judgement:
Appeal Nos.4538 39 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.3.1990 of the Hyderabad High Court in C.C.A. Nos. 54 & 55 of 1987.
Ashok K.Gupta for the Appellant.
Ms. Suruchi Agrawal and T.V.S.N.Chari for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, CJ.
Special leave granted.
By notifica tion dated 12th January, 1973, under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as modifiednby Notification of 27th July, 1978, 26 acres and 26 gunthas of land located within the Hyderabad District was notified for acquisition for the Bhagyanagar Urban Development Authority.
A similar notification was published on 14th June, 1979 for acquisi tion of two acres and 29 gunthas.
The Land Acquisition Officer made his award for both the properties on 10 th June, 1982 fixing the market value at Rs. 42,000 per acre with five per cent deduction towards development cost.
Being dissatisfied with the awards passed by Land Acquisition Officer, a reference was sought and made under section 18 of the Act.
The Claimants demanded compensation at the rate of Rs. 200 per square yard.
The Civil Court fixed the market value at Rs.200 per sq.yd.
as demanded but directed deduc tion of 20 per cent towards development charges.
The Land Acquisition Officer carried appeals against the escalation of compensation and the present appellants preferred cross objections.
The High Court reassessed the entire evidence and came to hold.
"Today the position of the acquired lands is altogether different.
It is common knowledge that the prices started soaring high from 1980 onwards and this part of Hyderabad, namely, 377 Gaddiannaram started developing from 1980 and today it is undoubtedly one of the important areas in Hyderabad.
But we must consider the position as it stood in 1978 and 1979.
Taking all the circumstances into account, we think it reasonable to fix the market value at Rs. 3 lakhs per acre.
The Civil Court had given a deduction of 20 per cent towards development charges.
The learned Advocate General contended that deduction should be enhanced to 33 1/3 per cent.
We do not think that any interference is called for in this regard.
The lands are abutting the highway.
Evidence shows that there are roads on three sides.
Hence.
we maintain the deduction of 20 per cent and if so done, the market value comes to Rs.2,40,000 which works out at Rs. 50 per sq.yd.
The Trial Court has awarded Rs.200 per sq.yd with a deduction of 20 per cent which comes to Rs. 160 per sq.yd.
We are unable to sustain the order of the Court below on any justifiable grounds.
We accordingly set aside the judgment and decree and determine the market value at the rate of Rs.50 per sq.yd . " It is against this deduction in compensation that the claimants have come to this court in appeal.
The Collector had adopted a deduction of five per cent.
The referee court adopted the deduction at 20 per cent and the High Court rejecting the claim of the Advocate General that deduction should be one third put it at one fifth.
We find that the High Court did not go by the percentage of deduction.
In fact, according to the High Court and particu larly as the portion we have extracted above would show the appropriate market value per square yard was Rs. 50 and if a 20 per cent deduction from out of Rs. 3 lakhs per acre was accepted, it worked out that way.
The Judgment of the High Court gives us the impression that in fixing the compensa tion.
the High Court did not go by the percentage of deduc tion but kept in view the market value of the land at the time of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act.
There is clear material and the High Court has accepted it that price went up in the area after 1980.
The notifications are within a range of a year or two from that time.
There fore, the valuation after 1980 is not the guideline.
Having looked into the material accepted by the High Court, we are not in a position to disturb the finding recorded by the High Court.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
No costs.
R.P. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Certain plots of land of the appellant were acquired by notifications dated 12.1.1978, 27.7.1978 and 14.6.1979 issued under s.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The Land Acquisition Officer by an order dated 10.6.1982 fixed the market value at Rs. 42,000 per acre with 5 per cent deduction towards development cost.
In appellant 's appeal the Civil Court fixed the market value at Rs.200 per sq. yard with a deduction of 5 per cent towards the development charges.
On the appeal by the land acquisition officer, the High Court reassessed the entire evidence and fixed the market value at Rs.3 lakh per acre holding that if a deduction of 20 per cent was allowed, the market value would come to Rs.2,40,000 per acre which worked out at Rs.50 per sq.yard, and accordingly set aside the judgment and decree, and determined the market value at Rs.50 per sq.yard.
Dismissing the appeals of the appellant claimant this Court, HELD: 1.
In fixing the compensation, the High Court did not go by the percentage of deduction but kept in view the market value of the land at the time of the notification under s.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
[p. 377 F] 2.
There was clear material and the High Court accepted it that price went up in the area after 1980.
The notifica tions were within a range of a year or two from that time.
Therefore, the valuation after 1980 was not the guideline.
[ p. 377 F G] 376 3.
In the instant case, the Collector had adopted a deduction of five per cent.
The referee Court adopted the deduction at 20 per cent and the High Court rejecting the claim of the Advocate General that deduction should be one third put it at one fifth.
The High Court did not go by the percentage of deduction.
The appropriate market value fixed by the High Court per sq.
yard was Rs 50 and if a 20 per cent deduction from out of Rs.3 lakhs per acre was accepted, it worked that way.
The finding of the High Court need not be disturbed.
[p. 377 E G]


judgement:
Special Leave Petition Nos.
16066.
16065 & 16451 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.1991,30.8.1991 & 9.10.1991 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P.Nos.
12644, 12485 and 14606 of 1991 respectively.
Kapil Sibal, Ranjit Kumar, J.D. Jain, Mrs. Kawaljit Kocher, Dr. Balram Gupta, Ms. Yasmin Tarapore, J. Lal Kai lash Vasdev, Ms Nandini Sawhney, R.K. Kapoor, A.A. Khan and Anil Verma for the appearing parties.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: In the Union Territory of Chandigarh, 5% of the seats are reserved in favour of sons/daughters/spouses of Mili tary/Para Military personnel.
Orders in this behalf are issued by the Administration in its memo dated 19th May, 1982 which were later modified in memo dated 6.9.1990.
In accordance with the said orders, Punjab Engineering College (a College run by the Chandigarh Administration and affili ated to Punjab University) reserved 15 seats in favour of sons/daughters/spouses of Military/ParaMilitary Personnel.
The College published a prospectus for the session 1991 92.
It contains inter alia the rules governing the admission of stu 326 dents to the said college.
So far as the reservation in favour of children and spouses of Military/Para Military Personnel is concerned, the rule, (printed at pages 23 and 24 of the Prospectus) reads as follows: "Sons/Daughters/Spouses of Military/Para military Personnel etc.
: 3 The Admission of the candidates against the reserved seats under this category will be made on the basis of merit list prepared according to the priorities given below in the descending order: 1.
Sons/Daughters/Spouses of defence personnel who are awardees of gallantry decorations of Paramvir/Mahavir/Vir Chakra in person or posthumously.
OR Sons/daughters/spouses of defence personnel and para military personnel like CRPF, BSF etc.
who are killed or are total incapacitated in action while in service and were wholly dependent on them.
Sons/daughters/spouses of defence person nel and para military personnel like CRPF/BSF etc.
who die while in service and were wholly dependent on them; 3.
Sons/daughters/spouses of defence per sonnel and para military personnel like CRPF/BSF incapacitated while in service and were wholly dependent on them; 4.
Sons/daughters/spouses of exservicemen (military and para military personnel like CRPF/BSF who are wholly dependent on them; 5.
Sons/daughters/spouses of serving de fence personnel and paramilitary personnel like CRPF/BSF who are wholly dependent on them: The candidates claiming admissions under the category 1 above are required to submit the photo copy of citation for the gallantry award, failing which the application will not be considered in this category, The candidates claiming admission under category I are required to submit a certificate from the respective Head quarters regarding death/total incapacitation in action while in service.
The candidates claiming admission under category 2 and 3 are required to submit a certificate from the respective Headquarters regarding death/total incapacitation.while in service.
327 The candidates claiming admission under category 4 are required to submit discharge certificate from sevice and certificate of dependence from the District Magistrate of the district concerned.
The candidates claiming admission under category 5 are required to submit the certificate of dependence from the unit in which parent/spouse is serving.
