judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 3045 of 1980 etc.
From the Judgment and order dated 3.6.1980 of the Kerala High (Court in C.R.P. No. 2711 of 19178 section Padmanabhan and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant.
Abdul Khader and K.M.K. Nair for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 665 NATARAJAN, J.
The appeals by special leave and the special leave petitions raise a common question of law regarding the scope and effect of Explanation II A to Clause (25) of Section 2 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
1964, (for short the Act hereafter) as amended by Act.
17 of 1972.
It is, however, necessary to mention two matters even at the outset of the judgment.
Had the judgments in the two appeals been pronounced after the decision in Velayudhan vs Aishabi, AIR 1981 Kerala 185 by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, the results would have been different and there would have been no necessity for these appeals being filed.
Secondly, the decision in Velayudhan vs Aishabi. has become final since no appeal has been preferred to this Court against the judgment therein.
What falls for consideration in all these cases is whether by reason of Explanation IIA to Section 2(25) of the Act, a person in occupation of a homestead or a hut belonging to another during the period stipulated in the Explanation would become a Kudikidappuka ran and be entitled to Kudikidappu rights under the Act.
For a proper understanding of the issue.
we may make a brief reference to the history of the Legislation and to some of the earlier decision of the High Court.
Originally.
the occupants of dwelling houses or huts on homestead land belonging to others were only given a right to remove the materials of the super structure put up by them or alternately to seek monetary compensation thereof.
The restricted conferment of rights exposed the occupants of huts belonging to others to indiscriminate eviction.
To afford protection to them, the erstwhile Cochin State and the Travancore State passed suitable enactments to safeguard their possession.
Eventually, when the Travancore Cochin State came to be formed, an Act known as the Travancore Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 1950 was passed.
Even under that Act, protection was given only to those persons who had put up the super structures themselves and not to persons who were occupying huts put up by the land owners.
Protection was extended to that class of persons also under the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act.
The said Act was amended by the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1958.
This was followed by the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 (the Act).
Clause (25) of Section 2 of the Act defined a Kudikidappukaran and Kudikidappu as under: "25. 'Kudikidappukaran means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other 666 municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or town ship, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and: (a) who has been permitted with or without an obligation to pay rent by a person in lawful possession of any land to have the use and occupation of a portion of such land for the purpose of erecting a homestead; or (b) who has been permitted by a person in lawful possession of any land to occupy, with or without an obligation to pay rent, a hut belonging to such person and situate in the said land; and 'Kudikidappu ' means the land and the homestead or the hut so permitted to be erected or occupied together with the easement attached thereto.
" There were two Explanation to Section 2(25).
For our purpose, it is enough if we set out Explanation II alone.
It read as under: "Explanation II".
"Any person who was in occupation of a Kudikidappu on the 11th day of April, 1957, and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to be in occupation of such Kudikidappu with permission as required under the clause.
(Emphasis supplied).
In Gopalan vs Chellamma, Madhavan Nair, J. of the Kerala High Court held, without noticing a contrary view taken in an earlier case in Second Appeal No. 558 of 1961, that to be a Kudikidappukaran, the occupancy must have commenced with the permission of the owner of the land, that the permission given should not have been withdrawn or terminated subsequently but must have continued to be effective till the relevant time, that Explanation II would only have the effect of extending the permission initially granted to the date of the commencement of the Act and that a trespasser forcibly entering upon the land will not be entitled to claim rights as a Kudikidappukaran.
Subsequent to this decision, the Act underwent several amendments under the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969.
One of the changes effected was the substitution of Explanation II 667 (extracted above) by a proviso which read as under: A "Provided that a person who, on the 16th August, 1968 was in occupation of any land and the homestead thereon, or in occupation of a hut belonging to any other person, and who continued to be in such occupation at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, shall be deemed to be in occupation of such land and homestead, or hut, as the case may be, with permission as required under this clause." (Emphasis supplied).
The proviso came to be construed by Krishna Iyer, J. (as he then was) in Mariam and others vs Ouseph Xavier, [19711 K.L.T. 709 and the learned Judge differed only partly from the view taken in Gopalan vs Chellamma (supra) and held that "the initial leave to occupy is obligatory to make the dweller a Kudikidappukaran" and that the proviso operates only at the next stage and hence such protection was afforded only to persons who had initially obtained permission to occupy the homestead or hut and continued to be in occupation till the commencement of the Act but without reference to any further question as to whether the permission initially granted continued to subsist or had been subsequently revoked.
After this decision was rendered, the Legislature once again brought about certain amendments to the Act by means of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972.
The Legislature omitted the proviso to Section 2(25) (extracted above) and introduced Explanation II A with retrospective effect.
Explanation II A is to the following effect: Explanation Il A "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who on the 16th day of August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessors in interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a Kudikidappukaran: (emphasis supplied).
Provided that no such person shall be deemed to be a Kudikidappukaran (a) in cases where the dwelling house had not been 668 constructed by such person or by any or his predecessors in interest, if (i) such dwelling house was constructed at a cost, at the time of construction, exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) such dwelling house could have, at the time of construction, yielded a monthly rent exceeding five rupees; or (b) if he has a building or is in possession of any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, either as owner or as ten ant, on which he could erect a building.
The scope and effect of Explanation II A introduced by the Amending Act of 1972 came to be construed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Achuthan vs Narayani Amma, [1980] K.L.T. 160: AIR 1980 NOC 90.
The Bench held that the effect of Explanation II A is to dispense with proof of permissive occupation, either in sup port or rebuttal thereof, and that even in the absence of such proof and without any enquiry as regards the original occupation, a person who satisfies the conditions mentioned therein and does not fall within the ambit of the proviso thereto has to be deemed a Kudikidappukaran.
However, in Moideenkuktty vs Gopalan, another Division Bench took a contrary view and held that the legal fiction which had all along existed right from 1955 under Section 4(2) of the Travancore Cochin Act, 1955, Explanation II to Section 2(20) of the Agrarian Relations Act, 1961, Explanation II To Section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 and the proviso thereto as inserted by the Amending Act, 1969 was only intended to protect a Kudikidappukaran who began his occupation of a Kudikidappu with permission by providing for the statutory continuance of the permission initially given till the commencement of each of the above mentioned Statutes and the Explanation II A introduced by Act 17 of 1972 had not altered or widened the legal fiction so as to cover a case of initial permission also.
The Bench, therefore, held that unless initial permission for occupation of a homestead or hut is established, Explanation II A will not be attracted.
It was on account of the conflicting views taken by the two Division Benches in Achuthan 's case (supra) and Moideenkukutty 's case (supra), a reference was made to a Full Bench for decision 669 of the case in Velayudhan & Ors.
vs Aishabi & Ors.
(supra) The Full Bench, after elaborately tracing the history of the Legislation and considering the changes brought about periodically by the Legislature to confer Kudikidappu rights on occupants of homesteads and huts and reviewing the earlier decisions, came to the conclusion that Explanation II A could be treated as an addendum to Section 2(25) in order to widen the definition or alternately Section 2(25) can be treated as the main provision and Explanation II A as an exception thereto.
In that view of the matter, the Full Bench held that the decision in Achuthan 's case (supra) laid down the correct law and the view taken in Moideenkukutty 's case was not sustainable.
It is in the conspectus of the several amendments made by the Legislature to Section 2(25) of the Act and the decisions rendered by the Kerala High Court, we have to examine the contentions of the counsel for the appellants and the respondents in the respective appeals.
The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has analysed the position and summed up its view in the following manner regarding the purpose underlying the changes brought about in the Act and the new dimension that has now been given by Explanation II A to Section 2(25).
The relevant passage in Velayudkan 's case (supra) occurs in para 24 at page 192 of the report (AIR 1981 Kerala 192) and is as follows: "When the words 'in occupation of a Kudikidappu ' in Explanation II to Sec. 2(25) in the K.L.R. Act as originally enacted was held by this Court to be suggestive of the need for the person claiming Kudikidappu right thereunder to prove permissive occupation as on the relevant date (11.4.1957) thereunder, the legislature omitted the word "Kudikidappu", and resorted to the terminology of 'in occupation of any land and the homestead thereon, or in occupation of a hut . . ' in the proviso to Section 2(25) as amended by the Amending Act, 1969.
When this Court pointed out that still the emphasis of the fiction is on the permissive aspect of occupation and not on the status of the person as Kudikidappukaran, and that the words 'homestead ' and 'hut ' are indicative of the requirement that permissive occupation as on the relevant date (16.8.1968) has to be established, the legislature reacted by omitting the words 'homestead ' and 'hut ' from the fiction and laying stress on the status as Kudikidappukaran by enacting Explanation II A to Section 2(25) of the K.L.R. Act as per the.
K.L.R. (Amending) Act, 1972.
" 670 At the outset it has to be pointed out that Explanation II A has been made a non obstante provision in order to give over riding effect to the Explanation over any judgment, decree or order of any Court passed against a person who was, on 16.8.1968 in occupation of a homestead or hut thereon and who continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January 1970.
Now, if we look at Explanation II to Section 2(25) as it originally stood and the proviso which replaced it under the 1969 (Amendment) Act and Explanation II A which was introduced by the amending Act 1972, we may notice the significant changes made by the Legislature and the underlying reasons therefor.
