judgement:
Appeal No. 533 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 28, 1959, of the Patna High Court, in Appeal from Original Decree No. 143 of 1948.
B. K. Saran and K. L. Mehta, for the appellants.
R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, section C. Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the respondents.
1962 May 4.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 292 RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.
This appeal, on a certificate granted by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, arises in the following circumstances: The plaintiffs respondents sued the appellants for the recovery of possession of the disputed lands and mesne profits as the family of the defendants did not have any raiyat interest in the disputed lands except rehan interest under the rehan deed dated July 3, 1906, and that subsequent to the redemption of that deed, they had no right to remain in possession and occupation of the disputed lands.
The plaintiffs alleged that Pranpat Bhagat and others held eight annas share of milkiat interest in village Sevathra, pargana Nonaur, tauzi No. 3879 and that the other eight annas share was held by Kunj Bihari Bhagat and others.
These persons also held khudkasht lands in the village and that such lands were treated as kasht lands.
In 1906 Ram Autar Bhagat, one of the members of the joint family of Pranpat Bhagat, executed the mortgage deed with respect to 15 bighas of land out of 16 bighas of kasht lands, to Sheo Dehin Ahir, on behalf of his joint family.
The defendants entered into possession on the basis of that mortgage deed, they having had no connection with the land mortgaged prior to the execution of the mortgage deed.
Later on, in 1912, Ram Lal Bhagat and Munni Bhagat, of Pranpat 's family, executed another mortgage deed with respect to their entire milkiat interest in favour of Jatan Ahir and Ram Saran Ahir who also belonged to the family of Sheo Dehin Ahir.
They then got into possession of the fresh land which had been mortgaged.
Ram Lal Bhagat and others sold their milkiat share together with the kasht lands to the plaintiffs in 1915.
The plantiffs entered into possession 293 of the milkiat property and subsequently redeemed the mortgage deeds in 1913.
The plaintiffs also purchased four annas share belonging to the branch ' of Kunj Bihari Bhagat, The other tour annas share of that branch was purchased by Raja Singh who then sold it to Ram Ekbal Singh, impleaded as defendant No. 6 in the plaint.
The defendants, however, did not make over possession of the land in suit after the mortgage deeds had been redeemed and hence the suit was instituted for a declaration and recovery of possession.
The defendants 1 to 5 did not admit the allegations made by the plaintiffs and stated the real state of affairs to be that the disputed lands were never the bakasht lands of the proprietors of the village and were really the raiyati qaimi kasht lands of the defendants.
that the plaintiffs never purchased the disputed lands, that the disputed lands were the raiyati kasht lands of Ram Autar Bhagat only, who let out the disputed lands in rehan under different rehan deeds alleging them to be raiyati kasht lands, and who had earlier treated it as his exclusive raiyati kasht lands, and that, ultimately, Ram Autar Bhagat sold the disputed lands to the defendants and got their names entered as qaimi raiyati kushtkars.
It was further alleged that the defendants bad acquired title to the land in suit by virtue of adverse possession.
The trial Court found that the plaintiffs had no subsisting title to the lands in suit as those lands were not sold to the plantiffs who had purchased the milkiat interest including the bakasht and zerat lands, that the suit was barred by adverse possession also and that it was barred by limitation.
It therefore dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the High Court held that the plaintiffs did purchase the land in suit and that the defendants were in possession only as mortgagees 294 and that, after the redemption of the mortgage, they had no right to continue in possession.
It therefore allowed the appeal and decreed the plain tiffs ' suit.
The defendants have now filed this appeal.
Learned counsel for the appellants has urged five points: (1) The record of rights supported the case of the defendants that they were the qaimi raiyats and that the High Court wrongly construed them.
(2) The sale deed of 1915 in favour of the respondents did not include the land in suit.
(3) Even if the plaintiffs respondents acquired right to the land in suit by purchase, they are estopped from taking any action against the defendants appellants who had been in possession for long.
(4) The suit is barred by limitation as the defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession and the plaintiffs had not been in possession within limitation, (5) The plaintiffs respondents had no subsisting title to evict the appellants in view of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950).
