judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
3752 3755 of 1982.
Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 2.2.1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.
S.C. Manchanda, Raja Ram Agarwal, Dr. Meera Agarwal and R.C. Mishra for the Appellant.
889 Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Manoj Arora and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.C. AGRAWAL, J.
These appeals, by certificate granted by the High Court under Section 29(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated February 2, 1982 in Wealth Tax Reference No. 179 of 1978.
The appellant, F.S. Gandhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the assessee '), owns properties situate at Mahatma Gandhi Marg and Sardar Patel Marg in Civil Lines area at Allahabad.
The lands on which these buildings stand were leased out to the assessee by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
The leases in respect of these properties, except the property situate at 30 A, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, expired in 1958 and the lease in respect of the property situate at 30 A Mahatama Gandhi Marg expired in 1963.
The Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notices to the assessee to hand over vacant possession of the leasehold lands.
The properties are let out to the tenants and the assessee was receiving rental income from the same.
For the assessment years 197 1 72, 1972 73, 1973 74 and 1974 75 the assessee submitted the Wealth Tax returns wherein he valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income.
The Wealth Tax Officer passed assessment orders wherein he valued the properties at fifteen times of the annual rental income.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax, valued the said properties at twelve and a half times of the annual rental income.
On further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinaf ter referred to as 'the Tribunal ') valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income.
At the request of the assessee the Tribunal referred the following questions of law to the High Court: "1.
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was fight in holding that properties in respect of which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received to hand over the possession were assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act and its value was liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee? 890 2.
Whether on correct interpretation of Section 2(e)(v) and relevant provisions of Transfer of Property Act, the Tribunal was right in holding that the interest of the appellant in respect of properties in dispute was for a period over six years? 3.
Whether there was any material before the Tribunal to hold that on the relevant valuation date the property situated at 30 A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg worth ten times of its annual was rental income while in previous years the value of the said property was shown and accepted at Rs. 1, 19,000? 4.
Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the property at 30 A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, was to be valued on the basis .of its annual income along with other properties notwithstanding the property in question was commercial property while other properties were residential houses and whether the multiple upheld by the Tribunal is justified in law and on facts? 5.
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the multiple of ten times of rental income in respect of property at 30 A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg, is not excessive and wholly unjustified?" By order dated February 2, 1982, the High Court answered the said questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
Thereafter the assessee moved an application under Section 29(1) of the Act for grant of certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court.
By 'order dated July 8, 1982, the High Court granted certificate of fitness on the view that the following ques tion is a question of law which is of general importance and as such this was a fit case in which an appeal could be filed before this Court: "Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was fight in holding that the properties in respect to which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received to hand over the possession were assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act and its valuation was liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee?" 891 This question was amongst the questions referred to the High Court.
While dealing with the said question the High Court has held: "on the determination of a lease by efflux of time or by notice, it is the duty of the lessee to deliver vacant possession of the demised premises to the lessor.
If he continues in possession even after the determination of the lease, his possession is secured inasmuch as the lessor cannot evict him otherwise than in due course of law and if he continues in possession without the assent or dissent of the landlord, he would be a tenant at sufferance.
His pos session would be wrongful but not unlawful.
It is wrongful because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession beyond the expiry of the period fixed in the lease.
It is not unlawful because the landlord cannot take law into in his own hands and evict him.
But in case the landlord expresses his assent by acceptance of rent or otherwise to his contin uing in possession this wrongful possession would be con verted into a lawful one.
The landlord 's assent may be expresse or implied.
" Taking into consideration the facts of the present case the High Court has found that the leases of the properties expired in 1958 and that of 30 A, Mahatama Gandhi Marg in 1963.
The High Court has observed: "There is nothing on record to show that any attempt was made whatsoever by the State Government to enforce those notices given by it and the assessee had continued in peace ful possession and enjoyment of these properties all along.
In our opinion, therefore, the assent of the landlord to the assessee 's continuing in possession of these properties can be inferred and that being so that assessee would be treated to be a tenant of the same by holding over." According to the High Court after determination of the earlier leases the assessee is lessee of properties under a new contract of tenancy and this tenancy is a tenancy from month to month under Section 116 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The High Court has further held that the present tenancy is a tenancy from month to month for an unstated period and it could not be said to be precarious in nature.
The High Court was of the view that the said tenancy is an asset.
as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and is not 892 excluded under sub clause (v) because the said interest has been available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the new contract of tenancy came into existence.
In the Act, as originally enacted, Section 2(e)(v) read as under: "In .this Act, unless the context otherwise re quires X X X X X X (e) "assets" includes property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not include X X X X X X (v) any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years.
" By the Wealth Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 which came into force with effect from April 1, 1965, the words "from the date the interest vests in the assessee" were inserted at the end of sub clause (v) and thereafter, sub clause (v) read as under: "any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee.
" By the Finance Act, 1969 clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act was substituted by the following provision: "(e) "assets" includes property of every description, movable or immovable, but does not include (1) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1969 or any earlier assessment year (i) agricultural land and growing crop, grass or standing trees on such land; (ii) any building owned or occupied by a cultivator of, or receiver of rent or revenue out of, agricultural land: Provided that the building is on or in the immediate 893 vicinity of the land is a building which the cultivator or the receiver of rent or revenue by reason of his connection with the land requires as a dwelling house or a store:house or an outhouse; (iii) animals; (iv) a right to any annuity in any case where the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lump sum grant; (v) any interest in property where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee; (2) in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1970 or any subsequent assessment year (i) animals; (ii) a right to any annuity in any case where the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into a lump sum grant; (iii) any interest in property where the interest is avail able to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee.
" As a result of the aforesaid amendment the provision which is applicable in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1970 and subsequent assessment years is sub clause (2) of clause (e) of Section 2.
Since the assessments in question relate to assessment years 1971 72 to 1974 75 the matter has to be considered in the light of the provisions contained in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act as substituted by Finance Act, 1969.
In framing questions Nos. 1 and 2 for reference to the High Court the Tribunal has erroneously made a reference to sub clause (v) of clause (e) of Section 2 as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment.
The High Court, while answering these questions and granting the certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court, did not notice this error.
The provisions of Section 2(e)(v) as amended in 1964 are identical with the provisions of Section 2(e)(2)(iii), as substituted by the 1969 amend ment.
