judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
308 313 Of 1977 Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th September, 1975 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. Nos.
1419/73, 467/74 and 522 of 1974.
L.N. Sinha, R.P. Singh, R.K. Jain, Suman Kapur, for the Appellant in CA.No. 308 of 1977.
R.K. Garg.
R.P. Singh, R.K. Jain & Suman Kapur, for the Appellant in CA.
309 of 1977.
600 R.K.Jain for the Appellant in CA.
310/77.
L.N. Singh and D.Gourdhan for the Appellant in CAs.
311 13 L.N. Sinha, D. Goburdhan for Respondents 3 7 in CA.
308/77 and for Respondents Nos. 2 6 in CA.
309/77 & for Respondents 2 to 4 in CA No. 310/77.
M.K. Ramamurthi D.P. Mukherjee for Respondents 12 13 in CA.
No. 308/77 & RR 9 10 in CA.
310/77.
U.S. Prasad for Respondent No. 4 in CA.
309/77.
G.L. Sanghi, Radha Mohan & M.L. Verma for RR.
1, 2 & 16 in CA.
309/77 & for R 11 in CA.
310 of 1977.
Jaynarain, R.P. Singh, R.K.Jain & Suman Kapoor for Respondents in CA.
311 313 of 1977.
A.K. Sen, Radha Mohan Prasad & M.L. Verma for RR.
1 & 2 in CA.
313 of 1977.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J.
This bunch of appeals is directed against a common judgment and order of the Patna High Court dated 8th September, 1975 allowing three petitions under article 226 of the Constitution in part.
The material facts to bring out the points for consideration in these appeals lie in a narrow compass.
The Public Works Department in Bihar had a very small mechanical organisation.
In 1962, however, it undertook the execution of a World Bank project.
In that connection a number of mechanical overseers were needed.
As the project had to be executed on an emergency basis within a short time and 601 `there being dearth of qualified overseers, persons who were working only as sub overseers or persons who had appeared at the diploma examination in engineering, but had not passed the same, were appointed against the sanctioned posts on a provisional basis.
There were some others who were also appointed as mechanical overseers on temporary basis in the World Bank project, a wing of the Public Works Department, after appearing before a selection committee duly constituted according to r.1, Appendix II of the Bihar Public Works Department Code, Ist Edn., 1958, Vol.
This rule reads: "All permanent appointments to the Bihar Subordinate Engineering Service either by absorption of temporary or work charged Overseers and Estimators, or by direct recruitment, will be made by the Chief Engineer, provided that in the case of direct recruitment (permanent or temporary) appointment will be made on the advice of the committee of senior officers constituted for the purpose.
The committee will constituted for the purpose.
The committee will consist of three members including the Chief Engineer, who will be the Chair man of the committee.
The other two members will be nominated by him with the approval of the Government in the Public Works Department from time to time".
The Chief Engineer by orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 appointed among others the following persons, already working as sub overseers in the department as temporary overseers against the sanctioned posts on their passing the diploma examination from the date of publication of their results of the diploma in mechanical/electrical engineering examination: 1.
Ramendra Singh 2.
Keshav Singh 3.
Bhola Nath Chaudhary 4.
Awadesh Kumar Singh 5.
Rajeshwar Sinha 6.
Ram Chandra Prasad 7.
Udai Narain Singh 8.
Sunil Kumar 9.
Rajnandan Pd.
Singh 10.
Gopal Ram 11.
Sidh Nath Singh 602 12.
Prem Chand Prasad, and many others who are not parties here.
It appears that a provisional gradation list of overseers was prepared.
Certain overseers who felt aggrieved by the provisional list made various representations and eventually a revised gradation list dated 17th November, 1973 was prepared, Some of the aforesaid twelve persons were promoted as Mechanical Sub Divisional officers by an order dated 13th March, 1974.
The revised gradation list dated 17th November, 1973 and the two orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 appointing the aforesaid twelve persons as temporary overseers with retrospective effect and the order dated 13th March, 1974 promoting some of them as Mechanical Sub Divisional Offers were challenged by three separate writ petitions: (1) writ No. 1419 of 1973 filed by Shyam Dayal Pandey, (2) writ No. 467 of 1974 filed by Ful Chand, and (3) writ No. 522 of 1974 filed by Jagdish Prasad and Mohammad Shamsuddin.
The respondents in the three petitions including the aforesaid twelve persons were common, though differently numbered.
It would be convenient to identify the parties with reference to the writ petitions.
The writ petitioners therein will be referred to herein after as the petitioners and the above mentioned twelve persons, whose retrospective appointment has been challenged, as the contesting respondents.
The case of the petitioners in the three petitions has been that they were appointed as mechanical overseers on temporary basis in the World Bank project, a unit of the Public Works Department after appearing before a selection committee duly constituted according to r. 1 referred to above.
The appointment of the contesting respondents by orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 with retrospective effect has been challenged on the ground that they were temporary mechanical sub overseers and had not got the requisite qualification for being appointed as overseers nor did they appear before committee as required by r. 1 of the PWD Code and in any case they could not be appointed with retrospective effect.
It was further pleaded that the contesting respondents were junior to the petitioners but in 603 the revised gradation list the contesting respondents were shown above the petitioners on the basis of the aforesaid two orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964.
The promotion of some of the contesting respondents as mechanical sub divisional officers was also bad on that account.
The contesting respondents as well as the State of Bihar filed a return justifying the appointment of the contesting respondents as well as the promotion given to some of the contesting respondents as mechanical sub divisional officer.
On the contentions of the parties, the High Court formulated the following points for consideration: 1.
Whether the impugned gradation list had been prepared in accordance with law? 2.
Whether the promotion of various respondents on the basis of the said gradation list is justified? 3.
Whether the appointment of the respondents was bad as they had not appeared before the selection committee? 4.
Whether the orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 appointing the respondents and some of the petitioners as temporary overseers from the date of publication of their result of diploma in mechanical/electrical Engineering examination, are justified and in accordance with law and whether the same could have been made the basis for preparing the gradation list? While supporting the appointment of contesting respondents on merits two preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the contesting respondents about the maintainability of the writ petitions: 1.
None of the requisites of r. 1 of the PWD Code was complied with while constituting the selection committee and this being the position the petitioners themselves were not selected by 604 a duly constituted committee, and, therefore, they had no right to assail the gradation list and to challenge the appointment of the contesting respondents under article 226 of the Constitution.
The petitioners could not challenge the gradation list without assailing the orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 on which the gradation list was based, and the petitioners could not be allowed to assail those orders after a lapse of about 10 years and if they were allowed to challenge the gradation list that would virtually amount to permitting the petitioners to challenge those orders.
The High Court overruled both the preliminary objections.
