judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2090 of 1980 973 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 30th January, 1979 of the Kerala High Court in l.
T.R. No. 76 of 1977.
Abdul Khadder and Miss. A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
P. Gobindan Nair, N. Sudhakaran and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.
Whether a company in liquidation is chargeable to super profits tax under the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963 Act XIV of 1963 (hereinafter called 'the Act ') is the short question arising for determination in this appeal.
The answer thereto will depend upon whether during the period subsequent to the date of winding up, any part of the funds in the hands of the official liquidator can be distinctly classified as representing paid up share capital of the company as on the first day of the year of account relevant to assessment year and whether any portion of the fund can be similarly identified as forming as, "reserve".
The assessee is a banking company, namely, The Palai Central Bank Ltd., which went into liquidation on August 8, 1960.
On that date the official Liquidator took charge of the assets and liabilities of the company and a balance sheet had been prepared as on the same date.
Thereafter, for every year, the liquidator used to prepare only an income and expenditure statement for submission to the Reserve Bank of India.
The assessment year, with which we are concerned is 1963 64 i.e., the year ended March 31, 1963.
For the said assessment year the taxable income of the assessee was determined by the Income tax officer at Rs. 5,76,678.
The officer was of the opinion that this amount would attract liability for super profits tax also and since the assessee had not submitted any return under the Act, a notice under section 9 (a) of the Act calling for the return was issued.
The assessee thereupon, submitted a return showing the chargeable profits as 'nil '.
In support of the said return the assessee contended inter alia before the officer that there could be not liability to super profits tax in respect of a company in liquidation since the formula laid down in the Second Schedule to the Act for calculation of the 'standard deduction ' was inapplicable on account of the fact that a company in liquidation could not be said to have paid up share capital as on the first day of 974 the previous year relevant to the assessment year which was long subsequent to the winding up.
Certain other contentions were put forward by the since they are not of any material relevance at this State, it is unnecessary to refer to them.
The Income tax Officer overruled the contentions raised by the assessee and worked out the chargeable profits at Rs. 2,04,740 after adopting minimum amount of Rs. 50,000 mentioned in 2 (9) of the Act as a "standard deduction" applicable to the case.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, before whom the assessee filed an appeal, confirmed the order of the Income tax officer.
The assessee carried the matter in further appeal before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
The Tribunal held that in the hands of the liquidator, there is only one integral fund which could not be split up into share capital, reserve and profits.
In the opinion of the Tribunal the exemption provision contained in section 27 of the Act which states that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to any company which has no share capital was clearly attracted to the case.
It was further held by the Tribunal that even if the exemption under section 27 of the Act did not get attracted, section 4 of the Act, which is the charging section would not apply to the assessee company in liquidation as the 'standard deduction ' was incapable of ascertainment.
The Tribunal, accordingly, allowed the appeal of the assessee and held that no assessment to super profits tax could be made on a company in liquidation.
Thereafter, at the instance of the revenue, the Tribunal referred the following question of law to the High Court of Kerala for its opinion: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, was the Tribunal justified in holding that no assessment under the Super Profits Tax Act, 1961, can be made on the assessee company (in liquidation)" ? The High Court agreed with the view taken by the Tribunal that after a company has gone into liquidation there cannot be said to be in the hands of the liquidator any amount that can be distinctly designated as paid up share capital of the company or as 'reserve ' with respect to which the capital of the company is to be worked out as provided in Second Schedule to the Act in order to arrive at the amount or standard deduction, The question referred 975 was accordingly answered by the High Court in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Aggrieved by the said decision, the revenue has preferred this appeal to this Court by special leave.
After hearing Counsel appearing on both sides, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the view taken by the High Court is perfectly correct and that this appeal is devoid of merit.
Section 4 of the Act which is the charging section reads: "4.
Charge of tax Subject to the provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged on every company for every assessment year commencing on and from the 1st day of April, 1963, a tax (in this Act referred to as the super profits tax) in respect of so much of its chargeable profits of the previous year or previous years, as the case may be, as exceed the standard deduction, at the rate or rates specified in the Third Schedule.
