judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No 385 of 1988.
D From the Judgment and order dated 14.8.1987 of the Guwahati High Court in Criminal Revision No. 303 of 1986.
R. Ramachandran for the Appellant.
B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, Kitty Kumar Marylar and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Special leave granted.
The appeal is disposed of by the order passed herein.
On 20th of November, 1976, the appellant was posted in the State of Arunachal Pradesh as an Executive Engineer (Elect).
An accident took place in the jeep which was alleged to have been driven by the appellant.
The accident took place within the Bomdila Police Station in Arunachal Pradesh.
In the said accident one of the occupants, J.K. Jain, Assistant Engineer (Elect) died and another section Karim, driver sustained grievous injuries.
According to the police the accident is attributable to rash and negligent driving of the appellant.
As per the case file, Shri R.B. Singh, Sub Inspector submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on 22nd November, 1976, who H 480 according to the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under section 32(c) of Regulation I of 1945 and the police registered the case.
The learned Magistrate held that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976.
This finding, however, was not sustained by the High Court.
The police is alleged to have registered the case and took up investigations and submitted the chargesheet in September, 1977 which, however, appears to have been placed before the Deputy Commissioner on 31st March, 1986, and it was on that date that the cognizance of the offence was taken, according to the High Court.
The learned Magistrate in his order stated that the reason why report could not be placed before the Court promptly merited detailed probing, which showed that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976 by the competent authority but the court proceedings thereof commenced on 31st March, 1986.
The appellant was chargesheeted under section 279 read with section 304A/338 of the Indian Penal Code.
According to the appellant cognizance was only taken on 31st March, 1986.
The first question, therefore, in this case is: when was the cognizance taken.
By the order of the learned Magistrate, the appellant was directed to appear on the next date of hearing, that is on 8th September, 1986.
The order was passed on 14th July, 1986.
Challenging the said order, the appellant moved the High Court of Gauhati under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing the charges framed by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bomdila.
The High Court in its judgment and order dated 14th August, 1987 held that the investigation started on 22nd November, 1976 on the registration of the case under sections 279, 304A and 338 of the I.P.C. and the investigation was completed on 8th September, 1977 and cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986 when the Deputy Commissioner passed the following order: "Records perused.
Issue summons to the accused to appear at Kameng on 9th May, 1986.
" Therefore, the first question that arises is, when was the cognizance taken, on 22nd November, 1976 or 31st March, 1986.
The High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986.
The offence under section 279 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or with fine, or with both.
Offence under section 304A is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or with fine, or with both.
Offence under section 338 is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.
Or with fine or with both.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offences would be three years.
Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 481 "468.
Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation: (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be (a) six months, if the offences is punishable with fine only, (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
" There is, however, a provision for extension of the period of limitation in certain cases where on the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary in the interest of justice to do so.
This is provided in section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the following terms: "473 Extention of period of limitation in certain cases Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice.
" It was contended before us that the first question that arises in this appeal is: when the cognizance of the offence was taken in this case.
This Court in Tula Ram and others vs Kishore Singh, ; explained the meaning of the words "taking cognizance" and held that it means judicial application of mind of the magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action.
In this connection reference may also be made to the observations of this Court in Bhagwant Singh vs Commissioner of Police and another; , It was held by this Court as follows: 482 "Now, when the report forwarded by the officer in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub section (2)(i) of section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise.
The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things:(1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or (3) he may direct further investigation under sub section (3) of section 156 and require the police to make a further report.
The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses; (1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub section (3) of section l56.
. . . . . . . .
But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part.
. . . . .
There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub section (2)(i) of section 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must by given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process.
" The High Court was of the view that really cognizance in this case was taken on 31st March, 1986.
The High Court has set out the facts on which it is relied.
The said finding of the High Court has not 483 been challenged.
The appellant in this case before this Court has proceeded on that basis.
Shri B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General contended that cognizance was taken as early as in September, 1977.
It was contended before us on behalf of the appellant as it was said before the High Court that if the cognizance was taken in 1986, then it was clearly beyond the time.
If the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied, the laking of cognizance of the offence was barred by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It was submitted before the High Court of Gauhati and reiterated before us that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
In this connection reliance was placed on section 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945.
Section 32 of the Regulation provides that the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner shall be guided in regard to procedure by the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as these are applicable to the circumstances of the District and consistent with the provisions of the Regultion.
There are exceptions to section 32.
Those exceptions are irrelevant for the present purpose.
The High Court held, and in our opinion rightly, that section 32 of the said Regulation should be guided by the spirit of the Code and it will be proper to throw out a complaint if there was inordinate or undue delay, which was not explained.
Indeed, this Court in State of Punjab vs Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 S.C.R. 349 observed at page 351 of the report that the object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence.
This Court reiterated that the object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.
Shri Raju Ramachandran submitted that the exercise of the power under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code extending the period of limitation by condoning the delay in launching the prosecution, should precede the taking of cognizance of the offence.
Reliance was placed on the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Kathamuthu vs Balammal, It was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ghansham Dass vs Sham Sundar Lal, that cognizance taken by the Magistrate without deciding the point in limitation was beyond his jurisdiction.
In this connection, reliance may be placed to the decision of this Court in Surinder Mohan Vikal vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra, [1978] 484 2 S.C.C. 403 where at page 407 of the report, while dealing with the provisions of section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court observed that it is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them.
For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment.
They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor.
As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.
Our attention was also drawn to the case of Vijay Kumar Agarwalla vs State of Assam, , where the Court held that taking of cognizance without condoning delay was bad and without jurisdiction.
The High Court in the instant judgment under appeal held that this aspect of the matter was not considered by the Magistrate and the High Court quashed the charges against the appellant and remitted the case to the Magistrate for considering the case afresh.
In the instant case, the broad facts that emerge are that the alleged offence took place in November, 1976, and until the High Court 's order in August, 1987 no investigation had taken place.
The offence is of rash and negligent driving.
It is, as such, neither a grave and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such, though all criminal offences are crimes against society.
It is not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to decide, whether cognizance was properly taken.
It is also not necessary to decide whether the extension of period of limitation under section 473 must precede or taking of the cognizance of the offence.
It 1:: is also not necessary to decide whether cognizance in this case was taken on 8th September, 1977 as held by the learned Magistrate or on 31st March, 1986 as held by the High Court.
Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the respondent 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time.
Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law.
In that view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further.
We do so accordingly.
485 In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the A proceedings cannot be proceeded any further.
We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court of Gauhati.
dated 14th August, 1987 and quash the proceedings against the appellant.
The proceedings against the appellant are hereby quashed.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant was driving a jeep which met with an accident and one of the occupants died and another sustained grievous injuries.
