judgement:
minal Appeal No. 119 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated ' March 15, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 375 of 1965.
B. Sen, P.K. Chatterjee and P.K. Chakravarti, for the appellant.
section V. Gupte and G.S. Chatterjee, for the Calcutta High Court.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J.
This appeal is filed with special leave against the order of the High Court of Calcutta declaring that a speech broadcast on the night of November 25, 1965, on the Calcutta Station of the All India Radio by Mr. P.C. Sen, then Chief Minister of West Bengal, was calculated to obstruct the course of justice and 651 on that account amounted to contempt of court and the conduct of Mr. Sen merited disapproval.
On August 23, 1965, the State of West Bengal issued, in exercise of power under sub rr.
(2) and (3) of r. 125 of the: Defence of india Rules, the West Bengal Channa Sweets Control Order, 1965, placing restrictions upon the right of persons carrying on business in milk products and especially dealers in sweetmeat made out of Channa.
In a petition moved by Nani Gopal Paul the High Court of Calcutta declared by order dated Novera bet 16, 1965, that the West Bengal Channa Sweets Control Order, 1965, is an "unreasonable piece of delegated legislation made in arbitrary exercise of power under r. 125 without any justification in law and regardless of the purpose for which such order may be made", and issued an injunction against the State of West Bengal from enforcing that order.
The State of West Bengal thereafter issued another order with immediate effect on November 18, 1965, called the "West Bengal ' Milk Product Control Order, 1965".
On November 22, 1965, Messrs Ramlal Ghosh and Grandsons challenged by Petition No. 369 of 1965 the validity of the Order issued on November 18, 1965, and prayed for a writ declaring the Order "null and void" and for an injunction restraining the State of West Bengal and the Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services from giving effect to the said Order.
Rule was issued on the Petition by Banerjee, J., and was duly served on the State of West Bengal, on November 23, 1965.
On the night of November 25, 1965, the Chief Minister of West Bengal broadcast a speech on the All India Radio, Calcutta Station, seeking to justify the propriety of the Control Order.
In the course of that broadcast speech the Chief Minister made several comments on controversial matters which were pending for adjudication before the court At the hearing of the rule on November 29, 1965, counsel 1or.
Ramlal Ghosh and Grandsons brought to the notice of the Court a newspaper report of the speech broadcast by the Chief Minister Rule was issued by Banerjee, J., requiring the Chief Minister to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court on the grounds ( 1 ) that the speech was likely to prejudice the Court and the public against the cause of the petitioners, and ' may compel or induce them to discontinue the action, (2) that it was likely to have "the pernicious con,sequence" of prejudicing the minds of the public against the petitioners, (3) and that it was likely to have the effect of misrepresenting a piece of illegal legislation before the Court had an opportunity to decide the matter, and was on that account calculated to deter other persons havingsimilar causes from approaching the Court for relief.
652 Instead of making a frank statement before the Court, the Chief Minister was apparently advised to adopt grossly technical pleas Counsel informed the Court that the Chief Minister did "not like to use any affidavit showing cause".
Evidence was then led before the Court to prove that the offending speech was in fact broadcast by the Chief Minister on the All India Radio, Calcutta Station.
After evidence was recorded in the Court about the speech broadcast by the Chief Minister he somewhat belatedly filed an affidavit on March 4, 1966, admitting that he had delivered the speech on the All India Radio on the night of November 25, 1965, the contents of which were proved by the evidence of the Programme Director.
It was also admitted that the Chief Minister had knowledge of the filing of the petition when he broadcast the speech and of the rule served upon the State Government.
By the affidavit it was attempted to justify the speech, on the plea that the Chief Minister came to learn that certain persons had started publicly propagating the view that far from achieving the objects, the Order will not only reduce the supply of fluid milk in the area, but also displace numerous persons from their normal avocation resulting in unemployment for many that the object of the propaganda was to criticise and ridicule the policy of the State Government in promulgating the Order, that the propaganda had misled certain sections of the people about the object, purpose and nature of the Order and the consequences thereof, particularly with regard to the position of supply of milk and the question of continued employment of the persons working in the sweetmeat shops in the area, that taking advantage of the situation, attempts were made to commence a political agitation against the State Government for having promulgated the Order, and in the circumstances and particularly with a view to preventing widespread agitation in connection with the Order, it was thought that it was the duty of the Chief Minister of the State to explain to the people the policy underlying and the reasons for promulgating the Order, that in making the speech his sole and only intention and purpose was to "remove the confusion and allay the fears, if any, from the minds of the people with regard to the purpose nature, object and effect of the promulgation of the Order", that he had no intention, whatsoever of either showing any disrespect to the Court or interfering in any manner with the due course of the administration of justice, nor did he anticipate that his speech could have any such effect, and that by broadcasting his speech he had committed no contempt of Court nor had he any intention of doing so.
Banerjee, J., after a detailed examination of the relevant law and the speech broadcast, held that the speech broadcast amounted to contempt of Court "in the sense that it was likely to have 653 several baneful effects upon the petitioners" in Petition No. 369 of 1965, "upon their cause and upon others having a cause similar to that of the petitioners".
The learned Judge accordingly recorded that "the Chief Minister cannot wholly escape the charge of having committed contempt of Court", since "the speech was contumacious in the sense that it was likely to have baneful effects upon the petitioners" in Petition No. 369 of 1965 "their cause, and upon persons having a similar cause and as such was likely to interfere with the administration of justice by the Court.
" The learned Judge, however, observed that "the condemner Mr. Sen should be let off with an expression of disapproval of his conduct and in the hope that the sort of indiscretion will not be repeated".
In This appeal counsel for the appellant has raised four contentions in support of his argument that the High Court erred in holding that the Chief Minister by broadcasting the speech did commit contempt of Court: (1) that there is no finding by the High Court that the contempt was intentionally committed by the Chief Minister; (2) that by broadcasting the speech no real prejudice was caused either in the mind of the Judge or to the cause of the petitioners in Petition No. 369 of 1965; (3) that the speech contained no direct reference to any pending proceeding; and (4) that the Chief Minister was under a duty to make the Speech to instruct the public about the true state of affairs and to remove the misgivings arising in the public mind from agitation carried on by political parties.
The law relating to contempt of Court is well settled.
Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a Court or a Judge into contempt, or to lower his authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court: R.v.
Gray(1).
Contempt by speech or writing may be by scandalising the Court itself, or by abusing parties to actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against a party before the cause is heard.
It is incumbent upon Courts of justice to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, for prejudicing the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes before the cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences.
