judgement:
Special LeaVe Petition (Civil) No. 6765 of 1985.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.
1984 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.M.A. No. 244 of 1981.
D .N. Gupta and Vijay Kumar Verma for the Petitioner.
The Order of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
This petition is filed under Arti cle 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 11.12.84 allowing an appeal filed against the judgment dated 31.12.80 in E.I. case No. 4 of 1980 on the file of the Employees ' Insurance Court at Hyderabad.
The petitioner is a limited company carrying on busi ness at Secunderabad and at some other places in India.
The petitioner is engaged in the business of importing fertiliz ers.
It represents some foreign principals for the sale of their products in India.
The petitioner imports fertilizers into India which is an item purchased by the Central Government through the State Trading Corporation/Minerals and Metals Trading 'Corporation of India.
In the course of its business the petitioner obtains the tenders from the State Trading Corporation Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India and passes them on to its principals abroad.
Thereafter negotiations are carried on directly between the State Trading Corporation/Minerals Metals and Trading Corporation of India and the foreign principals.
After the deal is completed and the fertilizers arrive at the Indian ports the fertilizers are delivered to the Cen tral Government at the ports.
Before delivering the goods to the Central Government the petitioner supervises the 984 unloading of the goods and conducts the survey of the goods imported to ascertain the condition of the goods and to find out whether there are any shortages in the consignments so that there may be no disputes later on about the quality and quantity of the goods delivered.
The petitioner company has its branch offices in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras for super vising its work at the ports and to attend to other matters relating to clearing of shipments and in Delhi for securing payments of bills.
Its central office is at Secunderabad.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh after giving six months notice vide its gazette notification No. 788 Health dated 25.9.74 as required under section 1(5) of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') extended the provisions of the Act with effect from 30.3.75 among others to the establishments mentioned therein in which 20 or more persons were employed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months by Notification G.O.M. section No. 297, Health dated 25th March, 1975 published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated March 26, 1975.
Item 3(iii) in the list of establishments in that notification to which the Act was so extended by the State Government was "shops".
On inspection by the Insurance Inspector of the premises in which the petitioner was carrying on its business at Secun derabad it was found on 28.4.75 that the petitioner had employed persons ranging from 27 to 29 for wages within the relevant period and was carrying on the business of import of fertilizers.
On being asked by the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation to comply with the provisions of the Act the petitioner agreed that its business was covered by the Act in view of the notification issued by the State Government as it happened to be a "shop" and submitted contribution forms of its employees to the office of the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation.
After complying with the provisions of the Act for a period of four years the petitioner raised a dispute about its liability to pay the contributions payable under the Act and instituted under section 75 of the Act the case out of which this petition arises before the Employees ' Insurance Court at Hyderabad for a declaration that the establishment in which the peti tioner was carrying on its business was not a "shop" and therefore it was not covered by the notification issued by the State Government and that the petitioner was not liable to comply with the provisions of the Act.
The above petition was resisted by the Regional Director, Employees ' State Insurance Corporation.
It was pleaded on his behalf that the establishment which was being run by the petitioner was a "shop" and therefore it was liable to comply with the provi sions of the Act.
The Employees ' Insurance Court upheld the plea of the petitioner and 985 declared that the establishment of the petitioner was not covered by the Act.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Employ ees ' Insurance Court, the Regional Director of the Employ ees ' State Insurance Corporation filed an appeal before the High Court under section 82 of the Act.
The High Court allowed the appeal, reversed the decision of the Employees ' Insurance Court and dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner under section 75 of the Act.
The High Court was of the view that the establishment of the petitioner at Secunderabad was a "shop" to which the Act was applicable by virtue of the notification issued by the State Government.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 136 of the Constitu tion requesting this Court to grant special leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court.
On behalf of the petitioner it is urged before us that since no goods were actually being delivered in the premises in which the petitioner was having its establishment the said establishment could not be treated as a shop which is referred to in item 3(iii) of the Government 's notification.
The word "shop" is not defined in the Act or in the notifi cation issued by the State Government.
According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression "shop" means "a house or building where goods are made Or prepared for sale and sold".
It also means a "place of business" or "place where one 's ordinary occupation is carried on".
In ordinary parlance a "shop" is a place where the activities connected with the buying and selling of goods are carried on.
The evidence produced in the case shows that the peti tioner is carrying on its business at its business premises in Secunderabad.
At that place the petitioner carries on the commercial activity facilitating the emergence of contracts of sale of goods between its foreign principals and the State Trading Corporation ' Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India.
It arranges for the unloading of the goods under its supervision and for the survey of the goods despatched by its foreign principals at the ports on behalf of its foreign principals and on the goods being delivered to the Central Government it collects the price payable by the Government and remits it to its foreign principals.
All these activities are directed and controlled from its prem ises at Secunderabad.
It is thus clear that the activities carried on by the petitioner constitute trading activities although the goods imported from abroad are not actually brought to the said premises and delivered to the purchaser there.
In our opinion it is not actually necessary that the delivery of the goods to the purchaser should take place at the premises in which the business of buying or selling is carried on to constitute the said premises into a "shop".
986 The delivery 0f the goods sold to the purchaser is only one aspect of trading activities.
Negotiation of the terms of sale, carrying on of the survey of the goods imported, arranging for the delivery of the goods sold, collection of the price of the goods sold etc.
are all trading activities.
The premises where business is carried on by the petitioner is undoubtedly a shop as the activities that are carried on there relate only to the sale of goods which are imported into India.
The petitioner acts as the agent of its foreign principals who are the sellers.
The petitioner directs and controls all its activities from the premises in question.
If orders are received at a place which ultimately fructify into sales and the resulting trading activity is directed from there that place comes to be known as a "shop".
In our view the Employees ' Insurance Court placed a very narrow interpretation on the expression "shop" white upholding the contention of the petitioner by confining "shop" to a place where goods are actually stored and delivered pursuant to a sale.
We agree with the decision of the High Court that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the notification issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legislation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frus trated or stultified.
There is no doubt that the establish ment of the petitioner at Secunderabad is a "shop" where selling activity is carried on and by virtue of the notifi cation issued by the State Government the Act became ap plicable to it.
The petitioner is bound to comply with the provisions of the Act as admittedly at all relevant times the petitioner had engaged more than 20 persons for wages at its place of business.
There is no ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.
In the result this petition fails and is dismissed.
N.P.V. Petition dis missed.

summary:
The petitioner, a limited company, having central office at Secunderabad was carrying on business of importing ferti lizers and represented some foreign principals for the sale of their products in India.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh after giving six months notice, vide its gazette notification No. 788 Health dated 25 9 74 as required under section 1(5) of the extended the provisions of the Act with effect from 30 3 75 to the establishments mentioned therein in which 20 or more persons were employed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months by Notification G.O.M.S. No. 297, Health, dated 25th March, 1975.
Item 3(iii) in the list of establishments in that notification to which the Act was so extended by the State Government was "shops".
On inspection of the premises of the petitioner company at Secunderabad on 28 4 75, the Employees ' State Insurance Inspector found that the petitioner had employed persons ranging from 27 to 29 for wages and was carrying on the business of import of fertilizers, and the petitioner was asked to comply with the provisions of the .
The petitioner agreed and submitted contribu tion forms of its employees to the office of the Corpora tion.
After complying with the provisions of the Act for a period of four years the petitioner instituted a case under Section 75 of the Act before the Employees ' Insurance Court for a declaration that the establish 982 ment in which the petitioner was carrying on its business was not a "shop", and, therefore, it was not covered by the aforesaid notification and that the petitioner was not liable to comply with the provisions of the Act.
On behalf of the Corporation it was submitted that the establishment being run by the petitioner was a "shop" and, therefore, liable to comply with the provisions of the Act.
The Employ ees ' Insurance Court upheld the plea of the petitioner and declared that the establishment was not covered by the Act.
The High Court allowed the appeal of the Corporation and held that the establishment was a "shop" to which the Act was applicable by virtue of the State Government 's notifica tion.
In the Special Leave Petition, on behalf of the peti tioner it was urged that since no goods were actually being delivered in the premises in which the petitioner was having its establishment, the said establishment could not be treated as a 'shop ' which was referred to in item 3(iii) of the Government 's notification.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, this Court, HELD: 1.
The petitioner company is bound to comply with the provisions of the Act as, at all relevant times, the company had engaged more than 20 persons for wages at its place of business.
