judgement:
ivil Misc.
Petition No. 15001 of 1989.
AND I.A. No. 1 of 1989 in S.L.P. No. 12288 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.4.1984 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Appeal No. 472 of 1976.
K. Mahadeva Reddy, Ms. Manjul Gupta, T.V.S.N. Chari and A. Subba Rao for the Petitioner.
K. Ram Kumar, S.A. Ahmed, Tanweer Abdul and Mohan Pandey for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: 540 The special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is directed against the affirming judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a suit for title and injunction.
In view of the fact that a petition of compromise in respect of the entire subject matter of litigation has been filed in this Court it is unnecessary to refer to the facts leading to the litigation.
We shall, therefore, confine the discussion to matters pertinent to the compromise.
Subbamma adopted one K.V Seshiah.
Seshiah married two wives.
Through the first wife he had a son born to him by name Sudarshan Gupta and through the second another son by name Anand Babu.
In February, 1985, during the pendency of the special leave petition the adoptive mother died.
Sudarshan and Anand Babu led claim to the entire property of Subbamma exclusively to each of them under two different wills said to be by subbamma and each contended that the other will was a forged one.
With the death of the adoptive mother, Seshiah led claim to the entire property as heir.
While each of the parties had taken such stand in the litigation a compromise was brought about on 21.8.1987 between the father and his two sons and the same was filed in this Court.
The terms of the compromise stipulated payment of Rs. 1 lakh by the father to each of his two sons in lieu of relinquishment of their interest.
When the matter was listed before the Court for recording of the compromise, Sudarshan Gupta, second respondent herein, maintained that he had not been paid Rs.1 lakh as stipulated and he had no intention to accept the compromise.
The question as to recording of the compromise was taken up by the Court and parties have been heard.
One of the stipulation in the compromise deed which has admittedly been signed by the father and his two sons stipulates: "The petitioner has given to the second and third respondents (the two sons) an amount of Rs. 1 lakh each and the second and third respondents have received the same." In the face of such a statement in the compromise deed signed by the parties the second respondent had disputed the fact of payment and has, in the meantime, alienated about 81 acres of property which constitutes the subject matter of dispute to third parties.
The alienees 541 have now been brought on record unders order of this Court.
We have heard counsel for the original parties as also the alienees.
The alienations are for about a purported consideration of Rs. 4 lakhs.
The sale deeds indicate that a sum of Rs. 1 lakh had been received earlier and a net amount of Rs.77,124 out of the consideration money under these documents has been paid before the registering authority.
The alienees have admittedly been in possession of the property from the date of the sales which is more than three years ' old by now.
Admittedly, the transfers are pendente lite.
In fact, if the compromise is valid and binding the alienor respondent No. 2 had no interest in the property to part with in view of the stipulation in the compromise that on receipt of Rs. 1 lakh he relinquished his entire interest in the property.
The alienees have made an attempt to hold out that there were agreements for sale prior to the compromise for which there is no acceptable evidence.
We think we have to find that the alienees had no interest in the property prior to the compromise and we must hold that the sale deeds are subsequent to 21.8.1987.
Mr Ram Kumar who appeared for the second respondent, apart from maintaining that his client has not received the sum of Rs.1 lakh has not been able to point out any justification as to why the compromise should not be acted upon and on the basis of it the litigation may not be disposed of.
The factum of compromise is not in dispute.
Respondent No. 2 and his counsel Mr. Ram Kumar have accepted the fact that the parties have signed the compromise petition which contain terms which they had accepted and all parties have accepted the document of compromise to be genuine.
Counsel for the alienees has taken the stand that the said alienations are valid and the transferees have become owners of the property and has even maintained that there have been improvements of the property by the alienees.
He sought to rely on certain decisions which on being referred to were found to be totally inapplicable to the facts of the case.
On the other hand, we find that a similar question arose before the Orissa High Court in the case of Bhoja Govinda Maikap & Anr.
vs Janaki Dei & Ors., AIR (1980) Ori.
108 where the power of the Court under Order 23, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the face of an objection of one of the parties to the compromise was considered.
Relying upon several authorities of different High Courts and one of the Privy Council referred to in the decision, the High 542 Court held that once the Court was satisfied that there was a compromise it was for the Court to record the same and no option lay before the Court to act otherwise.
We are in accord with the principle indicated in the said decision and are of the view that as the compromise petition is genuine and lawful the same has to be acted upon.