The error is, therefore, of no consequence and the matter has been examined by us in the 894 ight of the provisions contained in clause (e) of Section 2, as substituted in 1969.
Shri R.R. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the appel lant, has not disputed the findings recorded by the High Court that the assessee was n possession of the leasehold properties as a tenant holding over and hat the said tenancy was a tenancy from month to month for an restated period.
The submission of Shri Agarwal is that the interest of he assessee under the said tenancy could not be regarded as an 'asset ' ruder Section 2(e) of the Act and that it has to be excluded because he said interest cannot be regarded as an interest available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee.
The aforesaid contention of Shri Agarwal involves inter pretation of the words "where the interest is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee" contained in Sec tion 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act.
The word "available" is pre ceded by the word "is" and is followed by the words "for a period not exceeding six years.
" The word 'is ', although normally referring to :he present often has a future mean ing.
It may also have a past signification as in the sense of 'has been ' (See Black 's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn. P. 745) We are of the view that in view of the words "for a period not exceeding six years" which follow the word "available" the word is ' must be construed as referring to the present and the future.
In that sense it would mean that the inter est is presently available and is to be available in future for a period not exceeding six years.
The High Court has construed the word 'is ' to mean 'has been '.
As per the construction placed by the High Court in a case where an interest has been created for a period exceeding six years it would be included in he assets of the assessee under Section 2(e) of the Act only after the expiry of the period of six years even though the interest is available to he assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest tests in the assessee.
The construction placed by the High Court instead of placing emphasis on the nature of the interest attaches importance to the enjoyment of the interest.
We are unable to subscribe to that view.
In our opinion the question as to whether the interest should be included or excluded from the assets of the assessee under Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act has to be considered in the light of he nature of interest on the relevant date.
Under the said provision he relevant date is the date on which the interest vests in the assessee.
Therefore, the matter has to be considered by examining the nature of the interest on the date the interest vests in the assessee.
895 This view of ours finds support from the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Madras vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal; , wherein the provisions of Section 2(e)(v).
as it stood prior to the amendment of 1964, have been considered.
In that case the respondent assessee had obtained on lease from Government certain salt pans under two agreement dated January 1, 1943 and January 1, 1945, and each lease was to endure for 25 years but was liable to be determined by notice on either side at the close of any salt manufacturing season.
In relation to wealth tax assessment years 1959 60, a question arose as to whether the assessee 's interest in the salt pans for the unexpired period of the two leases was liable to be included in the computation of her net wealth.
This Court held that the interest of the lessee under each lease was precarious inasmuch as it was liable to be determined by notie by the Government at the expiry of any manufacturing season and that the leasehold interest in the salt pans was not avail able to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the valuation date.
It was urged on behalf of the Revenue that since the assessee had enjoyed the rights under one lease for 16 years and in the other lease for 14 years and on the valuation date both the leases were outstanding, the rights were "assets" within the meaning of the Act and that the expression "is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" in clause (v) of Section 2(e) means 'is and has been available to an assessee for the period of six years before the date of valuation. ' It was also urged that if interest in property though revocable has remained unre voked for more than six years before the valuation date, the interest would be an asset within the meaning of Section 2(e).
This Court rejected the said contention and held as under: "We are unable to agree with that contention.
The expression used by Parliament is "is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years", and it must mean that the assessee though he has interest in property at the valuation date the interest will remain available for a period not exceeding six years.
If it is to remain available for six years or for a shorter period the interest will fall within the exception: if it is to remain available for a period exceeding six years it will fall within the definition of "assets" and its value will be liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee. ' ' In that case this Court has noticed the amendment intro duced in sub clause (v) of Section 2(e) by the Wealth Tax (Amendment) Act, 896 1964 but did not consider it necessary to deal with it because the said matter related to the period prior to the said amendment.
The High Court has sought to distinguish this decision on the view that the position has changed after the amend ment introduced in 1964 and that the insertion of the words 'from the date the interest vests in the assessee ' means that if an interest has been available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee, it would be an asset while prior to its amendment if the interest was not available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years it could not be treated as an asset.
The High Court has observed that as a result of the amendment of 1964, Section 2(e)(v) can be interpreted to mean that if an interests has been available to an assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee, it would be asset.
We are unable to agree with the said view.
While construing the words "is available to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra) has rejected the contention urged by the Revenue that the said words mean "is and has been available to the assessee for a period of six years" and this Court has construed the said words to mean that "the interest will remain available for a period not exceed ing six years" meaning thereby that the interest must be such that on the relevant date it is available presently and is available for a period not exceeding six years in future.
The only change which was brought about in Section 2(e)(v) as a result of the amendment introduced in 1964, whereby the words "from the date the interest vests in the assessee" were inserted in that sub clause, was that prior to the said amendment the relevant date was the valuation date and the availability of interest had to be seen with reference to that date and as a result of the amendment of 1964, the relevant date became the date on which the interest vests in the asseses and, therefore, the availability of the interest was to be seen with reference to the date on which the interest vests in the assessee.
But the requirement that on the relevant date the interest would be available in future for a period exceeding six years, as held by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra), remained unaltered.
In this context, it may also be mentioned that Commis sioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra) was decided by this Court on September 6, 1968.
The Finance Act, 1969, whereby clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act was substi tuted, was enacted by Parliament on May 13, 1969.
In the amended provisions of clause (e), Parliament has repeated the same language, namely, "where the interest is avail 897 able to an assessee for a period not exceeding six years" in item (v) of sub clause (1) and in item (iii) of sub clause (2).
It must be assumed that while enacting the Finance Act, 1969, Parliament was aware of the construction placed by this Court on these words in Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra).
In repeating the said words in the amended clause (e) of Section 2, Parliament must be taken to have used the said words to bear the mean ing which has been put upon them by this Court in Commis sioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, (Supra).
In the instant case, it has been found that after the expiry of the leases of the assessee in the years 1958 and 1963 the assessee continued in possession under a new con tract of tenancy and the said tenancy was a tenancy from month to month for an unstated period.
The said tenancy was precarious in nature because it could be terminated by the lessor, viz., the Government of Uttar Pradesh, at any time by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The fact that such a notice was not given cannot mean that the interest created by the said new tenancy was an interest available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vested in the assessee.
In the circumstances in view of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) the said interest could not be treated as an asset of the asses see for the purpose of the Act.