The case set up by the defendants with respect to their acquiring the qaimi raiyati kasht rights, in their written statement, has been disbelieved by the Courts below and, we think, rightly.
It follows that the defendants were in possession of the land in suit only as mortgagees as held by the Court below and.
that they had no right to possession after the mortgage had been redeemed.
295 By the sale deed dated October 5, 1915, Ram Lal Bhagat and others sold the property described thus in the sale deed: "8 (eight) annas ancestral milkiat interest, out of Tauzi No. 3879, in mauza Sewathra, pergana Nanaur, thana Pito, district Shahabad, Sub registry office Jagdishpur, the Sadar Jama whereof is Rs. 190/which has been in possession and occupation of us, the executants without copartnership and interference by anybody together with all the present Zamindari rights appertaining thereto, without excluding any interest and profit, together with Zirat lands which have been recorded in the survey papers in the names of us, the executants as bakasht (lands) and new and old party lands, aam and Khas Chairmazrua lands, baharsi dih, house of the tenants ground rent, ahar, pond, reservoir, tank, orchard, fruit bearing and non fruit bearing trees and bambooclumps that is the entire lands and profit (derived from) zamindari below and above the surface existing or which may be derived in future without excluding anything." They emphasized the extent of the sale property further by saying: "We, the executants, gave up and relinquished our respective possession and occupation of vended property today.
The entire interest excluding only the chaukidari chakran (service) land which has been let out in settlement with us ' the executants is being sold.
The chaukidari land only is not being sound (sic).
" 296 It is clear therefore, as held by the High Court, that the land in suit which is included in the milkiat share was not excepted from sale.
The only property excluded from sale was the chaukidari chakran land.
The long possession of the appellants therefore does not estop the respondents from recovering possession from them.
The suit was instituted within 12 years of the redemption of the mortgage deed and is not therefore barred by limitation.
The only other question to determine is whether the plaintiffs respondents cannot recover possession from the appellants in view of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act XXX of 1950), hereinafter called the Act, which came into force during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court.
The trial Court dismissed the suit on March 8,1948.
The High Court allowed the appeal on January 28, 1958.
The Act came into force on September 25, 1950.
Sub section (1) of section 3 of the Act empowered the State Government to declare by notification that the estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure holder specified in the notification have passed to and become vested in the State.
Such vesting took place on January 1, 1955.
It is contended for the appellants that the respondents ceased to have any proprietary right in the land in suit when their estate vested in the State and therefore they had no right to recover possession from them.
Section 4 of the Act mentions the Consequences which follow on the publication of the notification under sub section
(1) of section 3.
According to section 4(a), such estate or tenure including the interests of the, proprietor or tenure holder in the various objects mentioned therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free fro., 297 all encumbrances, and such proprietor or tenureholder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or tenure other than the interest expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act.
This makes it absolutely clear that after the vesting of the estate, no interest other than that expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Act remained in the respondents.
The right to recover possession from .the trespasser also got vested in the State.
Subclause (f) of section 4 provides that the Collector shall take charge of such estate or tenure and of all interests vested in the State under the section.
In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Haji Sk.
Subhan vs Madhorao (1) which dealt with a similar question in the context of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estate 's, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (M.P. Act No. 1 of 1951).
We have now to consider whether any interest in the land in suit was expressly saved by or under the provision of the Act in favour of the respondents.
Section 6 of 4 the Act provides inter alia that on and from the date of vesting, all lands used for agricultural purposes which were in khas possession of a proprietor or tenure holder on the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State with such proprietor or tenure holder as the case may be and such proprietor or tenure holder shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as a raiyat under the State having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector.
The lands coming within this section included lands used for agricultural purposes forming the subject matter of a subsisting mortgage on the redemption of which the (1) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 123.
298 intermediary is entitled to recover khas possession.
thereof It follows that such lands, though not in the actual khas possession of the proprietor on the date of vesting would also be deemed to be settled with the proprietor, who would retain their possession as raiyat under the State.
According to s.2(k) of the Act, " 'khas possession ' used with reference to the possession of a proprietor or tenure holder of any land used for agricultural or horticul tural purposes means the possession of such proprietor or tenure holder by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock.
