judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 351 of 1974.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.2.1973 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 69 of 1968.
Rajinder Sachar, Sr.
Ad vs and K.C. Dua for the Appellants.
N.S. Das Bahal and D.N. Puri for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
This appeal is by special leave and the sole legal representative of the original plaintiff is in appeal.
The plaintiff sued for declaration that inclusion of the disputed property in the land records of the respondent Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested under the provi sions of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') was wrong, void and without juris diction and for a further declaration that she was entitled to bhumidhari rights in the property under section 11 of the Act.
Her suit was decreed in the trial court and the said decree was affirmed in appeal but at the instance of defend ant No. 1, Gaon Sabha, the High Court in second appeal reversed the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the suit.
593 The suit was instituted on 16.8.1966.
The decision of this Court in the case of Hatti vs Sunder Singh, ; settled the legal position that a claim under sec tion 11 of the Act for declaration of bhumidhari right was not maintainable in the Civil Court in view of section 185 of the Act read with Schedule I and exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication of such claims vested in the appropriate Revenue Court.
This position of law is not disputed before us.
In regard to the relief of bhumidhari rights the High Court had, therefore, rightly held that the plaintiff 's suit was not maintainable.
The only other submission advanced on behalf of the plaintiff for our consideration is that the disputed proper ty did not constitute 'land ' as defined in section 3(13) of the Act and, therefore, the right, title and interest of the appellant as proprietor of the property was in no way af fected by the provisions of the Act and the inclusion of the property in L.R. 2 was void, and liable to vacation.
In paragraph 4(d) of the plaint, plaintiff pleaded that the suit land was not 'land ' and was not banjar (waste) and did not come within section 154(1)(i) to (vii) of the Act and, therefore, there was no vesting in law.
The proprietor, according to the plaintiff, grew fuel wood and partly used the property as ghatwars and used the stones for building purposes.
The High Court has found that the property came within the definition of 'land ' and, therefore, was subjected to the legal incidence of the statutory provisions.
Section 3(13) defines land to mean: "land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming and includes (a) buildings appurtenant therto, (b) village, abadis, (c) grovelands, (d) lands for village pasture or land covered by water and used for growing singharas and other produce or land in the bed of a river and used for casual or occasional cultivation . " The definition of land in the Act is wide and in paragraph 4(d) ' 594 the admitted position is fuel wood was being grown on the property. 'Horticulture ', 'garden ' and 'groveland ' in the absence of statutory definitions, would have the common parlance meaning. 'Horticulture ', as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary indicates means: "the cultivation of a garden." 'Garden ', according to the Dictionary, means "an area of land, usually planted with grass, trees, flower beds, etc.; an area of land used for the cultivation of ornamental plants, herbs, fruit, vegetables, trees, etc.
A grove, as the Dictionary puts it means; "A small wood.
; small woodland area or plantation".
A land on which fuel wood is grown would constitute groveland.
In view of the inclusive definition of 'land ', the finding of the High Court that the disputed property consti tuted land cannot be said to be wrong.
Reliance was placed on the decision of the Punjab High Court in Nemi Chand vs Financial Commissioner, Punjab & Anr., where the meaning of land in Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act was under examination and the Court was called upon to decide whether banjar Jadid and banjar quadim came within the definition.
For that purpose the meaning of land occurring in the Tenures Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887 was examined.
The Court also referred to the definition of land in Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900.
In the presence of a definition in the Act under consideration, we find no justification to refer to definitions in different statutes for finding out whether the disputed property was land.
Appellant 's counsel also placed reliance on the decision of a Full Bench of the same High Court in the case of Ra jinder Prasad & Anr.
vs The Punjab State & Ors., AIR 1966 (53) Punjab 185.
Here again the question for consideration was whether gair mumkin land was land within the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act.
For the reason indicated above, we do not think that the appellant is entitled to any support from the Full Bench Judgment.
Lastly, reliance was placed on :he decision of this Court in Munshi Ram & Ors.
vs Financial Commissioner, Haryana & Ors.
, ; The Court was considering the true meaning of 'permissible area ' under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act and for that purpose the meaning of land was being examined; whether banjar Jadid should be excluded with reference to 595 the meaning of land under the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and the Punjab Tenancy Act was being debated before the Court.
We do not think in view of the statutory definition any digration is necessary.
It is impermissible to rely on definitions containing meanings different from the definition under the Act for a proper resolution of the dispute.
The High Court, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion when it held that the disput ed property constituted land under the Act and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act.
The judgment of the High Court, therefore, is upheld and the appeal is dis missed.
In the peculiar facts of this case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this Court.
N .V.K.
Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant plaintiff sued for declaration that inclu sion of the disputed property in the land records of the respondent Gaon Sabha on the basis that it had vested under the provisions of the Delhi Land and Reforms Act, 1954 was wrong, void and without jurisdiction, and for a further declaration that she was entitled to bhumidhari rights in the property under section 11 of the Act.
In paragraph 4(d) of the plaint, it was pleaded that the suit land was not 'land ' and was not banjar (waste) and did not come within section 154(1)(i) to (vii) of the Act and, therefore, there was no vesting in law.
The proprietor, according to the plaintiff, grew fuel wood and partly used the property as ghatwars and used the stones for building purposes.
The suit was decreed in the trial court, and the said decree was affirmed in appeal, but at the instance of the respondent defendant No. Gaon Sabha, the High Court in second appeal reversed the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the suit.
The High Court found that the property came within the definition of 'land ' and, therefore, was subjected to the legal incidence of the statutory provisions.
In regard to the relief of bhumidhari rights, it held that the plain tiffs ' suit was not maintainable.
Dismissing the appeal this Court, HELD: The definition of 'land ' in section 3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is wide.
A land on which fuel wood is grown would 592 constitute groveland.
In view of the inclusive definition of 'land ', the finding of the High Court that the dispute property constituted land cannot be said to be wrong.
[594C D] Nemi Chand vs Financial Commissioner, Punjab & Anr., ; Rajinder Prashad & Anr.
vs The Punjab State & Ors., AIR 1966 (53) Punjab 185; Munshi Ram & Ors.
vs Financial Commissioner, Haryana & Ors.
, ; ; Haiti vs Sunder Singh, ; referred to.
It is impermissible to rely on definitions containing meanings different from the definition under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 for a proper resolution of the dispute.
[595A] The High Court therefore came to the correct conclu sion when it held that the disputed property Constituted 'land ' under the Act, and became liable to vest in the Gaon Sabha under the Act.
[595B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
224 & 734 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.6.87 of the Calcut ta High Court in Ref.
No. 1/83 from C.R. Case No. 2938 40/81 & Civil Order No. 2537/81, C.R. Case No. 75/81, Civil Order No. 362/82, & C.R. No. 3803 of 1980.
Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Badar Durrez Ahmed, Parijat Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, A.K. Sahay for the Appellants.
Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A ,K. Gan guli, C.V. Subba Rao, A. Subba Rao and Hemant Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH, J.
These appeals, by certificate, pre ferred against the common order dated 17.6.1987 of the High Court of Calcutta in Full Bench Reference 1 of 1983 raise a short and interesting question, of some general importance, whether the choice of the forum for the cognizance of suits envisaged in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (As substituted by Section 14 of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 39 of 1961) is limited by Section 80 itself or whether provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 19 of the , as the cases may be, in regard to places of suing, are also applicable to the suits referred to in the said Section 80.
The question, in other words, is whether the said Sec tion 80 is a complete, self contained, exhaustive Code in regard to the place of suing respecting suits constituting a special law for such suits excluding, by necessary implica tion, the operation of provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency 443 Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.
The Full Bench, resolving the earlier conflicts of Judicial opinion in the High Court on the points has held Section 80 as containing within it a self contained scheme for suits envisaged by it and that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of the stand excluded from operation.
The Full Bench, however, has left open the question whether Section 80 also over rides clause 12 of the letters patent.