According to the Police, the accident was attributable to rash and negligent driving of the appellant.
He was charge sheeted under section 279 IPC read with sections 304 A/338 IPC and a report was submitted to the Deputy Commissioner on 22nd November 1976.
The Magistrate held that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976 itself.
The appellant moved the High Court under section 482 Cr.
P.C. read with article 227 of the Constitution.
The High Court held that the investigations started on 22nd November, 1976 on the registration of the case and were completed on 8th September, 1977, and cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986 when the Deputy Commissioner passed an order for issuing summons to the appellant.
The High Court quashed the charges against the appellant and remitted the case to the Magistrate for considering it afresh.
This appeal by special leave is against the High Court Judgment.
It was contended before this Court that since cognizance was taken in 1986, it was barred by section 468 Cr.
On behalf of the Respondent it was contended that the provisions of Cr.
P.C. do not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
478 Allowing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.1 Section 473 Cr.
P.C. provides that any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice.
Taking cognizance means judicial application of mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further action.
[484E H] Tula Ram and others vs Kishore Singh, ; , referred to.
1.2 As regards the contention that Cr.
P.C. is not applicable to the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the High Court rightly held that section 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945, on which reliance was placed, should be guided by the spirit of the Code and it will be proper to throw out a complaint if there was inordinate or undue delay, which was not explained.
[483D E] State of Punjab vs Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 SCR 349, referred to.
1.3 Statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them.
They shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment.
They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecution.
A bar has been prescribed under section 468 Cr.
P.C. and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.
[484A C] Surinder Mohan Vikal vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra, ; , relied on.
Kathamuthu vs Balammal, ; Ghansham Dass vs Sham Sunder Lal, and Vijay Kumar Agarwalla vs State of Assam, , referred to.
In the instant case, the broad facts that emerge are that the alleged offence took place in November, 1976, and until the High Court 's order in August, 1987 no investigation had taken place.
The offence is of rash and negligent driving.
It is, as such, neither a grave and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such, 479 though all criminal offences are crimes against society.
It is not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to decide, whether cognizance was properly taken, whether the extension of period of limitation under section 473 must precede taking of the cognizance of the offence, and whether cognizance in this case was taken on 8th September, 1977 as held by the learned Magistrate or on 31st March, 1986 as held by the High Court.
Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the respondent 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving is too long a time.
Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2 years without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law.
[484D G] C [This Court set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the proceedings against the appellant.] [485A B]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1523 of 1988.
From the Judgment and order dated 13.4.1988 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 479 of 1988.
K.K. Venugopal, A.N. Haksar, section Vazifdar, Raian Karanjawala, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala and Hardeep section Anand for the Appellant.
B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, P. Parmeswaran, S.C. Birala and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgement of the court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
This appeal by special leave is filed against an interim order of injunction issued by the High Court of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench on 13th April, 1988 directing the three respondents; (I) Union of India, (2) Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Parliament House, New Delhi and (3) State of Maharashtra, not to telecast and show episodes 12 and 13 of a serial entitled 'Honi Anhoni ' pending disposal of Writ Petition No. 479 of 1988 filed by Respondent No. 1, Lokvidayan Sanghatana, a registered social organisation of Pune having its branch at Aurangabad and Respondent No. 2 Mahila Sangharsha Samiti, Aurangabad represented by one of its members Smt.
Anagna Patil.
The writ petition was in the nature of a public interest litigation.
The prayer in the writ petition was that the respondents should be directed not to telecast the serial as such telecasting was not in the public interest.
The serial 'Honi Anhoni ' was being telecast by the Doordarshan, which was run by the Union of India, on every Thursday between 9 p.m. and 9.30 p.m.
The 12th episode of the said serial was to be telecast on 14th April, 1988 and the 13th episode was to be telecast on 21st April, 1988.
By virtue of the interim order passed on 13th April, 1988.
episode No. 12 could not be telecast on 14th April, 1988.
Aggrieved by the interim order passed by the High Court the appellant, Odyssey Communication Pvt. Ltd., which was the producer of the serial 'Honi Anhoni ' filed the special leave petition before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India out of which this appeal arises.
The said petition came up before this Court for consideration on April 2 1, 1988.
After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant this Court granted special leave to prefer an appeal against 489 the order passed by the High Court and also stayed the operation of the interim order dated 13th April, 1988 passed by the High Court until further orders and permitted the Doordarshan to telecast the serial in question.
In view of the above order the 12th episode of the serial was telecast on the 21st of April, 1988.
The appeal was heard on the 28th of April, 1988 and this Court reserved judgment on the appeal.
At the end of the hearing of the appeal on 28th April, 1988 the Court expressed that it would set aside the order passed by the High Court against which the appeal had been filed and would give reasons in the course of its judgment.
Since the order of stay passed by the Court was allowed to remain in force the 13th episode, which was the last episode of the serial was telecast on the 28th April, 1988.
The grounds mentioned in the writ petition in support of the prayer made in it were that in each and every episode telecast in the serial an obscure and mysterious atmosphere was being created due to the way of the presentation of the episodes and that it had created fear in the minds of the common viewers and especially of children as the serial had the effect of confirming blinds faiths, superstitious beliefs in stories of ghosts, rebirth, precognition etc.
and of spreading the unscientific way of thinking and blind beliefs.
It was further contended that it was the duty of the State not to encourage blind beliefs amongst the public by telecasting such episodes.
It was on the basis of these grounds the High Court was requested to grant the interim order of injunction.
The appellant was the producer of the said serial, yet the appellant was not made a party to the writ petition.
But on its application the appellant was impleaded as a party on 12.4.1988.
On 13.4.1988 the High Court passed the impugned order of temporary injunction.
The appellant rushed to this Court immediately thereafter with the above said special leave petition.
The appellant has stated before us that the said serial and in particular episodes 12 and 13 did not emphasise superstitious beliefs but on the contrary criticised and condemned superstition and blind faith as was ex facie apparent from the scripts of episodes 12 and 13 produced before this Court.
It is stated that at the end of both the episodes a doctor and a professor gave a scientific explanation for the unusual occurrences portrayed therein and considered by people as supernatural phenomena.
It is alleged that in the 13th episode after a scientific explanation of what had taken place the viewers were told as follows: "All those who without thinking spread blind faith ought to feel ashamed of themselves.
We request all of you that whenever any unusual occurrencces takes place or a 490 seemingly imporbable event occurs, before believing in it, to reflect as to whether there is a scientific reason for it or is it purely psychological by nature.
If all of us exercise such caution we believe that the malady of blind faith will soon be eradicated by our society.
