judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 722 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 11.4.1977 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 315 of 1970.
S.K.Gambhir for the Appellant.
S.S. Khanduja for the Respondent .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.RAMASWAMY,J.
The facts in this appeal would lie in a short compass.
The appellant appointed the respondent as Lower Division Clerk on September 22, 1966 and put him on probation for a period of two years which expired on September 21, 1968.
On December 9, 1968, the appellant served him with one month 's notice terminating the services with effect from January 9, 1969.
Calling in question the order of termination, the respondent laid the suit for declaration that the termination without enquiry and an opportunity of being heard was violative of Rule 9A of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Service Classification Control & Appeal (Rules), 1966 with consequential declaration that he became a permanent employee of the corporation with cotiuity of service and arrears of salary.
The Trial Court dismissed the suit and on appeal it was confirmed.
The High Court in Second Appeal No. 315/70 by judgment and decree dated April 11, 1977 allowed the appeal and decreed the suit as prayed for.
On leave under article 136 the Appellant filed this appeal.
Shri S.k.
Gambhir, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent being a probationer, acquires permanent status only on confirmation.
Before confirmation the appellant had exercised its power, in terms of the rules, and terminated the respondent 's service.
The High Court committed manifest error of law in its finding that on expiry of two years period of probation the respondent must be deemed to have been confirmed under Rule 14 of the Municipal Officers and Servants Recruitment Rules which no longer were in force.
He further contended that rule 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants ' General Conditions of Service Rules, 1961 for short 'the Rules ' expressly provides confirmation of probation as a condition precedent.
Notice was issued terminating the service before confirmation and so it is valid in law.
Shri S.S. Khanduja, learned counsel for the respondent contended that by operation of the resolution passed 324 by the Municipal Corporation under section 25 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipality Act 1922 the Municipal Officers and Servants are governed by recruitment rules thereunder.
Rule 14 thereof, relied on by the High Court expressly provided to put an employee on probation for a period of two years subject to being confirmed.
At the end of the probationary period, if the probationer was found unfit, the Municipal Committee shall, if he was a direct recruit, to dispense with his service and if he has been recruited by tranfer, to revert to his original post.
On expiry of the period of two years, no action was taken by the Municipal Corporation.
Therefore, the respondent must be deemed to have been confirmed.
Thereafter the only power which the Corporation had was to terminate the service of the respondednt in accordance with Classification Control and Appeal Rules after conducting an enquiry and giving him reasonable opportunity that too for misconduct.
No such procedure was adopted.
Therefore, the impugned notice was illegal and the High Court was justified in granting the decree.
The first question is, which are the relevant rules that would be applicable to the respondent? Admittedly, the Municipal Council became a Municipal Corporation on or after August 26, 1967.
A resolution was passed making a draft bye law by a Municipal Council on November 11, 1960, exercising the power under section 178(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Act, 1922 and confirmed the same under section 25 (1) of the said Act, adopting Government Rules to regulate the conditions of service of officers and servants of Municipal Committee which provides thus: "The fundamental rules and the Civil Service regulations as amended from time to time in their applications to M.P., the M.P.Government Servants Conduct Rules 1959, as amended from time to time and the General Book Circulars of the Govt.
of M.P. as in force for the time being shall apply to the officers and servants of the M.C. in the same way as they apply to Govt.
Servants".
Thus, it is clear that the Fundamental Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Govt, Servants Conduct Rules and the General Book Circulars of the Government of Madhya Pradesh as amended from time to time, etc.
shall apply to the officers and servants of the Municipal Committee.
The Previous rules were thus superseded and were no longer in force.
Reliance on Rule 14 referred to above made by the High Court is, therefore, wrong.
Rule 8 of the Rules reads thus: 325 "Probation (1) A person appointed to a service or post by direct recruitment shall ordinarily be placed on probation for such period as may be prescribed.
(2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year.
Note A probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this Sub Rule but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calender month given in writing by either side.
(3) A probationer shall undergo such training and pass such departmental examinations during the period of his probation as may be prescribed.
(4) and (5) are not relevant, hence omitted.
(6) On the successful completion of probation and the passing of the prescribed departmental examinations, the probationer shall be confirmed in the services or post to which he has been appointed." Thus, it is clear from Rule 8 of the Rules that the procedure to place a direct recruit on probation for a prescribed period was provided.
The appointing authority would be entitled to place a direct recruit on probation for a specified period and for sufficient reasons may extend the period of probation to a further period not exceeding one year.
Under the note to sub rule (2) if the probationer is neither confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation, he shall be deemed to have been continued in service as probationer subject to the condition of his service being terminated on the expiry of a notice of one calender month given in writing by either side.
As per sub rule (6) on passing the prescribed departmental examination and on successful completion of the period of probation, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed.
Then he becomes an approved probationer.
Therefore, after the expiry of the period of probation and before its confirmation, he would be deemed to have been continued in service 326 as probationer.
Confirmation of probation would be subject to satisfactory completion of the probation and to pass in the prescribed examinations.
Expiry of the period of probation, therefore, does not entitle him with a right to a deemed confirmation.
The rule contemplate to pass an express order of confirmation in that regard.
By issue of notice of one calender month in writing by either side, the tenure could be put to an end, which was done in this case.
In State of Punjab vs
Dharam Singh; , considering the effect of continuing a probationer in service after the period of probation was completed, the Constitution Bench held that there was no rule for the extension of probation after October 1, 1960 and it was not possible to presume the competent authority extended it beyond October 1, 1960.Thus in the above case there was no power to extend the probation in the rules beyond the specified period.
It was held that: "The initial period of probation of the respondents ended on October 1, 1958.
By allowing the respondents to continue in their posts thereafter without any express order of confirmation, the competent authority must be taken to have extended the period of probation upto October 1, 1960 by implication.
But under the proviso to Rule 6(3), the probationary period could not extend beyond October 1, 1960.
In view of the proviso to Rule 6(3), it is not possible to presume that the competent authority extended the probationary period after October 1, 1960, or that there after the respondents continued to hold their posts as probationers".
Accordingly it was held that the respondent therein was deemed to have been confirmed.
In Om Prakash Maurya vs U.P. Co op.
Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow & Ors.
; this Court held that U.P. Co op.
Sugar Factories Federation Service Rules, 1976 made under the U.P. Co op.
Societies Act were in force.
Regulations 17 of 1975 Regulations does not permit continuance of an employee for a period of more than two years.
One year normally was the period of probation and further being extended to a period of one more year.
Rule 5 of 1976 Rules does not prescribe any limit on the extension of the probationary period.
In the light of the operation of those rules when the probationary period was prescribed on promotion to the post of Commercial Officers with a condition that his probationary period may be extended and he could be reverted to the post of Office Superinten 327 dent without any notice, this Court held that the stipulation for extension of probationary period in the appointment order must be considered in accordance with the proviso to regulation 17(1) which means that the probationary period could be extended for a period of one year more and the probationary period was further extended to one year during which period the service of the appellant was neither terminated nor was he reverted to his substantive post, instead he was allowed to continue.
On those facts this Court held that "since under those regulations ' appellant 's probationary period could not be extended beyond the maximum period of two years, he stood confirmed on the expiry of maximum probationary period and there after he could not be reverted to lower post treating him on probation".
In M.A. Agarwal vs Gurgaon Bank & Ors., and in State of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav & Ors. ; this Court reiterated the same view.
