judgement:
Civil appeal No.387(N) of 1981 .
From the Judgment and order dated 11.2.1980 of the High Court of Calcutta in Appeal from Original order No. 588 & 594179.
Gobind Das and R.P. Singh for the Appellant.
O.P. Sharma, R.C. Gubrel and R.K. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.
This appeal by special leave raises a question as to whether the appellant upon his transfer from the North Eastern Railway, at his own request, to the South Eastern Railway was entitled under r. 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual, to be placed in the seniority list below the existing confirmed and officiating staff in the relevant grade and not below the temporary staff.
Put very shortly, the essential facts are these.
The appellant was holding the substantive post of a Clerk in the Commercial Department of the North Eastern Railway w.e.f.
May 22, 1956 and had applied for his transfer to the South Eastern Railway in the same post.
On October 15, 1958, he was transferred from the North Eastern Railway, at his own request, to the South Eastern Railway and was posted at the Sealdah Division on his existing pay and scale against an existing vacancy.
In 1967, the seniority list of the Clerks in the Sealdah Division was prepared by the South Eastern Railway and in that list the appellant was placed below the temporary staff.
Immediately upon his being placed below the temporary staff, the appellant made two representations, one dated March 4, 1967 and the other dated April 11, 1967, in the matter complaining that he could not be placed below the temporary staff, but without any avail.
Finding that there was no redressal of the wrong done to him, the appellant sent a reminder to the Chief Personnel Officer by name dated December 21, 1973.
The Chief Personnel Officer by his communication dated October 19, 1974, informed the appellant that his representation was rejected On April 30, 1975, the appellant moved the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ, direction or order in the matter 21 of his inter se seniority, and the High Court issued a rule nisi.
A During the pendency of that rule, respondents Nos. 7 to 45 arrayed in that petition whom the appellant considered to be junior to him were promoted to a higher post.
On August 10, 1976, the appellant filed another petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging their promotion.
On the same day, the High Court issued a rule nisi and also directed that the South Eastern Railway would be at liberty to confirm respondents nos.
7 to 45 in their post of promotion but such confirmation would be subject to the result of the rule.
In view of the interim order passed by the High Court, the Chief Personnel Officer by his letter dated October 10, 1976 clarified.
"The above promotion orders arc issued on provisional basis subject to result of the rule obtained by Sri Arun Kumar Chatterjee, Clerk CCS (Refunds) Office, in the Hon 'ble High Court at Calcutta.
" A learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated February 9, 1979 following the decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Lal Mohan Paul v The General Manager.
Eastern Railway, Calcutta & Ors.(l) held that in pursuance of r. 312 the relative seniority of the appellant was governed by the Railway Board 's Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 and not by its subsequent circular dated December 31, 1966,.
The learned Single Judge accordingly set aside the impugned order of the Chief Personnel Officer, South Eastern Railway dated October 7, 1974 and ordered that the Railway Administration should re fix his seniority below all permanent and officiating Clerks on the date of his transfer in the Sealdah Division of the South Eastern Railway but above the temporary Clerks in that Division.
He further directed that the appellant would be entitled to promotion w.e.f.
such date as he was eligible for such promotion according to the seniority so fixed.
The General Manager, South Eastern Railway preferred an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
A Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated February 11, 1980 while upholding the view expressed by the learned Single Judge as to the construction and effect of r. 312 of the Manual, held that the Circular No. 1565A (1) Civil Rule No. 620 (W)/70 dated April 23, 1974.
22 dated January 31, 1950 governed by the inter se seniority of the appellant.
It however observed that due to inordinate delay on his part in moving the Court, there was no justification for interfering with the promotions already made of respondents nos.
7 to 45 and made the following direction: "In the circumstances, we do not think that we shall be justified in interfering with the promotions granted to the respondents.
We, however, feel that the appellants should have placed the respondent No. I in the seniority list above the temporary staff.
The Board 's circular may be given effect to in the case of the transfer which had taken place after the date of the said Circular, but before that date we find no justification why in the face of Rule 312 the respondent No. 1 should not have been given the proper security by placing him above the temporary staff.
In our opinion.
The respondent No. 1 should be placed immediately below the Remaining respondents in FMA 588 of 1979, the seniority list. 'I he judgment of the learned Judge is modified to the extent indicated above.
" It accordingly modified the judgment and order of the learned Judge to the extent indicated above.
We have set out the facts at some length.
It would appear from these facts that there was no delay, much less inordinate delay, on the part of the appellant in filing the petition under article 226 of the Constitution for the protection of his right as to inter se seniority.
Earlier, he had made three representations to the departmental authorities in the matter without any redress.
If the attention of the learned Judges had been drawn to these facts, they would not have made the aforesaid modification.
It is, however, argued that the order of posting on transfer communicated by the Chief Personnel Officer dated October 14, 1958 specifically stated that the seniority of the appellant would be counted from the date of his posting below all permanent and temporary Clerks.
In his supple mentary rejoinder, the appellant has controverted this there is nothing on record to show that the said order of posting was ever communicated to him.
Rule 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual reads as follows: 23 "Transfer on request Seniority of Railway Servants transferred on their own request from one Railway to another should be allowed below that of the existing confirmed/officiating railway servants in the relevant grade in the promotion group in the new establishment irrespective of the date of confirmation or length of officiating service of the transferred railway servant.
" We may then set out the two circulars issued by the Railway Board explaining the purport and effect of r. 312.
Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 was explanatory and, insofar as material, reads: "On transfer at the employee 's own request or to save his own interests his position should be at the bottom of the seniority list of all permanent, employees of his grade, if he is permanent, and at the bottom of the whole list of employees (both permanent and temporary) in his grade, if he is temporary.
" The Railway Board 's subsequent circular dated December 31, 1966 sought to clarify that the term 'officiating ' in r. 312 includes temporary staff as well and that an employee transferred at his own request to a new establishment should be placed at the bottom of the seniority list in his relevant grade in that establishment.
It Provides: "It has been brought to the notice of the Railway Board that the orders contained in their letter No. E55SR6/3 dated 19.5.55 have been interpreted by your administration so as to exclude temporary staff from the purview of the term officiating staff, occurring therein.
The Board desire to point out that the term officiating ' occurring in Board 's letter dated 19.5.1955 includes temporary staff as well.
That is to say that an employee transferred at his own request to a new establishment should be placed at the bottom of the seniority list in the relevant grade in that Establishment .
" There can be no doubt on the terms of r. 312 of the Manual read with Railway Board 's Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 that the appellant having been transferred, at his own request, from one railway to another, had to be placed below all the existing 24 confirmed and officiating staff in the relevant grade, irrespective of the date of his confirmation or the length of his service.
The appellant on the date of his transfer i.e. On October 15, 1958 was not governed by the Railway Board 's Circular dated December 31, 1966.
In Lal Mohan Paul 's case, supra, Anil Kumar Sen, J. in a case where a railway employee was transferred on September 30, 1959, at his own request, from one railway to another held that he was governed by the Railway Board 's Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 and not by the subsequent circulars and therefore was entitled to be placed in the seniority list below the existing confirmed and officiating staff in the relevant grade and not below the temporary staff.
We uphold the view expressed by Sen J. in Lal Mohan Paul 's case, supra.
That apart, the Railway Board 's interpretation in the aforesaid Circular dated December 31, 1966, of the term 'officiating ' in r. 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual, as including both officiating as well as temporary staff, was apparently wrong.
According to its ordinary connotation, the word 'officiating ' is generally used when a servant having held one post permanently or substantively, is appointed to a post in a higher rank, but not permanently or substantively while still retaining his lien on his substantive post i.e. Officiating in that post till his confirmation.
Such officiating appointment may be made where there is a temporary vacancy in a higher post due to the death or retirement of the incumbent or otherwise In contrast, the word 'temporary ' usually denotes a person appointed in the civil service for the first time and the appointment is not permanent but temporary i.e. for the time being, with no right to the post.
We find no justification for the attitude adopted by the Rail way Administration in depriving the appellant of his legitimate rights.
Loss of seniority of a Government servant with consequent lose of promotional prospects, higher pay and emoluments is a matter of serious consequence to him.
When the appellant by his representations drew the attention of the departmental authorities to the injustice done to him, it was their duty to have rectified the mistake and re fixed the seniority of the appellant.
It was precisely to meet a situation of this kind that the Railway Board 's Circular dated October 16, 1964 was issued.
To provides that if a person has been promoted but not on the date on which he should have been promoted due to some administrative error then the employee should be assigned correct seniority vis a vis his juniors 25 already promoted irrespective of the date of promotion.
It further provides that the pay of such employee in higher grade on promotion will be fixed proforma at the stage which he would have reached if he had been promoted at the proper time.
There was no reason for the Railway Administration to have deprived the appellant of the benefit of the aforesaid circular, particularly in view of the decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Lal Mohan Paul 's case, supra.
The result therefore is that the appeal must succeed and is allowed with costs throughout.
