judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3586 of 1988.
From the Judgments and Orders dated 18.8.1987 & 9.11.1987 of the Goa High Court in W.P. No. 92/1986 & Misc.
Civil Application No. 334 of 1987.
Dr. R.S. Kulkarni, S.K. Mehta, Aman Vachher and Atul Nanda for the Appellant.
K.N. Bhat and Mukul Mudgal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, CJ.
The appellant was appointed as a Headmaster of a school which was being run by the Calangute Don Bosco Educational & Welfare Foundation in 1974 in the State of Goa (which was at the relevant time a Union Terri tory).
Disciplinary proceedings were started against him in accordance with the Grant in aid Code which was in force at that time, since the school was a recipient of the grant as per the Code.
The findings .of, the Dispute Settlement Committee were approved by the director of Education of the Government of Goa by his Order dated July 12, 1984 who permitted the termination of the services of the appellant: The Principal of the Don Bosco High School, therefore, terminated the services of the appellant 254 as Headmaster by his letter dated July 26, 1984 and the said order of termination was challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, Goa in Writ Petition No. 92 of 1986.
The petition was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the Manage ment of the school, which was a private body.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.
The school in question was a private school and was a recipient of the grant in aid under the Grant in aid Code issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power.
The relevant rule of the Grantin aid Code, i.e., rule 74.2 on which the Management relied read thus: "74.2(1).
The services of an employee appoint ed to a permanent post shall not be terminated except in accordance with the procedure pre scribed hereinunder.
No order of termination, dismissal or imposition of any other penalty shall be passed against such employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which action is proposed to be taken and has been given an adequate opportunity to defend himself.
The grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken shall be re duced to a form of a specific charge/charges which shall be communicated to the employee together with statement of allegation on which each charge is based.
(iii) Management shall refer the case to the Director of Education in writing, stating the date of the effect of the intended termination with a copy endorsed to the em ployee concerned for his acknowledgement.
The letter endorsed to the employee shall enclose a copy of allegation with complete substanti ating evidence and other documents relevant to the case.
The letter be issued to the employee at least one calendar month prior to the date of effect of intended termination.
The issue of the letter shall be subject to rule 74.1(3).
(v) The Director shall refer the case to the Disputes Settlement Committee within seven days of the receipt of the letter in the Directorate of Education.
The Disputes Settlement Committee shall give a hearing to both the 255 parties and also consider the written state ments, if any, submitted by either or both the parties, and give its decision within fifteen days from the date of reference.
In case any party fails to present the case, the Disputes Settlement Committee shall take an ex parte decision.
(vi) The decision of the Dispute settlement Commit ' tee shall be final and binding on both the parties provided that it shall be open to either party to prefer an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal estab lished under the Goa, Daman and Diu Adminis trative Tribunal Act, 1965 within thirty days of the date of receipt of the decision of the Disputes Settlement Committee.
" Rule 74.2 provides that the service of an employee appointed to a permanent post shall not be terminated except in accordance with the procedure prescribed thereunder and no order of termination, dismissal or imposition of any other penalty shall be passed against such employee unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which action is proposed to be taken and has been given an ade quate opportunity to defend himself.
The grounds on which the action is proposed to be taken shall be reduced to a form of a specific charge/charges which shall be communicat ed to the employee together with statement of allegation on which each charge is based.
Then the Management is required to refer the case to the Director of Education in writing, stating the date of the effect of the intended termination with a copy endorsed to the employee concerned for his acknowledgement.
The letter endorsed to the employee shall enclose a copy of allegation with complete substantiating evidence and other documents relevant to the case.
The letter shall be issued to the employee at least one calendar month prior to the date of effect of intended termination.
The issue of the letter shall be subject to rule 74.1(3).
The Director is then required to refer the case to the Disputes Settlement Committee within seven days of the receipt of the letter in the Directorate of Education.
The Dispute Settlement Committee shall give a heating to both the parties and also consider the written statements, if any, submitted by either or both the parties, and give its decision within fifteen days from the date of reference.
In case any party fails to present the case, the Disputes Settlement Committee shall take an ex parte decision.
The decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee shall be final and binding on the parties.
The Dispute Settlement Committee acquires the jurisdiction to hear the case only on a refer ence made to it by the Director of Education.
The order passed in this case by the 256 Director of Education on July 12, 1984 reads thus: "No. DE/Acad.
I/BEZ.
Bo/40/DBHS/Term.
HM/Vol.
III/82 Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, Directorate of Education, Panaji Goa.
Dated: 12.7.1984.
Read: 1.
This office order No. DE/Acad I/BEZ Bo/40/ DBHS/PC15/Term.
HM/Vol.
III/82 3610, dt.
3.9.1982.
Letter No. 17 1 5 82 AE/1115 dt.
26.3.1983 from the Convenor of the Dispute Settlement Committee and Asstt.
Director of Education.
ORDER Whereas a Dispute Settlement Commit tee was constituted to enquire into the pro posed case for Termination of Services of Shri Francis John, the Headmaster of Don Bosco High School, Calangute, Bardez, Goa, vide order referred to above; And whereas the accused Shri F. John participated in the deliberations of the Dispute Settlement Committee along with his nominee for some time and thereafter remained absent from the deliberation of the Committee inspite of all reasonable opportunities given to him by the Convenor; And whereas the said Committee, in majority, has decided that the termination of services of the said Shri F. John, Headmaster of Don Bosco High School, Calangute, is justi fiable.
The undersigned is inclined to agree with the findings of the Dispute Settle ment Committee and it is hereby ordered that the finding of the majority report of the Committee is accepted and the Principal of the School is permit 257 ted to terminate the service of Shri F. John, as per Rule 74 (amended) of the Grant in aid Code and the vacancy so caused be filled up as per Rules.
The Principal is further directed to revoke the order of suspension forthwith under intimation to the undersigned.
Sd/ L. Khisngte Director of Education.
" It was on the basis of the approval given by the Direc tor of.
Education, as stated above, the services of the appellant were terminated.
From a reading of the relevant rule of the Grant in aid Code which is a part of the Public Law of the land it be comes obvious that the reference of the dispute between the Management of the school and the appellant to the Dispute Settlement Committee was made by the Director of Education in exercise of the powers confened on him by the Grant in aid Code, which is issued by the Government in exercise of its executive power, even though it may not have been done under a statute.
The Director of Education who is a public functionary has given his approval to the decision of the Dispute Settlement Committee before it was communicated to the School.
While granting his aproval to the decision the Director of Education is discharging a governmental function as an authority constituted for the said purpose by the Government.
It is obvious that the Management, in the cir cumstances could not have terminated the services of the appellant without the communication received by it from the Director of Education.
In such circumstances it cannot be said that the decision is that of a just private management governed by private law.
It is the part of the process of the public law which affects public exchequer.
When the matter came up before the High Court a prelimi nary objection was taken by the Management regarding the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The appellant contended in the Writ Petition that the proceedings of the disciplinary Committee are in contraven tion of the principle of natural justice and fair play and the approval given by the Director of Education was unsus tainable.
The appellant relied upon the decision of this Court in Tika Ram vs Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal & Ors., [1985] 1 SCR 339 and contended that he was not asking for any relief against the private body but he was challeng ing 258 the order of the Director of Education who had granted approval to his removal on the basis of a report submitted to him by the Dispute Settlement Committee and hence the Director of Education, who was a public authority and whose orders had been questioned before the Court was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court distinguished the above case by observing in Para 11 of its judgment thus: ".
Mr Kakodkar had placed reliance on Tika Ram vs Mundikota Shiksha Prasarak Mandal, AIR 1984 SC 1621 in support of his proposition that a writ petition would be maintanable in the case of a Headmaster of a private school who is dismissed by the management of a pri vate school.
In Tika Ram 's case, the petition er was not seeking any relief against the management on the basis of the clauses in the Schools Code.
But the Court has observed: 'In the instant case the appellant is seeking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. ' Obviously, no decision of an Officer of the Government is being challenged in the present case and hence, Tika Ram 's case is easily distinguishable.
" With great respect to the High Court we should say that we do not find any substantial difference at all between the facts of this case and the facts involved in the Tika Ram 's case (supra).
In Tika Ram 's case (supra) the facts were these.
The appellant in that case was also working as a Head master in a private school.
On account of certain earlier events the Management instituted a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and on July 7, 1975, the appellant was informed by the Management that it had imposed on him the punishment of reversion to the post of Assistant Teacher which according to the Management was the substantive post held by him.