Exercise of the power to extend the probation is hedged with the existence of the rule in that regard followed by positive act of either confirmation of the probation or discharge from service or reversion to the substantive post within a reasonable time after the expiry of the period of probation.
If the rules do not empower the appointing authority to extend the probation beyond the prescribed period, or where the rules are absent about confirmation or passing of the prescribed test for confirmation of probation and inaction for a very long time may lead to an indication of the satisfactory completion of probation.
But in this case Rule 8 expressly postulates otherwise.
The period of probation is subject to extension by order in writing for another period of one year.
Passing the prescribed examinations and successful completion of probation and to make an order of confirmation are condition precedent.
Mere expiry of the initial period of probation does not automatically have the effect of deemed confirmation and the status of a deemed confirmation of the probation.
An express order in that regard only confers the status of an approved probationer.
We are of the view that note to sub rule (2) read with sub rule (6) of Rule 8 manifests the legislative intent that confirmation of the probation of the respondent would be made only on successful completion of the probation and the passing of the prescribed examinations.
It is not the respondent 's case that he passed all the examinations.
He shall be deemed to be continued on probation.
Before confirmation the appointing authority is empowered to terminate the service of the probationer by issuing on calender month 's notice in writing and on expiry thereof the service stands terminated without any further notice.
Within three months from the date of expiry of original two 328 years period of probation and within one year 's period, the order of termination was made.
In this view the question of conducting an inquiry under the Classification Control and Appeal (Rules) after giving an opportunity and that too for specific charges does not arise.
The High Court, therefore, committed manifest error of law in decreeing the suit.
By an interim order passed by this court, the respondent received a sum of Rs. 5,000 from the appellant.
The appellant shall not recover the same from him.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and that of the Trial Court and the Ist Appellate Court are confirmed.
But in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent was appointed in the appellant Corporation and put on probation for a period of two years.
About three month 's after the completion of two years ' period he was served with one month 's notice for termination of his service.
Challenging the termination order the respondent filed a suit for declaration that the termination without enquiry and opportunity of being heard was violative of Rule 9A of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services Classification, Control and Appeal Rules 1966 and that he became a permanent employee of the Corporation with continuity of service and arrears of salary.
The trail court dismissed the suit, and appeal, it was confirmed.
The High Court allowed the respondent 's second appeal and decreed the suit.
In the appeal, by special leave, before this Court, on behalf of the appellant Corporation it was contended that the respondent being a probationer, would acquire permanent status only on confirmation, that the High Court had committed manifest error in law in holding that on the expiry of two years ' period of probation, the respondent must be deemed to have been confirmed under Rule 14 of the Municipal Officers ' and Servants ' Recruitment Rules, which were no longer in force, and that Rule 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Government Servants ' General Conditions of Service expressly proved confirmation of probation as a condition precedent and since notice terminating respondent 's service was issued, in terms of the rules, before confirmation, it was valid in law.
On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that by operation of the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation under Section 25 of 321 the Central Provinces and Bearer Municipality Act, 1922, the Municipal Officers and Servants was governed by recruitment rules thereunder, that since no action was taken by the appellant Corporation to dispense with the respondent 's service, on the expiry of the period of two years, as envisaged in Rule 14 of the Municipal Officers ' and Servants ' Recruitment Rules, the respondent must be deemed to have been confirmed, and consequently, the only power the Corporation had was to terminate the respondent 's service in accordance with the classification, Control and Appeal Rules, after conducting an enquiry and giving him reasonable opportunity, that too for misconduct, but since no such procedure was adopted, the notice was illegal and the High Court was justified in granting the decree.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 Under the Note to sub rule (2) of Rule 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Govt.
Servant 's, General Conditions of Service Rules, 1961 if the probationer is neither confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation, he should be deemed to have been continued in service as probationer subject to the condition of his service being terminated on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month, given in writing by either side.
As per sub rule (6) on passing the prescribed departmental examination and on successful completion of the period of probation, the probationer should be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed.
Then he becomes an approved probationer.
Therefore, after the expiry of the period of probation and before its confirmation, he would be deemed to have been continued in service as probationer.
[375F H] 1.2 Confirmation of probation would be subject to satisfactory completion of the probation and pass in the prescribed examinations.
Expiry of the period of probation, therefore, does not entitle him with a right to deemed confirmation.
The rule contemplates to pass an express order of confirmation in that regard.
By issue of notice of one calendar month in writing by either side, the tenure could be put to an end.
[326A B] 1.3 If the rules do not empower the appointing authority to extend the period of probation beyond the prescribed period, or where the rules are absent about confirmation or passing of the prescribed test for confirmation of probation, inaction for a very long time may lead to an indication of the satisfactory completion of probation.
[327D E] 322 1.4 Rule 8 expressly postulates otherwise.
Hence mere expiry of the initial period of probation which is subject to extension for another period of one year does not automatically have the effect of deemed confirmation, and the status of a deemed confirmation of the probation.
An express order in that regard on fulfillment of the conditions stipulated in the Rule only confers the status of approved probation.[327E F] State of Punjab vs Dharam Singh ; ; Om Prakash Maurya vs U.P. Co op.
Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow & Ors.
; ; M.A. Agarwal vs Gurgaon Bank & Ors., and State of Gujarat vs Akhilesh C. Bhargav & Ors., ; , distinguished.
1.5 Note to sub rule (2) read with sub rule (6) of Rule 8 manifest she legislative intent that confirmation of the probation of the respondent would be made only on successful completion of the probation and the passing of the prescribed examinations.
The respondent shall, therefore, be deemed to be continued an probation.
Before confirmation the appointing authority is empowered to terminate the service of the probationer by issuing one calendar month 's notice in writing and on expiry thereof the service stands terminated without any further notice.
Within three months from the date of expiry of original two years period of probation and within th extendable period of one year the order of termination was made.
Hence, the question of conducting an inquiry under the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules after giving an opportunity and that too for specific charges does not arise.
[327G H, 328A] In the circumstances the High Court, committed manifest error of law in decreeing the suit.
[328B] 2.
By virtue of the resolution passed by the Municipal Council, which subsequently became Municipal Corporation, making a draft bye law , exercising power under section 173(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Act, 1922 and confirmed under Section 25(1) of the Act, adopting Government rules to regulate the conditions of service of officers and servants of the Municipal Committee, the Fundamental Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Government Servants ' Conduct Rules, and General Book Circulars of the State Government, as amended from time to time, etc. would apply to the officers of the Municipal Committee and the previous rules were superseded and were no longer in force.
Hence the reliance placed by the High Court on Rule 14 of the Municipal Officers ' and Servants ' Rules is wrong.
[324D E, G H] 323


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 294 of 1991.
422 From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.1990 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.
No. 3635 of 1989.
R.S. Suri for the Appellant.
Brijender Chahar and Ashok Mathur for the Respondent.
The following Order of the Court was delivered We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
The delay in filing the special leave petition is condoned and leave is granted.
The respondent who was undergoing sentence of life imprisonment, had served a period of eleven and an half years when he made an application for pre mature release.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court by the impugned order issued a direction to release the respondent on bail, observing further that if his mercy petition, which was pending, is dismissed, he will have to surrender.
The High Court has not taken into consideration the provisions of Section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code while passing the order.
A week back we have allowed a criminal appeal against a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in another case directing pre mature release on account of good conduct of the respondent in jail serving a life sentence although he had actually been in jail for a period of nine years only.
We set aside the order as the provisions under Section 433A had not been taken into consideration, and remitted the matter to the High Court for reconsideration in accordance with the provisions of Jail Manual.
