judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No. 310 of 1971.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23 4 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 168/ 69 with Criminal Appln.
No. 986/69).
Frank Anthony and U.P. Singh, for the Appellant.
O.P. Rana, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.
Some exceptions disprove the rule.
Cases are legion where the proverbial proposition of litiga tive finality at the High Court level on findings of fact has been affirmed by this Court, but the exceptions which prove the.
rule are also weB established.
We must at the outset state that this case does not fit into the conventional legal mould but, nevertheless, pos sesses such strange features that our 'ultimate ' power may legitimately come into play.
690 A petty store keeper cum cashier in a rural block devel opment office (in the district of Shahjehanpur) was charged.
with misappropriation of several sums adding up to a little over Rs. 5,000/ .
The charges having been denied and the real culprit having been pointed out as the boss of the block development office, the Sessions Court received evi dence on both sides, found the testimony of the Block Development Officer (BDO, acronymically) 'completely false and unbelievable ' in regard to many of the items of embez zlement and made critical observations about his culpability in respect of many of the malversations.
We may have something to say.
about the not unusual phenomenon of the 'small fry getting caught, and the big shark breaking through the net ' in economic offences where public money is handled by public servants.
For the nonce we may content ourselves with the statement that the little official in his twenties which the accused was was acquitted of all but one charge and the misappropriation of Rs. 5,194.82 dwindled into a solitary fugitive item of Rs. 50/ for which he was punished with imprisonment for one year a fine of Rs. 300/ .
The conviction was confirmed but the sentence was reduced by the High Court.
The aggrieved appellant urges before us that the soli tary surviving item of misappropriation held proved concur rently, had, in fact, been vitiated in the process by funda mental flaws.
We will proceed briefly to narrate the epi sode and examine the tenability of the extraordinary fea tures leading to the exculpatory sequel.
The agrestic immensity of Indian backwardness is sought to be banished by developmental activities through block level infrastructures.
Jaitipur Block is one such and it has a nucleus of small officials and some rural development assistants, the hegemony being vested in the BDO.
The dramaris personae here are the accused, the stock clerk cure cashier, the BDO (PW 8) and the Panchayat Secretary (PW 7) whose magnificent salary is Rs. 50/ per mensem.
The prosecution narrative runs long but can be short if we abandon the plurality of charges and limit the facts to.
the single item of Rs. 50/ .
In skeletal brevity, there was a,Block Office in Jaitipur where a small staff worked on low salaries to stimulate rural development.
The accused was cashier and used to be entrusted in such capaci ty with sums, large and small.
The case, as originally projected, was that Rs. 5,194.82 was committed to his custo dy and the whole sum was siphoned off into his own pocket by various acts of criminal breach of trust.
Admittedly it was the duty of the accused cashier to maintain the cash book and deal with the monies.
Equally clear is the fact that the head of the office, the BDO, was duty bound 'to tally and check the dally entries of the cash book with the rele vant vouchers, to affix his signature. after 'checking the total at the end of the day '.
The block office has, on its rolls, Panchayat Secre taries drawing small salaries.
One of them is PW 7, on a monthly pay of Rs. 50/ .
Another unfortunate feature of these.
offices, as disclosed in the evidence, is that even these petty emoluments are paid irregularly pro 691 ducing both discontent and inclination for manipulation.
That public offices should be so run is not too complimen tary.
Anyway, PW 7 received his pay for December 1964 on February 22, 1965 and his pay for the later month of January 1965 he drew a few days earlier on February 15, 1965 (vide Exhibits Ka 26 and Ka 29).
These oddities in disburse ments led to the plausible plea by Asiam, the accused, that P.W. 7 not having received his pittance for the month of December 1964 even after January had come and gone, pleaded his dire need for money and received Rs. 50/ as pay for the month of January 1965 and signed a separated voucher bearing that date, viz., February I, 1965.
It is conceivable that a little man with a little pay packet, which is tantalizing ly postponed, pressurizes the cashier to pay him the small sum signing a voucher and it need not surprise us if the cashier gives in to compassion and makes the payment.
This is precisely the case of the accused.
To shore up this plea, he points out a regular entry in the cash register against the date February 1, 1965 of a payment of Rs. 50/ as salary for the month of January 1965 to P.W. 7.
Rein forcement is received from the further fact that this spe cific entry of payment the falsification of which is the foundation.
for the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 50/ is ticked and 'initialled by the BDO P.W. 8.
We have earlier referred to the practice and the obligation of this officer to tally and check the daily entries in the cash book with the relevant vouchers and then to affix the signature after checking the total at the end of, day.
Moreover he had the special responsibility, as the most responsible officer on the staff on his own showing, 'to keep the cash balance found at the end of every day in the cash chest register '.
He does not do daily physical verification of the cash but does it on a monthly basis and he keeps the key of the same, although another key is left with the cashier.
The accused 's contention that he paid the salary of Rs. 50/ to P.W. 7 on February 1, 1965 supported though it is by an entry in the Books duly initialled by the BDO presuma bly after verification with the corresponding voucher has been rejected by the Courts without advertence to these spinal circumstances by the superficial plea that P.W. 7 is seen to have been paid the salary for December 1964 on February 22, 1965 with a regular entry and a stamped voucher.
P.W. 7, when examined, denied the earlier payment on February 1, with a touch of dubious candour and owned up the payment for December supported by the stamped voucher on February 22, 1965.
A streak of mystique generates doubt in P.W. 7 's testimony because in cross examination he says: '1 do not remember as such that along with other officials the cashier would have given me the salary for the month of January 1965 for two times by mistake '.
In the next breath he corrects himself to say that he had not been paid twice.
On the strength of these materials a conviction of guilt has been rendered by both the Courts and.
be the appreciation right or wrong, we, as the final court should have held back ordinarily from temptation for reappraisal, vehement argu ment notwithstanding.
But certain grave factors, condu cive to miscarriage of justice have bulked forward to induce us to make an exception, which we will presently expatiate 692 There were nine items of misappropriation originally imputed to the accused.