We direct that the compromise petition shall be accepted and in terms thereof the suit shall be disposed of and the terms of the compromise shall form part of the order to be drawn up in this Court for disposing of the special leave petition.
With a view to settling all equities between the parties and with the consent of Seshiah who is present in Court, and counsel for the sons and after hearing the Advocate for the alienees, we make the following directions: 1.
Seshaiah shall pay a sum of Rs. 1 lakh more to Sudarshan Gupta within eight weeks from today.
This amount shall be deposited in the Registry of this Court within the time indicated and Sudarshan Gupta shall be free to withdraw the amount.
Rs 77,124 being the amount paid by the alienees before the Sub Registrar in respect of the sale deeds shall be deposited within the same period in the Trial Court and the alienees of the different sale deeds would be entitled to withdraw the amounts on the basis of the record made by the Sub Registrar on each of the sale deeds.
The alienees have no right created under the alleged sale deeds.
Their possession is without authority of law.
Ordinarily, they would have been liable to account for mesne profits.
In view of the fact that there was the allegation of payment of Rs. 1 lakh to Sudarshan Gupta which we have not investigated and to meet the further allegation that some improvements have been made to the property which too we have not gone into, we direct that the mesne profits shall be set off against the same.
Under orders of this Court security has been furnished for mesne profits.
In view of the aforesaid direction, the security furnished in the Trial Court shall stand discharged and the alienees will have no liability to account for mesne profits.
We declare and clarify that none of the sale deeds is valid and none of the alienees has any interest in the aforesaid property.
543 4.
The alienees shall deliver vacant possession of the property by 30th of April, 1991, to Seshiah and in the event of failure to do so the Trial Court is directed by our present order to deliver vacant possession of the entire property in suit including those which are covered by the sale deeds in favour of the alienees to Seshiah within one month therefrom.
If necessary, the Trial Court may appoint a Commissioner and take police help for executing this order and such cost shall ultimately be borne by the defaulting alienees but may initially be met by Seshiah.
There would be no order for costs.

summary/full:
Respondent No. 1 adopted petitioner appellant, who married two wives and through the first wife he had a son, the respondent No. 2 and through the second, another son, the respondent No. 3.
During the pendency of the special leave petition the adoptive mother of appellant died.
Respondent 2 and 3 laid claim to the entire property of respondent No. 1 exclusively under two different wills said to be by the respondent No. 1 and each contended that the other will was a forged one.
On the death of the adoptive mother, the appellant laid claim to her entire property as heir.
While each of the parties had taken such stand, in the litigation a compromise was brought about on 21.8.1987 between the appellant and his two sons, the respondents 2 and 3 and the same was filed in this Court and in terms of the compromise the appellant, to make payment of Rs. 1 lakh to each of his two sons in lieu of relinquishment of their interest.
When the matter was listed for recording the compromise, the respondent No. 2 contended that as he had not been paid Rs. 1 lakh as stipulated in the compromise, in the meanwhile he had alienated about 81 acres of the suit properties to the third parties.
The alienees had been also impleaded as parties under the orders of this Court.
Disposing of the petition, this Court, HELD: 1.
Once the Court was satisfied that there was a compromise it was for the Court to record the same and no option lay before the Court to act otherwise.
[542A B] 539 2.
As the compromise petition in the instant case is genuine nd lawful the same has to be acted upon.
[542B] 3.
It is directed that the compromise petition shall be accepted and in terms thereof the suit shall be disposed of and the terms of the compromise shall form part of the order to be drawn up in this Court for disposing of the special leave petition.
[542B C] 4.
With a view to settling all equities between the parties, directed that the appellant to pay a sum of Rs.1 lakh more to respondent No. 2 within eight weeks.
Rs. 77,124 being the amount paid by the alienees before the Sub Registrar in respect of the sale deeds shall be deposited.
[542C E] 5.
The alienees have no right created under the alleged sale deeds.
Their possession is without authority of law and clarified that none of the sale deeds is valid.
[542F H] 6.
The alienees shall deliver vacant possession of the property by 30th of April, 1991, and in the event of failure to do so the Trial Court directed to deliver vacant possession.
[543A B] Bhoja Govinda Maikap & Anr.
vs Janaki Dei & Ors., , approved.


judgement:
Special Leave Petition Nos.
823 24 of 1990.
From the Judgement and Order dated 6.10.1989 of the Karnataka High Court W.A. Nos.
321 & 322 of 1989.