Speeches or writings misrepresenting the proceedings of the Court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or involving reflections on parties to a pro (1)[1900] at p.40.
Sup CI/69 9 654 ceeding amount to contempt.
To make a speech tending to influence the result of a pending trial, whether civil or criminal is a grave contempt.
Comments on pending proceedings, if emanating from the parties or their lawyers, are generally a more serious contempt than those coming from independent sources.
The question in all cases of comment on pending proceedings is not whether the publication does interfere, but whether it tends to interfere, with the due course of justice.
The question is not so much of the intention of the contemner as whether it is calculated to interfere with the administration of justice.
As observed by the Judicial Committee in Debi Prasad Sharma and Ors.
vs The King Emperor (1): " . the test applied by the .
Board which heard the reference was whether the words complained of were in the circumstances calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law.
" If, therefore, the speech which was broadcast by the Chief Minister was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, it was liable to be declared a contempt of the Court even asuming that he had not intended thereby to interfere with the due course of justice.
There is nothing in Saibal Kumar Gupta and Ors.
vs B.K. Sen and Ant.
(2), on which counsel for the appellant relied, which supports his contention that intention of the contemner is the decisive test.
The observations of Imam, J., speaking for the majority of the Court that the appellants should be acquitted, because they "had at no time intended to interfere with the course of justice and their conduct did not tend to interfere with the course of justice", does not imply that conduct which tends to or is calculated to interfere with the administration of justice is not liable to be punished as contempt because the contemner had no intention to interfere with the course of justice.
Nor does the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Arthur Reginald Perera vs The King(a) support the contention that in determining whether conduct which is otherwise calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice will not be contempt of Court because on the part of the contemner there was no intention to interfere with the administration of justice.
In that case, a member of the House of Representatives in Ceylon, on receiving a complaint from some of the prisoners about the practice of producing followed by the Jail Authorities in the Court when an appeal filed by the prisoners was being heard, made an entry in the prison visitors ' book that "The present practice of appeals of remand prisoners being heard in their absence is not healthy.
When (1) L.R. 70I. A. 216atp.
(2) [1961] 3S.C.R. 460.
(3) 655 represented by counsel or otherwise the prisoner should be present at proceedings".
Information conveyed to Perera was inaccurate It was held by the Judicial Committee that Perera acted in good faith and in discharge of what be believed to be his public duty as a member of the legislature, and that he had not committed any contempt of Court because the words made no direct reference to the Court or to any of its Judges, or to the course of justice or to the process of the Courts.
His criticism was honest criticism on a matter of public importance and there was nothing in his conduct which came within the definition of contempt of Court.
The Chief Minister in the speech broadcast 'by him in the first instance announced what in his view is the legal effect of the Order promulgated, and then proceeded to state the reasons which persuaded the Government of West Bengal to issue the Order banning the preparation of sweetmeats with milk products Channa and Khir and expressed the hope that the residents of Calcutta will be in a position to secure larger quantities of milk.
He stated that if producers of Milk cooperate with the Government, not only will they be benefited, but they will do real good to a large number of people of the State.
He estimated the number of establishments which were in his view likely to be affected, and stated that many of the employees in their establishments who it was expected were likely to be thrown out of employment, may be employed in depots for collection of milk.
He wound up by stating "This new Order will (not) only be beneficial to the buyers and sellers of milk alone it will (also) be of help in solving the milk problem in the whole of West Bengal in the near future".
In the course of his speech he stated after referring to the difficulties encountered in procuring milk and the acute scarcity of milk prevailing in West Bengal: "According to the science relating to nutrition a person requires at least 8 Ounces of milk per day Hence to prepare any food with Milk in our West Bengal is, indeed, tantamount almost to a crime.
" He also stated: "The quantity of the milk collected under the Greater Calcutta Milk Supply Scheme has increased to 65 thousand Litres from 23 thousand Litres per day on the average.
A large number of people were getting supply of milk according to their requirements from the local Milkman (Goalas).
The quantity of milk collected from different sources in Calcutta increased to 2 lakhs and 61 thousand Litres from 2 lakhs and 12 thousand Litres.
This volume of milk supply (however) consti 656 tutes 41% of the total demand.
This supply could have been augmented much more if powder milk could be obtained in sufficient quantity from foreign countries.
But in view of foreign exchange difficulties, the Government of India curtailed the import of powder milk and as a result thereof great inconvenience was felt.
In the Greater Calcutta areas, the total demand of Milk at present is at least 6 lakhs and 30 thousand Litres" and that "The Government have considered the question of few employees of sweetmeat establishments being thrown out of employment as a result of promulgation of this new Order.
There are about seven thousand sweetmeat shops in the City of Calcutta and the number of persons employed in them is nearly 3,500.
The number of sweetmeat shops in other towns is about 1,000 and the number of persons employed in them is approximately 4,000.
Hence the total number of employees in all these sweetmeat establishments comes to about 39,000.
We should bear in mind that almost all these sweetmeat shops prepare salted (nonta) variety of edibles, such as, nimki, singara, radhaballavi, luchi dalpuri, Kachuri, jhuribhaja, alurdom, curry, dal etc.
Besides, curd is also sold by those shops which also sell kinds of sweets that do not at all require Channa or Khir (for their preparation)," that "Those workers who had until recently been bringing milk and Channa to Calcutta will be able to supply from now on milk to the Milk Collection Centres of the Government", and that "The quantity of milk collected by the Government is indeed daily on the increase.
And yesterday nearly 92 thousand 800 (sic) litres of milk were collected.
New Milk Depots will have to be opened soon in Calcutta and outside.
25 depots will shortly be opened in Calcutta and its neighbouring areas.
If the quantity of milk collected increases according to expectations, at least 1,000 additional depots will have to be opened in different places.
If in spite of an increase in the demand for other sweets a number of workers become unemployed, the Government is prepared to employ them in those depots.
This new Order will only be beneficial to the buyers and sellers of milk alone.
it will (also) be of help in solving the milk problem of the whole of West Bengal in the near future".
In their Petition No. 369 of 1965 M/s. Ramlal Ghosh and Grandsons had pleaded that the State of West Bengal and the Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary 657 Services had acted mala fide and "in complete and utter disregard of the judgment and order of the High Court of Calcutta and without reading or considering the same had vindictively published" the impugned order "in anger and hot haste being recklessly careless as to the consequences thereof and without giving their mind to the comprehension and their wills to the discharge their duty towards the public" (Para 18).