In the original proceedings from which C.A. 224 of 1988 arises, appellant instituted Money Suit No. 35 of 1978 against the Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub Judge at Alipore, Distt. 24 Parganas, West Bengal, seeking recovery of Rs. 13,200 respecting an alleged short delivery of a consignment booked with the Respondent on 94.4.1975 Ex Ernakulam to Ranchi, a station under the South Eastern Railway Administration.
Respondent contested the suit on grounds, inter alia, that having regard to the said Section 80, the Court at Alipore had no jurisdiction.
The trial Court by its order 22.5.
1981 having rejected this objection as to jurisdiction, Respondent preferred C.R. 2938 of 1981 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before the High Court to have that order revised.
The matter was re ferred to a Full Bench, culminating in the order now under appeal.
In C.A. 734 of 1988, appellant instituted a Suit No. 3831 of 1985 in the Court of the Small Causes, Calcutta, for the recovery of a sum of Rs.6,573.50p.
on account of snort deliveries of two consignments booked with the Respondent on 27.4.1984 and 24.7.1984 respectively, Ex Saugar in Central Railway to Ramkrishtopur in Eastern Railway.
Similar objec tion as to jurisdiction having been urged, the trial Court rejected that objection and decreed the suit.
This was assailed before the High Court by the Respondent.
The Full Bench, by its common order, has held that the trial Court had no jurisdiction and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.
In order that the contentions of Dr. Shankar Ghosh urged in support of these appeals are apprehended in their proper perspective, it becomes necessary to refer to and notice the legislative history of the provision.
Section 14 of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1961, substituted the old Section 80 by a new provision.
The old Section reads: "Section 80: suit for compensation for injury to through booked traffic: 444 Notwithstanding anything in any agreement purporting to limit the liability of Railway Administration with respect to traffic while on the Railway of the another Administration, a suit for compensation for loss of the life of, or personal injury to, a passenger, or for loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods where the passenger was or the ani mals or goods were booked through over the Railways of two or more Railway Administra tions, may be brought either against the Railway Administration from which the passen gers obtained his pass or purchased his tick et, or to which the animals or goods were delivered by the consignor thereof, as the case may be, or against the Railway Adminis tration on whose Railway the loss, injury, destruction or deterioration occurred." The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by the amending Act provides: "80.
Suits for Compensation: A suit for com pensation for loss of the life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruc tion, damage, deterioration or non delivery of animals or goods may be instituted.
(a) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods were, booked from one station to another on the railway of the same railway administration against that railways adminis tration; (b) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods were, booked through over the railway of two or more railway administration against the railway administration from which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or to which the animals or goods were delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or against the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred; and, in either case the suit may be instituted in a Court having jurisdic tion over the place at which the passenger obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or the animals or goods were delivered for car riage, as the case may be, or 445 over the place in which the destination sta tion lies, or the loss injury, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred.
" The changes brought about in the scheme of the provisions are quite marked.
The old Section did not deal with liabil ity for claims in respect of goods carried by a single Railway.
It concerned itself with goods etc., carried by more than one Railways or what, in the concerned jargon, is called "through booked traffic" and provided that a suit inter alia for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or nondelivery could be brought against the Railway Administra tion with which the booking had taken place or against the Railway Administration of the delivery station.
The old section spoke nothing of the places where such suits could be laid.
The choice of the forum was regulated by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant provisions of the , as the case may be.
This Court in Union of India vs Ladu Lal Jain, ; observed that the principal place of Railway Administra tion can be said to be the place where the Railways can be said to carry on business for purposes of clause (a) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It was held: "The principle behind the provisions of Cls.
(a) and (b) of section 20 is that the suit be instituted at a place where the defendant be able to defend the suit without undue trouble." " . .
Union of India carries on the busi ness of running railways and, can be sued in the Court of the subordinate Judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the head quarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated.
" This was said in a case governed by the old Section.
Does the position continue to hold good even after the new Sec tion 80 was substituted in place of the old? the new Section 80 (substituted by Act 39 of 1961), however, brought about far reaching changes in its scheme, the notable amongst them being three.
The new Section made specific reference to a certain class of suits having regard to their subject matter, to be dealt with under that Sec tion.
Secondly, the new Section also dealt with identity of the Railway Administrations which were made liable to the claim 446 and, thirdly, the section specifically provided the places where such suits "may be instituted".
Referring generally to the scope of the changes brought about by the 1961 amendment to Chapter VII of the Railways Act, 1890, this Court, in Union of India vs The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, ; observed: "The history and the object with which the radical provisions of the new Act were intro duced bear testimony to change of the nature of the liability of the railway administra tion." "We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that under the new Act the liability of the Railway has been increased so as to take upon itself the responsibility of a common carrier." The new comprehensiveness of the scheme of the amend ments was one of the circumstances that commended itself to the High Court to persuade it to hold that the new Section 80 in Chapter VII, constituted a complete and self contained special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envis aged by that Section derogating from the generality of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Courts and that with the enactment of the new Section 80 there was an implied repeal of those other provisions re specting such suits.
The High Court took due notice of the fact that the new Section did not expressly provide that in respect of suits envisaged by it, the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the , as the case may be, shall no longer be applicable.
The High Court took due note of the situation emerging from this omission.
It noticed: "the new Section 80, no doubt, did not ex pressly provide that the said provision of Section 80 of the Act would override all other laws.
But Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act is in the nature of the special provision applicable only to suits for compensation against the Railways." "The point is whether by enacting" . the suit may be instituted" in the Courts having jurisdiction over the places mentioned in the last part of Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, the said Section of the Railways Act by 447 implication overrides section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Section 18 of the ." The High Court took into consideration what, according to it, was the real intention in enacting the new Section 80 and was persuaded to the view that the Section brought about an implied repeal of the other provisions as to the juris diction of Courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to these suits.
It was observed: "By mentioning the Courts in which the suits for compensation may be filed, Section 80 of the Railways Act purports to deal with matters which have been dealt with in Section 20 of the Code and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act.
These two sets of laws deal with the same subject of territorial jurisdiction of Courts.
We are, therefore, required to ascertain whether in respect of suits for compensation against the Railways, the intention was to override the general law." "We have already indicated that Section 80 of the Railways Act was a particular or special legislation.
Section 80 of the Railways Act purports to deal with the subject of places for instituting particular class of suits which was previously covered by Section 20 of the Code which was a general enactment.
Two statutes cover the same field, i.e., territo rial jurisdiction.
Mentioning for the first time in Section 80 of the Railways Act of the places where suits for compensation may be instituted was itself introductive of a new law implying a negative.
When the same subject of territorial jurisdiction has been dealt with in the subsequent legislation (i.e., Section 80 of the Railways Act) the prior laws (Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of the ) on the same subject were not intended to subsist." "In other words, Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act by requiring something special to be done repealed by necessary implication the former general statute relating to territorial jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the suits for compensation against the Railways were concerned." Any other construction, according to the High Court, would lead 448 to anomalies and render Section 80 a surplus age.
High Court said: "If it was to be held that clause (c) of Section 20 of the Code still applied to suits for compensation against the Railways, then the cause of action for the purpose of juris diction of Courts would arise not only at the three places mentioned in Section 80 of the Act but at several other places.
In other words, the provisions of Section 80 of the Act relating to places where the suits for compen sation may be instituted, would be, in that event, surplusage and unnecessary.
In the view of the High Court, the distinction be tween provisions in the New Section 80 on the one hand and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Small Cause Courts Act on the other, assumed particular significance as qualifying the Court 's jurisdiction in respect of a particular subject matter as distinct from those that relate to a Court 's territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction.
The High Court observed: "Section 80 of the Railways Act, in effect, limits the application of Section 20 of the Code by specifying the Courts which shall have jurisdiction over the suits whose subject matter is the claim for compensation against the Railways for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger or loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non delivery of animals or goods.
We have already held that Section 80 of the Act, in other words is in the nature of a special provision in respect of classes of suits mentioned in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act.
