judgement:
Appeals Nos. 333 334 of 1962.
Appeals by special leave from the preliminary order dated June 3, 1961 and Order dated September 29, '1961 of the Second Labour Court, Bombay in Applications (I.D.A.) Nos.
447 to 462 of 1958.
R.J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
section V. Gupte, Additional Solicitor General of India, K. T. Sule, M. C. Bhandare, M. Rajagopalas and K. B. Chaudhuri, for the respondents.
May 9.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR.J.
These 16 appeals arise out of petitions filed by the 16 respondents who arc the employees of the appellant, the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act).
These respondents are the District Siphon Pumpers and Heat Appliances Repairers Inspectors, and in their applications made before the Second Labour Court, Bombay, they alleged that as a result of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal in reference (I. T.) No. 54 of 1949 published in the Bombay Government Gazette on May 11, 1950, they were entitled to a certain benefit 712 and they moved the Labour Court to compute that benefit in terms of money and to direct the appellant to pay the same to them.
The direction in the earlier award on which this claim was based was made in these terms "The demand in respect of the workers of the Mains, Services and District Fittings Departments and Lamp Repairers and others who were till 1948 required to work on Sundays and in respect of whom a weekly day off was enforced thereafter without any corresponding increase in wages is granted.
In respect of the rest, the demand is rejected.
This demand was resisted by the appellant on several preliminary grounds which formed the subject matter of several preliminery issues framed by the Labour Court.
The principal contentions raised by the appellant by way of preliminary objections were.
that the applications made by the respondents were not maintainable under section 33C (2) of the Act and that the said applications were barred by res judicata by reason of awards made in other proceedings between the same parties.
It was also urged by the appellant that if the claim made by the respondents was held to be justified by the direction of the award on which the respondents relied, then the said direction was given by the earlier Tribunal without jurisdiction and as such, was incapable of enforcement.
On the construction, the appellant urged that the said direction did not cover the cases of the respondents, and it was argued that even if the said direction was held to be valid and it was also held that it gave the respondents the right to make the present claim, the conditions precedent prescribed by the said direction had not been satisfied by any of the respondents, and so, on the merits, their claim could not be sustained.
713 The Labour Court took up for trial 10 prcliminary issues in the first instance and by its judgment delivered on June 3, 1961, it rejected all the preliminary pleas raised by the appellant.
In other words, the preliminary issues framed by the Labour Court were found in favour of the respondents.
Thereafter, the applications were set down for hearing on the merits and evidence was led by both the parties in support of their respective claims.
On considering the evidence, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the respondents had established their claims, and so, it has directed the appellant to pay to the respondents the respective amounts specified against their names in the award.
The plea raised by the appellant that the whole of the: claim made by the respondents should not be allowed on the ground of belatedness and laches, was, according to, the Labour Court, not sustainable under section 33C (2).
That is why the Labour Court computed the benefits claimed by the respondents in terms of money from the date when the earlier award became enforceable until the date of the present applications filed before it.
The appellant has come to this Court by special leave against the preliminary decision and the final order passed by the Labour Court in favour of the respondents.
Before dealing with the points raised in the present appeals by the appellant, it is necessary to set out briefly the terms of the earlier award on which the respondents ' claims are based.
In the previous industrial dispute, the employees of the appellant had made several demands.
In the present case, we are concerned with demand No. 11.
This demand was made in these terms "(a) Workers should get a paid weekly off.
(b) Weorkers of Mains, Services and District Fitting Departments and Lamp Repairers, 714 who have been adversely affected in the matter of their earnings on account of closing down of the overtime and Sunday Work, should be compensated for the loss suffered by them; compensation being the amount lost by them since the scheme was introduced.
" The Tribunal which dealt with this demand observed that demand No. 11 (a) had been badly worded.
There was, however, no doubt that what the employees claimed against the appellant was, in substance, a demand for paid weekly off only for those workers who were actually getting a weekly off, though without pay.
In dealing with this demand, the Tribunal noticed the fact that all the monthly paid staff employed by by the appellant got a paid weekly off,and so,it thought that there was no reason to dicriminate between the said staff and the daily rated workers.
In regard to the daily rated workers usually, their mothly income would be determined on the basis of a month consisting of 26 working days.
From the Statement of claim 'filed by the Union before the Tribunal, it appeared that prior to 1946, most of the workers used to work for all the seven days of the week.