" The appellant further pleaded that the High Court was in error in issuing the order of injunction without giving a reasonable opportunity to it (the producer), which was likely to be affected by the order, to explain that the writ petitioners had no right to move the Court in the circumstances of the case.
It can no longer be disputed that the right of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by the Doordarshan is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which can be curtailed only under circumstances which are set out in clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
The right is similar to the right of a citizen to publish his views through any other media such as newspapers, magazines, advertisement hoardings etc.
subject to the terms and conditions of the owners of the media.
We hasten to add that what we have observed here does not mean that a citizen has a fundamental right to establish a private boardcasting station, or television center.
On this question we reserve our opinion.
It has to be decided in an appropriate case.
The relevant part of Article 19 of the Constitution reads thus: "19.
Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; . . . . . . (2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or moral 491 ity, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
. . . . . . . . ." Freedom of expression is a preferred right which is always very zealously guarded by this Court.
It was not the case of the petitioners in the Writ Petition that the exhibition of serial 'Honi Anhoni ' was in contravention of any specific law or direction issued by the Government.
They had not alleged that the Doordarshan had shown any undue favour to the appellant and the sponsoring institutions resulting in any financial loss to the public exchequer.
The objection to the exhibition of the film had, however, been raised by them on the basis that it was likely to spread false or blind beliefs amongst the members of the public.
They had not asserted any right conferred on them by any statute or acquired by them under a contract which entitled them to secure an order of temporary injunction against which this appeal is filed.
The appellant had denied that the exhibition of the serial was likely to affect prejudicially the well being of the people.
The Union of India and the Doordarshan have pleaded that the serial was being telecast after following the prescribed procedure and taking necessary precaution.
In such a situation, the High Court should not have immediately proceeded to pass the interim orde of injunction.
It was no doubt true that the 12th episode was to be telecast on 14th April, 1988 and the 13th episode was to be telecast on 21st April, 1988.
If the petitioners in the writ petition had felt, as they had alleged in the course of the petition, that all the episodes in the serial were offensive they could have approached the High Court as early as possible within the first two or three weeks after the commencement of the exhibition of the serial.
But they waited till the exhibition of the 11th episode of the serial was over and filed the petition only in the second week of April, 1988.
They had not produced any material apart from their own statements to show that the exhibition of the serial was prima facie prejudicial to the community.
The High Court overlooked that the issue of an order of interim injunction in this case would infringe a fundamental right of the producer of the serial.
In the absence of any prima facie evidence of grave prejudice that was likely to be caused to the public generally by the exhibition of the serial it was not just and proper to issue an order of temporary injunction.
We are not satisfied that the exhibition of the serial in question was likely to endanger public morality.
In the circumstances of the case the balance of convenience lay in favour of 492 the rejection of the prayer for interim injunction.
What we have stated here is sufficient to dispose of this appeal.
The other questions of law which may arise in a case of this nature will have to be dealt with in an appropriate case.
We express no opinion on those questions in this case.
We are, however, of the opinion that the High Court was in error in the present case in issuing the interim order of injunction against which this appeal is filed.
We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the interim order of injunction passed by the High Court on the 13th of April, 1988.
There is, however, no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The T.V. Serial 'Honi Anhoni ' was being telecast by Doordarshan on every Thursday between 9.00 P.M. and 9.30 P.M.
A writ petition was filed by the Respondents stating that the telecast was not in public interest as it had the effect of confirming blind faiths, superstitious beliefs in stories of ghosts, rebirth, precognition etc.
and of spreading the unscientific way of thinking and blind beliefs.
The High Court issued an interim order of injunction not to telecast and show episodes 12 and 13 of the serial.
Aggrieved by the interim order, the appellant, producer of the said serial, had come on appeal by special leave.
This Court, while granting special leave stayed the operation of the interim order passed by the High Court.
The appellant contended that the said serial and in particular episodes 12 and 13 did not emphasise superstitious beliefs but on the contrary criticised and condemned superstition and blind faith, and at the end of both the episodes a doctor and a professor gave a scientific explanation for the unusual occurrences portrayed therein and considered by people as supernatural phenomenon.
It was also submitted that the viewers were told that they should search for scientific reason whenever any unusual occurrence takes place.
Allowing the appeal, 487 ^ HELD:1.
Freedom of expression is a preferred right which is always very zealously guarded by this Court.
It can no longer be disputed that the right of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by the Doordarshan is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which can be curtailed only under circumstances which are set out in clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
The right is similar to the right of a citizen to publish his views through any other media such as newspaper, magazines, advertisement hoardings etc.
subject to the terms and conditions of the owners of the media.
[491B; 490C E] 2.
The High Court was in error in the present case in issuing the interim order of injunction which is set aside.
[492B] 3.1 The objection to the exhibition of the film was that it was likely to spread false or blind beliefs amongst the members of the public.
The Respondents had not asserted any right conferred on them by any statute or acquired by them under a contract which entitled them to secure an order of temporary injunction.
[491C D] 3.2 As alleged by the Respondents, if all the episodes in the serial were offensive they could have approached the High Court as early as possible within the first two or three weeks after the commencement of the exhibition of the serial.
But they waited till the exhibition of the 11th episode of the serial was over and then filed the petition.
They had not produced any material apart from their own statements to show that the exhibition of the serial was prima facie prejudicial to the community.
[491E G] 3.3 The High Court overlooked that the issue of an order of interim injunction in this case could infringe a fundamental right of the producer of the serial.
In the absence of any prima facie evidence of grave prejudice that was likely to be caused to the public generally by the exhibition of the serial it was not just and proper to issue an order of temporary injunction.
The exhibition of the serial in question was not likely to endanger public morality.
In the circumstances of the case the balance of convenience lay in favour of the rejection of the prayer for interim injunction.
[491G H; 492A] [This Court reserved its opinion on the question whether a citizen has a fundamental right to establish a private broadcasting station, or television centre, to be decided in an appropriate case.] [490E] 488


judgement:
Civil Appeal Nos.
973 74 of 1985.
From the Judgment and order dated 15.7.1983 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition Nos.
3532 of 1979 & 357 of 1981.
Dr. L.M. Singhvi, K.R. Nagaraja, R.S. Hegde and C. Mukhopadhyay for the Appellants.
A.D. Singh, Mrs. section Dikshit, A.K. Gupta, Raju Ramachandaran and B.S. Chauhan for the Respondents.
Subhash Chandra, Respondent No. 34 in person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
These two appeals by special leave involve the interpretation of the Uttar Pradesh Non Technical (Class II) Services (Reservation of Vacancies for Demobilised officers) Rules, 1973, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1973 Rules ', and the Uttar Pradesh Non Technical (Class II/Group 'B ') Services (Appointment of Demobilised officers) Rules, 1980, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1980 Rules ', relating to the seniority of the appellants vis a vis the private respondents.