The first preliminary objection was overruled on the ground that the requirements of r. I of the PWD Code are not mandatory, they are merely departmental instructions which had not acquired the statutory force and the petitioners could not be non suited merely because there was no compliance of r. 1 of the Code.
The second preliminary objection was also overruled on the grounds: (a) that the petitioners had not prayed for the quashing of the entire orders but they were aggrieved only with that portion of the orders by which the contesting respondents were appointed retrospectively from the date of the publication of the results of diploma in mechanical/electrical engineering examination, which affected the seniority of the petitioners in the revised gradation list:(b) that the petitioners came to know of the two orders after the preparation of the revised gradation list on 17th November, 1973 wherein the contesting respondents were placed above the petitioners; (c) that the Court was mainly concerned with the revised gradation list, but with a view to find out the basis for preparation of the revised gradation list, the Court had to examine as to whether the retrospective appointment of the contesting respondents by the aforesaid two orders in the circumstances was valid.
If the Court holds that they could not have been appointed retrospectively that would simply change their position in the revised gradation list and that would not affect the appointment of the contesting respondents; and (d) that ignoring the claim of the petitioners on the ground of laches or delay is not a rule of law but a rule of practice.
Coming to the merits, the appointment of the contesting respon 605 dents was challenged by the petitioners on the ground that they had not appeared before the selection committee as required by r. 1 and therefore their appointment was illegal and at any rate they could not have been placed higher than the Petitioners in the revised gradation list.
The High Court negatived the contention on the self same ground on which the preliminary objection No. 1 was overruled.
Rule I of the PWD Code was merely a departmental instruction and it had not acquired.
the statutory force therefore, the appointment of the contesting respondents could not be held to be invalid merely because they had not appeared before the selection committee.
Besides, there was no such stipulation in their initial order of appointment nor were they called for appearing before the selection committee.
Keshav Singh and Sunil Kumar, two of the contesting respondents and one Shyam Dayal Pandey, one of the petitioners in one of the writ petitions, who were placed in similar situation as the contesting respondents who were placed in similar situation as the contesting respondents appeared before the selection committee but it was due to some misunderstanding on the part of the Executive Engineer (Workshop Division) under whom they happened to be posted although their original letter of appointment contained no such stipulation that they would have to appear before the selection committee.
On the crucial point Whether the two orders dated 18th August and 26th September 1964 making retrospective appointments were the various authorities cited before it.
The Court further held that the petitioners were initially appointed provisionally but after they appeared before the selection committee they were appointed temporally and, therefore, the services of the petitioners from the date of their appointment could be counted while fixing their seniority, whereas those of the contesting respondents, who were provisionally appointed could not have been counted for fixing their seniority.
It also held that the revised gradation list showing the contesting respondents above the petitioners on the basis of the two orders dated 18th August and 26th September 1964 was bad in law.
Consequently, the High Court quashed only that part ofeth 606 two orders which had fixed the date of publication of the result of diploma in mechanical/electrical engineering examination as the date of commencement of length of services of temporary overseers.
The seniority list prepared in pursuance of the order dated 17th November 1973, insofar as it relates to the contesting respondents vis a vis the petitioners in the three petitions was also quashed.
The order of promotion of some of the contesting respondents, namely, Ramendra Singh, Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Prasad and Udai Narain Singh was also quashed.
The contesting respondents have now come to challenge the order of the High Court by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution.
The State of Bihar has also filed three separate appeals against the same order and for the same relief.
The crucial question for consideration in this case is whether the appointment of the contesting respondents, arrayed as appellants in the first batch of three appeals, by the two orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964, with retrospective effect is bad in law.
Shri A.K. Sen along with Shri G.L. Sanghi appearing for the petitioners, now arrayed as respondents in these appeals supported the judgment of the High Court.
Their main contention was that the contesting respondents had not acquired the requisite qualification on the date of their appointment and, therefore, their appointment by orders dated 16th August and 26th September, 1964, with retrospective effect was in the teeth of r. 1 of the PWD Code, and in any case there can be no retrospective appointment of the contesting respondents from the date of passing their diploma examination inasmuch as it affected the seniority of the petitioners in the revised gradation list.
Shri Lal Narain Sinha assisted by She R.K. Garg appearing for the (petitioners) contesting respondent appellants, raised the following three contentions: 1.
The impugned orders are about ten years old and the petitioners could not be permitted to challenge those orders after the lapse of such a long time.
607 2.
The High Court itself had made a discrimination inasmuch as the writ petitions against Keshav Singh and Awadesh Kumar Singh have already been dismissed.
In the absence of any statutory rule or rules framed under article 309 of the Constitution, it was open to the Government to make appointments to suit the exigencies of the situation.
The High Court has given detailed reasons for not accepting the contention of undue deal in filing the writ petitions.
It is not necessary to repeat those grounds over again.
We fully agree with the view taken by the High Court that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners could not be dismissed on the ground of laches.
As regards the second contention of Shri Lal Narain Singh, we are of the view that the mere fact that the writ petitions have been dismissed against Keshav Singh and Awadesh Kumar Singh, will not be a ground for setting aside the impugned order of the High Court.
The contesting respondents have to show that the two orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 making retrospective appointments were valid one.
As regards the third contention, Shri Lal Narain Sinha submits that the executive power of the State is co extensive with its legislative power and therefore if the State can pass an enactment so also it can pass orders in exercise of its executive power, as contemplated by article 162 of the Constitution to suit the exigencies of a particular situation.
In the instant case, as stated earlier, the World Bank project was undertaken by the PWD in 1962.
A large number of mechanical overseers were needed as the project had to be executed on emergency basis within a short time and there being dearth of qualified hands persons who were working only as sub overseers or who had appeared at the diploma examination but had not passed were appointed against sanctioned posts and were permitted to draw the pay scale of overseers from the date of the passing of the diploma examination.
There is no denying the fact that the executive power of the 608 State is in no way narrower than the legislative power.
But the question is whether in exercise of that power the State in violation of article 16 of the Constitution could make retrospective appointment of the contesting respondents in the instant case so as to affect seniority of the petitioners.
For the respondents reliance was placed on State of Punjab vs Kishan Dass.
In that case pursuant to certain charges against a police constable his entire service with permanent effect was forfeited, which meant reducing his salary to the starting point in the time scale for constables.
The constable challenged the order by filing a regular suit.
The two courts below decreed the suit holding that there was flagrant violation of article 311 (2) of the Constitution as the impugned order amounted to reduction in rank.
This Court interpreted the expression 'reduction in rank ' and held: "The expression 'reduction in rank ' in the article, therefore means reduction from a higher to a lower rank or post when imposed as a penalty.