Dr. Shankar Ghosh assailing the soundness of the High Court 's view, urged that the proposition on which its con clusions rest, if accepted, would render what was intended as a mere an enabling entitlement to lose its character as such and become, on the contrary, a limiting factor and convert a right into a liability.
Dr. Ghosh said that the legislative intent was clear; it did not render Section 80 over riding by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It expressly supplied, says Dr. Ghosh, an enabling provision when it chose the expression" . . may be instituted".
It is further con tended that the doctrine of implied repeal was, clearly inapplicable to the situation.
449 Dr. Ghosh commended for acceptance the reasoning of the Assam and Madras High Courts, in Assam Cold Storage vs Union of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69 and Hindustan Machine fools vs Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras 130, respectively, in pref erence to the views of the Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Karnataka High Courts in Oghamal Chaudhury vs Union of India, ; Union of India vs Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414; New India Assurance Co. vs Union of India, AIR 1981 Delhi 135 and Union of India vs C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132 respectively.
The thrust of the arguments of Dr. Ghosh is that the construction placed by the High Court ignores the crucial aspect that while the old Section 80 did not render the destination railway as such, liable to be sued if loss was not proved to have occurred there, the new Section, however, renders the destination Railway also liable even though no loss occurred there.
The provision in the new Section 80 enabling the suit to be instituted at the place of the destination Railway, where no part of the cause of action might otherwise be shown to have arisen, was, it is urged, a mere consequential provision to give effect to the substan tive provision, that the destination Railway was also li able.
Dr. Ghosh emphasised the expression "may be institut ed" in Section 80 to reinforce his contention that Section 80 did really expand the rights of and not seek to restrict therein suitors.
Learned counsel also emphasised that sec tion 80 did not contain any words expressly excluding clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as suits contemplated by Section 80 were con cerned.
The new Section 80, it is contended, did not intend to impair the choice of the forum afforded by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that any contrary view, offends settled principles of statutory construction guiding the matter.
Learned counsel invited attention to the follow ing observations in Ajay Kumar Banerjee & Others etc.
vs Union of India & Others etc.
; , at page 282: "The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one.
In other words, a prior special law, would yield to a later general law, if either of the two fol lowing conditions is satisfied: (i) The two are inconsistent with each other; (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment.
450 If either of these two conditions is ful filled, the later law, even though general, would prevail.
" and submitted that even if, conversely, the provisions of Section 80 are held to be a later special law, the principle of implied repeal could not be invoked as there was no inconsistency between the two provisions and that, on the contrary, both set of provisions could co exist and prevail.
Learned counsel invited our attention to and relied upon the following passage in Shah Babulal Khimji vs Jaya Ben D. Kania and Another, ; "We find ourselves in complete agreement with the arguments of Mr. Sorabjee that in the instant case section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 does not in any way abridge, interfere with or curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
What Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 does is merely to give an additional remedy by way of an appeal from the orders of the Trial Judge to a larger Bench.
" The learned counsel also placed reliance on the following observations of this Court in Municipal Council, Palai vs
T.J. Joseph and Others, ; at page 98: "In order to ascertain whether there is repug nancy or not this Court has laid down the following principles in Deep Chand vs The State of Uttar Pradesh,: 1. Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions; 2.
Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law; 3.
Whether the two laws occupy the same field.
Reliance was also placed on Section 21 A inserted by Section 4 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1980 which provides: "21A. Act to override other laws including Letters Patent: The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding 451 anything to the contrary in any other law, including in particular the Letters Patent of the High Court." to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court would run in the teeth of this express provision.
Lastly, learned counsel invited our attention to the following passage in Crawford on Statutory construction: "All laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing cases on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to inter fere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter,unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable.
Bowen vs Lease, 5 Will 225.
It is a rule, says Sedwick that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts are irrecon cilably inconsistent." (p. 633) "And, as we have already suggested, it is essential that the new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old; otherwise there is no indication.
of the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the old law.
Conse quently, the latter enactment will be con structed as continuation of the old one." (624) It was urged that repeal by implication is not to be pre sumed and that, on the contrary, there is always presumption against a repeal by implication.
In order that there be a repeal by implication, there should be a clear, irreconcila ble conflict between the two sets of provisions and the later enactment should be an exhaustive code in itself in respect of the subject matter.
On these submissions, Dr. Ghosh says that the view taken by the High Court is clearly unsustainable in law.
The contention emphasised is that where a statute merely recognises a right pre existing in common law and provides a remedy, such a remedy, unless the statute ex pressly bans or excludes other remedies, could only be an additional or concurrent one open to an election.
It is true that where a statute does not itself bring into being a 452 new right not a pre existing right and also provides a remedy therefore so however that the right and the remedy cannot be said to have been brought into existence for the first time uno flatu, such a remedy would not generally be held to be exclusive but only an additional and concurrent one, along with the pre existing remedies, unless there are express indications to the contrary in the statute itself.
In Municipal Council, Palai vs T.J. Joseph, ; , this Court considered the tests of repugnancy applied under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, relevant in the examination of circumstances bringing about an implied repeal.
Strictly speaking the examination of the question whether an act of Parliament prevails against the law enact ed by a State under Article 254, does not really involve any question of repeal.
In Zaver Bhai Amaidas vs State of Bom bay, AIR 1954 SC 752 this Court applied the test conversely, of the principle of implied repeal to cases of repugnancy under Article 254(2).
It was observed: "It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under article 25(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises, but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question trader article 254(2) where the fur ther legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law.
" The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions.
Courts, in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the legisla tive intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments.
But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter.
In such a case the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary.
It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneously.
Section 80 is a special provi 453 sion.
It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject matters.
The High Court has come to the conclusion that new Section 80 made a conscious departure on the law as to the place of suing in respect of suits of a particular subject matter envisaged by that Section.
The High Court has held that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision in regard to the choice of fora for such suits.
According to the High Court, there was no need for the legislature to specify the places of suing which would otherwise be covered by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription as to places of suing was considered to be necessary in deroga tion to the general law as contained in Sec.
20 CPC or the provisions in the Small cause Courts Act.
As to the words "may be instituted" occurring in that Section, the High Court observed: "The use of the expression 'may be instituted ' in Section 80 of the Railways Act was equiva lent to 'shall be instituted '.
Section 80 conferred right to institute suits for compen sation against the Railways for breach of their obligations for carrying passengers, animals or goods specified in Chapter VII of the Indian Railways Act.
Both the obligation on the part of the Railways and the right of the consignor and the consignee to institute suits are now statutory in their nature.
The clear intendment of the Legislature was that it would be obligatory for the plaintiffs to institute suits only in the Courts mentioned in Section 80 of the Railways Act for enforce ment of the claims for compensation against the Railways.
After a consideration of the matter, we are inclined to the view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision are sound and re quire to be preferred to the view expressed by the Assam and the Madras High Courts.
The view of the Full Bench is to be preferred having regard to the weight and preponderance of the relevant interpretatory criteria.
No appeal, in our opinion, could be made to Section 21A of the State Amendment to the Small Cause Courts Act either, in as much as, that provision cannot be understood to have been intended to cover a situation of the present 454 type.
It does not exclude a special law applicable to and governing a distinct class of subject matter intended to be covered by that special law.
In the result, for the fore going reasons, these appeals fail and are dismissed; but in the circumstances, without any directions as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.

summary:
Under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, prior to its substitution by the Amendment Act, 1961, the choice of forum for filing suits for compensation for loss, de struction, damage, deterioration or non delivery of goods etc.
carried by the Railways was regulated by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the , as the case may be.
However, the new section, besides making specific reference to a certain class of suits, to be dealt with under the section and identifying the Railways Administrations which were liable to the claim, also specifically provided the places where such suits may be instituted.
The appellants filed two separate suits in the courts at Alipore and Calcutta for recovery of certain amounts from the Railways for short deliveries of consignments booked by them.
The respondent contended that in view of Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, the trial courts concerned had no jurisdiction.
The trial courts rejected the objection and decreed the suits.
In the revisions filed by the respondent, the Full Bench of the High Court, by its common order, held that the trial courts had no jurisdiction.