[986E] 2.1 The word "shop" is not defined in the Act or in the notification issued by the Government.
[985D] 2.2 In ordinary parlance a "shop" is a place where the activities connected with the buying and selling of goods are carried on.
[985E] 2.3 It is not actually necessary that the delivery of the goods to the purchaser should take place at the premises in which the business of buying or selling is carried on to constitute the said premises into a "shop".
The delivery of the goods sold to the purchaser is only one aspect of trad ing activities.
Negotiation of the terms of sale, carrying on of the survey of the goods imported, arranging for the delivery.of the goods sold, collection of the price of the goods sold etc.
are all trading activities.
[985H, A] In the instant case, the premises where business is carried on by the petitioner is undoubtedly a "shop" as the activities that are carried on there relate only to the sale of goods which are imported into India.
983 The petitioner acts as the agent of its foreign principals who are the sellers.
The petitioner directs and controls all its activities from the premises in question.
If orders are received at a place which ultimately fructify into sales and the resulting trading activity is directed from there, that place comes to be known as a "shop".
[986B C] 3.
The High Court was right in holding that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the noti fication issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legis lation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frustrated or stultified.
[986D]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 137 of 1953.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the November 30, 1951, of the former Pepsu High Court in R. section Appeal No. 49 of 1948 against the judgment and decree dated the May 1, 1948, of the Court of the District Judge, Patiala, in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1946 47, arising from the judgment and decree dated the April 4, 1947, of the Court of the Sub Judge 11 Class, Bassi in Suit No. 721 of 1945.
Achhru Ram and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.
Raghbir Singh and section section Dhillon, for the respondent No. 1. 950 1957.
November 15.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR J.
The only question for decision in this appeal is whether title had been acquired to certain lands by adverse possession.
Ram Ditta was a Hindu Jat of village Bhathal in District Bassi which was originally in Patiala but subsequently came to be included in Patiala & Eastern Punjab States Union.
He died in April or May 1920 leaving certain lands which were the subject matter of dispute in the suit out of which this appeal arises.
Ram Ditta had a son named Jeona who predeceased him leaving a widow, Harnam Kaur.
Harnam Kaur has a daughter, Kirpal Kaur and the latter is the appellant before us.
Kirpal Kaur has a son of the name of Satwant Singh.
Ram Ditta had certain collateral relations and the dispute was between them on the one hand and Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur on the other.
These collaterals are the contesting respondents in this appeal.
On Ram Ditta 's death Harnam Kaur took possession of the lands, and on August 24, 1920, she obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands in the place of Ram Ditta.
By a deed dated November 27, 1929, she purported to make a gift of half of the lands to Kirpal Kaur on the occasion of the latter 's marriage.
Thereafter an attempt was made to obtain a mutation of the settlement records showing Kirpal Kaur as the owner of the lands given to her but on the objection of the collaterals the mutation was refused on May 12, 1930.
This gift gave rise to various litigation both civil and criminal between Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur on the one hand and the collaterals on the other.
Mutual friends intervened to put an end to this unhappy state of affairs and at their efforts a settlement of the disputes was arrived at.
On February 6, 1932, a document was executed by Harnam Kaur whereby she agreed that the lands would belong to her for her life and after her death to Kirpal Kaur for the latter 's life and that none of them would be entitled to sell or mortgage the lands.
The document further stated 951 that Harnam Kaur had previously created a mortgage on the lands and that she would have the right to create another mortgage on them to pay off certain specified debts due by her and such mortgage would be binding on the collaterals but after her death there would be no other burden on the collaterals.
This document was never registered.
In 1936, Harnam Kaur created another mortgage on the lands and this mortgage was subsequently transferred to Satwant Singh, son of Kirpal Kaur.
In 1939, Harnam Kaur again made a gift, this time of the entire lands, to Kirpal Kaur and the latter thereafter obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands in the place of Harnam Kaur.
This eventually brought about the institution of the suit out of which the present appeal arises.
This suit was filed in March 1945, by some of the collaterals against Harnam Kaur, Kirpal Kaur and Satwant Singh impleading certain other collaterals who did not join as plaintiffs, as defendants.
It sought a declaration that the gift of the lands by Harnam Kaur to Kirpal Kaur and the mortgage of 1936 were illegal and were not binding on the collaterals who were the then reversionary heirs of Ram Ditta.
The suit was contested by Harnam Kaur, Kirpal Kaur and Satwant Singh.
The court of first instance framed the following issues for trial: 1. Are the plaintiffs the collaterals of Jeona ? 2.
Is the property in dispute ancestral ? 3.
Was the mortgage in dispute effected for legal necessity ? 4.
Is the gift in dispute valid according to custom ? 5.
Is the suit time barred ? 6.
Had Harnam Kaur acquired a right to the lands by adverse possession at the time of the gift to Kirpal Kaur ? The first five issues were decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the sixth against them.
With regard to the sixth issue it appears to have been admitted 121 952 before the learned trial Judge by both parties that according to the general custom governing the parties a widow of a pre deceased son, as Harnam Kaur was, was entitled to maintenance only when there were collaterals of the degree that the collaterals in this case are.
The learned Judge held that the possession of Harnam Kaur was, therefore, adverse to the collaterals and that as she had admittedly been in possession since 1920 and as the relations between her and the collaterals had been unfriendly, she had acquired at the date of the gift an absolute title to the lands by adverse possession.
It was contended before him that the agreement of February 6, 1932, though not admissible in evidence in the absence of registration to prove that Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur had only life estates in the lands, was admissible to show the nature of Harnam Kaur 's possession and that it showed that her possession was not adverse.
The learned Judge did not accept this contention.
In the above view of issue No. 6 he dismissed the suit.
The plaintiffs then took the matter up in appeal to the District Judge of Patiala.
Harnam Kaur and her side never took any exception to the issues found against them by the trial Judge.
The learned District Judge was therefore only concerned with the sixth issue.
It was contended before him on behalf of the plaintiffs that Harnam Kaur 's possession was not adverse to them as she had been in Possession claim ing only a right of maintenance and this was sought to be supported by the Patwari 's report in connection with the mutation of August 24, 1920.
The learned District Judge held that the report, a reference to which will be made later, did not show any assertion on the part of Harnam Kaur that she claimed to be the heir of Ram Ditta or that she was in possession in lieu of her maintenance.
With regard to the agreement of February 6, 1932, he held that it was of no assistance to the collaterals.
In the result he dismissed the appeal.
The collaterals then went up in appeal to the High Court of Patiala and Eastern Punjab States 953 Union.
The High Court took the view that in coming to the conclusion that Harnam Kaur 's possession was adverse to the collaterals the Courts below had proceeded on the basis that being the widow of Ram Ditta 's predeceased son she was not an heir to him and, therefore, her possession of Ram Ditta 's estate was necessarily adverse to his heirs, the collaterals.
The High Court felt that in doing so the Courts below were thinking of Hindu Law under which the widow of a pre deceased son was not an heir but was entitled to maintenance only, and had overlooked the fact that the parties being Punjabi Jats, were governed by custom.
The High Court then referred to paragraph 9 of Rattigan 's Digest of Customary Law which is a book of unquestioned authority on Punjab customswhere it is stated that " the widow of a sonless son who predeceases his father, is, in some tribes, permited to succeed to his share " and held that it appeared from the Patwari 's report mentioned earlier that Harnam Kaur was regarded as Ram Ditta 's heir and that was why mutation in her favour had been sanctioned.
The High Court then proceeded to hold that it was legitimate to presume from this that the tribe to which Ram Ditta belonged recognised the right of a widow of a predeceased son to succeed her father inlaw in the place of her husband in preference to the collaterals of the deceased.
The High Court thought that in view of this custom, which it found was proved in this case, Harnam Kaur was entitled to the possession of the lands and no presumption could therefore &rise that she was holding them adversely to the collaterals.
The High Court also held that the agreement of February 6, 1932, was admissible in evidence to prove the nature of Harnam Kaur 's possession of the lands though it was not admissible to prove title as it had not been registered.
The High Court was of the view that the agreement showed that since its execution the nature of Harnam Kaur 's possession was permissive and not adverse and as at the date of the agreement she had not been in possession for the requisite period, she never acquired title by adverse possession, whatever may have been the character of 954 her possession prior to it.
