judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1773 of 1971.
(From the Judgment and order dated 20 2 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 2943/69) S.C. Manchanda and O.P. Rana, for the Appellants.
V.S. Desai, P.B. Agarwala and B.R. Agarwala, for the Respondents.
838 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J.
This appeal by certificate which is directed against the judgment and order dated February 20, 1970, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in writ petition No. 2943 of 1969 raises two interesting ques tions viz. ( 1 ) whether carbon paper is paper falling within the purview of the word 'paper ' as used in serial No. 2 of Notification Ng.
ST 3124/X 1012(4) 1964 dated July 1, 1966, issued by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the power vested in him under section 3 A of the U.P. Sales 'Fax Act, 1948 (U.P. Act No. XV of 1948) so as to be liable to sales tax at the point and at the rate specified in the Schedule to the Notification and (2) whether ribbon is an accessory or a part of the typewriter.
It appears that the respondent which is a company incor porated under the Indian Companies Act dealing in carbon paper, typewriter, ribbon, stepler machines and stepler pins, despatches the said goods from its head office at Bombay to its branch office at Kanpur wherefrom sales there of are effected in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
During the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1956 57, the respondent claimed that carbon paper not being paper falling within the ambit of Entry No. 2 of the Schedule to the aforesaid Notification but a specialised article used for copying purposes, its turnover had to be assessed at the rate of 2 per cent prescribed for unclassi fied goods and not at the rate of 6 paise per rupee i.e. 6% prescribed in the aforesaid Notification.
The respondent further claimed that ribbon being an accessory anti not a part of the typewriter, its turnover could not be subjected to sales tax at the rate of 10% prescribed inter alia for typewriters and parts thereof by Notification No. ST 1738/X I012 1963 dated June 1, 1963.
The Sales Tax Officer, (Section IV), Kanpur, did not accede to the conten tions of the respondent and holding that carbon paper re mained paper even after going through certain chemical processes and that ribbon was a part of the typewriter, taxed the turnover of carbon paper for the period commencing from July 1, 1966, to the end of March, 1967 at 6% and that of ribbon at 10%.
He, however, taxed the turnover of carbon paper for the period April 1, 1966 to June 30, 1966 at 2%.
The validity and correctness of this order in so far as it related to the levy of tax on carbon paper at 6% and ribbon at 10% was challenged by the respondent by means of the aforesaid writ petition before the High Court at Allahabad which by its aforesaid judgment and order allowed the same and quashed the levy.
Hence this appeal.
Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Manchanda has assailed the reasoning and approach of the High Court and has vehemently urged that carbon paper does not lose its character as paper even after being subjected to chemical processes and that ribbon is not an accessory but an essen tial part of the typewriter.
We have carefully considered the submission made by Mr. Manchanda but find ourselves unable to accept the same.
839 It is well settled that a word which is not defined in an enactment has to be understood in its popular and commer cial sense with reference to the context in which it occurs.
In Attorney General vs Winstanley (1), Lord Tenterden started as follows: "Now, when we look at the words of an Act of Parliament, which are not applied to any particular science or art, we are to construe them as they are understood in common language.
" In Grenfell vs Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2) Pollock, J, pointed out: "As to tile construction of the Stamp Act, I think it was very properly urged that the statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but that it is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning, of course, by the words 'popular sense ' that sense which people conversant with the sub ject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it." The word 'paper ' admittedly not having been defined either in the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 or the Rules made thereunder, it has tO be understood according to the afore said well established canon of construction in the sense in which persons dealing in and using the article understand it.
It is, therefore, necessary to know what is paper as commonly or generally understood.
The said word which is derived from the name of reedy plant papyrus and grows abundantly along the Nile river in Egypt is explained in 'The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Volume 2) (Third Edition) as "a substance composed of fibres interlaced into a compact web, made from linen and cotton rags, straw, wood, certain grasses, etc., which are macrated into a pulp, dried and pressed; it is used for writing.
printing, or drawing on, for wrapping things in, for covering the interior of wails, etc.