577 The appellants have all been appointed in the Provincial Civil Service of the State of Uttar Pradesh as direct recruits on the basis of competitive examinations held by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission.
The appointments of the appellants were made under the U.P. Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1941 framed under section 241(1)(b) of the Government of India Act, 1935, hereinafter referred to as 'the Service Rules '.
The respondents were recruited under the 1973 Rules and/or the 1980 Rules.
The respondents were either Emergency Commissioned officers or the Short Service Commissioned officers of the armed forces of the Union of India and were commissioned on or before November 1, 1962 during the Indo Chinese war.
They were demobilised from armed forces in or about 1968.
These respondents, therefore, rendered services to the country during the operation of the emergency when the nation 's security was in peril due to external aggression.
In order to rehabilitate such persons and to ensure them that in civil life, after the cessation of emergency, they were not to suffer for rendering services to the nation and with a view to putting the respondents at par with other persons, the 1973 Rules were framed by the Governor of U.P. in exercise of his powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
Rule 1(3) of the 1973 Rules provide that they shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of their commencement.
Rule 3, inter alia, provides for the reservation of ten per cent of the permanent vacancies in all Non Technical (Class II) Services to be filled substantively by direct recruitment through competitive examination in any year.
Rule 6 relating to seniority and pay, which is important for the purpose of these appeals, is extracted below: "R.6.
Seniority and pay (1) Seniority and pay of candidates appointed against the vacancies reserved under sub rule (1) of rule 3, shall be determined on the assumption that they entered the service concerned at their second opportunity, of competing for recruitment, and they shall be assigned the same year of allotment as successful candidates of the relevant competitive examination: Provided that any such candidate who had two opportunities before the date of his joining the training 578 prior to his commission whether he actually availed any A such opportunity or not, shall be assigned the same year of allotment as successful candidates of the first competitive examination held after the said date.
Explanation The year of a candidate 's second opportunity will be determined by the date of his birth in relation to the prescribed minimum age for competing for recruitment to the service.
(2) Seniority inter se of candidates who are appointed against vacancies reserved under sub rule (1) of rule 3 and allotted to a particular year shall be determined according to the merit list prepared by the Ayog on the basis of the results of their performance at the examination.
(3) All candidates appointed against vacancies reserved under sub rule (1) of rule 3 and allotted to any particular year shall rank below the candidates who were successful at the competitive examination held for recruitment to the service in that year.
(4) The pay of candidates appointed against vacancies referred to in sub rule (3) of rule 3 shall also be determined in the same manner as indicated in sub rule (1) of this rule but their seniority shall be determined in accordance with the foregoing sub rules only if and at the point of time when they are appointed substantively against permanent vacancies.
" For the purpose of seniority and pay, rule 6 takes into account the period of war service rendered by a candidate who, after his demobilisation from such service, successfully competes in the relevant examination which is in the present case, the Provincial Civil Service Examination.
Under Rule 6, when such a candidate is recruited after his successfully competing in the relevant examination, it will be assumed that he had entered service with retrospective effect from the year in which he had the second opportunity of taking the relevant examination for his recruitment, which he could not take on account of his having joined the service of the armed forces of the Union of India.
So far as the actual period rendered by the respondents in the 579 armed forces during the emergency is concerned, there is no dispute that such period shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the seniority and pay.
The grievance of the appellants is that although there were long gaps between the dates of demobilisation and the dates of recruitment of the respondents, the State of Uttar Pradesh had, in computing the seniority of the respondents, taken into consideration not only the period during which the respondents were in the services of the armed forces, but also such long gaps.
It is pointed out by the appellants that in the cases of one or two respondents, the gaps were even of about 11 years and these long gaps had been taken into account in computing their seniority.
As a result of such computation, the respondents after their appointments were placed above the appellants, although the appellants were recruited to the Provincial Civil Service under the Service Rules long before the respondents were recruited.
If such gaps are excluded from consideration, the appellants will be seniors to the respondents.
It is also alleged by the appellants that several of the respondents, after coming back from the army, joined various services, both Government and private services, and had spent 3 to 10 years or more in those services before they were recruited under the 1973 Rules or 1980 Rules.
In 1976, a seniority list was prepared showing the respondents seniors to the appellants on the basis of the period of their service in the armed forces and the gaps between their discharge and recruitment.
In 1980 also, a seniority list was prepared in like manner showing the appellants as juniors to the respondents.
Being aggrieved by the 1976 seniority list, the appellants moved two writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Allahabad High Court, inter alia, challenging the validity of the 1973 Rules and also 1980 Rules.
The High Court overruled the contention of the appellants that the 1973 Rules and 1980 Rules were invalid being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and held that both these Rules were legal and valid.
It, however, took the view that under rule 6 of the 1973 Rules or rule 5 of 1980 Rules, which are verbatim the same, the period during which the respondents had no employment or were employed elsewhere till recruitment in the Provincial Civil Service after competing in the relevant examination, will be taken into account along with the period during which they were in the services of the armed forces for the purpose of computing their seniority in the Provincial Civil Service.
Accordingly, the High Court upheld the vali 580 dity of the impugned seniority list.
Hence this appeal.
It is urged by Dr. Singhvi, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the interpretation given by the High Court of rule 6 of the 1973 Rules relating to seniority and pay is in excess of the relief intended to be granted by that rule.
It is submitted that rule 6 was framed for the purpose of taking into consideration the period of service in the armed forces in computing the seniority of a candidate appointed in the Provincial Civil Service after competing in the relevant examination, so that he does not suffer because of joining the armed forces.
Rule 6 does not provide for taking into consideration the gap between the date of demobilisation of a candidate and the date on which he is appointed in the Provincial Civil Service after competing in the relevant examination.
If such gaps are also taken into consideration, it would be doing injustice to the appellants who have been appointed long before the respondents.
Accordingly, Dr. Singhvi submits that when a candidate who was in the armed forces of the Union joined the Provincial Civil Service after his discharge from the armed forces, it would be assumed that he had entered the Provincial Civil Service at the second opportunity of competing for the recruitment, but no other period including that between the discharge and recruitment will be taken into account for the purpose of computing the seniority of such a candidate.
on the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Anil Dev Singh and Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents, and Mr. Subhash Chandra, respondent No. 34, appearing in person, that rule 6 does not prohibit, either expressly or by necessary implication, the taking into account of the period between demobilisation and recruitment in the Provincial Civil Service.
It is submitted that not only the length of the war service but also such gaps should be considered for the purpose of computation of seniority.