They also had averted that they and other traders who carried on business only in milk products like Channa, Kheer including Khoa Kheer were facing complete ruin by reason of the total prohibition of their trade, commerce and intercourse (Para 19); that the impugned Order had not only prohibited the trade, commerce and intercourse of the petitioners but also its movement, and by the impugned Order the petitioners were not only prohibited from manufacturing but were also ordered not to supply or to trains ' port the same and to deliver the same to various customers within and outside Calcutta (Para 20); that "there was not nor there was any material before the Governor of West Bengal to form the alleged opinion and/or that the purported opinion was not reasonably formed" (Para 24); and that according to newspaper reports there were about 8,000 shops in Calcutta and 4,000 more in the neighbouring areas and those employed about 50,000 men and presuming that each employee maintained a family of 4, at least 200,000 people would be affected by the impugned Order (Para. 32).
In his speech the Chief Minister characterised the preparation of any food with milk in West Bengal as tantamount to a crime.
He also announced his version about the validity of the Order, the reasons why it was promulgated, and asserted that it was an order made bona fide and in the interests of the public, and that those who resisted it were acting contrary to the public interest.
But these questions had to be determined by the Court.
Banerjee, 1, in the judgment under appeal was of the view that the speech was likely to influence public opinion against the petitioners since the Chief Minister occupies a highly responsible position of power and authority under the Constitution, and being a person most likely to know the needs of the State there would be many who may believe in factual statements made by him.
The learned Judge observed that he was not prejudiced by the speech against the petitioners before him, since he was only "concerned with the constitutional and legal validity of the Control Order, and incidentally only with its socio economic justification", but it could ' not be said that the speech did not or could not or was not likely to prejudice the public against the cause of the petitioners.
He also observed that for the Chief Minister to have made a public appeal in support of the Order, with the knowledge of the issue of 658 the Rule Nisi calling upon the State Government and the Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services to show cause why the Control Order should not be declared void was "improper and ill timed" and also "contumacious", for the Chief Minister had published in advance the defence to be taken against the Rule.
The criticism made by the learned Judge is not unwarranted.
The statements in a broadcast speech by an important dignitary of the State that persons who prepare sweets out of milk in the course of their business are on the version set up by him criminals, and the suggestion that the Order was issued in the interests of the public, whereas it was the contention of the petitioners that it was done "recklessly, arbitrarily and vindictively and without caring for the consequences, and without considering their duty to the public", are prima facie calculated to obstruct the administration of justice, since they are likely to create an atmosphere of prejudice against the petitioners and also to deter other persons having similar claims from approaching the Court.
There is in the speech no direct reference to the proceedings pending before the Court, but it is now common ground that the Chief Minister was aware of the filing of the petition and the issue of the rule which was served upon the Government.
Whether he was aware of all the details of the allegations made in the petition is not relevant.
If he knew that a petition was filed and the rule was served upon the Government of which he was the Chief Minister, before making any statement on a matter which was controversial it was his duty to acquaint himself with the allegations made and also to ascertain what the points in dispute were before going to on to a public broadcasting system to announce the case of the Government.
Whatever may be the motive of the Chief Minister and whatever he may have thought as a Chief Minister to be necessary in order to acquaint the public, a speech which presented the case of the Government to the public, before it was tried by the Court, and suggested that those who prepare sweetmeats out of milk were criminals and were acting in a manner contrary to the interest of the general public, was calculated to interefere with the due administration of justice.
Council for the Chief Minister contended, relying upon certain judgments of the Courts in the United Kingdom that in cases where the trial of a case is held without the aid of a jury, comments on matters in dispute in a pending proceeding or criticism of the parties thereto, will not amount to interference with the administration of justice.
Courts seek to punish acts or conduct calculated to interfere with the administration of justice; and we are unable to hold that when the trial of a case is held by a Judge 659 without the aid of a jury no contempt by interfering with the administration of justice may be committed.
The foundation of the jurisdiction lies not merely in the effect which comments on a pending proceeding may have upon the minds of the jury, but the pernicious consequences which result from the conduct of the contemner, who by vilification, or abuse of a party seeks to hold up a party to public ridicule, obloquy, censure or contempt or by comment on his case seeks to prejudge the issue pending.
We are unable to agree that where a trial of a case is held in the Court of First Instance, without a jury, or before a Court of Appeal persons so inclined are free to make comments on pending proceedings or to abuse parties thereto without any protection from the Court.
It is difficult to accept the contention that comments which are likely to interfere with the due administration of justice by holding up a party to a proceeding to ridicule or to create an atmosphere against him in the public mind against his cause when the trial is held without the aid of a jury do not amount to contempt.
If a party to the proceeding is likely to be deterred from prosecuting ,his proceeding or people who have similar cause are likely to be dissuaded from initiating proceedings, contempt of court would be committed.
It matters little whether the trial is with the aid of the jury or without the aid of jury.
In The William Thomas Shipping Co., In re.
H.W. Dhillon & Sons Ltd. vs The Company, In re.
Sir Robert Thomas and others(1) it was observed that the publication of injurious misrepresentations concerning parties to proceedings in relation to those proceedings may amount to contempt of Court, because it may cause those parties to discontinue or to compromise, and because it may deter persons with goods causes of action from coming to the Court, and was thus likely to affect the course of Justice.
But Maugham, J. observed: "There is an atmosphere in which a common law judge approaches the question of contempt somewhat different from that in which a judge who sits in this (Chancery) Division has to approach it.
The common law judge is mainly thinking of the effect of the alleged contempt on the mind of the jury and also, I think, he has to consider the effect or the possible effect of the alleged contempt in preventing witnesses from coming forward to give evidence.
In these days, at any rate, a Judge who sits in this Division is not in least likely to be prejudiced by statements published in the press as to the result of cases which are coming before him.
He has to determine the case on the (1) 660 evidence, of course, and with regard to the principles of law as he understands them; and the view of a newspaper, however intelligible conducted it may be, cannot possibly affect his mind.
Accordingly, a Judge in the Chancery Division starts on the footing that only in the rarest possible case is it likely that the publication by a newspaper of such a statement as I have here to consider will affect the course of justice in the sense of influencing, altering or modifying the judgment or judgments which the Court will ultimately have to deliver;" But our Courts, are Courts, which administer both law and equity.
Assuming that a Judge holding a trial is not likely to, be influenced by comments in newspapers or by other media mass communication may be ruled out though it would difficult to be dogmatic on that matter also the Court is entitled ' and is indeed bound to consider, especially in our country where personal conduct is largely influenced by opinion of the members of the caste, community, occupation or profession to which he belongs, whether comments holding up a party to public ridicule, or which prejudices society against him may not dissuade him from prosecuting his proceeding or compel him to compromise it on terms unfavorable to himself.