" In 'Encyclopaedia Britannica ', (Volume 13), (15th Edition), 'paper ' has been defined as the basic material used for written communication and the dissemination of information.
" In the Unabridged Edition of "The Randon House Dicition ary of the English Language", the word 'paper ' has been defined as "a substance made from rags, straw wood ' or other fibrous material, usually in thin sheets, used to bear writing or printing or for wrapping things, decorating walls etc.
" From the above definitions, it is clear that in popular parlance, the word 'paper ' is understood as meaning a sub stance which is used for bearing, writing, or printing, or for packing, or for drawing on, or for decorating, or cover ing the walls.
Now carbon paper which is manu (1) [1831] 2 Dow & Clark 302=(1901) ; (2) at 248.
840 factured by coating the tissue paper with a thermo setting ink (made to a liquid consistency) based mainly on wax, non drying oils, pigments and dyes by means of a suitable coat ing roller and equalising rod and then passing it through chilled rolls cannot be used for the aforesaid purposes but is used.
according to 'The Randon House Dictionary of the English Language ' between two sheets of plain paper in order to reproduce on the lower sheet that which is written or typed on the upper sheet i.e. making replicas or carbon copies cannot properly be described as paper.
It will be well at this stage to refer to a few deci sions which confirm our view.
In Kilburn & Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P., Lucknow(I) a Bench of Allahabad High Court while examining the very same entry in the Notification with which we are concerned in the instant case and holding that "Ammonia paper and ferro paper used for obtaining prints and sketches of site plans are not paper us understood generally and, therefore, will not come within the expression 'paper other than hand made paper ' as used in Notification No. ST 3124/X 1012(4) dated 1st July, 1966, issued under section 3 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948" observed : "The word 'paper ' has not been defined in the Act or the Rules, and, as such, it has to be given the meaning which it has in 'ordinary parlance.
Paper, as understood in common parlance, is the paper which is used for printing.
writing and packing purposes.
" In Sree Rama Trading Company vs State of Kerala(2) the High Court of Kerala after a good deal of research held that cellophane is not paper coming within entry 42 in the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, as it stood at the time relevant to the year 1966 67.
In State of Orissa vs Gestetner Duplicators (P) Ltd.(3) the HIgh Court of Orissa held that stencil paper was not paper within the meaning of serial No. 7 A of the Schedule to the Notification issued by the State Government under the first proviso to section 5(1) 'of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 and that sale of stencil paper was, therefore, not taxable at the rate of 7 per cent but is exigible to tax at the rate of 5 per cent.
In Commissioner of Sates Tax, U.P, vs
S.N. Brothers(1) this Court while upholding the decision of the Allahabad High Court which held that 'food colours ' and 'syrup es sences ' arc .edible goods while 'dyes and colours and compo sitions thereof and 'scents and perfume ' did not seem prima facie to connote that they are edible goods observed: (1) 31 S.T.C. 625.
(2) 28 S.T.C. 469.
(3) 33 S.T.C. 333.
(4) 31 S.T.C. 302. 841 "The words 'dyes and.
colours ' used in entry No. 10 and the words: scents and perfumes ' used in entry No. 37 have to be construed in their own context and in the sense, as ordinarily understood and attribut ed to these words by people usually conver sant with and dealing in such goods.
Simi larly, the words "food colours" and "syrup essences", which are descriptive of the class of goods the sales of which are to be taxed under the Act, have to be construed in the sense in which they are popularly understood by those who deal in them and who purchase and use them.
" Bearing in mind the ratio of the above mentioned decisions, it is quite clear that the mere fact that the word 'paper ' forms part of the denomination of a specialised article is not decisive of the question whether the article is paper as generally understood. 'the word 'paper ' in the common parlance or in the comercial sense means paper which is used for printing, writing or packing pur poses.
We are, therefore, clear of opinion that Carbon paper is not paper as envisaged by entry 2 of the aforesaid Notification.
Regarding ribbon also to which the above mentioned rule construction equally applies, we have no manner of doubt that it an accessory and not a part of the typewriter (unlike spool) though it may not be possible to use the latter without the former.
