judgement:
vil Appeals No. 2290 (N) of 1970 and 97 to 99 of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.5.1970 of the Rajas than High Court in First Appeal Nos.
134, 119, 120, 121 of 1960.
Harish Salve.
Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the Appellants.
V.M. Tarkunde, V.C. Mahajan, S.K. Jain, S, Atreya, E.K. Gupta and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J.
Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in favour of the four sons of the Sovereign Ruler of the then State of Jodhpur in the context of an order Passed by the said Ruler, and in dismissing the suits instituted by them against the State of Rajasthan for the recovery of various amounts under the said order, it the problem in these appeals2 by the unsuccessful plaintiffs.
That order issued by the Ruler inter alia provided that an annual sum of Rs.30,000 be paid to each of his aforesaid sons (de scribed as Maharajkumars) by way of an annual allowance with retrospective effect from the date of their birth till the date of their attaining majority.
On September 13, 1946, some two and a half years prior to the merger of the then State of Jodhpur with the United States of Rajasthan (which event occurred on April 7, 1949), the then Ruler of 1.
Order No. C.B./7114 dated 13th September, 1946.
(exhibit 1).
By certificate granted under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
212 the said State passed order exhibit 1 which is the foundation of the suits giving rise to the present group of appeals.
The said order in so far as material reads as under: "His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur has been pleased to order that with a view to making suitable provision for the maintenance of younger Maharajkumar and Shri Baiji Lal Sahiba: (i) XXXXX (ii) xxxxx (iii) An annual allowance of Rs.30,000 per annum each be granted to all younger Maharajkumars from the dates of their birth for the period of their minority.
(iv) XXXXXX (v) xxxxxxx.
" The amounts claimed by each of the four sons in the suits instituted by them in 1955 was in respect of the claim for annual allowance by way of grant at Rs.30,000 per annum computed retrospectively from the dates of their birth till the date of the passing of the order, that is to say, till September 13, 1946.
The particulars relating to the claim may be tabularized as under: Appeal No. Name of the Date of Period or Amount before the appellant.
Birth which claimed Supreme allowance Rs. Court is claimed C.A. 97(N) Devisinghji 20.9.1933 20.9.1933 of 1972 to 2,34,550 13.9.1946 (13 years & 7 days).
Dalipsinghji 20.10.1937 20.10.1937 of 1972 to 1,61,050 13.9.1946 (8 years, 11 months & 11days).
C.A.99(N) Harisinghji 21.9.1929 21.9.1929 of 1972 to 3,06,500 ( 17 years & 10 days) C.A. 2290(1) Himmat 21.6.1925 21.6.1925 of 1970 singhji to 4,42,000 13.9.1946 ( 17 years & 10days) The following facts have been established: (1) Jodhpur was a sovereign State till April 6, 1949.
(2) The said Jodhpur State merged with the other Sovereign States to form the United State of Rajasthan on April 7, 1949.
(3) On April 7, 1949, an ordinance was promulgated which provided for the continuance of the laws of the covenanting States (which included Jodhpur State) in the United State of Rajasthan by virtue of Section 3 which provid ed inter alia, that all laws in force in the aforesaid covenanting States immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance shall continue to be in force.
(4) On April 7, 1949, administrators were appointed in respect of different States which had merged in the State of Rajasthan.
The High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the State and dismissed the suits instituted by the sons of the late Ruler of Jodhpur on the following reasoning: (1) The Order(Ex. 1), on the basis of which the claim of 214 the plaintiffs was founded was not passed by the then Ruler in his capacity as the Head of the State in the discharge of any legal li ability or obligation subsisting in favour of his four sons.
It was an ex gratia payment ordered to be made by him in his personal capacity as the father of the four plaintiffs and not in his capacity as the Sovereign Ruler of the State inasmuch as the order for payment was not supported by any law or custom having the force of law in the then State of Jodhpur.
The cash allowance ordered to be paid to the four plaintiffs as per Order (exhibit 1) retrospectively for the past period preced ing the date of making of the order was in substance a gift by the ruler in his personal capacity to his children and not an enforce able obligation incurred by the Sovereign Ruler vis a vis the plaintiffs.
(3) On the aforesaid premises the amount which had not yet been recovered in respect of the past period could not be recovered from the State of Rajasthan as there was no legal and enforceable obligation against the said State.
It was contended before the High Court that on taking into account the true nature of the order (exhibit 1) it was a law within the meaning of Section 3 (ii) of Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, the order had all the characteristics of law that is to say, of a binding rule of conduct "of the will of the Sovereign".
Since this was a law in the Sovereign State of Jodhpur, its operation continued on the formation initially of the United State of Rajasthan and subsequently of the State of Rajasthan.
The High Court negatived this contention relying on the law enunciated by this Court in a catena of decisions.
2 The view taken in the 1.
In this section "Law" means any Act.
Ordinance, regula tion, rule, order or bye law which having been made by a competent Legislature or other competent authority in a Covenanting State.
has the force of law in that State.
" 2. ; = ; of Gujarat vs Vora Fiddali ).
; = ; (Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo v State of Orissa) ; = ; (State of Madhya Pradesh vs Bhargavendra Singh).
; = ; (State of Madhya Pradesh vs Lal Rampal).
215 aforesaid decisions in substance was that every order passed by a Sovereign Ruler was not 'law ' inasmuch as it was not necessarily an order passed in the discharge of its legisla tive function.
The Ruler of the Sovereign State, when he passes an order, may be acting in any one of the three spheres namely, legislative sphere, executive sphere or the judicial sphere, though all the three capacities were com bined in him.
All the same, only that order would constitute 'law ', which was passed in exercise of the powers of the Sovereign in the legislative.
sphere, and none other.
An order passed by the Sovereign in his executive capacity, if it is not the result of a legislative process, and if it is not calculated or designed to bind as a rule of conduct, cannot be characterized as a 'law '.
If the result of the order was no more then to bring about a contract, or a grant or a gift, it would not constitute 'law '.
The High Court was right in taking the view that having regard to the language of the order itself, it appeared to be an executive order conferring a grant (or a gift) on the plaintiffs appellants.
It did not have the characteristics of a legislative measure and did not constitute a law inasmuch as it failed to pass the earlier mentioned tests evolved by this Court in the matter of State of Gujarat vs Vora Fiddali, (supra) and Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo vs State of Orissa (supra).
It appears to us that in fact the then Ruler of Jodhpur was making a gift in favour of the appellants.
It is evident from the fact that the amount ordered to be paid at the rate of Rs.30,000 per annum is in respect of the preceding years.
The four sons had.
admittedly, already been maintained and brought up with due dignity and decorum, prior to the pass ing of the order in question.
Since they had already been maintained in a manner and style befitting their status and dignity, at the expense of the State, there was no question of granting any allowance in respect of the (past) period during which they had already been maintained.
There is therefore no escape from the conclusion that it was by way of a gift albeit.
without saying so in so many words.
The fact that the expression 'gift ' has not been employed did not detract from this obvious conclusion.
It was an amount ordered to be paid by the Ruler to his sons.
It was clearly a gift, inasmuch as it is not shown that till the date of the order any obligation had been incurred by the grantor in favour of the grantees either under any law or under 1.
As per order Ex.1 dated 13th September.1946. 2.
As disclosed by the Budget Estimate of the State of Jodhpur recorded at exhibit A 10 to exhibit A 12. 216 any custom.
It has of course been argued on behalf of the appellants that under the 'custom ' of the State, the Ruler was bound to maintain his sons.
To say that the Ruler was bound to maintain the appellants is not to say that the Ruler was obliged to make a gift in respect of the past period during which the appellants had 'already ' been maintained.
It is not the case of the appellants, and there is no evidence to that effect, that there was a custom of making any cash allowance every year besides being main tained with due dignity and decorum at the cost of the State exchequer.
No such allowance was shown to have been made in the past.
What, it may be wondered, was the occasion for making a retrospective allowance for a period ranging from 8 years to 17 years by the Order (exhibit 1) at a point of time, just two and a half years before the merger '? In fact the circumstances might well give rise to an inference that it was 'gift ' being made in anticipation of the forthcoming merger.
Be that as it may, at best it is a gift which has nothing to do with any customery obligation of the Ruler to maintain the sons, which obligation was already fulfilled by the Ruler in bringing up the appellants with due dignity and decorum at the cost of the State for all the past years till the passing of the said order.
A communication addressed by the Chief Minister of the then State of Jodhpur to the Finance Minister prior to the passing of the aforesaid order: supports and strengthens the conclusion that the allowance which was ordered to be paid had nothing to do with the past maintenance as will be evident from the fol lowing extract the refrom: "His Highness has expressed a wish that 'his two sons Maharaj Kumars Himmat Singhji and Hari Singhji should now be placed on an allow ance to be granted by the State as a prelimi nary to their being given Jagirs later on.
His Highness ' idea is that if they receive an allowance and it is carefully husbanded they should accumulate some surplus to help them when they become Jagirdars.