The order passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court making a modification in the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the appellant is restored.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed .

summary:
Rule 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual provides that seniority of railway servants transferred on their own request from one railway to another should be allowed below that of the existing confirmed officiating railway servants in the relevant grade.
To explain the purport and effect of r. 312, the Railway Board ' issued a Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 which provided that on transfer at the employee 's own request his position should be at the bottom of the seniority list of all permanent employees of his grade, if he is permanent and at the bottom of the whole list of permanent and temporary employees if he is temporary.
The Railway Board 's subsequent Circular dt.
31st Dec. 1966 sought to clarify that the term 'officiating ' in Rule 312 includes temporary staff as well.
The appellant, who was holding a substantive post of a clerk in the Northern Eastern Railway was transferred on October 15, 1958 on his own request to The South eastern Railway and was posted at the Sealdah Division.
He was however placed below the temporary staff, namely, respondents 7 to 45 in the seniority list of the clerks in the Sealdah Division prepared he the respondent Southern Eastern Railway in 1967.
After rejection of his two representations in the year 1967 and a reminder to the Chief Personnel Officer dated December 21, 1973 against the wrong fixation of his inter se seniority, he filed a writ petition in the High Court on 30th April 1975 challenging the said seniority list.
The learned Single Judge held that in pursuance of Rule 312, the relevant seniority of the appellant was governed by the Railway BOARD 'S Circular No. 1565A and not by its subsequent Circular dated December 31, 1966, and ordered the Railway Administration to refix his seniority below all permanent 19 ent and officiating clerks on the date of his transfer in the Sealdah Division, but above the temporary clerks in that Division with consequential benefits.
On appeal by the respondent the Division Bench upheld the view of the learned single Judge but, observed that due to inordinate delay on the part of the appellant in moving the court, there was no justification for interfering with the promotions already made of respondents No. 7 to 45 and ordered that he should be placed immediately below the remaining respondents.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: (1) It would appear from the facts that there was no delay, much less inordinate delay, on the part of the appellant in filing the petition under article 226 of the Constitution for the protection of his right as to inter se seniority.
In fact, he had made three representations in the matter but without any redress [22E F] (2) There can be DO doubt on the terms of r. 312 of the Manual road with Railway Board 's Circular No. 1565A dated January 31, 1950 that the appellant had to be placed below all the existing confirmed and officiating staff in the relevant grade, irrespective of the date of his confirmation or the length of his service.
He was not governed by the Railway Board 's Circular dated December 31, 1966 on the date of his transfer.
[23H; 24A] (3) According to the ordinary connotation, the word 'officiating ' is generally used when a servant having held one post permanently or substantively, is appointed to a post in a higher rank, but not permanently or substantively, while still retaining his lien on his substantive post i.e. officiating in That post till his Confirmation.
In contrast, the word 'temporary ' usually denotes a person appointed in the civil service for the first time and the appointment is not permanent but temporary i.e. for the time being, with no right to the post.
Therefore, the Railway Board 's interpretation in the aforesaid Circular dated December 31, 1966 of the 'officiating ' in r. 312 of the Railway Establishment Manual, as including both officiating as well as temporary staff, was apparently wrong.
[24D E] (4) The Railway Board 's Circular dated October ],1964 also provides that if a person has been promoted not on the date on which he should have been promoted to some administrative error then the employee should assigned correct seniority vis a vis his juniors already promoted irrespective of the date of promotion and the the pay of such employee in higher grade on promotion be fixed proforma at the stage which he would have reached if he bad been promoted at the proper time Was no reason for the Railway Administration to have deprived the appellant of the benefit of the aforesaid circular, particularly in view of an earlier decision of the High Court in Lal Mohan Paul 's case.
[24H; 25A B] Lal Mohan Paul vs The General Manager, Eastern Railway, Calcutta & Ors Civil Rule No. 620 (W)/70 dated April 23 1974 approved. 20


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 1984.
Appeal by Special leave from the judgement and order dated the 28th July, 1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Misc.
No. 1472 M/82.
K.C Dua and S.K. Bagga for the Appellant.
Frank Anthony and Sushil Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
Special leave granted.
One Nohar Chand, the respondent herein, was carrying on 841 business of manufacturing fertilisers at Ludhiana under the name and style of M/s Varinder Agro Chemicals (India).
One inspector designated as Fertiliser Inspector visited the premises of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, Kapurthala ( 'agent ' for short) on December 12, 1978 and obtained a sample of the fertiliser manufactured by Nohar Chand which was being marketed by the agent.
The sample was obtained for the purpose of analysis to ascertain whether it conformed to the prescribed standard.
On analysis it was found to be sub standard.
The Chief Agricultural Officer, Kapurthala filed a criminal complaint being C.C. No. 156 C of 1980 on December 24, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two partners of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, one Raj Shetty and respondent Nohar Chand Gupta, the manufacturer of sub standard fertiliser u/s 13 A of the read with Section 13(1)(a) of the Fertilisers Control Order, 1957.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate framed the charge against all the accused for the aforementioned offence.
On July 20, 1981 respondent Nohar Chand moved an application before the learned Magistrate praying that he be discharged and the proceedings be dropped against him on the ground that the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala had no territorial jurisdiction to try him because he carried on business of manufacture of fertilisers at Ludhiana.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate following the decision of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat vs Agro Chemicals discharged the respondent and dropped the proceedings against him.
The State of Punjab preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 48 of 1981 in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala who by his judgment and order dated February 13, 1982 set aside the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate holding that in view of the provisions contained in Section 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala had jurisdiction to try the respondent along with the other co accused.
Thereupon the respondent preferred a revision petition being Criminal Misc.
No. 1473 M of 1982 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court held that in view of the decision in Satinder Singh and Ors.
vs State of Punjab which accepted the view taken by the Gujarat High Court, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was in error in interfering with the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and that the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 842 Kapurthala had no jurisdiction to try Nohar Chand, the manufacturer.
Accordingly the revision application was allowed and the decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was set aside and the one by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was restored.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
The allegation against the respondent was that he manufactured sub standard fertiliser and through his marketing agents M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, Kapurthala marketed the same.
The offence was disclosed when the Fertiliser Inspector took a sample of the substandard fertiliser from the marketing agents at Kapurthala.
It is an admitted position that the respondent who is the manufacturer carries on his business of manufacturing fertilisers at Ludhiana.
The question posed is: whether the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala where the marketing agents of sub standard fertiliser manufactured by the respondent marketed the same, will have jurisdiction to try the respondent, the manufacturer of the sub standard fertiliser along with the marketing agents.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court following the decision in Satinder Singh 's case held that the manufacturer of sub standard fertiliser cannot be tried where the commodity was being marketed.
The view taken by the High Court with respect is wholly untenable in law.
But before examining the legal position subsequent development of law in the same High Court on this very point may be noticed.
To begin with, let it be pointed out that the decision against which the present appeal is being heard was quoted before another learned Single Judge of the same High Court and as the learned Single Judge had grave doubt about the correctness of the view taken by the learned Judge in this case, he referred the matter for authoritative pronouncement to a larger bench of the same High Court.
This referred matter: Incharge Production, Haryana State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. (HAFED) Fertilizer vs State of Punjab came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court.
The Division Bench referred to the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in this case and clearly disapproved it and in terms overruled it.
Simultaneously it also overruled the decision in Satinder Singh 's case which the learned Judge had followed in this case.
It can be safely said that the larger 843 bench of the High Court has disapproved the view taken by the learned Judge in this case.
The respondent, the manufacturer of the sub standard fertiliser is to be tried alongwith those who marketed the sub standard fertiliser manufactured by him as his agents.
The question is whether the court where the sub standard fertiliser is marketed would have jurisdiction to try the manufacturer of the sub standard fertiliser whose manufacturing activity is at a different place.
This very argument was posed before the Division Bench of the High Court.
The High Court after referring to Sections 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 held that the court where sub standard fertiliser was found to be marketed will have the jurisdiction to try the manufacturer of sub standard fertiliser even if the manufacturing activity is at an entirely different place.
The Division Bench held that the manufacturer as well as the dealer can be tried at a place where the consequences of the manufacturing and selling of sub standard fertiliser had ensued as envisaged in Sections 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
That in our opinion appears to be the correct view in law.
Section 179 provides that when an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.
Section 180 provides that where an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done.
Now if manufacturing sub standard fertiliser is by itself an offence and marketing the sub standard fertiliser is itself a distinct offence but they are so inter connected as cause and effect, both can be tried at one or the other place.
If one manufactures the sub standard fertiliser, wherever it is marketed the inter relation or casual connection is of cause and effect.
The situation will be adequately covered by Secs.
179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
We are in agreement with the later decision of the Division Bench rendered on March 9, 1983 that the court where the sub standard fertiliser is being marketed will equally have the 844 jurisdiction to try the manufacturer of sub standard fertiliser.
This is so obvious that any further discussion appears to us to be superfluous.