The candidates who apply for admission against this category will also be considered for admission against the seats allocated for Chandigarh/ General Pool to which they may belong as per their merit.
" A perusal of the rule shows that the five categories are mentioned in the order of priority in the descending order.
There is no allocation of seats as between these five cate gories.
It means that in the first instance, all the quali fied and eligible candidates falling in category 1 will be given admission and if any seats are left unfilled, quali fied candidates failing in category 2 will be admitted.
If there are any seats still left unfilled, qualified candi dates falling in category 3 will be given admission and so on.
In a given year, it may well happen that all the avail able seats reserved for children/spouses of defence person nel are taken away by the candidates in the first or first and second categories.
As a matter of fact, for the year 1990 91, only 6 candidates belonging to sub category 4 out of 90 candidates could be admitted and not the others and category 5 'went unprovided altogether.
It is stated that all candidates obtaining the specified minimum marks in the common entrance test were treated as qualified for being considered for admission.
S.L.P. 16066/91: The first respondent in the S.L.P. applied for admission to Punjab Engineering College under this quota.
He appeared in the common Entrance Test along with other applicants.
The College Authorities considered his case placing him in category 4 since his father was an Ex serviceman.
He could not, however, be given the admission because the 15 seats reserved for children and spouses of Military/ParaMilitary Personnel in this College were allo cated in the following manner: a.
There were three candidates falling in category 1 (i.e., children of Defence Person nel who are awardees of gallantry decoration, Paramvir Chakra/Mahavir Chakra, in person or posthumously).
All the three were given admis sion.
b. There were 5 candidates falling in catego ry 2.
They were admitted.
328 c. Only one candidate falling in category 3 appeared and was given the seat; d. There were 90 candidates failing in category 4.
But only 6 seats were available (nine seats having been taken away by sub categories a to c).
These six seats were allotted on the basis of inter se merit among the candidates failing in this category.
The first respondent being at a fairly lower position in this merit list could not be given the admission.
No seats were left for being allotted to candidates failing in category 5.
Finding that he has not been given admission in this Col lege, the first respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana being C.W.P. No.12644 of 1991.
His contention was that his father Major Kuldip Singh Malik was awarded Shaurya Chakra for acts of gallantry, that Shaurya Chakra is equivalent to Vir Chakra, in all respects and, therefore, his case ought to have been considered in category 1 and not in category 4.
He submitted that along with his application for admission he had enclosed a copy of the citation awarded by the President of India to his father showing that his father Major Kuldip Singh Malik was awarded Shaurya Chakra for displaying exemplary courage and leader ship in the course of his duties in the Mizo Hills.
He complained that two of the candidates admitted under catego ry 1 have received less marks than he.
The High Court has allowed the Writ Petition on the following reasoning: "According to Regulation 695 of the Defence Services Regulations relating to the Army, issued by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Shaurya Chakra is awardable for gallantry and comes after Ashoka Chakra and Kirti Chakra.
Further, according to Regulation 717, in order of precedence, this award of Shaurya Chakra is at number thirteen.
that is immediately below Vir Chakra and Param Vir Chakra is at number two and Maha Vir Chakra is at number seven.
Despite all this, the re spondents, while considering the candidature of the petitioner, did not grant him admission to the Bachelor of Engineering Course in the current session even though he was higher in academic merit as compared to respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who have been granted such admission.
In reply, the respondents have pleaded that no doubt the father of the petitioner was deco rated with Shaurya Chakra award in 329 1969, but it is gallantry award and is not strictly covered by the rules, regulations and the prospectus of the College, though it is admitted that both respondents Nos.3 and 4, who have been granted admission, were lower in merit than the petitioner, so far as the academic record is concerned.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the approach of the respondents in rejecting the candidature of the petitioner is neither legally correct nor just and fair.
However, as respondent Nos.3 and 4 who are lower in academic merit than the petitioner, happen to be the sons of the awardees of Vir Chakra and Maha Vir Chakra respectively, it would be unfair if the admis sion already granted to them by the Chandigarh Administration and the Punjab Engineering College, Chandigarh, is set aside.
Resultantly, we allow this petition and issue a direction to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to admit the petitioner against the category of sons/daughters of awardees of gallantry deco rations, without disturbing the admission of respondents Nos.3 and 4.
In case no such seat is available for the petitioner, the respond ents shall create a seat for the purpose forthwith.
This shall also be deemed to be a direction to the Punjab University for accord ing necessary approval for the creation of the additional seat.
There shall be no order as to costs.
" The decision of the High Court was rendered on 28th August, 1991.
The present S.L.P. was filed in this court on 7th October, 1991.
In fact, it appears that having waited for one month and not having been admitted in the college in pursuance of the Judgment, the first respondent took pro ceedings for Contempt against the College Authorities.
The first respondent, was admitted in the college on 28th Octo ber, 1991.
It is now stated by his counsel that the first respondent has given up his seat in another college (Jamia Millia), on being admitted to this College.
The writ peti tion came up for final hearing before us on 15.11.1991.
We disposed of the SLPs on that day stating that reasons for our orders will be given today.
S.L.P. No. 16065/91 Respondents 1 and 2 in this S.L.P. also applied for admission to Punjab Engineering College as children of serving Defence Personnel.
They too appeared for the common Entrance Test along with other applicants.
Since the parents of the two respondents were serving Defence Personnel, their case was considered under category 5, As stated herein 330 before, no seats were left for being allocated to candidates falling in category 5.
Respondents I and 2 were, therefore, not given admission in this College whereupon they ap proached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by way of a writ petition being C.W.P. No. 12485 of 1991.
Their case was that the categorisation of Defence Personnel was unjust and unreasonable in as much as while the children and spouses of serving Defence Personnel are placed in category 5, children and spouses of Exserviceman are placed above them in catego ry 4.
According to the respondents.
children of serving Defence Personnel must be preferred over the children of Exservicemen.
In a short order, the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed 'that category 5 should be treated as category 4 and category 4 should be treated as category 5.
The Court directed that admissions for the current year (1991 1992) shall be made accordingly.
The order of High court is a short one and may be set out in its entirity: "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through their plead ings, we are of the considered view that sub categories No. 1, 2 and 3 deserve to be re tained at their appropriate present places.
So far as sub categories No.4 and 5 i.e. relating to the sons, daughters and spouses of the exservice personnel ,as well as the sons, daughters and spouses of service Defence personnel are concerned, we find that the ends of justice would be adequately met and the object for which the reservation has been provided would be achieved if the sons, daugh ters and spouses of serving Defence personnel are placed at sub category No.4 i.e. above the category of Exservicemen.
This conclusion has been arrived at by us after considering the circumstances that the wards and spouses of serving Defence personnel are at a disadvan tage in the absence of their guardians serving at far off/distant places defending the coun try vis a vis who have retired from the mili tary and are now living with their wards.
Keeping these considerations in view, we dispose of this writ petition by issuing a direction to the respondent Union Territory Chandigarh and Principal, Punjab Engineering College, to go ahead with the admission of this reserved category.
Therefore, so far as such categories 1,2 and 3 are concerned, there shall not be any change.
However, we direct that so far as sub category No.4 is concerned, persons covered in this shall be considered at No. 5 and those covered in sub category 5 are concerned, shall be considered at No. 4.
The admission, which are going to be finalised tomorrow, shall not be made in accordance with these directions.
A copy of the order be supplied Dasti also to the learned counsel for the parties.
" 331 This order was made on 30th August, 1991 whereas the present SLP was filed in this Court on 7th October, 1991.
These respondents too took proceedings for contempt against the college for not implementing the direction of the High Court.
They were admitted on 28th October, 1991.
These respondents also say that on being admitted to this college they have given up their admission in other colleges.
This SLP was heard alongwith SLP.
No.16066 of 1991 on 15.11.91.
S.L.P. No. 16451 of 1991 This petition for Special Leave is directed against the order dated 9th October, 1991 passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab ,and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner.
