judgement:
scellaneous Petition No. 8678 of 1986.
IN Writ Petition No. 9 144 of 1983.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) G. Vishwanath Iyer, M.K.D. Namboodry and section Balakrishnan for the Petitioners.
R.B. Datar and V.B. Saharya for the Respondent.
The following order of the Court was delivered: O R D E R In this Writ Petition the petitioners have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate order or direction quashing the order No. Tax/HQ/Spl.
Cell/83 1948 dated 4 8 1983 734 issued by the Deputy Assessor and Collector of the Assessment and Collection Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi fixing the rateable value of the property of the petitioners at Rs.12,10,300 with effect from 9.6.
1981 and the consequent bill 180/II dated 4 8 1983 served on the petitioners making a demand of arrears of Rs. 14,07,328 as a composite amount of property tax, fire tax, water tax, scavenging tax and education tax and making any other order as the Court deems fit.
The first petitioner is a shareholder and company secretary of the company M/s.
Siddharth Inter Continental Hotels (India) Ltd. and the second petitioner is M/s. Siddharth Inter Continental Hotels (India) Ltd.
On 26. 10.
1987 we passed an order adjourning the case to 2.11.
1987 to hear the learned counsel for the parties on the question whether the above petition under Article 32 of the Constitution should be decided by this Court or whether we should direct the petitioners to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Accordingly we have heard the learned counsel.
We are of the view that this petition should be disposed of without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case reserving liberty to the petitioners to file a petition, if so advised, before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
We accordingly dispose of this petition for the following reasons: 1.
The scope of the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is wider than the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution 2.
The relief prayed for in the petition is one which may be granted by the High Court and any of the parties who is dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court can approach this Court by way of an appeal.
The fact that some case involving the very same point of law is pending in this Court is no ground to entertain a petition directly by passing the High Court.
If the parties get relief at the High Court, they need not come here and to that extent the burden on this Court is reduced.
The hearing of the case at the level of the High Court is more convenient from several angles and will be cheaper to the parties.
It saves lot of time too.
It will be easier for the clients to give instructions to their lawyers.
Our High Courts are High Courts.
Each High Court has its 735 own high traditions.
They have judges of eminence who have initiative, necessary skills and enthusiasm.
Their capacity should be harnessed to deal with every type of case arising from their respective areas, which they are competent to dispose of.
Every High Court Bar has also its high traditions.
There are eminent lawyers practising in the High Courts with wide experience in handling different kinds of cases, both original and appellate.
They are fully aware of the history of every legislation in their States.
Their services should be made available to the litigants in the respective States 7.
This Court has no time today even to dispose of cases which have to be decided by it alone and by no other authority.
Large number of cases are pending from 10 to 15 years.
Even if no new case is filed in this Court hereafter, with the present strength of Judges it may take more than 15 years to dispose of all the pending cases.
If the cases which can be filed in the High Courts are filed in the High Court and not in this Court this Court 's task of acting as original court which is a time consuming process can be avoided and this Court will also have the benefit of the decision of the High Court when it deals with an appeal filed against such decision.
If cases which may be filed in the High Courts are filed in this Court it would affect the initiative of the High Courts.
We should preserve the dignity, majesty and efficiency of the High Courts.
The taking over by this Court of the work which the High Courts can handle may undermine the capacity and efficiency of the High Courts and that should therefore he avoided.
Lastly, the time saved by this Court by not entertaining the cases which may be filed before the High Courts can be utilised to dispose of old matters in which parties are crying for relief.
These are some of the reasons which have compelled us to pass this order.

summary:
% The Deputy Assessor and Collector of the Assessment and Collection Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, issued an order to the petitioners, demanding payment of Rs.14,07,328 as composite arrears of the property tax, fire tax, water tax, scavenging tax and education tax.
The petitioners moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, quashing the demand order.
Disposing of the Writ Petition, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, and allowing liberty to the petitioners to file, if so advised, a writ petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the F. Constitution, the Court, ^ HELD: The scope of the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is wider than the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The relief prayed for in the petition is one which may be granted by the High Court.
Any party aggrieved by the decision of the High Court can appeal to this Court.
That some case involving the same point of law is pending in this Court, is no ground for this Court to entertain a petition, by passing the High Court.
If the parties get relief in the High Court, they need not come to this Court, and, to that extent, the burden on this Court is reduced.
This Court has no time today even to dispose of cases which have to be decided by it alone.
A large number of cases have been pending in this Court for ten to fifteen years.
If no fresh cases are filed in this Court thereafter, this Court, with its present strength of Judges, may take more than 15 years to dispose of all the pending cases.
If the cases, which can be filed in the High Courts, are filed there and not in this Court, the work of this Court in its original Jurisdiction, which is a time consuming process, can be avoided, and the time saved by this 733 Court by not entertaining the case which may be filed in the High Courts, can be utilized to dispose of the old matters, [734E H; 735A E] This Court will also have the benefit of the decisions of the High Courts when it deals with an appeal against such a decision.
The High Courts have judges of eminence, who have initiative, skill and enthusiasm.
Their capacity should be harnessed to deal with every type of cases, arising from their respective areas, which they are competent to dispose of.
If the cases, which may be filed in the High Courts are filed in this Court, this will affect the initiative of the High Courts.
The dignity, majesty and efficiency of the High Courts should be preserved.
The taking over by this Court of the work which the High Courts can handle, may undermine the capacity and efficiency of the High Courts, which should be avoided.
[735E F] The hearing of a case at the level of a High Court is also more convenient from several angles and will be cheaper to the parties.
That saves a lot of time too.
It is easier for the clients to give instructions to the lawyers.
There are eminent lawyers practising in the High Courts, with wide experience in handling different kinds of cases.
The lawyers there are fully aware of every legislation in their States.
[734G]


judgement:
ame an issue as to the respondents perfecting title to the suit property by adverse possession.
The respondents did not produce any evidence in support of the plea of adverse possession.
They were neither misled in their approach to the case nor denied of opportunity to put forward their evidence.
It is, therefore, not proper at this stage to remand the case to enable the respondents to make good their lapse.
[727G] The Judgment of the Division Bench has therefore, to be set aside, and that of Single Judge restored.
[731F] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1974.
From the Judgment and order dated 2.8.71 of the Madras High Court in O.S.A. No. 37 of 1963.
725 section Padmanabhan and A.T.M Sampath for the Appellant.
A M. Abdul Khadar, Mrs R. Ramachandran for Respondent No. 1. section Balakrishnan for Respondent No 3, 4 and 5.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
This appeal by Special Leave has been preferred against the judgment dated September 2, 1981 passed by the High Court of Madras in O.S.A. 37 of 1963.
The facts briefly stated are: Under Exhibit P. 2 dated May 24, 1929 Nagappa Naicker purchased from Manicak Naickar and his sons nanja lands in old Survey Nos. 187 and 188 (R.S. No. 3859) an extent of about 3/8 cawnie, roughly about 9 grounds for Rs.275.
It was recited in the document that the property was not fetching any income, that irrigation from the tank had failed and that as the property was a pit which required Rs.2,000 to fill, it was sold for meeting certain family expenses.
The boundary of the property was given as north of Government Maclean 's Garden, west of the fields of Thanappa Naicker and Srinivasa Naicker, south of the field of Srinivasa Naicker, and last of the road, Ramanatha Mudaliar 's vacant land and Masilamani Gramani 's house.
It may be noted that the re survey number was given as 3859.
On May 14, 1941 Nagappa died.
Jagdambal appellant is the widow of Nagappa.
She instituted the suit C.S. No. 52/1960 which was tried on the original side of the Madras High Court.
The suit was for recovery of the land purchased under exhibit P2 by her husband and for mean profits with other connected reliefs.
She alleged that the property was in possession and enjoyment of Nagappa during his life time and subsequently in her possession and enjoyment.
It was her case that neighbouring land owner South India Education Trust ( 'SIET ') trespassed and encroached upon the suit property taking advantage of her helpless condition as a widow.
The SIET is the 5th defendant in the suit.
We may now trace the title of the adjoining plot of land owned by the SIET.
One Kuppuswami Naiker was the owner in possession of 726 a land measuring 35 grounds 1989 sq.
This entire land was sold to Rani of Vuyyur for Rs. 10,000 under exhibit P6 dated July 30, 1940.
In the schedule, the property sold was described as R.S. No. 3859/1, 3859/ 2 and part of 3859/3.
The property was also described as bounded on the west partly by Nagappa Naicker 's land and partly by Mount Road and Duraiswami Gramani 's house.