Mr. Frank Anthony, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent urged that the concurring decision of Alagiriswami, J. in Bhagwandas Jagdish Chander vs Delhi Administration would clearly show that the manufacture of an adulterated article of food and selling the same cannot be said to be part and parcel of the same transaction and that unless therefore the complaint shows that the sample of fertiliser was taken from a bag of fertiliser as delivered by the manufacturer, it is distinctly possible that adulteration may have taken place on a subsequent occasion and therefore one cannot infer manufacture of sub standard fertiliser from it being so marketed when the sample was taken from the marketing agency.
This approach overlooks the fact that the trial is yet to be held.
One can envisage two situations.
When a sample of fertiliser is taken from a bag which was in the same condition as delivered by the manufacturer and it was in possession of a marketing agent manufacture and sale of sub standard fertiliser would constitute indisputably one transaction.
But this is predicated upon the facts which may be disclosed in the trial and proved.
In Bhagwandas Jagdish Chander 's case, the allegation was that the appellant before the court sold ghee to a vendor which was on analysis found to be adulterated and both were jointly tried under Section 7 read with Sec. 16 of the .
In the course of trial, the purchaser of ghee wanted warrantor to be discharged so that he can be examined as a defence witness to prove his own purchase of the offending article.
This application was granted and the warrantor was acquitted.
After the acquittal of the warrantor, the learned Magistrate impleaded the manufacturer Mr. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain under section 20 A of the .
An appeal was preferred by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi against the acquittal of the warrantor and the other accused.
The High Court maintained the acquittal of Lakshmi Narain but set aside the acquittal of warrantor.
That is how the matter came up to this Court.
We fail to see how this decision can at all help the respondent in this case.
However, reliance was placed on one observation in the concurring judgment of Alagiriswami, J. which reads as under: 845 "It would be noticed that while the charge states that the sample of ghee purchased from Lakshmi Narain was found to be adulterated, there is no allegation that the ghee sold by the appellant to Lakshmi Narain was adulterated.
While it may be readily conceded that the common object or common intention or unity of purpose between the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor was to sell the article of food sold, it is not said that it was to sell the adulterated article of food.
" At a later stage, it is observed that 'the validity of the charge has to be decided on the facts put forward as the prosecution case.
If it is not established against anyone of them that the article of food manufacture, distributed or sold by him was adulterated that person will be acquitted, not because the charge was not valid or was defective but because there was no proof to substantiate the charge.
But without that allegation there cannot be said to be a unity of purpose or common object or common intention on the part of all of them who manufacture, distribute or sell the adulterated food. ' It was further observed that "the manufacture, distribution and sale of adulterated ghee would be the same transaction if it was found to be adulterated at all the three stages.
Otherwise it only means that they were all same transaction only in the sense that the common object of all of them is the selling of the ghee.
" How the extracted observation in any way helps the respondent passes comprehension.
Firstly, the question of jurisdiction of the court trying the offender was never raised in that case.
And here the respondent was discharged on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
Secondly, the decision proceeded on the facts of the case as would be evident from the extracted passage which recites the charge.
That aspect does not figure in this case.
Let it be made clear that no affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent in this Court, nor the complaint was read over to us.
And the case proceeds on the averments not presently disputed.
Therefore in this case we are left with the allegations as found in the judgment of the High Court and the learned Additional Sessions Judge and it clearly establishes that where the marketing agent of the manufacturer of fertiliser which is found to be sub standard is being prosecuted for marketing sub standard fertiliser, the manufacturer can be tried with him and the court where the substandard fertiliser was marketed will have jurisdiction to try them both.
846 Therefore the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
This was the only point in this appeal and as it clearly transpired that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is restored.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The respondent was carrying on business of manufacturing fertilizers at Ludhiana under the name and style of Messrs Varinder Agro Chemicals (India) and marketed his product through his agent Messrs Sachdeva Enterprises Kapurthala.
On finding the sample collected by a Fertilizer Inspector from the said agent on December 12, 1978 to be of sub standard, quality the Chief Agricultural officer, Kapurthala filed a criminal complaint being CC No. 156 C of 1980 on December 24, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two partners of Messrs Sachdeva Enterprises and the Respondent under section 13A of the read with section 13(1) (a) of the Fertilizers Control order 1957.
On July 20, 1981 respondent moved an application before the trial court praying that he be discharged and the proceedings be dropped against him on the ground that the Kapurthala Court had no territorial jurisdiction to try him because he carried on business of manufacture of fertilizers at Ludhiana.
Relying no the decision of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat vs Agro Chemicals etc.
(1980 Cr. L. J. p. 516) the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate discharged the respondent and dropped the proceedings against him.
The Criminal Revn.
Application No. 48 of 1981 filed by the State of Punjab was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kapurthala holding that in view of the provisions of Section 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Kapurthala Court had jurisdiction to try the Respondent along with the other co accused.
Thereupon the respondent preferred a revision petition being Crl.
No. in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court relying on the decision of that Court in Satinder Singh and Ors.
vs State af Punjab, Crl.
Appln.
No. 1158 M/1981 dated 24 2 1982 which accepted the view taken by the Gujarat High Court, allowed the revision petition and set aside the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge.
Hence the State Appeal by Special Leave of the Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court 840 ^ HELD: 1.
The Court in whose jurisdiction sub standard fertilizer was found to be marketed will have the jurisdiction to try manufacturer of sub standard fertilizer even if the manufacturing activity is at an entirely different place.
The manufacturer as well as the dealer can be tried at a place where the consequences of the manufacturing and selling of sub standard fertilizer had ensued as envisaged in sections 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
[in] 1: 2.
Now if manufacturing sub standard fertilizer is by itself an offence and marketing the sub standard fertilizer is itself a distinct offence but they are so inter connected as cause and effect, both can be tried at one or the other place.
If one manufacturers the sub standard fertilizer, wherever it is marketed the inter relation or casual connection is of cause and effect.
The situation will be adequately covered by sections 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
[843G H] Incharge Production, Haryana State Coopt.
Supply And Marketing Federation Ltd. (HAFED) Fertilizer vs State of Punjab; Crl.
No. 6763 M of 1982 decided by the High Court on 9 3 1983 approved.
Where a sample of fertilizer is taken from a bag which was in the same condition as delivered by the manufacturer and it was in possession of a marketing agent manufacture and sale of sub standard fertilizer would constitute indisputably one transaction.
But this is predicated upon the facts which may be disclosed in the trial and proved.
[844D E] Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander vs Delhi Administration [1975] Supp.
S.C.R 30, distinguished.


judgement:
CIVIL Appeals Nos.
2498 2500 of 1978.
From the Judgement and Order dated 15th November, 1978 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in O.T.C. No. 381: 182 and 881 of 1976.
Shanti Bhushan and P. N. Misra for the appellants.
L. N. Sinha, R. K. Mehta and A. P. Mohanty, for the Respondents.
4 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J.
These three appeals are directed against the common judgment rendered by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in three writ petitions styled as C.J.C. No. 38 i, 182 and 881, all of 1976 moved by the appellants in these appeals.
A common question of law permeates these three appeals and therefore, factual matrix will be extracted from C. A. No. 2499/78 filed by one Mr. Ashutosh Swain as representative of the facts necessary for disposal of these appeals.
State Transport Authority, Orissa issued an advertisement dated June 24, 1974 inviting applications in the prescribed form for endorsement in the permit of the motor cabs or omnibuses enabling the holders of the permit to ply the vehicle as a tourist vehicle with all India operation.
In other words, applications were invited from the operators for all India tourist permit.
The last date for receiving the applications was July 13, 1974 In response to the advertisement number of intending operators including the appellants in these appeals submitted their applications for grant of all India tourist permit to the concerned authority within time.
The State Transport Authority processed these applications and disposed of the applications at its meeting held on Feb. 2, 1975.
The appellants herein were granted all India tourist permits for omnibus with passenger capacity not exceeding 29.
Some of She applicants who failed to obtain a permit filed three appeals being M. V.
Appeals Nos. 15, 16 and 17, all of 1975 to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( 'Appellate Tribunal ' for short) under Sec. 64 (2) of the (Act for short).
The Appellate Tribunal dismissed all the appeals and confirmed the order made by the State Transport Authority granting all India tourist permits to the appellants.
The writ petitions came to be filed by three unsuccessful applicants for permit questioning the correctness of the order granting the permit and dismissal of their appeals division Bench of the High Court by a common judgment allowed all the three writ petitions quashing and setting aside the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as well as the State Transport Authority.
Consequently these appellants surrendered their permits.
Hence these three appeals by special leave.
During the pendency of these appeals, appellants were granted temporary tourist permits in compliance with the interim orders made by this Court.
5 Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel who led on behalf of the appellants urged that the High Court erred in holding that only the holder of an existing contract carriage permit alone was eligible to make an application for endorsement of his existing permit enabling the permit holder to ply a tourist vehicle on all India operation, and consequently quashing the all India tourist permits granted to the appellants on the sole ground that the appellants did not have or hold existing contract carriage permit.
