judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9096 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.87 of the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 933 of 1987.
P.S. Potti and E.M. Anam for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
A piece of land measuring ten and a half cents situated at Kozhippathi Village of Chittur Taluk, Palghat District, State of Kerala originally belonged to Indrani, wife of the petitioner and it now belongs to the petitioner.
Under a preliminary notification issued under section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 24.2.1981 the said piece of land along with some other lands was PG NO 650 proposed to be acquired for a certain public purpose.
Both Indrani and the petitioner filed objections to the proposed acquisition.
After overruling the objections the State Government published a declaration under section 6 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act on 19.1.1984.
On 24.9.1984 the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 passed by Parliament came into force in the State of Kerala and some other parts of India to which it applies.
By section 9 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 a new section, i.e. section 11 A was introduced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act ') which reads thus: "11 A. Period within which an award shall be made The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
" The Land Acquisition Officer, i.e., the Sub Collector of Palghat who was exercising the powers of the Collector under the Act made an award in respect of the land of the Petitioner on 23.9.1986 which was filed in the office of the Collector on 24.9.1986.
The notice of the award was served on the petitioner on 30.9.1986.
The petitioner and his wife challenged the acquisition proceeding in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Kerala in O.P. No. 1536 of 1987.
The learned Single Judge, who heard the said petition overruled the objections of the petitioner and his wife and dismissed the petition.
Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge the petitioner and his wife preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court in W.A. No. 933 of 1987.
The said Writ Appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court.
Aggrieved by the decision of PG NO 651 the Division Bench the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India seeking special leave to appeal against the judgments of the Division Bench of the High Court.
The two grounds on which the acquisition proceeding was challenged by the petitioner and his wife before the High Court were: (i) that the award not having been made within a period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, that is, 24.9.1984, as required by the proviso to section 11 A of the Act, the acquisition proceeding should be deemed to have lapsed; and (ii) that the land acquisition proceeding was liable to be quashed on the ground that there was inordinate delay in making the award.
The contention of the petitioner and his wife before the High Court was that the notice of the award having been served on him on 30th September, 1986 it must be held that the award was actually made on 30th September, 1986 and since more than two years had elapsed from 24.9.1984, from the date on which the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force by the time the notice of award was served on him, the acquisition proceeding should be declared as having lapsed by virtue of the proviso to section 11 A of the Act.
In support of his contention the petitioner relied upon a decision of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676 in which this Court had taken the view that for purposes of calculating the period of limitation prescribed for making an application requesting the Collector to refer the question relating to the valuation of the land acquired under the Act to the Civil Court under section 18 of the Act, the date on which the notice of the award was served on the owner of the land should be treated as the date of the award and that the period of limitation should be counted from the date of the service of the said notice.
Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have declined to accept the said contention and we think rightly.
Before the insertion of the new section.
i.e., section 11 A of the Act there was no provision corresponding to it in the Act which provided for the period within which an award should be passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, that is, the Collector under the Act.
Since in a large number of cases there used to be abnormal delay in making the award, Parliament stepped in and introduced section Il A to the Act which is set out above.
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill introducing the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, PG NO 652 1984 by which section 11 A was introduced into the Act it was stated that "the pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods often causes hardship to the affected parties and renders unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them".
It was further stated in it that "it is proposed to provide for a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act within which the Collector should make his award under the Act.
If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land would lapse".
Pursuant to the above object section 11 A of the Act was enacted.
It provides that the Collector shall make an award under section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.
In the case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the award shall be made within two years from such commencement.
We are not concerned with the rest of the provisions of section 11 A of the Act in this case.
The crucial words which require to be interpreted are "the Collector shall make an award" appearing in section 11 A and the words `the award shall be made ' in the proviso to section 11 A.
The statute prescribes the maximum period of two years for making an award from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act and further attaches a condition that if the award is not made within the said period the proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.
Similarly in the case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act l984 the award shall be made within two years from such commencement and if the award is not so made the proceeding for acquisition shall lapse.
Thus it is seen that the consequence of not making an award within the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration or from the date of the commencement of the Act, as the case may be, is that the entire project for which the land is acquired will have to be abandoned or if it is intended to proceed with the project for which the land had been originally notified for acquisition it would become necessary for the Government to restart the proceedings once again with the publication of a fresh preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act or the corresponding provision in any local statute in force in a State.
If the date of the communication of the notice of the award to the person interested in the land is treated as the date of making the award then the maximum period prescribed under section 11 A of the Act for making the award would get reduced by the period for serving the notice of the award on the owner of the land.
Such maximum period may vary from one PG NO 653 case to another.
Even in the same land acquisition case if a notice of the award is to be served on two or more persons interested in the land the maximum period for making the award may vary from person to person interested in the property depending upon the date of service of notice of the award on each one of them.
If the person interested in the land is an unwilling person who is interested in defeating the land acquisition proceeding it is likely that it may not be possible to serve him with the notice of the award at all within the prescribed time and if he can avoid the service of said notice until the period of two years is over from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act or the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, as the case may be insofar as his interest in the land is concerned, the proceedings for the acquisition would lapse thus affecting seriously the public interest.
It would also lead to absurd and inconvenient results since the acquisition proceeding may be valid against some persons and may become invalid in the case of some others.
It is no doubt true that in Raja Harish Chandra 's case (supra) while construing section 18 of the Act this Court held by giving an extended meaning that the date of the award for purposes of calculating the period of limitation should be the date on which the notice of the award is served on the owner of the land.
The said interpretation was given by this Court on the principle that if a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and, therefore, must be presumed to have the knowledge of the order.
Under section 18 of the Act the person on whom the notice of the award is served has to make an application before the Land Acquisition Officer within six weeks from the date of the award if such person was present or represented before the Land Acquisition Officer at the time when he made his award and in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the award whichever expires first.
In a case where a person interested in the land is not present at the time when the award is made by the Collector he is entitled to make an application under section 18 of the Act seeking a reference of the case to the Civil Court for the determination of the proper compensation within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12(2) of the Act or within six months from the date of the Collector 's date whichever expires first.
Since the process of service of notice issued under section 12(2) would occupy PG NO 654 some time this Court was of the view that it would lead to injustice if the period of limitation prescribed by section 18 of the Act was computed from the date on which the award was actually made and not from the date on which the notice under section 12(2) of the Act was served on the person interested in the land as it would result in the reduction of the period of six weeks by the time required for serving the notice on the person interested in the land.
There is no doubt a difference between the meaning given by this Court in Raja Harish Chandra 's case (supra) to the words "date of the award" in section 18 of the Act and the interpretation of the High Court of the words `the Collector shall make an award ' or `the award shall be made ' in section 11 A of the Act but such a distinction had to be maintained because the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 11 A of the Act are different from the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 18 of the Act and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in the two cases are also different.
In the former case the period of limitation is prescribed for preventing official delay in making the award and the consequent adverse effect on the person or persons interested in the land but in the latter case the period of limitation is prescribed for providing a remedy to the persons whose lands are acquired to seek a reference to the civil court for the determination of proper and just compensation.
Secondly, while in the former case violation of the rule of limitation would result in the acquisition proceeding becoming ineffective, in the latter case such a violation will not have any effect on the validity of acquisition proceeding.
Thirdly, while in the former case the period of limitation prescribed represents the outer limit within which an award can be made in the latter case we are concerned with the point of time at which the time to make an application under section 18 of the Act will begin to run against the person interested in the land.
The provisions of section 11 A have to be construed bearing in mind these points of difference.
It is well known that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute depends upon the context in which they are found and the purpose behind them.
Under section 11 A of the Act the Collector is empowered to make an award before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act and in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 before the expiry of the period of two years from the date of its commencement.
