judgement:
ition No. 1543 of 1977.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
WITH W.P. No. 1542/77 and C.A. No. 1379/77, W.P. No. 838/78.
2360 2363/78 and S.L.P. (C) Nos.
1727/79 & 2333 & 2530 of 1978 AND S.L.P. (C) No. 2539 of 1978 and W.P. No. 228 of 1979.
M.S. Gupta for the petitioners in WPs.
1542, 1543, 838 & CA 1379/77.
Arvind Kumar, Mrs. Lakshmi Arvind & Prakash Gupta for the petitioners in SLPs.
1727, 2333 & 2530.
P.R. Mridul, R.K. Jain & Sukumar Sahu for the petitioners in WPs 2360 63.
Veda Vyasa, S.K. Gupta & A.K. Sharma for the petitioners in SLP 2599 and WP 228.
B.P. Singh Chauhan, Addl Adv.
U.P. and O.P. Rana the appearing respondents.
1162 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA, IYER, J.
This judgment deals with a flood of cases from Uttar Pradesh relating to limitation on agricultural land holdings and specifically disposes of the writ petitions, civil appeals and petitions for special leave listed below.
The pervasive theme of this litigative stream is not anti land reform as such but the discriminatory laws in the relevant legislation which make it 'unlaw ' from the constitutional angle.
The march of the Indian nation to the Promised Land of Social Justice is conditioned by the pace of the process of agrarian reform.
This central fact of our country 's progress has made land distribution and its inalienable ally, the ceiling on land holding, the cynosure of legislative attention.
And when litigative confrontation with large holders has imperilled the implementation of this vital developmental strategy, Parliament, in exercise of its constituent power, has sought to pre empt effectively and protect impregnably such statutory measures by enacting article 31A as the very first amendment in the very first year after the Constitution came into force.
Consequent on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, this court repelled the challenges to land reform laws as violative of fundamental rights in State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh but the constant struggle between agrarian reform legislation and never say die litigation has led to a situation where every such enactment has been inevitably accompanied by countless writ petitions assailing its vires despite article 31A, not to speak of the more extensive Chinese walls like articles 31B, 31C and 31D.
The forensic landscape is cluttered up in this court with appeals and writ petitions and petitions for leave to appeal, the common feature of each of which is a challenge to the validity of one or other of the State laws imposing ceiling on land holding in an inegalitarian milieu of the landed few and the landless many.
Of course, the court is bound to judge the attack.
On the legislative projects for acquisition and distribution, on their constitutional merits and we proceed to as say the task with special reference to the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (abbreviated hereafter as the Act).
Several counsel have argued and plural objections have been urged but we will grapple with only those contentions which have been seriously pressed and omit others which have either been only formally mentioned or left to lie in silent 1163 peace, or but feebly articulated.
In this judgment, we side step the bigger issue of the vires of the constitutional amendments in Articles 31 A, 31 and 31 as they are dealt with in other cases disposed of recently.
Indeed, the history of land reform, in its legislative dimension has been a perennial race between judicial pronouncements and constitutional amendments.
The anatomy of the Act must be scanned as a preliminary exercise so that the Constitutional infirmities alleged may be appreciated in the proper setting.
The long title gives the primary purpose of the Act as imposition of ceilings on land holdings in Uttar Pradesh and the Preamble amplifies it further.
All this is tersely spelt out in the Statement of objects and Reasons which runs thus: "With a view to provide for more equitable distribution of land by making the same available to the extent possible to landless agricultural labourers and to provide for cultivation on cooperative basis and to conserve part of the available resources in land so as to increase the production and up reserve stock of foodgrains against lean years by carrying on cultivation on scientific lines in State owned farms, it is expedient to impose Ceiling on existing large land holdings.
It is necessary to provide some land to the village communities for their common needs, such as establishment of fuel and fodder reserves.
The Bill is therefore being introduced to promote the economic interest of the weaker section of community and to subserve the common good.
" Thus we get the statutory perspective of agrarian reform and so, the constitutionality of the Act has to be tested on the touchstone of Art 31A which is the relevant protective armour for land reform laws.
Even here, we must state that while we do refer to the range of constitutional immunity article 31A confers on agrarian reform measures we do not rest our decision on that provision.
Independently of article 31A, the impugned legislation can withstand constitutional invasion and so the further challenge to article 31A itself is of no consequence.
The comprehensive vocabulary of that purposeful provision obviously catches within its protective net the present Act and, broadly speaking, the antiseptic effect of that Article is sufficient to immunise the Act against invalidation to the extent stated therein.
The extreme argument that article 31A itself is void as violative of the basic structure of the Constitution has been negatived by my learned brother, Bhagwati, J. in a kindred group of cases of Andhra Pradesh.
The amulet of article 31A is, therefore, potent, so far as it goes, but beyond its ambit it is still possible, as counsel have endeavoured, to 1164 spin out some sound argument to nullify one section or the other.
Surely, the legislature cannot run amok in the blind belief that article 31A is omnipotent.
We will examine the alleged infirmities in due course.
It is significant that even apart from the many decisions upholding article 31A, Golak Nath 's case decided by a Bench of 11 Judges, while holding that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act exceeded the constituent power still categorically declared that the said amendment and a few other like amendments would be held good based on the doctrine of prospective over ruling.
The result, for our purpose, is that even Golak Nath 's case has held article 31A valid.
The note struck by later cases reversing Golaknath does not militate against the vires of article 31A. Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharati 's case.
Article 31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power of Parliament and, therefore, invalid.
But, after listening to the marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13 Judges Bench of this Court upheld the vires of Article 31A in unequivocal terms.
That decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the constitutional ground of article 141.
Every now discovery or argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent.
In this view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with high pressure advocacy, cannot persuade us to re open, what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn pre posion by the epic Fundamental Rights case.
From Kameshwar Singh and Golak Nath (supra) through Kesavananda (supra) and Kanan Devan to Gwalior Rayons and after article 31A has stood judicial scrutiny although, as stated earlier, we do not base the conclusion on article 31A.
Even so, it is fundamental that the nation 's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vital issues deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blowup.
This, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national.
crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shakeup.
It is surely wrong to prove Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court right when he said.
1165 "The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only.
It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this Court which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion.
should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions".
It is wise to remember that fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned".
And none of these misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati 's case (supra).
For these reasons, we proceed to consider the contentions of counsel on the clear assumption that article 31A is good.
Its sweep is wide and indubitably embraces legislation on land ceilings.
Long years ago, in Ranjit vs State, a Constitution Bench, speaking through Hidayatullah, J., dwelt on the wide amplitude of article 31A, referred to Precedents of this Court on agrarian reform vis a vis article 31A and concluded that equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition of ceiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse planning and strategies are covered by the armour of article 31A. We may quote a part: The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other, but envisages also the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions.
Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc.
which (sic) enure for the benefit of rural population must be considered to be an essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken.
If agrarian reforms are to succeed, more distribu 1166 tion of lands to the landless is not enough.
There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual owners of small portions of lands.
Further the village panchayat is an authority for purposes of part III as was conceded before us and it has the protection of article 31A because of this character even if the taking over of Shamlat deb amounts to acquisition.
The setting of a body or agricultural artisans (such as the village carpenter, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, ferrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms.
It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of holdings, fixing of ceiling on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate.
This review has been reinforced by the later pronouncement of a Constitution Bench in the Gwalior Rayon Case, emphatically expressing support for the conceptual sweep of agrarian reform vis a vis article 31A.
The proposition, therefore, is invulnerable that article 31A repulses all invasion on "ceiling legislation" (armed with articles 14, 19 and 31).
The professed goal of the legislation is to maximise surplus lands for working out distributive justice and rural development, with special reference to giving full opportunity to the agrarian masses to become a major rural resource of the nation.
How to maximise surplus land ? By imposition of severe ceiling on ownership of land holdings consistently with the pragmatics of rural economies and the people 's way of life.