They submit that as only ten per cent of the vacancies were reserved for war service candidates, it was difficult for such candidates to get a chance within a reasonable time after their discharge from war service and it would be quite consistent with rules of natural justice to take into account the interregnum between the date of discharge and the date of recruitment.
Rule 6 only provides that after the discharge of a candidate from the armed forces and his subsequent appointment in civil service on the basis of competitive examination, it will be assumed that he had joined the service at the second opportunity of competing for the recruitment.
The second opportunity has been explained in the Expla 581 nation to rule 6.
It provides that the year of a candidate 's second opportunity will be determined by the date of his birth in relation to the prescribed minimum age for competing for recruitment to the service.
For example, if the minimum age for taking the competitive examination for recruitment is 21 years, the first opportunity of a candidate will be in the year he attains that age and the second opportunity will be in the next year, that is, at the age of 22 years.
Under rule 6, the recruitment of a war service candidate will be assumed to have been made in the year in which he had the second opportunity of competing for such recruitment.
In other words, the seniority of such a candidate will be computed on the basis that he had joined the civil service in the year of his second opportunity of competing for the recruitment.
It is true that rule 6 does not provide for the period between demobilisation and recruitment of a war service candidate in the civil service.
Nor does it forbid consideration of such period.
It cannot, however, be deemed that after the discharge from war service, there will be some lapse of time for the recruitment of a candidate in the Provincial Civil Service.
Immediately after discharge, one cannot get himself recruited in the Provincial Civil Service.
There is a question of competing in the examination.
Rule 6 does not provide for any gap to be taken into consideration, yet it is apparent that some reasonable period has to be allowed to a candidate so as to enable him to avail himself of the opportunity of appearing at the competitive examination for his recruitment in the Provincial Civil Service.
It cannot be gainsaid that to compete in the examination, a candidate has to make preparation for that.
Competitive examinations are generally difficult and, in our opinion, at least two years ' time should be allowed to a candidate, after his discharge, for his preparation for the competitive examination and that will be his first opportunity.
The second opportunity will arise in the next year, that is, in the third year of his discharge from the armed forces.
In other words, he should be allowed three years for competing in the relevant examination for recruitment in the civil service.
Even after he becomes successful, he is not recruited immediately.
There is the question of availability of vacancies and posting.
It is common knowledge that some time is taken for posting.
On a proper construction of rule 6, the period spent by a candidate for competing in the examination which, in our opinion, will not be more than three years, and the period of time taken for his recruitment or posting will also be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the 582 seniority of a war service candidate.
Thus, if a candidate is discharged in the year 1968, he should be given three years ' time to avail himself of the opportunity of competing in the examination.
Suppose, he is successful in the examination held in 1971 and posted in 1973.
In view of rule 6, he would be deemed to have entered service at the second opportunity of competing for recruitment and the entire period from the date of assumed entry in the service up to his recruitment in 1973 shall be taken into account for the purpose of computing seniority and pay.
If, however, a candidate does not avail himself of the opportunity within three years of his discharge from war service or takes the examination but becomes unsuccessful, the period between his discharge and subsequent recruitment will not be taken into account for the purpose of computing the seniority.
Rule 6 should be given a reasonable interpretation.
We do not find any reason to interpret rule 6 in a way which will be doing injustice to the appellants who have been recruited under the Service rules after competing successfully in the examination.
We agree with the High Court that the 1973 Rules as also the 1980 Rules are quite legal and valid.
We are, however, of the view that under rule 6 of the 1973 Rules or rule 5 of the 1980 Rules only a reasonable period, namely, the period of three years, required for taking the examination and the time taken for recruitment or posting, as discussed above, along with the period of war service, but no other period, will be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the seniority and pay.
The impugned seniority list prepared in 1976 and also that prepared subsequently in the year 1980 cannot be sustained, as they have been prepared by taking into consideration the entire period between the discharge and the recruitment without any reservation for computing the seniority.
For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the High Court relating to the interpretation of rule 6 of the 1973 Rules.
The impugned seniority lists of 1976 and 1980 are also quashed.
The State of Uttar Pradesh is directed to prepare the seniority list in the light of the observations made hereinabove within a period of six months from date.
The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above.
There will, however, be no order as to costs in either of these appeals.
G.N. Appeals allowed.

summary:
The appellants have been appointed in the U.P. Civil Service as direct recruits on the basis of competitive examination held by the U.P. Service Commission.
They are governed by the U.P. Civil Service (Executive Branch) Rules, 1941.
The respondents were recruited under the U.P. Non Technical (Class II) Services (Reservation of Vacancies for Demobilised officers) Rules, 1973 and/or U.P.
Non Technical (Class II/Group 'B ') Services (Appointment of Demobilised officers) Rules, 1980.
They were either Emergency Commissioned officers or Short Service Commissioned Officers of the armed forces.
They were demobilised from the armed forces in or about 1968.
In order to rehabilitate such persons who rendered services to the country during the operation of the emergency when the nation 's security was in peril due to aggression, the 1973 Rules were framed under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution of India.
In 1976, a seniority list was prepared showing the respondents as seniors to the appellants on the basis of their service in the armed forces and the gaps between their discharge and recruitment in civil service.
Similar list was prepared in 1980 as well.
Aggrieved by this, the appellants moved two writ petitions before the High Court challenging the validity of the 1973 Rules as also the 1980 Rules.
The High Court held that these Rules were legal and valid and upheld the validity of the impugned seniority list.
These two appeals by special leave are against the High Court judgment.
On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the High 575 Court 's interpretation of Rule 6 of the 1973 Rules relating to seniority and pay was in excess of the relief intended to be granted by the rule.
It was also urged that when a candidate who was in the armed forces joined civil service, the assumption should be that he had entered the civil service at the second opportunity of competing for the recruitment, but no other period including that between the discharge and recruitment would be taken into account for the purpose of computing his seniority.
The contention of the Respondents was that since only ten per cent of the vacancies were reserved for war service candidates, it was difficult for them to get a chance within a reasonable time after their discharge from war service and it would be quite consistent with rules of natural justice to take into account the interregnum between the date of discharge and the date of recruitment in civil service.
Allowing the appeals, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.1.
The High Court was right in holding that the 1973 Rules as also the 1980 Rules are quite legal and valid.
However, under Rule 6 of the 1973 Rules or Rule 5 of the 1980 Rules, only a reasonable period of three years for taking the examination and the time taken for recruitment or posting would be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing seniority and pay.
[582D E] 1.2.
Under Rule 6 of the 1973 Rules, the recruitment of a war service candidate will be assumed to have been made in the year in which he had the second opportunity of competing for such recruitment, the first being on attaining the minimum age to compete.
It does not provide for the period between demobilisation and recruitment of a war service candidate in the civil service.