His Highness considers that an allowance of Rs.5,000 per mensem in each case is the correct figure.
" We are therefore satisfied that the High Court was right in taking the view that the order for paying annual allowance at Rs.30,000 for the past years was not made in the dis charge of any legal liability or obligation of the Ruler under any law or custom having the force of law.
It was merely an ex gratia payment in the nature of a gift which could not dated 2.
Ex.1 217 be enforced against the State.
The relevant part of the order cannot be construed as a 'law ' obtaining in the then State of Jodhpur.
And accordingly it cannot be held that the said order continued to prevail as a 'law ' in the State of Rajasthan under the 1949 ordinance or any other law.
The order cannot therefore be enforced against the State of Rajasthan treating it as a 'law ' creating a legally enforce able obligation.
It was contended that the purpose of granting mainte nance allowance in cash to meet the expenditure from the civil list was to enable the junior members of the Ruler 's family to accumulate some surplus to help them when they become jagirdars in due course on attaining majority.
It was argued that if the allowance had been granted earlier, the allowance could have been accumulated by the beneficiaries and since it was not granted earlier, it was granted with retrospective effect.
We cannot accede to this submission.
In so far as it relates to the period anterior to the pass ing of the order (stretching from 8 to 21 years) it cannot be said to be an order passed in connection with the mainte nance of the junior members of the Ruler 's family for they had already been maintained at the expense of the State exchequer as revealed by the evidence, including the budget estimates.1 Another argument addressed by counsel for the appellants was that the annual allowance ordered to be paid to the junior members of the family of the Ruler has the same legal status as a 'Jagir ', and that the order granting such an allowance would have the force of law.
The submission is sought to be buttressed by two decisions of this Court.
In the first instance support is sought from Thakur Amarsinghji vs State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 S.C.R.p. 303.
This Court was concerned with the constitutional validity of Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act in Thakur Amarsinghji 's case.
In the course of the discussion, the Court had an occasion to consider the import of the expression 'Jagir '.
What emerges from the discussion is that the term 'Jagir ' originally connoted grants made by Rajput Rulers to their clansmen in lieu of services rendered or to be rendered.
With passage of time, the term 'Jagir ' came to be applied to grants made for religious and charitable purposes and even to non Rajputs.
The Court has then proceeded to make it clear that both in its popular sense and in legislative practice the word 'Jagir ' has come to be used as connoting all grants which conferred on the grantees rights in respect of land revenue.
And it was in this sense that the term 'Jagir ' was construed under Article 31A of the Constitution of India.
What is of significance is that jagir has been 218 associated with the grant in respect of land revenue.
Ac cordingly the Court proceeded to observe that considering the world jagir in that sense it must be held that a jagir was meant to cover all grants in which the grantees had only rights in respect of land revenue and were not tillers of the soil.
The expression 'Jagir ' would also be applicable to maintenance grants in favour of persons who were not culti vators such as the members of the ruling family.
However, the grant has been construed in relation to rights in re spect of land revenue recoverable from the actual tillers by intermediaries known as Jagirdars.
Testing the grant said to have been made under the order in question by the Ruler of Jodhpur in favour of the appellants, it is futile to contend that it is a grant of a 'jagir ' in this sense for no ques tion of alienation of land revenue in favour of the appel lants is involved.
All that the Ruler has done is to order that a particular amount of money be paid in respect of a specified period anterior to the date of the order at the specified rate.
There is nothing in Thakur Amarsinghji 's case which could come to the rescue of the appellants in support of the contention that the allowance in question would constitute a 'Jagir '.
It was argued as a matter of logical corrollary that since it was a jagir, the order confering the jagir could be construed as a 'law ' even if it was not a legislative measure promulgated by the Ruler.
Since the first premise that the allowance constitutes 'Jagir ' is found to be lacking in substance the submission urged as a corrollary of this premise must also fail to the grounds as a matter of logical necessity.
Reliance was also placed on Madhaorao Phalke vs The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1 S.C.R.p.
957 in support of the contention that the grant made in favour of the appel lants would constitute 'law ' and that the State of Rajasthan would therefore be under a legal obligation to make payment of the annual allowance to the appellants as provided in the order.
The submission, in our opinion, is not well founded.
Madhaorao 's case is not an authority for the proposition that any order passed by the sovereign directing payment of an allowance would constitute law of the State concerned which would have the force of 'law ' in the covenanting States by virtue of the provision made for continuing the existing laws in the covenanting States.
The question which had arisen before this Court in Madhaorao 's case was as regards the kalambandis ' issued by the then Ruler of Gwalior conferring a right to receive Rs.21 and annas 8 per month in favour of an Ekkan.
It may be mentioned that the Ekkans were a class of horsemen who formed part of the Peshwa 's Cavalry.
They were foreigners and they brought with them their own horses and accountrements.
After making an allowance for the fact that they would have to pay for the 219 maintenance of the horses, a provision for payment of Rs.21 and annas 8 per month was made, by way of 'Bachat '.
Whether the right to receive this amount was a statutory right, in other words, whether the kalambandis on which the rights were founded, constituted rules and regulations having the force of law was the problem posed before the Court in Madhaorao 's case.
The Court considered the nature of the provisions contained in the documents and came to the con clusion that the documents unambiguously bore the imprint of the character of a statute or regulation having the force of a statute inasmuch as it recognised and conferred: (i) hereditary rights; (ii) it provided for the adoption of a son by a widow of the deceased holder; (iii) it provided for the maintenance of widows out of the funds specially set apart for that purpose; (iv) it provided for the offering of a substitute when the holder became old or otherwise became unfit to render services; and (v) it also provided for protection in respect of the execution of decree against the amount payable under the kalambandi.
Having taken into account all these features of the grant, the Court proceeded to observe: "In our opinion, having regard to the contents of the two orders and the character of the provisions made by them in such a detailed manner it is difficult to distinguish them from statutes or laws; in any event they must be treated as rules or regulations having the force of law. " Far from supporting the claim of the appellants, the deci sion in Madhaorao 's case highlights the fact that the order in question providing for payment of annual allowance for the past years during which the appellants had already been maintained by the State exchequer lacks in the essential ingredients which would justify characterising the order as a rule or a regulation.
To put it somewhat crudely, divest ing of refinement, the order merely directs payment of a specified sum to 220 the appellants which payment has no nexus with any services rendered by them or any customary right enjoyed by them by virtue of their status as junior members of the family, but 'merely by reason of the fact that the appellants were the sons of the Ruler on whom the Ruler intended to confer cash benefit.
In our opinion, what has been granted under the aforesaid order is nothing but an ex gratia payment or a gift.
Lastly it was contended that the junior members of the family of the Ruler were entitled to a maintenance allowance during their minority as per the custom in the State and that they were entitled to grant of Jagir Upon their attain ing majority as per the same custom.
The allowance made to the junior members during their minority was treated under a separate head of the State Budget.
On these premises it ,was argued that the order in question must of necessity be construed as legislative in character.
We are not impressed by this submission.
The allowance made under the order had no nexus with any right to a jagir.
All the appellants were minors at the relevant point of time and they had not even become entitled to jagirs.
As discussed earlier the expres sion 'Jagir ' is apposite only in the context of alientation of land revenue recoverable from the tillers.
What was granted by the Ruler to the appellants had nothing to do with a jagir.
Even according to the custom pleaded by the appellants the question of granting a jagir would have arisen only after they had attained majority.
The payment which was directed to be made to them was not referable either to a jagir or to any other customary right.
It was merely a direction to pay a particular amount computed on a particular basis referable to a past period commencing from the date of their birth.
We are therefore fully convinced, and firmly of the view, that in substance the amount direct ed to be paid as per Order exhibit 1 was nothing else but a 'gift ' by the then Ruler to his sons, unrelated to any legal rights of the appellants.
And that it did not create any legal obligation enforceable against the State of Rajasthan inasmuch as the order in question was not a 'law '.
There is thus no substance in any of the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants.
The view taken by the High Court is unexceptionable and the appeals are devoid of merit.
We accordingly dismiss the appeals.
There will be no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Jodhpur was a sovereign State till April 6, 1949.
The said Jodhpur State merged with the other sovereign States to form the United State of Rajasthan on April 7, 1949.
On April 7, 1949, Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 was promulgated which provided for the continuance of the laws of the covenenting States (which included the Jodhpur State) in the United State of Rajasthan, by virtue of section 3 which provided, inter alia, that all laws in force in the aforesaid cove nanting States immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance shall continue to be in force.
On September 13, 1946, some two and a half years prior to the merger of the then State of Jodhpur with the United States of Rajasthan, the then Ruler of Jodhpur passed an order CB/7114 (exhibit 1) granting an annual allowance of Rs.30,000 per annum to each of the four Maharajkumars from the dates of their birth and for the period of their minori ty.
The amounts claimed by the sons by filing our different suits in 1955 were decreed by the Trial Court.