If an award is not made within the prescribed period of two years in either case, it is open to the person PG NO 655 interested in the land to approach the Collector and tell him that the acquisition proceeding should be dropped unless the Collector is able to produce before him an award made by him within the period of two years.
He may also in such a case question the continuance of the acquisition proceeding in court.
Thus no prejudice will be caused to the person interested in the land.
At the same time it would not be open to a person interested in the land to get rid of the acquisition of proceeding by avoiding service of notice issued by the Collector within the prescribed period.
We are of the view that under section 11 A of the Act the words "the Collector shall make an award. .within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration" mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of the date on which the notice of the award is served upon the persons interested in the land.
`To make an award ' in this section means `sign the award '.
That is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words `to make an award '.
An extended or a different meaning assigned to the words `the date of the award ' by this court in Raja Harish Chandra 's case (supra) cannot be applied in this case since such an extended or different meaning is neither warranted by equity nor will it advance the object of the statute.
Similarly under the proviso to section 11 A of the Collector, the Collector is empowered to make an award within two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 irrespective of the date on which the notice of award is served on the person concerned.
We do not find any analogy between section 11 A and section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question is concerned.
The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the above contention of the petitioner.
We find very little substance in the other contention of the petitioner, namely, that the award was liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay since it had been made at the end of two years from the date of commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.
While we expect an award to be passed by the Collector as early as possible without delaying till the close of the period of two years prescribed by section 11 A of the Act, we do not see any good reason to set aside a proceeding for acquisition on the ground of delay by applying our own standard of speed in the matter of making awards even where the period occupied is less than two years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act as such an approach may drive the Collector to make awards without giving adequate time to the claimants to adduce evidence in support of the valuation of the property PG NO 656 proposed to be acquired and without giving sufficient consideration to the material placed before him.
It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in making the awards by applying varying standards to different cases even though the maximum time of two years has not been exceeded.
The very fact that section 11 A has prescribed the period of two years from the date of the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 as the maximum period within which the award can be made suggests that the time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding.
We, therefore, affirm the decision of the High Court and reject this Special Leave Petition.
R.S.S. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The Kerala State Government, after completion of preliminary steps, published a declaration on 18.1.1984 concerning the acquisition of petitioner 's land for a public purpose.
On 24.9.1984 the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 came into force whereby section 11 A was introduced into the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Section 11 A provided that the Collector shall make an award under section 11 of the Act within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, and in the case where the said declaration had been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 within two years from such commencement.
The Collector made the award on 23.9.1986.
The notice of the award was served on the petitioner on 30.9.1986.
The petitioner challenged the award before the High Court of Kerala on the grounds (1) that the notice of the award having been served on 30.9.1986, the award was not made within the prescribed period of two years, and (ii) that there was inordinate delay in making the award.
Both the writ petition and the writ appeal were dismissed by the High Court.
Dismissing the special leave petition, it was, HELD: (1) In section 11 A the words "the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration" mean that the Collector is empowered to make an award till the expiry of the last date of the period of two years irrespective of he date on which the notice of the award is served upon the persons interested in the land.
`To make an award ' in this section PG NO 648 PG NO 649 means `sign the award '.
That is the ordinary meaning to be ascribed to the words `to make an award '.
[655C D] (2) It is well known that the meaning to be assigned to the words in a statute depends upon the context in which they are found and the purpose behind them.
(3) The object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 11 A are different from the object of and the reason for prescribing the period of limitation under section 18 of the Act and the consequences that would flow from the violation of the rule of limitation in the two cases are also different.
There is no analogy between section 11 A and section 18 of the Act insofar as the above question is concerned.
[654C D; 655E] (4) It would be safer in such cases to rely upon the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award, instead of proceeding to strike down acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay in making the award by applying varying standards to different cases even though the maximum time of two years has not been exceeded.
The time taken by the Land Acquisition Officer in this case to make the award cannot be considered to be fatal to the acquisition proceeding.
[656B C] Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676, distinguished.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1201 of 1976.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.8.76 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 12204 of 1975.
Appellant in person.
Dileep Tandon and R.B. Mehrotra for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN, J.
This appeal by special leave by a tenant is directed against the dismissal of Civil Miscellaneous Writ No 12204 of 1975 by the High Court of Allahabad.
The second respondent became the owner of a house bearing Municipal No. 140 (old No. 94 A) in Hewett Road, Allahabad under a gift deed executed in his favour by his mother in 1945.
However even in 1944, his father had leased the house to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs.30 which after some years was raised to Rs.35 The house is a three storeyed building and the appellant was residing in the first and second floors and running a drug store belonging to his wife in the ground floor.
Some years later the second respondent 's father leased out an adjacent building also to the appellant for being used for the drug store business.
In 1967 it became necessary for the second respondent to seek recovery of possession of the house because his elder brother, with whom he was living, asked him to find accommodation elsewhere.
Therefore the second respondent applied for permission under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Rent Act) to the Prescribed Authority to file a suit for eviction against the PG NO 725 appellant on the ground of urgent and reasonable requirement of the house for his own occupation.
The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on November 10, 1967.
After the 1947 Rent Act came to be replaced by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter the 1972 Rent Act), the second respondent again sought the permission of the Prescribed Authority to file a suit against the appellant but this time he sought for recovery of possession of the leased premises either fully or partially.
He averred in the application that since his brother had asked him to vacate his house he had taken up residence in a single room in the house of one Srivastava and was living there in great hardship and as such he wanted to recover possession of his house in its entirety failing which at least a portion of it.
The Prescribed Authority refused to grant permission on the ground the application had been made within a period of six months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act and hence it was barred by Rule 18(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter the Rules).
The Appellate Authority, however, differed from the Prescribed Authority and granted permission to the second respondent to recover possession of the ground floor portion of the house alone.
Thereupon the appellant moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ to quash the order of the Appellate Authority but did not meet with Success and hence this appeal by special leave.
A few facts may first be noticed before the appellant 's contentions are set out and examined.
Admittedly, the second respondent became the owner of the leased premises in the year 15145 under a gift settlement made by his mother and except the leased building he has no other house.
It is also an admitted fact that when the first Application for permission to sue was made, the second respondent was living with his brother but subsequently he had to move out of that house and take up residence in a single room in a building belonging to one Srivastava.
A Commissioner appointed by the Court had inspected the room occupied by the second respondent and found that the second respondent was faced with acute shortage of space and that the bath room and latrine were situated in the ground floor which was in the landlord 's occupation.
While the prayer in the first application was for the release Of the entire house, the prayer in the second application was for release of the whole house or in the alternative for the release of at least a portion of the house.
PG NO 726 Coming now to the contention of the appellant, who is a member of the bar and who appeared in person and argued the case for himself.
they were as follows: 1.
The application made under the 1972 Rent Act was a second application for release of the house on the same ground of requirement and hence it was barred under Rule 18(1) of the Rules since it had been made within six months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act.
The High Court 's view that the second application was not barred under Rule 18(1) because it is the circumstances of requirement and not the nature of the requirement that would constitute the ground of eviction is erroneous and unsustainable.
The Act and the Rules do not permit the creation of two dwelling units in a building covered by a single tenancy and hence the grant of permission for partial eviction is bad in law.
The Appellate Authority has erred in rendering a finding against the appellant in the matter of comparative hardship merely because the appellant had another building adjacent to the leased premises for running the drug store.
In any event, the Appellate Authority and the High Court have failed to notice that without the ground floor, the first and second floors cannot be used as residence because the bath and toilet rooms are situated only in the ground floor. 'The learned counsel for the second respondent.
besides refuting the above contentions of the appellant argued that the appeal itself has become unsustainable because the appellant has vacated the building in the year 1976 itself and taken up residence in another house belonging to his wife and consequently by reason of Explanation (1) to Section 21 of the 1972 Rent Act, he is disentitled to dispute the second respondent 's right to recover possession of the house.