Therefore, an order forfeiting the past service which has earned a government servant increments in the post or rank he holds, however adverse it is to him, affecting his seniority within the rank to which he belongs, or his future chances of promotion does not attract the article.
His remedy, therefore, is confined to the rules of service governing his post.
" The impugned orders in the instant case may not have resulted in reduction of rank but all the same they affected the seniority of the petitioners which eventually might result in reducing their chances for promotion.
Reliance was next placed on B.N. Nagarajan & Ors.
vs State of Mysore & Ors.
One of the arguments advanced in that case was that till the rules are made in that behalf no recruitment could be made to any service.
This argument was, however, repelled by this Court, firstly because, it was not obligatory under proviso to article 309 to make rules of recruitment, etc.
before a service could be constituted or a 609 post created or filled; secondly the State Government had executive power in relation to all matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has power to make rules; and it follows from this that the State Government will have executive power in respect of List II, Entry 41, State public Services.
Relying on Ram Jawaya Kapoor vs State of Punjab.
Ram was held that it was not necessary that there should be a law already in existence before the executive is enabled to function and that the powers of the executive were limited merely to the carrying out of these laws.
There was nothing in the terms of article 309 of the Constitution which abridges the power of the executive to act under article 162 of the Constitution without a law.
The Court, however, put a word of caution in mentioning that if there is statuary rule or an Act on the matter, the Executive must abide by that Act or rule and it could not in exercise of executive power under article 162 of the Constitution ignore or act contrary to that rule or Act.
The second contention in the above case was that the Executive could not frame rules retrospectively unless the Act specifically empowers it to do so.
This Court, however, refrained from deciding this point because in their opinion the appeal could be disposed of on another ground.
This Court observed that assuming for the sake of argument that the Mysore State Government could not make rules retrospectively and that the rules were thus void so far as they operated retrospectively, proceeded to ignore those rules and to examine whether the appointments made on October 31, 1961 could be upheld.
The Court came to the conclusion that those appointments could be considered to have been validly made in exercise of the executive power of the State under article 162 of the Constitution.
For the appellants strong reliance was also placed upon Rajendra Narain Singh & Ors.
vs State of Bihar & Ors.
It was laid down in that case that in the absence of any legislation on the subject or a rule framed under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution, the State Government could regulate its public services in the exercise of its executive power.
In the above case there was no statute or any rule framed under the provision to article 309 to determine the seniority as between the direct recruits and the promotees.
The determination of the seniority on the 610 basis of continuous officiation was held to be valid on the basis of the decision in S.B. Patwardhan 's case.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the executive power of the State is co extensive with the legislative power, but whether the exercise of the power can be in such a way as to offend article 16 of the Constitution.
The retrospective appointment of the respondents in the aforesaid writ petitions affected the seniority of the respondents.
This question, however, need not detain us as the point in question is covered by R.N. Nanjundappa vs T. Thimmiah & Anr.
In that case the respondent Thimmiah was appointed through the Public Service Commission as an Assistant Geologist in the Department of Geology in the Mysore Government in 1951 in the grade of Rs. 125 10 175.
When the Kolar Gold Fields School of Mines was set up in July 1957 the respondent was sent on deputation for two years as Vice principal of the School of Mines.
When the then Principal of the School of Mines, who was employed on a part time basis on an allowance of Rs. 200/ left on 22nd July 1958, the respondent who was Vice Principal and was also doing the duties of Principal since 15th February 1958, was appointed as officiating Principal with effect from 22nd July, 1958 in the grade of Rs. 500 30 800 by an order dated 25th September, 1958.
On 3rd April, 1959 the State Government in modification of the notification dated 25th September, 1958 appointed the respondent as temporary officiating Principal with effect from 15th February, 1958.
The Mysore Education Department Service Rules 1967 regularised the appointment of the respondent.
The relevant portion of the Rules reads: "Notwithstanding any rule made under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution of India, or any other rules or Order in force at any time, Dr. T. Thimmiah, B.Sc. (Hons.) Ph.D. (Lond.) F.G.S. shall be deemed to have been regularly appointed as Principal, School of Mines, Oragaum, Kolar Gold Fields, with effect from 15 2 1958.
" This rule was challenged by the appellants on various grounds: 611 (a) That the respondent was governed by the Mysore Service Regulations, 1943, the Mysore State Civil Services General Recruitment) Rules, 1957 as well as the Mysore Education Department Services (Technical Education Department) (Recruitment) Rules, 1964.
(b) That the respondent was in Class III service and his appointment by the impugned regulation amounted to his promotion from Class III service to Class I.
If so, it is hedged by two limitations as contemplated by sub clauses (a) and (b) of rule 4 (3) of the Mysore State Civil Services Rules, 1957, i.e. (1) it has to be on the basis of merit and suitability with due regard to seniority from among persons eligible for promotion, and (2) it has to be on the basis of seniority cum merit from among persons eligible for promotion.
The stand of the respondent, however, was that (1) he was a local candidate in service and, therefore, the aforesaid rules did not apply to him and the regularisation of his appointment was valid; (2) under article 162 of the Constitution regularisation would in itself be a mode of exercise of power of appointment of the Executive Government.
Such an appointment even if made in the shape of rules under article 309 could not be attacked on the ground of being made for one person just as a piece of legislation could not be attacked on the ground of being made for a particular person or entity.
The High Court came to the conclusion that the appointment of the respondent could be regularised with effect from any date as he was a local candidate within the meaning of the Mysore Government Seniority Rules, 1957.
This Court in appeal, however, reversed the judgment of the High Court and observed: "No one can deny the power of the Government to appoint.
If it were a case of direct appointment or if it were a case of appointment of a candidate by competitive examination or if it were a case of appointment by selection recourse to rule under Article 309 for regularisation would not be necessary.
Assume that rules under Article 309 could be made in respect of appointment of one man but there are two limitations.
Article 309 speaks of 612 rules for appointment and general conditions of service.
Regularisation of appointment by stating that notwithstanding any rules the appointment is regularised strikes at the root of the rules and if the effect of the regularisation is to nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules, the rule itself is open to criticism on the ground that it is in violation of current rules.
Therefore the relevant rules at the material time as to promotion and appointment are infringed and the impeached rule cannot be permitted to stand to operate as a regularisation of appointment of one person in utter defiance of rules requiring consideration of seniority and merit in the case of promotion and consideration of appointment by selection or by competitive examination".
The Court gave further reasons for holding the regularisation to be bad in law.
It observed: "This regularisation is bad for the following reasons, First, regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment.
Secondly, the modes of appointment are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade, by transfer, from any other service of the State.
The Government did not contend it to be a case of promotion.
If it were a case of promotion it would not be valid because it would be a promotion not on the basis of seniority cum merit but a promotion of some one who was in Class III to Class I. Even with regard to appointment under rule 16 by transfer of a person holding an equivalent grade the appointment would be offending the rules because it would not be transfer from an equivalent grade.