The learned counsel for the respondent in the present appeal attempted to distinguish the case on the ground that here the respondent has been only enlarged on bail and has not been finally released.
We do not think that Section 433A, which is quoted below, is inapplicable in the present case: "Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had 423 served at least fourteen years of imprisonment." (emphasis supplied) The respondent in his writ petition before the High Court relied upon three instructions (Annexures P 1 to P 3) in support of his claim that he is entitled to pre mature release.
Earlier the High Court had directed the mercy petition, pending before the Governor, to be decided within a period of three months.
This was not done and a reply was filed on behalf of the State explaining the circumstances under which the matter remained pending.
In this background the impugned order was passed.
The judicial proceeding dealing with the conviction and sentence of the accused had been earlier concluded, and the order of his release on bail was passed while finally disposing of the writ petition alleging delay in disposal of the mercy petition.
In other words, no case in now pending before the Court, and it cannot be suggested that the order of the respondent 's release on bail has been passed as an interim measure pending the decision of a case before the Court.
In such a situation the provisions of Section 433A are attracted.
The words in the Section quoted above and underlined by us are wide in their application and cannot be restricted as suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent.
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and remit the case to the High Court for reconsideration of the writ petition confined to its limited scope in accordance with law.
The respondent shall surrender without delay and only thereafter he shall be allowed to press his application before the High Court.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
On the application for pre mature release, made by the respondent, who was undergoing sentence of life imprisonment and had served a period of eleven and a half years the High Court directed that the respondent 's mercy petition pending before the Governor, should be decided within three months.
Since this was not done, the High Court directed his release on bail, observing that if his mercy petition was dismissed he would have to surrender.
Against this decision the State filed an appeal before this Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: The High Court has not taken into consideration the provisions of Section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 while passing the order for the respondent 's release on bail.
The judicial proceeding dealing with the conviction and sentence of the accused had been earlier concluded, and the order was passed while finally disposing of the writ petition alleging delay in disposal of the mercy petition.
Thus, no case is now pending before the court.
The order for the respondent 's release on bail has not therefore, been passed as an interim measure pending the decision of a case before the Court.
In such a situation the provisions of Section 433A are attracted.
The words "such person shall not be released from prison" are wide in their application and cannot be restricted only to case where the person has been released finally.
The judgment in question is set aside and the case remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of writ petition confined to its limited scope.


judgement:
ON: civil Appeal No. 4032 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.1983 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 166 and CMP No. 1714 of 1983.
U.R. Lalit and section Srinivasan for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Darshan Singh, Praveen Kumar and Sumit Sen for the Respondent.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN, J.
The appellant, the East India Corporation Limited, is the defendant in O.S. No. 623 of 1980, which is a suit instituted by the respondent, Shree Meenakshi Mills Limited, for recovery of possession of a building on the ground of arrears of rent, etc.
The respondent plaintiff alleged that the appellant defendant was the tenant of the building in question and that it has not paid the agreed rent of Rs. 900 per month for a long period, despite persistent demands, and has thus been in "wilful default" of payment of the agreed rent.
The appellant denied these allegations.
It specifically denied any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and contended that its occupation of the building was not as a tenant of the respondent, but as one of its "associates" or "co sharers" or "co owners".
The suit was decreed.
The decree of the learned Munsif was affirmed in appeal by the First Appellate Court as well as by the High Court.
All the three courts, rejecting the appellant 's contentions 314 to the contrary, found that it was a tenant of the respondent; it questioned without bona fide the respondent 's title as landlord; it was in default of payment of rents, and, if was liable to be evicted from the building.
Against these concurrent findings, the present appeal was brought to this Court by means of a special leave petition.
Leave was granted by order of this Court dated 24.9.84.
At the time of the institution of the suit, or the grant of leave by this Court, the building in question did not come within the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 ( 'the Act ') for the agreed rent, as alleged by the plaintiff respondent and as found by all the courts, was Rs. 900 per month, and as such was outside the limit prescribed under section 30(ii) of the Act for a residential building to fall within the statutory ambit.
Section 30, as it stood at the relevant time, stated: "30.
Exemption in the case of certain buildings.
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to (i) any building for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed and notified to the local authority concerned; or (ii) any residential building or part thereof occupied by any one tenant if the monthly rent paid by him in respect of that building or part exceeds four hundred rupees.
" Clause (ii) of section 30 was, however, struck down by this Court in Rattan Arya & Ors.
vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
, ; This Court stated: ".
Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has to be struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
A writ will issue declaring Section 30(ii) as unconstitutional".
As a result of this declaration of the constitutional invalidity of section 30(ii), the Act in question, according to the appellant, has to be read as if clause (ii) of section 30 was never brought into force, and consequently all residential buildings, which are older than five years (see clause (i) of section 30) and let out for whatever rent, came within the ambit of the Act.
Accordingly, although the suit was properly 315 instituted in the civil court without regard to the special provisions of the Act, it is now contended that as a result of the declaration by this Court of the constitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30, which excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 the decree of the civil court, whatever be the merits of the findings on the respective contentions of the parties, has become null and void and of no effect whatever.
This contention of the appellant is based on the principle that any decree passed by an incompetent court is a nullity.
The appellant 's counsel relies on the principle reiterated by this Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta vs Gobind Ram Bohram ; and the earlier decisions referred to therein on the point.
In Kiran Singh & Ors.
vs Chaman Paswan & Ors., ; at 121, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. pointed out : ".
It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and where ever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings.
A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram no judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities." Dr Y.S. Chitale, appearing for the respondent, however, submits that the decree passed by the civil court in the present case is not a nullity for the Act has not barred the jurisdiction of the civil court, but only prohibits execution of a decree for eviction otherwise than in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions.
Such a decee, he says, is not void, but is merely under an eclipse, and will become executable as and when the bar is removed.
He refers to section 10 of the Act which reads : "section 10.
Eviction of tenants. (1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or sections 14 to 16: 316 . . . . . . . . .
Relying on certain observations of this Court in B.V. Patankar & Ors.
vs C.G.Sastry, ; in the context of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948, Dr. Chitale submits that, like in that case, what is prohibited by section 10 in the present case is execution of the decree and the validity of the decree as such is not affected.
We do not agree.
Section 9 of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, 1948 reads : "section 9(1) A tenant in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause.
. . . . . . . . . " Section 16 of that Order reads: "section 16.
Nothing in this order shall prevent a landlord from filing a suit for eviction of a tenant before a competent civil court, provided that no decree for eviction of a tenant, passed by a civil court shall be executed unless a certificate to that effect is obtained from the Controller.
" Section 16 of the Mysore Order, 1948, thus specifically allows the institution of a civil suit for eviction of a tenant, although a decree passed by such a court for eviction cannot be executed without a certificate to that effect from the Controller.
Jurisdiction of the civil court is thus not only not barred but specifically preserved, except for the restriction imposed on the execution of decrees in matters of eviction.
On the other hand, such a provision is significantly absent in the enactment in question, The provisions of the Mysore Order considered by this court in B.V. Patankar & Ors.
vs C.S.Sastry, ; and those of the Act in question here are not in pari materia.
The observations of this Court relied on by Dr. Chitale are not, therefore, helpful in understanding the provisions in question in the instant case.
Section 10 of the Act, as seen above, prohibits eviction of a tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section or sections 14 to 16.