It was of the view that the new Section 80, was a complete and self contained special law, as to the place of suing, respecting suits envisaged by the section derogating from the generally of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1890 and Section 18 of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and that it brought about an implied repeal of those provisions as to the jurisdiction of 441 courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to those suits.
In the appeals before this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the legislative intent was clear: that it did not render Section 80 over riding, by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil Proce dure, 1890, and that even if the provisions of Section 80 were held to be a later special law, the principle of im plied repeal could not be invoked, as there was no incon sistency between the two provisions and, on the contrary, both sets of provisions could exist and prevail.
Dismissing the appeals, HELD: The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions.
Courts in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two enactments.
But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provisions may by itself, lead to an infer ence of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provi sions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same matter.
In such a case, the actual detailed comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary.
[452F G] It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneous ly.
[452H] Section 80 is a special provision dealing with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their partic ular subject matter.
It made a conscious departure on the law as to the place of suing in respect of suits envisaged by that Section, and is a self contained provision in regard to the choice of fora for such suits.
There was no need for the legislature to specify the places of suing which would otherwise be covered by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription as to places of suing was considered to be necessary in derogation to the general law as the matter contained in Section 20 C.P.C. or the provisions in the Small Cause Courts Act.
[453B C] Assam Cold Storage vs Union of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69; Hindustan Machine Tools vs Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras 130; Oghamal Chaudhury vs Union of India, and Union of India vs Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414, approved.
442 New India Assurance Co. vs Union of India, AIR 1981 Delhi 135 and Union of India vs C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132, over ruled.
Shah Babulal Khimji vs Jaya Ben D. Kania and another; , ; Municipal Council, Palai vs T.J. Joseph and others; , ; Zaver Bhai Amaidas vs State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752; Union of India vs Ladu Lal Jain, ; and Union of India vs The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, ; , referred to.


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 3 108 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.1.86 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1510 of 1977.
Harbans Lal and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Appellant.
Jitender Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J.
We grant leave in the Special Leave Peri 612 tion and proceed to dispose of the appeal on the merits after hearing both sides.
The appellant is the successor in interest of the mort gagor of the suit property.
The suit property was mortgaged on 22.5.
In the normal course the suit for redemption should have been filed on or before 22.5.
1946, the limita tion for such a suit being 60 years under the Limitation Act, 1908.
The appellant, however, filed the suit for re demption only on 28.12.
He sought to meet the plea of limitation by urging that the son of the original mortgagee, while selling the property on 1.11.19 13, had specifically acknowledged the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property.
It was claimed that this acknowledgment constitut ed a fresh starting point for computing the period of limi tation.
If the plea of the mortgagor were right and the Limita tion Act, 1908, had continued to be operative, the suit for redemption could have been filed on or before the 1st of November, 1973.
However, in the meantime the replaced the of 1908.
The period of limitation for a suit for redemption was reduced under the new Act to 30 years.
Section 30 of the Act, however, provid ed as follows: section 30.
Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (a) any suit for which the period of limita tion is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, may be instituted within a period of seven years next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier: By virtue of this provision, the suit for redemption could have been filed, if the appellant 's plea that the sale deed dated 1.11.1913 constituted a fresh starting point for computation of the period of limitation is accepted, on or before the 1st of January, 1971, having regard to the fact that the came into force on 1.1.1964.
613 The first question for consideration in this appeal is whether the sale deed of 1.11.19 13 contained an acknowl edgement by the original mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption on the part of the mortgagor as on the date of the sale deed viz. 1.11.19 13.
The sale deed contained the following recitals: "Now I of my own accord have sold all my mortgagee rights along with the original mortgage consideration and interest which according to the terms of the aforesaid mort gage deed has accrued and is payable to the instant vendor . .
The rights and interest regarding recovery of original mort gage money and interest according to mortgage deeds executed by Jangi Khan original mortga gor deceased and redemption of the mortgaged land which hence to fore vested in the instant vendor stand vested in the purchaser . . (underlining by us) On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that the words extracted above clearly contained a specific acknowl edgement by the mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemp tion in the mortgagor.
On the other hand.
for the respond ents, it is contended and this contention was accepted by the High Court that the recitals mentioned above do not serve as an acknowledgment.
The High Court observed: "The mortgagee Mool Raj gave the description of the mortgage only with a view to showing his status but nowhere did he acknowledge his liability for redemption of the mortgage.
According to the recital in the deed, whatever rights as a mortgagee he had in the suit land were transferred to the vendee.
There was nothing more than this.
The right of the mortgagor to redeem the land, and his liabili ty to redeem the same, was nowhere acknowl edged.
" The respondents strongly rely on this finding and also rely on the decision of this court in Tilak Ram vs Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935.
We are of the opinion that the High Court erred in accepting the above contention.
It is true, as pointed out in Tilak Ram vs Nathu, that the period of limitation cannot be extended by a mere passing recital regarding the factum of the mortgage but that the statement on which the plea of an acknowledgement is based must relate to a subsisting liability.
The words used must indicate the jural relation ship between 614 the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made with the intention of admitting such jural relation ship.
But, in our opinion, the recitals in the sale deed on 1.11.1913 fulfil_ the above requirements.
The fact of Nanak Chand having obtained a mortgage with possession had already been recited in an earlier part of the sale deed.
The pass sages in the sale deed, which have been extracted by us above, contain two specific recitals.
The first is that "the original consideration and interest under had accrued and Was payable to the instant vendor.
" These words acknowledge that the mortgage had not been redeemed and that the mort gage moneys remained outstanding to the mortgagee From the mortgagor as on the ' date of the sale deed.
The second recital is even more specific.
It says that what stands transferred to the purchaser is not only the fight of the mortgagee for recovering the principal amounts and interest according to the mortgage deed (which, as earlier stated, still remained outstanding) but also "the rights and inter est" regarding the redemption of the mortgaged land.
These words are, of course, a little inappropriate because the right of redemption is in the mortgagor and not in the mortgagee.
But, read as a whole, the second sentence we have quoted here from the sale deed clearly manifests an inten tion on the part of the mortgagee to acknowledge that his right to recover the moneys under the mortgage deed as well as his liability to have the property redeemed by the mort gagor in the event of his paying off the moneys due under the instrument both stand vested in the purchaser.
We are of the opinion that it is not correct to treat the recitals in the document as a mere narration of the previous mortgage that had been created on the property.
The words spell out a clear intention that the moneys due under the mortgage still remained unpaid and also that the mortgagor had a subsisting right of redemption which he could enforce against the mortgagee.
In this view of the matter the contention on behalf of the appellant that the recitals in the document of 1.11.1913 constituted an acknowledgement of liability for redemption within the meaning of section 19 of the Limita tion Act deserves to be accepted.
On behalf of the respondents it is submitted that, even if the above position is accepted, the suit should have been filed on or before 1.4.1971 but that it was actually insti tuted only on 18.4.1973.
Our attention is drawn to the cause title of the suit in the trial court where the suit is described as Case Civil Suit No. 204 of 1973 and the date of institution is set out as 28.12.1968/18.4.1973.
It is sub mitted that perhaps the suit had been flied on 28.12.1968 with defects and that the defects had been rectified subse quently so that the suit can be properly said to have been instituted only on 18.4.1973.
It has been numbered 615 only as a suit of 1973.
It is, therefore, contended that in any event the suit was barred by limitation being beyond 1.4.1971.
This contention is without force.
This point does not appear to have been specifically taken either in the trial court or in the first appellate court.
On the other hand in the trial court the plaintiff had adverted to the provisions of the Limitation Act and the position that the suit should have been filed within 7 years of the applica tion of the new Act and urged that the suit was within time.
This contention was accepted by the trial court.
It could not have been so accepted if the suit had in fact been instituted Only in 1973 as at present submitted.
That apart the High Court in the course of its judgment has pointed out that the present suit had been filed on 28th of December, 1968.
In this state of the record we have to proceed on the basis that the suit had been filed on 28th of December, 1968, and, therefore hold, for the reasons stated earlier, it had been filed in time.
