocate, 2 Bombay High Court, with special permission and 1.
N. Shroff, for the respondent No. 1.
Y. Kumar, for the interveners.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and B. Sen, for the Attorney General of India (To assist the Court).
March 19.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.
This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner is a private limited company having its registered office at No. 201, Mount Road, Madras.
The company is the, proprietor of a daily newspaper called " The Hindu " which is published at Madras and has a large circulation in India and abroad.
The shareholders of the company are all citizens of India.
The first respon dent, Shri N. Salivateeswaran, is a journalist of Bombay and he has been supplying news to various newspapers and journals one of which was the Hindu.
The supply of news by the first respondent to the Hindu was under an agreement under which he was being paid a fixed monthly honorarium.
Contrary to the advice and instructions of the petitioner, the first respondent left India for Zurich on May 1, 1956.
The petitioner thereupon relieved him of his duties and terminated with effect from March 1, 1956, the arrangement under which he was supplying news to the Hindu.
He returned to India in July 1956, and requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision; but the petitioner did not think that any case for reconsideration had been made out.
Thereupon the first respondent made an application to the Labour Minister of the State of Bombay under section 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as the act.
On receiving this application the State of Bombay nominated Shri M. R. Meher, 1.
C. section (Retired), second respondent, as the authority under section 17 of the act for the purpose of enquiry into the first respondent 's application and requested him to examine the claim made by the first 3 respondent and, in case he was satisfied that any money was due, to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector of Bombay for further action as provided under section 17.
A copy of the application was served on the petitioner by order of the second respondent; and a covering letter addressed to the petitioner called upon him to file his written statement in reply to the first respondent 's claim.
By his application the first respondent had claimed a sum of Rs. 1,57,172 8 0 from the petitioner.
In his written statement, the petitioner disputed the whole of the claim made by the first respondent and traversed all the material allegations made by him in support of his claim.
The petitioner also contended that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to go into the matters arising from the first respondent 's application.
It was also urged by the petitioner alternatively that, even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, he had the discretion to decline to consider the matter and leave it to be tried in the ordinary courts.
The petitioner requested the second respondent to exercise his discretion and direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the appro priate civil court.
The petitioner 's written statement was filed on October 18, 1956.
The second respondent decided to deal with the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.
He heard both the parties on this preliminary issue and, by his order dated November 12, 1956, he recorded his conclusion that he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that it was unnecessary to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court.
Accordingly the matter was adjourned to December 1, 1956, for hearing on the merits.
It is this order which is challenged by the petitioner before us by his present petition under article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner 's case is that section 17 of the act provides only for a mode of recovery of any money due to a working journalist.
It does not empower the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to act as a forum for adjudicating 4 upon the merits of the disputed claim.
That being so, the second respondent has no jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the first respondent 's claim against the petitioner.
In the alternative, the petitioner contends that,if section 17 confers jurisdiction on the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government to adjudicate upon disputed claims mentioned in the said.
section, the said section would be ultra vires and void.
On these alternative pleas, two alternative reliefs are claimed by the petitioner.
The first relief claimed is that a writ in the nature of the writ of prohibition or other suitable writ or direction be issued restraining the second respondent from exercising any powers under section 17 of the act and proceeding with the enquiry into the application filed by the first respondent and forwarded to him by the State Government and issue him a certificate.
The other relief claimed is that this court should be pleased to order and direct that section 17 of the act is ultra vires and void on the grounds set out in the petition.
It would be necessary and convenient to construe section 17 of the act first and determine its true scope and effect.
The larger question about the vires of this act and the validity of the decision of the Wage Board set up by the Central Government under section 8 of the act have been considered by us in the several petitions filed by several employers in that behalf before this Court.
We have held in those petitions that, with the exception of section 5 (1) (a) (iii) which deals with the payment of gratuity to employees who voluntarily resign from service, the rest of the act is valid.
That is why the question about the vires of section 17 need not be considered in the present petition over again.
The main point which remains to be considered, however, is: Does section 17 constitute the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government into a forum for adjudicating upon the merits of the claim made by newspaper employee against hip, employer under any of the provisions of this act ? Section 17 provides: " Where any money is due to a newspaper employee from an employer under any of the provisions 5 of this Act, whether by way of compensation, gratuity or wages, the newspaper employee may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the State.
Government or such authority as the State Government may specify in this behalf is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that ' amount to the collector and the collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
" It is clear that the employee 's claim against his employer which can form the subject matter of an enquiry under section 17 must relate to compensation awardable under section 4 of the act, gratuity awardable under section 5 of the act, or wages claimable under the decision of the Wage Board.