The appeals preferred by the State were allowed by the High Court hold ing that the order dated 13.9.49 granting the annual allow ance was not a 'law ' within the meaning of section 3 of the Ordinance.
Hence the appeals by certificate granted under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1 In substance the amount directed to be paid as per Order exhibit I was nothing else but "a gift" by the then Ruler to his.sons, unrelated to any legal rights of the said sons (appellants).
It did not create any legal obligation enforceable against the State of Rajasthan inasmuch as the order in question was not a 'law ' obtaining in the then State of Jodhpur.
And accordingly it cannot be held that the said order 210 continued to prevail as a 'law ' in the State of Rajasthan under the 1949 ordinance or any other law.
The order cannot therefore be enforced against the State of Rajasthan treat ing it as a 'law ' creating a legally enforceable obligation.
[216C D, H 217B] 1.2 Having regard to the language of the order itself, it appeared to be an executive order conferring a grant (or a gift) on the appellantsplaintiff.
It did not have the characteristics of a legislative measure and did not consti tute a law inasmuch as it failed to pass the tests laid down by the Supreme Court.
[215C D] State of Gujarat vs Vora Fiddali, ; = ; ; Narsingh Pratap Singh Deo vs Sate of Orissa, AIR = ; ; State of Madhya Pradesh vs Bhargavendra Singh, ; = ; ; and State of Madhya Pradesh vs Lal Rampal, AIR 1966 SC 821 = ; , referred to.
1.3 In so far as it relates to the period anterior to the passing of the order (stretching from 8 to 21 years) the order cannot be said to be an order passed in connection with his maintenance of the junior members of the Ruler 's family for they had already been maintained at the expense of the State exchequer as revealed by the evidence, includ ing the budget estimates.
[217D] 1.4 "Jagir" has been associated with the grant in re spect of land revenue.
In Thakur Amar Singhji 's case, the Supreme Court construed the term "jagir" in that sense only.
Though the expression "Jagir" would also be applicable to maintenance grants in favour of persons who were not culti vators, such as the members of the Ruling family, the grant has been construed in relation to rights in respect of land revenue recoverable from the actual tillers by intermedi aries known as Jagirdars.
Testing the grunt said to have been made under the order in question by the Ruler of Jodh pur in favour of the appellants, it cannot be said that it is a grunt of a 'Jagir ' in this sense, for, no question of alienation of land revenue in favour of the appellants is involved.
All that the Ruler has done is to order that a particular amount of money be paid in respect of a specified period anterior to the date of the order at the specified rate.
Further the order in question providing for payment of annual allowance for the past years during which the appel lants had already been maintained by the State exchequer lacks in the essential ingredients which would justify characterising the order as a rule or a regulation.
To put it somewhat crudely, divesting of refinement, the 211 order merely directs payment of a specified sum to the appellants which payment has no nexus with any services rendered by them or any customary right enjoyed by them by virtue of their status as junior members of the family, but merely by reason of the fact that the appellants were the sons of the Ruler on whom the Ruler intended to confer cash benefit.
[217F G, 218B D, 219H 220B] Thakur Amarsinghji vs State of Rajasthan, [1955] 2 SCR p. 303; and Madhaorao Phalke vs The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961] 1 SCR p. 957.
distinguished.


judgement:
Appeal No. 203 of 1986 'From the Judgment and Order dated 16.7.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 995 of 1985.
Manoj Swaroop and Ms. Lalita Kohli for the Appellant.
A.K. Gupta, Brij Bhushan Sharma and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondents.
227 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Allaha bad (Lucknow Bench) dated 16.7.85 dismissing the appellant 's petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution chal lenging orders for his eviction from the premises in dis pute.
Briefly the facts giving rise to this appeal are, that the appellant was a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.100 of house No. 293/246 situated in old Haider Ganj of which N.N. Meithy was the owner and landlord.
On Meithy 's death his heirs respondents nos.
3 to 12 became the owners of the house.
It appears that the appellant tendered rent to Prab hat Kumar respondent No. 3 but he did not accept the same.
The appellant made application before the Munsif under section 30(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The Munsif permitted the appellant to depos it rent and since then the appellant has been depositing rent in the Munsif 's court.
The respondent landlords served a notice dated 4.8.82 on the appellant on 9.8.82 through their counsel calling upon him to vacate the premises and hand over possession to them and to pay the arrears with effect from 18.10.1979 to 17.9.1982.
The appellant through his Advocate gave a reply to the notice on 6.9.82 stating therein that he was ready and willing to pay the rent, and if Prabhat Kumar Meithy, respondent No. 3 was willing to accept the rent he may inform the appellant within reasona ble time so that he may pay the same to him otherwise he would deposit the rent in the Miscellaneous Case No. 57/78 in the Munsif 's court.
The respondentlandlords did not give any reply to the appellant instead they filed suit for eviction.
Meanwhile the appellant deposited the entire amount of arrears in Munsif 's court on 6.10.1982.
The appel lant contested the eviction proceedings before the Judge, Small Causes Court on the ground that he was always ready and willing to pay rent and on landlords ' refusal he had deposited rent in the court under section 30(1) of the Act therefore he was not liable to ejectment The Judge, Small Causes Court decreed the suit on the findings that the appellant had committed default for a period of four months from the date of suit.
The appellant preferred revision before the District Judge which was dismissed on 22.2.85.
Thereafter the appellant approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking relief for quashing the order of the Trial Court as well as Revisional court.
A learned single judge of the High Court by his order dt.
16.7.1985 dismissed the petition on the finding that the appellant had failed to 228 tender the arrears of rent to the landlord within one month from the date of service of notice on him therefore he was liable to ejectment and the findings recorded by the subor dinate court did not suffer from any legal infirmity.
Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court and the courts below failed to appreciate that the appellant had all along been ready and willing to pay the rent to the landlords and in his reply to the notice dated 6.9.82 he had offered to pay the rent on hearing from Prab hat Kumar Meithy, respondent No. 3.
But since the appellant did not receive any reply he deposited the rent in Munsif 's court in proceedings taken under section 30 of the Act, therefore he was not liable to ejectment.
On behalf of the respondent landlords it was urged that all the three courts have recorded findings holding the appellant in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months on the date the suit was instituted, therefore the impugned Orders do not suffer from any illegality warranting interference by this Court.
Having given our anxious consideration to the submis sions made by the counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, and after considering the relevant provisions of the Act we are of the opinion that the High Court as well as the courts below have taken a too technical view in holding the appellant guilty of wilful default in payment of rent.
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 was enacted as the preamble indicates to provide, in the interest of the general public, for the regulation of letting and rent, and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith.
Section 4 imposes prohibition on a landlord to take or receive for admitting a tenant to any building any premium or additional payment over and above the rent payable by him.
Sections 8 and 9 provided for determination of standard rent in the absence of any agreement between the tenant and the landlord.
Sec tion 11 curtails right of a landlord to induct any tenant in a building in pursuance of an allotment order issued under sec.
Section 16 provides for allotment of building which may have fallen vacant or is about to fail vacant, or a part thereof to the landlord if he bonafide requires the same.
Section 20(1) prohibits institution of a suit by landlord for eviction of a tenant except on the grounds specified under sub sec.
Section 20(2)(a) permits filing of a suit by a landlord for the eviction of a tenant, after determination of his tenancy if the tenant is in arrear of rent for a period of not less than four months, and he has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month 229 from the date of service upon him a notice of demand.
When the tenant fails to pay arrears of rent within one month from the date of service of notice of demand the landlord is entitled to obtain decree of eviction but the legislature has provided another opportunity to the tenant to relieve himself from the liability of eviction.
Section 20(4) safe guards tenants from eviction if on the first date of hearing of the suit he unconditionally pays, or tenders to the landlord or deposits the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building together with inter est thereon @ 9% and the landlords ' costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount depos ited by him under sub sec.
(1) of sec.
If that is done the Court is bound to pass orders relieving the tenant from liability of eviction.
Legislative policy to protect the tenant from eviction is further evidenced from sec.
39 and 40.
Section 39 protects a tenant from eviction, it lays down that if a suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent was pending on the date of com mencement of the Act no decree for eviction shall be passed if the tenant deposited arrears of rent within one month from the date of commencement of the Act.
Section 40 also protects tenants from eviction in similar circumstances even at the stage of the pendency of appeal or revision.
Section 30 of the Act lays down that if a dispute or difference arises as to the entitlement of landlord to receive rent, the tenant may deposit rent in the prescribed manner and continue to do so in the Munsif 's court, until the landlord signifies in writing his readiness and willingness to accept the rent and if the landlord does not accept the rent it is open to the tenant to deposit the rent in Munsif 's court.
Once deposit is made under sub sec.
(1) the court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord and the amount so deposited may be withdrawn by him on an appli cation made by him to the court.
Section 30(6) declares that if deposit is made under sub sec.
(1) or under sub sec.
(3) of the Act in Munsif 's court it shall be deemed that the tenant has paid the rent to the landlord.