Nor does it forbid consideration of such period.
It cannot, however, he denied that after the discharge from war service, there will be some lapse of time for the recruitment of a candidate in the Provincial Civil Service.
There is a question of competing in the examination.
Though Rule 6 does not provide for any gap to be taken into consideration, it is apparent that some reasonable period has to be allowed to a candidate to enable him to avail himself of the opportunity of appearing at the competitive examination for recruitment in the Provincial Civil Service.
Competitive examinations are generally difficult and at least two years ' time should be allowed to a candidate, after his discharge, for his preparation for the competitive examination and that will be his first opportunity.
The second opportunity will arise in the next year, that is, in the third year 576 of his discharge from the armed forces.
In other words, he should be allowed three years for competing in the relevant examination for recruitment in the civil service.
Apart from the three years, the period of time taken for recruitment or posting will also be taken into consideration for the purpose of computing the seniority of a war service candidate.
[580H; 581C H] 1.3.
If, however, a candidate does not avail himself of the opportunity within three years of his discharge from war service or takes the examination but becomes unsuccessful, the period between his discharge and subsequent recruitment will not be taken into account for the purpose of computing the seniority.
[582C] [This Court set aside the judgment of the High Court relating to the interpretation of Rule 6 of the 1973 Rules, quashed the seniority lists of 1976 and 1980, and directed the State of U.P. to prepare the seniority list within six months in the light of this judgment.] [582F G]


judgement:
Civil Appeals Nos.
272 1 & 2722 (N) of 1972.
From the Judgment and order dated 30.3.1972 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 440/62 and 577 of 1962.
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, section Dutt and P.H. Parekh for the Appelant.
A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajit section Bhasme for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J.
Controversy is centred on the question of valuation of the lands under acquisition.
The trial Court had correctly valued the lands and the High Court had erroneously revised the valuation downwards complains the original owner of the land who is the appellant in these two allied appeals.
The lands in question situated in a locality known as 'Tigris Camp ' within the city limits of Poona in Maharashtra admeasuring 15 acres and 17 Gunthas, comprised in Survey Nos. 85 and 86, were 1.
By Certificate under Article 133( l)(a) of the Constitution of India as it existed at the material time.
534 placed under acquisition pursuant to a Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act published on March 8, 1956.
The acquisition was a part of the total acquisition of 101 acres 33 Gunthas made for a public purpose viz. for construction of the Headquarters, Poona Rural Police Charge.
The appellant was not satisfied with the compensation offered by the Land Acquisition officer in respect of his parcel of 15 Acres 7 Gunthas and applied for a reference being made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Two references were made to a Civil Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for determining the market value of the lands for the purpose of awarding compensation to the appellants.
The Trial Court determined the market value of 2 1/4 acres forming part of Survey Nos. 85 and 86 at Rs.15,00 per acre.
Market value in respect of the remaining 13 acres and 7 Gunthas was determined at Rs.8692 per acre.
The present dispute is confined to valuation of 13 Acres 7 Gunthas forming part of Survey No. 85.
The High Court has reduced the total compensation payable in respect of the land in question from Rs.1,14,517 computed at Rs.8692 per acre to Rs.63,846 (which works out at Rs.4845.87 per acre) thereby reducing the compensation awarded to the appellant by Rs.50,554 in respect of this parcel of land.
Before tackling the problem of valuation of the land under acquisition it is necessary to make some general observations.
The compulsion to do so has arisen as the Trial Court has virtually treated the award rendered by the Land Acquisition officer as a judgment under appeal and has evinced unawareness of the methodology for valuation to some extent.
The true position therefore requires to be capsulized.
The following factors must be etched on the mental screen: (1) A reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court.
(2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisition officer is not to be treated as a judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the Reference.
It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before 535 it.
It is not the function of the Court to suit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition officer, as if it were an appellate court.
(3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it.
(4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the Court.
Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose.
(5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under sec.
4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of Notifications under secs.
6 and 9 are irrelevant).
(6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under sec.
4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day.
It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(7) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value.
(8) only genuine instances have to be taken into account.
(Some times instances are rigged up in anticipation of Acquisition of land).
(9) Even post notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate,(2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
536 (l0) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) proximity from time angle, (ii) proximity from situation angle.
(11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis a vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition.
(12) A balance sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(13) The market value of the land under acquisition has there after to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors (14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do.
We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors: Plus factors Minus factors 1.
smallness of size.
largeness of area.
2. proximity to a road.
situation in the interior at a distances from the Road.
frontage on a road.
narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to death.
nearness to developed area.
lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up.
regular shape.
remoteness from developed locality.
537 6.
level vis a vis land 6.
some special under acquistion.
disadvantageous factor which would deter a purchaser.
special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage.
(15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case.
There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule.
Common sense is the best and most reliable guide.
For instance, take the factor regarding the size.
A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq.
yds cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say l000 sq.
yds or more.
Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur.
The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx.
between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots.
The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be looked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards.
(16) Every case must be dealt with on its own facts pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the Judge must place himself.
(17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense.
The problem which has surfaced in the present appeals needs to be recapitulated.
The question is whether in scaling down the total compensation payable to the appellant from Rs.1,14,517 to Rs.63,846, the High Court has violated any principle of valuation or adopted any faulty methodology.
538 The formula evolved by the High Court may be briefly outlined.
The High Court has taken into account the market value reflected in the instances pertaining to small parcels of land cited by the parties which on the analysis of the evidence have been considered as compar able subject to factors of differentiation.
The High Court has valued the land having best situation admeasuring 9 acres comprised in Survey No. 86 which abuts on the Ganeshkhand Road at Rs.20,000 per acre.
Having done so the market value reflected therein has been unloaded to account for the minus factors pertaining to the rest of the lands including the land in question.
The lands comprised in Survey No. 86 situated in the interior were valued at Rs.16,000 per acre, whereas lands abutting on Pashan Road were valued at Rs.12,000 per acre.
The appellant 's land, which was agricultural land albeit with future potential for development as building site, was situated far far in the interior in the midst of blocks of undeveloped land.
The formula for evaluation involved taking of three steps: (1) The High Court formed the opinion that allowance for largeness of block deserved to be made at 25% instead of 20% as done by the Trial Court.
(2) The High Court formed the opinion that the development would take about 12 years to reach the appellant 's land.
On these premises the High Court formed the opinion that the land of the appellant could be valued at Rs.7000 per acre as a block.
(3) The High Court directed that the market value so ascertained should be further depressed to account for the factor as regards the waiting period of 12 years which was the estimated period for development reaching the appellant 's land.