" The expression "chargeable profits" has been defined in clause (5) of section 2 thus: "2(5) "Chargeable profits" means the total income of an assessee computed under the Income tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961), for any previous year of years as the case may be, and adjusted in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule.
" The next definition, that is relevant is contained in clause (9) of the same section which deals with the expression "standard deduction".
That clause reads as follows: 2(9) "Standard deduction" means an amount equal to six per cent, of the capital of the company as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule or an amount of fifty thousand rupees, whichever is greater: Provided that where the previous year is longer or shorter than a period of twelve months, the aforesaid amount of six per cent or, the case may be, of fifty thousand rupees shall be increased or decreased proportionately: 976 Provided further that where a company has different previous years in respect of its income, profits and gains, the aforesaid increase or decrease, as the case may be, shall be calculated with reference to the length of the previous year of the longest duration.
It is seen from the above definition that for the calculation of 'standard deduction ' one has to ascertain the capital of the company as computed in the manner specified in second Schedule.
That makes it necessary for us to examine the provisions of Second Schedule of the Act which contains the rules for computing the a capital of a company for the purpose of levy of super profits tax.
The relevant provision is contained in rule I of the said Schedule which is in the following terms: " 1.
Subject to the other provisions contained in this Schedule, the capital of a company shall be the sum of the amounts, as on the first day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year, of its paid up share capital and of its reserve, if any, created under the proviso (b) to clause (vi b) of sub section (2) of section 10 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), or under sub section (3) of section 34 of the Income tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961), and of its other reserves in so far as the amounts credited to such other reserves have not been allowed in computing its profits for the purpose of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) or the Income tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961), diminished by the amount by which the cost to it of the assets the income from which in accordance with clause (iii) or clause (vi) or clause (viii) of rule 1 of the First Schedule is not includible in its chargeable profits, exceeds the aggregate of (i) any money borrowed by it which remains outstanding, and (ii) the amount of any fund, any surplus and any such reserves is not to be taken into account in computing the capital under this rule.
Explanation 1 A paid up share capital or reserve brought into existence by creating or increasing (by revaluation or otherwise) any book asset is not capital for computing the 977 capital of a company for the purposes of this Act.
Explanation 2 Any premium received in cash by the company on the issue of its shares standing to the credit of the share premium account shall be regarded as forming part of its paid up share capital.
Explanation 3 Where a company has different previous years in respect of its income, profits and gains, the computation of capital under rule 1 and rule 2 of this Schedule shall be made with reference to the previous year which commenced first.
" It is manifest from the terms of rule that the essential components which will together go to make up the capital of a company are: (i) Its paid up share capital on the first day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year.
(ii) Its reserves, if any, created under the proviso (b) to clause (vi b) of sub section (2) of section 10 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 or under sub section (3) of section 34 of the Income tax Act, 1961; and (iii) Other reserves in so far as the amounts credited there to have not been allowed in computing the profits of the company for the purposes of the assessment to income tax.
From the aggregate of the aforesaid amounts certain deductions as specified in the section have to be made but the details of such deductions are not relevant for the purposes of the present case.
What is important to notice is that unless the company can be said to have a paid up share capital as on the first day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year the formula laid down in the rule for computation of capital of the company cannot have any application and calculation of "standard deduction" being based wholly on the capital of the company it becomes wholly incapable of ascertainment.
After a company has gone into liquidation, can it be said that as on the first day in any subsequent year forming the previous year relevant to the assessment year, there exists in the hands of the liquidator any amount distinctly forming the paid up share capital of the company or any sum that can be 978 characterized as "reserve"? In our opinion the answer must clearly be in the negative.
In Commissioners of Inland Revenue vs George Burrell, Pollock M.R. Observed: ". it is a misapprehension, after the liquidator has assumed his duties, to continue the distinction between surplus profits and capital.
Lord Macnaghten in Birch vs cropper the case which finally determined the rights inter se of the preference and ordinary shareholders in the Bridgewater Canal, said ': I think it rather leads to conclusion to speak of the assets which are the subject of this application as "surplus assets" as if they were an accretion or addition to the capital of the company capable of being distinguished from it and open to different considerations.