Aggrieved by that order of reversion, the appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur Division, contending that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice and that he had never held the post of an Assistant Teacher to which he had been reverted.
After hearing both the parties, the Deputy Director of Education passed an order 259 dated October 3, 1975 setting aside the decision of the Management and remanding the case to the Management for fresh decision on the ground that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice.
Instead of filing an appeal against that order, the Management filed a review petition before the Deputy Direc tor himself on October 17, 1975.
That was rejected by the Deputy Director by his order dated November 11, 1975 on the ground that no such review could be filed before him.
Against that order the Management filed an appeal before the Director of Education and that was dismissed on May 12, 1976 affirming the order of remand passed by the Deputy Director of Education to reconsider the case.
The Management again filed a petition before the Director of Education to recon sider the case.
This petition for review was allowed by the Director of Education on November 26, 1976 and the order passed by the Deputy Director on October 3, 1975 remanding the case to the Management for a fresh decision was set aside.
Aggrieved by the said order dated November 26, 1976, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay on the principal ground that the Director had no jurisdiction to review his earlier order May 12, 1976 by which he had dismissed the appeal against the order of the Deputy Director.
The High Court dismissed that writ petition holding that the appellant could not file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order passed by the Director on the ground that the teachers working in private schools could not enforce their right under clause 77 and connected clauses of the School Code which were not statutory rules.
It was against that order the appellant in that case had filed the appeal before the SUpreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Allow ing the said appeal this Court observed thus: "In the writ petition the appellant was not seeking any relief directly against the man agement on the basis of the clauses in the School Code.
If the management does not obey the order passed by the Deputy Director or the Director, it is open to the State Government to take such action under the School Code as may be permissible.
In such an event, the recognition accorded to the school may be withdrawn or the grant in aid may be stopped.
In the instant case the appellant is seking a relief not against a private body but against an officer of Government who is always amena ble to the jurisdiction of the Court.
The appellant has merely sought the quashing of the impugned order dated November 26, 1976 passed by the Director on review setting aside the order of the Deputy Director.
What .
260 consequences follow from the quashing of the above said order in so far as the management is concerned is an entirely different issue.
In the circumstances, the High Court was wrong in holding that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution did not lie against the impugned order passed by the director.
We are aware of some of the decisions in which it is observed that no teacher could enforce.
a fight under the School Code which is non statutory m character against the management.
But since this petition is principally direct ed against the order passed in a quasijudicial proceeding by the Director, though in a case arising under the School Code and since the Director had assumed a jurisdiction to review his own orders not conferred on him, we hold that the appellant was entitled to maintain the petition under Article 226 of the Consti tution.
" In the instant case also we are concerned with the Grant in aid Code.
The decision which was challenged before the High Court was the order of the Director of Education dated July 12, 1984 which is fully extracted above.
It is further seen that a copy of the above order has been commu nicated by the Director of Education not merely to the Management of the School but also to the Zonal Officer, North Education Zone, Mapsa and the Grant in aid Section of the Directorate of Education.
If the impugned orders of the director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Commit tee to which he had referred the case are set aside then the order of termination of service of the appellant, which is pursuant to them would also have to fall.
Any private school which receives aid from the Government under the Grant inaid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the Management but also for the benefit of the employees in the School for whose salary and allowances the Government was contributing from the public funds under the Grant in aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and particularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumentality of the State is partici pating in the decision making process.
Under these circum stances we find that the High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the juris diction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu tion since the matter squarely falls within the principles laid down by this Court in Tika Ram 's case (supra).
261 We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that the writ petition was not maintainable before it.
Since the High Court has not gone into the merits of the case we remand the case to the High Court and direct it to hear the writ petition on merits in accordance with law.
The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there shall be no order as to costs.
R.N.J. Appeal al lowed.

summary:
Disciplinary proceedings were started against the appel lant who was a headmaster in a private school in accordance with the Rule 74.2 of the Grant in aid Code since the school was a recipient of grant as per the code.
The Director of Education approved the findings of the Dispute Settlement Committee and permitted the termination of the appellant by the Principal of the School.
The said order of termination was challenged by the appellant before the High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, in a Writ Petition.
The petition was dismissed by the High Court upholding the preliminary objec tion that the petition was not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the management of the School which was a private body.
Aggrieved by the deci sion of the High Court the appellant fried this appeal by special leave.
According to the relevant rule of the Grant in aid Code the management could not have terminated the services of the appellant without the communication received by it from the Director of Education who was a public functionary and was discharging a governmental function as an authority consti tuted for the said purpose by the government.
Obviously in such circumstances it cannot be said that the decision is just that of a private management governed by private law.
The High Court erred in not properly following the ratio of the decision of this Court in Tika Ram 's case the facts of which were not substantially different from the facts of the present case.
This Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court and remanding the case to the High Court to hear the Writ Petition on merits, 253 HELD: Any private school which receives aid from the government under the Grant in aid Code, which is promulgated not merely for the benefit of the management but also for the benefit of the employees in the school for whose salary and allowances the government was contributing from public funds under the Grant in aid Code cannot escape from the consequences flowing from the breach of the Code and partic ularly where the Director of Education who is an instrumen tality of the State is participating in the decision making process.
[260F G] The High Court was wrong in upholding that the orders of the Director of Education and of the Dispute Settlement Committee were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
[260G] Tika Ram vs Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal & Ors., [1985] 1 SCR 339, referred to.


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 1 147 of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.12.1973 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 4818 of 1973.
With Civil Appeal Nos.
1054 55 of 1976, 1503 and 1546 of 1977 T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, C. Sitaramiah, K. Madhava Reddy, Chella Sitaramani, K. Ram Kumar, Mrs. J. Ramachan dran, Mrs. Anjani, TVSN Chari, A.V. Rangam, Jagan Rao and A.V.V. Nair for the appearing parties.
316 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J.
This appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 48 18 of 1973 wherein the writ petition filed by the Appellant/Peti tioner was dismissed.
In the writ petition before the High Court the petition er sought mandamus directing the respondent to pay forthwith to the petitioner compensation for the lands surrendered by her under the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Hold ings Act 1961.
A further direction was sought prohibiting the third respondent from proceeding with the revision under section 19(1) of the Act as amended by Act No. I of 1972 w.e.f. 19.1.72.
Necessary facts are that the petitioner 's husband owned extensive lands in Gadwal.
After the Act came into force the Revenue Divisional Officer, Gadwal issued a notice under section 3(2) of the Act directing the petitioner 's husband to file a declaration of his holdings.
The petitioner 's husband accordingly filed the declaration.
Thereafter he died in 1969 leaving behind the petitioner and three minor children.
The Revenue Divisional Officer held an enquiry under section 6 of the Act and by his order dated 25.1.71 he held that the petitioner 's husband legal representatives were holding 29.72 family holdings in excess of the ceiling area which they were entitled to hold.
A notice was then issued to the petitioner under section 7(2) on 25 ! .71 requiring the petitioner to file a state ment indicating the land which she proposes to surrender.
The petitioner thereupon filed a detailed statement of lands she proposes to surrender on 19.3.71.
The Revenue Divisional Officer on being satisfied after an enquiry that the lands proposed to be surrendered satisfy the requirements of sec.
7(1) and (2) of the Act passed an order on 31.3.71 under section 7(3) of the Act approving the surrender of 7 13.16 acres (an equivalent of 29.72 family holdings) by the petitioner.
Thereafter the petitioner filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer for fixation of compensation in respect of lands surrendered by her under section 10 of the Act.
The Revenue Divisional Officer fixed the compensa tion of Rs.6,44,265.09 in respect of lands surrenderd by her.
317 The .Revenue Divisional Officer published a notification containing particulars of the lands surrendered by the petitioner and the compensation payable therefor in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 7.7.71 according to section 11 of the Act.
Instead of paying the compensation as determined, the District Revenue Officer Mahboobnagar issued a notice dated 21.3.72 proposing to revise the orders of the Revenue Divi sional Officer dated 15.4.71 fixing compensation of the lands surrendered by the petitioner.
This notice is purport ed to have been issued under section 19 clause 1 of the Act as amended.
The petitioner filed an objection contending that the 3rd respondent had no jurisdiction to revise the order fixing compensation which was passed before, as on the day the Divisional Officer issued notice the order sought to be revised had become final.
In spite of this the 3rd respond ent has not disposed of the revision proceedings and it because of this writ petition was filed before the High Court.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that once under section 7 the land which is in excess of the ceiling limit is determined and a statement of surrender is filed by a holder which is accepted by the Revenue Division al Officer under clause 3 of section 7, the land vests in the State and thereafter the authorities have no jurisdic tion to attempt to revise the compensation or any order which has already been passed under the Act.