These provisions as well as the other provisions of the Act are a self contained code, regulating the relationship of parties, creating special rights and liabilities, and, providing for determination of such rights 317 and liabilities by tribunals constituted under the statute and whose orders are endowed with finality.
The remedies provided by the statute in such matters are adequate and complete.
Although the statute contains no express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court, except for eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise", the provisions of the statute are clear and complete in regard to the finality of the orders passed by the special tribunals set up under it and their competence to administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil suits.
Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by the tribunals constituted under it.
Although the jurisdiction of the civil court is not expressly barred the provisions of the statute explicitly show that, subject to the extra ordinary powers of the High Court and this Court, such jurisdiction is impliedly barred, except to the limited extent specially provided by the statute.
See in this connection the principle stated by this Court in Dhulabhai & Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., ; See also Secretary of State vs Mask & Co., [1939 40] 1A 222 (PC): Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. vs Governor General in Counsil.
[1946 47] IA 50 (PC) and Barraclogh vs Brown & Ors., Judged by this test, the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of eviction of tenants is barred except to the extent and subject to the conditions prescribed under Section 10.
The second provision to section 10(1) reads: "Provided further that where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sections, notwithstanding that the Court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded".
What is stated in the second proviso to section 10(1) is the sole circumstance in which the civil court is invested with jurisdiction in matters of evictions.
But this jurisdiction cannot be invoked otherwise than as stipulated in the second proviso.
This means that the condition 318 precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil court is that the tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and the Controller should, on such denial or claim by the tenant, reach a decision whether such denial or claim is bona fide.
Upon such decision, the Controller must record a finding to that effect.
In that event, the landlord is entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court.
Where these conditions are satisfied, the civil court will have jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned, in section 10 or Sections 14 to 16, notwithstanding that the Court has found that the tenant 's denial of the landlord 's title does not involve forfeiture of the lease, or, his claim of right of permanent tenancy is unfounded.
Except to this limited extent, the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters of eviction of a tenant is completely barred and the jurisdiction in such matters is vested in the tribunals set up under the statute.
Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked only where the controller comes to a decision, and records a finding, that the denial or claim by the tenant, as aforesaid, is bona fide.
If the Controller were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of invoking the jurisdiction of the civil court would arise.
But the decision of the controller is concerned solely with the bona fides and not the correctness or validity, of the denial or claim, for these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters (See the principle discussed in Magiti Sasamal vs Pandap Bissoi, In such an event, the civil court will become competent to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in section 10 or sections 14 to 16.
On the other hand, if the decision of the controller is that the tenant 's denial or claim is not bona fide the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked by the landlord and the Controller will then be the competent authority to order eviction, after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, on any one of the grounds specified under the statute, including the ground that the tenant has, without bona fide, denied the landlord 's title or claimed right of permanent tenancy.
What is significant is that the decision of the Controller, duly recorded by him, as regards the bona fide denial or claim by the tenant is the condition precedent to the invocation of power of the civil court.
Any suit instituted by the landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the ambit of the Act, otherwise.
Than as stipulated by the section, is, therefore, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and any decree of the Court in such a suit is null and void and no effect.
319 In the present case, the procedure stipulated in the second proviso to section 10 has not been complied with.
At the time of the institution of the suit, the building in question did not come within the ambit of the Act, owing to the exclusionary provision contained in clause (ii) of section 30, but after leave to appeal was granted by this Court, the applicability of the Act was extended to the building by reason of the decision of this Court in Rattan Arya & Ors.
vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., ; declaring the invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30 on account of its inconsistency with Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whatever be the consequence of that declaration whether it has rendered the statutory provision null and void and of no effect.
See Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs The State of Bombay, and Saghir Ahmed vs The State of U.P. and others; , or merely inoperative, unenforceable and dormant to be revitalised on subsequent removal of the constitutional ban.
See Bhikaji Marain Dhakras and Others vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another. ; and M.P.V. Sundararamier & Co. vs The State of Andhra Pradesh & Another, ; in either event, the Civil Court acting without the aid of the exclusionary provision in clause (ii) of section 30, during the period of invalidity, has become coram no judice and its proceedings resulting in the decree a nullity.
See Kiran Singh & Others vs Chaman Paswan & Others, ; at 121.
In the circumstances, we set aside the decrees of the courts below.
The appeal is allowed and the appellant is entitled to costs throughout.
R.P. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent field a suit against the appellant for recovery of possession of a building on the ground of wilful deflault in payment of rent which was Rs. 900 per ;month.
The appellant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, claiming himself as one of the "associates" or "co sharers" or "co owners" of the building.
The Munsif decreed the suit; and the decree was affirmed in appeal by the first appellate court as also by the High Court.
Hence the present appeal.
During the pendency of the present appeal, cl.
(ii) of section 30 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which exempted from application of the Act premises the monthly rent in respect of which exceeded Rs. 400, and on the basis of which the suit giving rise to the present appeal emanated, was struck down in a judgment by this Court.
** The appellant contended that as a result of the declaration by this Court of the constitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30, of the Act, 311 which excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 400, the decree of the civil court became null and void and of no effect.
On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the decree passed by the civil court was not a nullity for the Act did ;not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court but only prohibited execution of a decree of eviction otherwise than in accordance with the relevant statutory provision; and that such a decree was not void, but was merely under an eclipse, and would become executable as and when the bar is removed.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD; 1.1 Section 10 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 prohibits jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of eviction of a tenant whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section and sections 14 to 16.
The sole circumstance and the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil court as stated in second proviso to section 10(1) is that the tenant should have denied the title of the landlord or claimed right of permanent tenancy and the Controller, on such denial or claim by the tenant, reaches a decision and duly records a finding that such denial or claim was bona fide and only when these conditions are satisfied jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked to pass a decree for eviciton on any of the grounds mentioned in section 10 or sections 14 to 16.
Except to this limited extend the jurisdiction of the civil court is completely barred and the same is vested in the tribunals set up under the Act.
Any suit instituted by a landlord for eviction of a tenant from a building falling within the ambit of the Act,otherwise than as stipulated by the section is, therefor, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the court and any decree of the court in such a suit is null and void and of no effect.
[317D E, G H; 318 D,G H] Sushil Kumar Mehta vs Gobind Ram Bohra, [1990] 1 SCC page 193, referred to.
1.2 The decision of the Controller is concerned solely with the bona fides, and not the correctness or validity, of the denial or claim, for these difficult questions of title are by the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters.
[318D E] Magiti Sasamal vs Pandab Bissoi,[1962] 3 SCR 673, referred to.
1.3 If the decision of the Controller is that tenant 's denial or 312 claim is not bona fide, the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked by the landlord and the Controller will then be the competent authority to order eviction, after affording the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, on any one of the grounds specified under the statute, including the ground that the tenant has, without bona fide denied landlord 's title or claimed right of permanent tenancy.[318E F] 1.4 Although the Act contains no express bar of jurisdiction of the civil court, its provisions explicitly show that, subject to the extraordinary powers of the High Court, and this Court, such jurisdiction is statute for eviction of tenants "in execution or otherwise".
The provision of the Act are clear and complete in regard to the finality of the orders passed by the special tribunals set up under it, and their competence to administer the same remedy as the civil courts render in civil suits.
Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating to the special rights and liabilities created by the statute should be decided by the tribunals constituted under it.
[317A C] Dhulabhai &Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
, ; ; Secretary of State vs Mask & Co., [1939 40] IA 222 (PC, Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. vs Governor General in Council, [1946] 47 IA 50 (PC and Barraclough vs Brown & Ors., , referred to.