According to the sale deed the property sold was only 35 grounds 1980 sq.
and it was marked yellow in the plan attached thereto.
Under exhibit P7 dated December 24, 1953 Rani of Vuyyur sold the property she purchased under exhibit P6 to SIET.
The property was described as bearing R.S. No. 3859/1, 3859/2 and 3859/3 part and 3872 in Teynampet measuring about 38 grounds.
In the schedule to exhibit P7 the property was described as Lying east of Nagappa Naicker 's land and Mount Road It will be seen that though the Rani Yuyyur purchased 35 grounds 1989 sq.
the extent mentioned in exhibit P7 was about 38 grounds.
On February 11, 1954 the SIET exchanged its land under exhibit P8 with the property belonging to the defandants 1 to 4 in the suit.
exhibit P8 recited that the SIET was conveying an extent of 43 grounds 1324 sq.
ft. comprised in R.S. Nos.
3859;1, 3859/2 and 3859/3 and 3872 Mount Road Madras.
Here again the land has been described as bounded on the west by Nagappa Naicker 's land and Mount Road.
The curious thing to be noted is about the extent of land exchanged.
38 grounds purchased by the SIET under Ex P7 has become 43 grounds 1324 sq.
in the Exchange deed exhibit P8.
The suit was resisted by all the defendants.
They contended that the plaintiff has no title to the suit property and the suit was barred by time.
They denied the trespass or encroachment alleged by the plaintiff.
They set up title in themselves They particularly contended that the plaintiff was not in possession at any time within 12 years next before the suit.
The plaintiff examined in all seven witnesses as against six witnesses by the defendants.
The learned single judge after considering the material on record held that Nagappa during life time and the plaintiff after Nagappa 's death had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
The title was also held in her favour.
On the question of trespass by the defendants, learned judge with reference to documents and pleadings observed that the defendants trespassed the suit property after the measurement and demarcation of the land by the Tehsildar in January 1954.
That means, learned judge held that the plaintiff was in posses 727 sion within 12 years prior to the date of filing the suit.
Accordingly the suit was decreed with a direction to the defendants to vacate the suit land marked as R.S. No. 3859/4 and deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff.
Being aggrieved by the judgment of learned Judge, the SIET preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.
The Division Bench affirmed the finding as to the plaintiff 's title to the property.
It was held that the plaintiff has satisfactory established the title to the suit property.
On the question of possession, however, it was observed that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was vague and unacceptable.
The plaintiff has not proved her possession of the suit property at any time within 12 years prior to the suit.
At the same time, it was also observed that the defendants have not perfected title by adverse possession.
So stating the Division Bench allowed the appeal and dimissed the suit.
Hence this appeal by the plaintiff.
Mr. Padmanabhan learned counsel for the appellant urged two contentions before us.
The first contention related to the jurisdiction of the appellate court to reverse the finding of the fact properly recorded by the trial judge.
The second contention rested on the undisputed nature of the suit property and the legal presumption of possession in favour of the title holder.
Mr. Abdul Khader and S Balakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondents, urged in support of the judgment of the Division Bench.
In the alternate they contended that it is a fit case for remand to consider the question of adverse possession raised by the SIET in the pleading.
We are not pursuaded by the alternate contention urged by learned counsel for the respondent.
The trial court did not frame an issue as to the defendants perfecting title to the suit property by adverse possession.
The defendants did not produce any evidence in support of the plea of adverse possession.
It is not the case of the defendants that they were misled in their approach to the case.
It is also not their case that they were denied opportunity to put forward their evidence.
It is, therefore, not proper for us at this stage to remand the case to enable the defendants to make good their lapse.
We find considerable justification for the criticism of Mr. 728 Padmanabhan about the manner in which the Division Bench considered the oral evidence in the case.
So far as the appreciation of oral testimony by the appellate court is concerned there are two view points.
One view is that the Court of appeal has undoubted duty to review the recorded evidence and to draw its own inference and conclusion.
The other view is that the Court of appeal must attach due weight to the opinion of the trial judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and noticing their look and manner.
The rule of practice which has almost the force of law is that the appellate court does not reverse a finding of fact rested on proper appreciation of the oral evidence.
That was the view taken in Sarju Pershad vs Raja Jawaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh & Ors., ]1950] Vol.
I SCR 781 at 783 where this Court observed: "The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case.
In such cases, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court.
This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies, on fact, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge.
The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of the practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the party or any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial judge on a question of fact." In the instant case, it may be noted that the trial judge on a consideration of every material on record reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the property and it was only in 1954 she was dispossessed.
This conclusion was also based on the credibility of the witnesses examined by the parties.
The Division Bench reversed that finding without due regard to the probability of the case and the considerations weighed with the trial judge.
The Division Bench appears to have missed the important features which have not been properly explained by the defendants.
729 First, about the western boundary of the property purchased by the defendants.
In all the sale deeds forming links in the defendants title exhibit P6 of 1953 and exhibit P8 of 1954, the western boundary has been shown as the property belonging to Nagappa.
What was that property belonging to Nagappa which formed the western boundary? It was certainly not the land bearing R.S. No. 3862 and 3863 although counsel for the respondents made an attempt before us to show that the said land formed the western boundary.
But there is nothing on record to lend credence to this belated submission.
It was never the case of the parties that the plaintiff had no other property apart from R.S. No. 3862 and 3863.
Second, the SIET purchased under exhibit P7 the land measuring 38 grounds.
Within a couple of months thereafter the SIET conveyed under the deed of exchange exhibit P8, 43 grounds 1324 sq.
If one prefers to go yet further back, the Rani of Vuyyur purchased only 35 grounds 1989 sq.
It was the same property which was the subject matter of sale under exhibit P7 and later the subject matter of exchange under exhibit P8.
One fails to understand how that waxing could be possible without an attempt to grab the adjacent property Thirdly, the plaintiff has come forward with specific case that her land was encroached by the defendants in the early part of January February 1954.
That has been denied in the written statement filed by the Secretary of the SIET.
The Secretary was examined as D.W. 3.
He was a star witness in support of the defendants case.
The sale deed exhibit P7 was in his name.
The exchange deed EX.
P8 was executed by him along with treasurer of the SIET.
D.W. 3 in his evidence has given a go by to his pleading.
He stated that he did not examine the title deeds of his property.
He did not know anything about the contents of the title deeds except in a general way.
He did not take any responsibility for any portion of the sale deed in favour of the SIET.
He said that the exchange deed was given to him by the Chairman of the SIET and he did not actually draft it.
He also stated that he could not explain how the property which was 38 grounds at the time of purchase under exhibit P7 came to be described as 43 grounds in exhibit P8, although he later said that exhibit P8 was written after measurement and demarcation of the property.
We do not know whether he feigned his ignorance, or whether he was trying to be ingenious.
We could only conclude that he was fair enough and ingenuous.
He stated before the Court that he did not investigate the title and could not take personal responsibility for the statement he made in the written statement to the effect that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property.
This was the final blow 730 to the defendants case which the Division Bench has failed to A appreciate.
The force of the second contention, urged for the appellant cannot also be gainsaid.
We have already stated that the suit property was admittedly located in a low lying area with a deep pit where water stagnated making it incapable of use and enjoyment.
The sale deed exhibit P2 by which the property was purchased by Nagappa described the property as a pit.
It has come from the evidence that the land was 8 feet below the road level.
It was called "Pallam".
There would be water in the "Pallam" during the rainy reason making it a pond (see the evidence of P.W. 1) It was also admitted before the trial judge that the suit property was low Lying where water did stagnate.
The learned judge, however, found it unnecessary to draw legal presumption of possession because on other material he found the defacto possession with the plaintiff till 1954.
The law with regard to possession of such land is clear.
The possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession.
There would be no continuance of adverse possession when the land remains submerged and when it is put out of use and enjoyment.
In such a case the party having title could claim constructive possession provided the title had not been extinguished by adverse possession before the last sub mergence.
There is no difference in principle between seasonal submersion and one which continues for a length of time.
This view has been applied by the Privy Council in Basanta Kumar Roy vs Secretary of State, ILR Vol. 44 (1917) Calcutta series 858 at 871 2 where Lord Summer observed: "The Limitation Act of 1877 does not define the term "dispossession" but its meaning is well settled.
A man may cease to use his land because he cannot use it, since it is under water, he does not thereby discontinue his possession: constructively it continues, until he is dispossessed; and, upon the cessation of the dispossession before the lapse of the statutory period, constructively it revives.
"There can be no discontinuance by absence of use and enjoyment, when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment" (Per Cotton, L.J. in Leigh vs Jack (1).