The petitioner (writ petitioner) applied for admission to the Punjab Engineering College for the year 1991 92 under category 4 being the son of an Exserviceman.
By virtue of the directions given by the High Court in its order dated 30.8.1991 in C .W.P.
No. 12485 of 1991, category 4 became category 5 and category 5 became category 4 and admissions were being made on that basis.
The petitioner who fell in category 4 (,as per the prospectus of the College) and which was now converted to category 5 by virtue of the decision of the High Court aforesaid applied to the High Court to consider his case in category 4 itself and grant him admission.
His writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on 9th October, 1991 under a short order which reads thus: "Admissions are being done as per the direc tions issued in Civil Writ Petition No.12485 of 1991, decided by the Division Bench on August 30. 1991.
In view of the said decision, we do not find any merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the peti tioner.
The Writ petitions dismissed.
A copy of this order be given dasti.
" The petitioner is in fact questioning the correctness of the directions given by the High Court in C.W.P.No.12485 of 1991 disposed of on August 30, 91.
Counsel for Chandigarh Administration and the College (petitioners in SLP 's 16066 and 16065 of 1991) contended that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in grant ing the impugned directions.
He submitted that High Court, while exercising the writ jurisdiction conferred upon by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not sit as an Appellate Authority over the rule making authority nor can it re write the rules.
If the rule or any portion of it was found to be bad, the High Court could have struck it down and directed the rule making authority to re frame the 332 rule and make admissions on that basis but the High Court could not have either switched the categories or directed that Shaurya Chakra should be treated as equivalent to Vir Chakra By its directions, the High Court has completely upset the course of admissions under this reserved quota and has gravely affected the chances of candidates failing in category 4 by down grading them as category 5 without even hearing them.
These are good reasons for the categorisation done by the Administration which was adopted by the College.
He submitted that while Paramvir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra and Vir Chakra are awarded for gallantry in war, Ashok Chakra, Kirti Chakra and Shaurya Chakra are awarded for gallantry otherwise than in war.
Shaurya Chakra was awarded to the father of the first respondent in SLP.No.
16066 of 1991 for his gallant conduct in counter insurgency operations in Mizo Hills.
It was not a war.
He placed, before us, the true extract of order of precedence of awardees.
It reads thus: "TRUE EXTRACT OF ORDER OF PRECEDENCE OF AWARDS.
Order of Precedence of Awards The order of precedence of various awards is as follows: Bharat Ratna Param Vir Chakra Ashoka Chakra Padma Vibhushan Padma Bhushan Param Vishisht Seva Medal Maha Vir Chakra Kirti Chakra Padma Shri Sarvottam Jeevan Raksha Padak Ati Vishisht Seva Medal Vir Chakra Shaurya Chakra The President 's police and Fire Service Medal for gallantry.
Sena/Nao Sena/Vayu Sena Medal Vishisht Seva Medal The Police Medal for gallantry Uttam Jeevan Raksha Padak Wound Medal The General Service Medal 1947.
Samar Seva Star 1965 Poorvi Star Paschimi Star Raksha Medal 2965." 333 Counsel says that by its directions contained in the two orders impugned herein, the High Court has exercised a jurisdiction, which really did not belong to it.
We are inclined to agree with him.
Counsel for the petitioner in S.L.P.No.
16451 of 1991 supported the aforesaid arguments.
On the other hand, the counsel for respondents (writ petitioners in the High Court) in the first two SLPs.
sup iported the order of the High Court and submitted further that since the said respondents have given up their seats in other colleges and have been admitted in the Punjab Engi neering College any order throwing them out from the Punjab Engineering College, at this juncture would cause them irreparable prejudice.
They submitted that the Chandigarh Administration and the College authorities have been sleep ing over the matter until a contempt petition was filed and that they moved this Court only after they were summoned in the Contempt proceedings.
They should be held dis entitled to any relief on account of laches, submitted the counsel.
We are of the considered opinion that the orders of High Court are wholly unsustainable.
We shall consider both the directions separately.
Let us first consider SLP 16066 of 1991, arising from C.W.P. 12644/91.
The rule as framed by the Chandigarh Administration and as published by the College in its prospectus in the year 1991 92 placed in category I children and spouses of only those Defence Personnel who were awardees of gallantry decorations of Paramvir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra or Vir Chakra in person or posthumously.
It did not include Ashok Chakra, Kirti Chakra or Shaurya Chakra.
The validity of the rule was not expressly questioned before the High Court.
Assuming that it was so questioned and assuming that the High Court was satisfied that the rule was discriminatory and bad for the reason of not including Ashok Chakra etc., the only course open to it was to strike down the offending rule.
It could also have directed the authorities to reframe the rule and to make admissiions accordingly.
High Court however did not choose to do so.
It merely directed that since Shaurya Chakra is immediately below Vir Chakra in the order of precedence and since respondents 3 and 4 in the writ peti tion admitted under sub category I have obtained lesser marks than the writ petitioner, he should be given admission without disturbing the admission given to respondents 2 and 3 in that writ petition.
The entire reasoning of the High Court has been extracted by us herein above.
It shows that absolutely no reason is assigned for granting the said direction.
All that it says is that since Shaurya Chakra is also awardable for gallantry and is placed imme 334 diately below Vir Chakra, the writ petitioner should be granted admission.
If really the High Court was of the opinion that Shaurya Chakra is equivalent to Vir Chakra and should be treated on the same par as Vir Chakra then it should spelt out the position also of Ashok Chakra and Kirti Chakra.
which are above Shaurya Chakra.
According to the Rules notified children/spouses of Ashok Chakra, Kirti Chakra & Shaurya Chakra awardees did not fall under category 1 nor under categories 2 or 3.
They would fail under catego ry 4 or category 5, as the case may be, depending upon whether their parent/spouse was an ex service person or a serving person.
There may have been other candidates who are the children/spouses of Shaurya Chakra awardees and for that matter, Ashok chakra and Kirti Chakra awardees who may have obtained more marks than the writ petitioner (first respond ent in SLP 16066 of 1991) but who did not claim a seat under category 1 nor were considered as such.
They may not have stated the fact of their parent/spouse being a Ashok chakra/Kirli Chakra Shaurya Chakra awardee, nor filed the relevant citation, since it was not relevant as per the published Rules.
Had the proper course been followed, all of them could have applied properly and could have been consid ered.
By saying this we do not mean to say that the Rule is bad.
We do not mean to say so at all.
There may be good reasons for the Rule as published or there may not be.
That is not the issue.
What we are saying is that if the High Court was of the opinion that all the gallantry awar dees (including Ashok, Kirti and Shaurya Chakra) should be placed in category 1, it should have said so, struck down the category and, may be, directed reframing of rule and admissions made on that basis.
Coming to SLP 16065 of 1991, the position appears to been even worse.
Without assigning any reason the High Court has directed that category 4 should be made category 5 and category 5 should be made category 4.
In short, it has switched these two categories.
Again, we must say that if the High Court thought that this categorisation was discrim inatory and bad it ought to have struck down the categorisa tion to that extent and directed the authority to ' re frame the rule.
It would then have been open to the rule making authority either to merge these two categories or delete one or both of them, depending upon/he opinion they would have formed on a review of the situation.
We must make it clear again that we express no opinion on the question of validity or otherwise of the rule.
We are only saying that the High Court should not have indulged in the exercise of 'switch ing ' the categories, and that too without giving any reasons thereafter.
Thereby.
it has practicably assumed the rule of rulemaking authority, or.
at any rate, assumed the role of an Appellate Authority.
That is clearly not the function of the High Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Now, let us notice the implications and consequences of the said 'switching '.
335 By directing that category 4 should be treated as category 5 and conversely category 5 should be treated as category 4, the High Court has prejudicially affected the rights of candidates falling under category 4 without even hearing them.
It must be remembered that these categories are mentioned in the order of priority as emphasised herein before.
A rulemaking authority need not observe the rule of hearing, but the High Court exercising its judicial power cannot dispense with the requirement and that is precisely the grievance of the petitioner in S.L.P. 16451/91 arising from V.W.P. 14606 of 1991.