Again, merit and seniority could not be disregarded because the respondent was not in the same class as the Principal of the School of Mines.
The pay of the Principal was Rs. 500 800 where as the respondent was getting a salary of Rs. 165 in the grade of Rs. 125 165 plus an allowance of Rs. 75".
The Court also brought out the distinction between the scope of article 309 and article 162 of the Constitution.
It observed: 613 "There were 1957 rules which spoke of appointment by competitive examination or by selection or by promotion.
Even if specific rules of recruitment for such services were not made the rule as to appointment by competitive examination or Selection or by promotion was there.
Article 162 does not confer power of regularisation.
Article 162 does not confer ' power on the Government to make rules for the recruitment or conditions of service.
Rules are not for the purpose of validating an illegal appointment or for making appointments or promotions or transfer.
Rules under Article 309 are for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment.
Therefore, regularisation by the way of rules under Article 309 in the present case by stating that notwithstanding anything in the rules the appointment of the respondent was being regularised was in itself violation of the rules as to appointment and as to cadre and also as to the proper selection".
In view of this clear authority, it cannot be argued for the appellants that they could be appointed with retrospective effect so as to affect the seniority of the respondents.
The orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 which purported to appoint the sub overseers named therein as temporary overseers from the date of Publication of their result of diploma examination are clearly violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioners had already been appointed as overseers by selection committee constituted under the rules contained in P.W.D. Code.
The order of temporary appointment by the impugned orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 conferred national seniority on the contesting respondents for the period while they were actually working as sub overseers in the lower scale outside the cadre of overseers.
The High Court in our opinion was fully justified in allowing the writ petitions in part.
For the reasons given above the appeals must fail.
They are accordingly dismissed.
In the circumstances of the case, however, we allow the parties to bear their own costs.
P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.

summary:
In connection with the execution of a World Bank Project on an emergency basis, which was required to be completed within a short time, the Public Works Department of the State needed a number of mechanical overseers.
Since at that time there was acute shortage of qualified overseers the Department had appointed, as overseers on provisional basis against the sanctioned posts, certain persons who were working in the department as sub overseers even though they had only appeared in the diploma examination in engineering but had not yet passed it.
In the meantime, the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were selected by a Selection Committee constituted in accordance with he procedure laid down in Bihar Public Works Department Code.
After they passed the diploma examination the Chief Engineer had in 1964 appointed the appellants (contesting respondents before the High Court) as temporary overseers against the sanctioned posts from the date of publication of results of the diploma examination.
In 1973, a gradation list was prepared and some of the appellants were subsequently promoted to higher posts.
The respondents in a writ petition filed in the High Court had impugned the order of the Chief Engineer appointing the appellants reproductively as overseers on the ground that while they were appointed after following the procedure prescribed under the rules, the appellants at the time of their appointment as overseers were neither qualified to be appointed as overseers nor were they selected by a Selection Committee constituted under the rules and that in any event the appellants could not be appointed with retrospective effect.
Secondly, though the appellants shown as seniors to the respondents by the Chief Engineer 's orders of 1964, the appellants were in fact junior to them and that their later promotion was improper.
The High Court held that the Public Works Department Code in accordances with which the respondents were recruited directly contained merely departmental instructions and had not acquitted statutory force and that, therefore, the appointment of the appellants could not be held to be invalid on the ground that the department had no power to make retrospective appointments.
It however held that the revised gradation list, showing the appellants above the respondents, on the basis of the 1964 orders was bad in law.
Consequently, the High Court quashed that part of the two orders which had fixed the date of publication of the result of diploma examination as the commencement of length of service of temporary overseers.
599 In appeal to this Court is was contended on behalf of the appellants that since the executive power of the State is co extensive with its legislative power, in the absence of a statutory rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, it was open to the executive, in exercise of its executive power under article 162 of the Constitution, to make appointment to meet the exigencies of a situation.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: The impugned order of 1964 which purported to appoint the sub overseers as temporary overseers from the date of publication of their result of diploma examination are clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution inasmuch as the respondents had already been appointed as overhears by a Selection Committee constituted under the rules contained in the public Works Department Code.
The 1964 order making the temporary appointments conferred national seniority on the appellants for the period they are actually working as sub overseers in the lower scales outside the cadre of overseers.
The impugned orders may not have resulted in reduction of rank but yet they did affect the seniority of the respondents which eventually might result in reducing their chances for promotion.
[613 D F] There is no gain saying the fact that the executive power of the State is co extensive with the legislative power and that it is not necessary that there should be a law in existence before the executive is enabled to function and the power of the executive is limited merely to the carrying out of the laws.
There is nothing in terms of Article 309 which abridges the powers of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law but yet if there is a statutory rule or an Act on a matter the exercise of its executive power under article 162, ignore or act contrary to that Rule or Act. [609 B C] B.N. Nagarajan & Ors.
vs State of Mysore & Ors.
; Ram Jawaya Kapur vs State of Punjab ; Rajendra Narain Singh & Ors.
vs State of Bihar & Ors.
; ; S.B. Patwardhan 's case ; and R.N. Nanjundappa vs T. Thimmiah & Anr.[1972] 2 SCR 799, referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal Nos.
1233 1237 of 1973.
Appeals from the Judgment and order dated the 5th May, 1972 of the Patna High Court in Tax Cases Nos.
64 to 68 of 1967 G.C; Sharma, B. B. Ahuja & Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
628 P.K. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
These appeals from the judgment of the High Court of Patna have come to this Court by certificates granted under Section 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
The questions upon which the certificates of fitness of appeal to this Court have been granted are question Nos.
(2), (3) and (4) in Tax Cases Nos. 64 to 68 of 1467.
The questions are as follows: "QUESTION No. 2.