The pervasive, pivotal concepts are, therefore, ceilings on holdings and surrender of surplus land.
The working unit with reference to which the legal ceiling is set is the realistic family.
So, the flexible concept of 'family ' also becomes a central object of legislative definition.
Having regard to the diversity of family units among the various communities making up Indian society and having the object of the legislation as the guiding principle, the statute under consideration has given a viable and realistic definition of 'family ', with provision for some variables and special situations.
The machinery for implementing the statute is also set up with adjudicative powers, including appeals.
Compensation, with 1167 out invidious discrimination, has to be paid, according to the scheme, when surplus land is taken away and for the determination and payment of such compensation a whole chapter is devoted.
The disposal of land secured as surplus is, perhaps, the elimination of the legislative project.
and so, Chapter 4 stipulates the manner of disposal and settlement of surplus land.
Thus, we have the definitional provision in Chapter 1, followed by imposition of "ceilings" with ancillary provisions for exemption.
The judicial machinery for enforcement and the provisions for pre emption of manipulation and prevention of fraud on the statute, the assessment of compensation and its payment and the like have also been enacted in Chapters 2 and 3.
A miscellaneous chapter deals with a variety of factors, including offences and penalties, mode of hearing and appellate powers and kindred matters.
Inevitably, such a progressive legislation runs drastically contrary to the feudal ethos of the landed gentry and the investment intancts of the nouveau riche and green revolutionists.
Therefore, the holders who are hurt by the provisions of the Act have chosen to challenge their vires and they must succeed if the ground is good.
Since the legislature has plenary power to tile extent conferred by the Constitution, the attack has to be based, and, deed has been on constitutional infirmities which If sound, must shoot down the Act.
By way of aside, one might query whether agrarian reform, with all the fanfare and trumpet, has seriously taken off the ground or is still in the hangar? Any way, the court can only pronounce, the Executive must execute.
We will now proceed to formulate the points which, according to counsel, are fatal to the legislation and proceed to scan them in due course.
Various miniscule matters have been raised in the plethora of cases largely founded on some real or fancied inequity, inequality, legislative arbitrariness or sense of injustice.
Speaking generally and with a view to set the record straight, injustice is conditioned by the governing social philosophy, the prevailing economic approach and, paramountly, by the constitutional parameters which bind the court and the community.
The Indian Constitution is a radical document, a charter or socio politico economic change and geared to goals spelt out in the objectives Resolution which commits the nation to a drive towards an egalitarian society, a note struck more articulately by the adjective 'socialist ' to our Republic introduced by a recent Amendment and survives after Parliament, differently composed, had altered the 42nd Amendment.
This backdrop suggests that agrarian legislation, organised as egalitarian therapy, must be judged, not meticulously for every indi 1168 vidual injury but by the larger standards of abolition of fundamental in equalities, frustration of basis social fairness and shocking unconscionableness.
This process involves detriment to vested interests.
The perfect art of plucking the goose with the least squealing is not a human gift.
A social surgery, supervised by law, minimises, not eliminates, individual hurt while promoting community welfare.
The court, in its interpretative role, can neither be pachydermic nor hyperreactive when landholders, here and there lament about lost land.
We will examine the contentions form this perspective, without reference to articles 31B, C and D. Justice Cardozo has a message for us when he says: Law and obedience to law are facts confirmed everyday to us all in our experience of life.
If the result of a definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so much the worse for the definition; we must enlarge it till it is broad enough to answer to realities.
Shri Mridul, who led the arguments, mounted a three point attack.
Article 31A(1) (ii) was the target of an obscure submission which counsel, with characteristic fairness, did not press at a later stage.
Linked up with it was queer nexus between article 21 and.
the right to property, deprivation of which was contended to be an unreasonable procedure somehow falling within the lethal spell of article 21.
Proprietary personality was integral to personal liberty and a may hem inflicted on a man 's property was an amputation of his personal liberty.
Therefore, land reform law, if unreasonable, violates article 21 as expansively construed in Maneka Gandhi.
The dichotomy between personal liberty, in article 21, and proprietary status, in articles 31 and 19 is plain, whatever philosophical justification or pragmatic realisation it may possess in political or juristic theory.
Maybe, a penniless proletarian, is unfree in his movements and has nothing to lose except his chains.
But we are in another domain of constitutional the jurisprudence.
Of course, counsel 's resort to article 21 is prompted by the absence of mention of article 21 in article 31A and the illusory hope of inflating.
Maneka Gandhi to impart a healing touch to those whose property is taken by feigning loss of personal liberty when the State takes only property.
Maneka Gandhi is no universal nostrum or cure all, when all other arguments fail! The last point which had a quaint moral flavour was that transfers of landed property, although executed after the dates specified in the 1169 Act were unreasonably invalidated by the Act even when there was no "mens rea" vis a vis the ceiling law on the part of the transferor and this was violative of article 19(1) (f) and of article 14 as arbitrary.
A facet of over inclusiveness which breaches article 14 was also urged.
It is perfectly open to the legislature, as ancillary to its main policy to prevent activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such actions.
When the alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition.
Otherwise, all the lands would have been transferred and little would have been left by way of surplus.
Let us read the text of s.5(6) which is alleged to be bad being over inclusive or otherwise anomalous.
The argument, rather hard to follow and too subtle for the pragmatic of agrarian law, may be clearer when the provision is unfurled.
Section 5(6) runs thus: In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account .
Provided that nothing in this sub section shall apply to: (a) a transfer in favour of any person(including Government) referred to in sub section(2); (b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument riot being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder or other members of the family.
There is no blanket ban here but only qualified invalidation of certain sinister assignments etc.
Counsel weaves gossamer webs which break on mere judicial touch when he argues that transfer 'in good faith and for adequate consideration ' have been unconstitutionally exempted.
The bizarre submission is that 'adequate consideration ' is an arbitrary test.
We reject it without mere discussion.
The second limb of the submission is that while section (6) directs the authority to ignore certain transfers it does not void it.
The further spin off adroitly presented by counsel is that the provision violates the second proviso to article 31.
It is a little too baffling to follow and we dismiss the submission as hollow.
The provision in s.5(6), when read in the light of the Provisos, is fair and valid.
1170 Counsel 's further argument is to quote his own words that "the impugned provisions do not establish a reasonable procedure" because: "The expression 'in good faith ' is over inclusive and takes within its sweep situations which are not only very different but which may not have any nexus or legitimate relationship with the objects and purposes of the ceiling law . " We are hardly impressed by it and find no substance on it.
There is no question of morality or constitutionality even if the clause may be a little over drawn.
On the contrary, it is legislative folly not to preserve, by appropriate preventives and enacted contraceptives, the 'surplus ' reservoir of land without seepage or spill over.
It is legal engineering, not moral abandonment.
Indeed, the higher morality or social legitimacy of the law requires a wise legislature to prescribe transfers, lest the surplus pool be drained off by a rush of transactions.
Maybe, individual hardship may happen, very sad in some instances.
But every great cause claims human martyrs! Poor consolation for the victim but yet a necessary step if the large owners are not to play the vanishing trick or resort to manipulated alienations! After all, this ban comes into force only on a well recognised date, not from an arbitrary retroactive past.
We cannot discover anything which is morally wrong or constitutionally anathematic in such an embargo.
Article 19(1) (f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Art.19(6), to reasonable restrictions such as the one contained in s.5(6).
We do not think there is merit in the triple submissions spun by Shri Mridul.
Even on the merits, the transfers have been rightly ignored, the vendees who are the grandsons have been held to be not bona fide transferees for adequate consideration; and the findings are of fact and concurrent.
We over rule the grounds of grievance as unsustainable.
In sum, without reliance on article 31A, Shri Mridul 's contentions can be dismissed as without merit.