It was next contended that the High Court was further in error in holding that the applications made by the appellants were incomplete as some of the columns were found blank.
It was further submitted that the High Court was in error in relying upon sub rules (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of the Orissa Tourist Vehicles Rules, 1967 (1967 Rules for short) because the concept of all India tourist permit received for the first time a legal format on the introduction of sub section
(7) in Sec. 63 of the Act by Amending Act 56 of 1969 which came into force on October 1, 1970.
The scheme of the forbids an owner of a transport vehicle to use or permit the use of a vehicle in any public place (whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passenger or goods) save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by the authority therein mentioned authorising the use of the vehicle in the place and in the manner in which the vehicle is to be used.
The expression 'transport vehicle ' is termed in Sec. 2 (33) of the Act to mean 'a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. 'Public service vehicle ' is defined in Sec. 2 (25) of the Act to mean 'any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage '.
Thus the scheme of the Act envisages three kinds of permits in respect of a public service vehicle, namely, permit for the use of motor cab or a permit to use an omnibus for contract carriage or a permit to use the same as a stage carriage.
46 provides for application to be made for stage carriage permit.
The holder of a stage carriage permit can use the vehicle to carry passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey.
The second kind of permit in respect of a public service vehicle is the one contemplated by Sec. 49 and styled as 'contract carriage permit. ' A vehicle in respect of which there is a contract carriage permit can be used for carrying passengers for hire or reward under a contract express or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate 6 of sum (i) on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance, or (ii) from one point to another, and in either case without stopping to pick up, or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract, and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares.
By the Amending Act 56 of 1969, a concept of a tourist permit for a tourist vehicle was introduced in the Act. 'Tourist vehicle ' is defined in Sec. 2 (29A) to mean 'a contract carriage constructed or adapted and equipped and maintained in accordance with such specification as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in that behalf.
By the same Amending Act, sub s (7) of Sec. 63 was introduced enabling State Transport Authority of any State to grant permits valid for the whole or any part of India, in respect of such number of tourist vehicles as the Central Government may, in respect of that State, specify in this behalf, and such applications have to be dealt with according to the provisions of Sections 49, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 59 A, 60, 61 and 64.
Section 44 confers power on the State Government to set up such transport authorities in the State being State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authority.
The State Transport Authority will have its jurisdiction over the whole State and the State will be divided into various regions in respect of which a Regional Transport Authority will be specified Any one desiring to obtain either a stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit has to apply to the Regional Transport Authority in whose jurisdiction the vehicle is sought to be operated.
63 provides that permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any region shall not be valid in any other region unless the permit has been counter signed by the Regional Transport Authority of that region and a permit granted in one P State shall not be valid in any other State unless counter signed by the State Transport Authority of that other State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned This scheme of law would manifestly reveal that a permit without the necessary counter signatures as hereinabove indicated, enabling the permit holder to have the whole of India as its area of operation was unknown to the Act.
By introduction of sub sec.
(7) in Sec. 63, the concept of a permit to be granted by State Transport Authority of a State within the limits of the quota prescribed by the Central Government which would enable the holder of the permit to operate in the whole of India, was introduced.
For the sake of brevity, this permit is described as all India tourist permit.
7 Sub sec.
(7) of Sec. 63 provides that for obtaining such a permit as envisaged therein which enables the holder of such a permit to ply vehicle as a tourist vehicle in the whole of India has to make an application to the State Transport Authority constituted for the State under Sec. 44.
The underlying object for creating this new class of permit was to promote tourism.
If a tourist vehicle is hired by a tourist party for moving from State to State, the vehicle cannot be taken to another State from the place of commencement of journey unless a valid contract carriage permit of that State is obtained or the existing permit is counter signed.
This would impede tourism causing inconvenience to the tourists.
To remove this barrier, Parliament introduced sub sec.
(7) in Sec. 63 envisaging a new kind of permit to be granted by the State Transport Authority of the State within the prescribed quota which would enable the, holder of the permit to ply the tourist vehicle in the whole or any part of India.
The impediment in the free flow of tourist traffic was sought to be suitably removed by this provision.
Sub sec.
(7) of Sec. 63 further provided that an application for such a permit has to be made to the State Transport Authority from whom the permit is sought to be obtained.
The State Transport Authority has to process the application in the manner prescribed in the sections set out in sub s.(7), which amongst others includes Sec.
provides for making an application for a contract carriage permit.
Therefore, an all India tourist permit is primarily a contract carriage permit but while the ordinary contract carriage permit can be granted by the Regional Transport Authority, for operation within local jurisdiction, or when countersigned by Regional Transport Authority of adjacent area in more than that one such jurisdiction but not at any rate outside the State and not in any case on an all India basis.
To this extent, an ordinary contract carriage permit differs from an all India tourist permit but an all India tourist permit is none the less a contract carriage permit.
50 prescribes the procedure for processing an application for contract carriage permit.
51 confers power on the Regional Transport Authority to grant contract carriage permit.
Sub section
(7) of Sec. 63 on the other hand confers power on the State Transport Authority to grant an all India tourist permit which in effect is a contract carriage permit but which permits plying of tourist vehicle throughout India.
Even for obtaining such a permit, Sec.
51 will apply with this modification that the application for all India tourist permit has to be made to State Transport Authority of the State in which the permit is sought.
Such an application may be further 8 processed according to the provision contained in Sec. 57 which prescribes procedure for applying and granting permit.
58 prescribes duration of a permit and renewal of it.
59 sets out general conditions attaching to all permits.
59 A prescribes general form of permits.
60 confers power on the authority granting the permit to cancel or suspend permits.
61 makes the permit heritable on the death of the holder and Sec. 64 provides for appeals against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority.
An Application for an all India tourist permit has to be processed in accordance with provisions contained in sections set out herein above.
A resume of the relevant provisions and a brief outline of the Scheme of the Act sheds light on the concept of an all India tourist permit.
This scheme of law nowhere expressly or by necessary implication suggests that an applicant for an all India tourist permit must of necessity or as a pre requisite have a contract carriage permit which alone can be endorsed for the purpose of all India operation.
Sub s.(7) of Sec. 63, if read thus would render nugatory the affirmative provision that on a proper application being made and legally processed, the State Transport Authority can grant an all India tourist permit.
If sub section
(7) of Sec.
63 is read as interpreted by the High Court, one will have to redraft the section to read that the holder of a contract carriage permit may apply for an all India tourist permit.
There is no warrant for reading the section like this.
Undoubtedly, an application for an all India tourist permit has to be made under Sec. 49 which prescribes procedure for obtaining a contract carriage permit This ought to be so because in substance an all India tourist permit is none the less a contract carriage permit but with a much wider area of operation.
That however, does not permit an inference that before obtaining an all India tourist permit, the intending operator must obtain a contract carriage permit from the Regional Transport Authority and then get it endorsed from the State Transport Authority to make it valid for the whole or any part of India.
Sub section
(7) of Sec.
63 does not speak of any endorsement on permit.
It speaks of granting a permit.
Endorsement may be another mode of enlarging the area of Operational But that is not contemplated by sub section
(7) of Sec. 63.
It speaks of granting a permit valid for the whole or any part of India When granted by a State Transport Authority in exercise of the power conferred by Sub Sec.
(7) of Sec. 63 without any further endorsement of any other authority.
Therefore, with respect, the High Court was not right in observing that 'it is clear from the 9 aforesaid provision of the rules and Schedule I that an holder of a permit issued in the State in relation to a motor cab or an omnibus is only competent to apply to the State Transport Authority for endorsement on that permit to the effect that the vehicle to which the permit relates is a tourist vehicle. ' There is nothing in sub section
(7) of Sec 63 to warrant this construction.
The High Court unfortunately did not look at the substantive provision enacted in sub section
(7) of Sec. 63, did not analyse it to ascertain its width and content but merely referred to rules which would be presently shown to be not applicable and reached the conclusion on the meaning of sub section
(7) of Sec. 63 without reference to it.
The High Court referred to sub.
(2), (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of 1967 Rules.
Rule 3 confers power on the State Transport Authority to endorse any permit granted in the State in relation to any motor cab or omnibus to the effect that the vehicle to which the permit relates is an all India tourist vehicle.
Sub rule (2) provides that 'any person who holds a permit issued in the State in relation to a motor cab or an omnibus may apply in the forms specified in Schedule I, to the State Transport Authority for an endorsement on the permit to the effect that the vehicle to which the permit relates is a tourist vehicle. ' Sub rule (3) provides that an application under sub rule (2) shall be made in the manner provided therein and within the time limit prescribed therein.
Sub rule (4) provides for the procedure before granting the necessary endorsement.
Having referred to these three sub rules, the High Court held that there must, be a pre existing contract carriage permit granted in the State which alone can be endorsed subsequently as an all India tourist permit.
These rules were enacted in the year 1967 and were put into operation on 19/20 June, 1967.
They were enacted in exercise of the power conferred by Sec.