In Explanation II, it was laid down that any person in occupation of a Kudikidappu during the prescribed period viz. 11.4.1957 to the date of commencement of the Act "shall be deemed to be in occupation of such Kudikidappu with permission as required under this clause".
Since it was held in Gopalan 's case (supra) that the use of the words "in occupation of a Kudikidappu with permission", obligated an occupant of a Kudikidappu to prove initial permission to enter a homestead or occupy a hut on the land of another and further prove continuance of such permission till the relevant date, the Legislature omitted the word "kudikidappu" in the proviso that was substituted for Explanation II under the 1969 Amendment Act.
Even then, it was held in Mariam 's case (supra) that initial leave to occupy was obligatory to make an occupant a Kudikidappukaran because of the use of the words "with permission as required under the clause" in the proviso.
Therefore, what the Legislature has done while introducing Explanation by the 1972 Amendment Act is to do away with any reference to occupation being referable to any permission granted by the owner of the land or the hut as the case may be.
Not only has the Legislature eschewed any reference to permissive occupation but has also given a mandate that everyone in actual occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon, between the dates 16.8.1968 to 1.1.1970, irrespective of who built the dwelling place, shall be granted recognition as a Kudikidappukaran.
The words used are "the person . in occupation . shall be deemed to be a Kudikidappukaran.
" By reason of this explicit provision, there is no scope whatever for restricting the class of persons entitled to the benefit of Explanation II A to only those who are able to prove obtainment of initial permission to occupy a homestead or a hut thereon.
Explanation II A equates an occupant of a homestead or a hut thereon during the relevant period with a Kudikidappukaran as defined under the main clause.
Such being the case, anyone satisfying the requirements of Explanation II A would automatically be entitled to have the status of a Kudikidappukaran and to all the benefits flowing therefrom.
In other 671 words, a person falling under Explanation II A has to be statutorily deemed as one permitted to occupy a homestead or the hut thereon as envisaged in Sub Clauses (a) and (b) of Clause(25) to Section 2.
The only limitation placed by Explanation II A is that a person falling within the terms of the definition should satisfy the conditions laid down by the proviso to the Explanation viz. that if he or his predecessor had not constructed the dwelling house, the house should not costwise exceed Rs.750 or rentwise exceed a monthly rent of Rs.5 and the occupant should not be in possession of land exceeding three cents in extent in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township either as owner or as a tenant on which he could erect a building.
viewed in the proper perspective, Explanation II A constitutes a second limb of Clause (25) of Section 2 devised by the Legislature to give full effect to its intendment viz. entitling a person to claim Kudikidappu rights under Section 2(25) if he proves initial permission to occupy the land and the dwelling house without the need of proving continuous possession during a prescribed period of time or in the alternative to claim Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A by proving continuous occupation during the period of time prescribed by the Explanation without the necessity of proving obtainment of initial permission to occupy the land and the dwelling house thereon.
Explanation II A has got operative force of its own and this may be seen from the fact that Clause (25) of Section 2 as well as Sub Clause (b) of the proviso to Explanation II A lay down identical conditions which are to be satisfied by an applicant under the main clause or the Explanation for claiming rights as a Kudikidappukaran.
Both the provisions lay down that any claimant for Kudikidappu rights should not have a homestead or any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township in his possession either as owner or tenant on which he could erect a homestead.
If the Explanation is subservient to Section 2(25), there was no need for the Legislature to have provided Sub Clause (b) to the proviso to Explanation II A.
There is no repugnancy between the two provisions because Section 2(25) pertains to occupants of homestead of one category while Explanation II A pertains to homestead occupants of a different category.
By introducing Explanation II A, the Legislature has created a statutory fiction.
As to how statutory fictions are to be interpreted is by now well settled.
The approach formulated by Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. vs Finsbary Borough Council, has been approved by this Court in a number of cases.
The line of 672 approach set out by Lord Asquith is as under: "If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanies it.
The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.
" This line of approach has been adopted by this Court in a number of cases and we may refer only to some of them.
See M.K. Venkatachalam v Bombay Dyeing and manufacturing Co. Ltd.; , ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 355 In Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs Teja Singh (supra), this Court pointed out that "it is a rule of interpretation well settled that in construying the scope of a legal fiction it would be proper and even necessary to assume all those facts on which alone the fiction can operate." In Industrial supplies Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India, [1980] IV SCC 341, this Court observed as follows: "It is now axiomatic that when a legal fiction is incorporated in a statute, the court has to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created.
After ascertaining the purpose, full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion.
The court has to assume all the facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to giving effect to the fiction.
The legal effect of the words 'as if he were ' in the definition of owner in Section 3(n) of the Nationalisation Act read with Section 2(1) of the Mines Act is that although the petitioners were not the owners, they being the contractors for the working of the mine in question, were to be treated as such though, in fact, they were not so.
" It has also to be borne in mind that the Kerala Land Reforms Act is a beneficial enactment intended to secure occupancy rights to farmers and agricultural labourers who do not have homestead lands and dwelling places of their own for their occupation.
Incidentally, we may mention that Act 17 of 72 has been subsequently included in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution and this would reflect in fuller mea 673 sure the anxiety of the Legislature to protect the rights of occupants of homestead and huts thereon.
In the case of beneficial enactments the courts should follow a policy of benevolent and liberal construction.
In Jeewanlal & Ors.
vs Appellate Authority; , it was observed as follows: "In construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed.
When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature.
When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the courts to consider.
The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the status is obscure and there are two methods of construction.
In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none.
In Bharat Singh vs Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi & Ors., ; , the abovesaid policy was reiterated in the following words: "Now it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have nots should receive liberal construction.
It is always the duty of the court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act.
A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction.
A construction which would defeat the rights of the have not and the underdog and which would lead to injustice should always be avoided.
" Therefore, even if there is any little room for doubt whether Explanation II A can go to the extent of conferring Kudikidappu rights on persons who are not able to prove their lawful entry upon the land on the occupation of the dwelling house, it has to be held that the Explanation has been specifically provided for giving greater thrust to 674 the intendment of the legislature and, therefore, the Explanation warrants a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to fulfil the object of the legislation and comply with the legislative intent.
Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the respondent however sought to contend, that whichever way Explanation II A is construed i.e. whether as a legal fiction or as a re enacted provision of substantive law the Explanation would still be trammelled by the basic prescription contained in the main clause regarding permissive occupation.
The counsel argued that so long as clause (25) of Section 2 continued to define a Kudikidappukaran as a person "who has been permitted . by a person in lawful possession . to have the use and occupation of a portion of the land for the purposes of erecting a homestead/hut belonging to him in the said land", the Explanation would necessarily be governed and controlled by the words in Clause (25) of Section 2 and as such even if a person was in occupation of a homestead or hut between the period 16.8.1968 to 1.1.1970 he will not be entitled to claim rights as a Kudikidappukaran unless he is able to prove grant of initial permission by the owner of the land or the hut, as the case may be.
It was argued that it was not the intention of the legislature to confer Kudikidappukaran rights on trespassers and unauthorised occupants.
Our attention was drawn to the decisions in Sonawati & Ors.
vs Shri Ram & Anr., [1968] 1 SCR 617, and Azad Singh & Others vs Barkat Ullah Khan & others; , In these decisions the words "Cultivatory possession" occurring in the U.P. Zamindari abolition & Land Reforms Act and the U.P. Land Reforms (Supplementary) Act have been held to refer to lawful possession and as such they would not, cover the case of a trespasser upon the land.
These decisions can be of no avail in this case because Explanation II A has avoided any reference to permissive occupation and has straight away equated an occupant of a homestead during the prescribed period with a Kudikidappukaran as defined in the main clause.
The Explanation has to be interpreted in the light of the words used by the legislature and having in mind the object sought to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied by the Act Mr. Abdul Khader alteratively contended that Explanation II A should be construed as a validating provision introduced by the legislature to overcome the limitations noticed by the Courts in the corresponding provisions in the previous enactments and as such the validation exercise cannot be given acceptance unless the validating law satisfied the tests prescribed therefor.
The learned counsel referred to certain decisions in this behalf.
viz. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills 675 Ltd. & Anr.
vs Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., ; Hari Singh & Ors.
vs The Military Estate officer and Anr.; , and D. Cawassi & Co. Mysore vs The State of Mysore & Anr., ; AIR 1984 SC 1980 and argued that a validating law can be upheld only if the legislature has competence to legislate over the subject matter and secondly, only if the legislature has removed the defects noticed by the Courts in the previous law.
This argument fails to take note of the significant change the legislature has made in the wording of Explanation II A.
It is therefore futile to contend that Explanation II A suffers from the same limitations the earlier provisions were thought to suffer from.
After the arguments were concluded, learned counsel for the respondents have circulated a copy of the judgment of this Court in C.A. No. 165 of 1974 etc.
Palayi Kizhakkekara Mathaiy 's son K.M. Mathew & Anr.
v Pothiyill Mommutty 's son Hamsa Haji & Ors.
, JT delivered on 29.4.1987 wherein Section 7D of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 has been interpreted as conferring benefit thereunder only on persons whose occupation of the private forests or unsurveyed lands had a lawful origin and not on persons in unlawful occupation based on trespass or forcible and unlawful entry.