By about August, 1946, however, weekly offs were enforced upon the major section of the workmen.
In June 1946, the appellant and the Union had entered into an agreement as regards wage scales of various categories of workers, and the Tribunal assumed that in respect of most of the daily rated workers, the wages must have been fixed on the basis of what their monthly income would be for 26 working days.
It is in the light of this.
background that the Tribunal proceeded to examine demand No. 11 (a).
The Tribunal noticed that in the case of the four categories of workers specified in demand No. 11 (b), difference had to be made because it could not be said in their case that their daily rates of 715 wages were fixed with reference to a month of 26 working days.
The result was that with the introduction of the weekly off, the wages of those workers were reduced.
Naturally, the Tribunal observed that in such a case, the concession of a weekly off would be a very doubtful benefit if as a result, the monthly income of the workers was to go down.
That is why the Tribunal gave the direction on which the respondents ' present claim is based.
This direction we have already quoted at the beginning of the judgment.
Having thus dealt with demand No. 11 (a), the Tribunal proceeded to examine, demand No, 11 (b), and it ordered that the workers of Mains, Services and District Fittings Departments and Lamp Repairers who had been adversely affected in the matter of their earnings on account of closing down of Sunday work, should be compensated for the loss suffered by them, by payment of their wages and dearness allowance for the weekly off given to them from June 1, 1949 onwards till the date of the publication of the award.
The question about the scope and effect of the provisions of section 33C (2) of the Act and the extent of the jurisdiction conferred on the Labour Court by it have been recently considered by us in the case of The Central Bank of India Ltd. vs P. section RajagopaIan (1).
That decision shows that the applications made by ' the respondents were competent and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to deal with the question as to the computation of the benefit conferred on the respondents in terms of money.
Mr. Kolah for the appellant contends that though the applications made by the respondents may be competent and the claim made by them may be examined under section 33C (2), it would, nevertheless, be open to the appellant to contend that the award on which the said claim is based is without jurisdiction and if he succeeds in (1) , 716 establishing his plea, the Labour Court would be justified in refusing to give effect to the said Award.
In our opinion, this contention is well founded.
The proceedings contemplated by section 330 (2) are, in many cases, analogous to execution proceedings, and the labour Court which is called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial employee is, in such cases, in the position of an executing court; like the executing court in execution proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure the Labour Court under section 33C (2) would be competent to interpret the award on which the claim is based, and it would also be open to it to consider the plea that the award sought to be enforced is a nullity.
There is no doubt that if a decree put in execution is shown to be a nullity the executing court can refuse to execute it.
The same principle would apply to proceedings taken under s 33C (2) and the jurisdiction of the labour court before which the said proceedings are commenced.
Industrial Tribunals which deal with industrial disputes referred to them under section 10 (1) (d) of the Act are, in a sense, Tribunals with limited jurisdiction.
They are entitled to deal the disputes referred to them, but they cannot I outside the terms of reference and deal with matters not included in the reference, subject, of course, to incidental matters which fall within their jurisdiction.
Therefore, on principle, Mr. Kolah is right when he contends that the Labour Court would have been justified in refusing to implement the award, if it was satisfied that the direction in the award on which the respondents ' claim is based is without jurisdiction.
That takes us to the question about the merits of the plea raised.
by Mr. Kolah.
Mr. Kolah contends that the direction in question on which the respondent 's claim is based, is invalid for the reason that the Tribunal travelled outside the terms of reference when it added the words " 'and others" in the 717 said direction.
His argument is that the said direction has really been issued under demand No. 11 (b) and since the said demand was confined to the four categories of workmen specified in it, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to extend the relief to any workers outside the said four categories by adding the words " and others".
Thus presented, the argument is no doubt attractive, but on a careful examination of the scheme of the award in so far as it relates to demand No. 11, it would be clear that the impugned direction has relation not to demand No. 11 (6), but to demand No. 11(a), and it is obvious that demand referred to all workers and was not confine to any specified categories of workers.
It is true that in dealing with the said demand, the Tribunal prominently referred to the four categories of employees specified in demand No. 11 (b), but that is not to say that it was confining the said demand to the said four categories.
The said four categories were mentioned specifically because they clearly brought out the cases of workmen to whom relief was due under demand No. 11 (a).