68 of the .
68 confers powers on a State Government to make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Chapter IV.
These rules were made at a time when the only way to enlarge the area of operation in respect of a permit was endorsement by various authorities on the original permit granted by a Transport Authority.
All India tourist permit was not conceptualised by the time 1967 Rules were framed.
All India tourist permit as contemplated by sub section
(7) of Sec.
63 was not on the statute book at the time when these rules were enacted.
Therefore, the rules at the relevant time caters to a situation when the area of operation 10 specified in a contract carriage permit could be enlarged by endorsement by authority other than The grantor.
The concept of all India tourist permit without any necessity of any endorsement by any authority save and except the grantor was then not known to law.
In order to avoid endorsements by various authorities so as to enlarge the area of operation of a contract carriage permit and with avowed object of facilitating unimpeded free from of tourist traffic, the concept of all India tourist permit was introduced with effect from October 1, 1970.
It also introduced a new type of vehicle specified as tourist vehicle.
The aforementioned rules enacted in June 1967 when an all India tourist permit not necessitating any endorsement save the grant of it by the State Transport Authority and the concept of a tourist vehicle were foreign to the cannot be held to apply unless a provision to that effect was made in the substantive enactment conferring power on the State Transport Authority to grant an all India tourist permit which needs no endorsement for operation throughout India.
One cannot read the concept of endorsement envisaged in the 1967 Rules in respect of a permit that can be granted as an all India tourist permit under sub s.(7) of Sec. 63 of the Act by insisting upon, as per the scheme of rules a pre existing contract carriage permit which alone can be endorsed.
Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that these rules were not at all attracted while considering the applications for all India tourist permit made by the appellants under sub section
(7) of Sec. 63.
The High Court with respect fell into another error when it failed to take notice of the advertisement issued by the State Transport Authority on June 24, 1974 inviting applications for permits in respect of omnibus authorising it to ply as an all India tourist vehicle in the prescribed form.
Two prescribed forms were annexed to the advertisement.
The High Court overlooked the first form and only took notice of the second form.
The first form was meant for those who had no existing contract carriage permit and were applying straightway for the first time for an all India tourist permit.
The form itself shows that the application had to be made to the State Transport Authority for a contract carriage permit with an all India operation.
There was another form which catered to the needs of the holder of the existing contract carriage permits who wanted the area of operation to be enlarged by converting an ordinary contract carriage permit into all India tourist permit.
After referring to the second form, the High Court found fault with the applica 11 tions made by the present appellants by observing that some of the columns were left blank.
For a .
fresh applicant who had no existing contract carriage permit, the blanks could not have been filled in.
This is another unfortunate error in which the High Court fell while granting a writ of certiorari quashing the order under which permits were granted to the applicants.
Having thus examined the various aspects which appealed to the High Court in reversing the decision granting all India tourist permit to the appellants, we are of the opinion that none of them can be sustained.
Firstly, it was not necessary that the applicants for an all India tourist permit must have a pre existing contract carriage permit which alone could be endorsed so as to convert it into an all India tourist permit.
Secondly, the applications of the appellants for all relevant information were complete and the blanks were irrelevant and lastly sub rules (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 3 had absolutely no application to the proceedings of the State Transport Authority held for consideration of applications for all India tourist permit and granting them to the appellants.
These were the grounds on which the High Court reversed the decision of the State Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
But as these reasons are unsustainable, these appeals will have to be allowed.
Accordingly these three appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the decision of the State Transport Authority granting all India tourist permits to the appellants is restored.
As the appellants surrendered their all India tourist permits when they lost in the High Court and they plied their vehicles on temporary permits, it must be held that if the duration of the original permits has expired, they have to make a fresh application for all India tourist permit but in that event they will be treated as applications for renewal of all India tourist permit as contemplated by Sec.
58 of the Act and not as fresh applications under Sec.
63(7) read with Sec.
the appeals are accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeals allowed.

summary:
In response to an advertisement dated 25th June, 1974 issued by the State Transport Authority, Orissa inviting applications in the prescribed forms, from the operators for all India Tourist Permit, a number of intending operators including the appellants submitted their applications and at the meeting held on February 2, 1975, the State Transport Authority granted to the appellants all India Tourist Permits for omnibus with passenger capacity not exceeding 29.
Some of the applicants who failed to obtain a permit filed three appeals being M. V.
Appeals Nos. 15, 16 and 17 all of 1975 to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under sec.
64 (2) of the .
The Appellate Tribunal dismissed all the appeals and confirmed the order made by the State Transport Authority granting all India tourist permits to the appellants.
Three unsuccessful applicants for permit filed three writ petitions styled as C.J.C. No. 381, 182 and 881, all of 1976 questioning the correctness of the order granting the permit and dismissal of their appeals in the High Court of Orissa.
A Division Bench of the High Court, by a common judgment, allowed all the three writ petitions quashing and setting aside the order of the State Transport Authority.
Consequently, these appellants surrendered their permits.
Hence these three appeals by special leave.
During the pendency of these appeals The appellants were granted temporary all India tourist permits in compliance with the interim orders made by the Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court 2 ^ HELD: 1.1 It was not necessary that the applicants for an all India tourist permit must have a pre existing contract carriage permit which could be endorsed so as to convert it into all India tourist permit [11 B C] 1.2 By introducing sub section 7 in section 63 of the the concept of all India permit to be granted by a State Transport Authority of a State within the limits of the quota prescribed by the Central Government which would enable the holder of the permit to operate in the whole of India, was introduced, for the first time with effect from 1st October, 1970.
The underlying object for creating this new class of permit was to promote tourism and to remove the barrier caused by the earlier system under which if a tourist vehicle is hired by a tourist party for moving from State to State, the vehicle cannot be taken to another State from the place of commencement of journey unless a valid contract carriage permit of that State is obtained or the existing permit is counter signed.
[6G H, 7A B] 1.3 An Application for an all India tourist permit has to be processed in accordance with the provisions of sections 49, 50, 51, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 and 63 (7).
An all India tourist permit is primarily a contract carriage permit but while the ordinary contract carriage permit can be granted by the Regional Transport Authority, for operation within local jurisdiction, or when counter signed by Regional Transport Authority of adjacent area in more than one such jurisdiction but not at any rate outside the State and not in any case on an all India basis.
To this extent, an ordinary contract carriage permit differs from an all India tourist permit but an all India tourist permit is none the less a contract carriage permit.
Sub section (7) Of section 63 on the other hand confers power on the State Transport Authority to grant an all India tourist permit which in effect is a contract carriage permit but which permits plying of tourist vehicle throughout India.
Even for obtaining such a permit, section 51 will apply with this modification that the application for all India tourist permit has to be made to State Transport Authority of the State in which their permit is sought.
This scheme of law nowhere expressly or by necessary implication suggests that an applicant for an all India tourist permit must of necessity or as a prerequisite have a contract carriage permit which alone can be endorsed for the purpose of all India operation.
Sub section (7) of section 63 if read thus would render nugatory the affirmative provision that on a proper application being made and legally processed, the State Transport Authority can grant an all India tourist permit.
[6D, 7E H, 8C D] 1.4 The fact that an application for an all India tourist Permit has to be made under section 49 which prescribes procedure for obtaining a contract carriage permit, because in substance an all India tourist permit is none the less a contract carriage permit but with a much wider area of operation, however, does not permit an inference that before obtaining an all India tourist permit, the intending operator must obtain a contract carriage permit from the Regional Transport Authority and then get it endorsed from the State Transport Authority to make it valid for the whole or any part of India.
Sub section (7) of section 63 does not speak of any 3 endorsement on permit, though endorsement may be another mode of enlarging the area of operation It speaks of granting a permit valid for the whole or any part of India when granted by a State Transport Authority in exercise of The power conferred by sub section (7) of section 63 without any further endorsement of any other authority [8E H] 2.
Sub Rules (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of the Orissa Tourist Vehicles Rules, 1967 had absolutely no application to the proceedings of the State Transport Authority held for consideration of applications for all India Tourist Permit and granting them to the appellants.
These Rules were enacted in the year 1967 in exercise of the power conferred by section 68 of the and were brought into operation on 19/20 June, 1967.
These rules were made at a time when the only way to enlarge the area of operation in respect of a permit was by endorsement by various authorities on the original permit granted by a Transport Authority.
All India tourist permit was not conceptualized by the time 1967 Rules were framed.
Therefore, the rules at the relevant time catered to a situation When the area of operation specified in a contract carriage permit could be enlarged by endorsement by authority other than the grantor only.
[9F H; 10A] 3.
The applications of the appellants with all relevant information were complete and the blanks in their application forms were irrelevant.
In the advertisement issued by the State Transport Authority on June 24, 1974 inviting applications for permits in respect of omnibus authorising it to ply as an all India tourist vehicle in the prescribed forms, two prescribed forms were annexed.
The first form was meant for those who had no existing contract carriage permit and were applying straightaway for the first time for an all India tourist permit.