We will now consider the mini arguments of the other counsel some of them do merit serious consideration by the court and even where direct relief does not flow from the judicial process, State action to avoid anomalies may well be called for in the light of genuine hardships.
Shri Veda Vyas, appearing in W.P. No. 228 of 1979 and SLP No. 2599 of 1978, pleaded powerfully for gender justice and sex 1171 equity because, according to his reading, the Act had a built in masculine bias in the definition of 'family unit ' and allocation of ceiling on holdings, and therefore, perpetrated unconstitutional discrimination.
Indeed, his case illustrated the anti woman stance of the statute, he claimed.
The submission is simple, the inference is inevitable but the invalidation does not follow even if article 31A is not pressed into service to silence article 14.
We will formulate the objections and examine their merit from the constitutional perspective.
Maybe, there is force in the broad generalisation that, notwithstanding all the boasts about the legendary glory of Indian womanhood in the days of yore and the equal status and even martial valour of heroines in Indian history, our culture has suffered a traumatic distortion, not merely due to feudalism and medievalism, but also due to British imperialism.
Indeed, the Freedom.
Struggle led by Mahatma Gandhi, the story of social reforms inspired by spiritual leaders like Swami Vivekananda and engineered by a galaxy of great Indians like Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Dayananda Saraswati and Maharishi Karve and the brave chapter of participation in the Independence Movement by hundreds and thousands of woman patriots who flung aside their unfree status and rose in revolt to overthrow the foreign yoke, brought back to Indian womanhood its lustrous status of equal partnership with Indian manhood when the country decided to shape its destiny and enacted a Constitution in that behalf.
Our legal culture and Corpus juris, partly a heritage of the past, do contain strands of discrimination to set right which a commission elaborately conducted enquiries and made a valuable report to the Central Government.
Shri Veda Vyas may be right in making sweeping submissions only to this limited extent but when we reach the concrete statutory situation and tackle the specific provisions in the Act, his argument misses the mark.
A better appreciation of his contention must be preceded by excerption of two definitions and consideration of the concepts they embody.
Section 3(7) defines 'family ' thus: 'family ' in relation to a tenure holder, means himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters); This definition is incomplete without contextually reading section 5(3) and so we quote the provision which, in the view of Shri Veda Vyas, enwombs the vice of discrimination against women.
Sec.5(3)(a) & (b) & Explanation: Subject to the provisions of sub sections (4), (5), (6) and (7) the ceiling area for purposes of sub section (1) shall be (a) In the case of a tenure holder having a family of not more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family) plus two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by him aggregates to two hectares, for each of his adult sons, who are either not them selves tenure holders or who hold less than two hectares of irrigated land, subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land; (b) in the case of a tenure holder having family of more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated land (including land held by other members of his family), besides, each of the members exceeding five and for each of his adult sons who are not themselves tenure holders or who held less than two hectares of irrigated land, two additional hectares of irrigated land or such additional land which together with the land held by such adult son aggregates to two hectares subject to a maximum of six hectares of such additional land Explanation: The expression 'adult son ' in clause (a) and (b) includes an adult son who is dead and has left surviving behind him minor sons or minor daughters (other than married daughters) who are not themselves tenure holders or who hold land less than two hectares of irrigated land; The anti female kink is patent in that the very definition of family discloses prejudice against the weaker sex by excluding adult daughters without providing for any addition to the ceiling on their account.
In the case of an adult son, section 5(3) (a) of the Act provides for the addition of two hectares of irrigated land for each of his tenure holder 's) sons where the family has a strength of less than five.
Section 5(3)(b) similarly provides for two additional hectares of irrigated land for each of his (tenure holder 's) adult sons where the strength of the family is more than 5.
It must be remembered that this addition is on account of the fact that there are adult sons, even though they are not tenure holders or held less than two hectares or none.
This previlege of adding to the total extent that the family of a tenure 1173 holder may keep is denied to an adult daughter, even though unmarried, and, therefore, dependent on the family for that a married son stands on a different footing from a married daughter, what justice is there in baring a dependent unmarried daughter in the cold? Assuming without admitting, Shri Veda Vyas further urges that having regard to the and the increasing prevalence of unmarried adult daughters in families these days, the discrimination is not theoretical but real because no minor girl can now marry.
Another similar invidious provision is the definition of tenure holder.
Ceiling on holdings is fixed with reference to tenure holders.
We wonder whether the Commission on the Status of Women or the Central Governments or the State Governments have considered this aspect of sex discrimination in most land reforms laws, but undoubtedly the State should be fair especially to the weaker sex.
Adult damsels should not be left in distress by progressive legislations geared to land reforms.
This criticism may have bearing on the ethos of the community and the attitude of the legislators, but we are concerned with the constitutionality of the provision.
Maybe, in this age of nuclear families and sex equal human rights it is illiberal and contrary to the zeit geist to hark back to history 's dark pages nostalgically and disguise it as the Indian way of life with a view to deprive women of their undeniable half.
articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the Preamble rebel against the de facto denial of proprietary personhood of woman hood.
But this legal sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy provisions which do not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely organise a scheme where life 's realism is legislatively pragmatised.
Such a scheme may marginally affect gender justice but does not abridge, even a wee bit, the rights of women.
If land holding and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount purpose of maximising surpluses without maiming woman 's ownership no submission to destroy this measure can be permitted using sex discrimination as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable.
No woman s property is taken away any more than a man 's property.
Section 5(3) reduces daughters or wives to the status of stooges.
It forbids excessive holdings having regard to rural realities of agricultural life. 'Family ' is defined because it is taken as the unit for holding land a fact of extant societal life which cannot be wished away.
This is only a tool of social engineering in working out the scheme of setting limits to ownership.
Section 5(3) does not confer any property on an adult son nor withdraw any property from an adult daughter.
That provision shows a concession to a tenure holder who has propertyless 1174 adult sons by allowing him to keep two more hectares per such son.
The propertyless son gets no right to a cent of land on this score but the father is permitted to keep some more of his own for feeding this extra mouth.
If an unmarried daughter has her own land, this legislation does not deprive her any more than a similarly situated unmarried son.
Both are regarded as tenure holders.
The singular grievance of a chronic spinster vis a vis a similar bachelor may be that the father is allowed by section 5(3) to hold an extra two hectares only if the unmarried major is a son.
Neither the daughter nor the son gets any land in consequence and a normal parent will look after an unmarried daughter with an equal eye.
Legal injury can arise only if the daughter 's property is taken away while the son 's is retained or the daughter gets no share while the son gets one.
The legislation has not done either.
So, no tangible discrimination can be spun out.
Maybe, the legislature could have allowed the tenure holder to keep another two hectares of his on this basis of the existence of an unmarried adult daughter.
It may have grounds rooted in rural realities to do so.
The court may sympathize but cannot dictate that the land holder may keep more land because he has adult unmarried daughters.
That would be judicial legislation beyond permissible process.
The same perspicacious analysis salvages the provision regarding a wife.
True, section 3(17) makes the husband tenure holder even then the wife is the owner.
So long as the land is within the sanctioned limit it is retained as before without affecting ownership or enjoyment.
But where it is in excess, the compensation for the wives land, if taken away as surplus, is paid to her under Chapter III, And even in the choice of land, to declare surplus, the law, in section 12A, has taken meticulous care to protect the wife.
The husband being treated as tenure holder even when the wife is the owner is a legislative device for simplifying procedural dealings.
When all is said and done, married woman in our villages do need their husband 's services and speak through them in public places, except, hopefully in the secret ballot expressing their independent political choice.
Some of us may not be happy with the masculine flavour of this law but it is difficult to hold that rights of women are unequally treated, and so, the war for equal gender status has to be waged elsewhere.
Ideologically speaking, the legal system, true to the spirit of the Preamble and article 14, must entitle the Indian women to be equal in dignity, property and personality, with man.
It is wrong if the land reforms law denudes woman of her property.