Having thus dealt with the said four categories by name, the Tribunal thought it necessary, and we think, rightly, to add the words "and others", because if there were other workmen who were till 1948 required to work on Sundays and in respect of whom a weekly day off was introduced thereafter without any corresponding increase in their wages, there was no reason why they should not have been given the benefit which was given to the workmen of the four categories specifically discussed.
it is significant that having thus comprehensively described the workmen who were entitled to the said benefit, the Tribunal has added that in respect of the remaining workmen, demand No. 11 (a) was rejected.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the relief granted by the Tribunal in paragraph 115 of its award has reference.
to demand No. 11 (a) and the use of the words "and others" is not only not outside the terms of reference, but is quite appropriate and justified.
718 That being so, it is difficult to sustain the plea that the impugned direction was without jurisdiction.
Mr. Kolah no doubt relied on the fact that the present respondents never thought that they were entiteld to the benefit conferred by the impugned direction and in support of this plea, he referred us to the fact that in ' 1952, a demand was made on their behalf for a similar benefit.
If the respondents had felt that the benefit conferred by the impugned direction was available to them, it is very unlikely says Mr. Kolah, that they would have made the same demand in 1952 on the basis that it had not been granted to them by the earlier award.
It does appear that this demand was made on behalf of the respondents and the Government of Bombay took the view that the said demand had already been considered by the Tribunal and that it was too late to reopen it in regard to other categories of employees; that is why the Government refused to make a reference.
In our opinion, this fact cannot materially assist Mr. Kolah, because on a fair and reasonable construction of the material direction in the award, we are satisfied that the said clause applies to all workers of the appellant who satisfy the test prescribed by it.
If the respondents did not understand the true scope and effect of the said clause, that cannot affect the construction of the clause.
Therefore, we do not think that the failure of the respondents to take advantage of the said clause soon after the earlier award was pronounced can have any bearing on the construction of the clause.
Then, Mr. Kolah has suggested that on the merits the respondents are not entitled to make the claim, because, it is not shown by them that they were required to work on all Sundays in the relevant years.
He argues that the test prescribed by the direction is that the benefit should be available to 719 workmen who were, till 1948, required to work on Sundays and that, it is suggested, must mean "who were required to work on all Sundays in the year".
This argument has been examined by the Labour Court and it has found that the respondents were required to work on Sundays before 1948, though they might not have attended on all Sundays.
In support of this finding, the Labour Court has referred to Ext.
32 and has drawn the inference from the said document that the workers in the Syphon Department were required to work on all Sundays before September, 1948, and it has added that the fact that they did not work on some Sundays may be attributed to some casual circumstances, such as the workers having voluntarily remained absent, or there not being sufficient work for all, some might have been sent home.
Mr. Kolah has invited our attention to the chart (Ext. 32) and has shown that in some cases, the employees were not required to work even half the number of Sundays during that year.
In our opinion, this argument proceeds on a misconstruction of the relevant clause in the award.
The said clause does not provide that before getting the benefit in question, the workers must show that they actually worked on all Sundays in the year.
The test which has to be satisfied by the workers is that they could have been required to work on Sundays in that year.
In other words, what the Tribunal decided was that if there were workers employed by the appellant whom the appellant could require to work on Sundays during the relevant year, they would be entitled to the benefit.
In other words, the test is : did the terms and conditions of service impose an obligation on the workers to attend duties on Sundays if called upon to do so? That is very different from saying that the benefit would be available only if the workers in question worked on all Sundays.
Therefore, we do not think there is any substance in the argument that since the respondents had not been actually required to work on all Sundays in the 720 relevant year, they were not entitled to the benefit of the relevant clause in the award.
That leaves one more question to be considered.
Mr. Kolah has strenuously argued that the Labour Court should not have allowed the claim of the respondents for such a long period when they made the present applications nearly 8 years after the award was pronounced.
It is true that the earlier award was pronounced on May 11, 1950 and the present applications were made in 1958.
In support of his argument that the delay made by the respondents should be taken into account, Mr. Kolah has referred to the fact that under the Payment of Wages Act (No. 4 of 1936) a claim for wages has to be made within six months from the date on which the cause of action accrues to the employees.
In the State of Maharashtra, by local modification, this period is prescribed as one year.
The argument is that the present claim made by the respondents under section 33 C(2) is a claim for wages within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act.
If the respondents had made such a claim before the authority under the said Act, they could not have got relief for more than a year.