It seems to follow that there can be no continuance of adverse possession, when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment, so long as such adverse possesion must rest on de facto use and occupation.
When sufficient time has elapsed to extinguish the old title and start a new one, the new owner 's posses 731 sion of course continues untill there is fresh dispossession, and revives as it ceases In the case of Secretary of State for India vs Krishnamoni Gupta, Cal 5 18 their Lordships ' Board applied this view to a case, where a river shifting its course first in one direction and then in the opposite direction, first exposed certain submerged lands, of which the Government took possession, and then after a few years flooded them again.
No rational distinction can be drawn between that case and the present one, where the reflooding was seasonal and occurred for several months in each year.
It was held that when the land was re submerged the possession of the Government determined, and that while it remained submerged, no possession could be deemed to continue so as to be available towards the ultimate acquisition of title against the true owner.
" These principles, in our opinion, are equally applicable to the present case.
The plaintiff has proved title to the property.
The defendants have not acquired title by adverse possession.
The property as described in the sale deed exhibit P2 was a vacant land fetching no income.
It was called "Pallam" or pond that was seasonally submerged.
The entire land might not be seasonally submerged, but it makes little difference in the position of law.
"As a general rule possession of part is in law possession of the whole, if the whole is otherwise vacant. " Sarkar on Evidence Vo.
2 13th Edn.
p. 110.
In the view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal with cost, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restore that of the learned single judge.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
% The appellant 's Husband purchased the lands in dispute under exhibit P2 wherein it was recited that the property was not fetching any income, that irrigation from the tank had failed, and that as the property was a pit which required Rs.2,000 for filling it was sold for meeting certain family expenses.
The appellant, after the death of her husband, instituted a suit in High Court for recovery of the land purchased by her husband and for mesne profits and other connected reliefs, alleging that the property was in possession and enjoyment of her husband during his life time, and subsequently in her possession and enjoyment, and that the neighbouring land owner, i.e. respondent No. 1 had trespassed and encroached upon the suit property taking advantage of her helpless condition as a widow.
The suit was resisted by the respondents contending that the appellant had no title to the suit property and the suit was barred by time.
The respondents denied trespass or encroachment and set up title in themselves, contending that the appellant was not in possession at any time within 12 years next before the suit.
A Single Judge of the High Court, found that the appellant 's husband, during his life time, and the appellant after her husband 's death had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and held the title in her favour.
He also held that the respondent trespassed the suit property after measurement and demarcation of the land by the Tahsildar in Jan/Feb, 1984, and, therefore, the appellant was in possession within 12 years prior to the date of filing the suit.
The suit was accordingly decreed.
Aggrieved by the judgment, the respondents filed an appeal before the Division Bench which, while affirming the appellant 's title to 723 the property, held that the appellant had satisfactorily established title to the suit property.
On the question of possession, however, it observed that the appellant had not proved her possession of the suit property at any time within 12 years prior to the suit and the evidence adduced by her was vague and unacceptable.
At the same time, it held that the respondents had not perfected title by adverse possession.
In the appeal by special leave, it was contended that the appellate Court had no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of fact properly recorded by the trial Judge and that the suit property was a low lying area with deep pit where water stagnated during rainy reason and was seasonably submerged, making it incapable of use and enjoyment and the legal presumption was that possession continued with the title holder.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1.
Possession continues with the title holder unless and until the defendant acquires title by adverse possession.
There would be no continuance of adverse possession when the land remains submerged and when it is put out of use and enjoyment.
In such a case the party having title could claim constructive possession provided the title had not been extinguished by adverse possession before the last submergence.
There is no difference in principle between seasonal submersion and one which continues for a length of time.
[730D E] Basanta Kumar Roy vs Secretary of State ILR Vol.
44 (1917) Calcutta series 858 at 871 2 and Sarkar on Evidence Vol. 2, 13th Edn.
p. 110 referred to.
In the instant case, the appellant has proved title to the property.
The respondents have not acquired title by adverse possession.
The property as described in the sale deed exhibit P 2 was a vacant land fetching no income.
It was called "Pallam" or pond that was seasonally submerged, but it makes little difference in the position of law.
As a general rule, possession of part is in law possession of the whole, if the whole is otherwise vacant.
[731D E] 2.
The appellate court does not reverse a finding of fact rested on proper appreciation of the oral evidence.
This is a rule of practice which has almost the force of law.
[728B C] Sarju Pershad vs Raja Jawaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh 724 ]1950] Vol.
I SCR 781 relied on.
In the instant case, the trial judge on a consideration of every material on record reached the conclusion that the appellant was in possession of the property and it was only in 1954 that she was dispossessed.
This conclusion was also based on the credibility of the witnesses examined by the parties.
The Division Bench reversed that finding without due regard to the probability of the case and the considerations which weighed with the trial judge.
[728G H] The Division Bench appears to have missed important features which have not been properly explained by the respondents, namely, about the western boundary of the property purchased by the respondents and the discrepancy in the area of the property purchased by first respondent which has been shown differently in Exs.
P6, P7 and P8, and the contradictory stand of DW 3, Secretary of the first respondent trust, who was the star witness in support of the respondents ' case, regarding the first respondent 's title and the appellant s possession of the disputed property.
While DW 3 denied in his written statement the appellant 's allegation that her land was encroached by the respondents in the early part of January February 1954, he stated before the Court that he did not investigate the title and could not take personal responsibility for the said statement.
This was the final blow to the respondents ' case, which the Division Bench has failed to appreciate.
[729F H; 730A]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 558 and 559 of 1985.
From the Judgment and order dated 14.2.85 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 5805 and 5806 of 1985.
775 Mohan Pandey for the Appellants.
Yogeshwar Prasad and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B.C. RAY, J.
These two appeals by special leave are against the order passed on February 14, 1985 by the High Court of Allahabad dismissing the writ petition No. 5806 of 1984 and writ petition No. 5805 of 1984 as well as writ petition No. 309 of 1985 whereby the order of detention passed against the appellants on October 1, and October 20, 1984 respectively under section 3(2) of the , was upheld as legal and valid.
The copy of the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention and the first information report on the basis of which the detention order was made, were served on the appellants at the time of their detention.
The grounds of detention are as follows: "On 25.9.1984, Shri Surya Kumar, son of Shri Vishwa Pal, resident of 33, Babuganj, P.S. Hasanganj, District Lucknow, lodged a report at P.S. Hazratganj, Lucknow that on 15.9.1984 there was a tender for the supply of ballast in P.W.D. in which tenders had been submitted by him in K.P. Singh 's name.
You keep share with K.P. Singh.
On account of your and K.P. Singh 's terror no other person submits any tender against you people for which reason you people obtain tenders at rates of your choice.
If any other person submits his tender you and K.P. Singh terrorise him.
On account of the rates of his tender being lower on 15.9.1984, the tender of the complainant was accepted in one group and in the remaining groups the tenders of K.P. Singh etc.
were accepted.
For this reason you and K.P. Singh bore a grudge against the complainant.
On 25.9.1984 at about 3.45 P.M. when Surya Kumar was going, in connection with his tender, in his Ambassador Car No. USS 7418, accompanied by his brother in law, opposite to the National Highway Khand, he saw some contractors.
On reaching near them the complainant had just started talking to them, when suddenly in two cars, you with a pistol, Phool Chand with a revolver, Jaleel with a revolver, Ashok with Desi katta, Ashok Sonkar and Sarrif 776 with hand grenade and Shankar Dey with a gun along with three other persons came and with intent to kill the complainant fired at the complainant, threw hand grenades which fell on the car of the complainant.
Consequently, there was a commotion.
Traffic was obstructed and public tranquility was disturbed.
The complainant immediately saving his life took flight in his car.
On the above information by the complainant a case FIR No. 1034 was registered at police station, Hazratganj against you and your other companions under Section 147, 148, 149, 307 I.P.C. and Section 6 of Explosives Act and after investigation a charge sheet No. 279 has been put up against you for the said offence.
I have also been put up against you for the said offence.
I have also come to know that on your behalf an application for grant of bail has been moved in a competent court, therefore, in case you come out on bail from the jail you will again start activities causing breach of public order on the abovesaid grounds, I have been satisfied that there is possibility of your acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and in order to prevent you from so acting, it is necessary to detain you.
" The said order of detention was duly approved by the State Government under section 3(4) of the .
The appellants made representation against the grounds of detention.
The representations were rejected by the Government and the same were communicated to the appellants by the Joint Secretary, Vigilance & Home Department, Government of U.P.