In the instant case, the procedure stipulated in the second proviso to section 10 had not been complied with.
At the time of institution of the suite, the building in question did not come within the ambit of the Act, owing to the exclusionary provision contained in cl.
(ii) of section 30, but after leave to appeal was granted, the applicability of the Act was extended to the building by reason of the decision of this Court, declaring the invalidity of cl.
(ii) of section 30 on account of its inconsistency with Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whatever be the consequences of that declaration whether it has rendered the statutory provision null and void and of no effect, or, merely inoperative, unenforceable and dormant to be revitalised on subsequent removal of the constitutional ban in either event, the civil court acting without the aid of the exclusionary provision in cl.
(ii) of section 30, during the period of invalidity,had become coram non judice and its proceedings resulting in the decree a nullity.
[319A D] 313 Ratan Arya & Ors.
vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.
, ; , referred to.
Kiran Singh & Ors.
vs Chaman Paswan & Ors., ; relied on.
V.B. Patankar & Ors.v.
C.G. Sastry, ; , held inapplicable.
Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs State of Bombay, ; Saghir Ahmad vs State of U.P. and Ors. ; ; Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors.
vs The State of M.P.
The State of A.P. & Anr., ; , referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1976 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.7.1987 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi in Regn.
No. O.A.No. 511 of 1986.
V.C. Mahajan, C.V.S. Rao, A.K. Srivastava and P.Parmeshwaran for the Appeallants.
Dr. D.C. Vohra, P.K. Bansal and S.K. Bisaria for the Respondent.
The Judgment of Court was delivered by SINGH, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi, quashing the order of the Ministry of Commerce dated 6.1.1986 rejecting the respondent 's representation against remarks awarded to him.
E.G. Nambudiri respondent is a Section Officer in the office of Chief Controller of Import and Exports, Ministry of Commerce.
By a 455 memorandum dated 7th May, 1985, the Director communicated adverse remarks awarded to the respondent for the year ending 1984.
These remarks were under: "1.
That you were not associated with the important work of the section such as the open house discussions, monthly analysis of the returns received from regional offices, complaints and port Officers meetings.
That the quality of performance and application of knowledge, delegated authority and conceptual and professional skills on the jobs is very poor.
That you had a casual attitude to the work assigned.
Your devotion to duty was insufficient.
That subordinates used to complain that they could not work under you, as you could not give proper guidance.
That your job did not involve contact with the public indications and your intellectual honesty and innovative opaity are average.
That nothing adverse has come to notice regarding your integrity.
That you were given advice/warning at various levels both orally and in writing but you did not react to these.
" The respondent made representation against the adverse remarks but the same was rejected by the order dated 6.1.1986.
The respondent, thereafter, made a memorial to the President of India against the adverse remarks, as a result of which the adverse remarks as contained in Item Nos.
1 to 4 as quoted above were expunged, whereas the remaining adverse entries were maintained.
The Govt '.s decision was communicated by a memorandum dated 14.8.1986.
But before the aforesaid decision of the Government partially expunging the adverse remarks could be communicated to the respondent, he filed a petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the order of the Ministry of Commerce dated 6.1.1986 rejecting his representation made against the adverse entries.
The respondent challenged the order dated 6.1.1986 rejecting his representation on the ground that it did not contain any reasons.
Plea of mala fide was also raised against the Joint Director, Ministry of Commerce, who had awarded the adverse 456 remarks to the respondent.
The Tribunal by its order dated 27.7.1987 quashed the Government Order as contained in the communication letter dated 6.1.1986 and also subsequent order dated 14.8.1986 on the ground that those orders were vitiated in law in the absence of reasons.
The Tribunal held that it was a basic principle of natural justice of every quasi judicial process, that order should contain reasons.
Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi judicial as well as administrative inquiries, an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than in a quasi Judicial enquiry, therefore, it was necessary that in rejecting the representation against an adverse entry, reasons must be stated and in the absence of reasons the order would be arbitrary and liable to be quashed.
Placing reliance on a number of decisions of High Courts, the Tribunal held that a bald communication rejecting the representation made against the adverse entries does not meet the requirement of law.
The Tribunal further held that in the absence of reasons it would follow that the competent authority rejected the representation without applying its mind to the grounds raised in the representation.
Learned counsel for the parties conceded that there are no statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution regulating the award of entries in the character roll of a Central Government employee or providing for filing of representation against the adverse entries, or its disposal.
The entire field in this regard is regulated by administrative directions issued from time to time.
Under these directions the character roll of Government servants is required to be maintained wherein the entries are made every year by superior competent authority regarding the work, conduct and character of the Government servant.
These entries are confidential in nature, which contain the assessment of the work and conduct of the Government servant, reflecting his efficiency or defect in his work and conduct.
The confidential reports, contain general assessment of character, conduct and qualities of a Govt.
Servant which may include comments about his good work, drive, initiative, devotion to duty and integrity.
These entries also reflect the inefficiency, delay, lack of initiative, carelessness in handling the problems, or any defect in character and integrity.
These entries contain reference to any penalty which may have been awarded to a government servant in departmental proceedings.
These entries are important in nature as on the basis of these entries, a Government servant 's suitability to the office is assessed for the purposes of his confirmation, promotion and even for retention in service.
Any adverse remark awarded against a Government servant is 457 communicated to him to afford him opportunity of explaining the correct position by means of a representation.
The competent authority is required to examine the adverse remarks in consultation, if necessary, with the reporting officer and counter signing authority.
If the competent authority finds that the remarks are justified and there are no sufficient grounds for interference, he may reject the representation and the Government servant is informed accordingly.
If, however, the competent authority finds that the adverse remarks are incorrect, unfounded or unjustified, he would expunge the same and inform the Government servant.
The competent authority may having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cast modify, or tone down the remarks.
The administrative instructions issued by the Government do not require the competent authority to record reasons either in accepting or rejecting the representation of a Government servant, made against adverse entries.
Entries made in the character roll and confidential record of a Government servant are confidential and those do not by themselves affect any right of the Government servant, but those entries assume importance and play vital role in the matter relating to confirmation, crossing of efficiency bar, promotion and retention in service.
Once an adverse report is recorded, the principles of natural justice require the reporting authority to communicate the same to the Government servant to enable him to improve his work and conduct and also to explain the circumstances leading to the report.
Such an opportunity is not an empty formality, its object, partially, being to enable the superior authorities to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified.
The superior authority competent to decide the representation is required to consider the explanation offered by the Government servant before taking a decision in the matter.
Any adverse report which is not communicated to the Government servant, or if he is denied the opportunity of making representation to the superior authority cannot be considered against him.
See: Gurdial Singh Fijji vs State of Punjab & Ors., In the circumstances it is necessary that the authority must consider the explanation offered by the Government servant and to decide the same in a fair and just manner.
The question then arises whether in considering and deciding the representation against report, the authorities are duty bound to record reasons, or to communicate the same to the person concerned.
Ordinarily, Courts and Tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons.
Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an 458 obligation to record reasons.
But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion.
Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons.
If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the Court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders.
Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records.
Reasons are not necessary to be communicated to the Government servant.
If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons do not affect the validity of the order.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that principles of natural justice require the superior authority to record reasons in rejecting the Government servant 's representation made against the adverse remarks as the order of rejection affected the respondent 's right.