That is a real danger which must be guarded against: the Court is not in initiating proceedings for contempt for abusing a party to a litigation merely concerned with the impression on the Judge 's mind even on the minds of witnesses for a litigant, it is also concerned with the probable effect on the conduct of the litigant and persons having similar claims.
In Regina vs Duffey and others Ex Parte Nash(1) the Court of Appeal in England had to consider the question whether comments made upon a person after his conviction and before appeal was heard may be regarded as contempt of Court.
Lord Parker, C.J., observed: "Even if a Judge who 'eventually sat on the appeal had seen the article in question and had remembered its contents, it is inconceivable that he would be influenced consciously or unconsciously by it.
A Judge is in a very different position to a juryman.
Though in no sense superhuman, he has by his training no difficulty in putting out of his mind matters which are not evidence in the case.
This, indeed, happens daily to Judges on Assize.
This is all the more so in the case of a member of the Court of Criminal (1) 662 Appeal, who, in regard to an appeal against conviction is dealing almost entirely with points of law,.
and who, in the case of an appeal against sentence is considering whether or not the sentence is correct in principle.
" This may be true when a Court of Appeal determines questions of law only or the appeal is confined to questions of sentence, but where a proceeding which is tried on evidence in the Court ' of First Instance, or in the Court of Appeal on questions of fact as well as of law, it would be an over statement to assert that a Judge may not be influenced even "unconsciously" by what he has read in newspapers.
No distinction is, in our judgment, warranted that comment on a pending case or abuse of a party may amount to contempt when the case is triable with the aid of a jury, and not when it is triable by a Judge or Judges.
Ordinarily a Court will not initiate proceedings for commitment for contempt where there is a mere technical contempt.
In Legal Remembrancer vs Matilal Ghose and Others(1) it was observed by Jenkins, C.J., that proceedings for contempt shotfid be initiated with utmost reserve and no court in the due discharge of its duty can afford to disregard them.
It was also observed that jurisdiction to punish for contempt was arbitrary, unlimited and uncontrolled and should be exercised with the greatest caution: that this power merits this description will be realised when it is understood that there is no limit to the imprisonment that may be inflicted or the fine that may be imposed save the Court 's unfettered discretion, and that the subject is protected by no right of general appeal.
We may at once observe that since the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act 12 of 1926 and Act 32 of 1952 the power of the Court in imposing punishment for contempt of court is not an uncontrolled or unlimited power.
That, however does not justify the court in commencing proceedings without due caution and reserve.
But Banerjee, 1., who must be conversant with local conditions was of the view that action of the Chief Minister was likely to interfere with the course of justice for it was likely to have "baneful effects" upon the petitioners their cause and upon persons having a similar cause, and sitting in appeal we do not think that we can hold that he took an erroneous view of his power or of the tendency of the speech, which he has characterised as having "baneful effects".
Banerjee, J, has ultimately treated the contempt as technical for he has not imposed any substantive sentence, not even a warning.
He has merely expressed his displeasure.
The speech was ex facie calculated (1) I.L.R. 662 to interfere with the administration of justice.
In the circumstances the order of Banerjee, J., observing that the Chief Minister had acted improperly and expressing disapproval of the action does not call for any interference by this Court.
The appeal is dismissed.

summary:
The West Bengal Government issued an Order under Rule 125 of the Defence of India Rules, placing certain restrictions upon the right of persons carrying on business in milk products.
The validity of this Order was challenged by a writ petition.
After Rule had been issued on the petition and served on the State Government, the State Chief Minister broadcast a speech sreking to justify the propriety of the Order.
The High Court issued a Rule requiring the Chief Minister to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court.
It was contended on behalf of the Chief Minister that he had come to learn of certain persons propagating the view that the Order would not only have the effect of reducing the supply of milk, but also of displacing numerous persons from work and causing unemployment; that attempts were made to commence a political agitation against the Order; and that with a view to agitation it was considered that the Chief Minister was under a duty to explain to the people the policy underlying, and the reasons for promulgating the Order.
The High Court held that the speech amounted to contempt of Court; that it was contumacious in that it was likely to have a baneful effect upon the petitioners who had challenged the validity of the Order, and their cause and upon other persons having a similar cause; and that it was likely to interfere with the administration of justice.
The High Court therefore expressed disapproval of the Chief Minister 's conduct.
In appeal to this Court it was contended, inter alia, on behalf of the Chief Minister that the High Court erred in holding that the Chic/ Minister committed contempt of court because there was no finding that the contempt was intentionally committed; no real prejudice was caused either in the mind of the Judge or to the cause of the petitioners; that the speech contained no direct reference to any pending proceedings and that the Chief Miraster was under a duty to make the speech to instruct the public about the true state of affairs.
HELD :The speech was ex facie calculated to interfere with the administration of justice.
The High Court 's orders observing that the Chief Minister had acted improperly and expressing disapproval of his action was correct and did not call for any interference, by this Court.
Gray, at p. 40 and Legal Remembrancer .v.
Matilal Ghose and Others, I.L.R. ; referred to.
The, question in all cases of comment on pending proceedings is not whether ' the publication does interfere, but whether it tends to interfere, with the due course of justice.
The question is not so much of the in tention.
of the contemner as whether it is calculated to interfere with the 650 administration of justice.
If, therefore, the speech broadcast by the Chief Minister was calculated to interfere with the course of justice, it was liable to be declared a contempt of the Court even assuming that he had not intended thereby to interfere with the due course of justice.
[654 B] Debi Prasad Sharma and Ors.
vs The King Emperor, L.R. 70 I.A. 216 at p. 224; Saibal Kumar Gupta and Ors.
B.K. Sen and Anr., ; ; and Arthur Reginald Perera vs The King, ; referred to.
The Chief Minister in his speech characterised the preparation of food with milk in West Bengal as tantamount to a crime.
He also announced his version about the validity of the order, the reasons why it was promulgated, and asserted that it was an order made bona fide and in the interest of the public so that those who resisted it were acting contrary to the public interest.
These were the very questions that had to be determined by the Court.
The statements in the Chief Minister 's broadcast were therefore prims facie calculated to obstruct the administration of justice, since they were likely to create an atmosphere of prejudice against the petitioners and also to deter other persons having similar claims from approaching the Court.
It could not be held that when the trial of a case is held by a Judge without the aid of a jury, no contempt by interfering with the administration of justice may be committed.
The foundation of the jurisdiction lies not merely in the effect which comments on a pending proceeding may have upon the mind of the jury, but the consequences which result from the conduct of the contemner, who by vilification or abuse of a party seeks to hold him up to public ridicule, obloquy, censure or contempt or by comment on his case seeks to prejudice the issue pending before the Court.