The deeming provi sion stipulates that if the tenant is permitted to deposit rent in court, it will amount to payment of rent to the landlord and no decree for eviction of tenant can legally be passed on the ground of arrears of rent.
The Scheme and structure and the policy discernible from the provisions of the Act, as discussed, unmistakably aim at regulating the conditions of tenancy, rent and pre venting eviction of tenants.
The legislature has taken care to make special provisions protecting the interest of ten ants from eviction while placing obligation on him to pay rent.
The right of a tenant not to be evicted and the prohi bition against a landlord from seeking eviction except upon specified grounds are 230 well protected by the provisions of the Act and the tenant is afforded opportunity to pay arrears of rent even after filing of the suit, and, in some cases even after a decree of eviction is passed.
The special provisions as contained in secs.
30(4), 30, 39 and 40 indicate the legislative policy to safeguard the interest of a tenant, who he depos its rent in accordance with those provisions.
The court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment.
Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy.
The courts must therefore keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provisions of the act to facts of each case.
In the instant case on the death of N.N. Meithy the original landlord, eight different persons respondents nos.
3 to 12 succeeded to him.
The appellant was in doubt as to which of them was entitled to receive rent, he made an attempt to tender rent to Prabhat Kumar, respondent No. 3 but he refused to accept the same, thereupon the appellant made an application under sec.
30(1) in the Munsif 's court and on the permission being granted to him he continued to deposit rent in that court.
It is true that on service of the landlord 's notice of demand on 8.9.82 the appellant did not tender the amount to the respondents, instead he gave a reply on 6.9.82 stating therein that he was willing to pay the rent to the landlord, Prabhat Kumar, respondent No. 3 if he expressed his willingness in writing to accept the same.
The appellant 's insistence in requesting Prabhat Kumar to signify his willingness in writing appears to be founded on the provision of sec.
30(1) of the Act.
It is noteworthy that in his notice dt.
6.9.82 the appellant had clearly stated that he was ready and willing to pay the rent to Prabhat Kumar if he signified his willingness in writing to accept the rent within a reasonable time otherwise he would deposit the same in the Munsif 's court in Misc.
Case No. 57 of 1978.
Admittedly the appellant 's notice dt.
6.9.82 was served on the respondent landlords but no reply was sent to the appellant, instead they filed suit for his eviction.
Since no reply was received by the appellant from the land lords he ,deposited the arrears of rent in the Munsif 's court in Misc.
Case No. 57/78.
In the face of these facts and circumstances it would be unjust to hold the appellant in arrears of rent, rendering him liable to eviction.
It is true that on landlord 's serving notice of demand on a tenant who may be in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and on the tenant 's failure to tender the rent to the landlord within one month from the service of the notice the tenant is liable to eviction, but in the instant case having regard to the special facts and circumstances available on the record we do not find that the appellant failed to tender the 231 rent to the landlords or that he was in arrear for a period of more than four months.
He was all along ready to pay and since the landlords did not give any reply to his notice dt.
6.9.82 he was justified in depositing the arrear in the Munsif 's court.
Since the deposit was made it must be deemed that the appellant had tendered rent to the landlords as contemplated by sec.
13(6) of the Act.
In this view the High Court as well as the courts below committed error in holding that the appellant had failed to pay arrears of rent for a period of more than four months and on that ground he was liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute.
We should not be understood to have laid down that the tenant should deposit rent in court instead of paying the same to the landlord.
Primarily a tenant is under a legal obligation to pay rent to the landlord as and when due and if he fails to pay the same on demand from the landlord and if he is in arrears for a period of more than four months he would be liable to ejectment.
Where there is a bonafide dispute regarding the landlord 's right to receive rent on account of there being several claimants or if the landlord refuses to accept the rent without there being any justifi cation for the same, the tenant would be entitled to take proceeding under sec.
30 of the Act and deposit the rent in court thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent to the landlord, consequently he would be relieved of his liability of eviction.
It does not however follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him.
The provisions of the Act safeguard tenant 's interest but it must be kept in mind that the landlord 's right to receive rent and in the event of the tenant 's being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months, his right to ,evict the tenant is preserved.
If the tenant makes the deposit in court without there being any justification for the same or if he refuses to pay the rent even on the service of notice of demand by the land lord, he would be liable to eviction.
However the question whether the tenant is justified in depositing the rent in court and whether deeming provision of section 30(6) would be available, him to relieve him from the liability of eviction would depend upon facts of each case.
As noted earlier on the special facts of the instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the appellant had relieved himself from the liability of eviction and he was not in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the High Court and the subordinate courts and dismiss the respondent landlords ' suit.
In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
A.P.J. Appeal allowed.

summary:
On the death of the owner, landlord of the tenanted premises, his heirs respondents, Nos. 3 to 12 became the owners.
The appellanttenant tendered rent to respondent No. 3 but he did not accept the same.
The appellant made appli cation before the Munsif under section 30(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972, who permitted deposit of the rent and since then the appellant had been depositing rent in the Munsif 's Court.
The respondentlandlords served a notice on the appellant calling upon him to vacate the premises, hand over posses sion and pay the arrears of rents from 18.10.1979 to 17.9.1982.
In his reply the appellant stated that he was ready and willing to pay the rent, and if respondent No. 3 was willing to accept the rent he may inform him within reasonable time so that he may pay the same to him otherwise he would deposit the rent in the Munsif 's Court.
The re spondent landlords did not give any reply to the appellant instead they filed suit for his eviction.
Meanwhile the appellant deposited the entire amount of arrears in Munsif 's Court.
The Judge, Small Causes Court, decreed the suit holding that the appellant had committed default for a period of four months from the date of suit.
The revision filed by the appellant was dismissed by the District Judge.
The High Court dismissed the petition of the appellant under Article 226 holding that the appellant had failed to tender arrears of rent within one month from the date of service of notice on him and, therefore, he was liable to ejectment.
In appeal to this Court on behalf of the appellant ten.ant it was urged, that the courts below failed to appre ciate, that the appellant had all along been ready and willing to pay the rent to the landlords and in the reply to the notice he had offered to pay rent on hearing from re spondent No. 3 but since the appellant did not receive any reply, he 225 deposited the rent in Munsil"s Court under s.30 and, there fore, he was not liable to ejectment.
On behalf of the respondent landlords it was urged that all the three Courts have recorded findings holding the appellant in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months on the date of the suit, therefore, the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality warranting interference by this Court.
Allowing the appeal of the appellant tenant, HELD: 1.
The High Court as well as the Courts below have taken a too technical view in holding the appellant guilty of wilful default in payment of rent.
[230B] 2.
The High Court as well as the Courts below have committed error in holding that the appellant had failed to pay ar rears of rent for a period of more than four months and on that ground he was liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute.
[231B] 3.
On landlord 's serving notice of demand on a tenant who may be in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months, and on the tenant 's failure to tender the rent to the landlord within one month from the service of the no tice, the tenant is liable to eviction, but in the instant case, having regard to the special facts and circumstances available on the record it cannot be said that the appellant failed to tender the rent to the landlords or that he was in arrear for a period of more than four months.
He was all along already to pay and since the landlord did not give any reply to his notice, he was justified in depositing the arrears in the Munsif 's Court.
Since the deposit was made it must be deemed that the appellant had tendered rent to the landlords as contemplated by section 13(6) of the Act.
[230H 231B] 4.
The question whether the tenant is justified in depositing the rent in Court and whether the deeming provi sion of section 30(6) would be applicable to relieve him from the liability of eviction would depend upon facts of each case.
The appellant, in the instant case, had relieved himself from the liability of eviction and he was not in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months.
[23IF G] 5.
The scheme, structure and the policy discernible from the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 unmistakably aim at regulating the conditions of tenancy, rent and preventing eviction of tenants.
The legislature has taken care to make special provisions protecting the interest of tenants 226 from eviction while placing obligation on him to pay rent.
The right of a tenant not to be evicted and the prohibition against a landlord from seeking eviction except upon speci fied grounds are well protected by the provisions of the Act, and the tenant is afforded an opportunity to pay ar rears of rent even after filing of the suit and, in some cases even after a decree of eviction is passed.
[229G 230A] 6.
The special provisions as contained in sections 30(4), 30, 39 and 40 indicate the legislative policy to safeguard the interest of a tenant, who deposits rent in accordance with those provisions.
The Court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment.
Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy.
The Courts must, therefore, keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case.
[230B] 7.
Primarily a tenant is under a legal obligation to pay rent to the landlord as and when due and if he fails to pay the same on demand from the landlord and if he is in arrears for a period of more than four months he would be liable to ejectment.
Where there is a bonafide dispute regarding the landlord 's right to receive rent on account of their being several claimants or if the landlord refuses to accept the rent without there being any justification for the same, the tenant would be justified to take proceeding under section 30 of the Act and deposit the rent in Court.
Thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent to landlord, consequently, he would be relieved of liability of eviction.
It does not, however, follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him and deposit the same in Court.