If the employee wishes to make any other claim against his employer, that would not be covered by section 17.
As the marginal note shows, the section deals with the recovery of money due from an employer.
The employee contends that the process of recovery begins with the making of an application setting out the claim and ends with the actual recovery of the amount found due.
On this construction, the dispute between the employee and his employer in regard to any claim which the employee may make against his employer would fall to be determined on the merits right up from the start to the issue of the certificate under this section.
In other words, if a claim is made by the employee and denied by the employer, the merits of the claim together with the other issues that may arise between the parties have to be considered under this section.
On this argument section 17 provides a self contained procedure for the enforcement of the claims covered by it.
On the other hand, the case for the petitioner is that the section provides for a procedure to recover the amount due from an employer, not for the determination of the question as to what amount is due.
The condition precedent for the application of section 17 is a prior determination by a competent authority or the 6 court of the amount due to the employee from his employer.
It is only if and after the amount due to the employee has been duly determined that the stage is reached to recover that amount and it is at this stage that the employee is given the additional advantage provided by section 17 without prejudice to any other mode of recovery available to him.
According to this view, the State Government or the authority specified by the State Government has to hold a summary enquiry on a very narrow and limited point: Is the amount which is found due to the employee still due when the employee makes an application under section 17, or, has any amount been paid, and, if yes, how much still remains to be paid? It is only a limited enquiry of this type which is contemplated by section 17.
Within the scope of the enquiry permitted by this section are not included the examination and decision of the merits of the claim made by the employee.
When the section refers to the application made by the employee for the recovery of the money due to him, it really contemplates the stage of execution which follows the passing of the decree or the making of an award or order by an appropriate court or authority.
In our opinion, the construction suggested by the petitioner should be accepted because we feel that this construction is more reasonable and more consistent with the scheme of the act.
It is significant that the State Government or the specific authority mentioned in section 17 has not been clothed with the normal powers of a court or a tribunal to hold a formal enquiry.
It is true that section 3, sub section
(1) of the Act provides for the application of the , to or in relation to working journalists subject to sub section
(2); but this provision is in substance intended to make working journalists workmen within the meaning of the main .
This section cannot be read as conferring on the State Government or the specified authority mentioned under section 17 power to enforce attendance of witnesses, examine them on oath, issue commission or pass orders in respect of discovery and inspection such as can be passed by the boards, courts 7 or tribunals under the .
It is obvious that the relevant provisions of section 11 of the , which confer the said powers on the conciliation officers, boards, courts and tribunals cannot be made applicable to the State Government or the specified authority mentioned, under section 17 merely by virtue of section 3(1) of the act.
In this connection, it would be relevant to remember that section 11 of the act expressly confers the material powers on the Wage Board established tinder section 8 of the Act.
Whatever may be the true nature or character of the Wage Board whether it is a legislative or an administrative body the legislature has taken the precaution to enact the enabling provisions of section 11 in the matter of the said material powers.
It is wellknown that, whenever the legislature wants to confer upon any specified authority powers of a civil court in the matter of holding enquiries, specific provision is made in that behalf.
if the legislature had intended that the enquiry authorised under section 17 should include within its compass the examination of the merits of the employee 's claim against his employer and a decision on it, the legislature would undoubtedly have made an appropriate provision conferring on the State Government or the specified authority the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively holding such an enquiry.
The fact that the legislature has enacted section 11 in regard to the Wage Board but has not made any corresponding provision in regard to the State Government or the specified authority under section 17 lends strong corroboration to the view that the enquiry contemplated by section 17 is a summary enquiry of a very limited nature and its scope is confined to the investigation of the narrow point as to what amount is actually due to be paid to the employee under the decree, award, or other valid order obtained by the employee after establishing his claim in that behalf.
We are reluctant to accept the view that the legislature intended that the specified authority or the State Government should hold a larger enquiry into the merits of the employee 's claim without conferring on the State Government or the 8 specified authority the necessary powers in that behalf.
In this connection, it would be relevant to Point out that in many cases some complicated questions of fact may arise when working journalists make claims for wages against their employers.
It is not unlikely that the status of the working journalist, the nature of the office he holds and the class to which he belongs may themselves be matters of dispute between the parties and the decision of such disputed questions of fact may need thorough examination and a formal enquiry.
If that be so it is not likely that the legislature could have intended that such complicated questions of fact should be dealt with in a summary enquiry indicated by section 17.
Section 17 seems to correspond in substance to the provisions of section 20, sub section
(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which has now been repealed.