We will now consider the contentions of the appellant in seriatum In so far as the first contention is concerned, it suffers from a fallacy in that it is founded upon a misconstruction of Rule 18 (1) The Rule in question is worded as under: 18.
Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings (Section 38(4) and 41) (l) Where an application of a landlord against any tenant for permission to file a suit for PG NO 727 eviction under Section 3 of the old Act, on any ground mentioned in Section 21(1) has been finally allowed or rejected on merits either before or after the commencement of the Act, whether by the District Magistrate or on revision by the Commissioner or the State Government or under clause (i) or clause (m) of Section 43(2) by the District Judge, and the landlord instead of filing a suit for eviction makes an application under Section 21 on the same ground within a period of six months from such decision or from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings conclusive. " (emphasis supplied) Provided that the period during which the operation of any permission as aforesaid is stayed by order ot ' any court or authority shall be excluded in computing the said period of six months (2) . . omitted.
On a reading of Rule 18(1), it may be seen that the Rule does not prohibit or bar the filing of an application for release of any building on any ground mentioned in Section 21( 1) within a period of six months from the date on which a final order was passed in the previous application made under Section 3 of the 1947 Rent Act or within a period of six months from the commencement of the Act.
All that the Rule says is that it a second application is made for release of the house on which permission to sue was sought in the previous application on the same ground within a period of six months from the date of the final order in that application or within six months from the commencement of the Act whichever is later," the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive.
" The Rule only sets out a rule of presumption to be followed by the Prescribed Authority for dealing with an application for release on the same ground without a sufficient interval of time between the filing of the two petitions The Rule does not mandate that a second application preferred on the same ground within a period of six months from the date of the order in the previous application or from the commencement of the Act must necessarily be dismissed as barred under the Rules.
The first contention of the appellant is therefore obviously misconceived and cannot therefore be sustained PG NO 728 In so far as the second contention is concerned, the appellant is right when he says that the earlier application under Section 3 of the 1947 Rent Act and the later application under Section 21(1) of the 1972 Rent Act should be construed as having been made on one and the same ground viz. bona fide requirement of the premises by the second respondent for his own occupation.
The High Court has however taken the view that the ground of eviction in the two applications is not the same because different sets of circumstances would constitute different grounds and such a test is satisfied in this case.
We do not think it necessary to go into the question whether the High Court 's view is correct or not because even if we treat the two applications as having been made on the same ground, the second application would not attract the operation of Rule 18(1).
Since the Rule contains only a formula of presumption based on facts, it goes without saying that the prescription is only of a directory nature and not of a mandatory nature.
In this context we may appositely refer to the following passage in Phipson on Evidence (Thirteenth Edition) at pages 4 and 5: "Presumptions are either of law or fact.
Presumptions of law are arbitrary consequence expressly annexed by law to particular facts; and may be either conclusive, as that a child under a certain age is incapable of committing any crime; or rebuttable, as that a person not heard of for seven years is dead, or that a bill of exchange has been given for value.
Presumptions of fact are inferences which the mind naturally and logically draws from given facts, irrespective of their legal effect.
Not only are they always rebuttable, but the trier of fact may refuse to mke the usual or natural inference notwithstanding that there is no rebutting evidence.
" Besides it is a well known principle that in the interpretation of statutes that where the situation and the context warrants it, the word "shall" used in a Scction or Rule of a statute has to be construed as "may".
The present context is one such where the words "the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive" have to be read as "the Prescribed Authority may accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive" because the findings are based upon existence of facts.
We may now set out the reason as to why the prescription in Rule 18(1) should be construed as only PG NO 729 directory and not mandatory In the first place, the Rule envisages two kinds of situations, one of them where the second application is made within an interval of six months from the date on which final orders were passed in the previous application and the other where the second application is made beyond an interval of six months, which may even go up to several years, as in this case where the interval was over five years, but within six months of the Act coming into force.
Surely, the legislature would not have intended that the interval factor in the two sets of situations should be visited with the same consequences by adopting a rigid and inflexible application of the prescriptive guideline given in Rule 18(1) .
The second factor is that even if the interval factor is the sole criterion for the application of the formula contained in Rule 18(1), the legislature could not have intended that even where drastic changes had taken place subsequent to the disposal of the earlier application, the prescribed authority should shut his eyes to the realities of the situation and blindly and mechanically apply the formula in Rule 18(1) and reject the second application.
To cite a few examples it may be that after the disposal of the first application, the landlord had been rendered houseless due to the house occupied by him falling down due to decay or heavy rains or being destroyed by fire Could any one say that irrespective of the changes that have taken place, the findings rendered in the previous application would have the force of relevancy till the period of six months fixed under the Rule has expired? It is, therefore, manifest that the rule of presumption enunciated in Rule 18(1) is only to serve as a guideline to be followed by the prescribed authority if he finds the circumstances to remain unchanged and the finding rendered in the earlier application to have relevancy even with reference to the facts set out in the second application the Rule intended to avoid multiplicity of proceeding as the very heading given to the Rule would make it clear It will therefore be inequitable and unrealistic to construe Rule 18 (1) as containing an inexorable legal prescription for rejecting a second application filed within the prescribed time limit solely on the basis of the findings rendered in the earlier application.
In this case we have already referred to the fact that after the first application was rejected, the living conditions ot ' the second respodent had changed materially He had been turned out of his brother 's house and forced to take up residence in a single room belonging to a third party and live there in great discomfort and hardship In the plight in which he was placed, he was even prepared to accept partial release of the house it ' he could not get release of the entire premises.
The long interval of time PG NO 730 between the rejection of the first application and the date of making the second application viz. about five years and the significant changes that had taken place during the interval in the living conditions of the second respondent undoubtedly rendered irrelevant the earlier findings and such being the case the rule of presumption given in Rule 18(1) can have no application or relevance to the second application.
Viewed in this manner, we do not think the Appellate Authority or the High court has committed any error in granting the relief of partial release of the house to the respondent Hence the second contention of the Appellant has also to fail.
So far as the third contention is concerned viz. the impermissibility of creating two dwelling units in a single tenanted premises, the argument fails to note that Section 21(1) provides for an order of eviction being passed against a tenant "from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof." (Emphasis supplied).
We do not therefore find any error in the second respondent being granted the relief of partial eviction.
As regards the fourth contention, it is admitted that the appellant had been given an additional building by the second respondent 's father for being used for the drug store business Since the appellant was using the ground floor in the suit premises only for running his wife 's drug store and was not living there in the Appellate Authority cannot be said to have committed any error in taking the view that in the matter of comparative hardship the second respondent would be the more affected person if eviction was not ordered than the appellant by an order of partial eviction being passed because he had another building and could conveniently shift his business to that building.
Coming to the last contention of the appellant viz the unsuitability of the first and second floors for residential purpose without the use of the bath and toilet rooms in the ground floor, it is open to the appellant to move the Prescribed Authority for directions being given to the second respondent to make suitable provision in the ground floor for the appellant and his family members to have access to and make use of the bath and toilet rooms in the ground floor.
As regards the contention of the respondent that the appellant and his wife are now living in a house belonging to the appellant 's wife and as such the appellant is precluded under Explanation (i) to Section 21(1) of the 1972 Rent Act from resisting the second respondent 's suit for eviction, we are unable to make any pronouncement on it because of lack of evidence in support of that plea and PG NO 731 besides the appellant would say that the house now occupied by him and his wife is the subject matter of a litigation between his wife and her uncle.