All, but one, remained unproven and the guilt is now fixed on one of the inconsiderable items.
Not that the littlest sum of public money can be taken on privately with impunity but that the perspective is coloured somewhat by the substantial failure of the prosecution to make out its case regarding all the major items.
More disquieting is the fact that the Single surviving charge stands or falls on the veracity or unveracity of a solitary witness appreciated in the light of the conspectus of circumstances.
What are those circumstances ? The BDO, charged as he is with serious responsibilities including guardant functions over the finances of the institution, has sworn that he checks the daily entries in the cash book with the relevant vouchers and affixes his signature, checks the total at the end of the day and again affixes his signature.
It is a pregnant piece of evidence that there is a specific entry on February 1, 1965 in the cash book that a payment of Rs. 50/ by way of salary to P.W. 7 has been made.
The BDO has signed against the entry which means, in the ordinary course, he has verified the payment with reference to the relevant voucher.
If this be a fact, the accused has proba bly paid the salary, made the necessary entry, shown it together with the relevant, voucher to the BDO, got his signature, totalled up the figures correctly and secured the BDO 's signature over again.
The exculpatory impact of this testimony is sufficient, according to ordinary canons of criminal jurisprudence to relieve the accused of culpa bility since reasonable doubt is generated.
The sensi ble scepticism about guilt which springs from the BDO 's signature against the relevant entry is heightened by the fact that the Finance Handbook referred to by the High Court in its judgment states that it is the duty of the drawing and disbursing officer to check each and every entry of receipt and expenditure recorded in the cash book and peri odically to check physically the cash balances.
The BDO, according to the High Court, has made evasive statements to suppress certain facts and 'spoken some apparent ties '.
Startlingly enough, the Sessions Court has recorded P.W. 8, the BDO, as false and unbelievable in regard to certain other charges and gone to the further extent of concluding that four entries figuring as charges against the accused had been really made to the BDO himself 'who probably embezzled these amounts '.
The consequential acquittal of the accused on these four charges has not been disturbed.
In sum, therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the BDO, the top officer in full financial control, had behaved irresponsibly or delinquently with regard to the funds of the block office, had been described as too mendacious to be depended and had convicted himself, of gross neglect of public duty in regard to the checking of the cash register, out of his own mouth.
If we are to attach there is no reason for a Court not to do so weight to the contemperane ous entry in the cash register coupled with the signature of the BDO the same day, as against his ipse dixit later, the accused is entitled to the benefit of reasona ble doubt.
There is likely to have been a separate voucher evidencing the payment of Rs. 50/ which is the subject of the defalcation because the BDO is not likely to have at tested the entry of that payment without checking it up with the corresponding receipt.
693 Two circumstances fall to be mentioned before the probative balance sheet can be struck.
The entry of Rs. 50/ on February 1, 1965 is seen scored off.
Who did it ? Can we guess in the dark ? Nothing on record suggests that the accused alone could have done it There is much credibil ity in the theory that with the connivance of the BDO and the clerks petty sums are quietly abstracted from the public exchequer, make believe entries are made and attest ing signatures appended by the BDO and, if the peril of detection by higher officers is apprehended, scorings, additions, alterations and the like are made.
It is common case that in the cash register there are many such cross ings, cuttings, scorings and like tamperings.
Many scape graces were perhaps party to these processes but one scape goat cannot, for that reason, get convicted in the criminal court.
In this context it is pertinent to remember that the District Accountant, after a fuller examination of the books of the block offices, has stated that the several embezzle ments have been facilitated by the laxity of the BDO who should be directed to make good the loss.
A further recom mendation by him to proceed departmentally as against the BDO and as against the Cashier is also found in the report.
Whether action had been taken against the BDO, the State 's counsel was not able to tell us.
The sole lip service to the criminality imputed is lent by PW 7.
Did he receive his salary of Rs. 50/ twice over ? Undoubtedly he was interested in denying it.
Doubt hardly exists of the fact that he got his small December salary of Rs. 50/ only in February next.
Far more likely that in such a situation he would have pressed for the payment of Rs. 50/ to be adjusted later.
Likewise, his initial ambi guity in plainly denying that he had been paid twice en hances this suspicion.
When the cash affairs of the office is in a mess, when the Chief is guilty of dereliction, when the clerks are receiving petty salaries at irregular intervals, the somewhat tainted testimony of PW 7 is fax too slender a string to hang the guilt upon, pitted as it is against the cash register entry by the BDO, apparently after consulting the payment voucher.
The accused was suspended promptly and therefore this voucher, if it did exist, must have been in the office and its non production in court is not a matter for drawing an inference against the ac cused.
We have made this unusual probative survey of the evi dence for the sole reason that the bona fides of the prose cution, leaving off bigger and going at the smaller, mixing false testimony with true seriously suspect and holding on to the conviction of the accused on no evidence, which a reasonable person reasonably instructed in the law will rely upon, is neither just nor legal.
The accused, at the time of the offence, was in his early twenties probably a neophyte or new entrant into a little racket.
Doubts there are about his complicity but that a man may be guilty is different from saying that he must be guilty.
The dividing line between the two is 694 sometimes fine, but always real.
There is undoubtedly collective.
guilt in the conjoint delinquency in the running of the block development office.
Public affairs and public funds, especially on the developmental front, require far more integrity, orderliness, activism and financial pru dence.
Its absence we regret, but the specific guilt of the particular accused not having been proved, as mandated by the law, results in his acquittal.
We accordingly allow the appeal.
The guilt finding function is over, but judges have accountability to the country to the extent matters falling within their professional examination deserve sounding the tocsin.
With this alibi we make a few observations.
The popular art of helping oneself to public money, in little bits or large slices, is an official pathology whose pernicious spell has proliferated with the considerable expansion in institutions of public welfare and expenditure for rural development.