Whereas on behalf of the State it was contended that clause 3 of section 7 uses the word "deemed to have been surrendered" which clearly indicates that although by an order passed by Revenue Divisional Officer the proposal made by the holder about the surrender of land is accepted and it is finalised but still it is only deemed surrender as even after this land does not vest in the State but it only vests as has been contemplated under section 8 which clearly lays down that the land which is deemed to have been surrendered under section 7 only vests in the State when it is taken over after payment of compensation in accordance with sec tion 8.
The High Court accepted the contention of the State and it took the view that unless taking over is completed under sec.
8 the land does not vest in the State and therefore it could not be said that the proceedings under this Act has come to an end and at this stage when the land has yet not vested in the State if the authorities have jurisdiction 318 to revise the compensation it could not be said that the authorities have done something beyond their jurisdiction.
The main argument before the High Court and before us on behalf of the appellant is that once under the scheme of the Act an order is passed by the competent authority under section 7 sub clause 3 so far as the holder is concerned he has surrendered the surplus land and what remains under the scheme of section 10 and 11 is only the question of deter mining of compensation and once that is determined there is no option to the authorities but to pay compensation to the person Who has surrendered the holding in accordance with the scheme of section 7 of the Act.
It is not in dispute that the proceedings were taken under Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 1961 and after the declaration was filed the ceiling area was determined in accordance with section 6.
It is also not in dispute that in accordance with section 7 sub clause 2 a notice was served on the petitioner/appellant for filing a statement indicating the land which she proposes to surren der and it is after the statement was filed by the appellant that an order in accordance with sub clause 3 of section 7 was passed.
Section 7 reads: "(1) If the extent of the holding of a person is not more than the ceiling area determined under section 6, he shall be entitled to retain such holding, but if it is more than the ceiling area, he shall be liable to sur render the extent of land in excess of the ceiling area.
(2) The Revenue Divisional Officer shall serve on every person who is liable to surrender land in excess of the ceiling area under sub section (1), a notice specifying therein the extent of land which he has to surrender, and requiring him to file a statement in such manner and within such period as may be pre scribed indicating therein the land which he proposes to surrender.
(3) If the person, on whom a notice is served under sub section (2), files the statement referred to in that subsection, within the prescribed period and Revenue Divisional Officer is satisfied, after making an inquiry in the prescribed manner, that the proposed surrender of the land is in accordance with the provisions of sub sections (1) and (2), he shall pass an order approving the surrender and the 319 said land shall thereupon be deemed to have been surrendered by such person.
(4) If the person, on whom a notice is served under subsection (2), does not file the state ment referred to in that sub section within the prescribed period, or filed such statement within the prescribed period, but does not specify therein the entire extent of land which he has to surrender, the Revenue Divi sional Officer may himself select, in the former case, the entire extent and in the latter case the balance of the extent which such person has to surrender, and pass an order to that effect; and thereupon the said land or the balance of land, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been surrendered by such person".
The scheme of this section indicates that when the extent of holding of a person is determined under section 6 and if while determining it under section 6 it is found that he is holding more than the ceiling area he shall be liable to surrender the extent of the land which is in excess of the ceiling area.
Sub clause 2 of this section contemplates that the Revenue Divisional Officer will serve a notice on all such persons who are liable to surrender the land in excess of the ceiling area and this notice will specify the extent of the land which he has to surrender and a direction that the person concerned will file a statement indicating the land which the holder proposes to surrender.
Sub clause 3 of the this section contemplates that after the notice under sub clause 2 is served and the person concerned files his statement within the prescribed period, the Revenue Divisional Officer if he is satisfied from the statement filed in response to a notice under clause 2 about the land which the holder proposes to surrender, he shall pass an order approving the surrender of the land.
Sub clause 4 contemplates a situation where after a notice is served under clause 2 the holder does not file a statement as contemplates under clause 3.
It is, therefore, clear that so far as the surplus land which a holder will surrender is concerned it is finally determined when an order under clause 3 of section 7 is passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but it is signifi cant that in spite of the finality of these proceedings the legislature uses the phrase "thereupon deemed to have been surrendered by such person".
It is significant that instead of using the 320 phrase "have been surrendered" the legislature uses the term "deemed to have been surrendered" and it is clear from these words that something more remains to be done.
Section 8 reads as under: (8) "Where any land is deemed to have been surrendered under section 7 by an owner, the Revenue Divisional Officer may, by order, take over such land on payment of compensation under section 10, and such land shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner by as signment to landless poor persons".
This provides for vesting 'of the land deemed to have been surrendered by the owner.
This terminology used in the heading of the section itself indicates that even after determination of the surplus land which is deemed to have been surrendered ' vesting only takes ' place when something more is done and that is what is provided in this section.
This section authorises the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land on payment of compensation, compensation which is determined u/s 10 and land which is deemed to have been surrendered u/s 7 and it is only after this taking over under section 8 'that under the scheme of this section the land vests in the State and thereafter it is provided that such land shall be disposed of in the prescribed manner by assignment to landless poor persons.
A perusal of the scheme of the section therefore clearly indicates that after an order is passed under sub clause 3 of sec.
7 although the proceedings for surrender of the surplus land and the selection of the land which is sought to be surrendered is complete but still it is not surrender but it is only deemed to have been surrendered which clearly indicates that so far as the holder is concerned he has finally got determined the lands which he will surrender as surplus which in due course will vest in the State for distribution to other landless persons but it is also clear from the language of section 8 and also from the language used in sub clause 3 of section 7 that unless the land which is deemed to have been surrendered is taken over by payment of compensation determined under section 10 it does not vest in the State.
The scheme of section 8 therefore indicates that vesting in the State that is taking over by the Revenue Divisional Officer and payment of compensation has to be simultaneous with and an order under section 8.
It, there fore, appears that after proceeding for determination of surplus under section 7 is completed, proceedings for deter mination of compensation will start as is provided in sec tion 10 and it is only when compensation is also finally determined that under section 8 321 taking over will take place after the compensation is paid.
It is, therefore, clear that after the proceedings have been completed in accordance with section 7 sub clause 3 and even after the compensation has been determined but action under section 8 has not been taken it could not be said that the land vests in the State.
The competent authorities can revise the orders passed if an amendment has taken place in between.
It is apparent that in spite of proceedings having come to an end under sub clause 3 of section 7 and that the compensation has been determined still the land remains with the holder who is enjoing the benefits out of the land until action under section 8 is completed.
Under these circumstances therefore the contention advanced by the appellant that when the proceedings are concluded under subclause 3 of section 7 the surrender is complete and the land vests in the State cannot be accepted as admittedly action under section 8 has not been taken.
On the basis of some orders which appear to have been passed under section 10 it was contended that taking over is complete but in these orders only language of section 10 is reproduced.
Section 10 reads as under: "Compensation for lands taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer: (1) The compensa tion payable for any land taken over by the Revenue Divisional Officer under section 8 or section 9 shall be an amount calculated at the rates specified in the Second Schedule.
Where there are any structures of a permanent nature or trees on such land the value of such struc tures or trees shall be determined by the Revenue Divisional Officer in the manner pre scribed and paid to the person who is entitled thereto.
(2) The compensation payable under sub section (1) shall be paid either in cash or in bonds, or partly in cash and partly in bonds as the Government may deem fit.
The bonds shall be issued on such terms and carry such rate of interest as may be prescribed." But admittedly no order could be produced under section 8.
It is clear that orders under section 8 can only be passed after compensation as determined under section 10 is paid.
322 Therefore no advantage could be taken from these orders under section 10.
It was also alleged on behalf of the State that against these orders under section 10, it were the appellants (some of them) who filed writ petitions in the High court challenging the compensation and thus question of determination of compensation itself remained pending.
Consequently, in our opinion, the High Court was right in rejecting the writ petitions filed by the appellants.
We therefore see no reason to entertain this appeal.
It is therefore dismissed.
No order as to costs.
For the reasons stated above, Civil Appeal Nos.
1054/76, 1055/ 76, 1503/77 and 1546/77 are allowed.
No order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Sub clause (2) of section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 mandates the Revenue Divi sional Officer to serve a notice on every person liable to surrender land in excess of the ceiling area requiring him to file a statement indicating the land which he proposes to surrender.
Sub clause (3) requires the Revenue Divisional Officer to pass orders on that statement approving the surrender, and the said land shall thereupon be deemed to have been surrendered.