[658 H; 659 A, B] The William Thomas Shipping Co., In re.
H.W. Dhillan & Sons Ltd. vs The Company, In re, Sir Robert Thomas and Others, and Regina vs Duffey and others Ex Parte Nash, ; referred to.


judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1953.
Appeal under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated the 18th February, 1953, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 592 of 1952 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated the 21st May, 1952, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay, in Case No. 147/P/ 1951.
B. H. Lulla and Rajinder Narain for the appellants.
Porus A. Mehta for the respondent.
May 13.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J.
The appellants were charged under section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent I Restriction Act, 1947, for receiving from Shankar Das Gupta through Mathra Das, accused No. 3, on 23rd November, 1950, a sum of Rs. 2,400 as premium or 160 pugree in respect of the grant of lease of Block No. 15 in a building under construction.
The magistrate found 'the appellants guilty of the charge and sentenced each of them to two months ' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1,200.
Mathra Das was convicted and sentenced to one day 's S.I. and a fine of Rs. 100.
The fourth accused, Roshanlal Kanjilal, was acquitted.
Mathra Das preferred no appeal against his conviction and sentence.
The appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court against their conviction.
This was heard by Gajendragadkar and Chainani JJ.
on the 8th of October, 1952.
It was contended, inter alia, that even if it were held that the appellants had accepted the sum of Rs. 2,400 they could not be said to have committed an offence under section 18(1) of the Act inasmuch as the amount could not in law be held to be a premium in respect of the grant of a lease.
On this point the learned Judged said as follows : " In the present case the work regarding the building which still remained to be done was so important that both the parties agreed that the complainant should get into possession after the said work was completed.
In such a case unless the building is completed the tenant has no right which can be enforced in a Court of law.
If the landlord finds it impossible for any reason to complete the building, what is the right which an intending tenant can enforce against him.
Therefore, in our opinion, there is considerable force in the contention urged by Mr. Lulla that in the present case even if it be held that the accused had received Rs. 2,400 in the circumstances to which we have already referred that would not bring them within the mischief of section 18(1) because there has been no grant of a lease at all.
There is only an agreement that the landlord would lease to the complainant a particular flat after the building has been fully and properly completed.
It does appear that section 18 1 does not bring within its mischief executory agreements of this kind." A contrary view had been expressed in Criminal Revision No. 1178 of 1949, by another Bench of the High Court on the construction of section 18(1).
The 161 matter was therefore referred to the Full Bench.
The question framed for the consideration of the Full Bench was in these terms: If as owners of an in complete building the appellants accepted Rs. 2,400 from the complainant in respect of an agreement between them that the appellants were bound to give and the complainant was entitled to take possession of flat No. 15 in the said building as soon as the said building was completed on the agreed rent of Rs. 75 per month, did the acceptance of Rs. 2,400 by the appellants fall within the mischief of section 18 of Bombay Act LVII of 1947 This question, if answered in the negative by the Full Bench, would have concluded the case.
The Full Bench answered the question referred in the affirmative.
It held that the oral agreement did not constitute a lease but it amounted to an agreement to grant a lease in future, and that the receipt of consideration for an executory agreement was within the mischief of section 18(1) of the Act.
The Full Bench Expressed its opinion in these terms: " What the Legislature has penalized is the receipt of a premium by the landlord and the Legislature has also required a nexus between the receipt by the landlord of a premium and the grant of a lease of any premises.
Therefore a receipt alone by a landlord would not constitute an offence, but that receipt must be connected with the grant of the lease of any premises.
Unless that connection is established no offence would be committed.
The contention of Mr. Lulla on behalf of the accused is that the receipt of the premium must be simultaneous with the grant of the lease.
If the lease comes into existence at a future date, then the receipt of a premium according to him is not "in respect of " the grant of a lease.
Therefore the key words according to us in this section are " in respect of.
" It is relevant to observe that the Legislature has advisedly not used the expression "for" or "in consideration of" or " as a condition of " the grant of a lease.
It has used an expression which has the widest connotation and 21 162 means in its plain meaning " connected with or attributable to," and therefore it is not necessary that there must be simultaneous receipt by the landlord with the grant of the lease.
So long as so 'me connection is established between the grant of the lease and the receipt of the premium by the landlord, the provisions of the section would be satisfied.
In our opinion it is impossible to contend that in the present case there was no connection whatever between the landlord receiving the premium and his granting the lease of the premises.
It is true that when he received the premium he did not grant a lease.
It is true that all that he did when he received the premium was to enter into a contract with his tenant to grant a lease in future.
But the object of the landlord in receiving the premium and the object of the tenant in paying the premium was undoubtedly on the part of the landlord the letting of the premises and oh the part of the tenant the securing of the premises.
Therefore the object of both the landlord and the tenant was the grant of the lease of the premises concerned and that object was achieved partly and to start with by an oral agreement being arrived at between the landlord and the tenant with regard to the granting of this lease, the lease being completed when delivery of possession of the premises would be given.
Therefore, in our opinion, on the facts of this case it is not possible to contend that the payment of the premium received by the landlord was unconnected with the grant of a lease of any premises.
The fact that no grant was made at the time when the premium was received, the fact that there was merely an agreement to grant a lease, the fact that the lease would come into existence only at a future date, are irrelevant facts so long as the connection between the receiving of the premium and the granting of the lease is established.
" On return from the Full Bench, the Division Bench considered the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellants and held that there were no merits in any one of those points and in the result the appeal was dismissed.
It was certified that the case involved a substantial question of law and was a fit one for appeal to this Court.
This appeal is before us on that certificate, 163 The principal question to decide in the appeal is whether the answer given by the Full Bench to the question referred to it is right, and whether receipt of a sum of money by a person who enters into an executory contract to grant a lease of a building under construction falls within the mischief of section 18(1) of the Act Section 18(1) provides: " If any landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf receives any fine, premium or other like sum or deposit or any consideration, other than the standard rent. " in respect of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease of any premises such landlord or person shall be punished " in the manner indicated by the section Under the section the money must be received by the landlord in respect of the grant of a lease.
The section refers to the " grant, renewal or continuance of a lease.
" Prima facie, it would not cover an executory agreement to grant a lease.
The words " renewal or continuance of a lease " clearly suggest that there must be a renewal or continuance of a subsisting lease.
In the context, grant of tenancy means the grant of new or initial tenancy; renewal of tenancy means the grant of tenancy after its termination; and continuance seems to contemplate continuance of a tenancy which is existing.