From Kautilya 's Arthashastra to Gunnar Myrdal 's Asian Drama, the vice is writ large and the demoralising kink in the projects for criminal prosecution to eradicate these vices in public offices is that more often than not the bigger engineer of these anti social schemes figures as prosecuting witness and the smaller men in the package deal are put up as sacrificial goats.
The head escapes, the hand is chased down and, when the Court convicts, cynicism, instead of censure, is the unintended public response.
In a social system of the high and low, where the wheels of punitive processes are steered by the former, laws equal in the face quirk unequal at heart.
Crack down Crime Control itself takes its alignment from the social philosophy of the agencies of public power.
The present ease is a small symptom of a spread out disease and the State, in its highest echelons, determined to down this rocket of economic offences must launch massive, quick acting, broad spectrum prosecutorial remedies, regardless of personal positions, and leisurely procedural apparatuses, if high social dividends are to be drawn.
The mystique of ,making the dubious officer the veracity vendor in the witness box and the collaborating minion the dock dweller, is suspected as intrigue to Shelter the upper berth culprit.
Caesar 's wife, where public interest is at stake, must be above suspicion, if prosecutorial credibility is to be popular purchase.
If the nation, poised for socialism, must zero in on public office offences, what we have observed must not and surely, will not slumber as obiter sermons but serve as catalysts to crash strategies on white collar crimes.
In a developing country of scarce resources, husbanding public funds has a special onerousness.
Gross negligence, even absent mens rea, in handling the nation 's assets by those in office must be visited with criminal liability as it in flicts double injury on that voiceless, faceless, woe stricken have not community which is aplenty.
Public power, under the penal Law, must be saddled with 695 higher degree of care, if Indian jurisdiction is to fulfil its social mission through developmental legislation.
Had such a law existed, many superior officers routinely signing away huge sums or large contracts could have been alterted into better standards by potential penal consequence.
The present case is an instance in point and our parliamen tarians we hope, will harken.
M.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant, a cashier in a rural block development office of Shahjahanpur district, was convicted for misappro priating public money.
Both the courts concurrently found that he had pocketed the sum which he claimed to have paid the Panchayat Secretary as salary.
The appellant contended that the charge against him was falsified by the voucher and regular entry of the cash register regarding the above payment, which had been ticked and initialled by the Block Development Officer, and pro duced in evidence.
Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: (1) The proposition of litigative finality at the High Court level on findings of fact has been affirmed by this Court, but the exceptions which prove the rule are also well established.
A conviction of guilt has been rendered by both the Courts, but certain grave factors conducive to miscarriage of justice, induce us to make an exception.
The accused is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt owing to the contemporaneous entry in the cash register coupled with the signature of the B.D.O. the same day, as against ipsi dixit later.
[689 G, 691 H, 692 G H] (2) Our observations must serve as catalysts to crash strategies on white collar crimes.
Gross negligence, even absent mens rea, in handling public funds by those in office must hold penal consequences as it inflicts double injury on the poor masses.
[694 G H]


judgement:
Appeal No. 799 of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31 1 75 of the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench in Election Petition No. 2/74.
Janardhan Sharma and Jitendra Sharma; for the appellant.
section V. Gupte Naunit Lal and (Miss) Lalita Kohli, for Respondent No. 1. 574 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J.
In the mid term poll to Manipur Legislative Assembly held in February 1974, respondent No. 1 (hereinaf ter referred to as the respondent) was declared ' elected from the Patsoi Assembly constituency.
The appellant, who was one of the rival candidates, filed an election petition to challenge the election of the respondent.
The election petition was dismissed by the Gauhati High Court.
The appellant has now come up in appeal against the judgment of the High Court.
The respondent, who was a candidate sponsored by the Manipur people 's Party secured 5,033 votes, while the appellant who was Iris nearest rival secured 2,473 votes.
There were some other candidates, but we are not concerned with them.
The respondent was the Speaker of Manipur Legislative Assem bly at the relevant time.
The Assembly was dissolved in 1973.
The respondent, however continued to hold the office of the Speaker fill March 8, 1974.
The appellant chal lenged the election of the respondent on two main grounds.
One of the grounds was that the respondent being Speaker of the Assembly held an office of profit in the State Govern ment and as such was disqualified to seek election.
The other ground was that the election expenses of the respondent exceeded the prescribed limit of Rs. 2,500.
It was also stated that some of the expenses incurred by the respondent for the purpose of election had not been shown by him in the return filed by him, and as such, he was guilty of corrupt practice.
The High Court repelled all the grounds, and in the result dismissed the election peti tion.
In appeal before us Mr. Sharma on behalf of the appellant has not challenged the finding of the High Court insofar as it has held that the respondent was not disqualified from seeking election because of the fact that he held the office of the Speaker.
The appellant indeed could not challenge this finding as we find that the Manipur Legislature has now passed the Manipur Legislature (Removal of Disqualifica tions , (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Manipur Act 1 of 1975).
As a result of this amendment, a person holding the office of Speaker of Manipur Legislative Assembly shall not be dis qualified from seeking election to the Legislative Assembly of that State because of his holding that office.
The amend ing Act, according to clause (2) of section 1, shall be deemed to have come into force on February 6, 1973.
The fact that the legislature is competent to enact such a law with retrospective operation is now well established (see Kanta Kathuria v.and Smt Indira Nehru Gandhi vs Shri Rat Manak Chand Surana(1) above amending Act the respondent Narain(2).
In view of.
the above from seeking election to the respondent cannot be held to be disqualified on account of his having held the office of the Speaker of the Legis lative Assembly of Manipur on account of his having held the office of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.
(1) [1970] 2S.C.R. 830.
(2) 575 Mr. Sharma has assailed the finding of the High Court inso far as it has held that the election expenses of the re spondent did not exceed the prescribed limit of Rs. 2,500.
According to the return filed by the respondent, he incurred a total expense of Rs. 2,160 in connection with his elec tion.
It is urged.
by Mr. Sharma that though the respondent paid Rs. 500 to the Manipur People 's party for securing a ticket of that party, he did not show that amount in the return filed by him.