There should be justification for depositing rent in court, in the absence of any justifica tion, tenant would be liable to eviction.
[231C E]


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 575 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.3.1986 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.
W.P. No. 153 of 1986.
M.S. Gupte, Rajendra Desai and V.B. Joshi for the Appel lant/ Petitioner.
S.V. Deshpande, A.M. Khanwilkar and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID, J.
The same questions of law and facts are involved in these two cases.
One is a Criminal Writ Petition under Article 32 filed by the detenue 's wife and the other a Special Leave Petition filed by him against the Judgment of the Bombay High Court rejecting his plea to quash the order of detention.
Special Leave granted.
Both are being disposed of by this common Judgment.
We will refer to the detenue as the petitioner in this Judgment.
The petitioner was detained pursuant to an order of detention dated 15th January, 1986, issued by the Commis sioner of Police, Bombay who is respondent No. 2 herein, under Section 3(2) of the .
The grounds of detention are given in Annexure C.
The detention is based on three incidents; one on 16 9 1985, the other on 1 12 1985 and the third on 25 12 1985; the offences involved in the three cases being 324 & 336 I.P.C., 324 & 506(ii) I.P.C. and 452 I.P.C. respectively.
There are three cases pending in respect of these three incidents.
The order of detention discloses that the people within the jurisdiction of Bandra Police Station in Greater Bombay are experiencing a sense of insecurity and fear to their lives due to the petitioner 's activities which are "prejudi cial to the maintenance of public order in the said locali ties and areas.
" From the materials placed before us we find that the first two incidents involve the same person between whom and the petitioner there appears to be some enmity.
The third incident relates to some 223 other person.
The petitioner was an under trial prisoner at the time the detention order was made.
We do not think it necessary to go into all the grounds urged before us by the petitioner 's counsel in support of his prayer to quash the order of detention.
The one conten tion strongly pressed before us by the petitioner 's counsel is that the detaining authority was not made aware at the time the detention order was made that the detenue had moved applications for bail in the three pending cases and that he was enlarged on bail on 13 1 1986, 14 1 1986 & 15 1 1986.
We have gone through the detention order carefully.
There is absolutely no mention in the order about the fact that the petitioner was an under trial prisoner, that he was arrested in connection with the three cases, that applications for bail were pending and that he was released on three succes sive days in the three cases.
This indicates a total absence of application of mind on the part of detaining authority while passing the order of detention.
In our view this is the short manner in which the two cases can be disposed of.
If the petitioner is found dis turbing law and order or misusing the bail granted to him, the authorities would be at liberty to move the appropriate Court to get the bail orders cancelled.
One does not know how the detaining authority would have acted if he was made aware of the above details.
We are not satisfied that this is a fit case to resort to preventive detention.
We refrain from referring to the other grounds urged before us and from examining them.
The petitioner is entitled to succeed on the first ground.
We hold that there was clear non application of mind on the part of the detaining authority about the fact that the petitioner was granted bail when the order of detention was passed.
In the result we set aside the Judgment of the Bombay High Court under appeal, quash the order of detention and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith.
The Appeal and the Writ Petition are allowed without any order as to costs.
M.L.A. Appeal & Petition allowed.

summary:
The petitioner detenue was detained pursuant to an order of detention passed under section 3(2) of the .
The detention was based on three incidents in respect of which criminal Cases were already pending against the petitioner.
Before the detention order was passed, he had moved applications for bail and was released on three successive days in the three cases.
The detention order did not mention the fact that the detenue had made application for bail in the three criminal cases relating to the afore said incidents and was enlarged on bail.
The petitioner moved the High Courts for quashing the order of detention.
The High Court dismissed the petition.
The petitioner in special leave petition against the judgment of the High Court and his wife in a Writ Petition under article 32 of the Constitution prayed for quashing the aforesaid order of detention on the ground that there was clear indication of non application of mind by the detaining authority when it passed the detention order.
Allowing the petitions, HELD: (1) This is not a fit case to resort to preventive detention.
As there was clear non application of mind on the part of the detaining authority, the judgment of the High Court under appeal is set aside and the order of detention is quashed and it is directed that the petitioner be re leased forthwith.
[223E G] (2) There is absolutely no mention in the order about the fact that the petitioner was an under trial prisoner, that he was arrested in connection with the three cases, that applications for bail were pending and that he was released on three successive days in the three cases.
This indicates a total absence of application of mind on the part of detaining 222 authority while passing the order of detention.
[223C]


judgement:
No. 67 of 1985 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) Dr. Gaurl Shanker (Amicus Curiae) for the Petitioner.
Madhu Sudan Rao, Mrs. Kittu Kumarmangalam and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Harbhajan Singh Dhalla, the petitioner herein asserts that he is going from piller to post to collect Rs.27,000 which according to him is due from the Algerian Embassy, he further asserts that this is a case where a little man 's small claim is attempted to be thwarted by technical device.
He is an Indian National.
He had under taken general maintenance work at the Embassy of Algeria in India and at the residence of the then Ambassador of Algeria in New Delhi in the year 1976.
He claims that his rightful dues in respect of the said work runs into more than Rs.28,500.
He says that he has been deprived of the same.
He states that he is in search of a remedy but the remedy alludes him and his claim remains uninvestigated and unde cided.
117 The petitioner narrates his story that he had written to fail and sundry to extend some help in obtaining his dues but nothing tangible has resulted so far.
The petitioner had approached the Ministry of External Affairs for granting permission to sue the Algerian Embassy for recovering his dues.
After numerous letters and passage of number of years in the processing of his request,, he received a letter from the Ministry of External Affairs dated 26th November, 1983 which is Annexure 'A ' to the petition.
It states, inter alia. "After due consideration the Government of India regrets that permission to sue the State of Algeria cannot be given on political grounds".
It may be mentioned that according to the petitioner he had done the jobs of building maintenance, reconditioning and renovation work at the Embassy of Algeria and at the residence of the then Ambassador of Algeria in the year 1976.
He completed the work assigned to him and submitted the bills for Rs.29,000 which were not settled in toto and he claimed that even the sum of Rs.11,380 had not been.
settled by the Embassy.
The balance, according to the peti tioner, accumulated to Rs.27,000 at the rate of 18% inter est.
A representation was made to the Ministry of External Affairs. ' The Ministry delayed action and then allegedly took up the matter with the Algerian Embassy who in turn intimated the Ministry that according to the accounts main tained by the Embassy all bills pertaining to work done by the petitioner had been settled by the Embassy.
The Embassy further claimed to have issued a cheque beating cheque No. 245273 amounting tO Rs.17,500 in favour of the petitioner on 17th June, 1976 which, according to the Embassy, was en cashed by the petitioner the same day.
This fact was sought to be corroborated by the State Bank of India with whom enquiries were made by the Ministry of External Affairs.
The petitioner, however, claimed that though he received payment against this cheque, he had handed over the amount to the Financial Attache of the Embassy who paid him only Rs.3,330.
The petitioner alleged further that when he went to get the remaining amount, the financial attache had pointed a re volver at him and threatened him with dire consequences.
(See Annexure 'A ' to .the affidavit of the petitioner af firmed on 17th March, 1986 p.31 of the Paper Book).
The petitioner mentioned hereinafter that he had requested the Ministry of External Affairs to grant permission to sue the State of Algeria under section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure for realisation of the claim with interest.
The petitioner was given a hearing as required under section 86 of the Code, according to the respondent, on 2nd November, 1983, which is, however, denied by the petitioner.
118 According to the affidavit of the respondent, which is the Union of India, after giving due consideration, the Ministry was of the opinion that no prima facie case had been made out and it was decided not to grant permission to the petitioner.
After receipt of the official communication from the Ministry as noted above, the petitioner got an appointment with Late Smt.
Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and requested her for compensation from Prime Minis ter 's relief fund or some loan from any Nationalised Bank.
He further alleged that Late Shrimati Gandhi helped the petitioner to get a letter which was addressed to the Minis try of Finance but the appropriate authorities failed to acknowledge the grievances and demands of the petitioner.
In those circumstances the petitioner has approached this Court for issue of an appropriate writ.
A rule Nisi having been issued on this application, an affidavit on behalf of the respondent was filed.
In the counter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, the facts as mentioned hereinbefore have been reiterated and it was stated in the submission that the petition for recovery of the compensation as claimed was not maintainable.
It in volved the disputed questions of facts and there was no cause of action against the Union of India.
The petitioner filed an affidavit in reply.
There are certain annexures indicating as to what happened.
For the purpose of disposing of the present application, it is not necessary to refer to the same.
We have heard the parties.
We requested Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Senior Advocate of this Court, to help us as amicus curie since the petitioner was appearing in person.
He has rendered valuable assistance and we record our appreciation and gratitude for the same.
In this case two aspects require to be emphasized.
First is the right of a citizen to carry on his business and carry on trade freely subject to limitation under the law.
Our Constitution guarantees that right subject to certain limi tations as contained in the relevant articles of the Consti tution.