For the reasons above mentioned, we set aside the order of the High Court confirming the order of the Additional District Judge and restore the decree for redemption passed by the trial court.
We would only like to clarify that there were two mortgage deeds the redemption of which had been sought by the plaintiff in the suit.
We are concerned in this appeal only with the property mortgaged under the deed of mortgage dated 22.5.1986 by Jangi Khan in favour of Nanak Chand and sold on 1.11.1913 by Mool Raj, son of Nanak Chand, to the predecessor in interest of the present respondent.
The concurrent findings of the three courts in respect of the other mortgage are not, in any way, disturbed by our judgment.
The appeal, therefore, stands allowed and the appellant will be entitled to his costs.
R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant is the successor in interest of the mort gagor of the suit property.
The suit property was mortgaged on 22.5.1886.
In the normal course the suit for redemption should have been filed on or before 22.5.1946, the limita tion for such a suit being 60 years under the Limitation Act, 1906.
The appellant, however, filed the suit for re demption only on 28.12.1968.
The defence to the plea of limitation urged was that the son of the original mortgagee, while selling the property on 1.11.
1913, had specifically acknowledged the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property.
It was claimed that this acknowledgment constitut ed a fresh starting point for computing the period of limi tation.
The Trial Court accepted the plea and granted decree for redemption.
The Additional District Judge however ac cepted the appeal of the respondents.
The High Court, in appeal, confirmed the order of the Additional District Judge and held that the sale deed had nowhere acknowledged the right of the mortgagor to redeem the land.
Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the recital in the sale deed clearly con tained a specific acknowledgment by the mortgagee of a subsisting right of redemption in the mortgagor.
On the other hand, it was contended that the said recital did not serve as an acknowledgment.
It was further urged by the respondents that even otherwise the suit should have been filed within 7 years of the coming into force of the Limita tion Act, 1963, i.e., on or before 1.4.1971, and that it was actually instituted only on 18.4.1973.
Allowing the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Additional District Judge and the High Court, and restoring the decree for redemption passed by the Trial Court, this Court, 611 HELD: (1) The period of limitation cannot be extended by a mere passing recital regarding the factum of the mortgage but the statement on which the plea of an acknowledgment is based must relate to a subsisting liability.
The words used must indicate the jural relationship between the parties and it must appear that such a statement is made with the inten tion of admitting such jural relationship.
[613G 6 14A] Tilak Ram vs Nathu, AIR 1967 S.C. 935, referred to.
(2) In the instant case, it is not correct to treat the recitals in the document as a mere narration of the previous mortgage that had been created on the property.
The words spell out a clear intention that the moneys due under the mortgage still remained unpaid and also that the mortgagor had a subsisting right of redemption which he could enforce against the mortgagee.
[614E F] (3) In the Trial Court the plaintiff appellant had adverted to the provisions of the and the position that the suit should have been filed within 7 years of the application of the new Act, and had urged that the suit was within time.
The Trial Court had accepted the contention of the plaintiff appellant on this point.
It could not have been so accepted if the suit had in fact been instituted only in 1973.
In the cause title of the suit in the Trial Court the date of institution is set out as 28.12.1968/18.4.1973.
This position does not appear to have been specifically challenged either in the Trial Court or in the first Appellate Court.
The High Court in its judgment has pointed out that the suit had been filed on 28th of December, 1968.
In this state of the record, this Court has to proceed on the basis that the suit had been filed on 28th of December, 1968 and therefore to hold that the suit had been filed in time.
[615B C]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2548 of 1983 From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9.82 of the Allaha bad High Court in Civil Misc.
W.P. No. 14807 of 1981.
Pramod Swarup for the Appellant.
R.B. Mehrotra for the Respondents.
562 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
This is an Appeal by Special Leave against a judgment and order dated September 15, 1982 delivered by the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 14807 of 1981.
The appellant before us is the tenant of the shop in question.
Respondent No. 1 is a proforma party, namely, the Prescribed Authority, and respondent No. 2 is the landlord of the building containing the shop in question, situated at Mandi Harbansganj Dhampur.
We propose to refer to the appel lant as the tenant and respondent No. 2 as the landlord.
In 1959 the landlord filed an application under section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the U.P. Rent Act of 1947") for the eviction of the tenant from the said shop.
The said application was made on the ground that the landlord wanted to demolish the shops in the building including the said shop and in their place wanted to construct new shops and also to construct the residential portion on the first floor.
In the new building the accommodation would be much larger and, apart from shops, even residential premises would be constructed.
In paragraph 7 of the application, the landlord gave an "assurance (undertaking that the applicant will give the new shop to the second party after the new shops are constructed on a reasonable rent.
" It is common ground that the applicant referred to was the landlord and the second party referred to was the tenant.
This applica tion was contested by the tenant along with other tenants, against whom also, the similar applications were filed.
The application was made to the District Magistrate within the meaning of the said expression in sub section (d) of section 2 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947.
The Rent Controller and Eviction Officer who acted as District Magistrate with in the connotation of the said term under the said Act, about which there is no dispute, granted the permission and rejected the contentions of the tenant.
In the order grant ing the permission, which order.
is dated February 27, 1980, the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer noted that the landlord was ready to give the newly constructed shops to the tenants on a reasonable rent.
Taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances including the aforesaid fact of the assurance cure undertaking given by the land lord, the permission to evict the tenant was granted.
Against this decision all the tenants including the tenant herein filed revision petitions which were dismissed by the Commissioner, Rukhilkand and Division, Bareilly.
The tenants applied by way of further revision to the State Governor under Section 7 F of the said U.P. Rant Act of 1947.
In disposing of the revision 563 petitions, the Special Secretary, who disposed of the same in the name of the Governor of the State of U.P., noted that the landlord had given an undertaking to the tenants that they would be given newly constructed shops on standard rent and that during the period taken for construction, alterna tive accommodation would also be given to them.
Thereafter, the landlord filed a suit on the basis of the aforesaid permission for eviction of the tenant.
During the pendency of the suit, the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter re ferred to0 as 'the U.P. Rent Act of 1972") came into force.
The U.P. Rent Act of 1947 was repealed by sub,section (1) of section 43 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 save and except to the extent provided in the savings clause set out at subsec tion (2) of that section.
Some amendments were made to section 43(2) (rr) in the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 by the U .P.
Act of XXXIII of 1976, whereby the landlords who had on the basis of the permissions granted to them under section 3(1) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 instituted suits for the evic tion of their tenants were given the right to apply for eviction of their tenants straightaway if the permission granted to them under section 3(1) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 had been obtained on any ground specified in sub,sec tion (1) or subsection (2) of section 21 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972.
Taking advantage of these provisions, the landlord filed an application for an order of eviction against the tenant on the ground that the permission had been obtained by the landlord on the ground specified in clause (b) of section 21(1) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 and hence, he was entitled to an order of eviction straightaway under section 43(2) (rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972.
The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application of the land lord on the ground that the permission obtained by him was a conditional permission and it could not come into operation unless the landlord had complied with the offer made by him before the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer, namely, to make available to the tenant an alternative shop.
It was held by the Prescribed Authority that till that condition was satisfied by the landlord, he could not claim the evic tion of the tenant under section 43(2) (rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972.
Against this order, the landlord preferred the aforesaid writ petition which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by the impugned judgment.
The learned Judge took the view that the Prescribed Authority was bound to allow the application of the landlord under section 43(2) (rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 and order eviction.
It was held by the learned Judge that the ground on which permission was granted by the Rent Controller and Eviction Authorities under the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 fell within clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 21 of the U.P. 564 Rent Act of 1972 and hence, the Prescribed Authority under the Act of 1972 had no jurisdiction to embark upon any fresh enquiry as to the nature of the permission.
It was held by the learned Judge that the finding of the Rent Control authorities was that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and hence, the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to impose any condition before granting an eviction order.
It was held by him that the Prescribed Authority had failed to exercise its statutory duty to order the eviction of the tenant.