The High Court lastly held that in any event, Harnam Kaur had entered into possession as heir of her father in law and, therefore, adverse possession by her would be considered as creating only a widow 's estate in her and therefore she had not become an absolute owner and the nature of the estate acquired by her by adverse possession was that of a widow 's estate governed by the customary law with no power of alienation.
The High Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.
From this judgment of the High Court the present appeal to us arises.
The appeal had been filed by Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur, but later Harnam Kaur abandoned it and she was removed from the record as an appellant.
The appeal before us now, therefore, is only by Kirpal Kaur.
Learned counsel for the respondents, by which we mean the contesting respondents, contended that Kirpal Kaur alone was not competent to appeal because the alienations challenged had been made by Harnam Kaur.
We cannot accept this contention.
Kirpal Kaur as the alienee is certainly entitled to prosecute this appeal to protect her rights under the alienation.
Her rights in no way depend on whether the alienor chooses to stand by the alienation or not.
The points argued before us were the same as were canvassed in the High Court.
With regard to the special custom, which the High Court held governed the parties to this case, learned counsel for the appellant contended that no such custom had been pleaded and no issue about it framed, nor indeed any hint of it given at any earlier stage of the proceeding in any of the courts below.
We feel that these contentions are justified.
In the plaint no mention of the custom is to be found.
The plea as to adverse possession was raised by Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur in an amended written statement that they filed.
The plaintiffs never filed any replication setting up the special custom alleged by them as they should have done if they wished to rely on it in answer to the case made by the defendants by the amendment.
Further.
more, as earlier stated, it was admitted by both, 955 parties before the trial Judge, that the custom governing the parties was that the widow of a predeceased son was only entitled to maintenance out of her fatherin law 's estate.
As learned counsel for the appellant pointed out, the passage in Rattigan 's Digest makes it clear that the general custom is that the widow of a predeceased son is not an heir of her father in law but that in some tribes a special custom prevails which makes her the heir, and that the onus of proving the special custom lies on those who assert it.
It was therefore in this case for the respondents to have pleaded and proved the special custom.
As already stated, they neither pleaded the special custom, nor proved it nor even made an attempt to do so.
After Harnam Kaur and Kirpal Kaur had closed their case, the respondents were given a chance to produce evidence in rebuttal but even then they did not make any attempt to establish the special custom.
In these circumstances, in our view, no question as to the special custom should have been permitted by the High Court to be raised.
Furthermore, we are unable to agree with the High Court that there is evidence in this case to prove the special custom.
As already stated, the High Court thought that it might be presumed from the Patwari 's report that the special custom governing the tribe to which the parties belonged prevailed.
This report of the Patwari is dated June 9, 1920, and was made in connection with the proceedings for the mutation of the name of Ram Ditta to that of Harnam Kaur soon after the former 's death.
That report reads as follows: "Sir, Ram Ditta S/o Begha Jat Bhathal died a month back.
Harnam Kaur widow of Jeona, who is the real daughter in law of the deceased, is the heir and is in possession of the property.
Hence the mutation having been entered is hereby submitted for orders.
" Upon this report the following order was made: " The factum was confirmed in the general gathering in presence of Bhana, Arjan Singh and Narain Singh, lambardars and of Mst.
Harnam Kaur, the daughter in law of the deceased.
Hence the mutation 956 of the holding of Ram Ditta deceased in favour of Mat.
Harnam Kaur, widow of Jeons Jat, is hereby sanctioned.
Dated. . 24th August, 1920, A.D." The report, no doubt, states that Harnam Kaur was Ram Ditta 's heir.
It is said that she could be an heir only under the special custom and hence the special custom must be deemed to have been proved in this case.
But the report of the Patwari shows that in his own opinion Harnam Kaur was the heir of Ram Ditta.
We do not know, how he came to have such an opinion or whether he had based it on the special custom.
The report was not evidence given in court and is not strictly admissible to prove the custom and, in fact, the report was not tendered as evidence of the custom.
It is said that the Patwari 's report indicated that there must have been an application by Hamam Kaur claiming the mutation on the basis that the had succeeded to the lands as the heir of Ram Ditta under the special custom.
No such application is, however, on the records.
We are unable to draw any presumption as to what statement might have been made in the application, if there was one.
We do not think that the order of August 24, 1920, carries the matter further.
It is said that when the order stated that " the factum was confirmed " it meant that the factum of the custom was confirmed.
We cannot accept this contention.
The factum referred to may well have been the death of Ram Ditta or that Harnam Kaur was the daughter in law of Ram Ditta.
Even if it could be said that the factum confirmed was the special custom, the same difficulty would arise again, namely, that the order would show that it is only the opinion of the lambardars as to the existence of the special custom.
Such opinion, for the reasons earlier stated, would not be evidence in this case to prove the custom.
Further in the operative part of the order the mutation is not stated to be based on the ground that Harnam Kaur was the "heir" of Ram Ditta.
We are, therefore, unable to hold that the Patwari 's report or the order thereon proves that Harnam,Kaur was the customary heir of Ram Ditta and had got into possession in 1920, as such heir and,, 957 therefore, could not have been in adverse possession.
It is then said that the agreement of February 6, 1932, showed that since its date her possession was permissive.
The High Court has held that the agreement was admissible to prove the nature of her possession.
In Varatha Pillai vs Jeevarathnammal (1) it was held that a document which should have been registered but was not, was admissible to explain the nature of the possession of a person.
What had happened there was that two widows who were in possession of a property in equal shares, presented a petition to the Collector on October 10, 1895, whereby after reciting that they had on October 8, 1895, given away the property as stridhan to one Duraisani, they prayed that orders might be passed for transferring the villages into her name.
On this petition the property was registered in the name of Duraisani and she was put in possession and thereafter continued in possession till her death in 1911.
The question was whether Duraisani had acquired title to the property by adverse possession.
It was held that though the petition in the absence of registration could not be admitted to prove a gift, it might be referred to for showing that the subsequent possession of Duraisani was as a donee and owner of the land and not as trustee or manager for the two donors and therefore to show that the nature of such possession was adverse to them.
We cannot agree that on the authority of Paratha Pillai 's case (1) the agreement of February 6, 1932, can be admitted in evidence in the case in hand to show the nature of Harnam Kaur 's possession of the lands subsequent to its date.
In Varatha Pillai 's case (1) Duraisani had got into possession only after the petition and claimed to retain possession only under the gift mentioned in it.
The petition was therefore admissible in evidence to show the nature of her possession.
In the present case Harnam Kaur had been in possession before the date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the (1)(1918) 46 I.A. 285.
958 previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration.
To admit it in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by section 49 of the .
Lastly, the High Court held that as Harnam Kaur had entered into possession as the heir of Ram Ditta she could, at most, be considered to have acquired by adverse possession a widow 's estate in the lands and could not therefore, make a gift of them.
The High Court had referred to Bura Mal vs Narain Das (1) as an authority for this proposition.
In our view, that case is of no assistance.
There a female who was not an heir of the last full owner but was only entitled to maintenance, took possession of the properties in lieu of her maintenance by an arrangement with the heirs of the owner, and in those circumstances it was held that her possession could not be adverse to the heirs.
There is no evidence of any such arrangement in this case, nor is it the case of the respondents that such an arrangement had ever been made.
The High Court also referred to the case of Pandappa Mahalingappa vs Shivalingappa This case was based on Lajwanti vs Safa Chand and it would be enough to refer to " It was then argued that the widows could only possess for themselves; that the last widow Devi would then acquire a personal title; and that the respondents and not the plaintiffs were the heirs of Devi.
This is quite to understand the nature of the widows ' possession.
The, Hindu widow ' as often pointed out, is not a life renter, but has a widow 's estate that is to say, a widow 's estate in her deceased husband 's estate.
If possessing as widow she possesses adversely to any one as to certain parcels.
, she does not acquire the parcels as stridhan, but she makes them good to her husband 's estate.
" (1) 102 P. R., 1907.
(2) A.I.R. 1946 Bom.
(3) (1924) 51 I.A. 71, 176.
959 In order that the authority of this case may apply to the case in hand, it has to be proved that Harnam Kaur entered into possession of lands claiming a widow 's estate therein as an heir of Ram Ditta.
We find no evidence to prove that such was her claim.
The Patwari 's report earlier referred to cannot be construed as such a claim.
It was only the Patwari 's opinion of the situation.
It cannot therefore be said in this case that Harnam Kaur was in possession claim ing a widow 's estate in the lands, as the customary heir of her father in law.