We have carefully considered the judgment and find that the pronouncement therein does not in any way lend support to the contentions of the respondents herein.
The scheme of Sections 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 8 & 9 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is entirely different and this position is succinctly brought out by the following passage in the decision referred to above.
The Court had summed up the scheme of the Act in the following words: "On a careful scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions, it becomes abundantly clear that the intention of the legislature was to grant protection only to persons whose possession had a lawful origin in the sense that they had either bona fide believed the lands to be Government 's land of which they could later seek assignment or had taken the lands on lease from person whom they bona fide believed to be competent to grant such leases or had come into possession with the intention of attorning to the lawful owners or on the basis of arrangements like varam etc.
which were only in the nature of licences and fell short of a leasehold right.
It was not within the contemplation of the legislature to confer the benefit of protection on persons 676 who had wilfully trespassed upon lands belonging to others and whose occupation was unlawful in its origin.
The expression "in occupation" occurring in Section 7D must be construed as meaning "in lawful occupation.
" The clear finding in that case was that the appellant had claimed title on the basis of adverse possession and his own plea was that he had come into possession of the lands by trespass.
He was therefore, far removed from the class of persons whom the Legislature wanted to provide for viz. persons who had entered upon land under a bona fide mistaken belief that the land belongs to Government and is capable of assignment or that the land belongs to the person who had granted them lease etc.
The entry was, therefore, linked with a bona fide belief though mistaken, about the character of the land and hence a trespasser is not entitled to claim any benefit.
But in so far as Section 2(25) and Explanation II A of the Act are concerned the occupant of the homestead or hut is not enjoined to prove that he occupied the homestead or hut under a bona fide mistaken belief and that he was not a trespasser.
He need only prove under the main clause that he had been permitted to occupy the homestead or hut and under Explanation II A that he had been in continuous occupation from 16.8.1968 to 1.1.1970.
Presumably the Legislature has thought that an occupant of a homestead or a hut would not have been allowed to remain in occupation for so long if he was a trespasser.
There is therefore, no conflict between the view taken by us in these appeals and the view taken by this Court in CA No. 165/74 etc.
(supra) Having settled the question of law we will now deal with the appeals and the Special Leave Petitions on their merits.
In C.A. No. 3045 of 1980 it was found that the appellant was in possession of a hut from 1962 onwards.
Nevertheless his claim for Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A was rejected as he was not able to prove grant of permission to him by the respondent for occupying the hut.
Since we have held that a claimant for Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A, who does not suffer any disqualification under the proviso, need only prove the factum of possession between the prescribed dates for being placed on par with a Kudikidappukaran as defined in Section 2(25) of the Act, the appeal has to succeed and will accordingly stand allowed.
Consequently, the order of the Land Tribunal Telicherry in O.A. No. 22 of 1973 will stand restored but having regard to the lapse of time, the appellant is directed to pay the entire amount towards the value of the hut and the land, as fixed by the Land Tribunal, within three months from today.
677 As regards C.A. No. 2505 of 1977, the appellant claimed Kudikidappu rights in respect of two sheds set out in plaint A & schedules.
In so far as A schedule property is concerned, the appellant is not entitled to any relief because it has been concurrently found by all the Courts that he had taken the shed on lease in the year 1954 under a rent chit for running a tea shop and that the shed continued to be in existence and it had not been rebuilt by the appellant.
However, in so far as the shed comprised in schedule is concerned, the appellant has been denied relief solely on the ground that he had failed to prove grant of permission by the respondent and his predecessors in title to occupy the homestead and put up the shed.
Having regard to the factum of occupation of the schedule property during the period envisaged by Explanation II A, it follows that the appellant is entitled to a decree in respect of the schedule property.
The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed in so far as the schedule property is concerned.
The matter will stand remitted to the Land Tribunal Telicherry for determining the price of the schedule property for the directions regarding the manner in which the purchase price should be paid by the appellant Special Leave Petitions 204 & 205 have to fail because it has been concurrently found that the sheds occupied by the respondent in each case were included in the property leased to the petitioner though possession was allowed to be retained by the respondents, and as such the respondents are entitled to claim Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A of Section 2(25) of the Act As the respondents had been inducted into possession of the huts by the owner of the land and as the lease granted to the petitioner comprised the sheds occupied by the respondents also, the petitioner cannot contend that the respondents are not entitled to seek the sale of ten cents of land adjoining each hut under Section 80B of the Act.
Hence the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs in the appeals as well as the special leave petitions.

summary:
% These appeals and Petitions for Special Leave raised a common question of law regarding the scope and effect of Explanation 11 A to clause (25) of section 2 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964, as amended by Act 17 of 1972.
What fell for consideration was whether by reason of Explanation Il A to section 2(25) of the Act, a person in occupation of a homestead or a hut belonging to another during the period stipulated in the Explanation would become a Kudikidappukaran and be entitled to Kudikidappu rights under the Act.
Allowing Civil Appeal No. 3045 of 1980, allowing C.A. No. 2505 of 1977 partly and dismissing the Petitions for Special leave, the Court, ^ HELD: The contentions of the parties in these cases had to be examined in the conspectus of the several amendments made by the legislature to section 2(25) of the Act and the decisions rendered by the Kerala High Court.[669C] Explanation Il A has been made a non obstante provision in order to give over riding effect to the Explanation over any judgment.
decree or order of any court, passed against a person who was on 16.8.68 in occupation of a homestead or hut thereon and who continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970.
The Legislature has by introducing Explanation II A done away with any reference to occupation being referable to any permission granted by the owner of the land or the hut as the case may be.
Not only had the Legislature eschewed any reference to permissive occupation but had also given a mandate that every one in actual occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon between 16.8.68 and 1.1.70, irrespective of who built the dwelling place, should be granted recognition as a Kudikidappukaran.
By reason of this explicit provision, there was no scope whatever restricting the class of person entitled to the benefit of Explanation Il A to only those who were able to prove obtainment of initial permission to 662 occupy a homestead or a hut thereon.
Explanation II A equates an occupant of a homestead or a hut thereon during the relevant period with a Kudikidappukaran as defined under the main clause.
Such being the case, anyone satisfying the requirements of Explanation II A would automatically be entitled to have the status of a Kudikidappukaran and to all the benefits flowing therefrom.
In other words, a person falling under Explanation II A has to be statutorily deemed as one permitted to occupy a homestead or the hut thereon as envisaged in sub clauses (a) and (b) of clause (25) of section 2.
The only limitation placed by explanation Il A is that a person falling within the terms of the definition should satisfy the conditions laid down by the proviso to the Explanation, viz. that if he or his predecessor had not constructed the dwelling house, the house should not costwise exceed Rs.750 or rentwise exceed a monthly rent of Rs.5 and the occupant should not be in possession of land exceeding three cents in extent in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township either as owner or as a tenant on which he could erect a building.
Viewed in the proper perspective, Explanation II A constitutes a second limb of clause (25) of section 2 to give full effect to its intendment, viz., entitling a person to Kudikidappu rights under section 2(25) if he proves initial permission to occupy the land and the dwelling house without the need of proving continuous possession during a prescribed period of time or in the alternative to claim Kudikidappu rights under Explanation lI A by proving continuous occupation during the period of time prescribed by the Explanation without the necessity of proving obtainment of initial permission to occupy the land and the dwelling house thereon.
Explanation II A has got operative force of its own, which may be seen from the fact that clause (25) of section 2 as well as sub clause (b) of the proviso to Explanation II A lay down identical conditions which are to be satisfied by an applicant under the main clause or the Explanation for claiming rights as a Kudikidappukaran.
If the Explanation was sub servient to section 2(25), there was no need for the Legislature to have provided sub clause (b) of the proviso to Explanation II A.
There was no repugnancy between the two provisions because section 2(25) pertains to occupants of homesteads of one category while Explanation II A pertains to homestead occupants of a different category.
[670A H; 671A G] The Kerala Land Reforms Act was a beneficial enactment intended to secure occupancy rights to farmers and agricultural labourers who did not have homestead lands and dwelling places of their own for their occupation.
In the case of beneficial enactments, the courts should follow a policy of benevolent and liberal construction.
Even if 663 there was any little room for doubt whether Explanation II A could go to the extent of conferring Kudikidappu rights on persons who were not able to prove their lawful entry upon the land and the occupation of the dwelling house, it had to be held that the Explanation had been specifically provided for giving greater thrust to the intendment of the legislature, and, therefore, the Explanation warranted a liberal and purposive interpretation so as to fulfil the object of the legislation and comply with the legislative intent.
[1672G H; 673G H; 674A] The attention of the Court was drawn to a judgment of this Court in Palayi Kizhakkekara Methai 's son K. M. Mathew and anr.
vs Pothiyill Mommutty 's son Hamsa Haji & Ors., C.A. No. 165 of 1974, etc.
J.T. , but the Court found no conflict between the view taken by the Court in these appeals and the view taken by this court in C.A. No. 165 of 1974, etc.
[675C; 676E] In C.A. No. 3045 of 1980, the appellant was in possession of a hut from 1982 onwards; nevertheless his claim for Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A was rejected as he was not able to prove grant of permission to him by the respondent for occupying the hut.