It is true that the distinction between judicial act and administrative act has withered away and the principles of natural justice are now applied even to administrative orders which involve civil consequences, as held by this Court in State of Orissa vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., ; What is a civil consequence has been answered by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill & Ors.
vs The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed: "But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby traps? "Civil consequences" undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights out of civil liberties, material deprivations and nonpecuniary damages.
In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence.
" The purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and it is no more in doubt that the principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative orders if such orders affect the right of 459 a citizen.
Arriving at the just decision is the aim of both quasi judicial as well as administrative enquire, an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than decision in a quasi judicial enquiry.
Now, there is no doubt that the principles of natural justice are applicable even to administrative inquiries.
See: A.K. Kraipak & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors., The question is whether principles of natural justice require an administrative authority to record reasons.
Generally, principles of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed.
The application of principles of natural justice, and its sweep depend upon the nature of the rights involved, having regard to the setting and context of the statutory provisions.
Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil consequences ensue, principles of natural justice apply even if the statutory provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed.
But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for its decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision.
Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of it decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons.
It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions.
See: Regina vs Gaming Board for Great Britain ex p. Benaim and Khaida ; at 431.
Though the principles of natural justice do not require reasons for decision, there is necessity for giving reasons in view of the expanding law of judicial review to enable the citizens to discover the reasoning behind the decision.
Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review.
Under our Constitution an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of a citizen, it is therefore desirable that reasons should be stated.
There are however, many areas of administrative activity where no reasons are recorded or communicated, if such a decision is challenged before the Court for judicial review, the reasons for the decision may be placed before the court.
The superior authority while considering the representation of a Government servant against adverse remarks, is not required by law to act judicially, it is under no legal obligation to record or communicate reasons for its decision to the Government servant.
The decision, rejecting the representation does 460 not adversely affect any vested right of the Government servant nor does it visit him with any civil consequences.
In many cases having regard to infinite variations of circumstances, it may not be possible to disclose reasons for the opinion formed about the work and conduct or character of the Government servant.
In the instant case adverse remarks as contained in item Nos. 1 to 4 were expunged but those at serial numbers 5 and 6 were not expunged and the respondent 's representation to that extent was rejected.
On a careful scrutiny of the two remarks, it would appear that observation contained in Item No. 5 "that nothing adverse has come to notice regarding your integrity" is not adverse to the respondent 's work and conduct.
These remarks are neutral in nature, and they do not adversely comment upon the respondent 's work, conduct or character, though they are no commendatory in nature.
As regards the remarks at Serial No. 6, they are self explanatory, which show that inspite of oral and written warnings the respondent the respondent did not improve.
If the superior authority was not satisfied with the explanation of the respondent as cantained in his representation, what reasons could be stated, except that the authority was not satisfied with the explanation.
The superior authority was not obliged to write detail judgment or order giving detais of the warnings or the material on which he formed opinion.
There is no dispute that there is no rule or administrative order for recording reasons in rejecting a representation.
In the absence of any statutory rule or statutory instructions requiring the competent authority to record reasons in rejecting a representation made by a Government servant against the adverse entries the competent authority is not under any obligation to record reason.
But the competent authority has no licence to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner.
He is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the office awarding the adverse entries and the officer counter signing the same.
If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reasons.
In the absence of any statutory or administrative provision requiring the competent authority to record reasons or to communicate reasons, no exception can be taken to the order rejecting representation merely on the ground of absence of reasons.
No order of an administrative authority communicating its decision is rendered illegal on the ground of absence of reasons ex facie and it is not open to the court to interfere with such orders merely on the ground of absence of any reasons.
However, it does not mean that the administrative authority 461 is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same.
In governmental functioning before any order is issued the matter is generally considered at various levels and the reasons and opinions are contained in the notes on the file.
The reasons contained in the file enable the competent authority to formulate its opinion.
If the order as communicated to the Government servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law.
If such an order is challenged in a court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation.
it is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence alinude before the court to justify its action.
The President was under no legal obligation to record reasons in rejecting the respondent 's representation against the adverse remarks.
Consequently, the order of the president was not vitiated in law.
The Central Administrative Tribunal committed error in quashing the order of the president as well as the order of the Ministry of Commerce dated 6.1.1986.
Assuming that there was some defect in the order rejecting the respondent 's representation, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the adverse entries awarded to the respondent should be treated as having been expunged.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 27.7.1987.
There will be no order as to costs.
T.N.A Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent, a Section Officer in the office of the Chief Controller of Import and Exports, was communicated adverse remarks for the year 1984.
He made a representation against the adverse remarks but the same was rejected by the Ministry of Commerce by its order dated 6.1.1986.
Thereafter he made a Memorial to the President and the Government by its order dated 14.8.86 partially expunged the adverse remarks.
The respondent filed a petition before the Central Administrative Trubunal challenging the order rejecting his representation on the ground that it did not contain any reasons.
The Tribunal by its order dated 27.7.87 quashed both the order dated 6.1.86 as well as 14.8.86 by holding that the orders were vitiated in law in the absence of reasons.
In appeal to this Court by the Union of India, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the principles of natural justice require the superior authority to records reasons in rejecting the Government servant 's representation made against the adverse remarks as the order of rejection affected the respondent 's right.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
The superior authority while considering the represen 452 tation of a Government servant against adverse remarks, is not required by law to act judicially, it is under no legal obligation to record or communicate reasons for its decision to the Government servant.
There is no rule or administrative order for recording reasons in reacting such a representation.
In the absence of any statutory rule or statutory instructions requiring the competent authority to record reasons in rejecting a representation made by a Government servant against the adverse entries the competent authority is not under any obligation to record reasons.
The decision, rejecting such a representation does not adversely affect any vested right of the Government servant nor does it visit him with any civil consequences.
It does not mean that the competent authority has licence to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner.
He is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the officer awarding the adverse entries and the officer counter signing the Confidential Reports.
If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reason.
In many cases having regard to infinite variations of circumstances it may not be possible to disclose reasons, for the opinion formed about the work and conduct or character of the Government servant.
However, it does not mean that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same.
In Governmental functioning before any orde is issued the matter is generally considered at various levels and the reasons and opinions are contained in the notes on the file.
The reasons contained in the file enable the competent authority to formulate its ipinion.
If the order as communicated to the Government servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons the order cannot be held to be bad in law.
If such an order is challenged in a court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation.
It is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence ali unde before the court to justify its action.
[459G H, 460A, E F H, 461A B] Gurdial Singh Fijji vs State of Punjab & Ors., , referred to. 2 The President was under no legal obligation to record reasons in rejecting the respondent 's representation against the adverse remarks.
Consequently, the order of the President was not vitiated in law.
The Central Administrative Tribunal committed error in quashing the order of the President as well as the order of the Ministry of Com 453 merce dated 6.1.1986.
Accordingly, the Tribunal 's order dated 27.7.1987 is set aside.
[461C E] 3.
The purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and the principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative orders if such orders affect the right of a citizen.
Arriving at the just decision is the aim of both quasi judicial as well as administrative enquiry, an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than decision in a quasijudicial enquiry.
Generally, principles of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed.
The application of principles of natural justice, and its sweep depend upon the nature of the right involved, having regard to the setting and context of the statutory provisions.
Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil consequences ensue, principles of natural justice apply even if the statutory provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed.
But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for its decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision.
Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons.
It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions.
[458H, 459A D] State of Orissa vs Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., ; ; Mohinder Singh Gill & Ors.
vs The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., ; A. K. Kraipak & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors., and Regina vs Gaming Board for Great Britain ex.
p. Benaim and Khaida, ; , referred to.