Our attention has been invited to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Purshottam Dass Tandon and Others vs State of U.P., Lucknow and Others, A.I.R. 1987 All.
From the said decision it appears that a number of petitions were filed in the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by lessees who had been granted leases of nazul lands in Civil Lines area of Allahabad and whose leases have expired and who were seeking renewal of those leases.
After considering the various orders that were passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, from time to time, the High Court, while disposing of the said petitions, has given the following to the opposit parties: (i) grant fresh leases to all those who had deposited the premium or at least one instalment on terms and conditions mentioned in 1959 Order read with 1960 Order; (ii) issue notices to all those lessees to whom no notice was issued and determine their premium etc.
on terms and conditions mentioned in 1959 60 Orders expeditiously; 898 (iii) determine premium etc.
of others to whom notices were issued but it could not be finalised for one reason or other at an early date; (iv) determine rate of premium etc.
for premises which are used as residential cum commercial purpose in light of 1965 Order; (v) determine rate of premium used for commercial purpose in light of various Orders issued till 1965; and (vi) lessees shall after grant of fresh leases file the necessary forms etc.
within one month before the Prescribed Authority under Urban Ceiling Act, 1976 (Act 33 of 76) if it had already not been filed who shall proceed to decide the same as expeditiously as possible.
In view of the aforesaid directions that have been given by the High Court it can be said that the assessee whose leases expired in 1958 and 1963, can ask for grant of fresh leases on the terms and conditions mentioned in 1959 and 1960 Orders issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
In other words it can be said that in the relevant assessment years the assessee had the right to obtain fresh leases for the lands of the properties in question.
But there is noth ing to show that in pursuance of the said right fresh leases have been granted by the Government of U.P. in respect of those lands and such leases were available to the assessee during the assessment years in question.
For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that the properties in respect of which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received by the assessee to hand over the possession were not assets within the meaning of section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act and the valuation of the same was not liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee.
Question No. 1 referred by the Tribunal to the High Court must, therefore, be answered in the negative i.e. in favour of the assessee.
Question No. 2 referred by the Tribunal to the High Court is connected with Question No. 1 and both the questions were considered by the High Court together.
Since Question No. 1 is answered in Favour of the assessee, Question No. 2 must also be answered in the nega tive i.e., in favour of the assessee and it must be held that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the interest of the assessee in respect of the properties in dispute was for a period over six years for the purpose of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act.
899 In the result the appeals are allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside insofar as it relates to Questions Nos. 1 and 2.
The said questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
No order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals allowed.

summary:
The appellant assessee owned certain properties on lease hold lands.
The leases in respect of these lands expired in 1958 and 1963 and the lessor State Government issued notices to the assessee to hand over vacant posses sion of the leasehold lands.
The properties were let out to the tenants and the assessee was receiving rental income from the same.
In the Wealth Tax Returns for the assessment years 1971 72, 1972 73, 1973 74 and 1974 75, the assessee valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income.
In the assessment order the Wealth Tax Officer valued the properties at fifteen times of the annual rental income.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth Tax valued the said properties at twelve and a half times of the annual rental income.
On further appeal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal valued the properties at ten times of the annual rental income, but, at the request of the assessee, referred to the High Court for its opinion certain questions of law, includ ing the questions whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the properties in respect of which the leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been issued to hand over the possession were assets within the meaning of Sec tion 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and its value was liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee and that, on correct interpretation of Section 2(e)(v) of the Wealth Tax Act, and relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, the interest of the appellant in respect of properties in dispute was for a period of over six years.
887 The High Court held that after the determination of the earlier leases, the assessee was lessee of properties under a new contract of tenancy, and it was a tenancy from month to month under Section 116 read with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and for an unstated period, and could not be said to be precarious in nature, that the said tenancy was an asset as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and was not excluded under sub clause (v) because the said interest had been available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the new contract of tenan cy came into existence.
It, however granted certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
The properties in respect of which leases had expired in 1958 and 1963 and notices had been received by the assessee to hand over the possession were not assets within the meaning of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act 1957 and the valuation of the same was not 'liable to be included in the net wealth of the assessee.
The Tribunal was not right in holding that the interest of the assessee in respect of the properties in dispute was for a period over six years for the purpose of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act.[898F H] 2.1 The word "available" in Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act is preceded by the word "is" and is followed by the words "for a period not exceeding six years".
The word 'is ', although normally referring to the present, often has a future meaning.
It may also have a past signification as in the sense of 'has been '.
In view of the words "for a period not exceeding six years" which follow the word "available", the word 'is ' must be construed as referring to the present and the future.
In that sense, it would mean that the inter est is presently available and is to be available in future for a period not exceeding six years.
[896C D] The High Court has construed the word 'is ' to mean 'has been '.
As per the construction placed by the High Court in a case where an interest has been created for a period exceed ing six years it would be included in the assets of the assessee under Section 2(e) of the Act only after the expiry of the period of six years even though the interest is available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vests in the assessee.
The con struction placed by the High Court attaching importance to the enjoyment of the interest, instead of placing emphasis on the nature of the interest is not correct.
[894E G] 2.3 The question as to whether the interest should be in cluded or 888 excluded from the assets of the assessee under Section 2(e)(2)(iii) of the Act has to be considered in the light of the nature of interest on the relevant date.
Under the said provision, the relevant date is the date on which the inter est vests in the assessee.
Therefore, the matter has to be considered by examining the nature of the interest on the date the interests vests in the assessee.
[894G H] Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs Smt.
Muthukrishna Ammal, ; , relied on.
In the instant case, after the expiry of the leases of the assessee in the years 1958 and 1963 the assessee contin ued in possession under a new contract of tenancy and the said tenancy was a tenancy from month to month for an un stated period.
The said tenancy was precarious in nature because it could be terminated by the lessor, at any time by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The fact that such a notice was not given cannot mean that the interest created by the said new tenancy was an interest available to the assessee for a period exceeding six years from the date the interest vested in the assessee.
In the circumstances, in view of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) the said interest could not be treated as an asset of the assessee for the purpose of the Act.
[897C D] [Section 2(e)(v), as amended in 1964, was substituted by the Finance Act,1969 and the relevant provision applicable to the instant case was Section 2(e)(2)(iii).
However, in the reference to the High Court, the Tribunal referred to sub clause (v) of clause (e) of Section 2, as it stood prior to the 1969 amendment and the High Court also did not notice it.