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decrees obtained by the assessee against Shri A.H. Lal and Shri D.D. Tulsi for Rs. 1,11,747 and Rs. 51,525 respectively, have been valued under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, by correctly applying the provisions of section 9 of the Act for the purpose of including their values in the net wealth of the assessee? Question No. 3 Whether, the sum of Rs. 32,266, the amount of Agricultural income tax due from the asessee, falls for deduction in hands of the assessee in arriving at his total wealth for the years 1957 58, 1958 59, 1959 60 and 1960 61? Question No. 4 Whether, the sums of Rs. 597909 due from Tikait Girja Prasad Singh, Rs. 40001 due from Sri Gangeshwar Prasad Singh, Rs. 64000 due from Mahanth Mahabir Das, Rs. 37773 due from Sri Lakshmi Narain Singh, Rs. 2600 due from Sri Jamuna Prasad Missir, Rs. 1250 due from Sri Sarjug Kumar, Rs. 15344 due from Sri Nandkishore Singh, and Rs. 388760 due from Raja Prithivichand Lal Chaughury under claim decrees obtained against them by the assessee under the Bihar Land Reforms Act are assets of the assessee within the meaning of Wealth Tax Act, 1957, and have been valued under the said Act by correctly applying, the provisions of section 7 of the Act for the purpose of including their values in the net wealth of the assessee ' ? 629 Regarding Question No. 3 which is the question whether, the A amount of agricultural income tax dues from the assessee is a factor which has to be taken into account for valuing the compensation payable to the assessee, we have held that agricultural income tax dues from the assessee which are deductible from the compensation under Section 4 (c) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, if the same has not been deducted before the issue of the compensation bond, then the possibility and the hazard of its being deducted from the compensation involved is a factor which has to be taken into account in estimating the value of the right of compensation for the purpose of estimating the net wealth of the assessee on the valuation date under the Wealth Tax Act.
The arrears of agricultural income tax is not to be deducted from the net wealth as such but is a factor which a willing C purchaser will take into consideration in estimating the value of these assets and that is a factor which should be taken into consideration.
The point has been discussed by this Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bihar, patna vs Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh (Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT) of 1973).
The question, is, therefore answered as the answerer given in the said appeals and the Tribunal will estimate the value by taking into consideration the possibility for deduction on account of the liability of the assessee on account of agricultural income tax if it had not been already deducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and determine the net value of the assets of the assessee, accordingly.
These questions are for the wealth tax assessments of the assessee for the assessment years 1957 58, 1958 59, 1959 60, 1960 61 and 1961 62.
The assessments involved were for those years in which the relevant valuation dates were 20th September, 1956, 21st March, 1958, 21st March, 1959, 21st March 1960 and 20th March 1961 respectively.
In the first year the assessee had filed return of wealth for Rs. 447065.
The Wealth Tax officer, however, determined the total wealth of the assessee at Rs. 1608863.
The Wealth Tax officer included in the net wealth of the assessee, various amounts of money due under the decrees which the assessee had obtained against certain debtors, as well as the compensation payable to him under the Bihar Land Reforms Act after valuing the bonds.
It may be mentioned that the assessee had appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and thereafter he had carried appeals to the Tribunal also and had obtained some relief in the process.
For the subsequent assessment years of 1958 59, 1959 60, 1960 61 and 1961 62, similar considerations had come up before the Wealth Tax officer, on the assessee filing separate returns and similar results were followed.
In each year 630 the assessee had claimed certain deductions, including an amount of Rs. 32266 due as agricultural income tax.
The later sum has been consistently disallowed.
This point we have disposed of in terms of the decision of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1,240 (NT) of 1973.
So far as Question No. 2 is concerned, while computing the net wealth, the Wealth Tax Officer had included the sums of Rs. 8000 and Rs. 13011 for the year 1957 58, due from Sri A.K.Hazra and Sri N. Sahay respectively, on the basis of usfructuary mortgage in favour of the assessee as his assets.
On the last point the assessee has obtained relief from the Appellate Tribunal for the year 1957 58 and for that reason these two sums were excluded from the net wealth of the assessee for the subsequent assessment years and that point had given rise to the reference in Tax Cases Nos. 23 to 271 of 1966.
On the other questions raise(l by the assesses, reference in Tax Cases Nos. 64 to 68 of 1967 had arisen.
Now the facts material for question No. 2 are as follows: The assessee had obtained civil court decrees for Rs. 111747.
and Rs. 51525 against Sri A.H. Lal and Shri D.D. Tulsi.
The decrees are still pending execution.
In the books of the assessee these two decretal amounts were shown as tstill outstanding.
So far as the decree obtained against Shri D.D. Tulsi, the position seems to be that Tulsi owed a decree to the assessee and the assessee owed money to the bank.
In connection with the decree obtained against D.D. Tulsi, it had been contended before the Tribunal that at the instance of the official Liquidator, the Calcutta High Court had issued a Garnishi order on 13th January, 1960 for setting of the assessee 's liability to the Pacific Bank and, therefore, the decree did not represent wealth which could be valued under the Act.
lt was recorded by the Tribunal that the order Of the Calcutta High Court had been passed after the relevant dates of the first three assessment years and it held that even for the assessment years 1960 61 and 1961 62, the order of attachment could not indicate that the value of the decree was 'nil ', as was the assesses case.
Hence, the decree against Sri Tulsi was valued by the Wealth Tax officer at Rs. 51525.
As regards the decree against Sri A.H. Lal, the attachment order passed by the Calcutta High Court was on 21st June, 1961, that is to say, even after the valuation date for the 631 assessment year 1961 62.
The decree was therefore valued by the Wealth Tax Officer at the figure of Rs. 111747.
It was the contention of the assessee that the two decrees had been erroneously valued and the principles for valuation under Section 7 (1) had not been followed.
On the other hand it was contended on behalf of the revenue that decrees had.
been correctly valued under Section 7 (2) (a) Of the Act.
The High Court held and in our opinion rightly that two decrees had not been valued under Section 7 (2) of the Act at all and had been valued under Section 7 (1) of the Act.
We are in agreement with the High Court that merely because the assessee had shown the full decretal amounts in his books as still due, would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that they would be valued at those sums without taking into consideration the hazards of realisation of the decrees.
These decrees had not been executed and in the process of execution, there may be hazards and the Wealth Tax officer must estimate the price of the decree by anticipating what a willing purchaser would have.
paid for those decrees taking the hazards into consideration in open market on the valuation date and should estimate the price of the asset in question accordingly.
The High Court answered this question in the negative.
We are of the opinion that in view of the well settled principles which we have discussed in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax Bihar, Patna vs Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh (Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT) of 1973, the High Court was right in its decision.
So far as the Question No. 3 is concerned, the same question would have to be answered in the manner indicated above and the High Court has done the same and we affirm the said decision in view of the decision of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT) of 1973.
The facts regarding question No. 4 after taking into consideration statement of this case as also the supplementary statement of the case sent to the High Court pursuant to its directions are as follows: In respect of sums due from Tikait Girja Prasad Singh, the High Court has observed that assessee was entitled in respect of the zamindari compensation of Tikait Girja Prasad Singh which had.
vested in the Government and the value of the compensation had been estimated at 75 per cent of certain figure.
The High Court directed that when assessee had a claim decree against its debtor, the Wealth Tax officer should ascertain the price that a reasonable person would have paid for it on the relevant date, valuation 632 in open market considering that this claim decree can only be satisfied wholly or partly from the compensation which the debtor would receive under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.
The claim decree was an asset, the High Court held, but it was wrongly valued by the authorities and directed to be valued by estimating that it would fetch in the open market on the valuation date taking into consideration all the hazards.