The learned Single Judge directed the Prescribed Authority to pass an order of eviction against the tenant.
It is this judgment of the learned Single Judge which is impugned before us by Shri Parmod Swaroop, learned counsel for the appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the decision of the prescribed Authority to decline the prayer for eviction made by respondent No. 2 was justified in view of the undertakings given by respondent No. 2 when the permission to file a suit for eviction was given under the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 and the High Court was in error in upsetting the decision of the Prescribed Authority.
It was, on the other hand, contended by Mr.Mehrotra, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that in view of the provisions of section 43(2) (rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972, the Pre scribed Authority had no jurisdiction to go behind the permission and was bound to give an order for eviction unconditionally as held by the High Court in its impugned judgment.
Although the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, which was set aside by the High Court, is not before us, it appears clear from the impugned judgment that the Prescribed Authority took the view that the permission granted to respondent No. 2 to file the suit for eviction was a condi tional one and was operative only on the performance of the condition incorporated in the undertaking given by the landlord.
We are of the view that the entire argument before us proceeds to a large extent on a misapprehension.
However, before dealing with the rival submissions, we propose to refer to the relevant provisions of the aforestated two Acts very briefly.
U.P. Rent Act of 1947 was a temporary measure enacted with the object of continuing during a limited period the powers to control the letting and the rent of residential and non residential accommodation and to prevent the evic tion of tenants from the same.
The relevant portion of sub section (1) of section 3 of that Act runs as follows: 565 "3.
Restrictions on eviction.
(1) Subject to any order passed under sub section (3) no suit shall, without the permis sion of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds:" Thereafter, clauses (a) to (g) set out the grounds on which a suit for eviction could be filed without the permission of the District Magistrate.
Sub section (2) of section 3 pro vides for an application for revision against the order of the District Magistrate granting or refusing the grant of permission to file a suit for eviction of a tenant to the Commissioner.
Sub section (4) provides that the order of the Commissioner made in such revision application as set out above, shall be subject to any order passed by the State Government under section 7F of that Act.
Sub section (d) of section 2 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 gives an inclusive definition of the term "District Magistrate" ,red states that the said term would include an officer authorised by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under that Act.
The U.P. Rent Act of 1972 was enacted to make provisions in the interest of the general public for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situated in the urban areas.
Section 21 of this Act provides for release of a building under occupation of the tenants, that is, very briefly, for the eviction of tenants from the buildings under tenancy and also inter alia prescribes grounds on which such eviction can be ordered.
It may be mentioned that eviction of tenants is not permitted except on prescribed grounds.
Section 43 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 provides for repeal and savings.
Under sub section (1) of that sec tion the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 is repealed.
The relevant portion of sub section (2) of section 43 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 which is in the nature of a savings provision runs as follows: "43 Repeal and savings.
(1) x x x x (2) Notwithstanding such repeal X X X (rr) where any permission referred to in section 3 of the 566 old Act has been obtained on any ground speci fied in subsection (1) or sub section (2) of section 21, and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub section, after the commencement of this Act, whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted, the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for the pre scribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under section 22".
The provisos to the clause are not relevant for our purpose.
The main contention of the learned counsel for respond ent No. 2 before us was that in view of the provisions of clause (rr) of sub section (2) of section 43 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972, once the permission to file the suit for eviction was granted by the authorities concerned under the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 and that permission was on a ground specified in sub section (1) or sub section (2) of section 21 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972, it was not open to the Prescribed Authority before which the application for evic tion was filed to reconsider the same.
The Prescribed Au thority, in the present case, has tried to analyse that permission and declined to grant the decree for eviction on the basis that the permission was conditional and the land lord was not willing to carry out those conditions.
In our view, the question of the authority under the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 having imposed any condition, does not arise at all.
A plain reading of the order of the Rent Controller and Eviction Officer, Bijnor as well as the orders of the Com missioner in revision and that of the State Government makes it clear that the permission given to the landlord to file the suit was not subject to any condition at all.
At the same time, the judgment of the Rent Controller clearly shows that one d the circumstances which constituted the basis for the grant of the permission to file the ,suit for eviction was that the landlord gave an assurance cum undertaking to give newly constructed shops to the tenants sought to be evicted including the tenant before us and that the landlord also gave a similar assurance to give alternative accommoda tion to the tenant during the period which would be taken in completing the new construction.
As we have already pointed out, the petition for permission to file a suit, flied before the Rent Controller by the landlord, in terms, con tained an 567 assurance cum undertaking that the landlord would give the newly constructed shops after the new shops were constructed to the tenants sought to be evicted on a reasonable rent.
It appears that the offer to provide for alternative accommoda tion during the period when the new construction was coming up was made by the landlord in the course of the hearing before the said Eviction Officer, Bijnor.
The revision petition against that said order was dismissed by the Com missioner, Rukhilkhand Division, as we have already pointed out earlier.
The order passed under section 7F of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 by the State Government also dismissed the revision petition preferred by the tenant to the State Government.
The order of the State Government which was passed on behalf of the Governor of the State by the Special Secretary, however, clearly notes that the landlord had given an undertaking to the tenants that they would be giving the newly constructed shops to them on standard and that during the period taken up in completing the new con struCtion, alternative accommodation would also be given to them.
However, no condition in this connection was imposed by the State Government on the permission to file the suit for eviction.
Under these circumstances, we propose to proceed on the assumption that the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 had no jurisdiction to go behind the permission granted by the relevant authorities under the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 for the filing of the eviC tion suit.
However, it appears to us that the High Court was, with respect, in error in not taking into account the undertakings cumassurance given by the landlord to the tenant in his application for permission to file a suit as well as in the course of the hearing before the aforemen tioned authorities.
We do not find anything in the provi sions of seCtion 43(2) (rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 which would enable the landlord to evade his duty to comply with the undertakings cum assurances given by him.
These undertakings cum assurances givenby the landlord certainly formed part of the basis on which the permission to file the suit for eviCtion was unconditionally given to him.
It is but fair that the court should see to it that the tenant is not deprived of the benefit of the undertakingscum assur ances.
In fact, no good reason has been shown as to how the landlord can justly claim that he is no longer bound by the undertakingscum assurances given by him as set out earlier.
In these circumstances, we set aside the order of the High Court and pass the following order in its place: (1) We direct that the Prescribed Authority, Nagina, District Bijnor, to pass an order of eviCtion against the appellant tenant before us but the ' Prescribed Authority will give the necessary directions or 568 orders to respondent No. 2 landlord to provide alternative accommodation to the appellant during the period when the new construction is coming up and also pass appropriate orders for ensuring that after the new construction is completed, a comparable shop is given to the appellant herein.
(2) In order not to delay the construction of the new shops, the Prescribed Authority may provide that, in case the landlord fails to or is unable to provide alternative accommodation to the appellanttenant during the period when the new construction is being completed, he shall pay a certain sum as fixed by the Prescribed Authority per month to the appellant tenant which would be reasonably adequate to enable that tenant to obtain alternative accommodation for that period.
For the aforesaid purpose, the Prescribed Authority may give such directions as it may think fit.
Before parting with the matter, we may refer to two decisions which were cited before us.
The first of these is the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Asa Singh vs B.D. Sanwal & Ors., AIR 1969 All. 474.
The Full Bench of that High Court inter alia held in that case that while granting permission under section 3 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 the District Magistrate was bound to consider also the need of the tenant for the accommodation, if such a case is set up by the tenant.
This case was cited by the learned counsel for the tenant.
Learned counsel for respond ent No. 2, on the other hand, cited the decision of another Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bansilal Sahu vs The Prescribed Authority & Anr., AIR 1980 All. 194 which, very briefly stated, laid down that the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 is bound while acting under clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the said Act, irrespective of the occurrence of subsequent events, to order eviction according to the permission granted by the Prescribed Au thority under section 3 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947.
In our view, it is not necessary for us to enter into a discussion of either of the authorities because they do not touch upon the question which has arisen before us, namely, enforcing the undertakings cumassurances given by the land lord in obtaining the permission under section 3 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947.