He was entitled to be considered under category 4 (as per the prospectus) whereas by virtue of the High Court 's order his category has become category 5, the result of which is that no seat may be left for his category, whereas the said category was entitled to some seats at least according to the Rules as framed and pub lished by the Administration and College.
Suffice is to say that the giving the said direction, while the admission were in progress, the situation has been confounded beyond re call.
Article 226 of the Constitution of India empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority (including the government) directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, Prohibition, quo warrants and certiorari, or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
Though the Article itself does not contain any restric tive words, the Courts have, ever the years, evolved certain self constraints though, we are not bound by the procedural technicalities governing these high prorogative writs in English law.
As observed by a Constitution Bench in Bassappa vs Nagappa ; at 256: "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel op pressed by any difference or change of opin ion, expressed in particular cases of English Judges.
We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental princi ples that regulate the exercise of jurisdic tion in the matter of granting such writ in English law.
" While this is not the place to delve into or detail the self constraints to be observed by the Courts while exercis ing the jurisdiction under Article 226, one of them, which is relevant herein, is beyond dispute viz. while acting under Article 226, the High Court does not sit and/or act as an Appellate Authority over the orders/actions of the Subor dinate Authori 336 ties/Tribunals.
Its ' jurisdiction is supervisory in nature.
One of the main objectives of this jurisdiction is to keep the government and several other authorities and Tribunals within the bounds of their respective jurisdiction.
The High Court must ensure that while performing this function it does not overstep the well recognized bounds of its own jurisdiction.
Though we are satisfied that the orders and directions made by the High Court are totally unsupportable in law, the subsequent developments dissuade us from allowing these SLPs.
As stated above, the three respondents writ petition ers (first respondent in SLP.
16066/91 and respondents I and 2 in SLP.
16065/91) have been admitted into this college (Punjab Engineering College) on 28th October, 1991, where upon they have given up the seats which they had obtained in other colleges.
This statement of theirs is not disputed either by the Chandigarh Administration or the college authorities.
Depriving the said respondents of their admis sion in this college at this stage would result in grave and irreparable prejudice to them.
We think that the Administra tion and College authorities ought to have acted with more alacrity and approached this Court earlier than they did.
By the time, these SLPs were taken up by us and stay granted, the said respondents were already admitted into the College and, they say, they had given up their seats in the other colleges.
On this score alone, we decline to interfere with the orders in C.W .P. 12644/91 and 12485/91.
Now coming to SLP 16451 of 1991, the situation is this: By virtue of the orders of the High Court, three students who were not entitled to admission according to rules have been given admission against the three vacancies which had arisen since the finalization of the admissions.
The college authorities say that but for the orders of the High Court, these three vacancies would have gone to the first three candidates in the waiting list.
The petitioner in SLP 16451 of 1991 says that he is one such person in the waiting list and he would have obtained admission but for the admission given to the three candidates in pursuance of the High Court orders.
We do not know whether the petitioner 's case is true.
All the same, we think it appropriate to make the following direction: the college authorities shall create three more seats in the said course and admit the first three available students in the waiting list against those seats.
The Chandigarh Administration shall pass the neces sary orders in this behalf.
Action in terms of this direc tion shall be taken forthwith by the Chandigarh Administra tion and the college authorities.
Before we part with this case we wish to make an obser vation.
In matters of this nature where the High court directs students to be admitted in Educational Institutions.
it would be advisable if the High Court stays 337 the operation of its order for a period of about 3 to 4 weeks, if a request therefor is made by the Educational Institution or the State, as the case may be.
SLPs disposed of accordingly.
R.P. Petitions disposed of.

summary:
The Union Territory of Chandigarh, by its Memo dated 19.5.1982 as modifited by another Memo dated 6.9.1990, reserved 5% of seats for children/spouses of military/pars military personnel.
Pursuant thereto the Punjab Engineering College, reserved 15 seats for such candidates.
For the purpose of admission the college categorised in its prospec tus these candidates into 5 sub categories.
These belonging to the respective categories and obtaining qualifying marks in the entrance examination were to be admitted meritwise in the order of priority in descending order: sub category 1 consisted of children/spouses of defence personnel who were awardees of gallantry decorations of Paramvir/Mahavir/Vir Chakra in person or posthumously, or, dependent children/spouses of defence/pars military personnel who were killed or totally incapacitated in action while in service.
Dependent childern/spouses of defence/pars military person nel who died in service were put in sub category 2.
Subcate gory 3 comprised the dependent children/spouses of defence/pars military personnel incapacitated while in service, Dependent children/spouses of Ex servicemen (mili tary and pars military) were 323 placed in sub category 4; and those of serving defence/pars military personnel found place in sub category 5.
For the academic year 1991 92 out of the 15 seats, 9 seats went to all the 9 qualified candidates belonging to sub categories 1 to 3, and remaining seats were allotted to 6 candidates meritwise out of 90 qualified candidates be longing to sub category 4.
Sub category 5 went unprovided.
Respondent no.1 in SLP No.16066/91, who appeared in the entrance examination for the academic year 1991 92 but did not get admission, filed a writ petition before the High Court contending that his father was an awardee of 'Shaurya Chakra ' which was equivalent to Vir Chakra and therefore his case ought to have been considered in sub category 1.
On behalf of the College it was stated that 'Shaurya Chakra ' award was not covered under the rules and regulations and, therefore, respondent no.1, being the son of an Exservice man, could be considered only in sub category 4.
Respondents no.1 and 2 in SLP No.16065/91, the sons of the serving defence personnel, filed another writ petition before the High Court challenging the categorization of defence personnel as unreasonable and contended that chil dren of serving defence personnel should have been preferred over the children of Exserviceman.
The High Court allowed both the writ petitions and directed the College to admit all the three petitioners.
It ordered that subcategory 5 should be treated as sub category 4 and sub categery 4 should be treated as sub category 5, and the admissions should be made accordingly.
The petitioner in SLP No.16451/91, being the son of an serviceman, was initially entitled to be considered under sub category 4 which by the order of the High Court was converted into sub category 5.
He challenged the said con version of categories by yet another writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court.
The Chandigarh Administration and the College filed SLPs No.16066 and 16065 of 1991 against the orders of the High Court allowing the two writ petitions, whereas SLP No. 16451 of 1991 was filed by the petitioner in the third writ peti tion which was dismissed by the High Court.
324 It was contended on behalf of Chandigarh Administration and the College that the High Court exceeded its jurisdic tion in granting the impugned order in as much as in writ jurisdiction the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the rule making body nor can it re write the rules.
On 15.11.1991 the three Special Leave Petitions were dis posed of.
Giving reasons in support of its order dated 15.11.1991 this Court, HELD: 1.
While acting under Article 226 of the Constitu tion, the High Court does not sit and/or act as an appellate authority over the orders/actions of the subordinate author ities/tribunals.
Its jurisdiction is supervisory in nature.
[pp. 335 H; 336 A] One of the main objectives of this jurisdiction is to keep the government and several other authorities and tribu nals within the bounds of their respective jurisdiction.
The High Court must ensure that while performing this function it does not overstep the wellrecognised bounds of its own jurisdiction.
[p. 336 A] 2.1 In the instant case, the High Court should not have indulged in the exercise of 'switching ' the categories and that too without giving any reasons therefor.
Thereby, it has practicably assumed the role of rule making authority, or, at any rate, assumed the role of an appellate authority.
That is clearly not the function of the High Court acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
334 G H1 2.2 If the High Court was satisfied that the rule was discriminatory and bad, the only course open to it was to strike down the offending rule.
It could also have directed the authorities to reframe the rule and make admissions accordingly.
[p. 333 F] By directing that category 4 should be treated as cate gory 5 and conversely category 5 should be treated as cate gory 4, the High Court has prejudicially affected the rights of candidates falling under category 4 without even hearing.them, particularly when these categories were men tioned in the order of priority.