That right of the petitioner in this case was sub ject to the provisions of law controlling, restricting or inhibiting that right.
The petitioner states that he had performed the general maintenance work at the 'Embassy of Algeria and at the residence of the then Ambassador of Algeria.
He had therefore the right to be paid his reasona ble remuneration or dues in accordance with the law subject to the bargain between the parties and subject further to any reasonable 119 prohibitions or restrictions under the law of the country.
There are disputes in this case as we have noticed as to what is the amount due, if any, and further whether any amount was paid as asserted by the Algerian Embassy and as denied by the petitioner.
These disputes have to be resolved in accordance with the law of this country, both under the principles of Lex Loci contractus as well as lex situs.
The Union of India has indubitably the jurisdiction and obliga tion in the appropriate case to give sanction but the Union cannot in any arbitrary manner or administratively adjudi cate those disputes or determine the claim.
The petitioner wants to have the disputes adjudicated as he alleges that he has failed to realise the amount which, according to him, is reasonably and lawfully due to him.
The communication to the petitioner which is impugned in this application dated 26th November, 1983 states that "permission to sue the State of Algeria cannot be given on political grounds".
But in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India in these proceedings, it is stated that "The Ministry was of the opinion that no prima facie case was made out and the facts of the case were not superiorily covered under section 86 of Code of Civil Procedure.
It is submitted that under section 86, paras 86(1) and (2), the Central Government has discre tion to refuse consent as required under that section.
" In this application, the court is not concerned with the cor rectness or genuineness or otherwise of his claim or asser tion, except perhaps prima facie maintainability.
What concerns this Court is whether the. grievances of the citi zen of this country have been properly and legally dealt with.
Immunity of foreign States to be sued in the domestic forum of another State was and perhaps still is part of the general international law and international order and it is not necessary for the present purpose to consider its ori gin, development and the trends in different countries.
As Professor H. Lauterpacht writes in "The British Yearbook of International Law 1951" (Volume 28) on "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States" at page 230 the assumption of jurisdiction over foreign states by the domes tic court was considered at one point of time to be contrary to the dignity of the foreign states and as such inconsist ent with the international courtesy and the amity of inter national relations.
This has been in the past a persistent theme of judicial decisions.
It may be noted that in so far as the doctrine of immunity owed its acceptance to the decisions of the courts of the United States it is explained to some extent by the fact that it was by reference to dignity of the states of the Union that their immunity from suit was urged insistently and repetitiously.
During the debates preceding the adoption of the Virginian Convention in 1978, 120 John Marshall stressed the element of indignity inflicted upon a state by making it a defendant in an action.
(Elliot, Debates 2nd Ed. 1836, page 555).
It may be of historical amusement specially in the context of Indian Constitution and the growth and the history of the Indian Constitution to note that in the leading case of Chisholm vs Georgia, Dall, Page 419, 425(US) 1793, the main argument for the defendant state was that it was a 'degradation of sovereignty in the states to submit to the supreme judiciary of the United States '.
The courts of the United States have gone to the length of relying on the argument of dignity in the matter of immunity of foreign states from taxation.
In England, 'dignity ', coupled or identified with 'independence ', played an important part as an explanation of the doctrine of immunity of foreign states.
Esher L.J. in The Parlement Beige (1880) L.R. 5P.D. 197,207 had observed: "From all these authorities it seems to us, although other reasons have sometimes been suggested, that the real principle on which the exemption of every sovereign from the jurisdiction of every Court has been deduced is that the exercise of such jurisdiction would be incompatible with his regal dignity that is to say, with his absolute independence of every superior authority.
" In the said case, Lord Justice Brett at pages 2 14, 220 of the report referred variously to 'independence and dignity ' and to 'equality and independence ' as the basis of immunity.
To the same effect are the observations of Lord Macmillan in Cristina, at 498.
According to Professor Lauterpacht these strained emanations of the notion of dignity were an archaic survival and therefore these could not and should not continue as a rational basis of immunity.
The legal development of this aspect has been discussed by Sompong Sucharitkul in "State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law".
Professor H. Lauterpacht has also discussed this aspect in the said article "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States" in "The British Year Book of International Law 1951 .
The problem was also discussed by several High Courts and this Court.
These have been noted in the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in United Arab Republic and another vs Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani, AIR 1962 Calcutta 387.
In India where rule of law prevails, the foreign State ought to be entitled to such immunities but to no more as are enjoyed by the I domestic State before its own Tribu nal.
This was observed by Ray, J. 121 sitting singly, as the Chief Justice of India then was, in Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic and another, AIR 1960 Calcutta 768.
Lord Denning in Rahimtoola vs Nizam of Hyderabad and Another, [1958] Appeal Cases 379 at 418 observed in the context of English courts: "There is no reason why we should grant to the departments or agencies of foreign Governments an immunity which we do not grant our own, provided always that the matter in dispute arises within the jurisdiction of our courts and is properly cognizable by them".
Lord Denning noted in the said decision as early as 1957 that among the decisions of the English courts, one would not find consistency on this aspect.
Lord Denning was of the view that there was no uniform practice or uniform rule.
It may incidentally be noted that this was the opinion of Lord Denning expressed in the House of Lords.
Viscount Simonds in his opinion observed that he should not be taken to have assented to the views of Lord Denning upon a number of questions and authorities in regard to which the House of Lords had not the benefit of the arguments of counsel or the judgments of the courts below.
It is instructive to note what Lord Denning had to say on matters on which he had expressed views without the help of counsel of the parties.
Lord Denning concluded at pages 423 424 of the report as follows: "My Lords, I acknowledge that, in the course of this opinion, I have considered some ques tions and authorities which were not mentioned by counsel.
I am sure they gave all the help they could and I have only gone into it fur ther because the law on this subject is of great consequence and, as applied at present, it is held by many to be unsatisfactory.
I venture to think that if there is one place where it should be reconsidered on principle without being tied to particular precedents of a period that is past it is here in this House: and if there is one time for it to be done, it is now, when the oppor tunity offers, before the law gets any more enmeshed in its own net.
This I have tried to do.
Whatever the outcome, I hope I may say, as Holt C.J. once did after he had done much research on his own: "I have stirred "these points, which wiser heads in time may settle." (Emphasis supplied).
122 With the observations of Lord Denning on the question of immunity of the foreign states, the other Law Lords disassociated themselves.
Mr. Justice Bachawat, speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, rejected the contention urged by counsel in United Arab Republic and another vs Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani (supra) .
that the foreign State enjoyed the same immunity as a domestic state enjoyed and no more.
This decision came up in appeal before this Court in Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic and Anr,, 19 and this Court upheld the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court and held that section 86(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood at the relevant time was the statutory provision coveting a field which would otherwise be covered by the doctrine of immunity under International Law and save and except in accordance with the procedure indi cated in section 86 of the Code a suit against a foreign State would not lie.
Section 86 at the material time controlled the suits against foreign States and provided that no foreign state might be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Govern ment certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government save and except, certain specified type of suits, with which we are not concerned in this appeal.
Sub section (2) of section 86 of the Code stipulates inter alia, that no such sanction shall be given, unless the foreign State is in possession of immova ble property situate within those limits and is to be sued with reference to such property or for money charged thereon or by itself or another trade within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the courts in India.
In this case the petitioner had a right to carry on the work of maintenance and repairs in this country.
This right is granted to him under the Constitution and he trades within the local limits of the courts in India and the foreign State which he wants to sue has immovable property situate within the limits of this country.
There is dispute about the petitioner 's claim.
That dispute has not been judicially determined.
It has not been held that the claim of the petitioner is frivolous.
In that view of the matter, it appears to us that a foreign State in this country if it fulfils the conditions stipulated in sub section (2) of section 86 of the Code would be liable to be sued in this country.
That would be in conformity with the principles of inter national law as recognised as part of our domestic law and in accordance with our Con stitution and human fights.
the power given to the Central Government must not be exercised arbitrarily or on whimsical grounds but upon proper reasons and grounds.
The order merely states that the 123 Government could not grant the permission to sue the State of Algeria on political grounds.
In respect of a building where a masonary work was supervised by a contractor or an archi tect, how the dignity of a foreign.
state or relationship between the two countries would be jeopardised or undermined or endangered, it is difficult to comprehend or understand from this reason nor are the reasons explained or demonstrated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Government.
The reasons given in the counter affidavit on the other hand are different namely (a) the gov ernment found no prima facie ground and (b) the claim was outside the provisions of sec tion 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The second ground now stated is patently erroneous and contradictory to the ground mentioned in the letter dated 26th November, 1983.
One should have thought that the political rela tionship between the two countries would be better served and the image of a foreign State be better established if citizens ' grievances are judicially investigated.
This would also be in consonance with human rights.
Sub section (6) of section 86 enjoins that opportunity being given before passing of the order.
There is dispute in this application as to whether such reasonable opportunity was given.
The respondent Union of India asserts that such opportunity was given.
No satisfac tory evidence of such opportunity being given was produced before us.