On November 26, 1984, the Secretary, Vigilance & Home Department, Government of U.P. informed the appellants that the Government after considering the report of the Advisory Board had confirmed the order of detention and directed that the appellants be detained for a period of 12 months with effect from October 1, 1984 and October 20, 1984 respectively.
Aggrieved by this order of detention the appellants moved applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order of detention made by the respondent No. 1 and for setting 777 them free.
These were registered as writ petition No. 5806 of 1984 and writ petition No. 5805 of 1984.
Another detenu who was detained on identical grounds also filed writ petition No. 309 of 1985 before the High Court.
The main contention advanced on behalf of the appellants before the High Court was that on the basis of facts alleged, at the most it could be said that the matter related to the maintenance of law and order.
It was not a matter relating to the disturbance of public order.
The assault on Surya Kumar can only be on account of an ill will arising out of business rivalry.
It had been submitted that it affects only an individual and the society or community were not affected by the alleged act of omission on the part of the appellants.
It therefore raised no problem of public order.
It had been further contended that a solitary act can not be considered to be an act prejudiced to the maintenance of public order.
The High Court of Allahabad after hearing the parties and on a consideration of the decisions cited before it found that whether an act creates a mere law and order problem or affects the even tempo of the life of the community, it is to be seen what is the extent of the impact of the act in question upon the society as a whole; whether the effect is restricted to an individual or a few individuals alone or it creates a sense of insecurity, danger and apprehension in the minds of the people in general apart from those who are the victims of the incident; whether the act or acts disturb the even tempo of life of the society or a section of society; whether the act leads to disturbance of public order or only law and order.
The High Court further found that in the context the act committed tends to teach a lesson to the complainant and to act as a warning to prospective tenderers in future who may not dare to avail of the opportunity to submit their tenders against that of the appellants.
It was also found that the impact and reach of the act in question goes beyond the individual and affects the community of contractors who take contracts for executing the public works.
The Court further held that the order of detention made by the detaining authority is legal and valid and the writ petitions were dismissed.
Undoubtedly, on the basis of the FIR lodged by Surya Kumar a case under Section 147/148/149/307 I.P.C. and under Section 5 of the Explosives Act has been registered as crime No. 1034 and the said case is pending for decision before the criminal court.
The main question which falls for decision is whether the act 778 referred to in the grounds of detention is directed against certain individuals creating a law and order problem or the reach and potentiality of the act is so deep as to disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility.
It has now been well settled by several decisions of this Court (the latest one being Gulab Mehra vs State of U.P. & Ors., SC 559 judgment in which case was pronounced by us on September 15, 1987) that public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality.
Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility.
It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order or it affects public order.
It has also been observed by this court that an act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity.
In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different.
Therefore it is the impact, reach and potentiality of the act which in certain circumstances affect the even tempo of life of the community and thereby public order is jeopardized.
Such an individual act can be taken into consideration by the detaining authority while passing an order of detention against the person alleged to have committed the act.
In the instant case the alleged act of assault by fire arms is confined to the complainant Surya Kumar and not to others.
It is an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so extensive as to affect a considerable members of the society.
In other words, this act does not disturb public tranquility nor does it create any terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality nor does it affect in any manner the even tempo of the life of the community.
This criminal act emanates from business rivalry between the detenus and the complainant.
Therefore such an act can not be the basis for subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order of detention on the ground that the impugned act purports to affect public order i.e. the even tempo of the life of the community which is the sole basis for clamping the order of detention.
Moreover, no injury was caused to the person of the complainant, Surya Kumar by the appellants nor any damage was caused to the car though hand grenade was alleged to have been thrown on the car.
No mark has been caused to the car also.
It is relevant to mention in this connection that the appellants were released on bail by this Court after duly considering the facts and 779 circumstances of the case in July, 1985.
The period of one year has also expired.
We have already held hereinbefore that a solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed.
Thus it is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order.
It is pertinent to note in this connection that the Criminal Appeal Nos. 826 and 827 of 1985 arising out of the same incident and identical grounds of detention, filed by Ashok Arora and Ashok Kumar Sonkar have been allowed by this Hon 'ble Court by its order dated November 29, 1985 and the appellants were directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the appeals without any order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals allowed.

summary:
% The appellants were contractors for the supply of ballast to PWD.
They were detained under section 3(2) of the .
It was stated in the grounds of detention that on account of business rivalry, appellants and their companions attacked the complainant with fire arms and hand grenades with intent to kill him, FIR was lodged by the complainant, a case was registered against them under section 147, 149, 307 I.P.C. and section 6 of the Explosives Act, and a chargesheet put up against the appellants, and since they had applied for bail, and if released there was a possibility that they will again start activities causing breach of public order, it was necessary to detain them in order to prevent them from so acting.
The detention orders were approved by the State Government under section 3(4) of the Act, and the representations made by the appellants having been rejected they were directed to be detained for a period of 12 months.
Challenging their detention, the appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court contending that the alleged assault on the complainant affected only an individual and such a solitary act could not be considered to be an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The High Court, dismissing the writ petitions, held that the assault was to teach a lesson to the complainant and serve as warning to prospective tenderers who may not dare to submit their tenders and that the impact and reach of the act went beyond the individual and affected the community of contractors who take contracts for executing the public works.
Allowing the appeals to this Court, 774 ^ HELD: Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility.
An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be different.
[778C D] A solitary act of omission or commission can be taken into consideration for being subjectively satisfied, by the detaining authority to pass an Order of detention if the reach, effect and potentiality of the act is such that it disturbs public tranquility by creating terror and panic in the society or a considerable number of the people in a specified locality where the act is alleged to have been committed.
It is the degree and extent of the reach of the act upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order.
[779A C] In the instant case, the alleged act of assault by fire arms is confined to the complainant and not to others.
It is an act infringing law and order and the reach and effect of the act is not so extensive as to affect considerable members of the society.
In other words, this act does not disturb public tranquility, nor does it create any terror or panic in the minds of the people of the locality nor does it affect in any manner the even tempo of the life of the community.
This criminal act emanates from business rivalry between the detenus and the complainant.
Therefore, such an act cannot be the basis for subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order of detention on the ground that the impugned act purports to affect public order i.e. the even tempo of the life of the community, which is the sole basis for clamping the order of detention.
Moreover, no injury was caused to the person of the complainant, by the appellants nor any damage was caused to the car though hand grenade was alleged to have been thrown on the car.
No mark has been caused to the car also.
[778E H] Gulab Mehra vs State of U. P. & Ors., 3 SC 559, applied.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2010 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.4.
1986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.A.O. Nos.
737 of 1981 275 of 1982 and 69 of 1984.
Shanker Ghosh, A.V. Rangam and T.V. Ratnam for the Appellant.
Ashok Sen. A. Subba Rao, Qamaruddin, Mrs, Qamaruddin, C.S.S. Rao and S.V. Deshpande for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 15th April, 1986.
On or about th of April.
1948 Sail Nawaz Jung, the then ruler of Mukkalla State, South Yeman in Arabia settled some of the properties with which the appeal is concerned by a Registered Tamleeknama in favour of his son Sultan Awaz and his grand son Galib Bin Awaz.
In 1954, there was Wakfnama by the said Sail Nawaz Jung.
On or about 23rd of August, 1963 the Military Estate Officer, Secunderabad of.
Andhra Pradesh requested for the requisition of the property named as "Sail Gulshan" with a vast extent of land and palaces with roads and surrounded by a compound wail measuring 19 acres and 10 guntas situated in the heart of Hyderabad city near Sarojini Devi Hospital.
The property in question was taken possession of on or about 12th of September, 1963.
In this appeal we are concerned with the claim for compensation for the said acquisition by one Abdul Khader who was a flower picker.
He had claimed rights as a tenant during the requisition.
His claim for compensation for requisition was settled by sharing the rent in or about 1969.
The appellant is one of the owners of the property in question deriving their title 1233 and right from the said Sail Nawaz Jung.
On or about 3rd February, 1970 the Collector issued notice for acquisition of the property under section 7(1) of the being Act 30 of 1952 (hereinafter called the Central Act).
The Gazette Notification for the acquisition was issued on 12th March, 1970.
The controversy in this case relates to the question whether Abdul Khader was 'a protected tenant ' under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 being Act No. XXI of 1950 (hereinafter called the Andhra Pradesh Act).
The purpose of the said Act as the Preamble states was, inter alia, to enable the land holders to prevent the excessive sub division of agricultur al holdings and empower government to assume in certain circumstances the management of agricultural lands, to provide for the registration of Co operative Farms and to make further provision for matters incidental thereto.
Section 2(r) states that the expression 'protected ' means a person who is deemed to be a protected tenant under the provisions of the said Act.