[p. 335 A] 3.
A rule making authority need not observe the rule of hear 325 ing, but the High Court exercising its judicial power cannot dispense with the requirement.
[p. 335 AB] 4.
Although the orders and directions made by the High Court were totally unsupportable in law, yet, in view of the subsequent developments, the Special Leave Petitions could not be allowed.
By the time the SLPs were taken up and stay granted, the respondents were already admitted in the Col lege and they gave up their seats which they had obtained in other colleges.
Depriving them of their admission in the College at such a late stage would result in grave and irreparable prejudice to them.
The Administration and the College authorities ought to have acted with more alacrity and approached this court earlier than they did.
[p. 336 B D] 5.
In matters where the High Court directs the students to be admitted in educational institutions it would be advisable if the High Court stays the operation of its order for a period of about 3 to 4 weeks if a request therefor is made by the educational institution or the State as the case may be.
[pp. 336 GH; 337 A]


judgement:
(Civil) No. 1345 of 1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
431 WITH WRIT PETITION (Civil) 1110/89, 869/90, 740/90, 1100/90, 194/91, 195/91, 265/90, 327/91, 337/91, 334/91, 333/91, 330/91, 329/91, 322/91, 432/91, 420/91, 431/91, 573/91, 181/91, 316/91, 381/91, 390/91, 238/91, 686/91, 687/91 & 167/91) R.K. Garg, R.K.Jain, Govind Mukhoty, Ved Prakash Gupta, Suresh Chand Garg, Ms. Bharti Sharma, Rani Chhabra, B.S. Chauhan, Gaurav Jain, N.K. Goel, D.B. Vohra, Ms. Abha Jain, Vijay Hansaria, A.K. Tiwari and C.K. Ratnaparkhi for the Petitioners.
Yogeshwar Prasad, Mrs. S.Dixit, G.V.Rao, A.V.Rangam, B.Parthasarthy and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J.
The liberalization for private sector operations in the Road Transport field under Section 80 and other provisions of The has been challenged in these bunch petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, filed by the existing operators, primarily on the ground that they have been adversely affected in the exercise of their rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
It is necessary to notice the statutory provisions operating in the field of motor transport business prior to and after the coming into force of The (hereinafter called 'the Act ') The (hereinafter called 'the old Act was enacted and en forced with the object of having closer control to establish a coordinated system of transport.
The subject of 'Mechani cally Propelled Vehicles ' being in List Ill of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution, various amendments were made from time to time by several State Legislatures either adding to or modifying the provisions of the old Act.
Chap ter IV of the old Act consisted of sections 42 to 68 provid ing "control of transport vehicles".
Sections 47 and 57, to the relevant extent, are re produced as under: "47.Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carnage permit (1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely: (a) the interest of the public generally; (b) the advantages to the public of the serv ice to be provided, 432 including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; (c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served: (d) the benefit to any particular locali ty or localities likely to be afforded by the service; (e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending; (f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area, and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already pro viding passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognized in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within Whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies; . . . . (3) A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub section (1), limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region.
Procedure in applying for and granting permits. (1) An application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier 's permit may be made at any time.
(2) An application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier 's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authori ty appoints dates for the receipt of such applications, on such dates.
(3) On receipt of an application for a stage carnage permit or a public carrier 's permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or the sub ' 433 stance thereof in the prescribed manner to gether with a notice of the date before which representation in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which, and the time and place at which, the applica tion and any representations received will be considered: Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modi fications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the re gion, or in any area or any route within the region, under the class Of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub section (3) of Section 47 or sub section (2) of Section 55, as the case may be,, the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in this sub section.
The old Act was repealed by the Act which came into force on July 1, 1989.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act is re produced as under: "The (4 of 1939), consolidates and amends law relating to motor vehicleS.
This has been amended several times to keep it up to date.
The need was, however, felt that this Act should now inter alia, take into account also changes in the road trans port technology, pattern of passenger and freight movements, development of the road network in the country and particularly the improved techniques in the motor vehicles management.
Various Committees like National Transport Policy Committee, National Police Commission, Road Safety Committee, Low Powered Two wheel ers Committee, as also the Law Commission have gone into different aspects of road transport.
They have recommended updating, simplification and rationalisation of this law.
Several Members of Parliament have also urged for comprehensive review of the , to make it relevant to the modern day requirements.
A Working Group was, therefore, constitut ed in January, 1984 to review all the provi sions of the and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legislation to replace the existing Act.
This Working Group took into account the suggestion and recommendations earlier made by various bodies and institutions like Central Institute of Road 434 Transport Automotive Research Association of India, and other transport organisations including the manufacturers and the general public.
Besides, obtaining comments of State Governments on the recommendations of the Working Group, these were discussed in a specially convened meeting of Transport Minis ters of all States and Union Territories.
Some of the more important modifications so sug gested related for taking care of (a). . . . . (b). . . . . . (c) the greater flow of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; (d). . . . . (e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalization for private sector operations in the road transport field; and (f). . . .
The proposed legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background.
Some of the more important provisions of the Bill provide for the following matters, namely: (a) to (f) . . . . . . (g) liberalized schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non nationalized routes, all india tourist permits and also national permits for goods carriages. (h) to 1) . . . . .
Chapter V of the Act substitute for Chapter IV of the old Act consisting of Sections 66 to 96, provides for 'co ntrol of transport vehicles '.
Sections 71, 72 and 80, to the relevant extent, are reproduced as under: "71.Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit.
(1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of this Act: Provided that such permit for a route of fifty kilometers or less shall be granted only to an individual or a State transport undertaking.
435 (2) A Regional Transport Authority shall refuse to grant a stage carnage permit if it appears from any time table furnished that the provisions of this Act relating to the speed at which vehicles may be driven are likely to be contravened: Provided that before such refusal an opportunity shall be given to the applicant to amend the time table so as to conform to the said provisions.
(3)(a) The State Government shall, if so directed by the Central Government having regard to the number of vehicles, road condi tions and other relevant matters, by notifica tion in the Official Gazette, direct a State Transport Authority and a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage car riages generally or of any specified type, as may be fixed and specified in the notifica tion, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less than five lakhs. . . . (4) A Regional Transport Authority shall not grant more than five stage carriage permits to any individual or more than ten stage carriage permits to any company (not being a State transport undertaking).
(5) In computing the number of permits to be granted under sub section (4), the permits held by an applicant in the name of any other persons and the permits held by any company of which such applicant is a director shall also be taken into account.
Grant of stage carriage permits (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an appli cation made to it under Section 70, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit: Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any route or area not specified in the application.
Procedure in applying for and granting permits, (1) An application for a permit of any kind may be made at any time.
(2) A Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act: Provided that the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in 436 accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notifi cation in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub section (3) of Section 74: Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter.
" A comparative reading of the provisions of the Act and the old Act make it clear that the procedure for grant of permits under the Act has been liberalised to such an extent that an intended operator can get a permit for asking irre spective of the number of operators already in the field.
Under Sections 57 read with Section 47(1) of the old Act an application for a stage carnage permit was to be published and kept for inspection in the office of the Regional Trans port Authority so that the existing operators could file representations/objections against the said application.
The application, along with objections, was required to be decided in a quasi judicial manner, Section 47(3) of the old Act further permitted the imposition of limit on the grant of permits in any region, area or on a particular route.
It is thus obvious that the main features of Chapter IV "con trol of transport vehicles" under old Act were as under: 1.
The applications for grant of permits were published and were made available in the office of the Regional Transport Authority so that the existing operators could file repre sentations; 2.
The applications for grant of permits along with the representations were to be decided in quasi judicial manner; and 3.
The Regional Transport Authority was to decide the applications for grant of permits keeping in view the criteria laid down in section 47(1) and also keeping in view the limit fixed under Section 47(3) of the Act.
An application for grant of permit beyond the limited number fixed under Section 47(3) was to be rejected summarily.
The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features.
The scheme envisaged under Section 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the Act.