" On the date of vesting, the respondents were not in khas possession of the land in suit as they were not in possession in any of the manner mentioned in this definition.
Section 6 does not really enlarge the scope of the expression 'Khas possession but includes lands covered by cls.
(a), (b) and (c) of sub.
section (1) among the lands which can be deemed to be settled by the State with the proprietor.
Clause (c) originally was : "lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and in the possession of a mortgagee which immediately before the execution of the mortgage bond were in khas possession of Such 'proprietor or tenure holder " This clause was substituted by another clause by a. 6 of the Bihar land Reforms (Amendment) Acts 1959 (Act XVI of 1959) and under that section the substituted clause shall be deemed always to have 299 been substituted, that is to say, is to be deemed to have been in the of original Act from the very beginning.
The substituted el.
(c) reads : "(c) lands used for agricultural or horti cultural purposes forming the subject matter of a subsisting mortgage on the redemption of which the intermediary is entitled to recover khas possession thereof.
" It is therefore necessary for the respondents, to get advantage of the pro visions of this clause, that there be a subsisting mortgage on the date of vesting and that the land included in the subsisting mortgage be such that on the redemption of the mortgage the respondents be entitled to recover khas possession thereof.
No mortgage subsisted on the date of vesting and therefore the benefit of this clause cannot be taken by the respondents.
The land in suit does not come within the provisions of el.
(c) or any other clause of sub section
(1) of section 6 of the Act.
This point was raised in the High Court which observed as follows in this connection : "In the first place the defendants were in possession as mortgages and, even section 6 of the Bihar land Reforms Act provides that, the possession of the mortgagee is the possession of the mortgagor even for the purpose of construing the meaning of Khas possession of the intermediary over the land which may be deemed to be settled with him by virtue of section 6 of the Act.
The defendants ' possession being the mortgagees ' possession, the case is covered by the terms of section 6 itself.
Apart from it, it has been held in the case of Brij Nandan Singh vs Jamuna Prasad Sahu and Another (First 300 Appeal No. 205 of 1948) by a Division Bench of this Court that the words 'Khas possession include subsisting title to possession as well and any proprietor, whose right to get khas possession of the land is not barred by any provision of law, will have a right to recover possession and the State of Bihar shall treat him as Raiyat with occupancy right and not the trespassers.
The contention of the learned Advocate General must fail in terms of the above decision.
" On the date of vesting, the appellants were not in possession as mortgagees.
The mortgages had been redeemed in 1943, Thereafter, the possession of the appellants wasnot as mortgagees.
It may be as trespassers or in any other capacity.
The land in suit, therefore, did not come within cl.
(c) of section 6 of the Act as it stood when the High Court.
delivered the judgment.
Reliance was placed by the High Court on the case reported as Brijnandan Singh vs Jamuna Prasad (1) for the construction put on the expression 'khas possession ' to include subsisting title to possession as well, and therefore for holding that any proprietor, whose right to get khas possession of the land is not barred by any provision of law, will have a right to recover possession and that the St .to of Bihar shall treat him as a raiyat with occupancy right and not as a trespasser.
We do not agree with this view when the definition of 'khas possession ' means the possession of a proprietor or tenure holder either by cultivating such land himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock.
The mere fact that a proprietor has a sub sisting title to possession over certain land on the date of vesting would not make that land under his 'khas possession '.
(1) A. I. R. 1958 Pat.
301 It is clear therefore that the land in suit cannot de deemed to be settled with the respondents by the State in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Act.
In the absence of any such settlement, no rights over the land in suit remained in the respondents after the date of vesting, all their rights having vested in the State by virtue of sub.
section (1) of section 3 of the Act.
We are therefore of opinion that the respondents lost their right to recover possession.
from the appellants, even if they were trespassers, on their estate vesting in the State, by virtue of sections 3 and 4 of the Act and that therefore, thereafter, they had no subsisting right to recover possession from the appellants.
The right to possession now vests in the State.
The respondents being no more entitled to recover possession of the land in suit the decree of the High Court has to be set aside.
We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the decree.
of the Court below and restore the decree of the trial Court, though for reasons other than those given by that Court in its judgment.