Chapter IV of the Andhra Pradesh Act deals with protected tenants and section 34 of the said Act provides who is to be considered as a protected tenant and uses the expression that a person shall, subject to the provisions of sub sections (2) and (3), be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of the land if he has fulfilled the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (1) of Section 34 of the said Act.
Sub section (2) of Section 34 of the said Act also deals with "to be deemed to be a protected tenant in respect of any land", for cer tain purposes.
Section 35 of the said Act deals with deci sion on claims and stipulates by sub section (1) of Section 35 of the said Act that if any question arises whether any person, and if so what person, is deemed under Section 34 to be a protected tenant in respect of any land, the landhold er, or any person claiming to be so deemed, may, within one year from the commencement of the Act apply in the pre scribed form to the Tahsildar for the decision of the ques tion and the Tahsildar shall after enquiring into the claim or claims in the manner prescribed, declare what person is entitled to be deemed to be protected tenant or as the case may be, that no person is so entitled.
Sub section (2) of Section 35 stipulates that a declaration by the Tahsildar that the person is deemed to be a protected tenant or, in the event of an appeal from the Tahsildar 's decision such declaration by the Collector on first appeal or by the Board of Revenue on second appeal, shall be conclusive that such person is a protected tenant and his rights as such shall be recorded in the Record of Right of where there is no Record of Rights in such village record as may be prescribed.
Section 36 of the said Act deals with the recovery of pos session by protected tenant.
Section 37 deals with persons not entitled 1234 under section 34 to be deemed in certain circumstances as protected tenants.
Section 38 of the said Act deals with right of protected tenant to purchase land.
Section 39 deals with right of protected tenants to exchange lands.
Section 40 of the said Act makes rights of protected tenant herita ble.
Sub section (2) of section 40 of the said Act indicates who are the heirs who would be entitled to hold the tenancy on the death of the protected tenant and on what terms.
Sub section (3) of section 40 of the said Act provides that if a protected tenant dies without leaving any heirs all his rights shall be so extinguished.
The explanation to sub section (3) of section 40 of the said Act provides who should be 'deemed to be the heirs ' of a protected tenant.
Subsection (4) of section 40 stipulates that the interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as a protected tenant shall form sixty per cent.
It is necessary also to note the provisions of section 99 of the Act.
It is as follows: "99.
Bar of Jurisdiction: (1) Save as provid ed in this Act no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act re quired to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or by the Board of Revenue or Government.
(2) No order of the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector or of the Board of Revenue or Government made under this Act, shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court. ' Section 102 of the said Act stipulates that the Act shall not apply to certain lands and areas and provides inter alia as follows: "102.
Nothing in this Act shall apply (a) to lands leased, granted, alien ated or acquired in favour of or by the Cen tral Government or the State Government, a local authority or a Cooperative Society.
" It is relevant at this stage to refer to certain provi sions of the Central Act to consider the controversy in volved in this appeal.
The Central Act was enacted giving power for requisitioning and acquisi 1235 tion of immovable property for Union purposes.
Section 3 of the said Act gave power to requisition immovable property.
Section 4 of the said Act empowers taking possession of requisitioned property.
Section 5 deals with rights over requisitioned property.
Section 6 deals with the power of release from the requisitioning.
Section 7 authorises the Central Government where it is of the opinion that it is necessary to do so to acquire requisitioned property.
Sec tion 8 deals with 'principles and method of determining compensation either for requisitioning or acquisition of the property and, inter alia, provides for appointment of an arbitrator in certain contingencies in case there was no agreement for determining compensation.
Section 9 deals with the payment of compensation and provides that the amount of compensation payable under an award shall, subject to any rules made under that Act, be paid by a competent authority to the person or persons entitled thereto in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the award.
Suspect ing that the entry in the Protected Tenancy Register might not be genuine, on or about 24th of October, 1970 the Tah sildar passed an order cancelling that entry.
The main question centres around the right of Abdul Khader, respond ent No. 1 herein to the compensation awarded by the arbitra tor, it is therefore, necessary to refer to the relevant portion of the said order which inter alia, stated as fol lows: "By perusal of the Tenancy Register of 1958 it is evident that Sri Mohd. Abdul Khader is not a genuine protected tenant.
The entries of this particular so called tenant is doubtful.
I suspect that somebody has tampered the register and entered the name of Sri Mohd. Abdul Khader.
Separate enquiry in this connec tion is going on in this office to know under what circumstances such entry has been made and copy also issued without knowledge of the Tahsildar.
Hence I suspect the entry and order to cancel the copy of the tenancy issued in favour of Sri Modh.
Abdul Khader.
Sd Tahsildar.
Hyderabad West Taluk.
" This order of cancellation was challenged by Abdul Khadar by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh being W .P.
No. 1786 of 197 1 and by judgment and order passed on 27th August, 197 1, the learned single Judge, Vaidya, J. held, inter alia, as follows: 1236 "Whether the petitioner (Abdul Khader) is a protected tenant or whether he has any prima facie interest in the suit property are mat ters entirely within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator who has to be appointed under Section 8 of the 'Central Act '.
" In the appeal of Abdul Khader the proceedings of Revenue Divisional Officer while questioning entry of the name of Abdul Khader in the Register is a genuine one or net and while it is stated that it was entered in the Register in such suspicious way by giving Serial No. 1/A between Serial Nos. 1 and 2 of Register being Exhibit A. 106 and Exhibit A. 107, it ultimately held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
On or about 19th of April, 1972 the order was passed by the Dis trict Revenue Officer who held that Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant.
He held further that Khasra Pahani which is the basic record of occupancy period after spot inspec tions does not find the name of Abdul Khader and further held that all entries except this entry in the Protected Tenancy Register prepared under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act was supported by an enquiry.
It was in those circumstances held by him that the entry was a spurious one.
In Civil Revision Petition No. 1006 of 1972 which was filed by Abdul Khader as against others, Justice R. Ramachandra Raju of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on or about 19th August, 1974 held that Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant and directed deletion of entry made in the Final Record of tenancies as a spurious one.
The learned Judge observed, inter alia, as follows: "I am told by the counsel for both the parties that the lands in question were already ac quired for military purpose under the Requisi tion and Acquisition of Immovable property Act, 1952 and that Sri M.S. Sharma, the Addi tional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hydera bad has already been appointed as Arbitrator under the Act for determining the compensation and the persons entitled to it.
Not only that, in the writ petition filed by the present petitioner in this Court, it was held that it is not necessary to go into the question whether the petitioner is a protected tenant or whether he has any prima facie interest in the property because they are the matters entirely within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator who has to be appointed under Section 8 of the Act.
Now, as the arbitrator has already been appointed, he will go into the matter as to whether the 1237 petitioner was a protected tenant of the lands or not and if he was the protected tenant to what share in the compensation amount he would be entitled to.
Under these circumstances, the C.R.P. is dismissed with a direction that the entry made in the Final Record of Tenancies that the petitioner was the protect ed tenant, for the lands in question which is spurious as found by both the Revenue Divi sional Officer and the District Revenue Offi cer should be deleted.
" The matter was brought to this Court by a special leave application and this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10 of 1975 on or about 30th January.
1975 held that since the question whether the petitioner in that case namely, Abdul Khader was a protected tenant had been left open by the High Court to be decided by the Arbitrator under section 8 of the Central Act, special leave petition was rejected with those observations.
Thereafter there was an order appointing arbitrator on 29th of March, 1975 under section 8(1)(b) of the Central Act.
Claim petition was filed by the appellant before the arbitrator ' Claim petition was also filed by Abdul Khader claiming 60 '% of compensation as a 'protected tenant '.
There was an award by the arbitrator holding that as this Court had left it open to decide whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant.
Despite the objection exercising the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to go into the question of protected tenant, the arbitrator held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the appellant claiming as one of the owners of the property filed a statutory appeal to the High Court.
In the meantime Abdul Khader filed an application on or about 21st of Octo ber, 1984 for adducing additional evidence to mark Kaulnama dated 2nd of December, 1950 for the first time and Oubu liatnama dated 2nd December, 1950 as exhibits in deciding the protected tenancy rights.
The appellant objected to that application but the High Court on 1st April, 1985 appointed Advocate Commissioner to record additional evidence.
On or about 22nd of April, 1985 the appellant filed the objection reserving the right of raising the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to go into the question whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant in the light of the Act 21 of 1950.
Three civil appeals were filed before this Court against the order of the High Court on 15th May, 1985.
This Court passed the order, on 19th August, 1985.
The said order is important and reads as follows: 1238 "Special leave are granted.