Just as aviation petrol is not a part of the aero plane nor diesel is a part of a bus in the same way, ribbon is not a part of the type writer though it may not be possible to type out any matter without it.
The very same question with which we are here confronted came up for decision before the High Court of Mysore in State of Mysore vs Kores (India)Ltd.
(1) where it was held: "Whether a typewriter ribbon is a part of a typewriter is to be considered in the light of what is meant by a typewriter in the commer cial sense.
Typewriters are being sold in the market without the typewriter ribbons and therefore typewriter ribbon is not an essen tial part of a typewriter so as to attract tax as per entry 18 of the Second Schedule to the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957.
" For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any force in this appeal which is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
M.R. Appeal dismissed (1) 26 S.T.C. 87.

summary:
The Governor of U.P. issued a Notification under Section 3 A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the Sales Tax Officer (Section IV) Kanpur, ordered the respondent company to pay tax on the turnover of ' carbon paper at 6%, and that of ribbon at 10%, as per entry 2 of the Notification.
The respondent challenged the order in a writ petition before the High Court.
contending that carbon paper was not 'paper ' with the meaning of entry 2 and its turnover was therefore to be assessed at the rate of 2% prescribed for unclassified goods, and that 'ribbon ' being an accessory and not a part of the typewriter, could only be taxed at the rate of 6% and not 10%.
The High Court allowed the writ and quashed the levy.
The appellant contended that carbon paper does not lose its character as paper in spite of being subjected to chemi cal processes, and that ribbon is not an accessory but an essential part of the typewriter.
Dismissing the appeal the Court, HELD :(1) A word which is not defined in an enactment has to be understood in its popular and commercial sense with reference to the context in which it occurs.
It has to be understood according to the well established canon of construction in the sense in which persons dealing in and using the article understand it.
[839 A B] Attorney General vs Winstanley (1831) 2 Dow & Clark 302:(1901) ; , and Grenfell vs Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1876)1 exhibit D. 242 at p. 248 applied.
(2) The word 'paper ' is understood as meaning a sub stance which is used for bearing writing or printing, or for packing.
or for drawing on.
or for decorating, or covering the wails.
Carbon paper cannot be used for these purposes but is used for making replicas or carbon copies, and cannot properly be described as paper.
[839 G, 840 A B] K. Kilburn & Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Lucknow (31 S.T.C. 625), Sree Rama Trading Company vs State of Kerala (28 S.T.C. 469).
state of Orissa vs Gestetner Duplicators (P) Ltd. (33 S.T.C. 333 ) Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.v.
S.N. Brothers (31 S.T.C. 302) applied.
(3) The above mentioned rule of construction equally applies to ribbon.
an accessory and not a part of the typewriter, though it may not be possible type out any matter without it.
[841 D E] State of Mysore vs Kores (India) Ltd. (26 S.T.C. 87) ap proved.


judgement:
il Appeal.
No. 1745 of 1968.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 13 10 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 1113 of 1966).
O.P. Sharma, for the appellants.
section K, Mehta, K.R. Nagaraja and P.N. Puri, for the Respond ents, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J.
The State of Punjab has come up by special leave against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court o[ Punjab & Haryana allowing the Writ petition of the respondents who, it is admitted by the State, are teachers of the Junior Vernacular grade working, on the dates on which they filed the Writ petition, as "promotees" in the senior vernacular grade temporarily but had not been con firmed there.
It appears that the only difference between the junior vernacular cadre and the senior vernacular cadre is that those who teach lower classes were placed in the "junior" cadre and those who teach higher classes were in the "senior vernacular cadre".
But, for some reason, working in senior vernacular cadre was considered a promotion.
After consideration of the whole position, the two grades were integrated by the Government from 1st October.
1957, with retrospective effect, under the Punjab Educational Service 833 (Provincialised Cadre) Class III Service Rules, 1961.
This meant that the Government recognised that both the cadres should be really considered as one and that there were no acceptable grounds for a differentiation.
Nevertheless, it appears that the names of the petitioners were dropped from the junior vernacular cadre as they had been working for more than the probationary period in the senior vernacular cadre.