Under this section, any money due from an employer under any award or decision of an industrial tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate Government on an application made to it by the person entitled to the money under that award or decision.
It is clear that the proceedings under section 20, sub section
(1) could commence only if and after the workman had obtained an award or decision in his favour.
We are inclined to think that the position under section 17 is substantially similar.
In this connection we may also refer to the provisions of section 33C of the (14 of 1947).
sub section
(1) of section 33C has been added by Act 36 of 1956 and is modelled on the provisions of section 17 of the present Act.
Section 33C, sub section
(2), however, is more relevant for our purpose.
Under section 33C, sub section
(2), where any workman is entitled to receive from his employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit may be computed may, subject to any rules made under this act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined should be recovered as provided for in 9 sub section
Then follows sub section
(3) which provides for an enquiry by the Labour Court into the question of computing the money value of the benefit in question.
The Labour Court is empowered under this sub section to appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court, and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case.
These provisions indicate that, where an employee makes a claim for some money by virtue of the benefit to which he is entitled, an enquiry into the claim is contemplated by the Labour Court, and it is only after the Labour Court has decided the matter that the decision becomes enforceable under section 33C(1) by a summary procedure.
It is true that, in the present case, the Government of Bombay has specified the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act and the as specified authorities under section 17 to deal with applications of newspaper employees whose wages are less than Rs. 200 per month or more respectively; but there can be no doubt that, when the second respondent entertained the first respondent 's application, he was acting as the specified authority under section 17 and not as an industrial tribunal.
It is clear that, under section 17, the State Government would be entitled to specify any person it likes for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the said section.
The powers of the authority specified under section 17 must be found in the provisions of the act itself and they cannot be inferred from the accidental circumstance that the specified authority otherwise is a member of the industrial tribunal; since there is no provision in the act which confers on the specified authority the relevant and adequate powers to hold a. formal enquiry, it would be difficult to accept the position that various questions which may arise between the working journalists and their employers were intended to be dealt with in a summary and an informal manner without conferring adequate powers on the 2 10 specified authority in that behalf.
The second respondent himself was impressed by this argument but he was inclined to hold that the necessary power could be assumed by him by implication because he thought that, in the absence of such implied power, his jurisdiction under section 17 could not be effectively exercised.
In our opinion, this approach really begs the question.
If the legislature did not confer ad.
equate powers on the specified authority under section 17, a more reasonable inference would be that the nature and scope of the powers under section 17 is very limited and the legislature knew that, for holding such a limited and narrow enquiry, it was unnecessary to confer powers invariably associated with formal and complicated enquiries of a judicial or quasi judicial character.
We must accordingly hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent 's application at this stage.
It appears from the order made by the second respondent that he took the view that, though he had jurisdiction to deal with the application, it would have been open to him to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction and to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court.
He, however, thought that he need not exercise that power in the present case.
We are satisfied that the second respondent was in error in both these conclusions.
If he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under section 17, it is difficult to appreciate how, in the absence of any provision in that behalf, he could have directed the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court.
Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondent 's failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.
Besides, if section 17 had really given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the second respondent, on the merits of this case it would obviously have been a case which should have been referred to the ordinary civil court.
This, however, is now a matter of purely academic interest.
The question which still remains to be considered is: What would be the proper order to make on the present petition in view of our conclusion that the 11 second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent 's application.
The present petition purports to invoke our jurisdiction under article 32 of the Constitution and it was a valid and competent petition in so far as it challenged the vires of section 17 itself; but, once section 17 is held to be valid and in order, the competence of the petition under article 32 is naturally open to serious jeopardy.
No question about the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under article 32.
This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
He, however, argued that, if we construe section 17 in his favour and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent 's application, his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under article 32 of the Constitution.
In our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention.
We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondent 's application; but, since the petition itself is not competent under article 32, we would direct that the petition fails on this technical ground and must be dismissed.
There would be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.

summary/full:
The respondent No. I was a journalist supplying news to the petitioner 's newspaper on payment of a fixed monthly honorarium.
Contrary to the petitioner 's instructions the respondent No. I left India and thereupon the petitioner terminated the arrangement.
Upon his return to India the respondent No. I requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision but the petitioner declined to do so.
The respondent No. I applied to the State Government under section 17 Of tile Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 claiming a large sum of money from the petitioner.
The State Government nominated respondent NO. 2 as the authority under section 17 of the Act and referred the claim to him.
The petitioner disputed the whole claim and contended that the respondent NO. 2 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the disputed claim: Held, that the authority specified under section 17 of the Act had no jurisdiction to determine the amount due as the section merely provided for a procedure to recover an amount from the employer which had previously been determined by a competent authority or court.