Adding that sum of Rs. 500 to the amount of Rs. 2,160 would take the expenses beyond the prescribed limit of Rs. 2,500.
The said amount of Rs. 500, we find, was paid by the respondent to Manipur People 's party on December 5, 1973.
According to an amendment made in section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 by Act 40 of 1975, every candidate at an election will either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct account of all the expenditure in connection with the election, incurred or authorised by him or by his election agent between the date on which he has been nomi nated and the date of the declaration of the result thereof, both dates inclusive.
The respondent admittedly filed his nomination on January 23, 1974.The amount of Rs. 500 was paid by the respondent on December 5, 1973 long before the date on which the respondent filed his nomination.
The said amount of Rs. 500 consequently need not have been shown in the return of expenses filed by the respondent, nor could the said amount be taken into consideration in calculating the total expenses of the respondent with a view to judge as to whether his expenses exceeded the prescribed limit.
It has not been disputed that Act 40 of 1975 by which amendment was made in section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has a retrospective effect and was in operation at the time the election with which we are concerned was held.
Mr. Sharma has next contended before us that an amount of Rs.101/55 paise was spent for the purchase of petrol and mobil oil by the respondent in addition to the amount of Rs. 586 which was shown by the respondent to have been spent by him on the purchase of petrol and mobil oil.
According to Mr. Sharma, petrol and mobil oil worth Rs. 101/55 were purchased by the respondent from Singh & Co., Imphal during the dates January 18 to 23, 1974.
In this respect, we find that the evidence adduced by the appellant is not at all satisfactory.
Two witnesses were examined by the appellant in this connection.
One of them was the appellant himself, who came into the witness box as PW 1.
It is apparent that this witness has no personal knowledge in the matter.
The other witness examined by the appellant is R.B. Shukla, PW 21.
The evidence of Shukla shows that he sold petrol and mobil oil.
worth Rs. 101/55 paise for vehicle bearing number 194.
The respondent undoubtedly used jeep NLM 194 during the elections.
There is nothing in the record of Singh & Co. or in the evidence of PW Shukla to indicate that the petrol and mobil oil worth Rs. 101/55 paise were sup plied for jeep NLM 194 and not for another vehicle beating that number.
The respondent in the course of his deposition has denied having purchased petrol and mobil oil from Singh & Co. 576 Mr. Sharma has also assailed the finding of the High Court regarding the expenses incurred by the respondent.
on microphones.
According to the retrun filed by the respond ent, he spent Rs. 720 on that account.
The case of the appellant is that the respondent paid Rs. 1,130 to Sena Yaima Sarma, Rs. 1,180 to Lockey Sound Equipment and Rs. 1,000 to Hijam Iboton Singh for use of microphones in connection with his election.
As against that, the case of the respondent is that he hired microphone from Lockey Sound Equipment and paid Rs. 720 only to that concern in that connection.
There is no cogent evidence on the record to indicate that respondent paid anything over and above Rs. 720 on account of the use of microphones.
The High Court found that the representatives of the firms from which the microphones were alleged by the appellant to have been taken on hire by the respondent, were not examined as wit nesses and that evidence adduced in this behalf was of a most unsatisfactory character.
We find no cogent ground to take a different view.
Emphasis has been laid by Mr. Sharma upon the fact that in the return filed by the re spondent, the date of payment of Rs. 720 has been mentioned to be February 26, 1974 while according to the evidence of the respondent in the witness box, the said payment was made on March 24, 1974.
In this connection, we find that the bill of Lockey Sound Equipment for the hire charges of microphones is dated February 26, 1974.
It seems that the respondent mentioned the date of the bill in connection with that payment.
No inference adverse to the respondent, in our opinion, can be drawn from the above crepancy regarding the date of payment.
Lastly, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent also used jeep MNS 7343 in addition to jeep NLM 194.
It is stated that the expenses incurred by the respondent on account of petrol and mobil oil for jeep MNS 7343 were not shown by him in his return.
In this respect we find there was no allegation in the election petition as originally field regarding the use of jeep MNS 7343 by the respondent.
This allegation was introduced by the appellant only as a result of the amendment of the election petition.
No documentary evidence was placed on the file by the appellant to show that the respondent used jeep MNS 7343 for the purpose of his election.
Oral evi dence was however, adduced by the appellant for this pur pose.
The High Court found the evidence adduced in this conection by the appellant to be wholly unreliable.
After hearing Mr. Sharma, we find no cogent reason to take a contrary view.
It is well established that this Court should not normally interfere in an election appeal with the High Court 's appraisement of oral evidence of witnesses unless such appraisement is vitiated by some glaring infirmity.
No such infirmity has, been brought to our notice.
Reference has been made by Mr. Sharma to first information report dated February 23, 1974 which was al leged to have been made by the respondent to the police.
No attempt was made by the appellant to bring on record the original first information report or to prove the same.
The High Court in the circumstances held that the appellant could not rely upon a copy of the said first information report.
577 Mr. Sharma then contends that the appellant in any case can rely upon the oral deposition of the respondent when he came into the witness box.
We have been taken through that deposition, and we find no warrant for the conclusion that jeep MNS 7343 was used by the respondent in connection with his election.
All that has been stated by the respondent in the course of his deposition is that on February 23, 1974 he came to know of some untoward incident at a distance of a few hundred yards away from the place of his residence.
He went in jeep MNS 7343 towards that spot and thereafter returned in that jeep from that spot.
Such stray and solitary use of the jeep for visiting the place of incident a few hundred yards away from the residence of the respond ent cannot, in our opinion be held to tantamount to the use of the jeep for election purpose.
There is no cogent evi dence to show that the jeep was used otherwise by the re spondent for attending his election meetings or for other election purposes.
As a result of the above, we dismiss the appeal.
Considering the fact that the first ground which constituted the principal weapon of attack of the appellant against the validity of the respondent 's election is not available because of the change made in law during the pendency of the appeal, we direct that the parties should bear their own costs of the appeal.