In the circumstances of the case, we order the parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal allowed.

summary/full:
The plaintiff respondents sued the appellants for recovery of possession of the lands in dispute.
The appellants had entered into possession of the lands on the strength of a mortgage deed.
The mortgagors executed another mortgage with respect to their milkiat interest in favour of certain persons.
The plaintiff respondents bought the milkiat rights shares together with the kasht lands from the mortgagors and entered into possession of the milkiat property and subsequently redeemed the mortgage deeds in 1943.
The appellants however did not make over possession of the lands in dispute after the mortgages had been redeemed.
The trial court found that the plaintiff respondents had no subsisting title to the lands and that the suit was barred by adverse possession and limitation.
The High Court, on appeal filed by the plaintiff respondents, allowed the appeal on the 291 ground that the defendant appellants were in possession only as mortgagees and that after the redemption of the mortgage they had no right to continue in possession.
The appellants than appealed to the Supreme Court by certificate granted by the High Court.
Apart from the ques tions of estoppel and limitation by adverse possession the main point which was raised in the appeal was that the plaintiff respondent had no subsisting title to evict the appellant in view of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.
Held, that the suit was instituted within twelve years of the redemption of the mortgage deed and was not therefore barred by limitation.
Section 4 of the Act vests in the State all the interests of the proprietor or tenure holder, including the right to recover possession from the trespasser, except those interests which are expressly saved by the Act.
Since no mortgage subsisted on the date of the vesting in the State the respondent could not take advantage of section 6(1) (c) of the Act (as amended by Act XVI of 1959).
The mere fact that a proprietor had a subsisting title to possession over certain land on the date of vesting would not make that land under his 'Khas Possession '.
The res pondents lost their right to recover possession from the appellants even if they were trespassers, on their estate vesting in the State.
Brijnandan Singh vs Jamuna Prasad A. I. R., 1958 Pat. 589, Haji Sk.
Subhan vs Madhorao [1962] Supp.
I S.C.R. 123.


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 152/59.
, xi Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and Order dated May 12, 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1182 of 1957.
Nur ud din Ahmed, J.,B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur, and Ravindar Narain for the Appellants.
852 G. C. Mathur and C.A. Lal for the Respondent.
May 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J.
The appellants are father and son carring on business in vegetable ghee at Aligarh.
They along with Romesh, the second son of appellant Jagannath Prasad were prosecuted under section 14 (d) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.P. 15 of 1948) hereinafter called the 'Act ' and under section 471 read with section 468 and section 417 of the Indian Penal Code.
They were all acquitted of the charge under section 468.
Jagannath Prasad was convicted under section 471 and 417 of the Indian Penal Code and a. 14 (d) of the Act and was sentenced to two years ' rigorous imprisonment under a. 471, to one years ' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ under section 417 and to a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 14 (d) of the Act.
Bhagwan Das was convicted under section 14 (d) of the Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1, 000/ .
Romesh was acquitted.
The sentences passed on Jagannath Prasad were.
concurrent.
Their 'appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed and in revision to the High Court Jagannath Prasad was acquitted of the offence under a. 417 of the Indian Penal Code but the other convictions and sentences were upheld.
Against this judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad the appellants have come to this court by special leave.
The facts leading to the appeal are these: In 1950 51, the firm of the appellants purchased vegetable ghee valued at about Rs. 3 lacs from places outside the State of U. P. in the name of four fictitious firm.
The firm made its return for that year to the Sales Tax Officer Aligarh and did not include the sale proceeds of these transactions on the ground that they had purchased them from these four firms who were supposed to be carrying 853 on business in Hathras, Aligarh, and other places in U. P. By thus not including the proceeds of the sales of these transactions the firm evaded payment of sales tax for that year on those transactions.
The return of sales tax made by the firm was accepted by the Sales Tax Officer with the consequence that the sale of goods covered by those transactions was not taxed.
A complaint was made against the Sales Tax Officer in regard to these transactions; an enquiry was held with the result that the appellants and Romesh were prosecuted and convicted as above stated.