They are part and parcel of the property of the company part and parcel of the joint stock or common fund which at the date of the winding up represented the capital of the company.
" The above statement of the law was cited with approval and adopted by this Court in Commissioner of Income tax vs Girdharas and Co. Private Ltd., and it was held that in respect of a company in liquidation after the date of its winding up, the distinction between capital, reserve and the accumulated profits disappears and there is only one integrated or consolidated fund in the hands of the liquidator.
The concept of a fluctuating share capital or reserve which is the basic premise necessary to attract the applicability of rule 1 of the Second Schedule is wholly foreign in respect of a company in liquidation.
In Commissioner of Income tax, Bangalore vs B.C. Srinivasa Setty, this Court pointed out that under the scheme of the Income tax Act, 1961, charge of tax will not get attracted unless the case or transaction falls under the governance of the relevant computation provisions.
"The character of the computation provisions in each case bears a relationship to the nature of the charge.
Thus, the charging section and the computation provisions together 979 constitute an integrated code.
When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section.
Otherwise, one would be driven to conclude that while a certain income seems to fall within the charging section there is no scheme of computation for quantifying it.
The legislative pattern discernible in the Act is against such a conclusion".
Exactly similar being the scheme of the ; the above observations fully apply to case before us.
Hence, it has to be held that inasmuch as the provisions contained in the Act for computing the capital of the company and its reserves and cannot have any application in respect of a company in liquidation and consequently the 'standard deduction ' is incapable of ascertainment, the charge of super profits tax under section 4 of the Act is not attracted to such a case.
The judgment of the High Court does not, therefore, call for any interference.
This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
M.L.A. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The assessee company went into liquidation on August 8, 1960.
The Income tax officer, while determining the taxable income of the assessee company at Rs. 5,79,978 for the assessment year 1963 64, was of the opinion that this amount would attract liability for super profits tax also and therefore asked the assessee company to file its return.
The assessee company submitted its return showing the chargeable profits as 'nil ', contending that there could be no liability to super profits tax in respect of a company in liquidation since the formula laid down in the Second Schedule to the for calculation of the 'standard deduction ' was inapplicable on account of the fact that a company in liquidation could not be said to have paid up share capital as on the first day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year which was long subsequent to the winding up.
The Income Tax officer however overruled the aforesaid contention and worked out the chargeable profits at Rs. 2,04,740 after adopting a minimum amount of Rs. 50,000 mentioned in s.2 (9) of tho Act as a "standard deduction".
The said order was confirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
But, on further appeal by the assessee company the Income tax Appellate Tribunal while allowing the appeal held: (1) that in the hands of the liquidator there is only one integral fund which could not be split up into share capital, reserve profits and therefore s.27 of the Act was clearly attracted to the case; and (ii) that no assessment to super profits could be made on a company in liquidation since section 4 of the Act would not apply to the assessee company in liquidation as the standard deduction was incapable of ascertainment.
The High Court, rejected the reference made at the instance of the Revenue.
972 Dismissing the appeal by the Revenue, ^ HELD: (1) After a company has gone into liquidation it cannot be said that as on the first day in any subsequent year forming the previous year relevant to the assessment year, there exists in the hands of the liquidator any amount distinctly forming the paid up share capital of the company or any sum that can be characterized as "reserve.
" The distinction between capital, reserve and tho accumulated profits disappears in respect of a company in liquidation after the date of its winding up and there is only one integrated or consolidated fund in the hands of the liquidator.
The concept of a fluctuating share capital or reserve which is the basic premise necessary to attract the applicability of rule 1 of the Second Schedule is wholly foreign in respect of a company in liquidation.
[977H; 978E F] (2) It is clear from the definition of "standard deduction" that for the purpose of calculation of "standard deduction" one has to ascertain the capital of the company as computed in the manner specified in Second Schedule.