In the light of our conclusions, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
In 1967 the second respondent landlord applied to the Prescribed Authority, under section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 for permission to file a suit for eviction against the appellant tenant on the ground of his own requirement because his brother with whom he was living had asked him to find accommodation elsewhere.
This application was rejected.
After the 1947 Rent Act was replaced by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972, the second respondent again sought the permission of the Prescribed Authority for recovery of possession of the leased premises either fully or partially, on the ground that he was living in great hardship in a single room in a house.
The Prescribed Authority refused to grant the permission on the ground that the application had been made within a period of six months from the commencement of the 1972 Rent Act and hence it was barred by Rule 18 (1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972.
The Appellate Authority, however, granted permission to the second respondent to recover possession of the ground floor portion of the house.
The appellant moved a petition in the High Court against the order of the Appellate Authority but did not succeed.
Before this Court the appellant contends that(l) a second application on the same ground made within six months from the commencement of the 1972 Act was barred under Rule 18 (1) of the 1972 Rules; (2) the High Court 's view that it is not barred because it is the circumstances of requirement and not the nature of the requirement that would constitute PG NO 722 PG NO 723 the ground of eviction is erroneous and unsustainable (3) the Act and the Rules do not permit the creation of two dwelling units in a building covered by a single tenancy; (4) the Appellate Authority has erred in rendering a finding against the appellant in the matter of comparative hardship; and (5) the Appellate Authority and the High Court have failed to notice the without the ground floor, the first and second floors cannot be used as residence because the bath and toilet rooms are situated only in the ground floor.
Dismissing the appeal, it was, HELD: (I) All that Rule 18(1) says is that if a second application is made for release of the house on which permission to sue was sought for in the previous application on the same ground within a period of six months from the date of the final order in that application or within six months from the commencement of the Act, whichever is later, 'the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive." [727E Fl (2) Even if the two applications are treated as having been made on the same ground, the second application would not attract the operation of Rule 18(1) since the Rule contains only a formula of presumption based on facts.
The prescription of the rule is only of a directory nature and not of a mandatory nature [728C] (3) In the interpretation of statutes, where the situation and the context warrants, the word "shall" used in a section or rule has to be construed as "may".
The present context is one such where the words "the prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive" have to be read as "the Prescribed Authority may accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive" because the finding are based upon existence of facts.
[728(, H] (4) It will be inequitable and unrealistic to construe Rule 18(1) as containing an inexorable legal prescription for rejecting a second application filed within the prescribed time limit solely on the basis of the findings rendered in the earlier application.
[729F] (5) The long interval of time between the rejection of the first application and the date of making the second application viz., about five years, and the significant changes that had taken place during the interval in the living conditions of the second respondent undoubtedly rendered irrelevant the earlier findings.
[730A B] PG NO 724 (6) Section 21(1) provides for an order of eviction being passed against a tenant 'From the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof." [730C] (7) It is open to the appellant to move the Prescribed Authority for directions being given to the second respondent to make suitable provision in the ground floor for the appellant and his family members to have access to and make use of the bath and toilet rooms in the ground floor.
[730G]


judgement:
ivil Appeal NO. 293 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.4.1987 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P.
NO.1645 Of 1987.
M.C. Bhandare, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Appellant.
P.A. Choudhary, A.V. Rangam and T.V.S.N. Chari for the Respondents.
JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment and order dated April 24, 1987 Of the Division Bench Of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing the writ petition NO.1645 Of 1987.
PG NO 896 Briefly stated, the facts are these: In the month of August 1984 a Ministry headed by Sri N. Bhaskara Rao suddenly came into power in A.P.
The said Ministry just lasted for about a month and had to go out of office for want of vote of confidence by the State Legislative Assembly.
During that short term, the Government granted a number of permissions to various private bodies and individuals for starting colleges of education (B.Ed.) courses.
The appellant was one among those beneficiaries.
The permission was granted with several conditions.
Those conditions were required to be complied with within a period of six months.
In the middle of September 1984 Bhaskara Rao 's Ministry went out of office and the Government headed by Sri N.T. Rama Rao came back to power.
Soon thereafter the permissions granted were suspended or cancelled.
The appellant and other institutions aggrieved by the cancellation moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for relief under Article 226.
~he appellant filed writ petition No. 812 of 1986.
The State contended that the parties did nOt comply with the conditions of the grant of permission.
All those writ petitions were disposed of by common order dated March 7, 1986.
The High Court was of opinion that the cancellation was as arbitrary as the grant of permission.
So a via media was taken since the parties have invested large sums of money for establishing the colleges.
The High Court laid down certain conditions and issued directions for compliance for granting permission and recognition to the colleges.
Some of those directions are as follows| "(1) The petitioners shall comply with the requirement of the deposit of Rs.4,50,000 within one month from this date.
If the Director of School Education does not cooperate with the petitioners in opening a joint account the deposit shall be made in a fixed deposit account in the name of the college in any nationalised or scheduled bank.
(It shall be open to the petitioner to pursue his application for exemption meanwhile but the time limit prescribed herein remains or applies to this petition as well).
(2) The petitioners shall comply with the requirements relating to the appointment of qualified staff and the laboratory, Library and audio visual equipment within three months from today.
For the purpose of recruitment of the teaching staff, the petitioners shall issue Notifications in two dailies with wide circulation in this State Calling PG NO 897 for applications from the qualified teachers on receipt of applications selections shall be made by the Selection Committee if one is already constituted by the Government or the University and if no Selection Committee is constituted, it shall be constituted consisting of a member of the Management, the Director of School Education or his nominee, not below the rank of a Joint Director and in his absence by D.E.O and an Expert to be nominated by the University.
The petitioners shall send communications to the Director of School Education and the University as soon as applications are received for the purpose of constituting the Selection Committee and the said officers shall take the necessary steps in this behalf.
(3) If the qualified staff do not respond to the Notification issued by the petitioners and consequently the petitioners find difficulty in appointing qualified staff the petitioners shall made a representation to the Director of School Education seeking his help in the recruitment and appointment of qualified teaching staff.
(4) All other requirements, including the Model School, subject to which permissions were initially granted to the petitioners shall be complied with by the petitioners not later than 3]st July, 1986.
(5) The petitioners shall send a compliance report to the Director of School Education as soon as the requirement regarding deposit of Rs.4,50,00() within the permitted time is complied with duly endorsing a copy of the compliance report to the Government.
Similarly, the petitioners shall send a compliance report to the Director of School Education regarding the appointment within the permitted time of the required qualified teaching staff and also the provision of library laboratory and audio visual equipment endorsing a copy of the compliance shall send a report to the Director of School Education endorsing a copy thereof to the Government regarding the compliance of all other requirements as directed above by 3 Ist July, 1986.
" The Director of School Education was asked to make such enquiry as he thinks fit to satisfy himself about compliance of the above requirements.
If there was no satisfactory compliance within the prescribed period, the High Court said PG NO 898 that the concerned institution shall cease to function at the end of the academic year 1985 86.
In accordance with directions issued by the High Court, the District Educational Officer inspected the appellant 's college.
He made a report dated June 25, 1986 stating that there was non compliance with the directions of the High Court.
Accepting that report, the Director made an order dated September 20, 1986 declaring that the college shall cease to exist with effect from the last working day of the academic year 1985 86.
Challenging the validity of that declaration, the appellant moved the High Court with writ petition No. 1645 of 1987.
The appellant also filed three more writ petitions.
Writ petition No. 11087 of 1985 was filed for a direction to the Nagarjuna University, Guntur to grant affiliation to the appellant 's college.
Writ petition No. 9417 of 1986 was filed for a declaration that the resolution of the Nagarjuna University refusing to grant affiliation to the college was arbitrary and illegal.
Writ petition No. 17725 of 1986 was filed by the students of the college for a direction to declare the results of their B.Ed.
examination held on October 7, 1985.