In the High Court there was no controversy about the facts i. e. the finding of the courts below that the appellants ' firm purchased vegetable ghee from outside U. P. and did not show the sale proceeds of the sale of those goods on the ground that they had been purchased from inside the State of ' (J. P. when in reality they had been purchased from outside the State, that the statements made by the appellant Jagannath Prasad before the Sales Tax Officer were false and that the bills produced by him before the Sales Tax officer were forged.
The conviction was challenged on grounds of law alone.
Before us five points were raised: (1) that no sales tax was exigible on these transactions under a. 3A of the Act in 1950 51 and liability arose by the amendment of the Act in 1952 which gave retroactive operation to the section and became applicable to sales in dispute and therefore there could be no prosecution under an ex post facto amendment; (2) the trial of the appellants was illegal because of ' want of complaint by the Sales Tax Officer under a. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code; (3) there was no offence under section 14 (d) of the Act; (4) forged invoices were produced by appellant Jagannath Prasad because they were called for by the Sales Tax Officer and therefore it cannot be said.
that they were used by the appellant and (5) the Sales Tax Officer having accepted 854 he invoices as genuine no prosecution could be Entertained in regard to those invoices.
Now the appellants cannot be prosecuted on the basis of any amendment subsequent to the date of the alleged offence committed by them.
Both parties are agreed on that and therefore we have to see the Act as it stood on the date when the offence is alleged to have been committed.
According to the charge the offence was committed on or about July 16, 1951, when forged invoices produced by the appellants before the Sales Tax Officer.
So what we have to see is the law as it stood on that day.
Section 3 of the Act deals with liability to tax under the Act and section 3A with single point taxation.
Under section 3 every dealer was required to pay on his turnover of each assessment year a tax at the rate of three pies a rupee.
Thus the tax was payable in regard to all sales but under section 3A (1) the tax was leviable only at a single point.
That section provided.
section 3A (1) "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare that the turnover in respect of any goods or class of goods shall not be liable to tax except at such single point in the series of sales by successive dealers as may be prescribed".
The Government could declare the tax to be payable at a single point but there were two requirements; there had to be a notification in the Official Gazette declaring the point at which the tax was payable and in the series of sales by successive dealers it had to be "as may be prescribed" i. e. as may be prescribed by rules.
Section 3A was amended in 1952 with retrospective effect but retroactive provision is not applicable to the present proceedings.
Under section 3A a notification No. 1 (3) was issued on 855 June 8, 1948, declaring that the proceeds of sales of vegetable ghee imported from outside shall not be included in the turnover of the dealer other than the importer himself.
The effect of the notification thus was that if a dealer imported vegetable ghee from outside U. P. and sold it he was required to include the sale proceeds in his turnover but the other dealers who bought vegetable ghee from the importer in U. P. and sold it were not so required.
The appellants having thus imported the vegetable ghee from outside U. P. were required by the notification to include the proceeds in their turnover and it was to avoid this that they falsely produced forged invoices that they had purchased the vegetable ghee from those fictitious dealers within the State of U. P. and thus if the notification was an effective notification the appellants successfully evaded the payment of sales tax which under the law they were required to pay.
But it was agreed that the notification was ineffective in view of the words "as may be prescribed" because that could only be done by rules and no rules bad been made under section 3A which made every dealer liable to sales tax if he was an importer from outside U. P.
To this, extent the contention of the appellants is well founded and therefore under a. 3A merely by notification the Government could not prescribe a single point taxation as was done by the notification but that does not help the appellants very much.
Under section 3 every dealer was liable to pay sales tax on every transaction and section 3A only gave relief in regard to sales at every point and thus prevented multi point taxation.
If the notification under section 3A was ineffective, as indeed it was, the appellants were required to pay tax on all their sales and in order to escape multi point taxation they took advantage of an ineffective notification and tried the false plea of the goods having been imported by fictitious persons and their having purchased those goods from those 856 fictitious dealers and in this manner the appellants escapes payment of sales tax under section 3.
In other words they tried to take advantage of section 3A by producing false documents and thereby evaded payment of tax under section 3 which every dealer was required to pay on his turnover.
In trying to get the benefit under the ineffective notification issued under section 3A the appellants evaded payment of tax under section 3 which they were in any case liable to pay.