The right of existing 437 operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away.
There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under the Act.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing in the Act was to liberalize the grant of permits.
Section 71(1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act.
Section 80(2), which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act.
There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act.
There is, however, a provision under Section 71(3) (a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having popula tion of more than five lakhs.
The petitioners are existing stage carnage operators on different routes.
They hold permits granted by the Regional Transport Authorities concerned.
Mithlesh Garg, petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1345/89 has stated that he holds a stage carnage permit and plies his vehicles on the Meerut Parikshitgarh Hasifabad Laliana and allied routes under the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Meerut.
According to him prior to the enforcement of the Act, 23 permit holders were operating on the said route but thereafter under Section 80 of the Act the Regional Trans port Authority, Meerut has issued 272 more permits in re spect of the same route.
Similar facts have been stated in the other writ petitions.
As mentioned above the petitioners are permit holders and are existing operators.
They are plying their vehicles on the routes assigned to them under the permits.
They are in the full enjoyment of their funda mental right guaranteed to them under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators.
There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statu tory rights.
Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors.
We see no justifi cation in the petitioners ' stand.
More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system.
Over crowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, persons clinging to the bus doors and even sitting on the roof top are some of the common sights in this country.
More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstry, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of black smoke from the exhaust pipe.
It is, therefore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to pro vide ample choice to the commuter public to board the vehi cle of their choice and patronize the operator who is 438 providing the best service.
Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting permits.
Re stricted licensing under the old Act led to the concentra tion of business in the hands of few persons thereby giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest.
The apprehensions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession, is without any basis.
The transport business is bound to be ironed out ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply.
Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge invest ment.
The intending operators are likely to be conscious of the economics underlying the profession.
Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable.
In any case the transport system in a state is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public.
The policy to grant permits Liberally under the Act is directed towards the said goal.
The petitioners who are already in the business want to keep the fresh entrants out of it and as such eliminate the healthy compe tition which is necessary to bring efficiency in the trade.
This Court in Jasbhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar & Ors., ; posed the following questions for its determina tion: "Whether the proprietor of a cinema theater holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films, is entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to get a 'No Objection Certificate ', granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 (for short, the Rules) by the District Magistrate in favour of a rival in the trade, brought up and quashed on the ground that it suffers from a defect of jurisdiction, is the principal question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave.
" Sarkaria, J. speaking for the Court an swered the question in the following words: "In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right.
He has not sustained injury to any legally pro tected interest.
In fact the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something.
He has not been subjected to a legal wrong.
He has suffered no legal griev ance.
He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on.
While a Procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule the Court should not interfere at 439 the instance of 'stranger ' unless there are exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests.
Assuming that the appellant is a 'stranger ', and not a busybody, then also, there are no exceptional circum stances in the present case which would justi fy the issue of a writ of certiorari at his instance.
On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public policy.
It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to prepetuate the appellant 's monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will, in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 & 2, which they have under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions ' imposed by law.
The instant case fails well nigh within the ratio of the this Court 's decision in Rice and Flour Mills vs N.T. Gowda, wherein it was held that a rice mill owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of section 8(3) (c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 because no right vested in such an appli cant is infringed.
For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under article 226 of the Consti tution.
Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the negative.
" We, therefore, see on justification for the petitioners to complain against the liberalised policy for grant of permits under the Act.
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to rea sonable restrictions imposed by the State under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad vs The State of U.P. and Others, ; held that the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) entitles, any member of the public to carry on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of the vehicles.
Mukerjea, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: "Within the limits imposed by State regula tions any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road.
To that extent he can also carry on the business of transporting passen 440 gers with the aid of the vehicles.
It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can legitimately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under clause (6) of that article.
" It is thus a guaranteed fight of every citizen whether rich or poor to take up and carry on, if he so wishes, the motor transport business.
It is only the State which can impose reasonable restrictions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.
Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the fight under Article 19(1)(g) so far as the motor transport business was concerned.
The said restrictions have been taken away and the provisions of Section 47(3) and 57 of the old Act have been repealed from the Statute Book.
The Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business.
The provisions of the Act are in con formity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
The petitioners are asking this Court to do what the Parlia ment has undone.
When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of india in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g) there can be no cause for complaint by the petitioners.
On an earlier occasion this Court dealt with somewhat similar situation.
The Uttar Pradesh Government amended the old Act by the Motor Vehicle (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1972 and inserted Section 43A.
The new Section 43 A apart from making certain changes in Section 47 of the old A Act also omitted sub section (3) of Section 47 of the old Act) Section 43A provided that in the case of non nationalised routes, if the State Government was of the opinion that it was for the public interest to grant permits to all eligible applicants it might, by notification in the official gazette issue a direction accordingly.
The necessary notification was issued with the result that the transport authorities were to proceed to grant permits as if sub section (3) of section 47 was omitted and there was no limit for the grant of permits on any specified route within the region.
Section 43 A and the consequent notification was challenged by the existing operators before the Allahabad High Court.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions.
On appeal this Court in Hans Raj Kehar & Ors.
vs The State of U.P. and Ors., ; dismissed the appeal.
Khanna, J.speaking for the Court held as under; "It hardly need much argument to show that the larger number of buses operating on different routes would be for the conven 441 ience and benefit of the travelling public and as such would be in the public interest.
Any measure which results in larger number of buses operating on various routes would neces sarily eliminate or in any case minimise long hours of waiting at the bus stands.
It would also relieve congestion and provide for quick and prompt transport service.
Good transport service is one of the basic requirements of a progressive society.
Prompt and quick trans port service being a great boon for those who travel, any measure which provides for such an amenity is in the very nature of things in the public interest. . . .
The conten tion that the impugned notification is viola tive of the rights of the appellants under article 19(1)(f) or (g) of the Constitution(is equally devoid of force.
There is nothing in the notification which prevents the appel lants from acquiring, holding and disposing of their property or prevents them from practis ing any profession or from carrying on any occupation, trade or business.
The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a violation of the appellants ' rights under the above two clauses of article 19 of the Consti tution.
The above provisions are not intended to grant a kind of monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons.
No right is guaranteed to any private party by article 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without compe tition from other eligible persons.
Clause (g) of article 19(1) gives a right to all citizens subject to article 19(6) to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
It is an enabling provision and does not confer a right on those already practising a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practising that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade or business.
The said provi sion is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons.
We, therefore, find no valid basis for holding that the impugned provisions are violative of article 19".
The identical situation has been created by Sections 71, 72 and 80 of the Act by omitting the provisions of Section 47(3) of the old Act.
It has been made easier for any person to obtain a stage carriage permit under the Act.
The attack of the petitioner on Section 80 on the ground of Article 19 has squarely been answered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar 's case (supra).
It has been contended in the writ petitions that differ ent yard sticks have been provided for interregion, intra region and inter State permits 442 under the Act.
According to the petitioners the imposition of limit for grant of inter State permits is permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act whereas no such limit can be imposed in respect of intra region permits.
The contention is that the provisions are discriminatory and are violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.
We are not impressed by the argument.
The three categories of permit seekers cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class.
Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories.
It is nobody 's case that Section 80 brings about discrimina tion in the matter of grant of permits between applicants belonging to the same class.
The argument on the ground of Article 14 is thus wholly untenable and is rejected.
This question also came for consideration in Hans Raj Kehar 's case (supra) and this Court rejected the contention in the following words: "Argument has also been advanced that the deletion of Section 47(3) would have the effect of removing the limit on the number of permits for intra region routes but that fact would not prevent the imposition of a limit for the number of permits for inter region routes.
This argument has been advanced in the context of the case of the appellants that the impugned provisions discriminate in the matter of issue of permits for intraregion routes and those for inter region routes and as such are violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
We are not impressed by this argument for we find no valid basis for the inference that if there is no limit on the number _of permits for intra region routes,limit on the number of permits for interregional routes would ' have to be imposed.