But, it is important to notice from the terms of Rule I of Second Schedule that unless the company can be said to have a paid up share capital as on the first day of the previous year relevant to the assessment year the formula laid down in the rule for computation of capital of the company cannot have any application and the calculation of "standard deduction" being based wholly on the capital of the company, it becomes wholly incapable of ascertainment.
[976B; 977F G] Commissioner of Inland Revenue vs George Burrell, 1924 2 [K.B.] 52, 63 and Birch vs Cropper [1889] L.R. 14 App.
525, 546 referred to.
Commissioner of Income tax vs Girdhars and Co. Private Ltd, ; followed.
(3) Under the scheme of the Income tax Act 1961, charge of tax will not get attracted unless the case or transaction falls under the governance of the relevant computation provisions.
The character of the computation provisions in each case bears a relationship to the nature of the charge.
Thus, the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code.
When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all.
it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall Within the charging section.
The scheme of the being similar to that of the Income tax Act 1961, it has to be held that inasmuch as the provisions contained in the Act for computing the capital of the company and its reserves and cannot have any application in respect of a company in liquidation and consequently the 'standard deduction ' is incapable of ascertainment, the charge of super profits tax under section 4 of the Act is not attracted to such a cases.
[978G H ; 979A C] Commissioners of Income tax, Bangalore vs B.C. Srinivasa Setty; , ; referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
3452 54 and 4030 32 of 1982.
Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 20th November, 1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos.
26,62, 29, 38,39, and 30 of 1978.
R.K. Garg and N.S. Das Bahl for the Appellants in CAs.
Nos 3452 54 of 1982.
M.K. Ramamurthi, and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Appellants in CAs.
4031/82 and CAs.
4030 32 of 1982.
P.P. Rao and D.D. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J.
The appellants, in these appeals by special leave, are aggrieved by the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana affirming the dismissal of their writ petitions by a learned Single Judge of that Court.
The appellants are teachers in the service of the State of Punjab.
They claim the grades prescribed in paragraph 2 of the Government Circular letter No. 2036 ED.
1 67/2167 dated July 29, 1967, and in that regard seek the benefit of the Circular letter No. 9/9179 FR (2)/143 dated February 19, 1979 and its clarification by Circular letter No. 8937 5ED.
1179/2659 dated September 20, 1979.
The Circular letter dated July 29, 1967 gave effect to the recommendations of the Kothari Commission with effect from November 1, 1966 in respect of teachers in Government Schools.
Paragraph 2 of the Circular letter provided: "2.
Lectures in Higher Secondary Schools, Punjab Institute of English and Masters/Mistresses with Post 884 graduate qualifications in High/Higher Secondary Schools will be placed in Rs. 300 25 450/25 600 grade provided they have 1st and 2nd Division Master 's Degree.
Those with 3rd Class Master 's Degree will be placed in the grade of Rs. 250 25 400/25 550.
" It was specified that "the number of posts in Lecturer 's grade will be 1517 i.e. 742 posts for the existing school Lecturers and 829 additional posts for other Masters/Mistresses with Post graduate qualifications.
" It was clarified that "the Masters/Mistresses will be eligible to Lecturer 's grade only if they have Post graduate qualifications in the subject of their teaching.
No one will be entitled to those 829 additional posts automatically.
These posts will be allocated to various subjects keeping in view the requirements of the educational institutions and the appointments will be made keeping in view the rules/instructions as amended from time to time.
" Paragraph 3 stated that "all trained graduates and all other Masters with Post graduate qualifications, who are not fitted in the scale of Lecturer, will be in the scale of Rs. 220 8 300 10 400/20 500.
" It is apparent that paragraph 2 of the Circular letter dated July 29, 1967 is concerned essentially with providing for a Lecturer 's Grade: (1) It was intended to have 1571 posts in the Lecturer 's grade, consisting of 742 posts for the existing Lecturers and another 829 posts for Masters or Mistresses.
Masters or Mistresses were eligible for these posts in the Lecturer 's grade only if they possessed Post graduate qualifications in the subject of their teaching.
Those who did not satisfy that criterion were not eligible for those posts.
Moreover, no one was entitled to any of the 829 additional posts automatically.