Section 8 provides for the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over such land on payment of compensation under section 10.
Section 10 lays down the mode of compensation.
In the instant case, proceedings under section 7(3) of the Act in respect of appellant 's land having concluded the Revenue Divisional Officer had made an order under section 10 fixing the compensation.
The District Revenue Officer howev er instead of making the payment, issued a notice, purport ing to be under section 19(1), as amended, proposing to revise the said order.
The appellant filed a writ petition contending that when the proceedings are concluded under sub clause (3) of section 7 the surrender is complete and the land vests in the State, that what remains under the scheme of section 10 is only the question of determining compensation, and once that is determined the authorities have no jurisdiction to revise the compensation.
On behalf of the State it was contended that cl.
(3) of section 7 uses the words "deemed to have been surrendered" which indicates that although by an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer the proposal about the surrender of land is finalised but still it is only 315 deemed surrender, and that the land only vests in the State when it is taken over after payment of compensation in accordance with section 8.
The High Court took the view that unless taking over is completed under section 8 the land does not vest in the State and, therefore, it could not be said that the proceedings under the Act had come to an end and at this stage if the authorities have jurisdiction to revise the compensation it could not be said that the authorities have done something beyond their jurisdiction.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court, HELD: The scheme of section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1961 indicates that the sur plus land which a holder will surrender is finally deter mined when an order under cl.
(3) is passed.
However, in spite of the finality of these proceedings the legislature instead of using the phrase "have been surrendered" in the said clause uses the term "deemed to have been surrendered.
" It is clear from these words that something more remains to be done, and that is what is provided in section 8 by authorising the Revenue Divisional Officer to take over the land, which is deemed to have been surrendered, on payment of compensa tion determined under section 10.
It is only after this taking over that the land vests in the State.
[319G; 320A; 320C D] It is, therefore, apparent that orders under section 8 can only be passed after compensation as determined under section 10 is paid, and so far action under section 8 has not been taken it could not be said that the land vests in the State.
The competent authorities can revise the orders passed under section 10 if an amendment has taken place in between.
[321H; 321B] In the instant case, action under section 8 had not been taken.
The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the writ petitions.
[321H; 322B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 220 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.5.1986 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 19 15 of 1986.
Soli J. Sorabjee and Ranjit Kumar for the Appellants.
Sharma and S.K. Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.N. SAIKIA, J.
This appeal by special leave is from the Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated May 22, 1986 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 19 15 of 1986 quashig the bills issued by the appellants demanding minimum guaranteed charges from the respondents.
The appellants Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna, hereinafter referred to .as 'the Board ', entered into an agreement with the respondent M/s.
Green Rubber Industries, a partnership firm, hereinafter referred to as 'the firm ', on the latter 's application dated 26th July, 1978, for supplying the electricity of 60 KVA and on 13.4.
1981 gave electricity connection.
The firm later applied that it 277 may be given 45 KVA instead of 60 KVA and it deposited the requisite sum of Rs.2700 and a fresh agreement was executed on May 2, 1981.
On May 29, 1981 the firm was given fresh connection of 45KVA.
According to the firm it requested the Board on 19.6.
1981 to cut off the connection.
The firm received the bills for minimum guaranteed charges for the months of June, July, August and September, 1981, though according to it no electricity was consumed by it during that period.
According to the Board on failure to pay the bills, the supply was disconnected on 28th September, 1981.
The firm ultimately received a demand notice in October, 1981 for the minimum guaranteed charges from June, 1981 to August, 1981 amounting to Rs.22,95 1.50p.
The firm having not paid the amount, the Board sent a requisition to the Certificate Officer who sent a notice to the firm on July 6, 1984.
Rejecting the contention of the firm that it was not liable to pay, the Certificate Officer proceeded to pass an order for attachment of the firm 's property wherefore the firm filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Patna under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the bills as well as the certificate proceedings.
Before the High Court the Board contended that the firm was liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges in terms of the agreement, the disconnection itself having been in terms thereof.
The High Court took the view that the Board itself having effected the disconnection it was not entitled to any charges for the period after September, 1981 and it was not open to the Board to contend that under clause 9 of the agreement it was not open to either party to terminate the agreement of minimum guaranteed charges before the expiry of two years from the date of the agreement.
In that view of the matter, the High Court quashed the bills as well as the certificate proceedings, but allowed the charges for the months of July, August and September, 1981 to be adjusted against the security money.
Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the learned counsel for the appel lants, submits, inter alia, that the firm under the agree ment was liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges irre spective of whether energy was consumed or not during the period of the agreement and that disconnection of the supply on failure of the firm to pay the energy bills would not affect the obligation; and that the High Court fell into error in holding that the Board itself having disconnected the energy supply line it could not claim minimum guaranteed charges thereafter.
278 None appears for the respondents despite notice in the regular as well as substituted manner of service.
The question to be decided is whether despite the fact that the supply line was disconnected on September 28, 1981, the firm was still liable to pay the minimum guaranteed charges under the agreement.
The answer depends on the agreement itself and the relevant provi sions of law.
Clause 4 of the agreement says: "The Consumer shall pay to the Board for the energy so supplied and registered or taken to have been supplied as aforesaid at the appropriate rates applicable to the Con sumer according to the tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time, the present ly enforced tariffs being indicated in the Schedule to this agreement for easy reference.
Such reference is subject to provisions of clause 15 appearing here inafter.
Provided that notwithstanding any thing said above but subject to the provisions of clause 13 hereinafter, the Consumer shall have to pay minimum charges as specified in the above said tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time irrespective of whether energy to that extent has been con sumed or not.
(Such minimum charges are re ferred to as "the minimum guaranteed charges" in other places in this agreement.) That part of minimum guaranteed charges as is not billed monthly, the assess ment for the same will be generally made at the end of the year commencing from the 1st April, and ending with the 31st March of the following year which is the financial year of the Board.
In case any agreement is entered into in between this period the above said part of the minimum guaranteed charges will be proportionate to the period for which the Consumer is connected.
Any bill on account of the minimum guaranteed consumption for the year or part thereof will be submitted by the end of June in each year.
" From a perusal of the above clause it would be clear that the minimum guaranteed charges would be payable by the consumer irrespective of whether energy to that extent has been consumed or not.
Indeed, there would be no need for such a provision if the charges were to 279 depend only on the energy actually consumed.
Clause 5 of the agreement is to the following effect: "(a) Readings of meter shall be taken by the Board once in each month or such other inter vals or times as the Board shall deem expedi ent and the Board 's meter reader shall have access to the consumer 's premises at all reasonable time for the purpose of taking such readings.
The Board shall within reasonable time deliver to the Consumer the bill for energy consumed during the month in accordance with the readings of the meters and subject to the minimum guaranteed charges.
The consumer shall pay the amount under the bill so deliv ered within the due date specified therein as per terms of the tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time.
(b) If the consumer fails to pay the amount of any bill due under this agreement within the due date specified in the bill referred to in clause 5(a) above, he shall pay a surcharge at the rate given in the tariffs framed by the Board and enforced from time to time.
If the amount of such a bill remains unpaid after the due date specified in the bill, the Board may discontinue the supply after giving the Con sumer not less than 7 clear days ' notice.
The service will be reconnected only on receipt of full payment for all obligations outstanding up to the date of reconnection and charges for the work of disconnection and reconnection of service. ' ' On a perusal of this clause there arises no doubt that if the amount of a bill submitted according to law remains unpaid after the due date specified in the bill, the Board may discontinue the supply after giving the consumer not less than 7 clear days ' notice.
There is no dispute about notice in this case.
Clauses 8 and 9 of the agreement deal with its duration and termination.
Clause 8 of the agreement says: "The agreement shall be ordinarily enforced for a period of not less than two years in the first instance (except in exceptional cases in which written consent of the Board will 280 be taken) from the date of commencement of supply, i.e. . . and thereafter shall continue from year to year until the agreement is determined as hereinafter provided.
Note: In case where the date of commence ment of supply is a date subsequent to that of the execution of this agreement, the Board is given power to fill in the date in the blank space.
provided for the same in this clause with prior intimation to the Consumer.
The Consumer can produce his copy of the agreement to have such date filled in by the Board.
" Clause 9 Provides: "(a) The consumers shall not be at liberty to determine this agreement before the expiration of two years from the date of commencement of supply of energy.