All the four writ petitions were disposed of by the High Court by a common order which is now under appeal before us.
The writ petition No. 1645 of 1987 was dismissed on the ground that the appellant has not complied with the conditions laid down by the High Court.
Consequently, Writ Petition Nos. 11087 of 1985 and 9417 of 1986 which were filed against the Nagarjuna University were also dismissed.
The High Court however, made some observations regarding the manner in which the syndicate of the University has to dispose of the application for affiliation.
The High Court observed that denial of affiliation affects the very life and existence of institution.
Therefore, it would be fair and proper that the syndicate or other competent authority of the University which deals with the question of affiliation, must give reasons for refusal to grant affiliation.
However, there are no appeals before this court against the dismissal of those two writ petitions.
The present appeal is only against the order of dismissing writ petition No. 1645 of 1987.
At the outset.
it may be stated that before the High Court the appellant did not contend that it had complied with all the conditions laid down for recognition.
The contention.
however, was that the college is a minority institution and therefore.
it need not comply with all those requirements.
The High Court did not accept that contentionand in our opinion very rightly.
It was observed that since the appellant has deliberately refused to comply PG NO 899 with the conditions by taking a new and untenable stand that it is a minority institution, it is not entitled to any relief.
The High Court also noted the inadequacy in the recruitment of lecturers.
As against seven lecturers, only five lecturers were appointed by the appellant.
The posts of lecturer in Mathematics and Physical Science were left unfilled.
The Principal was not qualified to hold the post.
The lecturer in social studies was also not qualified.
The High Court further referred to the deficiencies pointed out by the Inspection Commission of Nagarjuna University and finally said: "The court allowed the writ petition subject to directions (a) to (j) contained in paragraph 134 of its judgment.
Direction (b) clearly says that the selections shall be made by a selection committee comprising of one nominee of the Director of School Education and one nominee of the University.
This was so directed notwithstanding the contention urged by the petitioner that it is a minority institution.
Indeed, the Bench was of the opinion that the said aspect is totally irrelevant in the circumstances of the case.
The reason is evident.
The Division Bench merely directed the petitioner institution to comply with the conditions of grant within a certain extended period and no more.
The petitioner did not question the judgment of the Division Bench dated 7.3.1986, which means that he has accepted it.
The said judgment has become final so far as the petitioner is concerned.
Now when the question of compliance with and implementation of those direction arise, the petitioner cannot turn round and say that since the petitioner institution is a minority institution.
it need not comply with the said directions.
Such a contention cannot be countenanced, and cannot be taken note of in the circumstances of the case.
" Before us, the question as to the nature of the institution whether it is a minority institution or not, has not been canvassed.
Counsel for the appellant said that he will urge that contention in other appropriate case.
He rested this case on one ground that the conditions laid down by the High Court have been substantially complied with.
Reference was made to the earnest efforts made by the appellant to recruit the best qualified staff by inviting applications through successive advertisements in news papers.
When there was no response to the advertisements, the appellant, it is said, approached the department for recruitment of staff.
But the department did not cooperate.
PG NO 900 It was argued that the appellant in the circumstances could not be blamed and if at all it should be the department to be found fault with.
In the alternative it was contended that the appellant has since satisfied all the necessary requirements for grant of permission and affiliation of the college.
We do not want to examine the alternate contention urged by the appellant.
That is a matter for the statutory authorities like the District Educational Officer and the Nagarjuna University to satisfy them selves whether the institution should be permitted to carry on the course of study.
Whether it has satisfied the necessary conditions for grant of permission and affiliation.
We express no opinion on that aspect of the matter.
As to the first contention, very little remains in favour of the appellant.
While considering the validity of the earlier cancellation of the permission, the High Court had laid down certain guidelines and issued some directions for obedience.
The High Court made that order in the interest of the institution and the students, though strictly speaking it was beyond the power of the High Court.
The High Court did make it clear that if those conditions were not complied with within the prescribed period, the institution shall cease to function.
The record reveals that there were many deficiencies in the institution.
The reports of the District Educational Officer and the Inspection Commission of Nagarjuna University indicated that the appellant did not satisfy all the requirements for granting permission or affiliation.
We find no justification to consider the correctness of those reports.
Nor we could find fault with the order of the High Court.
Indeed we must accept it in the circumstances of the case.
We may however, state that if the appellant has since substantially complied with the necessary conditions after the disposal of the matter by the High Court, it will be open to it to approach the concerned authorities for permission to start the college again.
This however, is not the end of the matter.
There still remains another question.
That question arises out of the interim order made by this Court.
In this Court when the Advocates were on strike, the appellant appears to have personally moved CMP No. 5153 of i988 for permission to admit students for the term l987 88.
That petition came up before a Bench of this Court on February 23, 1988.
Mr. J. Prasad, petitioner in person was present in the Court and Mr. Balasubramaniam on behalf of the State Government was present.
No advocate was present.
Mr. Balasubramaniam, was PG NO 901 an officer of the establishment of the Andhra Pradesh Government Legal Cell at Delhi.
Obviously he was ignorant of, the facts of the case.
This Court after going into the relevant papers made an interim order as follows: "We have also read the report of 9th February, 1988 made by the District Educational Officer, Ongole.
We direct subject to compliance of the conditions, petitioners should be permitted to admit students for the term 1987 88.
The verification should be made within one week from today and if there have been any shortfall, petitioner has opportunity to comply the same within one week.
The time granted upto Ist of March, 1988 shall stand extended upto 15th March, 1988.
CMP is disposed of.
" As is obvious from the above interim order that the appellant was permitted to admit students for the academic year 1987 88 subject to compliance with the conditions.
This Court did not specify the number of students to be admitted.
On March 9, 1988, the Department sent a Committee of two persons for inspection and report about the facilities available in the college.
The Committee consisted of Shri R. Durga Prasad of G.G.C.E. Nellore and Shri B. Venkateswara.
District Educational Officer, Ongole.
They visited the college and submitted the report dated March 9, 1988.
Several irregularities were pointed out in that report particularly with regard to accommodation, furniture, library.
laboratory and games material.
With regard to staff it is stated that the staff appointed are qualified, but it does not state whether the required numbers in different disciplines have been recruited or not.
That report was forward to the Directorate of School Education.
On March 11, 1988, the Director wrote to the Secretary.
Government Education Department, A.P. to examine the case of the appellant in detail and accord permission to run the college till 1987 88 and also permit admissions of students in view of the interim order made by this Court.
The Director also pointed out in his letter that the appellant is claiming to be a minority institution and seeking admission of 160 students.
On April 4, 1988, the Government made an order according sanction to run the college till 1987 88 with an intake capacity of 100 students subject to fulfilment, among others, the following conditions: "(1) The college building should be constructed expeditiouly.
The management should procure equipment and material for the laboratories expending an amount of not PG NO 902 less than Rs.20,000 during 1987 88.
They should also procure audio visual equipment and material at a cost of not less than Rs.30,000.
The management should provide library facilities and expend a sum of Rs.5,000 towards purchase of books.
They should also provide adequate furniture.
(2) The management should appoint full contingent staff on prescribed scales of pay.
(3) They should appoint edequate teaching and non teaching staff on prescribed scales of pay.
(4) Admissions into the B.Ed.
Course in the College should be through the Common Entrance Examinations conducted by the University in view of the High Court judgment dated 8.10.1987 in W.P. No. 552 of 1986.
(6) The management should not collect any capitation fees.
(7) To establish a Model School The Director of School Education was requested to report the fulfilment of conditions by the management to the Government within six months from the date of issue of the order, failing which the permission accorded as liable to be cancelled without any notice.
This order was made subject to final judgment of the Supreme Court of India. ' ' It appears even before the aforesaid Government order, the appellant had admitted 160 students.