Furthermore, in Lajwanti 's Case the widows who were found to have acquired title by adverse possession were undoubtedly the heirs of their husband and would have succeeded to his properties if a posthumous son whose existence was assumed by the Judicial Committee, had not been born to him.
It was possible for these widows to bold property as heirs of their husband and make them good to his estate.
Lajwanti 's Case therefore was concerned with a female who was admittedly an heir.
That is not the case here.
As we have already stated, the special custom under which alone Harnam Kaur could have become an heir of Ram Ditta has not been proved.
On the case as made and the evidence before us, it must be held that Harnam Kaur could never have been the heir of Ram Ditta.
That being so, it was impossible for her to have acquired by adverse possession title to property as his heir or to make such observation of the Judicial Committee in sham Koer vs applies to this case " Assuming that Bhau Natli Singh was a member of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, as the Lower Court found and the High Court assumed, neither his widow nor his son 's widow would be entitled to anything more than maintenance out of his estate.
Their possession, therefore, of the three villages in question would be adverse to the reversionary heirs unless it was the result of the arrangement with them.
If the possession was (1) (1902) 29 I.A. 132, 135, 136.
1 22 960 adverse, the rights of the reversionary heirs would of course be barred at the expiration of twelve years from the date of Bhau Nath Singh 's death, or the date of the widows ' taking possession, which seems to have been at or shortly after his death.
" As there is no evidence of any arrangement with the respondents under which Harnam Kaur can be said to have taken possession of the lands, her possession must be taken to have been adverse to the collaterals.
Admittedly such possession commenced in 1920 on the death of Ram Ditta and has continued ever since.
So at the date of the mortgage and gift, Harnam Kaur had acquired a title to the lands by adverse possession.
The respondents ' claim must fail.
We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
On the death of R, a Hindu jat, in April or May, 1920, the widow of his pre deceased son, H, took possession of the properties and on August 24, 1920, obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands in the place of R. A gift of half of the properties by H to her daughter K 949 gave rise to disputes between them and the collaterals but the matter was settled on H executing a document on February 6, 1932, whereby, inter alia, she agreed that the lands would belong to her for her life and after her death to her daughter for the latter 's life and that none of them would be entitled to sell or mortgage the lands.
The document, however, was not registered.
In 1939 H made a gift of the entire lands to K who obtained a mutation of the settlement records showing her as the owner of the lands, and in 1945 a suit was filed by the collaterals challenging the transaction as not binding on them as the reversionary heirs of R. Under the general custom governing the parties as admitted by them a widow of a pre deceased son was entitled only to maintenance when there were collaterals, and as H was in possession of the properties since 1920 it was said by her and K that she had, at the date of the gift, acquired an absolute title by adverse possession.
It was contended for the plaintiffs, interalia, that the agreement of February, 1932, though not admissible in evidence to prove that H and K had only life estates in the lands, was admissible to show the nature of H 's possession and that it showed that her possession was not adverse.
Held, that the document dated February 6, 1932, was in admissible in evidence, in view Of section 49 of the Indian , as H had been in possession before the date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession, and therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it.
Varatha Pillai vs jeevarathnammal, (1918) L.R. 46 I. A. 285, distinguished,


judgement:
pecial Leave Petitions (Civil) Nos.
5535 36 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.
1987 of the Madras High Court in W.A. No. 1302 and 1307 of 1986.
Nalini Chidambaram and Ms. Seita Vaidyalingam for the Petitioner.
1051 B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, Shanti Bhushan section Padmanabhan, M.A '.
Krishnamurthy, K.K. Mani, K. Swami anti A.V. Rangam for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J.
The short question involved in these special leave petitions is whether the proper criterion to adopt for selection of candidates belonging to the category 'eminent sportsmen ', for admission to the MB.B.S. course, is pre eminence in sports, and not academic excellence.
In the prospectus issued by the State Government of Tamil Nadu for admission to the M.B.B.S. course for 1986 87 in the Govern ment Medical Colleges in the State, there was reservation of three seats for the category 'eminent sportsmen ' as speci fied in category (iii) to Annexure I, also indicating the order of preference.
The relevant provision reads: "(iii) Eminent Sportsmen, The order of preference is as follows: (a) participation at International level, the candidate being sponsored by a national body.
(b) participation at National level, the candidate being sponsored by a State Body or University.
(c) participation at State level, the candi date being sponsored by Zonal or District Association.
Sponsorship Certificate should be produced.
If not produced, candidate will not be considered under this category.
Note: Candidates applying for admission to categories (i), (ii) and (iii) must have secured 50% aggregate marks in science sub jects in the qualifying examination.
" It appears that the petitioner along with 2 16 others ap plied for the sports quota reserved for 'eminent sportsmen '.
The petitioner who is a champion in acquatics had been sponsored by the Tamil Nadu State Acquatic Association showing participation in several tournaments at National level.
The Selection Committee adopted participation at 1052 National level to be the criterion and thus 16 candidates were left in the field.
It selected respondents nos.
4 6 for the three seats reserved for 'eminent sportsmen ' on the basis of marks obtained by them at the qualifying examina tion.
The petitioner having obtained 174.50 marks was not placed either in the select list or in the waiting list.
It is necessary to set out the marks obtained by the petitioner as well as respondents nos.4 6 as also.the candidates placed in the waiting list: 1.
Khalid Hussain, Petitioner 174.50 2.
R. Vijaya Sree, 4th Respondent 215.40 3.
Seshasayee Narasimhan, 5th res.
202.95 4.
K. Subramaniam, 6th res.
200.90 Waiting List Candidates 1.
T. Jayaraj 196.55 2.
Suja Ramakrishnan 192.80 3.
Praveen Kumar David 190.58 4.
G. Rajalakshmi 186.60 Aggrieved by the non inclusion of his name in the select list, he moved the High Court of Madras by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution.
A learned Single Judge (Mohan, J.) by his judgment dated December 2, 1986 observed that the whole purpose of reservation of three seats for the category 'eminent sportsmen ' was to encourage sports and held that in order to show some distinction with regard to individual achievements, three categorisations had been made, such as participation at International level, National level and State level and beyond that, he saw absolutely no scope for importing the concept of determining eminence inter se among the candidates falling within a particular category.
He further observed that the decision of a Division Bench in P. Sabitha vs The Director of Medical Education & Ors., (W.P. No. 9406/83 decided on April 6, 1984) which upheld the validity of such reservation of seats for sportsmen was of little avail to the petitioner.
The learned Judge struck down the selection of respondent No. 6 as invalid on the ground that the Selection Committee proceeded on a wrongful assumption that he had actually played at National level in the V. Pattabhiraman Trophy Tournament, while he had only been selected to play at the Tournament.
He, however, dis missed the writ petition and declined to grant the petition er any relief since he had no chance of getting admission as there were candidates in the waiting list who had obtained higher marks than him and made a direction that the Selec tion Committee would fill up the vacancy from the waiting list and go by the order of merit.
1053 Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the petitioner preferred an appeal, but the Division Bench declined to interfere.
In delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, M.N. Chandurkar, CJ speaking for himself and M. Srinivasan, J. referred to P. Sabitha 's case which upheld reservation of seats for the category 'eminent sportsmen '.
As regards the category 'eminent sportsmen ' appearing in the present rule, the learned Chief Justice observed: "It has to be pointed out that the rules themselves do not provide for any comparative degree of eminence between different candi dates in the same category.
Such a determina tion of comparative eminence, apart from introducing an element of subjective determi nation and providing a scope for discretion which would be capable of being arbitrarily exercised in the absence of any guidelines, also appears to us to be impracticable.
The reservation for 'eminent sportsmen ' is not restricted to any particular game.
There are different kinds of game and different kinds of tournament.
In some games, tournaments are held more frequently than in others.
To com pare the performance, whether qualitywise or quantitywise, by a candidate proficient in one game with the performance of a candidate in an altogether different game is neither possible nor feasible.
The proper approach to determine which of the candidates in one particular category should be given a preference in the selection must therefore necessarily depend only on their academic merit.
" We are in agreement with the observations made by the learned Chief Justice.
In support of the petition, Ms. Nalini Chidambaram, learned counsel for the petitioner sought to raise two points before us.
The first was that a Division Bench of the High Court in P. Sabitha vs The Director of Medical Educa tion (supra) laid down a principle that preeminence in sports was the only criterion for select ion of candidates falling under the category 'eminent sportsmen ', and not academic excellence.