P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Respondent No. 1 was declared elected to Manipur Legis lative Assembly.
The appellant who was one of the rival candidates filed an Election Petition on two grounds (1) Respondent No. 1 was holding office of profit inasmuch he was the speaker of the Assembly; and (2) the Respondent No, 1 incurred election expenses in excess of what is permissi ble.
The High Court negatived both the contentions and dismissed the Election Petition.
In an appeal filed by the Election Petitioner to this Court in view of the change in law with retrospective effect the first ground was not available to the appellant in this Court.
The appellant contended (1 ) The sum of Rs. 500 paid to his party by respondent No. 1 has been wrongly excluded by the High Court from the total expenditure.
(2) The sum of Rs., 101.50 spent for the purchase of petrol and mobil oil was not shown by respondent No. 1 in his return.
(3) Respondent No. 1 spent Rs. 1180/ on the microphone.
He has, however, shown Rs. 720 only in the return.
(4) Respondent No. 1 used Jeep No. 7343 in addi tion to Jeep No. 194 and the expenses incurred on that jeep are not known.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: It is well settled that this Court does not nor mally interfere in an election appeal with the High Court 's appraisement of oral evidence of witnesses unless such appraisement is vitiated by some glaring infirmity.
In the present case no such infirmity is shown.
The evidence led by the Election Petitioner is not cogent and sufficient to come to the conclusion that various amounts mentioned.
by him were actually spent by Respondent No. 1.
As far as the payment of Rs. 500/ is concerned, the same is admitted by respondent No. 1, but that was paid before the filing of the nomination and what the Statute requires is the expenses incurred from the date of nomination till the date of the declaration of the result.
[575 B C, 576G] Stray and solitary use of a jeep for visiting a place a few hundred yards away from the residence of the respondent where some untowards incident had taken place cannot be held tantamount to the use of the jeep for election purposes.
[577B C]


judgement:
Appeal No. 768 of 1972.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 24 8 71 of the Delhi High Court in R.S.A. No. 137/67.
G.N. Dikshit and R.N. Dikshit, for the Appellant.
O.P. Malhotra, S.N. Mehta, Uma Datta, Sat Pal and M. Iyengar, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court .was delivered by BEG, J. Jangbir, appellant, is a tenant of a room in a house which was purchased by the respondent Mahavir Prasad Gupta on 15th May, 1956, for Rs. 1930/ shown in his sale deed as situated in "Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1, situated at Village Chowkri Mubarkabad, Delhi Province, within the abadi of Onkar Nagar II".
The landlord owner had filed a suit for the ejectment of the appellant and for recovery 9f rent which was dismissed by a Subordinate Judge of Delhi on 26th May, 1966 on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') which provided the only modes of relief for aggrieved landlords by proceeding under the Act.
The respondent landlord had alleged that the suit lay in the ordinary Civil Court and that it was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as the house, in which the appellant was the tenant of a room, fell outside the area to which the Act was applicable.
The short question on which the case was decided was whether the house of the respondent was situated in an area to which the Act had been applied by a notification under Section 507(a) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, dated 7th January, 1960.
published in the Delhi Gazette on 17th January, 1960 read with the notification dated 12th April, 1962 under Section 1, sub.
section (2) of the Act.
published in the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962.
672 The operative part of the notification of the Delhi Administration reads as follows: "No. F. 9/5/59 R&S In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), the Corporation with the previous 'approval of the Central Government hereby declares that the fol lowing localities mentioned in the Schedule given below, hitherto forming part of the rural areas, shall cease to be rural area".
Thereafter, was given a schedule and then came the heading: "Shahdara Zone".
The schedule has 5 columns.
The first is for the "Serial No." The second is for the name of the "Revenue estate", which is translation of Mauza, said to be an area composed of several villages.
The third column is for the name of the actual village or colony of the Mauza.
It is headed "Name of Colony Village pro posed to be included in the urban area".
The fourth column is for what is called the "square number".
The last and the fifth column was headed: "Khasra/Killa Nos.
covered by the Colo ny/Villages".
We are.
concerned here with serial No. 7 which has the entries indicated below made under the appropriate number of each column: "1. No. 7. 2.
Chowkri Mubarakabad.
Onkar Nagar.
Lekhu Pura.
Square No. Not given.
Across "Onkar Nagar" are shown: "238, 242, 240, 234, 235, 236, 234, 231, 230 and 271"; and, across "Lekhu Pura" are shown: "215 to 217, 211,212, 199 to 203".
The notification published in the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962, may be reproduced in toto.
It reads: "New Delhi, the 12th ' April, 1962.
G.S.R. No. 486 In exercise of powers con ferred by the proviso to sub section (2) of Section 1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), the Central Government hereby extends all the provisions of the said Act : (a) to the areas which immediately before the 7th April, 1958, were included in the Notified Area Committee, Najafgarh and the Notified Area Commit tee, Narela; and (b) to the localties mentioned in the schedule to the notification of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi No. F 9/5/59 R&S, dated the 28th December, 1959, published in the Delhi Gazette Part IV, dated the 7th 673 January, 1960, and which by virtue of that notifi cation have formed part of the urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
(No. 35/8/61 Delhi I) A.V. Venkatasubban, Deputy Secretary".
The Subordinate Judge, very rightly observed that there was no dispute between the parties that Mauza Chowkri Muba rakabad was included.
within the limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation by the notification dated 7th January, 1960.
He pointed out that there was no indication of a sub diviSion of Khasra No. 203 showing that any part of it was divided or separately numbered.
The disappointed plaintiff landlord was, however, not content with so obviously correct a finding.
He appealed to the District Judge who agreed entirely with the Trial Court and also recorded a finding of fact that Khasra No. 203, situated in the Mauza or Revenue Estate of Chowkri Mubara kabad, was covered by the notifications.
It seems to us that no other inference was reasonably possible.
The plaintiff respondent seems, in a gambling spirit, to have decided to try his luck by a second appeal to the High Court.