The students were not allotted by the Convenor, B.Ed., Common Entrance Test.
It is now said that these 160 students have undergone the required nine months training in the academic year 1987 88 and therefore, they should be permitted to appear for the examination.
Counsel for the State submitted that the appellant has been a law breaker from the very beginning and no concession should therefore be extended to perpetuate the illegality by permitting the students to appear in the examination.
In any event, he said that more than 100 students should not be permitted.
PG NO 903 The explanation of the appellant however, in this context is, that there is a general circular of the State Government permitting unaided schools/colleges to admit 160 students for B.Ed.
course as economic viability.
The appellant, therefore, had to admit the students before the due date extended by this Court and could not have waited for the belated Government order.
The explanation of the appellant appears to be far from satisfactory.
The permission to start the college by the appellant was cancelled twice by the authorities for want of requirements.
On the ground, the university also has refused to grant affiliation to the college.
The order of the High Court affirming the decision of the university is not under appeal before us.
In spite of it, the appellant s sought an interim order from this Court and admitted 160 students.
If the Government order had been delayed, the appellant ought to have asked the Convenor, B.Ed.
Common Entrance Test to allot the students for admission to the college.
That was one of the conditions laid down by the High Court also.
Even that was not complied with.
From the sequence of events which were earlier referred to, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the appellant was trying to overreach everybody body at every stage.
This is one side of the picture.
There is however, another side.
They are the students who were admitted on the strength of the interim order made by this Court.
The student were perhaps led to believe that this Court permitted the appellant to admit them.
We consider, therefore, that it may not be proper to drive them to street if they have undergone the prescribed course with the necessary syllabi and other matters relating thereto.
But it would be for the Director of School and the Registrar.
Nagarjuna University to consider and satisfy themselves and not for this Court at once to permit to them to appear in the examination.
In the result we dismiss the writ appeal.
but direct respondent 1 and 3 to consider forthwith whether the students in the appellant 's college have undergone the necessary B.Ed.
course and if so, permit them to appear for the ensuing examination and publish their result.
In the circumstances.
however, we make no order as to costs.
Before parting with the case, we should like to add a word more.
Though teaching is the last choice in the job market, the role of teachers is central to all processes of formal education.
The teacher alone could bring out the PG NO 904 skills and intellectual capabilities of students.
He is the 'engine ' of the educational system.
He is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.
He needs to be endowed and energised with needed potential to deliver enlightened service expected of him.
His quality should be such as would inspire and motivate into action the benefitter.
He must keep himself abreast of ever changing conditions.
He is not to perform in a wooden and unimaginative way.
He must eliminate fissiparous tendencies and attitudes and infuse nobler and national ideas in younger minds.
His involvement in national integration is more important, indeed indispensable.
It is, therefore, needless to state that teachers should be subjected to rigorous training with rigid scrutiny of efficiency.
It has greater relevance to the needs of the day.
The ill trained or substandard teachers would be detrimental to our educational system; if not a punishment on our children.
The Government and the University must, therefore, take care to see that inadequacy in the training of teachers is not compounded by any extraneous consideration.
A.P.J. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
In August, 1984 the State Government granted permission to various private bodies and individuals for starting colleges of education (B.Ed.) courses, with several conditions required to be complied with within a period of six months.
The appellant was one among these beneficiaries.
When a change of the Government ensued in September 1984, the permissions granted were suspended or cancelled.
The appellant and other institutions aggrieved by the cancellation moved the HighCourt for relief under Article 226.
The High Court while disposing of all the writ petitions by a common order was of the opinion that the cancellation was as arbitrary as the grant of permission.
Since the parties had invested large sums money for establishing the colleges a via media was taken.
The High Court laid down certain conditions and issued directions for compliance for granting permission and recognition to the colleges.
The District Educational Officer inspected the appellant 's college and made a report stating that there was non compliance with the directions of the High Court.
Accepting that report, Director of School Education made an order declaring that the College of the appellant shall cease to exist with effect from the last working day of the academic year 1985 86.
Challenging the validity of that declaration, the appellant again moved the High Court by filing a writ petition.
He filed two more writ petitions for a direction to the Nagarjuna University to grant affiliation to the appellant 's college and for a declaration that the resolution of the Nagarjuna University refusing to grant affiliation to the college of the appellant was arbitrary and illegal.
The students of the college also filed a writ petition for a direction to declare the results of their B.Ed.
examination held in 1985.
The High Court by a common order disposed of all the four writ petitions.
PG NO 893 PG NO 894 The appellant filed an appeal to this Court only against the order dismissing writ petition No. 1645 of 1987, on the ground that the appellant has not complied with the conditions laid down by the High Court.
Before the High Court the appellant did not contend that it had complied with all the conditions laid down for recognition.
However, it was contended that the college is a minority institution and, therefore, it need not comply with all those requirements.
The High Court did not accept this contention.
Before this Court he relied solely on the ground that the conditions laid down by the High Court have been substantially complied with.
On behalf of the respondent State it was contended that the appellant has been a law breaker from the very beginning and no concession should be extended to perpetuate the illegality by permitting the students to appear in the examination and in any event, more than 100 students should not be permitted.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
While considering the validity of the earlier cancellation of the permission, the High Court had laid down certain guidelines and issued some directions for obedience.
The High Court made that order in the interest of the institution and the students, though strictly speaking it was beyond the power of the High Court.
The High Court did make it clear that if those conditions were not complied with within the prescribed period, the institution shall cease to function.
The record reveals that there were many deficiencies in the institution.
The reports of the District Educational Officer and Inspection Commission of Nagarjuna University indicated that the appellant did not satisfy all the requirements for granting permission or affiliation.
[900D E] 2.
The permission to start the college by the appellant was cancelled twice by the authorities for want of requirements.
On that ground,the University also has refused to grant affiliation to the college.
The order of the High Court affirming the decision of the University is not under appeal before this Court.
In spite of it, the appellant 's sought an interim order from this Court and admitted 160 students.
If the Government order had been delayed, the appellant ought to have asked the Convenor, B.Ed.
Common Entrance test to allot the students for admission to the college.
That was one of the conditions laid down by the High Court also.
Even that was not complied with.
[903B D] 3.
They are the students who were admitted on the strength of the interim order made by this Court.
It may not be proper to drive them to street if they have under gone the prescribed course with the necessary syllabi and other PG NO 895 matters relating thereto.
But it would be for the Director of School Education and the Registrar, Nagarjuna University to consider and satisfy themselves and not for this Court at once to permit them to appear in the examination.
[903E F] 4.
Though teaching is the last choice in the job market, the role of teachers is central to all processes of formal education.
The teacher alone could bring out the skills and intellectual capabilities of students.
He is 'engine ' of the educational system.
He is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values.
He needs to be endowed and energised with needed potential to deliver enlightened service expected of him.
His quality should be such as would inspire and motivate into action the benefitter.
He must keep himself abreast of ever changing conditions.
He is not to perform in a wooden and unimaginative way.
He must eliminate fissiparous tendencies and attitudes and infusenobler and national ideas in younger minds.
His involvement in national integration is more important, indeed Indispensible.
It is, therefore, needless to state that teachers should be subjected to rigorous training with scrutiny for efficiency.
It has greater relevance to the needs of the day.
The ill trained or sub standard teachers would be detrimental to our educational system; if not a punishment on our children.
The Government and the University must, therefore, take care to see that inadequacy in the training of teachers is not compounded by any extraneous consideration.
[903H; 904A D]


judgement:
iminal Appeals Nos.
60 and 61 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955 and Referred No. 31 of 1955 with connected Criminal Appeals Nos. 299 and 307 of 1955 arising out of the judgment and order dated February 28, 1955, of the Court of Sessions Judge, Meerut in Criminal Sessions rial o. 142 of 1954.