The 'present value ' of the land was accordingly de duced by depressing the valuation of Rs.7000 per acre by reference to Miram 's Tables on the basis of discount rate of 5% per annum to account for the factor that approximately 12 years would elapse before development could reach the appellant 's land.
That is how the total compensation payable to the appellant for the block of land admeasuring 13 acres 7 gunthas was determined at Rs.63,846 which works out at approximately Rs.4,845.87 per acre.
539 The valuation made by the High Court has been faulted on three A grounds: (1) The High Court should not have made a deduction of 25% in place of deduction made by the Trial Court at 20% to account for the factor pertaining to the largeness of the block of land under acquisition.
(2) The High Court had grossly undervalued the land in determining the market value of the appellants ' land at Rs.7,000 per acre.
(3) There was no warrant for pushing down or depressing the market value of land as determined by the Trial Court in order to deduce the 'present value ' by reference to Miram 's Tables to account for the factor as regards the estimated time lag for development reaching the block of land in question which was situated in the interior.
Besides, the time lag of 12 years as estimated by the High Court was excessive and unrealistic.
The first two grounds are devoid of merit.
It is common knowledge that when a large block of land is required to be valued, appropriate deduction has to be made for setting aside land for carving out roads, leaving open spaces, and plotting out smaller plots suitable for construction of buildings.
The extent of the area required to be set apart in this connection has to be assessed by the Court having regard to shape, size and situation of the concerned block of land etc.
There cannot be any hard and fast rule as to how much deduction should be made to account for this factor.
It is essentially a question of fact depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
It does not involve drawing upon any principle of law.
It cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error in forming the opinion that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case 25% deduction was required to be made in this connection.
The High Court cannot be faulted on this score.
The more serious grievance of the appellant however is that the High Court has depressed the market value excessively in evaluating the land in question at Rs.7,000 per acre as compared to the land abutting on the Ganeshkhand Road valued at Rs.20,000 per acre, the land abutting in the interior of Survey No. 86 valued at Rs.16,000, and land abutting on Pashan Road valued at Rs.12,000 per acre.
A glance 540 at the sketch on the record shows that the appellant 's land is situated very much in the interior as compared to the other parcels of land.
It is in the midst of large blocks of undeveloped land.
A hypothetical purchaser would not offer the same market value for lands with such a situation as lands which are nearer to the developed area and abut on a road or are nearer to a road.
The development of lands which are nearer to the developed area and nearer to the road can reasonably be expected to take place much earlier.
Only after such lands are developed and construction comes up, the development would proceed further in the interior.
It would not be unreasonable to visualize that a considerable time would elapse before development could reach the block of undeveloped land located in the interior.
Besides, the land which is situated in the interior does not fetch the same value as the land which is nearer to the developed area and nearer to the road.
If a hypothetical purchaser opts to purchase the land situated in the interior in the midst of an undeveloped area, he would doubtless take into account the factor pertaining to the estimated time for development to reach the land in the interior.
For, his capital would be unprofitably looked up for a very long time depending on the estimated time required for the development to reach the land in the interior.
Meanwhile he would have to suffer loss of interest.
It is, therefore, understandable that the land in the interior would fetch much smaller price as compared to the lands situated nearer to the developed locality.
More so as all these factors are incapable of precise or scientific evaluation.
The valuer has to indulge in some amount of guess work and make the best of the situation.
The High Court having accorded anxious consideration to all these factors of uncertainty has arrived at the valuation of Rs.7000 per acre.
Says the High Court in paragraph 51 of the Judgment: "This brings up for final consideration the plots which we have described as interior plots in all the survey numbers and which do not have a frontage on the roads.
A lower price will have to be provided for these plots, since the plot holders will have to spend moneys for getting water and drainage connections which are given only upto the Municipal Roads.
Then again, in our opinion, the interior plots would not be sold at all as long as any of the plots having a frontage on Pashan Road or Baner Road are sold, though once such plots have been disposed of the demand for interior plots would certainly pick up.
Here again, it is impossible to be precise in fixing the value; but in our opinion the interior plots may fairly be valued at Rs.7,000 541 per acre.
As stated earlier, the sales of these plots would commence after all the plots having a frontage on Pashan Road and Baner Road are disposed of i.e. after 12 years, and we may say that those plots would be sold within a period of about 4 years.
" It is not possible to find fault with the reasoning or conclusion of the High Court.
The High Court was day in and day out engaged in valuation of the lands in different parts of the state and was fully aware of the landscope.
There is no yardstick by which the future can be forseen with any greater degrees of preciseness.
The High Court has made the estimate as regards the time lag for development to reach the appellant 's land to the best of its judgment.
Having taken into account all the relevant factors, the High Court has arrived at the aforesaid determination.
And in doing so, the High Court has not committed any error or violated any principle of valuation.
It is purely a question of fact and it is not possible to detect any error even in the factual findings recorded by the High Court.
In fact the High Court has been extremely considerate and has approached the question of valuation with sympathy and understanding for the land owner.
The High Court did not opt for an easy way out by taking the view that since there was no comparable instance of undeveloped lands in the interior on the basis of which the valuation of the appellant 's land could be made, the Award made by the land Acquisition officer should remain undisturbed.
The High Court has done the best under the circumstances albeit by making recourse to some guess work which in the circumstances of the case was inevitable.
There is no material on the basis of which this Court can uphold the plea of the appellant that the valuation at Rs.7,000 per acre does not reflect the true market value or that the land in question is under valued.
The argument urged by the appellant in this behalf, under the circumstances, cannot be accepted.
Turning now to the third ground, it appears that the appellant 's grievance is justified.
The grievance is that there was no warrant for making any further deduction once the land was valued at Rs.7,000 as against the valuation of the best parcel of land at Rs.20,000 which was made precisely to account for the factor pertaining to its situation in the interior.
There was therefore no warrant for ascertaining the present value of Rs.7,000 as if Rs.7,000 would be fetched after 12 years.
Now the parcel of land admeasuring 13 acres 7 gunthas comprised in Survey No. 85 which was situated very much in the interior was valued by the Trial Court at Rs. 10,866 per acre (less 20% to account for roads etc.).
This parcel of land was valued at Rs.7,000 per acre by the High 542 Court.
The High Court had valued the land with the best situation on the Ganeshkhand Road at Rs.20,000 per acre.
As against this the appellant 's land was valued at mere Rs.7,000 per acre which reflected an unloading by Rs.13,000 per acre which works out at 65%.
This pushing down was made to account for its situation in the interior on the premise that development would take about 12 years to reach the land under acquisition.
If the appellant 's land just adjoined the land valued at Rs.20,000 per acre it would have been valued at the same figure of Rs.20,000.