The law on this aspect of sovereign immu nity in England is regulated by the State Immunity Act, 1978 which introduced or con ferred a number of exceptions to the basic rule of immunity.
Although the Act .was de signed in part to implement the European Convention of State Immunity, it goes consid erably further than the Convention in re stricting immunities See in this connection Diecy & Morris 'The Conflict of Laws, ' 10th Edition page 157 (Volume 1).
Dr. Gauri Shankar had drawn our attention to Maharaj Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh vs Secre tary, to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and another, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1663 which deals with the conditions under which sanction under section 87B of the Code are obtained and observed that in granting the consent, the Central Government was not to adjudicate upon the correctness of the claim.
The Court noted that the power conferred on the Central Government to refuse to accord consent to the proposed suit shall be careful ly exercised.
These principles would be ap plicable to the facts of this case.
It is true that these provisions both of sections 86 and 87 are intended to save the foreign states from harassment which would be 124 caused by the institution of a suit but except in cases where the claim appears to be frivu lous patently, the Central Government should normally accord consent or give sanction against foreign states unless there are cogent political and other reasons.
Normally, howev er, it is not the function of the Central Government to attempt to adjudicate upon the merits of the case intended to be made by the litigants in their proposed suits.
It is the function of the courts of competent jurisdic tion and the Central Government cannot under section 86 of the Code usurp that function.
The power given to the Central Government must be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice and in consonance with the principle that reasons must appear from the order.
We may note that in the counter affida vit we do not find any such cogent reasons or due consideration.
It is well to bear in mind the two princi ples on which sovereign immunity rest.
So far as the principle expressed in maxim par in parem non habet jurisdictionem is concerned with the status of equality.
The other princi ple on which immunity is based is that of non intervention in the internal affairs of other states.
See in this connection Brownlie "Principles of Public International Law" Third Edition 322 325.
Much has happened in differ ent States since Marshall, C.J. of the United States in The Schooner Exchange vs Mc Faddon, ; ; Green, p. 237 Briggs, p. 413; Bishop, p. 659 explained the principle and said that a state within its own territory as being "necessarily exclusive and absolute".
In the days of international trade and com merce, international interdependence and international opening of embassies, in grant ing sanction the growth of a national law in this aspect has to be borne in mind.
The interpretation of the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure must be in consonance with the basic principles of the Indian Constitution.
The expression 'political ground ' used in the communication of the Government noted before covers a wide range as explained in Aiyar 's Law Lexicon page 986.
It connotes without further particulars vague and fanciful attitude.
Corpus Juris Secundum Vol.
48 page 28 at pages 30 to 35 deals with the various kinds of remedies by a citizen against foreign state.
In granting of sanction or refusing sanction under section 86, the Central Government must bear these factors in mind.
In this case there is no provision of any appeal from the order of the Central Govern ment in either granting or refusing to grant sanc 125 tion under section 86 of the Code.
This sanc tion or lack of sanction may, however, be questioned in the appropriate proceedings in court but inasmuch as there is no provision of appeal, it is necessary that there should be an objective evaluation and examination by the appropriate authority of relevant and material factors in exercising its jurisdiction under section 86 by the Central Government.
There is an implicit requirement of observance of the principles of natural justice and also the implicit requirement that decision must be expressed in such a manner that reasons can be spelled out from such decision.
Though this is an administrative order in a case of this nature, there should be reasons.
If the admin istrative authorities are enjoined to decide the rights of the parties, it is essential that such administrative authority should accord fair and proper hearing to the person to be affected by the order and give suffi ciently clear and explicit reasons.
Such reasons must be on relevant material factors objectively considered There is no claim of any privilege that disclosure of reasons would undermine the political or national interest of the country.
In the aforesaid view of the matter we order as follows: 1. Order dated 26th November, 1983 at Annexure 4 to this Petition ' tion is set aside; 2.
Union of India is directed to reconsider the matter; 3.
The Central Government should also explore the possibilities with Algerian au thority of mutual settlement either by arbi tration or by other accepted legal norms; 4.
The Union of India should pass rea soned order in accordance with the principle of natural justice and keeping in view ' the trend and the development of the international law as noted hereinbefore We further direct that the Central Gov ernment in considering the question of accord of sanction should ignore the limitation of time that may have lapsed in view of the action taken in obtaining the consent in accordance with the principles of the Limita tion Act, 1963.
As the petitioner is appearing in person the Union of India should ensure in considering the case of the petitioner giving him proper legal assistance The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid manner.

summary:
The appellant, an Indian national who had undertaken general maintenance work and repairs at the Embassy of Algeria and at the residence of the then ambassador in New Delhi in the year 1976, in order to recover certain alleged payments due from the Embassy sought the consent of the Central Government under section 86(4)(aa) of the Code of Civil Procedure which was refused on "political grounds".
Hence the writ petition by the aggrieved citizen.
Allowing the petition, the Court, HELD: 1.1 Immunity of foreign States to he sued in the domestic forum of another State was and still is part of the general international law and international order.
In India where the rule of law prevails, the foreign State ought to he entitled to such immunities but to no more as are enjoyed by the domestic state before its own Tribunal.
[119E, 120H] Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic and Anr., ; , followed.
Cristina at 498; and Rahimtoola vs Nizam of Hyderabad and Anr., 1958 Appeal Cases 379 at 418, quoted with approval.
Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani vs United Arab Republic and Anr., AIR 960 Calcutta 768, approved.
115 1.2 Indian Constitution guarantees the right of a citi zen to carry on his business and carry on trade freely subject to certain limitations as contained in the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
In the instant case, the petitioner had the right to be paid his reasonable remmuner ation or dues in accordance with the law subject to the bargain between the parties and subject further to any reasonable prohibitions or restrictions under the law of the country.
The disputes that has arisen have to he resolved both under the principles of Lex Loci Contractus and lex Situs.
Since the disputes have not been judicially deter mined nor the claim held frivolous, a foreign State in this country if it fulfills the conditions stipulated in sub section (2) of section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure would he liable to he sued.
That would be in conformity with the Principles of international law as recognised as part of our domestic law and in accordance with the Indian Constitu tion and human rights.
[118G 119B, 122G] 1.3 It is true that the provisions both of sections 86 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure are intended to save the foreign states from harassment which would he caused by the institution of a suit but except in cases where the claim appears to he frivulous patently, the Central Govern ment should normally accord consent or give sanction against foreign states unless there are cogent political and other reasons.
Normally, however, it is not the function of the Central Government to attempt to adjudicate upon the merits of the case intended to be made by the litigants in their proposed suits.
It is the function of the courts of compe tent jurisdiction and the Central Government cannot under section 86 of the Code usurp that function.
The power given to the Central Government must he exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice and in consonance with the principle that reasons must appear from the order.
[123H 124C] Maharaj Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh vs Secretary, to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Anr., , followed.
1.4 There is no provision of any appeal from the order of the Central Government in either granting or refusing to grant sanction under section 86 of the Code.
This sanction or lack of sanction may, however, be questioned in the appropriate proceedings in court but inasmuch as there is no provision of appeal, it is necessary that there should he on objective evaluation and examination by the appropriate authority of relevant and material factors in exercising its jurisdiction under section 86 by the Central Government.
There is an implicit re 116 quirement of observance of the Principles of natural justice and also the implicit requirement that decision must be expressed in such a manner that reasons can be spelled out from such decision.
[124H I25B] 1.5 Though this is an administrative order, in a case of this nature, there should be reasons.
If the administrative authorities are enjoined to decide the rights of the par ties, it is essential that such administrative authority should accord fair and proper bearing to the person to be affected by the order and give sufficiently clear and ex plicit reasons.
Such reasons must be on relevant material factors objectively considered.
There is no claim of any privilege that disclosure of reasons would undermine the political or national interest of the country.
[125C] 1.6 The expression 'political ground ' covers a wide range and connotes without further particulars vague and fanciful attitude.
The refusal by the Central Government to accord its sanction to sue the foreign ambassador, in this case, is not in accordance with law.[124F, 125C]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No: 446 of 1973 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.11.1970 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 389 of 1967.
M.M. Abdul Khader and A.V. Rangam for the Appellant.
K. Ram Kumar and Mrs. J. Ramachandran for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
This appeal is by a certificate granted by the Madras High Court under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
The appellant is the State of Tamil Nadu.
The respondent is the Ahobila Matam, a well known religious institution.
The question relates to the applicability of the Tamil Nadu Inams (Assessment) Act, 1956 in regard to some lands situated in Narasimhapuram, Papanasam Taluk, Thanjavur District belonging to the institution.
The lands are covered by Inam Title Deed No.2214 dated July 29, 1881 granted by the Inam Commissioner to the Manager for the time being of Sri Ahobila Matam.