Whether or not an executory agreement for grant of a lease comes within the ambit of the section by reason of the use of the words " in respect of " would be examined hereinafter.
Before doing so it may be stated that an instrument is usually construed as a lease if it contains words of present demise.
It is construed as an executory agreement, notwithstanding that it contains words of present demise, where certain things have to be done by the lessor before the lease is granted, such as the completion or repair or improvement of the premises, or by the lessee, such as the obtaining of sureties.
(Vide Halsbury 's Laws of England, Second Edition, Vol. 20, pp. 37 39).
On the facts of this case therefore the Full Bench very rightly held that the 164 oral, agreement made between the parties did not constitute a lease but it amounted to an agreement to grant a lease in future.
It may further be pointed out that, in fact, in this case the lease never came into existence.
Moreover, in view of the provisions contained in the Bombay Land Requisition Act XXXIII of 1948, as amended, the appellants could not let out the building even after its completion unless on a proper notice being given the Controller of Accommodation did not exercise his powers under that Act.
It so happened that as soon as the building was completed the Controller of Accom modation requisitioned it, and thus no occasion arose for giving effect to the executory contract.
The question that needs our determination in such a situation is Whether section 18(1) makes punishable receipt of money at a moment of time when the lease had not come into existence, and when there was a possibility that the contemplated lease might never come into existence.
It may be here observed that the provisions of section 18(1) are penal in nature and it is a well settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty.
It if; not competent to the Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out the intention of the Legislature.
As pointed out by Lord Macmillan in London and North Eastern Railway Co. vs Berriman(1), " where penalties for infringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch the language of a rule, however beneficent its intention, beyond the fair and ordinary meaning of its language.
" The High Court took the view that without stretching the language of section 18(1) beyond its fair and ordinary meaning, the very comprehensive expression " in respect of " used by the Legislature could lead to only one conclusion, that the Legislature wanted the (1) , 295, 165 penal consequences of section 18(1) to apply to any nexus between the receipt by a landlord of a premium and the grant of the lease.
In our judgment, the High Court laid undue emphasis on the words "in respect of" in the context of the section.
Giving the words " in respect of " their widest meaning, viz., " relating to " or " with reference to", it is plain that this relationship must be predicated of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease, and unless a lease comes into existence simultaneously or near about the time that the money is received, it cannot be said that the receipt was " in respect of " the grant of a lease.
The relationship of landlord and tenant does not come into existence till a, lease comes into existence; in other words, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant until there is a, demise of the property which is capable of being taken possession of If the Legislature intended to make receipts of money on executory agreements punishable, the section would have read as follows: " receives any fine, premium or other like sum or deposit or any consideration other than the standard rent in respect of the lease or an agreement of lease of the premises, such landlord or person shall be punished " in the manner indicated in the section.
The section does not make the intention punishable; it makes an act punishable which act is related to the existence of a lease.
It does not make receipt of money on an executory contract punishable; on the other hand it only makes receipt of money on the grant, renewal or continuance of the lease of any premises punishable and unless the lease come into existence no offence can be said to have been committed by the person receiving the money.
It is difficult to hold that any relationship of 'landlord and tenant comes into existence on the execution of at agreement executory in nature or that the expression " premium " can be appositely used in connection with the receipt of money on the occasion of the executor of such an agreement, It may well be that if a leas( actually comes into existence then any receipt of money which has a nexus with that lease may fall within the mischief of section 18(1), but it is unnecessary to ex press any final opinion on the question as in the present 166 case admittedly no lease ever came into existence and the relationship of landlord and tenant was never created between the parties.
The landlord never became entitled to receive the rent from the tenant and the tenant never became liable to pay the rent.
There was no transfer of interest in the premises from the landlord to the tenant.
On its plain, natural, grammatic meaning, the language of the section does not warrant the construction placed upon it by the Full Bench merely by laying emphasis on the words " in respect of.
" In our opinion the language of the section ; 'in respect of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease " envisages the existence of a lease and the payment of an amount in respect of that lease or with reference to that lease.
Without the existence of a lease there can be no reference to it.
If the Legislature intended to punish persons receiving pugree on merely executory contracts it should have made its intention clear by use of clear and unambiguous language.
The construction we are placing on the section is borne out by the circumstance that it occurs in Part I of the Act.
Section 6 of this Part provides that " in areas specified in Schedule I, this Part shall apply to premises let for residence, education, business, trade or storage.
" This Part relates to premises let, in other words, premises demised or given on lease and not to premises that are promised to be given on lease and of which the lease may or may not come into being.
The definition of the expression " landlord" also suggests the same construction.
Landlord " as defined in section 5 of the Act means any person who is for the time being receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant. .
It is obvious that on the basis of an executory agreement the appellants would not be entitled to receive any rent.
They would only be entitled to receive rent after the lease is executed and actual 167 demise of the premises or their transfer is made in favour of the complainant.
The definition of the expression tenant" also suggests the same construction.
Mr. Mehta for the State, besides supporting the emphasis placed by the High Court on the words " in respect of," contended that that construction could be supported in view of the provisions of sub section (3) of section 18 which is in these terms: " 18(3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any payment made under any agreement entered into before the first day of September, 1940, or to any payment made by any person to a landlord by way of a loan, for the purpose of financing the erection of the whole or part of a residential building or a residential section of a building on the land held by him as an owner, a lessee or in any other capacity, entitling him to build on such land, under an agreement which shall be in writing and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian , be registered.
Such agreement shall inter alia include the following conditions, namely, (1) that the landlord is, to let to 'such person the whole or part of the building when completed for the use of such person or any member of his family. .
It was suggested that but for this exception the executory agreement would be included within the mischief of section 18(1) and that unless such agreements were within the mischief of the section there would have been no point in exempting them from its provisions.
In our view, this contention is not sound.
In the first place, the exception was added to the section by Act 42 of 1951, subsequent to the agreement in question, and for the purposes of this case section 18(1) should ordinarily be read as it stood in the Act, at the time the offence is alleged to have been commit ted.
Be that as it may, it appears that sub section (3) was added to the section by reason of the fact that some Courts construed section 18(1) in the manner in which it has been construed by the Full Bench in this case, and the Legislature by enacting clause (3) made it clear that agreements of the nature indicated in the 168 subjection were never intended to be included therein.
In our opinion, the language of that section is not of much assistance in construing the main provisions of section 18(1).
The result therefore is that in our view the receipt of money by the appellants from the complainant at the time of the oral executory agreement of lease was not made punishable under section 18(1) of the Act and is outside its mischief, and the Presidency Magistrate was in error in convicting the appellants and the High Court was also in error in upholding their conviction.