What surprises .
us is that a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, without considering the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for decision before him, decided to set aside the concurrent findings of fact, and, thereby, patently exceeded the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code.
We need hardly say that there cannot be any doubt that he did so.
We are surprised that the law laid down by this Court, and, before that, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should have been so completely ignored.
By way of example we may refer to the following cases: Deity Pattabhiramaswamy vs
section Hanyamayya & Ors.
(1); Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors.
vs Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr.(2); Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao(3); Bhusawal Borough Municipality vs Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr.(4); Secy. of State vs Rameshwa ram Devasthanam & Ors.(5);Anup Mahto vs Mira Dusadh & Ors.,(6) Sahebrao Narayanrao Deshmukh vs Jaiwantrao Yadaorao Deshmukh & Ant.(7) It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the con struction of a document is always a question of law.
Reli ance was placed upon Meenakshi Mills, Madurai vs The Commissioner of income tax, Madras,(8) and Nedunuri Kames waramma vs Sampati Subba Rao (Supra).
This Court has never laid down that inferences from contents of a documents always raise questions of law.
Indeed, in (1) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 57.
(2) [19621 (2)S.C.R. 509.
(3) ; (4) ; (5) A.I.R. 1934 PC.
(6) A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 5.
(7) A.I.R. 1933 P.C. 171.
(8) [1956] S.C.R. 691.
674 Nedunuri Kameshwaramma 's case (supra), this Court observed (atp. 215 216): "A construction of documents (unless they are documents of rifle) produced by the parties to prove a question of fact does not involve an issue of law, unless it can be shown that the material evidence contained in them was misunderstood by the Court of fact.
The documents in this case, which have been the subject of three separate considera tions, were the Land Registers the Amarkam, and Bhooband Accounts and the Adangal Registers, to gether with certain documents derived from the Zamindari records.
None of these documents can be correctly described as a document of title, whatev er its evidentiary value otherwise".
We think that, unless interpretation of a document involves the question of application of a principle of law mere inferences from or the evi dentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact.
We think that, if the learned Judge of the High Court had cared to consider the provisions of law relating to the extension of the Act to urban areas.
or to bear in mind the correct principles of construction.
of documents, or, tried to appreciate the true nature of the case before him, he could not have possibly interfered with the concurrent findings of the two Courts below simply because the number of the Khasra in which the house of respond ent lay was not mentioned against both the portions of Chowki Mubarakabad but wholly against Lekhu Pura.
In so far as the assumption, from the en tries in column 5 of ' the notification, could be that the whole of No. 203 fell in Lekhupura, it was an obviously erroneous assumption.
A clerical error was the most that was indicated by such an entry.
But, even so, it left no doubt that the whole Khasra No. 203 was duly notified.
"1. (1) This Act may be called the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(2) It extends to the area included within the limits of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment Board and ' to such urban areas within the limits of the Municipal Corpora tion of Delhi as are specified in the first ScheduIe; Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend this Act or any provision thereof, to any other urban area included within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or exclude any area from the operation of this Act or any provision thereof".
It is evident that the proviso does not require the mention of anything more than the urban area which is to be included or excluded from the limits of the Municipal Corporation, That area was suffi ciently clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant for ' the Revenue 675 Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the village.
It is clear from these that the whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to be notified.
The mere fact that the last column was not filled up by whoever drew up the notification in such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra number lay did not affect the question whether the area to be included was sufficiently indicated or not.
The well known principles of interpretation applicable to such cases are: (a) Firstly, a document must be construed as a whole.
(b) Secondly, it has to be so construed as not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a patent absurdity.
(c) Third ly, if any entry of a column appears to have been carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indi cation of what was otherwise clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the contents of such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadvertence, would not matter on an application of the principle: Falsa Demonstra tio non nocet.
A deliberate intention to omit a part of a Khasra number the whole of which is given in the notification of 7th January, 1960, could not possibly be inferred.
When we look at Section 507 of the Delhi Munic ipal Corporation Act, 1957, we find the relevant part runs as follows: "507.
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, (a) the Corporation with the previous approv al of the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portion of the rural areas shall cease to be included therein and upon the issue of such notification that portion shall be included in and form part of the urban areas; (b) the Corporation with the previous ap proval of the Central Government may, by notifica tion in the Official Gazette, (i) exempt the rural areas or any portion thereof from such of the provisions of this Act as it deems fit.
(ii) Levy taxes, rates, fees and other charges in the rural areas or any portion thereof at rates lower than those at which such taxes, rates, fees and other charges are levied in the urban areas or exempt such areas or portion from any such tax, rate, fee or other charge;" Thus, we find the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the Act as well as of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra Nos.
which are convenient divisions for the purposes of indicating what lay within each area.
The Khasra is often spoken of as the "village map".
Khasra for "abadi" areas even indicate.
the type of construction which may lie within a particular number or the use to which a piece of land was being put.
The term "urban area" or "rural area" is used for much larger units than Khasra Nos.
It would, obviously, be quite impossible to think of one particular number, within an "abadi" area, left out or 676 dropped deliberately, without any rhyme or reason, from the notifications mentioned above.
No conceivable reason has been suggested for such an omission.
Indeed, there is not even an omission the effect of which may have been helpful to the appellant.
It was only a case where the whole number is shown against one village only instead of being shown against two.
The learned High Court Judge, by basing his whole judg ment on a farfetched conjecture from supposed omission of No. 203 in column 5, against Onkar Nagar, adopted a con struction of the Notification, if that is what the learned Judge was doing, which was quite unintelligible with refer ence to the facts of the case or purposes of such notifica tions.
The learned Judge would have been well advised to rest content with the obviously correct position that what the two Courts below had done was to arrive at a pure find ing of fact as to whether a particular Khasra number con taining the house in question was included within a Mauza to the whole of which the provisions of the Act had been plain ly extended.
In view of all the facts of the case, no other conclusion was reasonably possible.
Consequently, we allow this appeal, by special leave, with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the plaintiff 's suit.