The appeal is heard.
Dr. Chitale learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court should be directed to consider the issues relating to the jurisdic tion of the arbitrator appointed and function ing under the , 195 i to decide whether a person is protected tenant of an agricultural land or not in the light of Sections 99 and 102 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950.
We have heard the learned counsel for the respondents on the above question.
After giving our due consideration to the question we are of the view that the High Court should determine this question.
The High Court shall decide the question of juris diction referred to above in light of the submissions to be made by both the parties.
Shri Subba Rao, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appellants should not be permitted to withdraw from the authorities concerned more than 40 per cent of the total compensation awarded in respect of the lands in question pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court.
We agree with his submission.
We direct that the appellants shall withdraw not more than 40 per cent of the compensation pending disposal of the appeal before the High Court.
The remaining 60 per cent shall be disbursed in accordance with the directions to be given by the High Court after hearing all the parties concerned.
" The appeals were disposed of accordingly.
Other C.M.Ps. were filed for clarification of the second part of the order dated 19th August, 1985 and this Court on 29th November, 1985 in CMPs.
Nos. 4692 to 4694 of 1985 clarified and ob served that there was no need for further clarification.
It was observed that the High Court was at liberty to consider the claims to be made by both the parties and pass any fresh order with regard to the disbursement of the remaining 60% of the compensation.
The judgment under appeal was passed on 15th of April, 1986.
This appeal arises out of the said judgment.
In the judgment under appeal which is directed against the award made by the arbitrator formulated the following four issues (1) what is the value of the land; (2) who are entitled to the compensation amount; (3) whether Abdul Khader is a protected tenant of Sail Gulshan of the area 19 02 guntas excluding the 1239 land of buildings, wells, etc.
and (4) what share is to be apportioned to successors of Sail Nawaz Jung.
It has to be borne in mind that in the award, the arbitrator after ex haustively discussing the evidence on record held that Abdul Khader was a protected tenant and as such further held that he was entitled to 60% of the compensation money payable for the acquisition of the land excluding the land of buildings, wells etc.
In this appeal we are concerned with the question wheth er the High Court was right in upholding the award of the arbitrator so far as it has held in favour of Abdul Khader and his rights to get 60% of the compensation.
The High Court dealt with the value of the land.
We are not concerned with the challenge to this aspect in this appeal.
The High Court further modified a portion of the order in view of the decision of this Court in Bhag Singh vs Union Territory of Chandigarh, ; on the question of solati um and interest on the amount awarded.
The judgment also dealt with the question as to who were the successors of Nawaz Jung.
We are also not concerned with this aspect of the matter inasmuch as the same is the subject matter of another appeal being Civil Appeal No. 4406 of 1986.
We are concerned in this appeal with the right of Abdul Khader.
The High Court discussed 18 documents out of which two are challans and other depositions.
Kowlnama executed in favour of Shaik Hussain was not filed.
The Kowlnama executed in favour of the son, Mohd. Abdul Khader, on December 3, 1950 was filed and was marked as Exhibit C 1.
The document recited: "permitted to utilise garden fruits, flowers and mango fruits".
The tenant was permitted to raise flower trees at his own expenses.
The High Court took into consid eration the judgment in Suit No. 13(1) of 195 1 52 by the tenant.
The High Court on consideration of these documents was of the view that these documents showed unequivocally that the tenancy was in favour of Shaik Hussain from 1935.
After his death Mohd. Abdul Khader was recognised as the tenant.
The land was taken possession of under a panchanama dated 12th of September, 1963.
According to the High Court the documents discussed in the judgment indicated that Shaik Hussain was a tenant from 1935.
After his death on July 18, 1949, his son Mohd. Abdul Khader became a tenant.
In this background the Court addressed itself to the question wheth er Abdul Khader was a protected tenant or not entitled to 60% of the compensation.
No document was filed to show that Abdul Khader was declared by the revenue courts as a pro tected tenant.
1240 The High Court was of the view that there was surfeit of evidence prior to the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Act that Shaik Hussain was a tenant of the land.
The question was whether on enforcement of the said Act Abdul Khader, respondent herein, was a protected tenant.
The High Court thereafter discussed the facts mentioned hereinbefore about the order of the District Revenue Officer and the orders of this Court referred to hereinbefore.
The High Court noticed the position that under the said Andhra Pradesh Act it was for the revenue authorities to order whether a tenant is a protected tenant under section 34, section 37 'and section 37A of the said Act.
Section 37A was enacted on 12th of March, 1956.
The High Court was, however, of the view that it cannot be said that it was for the revenue authorities alone to decide the issue because the arbitrator was ordered to decide the issue by the High Court on 19th August, 1974 and by this Court on 30th of January, 1975.
The High Court also referred to the directions of this Court dated 19th August, 1985 mentioned hereinbefore.
The High Court was of the view that the arbitrator was to decide that question and the arbitrator was not in error in deciding the issue in the manner it did.
The Court reiterated that there was surfeit of evidence to declare that Abdul Khader was a tenant.
If he was a tenant, the High Court observed.
he was a protected tenant under section 34 read with section 37 or under sec tion 37 A of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
The High Court on reciting the facts came to the conclusions, inter alia: (a) that Abdul Khader because he was a tenant between January, 1942 to January, 1948 for six years, therefore, was a pro tected tenant under sub clause (ii) of clause (1) of section 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Act; (b) that Abdul Khader held the land from October, 1943 to October, 1949, therefore, was a protected tenant of Sail Gulshan under sub clause (iii) of clause (1) of section 34 of Act 21 of 1950.
In these circum stances, the High Court held that Adbul Khader was entitled to 60% of the compensation paid.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellants being the successor of the owner of the land in question is in appeal before us.
Shri Shanker Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that under the said Andhra Pradesh Act it was mandatory under section 99 read with section 102 of the said Act in conjunction with the definition of section 2(r) of the Act for the revenue authorities to decide wheth er Abdul Khader was a protected tenant or not.
There being no such finding by the revenue officer, on the other hand there being a finding mat Abdul Khader was not a protected tenant by the revenue authorities it was not open to the arbitrator to decide the question of 1241 protected tenancy.
The arbitrator therefore, exceeded his jurisdiction and the High Court was in error.
Shri A.K. Sen, on behalf of the respondents on the other hand contended that the compensation payable in respect of the requisitioning and acquisition must be determined under the Central Act and the arbitrator was the authority to decide that question.
The question of Abdul Khader 's right to compensation had to be decided in accordance with law.
He had claimed rights of a protected tenant.
He had sought to establish his rights which must be found within the fourcor ners of the Andhra Pradesh Act along with other documents because under section 40(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Act the interest of a protected tenant in the land held by him as a protected tenant formed 60%.
The rights of the protected tenants have been defined in the Andhra Pradesh Act and relevant provisions of that Act namely, sections 34, 37, 37A and 40 in conjunction with the definition under section 2(r) have to be taken into consideration in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case.
The two orders of this Court as we have mentioned hereinbefore dated 30th of Janu ary, 1975 and 19th of August.
1985 reiterated the position that it was for the arbitrator to decide the question and he should decide the question in the light of sections 99 and 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act as set out hereinbefore.
On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that there was a complete bar for any civil court to go into the question whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant and as such the arbitrator and the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide this question.
For this reliance was placed on Section 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act which lays down that the Act will not apply to lands leased, granted, alienated or acquired in favour of or by the Central Government or the State Govern ment etc.
and on Section 99 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with any question which is under the Andhra Pradesh Act required to be settled, to be decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Collector.
According to the appellant inasmuch as whether Abdul Khader was a protected tenant had not to be settled by the Collector or the Tribunal, the arbitrator and the High Court were in error in going to that question.
We are unable to accept this submission.
By the scheme of the Central Act compensation was payable to persons who had interest in the land acquired.
Who are the persons who have interest in the land had to be decided in accordance with the law and the evidence.
Determination by the revenue authorities and non determination is not conclusive or decisive.
It is clear that section 102 of the Andhra 1242 Pradesh Act mentions that after acquisition the Act was not to apply in respect of certain land.
Therefore, it was submitted by the respondents that section 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
which made the determination by the Tahsildar to be final and debarred other courts from going into the question did not apply in case of compensation payable.
In the background of the totality of circumstances as manifest in the different orders it appeared to the arbitrator and the Court that the entry which was made in favour of Abdul Khader as the protected tenant was of doubtful validity.
We are of the opinion that the High Court was not in error in so holding.
It was the observation of the revenue authori ties that it was spurious.