The form itself shows that the application had to be made to the State Transport Authority for a contract carriage permit with an all India operation.
There was another form which catered to the needs of the holder of the existing contract carriage permits who wanted the area of operation to be enlarged by converting an ordinary contract carriage permit into all India tourist permit.
For a fresh applicant like the appellants who had no existing contract carriage permit, therefore, the blanks could not have been filled in.
[10F H; 11A]


judgement:
ns nor in arguments any challenge was advanced against the vires of the Rules.
In the absence of challenge to the Rules and the Regulations, resultant situations flowing from compliance of the 274 same are not open to attack.
Occasion for similar grievance would not arise in future as the proviso in the relevant regulation and clauses (4) and (5) Of the Regulation 3 will now meet the situation.
[280F G] & ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos.
9328,9333/82 & 4830/83 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) R.K. Garg, V.J. Francis, for the petitioners.
Shanti Bhushan, Miss A. Subhashini, A. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
S.N. Andley, S.S. Jouhar, R.N. Poddar, K.M. Sharma, Randhir Jain, J.D. Jain and Mrs. K. Kocher for the Interveners.
These 12 applications under Article 32 of the Constitution are by Assistants covered by the Central Secretariat Service Rules, 1962 ( 'Rules ' for short), and challenge is to the select list for the grade of Section Officers for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980, and the common seniority list dated April 26, 1979, as also the provisional supplementary list of Assistants dated August 21,1980.
They have further prayed that the select list and seniority list be re published on the basis of length of continuous service in the grade of Assistants and promotion to the grade of Section Officers be granted from the dates when Assistants junior to them were promoted as Section Officers.
The Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution came into force from October 1,1962.
Under the Rules, the Central Secretariat Service was constituted and as per rule 3 there are four grades in the Service classified as follows: (i) Selection Grade (Deputy Secretary to the Government of India or equivalent); (ii) Grade I (Under Secretary to the Government of India or equivalent); (iii) Section Officers; (iv) Assistants.
275 The first two grades are classified as Central Civil Service, Grade 'A ', while the other two are known as the Central Civil Service, Grade 'B ' Ministerial.
Post in the first three grades are gazetted while posts in the Assistants ' Grade are non gazetted.
The Rules contemplate that there shall be separate cadres in respect of Section Officers ' grade and the Assistants ' grade and these shall be constituted for each Ministry or office specified in col. 2 of the First Schedule.
Under rule 4, a single point gradation list in respect of officers of the Selection Grade and Grade I for all the Ministries or offices specified in col. 2 and for the offices specified against such Ministries or offices in col. 3 of the Schedule is to be maintained.
The Rules contemplate direct recruitment as also promotion in respect of certain grades.
According to the petitioners the quota rule had broken down as direct recruitment had not been made in many years and on account of such failure, fixation of seniority with reference to the rotational method was not available to be followed.
The petitioners also contended that select lists as contemplated by the Rules had not been framed for quite a long period and in the absence of such a select list framed in time, select lists of 1978, 1979 and 1980 prepared without following the criterion of length of service of officers in the grade of Assistants was not only unfair and arbitrary but worked out prejudicially to the petitioners.
The main grievance of the petitioners in short is that the scheme for fixation of seniority and consequently the provisions relating to promotion having not worked out as contemplated, the manner of determination of seniority should be usual rule of total length of service and action taken otherwise should be struck down and seniority should be directed to be redetermined on the basis of length of service only.
F Respondent No. 1, Union of India, has challenged these allegations by contending that the manner of fixation of seniority is covered by statutory rules and the petitioners are, therefore, not entitled to claim determination of seniority on the basis of length of service; the plea of the petitioners that there had been no direct recruitment for several years is denied and it has been pleaded that direct recruits have come into the service in all years except only two, viz., 1966 and 1970.
The quota rule has, therefore, really not broken down as pleaded by the petitioners and the rules having contemplated a scheme of direct recruitment and promotion, quota and rota have to work together Therefore, fixing seniority 276 with reference to the rotational method was not open to challenge.
The Rules have been in force for well over two decades.
Great care has been taken in making provision in the Rules to safeguard the interests of the different groups and greater care has also been taken by the Department of Personnel in the Ministry of Home Affairs to give effect to the Rules.
Since the officers are drawn from different Ministries for promotion and working out the scheme involves a somewhat complicated process, as long as the policy under the Rules has been given effect to, the working should not be allowed to be attacked merely on account of a casual failure to work up to mathematical precision.
Before we start examining the correctness of the rival contentions advanced on either side, it is appropriate that a detailed reference to the Rules is made in order to ascertain the scheme. 'Cadre ' has been defined in rule 2, sub rule (2) to mean the group of posts in the grades of Section Officer and Assistant in any of the Ministries or offices specified in col. 2 of the First Schedule and any of the offices specified against such Ministry or office in col. 3 of that Schedule. 'Cadre Officer ' in rule 2(g) in relation to the Section Officers ' grade or the Assistants ' grade means a member Of the service of the Section Officers ' grade or Assistants ' grade, as the case may be, and includes a temporary officer approved for long term appointment to that grade. 'Long term appointment ' means under rule 2(1) appointment for an indefinite period as different from a purely temporary or ad hoc appointment.
Common Seniority List ' has been defined in rule 2(hh) in relation to any grade to mean the seniority list of officers in that grade serving in all the cadres specified in the First Schedule as on the appointed day any revised from time to time in accordance with the regulations to be framed in that behalf by the Central Government. 'Probationer ' has been defined in clause (o) of rule 2 to mean a direct recruit appointed to a grade on probation in or against a substantive vacancy, and 'select list ' under rule 2(q) is defined to mean the select list prepared in accordance with the regulations made under rule 12(4) or under the regulations contained in the Fourth Schedule.
Rule 8 contemplates the initial constitution of each cadre and provides that the permanent and temporary officers of the Section Officers ' grade and the Assistants ' grade in each cadre on the appointed day shall be determined by the Central Government in the Department of 277 Personnel & Administrative Reforms in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Rule 12 makes provision for recruitment to selection grade and grade I.
We are not concerned with this rule in the present case as the dispute is raised by Assistants and the promotional rank to which claim has been laid is that of Section Officer.
For them rule 13 is the relevant rule.
Sub rules (1) to (5) relate to Section Officers while the remaining sub rules (6) to (10) relate to Assistants.
At the time when the Service was constituted sub rule (1) read thus: "Subject to the provisions of sub rule (3), for a period of five years from the appointed day, 1/4 of the substantive vacancies in the Section Officers ' grade in any cadre and thereafter, 1/3 of the substantive vacancies in that grade, shall be filled by direct recruitment on the results of the competitive examinations held by the Commission for this purpose from time to time. " Sub rule (I) of rule 13 as it now stands reads thus: "1/6 of the substantive vacancies in the Section Officers ' grade in any cadre shall be filled up by direct recruitment on the results of the competitive examinations held by the Commission for this purpose from time to time.
The remaining vacancies shall be filled by the substantive appointment of persons included in the select list for the Section Officers ' grade in that cadre.
Such appointments shall be made in the order of seniority in the select list except when for reasons to be recorded in writing, a person is not considered fit for such appointment in his turn.
" It is thus clear that the proportion of direct recruits has been reduced from the initial l/4th or 1/3rd to the present 1/6th.
Sub rule (2) of rule 13 prescribes: "Temporary vacancies in the Section Officers grade in any cadre shall be filled by the appointment of persons included or approved for inclusion in the select list for the Section Officers ' grade in that cadre.
Any vacancies remaining thereafter shall be filled in equal proportion from among the (a) officers of the Assistants ' grade who have rendered 278 not less than 8 years ' approved service in the grade and are within the range of seniority on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit. and (b) officers of the Assistants ' grade in that cadre with the longest period of continuous service in that grade on the basis of length of service subject to the rejection of the unfit.
" Sub rule (5) prescribes the preparation of a select list of Assistants for promotion to the Section Officers ' grade and the manner of preparing and revising the select list has been set out in the Fourth Schedule.
Sub rule (6) prescribes that 50% of the vacancies in the Assistants ' grade in any cadre is to be filled by direct recruitment on the results of the competitive examinations to be conducted by the Commission from time to time and the remaining vacancies are to be filled by substantive appointment of persons included in the select list for the Assistants ' grade in that cadre.
Such appointments are to be made in the order of seniority in the select list except when for reasons to be recorded in writing, a person is not considered fit for appointment in his turn.
When difficulties were experienced in working out the rule, two provisos were added to sub rule (6), one with effect from December 15, 1979.
these were to the following effect: "Provided further that substantive vacancies in any cadre reserved for direct recruitment on the appointed day against which no direct recruits have been appointed may be filled by substantive appointments made after the date of commencement of the Central Secretariat Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 1970, of persons included in the Select List for the Assistants ' grade in that Cadre.
Provided also that if sufficient number of candidates are not available for filling up the vacancies in a cadre in any year by direct recruitment as aforesaid, the unfilled vacancies in the direct recruitment quota in that cadre shall be filled by the substantive appointment of persons included in the Select List for the Assistants ' Grade in that cadre.