She pointed out that the learned Advo cate General in P. Sabitha 's case adopted the stand that the seats were reserved for eminent sportsmen and therefore it is only eminence attained in the field of sports that can be the guiding factor for selection of candidates in that category, and not anything else, and submitted that it was not open to the State Government to shift the stand now and justify the action of 1054 the Selection Committee in selecting candidates, not by their distinguished superiority as compared with others, fame or excellence in the field of sports, but merely on the basis of higher marks obtained in the qualifying examina tion.
The contention was that the view expressed by the learned Judges that in case of professional courses merit alone should be the criterion and therefore reservation of seats under the category 'eminent sportsmen ' could be availed of only by deserving candidates which, it was said, runs counter to the principle laid down by the earlier Division.
Bench in P. Sabitha 's case.
The second contention was that at any rate, the learned Judges were in error in observing that though they were inclined to take the view that respondent No. 6 had really not participated in a national tournament as he had in fact played in the zonal tournament, that the Selection Committee had wrongly select ed him as a successful candidate on the impression that the zonal tournament was of national level, even then they were not inclined to sustain the order of the learned Single Judge by which he set aside the selection of respondent No. 6.
The learned Judges held that the Selection Committee was justified in making the selection of respondents nos.
4 6 under the category 'eminent sportsmen ' on the basis of their academic merit.
The learned Judges further held that there were no allegations of mala fides and the decision of the Selection Committee was reached bona fide and merely because respondent No. 6 had been wrongly selected, that was no ground for interference inasmuch as respondent No. 6 had been admitted to the Medical College and undergone studies for the M.B.B.S. course for almost a period of six months, and had given up his seat in another technical course for which he had been admitted, namely, in the Regional Engi neering College, Kurukshetra and there was no change of his getting back that seat, and it would not be just and proper that he should lose his seat in the Medical College for no fault of his but at the instance of the petitioner who stood no chance compared to the other candidates in the waiting list having secured much lesser marks.
In 'taking 'that view, the learned Judges observed that it was not obligatory for the Court to interfere in all cases unless justice of the case requires interference.
We are afraid, we are unable to accept any of the contentions.
The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner does not take note of the fact that the decision in P. Sabitha 's case proceed on an interpretation of a provision for reser vation of seats for the category 'eminent sportsmen ' which was altogether different.
The importance of the decision in P. Sabitha 's case lies only on the view that a provision for reservation of seats in professional courses for sportsmen was 1055 not irrational or arbitrary but had reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved in public interest, namely, promotion of sports.
In the prospectus for the year 1986 87, the State Government has brought about a change.
The provi sion, as it now stands, provides for a rule of preference.
Category (iii) dealing with eminent sportsmen lays down the order of preference as between candidates for selection and makes sponsorship certificate a condition prerequisite for eligibility.
Further, candidates applying for admission to category (iii) like categories (i) and (ii) must have se cured 50% aggregate marks in science subjects in the quali fying examination.
The rule nowhere provides for any deter mination of comparative eminence.
All that the rule does is to lay down a rule of preference.
A candidate who had par ticipated at International level would exclude a candidate participating at National level and a person who had partic ipated at National level would exclude a person participat ing at State level.
It has to be pointed out that the rule itself does not provide for determination of comparative eminence as between different candidates falling within the same class but as between sportsmen who have participated at International level, National level and State level.
It only provides for the rule of exclusion of one by the other.
There are no guidelines provided by which comparative emi nence can be judged as between candidates belonging to the same class e.g. at National level, as here.
Nor does it provide for any guidelines by which the choice has to be made as between the candidates who have excelled in a par ticular field of sports e.g. acquatics.
The real difficulty arises when there is more than one candidate who have ex celled in their respective fields of sports e.g. cricket, football, hockey etc.
and the number of seats reserved are less than the candidates found eligible.
All of them being more or less equal, the best method is to go by marks ob tained at the qualifying examination.
In such a case, the selection must necessarily depend upon their academic mer its.
Even in P. Sabitha 's case, the Court realised the difficulty to lay down any guidelines for adjudging compara tive eminence between sportsmen falling within the same class and it was said that when candidates are shown to have attained equal proficiency in sports, then their academic superiority can be pressed into service as a tilting factor in their favour.
In the absence of any guidelines for purposes of selec tion, the adjudging of comparative merits among the eligible candidates falling under the category 'eminent sportsmen ' would necessarily introduce, as the learned Chief Justice observed, "an element of subjectivity which would introduce arbitrariness" in the selection of candidates 1056 because it would be left to the discretion of the Executive in making the choice.
In the absence of any guidelines, there is.
nothing for the Selection Committee to fall back upon except the marks obtained by the candidates at the qualifying examination.
The argument of the learned counsel obviously based on the observations in P. Sabitha 's case that the proper test to adopt in the matter of selection of candidates for admission to the M.B.B.S. course belonging to the category 'eminent sportsmen ' was pre eminence in sports and not academic excellence, cannot be accepted.
That test cannot obviously be applied in interpreting the present rule.
The remaining contention does not merit consideration.
The learned Judges although inclined to the view that re spondent No. 6 had really not participated in a National tournament, were entitled to take the view that the Court ought not to, in the facts and circumstances of the case, exercise its discretionary powers under article 226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner who was not entitled to any relief merely because the Selection Commit tee was wrong in its view that respondent No. 6 had played in a National tournament although he had in fact played in a zonal tournament.
Any other view would have been manifestly unjust as respondent No. 6 though admitted to the Regional Engineering College, Kurukshetra had given up his seat there on his being admitted to the M.B.B.S. course and had already undergone his course of studies for more than six months.
The learned Judges rightly observe that it is not obligatory for the Court to interfere in all cases unless justices of the case so demands.
In the result, the special leave petitions must fail and are dismissed.
P.S.S Petitions dismissed.

summary:
The State Government of Tamil Nadu reserved three seats for the category 'eminent sportsmen ' for admission to the MBBS Course for 1986 87 in the Government Medical Colleges.
Category (iii) in Annexure I to the prospectus indicated their order of preference as participation at (a) Interna tional level, (b) National level, and (c) State level.
Candidates securing 50 per cent aggregate marks in science subjects in the qualifying examination were made eligible.
The Selection Committee adopted participation at the nation al level to be the criterion and selected three candidates on the basis of merit in the qualifying examination.
Four candidates were placed in the waiting list in order of merit.
The petitioner who was next in order of merit and could not be selected, filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution assailing the select however, struck down the selection of respondent No. 6 placed third in the select list since he had actually not played at the national level, and directed the Selection Committee to fill up the vacancy from the waiting list and go by the order of merit.
Dismiss ing the appeal by the petitioner the Division Bench held that the decision of the Selection Committee was reached bona fide on the basis of academic merit and that it was not just and proper that the respondent No. 6 should lose his seat in the medical college for no fault of his but at the instance of the petitioner who stood no chance compared to the other candidates in the waiting list.
In this special leave petition, it was contended for the petitioner that the only criterion for selection was pre eminence in sports and not 1050 academic excellence, and that the Division Bench was in error in not sustaining the order of the Single Judge set ting aside the selection of respondent No. 6, who had played in the Zonal tournament which was not of national level.
Dismissing the special leave petition, HELD: 1.
All that Category (iii) does is to lay down a rule of preference.
A candidate who had participated at international level would exclude a candidate participating at National level and a person who had participated at National level would exclude a person participating at State level.
There are no guidelines provided for determination of comparative eminence as between candidates belonging to the same class, e.g. at National level.
Nor does it provide for any guidelines by which the choice has to be made between the candidates who have excelled in a particular field of sports, e.g. acquatics, or when there is more than one candidate who have excelled in their respective fields of sports e.g. cricket, football, hockey etc.
and the number of seats reserved are less than the candidates found eligible.
All of them being more or less equal, the best method is to go by marks obtained at the qualifying examination.
The selection must, therefore, necessarily depend upon their academic merits.
If the adjudging of comparative merit amount the eligible candidates is left to the discretion of the Executive that would necessarily introduce an element of subjectivity, which would introduce arbitrariness.
[1055B F] 2.
It is not obligatory for the Court to interfere in all cases unless justice of the case so demands.
In the instant case the High Court was entitled to take the view that the Court ought not to, in the facts and circumstances of the case, exercise its discretionary powers under article 226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner who was not entitled to any relief.
Any other view would have been manifestly unjust.
[1056C D]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 859 of 1987.