The additional posts were to be distributed with reference to different subjects, and the distribution would be made having regard to the requirements of the educational institutions and subject to the rules and instructions currently in force.
(2) Existing Lecturers and Masters or Mistresses with Post graduate qualifications, who possessed a Master 's degree in the first or second division, would be entitled to the grade of Rs. 300 25 450/25 600.
Lecturers and 885 Masters or Mistresses with Post graduate qualifications who possessed a Master 's degrees in the third division would be entitled to the grade of Rs. 250 25 400/25 550 .
The appellants say that they are employed as Masters and Mistresses in High and Higher Secondary Schools run by the Punjab Government and possess an M.A. or M.Sc.
or B.T. or B.Ed.
degree and some of them have even acquired an M.Ed.
degree.
They are presently paid according to the pay scale Rs. 220 500.
They claim that they are entitled to either of the higher grades set forth in paragraph 2 of the Circular letter dated July 29, 1967.
From what has gone before it is clear that they can legitimately claim the benefit of those grades only if they are appointed to the posts of Lecturer.
And they do not dispute that they are not incumbents of those posts.
Much reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in State of Punjab vs Kirpal Singh Bhatia.
In our opinion, that case is of no assistance to the appellants.
That was a case which was primarily concerned with Circular letter No. 5058 FR II 57/5600 dated July 23, 1957.
The Circular letter dated July 29, 1967 operates on a very different plane from the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957.
A brief reference to the historical background of the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957 will suffice.
Concerned at the low salaries granted to certain categories of Government servants, the Punjab Government issued Circular letter No. 5058 FR II/5600 dated July 23, 1957 revising their scales of pay.
Paragraph 3 classified all teachers in the Education Department according to their qualifications in two broad categories, category A being: "B.A./B.Sc./B.Com./B.Sc.
(Agriculture) and B.T./Diploma in Physical Education/Diploma in Senior Basic Training".
and they would now carry the scale of pay: 886 "Rs. 100 8 190 10 250 with a higher start for M.A. or M.Sc.
as at present.
" As is evident, the category was defined by reference to the possession of the specified graduate degree or Diploma.
In the event such a teacher also held a Post graduate degree he was entitled to a higher start in the grade.
The grade, however, remained the same.
It appears that several teacher tiled writ petitions in the High Court claiming revised scales of pay on the ground that they had taken graduate degrees and, therefore, were entitled to the benefit of the grade mentioned against Category in the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957.
In opposition to the writ petitions, the State Government contended that the letter did not contemplate tho grant of the grade to all teachers but only to teachers appointed as Masters.
The High Court held the teachers entitled to the benefit of the revised grade, whether or not they had been appointed as masters, because, in the opinion of the High Court, the qualifying criterion was the possession of a graduate degree.
The judgment of the High Court was affirmed by this Court in Kirpal Singh Bhatia (Suprd).
The State Government found it difficult, having regard to The prevailing burden on its financial resources, to extend the benefit of the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957 to the much wider section of teachers covered in consequence of the Court 's judgement.
Accordingly, the State Government issued Circular letter No. 9/9/79 FR (2)/143 dated February 19, 1979, paragraph 3 of which stated that in order to ensure that "these unintended and large financial implications do not continue arising in future" the whole matter had been reconsidered by the State Government and as a result the government ordered that henceforth the teachers or the Education Department would not automatically be entitled to placement in the higher scales of pay in terms of paragraph 3 of the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957 by the mere circumstance of their improving or acquiring higher qualifications in the course of their service.
The rigour of the restriction was relaxed in some measure.
Paragraph 3 said further: "However, in order to avoid discrimination between teachers who have already been allowed higher scales of pay on account of having improved their qualifications and those who have not yet been allowed this benefit even though they also possess higher qualifications it is decided that all teachers in the Education Department who have 887 improved their qualifications before the issue of this letter may be allowed the benefit of higher scale of on the basis of their qualifications.
" The benefit was not extended to those who were appointed or who had improved their qualifications after the issue of that Circular letter.
The teachers continued to agitate for a more generous dispensation.