It has been valued at Rs.7,000 per acre precisely because it is so situated that development would reach the appellant 's land after 12 years as estimated by the High Court.
But after 12 years it would become land adjoining to developed area and not land which could be treated as in the interior.
Therefore, if present value was to be ascertained it should be ascertained on the basis of present value of land which would fetch Rs.20,000 per acre after 12 years and not present value of land which would fetch Rs.7.000 per acre after 12 years.
In fact present value of Rs.20,000 payable at the end of 12 years at 8% would work out at Rs.6942 (.3971 x 20,000 = 6942)1.
The High Court was therefore right in valuing the land in interior at Rs.7,000 per acre but wrong in directing that present value of Rs.7,000 payable after 12 years should be ascertained.
The last ground is thus well founded .
In the result appellant must be awarded compensation at Rs.7,000 per acre subject to deduction or allowance of 25% to account for land required to be set apart for roads, open spaces etc.
In other words appellant will be entitled to be paid compensation for 13 acres 7 gunthas comprised in Survey No. 85 at Rs.5,250 per acre (Rs.7,000 less 25% i.e. Iess 1750=Rs.5,250) in place of the lesser sum awarded by the High Court.
Appeal must be partly allowed to this extent accordingly.
F The question however remains whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Central Amending Act (Act 68 of 1984) providing payment of solatium and interest at enhanced rates on the ground that present appeals were pending before this Court on 30th April, 1982.
The appellants would be entitled to the benefit thereof by virtue of section 30(2) of the Act if the view is taken that the said Act has retrospective operation in the sense that amended section 23(2) and section 28 apply also in relation to an order under appeal against an award made by the Collector of Court between April 30, 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act.
This must depend on the deci 1.
See Mirarm 's Table 7 at 657 of A.K. Mitra 's Theory and Practice of Valuation (2nd Edition) Published by Eastern Law House.
543 sion of the Constitution Bench which is expected soon.
The appellant Will be entitled to the benefit of Central Amending Act (Act 68 of 1984) in case the Constitution Bench upholds the view expressed in Bhag Singh case [1985] 3 SCC p. 737 and overrules the view expressed in Kamalajammanniavaru Case [1985] 1 SCC p. 582.
In case the Constitution Bench affirms the view taken in Kamalajammanniavaru Case, the appellant will not be entitled to such benefit.
Appeal is partly allowed accordingly to the aforesaid extent.
Order passed by the High Court is modified to the corresponding extent.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order regarding costs in this Court.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant not being satisfied with the compensation offered by the Land Acquisition officer in respect of his land placed under acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, applied for a reference to a civil court, for determining the market value of the land for awarding compensation to the appellant.
The Trial Court determined the market value of the land in question at Rs.8692 per acre.
The High Court reduced the amount of compensation payable to Rs.4845.87 from Rs.8692 per acre.
The appellant moved this Court for relief, complaining that the High Court had erroneously revised downwards the valuation correctly arrived at by the Trial Court.
Allowing the appeal partly, the Court ^ HELD: The trial Court had virtually treated the award rendered by the Land Acquisition officer as a judgment under appeal.
The Court laid down general guidelines to be followed in respect of methodology for valuation, in order to capsulize the true position.
[534E] F The valuation made by the High Court had been faulted on three grounds: (1) The High Court should not have made a deduction of 25% in place of deduction made by the Trial Court at 20% to account for the factor pertaining to largeness of the block of land under acquisition.
[539B] (2) The High Court had grossly under valued the land in determining the market value of the appellant 's land at Rs.7000 per acre as a block.
[539B C] 532 (3) There was no warrant for pushing down or depressing the market value of land as determined by the Trial Court in order to deduce the 'present value ' by reference to Miram 's Tables to account for the factor as regards the estimated time lag for development reaching the block of land in question which was situated in the interior.
Besides, the time lag of 12 years as estimated by the High Court was excessive and unrealistic.
[539C D] The first two grounds were devoid of merit.
It was not possible to find fault with the reasoning or conclusion of the High Court.
The High Court was regularly engaged in valuation of the lands in different parts of the State and was fully aware of the landscape.
It had made the estimate as regards the time lag for development to reach the appellant 's land to the best of its judgment, and having taken into account all the relevant factors, it had arrived at its determination.
The High Court had not committed any error or violated any principle of valuation.
It was purely a question of fact and it was not possible to detect any error even in the factual findings recorded by the High Court.
There was no material on the basis on which the plea of the appellant could be upheld that the valuation of Rs.7000 per acre did not reflect the true market value or that the land in question was undervalued.
[541B F] The Appellant 's grievance with regard to the third ground was justified.
The appellant 's parcel of land in question, situated very much in the interior, was valued by the Trial Court at Ks.
l0,866 per acre (less 20% for roads, etc.).
The High Court valued this parcel of land at Rs.7,000 per acre.
It had valued the land with the best situation on the Ganeshkhand Road at Rs.20,000 per acre.
As against this, the appellant 's land was valued at Rs.7,000 per acre.
This pushing down was made to account for its situation in the interior on the premise that development would take about 12 years to reach the appellant 's land under acquisition.
But after 12 years, it would become land adjoining the developed area and not land which could be treated as in the interior.
If the present value was to be ascertained, it should be ascertained on the basis of present value of land which would fetch Rs.20,000 per acre after 12 years and not present value of land which would fetch Rs.7,000 per acre after 12 years.
In fact the present value of Rs.20,000 payable at the end of 12 years at 8% would work out to Rs.6942 according to Miram 's Table 7, p.657 of A.K. Mitra 's Theory and Practice of Valuation 2nd Edition.
The High Court was right in valuing the land in interior at Rs.7,000 per acre but wrong in directing that present value of Rs.7,000 payable after 12 years should be ascertained.
The appellant must be awarded compensation at Rs.7,000 533 per acre subject to deduction or allowance of 25% to account for land required to be set apart for roads, open spaces, etc.
The appellant would be entitled to be paid compensation for his land in question at Rs.5250 per acre (Rs.7,000 less 25%) in place of lesser amount awarded by the High Court.
[541F H; 542A F] The appellant would be entitled to the benefit of the Central Amending Act 68 of 1984 in view of section 30(2) of the Act because these appeals were pending before this Court on 30th April, 1982, if the view is taken that the said Act had retrospective operation in the sense that the amended section 23(2) and section 28 apply also in relation to an order under appeal against an award made by the Collector or Court between April 30, 1982 and the commencement of the Amending Act.
This must depend upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court, expected soon; the appellant would be entitled to the benefit as above said if the Constitution Bench upholds the view expressed in Bhag Singh case, (1985) 3 SCC p. 737 and overrules the view expressed in Kamalajamanniavaru case, [542G H; 543A B]