This Court observed that since the provisions of Section 2(e)(v) as amended in 1964, were identical with the provi sions of Section 2(e)(2)(iii) as substituted by the 1969 amendment the error was of no consequence and examined the matter in the light of the provisions contained in Section 2(e) as substituted by the 1969 amendment.] [893G H; 894A]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2054 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.1.
1987 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta in Transfer Appli cation No. 1263 of 1986.
A.P. Chatterjee, G.S. Chatterjee (NP) and Ms. Ratna Bhattacharya for the Appellants.
R.B. Dattar (NP), Anil Dev Singh, B.K. Prasad, C.V. Subba Rao and R.B. Misra for the Respondents.
816 A. Bhattacharya for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M. SAHAI, J.
Special leave granted.
Station Masters of South Eastern Railways are aggrieved by implementation of the scheme of re structuring by the Chief Personnel Officer framed by the Railway Board for 'C ' and 'D ' cadre.
Their claim was not accepted by the Central Administrative Tribunal as implementation as such, was beneficial to the majority.
It was further found that alter native 'I ' of the scheme meant for the combined cadre was rightly adopted as the cadre of Assistant Station Master (ASM) and Station Master (SM) in the South Eastern Zone was combined before 1983.
The appellants have challenged cor rectness of these findings.
They also claim that implementa tion of scheme is highly unjust and inequitable.
Prior to re structuring the cadre comprised of Assistant Station Masters at the bottom and Station Superintendent at the top.
Initial appointment of ASM was made in the scale of Rs.360 540.
The promotional ladder bifurcated into (i) ASM to ASM and (ii) ASM to SM, both in the scale of Rs.425 640 (non selection) and then Rs.455 700 (selection) before becoming one common source for promotion to Deputy Station Superintendent/SM Rs.550 750 (non selection) Rs.700 800 Station Superintendent (selection) and Rs.840 1010 Station Superintendent (non selection).
For moving up the promotion al ladder every ASM was required to opt if he would proceed on the channel of ASM to ASM or ASM to SM.
Re structuring was done in 'C ' and 'D ' cadres in the scales, designation and percentage in selection and non selection posts.
Two alternatives were framed described as alternative 'I ' for the combined cadre and alternative 'II ' for the separate cadres.
They were to be adopted by the respective zones depending on the cadre pattern prevalent there.
One of the principles visualised for group 'C ' was that if all posts in an existing grade were en bloc placed in a higher grade the existing regular incumbents thereof were to be allowed the higher grade without subjecting them to any selection.
For ASM/SM two alternatives were provided to be adopted by the respective zones depending on whether the existing cadre was separate or combined.
In alternative 'I ' meant for the combined cadre SMs in the scale of Rs.425 640 and Rs.455 700 were designated as Deputy Station Superin tendents and 817 Station Superintendents in the scale of Rs.550 750 and Rs.700 900 respectively.
Therefore, the appellants claim that if alternative 'I ' was adopted, then it should have been given full play and the SMs who were working in the aforesaid scales should also have been placed en bloc in the re designated posts without any further process of selec tion.
In pursuance of the re structuring, the Chief Personnel Officer issued a letter to the Divisional Manager, South Eastern Railway that it had been decided that alternative 'I ' enunciated by 'the Board shall be followed on the South Eastern Railway.
It further provided that the existing system of calling for options from ASMs for the post of SMs/ ASMs in the higher grade was being dispensed with and sen iority of staff in each grade shall be determined on the basis of non fortuitous service rendered in such grade.
Other paragraphs of the letter are not relevant for the resolution of the present controversy.
Since the direction of the Chief Personnel Officer worked to prejudice of numer ous persons who had exercised their options to the promo tional channel of Station Master, they approached the High Court or Tribunal by way of Writ Petition or Claim Petition but without any success.
Some of such disputes came up for disposal before this Court in Civil Appeal Nos.
1536 41 of 1987 which were disposed of by order dated 30th July, 1987, directing the Railway Board to consider if the Chief Person nel Officer while implementing the scheme deviated from its terms and implemented it to the prejudice of those appel lants.
Since it was conceded that the scheme did not affect present status and emoluments, this Court then made it clear that implementation should not be done to prejudice of appellants.
It further protected the interests of those who due to wrong implementation might have got benefit by di recting that they shall not be disturbed.
The direction given by this Court was not complied with; therefore, con tempt proceedings were filed the hearing of which was de ferred till the disposal of the present appeals.
When these appeals were taken up for hearing, it tran spired that total number of employees of the appellants ' category were not more than 206.
Therefore, the Court passed the order on 26th JUly, 1989 that if relief was granted to these 206 employees.
by implementing the scheme in the manner indicated in the earlier order of 1987, they shall be satisfied and the litigation shall come to an end.
But nothing more was done and on 8th September, 1989 this Court after heating learned counsel for the parties at great length recorded that two questions were required to be looked into: (i) if the cadre of ASM and SM was common or different and (ii) if alternative 'I ' was adopted, then why 818 the SMs could not be re designated and Deputy Station Super intendents and wanted response of the Administration about them.
On both these aspects an affidavit was filed by the Chief Personnel Officer.
Regarding the first, it is stated that cadre of ASM and SM before restructuring was a common one in South Eastern Railway for all 'intents and purposes '.
It is explained that separate cadre meant that the ASMs and SMs would have sought their advancement separately, 'in a way different from them in the entire non gazetted cadre '.
And then ASM and SM had to combine again to work as Deputy Station Superintendent/SM.
In respect of automatic re desig nation, the explanation is that eight different scales of pay existing before re structuring were reduced to six and designation of ASM in the scale of Rs.455 700 and SM in scale of Rs.425 640, were abolished and the post belonging to six revised designations have been distributed on the prescribed percentage basis.
It is further stated that incumbents of the existing grades were promoted according to their positions of seniority against the posts which were available on percentage basis distribution.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that the Station Masters should be automatically designated as Deputy Station Super intendent was not correct.
According to the Chief Personnel Officer the appellants along with ' others in accordance with their seniority were required to be subjected to the proce dure of selection/suitability test as per procedure envis aged in the re structuring scheme.
The affidavit also at taches a letter from the Railway Board addressed to the General Manager, reiterating that the implementation of the scheme by the Chief Personnel Officer was as intended by the Board.