Shankar Ghosh and L.P.Aggarwal for the Appellants From the Judgment and order dated 8.8.
1985 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 329 of 1982.
V.C. Mahajan, B. Parthasarhti and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave is confined solely to the question of interest.
In other words, the entitlement of interest on the amount awarded by Arbi trator for the requisition of the premises under the Requi sitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952 is the issue.
The principles upon which the compensation on this aspect is payable are by now well settled.
In Satinder Singh & Ors.
vs Amrao Singh & Ors., ; this Court reiterated the principles at page 694 of the report as follows: "In Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. vs New Burnswick Electric Power Commission it was held by the Privy Council that "upon the expropriation of land under statuto ry power, whether for the purpose of private gain or of good to the public at large, the owner is entitled to interest upon the princi pal sum awarded from the date when possession was taken, unless the statute clearly shows a contrary intention. ": Dealing with the argu ment that the expropriation with which the Privy Council was concerned was not effected for private gain, but for the good of the public at large, it observed "but for all that, the owner is 1047 deprived of his property in this case as much as in the other, and the rule has long been accepted in the interpretation of statutes that they are not to be held to deprive indi viduals of property without compensation unless the intention to do so is made quite clear.
The right to receive the interest takes the place of the right to retain posses sion and is within the rule".
It would thus be noticed that the claim for interest proceeds on the assumption that when the owner of immovable property loses possession of it, he is entitled to claim interest in place of right to retain possession.
The question which we have to consider is whether the application of this rule is intended to be excluded by the Act of 1948, and as we have already observed, the mere fact that section 5(3) of the Act makes section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 applicable we cannot reasonably infer that the Act intends to exclude the applica tion of this general rule in the matter of the payment of interest.
That is the view which the Punjab High Court has taken in Surjan Singh vs The East Punjab Government, (AIR 1957 Punj.
265) and we think rightly.
" The same principle was reaffirmed not in the context of Acquisition of Immovable Property, which Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondents tried to make a point before us, was highlighted in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Calcutta vs Life Insurance Corporation of India, [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 971.
at 992 where speaking for the court Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, as learned Chief Justice of India then was observed: "The reason of the rule was stated a long time ago by Lord St. Leonard L.C. Birch vs Joy, [1852] III H.L.C. 565:10 E.R. 222 as follows: "The parties change characters, the property remains at law just where it was, the purchas er has the money in his pocket, and the seller still has the estate vested in him; but they exchange characters in a Court of Equity, the seller becomes the owner of the money and the purchaser becomes the owner of the estate." On entering possession the purchaser becomes entitled to the rents but if he has not paid the price, interest in equity is deemed pay able by him on the purchase price which 1048 belongs to the seller.
This principle was applied by the House of Lords in cases of compulsory purchases.
In Swift & Co. vs Board of Trade, Viscount Cave L.C. gave the reason that the practice rests upon the principle that the taking of possession is an implied agreement to pay interest which was stated by Sir William Grant M.R. in Fludyer vs Cocker; , This principle was further extended by the Privy Council to the compulsory taking over of a business as a going concern in International Railway Co. vs Niagara Parks Commission, [1944] A.C. 328.
It was noted by Justice Hidayatullah that this principle has also been accepted by this Court in Satinder Singh vs Amrao Singh (supra).
The principle stated was followed in Hirachand Kothari (dead) through Lrs.
vs State of Rajasthan & Anr., [1985] Suppl.
1 SCR 644 where this court noted the principle at page 655 of the report.
In the light of the aforesaid decision we are of the opinion that the appellants herein are entitled to the interest for the period from March 1975 to 31st July, 1987 when principal amount of compensation had been paid and or when the premises in question had been de requisitioned and handed back to the owner, on the amount awarded.
As to how the interest would vary, but the right of interest was well avered and also should have been considered in the light of the observations of Privy Council in Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. vs New Burnswick Electric Power Commission, AIR 1928 Privy Council 287.
We are of the opinion that from the period from March 7, 1975 to February 28, 1985 being the date on which the judgment of the High Court was pronounced in this case the appellants are entitled to the interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum and from the period from August 87 1985 to July 31, 1987 and for that period only at the rate of 12% per annum.
Interest will be payable only on the balance amount which remained to be payable to the appellants i.e. the amount due minus what has been paid from the respective dates.
The appellants are entitled to the costs of this appeal.
The amount is directed to be paid within three months from this date by the respondents.
In case, there is any difficulty in calculating the amount, the parties will be at liberty to apply to the High Court of Calcutta.
The appel lants are entitled to costs of this appeal.
The appeal is thus disposed of.
S.L. Appeal dis posed of.

summary:
This appeal by special leave was confined solely to the question of entitlement of interest on the amount awarded by the Arbitrator for the requisition of the premises under the .
Disposing of the appeal, the Court, HELD: The principles upon which the compensation on this aspect is payable are by now well settled.
This Court reit erated the principles in Satinder Singh and Ors.
vs Amrao Singh and Ors., ; at 694; National Insurance Co. Ltd. Calcutta vs Life Insurance Corporation of India [1963] Supp.
2 SCR 971 at 992 and Hirachand Kothari (dead) through Lrs.
vs State of Rajasthan & Anr., [1985] Suppl.1 SCR 644 at 655.
[1046F; 1048C] In the light of the aforesaid decisions, the Court was of the opinion that the appellants herein were entitled to the interest for the period from March 1975 to the 31st July, 1987, when the principal amount of compensation had been paid and/or when the premises in question had been de requisitioned and handed back to the owner, on the amount awarded.
The Court was of the opinion that for the period from March 7, 1975 to February 28, 1985 being the date on which the judgment of the High Court was pronounced in this case, the appellants were entitled to the interest on the amount awarded at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, and for the period from August 8, 1985 to July 31, 1987 for that period only at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
The interest would be payable only on the balance amount which remained to be paid to the appellants i.e. the amount due minus what had been paid from the respective dates.
The Court directed that the amount be paid by the respondents within three months from the date of this judgment, and that in case there was any difficulty in calculating the amount, the 1046 parties would be at liberty to apply to the High Court.
[1048C H] Satinder Singh & Ors.
vs Amrao Singh & Ors., ; ; National Insurance Co. Ltd. Calcutta vs Life Insurance Corporation of India, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 971 at 992; Hirachand Kothari (dead) through Lrs. vs State of Rajasthan & Ors., [1985] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 644 and Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. vs New Burnswick Electric Power Commission, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council 287, referred tO.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 289 of 1982.
1003 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.7.
1981 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 249 of 1981.
Soli J. Sorabji, Anil Kumar Gupta and Brij Bhushan for the Appellant.
B.R. Agarwala for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Delhi dated 17th of July, 1981 dismissing the second appeal in limine against the ' order dated 2nd July.
1981 in RCA No. 87 1 of 1980 of the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi.
The order of eviction in this case on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord was passed by the Rent Controller on or about 15th of October, 1960.
There was an appeal from the said order of the Rent Controller and the appeal was dismissed on or about 9th October, 1961 by the 2Rent Tribunal.
In May 1962 the respondent filed an applica tion before the Competent Authority under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement of Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called 'the Slum Act ') for permission to execute the order of eviction.
On or about 21st of March, 1963 the said application was dismissed by the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
In the meantime in January, 1964.
the came into operation.
On the 19th of April.
1978, the respondent filed a second application before the Competent Authority for permission to execute the order of eviction.
In June, 1979 permission was granted by the appropriate authority under the Slum Act.
On 28th of August, 1979 the appeal from the said Rent Controller was dismissed by the High Court.
Thereafter on or about 25th of September, 1979 the respond ent herein filed an application before the Rent Controller for execution of the decree.
Objections under section 47, Order 21 Rule 22 and section 15 1, Code of Civil Procedure were filed on behalf of the appellant.
On 22nd of August, 1980 order was passed by the Rent Controller that the execu tion application was not barred by limitation.
Execution was stayed, however, to decide the question of fresh tenancy.
There was an appeal under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 filed by the appellant against the order of 22nd of August, 1004 1980.
Thereafter the Tribunal in July 1981 ordered that the execution was maintainable and was not barred by limitation and it was further held that supplementary objections were not maintainable.
On 17th of July, 1981 the High Court dismissed in limine the second appeal from the same as aforesaid.
The question that falls for consideration is whether the decree for eviction of the tenant under the Rent Act passed against the appellant was executable by the respondent or whether the same had become barred by limitation or by principles of res judicata.