It is urged that it must be deemed that they were confirmed in the senior vernacular cadre automatically.
However, they had to be "probationers" in the senior cadre for such a result to enure.
We fail to see how they become "probationers" there.
Curiously, the prospects of those who were not considered "promoted" to the senior vernacular cadre and were junior to the petitioners respondents in that cadre, improved as they were offered opportunities of being taken in a "selection grade".
But, no such opportunities were offered to the petitioners on the ground that they had been removed from the junior vernacular cadre.
The names of the petitioners respondents had been automatically dropped from the cadre in which they held their liens having been appointed there initially permanently.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana held that the peti tioners respondents are entitled to the benefit of their substantive posts, which were still in the junior vernacular cadre, as they were never confirmed in the senior vernacular cadre whatever may be the sentimental satisfaction of being considered as persons "promoted" to and working in the "senior vernacular cadre".
Subsequent events showed that those who are junior to the petitioners, and, for that reason, did not get the opportunity of serving in the "senior" cadre, had better opportunities offered to them without any reasonable ground of discrimination between the two cadres except that the petitioners were seniors and could consider themselves "promoted" because they had been performing the duties of teachers of the "senior" cadre.
The petitioners, after discovering that those who were junior to them and had, therefore, not been given the oppor tunity of serving in the senior vernacular cadre, had a better opportunity of moving into the selection grade, which had not been offered to them, applied for this very opportunity as they still continued in their substantive posts which were in the junior vernacular cadre.
They took up the correct position that they had merely been officiat ing in the senior vernacular cadre but their right places were in the junior vernacular cadre.
The mere fact that they worked in the senior cadre for longer periods than proba tioners would could not give them the status of either more probationers or persons Confirmed in the senior vernacular cadre.
They could not, for that reason alone, be deprived of the benefits of their substantive appointments in the junior vernacular cadre.
Hence, their Writ Petitions were allowed and they were afforded all the benefits which would have accrued to them as members of the junior vernacu lar cadre to which they did not really cease to belong.
Moreover, as already pointed out, the Government had itself considered the position and had integrated the two cadres into one with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1957.
834 The position of the petitioners appears to us to be fully covered by the following rules contained in the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume I: "3.10.
Unless in any case it be other wise distinctly provided the whole time of a Government servant is at the disposal of the Government which pays.
him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority, without claim or additional remu neration, whether the services required of him are such as would ordinarily be remunerated from Union or State revenues, or from the revenues of a local fund.
Substantive Appointment and Lien.
(a) Two or more Government serv ants cannot be appointed substantively to the same permanent post at the same time.
(b) A Government servant cannot be appointed substantively except as a temporary measure, to two or more permanent posts at the same time.
(c) A Government servant cannot be appointed substantively to a post on which another Government servant holds a lien.
Unless in any case it be otherwise provided in these rules, a Government servant on substantive appointment to any permanent post acquires a lien on that post and ceases to hold any lien previously acquired on any other post.
Unless his lien is suspended under rule 3.14 or transferred under rule 3.16, a Government servant holding substantively a permanent post retains a lien on that post (a) while performing the duties of that post; (b) while on foreign service, or holding a temporary post, or officiating in another post; (c) during joining time on transfer to another post, unless he is transferred sub stantively to a post on lower _pay, in which case his lien is transferred to the new post from the date on which he is relieved of his duties in the old post; (d) except as provided in Note below while on leave; and (e) while under suspension.
(a) A competent authority shall suspend the lien of a Government servant on a permanent post which he 835 holds substantively, if he is appointed in a substantive capacity: (1) to a tenure post, or (2) to a permanent post outside the cadre on which he is borne.
or (3) provisionally, to a post on which another Government servant would hold a lien, had his lien not been suspended under rule.
(b) A competent authority may, at its option, suspend the lien of a Government servant on a permanent post which he holds substantively if he is deputed out of India or transferred to foreign service, or in circumstances not covered by clause (a) of this rule, is trans ferred, whether in a substantive or officiat ing capacity, to a post in another cadre, and if in any of these cases there is reason to believe that he will remain absent from the post on which he holds a lien, for a period of not less than three years.