If the legislature had intended that the enquiry under section 17 should include the examination of the merits of the claim and a decision thereon, it would have made appropriate provisions conferring upon the State Government or the specified authority the relevant powers essential for the purpose of effectively holding such an enquiry; but no such powers had been conferred.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2640(L) of 1980 From the Judgment and order dated 14.2.1978 of the Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court New Delhi in L.C.A. Nos.
389. 391 393, 395 406 of 1978.
Mrs. Urmila Kapur Advocate, for the Appellants.
V.C. Mahajan, Miss A. Subhashini, R.P Srivastava and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMlAH, J.
This appeal by special leave is filed by 16 workmen of the Small Arms Factory, Kanpur against the common order dated 14th February, 1979 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Alipur Road, Delhi in applica 473 tions bearing L.C.A. Nos. 389, 391 to 393 and 395 to 406 of 1978 filed under section 33 C(2) of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') rejecting their claims.
The appellants filed the applications under section 33 C(2) of the Act for computation of the wages payable to them for certain periods as detailed in the respective petitions.
Their case was that even though they had been engaged as 'C ' Grade Fitters, they were entitled to the salary and allowances payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters, since they were doing the same duties as 'B ' Grade Fitters.
The Management contested the applications filed by the appellants stating that they were not maintainable since the principal question involved in all the applications related to the re classification of the workmen concerned and that such a relief could not be claimed under section 33 C(2) of the Act.
The Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court upheld the objection of the Management and rejected the applications by its common order dated 14th February, 1979.
Aggrieved by the said common order the appellants filed this appeal by special leave.
It is not disputed that the appellants had been employed as 'C Grade Fitters and in order to get the salary and allowances payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters they had to be promoted to the cadre of 'B ' Grade Fitters on their passing certain trade tests.
Admittedly, the appellants had not been so promoted.
But, their case before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court was that since they were doing the same duties which are performed by a 'B ' Grade Fitter, they were entitled to claim the wages payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters under section 33 C(2) of the Act.
Section 33 C(2) of the Act reads thus: "33 C(2).
Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may.
subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.
" 474 The above provision came up for consideration before this Court A in the Central Bank of India Ltd. vs P.S. Rajagopalan etc.
; , At pages 150 151 of the said Report this Court observed thus: "The Legislative history to which we have just referred clearly indicates that having provided broadly for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes on the basis of collective bargaining, the legislature recognised that individual workmen should be given a speedy remedy to enforce their existing individual rights, and so, inserted section 33 A in the Act in 1950 and added section 33 C in 1956.
These two provisions illustrate the cases in which individual workmen can enforce their rights without having to take recourse to section 10(1) of the Act, or without having to depend upon their Union to espouse their cause.
Therefore, in construing section 33 C we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations.
The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of section 33 C cases which would fall under section 10(1).
Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively 'and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under section 10(1).
These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of section 33 C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting section 33 C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen.
In other words, though in determining the scope of section 33 C we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under section 10(1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of section 33 C." It is obvious from the facts narrated above, which are not in dispute, that by merely doing the same kind of work which is done by a 'B ' Grade Fitter, a workman appointed as a 'C ' Grade Fitter will not be entitled to claim the wages of a 'B ' Grade Fitter unless he is duly promoted after getting through the prescribed trade tests Such a workman cannot complain that he is not being paid the salary and allowances due to a 'B ' Grade Fitter, since he does not possess an 475 existing right to claim it.
If on an adjudication made on the said question on a reference made under section 10(1) of the Act, it is held that he should be deemed to be a member of the cadre of 'B ' Grade Fitters, then only he would be able to claim the salary and allowances payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters.
The case before us is analogous to the claim made by a Junior Clerk, who can become a Senior Clerk only on promotion, to the salary attached to the post of Senior Clerk on the ground that both the Junior Clerk and the Senior Clerk are engaged in clerical work.
The learned counsel for the appellants, however, relied upon two other decisions of this Court State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Khandelwal (R. L.), and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Gopal Sahal Pareek, which were decided on the same day.
On going through those two decisions we feel that they are of no assistance to the appellants.
In the said cases this Court clearly laid down that a workman could not put forward a claim in an application filed under section 33 C(2) of the Act in respect of a relief which was not based on an existing right and which could be appropriately the subject matter of an industrial dispute requiring a reference under section 10 of the Act.
The decision of this Court in R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. vs Labour Court, Nagpur & Ors., ; is clearly distinguishable from the present case.