As mentioned hereinbefore the decree holder had filed an application under section 19 of the Slum Act to obtain the permission from the competent authority in the year 1962.
The permission was not granted and the application was dismissed in the year 1963.
The decree holder filed a fresh application seeking permission from the competent authority in the year 1978.
The permis sion was granted by the order dated 18th of June, 1979.
Thereafter on 25th September, 1979 the decree holder filed application seeking execution of the order of eviction.
The main objection raised by the appellant on the point of limitation was firstly, that the decree in question was passed in 1960 and therefore the decee holder ought to have got it executed within 12 years by 1970.
Secondly, it was contended that the application under section 19 of the Slum Act was filed in the month of March, 1975 but the decree holder did not take any steps for 12 years which expired before 20th of March, 1975 to obtain permission from the Competent Authority and from that aspect also the execution application was time barred.
There are two aspects of the matter which have to be borne in mind, one was, when the decree became executable in the facts and circumstances of the case and what would be the period applicable for such execution.
On the other aspect of the matter, it is necessary to consider the ques tion whether once permission under the Slum Act was refused, does it create resjudicata for the second application? As mentioned hereinbefore the Rent Controller by the impugned order held that the execution application was not barred by time because in the opinion of the said Rent Controller till such time the permission of the Competent Authority (Slums) was obtained, no execution application could have been filed.
The Trial Court further held that the amendment to section 19 of the Slum Act did not affect 1005 the pending execution application, or in other words, limi tation would not have started running.
However, the trial court held that in regard to dispute about the creation of fresh tenancy the matter required investigation and after holding that execution application was within the time adjourned the case for evidence of the appellant and stayed the execution during the pendency of the said objections.
The said objections have been overruled and these are not subject matter of this appeal.
Aggrieved by,the said order the appellant filed appeal before the Rent Tribunal.
The Tribunal noted the relevant provisions of the Slum Act.
Section 19(1) as it stood before the amendment read as follows: "19(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any buildings in a slum area shall be entitled to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority.
" Section 19(1) of the said Act now reads as follows: "19(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall except with the previous permission in writing of the Compe tent Authority, (a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amend ment Act, 1964, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area, or . . . " It is not disputed that 12 years had expired when the execution petition was filed from the date of the order of eviction but not from the date the permission of the Compe tent Authority (Slums) was obtained.
The question, there fore, is whether the Indian Limitation Act 1908 or Limita tion Act, 1963 was applicable to the execution proceedings and whether the limitation would start running from the date the permission of the Competent Authority (Slums) was ob tained.
So far as the first question about the applicability of the Limitation Act, it is necessary to refer to section 42 of the Delhi Rent Control (hereinafter called 'the Act ') which provided that an order of eviction has to be executed like a decree of the Civil Court.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure executing the decree are made applicable by legal fiction recognised by virtue of section 42 of the Act.
In any case procedure of the Small Causes is adopted by the Controllers under the provisions of the Act wherein also in execution the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable and as such law of limitation would be attracted.
The question is when the limitation starts running.
Once the limitation started running then unless the statute comes to the rescue of a person the period would expire after the efflux of time.
Discussing certain authorities the Rent Tribunal held that the limitation started from the date of the grant of the permission and as such the execution application was well within time.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal.
The High Court summarily rejected the second appeal.
The question before us is whether this execution was barred by limitation and secondly, whether there was a question of res judicata because a prior application for permission by the Slums Clearance Authority was rejected.
This particular point was considered by a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Des Raj and another vs Noor Khan, (A.I .R. 1985 Delhi 470, where the High Court held that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act of 1963 a decree was executable within 12 years from the date when it became executable.
where the decree when passed, was not enforceable no execution could be levied and hence period of limitation would not commence.
A decree of eviction passed under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 on 19 2 60 according to the said decision became executable only on 8 5 81 in the case when permission under the Slum Act to execute it was obtained and therefore the 12 years ' period prescribed by article 136 to execute the decree was held to have commenced only on 8 5 81 and not on 19 2 60.
The High Court followed a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court and a division bench decision of the Patna High Court.
It was further held that there was no bar under section 19 of the Slum Act to a second or subsequent application seeking permission to execute the order of eviction of tenant obtained under section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, in view of the changed 1007 circumstances entitling grant of the permission being shown.
This decision negates the two principal contentions urged in this case on behalf of the appellant, namely there was no question of res judicata in granting subsequent permission under the Slum Act if changed circumstances so warranted and secondly limitation would start after the permission was granted.
But the Delhi High Court had no occasion to consider the effect of the decision of this Court in Ravi Dutt vs Rattan Lal, ; where it was held that the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Act for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement being in Chapter III A of the said Act had overriding effect and the Slum Act was rendered inapplicable.
If that is the position then no permission under Slum Act was at all necessary in case of a decree for bona fide requirement.
The said princi ple was reiterated in two previous decisions.
If that was so then the decree for eviction having been passed on 15th October, 1960 and the application for execution being filed on or about 25th September, 1979 was clearly barred by limitation.
But the basic question in the instant case as we have noted from the facts of the case is that the decree for eviction under the Rent Act was passed in October, 1960 and the appeal against the same was dismissed in October, 1961 by the Tribunal.
Thereafter an application was made in May, 1962 for permission under section 19 of the Slum Act as it then stood was dismissed in March, 1963.
Thereafter no action was taken upto 1978.
When in 1978 action was initiat ed by filing the second application under the Slum Act 12 years from the dismissal of the application under the Slum Act had passed and the decree had become barred.
The decree had clearly become barred by limitation.
Article 136 of the provides that a decree can be executed within 12 years from the date on which it became executable.
Decree passed by the Rent Controller even if it was not executable and enforceable unless permission under the Slum Act had been taken, which as noticed before was not the position in law the steps for such permission had become barred.
Steps for filing the application under the Slum Act were not taken, on refusal of the first application within 12 years thereof.
It is apparent therefrom that the execu tion of the decree for eviction which was passed on 15th of October, 1960 became time barred on 14th of October, 1963 under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 as it stood at that time.
Under Section 31(a) of the 1963 Limita tion Act, the provisions of the 1963 Limitation Act would not be availed of in respect of an application for which the period of limitation had expired before the commencement of the 1963 1008 Limitation Act, that is to say, 1.1.64.
But even if article 136 of the was attracted it had become barred after 12 years from the date of the decree, i.e. 15th October, 1960.
In the Bench decision the Calcutta High Court in Lala Baijnath Prosad and others vs Nursingdas Guzrati, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 1 at p. 8).
Chakravartti, C.J. speaking for the division bench observed: "The right to enforce the decree, it appears to me, is one thing; the possibility or practicability of exercising the right is another.
If by the terms of a decree, the decreeholder has become entitled to execute it immediately, an instant right to execute it has accrued to him contemporaneously with the passing of the decree.
Even if he is prevented by some external circumstance from enforcing the decree for some time, the right as a right, is nevertheless a present right.
And what is a present right is not merely the right declared by the decree but the right to enforce the decree, because if a decree de clares certain rights in favour of a person and there is nothing in the decree itself by which they are declared with effect from a future date or which postpones the right to execution to some date in the future, there is no reason to say that a present right to enforce the decree does not accrue to the decree holder as soon as the decree is passed.
It may,be that, though entitled under the terms of the decree to enforce it immediately, he cannot in fact do so for some time by reason, say, of having to comply first with some procedural requirement, as in the present case, but that only means that it is not practicable for him yet to enforce the decree and not that a present right to enforce it has not accrued. ' ' The aforesaid principles, in our opinion, would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
It has been emphasised that there was no impediment or disability in the way of the respondent in applying for permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act.
It was, however, urged that unless the circumstances changed the permission under the Slum Act could not have been grant ed but for the off chance of circumstances changing and thereby giving a right to apply for permission under the Slum Act, a decree cannot be kept in suspended animation.
As we have noted before after the refusal of the application in March, 1963 until April, 1978 there 1009 were no steps taken.
This feature and this aspect, in our opinion, distinguishes this case from the other cases.
quite apart from the fact that in the light of the decision of this Court in Ravi Dutt vs Rattan Lal, (supra) there was no requirement of permission under the Slum Act and as such no impediment in putting the decree dated 15th October, 1960 into execution.
It has further to be borne in mind that respondent had filed a second application for permission after lapse of more than 15 years, there was, in any event.
no legal impediment or legal bar which prevented the re spondent from making the application for permission to the competent authority under the Slum Act before.