Facts as they ultimately emerge do not appear to have been adequately indicated in the affidavit of the senior officer even when the aspects were pointedly indicated by this Court.
It is not disputed that in the South Eastern Zone the practice of option by ASM for promotional channel was in vogue before 1983.
Dispute is about the time when it was exercised.
According to appellant it was at the time of recruitment and appointment even on pain of disciplinary action.
And option once exercised was irrevocable.
Whereas according to officials it used to be offered when vacancy arose according to seniority.
Unfortunately it was accepted by the Tribunal as well without any foundation in the record by shutting its eyes to various letters which clinch the issue in favour of the appellants, for instance the letter dated 14th May, 1965, and 20th May, 1970, issued by the Divisional Superintendent Railway filed before Tribunal, produced along with supplementary affidavit shows that options were required to be exercised by ASMs irrespective of availability of vacancy before the target 819 date and if it was not exercised then they were liable to disciplinary action.
And options, for or against could not be changed when once exercised.
Where it was not exercised on or before the date it was deemed to have been opted for ASM to SM.
No effort was made to meet these letters; yet an affidavit was filed that option was exercised when vacancy arose.
Options was thus exercised by appellants at the stage of appointment and recruitment.
But it appears to have resulted in dissatisfaction because even though the pay scales were identical those who became SM were entrusted with superviso ry control and administrative responsibility.
For this the ASM recruited in the same batch must have been unhappy.
And the SM must, also, have had the grievance as promotion in higher scale was obviously delayed because the post of SM must have been fewer in number as compared to ASM.
There fore, it was rightly abolished and was hailed by the two unions of employees.
But what happened to those who due to irrevocable option exercised prior to 1983 had been waiting for moving up and due to abolition of option and implementa tion of the alternative 'I ' lost the opportunity while ASMs junior to them availed it? No provision for them was made.
Even in this Court despite repeated directions, the Chief Personnel Officer or the Administration instead of resolving it have taken an uncharitable stand by asserting that those who opted for promotional channel of SM having enjoyed benefit of day duty and supervisory control on their own volition cannot be compared with ASMs whose working condi tions were different.
That is a person who worked with greater responsibility, and under strain must suffer.
What is surprising is that such unreasonable stand is supported even by the Board by relying on 'intents and contents '.
Even the claim of the Administration that cadre of ASM/SM was combined cadre in South East Railway was not substantiated by any document, letter or order.
On the other hand, from letter dated 10th May, 1984 issued by Additional District Pay Commissioner to General Manager recognises existence of separate cadre: "It is evident from the details furnished in the enclosure to your above quoted letter that your Railway had a separate cadre for ASMs/SMs and a decision had been reached prior to the issue of the restructuring orders No. PC.
III/80/ UPG/19 dated 29.7.83 to switch over to a combined cadre, except where in respect of any cadre or cadres avenues of advance ment have been prescribed by this Ministry, laying 820 down avenues of promotion in respect of non gazetted Railway staff, is within the competence of the General Managers of the zonal railways.
Since the matter has been processed on your railway in consultation and agreement of the two recog nised Trade Unions in the permanent Negotiating Machinery, the action by your Railway to switch over to a combined percentages scheme is within your powers. ' ' Existence of separate cadres prior to 1983 and changing over to a combined system is not the same thing as claiming that the cadre which existed prior to 1983 was a combined cadre.
Explanation in the affidavit while replying to the issue as to whether the cadre of ASM and SM was common or a different cadre is given thus: "The Railway Board 's letter dated 10.8.84 refers to only merging these two grades which should not mean that the cadre was separate.
In other words, the Railway Board 's said letter means that the action of the Railway to combine the two grades also is in order and it does not imply that the entire cadre was separate.
" It cannot be accepted either as correct or satisfactory.
Cadres of ASM/SM before 1983 was separate and different.
With abolition of option it has become one.
The letter of the Railway Board required revised percentages prescribed for the category depending on whether the existing cadre structure was a combined one or a structured one.
Since the cadre in South Eastern Railway was a separate one, the Chief Personnel Officer deviated from the scheme by applying alternative 'I ' which was to be adopted by a zone where combined cadre existed.
And if alternative 'I ' was adopted then the SMs should have been automatically designated as Deputy Station Superintendents and they should not have been subjected to the selection procedure.
The explanation in the affidavit of Chief Personnel Officer that the grade Rs. 425 640 having been abolished as a consequence of restruc turing is not acceptable.
In alternative 'I ' SM in scale of Rs.425 640 automatically stood redesignated as Deputy Sta tion Superintendent.
But the scale does not find place in alternative 'II '.
But both the employees unions have accept ed the implementation of the letter of Chief Personnel Officer as it is beneficial to a majority of the employees.
Therefore, it may not be disturbed.
At the same time all those 204 employees who had opted before 1983 must be enti tled to the benefit which would have been available to them on theft options.
821 In the result this appeal is disposed of by directing that the respondent authorities shall grant promotional benefit to those 204 SMs who had exercised options before 1983 in the same manner as it would have been if option had not been abolished in accordance with the earlier procedure provided they fulfilled the other requirements.
While doing so those who had been promoted shall not be disturbed as directed by this Court on 30th July, 1987.
Further if as a result of this exercise posts in higher grade fall short, the respondents shall create adequate number of additional posts to overcome the difficulty.
The respondents are fur ther directed to complete all this exercise within six months.
Persons promoted in pursuance of this order shall be entitled to all consequential benefits from the due dates.
Appellants shall be entitled to consolidated costs which are assessed at Rs.5,000 to be payable by respondent No. 2.
N.V.K Appeal disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
In the South Eastern Railway the cadre initially com prised of Assistant Station Masters at the bottom and the Station Masters at the top.
Initial appointment of ASM was made in the scale of Rs.360 540.
The promotional ladder bifurcated into: (i) ASM to SM, and (ii) ASM to SM, both in the scale of Rs.425 640 (non selection), and then Rs.455700 (selection); before becoming one common source for promotion to Deputy Station Superintendent/SM Rs.550 750 (non selec tion) Rs.700800 Station Superintendent (selection), and Rs.840 1010 Station Superintendent (non selection).
For moving up the promotional ladder every ASM was required to opt if he would proceed on the channel of ASM to ASM, or ASM to SM.
Later, re structuring was done in 'C ' and 'D ' cadres in the scales, designation and percentage; in selection and non selection posts.