The consumer may determine this agreement with effect from any date after the said period of giving to the Board not less than one calendar month 's previous notice in writing in that behalf and upon the expira tion of the period of such notice this agree ment shall cease and determine without preju dice to any right which may then have accrued to the Board hereunder, provided always that the consumer may at any time with the previous consent of the Board transfer or assign this agreement to any other person and upon sub scription of such transfer this agreement shall be binding on the transferee and the Board and take effect in all respects as if the transferee had originally been a party hereto in place of the consumer who shall henceforth be discharged from all liability under or in respect thereof.
(b) In case the consumer 's supply is discon nected by the Board in exercise of its powers under this agreement and/ or law and consumer does not apply for reconnection in accordance with law within the remainder period of the above given compulsorily availing of supply or that of notice whichever be longer, he will be deemed to have given a notice on the date of disconnection in terms of the aforesaid clause 9(a) for the determination of the agreement and on expiry of the above said remainder period of compulsorily availing of supply or notice whichever is longer, this agreement shall cease and determine in the same way as above.
" 281 Thus it is seen that the consumer cannot determine the agreement before expiry of two years and there is nothing to show in this case that he did so after expiry thereof with previous notice.
In fact the supply was disconnected by the Board for default.
What would be its effect on the agree ment? It is seen that in case of disconnection of the supply by the Board in exercise of its powers under the agreement it would be open for the consumer to apply for reconnection in accordance with the law within the remainder period of the above given compulsorily availing of supply or that of notice whichever is longer, he will be deemed to have given a notice on the date of disconnection in terms of aforesaid clause 9(a) for determination of the agreement and on expiry of the remainder period of compulsorily availing of supply or notice, whichever is longer, the agreement shall cease and determine.
It is therefore clear that in the instant case the disconnection on the default of the cosumer having ' been effected on 28.9.1981 and the consumer having not applied for reconnection, it would be deemed to have given a notice on the date of disconnection in terms of clause 9(a) for the determination of the agreement and the agreement must be taken to have ceased and determined either at the end of the notice or at the end of the period of compulsori ly availing of supply i.e. two years of the agreement which ever was longer.
The (fresh) agreement having been executed on May 4, 1981 it would expire on May 1, 1983.
The discon nection having been effected on September 28, 1981 the period of deemed notice of seven days expired before the period of compulsorily availing of supply under the agree ment expired and hence the agreement must be deemed to have determined only on May 1, 1983.
During this period the consumer 's liability to pay the minimum guaranteed charges must be held to have continued.
Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee submits, and we think rightly, that the High Court overlooked this important stipulation in the agreement which was binding on both the parties.
However, as the respondents are not before us, it is necessary to con sider the reasonability of the stipulation as to minimum guaranteed charges as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant Board.
Was there any power of the Board to enter into the agreement? If so, to what extent? The , hereinafter called 'the Act '.
provides the law relating to the supply and use of electrical energy.
As defined in section 2(11) of the Act "State Electricity Board" in relation to any State means the State Electricity Board, if any consituted for the 282 State under section 5 of the (54 of 1948) and includes any Board which functions in that State under sections 6 and 7 of the said Act.
The appellant the Bihar State Electricity Board is a Board.
As defined in section 2(h) "licensee" means any person licensed under to supply energy.
The appellant Board is such a licensee under this provision.
As defined in section 2(c) "consumer" means any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee or the Government or by any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, and in cludes any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of a licensee, the Government or such other person, as the case may be.
There is no doubt that the respondent was consumer.
The , hereinafter called the 'Supply Act ', is an Act to provide for the realisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development and for all matters incidental thereto.
Under sub section (1) of section 23 of the Act, a licen see shall not, in making any agreement for the supply of energy, show any undue preference to any person.
Thus, this section envisages making of an agreement by the licensee with the consumer for the supply of energy.
The instant agreement has, therefore, to be held as one envisaged by this provision.
Was the stipulation to pay minimum guaran teed charges, irrespective of whether energy was consumed or not, reasonable and valid? What is the consideration when less or no energy is consumed? Section 49 of the Supply Act makes provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees.
Under subsection (1), subject to the provisions of the Supply Act and the Regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purpose of such supply frame uniform tariff.
Under sub section (2) thereof nothing m sub sections (1) and (2) shall derogate from the power of the Board if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographi cal position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.
Sub section (2) enumerates the factors to be consi derd by the Board in fixing the uniform tariffs.
283 It is seen that the rule of charging minimum guaranteed charges has been in vogue since long.
In the London Electric Supply Corporation (Limited) vs Priddis, , the agreement between the appellant company and the consumer to supply electricity in clause 4 provided that the "consumer shall have the option at or after the expiration of five years from the date of installation" of purchasing the installation at a price.
7 said: "The consumer shall until purchase as aforesaid pay quarterly to the supply company for the use of the installation 3/4d.
per Board of Trade Unit for every unit of electrical energy supplied to the said premises and the minimum payment in any year shall be Is.
for each eight candle power lamp or its equivalent installed.
" During the period from Mid summer to Michaelmas, 1900, the defendant did not use any electricity supplied by the plaintiff, and the question was whether under the agree ment the defendant was bound to pay the minimum payment provided for by cl. 7, even though in fact he had used none of the plaintiff 's electricity during the quarter.
The Lord Chief Justice in giving judgment said that "it was suffi ciently clear that the installation was put in on the terms that the customer should have the right to purchase the installation after five years, and during that five years the customer should be liable to pay minimum rent whether the current was de facto used or not.
The minimum rent had no reference to the amount of current used, and it was, therefore, clear that the mere fact that the defendant had not taken any current or a small current did not affect the case.
" Channel.
J. concurring said that the "meaning of the clause was that the minimum rent did not merely cover the actual use but the right to use the current.
The customer had to pay for the right to use the current, although he did not in fact use it." In Saila Bala vs Darjeeling Municipality, AIR 1936 Calcutta 265, it was held by a learned single Judge that the minimum charge was not really a charge which had for its basis the consumption of electric energy.
It was really based on the principle that every consumer 's installation involved the licensee in certain amount of capital expendi ture in plant and mains on which he was to have a reasonable return.
He could get a return when the energy was actually consumed, in the shape of payments of energy consumed.
When no such energy was consumed by the consumer, or a very small amount was consumed in a longer period, the licensee was allowed to charge minimum charges by his licence, but those minimum charges were really interest on his capital outlay incurred for the particular consumer.
Natesan, J. in Natesa Chettiar vs The Madras State Electric ity 284 Board, , answering the question whether the provision for the minimum guarantee was just a stipulation by way of penalty or pre determined damages for breach on the part of the consumer or something else, held the view that the minimum fixed was only consideration for keeping the energy available to the consumer at his end; it was not a penalty for not consuming a stated quantity of energy but was a concession shown up to the amount fixed, energy at a specified rates could be consumed free, consump tion beyond only had to be paid for.
The statutory basis for the terms in the agreement providing for minimum annual charge was found in section 22 of the Act and section 48 of the Supply Act.
Section 22 deals with obligation on licensee to supply energy.
The proviso to the section says: "No person shall be entitled to demand, or to continue to receive, from a licensee a supply of energy for any premises having a separate supply unless he has agreed with the licensee to pay to him such minimum annual sum as will give him a reasonable return on the capital expenditure, and will cover other standing charges incurred by him in order to meet the possible maximum demand for those premises, the sum payable to be determined in case of difference or dispute by arbitration." Section 48 of the Supply Act empowers the licensee to carry out arrangement under that Act.
In Watkins Mayor & Co. vs Jullundhur Electric Supply Co., AIR 1955 Punj. 133 (136), it was observed that the whole scheme of the Act seems to show that the provision made in any contract for a minimum charge was really to provide for a fair return on the outlay of the licensee, and it was for this reason that the law allowed the contract of this kind to be entered into.
Clause XI A of the schedule to the Act, as it then stood, provided: "A licensee may charge a consumer a minimum charge for energy of such amount and determine in such manner as may be specified by his licence, and such minimum charge shall be payable notwithstanding that no energy has been used by the consumer during the period for which such minimum charge is made." The Court accordingly held that there was nothing illegal in the insertion of the term for payment of a minimum charge in the agreement for 285 supply of energy and held that it had not been made out that it was an unreasonable levy.
A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in Hari Shan kar & Ors.
vs U.P. State Electricity Board & Anr., AIR 1974 Allahabad 70, held that when the electrical supply was being made on the footing that the consumer would pay the minimum guaranteed charges that charge was one of the terms and conditions for supply and fixation of that would be included in the fixation rates ;or the supply of electricity.
Simi larly in M/s. Bhagwan Industries Pvt.