" Sub rule (6) (a) which was inserted along with the latter proviso authorised: "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule (6), the substantive vacancies reserved for direct recruitment as on 30th June 1979 on each cadre against which no direct recruits have been appointed till that date plus 50% of the number of such 279 substantive vacancies in the cadre may be filled by substantive appointments made after the date of commencement of Central Secretariat Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 1979, of persons included in the select list for the Assistants ' grade in that cadre." Under rule 15 every direct recruit to the grade of Assistant is Initially to be appointed on probation for the period of two years from the date of appointment and every person other than a direct recruit when he is appointed would be on trial for a period of two years also.
Rule 16 makes provision for confirmation of probationers subject to passing of prescribed tests and satisfactory completion of probation.
Rule 18 prescribes seniority in the different grades as on the appointed day.
Sub rule (1) indicates that relative seniority shall be as already determined on that day and if there had been no such determination the same has to be determined by the Department of Personnel & Administrative Reforms.
Sub rule (2) provides that all permanent officers included in the initial constitution of a grade shall rank senior to all persons substantively appointed to that grade after the appointed day and all temporary officers included in the initial constitution of a grade under rule 8 shall rank senior to all temporary officers appointed to that grade after the appointed day.
Rule 18.
sub rule (3) makes provision for the rule in the matter of fixation of inter se seniority for the Assistants ' grade.
Direct recruits are to rank inter se in the order of merit in which they are placed in the competitive examination on the result which recruitment is effected.
Recruits of an earlier examination are to rank senior to those of a later examination.
Persons appointed substantively to the grade from the select list for that grade p shall rank inter se according to the order in which they are so appointed and the inter se seniority between direct recruits and persons substantively appointed to the grade for that grade shall be regulated in accordance with the provision made in the Fourth Schedule.
Regulation 3 in the Fourth Schedule deals with seniority.
Clause 3 of this regulation provides: "Direct recruits to a Grade and persons substantively appointed to the Grade from the Select List for the Grade shall be assigned seniority inter se according to the quotas of substantive vacancies in the Grade reserved for direct 280 recruitment and the appointment of persons included in the Select List.
respectively," From December 1977, contemporaneously with the insertion of the second proviso to rule 13(6) of the Rules, the following was added as a proviso to clause 3 of Regulation 3: "Provided that persons appointed substantively in accordance with the provisions of sub rule (6) of rule 13, to the Grade from the Select List in any cadre in any year, against direct recruitment vacancies for which direct recruits are not available shall be placed en bloc below the last direct recruit appointed in that year irrespective of the quotas reserved for direct recruits and persons included in the Select List.
" In Course of the hearing counsel for the petitioners referred to instances where a direct recruit coming into the cadre several years after others coming into the cadre from the Select List had been assigned seniority over such promotees.
This was explained by counsel for the respondents to have been the outcome of giving effect to clause 3 of Regulation 3 as it stood prior to December, 1977 without the proviso.
The instances relied upon were found to be events prior to the introduction of the proviso.
In the absence of challenge to the Rules and the Regulations, resultant situations flowing from compliance of the same are not open to attack.
Occasion for similar grievance would not arise in future as the proviso in the relevant regulation and clauses (4) and (5) of the Regulation 3 will now meet the situation.
Neither in the writ petitions nor in arguments before us any challenge was advanced against the vires of the Rules.
One of the known patterns of constituting public service, particularly in the executive side, is to draw officers both by promotion as also by direct recruitment.
The proportion is fixed depending upon the nature of the service, the availability of suitable manpower and other relevant considerations.
The petitioners have, therefore, rightly not challenged before us the scheme under which a moiety of the substantive vacancies in the Assistants ' grade is to be filled by direct recruitment and the other by promotion through select lists.
The Rules have held the field for 22 years now.
During this period direct recruitment had not been made only in two years 281 being 1966 and 1970.
Though in the writ petitions of general stand had been adopted that direct recruitment had not been made in several years, after the counter affidavit was filed and it was emphatically asserted that excepting in these two years direct recruitment had been made in other years, there has been no challenge to that assertion.
We agree with the contention that quota and rota have got to go hand in hand and if the quota is not properly adhered to, the rota system must fail.
In fact, the scheme is such that it can operate in an appropriate way only when recruitment is effected through both the processes as envisaged.
As we have already pointed out, difficulty was experienced in working out the process when the quota fixed by the Rules had not been adhered to for one reason or the other and vacancies were being carried forward for being filled up in future years.
This situation necessitated insertion of the first proviso to sub rule (6) of rule 13 in August 1970) and the other proviso in 1977 as also sub rule (6) (a) in 1979.
The grievance voiced in these writ petitions obviously relates to a period prior to the modification of the scheme The petitioners had inter alia, prayed for the relief of striking down the select lists and for direction that the select lists he reframed on the basis of the length of continuous service in the grade of Assistants.
In view of what we have said regarding the claim of seniority on the basis of length of continuous service, it is not at all necessary to examine the validity of that contention and give any direction regarding the select lists, particularly because the claim relating to reconsideration of select lists was grounded upon length of continuous service.
Nothing was also shown in course of arguments as to why the select lists were bad.
Tn fact, unless the Rules and Regulations are successfully assailed, the select lists are not at all disputable.
The field which these Rules cover is indeed very wide one.
Assistants in all the Ministries or offices specified in the First Schedule are covered by the Rules.
With a view to maintaining the efficiency of the service and at the same time to meet the requirements and exigencies of the service.
separate cadres have been formed in respect of Assistants and Section Officers in the different Ministries and offices attached to such Ministries.
Notwithstanding the fact that these cadres are different, the scheme makes provision for pro 282 motional avenue taking all of them into consideration.
Obviously, working it out keeping in view the interests of so many employees in the different cadres is indeed a very onerous and difficult task.
This has, therefore, been assigned to the Department of Personnel.
Unless there is any serious failure in implementing the Rules and grave injustice is done to some individuals or a group of officers, we do not think it would be proper to interfere with the working of the scheme and dislocate the inter se seniority of the officers in these grades.
No mala fides has been pleaded nor has any grave injustice been established in the writ petitions.
At the most a case of improper working of the scheme with reference to some of the officers has been alleged.
Hairsplitting arguments, if accepted, might indicate that some of the petitioners have not been promoted to the grade of Section Officers as and when due.
We are of the view that if there has been substantial compliance in implementing the scheme under the Rules, judicial interference is not called for.
In a vast country such as ours, a strong and independent bureaucratic set up is indispensable.
At the same time it is equally necessary that the service from top to bottom must be alive to the fact that it is its obligation to maintain proper attitudes, discipline and duty oriented working.
While it is the right of every person in the Service set up to expect just and fair treatment in regard to his employment, frequent litigation between him and the State involving countless other co employees in the Service in the battle is a deviation from the right direction.
It is true that very often instances come to light where the grievance is genuine and the treatment meted is unwarranted and uncalled for.
Government in a democratic polity runs on impersonal basis but on the cardinal code that every one shall perform his duty.
We may recall what this Court observed in Dr. G. Marulasiddaiah vs Dr. T.G. Siddapparadhya & Ors.; "The canker of litigiousness has spread even to a sphere of life where discipline should check ambition concerning personal preferment.
A teacher is justified in taking legal action when he feels that a stigma or punishment is undeserved but he is expected to bear with fortitude and reconcile himself to his lot suppressing disappointment when he finds a co worker raised to a position which he himself aspired after.
" (1) 283 There has been a phenomenal rise in service disputes in the last three decades.
It is time that serious attention is devoted to discover the reason for it and take effective steps to ensure curtailment thereof.
Whether such litigations come before courts or tribunals is of no consequence here.
Frequent litigations between the State and its employees ultimately affect the efficiency of the service and bring about indiscipline, lack of loyalty and an attitude of indifference.
In the course of arguments reference was made to certain decisions of this Court.
In N.K. Chauhan & Ors.
vs State of Gujarat & Ors.
,(l) this Court held that the quota system does not necessitate the adoption of the rotational rule in practical application and many ways of working out quota prescribed can be devised of which rota is certainly one.
It was further held that while laying down a quota when filling up vacancies in a cadre from more than one source, it is open to Government, subject to tests under Article 16, to choose 'a year ' or other period or vacancy by vacancy basis, to work out the quota among the sources.
But once the Court is satisfied, examining the constitutionality of the method proposed, that there is no invalidity, administrative technology may have free play in choosing one or the other of the familiar processes of implementing the quota rule.
This Court did indicate that as Judges we cannot strike down a particular scheme because it is unpalatable to forensic taste.
This Court further pointed out that ordinarily seniority is measured by length of continuous officiating service.
This, however, does not preclude a different prescription, constitutionality tests being satisfied.
When the Court found that promotees had been appointed in excess of their quota, the following direction was given: "Promotees who have been fitted into vacancies beyond their quota during the period B the year being regarded as the unit must suffer survival as invalid appointees acquiring new life when vacancies in their quota fall to be filled up.