Since it has been held by the Court that a claimant for Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A, who did not suffer any disqualification under the proviso, needed only to prove the factum of possession between the prescribed dates for being placed on par with a Kudikidappukaran as defined in section 2(25) of the Act, the appeal had to succeed, with order of the Land Tribunal, restored.
[676F H] In the C.A. No. 2505 of 1977, the appellant claimed Kudikidappu rights in respect of two sheds set out in A & B Schedules.
The appellant was not entitled to any relief in respect of the A schedule property because it had been concurrently found by all the courts that he had taken the shed on lease in the year 1954 under rent chit and that the shed continued to be in existence and it had not been rebuilt by the appellant.
In respect of the schedule shed, the appellant had been denied relief solely on the ground that he had failed to prove grant of permission by the respondent and his predecessor in title to occupy the homestead and put up the shed.
In view of the factum of occupation of the schedule property during the period envisaged by Explanation II A, the appellant was entitled to a decree in respect of the schedule property.
Appeal was partly allowed in respect of the schedule property and the case, remitted to the Land Tribunal for determining the price of the schedule property and for directions, etc.[677A D] 664 The Petitions for Special Leave failed, because it had been concurrently found that the sheds occupied by the respondent in each case were included in the property leased to the petitioner though possession was allowed to be retained by the respondents and as such, the respondents were entitled to claim Kudikidappu rights under Explanation II A.
As the respondents had been inducted into possession of the huts by the owner of the land and as the lease granted to the petitioner comprised the sheds occupied by the respondents also, the petitioner could not contend that the respondents were not entitled to seek the sale of ten cents of land adjoining each hut under section 80 of the Act.
[677E F] Velayudhan vs Aishabi, A.I.R. 1981 Kerala 185; Gopalan vs Chellamma, ; Mariam and others vs Ouseph Xavier, ; Achutan vs Narayani Amma, [1980] K.L.T. 160, A.I.R. 1980 NOC 90; Moideen Kuktty vs Gopalan, ; East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. vs Finsbary Borough Council, M. K. Venkatachalam vs Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., ; ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 355; Industrial Supplies Pvt. Ltd. vs Union of India, [1980] IV S.C.C. 341; Jeewanlal & Ors.
vs Appellate Authority, 119841 4 S.C.C. 356; Bharat Singh vs Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New Delhi, & Ors., ; ; Sonawari & Ors.
vs Shri Ram & Anr., [1968] 1 SCR 617; Azad Singh & Ors.
vs Barkat Ullah Khan & ors.
; , ; Shri Prithvi (Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs Broach Borough Municipality & Ors., [19701] 1 SCR 388; Hari Singh & Ors.
vs The Military Estate Officer & Anr., ; ; D. Cawassi & Co. Mysore vs State of Mysore & Anr., ; and Palavi Kizhakkekara Mathaiy 's son K. M. Mathew & Anr.
vs Pothiyill Mommitty 's son Hamsa Haji & Ors., J.T. , referred to.


judgement:
ition No. 3727 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) Petitioner in person .
B. Datta, Additional Solictor General, R.K. Jain, Vinod Bobde, R.N. Trivedi, K.N. Bhat, Tapash Ray, B.R.L. Iyenger R.P. Singh, R.P. Kapur, Ravinder Narain, section Sukumaran, C.B. Singh, S.K. Dhingra, P.K. Jain, D.N. Goburdhan, Arvind Kumar, Ms. Laxmi Arvind, Vineet Kumar, Deepak K. Thakur, T.V. section N. Chari, Ms. Vrinda Grover, Badri Nath, Rakesh Khanna, Mukul Mudgal, A.K. Ghose, M.M. Gangadeb, Probir Mirtra, Sushil Kumar Jain, Saryakant, Pappy T. Mathews, Mrs, Mamta Kachhawaha, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, G.S. Misra, S.R. Srivastava, Parijat Sinha, R. Mohan, Ms. Bina Gupta, Ranjit Kumar, Krishna Kumar, R.C. Verma, Arun Minocha, Sri Narain, E.C. Agrawala, S.R. Setia, H.K. Puri, T.S. Rana, Pramod Swarup, Ashok Grover, section Markandeya, Swarup.
Ms, Lalita Kohli, K.C. Dua, Rajbirbal, R.A. Gupta and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
By our judgment dated September 22, 1987 in M.C. Mehta vs Union of India & others, , we issued certain directions with regard to the industries in which the business of tanning was being carried on at Jajmau near Kanpur on the banks of the river Ganga.
On that occasion we directed that the case in respect of the municipal bodies and the industries which were responsible for the pollution of the water in the river Ganga would be taken up for consideration on the next date of hearing.
Accordingly, we took up for consideration first the case against the municipal bodies.
Since it was found that Kanpur was one of the biggest cities on the banks of the river Ganga, we took up for consideration the case in respect of the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika is established under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Adhiniyam ').
Sub section (3) of section 535 1 of the Adhiniyam, which is to be found in its 1st Chapter, provides that the 1st Chapter of the Adhiniyam shall come into operation at once and the remaining provisions in relation to a city shall come into operation from such date as the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette appoint in that behalf and different dates may be appointed for different provisions.
In exercise of the powers conferred by the said sub section and in continuation of a notification dated September 28, 1959 bringing into operation sections 579 and 580 of the Adhiniyam, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh was pleased to issue a notification dated January 18, 1960 appointing the 1st day of February, 1960 as the date on which the remaining provisions of the Adhiniyam and the three Schedules, appended thereto, would come into operation in relation to the cities of Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi, Agra and Lucknow, as constituted under section 3 of the Adhiniyam.
The duties and powers of the Mahapalika and Mahapalika authorities are set out in Chapter V of the Adhiniyam.
Clauses (iii), (vii) and (viii) of section 114 of the Adhiniyam, which incorporates the obligatory duties of the Mahapalika, read as follows: "114.
Obligatory duties of the Mahapalika It shall be incumbent on the Mahapalika to make reasonable and adequate provision, by any means or measures which it is lawfully competent to it to use or to take, for each of the following matters, namely, .
. . (iii) the collection and removal of sewage, offensive matter and rubbish and treatment and disposal thereof including establishing and maintaining farm or factory; . . . . . . . . . (vii) the management and maintenance of all Mahapalika waterworks and the construction or acquisition of new works necessary for a sufficient supply of water for public and private purposes; (viii) guarding from pollution water used for human consumption and preventing polluted water from being so used; . . . . . . . . ." 536 Sections 251, 388, 396, 297, 398, 405, and 407 of the Adhiniyam read as follows: "251.
Provision of means for disposal of sewage The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may, for the purpose of receiving, treating, storing, disinfecting, distributing or otherwise disposing of sewage, construct any work within or without the City or purchase or take on lease any land, building, engine, material or apparatus either within or without the City or enter into any arrangement with any person for any period not exceeding twenty years for the removal or disposal of sewage within or without the City.
. . . . 388.
Provision may be made by Mukhya Nagar Adhikari for collection, etc., of excrementitious and polluted matter (1) The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may give public notice of his intention to provide, in such portion of the City as he may specify, for the collection, removal and disposal by Mahapalika agency, of all excrementitious and polluted matter from privies, urinals, and cess pools, and thereupon it shall be the duty of the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to take measures for the daily collection, removal and disposal of such matter from all premises situated in such portion of the City.
(2) In any such portion as is mentioned in sub section (1) and in any premises, wherever situated, in which there is a water closet or privy connected with a mahapalika drain, it shall not be lawful, except with the written permission of the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari, for any person who is not employed by or on behalf of the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to discharge any of the duties of scavengers.
. . . . . . . . . 396.
Removal of carcasses of dead animals (I) It shall be the duty of the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to provide for the removal of the carcasses of all animals dying within the City.
(2) The occupier of any premises in or upon which 537 any animal shall die or in or upon which the carcass of any animal shall be found, and the person having the charge of any animal which dies in the street or in any open place shall, within three hours after the death of such animal or.
if the death occurs at night within three hours after sunrise.
report the death of such animal at the nearest office of the Mahapalika Health Department.
(3) For every carcass removed by mahapalika agency, whether from any private premises or from public street or place, a fee for the removal of such amount as shall be fixed by the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari shall be paid by the owner of the animal, or, if the owner is not known.
by the occupier of the premises in or upon which, or by the person in whose charge, the said animal died.
Prohibition of cultivation, use of manure, irrigation injurious to health If the Director of Medical and Health Services or the Civil Surgeon or the Nagar Swasthya Adhikari certifies that the cultivation of any description of crops or the use of any kind of manure or the irrigation of land in any specified manner (a) in a place within the limits of a City is injurious or facilitates practices which are injurious to the health of persons dwelling in the neighbourhood, or (b) in a place within or beyond the limits of a City is likely to contaminate the water supply of such City or otherwise render it unfit for drinking purpose, the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may by public notice prohibit the cultivation of such crop, the use of such manure or the use of the method of irrigation so reported to be injurious, or impose such conditions with respect thereto as may prevent the injury or contamination: Provided that when, on any land in respect of which such notice is issued, the act prohibited has been practised in the ordinary course of husbandry for the five successive years next preceding the date of prohibition, compensation shall be paid from the Mahapalika Fund to all persons interested therein for damage caused to them by such prohibition.