The object of the impugned notification is to liberalise the issue of permits and we fail to see as to how such a liberal measure can have the effect of intro ducing strictness or stringency in the matter of grant of permits for inter region routes.
Assuming that a different rule is applicable in the matter of inter region routes, the differentiation is based upon reasonable classification.
It is nobody 's case that the impugned provision brings about discrimination in the matter of grant of permits between applicants belonging to the same class.
The argument about the impugned provision being violative of article 14 is wholly trotenable." The learned counsel for the writ petitioners, have relied upon a later decision of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad & Ors., vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [1983] 2 S.C.C. 195 and have contended that the decision of this Court in Hans Raj Kehars case (supra) no longer holds the 443 field.
There is no force in the contention.
This Court on two occasions interpreted the old Act as amended by the State of Uttar Pradesh at the relevant times.
The provisions of law which were interpreted in Hans Raj Kehar 's case were entirely different than those which were before this Court in Rameshwar Prasad 's ease.
The legal position with which we are faced in these writ petitions is almost similar to that which was considered by this Court in Hans Raj Kehar 's case.
What happened in the State of Uttar Pradesh was that after the U.P. Amendment of 1972 to the old Act, which was subject matter of interpretation before this Court in Hans Raj Kehars ease, it was found that certain anomalies had arisean in the working of the liberal policy of granting permits.
With a view to remedy the situation the U.P. Legislature amended the old Act again by the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 permit ting imposition of limit on the number of permits to be issued.
In spite of the restrictions on grant of permits as provided in the U.P. Act 15 of 1976 the State Government issued notifications permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit.
This Court held in Ratneshwar Prasad 's ease that the said notifications were inconsistent with the limitation as to the number of permits introduced by the U.P. Amending Act 1976 and as such were bad in law.
Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court in Rameshwar Prasad 's ease observed as under: "We may here state that any observations made in Hans Raj Kehar case would be inapplicable so far as these cases presently before us are concerned.
In that case the court was con cerned with sub section (2) of Section 43 A of the Act as it stood then which was a provision enacted by the legislature.
That sub section provided that without prejudice to the gener ality of the power contained in Section 43 A(1) of the Act where the State Government was of opinion that it was in public interest to grant stage carriage permits (except in re spect of routes or areas for which schemes have been published under Section 68 C) or contract carriage permits or public carrier permits to all eligible applicants it may issue appropriate directions as stated there in.
That sub section contained a clear legis lative policy which considered that there could be no public prejudice if all eligible applicants were granted permits.
Without saying anything more on the point, it may be slated that whatever this court may have observed while considering that provision would not apply now as there is a clear depar ture made by the legislature from that policy when it enacted the new sub section (2) of Section 43 A." It is thus obvious that the reliance by the petitioners on the ratio and observations of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad 's case is wholly mis 444 placed.
The Parliament has, under the Act, made a clear departure from the policy and has reverted to the position which was before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar 's case.
Relying on Rameshwar Prasad 's case the petitioners contend that it is in 'public interest ' to limit the grant of permits on intra region routes and while fixing the limit various factors indicated by this Court in the said case are to be taken into consideration.
We do not agree.
The concept of public interest, in relation to motor transport business, as propounded by this Court in Rameshwar Prasad 's case was only in the context of the old Act as amended by the U.P. Act.
We are of the view that the Act having brought in complete change in the policy of granting permits, the observations of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad 's case are not relevant in the present context.
The provisions of law for consideration before this Court in Hans Raj Kehar 's case were almost similar to Section 80 of the Act.
We are, there fore, bound by the law laid down by the four Judges Bench of this Court in Hans Raj Kehar 's case.
The petitioners have further contended that the condi tions of roads, social status of the applicants, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, condi tions of hilly routes, fuel availability and pollution control are some of the important factors which the Regional Transport Authority is bound to take into consideration while taking a decision on an application for grant of permit.
These are the matters which are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities.
The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds.
It is not disputed that the Regional Trans port Authority has the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons.
It is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits.
The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy.
We, therefore, see no force in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners and as such we dismiss the writ petitions.
The parties are left to bear their own costs.
G.N. Petitions dis missed.

summary:
These Writ Petitions filed before this Court challenged the liberalisation for private sector operations in the Road Transport field, under the .
The petitioners were the existing operators on different routes.
On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the issue of more permits on the same route adversely affected their rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
It was further contended that though imposition of limit for grant of inter State permits was permissible under Section 88(5) of the Act, it was not so in respect of intra region permits and hence it is discrimina tory; that in public interest the grant of intra region permits should be limited.
Dismissing the Writ Petitions, this Court, HELD: 1.1.
Restricted licensing under the old Act led to the 429 concentration of business in the hands of few persons there by giving rise to a kind of monopoly, adversely affecting the public interest.
The apprehensions of the petitioners, that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession, is without any basis.
The transport business is bound to be ironed out ultimately by the rational of demand and supply.
Cost of a vehicle being as it is the business requires huge investment.
The intending operators are likely to be con scious of the economics underlying the profession.
Only such number of vehicles would finally remain in operation on a particular route as are economically viable.
In any case the transport system in a State is meant for the benefit and convenience of the public.
The policy to grant permits liberally under the new Act is directed towards the said goal.
[438 A C].
1.2 The petitioners are in the full enjoyment of their fundamental right guaranteed to them under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
There is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators.
There is no complaint of infringement of any of their statu tory rights.
More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system.
Over crowded buses, passengers standing in the aisle, persons clinging to the bus doors and even sitting on the roof top are some of the common sights in this country.
More often one finds a bus which has noisy engine, old upholstery, uncomfortable seats and continuous emission of blacksmoke from the exhaust pipe.
It is, there fore, necessary that there should be plenty of operators on every route to provide ample choice to the commuter public to board the vehicle of their choice and patronise the operator who is providing the best service.
Even otherwise the liberal policy is likely to help in the elimination of corruption and favouritism in the process of granting per mits.
[437 EH; 438 A].
Hans Raj Kehar & Ors.
vs The State of U.P. and Ors., ; , followed.
Jasbhai Desai vs Roshan Kumar & Ors., ; ; ,Saghir Ahmad vs The State of U.P. and Ors., ; , relied on.
Rameshwar Prasad & Ors.
vs State of Uttar Pradesh & 0rs.[1983] 2 SCC 195, distinguished.
It is only the State which can impose reasonable res tric 430 tions within the ambit of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.
Section 47(3) and S7 of the old Act were some of the restrictions which were imposed by the State on the enjoyment of the right under Article (19)(1)(g) so far as the motor transport business was concerned.
The said re strictions have been taken away and the said provisions have been repealed from the Statute Book.
The new Act provides liberal policy for the grant of permits to those who intend to enter the motor transport business.
The provisions of the Act are in conformity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitu tion of India.
When the State has chosen not to impose any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India in respect of motor transport business and has left the citizens to enjoy their right under Article 19(1)(g) there can be no cause for complaint.
[440 B D].
The three categories of permit seekers in respect of interegion, intra region and inter State permits cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class.
Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories.
It is not the case that Section 80 brings about discrimination in the matter of grant of permits between applicants belonging to the same class.
[442 B] Hans Raj Kehar & Ors.
vs The State of U.P. and Ors.
; , relied on.
Matters such as conditions of roads, social status of the applicants possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, conditions of hilly routes, fuel availability and pollution control are supposed to be within the comprehension of the transport authorities.
The legislative policy under the Act cannot be challenged on these grounds.
It is not disputed that the Regional Trans port Authority has the power under the Act to refuse an application for grant of permit by giving reasons.
It is for the authority to take into consideration all the relevant factors at the time of quasi judicial consideration of the applications for grant of permits.
The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of.
power in granting permits under the liberalised policy.
[444 D F]


judgement:
Appeal No. 4542 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.1.
1990 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras in O.A. No. 552 of 1989.
P.P.Rao, Narsimha P.S. and Ms. Vijaylakshmi Menon for the Appellants.