We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellants and order that they be acquitted.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Section 18(1) of the Bombay Rents,. ,. .
Control Act 1947 provides; " If any landlord either himself or through any person acting or Purporting to act on his behalf. . receives any fine, premium or other like sum or deposit or any consideration, other than 159 the standard rent in respect of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease of any premises such landlord or in the manner indicated by the section.
Held, that the words " renewal or continuance of a lease clearly suggest that there must be a renewal or continuance of a subsisting lease.
They would not cover an executory contract to grant a lease.
Giving the words " in respect of " their widest meaning, viz., relating to " or " with reference to " it is plain that this relationship must be predicated of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease and unless a lease comes into existence simultaneously or near about the time that the money is received it cannot be said that the receipt was " in respect of " the grant of a lease.
The relationship of landlord and tenant does not come into existence till a lease comes into existence, in other words, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant until there is a demise of the property which is capable of being taken possession of.
The section does not make the intention punishable, it makes an act punishable which is related to the existence of a lease.
It does not make receipt of money on an executory contract punishable.
London and North EasterN Railway Co. vs Berriman (1946 A.C.278, 295) referred to.


judgement:
iminal Appeal No. 49 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 14, 1964 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Misc.
Civil Application No. 13 of 1963.
Mohan Behari Lal, for the appellants.
V.K. Sanghi and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.
This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of the Bombay High Court Nagpur Bench dated August 14, 1964 by which the appellants were convicted for contempt of Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200/ each.
By the same judgment respondent No. 3, Sri Ram Nath Vig was also convicted for contempt and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ .
It appears that a hire purchase agreement was entered into between the appellants and respondent No. 1 on or about August 12, 1959.
Under that agreement a motor truck was made available to respondent No. 1 for doing transport business.
The hire purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause for settlement of disputes arising between the parties.
It appears that subsequently disputes did arise between the parties and a reference was made to an arbitrator to settle the disputes.
Resportdent No. 3, Sri Ram Nath Vig who is a practicing lawyer in Delhi was the person named as arbitrator in the arbitration agreement itself and the dispute was submitted to him on or about June 25, 1962 at the instance of the appellants.
Thereafter the arbitrator gave notice of the reference and invited statements of the parties.
He fixed the hearing of the arbitration matter before him on July 17, 1962.
The case of respondent No. 1 is that he did not receive notice of this date from the arbitrator and 4Sup.
C.I./69 10 670 therefore he did not appear on the date fixed.
The arbitrator adjourned the hearing of the reference to another date, namely, August 29, 1962.
The contention of respondent No. 1 is that he was not given intimation of this date also but this point is controverted by the respondents.
Respondents nos.
1 and 2 filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur on August 30, 1962.
In this suit they claimed a declaration that the hire purchase agreement was brought about by fraud and was not binding on them on various grounds.
The suit was registered and the court ordered summons to be issued to the two appellants.
Meanwhile, the arbitrator postponed the hearing of the reference to September 15, 1962 and it is alleged that he issued fresh notices to the parties on September 1, 1962.
The hearing was again adjourned to October 23, 1962 and it is said that resportdent No. 3 made an award on October 24, 1962.
It has been found by the High Court that on October 18, 1962 a notice was issued by respondent No. 1 to the appellants and the arbitrator with 'a copy of the plaint.
This notice was received by the appellants on October 22, 1962.
In spite of this notice, evidence was recorded by the arbitrator on October 23, 1962 and he made the award on the next day directing respondent No. 1 to pay Rs. 20,400/ .
The allegation of the arbitrator is that he received the notice sent on October 18, 1962 on the next day of the award i.e., on October 25, 1962.
It appears that in the civil suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 which was registered as Civil Suit No. 657 of 1962 on the file of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, the first date of hearing was fixed, on October 15, 1962.
On that date the appellants filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for staying the proceedings before the court.
No progress was made in the suit which was adjourned to November 6, 1962 and again to November 28, 1962 at the instance of the appellants.
Finally on November 28, 1962 the arbitrator informed respondent No. 1 that he had made the award.
On these facts respondents 1 and 2 filed an application under section 3 of the Contempt of Court 's Act for action being taken ,against the two appellants, respondent No. 3 and one more person.
According to respondents 1 and 2 the appellants and respondent No. 3 had committed contempt of court in proceeding with the arbitration reference in spite of notice under section 35 of the Arbitration Act being given and in spite of the knowledge of the suit which was filed by respondents 1 and 2.
The application was contested by the 'appellants as well as the arbitrator.
The case of the appellants was that the suit itself was not sustainable and they were unaware that participation in the arbitration proceedings after receipt of notice was precluded by law and that they honestly and bona fide believed that they were not expected to take any action after the receipt of the notice without direction from the arbitrator.
It was for the arbitrator to take a decision in the matter and 'if the arbitrator decided to pro 671 ceed with the arbitration, they only obeyed the orders of the arbitrator and therefore had not committed any contempt.
The defence of respondent No. 3 was that in completing the arbitration and giving his award he was only performing his duty.
He denied that it was necessary for him to await the result of the stay application alleged to have been made by respondent No. 1 in the Nagpur Court as he was of the view that the subject matter in the Nagput Court was not the whole subject matter under arbitration, Respondent No. 3 denied that he had any bias or that he conducted the arbitration proceedings in order to defeat the object of the suit and to place an impediment in the conduct of the suit.
The High Court rejected the contention of the appellants and of respondent No. 3 and held that the action of the appellants in participating in the arbitration proceedings and the conduct of respondent No. 3 constituted contempt of court as the conduct of respondent No. 3 and of the appellants had a tendency to bring into contempt the proceedings before the Civil Court.
It is necessary at this stage to set out the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act (X of 1940).
Sections 32, 33, 34 and 35 are to the following effect: "32.
Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act." "33.
Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence, also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit." "34.
Where any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming under him in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are 672 pending to stay the proceedings, and if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, such authority may make an order staying the proceeding." "35.
(1 ) No reference nor award shall be rendered invalid by reason only of commencement of legal proceedings upon the subject matter of the reference, but when legal proceedings upon the whole of the subjectmatter of the reference have been commenced between 'all the parties to the reference and a notice thereof has been given to the arbitrators or umpire all further proceedings, in a pending reference shall, unless a stay of proceedings is granted under section 34, be invalid.
(2) In this section the expression 'parties to the reference ' includes any persons claiming under any of the parties and litigating under the same title.