538 398.
Power to require owners to clear away noxious vegetation The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may, by notice.
require the owner or occupier of any land to clear away and remove any vegetation or undergrowth which may be injurious to health or offensive to the neighbourhood.
. . . . . . . . . 405.
Power to require removal of nuisance arising from tanks, etc.
The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may by notice require the owner or occupier of any land or building to cleanse, repair, cover, fill up or drain off a private well, tank, reservoir.
pool, depression or excavation therein which may appear to the Mukhiya Nagar Adhikari to be injurious to health or offensive to the neighbourhood: Provided that the owner or occupier may require the Mukhya Nagar Adhikari to acquire at the expense of the Mahapalika or otherwise provide, any land or rights in land necessary for the purpose of effecting drainage ordered under this section 407.
Any place may at any time be inspected for purpose of preventing spread of dangerous disease The Mukhya Nagar Adhikari may at any time, by day or day night, without notice or after giving such notice of his intention as shall in the circumstances, appear to him to be reasonable, inspect any place in which any dangerous disease is reputed or suspected to exist, and take such mea sures as he shall think fit to prevent the spread of the said disease beyond such place.
" The above provisions deal with the specific duties of the Nagar Mahapalika or the Mukhya Nagar .
Adhikari appointed under the Adhiniyam with regard to the disposal of sewage and protection of the environment in or around the City to which the Adhiniyam applies.
There are almost similar provisions in sections 7, 189, 19 l and other provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916 which applies to the smaller municipal bodies.
The Uttar Pradesh Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 imposes statutory duties on the authorities mentioned therein regarding the provision of water supply to the cities and towns and construction of sewerage systems in them.
The perusal of these provisions in the laws governing the local bodies shows that the 539 Nagar Mahapalikas and the Minicipal Boards are primarily responsible for the maintenance of cleanliness in the areas under their jurisdiction and the protection of their environment.
We have, in the judgment delivered by us on September 22, 1987, briefly referred to the (Act No. 6 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Water Act ') in which provisions have been made for the establishment of the Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution, for conferring on and assigning to such Boards powers and functions relating thereto and for matters connected therewith.
In the Water Act the expressions 'pollution ', 'sewage effluent ', 'sewer ', 'stream ', and 'trade effluent ' are defined as follows: "2 Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires . .
. . . .
(e) 'pollution ' means such contamination of water or such alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of water or such discharge of any sewage or treade effluent or of any other liquid, gaseous or solid substance into water (whether directly or indirectly) as may or is likely to, create a nuisance or render such water harmful or injurious to public health or safety, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other legitimate uses, or to the life and health of animals or plants or of acquatic organisms; . .
(g) 'sewage effluent ' means effluent from any sewerage system or sewage disposal works and includes sullage from open drains; (gg) 'sewer ' means any conduit pipe or channel, open or closed, carrying sewage or trade effluent; .
(j) 'stream ' includes (i) river; 540 (ii) water course (whether flowing or for the time being dry); (iii) inland water (whether natural or artificial); (iv) sub terranean waters; (v) sea or tidal waters to such extent or, as the case may be, to such point as the State may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf; (k) 'trade effluent ' includes any liquid, gaseous or solid substance which is discharged from any premises used for carrying on any trade or industry, other than domestic sewage .
" Section 3 and 4 of the Water Act provide for the constitution of the Central Board and State Boards respectively.
A State Board has been constituted under section 4 of the Water Act in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
Section 16 of the Water Act sets out the functions of the Central Board and section 17 of the Water Act lays down the functions of the State Board.
The functions of the Central Board are primarily advisory and supervisory in character.
The Central Board is also required to advise the Central Government on any matter concerning the prevention and control of water pollution and to co ordinate the activities of the State Boards.
The Central Board is also required to provide technical assistance and guidance to the State Boards, carry out and sponsor investigations and research relating to problems of water pollution and prevention, control or abatement of water pollution.
The functions of the State Board are more comprehensive.
In addition to advising the State Government on any matter concerning the prevention, control or abatement of water pollution, the State Board is required among other things (i) to plan a comprehensive programme for the prevention, control or abatement of pollution of streams and wells in the State and to secure the execution thereof, (ii) to collect and disseminate information relating to water pollution and the prevention, control or abatement thereof; (iii) to encourage, conduct and participate in investigations and research relating to problems of water pollution and prevention, control or abatement of water pollution; (iv) to inspect sewage or trade effluents, works and plants for the treatment of sewage and trade effluents; (v) to review plans, specifications or other data relating to plants set up for the treatment of 541 water, works for the purification thereof and the system for the disposal of sewage or trade effluents or in connection with the grant of any consent as required by the Water Act; (vi) to evolve economical and reliable methods of treatment of sewage and trade effluents, having regard to the peculiar conditions of soils, climate and water resources of different regions and more especially the prevailing flow characteristics of water in streams and wells which render it impossible to attain even the minimum degree of dilution; and (vii) to lay down standards of treatment of sewage and trade effluents to be discharged into any particular stream taking into account the minimum fair weather dilution available in that stream and the tolerance limits of pollution permissible in the water of the stream, after the discharge of such effluents.
The State Board has been given certain executive powers to implement the provisions of the Water Act.
Sections 20, 21 and 23 of the Water Act confer power on the State Board to obtain information necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the Water Act, to take samples of effluents and to analyse them and to follow the procedure prescribed in connection therewith and the power of entry and inspection for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Water Act.
Section 24 of the Water Act prohibits the use of stream or well for disposal of polluting matters etc.
contrary to the provisions incorporated in that section.
Section 32 of the Water Act confers the power on the State Board to take certain emergency measures in case of pollution of stream or well.
Where it is apprehended by a Board that the water in any stream or well is likely to be polluted by reason of the disposal of any matter therein or of any likely disposal of any matter therein, or otherwise, the Board may under section 33 of the Water Act make an application to a court not inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, for restraining the person who is likely to cause such pollution from so causing.
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which has also been referred to in out earlier judgment, also contains certain provisions relating to the control, prevention and abatement of pollution of water and one significant provision in that Act is what is contained in section 17 thereof, which provides that where an offence under that Act is committed by any Department of Government, the Head of that Department shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and is liable to be punished.
It is unfortunate that although Parliament and the State Legislature have enacted the aforesaid laws imposing duties on the Central and State Boards and the municipalities for prevention and control of 542 pollution of water, many of those provisions have just remained on paper without any adequate action being taken pursuant thereto.
After the above petition was filed and notice was sent to the Uttar Pradesh State Board constituted under the Water Act, an affidavit has been filed before this Court by Dr. G.N. Misra, Scientific officer of the U.P. Pollution Control Board setting out the information which the Board was able to collect regarding the measures taken by the several local bodies and also by the U.P. Pollution Control Board in order to prevent the pollution of the water flowing in the river Ganga.
A copy of the report relating to the inspection made at Kanpur on 23.11.87/24.11.87 by Shri Tanzar Ullah Khan, Assistant Environmental Engineer and Shri A.K. Tiwari, Junior Engineer enclosed to the counter affidavit as Exhibit K 5 reads thus: "The inspection made on 23.11.87/24.1.87 alongwith Sri A.K. Tiwari, Junior Engineer.
Following are the facts observed at the time of inspection.
Kanpur town is situated on the southern bank of river Ganges.
The present population of the town is approximately 20 lacs.
The city is covered with piped water supply.
The city has developed between river Ganges on the north side and river Pandu on the south side.
G.T. Road divides the city into two halves.
In the north side most of the area is covered by sewerage system and the sullage/sewage is discharged without treatment into river Ganges through 17 nalas including sewerage by pass channel at Jajmau.
In the south side there is no sewerage system and the sewage/sullage are discharged without treatment into river Pandu through 5 nalas.
River Pandu joins river Ganges near Fatehpur(Sketch enclosed).
The Kanpur Nagar mahapalika has not yet submitted any proposal of sewage treatment works to the Board.
543 6.
Mr. Ikramur Rahman, A.E. Nagar Mahapalika told the Kanpur town is covered under Ganga Action Plan and following are the proposals (A) U. P. Jal Nigam (1) Re modelling of sewage pumping station at Jajmau and improvement to sewage farm.
(2) Nala Tapping.
(3) Sewage Treatment Plant.
(B) Kanpur Jal Sansthan (1) Cleaning of Trunk and main sewers.
(C) Integrated Environmental and sanitary Engineer project is being executed under the Dutch Assistance in Jajmau Area.
(1) Crash Programme (is to remove deficiencies in the existing sanitary facilities) (2) Laying of Industrial sewer.
(3) U.A.S.B. Sewage Treatment Plant.
Sd/ Sd/ A.K.TIWARI (TANZAR ULLAH KHAN) J.E. ASSTT.
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER.
" Appendix A/1 to 'An Action Plan for Prevention of Pollution of the Ganga ' gives the following particulars relating to the quantity of sewerage generated in the City of Kanpur which is discharged into the river Ganga and other relevant matters: KANPUR Population Estimated water Estimated sewage Treatment in 1981 supply in 1981 generated (70% of the water supply to the city 544 . . . . . . . . . . 16.39 lacks 392.14 million 274.50 million Nil litres a day litres a day . . . . . . . . . .