Two alternatives were framed described as alternative 'I ' for the combined cadre, and alternative 'II ' for the separate cadres; which were to be adopted by the respective zones depending on the prevailing cadre pattern.
For ASM/SM two alternatives were provided to be adopted by the respective zones depending on whether the existing cadre was separate or combined.
In alternative 'I ' meant for the combined cadre SMs in the scale of Rs.425 640 and Rs.455 700 were designated as Deputy Station Superin tendents and Station Superintendents in the scale of Rs.540 750 and Rs.700 900 respectively.
Pursuant to the re structuring, the Chief Personal Officer issued a letter to the Divisional Manager, South Eastern Railway that it has been decided that alternative 'I ' enunciated by the Board shall be followed on the said railway, and the existing system of calling for options from ASMs for the post of SMs/ASMs in the higher grade was being dispensed with seniority of staff in each grade shall be determined on 814 the basis of non fortutious service rendered in such grade.
Since the aforesaid direction of the Chief Personnel Officer worked to the prejudice of numerous persons who had exercised their options to the promotional channel of Sta tion Master, they approached the High Court/Tribunal by way of writ petitions/claim petitions but without any success.
Some of these disputes came up in appeal before this Court which were disposed of on July 30, 1987 by directing the Railway Board to consider if the Chief Personnel Officer while implementing its scheme deviated from its terms, and implemented it to the prejudice of those appellants.
The appellants Station Masters of South/Eastern Railway aggrieved by the implementation of the scheme of re struc turing by the Chief Personnel Officer approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which rejected their claim, as the implementation was beneficial to the majority, and further found that the alternative 'I ' of the scheme meant for the combined cadre was rightly adopted as the cadre of Assistant Station Masters and Station Masters in the South Eastern Zone was combined before 1983.
The appellants in their appeal to this Court challenged the correctness of the aforesaid findings and also claimed that the implementation of the scheme was highly unjust and inequitable.
It was claimed that if alternative 'I ' was adopted then it should have been given full play and the SMs should have been placed en bloc in the re designated posts without any further process of selection.
Disposing of the appeal by directing that the respond ents shall grant promotional benefit to those 204 SMs who have exercised option before 1983, this Court, HELD: 1.
It is not disputed that in the South Eastern Zone the practice of obtaining option by ASM for promotional channel was in vogue before 1983.
The dispute was about the time when it was exercised.
According to the appellant it was at the time of recruitment and appointment even on pain of disciplinary action whereas according to the officials it used to be offered when vacancy arose according to seniori ty.
Unfortunately, it was accepted by the Tribunal as well without any foundation in the record by shutting its eyes to the letters dated 14th May, 1965 and 20th May, 1970, issued by the Divisional 815 Superintendent which shows that options were required to be exercised by ASMs irrespective of availability of vacancy before the target date, and if it was not exercised then they were liable to disciplinary action.
[818F H; 819A] 2.
Even the claim of the Administration that cadre of ASM/SM was combined cadre in South East Railway was not substantiated by any document, letter or order.
On the other hand, the letter dated 10th May, 1984 issued by Additional District Pay Commissioner to the General Manager recognises existence of separate cadre.
[819F] 3.
Existence of separate cadres prior to 1983 and chang ing over to a combined system is not the same thing as claiming that the cadre which existed prior to 1983 was a combined cadre.
[820C] 4.
Since the cadre in South Eastern Railway was a sepa rate one, the Chief Personnel Officer deviated from the scheme by applying alternative 'I ' which was to be adopted by a zone where combined cadre existed and if alternative 'I ' was adopted then the SMs should have been automatically designated as Deputy Station Superintendents and they should not have been subjected to the selection procedure.
In alternative 'I ' SM in scale of Rs.425 640 automatically stood redesignated as Deputy Station Superintendents.
But the scale does not find place in alternative II.
But both the employees unions have accepted the implementation of the letter of the Chief Personnel Officer as h is beneficial to a majority of the employees.
Therefore, it may not be dis turbed.
At the same time all those 204 employees who had opted before 1983 must be entitled to the benefit which would have been available to them on their options.
[820F H]


judgement:
tion (Criminal) No. 421 of 1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Vishal Jeet petitioner in person.
V.C. Mahajan, A.S. Nambiar, R.B. Misra, Ms. A. Subha shini, T.V.S.N. Chari, Prabir Choudhary, D. Goburdhan, M.N. Shroff, K.R. Nambiar, Uma Nath Singh, N.N. Johri, V. Krish namurthy, V.N. Patil, A.S. Bhasme, P.R. Ramasesh, M. Veerap pa, R.K. Mehta, R.S. Suri, B.D. Sharma, D. Bhandari, Amal Dalla, D.K. Sinha, J.R. Das, S.K. Bhattacharya, S.K. Nandi, Mahabir Singh, I. Makwana, N.K. Sharma, A. Subba Rao, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, P.K. Manohar and Mrs. Shanta Vasudevan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J.
This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India at the instance of an Advo cate is filed by way of a Public Interest Litigation seeking issuance of certain directions, directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (1) to institute an enquiry against those police officers under whose jurisdiction Red Light areas as well Devadasi and Jogin traditions are flourishing and to take necessary action against such erring police officers and law breakers; (2) to bring all the inmates of the red light areas and also those who are engaged in 'flesh trade ' to protective homes of the respective States and to provide them with proper medical aid, shelter, education and train ing in various disciplines of life so as to enable them to choose a more dignified way of life and (3) to bring the children of those prostitutes and other children found begging in streets and also the girls pushed into 'flesh trade ' to protective homes and then to rehabilitate them.
The averments made in the writ petition on the basis of which these directions are prayed for can be summarised thus: Many unfortunate teen aged female children (hereinafter refer 864 red to as 'the children ') and girls in full bloom are being sold in various parts of the country, for paltry sum even by their parents finding themselves unable to maintain their children on account of acute poverty and unbearable miseries and hoping that their children would be engaged only in household duties or manual labour.
But those who are acting as pimps or brokers in the 'flesh trade ' and brothel keepers who hunt for these teenaged children and young girls to make money either purchase or kidnap them by deceitful means and unjustly and forcibly inveigle them into 'flesh trade '.