It would be anomalous, says Mr. Kolah.
that by merely changing the forum, the respondents should be permitted to make a claim for as many as 8.
years under section 33C (2).
In this connection, Mr. Kolah also contends that by virtue of section 22 of the Payment of wages Act, a claim for wages cannot be made by an industrial employee in a civil court after a lapse of one year, because though the period for such a., suit may be 3 years under article 102, a civil suit is barred by section 22.
The jurisdiction conferred on the payment authority is exclusive and so far as the said Act goes, all claims must be made within one year.
Prima facie, there is some force in this argument.
It does appear to be somewhat anomalous that a claim which would be rejected as barred by 721 time if made under the Payment of Wages Act., should be entertained under section 33C (2) of the Act; but does this apparent anomaly justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in proceedings under section 33C (2)? Mr. Kolah suggests that it would be open to this Court to treat leaches on the part of the employees as a relevant factor even in dealing with case under section 33C (2) and he has relied one fact that this Court has on several occasions discouraged belated claims in the matter of bonus.
in appreciating the validity of this I argument, we do not propose to consider whether the jurisdiction conferred on the authority under the Payment of Wages Act is exclusive in the sense that a claim for wages cannot be made by an industrial employee in a civil court within 3 years as permitted by article 102; that is a question which may have to be decided on the merits when it directly arises.
For the purpose of the present appeal, the only point which we have to consider is : does the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the payment of Wages Act.
Justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings taken under section 33C (2) of the Act ? In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that though the legislature knew how the problem of recovery of wages had been tackled by the Payment of Wages Act and how limitation had been prescribed in that behalf, it has omitted to make any provision for limitation in enacting section 33C (2).
The failure of the legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot, in our opinion, be deemed to be an accidental omission.
In the circumstances, it would be legitimate to infer that legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under section 33C (2).
It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of section 330 (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction 722 of limitation in respect of claims which they may have to make under the said provision.
Besides, even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution within 12 years, provided, of course, it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of execution from time to time as required by article 182 of the Limitation Act, so that the test of one year or six months ' limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims.
It seems to us that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice.
The words of section 33C (2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without any considerations of limitation.
Mr. Kolah no doubt emphasised the fact that such belated claims made on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience to the employer, but that is a consideration which the legislature may take into account, and if the legislature feels thatch play and justice require that some limitations be prescribed, it 'may proceed to do so.
In the absence of any provision,however, the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under section 33C (2).
Mr. Kolah then attempted to suggest that article 181 in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act may apply to the present applications, and a period of 3 years ' limitation should, therefore, be held to govern them.
Article 181 provides 3 years ' limitation for applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in Schedule 1, or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the said period starts when the right to apply accrues.
In our opion, this argument is one of desperation.
It is well settled 723 that article 181 applies only to applications which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and so, its extension to applications made under section 33C (2) of the Act would not be justified.
As early as 1880, the Bombay High Court had held in Rai Manekbai vs Manekji Kavasji (1), that article 181 only relates to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure in which case no period of limitation has been prescribed for the application, and the consensus of judicial opinion on this point had been noticed by the Privy Council in Hansraj Gupta vs Official Liquidator8, Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company Ltd. (2) An attempt was no doubt made in the case of Sha Vulchand & Co. Ltd. vs Jawahar Mills Ltd. (3), to suggest that the amendment of articles 158 and 178 ipso facto altered the meaning which had been attached to the words in article 181 by judicial decisions, but this attempt failed, because this Court held " 'that the long catenate of decisions under article 181 may well be said to have, as it were, added the words "under the Code" in the first column of that Article.
" Therefore it is not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by article 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications under section 33C (2) of the Act.
It is true that in dealing with claims like bonus, industrial adjudication has generally discouraged laches and delay, but claims like bonus must be distinguished from claims made under section 33C (2).
A claim for bonus, for instance, is entertained on grounds of social justice and is not based on any statutory provision.
In such a case,, it would, no doubt, be open to industrial adjudication to have regard to all the relevant considerations before awarding the claim and in doing so, if it appears that a claim for bonus was made after long lapse of time, industrial adjudication may refuse to entertain the claim, or Government nay refuse to make reference in that behalf.
But these considerations would (1)[1880] I.L R. (2) [1932] L.R. 60 I.A. 13, 20.