It is thus seen that 274.50 million litres a day of sewage water is being discharged into the river Ganga from the city of Kanpur, which is the highest in the State of Uttar Pradesh and next only to the city of Calcutta which discharges 580.
17 million litres a day of sewage water into the river Ganga.
Para 4 of the affidavit filed by Shri Jai Shanker Tewari, Executive engineer of Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika reads thus: "4.
That the pollution in river Ganga from Kanpur is occurring because of following reasons: (i) About 16 nalas collecting sullage water, sewage, textile waste, power plant waste and tannery effluents used to be discharged without any treatment into the river.
However some Nalas have been trapped now.
(ii) The dairies located in the city have a cattle population of about 80.000.
The dung, fodder waste and other refuse from this cattle population is quantitatively more than the sullage from the city of human population of over 20 lakhs.
All this finds its way into the sewerage system and the nalas in the rainy season.
It has also totally choked many branches of sewers and trunk sewers resulting in the overflow of the system.
(iii) The night soil collected from the unsewered areas of the city and thrown into the nalas.
(iv) There are more than 80 tanneries in Jajmau whose effluent used to be directly discharged into the river.
(v) The total water supply in Kanpur is about 55 mil lion gallons per day.
After use major part of it goes down the drains, nalas and sewers; sewage is taken to Jajmau sewage pumping station and a part of it is being supplied to sewage farms after diluting it with raw ganges water and the remaining part is discharged into the river.
(vi) Dhobi Ghats.
(vii) Defecation by economically weaker sections.
" 545 The affidavit further states that the U.P. Jal Nigam, the U.P. Water Pollution Control Board, the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute, the Central Leather Research Institute, the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika, the Kanpur Development Authority and the Kanpur Jal Sansthan have started taking action to minimise the pollution of the river Ganga.
It is also stated therein that the financial assistance is being provided by the Central Ganga Authority through Ganga Project Directorate, State Government, the World Bank, the Dutch Government etc.
for implementing the said measures.
The said affidavit gives information about the several works undertaken at Kanpur for minimising the pollution of the river Ganga.
It also states that Rs.493.63 lacs had been spent on those works between the years 1985 and 1987 and that the total allocation of funds by the Central Ganga Authority for Kanpur is Rs.3694.94 lacs and that upto the end of the current financial year it is proposed to spend Rs.785.58 lacs (1985 to 1987 88) towards various schemes to be completed under Ganga Action Plan.
The affidavit points out that in Kanpur City sewer cleaning has never been done systematically and in a planned way except that some sewers were cleaned by the U.P. Jal Nigam around 1970.
The main reasons for mal functioning and choking of the city sewerage, according to the affidavit, are (i) throwing or discharging of solids, clothes, plastics, metals etc.
into the sewerage system; (ii) throwing of cow dung from dairies which are located in every part of the city which consists of about 80,000 cattle; (iii) laying of under sized sewers specially in labour colonies; (iv) throwing of solid wastes and malba from construction of buildings into sewers through manholes; (v) non availability of mechanical equipment for sewer cleaning works; and (vi) shortage of funds for proper maintenance.
It is asserted that the discharge of untreated effluents into the river Ganga will be stopped upto 80% by March, 1988.
Shri M.C. Mehta, the petitioner herein, drew our attention to the Progress Report of the Ganges Action Plan (July 1986 January 1987) prepared by the Industrial Toxicology Research Centre, Council of Scientific & Industrial Research.
At page 20 of the said report the details of the analysis of the Ganga water samples collected during August, 1986 to January, 1987 from Uttar Pradesh region are furnished.
That report shows that the pollution of the water in the river Ganga is of the highest degree at Kanpur.
The Ganga water samples taken at Kanpur show that the water in the river Ganga at Kanpur consisted of 29.200 units (mg/ml) of iron in the month of August, 1986 when the ISI limit for river water is 0.3 and 0.900 (mg/ml) of manganese whereas the WHO limit of manganese for drinking water is 546 0.05.
The Progress Report for the period February 1987 June.
1987 of Microlevel Intensive Monitoring of Ganga under Ganga Action Plan describes the samples of the water taken from the river Ganga at Kanpur thus: "B.O.D. (Bio oxygen Demand) values are found to be higher than prescribed values of l.
S.I. C.O.D. (Chemical oxygen Demand) values are also found to be higher.
These values clearly indicate that river water is not fit for drinking, fishing and bathing purposes.
Table II further shows that Total Coliform and Fecal Coliform bacteria are always found very high.
This is due to disposal of large quantity of untreated municipal waste into river Ganga.
These high values of bacteria indicate that water is not fit for drinking, bathing and fishing purpose.
To improve quality of water in Ganga, all nullahs should be trapped immediately and raw water should be treated conventionally at water works and disinfected by chlorination " (underlining by us) In the concluding part of the said Progress Report it is stated thus: "The Ganga is grossly polluted at Kanpur.
All nullahs are discharging the polluted waste water into river Ganga.
But Jajmau by pass channel, Sismau, Muir Mill, Golf Club and Gupta Ghat nullah are discharging huge quantities of polluted waste water, To improve the water quality of Ganga all major nullahs should be diverted and treated.
Combined treatment should be provided for Jajmau tanneries.
Effluent treatment plants should be installed by all major polluting industries.
" It is needless to say that in the tropical developing countries a large amount of misery, sickness and death due to infectious diseases arises out of water supplies.
In Lall 's Commentaries on Water and Air Pollution Laws (2nd Edition) at pages 331 and 333 it is observed thus: "In the tropics, we cannot safely take such a limited 547 view.
Such Water borne diseases as malaria, schistosomiasis, guinea worm and yellow fever are either terrible scourges of, or threats to, many tropical populations.
The hazards from bad water are thus much greater.
Poverty is much more serious for many tropical areas; in the rural areas where most people live and around the edges of the cities, which are the fastest growing communities.
most people cannot afford a conventionally good water supply at present, and the choice in the short run may be between doing nothing and providing somewhat improved supply.
If an ideal water system is not possible, there are options as to what needs should be met by the partial improvements.
To make the right decisions we need again the broad picture of water related diseases.
So, because of these two tropical characteristics warmth and poverty a wider view than in temperate lands is necessary.(p.331) .
. . . . .
Water borne diseases The classical water borne diseases are due to highly infective organisms where only rather few are needed to infect someone, relative to the levels of pollution that readily occur.
The two chief ones have a high mortality if untreated and are diseases which a community is very anxious to escape: Typhoid and cholera.
Both are relatively fragile organisms whose sole reservoir is man.
These two diseases occur most dramatically as the 'common source out break where a community water supply gets contaminated by faeces from d person suffering from, or carrying, one of the infections.
Many people drink the water and a number of these fall ill from the infection at about the same time.
Typhoid is the most cosmopolitan of the classical water borne infections.
In man it produces a severe high fever with generated systemic, more than intestinal, symptoms.
The bacteria are ingested and very few are sufficient to infect.
The typhoid patient is usually too ill to go out polluting the water and is not infective prior o falling sick.
However, a small proportion of those who recover clinically continue to pass typhoid bacteria in their faeces for 548 months or years; these carriers are the source of water borne infections.
Gallstones predispose to the carrier state as the bacteria persist in the inflamed gall bladder.
In the tropics, lesions of Schistosoma haematobium in the bladder also act as nide of infection, producing urinary typhoid carriers, whilst rectal schistosomiasis combined with typhoid leads to a persistent sever fever lasting many months.
Typhoid bacteria survive well in water but do not multiply there.
Cholera is in some ways similar to typhoid, but its causative bacteria are more fragile and the clinical course is extremely dramatic.
In classical cholera the onset of diarrhoea is sudden and its volume immense so that the untreated victim has a high probability of dying from dehydration within 24 hours or little more.
Several other infections are water borne but are less important than typhoid and cholera.
Leptospirosis, due to a spirochaete, has its reservoir in wild rodents which pollute the water.
Leptospis can penetrate the skin as well as being ingested.
They produce jaundice and fever, called .Weil 's disease, which is severe but not common. ' The amount of suffering which the members of the public are likely to undergo by using highly polluted water can be easily gathered from the above extract.
In the book entitled 'Water Pollution and disposal of Waste Water on Land ' (1983) by U.N. Mahida.
I.S.E. (Retd) the problem of water pollution, the benefits of control of pollution and the urgency of the problem have been dealt with.
At pages l, 2, 4 and S of the said book it is observed thus: "As long as the human population was small and communities were scattered over large areas of land, the disposal of human wastes created no problems.
People could defecate in areas surrounding villages and other habitations and leave it to nature to dispose of the waste by assimilation in the surrounding land and air.
But as communities became more concentrated and villages and towns grew, such a mode of disposal by natural agencies came to be replaced by organised disposal, though again through 549 the agency of natural land and soil columns.
The collection of human excreta and its disposal in earthen trenches was resorted to by many towns and adopted the basket privy system.
The introduction of a system of water borne sewage created new problems in the disposal of human wastes, as now along with the earlier problem of getting rid of solid wastes, i.e., human excreta, the problem of the disposal of the water employed for the removal of human wastes had also to be faced.