By the title deed, the Inam Commissioner, by order of the Governor in Council of Madras acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council, acknowledged the title of the Ahobila Matam to "a religious endowment or a Matam Inam consisting of the right to the Government Revenue on land claimed to be acres 28.11 cents of dry, 58.38 acres of wet and 6.83 acres of garden and situated in the whole village of Narasimhapuram besides Poramboke in the taluk of Kumbakonam District of Tanjore and held for the support of the Ahobila Matam" and confirmed the Inam to the Manager for the time being of the Ahobila Matam and his successor "tax free to be held without interference so long as the conditions are duly fulfilled.
" The extract of the Inam Fair Register mentioned in Column 8 that the grant was made by one of the Tanjore Princes, but that the purpose of the grant was not known.
It was presumed that the inam was conferred for the benefit of the Matam.
Column 13 mentioned the original grantee as the Ahobilam Servatantra Sri 235 Srinivasa Swami, apparently, the then Jeer of the Matam.
The recommendation of the Inam Commissioner in Column 22 was that the title deed should be issued in the name of the priest for the time being of the Ahobila Matam.
It was in pursuance of this recommendation that Inam Title Deed No. 22 14 was issued.
Consequent on the enactment of the Madras Inams(Assessment) Act, 1956, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kumbakonam made an order on February.
28, 1963 levying full assessment on the lands.
The levy of the assessment was questioned by the Ahobila Matam by a Writ Petition in the Madras High Court.
First, a learned Single Judge and then, a Division Bench of Madras High Court quashed the assessment on the ground that the proviso to s.3 (1) of the Act pre vented the levy of full assessment of lands held on service tenure.
The proviso to section 3(1) of the Act is in the follow ing terms: "Provided that in the case of an Inam granted on service tenure which is proved to consist of an assignment of land revenue only, no assessment under this sub section shall be leviable, and the inamdar shall be liable to pay only the quit rent, Jodi, Kattubadi or other amount of a like nature, if any, which he has been paying before the commencement of this Act.
" The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the Inam was granted on 'service tenure '.
The High Court took the view that the expression 'service tenure ' was not to be restricted to a service inam and that it would include any grant for the support of a religious or charitable institution.
For that purpose reliance was placed on the classification of inams in the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue.
The Standing Orders divided inams into unenfran chised service inams and unenfranchised personal inams.
Under the heading of unenfranchised service inams, religious and charitable inams were dealt with in Paragraph 54.
Para graph 54 enjoined a duty on the Collector to see that the inams confirmed by the Inam Commissioner for the benefit of or for service to be rendered to any religious or charitable institution or for the maintenance of irrigation works or other works of public utility; were not enjoyed without the terms of the grant being fulfilled.
Religious and charitable inams were further classified and in the first category we get inams granted for the support or maintenance of Hindu religious institutions, inams granted for the performance of a charity or service connected with Hindu religious institu tions and inams granted for any other Hindu charitable trust.
In the second category came the other inams.
We do not think that the classification of grants 236 for the benefit of a religious institution along with other service inams by Paragraph 54 of the Board 's Standing Orders throws light on the interpretation of the expression 'serv ice tenure ' in Madras Inams Assessment Act.
The expression 'service ' in connection with religious institutions has acquired a special and significant meaning and we do not think that we will be justified in ignoring the well under stood meaning given to the expressions 'service inams ' and 'service tenure ' over decades of years.
We must not also forget that the object of Madras Inams Assessment Act was to impose full assessment on Inam lands hitherto wholly or partly exempt from levy of land revenue.
As far back as 1934, the Madras High Court in Subramania vs Kailasanatha AIR 1934 Madras 258 (Venkata Subba Rao, J.), pointed out that there were three possible views that might be taken of grants made in connection with religious institutions: "First, that the land was granted to the institution, sec ondly, that it was intended to be attached to a particular office, and thirdly, that it was granted to a named individ ual, burdened with service, the person so named, happening to be the office holder, at the time of the grant.
This distinction between grants to institutions as such and grants made for the performance of service either by attach ing the service to a particular office or by naming the individual grantee and burdening the grant with service, the named individual being the holder of an office, for the time being.
In Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras vs Thadi konda Koteswara Rao, , a Division Bench of the Madras High Court considered a number of grants bearing these distinctions in mind.
Where the grant was "for the worship of the idol in the pagoda" or "for the nithya naivedya deeparathana" or "for the offering of daily nai vaidyam and deeparathana", the grants were construed as grants in favour of the institution and not as grants in favour of the office holder or individual burdened with service.
In other words, such grants were not treated as service inams but as grants in favour of institutions.
The decision in Hindu Religious Endowments Board vs Koteswara Rao, (supra), is the leading case on the subject and has been followed consistently all these years by the Madras High Court.
Lands granted to religious institutions (not either to the office holder or to an individual burdened with service) for the performance of worship in a temple or math have never been considered as lands subject to 'service tenure '.
The High Court referred to section 44(B) of Madras Act 2 of 1927.
We find ourselves unable to derive any assistance from that provision.
Section 44B provided for resumption and regrant of inams granted for the support or maintenance of a math or for the performance of charity or service connected with a math or temple.
We do not think that it would be proper for us to interpret the expression 'service tenure ' by refer 237 ring section 44B of the Madras Act 2 of 1927 where that expres sion is in fact not used at all.
We are, therefore, of the view that the proviso to section 3(1) is inapplicable to lands held by religious institutions and, therefore, the lands are liable to full assessment.
Shri Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent argued that the imposition of full assessment on lands held by the religious institution in the present case would be hit by article 26 of the Constitution which gives to every religious.denomination the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property and to administer such property inaccordance with law.
We are unable to understand how the mere imposition of assessment on lands held by a religious denominational institution can possibly attract the right guaranteed by the article 26 of the Constitution.
The burden imposed is a burden to be shared in the same manner by all the owners of the lands in the State and not a special burden imposed on the denominational institution.
Burden of that nature are outside the right guaranteed by article 26 of the Constitution.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the orders of the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court are set aside.
The writ petition filed in the High Court is dismissed.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The proviso to section 3(1) of the Madras Inams (Assessment) Act, 1956 provides that no assessment shall be leviable in the case of an inam granted on service tenure which is proved to consist of an assignment of land revenue only.
Certain lands were granted to the respondent Matam by one of the Tanjore Princess.
The purpose of the grant was not known but it was presumed to have been made for the benefit of the Matam.
The original grantee was the then Jeer of the Matam.
The Inam Title Deed granted in 1881 by the Inam Commissioner acknowledged the title of the Matam to 'a religious endowment or a Matam Inam consisting of the right to the Government Revenue on the said land held for the support of the Matam ' and confirmed the Inam to the Manager and his successor tax free.
Consequent on the enactment of the Madras Inams (Assess ment) Act, 1956 the Revenue Divisional Officer made an order in 1963 levying full assessment on the lands.
The writ petition filed by the Matam against that order was allOWed by the High Court on the ground that the proviso to section 3(1) of the Act prevented the levy of full assessment on lands held on service tenure.
It took the view that the expression 'service tenure ' was not to be restricted to a service Inam and that it would include any grant for the support of a religious or charitable institution.
233 In appeal to this Court under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, it was contended for the respondent Matam that the imposition of full assessment on lands held by a reli gions institution would be hit by article 26 of the Constitu tion.
Allowing the appeal by the State, the Court, HELD: The proviso to section 3(1) of the Madras Inams (As sessment) Act, 1956 is not applicable to lands held by religious institutions The inam lands in question are, therefore, liable to full assessment.
[237A] Three possible views have been taken of the grants made in connection with religions institutions: first, that the land was granted to the institution; secondly, that it was intended to be attached to a particular office; and thirdly, that it was granted to a named individual, burdened with service, the person so named happening to be the office holder at the time of the grant.
This distinction between grants to institutions as such and grants made for the performance of service either by attaching the service to a particular office or by naming the individual grantee and burdening the grant with service, the named individual being the holder of an office, for the the time being, places the former in a category different from service inams.
[236 D] In the instant case, the lands were granted for the benefit of the Matam.
They fall in the first category.
These cannot, therefore, be considered as lands subject to service tenure.
[234H, 236G] Subramania vs Kailasanatha, AIR 1934 Madras 258 and Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras vs Thadikonda Koteswara Rao, , applied.
The High Court was not right in interpreting the expres sion 'service tenure ' by referring to section 44B of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927 (Act 2 of 1927) where that expression is in fact not used at all.
The classifica tion of grants for the benefit of a religious institution along with other service inams by Paragraph 54 of the Stand ing Orders of the Board of Revenue also does not throw any light on the interpretation of the expression 'service tenure ' in Madras Inams (Assessment) Act.
The expression has to be construed with reference to the object of the Act to impose full assessment on inam lands hitherto wholly or partly exempt from levy of land revenue.
[236H, 235H 236 B] The mere imposition of assessment on lands held by a reli gious 234 denominational institution cannot attract the right guaran teed by article 26.
The burden imposed is a burden to be shared in the same manner by all the owners of the lands in the State and not a special burden imposed on the denominational institution.
Burdens of that nature are outside the right guaranteed by article 26.
[237C]