That in any event what was the interest of Abdul Khader had to be determined in determining the question of payment of compensation to him and in so determining the facts and circumstances and the proceedings before the revenue authorities and entries and subsequent deletions had to be taken into consideration by the arbitra tor.
The arbitrator has done so.
He had jurisdiction to do so.
The High Court has so held.
This Court by the two orders referred to hereinbefore had also affirmed this position.
In that view of the matter we are unable to accept the challenge to the award.
Furthermore, under section 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Act the bar was not against the arbitrator but against a civil court.
In determining the amount of compensation payable to Abdul Khader under the Central Act, his interests in the property had to be determined.
In another context, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh enunciated the position that it was necessary to determine the interest of the persons claiming compensation.
Reference may be made to the decision in the case of Archi Appalareddi and another vs Special Tahsildar, land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam Municipality and mother, [1979] Andhra Weekly Reporter, Vol.
1 p. 101, where the Court observed in the context of the Land Acquisition Act that a tenant was a 'person inter ested ' as defined in clause (b) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act.
He has a right to object to the acquisition and/or the quantum of compensation.
The Land Acquisition Officer or the Court, as the case may be, had to ascertain the value of a claimant 's right in the property acquired and compensate him in that behalf.
We may mention that in the two orders of this Court dated 30th of January, 1975 and 19th of August, 1985 referred to here inbefore, this Court had left it open to the High Court and to the arbitrator to decide whether he is a protected tenant or not.
the arbitrator has decided that question and the High Court found 1243 over wheiming evidence in support of it.
In that view of the matter we must uphold that decision however unsatisfactory it might appear that a fruit plucker gets 60% of the compen sation while the owners get only If that is the law let it be.
In the aforesaid view of the matter this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
Section 8(1)(b) of the provides for appointment of an arbitrator by the Central Government in a case where there is no agreement for determining compensation.
Sub section (4) of section 40 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telanga na Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 stipulates the interest of a protected tenant in the land at sixty per cent.
The expression 'protected tenant ' is defined in section 2(r) to mean a person who is deemed to be a protected tenant under the provisions of the Act.
One of the conditions to be fulfilled by such a person under section 34(1)(a), sub cls.
(ii) and (iii) is that he should have held the land as tenant continuously for a period of six years immediately preceding the 1st day of January, 1948 or for a period of six years commencing not earlier than 6th October, 1943 and completed before the commencement of the Act.
Section 35 makes the decision of the Revenue Authorities on the question conclu sive.
Section 37 mentions other persons not entitled under section 34 to be deemed to be protected tenants.
Section 37A enables persons holding lands as tenants at the commencement of the Act to be deemed to be protected tenants.
Section 99 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and section 102 exempts lands leased, granted, alienated or acquired in favour of or by the Central Government.
Certain lands settled in favour of the appellant by his grandfather were requisitioned in 1963 by the Military Estate Officer, Secunderabad.
Respondent claimed rights as a tenant of the said land.
1230 His claim was settled by sharing of the rent.
The property was acquired under the Central Act subsequently in 1970.
The entry in the Protected Tenancy Register prepared under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act in favour of the respondent was cancelled by the Tahsildar in 1970 suspecting it not to be genuine.
That order was challenged by the respondent in a writ petition before the High Court which held that whether the petitioner was a protected tenant or whether he had any prima facie interest in the suit property were matters entirely within the sole jurisdiction of the arbitrator who was to be appointed under section 8 of the Central Act.
The District Revenue Officer in the proceedings before him held that entry in the Protected Tenancy Register was a spurious one as it was not supported by an inquiry.
This order was upheld by the High Court in revision filed by the respondent, In its order dated 30th January, 1975 in tile special leave petition this Court left it open to the High Court and the arbitrator to decide the question whether the respondent was a protected tenant or not.
The arbitrator after exhaustively discussing the evi dence on record held that the respondent was a protected tenant and as such he was entitled to sixty per cent of the compensation money payable.
In the statutory appeal of the appellant before the High Court an application filed by the respondent for adducing additional evidence was allowed and a Commissioner appointed.
Disposing of the appeal against the aforesaid order this Court in its order dated 19th August, 1985 reiterated its earlier view that the High Court should determine this issue.
The HIgh Court took the view that the arbitrator was not in error in deciding the issue in the manner it did, that there was surfeit of evidence to conclude that the respond ent was a protected tenant under section 34 read with section 37 or under section 37A of the Andhra Pradesh Act and, therefore, he was entitled to sixty per cent of the compensation payable.
In this Appeal by Special Leave, it was contended for the appellant that it was mandatory under section 99 read with section 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act for the Revenue Authorities to decide whether a person was a protected tenant or not and the Revenue Authorities having found that he was not a protected tenant, it was not open to the arbitrator to decide the question of protected tenancy.
On behalf of the respondent it 1231 was contended that the compensation payable must be deter mined under the Central Act and the arbitrator was the authority to decide that question.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: The challenge to the award is rejected.
The re spondent was a 'protected tenant ' under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
He was, therefore, entitled to get sixty per cent of the compensation amount.
[l242D, H; 1243A] Under section 99 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, which makes the determination by the Tahsildar to be final, the bar of jurisdiction is not against the arbitrator appointed under section 8 of the but against a civil court.
In determining the amount of compensation payable to a person under the Central Act his interest in the property had to be deter mined.
[1242DE] Atchi Appalareddi and another vs Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam Municipality and another, (1979 Andhra Weekly Reporter, Vol.
1 p. 101), referred to.
By the scheme of the Central Act compensation was pay able to persons who had interest in the land acquired.
Who were those persons had to be decided in accordance with law and the evidence.
Determination by the revenue authorities and non determination was not conclusive or decisive.
Sec tion 102 of the Andhra Pradesh Act lays down that after acquisition of the lands by the Central Government the Act was not to apply in respect of such lands.
Section 99 of that Act, therefore, had no application.
[124 1 G 1242B] In its two orders dated 30th January, 1975 and 19th August, 1985 this Court had left it open to the High Court and to the arbitrator to decide whether the respondent was a protected tenant or not.
What was the interest of the re spondent in the land acquired had to be determined in deter mining the question of payment of compensation to him and in so determining the facts and circumstances and proceedings before the revenue authorities and entries and subsequent deletions had to be taken into consideration by the arbitra tor.
The arbitrator had done so and held that the respondent was a protected tenant and as such entitled to sixty per cent of money payable for the acquisition of land.
He had jurisdiction to do so.
The High Court found overwhelming evidence in support of this view.
It discussed 18 documents and concluded (a) 1232 that because the respondent was a tenant of the said land between January 1942 to January 1948 for six years he was a protected tenant under sub cl.
(ii) of cl.(a) of sub section
(1) of section 34 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, and (b) that because he held the land from October 1943 to October 1949 he was a protected tenant under sub cl.
(iii) and held that he was entitled to sixty per cent of the compensation.
This view has to be upheld however unsatisfactory it might appear that a fruit plucker gets sixty per cent of the compensation while the owners get only forty per cent.
If that is the law let it be. ]1242G, C; 1239AB; 1242H 1243A; 1239DE; 1240EF; 1243A]


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 363 l of 1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 11.12.1986 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 1943 of 1986.
AND Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4321 of 1987.
From the Judgment and order dated 5.3.1987 of the Delhi High Court in R.A. No. 8 of 1987 in W.P. No. 2013 of 1986 B.R.L. Iyenger, Mrs. Lalitha Kaushik and Naresh Kaushik for the Petitioner.
V.B. Saharya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J.
In both these matters, notice was given to the respondent on a limited point: whether the Lt. Governor of Delhi to competent is issue a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
1894 ( 'the 1894 Act '), to acquire hand "for the planned development of Delhi".
That is the ground on which, inter alia, the petitioners unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court the validity of a notification dated 27.1.1984 issued by the Lt. Governor of Delhi (as the Head of the Delhi Administration) for the acquisition of about 3550 hectares of land situated in Delhi.
We have, therefore, heard counsel on this limited question.
Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, insofar as it is relevant, reads as follows: "4(1)Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette 763 Section 3(ee) of the same Act defines "appropriate Government" A as follows: "In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context (ee) the expression "appropriate Government" means, in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government.
A reference should also be made, in this context, to notifications issued under Article 23(1) of the Constitution of India by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India on 19.8.1954, 1.11.1956 and 7.9.1966.
The cumulative effect of these notifications is that the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi is entitled to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Central Government under the provisions of the 1894 Act within the Union Territory of Delhi.
There is no doubt, considering the provisions of the 1894 Act and the above notifications, that the Lt. Governor of Delhi was fully competent to issue the notification dated 27.1.1984.
The argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners, however, is that, after the enactment of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (the 1957 Act '), the provisions of the 1894 Act are no longer relevant in the present context.
It is submitted that the expression "planned development of Delhi" can and does envisage the development of Delhi only in accordance with the provisions of the Master Plan and the Zonal Plans drawn up under the 1957 Act.
Under the said Act, the full responsibility of drawing up plans for the development of Delhi as well as executing the same in several phases is vested in the Central Government.
Sec. 15 of the Act, makes it clear that this takes in also the acquisition of Lands for such planned development.
It reads: "section 15 Compulsory acquisition of land (1) If in the opinion of the Central Government, any land is required for the purpose of development, or for any other purpose, under this Act, the Central Government may acquire such land 764 under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
(1 of 1894).
(2) Where any land has been acquired by the Central Government, that Government may, after it has taken possession of the land, transfer the land to the Authority or any local authority for the purpose for which the land has been acquired on payment by the Authority or the local authority of the compensation awarded under that Act and of the charges incurred by the Government in connection with the acquisition.
" It is argued that while the notifications under Article 239 of the Constitution may have delegated the power of acquisition under the second part of section 15(1) to the Lt. Governor, they do not affect the Central Government 's jurisdiction under the first part to take a decision that certain lands are needed for the purposes of the Act.
The argument that land acquisition in Delhi for planned development is the 'business ' of the Central Government is sought to be reinforced by reference to the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, made by the President under Article 77(3) of the Constitution of India.
These rules enumerate the following items as falling within the purview of the Ministry of Works & Housing in the Union Government: 16.
Schemes of large scale acquisition, development and disposal of land in Delhi.
Delhi Development Authority.
Master Plan of Delhi, Co ordination of work in respect of the Master Plan and slum clearance in the Union Territory of Delhi.
Administration of the Delhi Development Act, 1957.
All this shows, according to the learned counsel, that the Lt. Governor has no jurisdiction or competence to issue the impugned notification.
There is ex facie, a very plausible reply to the petitioner 's arguments based on section 15 of the 1957 Act.
It is this: that the expression "Central Government" in section 15 of the 1957 Act has to be understood in 765 the light of the definition contained in section 3(8) of the .
That definition reads: "3.
In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, XX XX XX (8) 'Central Government ' shall (a) . . . (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include (i) in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause; (iii)in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the administration thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution.
" It, therefore, follows, it can be said that, even under this provision, the jurisdiction to acquire lands rests only in the Lt. Governor of Delhi.
Anticipating this reply counsel for petitioners urges that the definition in the is inapplicable in the context of the Delhi Development Act.
It is said that throughout this Act there runs a clear demarcation between the Central Government on the one hand and the Administrator of the Union Territory on the other.
Reference is made to section 30, 41 and 52 of the 1957 Act and it is urged, in the light of these provisions, that the reference to the Central Government in section 15 should be construed as a reference only to the Central Government and not to the Administrator (i.e. Lt. Governor) of the Union Territory.
766 A counter affidavit had been filed on behalf of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) which contained an annexure which would have provided a direct answer to the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners.
This answer is a notification dated 14.2.69, issued by the Central Government under section 52(2) of the 1957 Act.
By this notification, the Central Government directs that the powers of that Government under the provisions of the 1957 Act mentioned in the Schedule thereto annexed would, subject to the control of the Central Government and until further orders, also be exercised by the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi.
11 items are mentioned in the Schedule.
Of these, the powers in regard to item 2 of the Schedule alone have to be exercised by the Administrator with the prior approval of the Central Government.
The others, which include powers in regard to section 15(item 6) can be exercised by the Administrator even without such prior approval.
This notification places it beyond doubt that the powers of the Central Government under section 15 can be exercised by the Lt. Governor of Delhi.
Both the power to form an opinion under the first part of section 15(1) and the power of acquisition under the second part are comprehended by this notification.
This notification, therefore, would have furnished a complete answer to the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners.
Unfortunately, it appears, the notification was only at the draft stage and was never gazetted.
We have, therefore, to leave this notification out of account.
But, even otherwise, we are of the opinion that Lt. Governor was quite competent to issue the notification in question.
It is no doubt true that the 1957 Act makes separate mention of the Central Government and the Administrator and demarcates some functions between the Central Government on the one hand and the State Government or the Administrator on the other.
But, whatever may be the position in regard to other provisions, there can be no doubt that, in the con text of section 15, it would not be correct to understand these two expressions in different senses.
We say this because on reading of section 15(1) it is the obvious intention of the Legislature that the same authority should exercise its functions under both the parts of the sub section.
If the sub section is read in the manner in which the petitioners seek to read it, the working of the section would become impracticable and cumbersome.
According to them, the Central Government will first to have form an opinion that certain lands are required for the purposes of planned development of Delhi under the Act; thereafter this opinion has to be communicated to the Lt. Governor who, in view of the delegation of powers under Article 239 of the Constitution which we have referred to earlier, will have to apply his 767 mind once again to the same question before he can issue a notification under section 4 of the 1894 Act.
This is a duplication of functions which could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature.
The provision requires the satisfaction of only one authority and since the powers of the Central Government under the 1894 Act have been delegated to the Lt. Governor, the expression 'Central Government ' will have to be understood in the same sense for the first part of the sub section as well.
The Allocation of Business Rules relied on by counsel, have no relevance in this context.
They only provide that, when any of the items mentioned (such as DDA, master plan, the 1957 Act, or acquisition etc.
Of properties in Delhi) comes up for the consideration of the Central Government, it will have to be dealt within the Ministry of Works & Housing.
They are quite consistent with the position that even the powers delegated to the Lt. Governor are exercisable by him only subject to the control and further orders of the President.
They cannot be understood as negativing the competence of the Lt. Governor to deal with the subject matter in question.
Even assuming that the petitioners are right in their interpretation of section 15(1), the competence of the Lt. Governor to issue the impugned notification can be upheld on another ground.
The provisions of the 1894 Act clearly empower the Lt. Governor to acquire the lands for the planned development of Delhi, which, it is now settled law, is clearly a public purpose.
That competence cannot be denied without some express provision in some statute.
Both the 1894 Act and 1957 Act are Central enactments.
Granting that the 1957 Act desired to empower the Central Government to acquire lands in Delhi for the purposes of the said Act and even granting that such power has to be exercised through the Lt. Governor because of the notification under Article 239(1), such power can also stand size by side with the wider power of the Lt. Governor to acquire lands for a public purpose.
There is nothing in the 1957 Act which prohibits the Lt. Governor taking such steps as he desires, under the powers available to him, to carry out the planned development of Delhi in consonance with the plans approved or finalised under the 1957 Act.
Viewed in this light, the powers of the Lt. Governor under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act can be read as additional to the powers of the Central Government under the Delhi Development Act.
The 1957 Act does not destroy but only supplements the 1894 Act.
This is the view taken by the High Court and we agree with it.
Both counsel referred to certain decisions.
We do not think it is necessary to refer to them in detail except to say that the decision in H 768 the Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, [1985] Supplement 3 SCR 382 relied upon for the petitioner is clearly distinguishable and it related to a case regarding the powers of the Delhi Administration in regard to lands belonging to the Union.
For the reasons discussed above, we reject the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.
The Special Leave Petitions fail and are dismissed.
We, however, make no order as to costs.
S.L. Petitions dismissed.

summary:
The petitioners challenged before the High Court the validity of a notification issued by the Lt. Governor of Delhi for the acquisition of lands in Delhi for "planned development of Delhi".
The High Court decided against the petitioners.
The petitioners moved this court by special leave.
Notice was issued by the Court to the respondents on a limited point whether the Lt. Governor is competent to issue a notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the acquisition of the lands for the "planned development of Delhi.
" Dismissing the petitions for special leave, the Court, HELD: Considering the notifications dated 19.8.1954, 1.11.56 and 7 9 66 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India under Article 239 (1) of the Constitution of India, the Lt. Governor of Delhi is entitled to exercise the powers of the Central Government in Delhi under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and he was competent to issue the notification impugned.
The argument that after the enactment of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are no longer relevant in the present context and the Lt. Governor has no jurisdiction or competence to issue the notification in question, is not right.
It is no doubt true that the Delhi Development Act makes a separate mention of the Central Government and the Administrator of the Union Territory and demarcates some functions between the Central Government and the Administrator, but there can be no doubt that in the context of section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, it would not be correct to understand these two expressions in different senses.
The Delhi Development Act does not 762 destroy but only supplements the Land Acquisition Act.
[763D F; 767G] Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
[1985] Supp. 3 SCR 382, referred to.