It cannot be said therefore that no offence was committed under section 14 (d) of the Act which provides: Section 14. ,Offences and penalties.
Any person who (a). . . (b). . . (c). . . (d) fraudulently evades the payment of any tax due under this Act, shall, without prejudice to this liability under any other law for the time being in force, on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class, be liable to a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and where the breach is a continuing breach, to a further fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day after the first during which the breach continues".
It is no defence to say that the appellants were asked by the Sale,% Tax Officer to produce invoices.
The appellants were trying to get exclusion from their turnover of the sale of goods worth about 3 lacs and had made statements before the Sales Tax Officer in regard to it on July 9, 1951, and in order to prove that the goods 857 were not required to be included .,in the turnover the invoices were produced by appellant Jagannath Prasad.
When a fact has to be proved before a court or a tribunal and the court or the tribunal calls upon the person who is relying upon a fact to prove it by best evidence it can not be a defence as to the offence of forgery if that best evidence which, in this case, was the invoices turn out to be forged documents.
A person who produced those documents cannot be heard to say that he was required to prove his case by the best evidence and because be was so required be produced forged documents.
It was then submitted that the Sales Tax Officer was a court within a. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in the absence of a complaint in writing by such an officer no cognizance could be taken of any offence punishable under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
This, in our opinion, is an equally erroneous submission.
The Sales Tax Officers are the instrumentalities of the State for collection of certain taxes.
Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder certain officers are appointed as Sales Tax Officers who have certain duties assigned to them for the imposition and collection of taxes land ID the process they have to perform many duties which are of a quasijudicial nature and certain other duties, which are administrative duties.
Merely because certain instrumentalities of state employed for the purpose of taxation have, in the discharge of their duties, to perform certain quasi judicial functions they are not converted into courts thereby.
In a recent judgment of this Court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai vs The State of U.P. (1), all the opinions were unanimous on this point that taxing authorities are not courts even though they perform quasi judicial functions.
The following observation of Lord (1) (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778. 858 Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1)was quoted with approval : The authorities are clear to show that there "The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a court which, nevertheless are not courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power".
Lord Sankey also enumerated some negative propositions as to when a tribunal is not a court.
At p. 297 his lordship said : "In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject : 1.
A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision.
Nor because it hears witnesses on oath.
Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide.
Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects.
Nor because there is an appeal to a Court.
Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body.
See Rex vs Electricity Commissioners Hidayatullah J., 'in Shrimati Ujjam Bhai(2) case described Sales tax authorities thus : "The taxing authorities are instrumentalities of the State.
They are not a part of the legislature, nor are they a part of the judiciary.
Their functions are the assessment and collection of taxes and in the process of assessing taxes, they follow a pattern of action which is considered Judicial.
They are not thereby converted into Courts of Civil judicature.
They still (1) , 283.
(2) (1963) 1 S.C R. 778. 859 remain the instrumentalities of the State and are within, the definition of State" in article 12".
No doubt the Sales Tax officers have certain powers which, are similar to the powers exercised by courts. but still they are not courts as understood 'in section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
In sub section 2 of B. 195 it is provided: section 195(2) "In clauses (b) and (e) of sub section.
(1) the term "Court" includes a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877".
It cannot be, mid that a Sales Tax Officer, is a I Revenue Court.
Under section 2(a) of the Act an assessing authority is defined to mean any person authorised by the State Government to make assessment under the Act and under R. 2(h) 'a Sales, Tax Officer means : "Sales Tax Officer" means a Sales Tax Officer of a circle appointed by the State Government to perform the duties and exercise the powers of an assessing authority in such circle".
Thus under the Act a Sales Tax Officer is only an amassing authority.
Under section 7 of the Act, if the Sale*. Tax Officer, after making such enquiries,as he thinks necessary is, satisfied that a return made is correct and, complete, he shall assess the tax on the basis thereof ' and it no return is submitted he, can make such enquiries as he considers necessary and then determine the turnover of a dealer, Thus his determination depends upon enquiries he may make and which he may, consider necessary.
Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act deal with Appeals, Revisions and Statement of the Case to the High court.