In the said case the only dispute was whether workmen were not entitled to lay off compensation.
The Management in that case contended that the business had been closed and the workmen were not entitled lay off compensation.
This Court held that from the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that the business of the company was continuing and that the Labour Court 's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workmen 's claim to the computation of benefit in terms of money.
It was also held that the Labour Court in the circumstances had to go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure or a lay off.
If in the present case the claim of the appellants was that they had been actually promoted to 'B ' Grade Fitters cadre and that the Management had denied that there was such promotion, the Labour Court would have been under an obligation to determine whether there was such a promotion or not.
But the case of the workmen before us is that they should be classified as 'B ' Grade Fitters even though they had been appointed as 'C ' Grade Fitters merely because they had been performing the duties which were similar to the duties of 'B ' Grade Fitters.
476 The decision of the Gujarat High Court rendered by Thakkar, C.J. (as he then was) in V.M. Vankar (Macwana) vs Indian Farmers Fertiliser, is again of no assistance to the appellants.
In that case there was a settlement arrived at between the Management and the workmen and under the said settlement persons working as Conveyor Attendants, Bag Stitchers, Bag Fillers and Pointsmen were entitled to the pay scale of Rs.225 9 333.
The complaint of the workman concerned was that even though he was performing the duties of persons in the above category, he was being paid as per the pay scale of workmen in a lower category, i.e., the pay scale of Rs.210 8 314.
In that case the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the Labour Court was required to decide whether the workman concerned was doing the work of an employee who was in the category which carried a higher pay scale or was doing the work of an employee in a category which carried a lower pay scale for the purpose of granting relief to the workman.
The question of promotion from a lower post to a higher post or of the passing of a trade test for the n purpose of securing such promotion was not involved in that case.
In any view of the matter we feel that there is no ground to set aside the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court against which this appeal is filed.
The appeal fails and it is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
It is open to the workmen, if they are so advised, to seek a reference of the question whether they are entitled to be treated as 'B ' Grade Fitters under section 10 of the Act and if such a reference is sought we hope that the appropriate Government would decide expeditiously the question whether a reference should be made accordingly or not.
If a reference is made, the Tribunal or the Court to which the reference is made shall dispose of the case as early as possible.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary/full:
The appellant engaged as 'C ' Grade Fitters in a Central Government Undertaking filed applications under section 33 C(2) of the for computation of wages payable to them for certain periods.
Their case before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court was that since they were doing the same duties which were performed by a 'B ' Grade Fitter, they were entitled to claim wages payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters.
The Management contended that since the principal question involved in all the applications related to re classification of the workmen concerned, a relief which could not be claimed under section 33 C(2) of the Act, these were not maintainable.
The Tribunal rejected the applications by a common order.
In this appeal by special leave, it was contended for the workmen that they should be classified as 'B ' Grade Fitters even though they had been appointed as 'C ' Grade Fitters because they had been performing the duties which were similar to the duties of 'B ' Grade Fitters.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD:1.1 A workman cannot put forward a claim in an application filed under section 33 C(2) of the in respect of the relief which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an industrial dispute requiring a reference under section 10 of the Act.
[475C D] 1.2 By merely doing the same kind of work which is done by a senior grade workman, a junior grade workman will not be entitled to claim the wages of senior grade unless he is duly promoted.
Such a workman cannot complain that he is not being paid the salary and allowances due to a senior grade workman, since he does not possess an 472 existing right to claim it.
If on an adjudication made on the said question on a reference made under section 10(1) of the Act, it is held that he should be deemed to be a member of the senior cadre, then only he would be able to claim the salary and allowances payable to senior grade workmen.
[474G H;475A B] Central Rank of India Ltd. vs P.S,.
Rajagopalan etc.
; , ; State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Khandelwal (R.L.).
[1968] I L.L.J. 589 and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur vs Gopal Sahal Pareek.
[1968] 1 L.L.J. 593, referred to.
R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. vs Labour Court, Nagpur & Ors., ; and V.M Vankar (Macwana) vs Indian Farmers Fertilizer, [1984] Lab.
I.C. 1342, distinguished.
1.3 In the instant case, the appellants had been employed as 'C ' Grade Fitters and in order to get the salary and allowances payable to 'B ' Grade Fitters they had to be promoted to the cadre of 'B ' Grade Fitters on their passing certain trade tests.
They had not been so promoted.
The claim of the appellants, therefore, is not tenable.
[473D E] 2.
It is open to the workmen, if they are so advised, to seek a reference of the question whether they are entitled to be treated as 'B ' (grade Fitter Under section 10 of the Act.
[476E]