If such be the provision, it may be unconstitutional because we cannot expect that "home is the girl 's prison and the woman 's work house" But it is not.
1175 It must be said in fairness, that the legislature must act on hard realities, not on glittering ideals which fail to work.
Nor can large landholders be allowed to outwit socially imperative land distribution by putting female discrimination as a mask.
There is no merit in these submissions of Sri Veda Vyas.
In the view we have taken, we need not discuss the soundness of the reasoning in the ruling in Sucha Singh vs State(1).
The High Court was right, if we may say so with respect, in its justification of the section when it observed: The subject of legislation is the person owning or holding land and not his or her children.
Section 5 provides for the measure of permissible are that a person with one or more adult sons will be allowed to select out of the area owned or held by him and his children, whether male or female, have not been given any right to make a selection for himself or herself.
It cannot.
therefore, be said that this section makes a discrimination between a son and a daughter in respect of his or her permissible area on the ground of sex alone.
The legislature is the best Judge to decide how much area should be left as permissible area with each owner or holder of land.
Insofar as no distinction between a male and a female holder or owner of the land has been made in respect of the permissible area in any given circumstances? there is no violation of Article 15 of the Constitution.
This section does not provide for any succession to the land; it only provides for the measure of the permissible area to be retained by every holder or owner of the land out of the area held or owned by him or her on the appointed day on the basis of the number of adult sons he or she has.
It is for the legislature to prescribe the measure of permissible area and no exception can be taken because only adult sons have been taken into consideration.
Shri Veda Vyas objected to the further observations of Tuli, J. It.
is evident that distinction between an adult son and an adult daughter has been made not only on the ground of sex but also for the reason that a daughter has to go to another family after her marriage in due course, marriage being a normal custom which is universally practised.
This 1176 is an institution of general prevalence which is the foundation of organised and civilised societies and communities.
Our rapidly changing times, when women after long domestic servitude, seek self expression, cannot forge new legal disabilities and call it legislative wisdom.
But, without assent or dissent, we may pass by these observations because no property right of women is taken away, and discrimination.
if any, is not inflicted on rights, but sentiments.
Shri Arvind Kumar, who followed, also made some persuasive points and seeming dents in the legislation when read in the light of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the Consolidation Act).
In general terms, the submission turned on the operation of the law relating to consolation of holdings.
It is a great pity that a benign agrarian concept abolition of fragmentation and promotion of consolidation of agricultural holdings has proved in practice to be a litigative treachery and opened up other vices.
The provision for appeals and revisions and the inevitable temptation of the vanquished to invoke article 226 and article 136 of the Constitution has paved the protracted way for improvident lay out on speculative litigation.
More farmers are cultivating litigation than land, thanks to the multi docket procedure in the concerned law.
Even so, we see no force in counsel 's contention which we may now state.
The thrust of his argument, omitting subsidiary submissions which we will take up presently, is that so long as consolidation proceedings under the sister statute (U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953) are under way, two consequences follow.
Firstly, all other legal proceedings including the ceiling proceedings must abate.
A notification under section 4 of the Consolidation Act has been issued in regard to many areas in the State.
Consolidation has been completed in most places but is still pending in some places.
Counsel 's argument is that once a notification under s.4 has been issued, section 5(2)(a) operates.
This latter provision states that every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land laying in the area, or, for declaration or ad judication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference of revision, shall, on an order being passed in that 1177 behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated; Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that on the issue of a notification under sub section (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated; Thus the ceiling proceeding has abated and surplus land cannot be taken from him.
This plea has only meretritious attraction and superficial plausibility as we will presently see.
The whole scheme of consolidation of holding is to restructure agrarian landscape of U.P. so as to promote better farming and economic holdings by eliminating fragmentation and organising consolidation.
No one is deprived of his land.
What happens is, his scattered bits are taken away and in lieu thereof a continuous conglomeration equal in value is allotted subject to minimal deduction for community use and better enjoyment.
Once this central idea is grasped, the grievance voiced by the petitioner becomes chimerical.
Counsel complains that the tenure holder will not be able to choose his land when consolidation proceedings are in an on going stage.
True, , whatever land belongs to him at that time, may or may not belong to him after the consolidation proceedings are completed.
Alternative allotments may be made and so the choice that he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose of surrendering surplus lands and preserving 'permissible holding ' may have only tentative value.
But this factor does not seriously prejudice the holder.
While he chooses the best at the given time the Consolidation officer will give him its equivalent when a new plot is given to him in the place of the old.
where is no diminution in the quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere substitution of scattered pieces with a consolidated plot.
The tenure holder may well exercise his option before the prescribed officer and if, later, the Consolidation officer takes away these lands, he will allot a real equivalent thereof to the tenure holder elsewhere.
There is no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange.
Chapter III of the Consolidation Act provides, in great detail, for equity and equality, compensation and other benefits when finalising the consolidation scheme.
Section 19(1) (b) ensure that 16 610 SCI/80 1178 "the valuation of plots allotted to a tenure holder subject to deductions, if any, made on account of contributions to public purposes under this Act is equal to the valuation of plots originally held by him.
Provided that, except with the permission of the Director of Consolidation, the area of the holding or holdings allotted to a tenure holder shall not differ from the area of his original holding or holdings by more then twenty five percent of the latter.
" When land ii contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that behalf in the event of illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate and revisory remedies are also provided.
On such exchange or transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of the consolidation scheme, the holding, upto the ceiling available to the tenure holder, will be converted into the new allotment under the consolidation scheme .
Thus, we see no basis in justice nor gross arbitrariness in the continuance of the land reforms proceedings even when consolidation proceedings are under way.
We are not all impressed with counsel 's citation of the ruling in Agricultural & Industrial Syndicate Ltd. vs State of UP and others,(l), particularly because there has been a significant amendment to section S subsequent thereto.
The law as it stood then was laid down by this Court in the above case; but precisely because of that decision an explanation has been added to section 5 of the Consolidation Act which reads thus: Explanation: For the purposes of subsection(2) a proceeding under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 or an uncontested proceeding under Sections 134 to 137 of the U.P. Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, shall not be deemed to be a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest, in any land.
The view of the Allahabad High Court in Kshetrapal Singh vs State of U.P.(2) (H.C.) is correct, and in effect negatives the submission of Shri Arvind Kumar that there should be a stay of ceiling proceedings pending completion of consolidation proceedings.
The head note in Kshetrapal Singh 's case (Supra) brings out the ratio and for brevity 's sake, we quote it; By adding the Explanation after sub section(2) of Section 5 of the Act a legal fiction has been created.
What is 1179 otherwise a proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land is deemed not to be such a proceeding.
That is the clear legislative intent behind the Explanation.
ordinarily an Explanation is intended to explain the scope of the main section and is not expected to enlarge or narrow down its scope but where the legislative intent clearly and unambiguously indicates an intention to do so, effect must be given to the legislative intent notwithstanding the fact that the legislature named that provision as an Explanation.
A feeble submission was made that there was time wise arbitrariness vitiating the statute in that various provisions in the Act were brought into force on random dates without any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporally angle, article 14.
It is true that neither the legislature nor the Government as its delegate can fix fanciful dates for effectuation of provisions affecting the rights or citizens.
Even so, a larger latitude is allowed to the State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come into effect.
Many imponderables may weigh with the State in choosing the date l) and when challenge is made years later, the factors which induced '7 the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time.
Parties cannot take advantage of this handicap and audaciously challenge every date of coming into force of every provision as capriciously picked out.
In the present case, s.6(1) (g) has been brought into force on 8.6.73, s.6(3) on 10.10.75, s.3(4) on 15.8.72, s.16 on 1.7.73 and s.(l) (e) on 24.1.71.
This last date which was perhaps the one which gave the learned Advocate General some puzzlement was chosen because on that date the election manifesto of the Congress Party in all the States announced a revised agrarian policy and that party was in power at the Union level and in most of the States.