(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or (b) of this rule, a Government servant 's lien on a tenure post may, in no circumstances, be suspended.
If he is appointed substantively to another permanent post, his lien on the tenure post must be terminated.
(d) If a Government servant 's lien on a post is suspended under clause (a) or (b) of this rule, the post may be filled substantive ly, and the Government servant appointed to hold it substantively shall acquire a lien on it: Provided that the arrangements shall be reversed as soon as the suspended lien re vives.
(e) A Government servant 's lien which has been suspended under clause (a) of this rule shall revive as soon as he ceases to hold a lien on a post of the nature specified in sub clause (1), (2) or (3) of that clause.
(f) A Government servant 's lien which has been suspended under clause (b) of this rule shall revive as soon as he ceases to be on deputation out of India or on foreign service or to hold a post in another cadre: Provided that a suspended lien shall not revive because the Government servant takes leave if there is reason to believe that he will, on return from leave, continue to be on deputation out of India or on foreign service or to hold a post in another cadre and the total period of absence on duty will not fall short of three years or that he will hold substantively a post of the nature specified 'in sub clause (1 ), (2) or (3) of clause (a).
(a) Except as provided in clause (c) of this rule and in note under rule 3.13, a Government servant 's 836 lien on a post may, in no circumstances, be terminated, even with his consent, if the result will be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post.
(b) In a case covered by sub clause (2) of clause (a) rule 3.14 the suspended lien may not, except on the written request of the Government servant concerned, be terminated while the Government servant remains in Government service.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 3.14(a).
the lien of a Government serv ant holding substantively a permanent post shah be terminated on his appointment substan tively to the post of Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department.
Subject to the provisions of rule 3.17, a competent authority may transfer to another permanent post in the same cadre the lien of a Government servant who is not performing the duties of a post to which the lien relates, even if that lien has been suspended.
" According to the rules set out above, the lien of the petitioners in the junior vernacu lar cadre was retained by them and it could not be suspended by the mere fact that they were performing the duties of teachers working in ' the senior vernacular cadre.
Nothing beyond this was disclosed by the facts of these cases.
The definition of a probationer, given in rule 2.49 is as follows: "2.49.
Probationer means a Government servant employed on probation in or against a substantive vacancy in the cadre of a depart ment.
This term does not, however, cover a Government servant who holds substantively a permanent post in a cadre and is merely appointed on probation ' to another post".
Learned Counsel for the State was unable to substantiate the submission that the petitioners respondents were merely probationers the senior vernacular cadre and not really persons whose substantive posts were in the junior vernacu lar cadre, appointed to perform the duties of persons put in another cadre.
Their duties in the senior cadre involved teaching somewhat higher classes.
This additional experience could not reasonably be looked up as a disquali fication for the selection grade.
The High Court had, therefore, given the petitioner respondents the benefits of the cadre on which their names should have been retained.
Moreover, this is not a question which can arise again as the two different cadres have been merged with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1957.
It meant that they were enti tled to be considered for the selection grade, and, if they satisfy the requirements for selection to get the benefits of it.
Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with costs.
M.R. Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The respondents, teachers of the Junior vernacular cadre, Punjab, were promoted to the senior vernacular cadre temporarily.
After the expiry of their probationary period, they were not confirmed, but continued to work in the senior cadre and their names were dropped from the junior vernacu lar cadre.
Mean while, other teachers, junior to the re spondents in the junior cadre were offered better opportuni ties of being taken in a "selection grade".
The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that they were entitled to the opportunity of moving into the selection grade, as they were neither probationers nor confirmed members but were only officiating in the senior cadre while retaining their substantive places and liens in the junior cadre.
The High Court allowed the writ.
Dismissing the appeal the Court.
HELD: The state was unable to substantiate the submis sion that the petitioners respondents became probationers in the senior vernacular cadre.
According to the rules, their lien in the junior vernacular cadre was retained by them, and, it could not be suspended by the mere fact that they were performing the duties of teachers working in the senior vernacular cadre.
[836 D E]