" In our opinion, the High Court was in error in holding that in the circumstances of this case the appellants and respondent No. 3 were guilty of contempt of court.
It is not disputed that there was an arbitration clause in the agreement between the appellants and respondent No. 1 and in terms of the arbitration clause respondents 1 and 2 had a fight to refer the dispute to the arbitrator.
It is also not disputed that a reference to the arbitrator was made by respondents 1 and 2 long before the institution of the civil suit.
It is also apparent that in view of the admitted existence of the hire purchase agreement containing an arbitration clause the remedy of respondent No. 1 was to move the Civil Court under section 33 of the Arbitration Act challenging the existence or validity of the ,arbitration agreement and to have its effect determined.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that a separate suit was barred under section 32 of the Arbitration Act.
We do not wish to express any opinion on this point in the present case.
Even on the assumption that the suit filed by respondents nos.
1 and 2 in the Nagpur Court is competent, the question arises whether the arbitrator was bound to stay the proceedings beforehim after he got notice from respondents 1 and 2 of 'the institution of the civil suit.
Section 35 of the Arbitration Act does not expressly prohibit the arbitrator from continuing the hearing of the reference but the only effect of section 35 is that "all further proceedings in a pending reference shall, unless a stay of proceedings is granted under section 34, be invalid".
For this consequence to follow, however, two important and distinct conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) that such legal proceedings must be upon 673 the whole and not merely part of the subject matter of the reference, and (2) that a notice of such a legal proceeding must be given to the arbitrator.
We do not wish to express any opinion as to whether these conditions were satisfied in this case.
But even on the assumption that these conditions were satisfied the only effect is that the further proceedings before the arbitrator after the receipt of the notice are rendered invalid and there is no prohibition under section 35 requiring the arbitrator not to carry on the arbitration proceedings after the receipt of the notice.
It is well established that an 'authority holding an inquiry in good faith in exercise of the powers vested in it by a statute is not guilty of contempt of court, merely because a parallel inquiry is imminent or pending before a court To constitute the offence of contempt of court, there must be involved some 'act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority ' or 'something calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court (See Reg.
vs Gray(1) and Arthur Reginald Perera vs The King(2).
In Tukaram Gaokar vs S.N. Shukla(3), it was held by this Court that the initiation and continuance of proceedings for imposition of penalty on the appellant for his alleged complicity in the smuggling of gold under section 112(b) of the Sea did not amount to contempt of court though his trial in a criminal court for offences under section 135(b) of that Act and other similar offences was imminent 'and identical issues would arise in the proceedings before the customs authorities and in the trial before the criminal court.
In Rizwan ul Hasan vs The State of Uttar Pradesh(4) this Court stated: "As observed by Rankin, C.J. in Anantalal Singha vs Abred Henry Watson [(1931) at 895], the jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice and that the purpose of the court 's action is a practical purpose and it is reasonably dear on the authorities that the court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon a mere question of propriety." It follows therefore that even if the action of the appellants and respondent No. 1 in this case is assumed to be improper it will not justify the finding that they were guilty of contempt of court when their action was in no way calculated to obstruct the course of justice or to prejudice the trial of the Civil suit.
(1) [1900] 20.B. 36.
(2) (3) ; (4) ; ,588, 674 For these reasons we hold that this ,appeal should be allowed and the judgment of ' the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench dated August 14, 1964 should be set aside and the conviction and sentences imposed on the appellants should be quashed.
The arbitrator, respondent No. 3 has not flied an appeal but in view of our finding with regard to the appellants it is necessary that the conviction of respondent No. 3 and the sentence imposed upon him should also be quashed.
The fines, if already paid by respontdent No. 3 and the ,appellants should be refunded.

summary:
A hire purchase agreement was entered into between the appellants and respondent No. 1 Under that agreement a motor transport truck was made available to respondent No. 1 for doing transport business.
The agreement contained an arbitration clause for settlement of disputes When disputes arose reference was made to an arbitrator.
Respondent No. 3 a praetising lawyer was named as the arbitrator.
During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed a civil suit in which they claimed a declaration that the hire purchase agreement was brought about by fraud and was not binding on them on various grounds.
The suit was registered and the court ordered summons to be issued to the two appellants.
A notice was also issued by respondent No. 1 to the appellants and the arbitrator with a copy of the plaint.
When the arbitrator made an award after recording the evidence of the appellants respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application under section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act on the allegation on that the appellants and respondent No. 3 had committed contempt of court in proceeding with the arbitration reference in spite of the notice under section 35 of the Arbitration Act being given and in spite of the knowledge of the suit which was filed by respondents 1 and 2.
The application was contested by the appellants as well as the arbitrator.
The appellants contended that in obeying the orders of the arbitrator to produce evidence they did not commit any contempt.
Respondent No. 3 denied that he conducted the arbitration proceedings in order to defeat the object of the suit.
The High Court found the appellants and respondent No. 3 guilty of contempt of court on the view that their conduct had a tendency to bring into contempt the proceedings before the Civil Court.
In appeal to this Court by certificate, HELD: The High Court was in error in holding that in the circumstances of the case the appellants and respondent No. 3 were guilty of contempt of court.
Section 35 of the Arbitration Act does not expressly prohibit the arbitrator from continuing the hearing of the reference.
Its only effect is that "all further proceedings in a pending reference shall, unless a stay of proceedings is granted under section 34, be invalid".
For this consequence to follow, however.
two important and distinct conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) that such legal proceedings must be upon the whole and not merely part of the subject matter of the reference and (2) that a notice of such legal proceeding must be given to the arbitrator.
Even on the assumption that these conditions were satisfied the only effect is that the further proceedings before the arbitrator after the receipt of the notice are rendered invalid and there is no prohibition under section 35 requiring the arbitrator not to carry on the arbitration proceedings after the receipt of the notice.
[672 G 673 B] 669 It is well established that an authority holding an enquiry in good faith in exercise of the powers vested in it by a statute is not guilty of contempt of court, merely because a parallel enquiry is imminent or pending before a court.
To constitute the offence of contempt of court there must be involved some 'act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt or to lower his authority ' or 'something calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the court '.
[673 C] Reg.
vs Gray , Arthur Reginald Perera vs The King, , Tukaram Gaokar vs S.N. Shukla, ; and Rizwan ul Hasan vs State of Uttar Pradesh, ; , 588, applied.
It followed therefore that even if the action of the appellants and respondent No. 1 in the present case was assumed to be improper it would not justify the finding that they were guilty of contempt of court when their action was in no way calculated to obstruct the course of justice or to prejudice the trial of the civil suit.