Though the principles of natural justice do not require reasons for decision, there is necessity for giving reasons in view of the expanding law of judicial review to enable the citizens to discover the reasoning behind the decision.
Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review.
Under our Constitution an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of a citizen, it is therefor desirable that reasons should be stated.
[459F] 4.
Ordinarily, Courts and Tribunals, adjudicating rights of parties, are required to act judicially and to record reasons.
Where an 454 administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons.
But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion.
Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal.
But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered illegal for absence of reasons.
If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the Court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders.
Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by communicated to the Government servant.
If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons do not affect the validity of the order.
[457H, 458A C]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3644 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.1988 of the Allahabad High Court in S.A. No. 194 of 1987.
Yoeshwar Prasad and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Appellants.
471 B.D. Agarwala, Gopal Subramaniam, Ms. Bina Gupta, Arvind Verma, Ms. Monika Mohil, R.K. Srivastava and P. Misra for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN, J.
This appeal is by defendants 1 and 2 in a suit for mandatory injunction.
The appellants are officers of Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli, of which the third defendant, the U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. (the second respondent herein) is the holding company.
The State of Uttar Pradesh (the third respondent) is the fourth defendant.
The plaintiff, Badri Nath Dixit (the first respondent), instituted the suit for mandatory injunction to enforce a contract alleged to have been entered into between the plaintiff and defendants 1 & 2 for appointment of the plaintiff to the post of Instrumentation Foreman in the defendants company and for consequential reliefs.
The plaintiff contended that he had been sponsored by the Chairman and Managing Director of the third defendant, by his letters dated 18 October, 1982 and 14 December, 1982 for appointment by defendants 1 & 2 as an Apprentice Engineer in terms of a scheme formulated by the Government of India, but such appointment was not made by defendants 1 & 2.
The plaintiff prayed for an injunction compelling defendants 1 & 2 to appoint him to the post of `Instrumentation Foreman ', which post, according to him, was at the time of the suit lying vacant.
In effect, what the plaintiff seeks is a decree to compel the specific performance of a contract of personal service.
Defendants 1 to 3 filed a joint written statement denying the allegations.
They stated that there was no contract, as alleged, and there was no vacancy for any post to which the plaintiff was qualified to be appointed.
They further stated that the plaintiff had been conditionally offered appointment as a Fitter Trade Apprentice, subject to his possessing the requisite qualifications and his selection by the Apprentice Board, Kanpur.
The plaintiff was not qualified and was, therefore, not selected.
They further contended that neither as an Apprentice nor as Instrumentation Foreman was the plaintiff qualified to be appointed.
The suit was dismised by the trial court.
However, on appeal by the plaintifif it was decreed by the learned Additional District Judge who directed defendant 1 to appoint the plaintiff to the post of Apprentice Engineer under the s cheme sponsored by the Government of India.
This decree was confirmed in appeal by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
The High Court further held 472 that the plaintiff was entitled to be appointed to the post of Instrumentation Foreman with effect from the date on which the former incumbent of that post had resigned.
Counsel for the appellants (defendants 1 & 2 ) submit that there is no evidence of the alleged contract having been entered into by the defendants with the plaintiff; nor is there any evidence of a scheme of the Government of India which entitled the plaintifif to be appointed to any post in the defendants ' company.
Counsel states that, in any view, the plaintiff was not qualified for appointment as an Apprentice and much less to the higher post of Instrumentation Foreman.
The plaintiff 's counsel, however, submits that the letters addressed by the third defendant in his capacity as Chairman and Managine Director of the holding company to defendants 1 & 2, the officers of the subsidiary company, made it obligatory on the part of the latter to appoint the plaintiff in terms of the Government of India scheme.
It was so found by the first Applleate Court and the High Court.
That finding is not liable to be impeached in the present proceeding.
He says that the defendants are, therefore, liable to be compelled by means of a mandatory injunction to honor the offer held out by them to the plaintiff, who is entitled to enforce the contract founded on such offer by seeking specific performance of it.
We are surprised that the first Appellate Court and the High Court should have proceeded on the assumption that any enforceable contract existed.
Neither from the plaint nor from the evidence is it possible to identify and concluded contract to which the plaintiff is a party or which the plaintiff can enforce.
The defendants deny the existence of any contract or any other relationships which gives the paintiff any cause of action against the defendants.
There is no specific plea or evidence as regards the particulars of the alleged scheme of the Government of India in terms of which the plaintiff seeks relief.
Whether it is a statutory scheme, and if so what are the provisions relied on by the plaintiff, and whether a duty is cast on the defendants and a benefit conferred on persons like the plaintiff, is neither pleaded nor spoken to inevidence.
Assuming that any such scheme existed or any such contract bound the parties, to have decreed a suit for specific performance of a contract of personal service on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, was to violate all basic norms of law.
Courts do not ordinarily enforce performance of contracts of a personal character, such as a contract of employment.
In the words of Jessel M.R.: 473 "The courts have never dreamt of enforcing agreements strictly personal in their nature, whether they are agreements of hiring and service, being the common relation of master and servant . " [Rigby vs Connol, , 487; see Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston 's Law of Contract, 11th ed., p. 614].
" In the joint written statement filed by defendants 1 to 3, representing the holding and subsidiary companies, the alleged contract has been clearly denied.
We fail to see how the letters addressed by the Chairman of the holding company to the officers of the subsidiary company advising the appointment of the plaintiff to a post which he was found to be not qualified to hold could have resulted in any contract between the defendants of the one part and the plaintiff of the other part.
Assuming that the letters written by the Chairman of the holding company were in the nature of a direction which a subsidiary company was compelled to carry out, we fail to see how on the facts of this case, the plaintiff, who had no privity whatever to a contract, assuming there was a contract, could enforce any right under it.
In the first place, the letters sent by the Chairman of the holding company are merely in nature of an advise giving rise to no contractual relationship.
Even if the advise is taken to be of the character of a direction which the subsidiary company is bound to comply with, any obligation arising from such direction is not enforceable at the instance of a total stranger.
The Chairman was in no sense acting as a trustee of the plaintiff and no relationship of a fiduciary character whatever is alleged or proved to have existed between them.
Assuming that the then Chairman was personally interested in the plaintiff, that was not an interest which is legally enforceable against the defendants.
Such predilection on the part of the Chairman of a holding company, whatever be its impact on the subsidiary company, does not give rise to any actionable claim.
There is no evidence, whatsoever, as to the existence of a Government scheme, apart from a reference to it in the Chairman 's letter.
The plaintiff has not shed any light upon it.
The defendants have not admitted any such scheme.
Even if a scheme existed, there is no evidence that it was enforceable at the instance of a person seeking its benefit.
Nor has the plaintiff pleaded estoppel or adduced any evidence to support any such contention.
In the absence of any specific plea or evidence as regards the nature and other particulars of the scheme, it is preposterous that the courts below should have thought it fit to issue a mandatory injunction to compel the performance of the alleged contract of service in terms 474 of or pursuant to an unknown scheme.
Subject to certain well defined categories of exceptions, the law does not permit, and the does not contemplate, the enforcement of a contract of a personal nature by a decree for specific performance.
The facts of this case do not fall within the exceptions.
Assuming that the fact alleged by the plaintiff to be true as stated earlier, there is no evidence whatever to support them the plaintifif is not entitled to any relief other than damages in the even of his being in a position to prove that he has been damnified by reason of the defendants ' failure to carry out the obligations arising under what he calls a contract.