Although a mere election manifesto cannot be the basis for fixation of a date, here the significance is deeper in that it was virtually the announcement of the political government of its pledge to the people that the agrarian policy would be revised accordingly.
The other dates mentioned above do not create any problem being rationally related to the date of a preceding ordinance or the date of introduction of the bill.
The details are not necessary except to encumber this judgment.
We would emphasise that the brief of the State when meeting constitutional challenges on the ground of arbitrariness must be a complete coverage, including an explanation for the date of enforcement of the provision impugned.
Court and counsel cannot dig up materials to explain fossil dates when long years later an enterprising litigant chooses to challenge.
1180 A few other minor infirmities were faintly mentioned but not argued at all or seriously, such as, for instance, the contention that section 38B of the Act which understandably excludes res judicata is challenged as violative of the basis structure of the Constitution and otherwise exceeds legislative competence.
We do not think there is need to dilate on every little point articulated by one or other of the numerous advocates who justify their writ petitions or civil appeals by formal expression of futile submissions.
We dismiss all the appeals and all the writ petitions and all the special leave petitions with costs one set in all the cases together which we quantify as Rs. 5,000/ .
S.R. Appeals and Petitions dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Dismissing the appeals and the Writ Petitions, the Court ^ HELD: (1).
It is fundamental that the nation 's Constitution is not kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review every season because it paralyses, by perennial suspense, all legislative and administrative action on vital issues deterred by the brooding interest of forensic blow up.
This, if permitted, may well be a kind of judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stake, or the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shake up.
The decision in Kesavananda Bharati 's case, therefore, upholding the vires of Article 31A in unequivocal terms binds the court on the simple score of stare decisis and the constitutional ground of Article 141.
Further, fatal flaws silenced by earlier rulings cannot survive after death because a decision does not lose its authority "merely because it was badly argued, inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned".
And none of these misfortunes can be imputed to Bharati 's case.
[1164 C G, 1165 C D] (2).
The sweep of Article 31A is wide and indubitably embraces legislation on land ceilings.
Equitable distribution of lands, annihilation of monopoly of ownership by imposition of ceiling and regeneration of the rural economy by diverse planning and strategies are covered by the armour of Article 31A. Article 31A repulses, therefore, all invasions on ceiling legislation armed with Articles 14, 19 and 31.
[1165 D E, 1166 D E] Ranjit Singh and ors.
vs State of Punjab and Ors.
; , State of Kerala and Anr.
vs The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. etc. ; , reiterated.
The decision in Maneka Gandhi 's case is no universal nostrum or cure all.
Nor can it be applicable to the land reform law which is in another domain of constitutional jurisprudence and quite apart from personal liberty in Article 21.
To contend that land reform law, if unreasonable violates Article 21 as expansively construed in Maneka Gandhi case is incorrect.
[1168 E G] (4).
Section 5(6) d the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 is fair, valid and not violative of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
There is no blanket ban by it but only qualified invalidation of certain sinister assignments etc.
There is nothing in this section which is morally wrong nor is such an embargo which comes into force only on a well recognised date not from an arbitrarily retrospective past constitutionally anathematic.
Article 19(1)(f) is not absolute in operation and is subject, under Article 19(6), to 1160 reasonable restrictions such as the one contained in Section 5(6).
Further it is perfectly open to the legislature as ancillary to its main policy to prevent activities which defeat the statutory purpose, to provide for invalidation of such action.
When the alienations are invalidated because they are made after a statutory date fixed with a purpose, there is sense in this prohibition.
Otherwise, all the lands would have been transferred and little would have been left by way of surplus.
[1169 A B, D, F G, 1170 C, E F] (5).
Articles 14 and 15 and the humane spirit of the Preamble rebel against the defacto denial of proprietory personhood or womanhood.
But this legal sentiment and jural value must not run riot and destroy the provisions which do not discriminate between man and woman qua man and woman but merely organise a scheme where life realism is legislatively pragmatised.
Such a scheme may marginally affect gender justice but does not abridge, wee bit, the rights of women.
If land holding and ceiling thereon are organised with the paramount purpose of maximizing surpluses without maiming women 's ownership, any plea of sex discrimination as a means to sabotage what is socially desirable measure cannot be permitted. [1173 D F] From a reading of Section 3(7) read with Section S(3) it is clear that no woman 's property is taken away any more than a man 's property.
Section 5(3) does not confer any property on an adult son nor withdraw any property from adult daughter.
Legal injury can arise only if the daughter 's property is taken away while the son 's is retained or the daughter gets no share while the son gets one.
The legislation has not done either.
[1171 G, 1173 F, H, 1174 C D] (6).
Section 3(17) of the Act is not discriminatory Land does not offend Articles 14 & 15 of the Constitution.
True, Section 3(17) makes the husband a tenure holder even when the wife is the owner.
This is a legislative device for simplifying dealings and cannot therefore be faulted.
[1174 E, F G] (7).
Neither ceiling proceedings abate nor taking surplus land from the tenure holder is barred under the provisions of Section 4 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 read with Section 5(2) of the Ceiling Act.
[1177 C] The whole scheme of consolidation of holdings is to restructure agrarian landscape of U.P. so as to promote better farming and economic holdings by 'eliminating fragmentation and organising consolidating.
No one is deprived of his land.
What happens is, his scattered bits are taken away and in lieu thereof a continuous conglomeration equal in value is allotted subject to minimal deduction for community use and better enjoyment.
Whatever land belongs to the tenure holder at the time when consolidation proceedings are in an on going stage, may or may not belong to him after the consolidation proceedings are completed.
Alternative allotments may be made and so the choice that he may make before the prescribed authority for the purpose of surrendering surplus lands and preserving 'permissible holding ' may have only tentative value.
But this factor does not seriously prejudice the holder.
While he chooses the best at the given time the Consolidation Officer will give him its equivalent when a new plot is given to him in tho place of the old.
There is no diminution in the quantum of land and quality of land since the object of consolidation is not deprivation but mere substituting of scattered pieces with a consolidated plot.
The tenure holder may well exercise his option before the prescribed officer and if, later, the Consolidation Officer takes away there lands, he will allot a real equivalent thereof to the tenure holder elsewhere.
There is no reduction or damage or other prejudice by this process of statutory exchange.
[1177 C G] 1161 When land is contributed for public purposes compensation is paid in that behalf, and in the event of illegal or unjust orders passed, appellate and revisory remedies are also provided.
On such exchange or transfer taking place, pursuant to the finalisation of the consolidation scheme, the holding, upto the ceiling available to the tenure holder, will be converted into the new allotment under the consolidation scheme.
Thus there is no basic injustice nor gross arbitrariness in the continuance of the land reforms proceedings even when consolidation proceedings are under way.
[1178 B D] Agricultural & Industrial Syndicate Ltd. vs State of U.P. and Ors., [1974] 1 S.C.R. 253, distinguished.
Khetarpal Singh vs State of U.P. (High Court) [1975] Recent Decisions p. 366, approved.
There is no time wise arbitrariness vitiating the statute in that various provisions in the Act were brought into force on random dates without any rhyme or reason, thus violating, from the temporally angle, Article 14.
It is true that neither the legislature nor the Government as its delegate can fix fanciful dates for effectuation of provisions affecting the rights of citizens.
Even so, a larger latitude is allowed to the State to notify the date on which a particular provision may come into effect.
Many imponderables may weigh with the State in choosing the date and when challenge is made years later, the factors which induced the choice of such dates may be buried under the debris of time.
Parties cannot take advantage of this handicap and audaciously challenge every date of coming into force of every provision as capriciously picked out.
[1179 B D]


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
14 32, 902, 879, 1130 32, 1121, 1172, 1215, 1201, 1127, 1128, 1222, 1224, 1223, 1275, 1129, 1523, 1539, 1280, 863, 1361, 1323, 1375, 1621, 1374, 1410, 1628, 2117, 1961, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920 & 2290 of 1978 3447 3450/79.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgments and order dated 13.10.1977 etc.