The State Government then issued Circular letter.
No. 8937 5ED.1179/2659 dated September 20, 1979.
which declared: "The implementation of the decision contained in Finance Department Circular letter No. 9/9/79 FR (2)/143 dated February 19, 1979 to grant higher pay scales to the teachers on the basis of higher qualifications was kept pending for want of clarification on certain points from the Finance Department which has now become available and is reproduced below: 1.
The higher scale may be allocated from the date of passing the respective higher examination by the concerned teacher where this has already been done.
However, actual payment at enhanced rates should commence from 12 2.79 and the payment of arrears accruing from the date of passing the examination till 13.2.1979 be restricted to the maximum for 38 months.
The ben fit of the higher scale may be allowed from the date a particular teacher is appointed on regular basis or the date of passing the higher examination, which ever is later, but the payment of arrears as a result of grant of such benefit should be restricted to a period of 38 months only, as already mentioned above.
The teachers placed in the higher scale can only be regularly adjusted when corresponding posts in the higher scale become available; in that case such teachers may continue to enjoy the higher scale as a personal measure till they are adjusted against regular posts as and when the same become available.
" It was clarified that the contemplated benefit was confined to 888 the categories of teachers mentioned in the Circular letter No. 5058 FR II 57/5600 dated July 23, 1957.
The appellants claim the benefit of paragraph 2 of the Circular letter dated July 29, 1967, and therefore no reliance can be placed by them on the Circular letters dated February 19, 1979 and September 20, 1979, which relate merely to the scheme embodied in the Circular letter dated July 23, 1957.
The appellants contend that on the principle of "equal pay for equal work", affirmed by this Court in Randhir Singh vs Union of India & Ors.
they are entitled to the grades mentioned in paragraph 2 of the Circular letter dated July 29, 1967.
It is urged that like those Masters or Mistresses who have been given that benefit they have acquired Post graduate qualifications and are doing the same kind of work.
As has been explained earlier, the grades specified in paragraph 2 of the Circular letter dated July 29, 1967 are applicable only to those who specifically hold the posts of Lecturer.
There are a limited number of such posts, and appointment to them is strictly subject to the conditions detailed in paragraph 2 of the Circular letter.
In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there is no order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellants who were employed as Masters and Mistresses in High and Higher Secondary Schools run by the State Government and possessed an M.A. or M.Sc.
or B.T. or B.Ed.
degree contended in their writ petitions that they were paid according to the pay scale of Rs. 220 500 and claimed that they were entitled to either of the higher grades set forth in paragraph 2 of the State Government Circular Letter dated July 29, 1967 viz. Rs. 300 25 450/25 600 for those with 1st and 2nd Division Master 's Degree and Rs. 250 25 450/25 250 for those with 3rd Class Master 's Degree.
The High Court negatived their contentions and dismissed the writ petition, and this was affirmed by the Division Bench in appeal.
Dismissing the Appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
The grades specified in paragraph 2 of the Circular Letter dated July, 29, 1967 are applicable only to those who specifically hold the posts of lecturer.
There are a limited number of such posts, and appointment to them is strictly subject to the conditions detailed in paragraph 2 of the Circular Letter.
The contention on behalf of the appellants that on the principle of "equal pay for equal work" Randhir Singh vs Union of India and Ors., ; they are entitled to the grades mentioned in para 2 of the Circular Letter dated July 29, 1967 has there fore to be negatived.
[888 D; C] 2.
The appellants claim the benefit of paragraph 2 of the Circular Letter dated July 29, 1967 and therefore no reliance can be placed by them on the Circular Letters dated February, 19, 1979 and September, 20, 1979 which relate merely (o the scheme embodied in the Circular Letter 883 dated July 23, 1957.
The Circular Letter dated July, 29, 1967 operates on a very different plane from the Circular Letter dated July 23, 1957.
[888 B; 885 E] 3.
The decision of this Court in State of Punjab vs Kirpal Singh Bhatia; , is of no assistance to the appellants.
That was a case which was primarily concerned with Circular Letter dated July, 23, [885 D]