(3) ; , 371 , 724 be irrelevant when claims are made under section 33C (2), where these claims are, as in the present case, based on an award and are intended 'merely to execute the award.
In such a case, limitation cannot be introduced by industrial adjudication on academic ground of social justice.
It can be introduced, if at all, by the legislature.
Therefore, we think, that the Labour Court was right in rejecting the appellant 's contention that since the present claim was belated, it should not be awarded.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.
Appeals dismissed.

summary:
Petitions were filed by sixteen respondents under section 33C(2) of the , claiming certain benefits under an award made by an Industrial Tribunal.
The prayer was to compute the benefits in terms of money and direct the appellant to pay the same to them.
Many objections were raised by the appellant but these were rejected by the Labour Court which accepted the claim of the respondents and directed the appellant to pay to the respondents the respective amounts specified against their names in the award.
The appellant came to this Court by special leave.
The contentions raised by the appellant before this Court were that the award, on which the claim was based, was without jurisdiction and hence the Labour Court should have refused to implement it; that in order to get benefit, the workers must show that they actually worked on all Sundays in the year before September, 1948; and that as the claims of the respondents were belated, those should not have been awarded.
Held that the Labour Court would have been justified In refusing to implement the award if it was satisfied that the 710 direction in the award on which the respondents ' claim was based, was without jurisdiction, but as that was not actually so, the impugned direction was according to law.
The applications made by respondents were competent and the Labour Court had jurisdiction to deal with the question as to the computation of the benefit conferred on the respon dents in terms of money.
The proceedings contemplated by section 330 (2) were, in many cases, analogous to execution proceed ings and the Labour Court which was called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by an industrial employee, was in the position of an executing court and was competent to interpret the award on which the claim was based and also consider the plea that the award, sought to be enforced, was a nullity.
Held also, that there was no substance in the argument that since the respondents had not been actually required to work on all Sundays in the relevant year, they were not entitled to the benefit given in the award.
The test which had to be satisfied by the workers was that they could have been required to work on Sundays in that year and not that they actually so worked.
Held also, that the legislature has not made any provision for limitation for applications under section 33C (2) and it was not open to the Courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice, The words of section 33 C (2) were plain and unambiguous and it was the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provisions without any considerations of limitation.
The employees who are entitled to take the benefit of section 33C (2) may not always be conscious of their right and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claims which they may have to make under the said provision.
There was no justification for applying the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and article 181 of the Limitation Act to the proceeding under section 33C (2).
Claims like bonus arc distinguishable from claims made under section 33C (2).
A claim for bonus is entertained on grounds of social justice and is not based on any statutory provision and in such a case, it is open to industrial adjudication to have regard to all the relevant considerations before awarding the claim and in doing so if it appears that a claim for bonus was made after long lapse of time, industrial adjudication may refuse to entertain the claim or Government may refuse to make the reference in that , behalf.
711 However, those considerations are irrelevant when claims we made under section 330 (2).
In such cases limitation cannot be introduced by industrial adjudication on academic grounds of social justice.
Central Bank of India Ltd. vs P. section Rajagopalan, [1964] Vol.
3 S.C.R. 140; Rai Manekbai vs Manekji Kavasji, (1883) 7 Bom.
213; Hansral Gupta vs Official Liquidators, Dehra Dun Musoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., (1932) L.R. 60 I.A. 13 and Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd. vs Jawahar Millar Ltd. ; , referred to.


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 44 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 16, 1960 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 1958.
D.N. Mukherjee, for the appellant, 981 B. K. Bhattacharya, and Sukumar Ghose, for the respondent No. 1.
P. K. Chatterjee and P. K. Bose, for the respondent No. 2. 1963.
May 10.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J.
This appeal by special leave is against a decision of the Calcutta High Court.
The appellant was examined as a witness for the prosecution in the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, in a case instituted by one Mayadas Khanna against the respondent.
Chamanlal Mehra and two other persons under sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
That case ended in the acquittal of the accused persons on May 10, 1957.
On June 28, 1957 an application was made in the Magistrate 's court under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that this appellant and some of the other witnesses, including Mayadas Khanna, examined for the prosecution in that case had "given false evidence and/or have fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in proceedings before the Court and have used false and or fabricated evidence as genuine and/or have forged document and/or have used as genuine forged document and each of the accused has abetted others in commission of these offences, and praying that after the necessary enquiry a complaint be made to the Chief Presidency Magistrate against them for the offences committed by these acts.