Under a. 13 power.
is given 860 to a Sales Tax Officer to require the production of all accounts, documents and other information relating to business and accounts and registers ,shall be open to inspection of the Sales Tax Officer at all reasonable times.
He has the power to enter any office, shop, godown, vehicle or any other place in which business is done which is a power destructive of the Sales Tax Officer being a Court which is a place where justice is administered as between the parties whether the parties are private persons or one of the parties is the State.
Under section 23 certain secrecy is attached to documents filed before the Sales Tax officer and information received by him.
Similarly under R. 43 certain power is given to the Sales Tax Officer to calculate turnover when goods are sold for consideration other than money and this is after such enquiry as he considers necessary.
All these provisions show that the Sales Tax Officer cannot be equated with a Court.
In our opinion therefore the Sales Tax Officer is not a Court.
In Krishna vs Goverdhansiah(1), it was held that the Income Tax Officer is not law court within the meaning of section 195 of the Criminal 's Procedure Code and this view was accepted by this court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai 's(2) case.
In Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain(3), a Commissioner appointed under the Public Enquiries Act 1950 was held not to be a court.
Shell Co. of Australia vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation (4) was referred to in that case.
At p. 967 the following passage from Halsbury 's Laws of England, Hailisham Edition, Vol. 8, p. 526 was approved: "Many bodies are not courts, although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness (1) A.I.R. (1954) Mad.
(2) (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.
(3) ; (4) (1931) A.C. 275,2B3. 861 and impartiality, such as assessment committees, guardian committees, the Court of referee constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts to decide claims made on the Insurance funds the benchers of the Inns of Courts when considering the conduct of one of their members, the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the position of a medical man" That passage is now contained in Vol. 9 of the 3rd Edition at p. 343.
But it was submitted that the Sales Tax officer while acting as an assessing authority is a court within the meaning of section 195 (2) of the Procedure Code because by the amendment of 1923 the definition of the word "court" was enlarged substituting the word "includes" in place of the word "means" and the section now reads as has been set out above.
Undoubtedly by this change the legislature did mean to make the definition of the word "court" wider but that does not enlarge the definition of the words "Revenue Court".
The track of decision which was pressed on our attention is based primarily on a full bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in In re Punemchand Maneklal(1).
In that case an Income tax Collector was held to be a Revenue Court within the meaning of the word as used in section 195.
The learned Chief Justice who gave the judgment of the court proceeded on the basis that inquiries conducted according to the Forms of judicial procedure under Chapter IV of the Incometax Act were proceedings in a Revenue Court.
This was on the ground that under the law as it then stood revenue questions were generally removed from the cognizance of civil courts and the officers charged with the duty of deciding disputed question relating to revenue between an individual and the (1) , Bom.
862 Government would be invested with the functions of &,,Revenue Court".
This view was followed by the Bombay High Court in State vs Nemchand Pashvir Patel After referring to the various powers which were given to the Sales Tax Officers under the B " bay Sales Tax Act that Court proceeded to say that the Sales Tax Officers under the Bombay Sales Tax Act were Revenue Courts because ' they had jurisdiction to decide Questions relating to revenue, are exclusively empowered with the powers which are normally attributes of a court or a tribunal land are authorised to adjudicate upon a disputed question of law or fact relating to the rights of the citizens.
The Madras High Court in In re B. Nataraja Iyer held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals; under the Income tax Act was a court within the meaning of a. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code but a Tehsildar who was the original assessing authority was not because there was no lis before him.
There is one passage in the judgment of Sundara Ayyar J., which is of significance.
It was said: "I may observe that I am prepared agree with Dr. Swaminathan that more.
authority to receive evidence would not make the officer recording it a Court".
At page 84, it was said that the determination of the assessment in the first instance may not be of a court although the assessing officer may have the power to record statements.
But an appeal against the assessment is dealt with by the Collector in the manner in which an appeal is ' disposed of by ' a Civil Court.
In this connection reference may be; made to the statement of the law contained in the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar J., in Shri Virinder Kumar Satyawadi vs The State of Punjab (2).
There, (1) (1956)7 S.C.R. 404.