Once these unfortunate victims are taken to the dens of prosti tutes and sold to brothel keepers, they are shockingly and brutally treated and confined in complete seclusion in a tiny claustrophobic room for several days without food until they succumb to the vicious desires of the brothel keepers and enter into the unethical and squalid business of prosti tution.
These victims though unwilling to lead this obnox ious way of life have no other way except to surrender themselves retreating into silence and submitting their bodies to a11 the dirty customers including even sexagenar ians with plastic smile.
The petitioner has cited certain lurid tales of sex with sickening details alleged to have been confessed by some children and girls either escaped or rescued from such abodes of ill fame.
After giving a brief note on Devadasi system and Jogin tradition, the petitioner states that this system and tradition which are still prevailing in some parts of the country should be put to an end.
The ultimate plea of the petitioner is that the young children and girls forcibly pushed into 'flesh trade ' should be rescued and rehabilitated.
With this petition, the petitioner has filed 9 affidavits said to have been sworn by 9 girls who claim to be living in the brothel houses, pleading for rescue and a list of names of 9 girls who are mortally afraid to swear the affidavits.
Be it noted that no counter has been filed by any one of the respondents.
The matter is one of great importance warranting a comprehensive and searching analysis and requiring a human istic rather than a purely legalistic approach from differ ent angles.
The questions involved cause considerable anxie ty to the Court in reaching a satisfactory solution in eradicating such sexual exploitation of children.
We shall now examine this problem and address ourselves to the merits of the prayers.
No denying the fact that prostitution always remains as a running sore in the body of civilisation and destroys all moral values.
The causes and evil effects of prostitution maligning the society are so 865 notorious and frightful that none can gainsay it.
This malignity is daily and hourly threatening the community at large slowly but steadily making its way onwards leaving a track marked with broken hopes.
Therefore, the necessity for appropriate and drastic action to eradicate this evil has become apparent but its successful consummation ultimately rests with the public at large.
It is highly deplorable and heart rending to note that many poverty stricken children and girls in the prime of youth are taken to 'flesh market ' and forcibly pushed into the 'flesh trade ' which is being carried on in utter viola tion of all cannons of morality, decency and dignity of humankind.
There cannot be two opinions indeed there is none that this obnoxious and abominable crime committed with all kinds of unthinkable vulgarity should be eradicated at all levels by drastic steps.
Article 23 which relates to Fundamental Rights in Part of the Constitution and which has been put under the caption 'Right against exploitation ' prohibits 'traffic in human beings and begat and other similar forms of labour ' and provides that any contravention of Article 23(1) shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
The expres sion 'traffic in human beings ' is evidently a very wide expression including the prohibition of traffic in women for immoral or other purposes.
Article 35(a)(ii) of the Consti tution reads that notwithstanding anything in this Constitu tion, Parliament shall have, and the legislature of a State shall not have, power to make laws for prescribing punish ment for those acts which are declared to be offences under this part.
The power of legislation, under this article, is given to the Parliament exclusively, for, otherwise the laws relating to fundamental rights would not have been uniform throughout the country.
The power is specifically denied to the state legislatures.
In implementation of the principles underlying Article 23(1) the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women & Girls Act, 1956 (SITA for short) has been enacted under Article 35 with the object of inhibiting or abolishing the immoral traffic in women and girls.
In this connection, it is significant to refer Article 39 which relates to 'Directive Principles of State Policy ' under Part IV of the Constitution.
Article 39 particularises certain objectives.
Clause (f) of Article 39 was substituted by Forty Second Amendment Act, 1976.
Among the objectives mentioned under Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, we will confine ourselves only to certain relevant objectives under those two clauses which are sufficient for the purpose of this case.
One 866 of the objectives under clause (e) of Article 39 is that the State should, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused.
One of the objectives under clause (f) is that the State should, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment.
These objectives reflect the great anxiety of the Constitution makers to protect and safeguard the interests and welfare of the children of our country.
The Government of India has also, in pursuance of these constitutional provisions of clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, evolved a national policy for the welfare of the children.
It will be apposite to make reference to one of the principles, namely, principle No. (9) formulated by the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the Gener al Assembly of the United Nations on November 20, 1959.
The said principle reads thus: 'The child shall be protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation.
He shall not be the subject of traffic, in any form.
" Before the adoption of SITA, there were enactments in some of the states for suppression of immoral traffic, but they were not uniform nor were they found to be adequately effective.
Some states did not have any law on the subject.
With the growing danger in society to healthy and decent living with morality, the world public opinion congregated at New York in a convention for suppression of traffic in persons for exploitation for immoral purposes.
Pursuant to the signing of that convention on May 9, 1950, our Parlia ment has passed an Act called "Suppression of Immoral Traf fic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 which is now changed as "The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956" to which cer tain drastic amendments are introduced by the Amendment Acts of 46 of 1978 and 44 of 1986.
This Act aims at suppressing the evils of prostitution in women and girls and achieving a public purpose viz. to rescue the fallen women and girls and to stamp out the evils of prostitution and also to provide an opportunity to these fallen victims so that they could become decent members of the society.
Besides the above Act, :here are various provisions in the Indian Penal Code such as Sections 866 A (dealing with procuration of minor girl), 366 B (dealing with offence of importation of girl from foreign country), 372 (dealing with selling of minor for purposes of prostitution etc. ) and 373 (dealing with 867 the offence of buying minor for purposes of prostitution etc.).
The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which provides for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitaton of neglected or deliquent juveniles contains a specific provision namely Section 13 which empowers a police officer or any other person or organisation authorised by the State Government in this behalf to take charge of any neglected juveniles and bring them before the Board constituted under this Act which Board under section 15 has to hold an enquiry and make such orders in relation to the neglected juveniles as it may deem fit.
Inspite of the above stringent and rehabilitative provi sions of law under various Acts, it cannot be said that the desired result has been achieved.
It cannot be gainsaid that a remarkable degree of ignorance or callousness or culpable indifference is manifested in uprooting this cancerous growth despite the fact that the day has arrived imperiously demanding an objective multi dimensional study and a search ing investigation into the matter relating to the causes and effects of this evil and requiting most rational measures to weed out the vices of illicit trafficking.
This malady is not only a social but also a socioeconomic problem and, therefore, the measures to be taken in that regard should be more preventive rather than punitive.
In our view, it is neither practicable and possible nor desirable to make a roving enquiry through the CBI through out the length and breadth of this country and no useful purpose will be served by issuing any such direction, as requested by the petitioner.