To that extent they will step down, rather be pushed down as against direct recruits who were later but regularly appointed within their quota." (1.) ; 284 The rationale of this decision is indeed very much against the contentions of the petitioners.
Reference was also made to the case of S.B Patwardhan & Ors. etc.
vs State of Maharashtra & Ors.
The dispute that fell for adjudication in that case was one of seniority in the cadre of Deputy Engineers and grievance had been laid that notwithstanding the length of continuous service, later appointees had been shown as senior.
Attention in the decision was mainly confined to the terms of the provisions of the Rules applicable to the State Engineering Service.
In the view we have taken of the matter this decision indeed does not help the petitioners.
Next is the case of Baleshwar Dass & Ors., etc.
vs State of U.P. & Ors.
,(2) etc.
This Court pointed out that for the purposes of seniority appointment to the service in a substantive capacity was necessary.
But that again was said with reference to Rule 23 of the U.P. Service of Engineers (Junior and Senior Scales Irrigation Branch) Rules.
This Court in V.T. Khanzode & Ors.
vs Reserve Bank of India & Anr., (3)took not of the fact that " no scheme governing service matter can be fool proof and some section or the other of employees is bound to feel aggrieved on the score of its expectation being falsified or remaining to be fulfilled.
Arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fides will of course render any scheme unconstitutional but the fact that the scheme does not satisfy the expectations of every employee is not evidence of these. ' ' Next is the case of A. Janardhana vs Union of India & Ors.(4) That was a case relating to dispute of inter se seniority of direct recruits and promotees in the Military Engineering Service.
Seniority lists drawn up earlier on the basis of length of service including continuous officiation were subsequently altered to lists based on quota between direct recruits and promotees leading to rota for confirmation and this led to the dispute The Court found that some of the officers had been promoted prior to the enforcement of the Rules (1) [1981] 1 S.C.R. 449.
(2) ; (3) ; (4) ; 285 in 1969.
The Rules had no retrospective effect and, therefore, seniority lists drawn up prior to the enforcement of the Rules were not open to be revised and re drawn up after the Rules became operative The Court further found that the quota rule had not been worked out and if rotational confirmation was to be done, many of the employees considered hitherto senior would be very badly affected.
Here again we must point out that this decision has no application to the facts before us since on the finding reached by us the quota rule was substantially complied with.
The writ petitions must accordingly fail.
We make no order for costs.

summary:
The petitioners 1 Assistants are covered by the Central Secretariat Service Rules, 1962 (Rules, for short).
They challenged under article 32 the correctness of the Select List for the grade of Section Officers for the years 1978, 1979 and 1980 and the common seniority list dated April 26, 1979 as also the provisional supplementary list of Assistants on the ground: (i) that the quota rule had broken down as direct recruitment had not been made in many years and on account of such failure, fixation of seniority with reference to the rotational method was not available to be followed; and (ii) that Select List as contemplated by the Rules had not been framed for quite a long period and in the absence of such a select list framed in time, select lists of 1978, 1979 and 1980 prepared without following the criterion of length of service of officers in the grade of Assistants was not only unfair and arbitrary worked out prejudicially to the petitioners.
The petitioners prayed that the select list and seniority list be republished on the basis of length continuous service in the grade of Assistants and promotion to the grade of Section Officers be granted from the dates when Assistants junior to them were promoted as Section Officers.
On the other hand, Respondent No. 1 Union of India argued that there had been regular direct recruitment into the Service in all years except only two, viz., 1966 and 1970.
Thus, the quota rule has, therefore, really not broken down as pleaded by the petitioners and the Rules, having contemplated a scheme of direct recruitment and promotion, quota and rota have to work together and since the manner of fixation of seniority is covered by statutory rules, the petitioners are, not entitled to claim determination of seniority on the basis of length of service.
272 Dismissing the Writ Petitions, ^ HELD:1 (i) It will be appropriate if a detailed reference to the Rules is made in order to ascertain the Scheme.
The Rules contemplate that there shall be separate cadres in respect of Section Officers ' grade and the Assistants ' Grade and these shall be constituted for each Ministry or Office specified in Column 2 of the first schedule.
Sub rule (6) of Rule 13 prescribes that 50% of the vacancies in the Assistants ' grade in any cadre is to be filled by direct recruitment on the results of the competitive examinations to be conducted by the Commission from time to time and the remaining vacancies are to be filled by substantive appointment of persons included in the select list for the Assistants ' grade in that cadre.
Such appointments are to be made in the order of seniority in the select list except when for reasons to be recorded in writing, a person is not considered fit for appointment in his turn.
When difficulties were experienced in working out the Rule, two provision were added to sub rule(6).
The first proviso provided that substantive vacancies in any cadre reserved for direct recruitment on the appointed day against which no direct recruits have been appointed may be filled by substantive appointments made after the date of commencement of the Central Secretariat Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 1970, of persons included in the Select List for the Assistants ' grade in that cadre.
The second proviso was to the effect that if sufficient number of candidates are not available for filling up the vacancies in a cadre in any year by direct recruitment as aforesaid, the unfilled vacancies in the direct recruitment quota in that cadre shall be filled by the substantive appointment of persons included in the Select List for the Assistants ' Grade in that cadre.
" Sub rule (6)(a) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub rule (6), the substantive vacancies reserved for direct recruitment as on 30th June 1979 on each cadre against which no direct recruits have been appointed till that date plus 50% of the number of such substantive vacancies n the cadre may be filled by substantive appointments made after the date of commencement of Central Secretariat Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 1979, of persons included in the select list for the Assistants ' grade in that cadre." [276D; 278C D; H; 279A] 1(ii).
Rule 18, sub rule(3) makes provision for the rule in the matter of fixation of inter se seniority for the Assistants ' grade.
Direct recruits are to rank inter se in the order of merit in which they are placed in the competitive examination on the result of which recruitment is effected.
Recruits of an earlier examination are to rank senior to those of a later examination, Persons appointed substantively to the grade from the select list for that grade shall rank inter se according to the order in which they are so appointed and the inter se seniority between direct recruits and persons substantively appointed to the grade for that grade shall be regulated in accordance with the provision made in the Fourth Schedule.
Clause 3 of Regulation 3 in the Fourth Schedule provides that direct recruits to a grade and persons substantively appointed to the Grade from the Select List for the Grade shall be assigned seniority inter se according to the quotas of substantive vacancies in the Grade reserved for direct recruitment and the appointment of persons included in the Select List, respectively.
The proviso to Clause 3 of Regulation 3 provides that persons appointed substantively in accordance with the provi 273 sions of sub rule (6) of rule 13 to the Grade from the Select List in any cadre in any year, against direct recruitment vacancies for which direct recruits are not available shall be placed en bloc below the last direct recruit appointed in that year irrespective of the quotas reserved for direct recruits and persons included in the Select List.
[279F G; 279H; 280A] 2.
(i) The Rules have held the field for 22 years now.
During this period direct recruitment had not been made only in two years being 1966 and ]970 Though in the writ petitions a general stand had been adopted that direct recruitment had not been made in several years, after the counter affidavit was filled and it was emphatically asserted that excepting in these two years direct recruitment had been made in other years, there has been no challenge to that assertion.
There is no doubt that quota and rota have got to go hand in hand and if the quota is not properly adhered to, the rota System must fall.
In fact, the scheme is such that it can operate in an appropriate way only when recruitment is effected through both the processes as envisaged.
In the instant case, the difficulty was experienced in working out the process with the quota fixed by the Rules had not been adhered to for one reason or the other and vacancies were being carried forward for being filled up in future years.
This situation necessitated insertion of the first proviso to sub rule (6) or rule 13 in August 197() and the other proviso in 1977 as also sub rule (6) (a) in 1979.
The grievance voiced in these writ petitions obviously relates to a period prior to the modification of the scheme.
[280H; 281A D] 2 (ii) Unless there is any serious failure in implementing the Rules and grave injustice is done to some individuals or a group of officers, it would not be proper to interfere with the working of the scheme and dislocate the inter se seniority of the officers in these grades.
No mala fides has been pleaded nor has any grave injustice been established in the writ petitions.
At the most a case of improper working of the scheme with reference to some of the officers has been alleged.
Hari splitting arguments, if accepted, might indicate that some of the petitioners have not been promoted to the grade of Section Officers as and when due.
This Court is of the view that if there has been substantial compliance in implementing the scheme under the Rules, judicial interference is not called for.
[282B C] Dr. G. Marulasiddaiah vs Dr. T.G. Siddapparadhya & Ors. ; , N.K. Chauhan & Ors vs State of Gujarat State of U.P. & Ors.
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 449 & V.T. Khanzode & Ors.
vs Reserve Bank of India & Anr. ; referred to.
S.B. Patwardhan & Ors.
vs State of Maharashtra & Ors.
; & A. Janardhana vs Union of India & Ors ; held inapplicable.