Of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 1872/77 etc.
AND WRIT PETITION Nos: 3973, 3998, 3836, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4210, 4263, 4317, 4318, 4414, 4256, 4537 and 4500 of 1978.
F. section Nariman, K. Krishna Rao and K. Rajendra Choudhary far the Appellants in CA Nos.
14 to 23, 25 29, 1223 1224 1628/78, 3447 and 3449/79.
A. Subba Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1126 & WP Nos.
3973, 4198, 4199, 4200, 4317, 4318 4210/78.
A. V. V. Nair for the Appellants in CA Nos.
1215, 1361, 2117, 1286 and W.P. No. 1374/78.
G. section Rama Rao for the Appellants in CA No. 1121 & Petitioners in WP Nos. 4256 and 3836/78.
Vepa Sarathi and B. Ranta Rao for the Appellants/Petitioners in CA Nos. 24, 30, 32, 1172, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1261, 1323 1275/ 78 and WP Nos.
4263, 4500 4537/78.
section Venkata Reddy and G. Narsimulu for the Appellants in CA Nos. 31, 902, 879, 1130 32, 1410, 1621, 1917 20, 1961/78 & 1373/78.
A. K. Ganguli for the Appellants in CAs 1222 and 863/78.
R A. V. Rangam for the Petitioners in WP No. 3998/78.
section Balakrishan for the Petitioners in WP 4414/78.
V.S. Desai and A. Subba Rao for the Applicant/Intervener.
1147 K. K. Venugopal Addl.
, Ram Chandra Reddy Adv.
A Genl.
A. P. and B. Parthasarthy for the appearing respondents.
BHAGWATI, J.
These appeals by special leave and the writ petitions represent a last but desperate attempt by the; class of land holders in Andhra Pradesh to defeat an agrarian reform legislation enacted by the State or the benefit of the weaker sections of community.
It is indeed a matter of regret that a statute intended to strike at concentration of land in the hands of a few and to act as a great equaliser by reducing inequality in holding of land between the haves and the have nots should have practically remained unimplemented for a period of over seven years.
Unfortunately, this is the common fate of much of our social welfare legislation.
We can boast of some of the finest legislative measures calculated to ameliorate the socio economic conditions of the poor and the deprived and to reach social and economic justice to them, but regret ably, a large part of such legislation has remained merely on paper, and the benefits of such legislation have not reached the common man to any appreciable extent.
The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Andhra Pradesh Act) which is challenged in the present appeals was enacted by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 1st January 1973.
Soon after its enactment, the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court on various grounds, but a full Bench of the High Court negatived the challenge and held the Andhra Pradesh Act to be constitutionally valid.
Though this judgment was delivered by the High Court as early as 11th April, 1973, no effective steps for implementation of the Andhra Pradesh Act could be taken, since the Andhra Pradesh Act merely remained on the statute book and for some inexplicable reason, it was.
not brought into force until 1st January 1975.
Even after the Andhra Pradesh Act was brought into force, not much enthusiasm was shown be the Government in implementing its provisions and in the mean while, it was found necessary to amend the legislation and hence the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act 1977 was enacted with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 and by this amending Act certain amendments were made which included inter alia the introduction of section 41A.
We shall presently refer to the relevant provisions of the amended Andhra Pradesh Act, but before we do so, it is necessary to point out that as soon as the amending Act was passed, another round 1148 of litigation was started by the landholders by filing writ petitions in the High Court challenging once again the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
There were several grounds on which the constitutional validity was challenged but the main ground was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act), the Andhra Pradesh Act had become void and inoperative.
Certain other questions involving the interpretation of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were also raised in some of the writ petitions, but they too need not be mentioned here, because in the course of the hearing we made it clear to the parties that we would examine only the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act and other questions could be agitated by the landholders in the appeals filed by them against the orders determining surplus land.
It was pointed out to us that some of the landholders had not filed appeals within the prescribed time and grave injustice would therefore result to them if these question, were not decided by us.
But the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State family stated before us that if appeals have been filed beyond time or are filed within a month of disposal of these appeals, the delay in filing the appeals would be condoned.
Turning to the constitutional challenge which in those days was required to be decided by a full Bench of 5 Judges of the High Court, it was held that the enactment of the Central Act did not have the effect of invalidating the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of "land" in the Andhra Pradesh Act and the definition of "vacant land" in the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held not applicable to "vacant land" falling within the ambit of the Central Act.
The High Court accordingly granted a declaration to this effect to the landholders, but save for this limited relief, dismissed the writ petitions in all other respects, since in the opinion of the High Court there was no substance in any of the other contentions raised on behalf of the landholders.
The landholders thereupon preferred the present appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court.
The principal contention urged on behalf of the landholders in support of the appeals was that the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.
This contention was based on two resolutions, one dated 7th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council and the other dated 8th April 1972 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly under clause (1) of Article 1149 252 of the Constitution.
This Article carves out an exception derogating from the normal distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States under Article 246 and is in the following terms: article 252(1) : If it appears to the legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided in Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State be which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or, where there are two Houses, by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State.
(2) An Act so passed by Parliament may be amend ed or repealed by an Act of Parliament passed or adopted in like manner but shall not, as respects any State to which it applies, be amended or repealed by an Act of the Legislature of that State.
" The effect of passing of resolutions be the Houses of Legislature of two or more States under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise power to legislate with respect to a matter, except as provided in Articles 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with respect to such matter and the State Legislatures passing the resolutions cease to have power to make law relating to.
that matter.
The resolutions operate as abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can then legislate with respect to it.
It is as if such matter is lifted out of List II and placed in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
This would seem to be quite clear on a plain natural construction of the language of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 252 and no authority.
is necessary in support of it, but if any was wanted, it may be found in the decision of a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Union of India vs V. V. Chaudhary in fact the same Bench as the present one where an identical view has been taken.
It was in pursuance of clause (l) of this Article that a Resolution 1150 was passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council on 7th April 1972 to the effect that "the imposition of a ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters connected therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State of Madhya Pradesh by Parliament by law and an identical resolution in the same terms was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature Assembly.
Similar resolutions were also passed by the Houses of Legislature of some other States, though there is no material to show as to when they were passed.
It was however common ground that at best some of these resolutions were passed prior to the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
The result was that at the date when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all connected, ancillary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.
Now the Andhra Pradesh Act, as its long title shows, was enacted to consolidate and damned the law relating to the fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and taking over of surplus land and matter connected therewith.
On its plain terms, it applies to land situate in any part of Andhra Pradesh.
Section 3(f) creates an artificial unit called 'family unit ' by defining it as follows: "Sec. 3(f) "family unit" means (i) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses, such individual, the spouse or spouses and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters; if any; (ii) in the case of an individual who has no spouse such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters; (iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not remarried, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not; and (iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarried minor daughters.
Explanation Where a minor son is married, his wife and their offspring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of the family unit of which the minor son is a member: 1151 The term "land" is defined in section 3(j) to mean "land which A is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture, or for purposes ancillary thereto, including horticulture, forest land, pasture land, waste land, plantation and tope; and includes land deemed to be agricultural land under this Act".
Explanation I to this definition enacts a rebuttable presumption that land held under Ryotwari settlement shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be 'land ' under the Andhra Pradesh Act.
Section 3(o) defines 'person ' as including inter alia an individual and a family unit.
Section 10 is the key section which imposes ceiling on the holding of land by providing that if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to surrender the land held in excess.
If therefore an individual or a family unit holds land in excess of the ceiling area, the excess would have to be surrendered to the State Government.
But the question then arises, what is the ceiling area above which a person cannot hold land.
The answer is provided by section 4 which reads as follows: "Sec.
4(1) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an & extent of land equal to one standard holding.