(2) , 1018.
863 the, distinction between a quasi judicial tribunal and a court,was given as follows "It may be stated broadly that what disti nguished a Court from a quasi judicial tribu nal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare, the rights of parties in a definitive judgment.
,To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it.
And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law.
When a question therefore arisen as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as, distinguished from a quasi judicial tribunal, what has to: be decided.is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court".
Dealing with quasi judicial tribunals it was observed in Gullapelli Negeswara Rao vs The State of Andhra Pradesh(1) : ",The concept of a quasi judicial act, implies that the act is not wholly judicial, it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to,conform to the norms.
of judicial procedure in performing some act in the, 'exercise of its executive power".
It is not necessary to refer to other cases because they were decided on their own facts and related to different tribunals.
In our opinion a Sales Tax Officer is not a Court within the meaning of.s.
195 of,the criminal Procedure Code and there.
fore it was not necessary for a Sales Tax Officer to (1) (1959) Supp.
1 S.C.R. 319, 353 4. 864 make a complaint and the proceedings without such a complaint are not without jurisdiction.
In our opinion the appellants were rightly convicted and we therefore dismiss this appeal.
The appellant Jagannath Prasad must surrender to his bail bonds.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
The appellants who carry on the business in vegetable ghee purchased vegetable ghee from outside U. P. in the name of four fictitious firms.
In their return of sales tax they did not include the sale proceeds of these transactions on the ground that they had purchased from the four firms and that under a notification made under section 3A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, tax was leviable only at a single point on the sale by the outside suppliers to these four firms.
In support of this the appellant No. 1 made a false statement before the Sales tax Officer and also filed forged bill,.
before him.
The return was accepted by the Sales Tax Officer with the result that the sales covered by these transactions were not taxed.
The appellants were tried and convicted for offence under section 471 Indian Penal Code for using forged documents and under section 14(d) of the Act for fraudulently evading payment of tax due under the Act.
The appellants contended that the trial for the offence under section 471 was illegal as no complaint had been made by the Sales Fax Officer as required by section 14 (d) of the Act was not made out as no tax was payable under 'section 3A because the notification issued thereunder was invalid.
Held, that the Sales Tax Officer was not a Court within the meaning of section 195 Code of Criminal Procedure and it was not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of the Appellants under section 471 Indian Penal Code.
A Sales Tax Officer was merely an instrumentality of the State for purposes of assessment and collection of tax and even if he was required to perform certain quasi judicial functions, he was not a part of the judiciary.
The nature of the functions, of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner prescribed for their 851 performance showed that he could not be equated with a Court.
Nor could he be said to be a Revenue Court.
Though the definition of Court in section 195 of the Code Was enlarged by the substitution of the word "include" for the word "means" by the amendment of 1923, it did not change the definition of "Revenue Court.
" Smt.
Ujjam Bai vs The State of U. P. (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778), Shell Co. of Australia Ltd. vs Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Brajnandan Sinha vs Jyoti Narain ' ; , applied.
Krishna vs Gocerdhanaiah, A. I. R. , approved.
In re: Punamchand Maneklal (1914) 1. L. R. and State vs Nemchand Pashvir Patel, (1956) 7 section T. C. 404 not approved.
In re : R. Nataraja Iyer (1914) 1. L. R. and Shri Virender, Kumar Satyawadi vs The Sate of Punjab,[1955] 2 section C. R. 1013 referred to.
Held, further that the appellants were rightly convicted under section 14 (d) of the Act.
Sales tax was payable under s.3 of the Act in respect of all sales.
But under s.3A it was leviable only at a single point if the Government issued a notification declaring the point at which tax was payable and it was so prescribed by the rules.
Under the notification issued by the Government tax was payable only by the dealer who imported the goods and sold them.
The appellants having imported the ghee were liable to pay the tax on the sales of this ghee which they fraudulently evaded.
Though the notification was ineffective as no rules were made under the Act prescribing the single point, it did not help the appellants, as the only effect of this was that section 3A did not come into play.
In trying to get the benefit of the ineffective notification under section 3 A the appellants evaded payment of tax under section 3 which they were liable to pay.