Ltd. Lucknow vs U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow, AIR 1979 Allahabad 249, a Division Bench held that an agreement for supply of elec tricity with the Board empowered it to revise the rates and that imposition of minimum consumption guarantee charge imposed by new tariff schedule under section 49 of the Supply Act was valid.
A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Md. Abdul,Gaffar vs Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, , also held that fixation of monthly minimum charges based on connected load and revisional rates for electrical consumption by non domestic consumers in accordance with the factors in section 49(2) was neither ultra vires nor arbitrary.
The High Court in the case at hand relied on Rajeshwar Singh vs State of Bihar, AIR 1983 Patna 194, wherein it was held that when the disconnection of electric energy was effected by the Board then it could not ask for the minimum guaranteed charges.
That decision must be confined to the facts of that case only.
It is true that the agreement is in a standard form of contract.
The standard clauses of this contract have been settled over the years and have been widely adopted because experience shows that they facilitate the supply of electric energy.
Lord Diplock has observed: "If fairness or reasona bleness were relevant to their enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose bargaining power is fairly matched would raise a strong presumption that their terms are fair and reasonable." Schroder Music Co. Ltd. vs Macaulay, 16 (624).
In such contracts a standard form enables the supplier to say: "If you want these goods or services at all, these are the only terms on which they are available.
Take it or leave it.
" It is a type of contract on which the conditions are fixed by one of the parties in advance and are open to acceptance by anyone.
The contract, which frequently contains many conditions is presented for acceptance and is not open to discussion.
It is settled law that a person who signs a 286 document which contains contractual terms is normally bound by them even though he has not read them, even though he is ignorant of the precise legal effect.
In view of clause 4 having formed one of the stipulations in the contract along with others it cannot be said to be nudurn pactum and the maxim nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio does not apply.
Considered by the test of reasonableness it cannot be said to be unreasonable inasmuch as the supply of electricity to a consumer involves incurring of overhead installation expenses by the Board which do not vary with the quantity of electricity consumed and the installation has to be contin ued irrespective of whether the energy is consumed or not until the agreement comes to an end.
Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and the whole of its terms and accordingly the whole context must be considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an isolated clause.
This agreement with the stipulation of minimum guaranteed charges cannot be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it is incompatible with the statu tory duty.
Differences between this contractual element and the statutory duty have to be observed.
A supply agreement to a consumer makes his relation with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be statu tory rather than contractual.
In cases where such agreements are made the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless specifically assigned, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made, as was held in Northern Ontario Power Co. Ltd. vs La Roche Mines Ltd., For the foregoing reasons we have no hesitation in holding that the agreement was reasonable and valid and it was not determined with the disconnection of supply to the respondent firm by the Board on 28th September, 1981 but only accordingly to the stipulations in clause 9(b) of the agreement as discussed above.
The liability to pay the minimum guaranteed charges, therefore, continued till the determination of the contract.
The Board was, therefore, entitled to submit the bills and make the demand on that account, and recover the same according to law.
In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
No order as to costs.
Y. Lal Appeal al lowed.

summary:
The Respondent firm made an application to the appel lantElectricity Board for the supply of 60 KVA electricity and the Board entered into an agreement with the Respondent firm in that behalf and gave electricity connec tion on 13.4.1981.
Thereafter the Respondent firm applied for reduction of electricity from 60 KVA to 45 KVA and a fresh agreement was executed on May 2, 1981 and fresh con nection of 45 KVA was given on 29.5.1981.
It is respondent 's case that it had requested the Electricity Board on 19.6.1981 to cut off the Electricity.
The firm received Bills for minimum guaranteed charges for four months i.e. from June to September 1981.
The firm refuted its liability to pay the bill on the ground that it consumed no electrici ty during the aforesaid period of 4 months.
Consequent upon the firm 's failure to pay the Bill, the Board disconnected the electricity connection on 28.9.1981.
The firm ultimately received a bill for Rs.22,951.50p for the period commencing from June to August 1981.
On the firm 's failure to pay the Bill, the Board sent a requisition to the Certificate Offi cer who sent a notice to the firm on 6.7.1981.
The Certifi cate Officer rejected the plea of the firm that it was not liable to pay the Bill and proceeded to attach the property of the firm.
Being dissatisfied with the action, the re spondent firm filed a Writ Petition in the High Court for quashing the bills as also the certificate proceedings.
The High Court took the view that the Board itself having disconnected the connection, it was not entitled to any charges for the period after September 1981 and it was not open to the Board to contend that under clause 9 of the agreement it was not open to either party to terminate the agreement of minimum guaranteed charges before the expiry of two years from the date of the agreement.
The High Court accordingly quashed, the bills as well as the certificate proceedings but allowed the charges for July, August and September 1981 to be adjusted against the security money.
276 The Electricity Board has therefore filed this appeal after obtaining Special Leave.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: A supply.agreement to a consumer makes his rela tion with the Board mainly contractual, where the basis of supply is held to be statutory rather than contractual.
In cases where such agreements are made, the terms are supposed to have been negotiated between the consumer and the Board, and unless specifically assigned, the agreement normally would have affected the consumer with whom it is made.
[286D E] The agreement was reasonable and valid and it was not determined with the disconnection of supply to the respond ent firm.
The liability to pay the minimum guaranteed charges, therefore, continued till the determination of the contract.
The Board was therefore entitled to submit the bills and make the demand on that account and recover the same according to law.
[285F G]


judgement:
tion (Civil) No. 1695 of 1987 Etc.
(Under Article , ' 23 of the Consitution of India).
Govind Mukhotey, J.D. Jain and B.B. Sinha for the Petition ers.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Mahabir Singh, K.B. Rohtagi and Sha shank Shekhar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OJHA, J.
The petitioners in these writ petitions are licenced dealers having factories and manufacturing units at Panipat in the State of Haryana and consume sheep hair for manufacturing woollen fabrics and blankets.
In order to carry on their trade they purchase sheep hair to get yarn manufactured out of it for being used in its turn for manu facturing woollen fabrics and blankets.
The only question urged in these writ petitions is as to whether sheep hair was an agricultural produce within the meaning of the said 295 term as defined under Section 2(a) of the Punjab Agricultur al Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) so as to attract the provisions of the said Act to it.
The term "agricultural produce" according to its definition contained under Section 2(a) of the Act means all produce, whether processed or not, of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry or forest as specified in the Schedule to the Act.
On its plain meaning, therefore, only such produce as is specified in the Schedule to the Act shall fall within the term "agricultural produce".
Section 38 of the Act confers power on the State Government, by notification, to add to the Schedule any other item of agricultural produce or amend or omit any item of such produce specified therein.
The relevant items in the Schedule on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners in sup port of the contention that sheep hair was not an agricul tural produce are items 41.
Wool (Oon), 75.
Goat hair and 76.
Camel hair.
It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that even though Goat hair and Camel hair have been included in the Schedule, Sheep hair had not been so included and consequently sheep hair was not an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act and the insistence of the authorities that the petitioners should obtain a licence and pay market fee with regard to their transaction in respect of sheephair was unjustified.
With regard to item No. 4 l namely Wool (Oon), it was urged firstly that wool is the manufactured item of sheep hair and not sheep hair itself and secondly the word 'wool ' according to its dictionary meaning is the soft undercoat of various animals including sheep.
Reference in this behalf has been made to the Dic tionary of Scientific and Technical Terms M.C. Graw Hill.
According to it wool is a textile fibre made from raw wool characterised by absorbency, resiliency and insulation.
It further states that wool is the soft undercoat of various animals such as sheep, angora, goat, camel, alpaca, llamma and vicuna.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are not inclined to agree with the submission made by learned coun sel for the petitioners.
Before dealing with the matter further it would be useful to notice at this place that item No. 41 of the Schedule after the word 'wool ' uses the word '0on ' also within brackets which indicates as to what was really intended by the use of the word 'Wool '.
Indeed, in the Hindi version of the Act, item No. 41 of the Schedule uses the word '0on ' only and does not at all use the word 'wool '.
Now to the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, the first submission made by him that the word 'wool ' contemplated manufactured item of 296 sheep hair and not sheep hair itself, it believed even by the dictionary meaning of the said word relied on by him.
Firstly, the raw material out of which a textile fibre is made is also described as raw wool.
Secondly, not only the textile fibre but also the soft undercoat of various animals including sheep has itself been described as wool.
It is, therefore, apparent that not only the textile fibre made out of raw wool but even the soft undercoat of the various animals including sheep, according to the dictionary afore said, would be wool.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, under the heading wool in vol.