(2) The ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding plus an additional extent of one fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings.
(3) The ceiling area in the case of every individual who is not a member of a family unit, and in the case of any other person shall be an extent of land equal to one standard holding.
Explanation: In the case of a family unit, the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit".
It will thus be seen that the ceiling area in the case of an individual who is not a member of a family unit is equivalent to one standard holding and so also in the case of a family unit with not more than five members, the ceiling area is the same, but if the family unit consists of more than five members, the ceiling area would stand increased by one fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of the family unit, subject however to the maximum limit of 2 standard holdings.
When the ceiling area is applied to the holding of a 1152 family unit, the Explanation requires that the lands held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing, the holding of the family unit.
Where, therefore, there in a family unit consisting of father, mother and three minor sons or daughters, the lands held by all these persons would have to be clubbed together and then the ceiling area applied to the aggregate holding.
There is no distinction made in the definition of 'family unit ' between a divided minor son and an undivided minor son.
Both stand on the same footing and a divided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor son, and consequently the lands held by a divided minor son would have to be included in the holding of the family unit for the purpose of application of the ceiling area.
Section 7 invalidates certain transfers of land and provides for inclusion of such lands in the holding of an individual or a family unit.
Then there is a provision in section 8 for furnishing a declaration in respect of his holding by every person whose land exceeds the ceiling area and the Tribunal is required by section 9 to hold an enquiry.
and pass an order determining the land held in excess of the ceiling area.
Such land has to be surrendered by the person holding the land and on such surrender, the Revenue Divisional officer is empowered under section 11 to take possession of the land which thereupon vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
Section 14 provides inter alia that the land vested in the State Government shall be allotted for use as house sites for agricultural labourers.
village artisans or other poor persons owning no houses or house sites or transferred to the weaker sections of the people dependent on agriculture for purposes of agriculture/or for purposes ancillary thereto in such manner as may be prescribed by the Rules, subject to a proviso that as far as practicable not less than one half of the total extent of land so allotted or transferred shall be allotted or transferred to the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
Section 15 enacts a provision for payment of compensation for land vested in the State Government at the rates specified in the Second Schedule.
These are the only relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act which need to be referred to for the purpose of the present appeals.
We may now turn to examine the relevant provisions of the Central Act.
This Act was enacted by Parliament pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by the resolutions passed by the Houses of legislature of several States including the State of Andhra Pradesh under clause (1) of Article 252.
It received the assent of the President on 17th February 1 976 and as its long title and recital shows it was enacted to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant 1153 land is urban agglomerations for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to sub serve the common good.
We shall refer to a few material provisions of this Act.
Section 2(a) (i) defines "appointed day" to mean in relation to any State to which this Act applies in the first instance which includes the State of Andhra Pradesh the date of introduction of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Bill, 1976 in Parliament.
This was the Bill which culminated in the Act and it was introduced in Parliament on 28th January 1976.
Consequently, this date would be the 'appointed day ' for the purpose of applicability of the Act to the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The definition of "family" in section 2 (f) is materially in the same terms as the definition of "family unit" in the Andhra Pradesh Act.
Then follow two important definitions which needed to be set out in extenso.
The word "person" is defined in section 2(i) as including inter alia an 'individual ' and the 'family '.
Section 2(n) defines "urban agglomeration" in the following terms: "Sec.2(n) (A) in relation to any State of Union territory specified in column (1) of Schedule 1, means (i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof; and (ii) any other area which the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, having regard to its location, population (population being more than one lakh) and such other relevant factors as the circumstance of the case may require, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be an urban agglomeration and any agglomeration so declared shall be deemed to belong to category D in that Schedule and the peripheral area there for shall be one kilometre; (B) xx xx xx xx xx" The term 'urban land ' is defined in section 2(o) to mean: Sec.
2(o)(i): any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan; or 1154 (ii) in a case where there is no master plan, or where the master plan does not refer to any land as urban land, any land within the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any area included within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called), a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and town committee, a small town Committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, but does not include any such land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause and clause (q), (A) "agriculture" includes horticulture, but does not include (i) raising of grass, (ii) dairy farming, (iii) poultry farming, (iv) breeding of live stock, and (v) such cultivation, or the growing of such plant, as may be prescribed.
(B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture; (C) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture; " Section 2(q) gives a definition of "vacant land" by providing that "vacant land" means, subject to certain exceptions which are not material, land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.
Section 3 is the rebuttal section which imposes ceiling on holding of 'vacant land ' by providing that: "Sec. 3.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from the commencement of this Act, no person shall be n entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub section (2) of section 1." 1155 Section 4 divides urban agglomeration into categories A, B, C and D lays down different ceiling limits for these different categories.
Then there is a provision in section 5 invalidating in certain circumstances the transfer of vacant land made at any time during the period commencing on the appointed day and ending with the commencement of the Act.
The procedure for determining "vacant land" held in excess of the ceiling limit is laid down in sections 6 to 9 and section 10 enacts a provision for acquisition of such land held in excess of such limit.
Section 23 provides for disposal of vacant land acquired under the Act and it empowers the State Government to allot such vacant land to "any person for any purpose relating to or in connection with any industry or for providing residential accommodation of such type as may be approved by the State Government to the employees of any industry.
It will thus be seen that the Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection includes horticulture, but does not include raising of grass, dairy farming, poultry farming, breeding live stock and cultivation or the growing of such plants as may be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue or land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture.
Now, as we have already pointed out above, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature had, at the time when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, no power to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property.
That power stood transferred to parliament and as a first step towards the eventual imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every other description, the Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other than land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban agglomeration.
The argument of the landholders was that the Andhra Pradesh Act sought to impose ceiling on land in the whole of Andhra Pradesh including land situate in urban agglomeration and since the concept of agglomeration defined in section ' 2(n) of the Central Act was an expensive concept and any area with an existing or future population of more than one lakh could be notified to be an urban agglomeration, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and void as being outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.
This argument plausible though it may seem, in our opinion, is unsustainable.
It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside the area of its legislative competence, because it 1156 cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.
But the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in section 2(n) (A) (ii) and there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglomerations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban agglomerations.
It is, however, difficult to see how the Andhra Pradesh Act could be said to be outside the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature in so far as land situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned.
We accept that any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than one lakh could be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act but until it is so notified it would not be an urban agglomeration and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within such area.
No sooner such area is notified to be an urban agglomeration, the Central Act would apply in relation to land situate within such area, but until that happens the Andhra Pradesh Act would continue to be applicable to determine the ceiling on holding of land.
It may be noticed that the Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to this date the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling area was required to be determined and if there was any surplus it was to be surrendered to the State Government It must therefore follow that in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n) (A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be liable to be determined as on 1st January 1975 under the Andhra Pradesh Act and only land within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him.
It is only in respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to be an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act.
We fail to see how it can at all be contended that merely because an area may possibly in the future be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would cease to have competence to legislate with respect to ceiling on land situate in such area even though it is not an urban agglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
Undoubtedly, when an area is notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii), the Central Act would apply to land situate in such area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh 1157 Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding of land falling within the definition in section 3(j) of that Act and situate within such area.
It is therefore not possible to uphold the contention of the landholders that the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside the area of legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.
It is only in respect of land situate within the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n) (A) (i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Pradesh Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in respect of land situate in all the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The next contention urged on behalf of the landholders was that on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act, a divided minor son was not liable to be included in "family unit" as defined in section 3(f) of that Act.
The argument was that sub section (2) of section 7 did not invalidate all partitions of joint family property but struck only against partitions effected on or before 2nd May 1972 and thus by necessary implication recognised the validity of partitions affected prior to that date.
If therefore a partition was effected prior to 2nd May 1972 and under that partition a minor son become divided from his father and mother, the divided minor son could not be included in the family unit and his property could not be clubbed with that of his father and mother, because otherwise it would amount to invalidation of the partition though section 7, sub section (2) clearly recognised such partition as valid.