On the same principle, the other decrees mentioned in the questions have been disposed of by the High Court.
We are of the opinion that in view of the principles discussed by this Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax Bihar, Patna vs Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh the High Court was right in its conclusion.
Indeed this question was not seriously pressed before us separately.
We may reiterate that learned counsel for the revenue urged b before us certain propositions, namely: (1) For the purposes of computation of net wealth of an assessee each asset belonging to him and each debt owed by him has to be valued separately.
(2) The difference.
between the aggregate value of the assets and the aggregate value of the debts represents his net wealth.
(3) In determining the market value of an asset (or the residue of the asset diminished by an over riding title on the asset itself), any liability or debt incurred in relation to it has to be ignored as the debt or liability has to be separately evaluated: (4) What is the market value of a certain asset (or the residue asset as referred to above, is a question of fact, to be deter mined finally by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal taking into account the relevant evidence and considerations put foreward by both the sides anthem High Court cannot in 633 terfere with such a finding of fact unless it is found to be based on irrelevant consideration or is arrived at by ignoring relevant evidence, (5) When the debt is represented as an asset, its market value has to be determined in.
the same manner as the market value of any other asset irrespective of the fact whether such an asset debt is encumbered by another debt owed from the assessee, because the later mentioned debt can qualify for deduction at its market value independently.
About proposition No. (I) and (2) above, there cannot be any dispute.
But as regards Proposition No. (3), as this Court has discussed in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bihar Patna vs Maharaja Kumar Kamal singh, if there is an asset which is subject to certain hazards . including the liability of certain debts to be deducted from the said asset, then that factor would be relevant factor diminishing the market value of the asset in open market and has to be estimated taking into consideration that factor.
Regarding Proposition No. (4), it may be stated that while it is a question of fact but if the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion by taking wrong principles into consideration, then such a finding would not bind the High Court.
Regarding Proposition No. (5), it may be stated that (debts may be deducted from the value ' of assets but the valuation of an asset has to be done in terms of Section 7 (l) talking into considerations all the hazards including the possibility of an amount on account of debt being deducted from the value of the asset is a factor which will influence a prospective buyer in the open market, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we affirm the decision of the High Court in all these points and dismiss these appeals with costs.
S.R. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The assessee is an individual and his estate stood vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as and from 1st of July 1952, and he is entitled to receive compensation under the Act from the Government.
The assessors during the relevant assessment years had obtained two monetary decrees from his debtors, but the amounts receivable by the assessee were attached by two garnishee orders issued by the Calcutta High Court on 13th January 1960 and 21st June 1961.
The assessee also had some claim decrees but as they were not yet executed, they were shown in his book of accounts as still outstanding.
The assessee had to pay Agricultural Income Tax to the Government and this debt has to be deducted from the compensation receivable by the assessee.
In these five appeals by certificate of fitness, question arose as to whether the answers of the High Court of Patna given in the Tax references on the question of correctness of valuation of the "net wealth" under section 7 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 are correct.
The Revenue urged the following five propositions: (l) For the purposes of computation of net wealth of an assessee each Asset belonging to him and each debt owed by him has to be valued separately.
(2) The difference between the aggregate value of the assets and the aggregate value of the debts represents his net wealth.
626 (3) In determining the market value of an asset (or the residue of the asset diminished by an over riding title on the asset itself), any liability or debt incurred in relation to it has to be ignored as the debt or liability has to he separately evaluated.
(4) What is the market value of a certain asset or the residue asset as referred to above, is a question of fact, to be determined finally by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal taking into account the relevant evidence and considerations put forward by both the sides and the High Court cannot interfere with such a fielding of fact unless it is found to be based on irrelevant consideration or is arrived at by ignoring , relevant evidence (5) When the debt is represented as an asset, its market value has to be determined in the same manner as the market value of any other asset irrespective of the fact whether such an asset debt is encumbered by another debt owed from the assessee, because the later mentioned debt can qualify for deduction at its market value independently.
Dismissing the appeals the.
Court, ^ HELD: 1.1 Section 7 and 2(M} of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, though must be read harmoniously, apply at two different stages.
Section 7 deals with the estimation of the market value of the asset, while section 2(M) enjoins that from the same, the debt owned by the assessee to be deducted.
The debts may be deducted from the value of assets but the valuation of an asset has to he done in terms of Section 7(1) taking into consideration all the hazards including the possibility of an amount on account of debt being deducted from the value of the asset is a factor which will influence a prospective buyer in the open market, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[633 EF 1.2.
Agricultural income tax dues from the assessee which are deductible from the compensation under Section 4(c) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act.
1950, if the same has not been deducted before the issue of the compensation bond, then the possibility and the hazard of its being deducted from the compensation involved is a factor which has to be taken into account in estimating the value of the right of compensation for the purpose of estimating the net wealth of the assessee on the valuation date under the Wealth Tax Act.
The arrears of agricultural income tax is not to be deducted from the net wealth as such but is a factor which willing purchaser will take into consideration in estimating the value of these ' assets and that is a factor which should be taken into consideration.
The Tribunal will estimate the values taking into consideration the possibility of deduction on account of the liability of the assessee on account of agricultural income tax if it had not been already deducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and determine the net value of the assets of the assessee, accordingly.
[629A D] 627 kumar Kamal Singh (Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT)/1973 decided on 20 2 84 relied on.
If there is an asset which is subject to certain hazards including, the liability of certain debt to be deducted from the said asset, then that factor would be a relevant factor diminishing the market value of the asset in open market and has to be estimated taking into consideration that factor.
[633D] B 2.2.
Merely because the assessee had shown the full decretal amounts in his books as still due, would not upso facto lead to the conclusion that they 'should be valued at those slums without taking into consideration the lizards of realisation of the decrees.
These decrees had not been executed and in the process of execution there may be hazards and the Wealth Tax officer must estimate the price of the decree by anticipating what a willing purchaser would have paid for those decrees taking the hazards into consideration in open market on the valuation date and should estimate the price of the asset in question accordingly.
[631C D] 2.3 When assesses had a claim decree against its debtor, the Wealth Tax officer should ascertain the price that a reasonable person would have paid ' for it on the relevant date, and value in open market considering that this claim decree can only be satisfied, wholly opartly from the compensation which the debtor would receive under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950.
The claim decree is an asset, but it should be valued by estimating that it would fetch in the open market on the valuation date taking into consideration all the hazards.
[631H, 632A] 3.1.
For the purposes of computation of net wealth of an assessee each asset belonging to him and each debt owed by him has to be valued separatly.
[632E] 3.2.
The difference between the aggregate value of the assets an the aggregate value of the debts represents his net wealth [632F]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1981 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 26th August, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 790 of 1979.
WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2948 OF 1982 From the judgment and order dated the 17th December, 1981 of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 873 of 1981.
V. M. Terkunde, P.M. Parekh, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Kailash Mehta & Vimal Dave for the Appellant/Petitioners.
Bikarmjit Nayer and D.D. Sharma for the Respondent in GA.
212/81.
617 T.S. Kawatra & N.K. Agarwala for the Respondent in S.L.P. No. 2948 of 1982.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
This Appeal by special leave is directed against an order passed by the Delhi High Court on August 26, 1980 affirming an order of eviction of the appellant made by the Rent Controller.
The facts of the case lie within a very narrow compass and the appeal involves a pure point of law which is already convered by decisions of this court to which we shall presently refer.
The tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, was inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945.
The landlord Ratan Lal Bhargava applied under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Clearance Act ( 'Slum Act ' for short) before the Competent Authority for permitting him to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed on July 28, 1973.
An appeal against this order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner on October 4, 1974.
Thereafter Respondent filed a suit for eviction of the tenant under section 14 (1) (e) read with section 25 (B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act ("Rent Act ' for short) on April 13, 1979.
Under the provisions of the Rent Act as amended in 1976 it is incumbent upon the defendant tenant to apply for leave to defend a suit for eviction before entering contest.
The tenant applied for such leave but the same was rejected and an order of his eviction was passed on September 14, 1979.
A revision by the tenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has led to the appeal to this Court.
In the special leave petition Smt.
Puspa Rani filed a suit for eviction against her tenant, Swaran Kumar and others, which also was allowed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrom has been dismissed by the High Court.
Hence the petition for special leave against judgment of the High Court has been filed and that was directed to be heard along with the Civil Appeal.
It is unnecessary to give the facts involved in the case in which special leave has been asked for because the point of law for consideration is one and the same.
618 Admittedly the houses for which eviction has been asked for in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act.
It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the competent Authority under the Slum Act.
Under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit is not maintainable.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'Amending Act ' for short) a new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenant one of which was covered by section 14 (1) (e) and the other by section 14 (A).
In the instant case we are mainly concerned with eviction applications covered by section 14(1) (e) of the special procedure provided in Chapter III A introduced by the Amending Act.
It was contended by the respondent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special protection was given to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity) and in such cases a procedure different from the procedure followed in other cases had been prescribed.
Section 25 (A) and 25 (B) sought to simplify the procedure by insisting on the tenant to obtain permission to enter defence.
In other words, so far as suits for eviction on the ground of personal necessity were concerned, the case for eviction was put at par with suits under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure where the Court was satisfied that the tenant had an arguable case, leave to defend would be granted; otherwise the order of eviction would be passed straightway.
Learned counsel for the tenants then argued that sections 25(A) and 25 (B) were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and, therefore, the procedure substituted under Chapter III A, particularly in SS.
25(A) and 25 (B) should be invalidated.
On the other hand, counsel for the landlords contended that by virtue of the Amending Act a new procedure has been added in respect of evictions under section 14(1) (e) as also the newly added 14(A), and sections 25(A) and 25(B) have been brought into the Statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature by providing a Special procedure and 619 also making provision that the new procedure would override the existing law to the contrary.
In order to appreciate this contention it may be necessary to give an extract of Statement of objects and reasons of the Amending Act: "There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to conferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant to that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bonafide for his personal occupation.
Further Government decided on the 9th September 1975 that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December 1975.
Government considered that in the circumstances, the Act requires to be amended urgently.
" The dominant object of the Amending Act was, therefore, to provide a speedy, expeditions and effective remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by sections 14 (1)(e) and 14(A) and for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act.
It is common experience that suits for eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme Court.
In many cases experience has indicated that by the time the eviction decree became final several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared and if there was further delay in securing eviction and the family of the landlord had by then expanded, in the absence of accommodation the members of the family were virtually thrown on the road.
It was this mischief which the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new procedure in Chapter III A.
The legislature in its wisdom thought that in cases where the landlords required their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity they should be treated as a separate class along with the landlords covered by section 14 A and should be allowed to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction within the quickest possible time.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the classification of such landlords would be 620 an unreasonable one because such a classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the Amending Act and the purposes which it seeks to subserve.
Tenants cannot complain of any discrimination because the Rent Act merely gave certain protection to them in public interest and if the protection or part of it afforded by the Rent Act was withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under the Transfer of property Act was still preserved, no genuine grievance could be made.
This was clearly held in the case of Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti.(1) The matter is no longer res integra and is covered by two decisions of this Court which are directly in point.
The first one is the case of Sarwan Singh & Anr.
vs Kasturi Lal, (2) in which an identical point came up for consideration.
It was held by this Court that sections 25 (A), 25 (B) and 25 (C) of the Rent Act (introduced by the Amending Act) were special provisions with reference to section 14 (A) thereof which superseded all existing Acts to the contrary.
It was also pointed out that these newly added sections in the Rent Act were to apply only to a class of landlords and, therefore, the question of violation of Act.
14 of the constitution did not arise.
While considering various aspects of the aforesaid provisions, Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), spokes for the Court thus: "When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and inoisive problems of interpretation arise.
Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration.
For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law.
That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.
Section 14 A and Chapter III A having been enacted with effect from December 1,1975, are later enactments in reference to section 19 of the Slum Clearance Act which in its present form, was placed on the statute book with effect 621 from February 28, 1965 and in reference to section 39 of the same Act, which came into force in 1956 when the Act itself was passed.
The legislature gave over riding effect to section 14 A and Chapter III A with the knowledge that sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act contained non obstante clauses of equal efficacy.
Therefore, the later enactment must prevail over the former.
Bearing in mind the language of the two laws, their object and purpose, and the fact that one of them is later in point of time and was enacted with the knowledge of the non obstante clauses in the earlier l. w, we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of section 14 A and Chapter III A of the Rent Control Act must prevail over those contained in sections 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act.
" C An analysis of the aforesaid decision clearly reveals that the now sections 14A 25(A), 25(B) and 25(C) had been introduced for the purpose of meeting a particular contingency aespelt out in the objects and reasons behind the new provisions.
Once it is recoginsed that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Sulm Act stands withdrawn to that l extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections 14 (1) (e) and 14A would not be governed or controlled by section 19 (1) .
(a) of the Slum Act.
It was.
however.
submitted that section 14A of the Rent act dealt with a special contingency for which a different procedure had been provided in the matter of evicting tenants by the landlords in occupation of premisss allotted by the Central Government or any local 1 authority.
This was to enable them to get their own residential accommodation so that they would be in a position to vacate the premises allotted to them by the Central Government.
lt was contended that as the Central Government and persons in occupation as tenants of premises provided by Central Government were a class by themselves, section 14 A could be taken as a special provision but 14 (1) (e) of the Act could not be elevated to that pedestal.