Santosh Hegde, A.S. Nambiar, Ms. Sangeeta Garg, P.P.Tripathi, Mrs. Shanta Vasudevan, P.K. Manohar and K.R. Choudhary for the Respond ents.
425 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
The Recruitment Rules for the post of Assist ant Engineer in the Public Works Department, Pondicherry, prescribe the educational and other qualifications for appointment by direct recruitment and promotion.
For direct recruits, the qualification prescribed is a Degree in Civil Engineering of a recognised University or Diploma in Civil Engineering from a recognised institution with three years ' professional experience.
For appointment by promotion of Section Officers now called Junior Engineers, the qualifica tion prescribed is as under: "1.
Section Officers possessing a recognised Degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent with three years ' service in the grade failing which Section Officers holding Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years ' service in the grade 50%.
Section Officers possessing a recognised Diploma in Civil Engineering with six years ' service in the grade 50%".
The dispute in the present case is whether a Diploma holder Junior Engineer who obtains a Degree while in service becomes eligible for appointment as Assistant Engineer by promotion on completion of three years ' service including therein the period of service prior to obtaining the Degree or the three years ' service as a Degree holder for this purpose is to be reckoned from the date he obtains the Degree.
The Diploma holders contend that they are entitled to include the earlier period and would be eligible for promotion in this category on obtaining the Degree if the total period of service is three years inclusive of the earlier period.
The Degreeholders contest this position and contend to the contrary.
According to the Degree holders, these are two distinct categories.
In the first category are Degree holders with three years ' service in the grade as Degree holders, the period of three years being subsequent to the date of obtaining the Degree as in the case of the Junior Engineers who join the service with a Degree; and the other category is of Diploma holders with six years ' experi ence.
The Diploma holders went to the Central Administrative Tribunal with this contention and the Tribunals has upheld their claim and directed as under: "In the light of the above, we hold that the applicants are entitled to the relief asked for and accordingly we direct the respondents to consider them for promotion to the post of 426 Assistant Engineer on par with the other Degree ho1ding Junior Engineers, taking due note of their total length of service rendered in the grade of Junior Engineer.
Such a con sideration should be along side other Junior Engineers who might have acquired the neces sary Degree qualification earlier than the applicants, while holding the post of Junior Engineer.
For this purpose, the first three respondents shall take necessary action to convene a review D.P.C. and pass orders on the basis of the recommendations of that D.P.C. within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
The application is allowed as above".
Hence this petition for grant of special leave by the Degree holders.
Leave is granted.
In our opinion, this appeal has to be allowed.
There is sufficient material including the admission of respondents Diploma holders that the practice followed in the Department for a long time was that in the case of Diploma holder Junior Engineers who obtained the Degree during service, the period of three years ' service in the grade for eligibility for promotion as Degree holders commenced from the date of obtaining the Degree and the earlier period of service as Diploma holders was not counted for this purpose.
This earlier practice was clearly admitted by the respondents Diploma holders in para 5 of their application made to the Tribunal at page 115 of the paper book.
This also appears to be the view of the Union Public Service Commission contained in their letter dated December 6,1968 extracted at pages 99 100 of the paper book in the counter affidavit of re spondents 1 to 3.
The real question, therefore, is whether the construction made of this provision in the rules on which the past practice extending over a long period is based is untenable to require upsetting it.
If the past practice is based on one of the possible constructions which can be made of the rules then upsetting the same now would not be appropriate.
It is in this perspective that the question raised has to be determined.
The Recruitment Rules for the post of Assistant Engi neers in the P.W.D. (Annexure C) are at pages 57 to 59 of the paper book.
Rule 7 lays down the qualifications for direct recruitment from the two sources, namely, Degree holders and Diploma holders with three years ' professional experience.
In other words, a Degree is equated to Diploma with three years ' professional experience.
Rule 11 provides for.
recruitment by promotion from the grade of Section Officers now called Junior Engineers.
There are two catego ries provided therein one is of Degree holder Junior Engi 427 neers with three years ' service in the grade and the other is of Diplomaholder Junior Engineers with six years ' service in the grade, the provision being for 50% from each catego ry.
This matches with Rule 7 wherein a Degree is equated with Diploma with three years professional experience.
In the first category meant for Degree holders, it is also provided that if Degree holders with three years ' service in the grade are not available in sufficient number, then Diploma holders with six years ' service in the grade may be considered in the category of Degree holders also for the 50% vacancies meant for them.
The entire scheme, therefore, does indicate that the period of three years ' service in the grade required for Degree holders according to Rule 11 as the qualification for promotion in that category must mean three years ' service in the grade as a Degreeholder and, therefore, that period of three years can commence only from the date of obtaining the Degree and not earlier.
The serv ice in the grade as a Diploma holder prior to obtaining the Degree cannot be counted as service in the grade with a Degree for the purpose of three years ' service as a Degree holder.
The only question before us is of the construction of the provision and not of the validity thereof and, there fore, we are only required to construe the meaning of the provision.
In our opinion, the contention of the appellants Degree holders that the rules must be construed to mean that the three years ' service in the grade of a Degreeholder for the purpose of Rule 11 is three years from the date of obtaining the Degree is quite tenable and commends to us being in conformity with the past practice followed consist ently.
It has also been so under stood by all concerned till the raising of the present controversy recently by the respondents, The tribunal was, therefore, not justified in taking the contrary view and unsettling the settled practice in the Department.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed.
The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside resulting in dismissal of the respondents ' application made in the Tribunal.
The Depart ment will now consider the question of promotion in accord ance with this decision.
No costs.
N.P.V. Appeal al lowed.

summary:
The respondents, Diploma holder Junior Engineers in the Public Works Department, pondicherry, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, with the plea that the period of service rendered by them before they obtained the Degree should be included for reckoning the period of three years ' service prescribed in the Recruitment Rules for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in the category of those possessing Degree with three years ' service and if the earlier period was so included, they would be eligible for promotion.
However, Degree holders opposed the respondents ' plea contending that the period of three years prescribed in the Rules was subsequent to the date of obtaining the De gree.
The Tribunal upheld the respondents ' claim and directed that they should be considered for promotion on par with the other Degree holder Junior Engineers, taking due note of their total length of service rendered in the grade of Junior Engineer.
Hence the appeal, by the Special Leave, by the Degree hold ers.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD:1.1 The rules must be construed to mean that the three years ' service in the grade of a Degree holder for the purpose of Rule 11 of the Recruitment Rules, for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in the Public Works De partment Pondicherry, is 424 three years from the date of obtaining the Degree by a Diplomaholder.
This is in conformity with the past practice followed consistently.
The Tribunal was not justified in taking the contrary view and unsettling the settled practice in the Department.
[427 D] 1.2 Rule 7 of the Recruitment Rules lays down the quali fications for direct recruitment from the two sources, namely, Degreeholders and Diploma holders with three years ' professional experience.
Thus, a Degree is equated to Diplo ma with three years ' professional experience.
Rule 11 pro vides for recruitment by promotion from the grade of Section Officers, now called Junior Engineers.
There are two catego ries provided therein, viz., (1) Degreeholder Junior Engi neers with three years ' service in the grade and (2) Diplo ma holder Junior Engineers with six years ' service in the grade, the provision being for 50% from each category.
This matches with Rule 7 wherein a Degree is equated with Diploma with three years ' professional experience.
In the first category meant for Degree holders, it is also provided that if Degree holders with three years ' service in the grade are not available in sufficient number, then Diploma holders with six years ' service in the grade may be considered in the category of Degree holders also for the 50% vacancies meant for them.
The entire scheme, therefore, does indicate that the period of three years ' service in the grade re quired for Degree holders according to Rule 11 as the quali fication for promotion in that category must mean three years ' service in the grade as a Degree holder and, there fore, that period of three years can commence only from the date of obtaining the Degree and not earlier.
The service in the grade as a Diploma holder prior to obtaining the Degree cannot be counted as service in the grade with a Degree for the purpose of three years ' service as a Degree holder.
[427 G H, 428 A C]