This was the origin of the problem of sewage disposal.
At first, the natural instinct was to channelize the sewage the soiled water to natural streams and rivers.
For a time this mode of disposal was even considered quite efficacious.
Such methods did not create difficulties as sewage discharges were small as compared to the stream flow.
But with the increased discharge of progressively large quantities of sewage, polluted streams became a serious menace to public health.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM The introduction of modern water carriage systems transferred the sewage disposal from the streets and the surroundings of townships to neighbouring streams and rivers.
This was the beginning of the problem of water pollution.
It is ironic that man, from the earliest times, has tended to dispose of his wastes in the very streams and rivers from which most of his drinking water is drawn.
Until quite recently this was not much of a problem, but with rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, the problem of the pollution of natural waters is reaching alarming proportions.
The most disturbing feature of this mode of disposal is that those who cause water pollution are seldom the people who suffer from it.
Cities and industries discharge their untreated or only partially treated sewage and industrial waste waters into neighbouring streams and thereby remove waste matter from their own neighbourhood.
But in doing so, they create intense pollution in streams and rivers and expose the downstream riparian population to dangerously unhygienic conditions.
In addition to the with 550 drawal of water for downstream towns and cities, in many developing countries, numerous villages and riparian agricultural population generally rely on streams and rivers for drinking water for themselves and their cattle, for cooking, bathing, washing and numerous other uses.
It is thus riparian population that specially needs protection from the growing menace of water pollution.
(pages 1 and 2) . . . . . . . . .
BENEFITS OF CONTROL The benefits which result from the prevention of water pollution include a general improvement in the standard of health of the population, the possibility of restoring stream waters to their original beneficial state and rendering them fit as sources of water supply, and the maintenance of clean and healthy surroundings which would then offer attractive recreational facilities.
Such measures would also restore fish and other aquatic life.
Apart from its menace to health, polluted water considerably reduces the water resources of a nation.
Since the total amount of a country 's utilisable water remains essentially the same and the demand for water is always increasing, schemes for the prevention of water pollution should, wherever possible, make the best use of treated waste waters either in industry or agriculture.
Very often such processes may also result in other benefits in addition to mere reuse.
The application of effluents on agricultural land supplies not only much needed water to growing crops but also manurial ingredients; the recovery of commercially valuable ingredients during the treatment of industrial waste waters often yields by products which may to some extent offset the cost of treatment If appropriate financial credits could be calculated in respect of these and other incidental benefits, it would be apparent that measures for the prevention of pollution are not unduly costly and are within the reach of all nations, advanced or developing.
It is fortunate that people are be coming more receptive to the idea of sharing the financial burden for lessening pollution.
It is now recognised in most 551 countries that it is the responsibility of industries to treat their trade wastes in such a way that they do not deteriorate the quality of the receiving waters, which otherwise would make the utilisation of such polluted waters very difficult or costly for downstream settlers.
URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM The crucial question is not whether developing countries can afford such measures for the control of water pollution but it is whether they can afford to neglect them.
The importance of the latter is emphasised by the fact that in the absence of adequate measures for the prevention or control of water pollution, a nation would eventually be confronted with far more onerous burdens to secure wholesome and adequate supplies of water for different purposes.
If developing countries embark on suitable pollution prevention policies during the initial stages of their industrialisation, they can avoid the costly mistakes committed in the past by many developed countries.
It is, however, unfortunate that the importance of controlling pollution is generally not realised until considerable damage has already been done; (Pages 3 and 4)" In common law the Municipal Corporation can be restrained by an injunction in an action brought by a reparian owner who has suffered on account of the pollution of the water in a river caused by the Corporation by discharging into the river insufficiently treated sewage from discharging such sewage into the river.
In Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association vs British Celanese Ltd., [19531 Chancery 149 the second defendant, the Derby Corporation admitted that it had polluted the plaintiff 's fishery in the River Derwent by discharging into it insufficiently treated sewage, but claimed that by the Derby Corporation Act, 1901 it was under a duty to provide a sewerage system, and that the system which had accordingly been provided had become inadequate solely from the increase in the population of Derby.
The Court of Appeal held that it was not inevitable that the work constructed under the Act of 1901 should cause a nuisance, and that in any case the Act on its true construction did not authorise the commission of a nuisance.
The petitioner in the case before us is no doubt not a riparian owner.
He is a person interested in protecting the lives of the people who make use of the water flowing in the river Ganga and his right to maintain the petition cannot be dis 552 puted.
The nuisance caused by the pollution of the river Ganga is a public nuisance, which is wide spread in range and indiscriminate in its effect and it would not be reasonable to expect any particular person lo take proceedings to stop it as distinct from the community at large.
The petition has been entertained as a Public Interest Litigation.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case we are of the view that the Petitioner is entitled to move this Court in order to enforce the statutory provisions which impose duties on the municipal authorities and the Boards constituted under the Water Act.
We have already set out the relevant provisions of the statute which impose those duties on the authorities concerned.
On account of their failure to obey the statutory duties for several years the water in the river Ganga at Kanpur has become so much polluted that it can no longer be used by the people either for drinking or for bathing.
The Nagar Mahapalika of Kanpur has to bear the major responsibility for the pollution of the river near Kanpur city.
It is no doubt true that the construction of certain works has been undertaken under the Ganga Action Plan at Kanpur in order to improve the sewerage system and to prevent pollution of the water in the river Ganga.
But as we see from the affidavit filed on behalf of the authorities concerned in this case the works are going on at a snail 's pace.
We find from the affidavits filed on behalf of the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika that certain target dates have been fixed for the completion of the works already undertaken.
We expect the authorities concerned to complete those works within the target dates mentioned in the counter affidavit and not to delay the completion of the works beyond those dates.
It is, however, noticed that the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika has not yet submitted its proposals for sewage treatment works to the State Board constituted under the Water Act.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should submit its proposals to the State Board within six months from today.
It is seen that there is a large number of dairies in Kanpur in which there are about 80,000 cattle.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should take action under the provisions of the Adhiniyam or the relevant bye laws made thereunder to prevent the pollution of the water in the river Ganga on account of the waste accumulated at the dairies.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika may either direct the dairies to be shifted to a place outside the city so that the waste accumulated at the dairies does not ultimately reach the river Ganga or in the alternative it may arrange for the removal of such waste by employing motor vehicles to transport such waste from the existing dairies in which even 553 the owners of the dairies cannot claim any compensation.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should immediately take action to prevent the collection of manure at private manure pits inside the city.
The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should take immediate steps to increase the size of the sewers in the labour colonies so that the sewage may be carried smoothly through the sewerage system.
Wherever sewerage line is not yet constructed steps should be taken to lay it.
Immediate action should also be taken by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika to construct sufficient number of public latrines and urinals for the use of the poor people in order to prevent defecation by them on open land.
The proposal to levy any charge for making use of such latrines and urinals shall be dropped as that would be a reason for the poor people not using the public latrines and urinals.
The cost of maintenance of cleanliness of those latrines and urinals has to be borne by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika.
It is submitted before us that whenever the Board constituted under the Water Act initiates any proceedings to prosecute industrialists or other persons who pollute the water in the river Ganga, the persons accused of the offences immediately institute petitions under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in the High Court and obtain stay orders thus frustrating the attempt of the Board to enforce the provisions of the Water Act.
They have not placed before us the facts of any particular case.
We are, however, of the view that since the problem of pollution of the water in the river Ganga has become very acute the High Courts should not ordinarily grant orders of stay of criminal proceedings in such cases and even if such an order of stay is made in any extra ordinary case the High Courts should dispose of the case within a short period, say about two months, from the date of the institution of such case.
We request the High Courts to take up for hearing all the cases where such orders have been issued under sections 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 staying prosecutions under the Water Act within two months.
The counsel for the Board constituted under the Water Act shall furnish a list of such cases to the Registrar of the concerned High Court for appropriate action being taken thereon.
One other aspect to which our attention has been drawn is the practice of throwing corpses and semi burnt corpses into the river Ganga.
This practice should be immediately brought to an end.
The co operation of the people and police should be sought in enforcing 554 this restriction.
Steps shall be taken by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika and the Police authorities to ensure that dead bodies or half burnt bodies are not thrown into the river Ganga.
Whenever applications for licences to establish new industries are made in future, such applications shall be refused unless adequate provision has been made for the treatment of trade effuents flowing out of the factories.
immediate action should be taken against the existing industries if they are found responsible tor pollution of water.
Having regard to the grave consequences of the pollution of water and air and the need for protecting and improving the natural environment which is considered to be one of the fundamental duties under the Constitution [vide Clause (g) of Article 51A of the Constitution] we are of the view that it is the duty of the Central Government to direct all the educational institutions throughout India to teach atleast for one hour in a week lessons relating to the protection and the improvement of the natural environment including forests, lakes, L) livers and wild life in the first ten classes.
The Central Government shall get text books written for the said purpose and distribute them to the educational institutions free of cost.
Children should be taught about the need for maintaining cleanliness commencing with the cleanliness of the house both inside and outside, and of the streets in which they live.
Clean surroundings lead to healthy body and healthy mind.