23, states: "Animal fibres are usually spoken of as hair, with the exception of the coat of the sheep which is usually termed wool".
A perusal of what has been stated under the heading wool therein would indicate that wool has almost invariably been used in the context of sheep hair.
In Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. vs Union of India, [1985] 3 SCC page 284 after referring to several earlier decisions of this Court it was held that in determining the meaning or connotation of words and expressions describing an article in a tariff schedule those words and expressions should be construed in the sense in which they are under stood in the trade by the dealer and the customer when goods are marketable.
The same rule of interpretation was reiter ated in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs Krishna Carbon Paper Co., [1989] 1 SCC page 150.
It was held: "It is well settled, as mentioned before, that where no definition is provided in the statute itself, as in this case for ascertaining the correct meaning of a fiscal entry reference to a dictionary is not always safe.
The correct guide, it appears in such a case, is the context and the trade meaning XXXXX The trade meaning is one which is prevalent in that particular trade where the goods is known or traded.
If special type of goods is subject matter of a fiscal entry then that entry must be understood in the context of that particu lar trade, bearing in mind that particular word xxxxx It is a well settled principle of construc tion, as mentioned before, that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common par lance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clear ly expressed by the legislature.
This princi 297 ple is well settled by a long line of deci sions of Canadian, American, Australian and Indian cases.
Pollock, J. pointed out in Grenfell vs I.R.C., 248 that if a statute contains language which is capable of being construed in a popular sense, such a statute is not to be construed accord ing to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be con strud in its popular sense, meaning of course, by the words "popular sense" that which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it.
The ordinary words in every day use are, therefore, to be construed according to their popular sense.
The same view was reiterated by Story, J. in 200 Chests of Tea (1824) 9 Whea ton US 435,438 where he observed that the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists.
" In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of interpretation would apply even to the interpretation of the items of the Schedule to the Act keeping in view the nature and purpose of the enactment.
Interpreting item No. 41 Wool(Oon) of the Schedule in this light there seems to be no mannner of doubt that the word 'wool ' has been used therein only in the sense in which the word '0on ' is understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer in the popular sense namely that which people conversant with the word '0on ' would attribute to it.
If anyone goes to the market to purchase wool (0on) he would be offered only sheep hair and not goat hair or camel hair or for the matter of that the hair of any other animal.
Indeed, there is intrinsic evidence in the Schedule itself of the fact that in the English version the word 'Wool (0on) ' and in the Hindi version '0on ' only at item No. 41 has been used in the same popular sense namely that of sheep hair.
This intention is apparent from the circum stances that care has been taken to specifically include goat hair and camel hair at items 75 and 76 of the Schedule.
Had Wool (0on) been used at item No. 41 in the comprehensive sense as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petition ers it would have automatically included Goat hair and Camel hair also and the specific inclusion of Goat hair and Camel hair at items 75 and 76 would have been wholly unnec essary.
Consequently, their specific inclusion at items 75 and 76 is a clear indication of the awareness of the fact that the trade meaning of the word 'Wool (0on) ' which is prevalent in the popular sense would be sheep hair alone and as such unless goat hair and camel hair are included as specific items in the Schedule they will not be treated as agricultural produce.
The word 298 'Woo1 (0on) ' has obviously been used at item No. 41 of the Schedule in the aforesaid popular sense and not in the sense used in scientific and technical terminology which the traders and the consumers are not normally supposed to know.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are clearly of the opinion that sheep hair falls under the item No. 41 of the Schedule namely "Wool (0on)" as contained in the English version and "0on" only as contained in the Hindi version of the Act.
Sheep hair is consequently an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act so that the various provisions therein with regard to agricultural produce are applicable to sheep hair also.
In the result, we find no merit in these writ petitions.
They are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
G.N. Petitions dis missed.

summary:
These writ petitions were filed by licencesed dealers who manufacture woollen fabrics and blankets.
They purchase sheep hair and make them yarn for use in manufacturing the above items.
The challenge is against the insistence of the State Govt.
to treat sheep hair as agricultural produce under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 and requiring the petitioners to obtain licence and pay market fee for transactions in sheep hair.
It has been contended by the petitioners that even though goat hair and camel hair are included in the sched ule, sheep hair is not included and hence sheep hair is not agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act.
As regards item No. 41, Wool (0on) appearing in the schedule, it was contended that wool is a manufactured item of sheep hair and not sheep hair itself and the word "wool" according to its dictionary meaning is the soft undercoat of various animals including sheep.
Dismissing the writ petitions, this Court, HELD: 1.1 Item No. 41 of the schedule after the word "wool" uses the word "0on" also within brackets which indi cates as to what was really intended by the us of the word "wool".
Indeed, in the Hindi version of the Act item No. 41 of the schedule uses the word ' '0on" only and does not at all use the word "wool".
The raw material out of which a textile fibre is made is also described as raw wool.
Not only the textile fibre but also the soft under coat of various animals including sheep has itself been described as wool.
Wool has almost invariably been used in the context of sheep hair.
[295G; 296A] 294 1.2 Interpreting item No. 41 Wool (0on) of the schedule in the light of the above, there seems to be no manner of doubt that the word "wool" has been used therein only in the sense in which the word "0on" is understood in the trade by the dealer and the consumer in the popular sense namely that which people conversant with the word '0on ' would attribute to it.
This intention is apparent from the circumstance that care has been taken to specifically include goat hair and camel hair at items 75 and 76 of the schedule.
Had wool (0on) been used at item No. 41 in the comprehensive sense, it would have automatically included goat hair and camel hair and the specific inclusion of Goat hair and Camel hair at item No. 75 and 76 would have been wholly unnecessary.
Thus the word 'Wool (0on) ' has obviously been used in the popular sense and not in the sense used in scientific and technical terminology which the traders and the consumers are not normally supposed to know.
[297D H; 298A] Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. vs Union of India, ; and Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur vs Krishna Carbon Paper Co., ; , relied on.
Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol. 23, relied on.


judgement:
it Petition No. 1119 of 1986 etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
G. Ramaswamy, A.S.G., N.C. Sikri, N.S. Das Bahl, B.D. Sharma, Ms. Madhu Sikri, B.W. Vaidya, R.B. Misra, Ms. A. Subhashini (not present) and Dalveer Bhandari for the ap pearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
The first of these applications under article 32 of the Constitution is on behalf of the Delhi Reserve Trained Pool Telephone Operators (RTPTOs) asking for a direction to the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited to treat all the telephone operators at par after their absorp tion as regular employees.
Three letters addressed to the learned Chief Justice of this Court have been treated as writ petitions and are the remaining one under article 32 of the Constitution.
The first one (1276/86) is by the Reserve Trained Pool Telephone Operators of Bombay.
They claim the self same relief as asked for in the earlier case; the second one (1623/86) is on behalf of the Reserve Trained Pool Operators in the Department of Posts and they have .claimed relief of being placed at par with regular, permanent or temporary employees in the matter of service conditions.
The third one (1624/86) is on behalf of substi tute employees and casual labourers in the Department of Posts.
They have claimed that substitute employees and casual labourers be paid the same emoluments as regular employees.
331 In an earlier Writ Petition No. 11764 of 1985 filed by the All India Telegraph Engineering Employees Union Class III of Bombay Telephone where the prayer for treating the Reserve Trained Pool Telephone Operators at par with regular staff had also been asked for, this Court made the following order on 1.5.
1986: "The matter is adjourned to 28.7.
1986 to enable the newlyadded respondent No. 3 to file counter affidavit on or before 15.7.
Rejoinder, if any, will be filed within one week thereafter.
Meanwhile, the respondent will pay to the operators drawn from the Reserve Trained Pool of the Telephone Opera tors from Bombay and Delhi Telephones Rs.4.90 per hour provided that the total salary of the Telephone Operators from the Reserve Trained Pool shall not exceed the salary of regularly appointed Telephone Operators.
" On 23.7.
1986, this Court in that Writ Petition further ordered: "The order passed by the Court on 1.5.
1986 shall be final.
The wages shall be paid in accordance with the terms contained in that order.
We, however, make it clear that if the Dearness Allowance and other allowances are varied hereafter the workers concerned shall get D.A. and other allowances accordingly subject to the limit that the total emoluments would not exceed the salary of regularly appointed Telephone Operators.
If the peti tioners have any other grievance they are at liberty to agitate.
This order will apply to all RTPA employees who 'are similarly situated.
" It is the stand of the respondents that that order of this Court has been implemented with effect from 28.7.
After that was done, the RTPTOs of Bombay and Delhi have in their respective Writ Petitions applied for further reliefs as already indicated.