As no counsel appeared to hear the Judgment today 's costs are disallowed to both the parties.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad was included within the limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by a notification dated 7th January, 1960.
By a notification dated 12th April 1962, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was extended to the localities mentioned in the schedule to the, notification dated 7th January 1960.
The respondent landlord who purchased a house situated in Khasra No. 203, Khewat No. 1 situated at village Chowkri Mubarakabad, Delhi Province within the Abadi of Onkar Nagar II, filed a suit for ejectment of the appellant tenant of a room in the said house and for recovery of rent.
The trial court and the first appellate court held that the juris diction of the civil court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
However on second appeal, a single judge of the High Court disturbed the findings of fact and re versed the judgments of the courts below.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave the Court, HELD: (i) There cannot be any doubt, that, in the in stant case, by deciding to set aside the concurrent findings of fact, ignoring the law laid down by this Court, and, before that by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, the High Court, patently exceeded its jurisdiction under section 100 .C.P.C. without considering the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construction of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really arisen for decision.
[673 D F] Deity Pattabhiramaswamy vs
section Hanyamayya & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 57; Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer & Ors.
vs Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr.
1962(2) SCR 509; Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao, 1963(2) SCR 208; Bhusawal Borough Municipality vs Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. & Am '.
1964(5) SCR 905; Secy.
of State vs Rameswaram Devasthanam & Ors.
, AIR 1934 PC 112; Anup Mahto vs Mita Dusadh & Ors.
AIR 1934 PC 5 and Narayanrao Deshmukh vs Jaiwantrao Yadaorao Deshmnkh & Anr., AIR 1933 PC 171; applied (ii) The well known principles of interpretation of documents are: (a) firstly, a document must be construed as a whole; (b) secondly, it has to be so construed as not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a patent ab surdity; and (c) thirdly, if any entry of a column.
appears to have been carelessly made, so as not to give a correct indication Of what was otherwise clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and.
rest of the contents of such a notification, the slight error.
, due obviously to inadver tance, would not matter on an application of the principle: Falsa Demonstrated non nocet." [675 B C] 671 (iii) Unless interpretation of a document involves the question of application of a principle of law, mere infer ences from or the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question of fact.
[674 C] Nedanuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao, ; ; explained.
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, ; ; referred to (iv) In the instant case, it is evident that the proviso does not require the mention of anything more than the urban areas which is to be included or excluded from the limits of the Municipal Corporation.
That area was sufficiently clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant, for the Revenue Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the vil lage.
The whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to be noti fied.
The mere fact that the last column was not filled up in such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra number lay did not affect the question whether the area to be included was sufficiently indicated or not.
The provi sions of Section 1(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act as wellas of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra nos.
which are convenient divisions for the purpose of indicating what lay within each area.
[674 H, 675 A B, GH]


judgement:
Appeal No. 366 of 1976 (From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1974 of the Karnataka High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No. 171/73).
K.N. Bhatta and M. Rangaswamy for the Appellant Mrs. Shyamla Pappu and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. 3 B.R.G.K. Achar for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
666 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG J.
This appeal by special leave raises the question whether the State Government could, by a general direction given under Section 43(1) of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') fix the charges to be imposed upon operators of stage carriages for carrying mails as conditions of their permits.
Section 48 of the Act lays down the power of the Region al Transport Authority to grant stage carriage permits with conditions annexed thereto.
The first stage of exercise of this power is preceded by ' the quasi judicial enquiry, under Section 47 of the Act, into the matters affecting the interests of public in general.
Section 48, sub. section (1), subjecting the power to grant stage carriage permits to provisions of section 47 of the.
Act, includes what may be ' correctly characterised as the "quasi judicial" power either to grant or refuse to grant a permit after consideration of matters stated in Section 47 of the Act.
After that, we come to the power to attach conditions laid down in Sec tion 48(3), and we find: "49(3) The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriages of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriages, and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely: . . " Out of a number of kinds of conditions which may be imposed, the xvth, given below, is relevant: "(xv) that mails shall be carried on any of the vehi cles authorised by the permit subject to such conditions (including conditions as to the time in which mails are to be carried and the charges which may be levied) as may be specified".
Now, it is contended on behalf of the appellants, that the power to attach conditions under.
Section 48(3) is also quasi judicial with which the State Government neither has nor ought to have any concern.
The conditions of permits are prescribed by statute.
It is for the authority, exer cising the power quasi judicially to grant or not to grant permits, to decide what conditions to attach or not to attach to each permit.
It is.
not, it is submitted, for the State Government to dictate any conditions to be attached.
Hence, the challenge to the Government notification dated 30th May, 1968, which directed the State Transport Authori ty, to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of freight upon operators carrying mails or postal goods in stage carriages owned by operators other than State Transport Undertakings throughout the State.
The State Transport Authority had, in its turn, issued a direction to the Re gional Transport Authorities all over the State under Section 44 (1 ) of the Act to impose, 667 duty of carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by the Government as a condition annexed under Section 48(3) (xv) to permits.
The relevant part of Section 43 (1) of the Act enacts: "43 (1) A State Government having regard to (a) the advantage 's offered to the public, trade and industry by the above development of motor transport, and (b) the desirability of co ordinating road and rail transport, and (c) the desirability of preventing the deterio ration of the road system, and (d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, issue directions to the State Transport Authority (i) regarding the fixing of fares and freights for stage carriages, contract carriages and public carriers;" Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the power of the Government to issue directions relating to "freights" does not include imposition of charges for carry ing postal goods as conditions permits which the Regional Transport Authority grants in exercise of its quasi judicial powers.
The attack on the validity of the Government direc tion is thus two fold: firstly, that it falls outside the scope of Section 43(1) of the Act as charges for carrying mail are not "freight" on goods carried; and, secondly, that no directions could be given to a quasi judicial au thority as to how it should perform its functions.
So far as the first argument is concerned, we do not find much substance in it.
The term "charge" is a broad one.
As used here, it is not a technical term and has not been defined by the Act.
It has, therefore, its ordinary dic tionary meaning.