S.R. Bhat for the Petitioners.
R.N. Narasimha Murthy, K.H. Nobin Singh, M. Veerappa and S.N. Bhatt for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: A few facts are necessary for the disposal of these petitions.
The petitioners were the owners of certain lands which were acquired by the respondents under the provisions of Sections 17 and 19 of the Bangalore Development Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bangalore Act").
Under the provisions of Section 36 of the Bangalore Act, where the acquisitions, otherwise than by agreement, it will be regulated by the provisions , as far they are applicable, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Land Acquisition Act").
Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act, which section was included in the said Act in 1984 as set out hereinafter, very briefly states, provides that the Collector must make his award within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and that if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for acqui 565 sition of the land shall lapse.
Under the Explanation to the first proviso to Section 11 A,"the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded".
It was, inter alia contended by the petitioners that as the awards in these cases has not been made within two years of the notification making the declaration under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
That contention was repelled along with certain other contentions in the judgment of the High Court which is sought to be impugned before us.
The relevant dates which have to be borne in mind in this connection, are as follows: The notification making the declaration under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands in question was made on September 20, 1977.
On September 20, 1984 Section 11 A which introduced into the Land, Acquisition Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, was brought into force.
Under the first proviso to Section 11 A it was prescribed that where the said declaration (under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act) has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award must be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Thus, the award should have been made within two years from September 20, 1984.
On September 11, 1985, the petitioners obtained an interim order from this Court directing status quo with regard to the possession of the lands in question in Special Leave Petition No. 294 of 1985 preferred against the order of the Karnataka High Court dated August 14, 1984, with which we are not directly concerned here.
The said Special Leave Petition No.294 of 1985 was dismissed on April 29, 1987.
On December 16 17, 1987, two writ petitions were field by the respective petitioners in the Karnataka High Court challenging the acquisition on the ground that the awards were not made within the stipulated time.
In these two writ petitions, the Karnataka High Court granted interim stay of further proceedings in respect of the acquisition of the said lands.
These petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of that High Court on November 29, 1988.
Appeals against the decision of a learned Single Judge were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on October 6, 1989, by a Division Bench of that High Court.
The petitioners preferred these Special Leave Petitions, namely S.L.P. Nos. 823 and 824 of 1990 against the decision of the Devision Bench of that High Court, and obtained an interim stay of dispossession therein.
Whatever the ultimate effect of the stay orders, in view of the provisions of Section 11 A of the Land Acquisition Act, to which we have already referred 566 earlier, it is beyond dispute that the fact of the stay orders was highly material in the determination of these Special Leave Petitions.
Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special Leave Petitions to any to the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit.
In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts.
On this ground alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected.
It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts.
If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed.
We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.
There will be no order as to costs of these petitions.
R.P. SLPs dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary/full:
Petitioners ' lands were acquired by the respondents under sections 17 and 19 of the Bangalore Development Act, 1976.
Section 36 of the said Act made applicable the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where acquisition is otherwise than by agreement.
The notification making the declaration under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands in question was made on 20.9.1977.
On 20.9.1984s.
11 A was introduced and brought into force by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 prescribing that where the declaration under section 4 of the Land Acquisition ACt was published before the commencement of the Land Acquistion (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award was to be made within two years from such commencement.
The awards should have thus been made within two years from 20.9.1984.
On 11.9.1985 the petitioners obtained an interim order from this Court directing status quo with regard to the possession of the lands in question in a special leave petition which was dismissed on 29.4.87.
on December 16 17,1987 two writ petitions were filed by the petioners in the High Court Challenging the acquisition, contending that as the awards were not made within two years of the notification making the declaration under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the entire acquisition proceedings had lapsed.
The High Court granted interim stay in respect of the acquisition of the lands.
The petitions were later dismissed.
Appeals therefrom were also dismissed by a Division Bench.
The petitioners preferred these special leave petitions and obtained interim stay of dispossession.
Dismissing the special leave petitions, this Court, 564 HELD: 1.
The relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts.
If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed.[566B C] 2.Whatever the ultimate effect of the stay orders, in view of the provisions of section 11 A of the Land Acquisition ACt, the Fact of the stay orders was highly material in the determination of these special leave petitions.
There was no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and the Court could know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit.
The said interim orders had a direct bearing on the question raised and the non disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts.
On this ground alone, the special leave petitions were liable to be rejected.
[565G H; 566A B]