Training of teachers who teach this subject by the introduction of short term courses for such training shall also be considered.
This should be done throughout India.
In order to rouse amongst the people the consciousness of cleanliness of environment the Government of India and the Governments 1.
Of the States and of the Union Territories may consider the desirability of organising 'Keep the city clean ' week (Nagar Nirrnalikarana Saptaha), 'Keep the town clean week (Pura Nirmalikarana saptaha) and 'Keep the village clean week (Grama Nirmalikarna Saptaha) in every city, town and village throughout India at least once a year.
During that week the entire city, town or village should be kept as far as possible clean, tidy and free from pollution of land, water and air.
The organisation of the week should be entrusted to the Nagar Mahapalikas, Municipal Corporations, Town Municipalities, Village Panchayats or such other local authorities having jurisdiction over the area in question.
If the authorities decide to organise such a week it may not be celebrated in the same week throughout India but may he staggered depending upon the convenience of the particular city, town 555 or village.
During that week all the citizens including the members of the executive, members of Parliament and the State Legislatures, members of the judiciary may be requested to co operate with the local authorities and to take part in the celebrations by rendering free personal service.
This would surely create a national awareness of the problems faced by the people by the appalling all round deterioration of the environment which we are witnessing today.
We request the Ministry of Environment of the Government of India to give a serious consideration to the above suggestion.
What we have stated above applies mutatis mutandis to all other Mahapalikas and Municipalities which have jurisdiction over the areas through which the river Ganga flows.
Copies of this judgment shall be sent to all such Nagar Mahapalikas and Municipalities.
The case against the Nagar Mahapalikas and Municipalities in the state of Uttar Pradesh shall stand adjourned by six months.
Within that time all the Nagar Mahapalikas and Municipalities in the State of Uttar Pradesh through whose areas the river Ganga flows shall file affidavits in this Court explaining the various steps they have taken for the prevention of pollution of the water in the river Ganga in the light of the above judgment.
The case as against the several industries in the State of Uttar Pradesh which are located on the banks of the river Ganga will he taken up for hearing on the 9th of February, 1988.
L. Petition disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
% This Court in M.C. Mehta vs Union of India & ors., had issued certain directions with regard to the industries in which the business of tanning was being carried on near Kanpur on the banks of the River Ganga.
On that occasion, the Court had directed that the case in respect of the municipal bodies and the industries which were responsible for the pollution of the water in the river Ganga would be taken up next, and accordingly, the Court took up for consideration this case against the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika, since it was found that Kanpur was one of the biggest cities on the banks of the river Ganga.
Under the laws governing the local bodies, the nagar Mahapalikas and Municipal Boards were primarily responsible for the maintenance of cleanliness in the areas under their jurisdiction and the protection of their environments.
Under the water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (the 'Water Act ') provisions had been made for the establishment of Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution, etc.
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, contained provisions relating to the control, prevention and abatement of pollution of water.
Although Parliament and the State Legislature had thus enacted laws, imposing duties on the Central and State Boards and the municipalities for the prevention and control of pollution of water, no adequate action had been taken pursuant to many of their provisions.
274.50 million litres a day of sewage water was being discharged into the river Ganga from the city of Kanpur, which was the highest in the State of U.P. Sewer cleaning had never been done systematically in Kanpur, and there was mal functioning and choking of the city sewerage.
Pollution of water in the river Ganga was of the highest degree at Kanpur, and a large extent of misery, sickness and death due to infectious diseases arose out of water supplies.
The petitioner filed this writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation against the public nuisance 531 caused by the serious pollution of the river Ganga, for protecting the lives of the people using the Ganga water.
Disposing of the petition, the Court, ^ HELD: The petitioner before the Court was no doubt not a riparian owner.
He was a person interested in protecting the lives of the people who made use of the water flowing in the river Ganga and his right to maintain the petition could not be disputed.
The nuisance caused by the pollution was a public nuisance, wide spread in range and indiscriminate in its effect, and it would not be reasonable to expect any particular person to take proceedings to stop it as distinct from the community at large.
The petition was entertained as a Public Interest Litigation.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Court was of the view that the petitioner was entitled to move the Court in order to enforce the statutory provisions which imposed duties on the municipal authorities and the Boards under the water Act, on account of failure of which to obey the statutory duties for several years, the water in the River Ganga at Kanpur had become so much polluted that it could no longer be used by the people for drinking or bathing.
The Nagar Mahapalika of Kanpur had to bear the major responsibility for the pollution of the river near the Kanpur city.
The construction of certain works, undertaken under the Ganga Action Plan at Kanpur to improve the sewerage system and prevent pollution of the water in the river Ganga, were going on at a snail 's pace.
The Court expected the authorities concerned would complete those works within the target dates mentioned in their counter affidavits.
The Court noticed that the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika had not yet submitted its proposals for sewage treatment works to the State Board constituted under Water Act, and directed that the mahapalika should submit its proposals to the State Board within six months (from the date of this judgment).
[551H; 552A F] The Court further directed; (i) The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should take action under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, or the relevant bye laws made thereunder to prevent pollution of the water in the river Ganga by waste accumulated at the large number of dairies in Kanpur having about 80,000 cattle.
The dairies might either be shifted outside the city so that the waste at the dairies did not ultimately reach the river Ganga, or, in the alternative, the Mahapalika might arrange for the removal of the waste by motor vehicles, in which 532 event the owners of the diaries could not claim any compensation.
The Mahapalika should immediately take action to prevent collection of manure at private manure pits inside the city; [552G H; 553A] (ii) The Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika should take immediate steps to increase the size of the sewers in the labour colonies, so 13 that sewage might be carried smoothly through the sewerage system, and wherever sewerage line was not yet constructed, steps should be taken to lay it; [553B] (iii) Immediate action should also be taken by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika to construct sufficient number of public latrines and urinals to prevent defecation by people on the open land.
The proposal to levy any charge for use of such latrines and urinals shall be dropped as that would be a reason for poor people not to use the public latrines and urinals.
The cost of maintenance of cleanliness of those latrines and urinals had to be borne by the Mahapalika.
[553C] The Court was of the view that since the problem of pollution of the water in the river Ganga had become very acute, the High Court should not ordinarily grant stay of criminal proceedings in cases where the Board constituted under the Water Act initiated any proceedings to prosecute industrialists or other persons who polluted the water in the Ganga, as the stay orders on petitions under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, frustrated the attempt of the Board to enforce the provisions of the Water Act, and further, even if such an order of stay was made in any extraordinary case, the High Court should dispose of the case within a short period, say about two months from the date of the institution of the case, and further, should take up for hearing all the cases where such orders had been issued under section P 482, Cr.
P.C., staying prosecutions under the Water Act.
[553E G] The Court further directed that the practice of throwing corpses and semi burnt corpses into the river Ganga should be immediately brought to an end.
Steps should be taken by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika and the police authorities to ensure that the dead bodies or G half burnt bodies were not thrown into the river Ganga.
[553H; 554A] In future j application for licences to establish new industries should be refused unless adequate provision had been made for the treatment of trade effluents flowing out of the factories, and immediate action should be taken against the existing industries found responsible for the pollution of water.
[554B] 533 Having regard to the grave consequences of the Pollution of water and air and need for protecting and improving the natural environment, considered to be one of the fundamental duties under the Constitution, it was the duty of the Central Government to direct all the educational institutions throughout India to teach at least for one hour in a week lessons on the protection and improvement of the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life in the first ten classes.
The Central Government should get the text books written for the said purpose and distributed to the educational institutions free of cost.
Training of teachers, who teach this subject, by the introduction of short term courses for such training shall also be considered.
This should be done throughout India.
[554C E] The above directions of the Court would apply mutatis mutandis to all the other Mahapalikas and Municipalities, having jurisdiction over the areas through which the river Ganga flows.[555C] OBSERVATION: The children should be taught about the need for maintaining cleanliness, of the houses both inside and outside and of the streets in which they live.
Clean surroundings lead to healthy body and healthy mind.
[554E] In order to rouse amongst the people the consciousness of cleanliness of environments, the Government of India and the Governments of the States and the Union Territories may consider the desirability of organising 'keep the city clean ' week (Nagar Nirmalikarana Saptaha) and 'keep the village clean ' week (Gram Nirmalikarana Saptaha) in every city, town and village throughout India at least once a year.
During that week, the entire city, town or village should be kept, as far as possible, clean tidy and free from pollution of land, water and air.
The organisation of the week should be entrusted to the Nagar Mahapalikas, Town Municipalities, Municipal Corporation, Village Panchayats or such other authorities, having jurisdiction over the area in question.
If the authorities decide to organise such a week it may not be celebrated in the same week throughout India but may be staggered depending upon the convenience of the particular city, town or village.
During that week, all the citizens, including the members of the executive, Parliament, State Legislatures and Judiciary may be requested to co operate with the local authorities and take part in the celebrations by rendering free personal service.
This would surely create a national awareness of the problems faced by the people by the appalling allround deterioration of the environment which is witnessed today.
[554FM; 555A B] 534 M.C. Mehta vs Union of India & others, [1987] 4 S.C.C. 463 and Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association vs British Celanese Limited, [1953] Chancery 149.