Jai Gopal Sethi, section C. Saran and G. C. Mathur, for appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956.
J.N. Bannerji and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956.
H.J. Umrigar and C. P. Lat, for the respondents in both Appeals.
October 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOVINDA MENON J.
On September 6, 1955, this court granted the appellants herein, special leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the 736 Allahabad High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955 (Reference No. 31 of 1955) connected with Criminal Appeals Nos. 299 and 307 of 1955, limited to the question whether the failure to comply with the rules relating to the submission of the police case diary, vitiates the entire trial and what the consequences of such failure are.
It is in pursuance to the leave so granted, that Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956, has been preferred by accused Nos. 4, 7, I, 3, 5 & 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions 3 Trial No. 142 of 1954, in the court of Session at Meerut and Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956, is preferred by accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) in the same Sessions trial.
Appellants 1 to 3 in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956 (accused Nos. 4, 7 & 1, Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh and Kbarak Singh) have been sentenced to the extreme penalty of the law and the remaining appellants in that appeal sentenced to im prisonment for life.
The appellant (accused No. 6) in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, has also been sentenced to death.
On the night between February 28, and March 1, 1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty dacoits took part and considerable property was looted and taken away by the dacoits.
During the course of this incident four members of the family of Atal Singh, including himself, were shot dead and another received gun shot wounds as a result of which be died subsequently in the hospital.
Four other members of the family received gun shot wounds and incised wounds at the hands of the dacoits but they survived as a result of treatment in the hospital.
The prosecution case was that among the dacoits who took part were the seven appellants in these two appeals, as well as two others; and of them accused No. I (Kharak Singh), accused No. 4 (Niranjan Singh), accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) and accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) were armed with guns and as such were responsible for the shooting and murders.
The two others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias 737 Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos. 8 & 9 respectively in the court of Sessions, were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge, who, after an analysis of the large volume of evidence, found that all the appellants herein were guilty of an offence under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced accused Nos. 1, 4, 6 and 7 (Kharak Singh, Niranjan Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh) to death and accused Nos. 2, 3 & 5 (Satpal Singh, Harpal Singh and Sardar Singh).to imprisonment for life as hereinbefore mentioned.
On appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.) confirmed the convictions and sentences and dismissed the appeals.
As stated already, leave to appeal to this court under article 136 was granted restricted to the question outlined by us at the beginning.
The prosecution case is that the village of Akheypur is a factious one in which one Narain Singh, the brother of the 4th accused, was the leader of one party and Atal Singh, one of the deceased, was the leader of the other.
Consequently the dacoity and murders in the house of Atal Singh took place as a matter of revenge.
Shortly stated, the case put forward on behalf of the prosecution is that the appellants and others, some of whom were armed with guns, raided the house of Atal Singh on the night in question.
The inmates of the house and others were inflicted injuries and the dacoits after looting ?he house carried away valuable property.
It is not suggested that if the facts spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, who are eye witnesses, are true, then an offence under section 396 of the Indian Penal Code has not been amply proved; but the only question is whether the appellants took part in the crime.
That a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh admits of no doubt and the appellants do not deny the occurrence, but it is the case of accused Nos. 4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object 738 of giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as.
well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh 's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motor cycle in order to make a report to the police.
It is further alleged that both of them went to Kithore police station and reported the occurrence to the Sub Inspector Dalbir Singh (P.W. 28) who was in charge of the police station and on the direction given by him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information.
, In short, the defence is that these two accused were good Samaritans who tried to help the family of Atal Singh in their hour of dire need and not the assailants.
The other appellants denied the charge.
It is not necessary, in view of the concurrent conclusions arrived at by the trial court and by the learned Judges of the High Court, to restate with any elaboration the details of the incident which culminated in the dacoity and murders.
In addition to the corroborating pieces of evidence, there are eye witnesses who have identified some or all the accused at the scene of crime and it may also be stated that some of them had received injuries at the hands of the miscreants.
We have also a dying declaration, Exhibit P 50, recorded by P.W. 20, a Magistrate, who also had recorded the statements of Ganga Saran (P.W. 2) and Ranbir (P.W. 18) when they were in a serious condition anticipating that they might not survive the injuries but which they fortunately did.
The earliest information of the crime (exhibit P. 1) was given by Samey Singh (P.W. 1) at the Police Station Kithore at about 2 a.m. on March 1, 1954.
It does not contain any details of the incident and is confined to the statement that a dacoity was being committed at the house of Atal Singh in the village and that the informant had rushed from the village 730 for making a report.
That guns were being fired has also been recorded in it.
P.W. 28 Dalbir Singh, who was Sub Inspector of Police and the Station House Officer of Police Station Kithore at that time, received the information, and reached the scene of dacoity at about 2 30 a.m., whereupon Jhamel Kaur (P.W. 4) handed over to him the list of the looted property (exhibit P. 2).
According to this witness, he immediately examined P. W. 2 and other witnesses on the spot and recorded their statements.
The injured persons were sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses.
Between 2 30 a.m. and 7 or 7 30 a.m., P.W. 28, according to him, did a considerable amount of work, such as recording the statements of all the available witnesses, sending the injured persons to the hospital after taking their statements, holding inquests over the dead bodies, inspecting the scene of dacoity, finding lead shots and wads there, and taking such .things into custody, etc.
By about 7 or 7 30 a.m. the Senior Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other police officials reached the place of incident on bearing of the dacoity and by the time of their arrival, according to P.W. 28, he had finished the preliminary work.
He also deposes that the parchas of the case diary for the period between March I and March 7, 1954, were sent all together to the Superintendent of Police only on March 7, and not as is enjoined by the rules every day as and when the day 's recording is complete.
We shall advert to the arguments of the learned counsel about this circumstance at a later stage.
The prosecution case depends, mainly if not solely, on the identification of the various accused persons by some or all of the prosecution witnesses, in addition to the dying declaration Exhibit P. 50 and the corroborating statements of P.W. 2, vide Exhibit P. 49) and P.W. 18 (vide Exhibit P. 48).
We may here summarise in very sbort outline the details of identification by the witnesses.
P. W. 2 Ganga Saran identified accused Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 96 740 (Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh and Tikam Singh).
Dharam Singh P. W. 3 identified accused No. 6(Udaibir Singh) among the dacoits and also deposes that Atal Singh told him that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had shot him with a gun.
P. W. 4 Mst.
Jhamel Kaur, in addition to giving a list of the looted property (Exhibit P. 2), identified accused Nos. 2 & 6 (Satpal Singh and Udaibir Singh).
P. W. 5 (Richpal Singh) states that among the dacoits, there were accused Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Satpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh).
P. W. 7.
(Om Pal) found among the dacoits accused Nos.
2,6 and 7.
The, deposition of P. W. 9 is to the effect that he identified accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) and also that Atal Singh told him that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had shot him.
P. W. 10 Jagbir Singh identified accused No. 1 (Kharak Singh).
All the appellants before us were identified by W. 11 (Ganga Bal), and P. W. 18 (Rdnbir) was able to identify accused No. 6 Udaibir Singh.
The result of the above analysis is that each one of the accused has been identified by one or more of the prosecution witnesses.
Accused No. I (Kharak Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 10 and P.W. 1 1; accused No. 2 (Satpal Singh) is identified by P.W. 4) P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. 11; accused No. 3 (Harpal Singh) is identified by P.W. 2 and P.W. 11; accused No. 4 (Niranjan Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W 5 and P. W. 1 1; accused No. 5 (Sardar Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. 11; accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) by P.W. 4, P.W., 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9, P.W. 11 and P.W. 18; and accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9 and P.W. 11.
The learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony of these witnesses and disbelieved the story put, forward by the accused and in this he had the concurrence of the High Court.
Such being the case, this court would not be justified in re opening the finding about the guilt of the appellants if no question of law is involved, or if the conclusion is not preverse or opposed to principles of natural justice or revolt 741 ing to judicial conscience.
But Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi, counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended that in view of the failure of the Sub Inspector P.W. 28 to comply with para.
109 of Ch.
XI of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, which lays down that when the investigation is closed for the day, a copy of the case diary for the day should be sent to the superior police officers, there has been an infraction of a mandatory rule of law which has resulted in prejudice and if that is so, the findings regarding the guilt of the accused should be re opened and this court should reassess and assay the evidence to find out how far the guilt of the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The question, therefore, is whether the action of the Sub Inspector amounts to a violation of a statutory duty enjoined on him.
If the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations were a set of rules framed under any statute, and as such have the force of law, then a violation of any rule thereunder, may either amount to an illegality or an irregularity which may or may not vitiate the proceedings.
The Police Act, '1861 was enacted to reorganize the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crimes, whereby the State Government is given authority to appoint police officers, such as the Inspector General, ete,.
Under section 12 of that Act the Inspector General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government, frame such rules and orders as he shall deem expedient relative to the organization, classification and distribution of the police force, the places at which the members of the force shall reside, and the particular services to be performed by them; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information, and all such other orders and rules relative to the police force as the Inspector General shall, from time to time, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duties.
It is not as if 742 these police regulations are rules framed by the Inspector General in accordance with section 12; but they are the result of the State Government laying down the mode of conduct and how the officers have to perform their duties.
Rule 109 in Chapter XI dealing with the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officers when an investigation is closed for the day to note the time and place at which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investigation the diary must be sent daily to the Police Superintendent on all days on which any proceedings are taken.
If the investigating officer is not himself in charge of the station, the diary must be sent through the officer in charge except when this will cause delay.
It also directs the police officer to study carefully sections 162 and 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Nowhere in the rules is it stated that there is any statutory authority for the framing of rule 109, nor is it said to form any addition to a statute, even though some other rules are expressly stated to be statutory ones.
Such being the case, it is clear that rule 109 has no statutory ' foundation but is only an injunction by the executive Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation.
Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi, who appeared for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956, 'and Dr. Banerjee, who appeared for the appellant accused No. 6, in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, put their case in this way: According to the police officer P.W. 28, he recorded the statements of all the eye witnesses before day break, and in case the diary under section 172 containing the statements recorded under section 162 had been sent to the superior police officers every day, then that fact would vouchsafe for the correctness of that document and it would not be possible for the officer to change or alter the statements of witnesses as it suited his desire if he wanted to do so at a later stage.
In the present case since admittedly the case diary and the details of work during the course of seven days had not been sent to the superior police officers for a period of one week, it is suggested that it is possible that it might be considered a false document because it was not prepared then and there containing statements recorded as and when they were made.
In that case, both the learned counsel contend that the opportunity of cross examinidg the witnesses and finding out whether the names of the accused were given at the earliest point of time has been lost to the defence.
The result of this, according to the learned counsel, has caused 'irreparable prejudice which cannot be condoned or regularised.
But the learned counsel have not been able to show to us that para.
109 of Ch.
XI of the Police Regulations has the force of law.
In this connection reference may be made to Ch.
XLV of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with illegal and irregular proceedings and to section 529 laying down irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings, while section 530 concerns irregularities which vitiate proceedings.
Section 537 is to the effect that subject to the provisions contained in the previous sections of that Chapter no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Ch.
XXVII or on appeal or revision on account of among other things any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under the Code.
There is an Explanation added that "in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings".
It is true that the objection was taken before the learned Sessions Judge and, therefore, the Explanation cannot be applied.
In these circumstances and on the footing that the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, are merely directions regarding the course of conduct, can it be stated that a breach of it would vitiate the trial? The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere 744 specifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity.
Investigation is certainly not an inquiry or trial before the court and the fact that there is no specific provision either way in ch.
XLV with respect to omissions or mistakes committed during the course of investigation except with regard to the holding of an inquest is, in our opinion, a sufficient indication that the legislature did not contemplate any irregularity in investigation as of sufficient importance to vitiate or otherwise form any infirmity in the inquiry or trial.
The learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh invited our attention to a few cases which show that even violation of the provisions of the Code would not amount to an illegality.
The decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reported in Pulukuri Kotayya and otheers vs King Emperor (1) and Zahiruddin vs King Emperor (2) lay down that a breach of sections 162 and 172 of the Code does not amount to an illegality.
If therefore such an omission could not vitiate a trial, it is all the more reasonable that a failure to conform to a rule of conduct prescribed by the State Government on police officers cannot in any way interfere with the legality of a trial.
That failure to investigate an offence does not necessarily prejudice an accused and therefore any mistake or omission in conducting investigation cannot vitiate a trial has been laid down in Hafiz Mohammad Sani and Others vs Emperor(3).
At p. 152, Adami J. observes as follows: "There can be no doubt that the Sub Inspector in his procedure disobeyed certain provisions of the law, and for that he could be punished, if the authorities deemed it fit, but I cannot find that his failure was to the prejudice of the petitioners.
Nor can I see how failure properly to conduct an investigation into an offence can vitiate a trial which was started on the final report after the investigation".
(1) [1948] L.R. 74 I.A. 65.
(2) [1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 80, (3) A.I.R. 1931 Pat.
150, 745 We are in agreement with these observations.
In a recent case reported in Tilkeshwar Singh and Others vs The State of Bihar(1), Venkatarama Ayyar J. expressed the opinion that "while the failure to comply with the requirements of section 161(3) might affect the weight to be attached to the evidence of, the witnesses, it does not render it inadmissible".
He referred to the case of Bejoy Chand vs The State(2) and agreed with the observations of the Calcutta High Court therein.
We have no hesitation in following those observations.
Our attention was also drawn to the case of Gajanand and Others vs State of Uttar Pra desh(3), which contains statements of law helpful for the decision of this case.
We are not prepared to say that because P.W. 28 did not send copies of his diary to the superior officers every day, the same should be considered as a suspicious document unworthy of credit.
The learned Judges of the High Court and the court of first instance have cast no doubt upon the genuineness of the case diary and that being the case it is not open to us without any compelling reasons to say that it is spurious or suspicious.
In the circumstances, we do not feel justified in holding that the omission of P.W. 28 is a violation of the provisions of a statute or a rule having the force of law which renders the trial invalid.
Holding therefore the point on which the special leave had been granted, against the appellants, we order that the appeals be dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
(1) ; , 1047, 1048.
(2) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 363.
(3) A.I R. , 699.

summary:
Rule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an investigation is closed for the day to note the time and place at which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investigation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of Police on all days on which any proceedings are taken.
The question that had to be decided by the court was as to whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.
It was found that the investigating officer did not send the case diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at the end of the period of investigation.
It was contended for the appellants that the case diary could not be relied upon as it enabled the officer to make alterations during the course of the period of investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of (1) ; ; 735 the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations which had resulted in prejudice, the whole trial was vitiated thereby.
Held:(1) Rule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations has no statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the executive Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation and a failure to comply with the rule relating to the submission of the police diary cannot vitiate the trial.
Hafiz Mohammad Sanii and others vs Emperor (A.I.R. 1931 Patna 15O), approved.
Observations in Tilkeshwar Singh and others vs The State of Bihar ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1043), followed.
(2) It could not be said in the absence of compelling reasons that because the investigating officer did not send the case diary to the superior officers every day the same is unworthy of credit particularly in view of the fact that the courts below have cast no doubt upon its genuineness.