The Appeal is allowed to the extent aforestated.
Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
R.N.J. Appeal allowed.

summary:
In 1959 the landlord filed an application under section 3(1) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction Act, 1947 for the eviction of the tenant from the shop on the ground that the landlord wanted to demolish the shops in the building including the shop of the appellant/ tenant and in their place wanted to construct new shops and residential portion on the first floor.
In the application the landlord gave an assurance (undertaking) that he would give new shop to the tenant/appellant after the new shops were construct ed, at a reasonable rent.
This application was contested by the appellant/tenant alongwith other tenants.
The applica tion was made to the District Magistrate u/s 2(d) of the U .P.
Rent Act, 1947.
The Rent Controller and Eviction Officer who acted as District Magistrate under the said Act granted the permission and rejected the contentions of the tenants.
Against this decision all the tenants filed revi sion petitions which were dismissed by the commissioner Rohilkhand Division, Bareilly.
The tenants preferred further revision to the State Govt.
u/s 7 F of the said Act.
In disposing of the revision petitions the Special Secretary noted that the landlord had given an undertaking to the tenants that they would he given newly constructed shops on standard rent and that during the period taken for construc tion alternative accommodation would he given to them.
Thereafter the landlord filed a suit on the basis of the, permission for eviction of the tenants.
During the pendency of the suit the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 came into force.
The U.P. Rent Act of 1947 was repealed and some amendments were made to section 43(2)(rr) in the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 whereby the landlords who had on the basis of permission granted to them u/s 3(1) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 instituted suits for the eviction of the tenants were given the right to apply for eviction of their tenants straightaway if the permission granted to them under section 3(1) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1947 had been obtained on any ground 561 specified in sub section (1) or subsection (2) of section 21 of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972.
Taking advantage of these provisions, the landlord filed an application for an order of eviction u/s 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Rent Act 1972.
The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application of the land lord on the ground that the permission obtained by him was conditional permission and it would come into operation when the landlord had complied with the offer made by him and until then he could not claim eviction of the tenant u/s 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Rent Act, 1972.
Against that order the landlord preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad.
The High Court took the view that the Prescribed Authority was bound to allow the application of the landlord u/s 43(2) (rr) and order eviction.
Against this judgment the tenant appellant came up by way of special leave.
In setting aside the order of the High Court, this Court in allowing the appeal, HELD: One of the circumstances which constituted the basis for the grant of the permission to tile the suit for eviction was that the landlord gave an assurance cum under taking to give the newly constructed shops to the tenants sought to he evicted including the tenant in the appeal and that the landlord also gave a similar assurance to give alternative accommodation to the tenant during the period which would he taken in completing the new construction.
Nothing is found in the provisions of Section 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 which would enable the landlord to evade his duty to comply with the undertaking cum assurances given by him.
The undertaking cum assurances given by the landlord in the instant case certainly formed part of the basis on which the permission to file suit for eviction was unconditionally given to him.
It is but fair that the Court should see to it that the tenant is not deprived of the benefit of the undertakings cum assurances.
[566G, 567F] Asa Singh vs
B.D. Sanwal & Ors., AIR 1969 All.
474 and Bansilal Sahu vs The Prescribed Authority & Anr., AIR 1980 All. 194, referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 656 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.
1987 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J .C. No. 1254 of 1987.
Tapas Ray and D.P. Mukharjee for the Appellants.
M.K. Ramamurthi, P.P. Singh, A.N. Trehan and Promod Swarup for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of the Patna High Court dated 27.11.
1987 quashing the notification dated 18.11.1986 under which in terms of the Subordinate Education Service (Teach ing Branch) Determination of Seniority Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the hitherto single cadre known as Secondary Education Service was bifur cated.
On 20th of February, 1975, the State Government pub lished a joint seniority list of teachers of Subordinate Education Service belonging to the Boys school branch and the Higher Secondary Teachers 660 of the Subordinate Education Service.
The joint gradation list was challenged before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2956 of 1975.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition as also an application for review of such dismissal.
On 30th March, 198 1, this Court dismissed the special leave peti tion carried against the decision of the High Court.
When with the dismissal of the special leave petition the posi tion was getting settled, the State Minister of Education came forward with a proposal that the cadre should be sepa rated and the Higher Secondary teachers and Secondary teach ers of the Upper Division of the Subordinate Education Service should have a separate gradation list.
Ultimately by the impugned notification the bifurcation was done.
The Government took the stand that the demand to bifurcate was taken up in the Legislature and in terms of the decision taken by the Implementation Committee of the Bihar Legisla tive Council, the new scheme of bifurcate came to be done.
The High Court considered the matter at great length and with care.
The legal position as settled by several deci sions of this Court was noticed.
Towards the end of the judgment the High Court has said: "We have referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vora & Ors.
vs State of Gujarat & Ors., only to illustrate that the courts have at no time ignored the interest of the employees and questioned the authority of the State to frame rules in terms of the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, but the courts have always taken notice of the fact that those who stood together and fell in line to proceed further have to be provided all opportunities in respect of their avenues of promotion alike without breaking that order, so that one who ranks higher in the grade may not go down in due course of service.
It is in this context that we have no hesitation in holding that rules in the notification dated 18.11.1986 are ultra vires Articles 16(1) and 14 of the Constitu tion.
We do not propose to predicate into what is alleged to be the mala fide of the respondent State inasmuch as after the judg ment of this Court in C '.W.J.C.
No. 2956 of 1975, the Minister of State decided to find means to disintegrate the already integrated cadre or the Chairman of the Legislative Council, having no apparent role in the proc ess of making rules in terms of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution appeared and influenced the process.
We 661 refrain from going into this aspect, for we think, with our conclusion as above, the upper division of the Subordinate Education Service shall continue to have the same respect as it got from the judgment of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2956 of 1975 and no one in the Government shall in future again attempt to deny to the members of the said service their due rights for promotion to the selection grade and other higher posts.
" In course of hearing of the matter, counsel for the State was not able to dislodge the conclusion that bifurca tion was the outcome of an attempt to provide quick promo tional avenues to those who were lower down in the joint cadre and would not have come within the range of considera tion for promotional benefits but by bifurcation became entitled to such benefits.
The High Court, in our opinion, rightly found fault with such action.
We have considered the matter from different angles keeping the relevant aspects in view but have not been able to satisfy ourselves that the judgment of the High Court suffers from any infirmity to justify its vacation.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed but parties are left to bear their respective costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dis missed.

summary:
On 20th February, 1975, the State Government published a joint seniority list of teachers of subordinate Education Service belonging to the Boys branch, and the Higher Second ary Teachers of the Subordinate Educational Service.
This joint gradation list was challenged before the High Court, but the writ petition was dismissed as also an application for review of the dismissal.
The Special Leave Petition against the aforesaid decision was dismissed by this Court on 30th March, 1981.
The aforesaid single cadre known as Secondary Education Service was difurcated by the State Government by its Noti fication dated 8th November 1986 under which the Subordinate Education Service (Teaching Branch) Determination of Senior ity Rules, were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution This bifurcation scheme was challenged in the High Court.
The stand of the Government was that the demand for such bifurcation was taken up in the legislature and in terms of the decision of the Implementation Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council, the new scheme for bifurcation had to he implemented.
The High Court by its decision dated 27th November, 1987 quashed the Notification dated 18th November, 1986 under which the bifurcation was done.
The High Court was of the view that though the authority of the state to frame rules in terms of the proviso to Article 309 was unquestionable, yet notice had to he tam of time fact that those who stood 659 together and fell in line to proceed further in the seniori ty list have to he provided all opportunities in respect of their avenues of promotion alike without breaking that order, so that one who ranks higher in the grade may not go down in due course of service, and held that the rules in the Notification dated 18th November, 1986 were ultra vires Articles 16(1) and 14 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition to this Court, HELD: The High Court, rightly found fault with the State Government action, and holding that the rules in the Notifi cation dated 18th November, 1986 are ultra vires Articles 16(1) and 14 of the Constitution.