Further, this malignity cannot be eradicated either by banishing, branding, scourging or inflicting severe punishment on these helpless and hapless victims most of whom are unwilling participants and involun tary victims of compelled circumstances and who, finding no way to escape, are weeping or wailing throughout.
This devastating malady can be suppressed and eradicated only if the law enforcing authorities in that regard take very severe and speedy legal action against all the erring persons such as pimps, brokers and brothel keepers.
The Courts in such cases have to always take a serious view of this matter and inflict consign punishment on proof of such offences.
Apart from legal action, both the Central and the State Government who have got an obligation to safeguard the interest and welfare of the children and girls of this country have to evaluate various measures and implement them in the right direction.
868 Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) in Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India, while emphasizing the importance of children has expressed his view thus: "It is obvious that in a civilized society the importance of child welfare cannot be over emphasized, because the welfare of the entire community, its growth and development, depend on the health and well being of its children.
Children are a 'supremely important national asset ' and the future well being of the nation depends on how its children grow and develop.
" We, after bestowing our deep and anxious consideration on this matter feel that it would be appropriate if certain directions are given in this regard.
Accordingly, we make the following directions: 1.
All the State Governments and the Governments of Union Territories should direct their concerned law enforcing authorities to take appropriate and speedy action under the existing laws in eradicating child prostitution without giving room for any complaint of remissness or culpable indifference.
The State Governments and the Governments of Union Terri tories should set up a separate Advisory Committee within their respective zones consisting of the secretary of the Social Welfare Department or Board, the Secretary of the Law Department, sociologists, criminologists, members of the women 's organisations, members of Indian Council of Child Welfare and Indian Council of Social Welfare as well the members of various voluntary social organisations and asso ciations etc., the main objects of the Advisory Committee being to make suggestions of: (a) the measures to be taken in eradicating the child pros titution, and (b) the social welfare programmes to be implemented for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of the young fallen victims namely the children and girls rescued either from the brothel houses or from the vices of prostitution.
All the State Governments and the Governments of Union Territories should take steps in providing adequate and 869 rehabilitative homes manned by well qualified trained social workers, psychiatarists and doctors.
The Union Government should set up a committee of its own in the line, we have suggested under direction No.(2) the main object of which is to evolve welfare programmes to be implemented on the national level for the care, protection, rehabilitation etc.
of the young fallen victims namely the children and girls and to make suggestions of amendments to the existing laws or for enactment of any new law, if so warranted for the prevention of sexual exploitation of children.
The Central Government and the Governments of States and Union Territories should devise a machinery of its own for ensuring the proper implementation of the suggestions that would be made by the respective committees.
The Advisory Committee can also go deep into devadasi system and Jogin tradition and give their valuable advice and suggestions as to what best the Government could do in that regard.
The copies of the affidavits and the list containing the names of 9 girls are directed to be forwarded to the Commis sioner of Police, Delhi for necessary action.
We may add that we are not giving an exhaustive list of the members for the constitution of the committee.
There fore, it is open to the concerned Government to include any member or members in the committee as it deems necessary.
We hope and trust that he directions given by us will go a long way towards eradicating the malady of child prostitu tion, Tevadasi system and Jogin tradition and will also at the same time protect and safeguard the interests of the children by preventing of the sexual abuse and exploitation.
So far as the remaining prayer regarding rehabilitation of the children of prostitutes is concerned, we understand that a similar issue is raised in a separate writ petition bearing W.P. No. 824/88 pending before this Court and this Court is seized of the matter and also has given an interim direction on 15.11.1989 for setting up a committee to 870 go into the question from various angles of the problems taking into consideration the different laws relevant to the matter and to submit its report.
(Vide Gaurav Jain vs Union of India and Others, ; Therefore, we are not expressing any opinion on this prayer regarding the rehabil itation of the children of prostitutes.
With the above directions, the Writ Petition is dis posed of.
T.N.A. Petition disposed of.

summary:
The petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by way of public interest litigation seeking directions for (i) inquiry against police officials under whose jurisdiction the malady of forced prostitution, Devdasi system and Jogin traditions were flourishing and (ii) for rehabilitiation of the victims of this malady.
Disposing the writ petition, this Court.
HELD: 1.
The malady of prostitution is not only a social but also a socio economic problem and, therefore, the meas ures to be taken in that regard should be more preventive rather than punitive.
This cannot be 862 eradicated either by banishing, branding, scourging or inflicting severe punishment on the helpless and hapless victims most of whom are unwilling participants, and invol untary victims of compelled circumstances and who, finding no way to escape, are weeping or wailing throughout.
This devastating malady can be suppressed and eradicated only if the law enforcing authorities in that regard take very severe and speedy action against all the erring persons such as pimps, brokers and brothel keepers.
[867D; E G] 2.
In spite of the stringent and rehabilitative provi sions of law contained in Constitution of India, 1950, the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, it cannot be said that the desired result has been achieved.
It cannot be gainsaid that a remarkable degree of ignorance or callous ness or culpable indifference is manifested in uprooting this cancerous growth despite the fact that the day has arrived imperiously demanding an objective multi dimensional study and a searching investigation into the matter relating to the causes and effects of this evil and requiring the most rational measures to weed out the vices of illicit trafficking.
[867C D] 3.
The Courts also in such cases have to always take a serious view of this matter and inflict consign punishment on proof of such offences.
However, it is neither practica ble and possible nor desirable to make a roving enquiry through the C.B.I. throughout the length and breadth of the country.
and no useful purpose will be served by issuing any such direction.
[867G; 867E] 4.
Apart from legal action, both the Central and the State Governments have got an obligation to safeguard the interest and welfare of the children and girls of this country.
[867H] Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs Union of India, and Guarav Jain vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; , referred to.
All the State Governments and the Governments of Union Territories should direct their concerned law enforc ing authorities to take appropriate and speedy action under the existing laws in eradicating child prostitution without giving room for any complaint of remissness or culpable indifference.
They should also set up separate Advisory Committees for making suggestions for eradication of prosti tution, implementation of the social welfare programmes for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilita tion of the victims, and for 863 amendments of the existing law, or for enactment of any new law for prevention of sexual exploitation of the children.
These Governments should also devise a machinery for ensur ing proper implementation of the suggestions of their re spective committees.
[868D H; 869A E]