According to the petitioners in these two Writ Petitions, the RTPTOs are entitled to be brought on par with the regular staff for grant of other service bene fits as they have been performing the same duties as per formed by regular operators.
The two petitions have been opposed by the relevant Ministry by filing counter affidavits where the stand taken is that RTPTOs are a special class by themselves with their own incidents of service and they cannot be treated at par with regular employees.
The differences between the two services have been highlighted in the counter affidavits.
332 It is also the stand of the respondents that the order of this Court referred to above dated 28.7.1986 finally dis posed of the major claim raised in the two petitions of the employees of the two Telephone Nigams and fresh action was not appropriate.
It is also pointed out that on 10th of February, 1986, there was an agreement of settlement and the present petition was an attempt to reopen the matter.
On 31.1.
1989, when Writ Petition No. 1276 of 1986 came up for hearing before this Court, the following order was made: "Learned counsel for the petitioners concedes that the regularisation of 21,000 employees in the Department of Telecommunications has been effected but complains that no such proceeding has taken place in respect of the postal employees.
He states that there is pressing need for a parity of service conditions in cluding pay, house rent allowance and other allowances between the temporary employees and the regular employees covered by this catego ry.
The learned Additional Solicitor General of India assures us that the scheme will be finalised latest by first week of April, 1989 and that complete position will be placed before the Court at that stage . " The scheme known as Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status in Regularisation) Scheme has been formulated and put into operation from 1.10. 1989 and a copy thereof has been placed for our consideration.
We find that the scheme is comprehensive and apart from provision for conferment of temporary status, it also specifies the benefits available on conferment of such status.
Counsel for the respondent Nigams have told us that the scheme will be given full effect and other benefits contemplated by the scheme shall be worked out.
In these circumstances, no further specific direction is necessary in the two applications relating to the two Nigams of Bombay and Delhi except calling upon the respondents to implement every term of the scheme at an early date.
The two remaining writ petitions relate to the Depart ment of Posts.
Though an assurance had been held out by the learned Additional Solicitor General that a separate scheme for the postal employees would be prepared and placed before the Court within a time frame, that has not been done.
At the hearing, a note containing tentative proposals and a statement as to what has been done by way of improving the conditions of service have, however, been placed before the Court.
The statement relating to improvements brought about 333 indicates that after April, 1986, about seven thousand RTPs have been absorbed.
Since the RTP category is no more ex panding, only about 2,900 of them remain to be absorbed.
We have been told by learned counsel for the Department that equal number of justified and supernumerary posts are being created and the Ministry 's proposal is in the hands of the Ministry of Finance for approval and is expected to be finalised soon.
This has to be done within a time frame.
and we direct the posts of both the categories to be created by the end of January, 1990, and the process of absorption to be completed by 31.3.
With such absorption made, the RTPs will become regular employees.
All their claims would, thereafter, be regulated on the basis of entitlement in accordance with extant rules.
So far as the claim of earned leave is concerned, we find that Telecommunications Regularisation Rules provide for leave entitlement on pro rate basis one day for every ten days of work.
The same benefit would be admissible to the employees of the Department of Posts as we find no reason to adopt a different basis.
In National Federation of P & T Employees & Anr.
vs Union of India & Anr.
, , this Court direct ed: "The Union of India and other respondents are directed to pay wages to the workmen who are employed as casual labourers belonging to the several categories of employees in the Posts and Telegraphs Department at the rates equiva lent to the minimum pay in the pay scales of the regularly employed workers in the corre sponding cadres but without any increments with effect from February 5, 1986 on which date the first of the above two petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 302 of 1986 was filed.
The petitioners are entitled to corre sponding dearness allowance and additional dearness allowance, if any, payable thereon.
Whatever other benefits which are now being enjoyed by the casual labourers shall continue to be extended to them .
" It has been stated that in compliance with that direc tion the Department has alredy formulated a scheme for absorption of casual labourers and about a thousand justi fied posts are being created with concurrence of the nodal Ministry.
As per existing recruitment rules, extra depart mental agents are given preference in the matter of absorp tion as Group 'D ' postmen.
Directions have already been issued for their absorption against the vacancies.
It has been pointed out 334 again that casual labourers are being paid bonus while substitutes are not entitled under the existing scheme.
The other note placed before us at the bearing indicates: 1. Justified (by necessity) posts in Groups 'C ' and 'D ' will be created in the administra tive and operative establishments as per the existing norms for creation of posts in con sultation with the Finance Ministry, 2.
On creation of the posts, recruitment will be done following the existing recruitment rules giving preference to extra departmental agents over casual labourers; 3.
If on the basis of established norms, casual labourers are in excess, their services shall be dispensed with in accordance with law; and 4.
If any casual labourers cannot be re trenched straightaway, they shall be paid wages for three months at the existing rates.
This tentative scheme does not take into account the several specific claims advanced by the petitioners in the two writ petitions.
These are House Rent Allowance, City Compensatory Allowance, Bonus and Earned Leave.
There are also demands for weekly off day, postal holiday and materni ty leave.
Weekly off has now been given to RTPs, casual labourers and substitutes under order of this court and the claim does not survive for adjudication.
All these three categories in these two writ petitions are also being given three national Holidays.
For the remaining postal holidays, the claim has been pressed but we are of the view that until absorption, they may not be granted.
It has been agreed before us that the claim of bonus may be left to arbitration or for being dealt with by the Consultative Council.
As regards House Rent Allowances, City Compensatory Allowance and Maternity Leave, we see.
no justification for treating the employees of the Postal Department differently from those covered under the Regularisation Rules in the Telecommunications Department.
Temporary status would be available to the casual labourers in the Postal Department on completion of one year of continuous service with at least 240 days of work (206 days in the case of officers observing five days ' week) and on conferment of temporary status, House Rent Allowance and City Compensatory Allowance shall be 335 admissible.
There would be no justification to withhold Maternity Leave as that is an obligation of the employer under the law and the State as an ideal employer fulfilling the Directive Principles of State Policy envisaged in Part IV of the Constitution should provide the same.
After ren dering three years of continuous service with temporary status, the casual labourers shall be treated at par with temporary Grade 'D ' employees of the Department of Posts and would thereby be entitled to such benefits as are admissible to Group 'D ' employees on regular basis.
So far as the substitutes are concerned, it has been stated to us that orders have been issued for considering their claims against Group 'D ' vacancies and a copy of the Department 's letter has been produced.
We hope and trust that the direction shall be implemented in its true spirit.
The claim on behalf of substitutes ordinarily is not enter tainable but we have been told that there are substitutes who work for long periods continuously.
We are inclined to agree with counsel for the petitioners that in such cases their claims should have been appropriately considered by the Department.
The writ petitions are disposed of with the aforesaid directions without any order as to costs.
R.N.J. Petitions dis posed of.

summary:
The Petitioners in first two Writ Petitions are Reserve Trained Pool Telephone Operators (RTPTOS) of Delhi and Bombay Mahanagar Telephones who are seeking directions that after their absorption as regular employees following the implementation of the directions of this Court dated 28.7.1986 in an earlier Writ Petition No. 11764 of 1985 filed by the All India Telegraph Engineering Employees Union Class III of Bombay Telephones, they are entitled to be brought on par with the regular Staff for grant of all other service benefits as well since they have been performing the same duties as performed by regular operators.
The other two Petitions pertain to the Department of Posts.
One is by the Reserve Trained Pool Operators (RTPOS) and the other by the Substitute Employees and Casual Labour ers in that Department.
While the RTPOS have claimed relief of being placed at par with regular, permanent or temporary employees in the matter of service conditions, the substi tute employees and casual labourers claim that they be paid the same emoluments as the regular employees.
Disposing of the Petitions, this Court, HELD: The scheme known as Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status in Regularisation) Scheme has been formu lated and put into operation from 1.10.1989.
Hence no fur ther specific direction is necessary as regards applicants covered by the Telephone Nigams of Delhi and Bombay except calling upon the respondents 10 implement every term of the Scheme at an early date.
[332E F] As per existing recruitment rules, extra departmental agents are 330 given preference in the matter of absorption as Group 'D ' postmen.
Directions have already been issued for their absorption against the vacancies.
[333H] The claim to bonus may be left to arbitration or for being dealt with by a Consultative Council.
[334F] After rendering three years of continuous service with temporary status, the casual labourers shall be treated at par with temporary Grade 'D ' employees of the Department of Posts and would thereby be entitled to such benefits as are admissible to Group 'D ' employees on regular basis.
[335B]