In Halsbury 's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 44, at page 407, it is stated: "407.
Contracts for personal work or services.
A judgment for specific performance of a contract for personal work or services is not pronounced, either at the suit of the employer or the employee.
The court does not seek to compel persons against their will to maintain continuous personal and confidential relations.
However, this rule is not absolute and without exception.
It has been held that an employer may be restrained from dismissing an employee in breach of contract if there is no loss of confidence between employer and employee or if (at least in a contract of employment to carry out a public duty) the employee has been dismissed in a manner which does not comply with statutory or contractual regulations governing dismissal.
No court may, whether by way of an order of specific performance of a contract of employment or an injunction restraining a breach or threatened breach of such a contract, compel an employee to do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any work.
This principle applies not merely to contracts of employment, but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous services by one person to another, such as a contract to work a railway line. " (emphasis supplied) As stated by this Court in Executive committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Others vs Lakshmi and Ors., ; at 1020: 475 ". a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contracts subsists and the employee even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer.
This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions; (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Art.311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute." (emphasis supplied) A contract of employment cannot orodinarily be enforced by or against an employer.
The remedy is to sue for damages.
(See section 14 read with section 41 of the ; see Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, by Polock & Mulla, Tenth Edn., page 983).
The grant of specific performance is purely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice.
Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles.
In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer.
There are, of course, certain exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; reinstatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law; a statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations, and the like.
(B.N. Tiwari vs District Board, Agra, ; ; U.P. State Warehousing Corporation vs C.K. Tyagi, ; ; Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors.
vs Lakshim Narain and Ors., ; see Halsbury 's Laws of England, Fourth Edn., Volume 44, paragraphs 405 to 420.) On the facts of this case, the High court was clearly wrong in issuing a mandatory injunction to appoint the plaintiff.
Even if there was a contract in terms of which the plaintiff was entitled to seek relief, the only relief which was available in law was damages and not specific performance.
Breach of contract must ordinarily sound in damages, and particularly so in the case of personal contracts.
Assuming that a contractual relationship arose consequent upon the letters addressed by the third defendant to the 1st defendant, the plaintiff was a total stranger to any such relationship, for, on the facts of this case, no relationship of a fiduciary character existed between the plaintiff and 476 the third defendant or other defendants.
Neither on principles of law or equity nor under any statute did the plaintiff acquire an enforceable right by reason of the letters exchanged between the first and third defendants.
The plaintiff had no privity of any kind to their relationship.
No collateral contract to which the plaintiff was a party did arise on the facts of this case.
At no time was the third defendant acting as an agent of the plaintiff.
There is no express or implied contract which is enforceable by the plaintiff.
(See Halsbury 's Laws of England., Fourth Edn., Volume 9, paragraphs 334 to 342).
The plaintiff 's counsel suggests that the claim is justifiable on the basis of legitimate expectations for appointment.
There is no specific plea or evidence to support any such contention.
Whatever expectations might have arisen from the letters of the third defendant, they could not have in law given rise to any right enforceable by specific performance.
For all these reasons we hold that the plaintiff 's suit for mandatory injunction, on the facts of the case, was rightly dismissed by the trial court and wrongly decreed by the first Appellate Court and the High Court.
We set aside the decrees of the High Court and the first Appellate Court and restore that of the trial court.
The plaintiff 's suit shall accordingly stand dismissed and the defendants ' appeal allowed with costs throughout.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The first respondent instituted a suit for mandatory injunction to enforce a contract alleged to have been entered into between him and the appellant, officers of the second respondent Corporation, for appointment to the post of Instrumentation Foreman in the appellants ' company, and for consequential reliefs.
He contended that he had been sponsored by the Chairman and Managing Director of the second respondent Corporation, which was the holding company of the appellants 'company by his two letters for appointment as an Apprentice Engineer in terms of a scheme formulated by the Government of India.
The appellants and the second respondent denied the existence of any contract.
The trial court dismissed the suit.
However, on appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit and directed the first appellant to appoint the first respondent to the post of Apprentice Engineer under the scheme sponsored by the Government of India.
This was confirmed, in appeal, by the High Court, which held the first respondent was entitled to be appointed to the post of Instrumentation Foreman with effect from the date on which the former incumbent of that post had resigned.
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellants it was contended that there was no evidence of the contract having been entered into by the appellant with the first respondent; nor was there any evidence of a scheme of the Government of India, which entitled him to be appointed to any post in the appellants ' company, and that, in any view, he was not qualified for appointment as an Apprentice, much less to the higher post of Instrumentation Foreman.
469 On behalf of the first respondent it was contended that the letters addressed by the second respondent in his capacity as Chairman, and Managing Director of the holding company, to the appellants, the officers of the subsidiary company, made it obligatory on the part of the latter to appoint him in terms of the Government of India scheme, as so found by both the first Appellate court and the high Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 A contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer.
The remedy is to sue for damages.
The grant of specific performance is purely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice.
Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles.
In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer.
There are, of course, certain exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; reinstatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law; a statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations, and the like.
[475 E] B.N. Tiwari vs District Board, Agra, ; ; U.P. State Warehousing Corporation vs C.K. Tyagi, ; and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors.
vs Lakshmi Narain and Ors., ; , referred to.
Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, by Polock & Mulla, Tenth Edn., page 983 and Halsbury 's Laws of England.
Fourth Edn., Volume 44, paragraphs 405 to 420, referred to.
1.2 In the instant case, neither from the plaint nor from the evidence is it possible to identify and concluded contract to which the first respondent is a party or which he can enforce.
There is no specific plea or evidence as regards the particulars of the scheme of the Government of India in terms of which he seeks relief whether it is a statutory scheme, and if so, what are the provision relied on by him and whether a duty is cast on the appellants and a benefit is conferred on persons like the first respondent.
Assuming that such a scheme existed or any such contract bound the parties, it would be violative of all basic norms of law to decree a suit for specific performance of a contract of personal service.[472E G] 470 1.3 Courts do not ordinarily enforce performance of contracts of a personal character, such as a contract of employment.
Subject to certain well defined categories of exceptions, law does not permit, and the does not contemplate, the enforcement of a contract of a personal nature by a decree for specific performance.
The facts of the instant case do not fall within the exceptions.
[472A, 474D] Rigby vs Connol, , 487 and Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Others vs Lakshmi Narain and Ors., ; at 1020, referred to.
Cheshire, fifoot and Furmston 's Law of Contract, 11th ed., p. 614 and Halsbury 's Laws of England Fourth Edition, Volume 44, at page 407, referred to.
1.4 Even if there was a contract in terms of which the first respondent was entitled to seek relief, the only which was available in law was damages and not specific performance.
Breach of contract must ordinarily sound in damages, and particularly so in the case of personal contracts.
Assuming that a contractual relationship arose consequent upon the letters addressed by the second respondent to the first appellant, the first respondent was a total stranger to any such relationship, for no relationship of a fiduciary character existed between the first respondent and the second respondent or the appellants.
Neither on principles of law or equity nor under any statute did the first respondent acquire an enforceable right by reason of the letters exchanged between the appellant and second respondent, nor did he have private of any kind to their relationship.
No collateral contract to which he was a party did arise on the facts of this case and at no time was the second respondent acting as his agent.
There is no express or implied contract which is enforceable by him.
[475 H, 476 B] In the circumstances, the decrees of the High Court and the first appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial court is restored.[476D]