It was argued that the respondent did not apply because there was no change of circumstances which would entitle the respondent to obtain permission.
It was argued that the second applica tion was made in 1978 and at that time the law under the Slum Act had altered as we have noticed.
It appears to us that in this case in any event no permission was required to execute the decree.
Therefore the second application was unnecessary.
In that view of the matter in this case it is not necessary to examine whether a second application lay or not.
We are inclined to the view that an application might lie if it was within the period of limitation.
We need not decide in this case the question of res judicata.
It is clear that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Tribunal in 1961 had become obsolete in 1978 when the second attempt to execute the same was made.
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that it was not just, equitable and in good conscience to allow such stale claims to be effectuated and that would be contrary to the principles of the as well as Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
In the premises the order dismissing the appeal from the Rent Tribunal must be set aside and the application made for execution must be dismissed.
It must be held that the claim to execute the order of eviction of the Rent Controller in this case dated 15th October, 1960 had become time barred.
The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant tenant in October, 1960 on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord.
The appeal against this order was dismissed by the Rent Tribunal in October, 1961.
The application of the respondentlandlord for permission to execute the order of eviction under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement of Clearance) Act, 1956 filed in May, 1962 was dismissed by the Competent Authority in March, 1963.
In the meantime in January, 1964 the came into operation.
The respondent filed a second application in April, 1978 for permission to execute the eviction order.
Permission was granted in June 1979.
In September, 1979 the respondent filed an application before the Rent Controller for execution of eviction order.
Objections under Section 47, Order 21 Rule 22 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed on behalf of the tenant.
The Rent Controller passed an order on August 22, 1980 holding that the execution application was not barred by limitation, but stayed the execution to decide the question of fresh tenancy.
An appeal against this order was filed by the appellant before the Tribunal which held that the execution was main tainable and was not barred by limitation and that supple mentary objections were not maintainable.
The High Court confirmed this order by dismissing the second appeal in limine.
In the appeal by the tenant before this Court, the question for 1002 consideration was whether the decree for eviction under the Rent Act passed against the respondent was executable by the appellant or whether the same had become barred by limita tion or by res judicata Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 The claim to execute the order of eviction of the Rent Controller dated 15th October, 1960 had become time barred.
[1009G] 1.2 It was not just, equitable and in good conscience to allow such stale claims to be effectuated and that would be contrary to the principles of the as well as the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.
[1009E F] 1.3 The execution of the decree for eviction passed on 15th of October, 1960 became time barred on 14th of October, 1960 under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 as it stood then.
Under section 31(a) of the 1963 Limitation Act, the provisions of the 1963 Limitation Act would not be availed of in respect of an application for which the period of limitation had expired before the commencement of the 1963 Limitation Act, that it to say, 1.1.1964.
But even if Article 136 of the was attracted it had become barred after 12 years from the date of the decree, i.e. 15th October, 1960.
[1007G H; 1008A] 1.4 There was no requirement of permission under the Slum Act and, as such, no impediment in putting the decree dated 15th October, 1960 into execution.
Second application for permission was filed after a lapse of more than 15 years; there was, in any event, no legal impediment or legal bar which prevented the respondent from making the applica tion for permission to the competent authority under the Slum Act before.
[1009B C] 1.5 The order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller as confirmed by the Tribunal in 1961 had become obsolete in 1978 when the second attempt to execute the same was made.
[1009E] Des Raj and another vs Noor Khan, A.I.R. 1985 Delhi 470; Ravi Dutt vs Rattan Lal, ; and Lala Baijnath Prosad and others vs Nursingdas Guzrati, A.I.R. 1958 Calcut ta 1 at p. 8, referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1870 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1981 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1556 of 1980.
V.M. Tarkunde and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.
S.C. Mohanta, Mahavir Singh and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
In this appeal by special leave the appellant, a Bus Conductor of the Haryana Roadways, has challenged the validity of the order of termination of his service on the ground of failure of the punishing authority to give any reason for the impugned order in violation of the principles of natural justice.
A charge was levelled against the appellant that he did not issue tickets to nine passengers, although he had taken the fare from each of them.
A disciplinary proceeding was started against the appellant.
The 1059 Enquiry Officer, after considering the allegations consti tuting the charge, the plea of the appellant in defence and the evidence adduced by the parties including the appellant, held that the charge against the appellant was proved.
The punishing authority agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and by the impugned order terminated the service of the appellant.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed a suit challenging the legality of the order of termination.
It was contended by the appellant that as no reason was given in the impugned order, it was illegal and invalid being opposed to the principles of natural justice.
The Trial Court overruled the said contention and also held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.
Accordingly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held in disagreement with the Trial Court and, in our opinion, rightly that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.
The learned Additional District Judge, however, held that the impugned order was a non speaking order not containing any reason and, as such, it was in valid.
In that view of the matter, the learned Additional Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and the impugned order of termination of service of the appellant and decreed the suit.
The State of Haryana took the matter to the High Court in a second appeal.
The High Court affirmed the finding of the learned Additional District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but set aside his finding that the impugned order was a non speaking order.
The High Court took the view that the impugned order was quite legal and valid.
Upon the said findings.
the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Addi tional District Judge.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
It has been urged by Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that the punishing authority has not applied his mind before passing the im pugned order, which is apparent from the fact that he had not given any reason in justification of the impugned order.
Counsel submits that non application of the mind and failure to give any reason by the punishing authority vitiated the impugned order of termination and, accordingly, it should be set aside.
It has been pointed out by the High Court that the punishing 1060 authority has passed a lengthy order running into seven pages mentioning therein the contents of the charge sheet, the detailed deposition of the witnesses, as accorded by the Enquiry Officer, and the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
The explanation submitted by the appellant has also been reproduced in the impugned order.
Thereafter, the punishing authority stated as follows: "I have considered the charge sheet, the reply filed to the charge sheet, the statements made during enquiry, the report of the Enquiry Officer, the show cause notice, the reply filed by the delinquent and other papers and that no reason is available to me on the basis of which reliance may not be placed on the report of the Enquiry Officer.
Therefore, keeping these circumstances in view, I termi nate his service with effect from the date of issue of this order.
" In view of the contents of the impugned order, it is difficult to say that the punishing authority had not ap plied his mind to the case before terminating the services of the appellant.
The punishing authority has placed reli ance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer which means that he has not only agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, but also has accepted the reasons given by him for the findings.
In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the En quiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings.
We are unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non speaking order and does not contain any reason.
When by the impugned order the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reason given by him, the question of non compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise.
It is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order.
There is, therefore, no substance in the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
In view of the fact that it is the first offence of the appellant, who is said to be the father of five minor chil dren and has no other means of livelihood, the respondent may consider the re employment of the appellant to the post of Conductor or to any other post, to which he may be found to be suitable.
N.P.V. Appeal dismiss.ed.

summary:
The service of the appellant, a bus conductor, was terminated consequent upon the enquiry conducted into alle gations of non issue of tickets to nine passengers, though fare was collected from each of them.
A suit filed by the appellant, contending that the order of termination was illegal and void and was opposed to the principles of natu ral justice, as no reason was given in the order, was dis missed by the trial court.
It was also held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.
The Additional District Judge, on appeal, held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and set aside the impugned order of termination as invalid as it was a non speaking order not containing any reason.
In second appeal, the High Court affirmed the finding of the Additional District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but set aside his finding that the impugned order was a non speaking order and held that it was quite legal and valid.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the punishing authority had not ap plied his mind before passing the impugned order, which was apparent from the fact that he had not given any reason in justification thereof and this had vitiated the impugned order of termination.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: When the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer who accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings, it is not neces sary for the punishing authority to again 1058 discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the find ings.
[1060E] In the instant case, it is difficult to say that the punishing authority had not applied his mind.
The punishing authority has placed reliance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer, which means he has not only agreed with the find ings of the Enquiry Officer but also accepted the reasons given by him for the same.
When the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given by him, the question of non compliance with the prin ciples of natural justice does not arise.
[1060E F] It cannot be said that the impugned order is not a speaking order and is vitiated.
[1060F] [In view of the fact that it is the first offence of the appellant, who is said to be the father of five minor chil dren and has no other means of livelihood, the respondent may consider the re employment of the appellant to the post of Conductor or to any other post, to which he may be found to be suitable.] [1060G H]