It appears that the learned Magistrate Mr. jahangir Kabir who had disposed of the criminal case against Chamanlal Mehra was no longer available and the application under section 476 was transferred by the Chief Presidency Magistrate to the file of Mr. J. M. Bir, Presidency Magistrate, for disposal.
For this 982 purpose the Chief Presidency Magistrate nominated Mr. J. M. Bir as successor of the trying Magistrate.
Mr. Bir was of opinion that section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a complete bar against any action being taken by him in respect of this appellant and others who were merely witnesses on the side of the complaint in the criminal case.
He therefore directed a complaint to be lodged only against Mayadas Khanna, the complainant, in the criminal case under section 504 and section 506 of the Indian Penal Code and rejected the application as against the rest.
On appeal by Chamanlal Mehra against the Magistrate 's refusal to make a complaint against the other persons the High Court of Calcutta held that section 479 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no application to the offence of committing forgery or being a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit forgery.
The High Court considering it expedient in the interests of justice that a complaint should be made against this appellant in respect of an offence under section 467 and section 4671120 B of the Indian Penal Code that he appeared to have committed, set aside the order of the Magistrate in respect of this appellant and made an order that such a complaint be made.
The correctness of the High Court 's view that section 479A has no application to offences under section 467 and section 467/120B and does not bar an action being taken against a witness under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for such offences is challenged before us.
The relevant portion of section 479A which was inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Amendment Act or 1955 runs thus : "Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any Civil., Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness 983 has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceedings or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the Court shall, at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons therefore and may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court setting forth the evidence which, in the opinion of the court, is false or fabricated and forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. . .
There is divergence of judicial opinion on the question whether if action could have been taken by the criminal court under section 479A but was not taken action can still be taken under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
But that question does not arise for consideration before us.
The question here is : Assuming that where action could have been taken under section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure but was not taken by the criminal court concerned, for offences of giving false evidence in any stage of a judical proceeding or for intentional fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, no action can be taken under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is it further correct to say that no such action under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be taken even in respect of offences of forgery or conspiracy to commit forgery ? 984 We do not see any reason why this should be so.
The special procedure of section 479A is prescribed only for the prosecution of a witness for the act of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceedings or for fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding.
There is nothing in the section which precludes the application of any other procedure prescribed by the Code in respect of other offences.
In applying the principle that a special provision prevails over a general provision, the scope of the special provision must be strictly construed in order to find out how much of the field covered by the general provision is also covered by the special provision.
Examining the special procedure prescribed by section 479 A in that light, it is important to notice that the act of intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding and the act of fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding mentioned in section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are the acts which are made punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and cognate sections in Chapter XI.
It appears clear to us therefore that it is prosecution in respect of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and cognate sections in Chapter XI that is dealt with under section 479A.
If the legislature had intended that the special procedure would apply to offences other than offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code and cognate sections in Chapter XI it would have used clear words to that effect.
It will be unreasonable to read into section 479A the meaning that where a person who appears to have committed an offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence appears to have committed some other offence also say, forgery, for the very purpose of fabricating false evidence, complaint for such other offence also 985 can be made under section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
We are therefore of opinion that section 479A has no application to prosecution for offences other than an offence under section 193 and cognate sections in Chapter XI and that as regards other offences sections 476, 477, 478 and 479 continue to apply even after the enactment of section 479A.
Whether the High Court is right or wrong in its view that the appellant appeared prima facie to have committed offences under section 467 and section 467/120B of the Indian Penal Code has not been argued before us and we express no opinion either way on that matter.
The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant was a prosecution witness against the respondents.
That case ended in the acquittal of the respondents.
An application was moved under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Magistrate against the appellant and some other prosecution witnesses with a prayer that a complaint be made against them.
The Magistrate was of opinion that section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a complete bar to action being taken against the appellant and other prosecution witnesses.
So no complaint was filed against them.
On appeal the High Court set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed the Magistrate concerned to file a complaint against the appellant in respect of offences under section 467 and section 467/120B of the Indian Penal Code as section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure had no application to the facts of the present case.
Held that section 479A had no application to prosecution for offences other than an offence under section 193 and cognate sections in Ch.
XI and that as regards other offences sections 476, 477, 478 and 479 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continue to apply even after the enactment of section 479A.