It means any amount which may be demanded as a price for the rendering of some service or as price of some goods.
The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Act uses the term "freight" to.
indicate the charge made on carriage of goods, whereas the term "fare" is used for the charge made for carrying passengers, itself rests on the assumption that the term charge is a wide one.
It includes both freights and fares.
It is true that the term "fare" is used in relation to charges made for carriage of passengers and the term freight is used for charges made for the carriage of goods.
Nevertheless, both are charges.
It may be that stage carriages are meant for the carriage of passengers.
But, as is a matter of common knowledge, they also carry the luggage of passengers.
In other words, they also carry some goods incidentally.
The mail bags in which the postal goods are sent are only a type of goods which are not so bulky as to require trucks 11 l234SCI/76 668 Or special vans.
It is possible to carry them in stage carriages together with the luggage of the passengers.
In any case, this is a condition which is probably imposed only in those areas where mail vans of the State are not found to be necessary or economical to run.
In the villages in the interior of some rural areas, there may not be so much mail to carry as to justify sending a mail van.
Therefore, power is given to the Regional Transport Authori ty to attach the condition that postal goods should be carried in stage carriages at rates fixed by the Govern ment.
The real grievance of the operators is not that they have to carry postal goods as a condition of their permits but that the rates fixed are too low.
The proper remedy for such a grievance is, as the High Court rightly pointed out, to apply to the Government for revision of rates fixed.
Coming to the second submission, we may observe that, although, there is ample authority for the proposition that the grant of stage carriage permits is a quasi judicial function, with which the State Government cannot interfere by giving directions which may impede the due performance of such functions, yet, when Section 48(3) speaks of the power to attach conditions after the decision to grant the permit, it really deals with what lies past the quasi judi cial stage of decision to grant the permit.
At that stage, the decision to grant the permit is already there and only conditions have to be attached to the permit, such as the necessity to carry postal goods on certain routes at rates fixed by the Government.
On the face of it, these rates cannot be properly determined by the Regional Transport Authority.
They have to be uniform throughout the State.
A decision on what they should be must rest on considerations of policy and on facts which are not quite relevant to the grant of stage carriage permits.
In any case, it is the State Government which has the data and the legal power, under Section 43(1).of the Act, to fix freights for carriage of postal goods in various types of carriages, mentioned there, including stage carriages.
We 'think that such charges are merely a species of freight on postal goods about which the State Government can issue appropriate directions to the State Transport Authority.
The Regional Transport Authority has only to.
annex the condition auto matically in areas where such a condition may be required to be annexed to the permits granted.
A reference to Section 59, sub.
section (3)(c) would show that acceptance of the fixed rates of fares and freights, after their notification under Section 43, becomes a condi tion which has to be automatically attached to a permit.
The Regional Transport Authority has no option on this matter.
This is what this Court held in section Srikantiah & Ors.
vs The Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur & Ors.(1) In other words, the Regional Transport Authority has to act mainly mechanically after considering matters on which it has to form an opinion and take a decision quasi judicially.
We think that there is no scope for argument that there is any interference here with the quasi judicial functions of the Regional Transport Authority.
The (1) [1971] Supp.
S.C.R. 816.
669 annexation of a condition like this is a part of the purely executive Activities of the Regional Transport Authority.
By Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 4023 of 1976, learned Counsel for the appellant sought to add two further grounds of appeal.
These were: that, the special provisions of Section 49(3)(xv) over ride the general provisions of Section 43(I)(d) (i) on the principle of interpretation 'generalia specialibus non derogant ' : and, that, in view of the special provision of Section 48(3)(xv), the impugned notification of the State Government was ultra vires.
The second ground is what follows if the first is good.
But as we have already explained above, the first ground itself is not sound.
There is no question of any special provision over riding the general.
The provisions are complementary.
Section 48(3)(xv) is really meant to carry out the direction which can legally be given under section 43(1)(d)(i) of the Act.
Therefore, although we allow the miscellaneous applica tion and have permitted the grounds to be argued, we reject them as untenable.
For the reasons given above, we agree with the views contained in the judgment of the Karnataka High Court against which this appeal has been filed.
We hold that the impugned direction and notification by the Government was not invalid and that the Regional Transport Authority had not acted illegally in attaching the required condition to the permit.
Consequently, we dismiss this appeal with M.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The State Government issued a notification u/s 43(1) , directing the State Transport Authority to impose the charge of certain uniform rates of freight upon the operators of stage carriages other than State Transport undertakings, carrying mails or postal goods.
The S.T.A. then directed the Regional Transport Authority, u/s 44(1) of the Act, to impose the duty of carrying the postal goods upon rates fixed by the Government as a condition annexed u/s 48(3)(XV) to permits.
The appellant contended that the power of the Government u/s 43(1) to issue directions relating to "freights", does not include imposition of charges for carrying postal goods as conditions of permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority.
in exercise of its quasi judicial powers.
Dis missing the appeal the Court, HELD: The State Government has the data and the legal power under Section 43(1) of the Act to fix freights for carriage of postal goods in various types of carriages mentioned there, including stage carriages.
Such charges are merely a species of freight on postal goods about which the State Government can issue appropriate directions.
[668 E] (2) Section 48(3) deals with what lies past the quasi judicial stage of decision to grant the permit.
At that stage, the decision to grant the permit is already there and only conditions have to be attached to the permit.
The Regional Transport Authority has, at this stage to act mainly mechanically after considering matters on which it has, acting quasi judicially, formed an opinion and taken a decision.
There is no interference with the quasi judicial functions as the annexation of a condition like.
this is a part of the purely executive duties of the Regional.
Trans port Authority.
[668 D E, 669 A] section Srikantiah & Ors.
vs The Regional Transport Author ity, Anantapur & Ors followed.
(3) There is no question of any special provision over riding the general.
The provisions are complementary.
Section 48(3)(XV) is really meant to carry out the direc tions which can legally be given under section 43( 1 )(d)(i) of the Act.
[669 B C]