[660F] Counsel for the State was not able to dislodge the conclusion that bifurcation was the outcome of an attempt to provide quick promotional avenues to those who were lower down in the joint cadre and would not have come within the range of consideration for promotional benefits but by bifurcation became entitled to such benefits.
[661C]


judgement:
minal Appeal No. 178 of 1957.
117 920 Appeal by special leave from the order dated May 28, 1956, of the former Nagpur High Court in Criminal Revision No. 150 of 1956 arising out of the order dated February 2, 1956, of Shri K. L. Pandey, Special Magistrate at Nagpur in Criminal Case No. I of 1955.
R. Patnaik, for the appellant.
section N. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.
May 22.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J.
This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Nagpur confirming the decision of the Special Magistrate disallowing the application of the appellant to give evidence as a witness under section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh, on January 13, 1953, filed a complaint against the appellant and three others under section 282 of the Indian Companies Act and sections 465 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
The proceedings commenced in 1954 before a Magistrate but on May 18, 1955, they were transferred to a Special Magistrate who commenced the recording of evidence on July 4, 1955.
On August 12, 1955, the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (26 of 1955) received the assent of the President and came into force on January 2, 1956.
In this judgment it will be referred to as the Amending Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure as the Code.
On January 14, 1956, the appellant made an application to the Magistrate claiming the right to appear as a witness on his own behalf under section 342A of the amended Code "in disproof of the charges made against him ".
His application was dismissed and so was his revision to the High Court of Nagpur which held: " While it must be conceded that the wording of clause (c) as also the other clauses of section 116 of the amending Act could have been put in simpler and more direct language, its ingenuous circumlocution cannot be allowed to cloak.
its true meaning or to permit the construction which the applicant seeks to 921 put upon it.
The language used doe, , not justify hold ing that when the statute says " this Act it means only " some of the provisions of this Act Thus the High Court was of the opinion that the proceedings pending before the Special Magistrate would be according to the procedure laid down in the unamended Code and the appellant could not therefore appear as a witness under section 342A of the amended Code.
According to the provisions of the unamedded Code an accused person could not appear as a witness in his defence although for the purpose of enabling him to explain circumstances appearing in the evidence against him the Court could put such questions as it considered necessary.
Section 118 of the Evidence Act deals with persons who are competent to testify as witnesses but in view of section 342 of the unamended Code no accused person could appear as a witness and there fore section 118 was inapplicable to such persons.
Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself and section 342A was inserted into the Code by section 61 of the amending Act.
It provides: S.342A " Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charged together with him at the same trial: Provided that (a) he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing; or (b) his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Court to give rise to any presumption against him:self or any person charged together with him at the same trial." Thus the law was amended and the accused person has become a competent witness for the defence but he cannot be compelled to be a witness and cannot be called as a witness except at his own request in writing and his failure to give evidence cannot be 922 made the subject matter of comment by the parties or the Court.
The question that arises for decision is whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable.
There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case.
No person has a vested right in any course of procedure.
He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.
See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. vs Irving (1).
In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.
The amending Act contains provisions in regard to the procedure to be applied to pending cases in section 116 which is as follows: S.116 " Notwithstanding that all or any of the provisions of this Act have come into force in any State (a)the provisions of section 14 or section 30 or section 145 or section 146 of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall not apply to or affect, any trial or other proceeding which, on the date of such commencement, is pending before any Magistrate and every such trial or other proceeding shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed ; (b)the provisions of section 406 or section 408 or section 409 of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall not apply to, or affect, any appeal which, on the date of such commencement, is pending before the District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the First class empowered by the State Government to hear such appeal, and every such appeal shall, notwithstanding the repeal of the first proviso to section 406 or of section 407 of the principal Act, be heard and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed; (i)(1905) A.C. 369,"372. 923 (c)the provisions of clause (w) of section 4 or section 207A or section 251A or section 260 of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall not apply to, or affect, any inquiry or trial before a Magistrate in which the Magistrate has begun to record evidence prior to the date of such commencement and which is pending on that date, and every such inquiry or trial shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed; (d)the provisions of Chapter XXIII of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall not apply to, or affect, any trial before a Court of Sessions either by jury or with the aid of assessors in which the Court of Sessions has begun to record evidence prior to the date of such commencement and which is pending on that date, and every such trial shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed; but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act and the amendments made thereby shall apply to all pro ceedings instituted after the commencement of this Act and also to all proceedings pending in any Criminal Court on the date of such commencement.
" It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the following words in clause (c) of section 116 of the amending Act " and every such enquiry or trial shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed " mean that no provision of the Act would be applicable to pending trials and particular stress was laid on the words " as if this Act had not been passed".
If that is the interpretation to be put then it would be in conflict with the last portion of the section i. e. " Save as aforesaid the provisions of this Act and the amendments made thereby shall apply to all proceedings instituted after the commencement of this Act and also to all proceedings pending in any Criminal Court on the date of such commencement.
" The language used in this portion of the section in regard to the proceedings which are instituted after the commencement of the amended Code is identical with that dealing with proceedings pending in a Criminal Court on the date of its commencement.
Therefore if this Act applies to all proceedings which commenced 924 after the Act came into force they would equally apply to proceedings which had already commenced except those provisions which have been expressly excluded.
If the whole section is construed in the manner contended for by the respondent then there will be a conflict between the words used in the various clauses and words used in the main section 116 and it is one of the principles of interpretation that the words should be construed in such a manner as to avoid a conflict.
Thus construed the words of cl.
(c) and the words of the rest of the section 116 would mean this that the pro visions of sections 4 (w), 207A, 251A or 260 of the Code as amended shall not apply or affect any enquiry or trial before a Magistrate where the recording of evidence has started prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act and every such enquiry should be continued and disposed of as if these sections had not been enacted.
Except as to this and except as to the provisions mentioned in sub cls.
(a), (b) and (d) the other provisions of the amended Code would be applicable to such proceedings which is also in accordance with the general principles applicable to amendments in procedural law.
By section 34 of the amending Act, section 251 of the Code was substituted by two sections i. e. 251 and 251A. Section 251 lays down the procedure in warrant cases.
It provides: section 251 " In the trial of warrant cases by Magi.
strates,the Magistrate shall, (a) in any case instituted on a police report, follow the procedure specified in section 215A; and (b) in any other case, follow the procedure specified in the other provisions of this Chapter.
" Sub clause (a) deals with cases instituted on a police report and sub cl.
(b) with other cases.
To the former section 251A is applicable and to other cases procedure specified in other provisions in Chapter 21 is made applicable.
Section 342A is in Chapter 24 and there is nothing in the amending Act or the amended Code which makes the provision of section 342A inapplicable to criminal proceeding , which are pending before a Magistrate and in which the recording of evidence has commenced.
925 In our opinion on the plain construction of the words used in section 116 of the amending Act, section 342A available to the appellant.
The High Court, it appears, was misled into construing the words in clause (c) of section 116 i. e. "as if this Act had not been passed".
The High Court was therefore in error and the appellant is entitled, in our view, as a competent witness for the defence to testify in disproof of the charges made against him or any other person charged together with him at the same trial.
We would, therefore., allow this appeal, set aside the order of the courts below and hold that the application made by the appellant to appear as a witness was well founded and should have been allowed.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
A complaint was filed against the appellant on January 13,1953, and the Special Magistrate trying him commenced the recording of evidence on July 4, 955.
During the trial the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (26 of 955) came into force on January 2, 1956, which introduced section 342 A in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The appellant made an application to the Magistrate claiming the right to appear as a witness on his own behalf under section 342 A in disproof of the charges made against him.
The Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that section 342 A could not be applied to pending proceedings which would be according to the procedure laid down in the unamended Code: Held, that on a plain construction of section ii6 of the amending Act which provided for procedure to be followed in pending cases section 342 A was clearly applicable in such cases.
Under the general law also a change in procedure operates retrospectively.