We are not able to accept this argument.
It was open to the legislature to pick out one cl ass of landlords out of the several covered by section 14.
(1) (e) of the Rent act so long as they formed a class by themselves and legislature was free to provide the benefit of a special procedure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long the legisla 622 tion had an object to achieve and the special procedure had a reasonable naxus with such object to be secured.
Despite the ingenious and attractive arguments of Mr. Tarkunde, it seems to us that the distinction made by the learned counsel between sections 14 (1) (e) and 14 A is really a distinction without any difference.
Moreover, the newly added sections, viz., sections 14A, 25(A), 25 (B) and 25 (C) do constitute parts of a special scheme and have the effect of making the Sulm Act inapplicable.
In view of the pronouncement of this Court as referred to above, it is impossible to accede to the contention advanced on behalf of the tenants.
In Kewal Singh 's case (supra), a decision to which one of us was a party (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows "The Act actually replaced the ordinance which was promulgated on 1st December, 1979.
The objects and reasons clearly reveal that the amendment has been made or simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation.
It is a matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an immediate and imperative necessity for vacating the house given to . tenant he is compelled to resort to the time consulting and dilatory procedure of a suit which takes years before the landlord is able to obtain the decree and in most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely deprived of getting any relier.
It appears to us that it was for these reasons that the legislature in its wisdom thought that a short an. l simple procedure should be provided for.
those landlords who generally want the premises for their bona fide necessity in that they may be able to get quick and expeditious relief. .
The landlords having personal necessity have been brought together as a separate class because of their special needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreaso nable particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that the landlords should get this relief as quickly as possible Thus taking an overall picture of the situation, the circumstances under which the landlord 's needs have been classified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot be said by 623 any stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub sections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, or that section 29 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers.
In fact section 29 contains valuable and sufficient guidelines which completely exclude the exercise of uncanalised or arbitrary powers by the Rent Controller.
The ratio of this case reinforces the rule laid down in Sarwan Singh 's case supra and in Vinod Kumar Chowdhry vs Narain Delhi Taneja,(J) it was clearly pointed out that whenever there was any conflict between section 29A and any other provision of law.
section 29 A was to override and prevail.
Here again one of us (Fazal Ali, J.) observed; "The non obstante clause occurring in section 29A makes it quite clear that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Chapter III A on the one hand and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force on the other, the former shall prevail.
" It is, therefore, clear from the new provision in the Amending Act that the procedure indicated therein was intended to have over riding effect and all procedural laws were to give way.
to the new procedure, .
Applications under section 14 (1) (e), therefore, clearly fell within the protective umbrella of the new procedure in Chapter IIIA: An identical view has been taken by the Delhi High Court tn the case of Smt.
Krishnn Devi Nigam & Ors.
vs Shyam Babu Gupta & Ors., In this decision it has been clearly held that the provisions of section 29A cannot be controlled by the provisions of the Slum 4 Act.
We fully approved and endorse the, ratio laid down in that decision as it is in conformity with the consistent opinion of this Court.
On a consideration, therefore, of the facts and circumstances of tho case and the law referred to above, we reach the following conclusions: 624 (1) That sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non obstante clause these provisions would override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned; (2) That there is no difference either on principle or in law between sections 14 (l) (e) and 14A of the Rent Act even though these two provisions relate to tenants under different situations; (3) That the procedure incorporated in Chapter IIIA of the Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; (4) That in view of the procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not, therefore necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent Authority under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within section 19(1) (e) or 19A of the Rent Act We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting aside the .
Order of eviction.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
As a result of our decision, the special leave petition was to be dismissed.
In both these cases time to vacate the premiss is extends till June 30, 1984, subject to filing of the usual undertaking within four weeks from today failing which the landlords shall be free to ask for possession forthwith through the executing court.
N.V.K. Appeal & Petition dismissed.

summary:
The appellant tenant was inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945.
The respondent landlord applied under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 before the Competent Authority for permitting him to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed, and the order was confirmed in appeal by the Financial Commissioner.
Thereafter the respondent field a suit for eviction in April 1979 under section 14 (1) (e) read with section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958.
The tenant applied for leave to defend the suit but the same was rejected and an order of eviction was passed.
A revision filed by the tenant in the High Court was dismissed.
In the appeal to this Court as well as in the connected Special Leave Petition it was contended that: (1) under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before institution of a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit was no maintainable, and (2) sections 25A and 25B were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and, therefore, the procedure substituted under Chapter IIIA, particularly sections 25A and 25B should be invalidated.
Dismissing the Appeal and Special Leave Petition: 615 ^ HELD: A.(1) The High Court was correct in rejecting the applications of the tenants for setting aside the order of eviction.
[624F]] B.(1) Sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non obstante clause these provisions override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned; [624A] (2) There is no difference either on principle or in law between sections 14 (1)(e) and 14A of the Rent Act even though these two provisions relate to eviction of tenants under different situations; [624B] (3) The procedure incorporated in Chapter IIIA of the Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; [624C] (4) In view of the procedure in Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not, therefore, necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent Authority under section 19 (1)(a) of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within s.14 (1)(e) or 14A of the Rent Act.
[624D E] C.(1) The dominant object of the Amending Act of 1976 was to provide a speedy, expeditions and effect remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by sections 14(1)(e) and 14A and for avoiding unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act.
Suits for eviction under the Act take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and ending up with the Supreme Court.
In many cases by the time the eviction decree became final several years elapsed and either the landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared.
It was this mischief which the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new procedure in Chapter IIIA.
It cannot therefore be said that the classification of such landlords would be an unreasonable one because such a classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the Amending Act of 1976 and the purposes which it seeks to subserve.
[619D F; G] (2) The new sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C had been introduced for the purpose of meeting a particular contingency as spelt out in the object and reasons behind the new provisions.
Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stands withdrawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of sections 14(1)(e) and 14A would not be governed or controlled by section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act.
[621CD ] 616 (3) It is open to the legislature to pick out one class of the landlords out of several covered by section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act so long as they formed a class by themselves and the legislature was free to provide the benefit of the special procedure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long as the legislation had an object to achieve and the special, procedure had a reasonable nexus with such object to be secured.
[621F G] (4) The new provision in the Amending Act were intended to have overriding effect and all procedural laws were to give way to the new procedure.
[623D] Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti ; ; Sarwan Singh & Anr.
vs Kasturi Lal ; ; Vinod Kumar Chowdhry vs Narain Devi Taneja ; referred to.
Krishna Devi Nigam & Ors.
vs Shyam Babu Gupta & Ors. approved.