This argument is clearly fallacious in that it fails to give due effect to the definition of family unit in section 3(f) and the provisions of section 4.
It is undoubtedly true that a partition effected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invalidated by the Andhra Pradesh Act and therefore any property which comes to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be liable to be required as part of joint family property.
But under the definition of family unit in section 3(f) the divided minor son would clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section 4 his land whether self acquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with the land held by the other members of the family unit.
The land obtained by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with the lands of other members of the family unit not because the partition is invalid but because the land held by him howsoever acquired is liable to be clubbed together with the lands of others for the purpose of applying the ceiling area to the family unit.
We do not therefore see how a divided minor son can be excluded from the family unit.
That would be flying in the face of sections 3(f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
1158 Then a contention was advanced on behalf of the landholders that the definition of "family unit" was violative of Article 14, of the Constitution in that it made unjust discrimination between a minor son and the major son by including minor son in the "family unit" while excluding a major son from it.
This contention has already been dealt with by learned brother Tulzapurkar, J. in the judgment delivered by him today in the Haryana Land Ceiling matters and we need not repeat what he had already stated there while repelling this contention.
Moreover, this contention isl no longer open to the landholders since the Andhra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A.
We do not therefore see any substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the landholders and we accordingly dismiss the appeals and the writ petitions with costs.
S.R. Appeals & Petitions dismissed.

summary:
The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act I of 1973 was enacted on 1st of January 1973.
Though a Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh when challenged by some of the land holders held by its judgment dated 11th April, 1973, the Act to be constitutionally valid; yet the said Act was not brought into force till 1st January 1975.
In ]977, the Act was amended with retrospective effect from 1st January 1975 by the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Amendment Act 1977.
As soon ns the Amending Act was passed, the land holders once again filed writ petitions in the High Court, challenging the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
The main ground, inter alia, was that by reason of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Central Act, 1976, the Andhra Prdesh Act had become void and inoperative.
A Full Bench of five judges of the High Court held that the enactment of the Central Act did not have the effect of invalidating the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act, but since the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act were repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act so far as concerned land satisfying both the definition of "land" in the Andhra Pradesh Act and the definition of "vacant land", in the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Act was held not applicable to "vacant lands" falling within the ambit of the Central Act.
ave for this limited relief, the High Court dismissed the writ petitions in all other respects.
Hence the appeals by the land holders after obtaining special leave from this Court.
Writ Petitions were also filed directly in this Court by some of the land holders.
Dismissing the appeals, and writ petitions, the Court ^ HELD :1.
Article 246 of the Constitution of India carves out an exception derogating from the normal distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States.
The effect of passing of resolutions by the Houses of Legislature of two or more States under this constitutional provision is that Parliament which has otherwise no power to legislate with respect to a matter, 1144 except as provided in Articles 249 and 250, becomes entitled to legislate with regard to such matter and the State Legislature passing the resolutions cease to have power to make law relating to that matter.
The resolutions operate as abdication or surrender of the powers of the State Legislatures with respect to the matter which is the subject of the resolutions and such matter is placed entirely in the hands of Parliament and Parliament alone can then legislate with respect to each.
It is as if such matter is lifted out of list II and placed in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
A plain natural construction of the language of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 252 makes this position clear.
It was in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 352 that a resolution was passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council on 7th April, 1972 to the effect that "the imposition of ceiling of urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all matters concerned therewith or ancillary and incidental thereto should be regulated in the State or Andhra Pradesh by Parliament by law" and on identical resolution in the same terms was passed on the next day by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly.
The result was that at the date when the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, Parliament alone was competent to legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable property and acquisition of such property in excess of the ceiling and all connected, ancillary or incidental matters, and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature stood denuded of its power to legislate on that subject.
[1149 A, E H, 1150 A C] Union of India vs V. B. Choudhary, 19791 3 SCR 802; followed.
Under the powers thus transferred Parliament enacted the Central Act with a view to imposing ceiling on vacant land, other land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an urban.
agglomeration.
The Central Act imposes a ceiling on holding of land in urban agglomeration other than land which is mainly used for the purpose of agriculture and agriculture in this connection includes horticulture, but does not include raising of grass, daily farming, poultry farming, breeding live stock and such cultivation or the growing of such plants as may be prescribed by the Rules, and, moreover, in order to fall within the exclusion, the land must be entered in the revenue cr land record before the appointed day as for the purpose of agriculture and must also not have been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture.
[119 C F] 3.
It is no doubt true that if the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on land falling within an urban agglomeration, it would be outside rh art of its legislative competence, because it cannot provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable property.
But the only urban agglomerations in the State of Andhra Pradesh recognised in the Central Act were those referred to in Section 2(n) (A) (i) and there can be no doubt that so far as these urban agglomerations are concerned, it was not within the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature to provide for imposition of ceiling on land situate within these urban agglomerations.
But, the Andhra Pradesh Act is not out side the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative in so far as lands situate in the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh are concerned.
Any other area in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of more than one lakh could be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act but until it is so notified would not be an urban agglomeration and the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would have legislative competence to provide for imposition of ceiling on 1145 land situate within such area.
No sooner such area is notified to be an urban agglomeration, the Central Act would apply in relation to land situate within such area, but until that happens the Andhra Pradesh Act would continue to be applicable to determine the ceiling on holding of land.
The Andhra Pradesh Act came into force on 1st January 1975 and it was with reference to this date that the surplus holding of land in excess of the ceiling area was required to be determined and if there was any surplus it was to be surrendered to the State Government.
Therefore, in an area other than that comprised in the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n)(A) (i), land held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be liable to be determined as on 1st January 1975 under the Andhra Pradesh Act and only land within the ceiling area will be allowed to remain with him.
It is only in respect of land remaining with a person whether an individual or a family after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would apply if and when the area in question is notified to be an urban agglomeration under section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central Act.
[1155 G H, 1156 A G] Merely because an area may possibly in the future be notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n) (A) (ii) of the Central Act, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature would not cease to have competence to legislate with respect to ceiling on land situate in such area even though it is not an urban agglomeration at the date of the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
Undoubtedly, when an area is notified as an urban agglomeration under section 2(n) (A) (ii), the Central Act would apply to land situate in such area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application but by that time the Andhra Pradesh Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on holding of land falling within the definition in section 3(j) of that Act and situate within such area.
Therefore, the whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act is neither ultravires nor void as being outside the area of legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.
It is only in respect of land situate within the urban agglomerations referred to in section 2(n) (A)(i) of the Central Act that the Andhra Pradesh Act would not apply but it would be fully applicable in respect of land situate in all the other areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
[1156 G X 1157 A B] 4.
A divided minor cannot be excluded from the 'family unit ' as defined in section 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
That would be flying in the face of sections 3(f) and 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Act.
It is true that a partition affected prior to 2nd May 1972 is not invalidated by the Andhra Pradesh Act and therefore any property which comes to the share of a divided minor son would in law belong to him and would not be liable to be regarded as part of joint family property.
But under the definition of family unit in section 2(f) the divided minor son would clearly be included in the family unit and by reason of section 4 his land whether self acquired or obtained on partition would be liable to be clubbed with the land held by the other members of the family unit.
The land obtained by the divided minor son on partition would be liable to be aggregated with the lands of other members of the family unit not because the partition is invalid but because the land held by him howsoever acquired is liable to be clubbed together with the lands of others for the purpose of applying the ceiling area to the family unit.
[1157 C, F HI 14 610 SCI/80 1146 5.
The Andhra Pradesh Act is admittedly an agrarian reform legislation and it is protected against challenge on the ground of infraction of Article 14, 19 and 31 by the protective umbrella of Article 31A. [1158 B C] 6.
The definition of 'family unit ' is nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution by including ' a minor son in the family unit while excluding a major son from it.
[1158 A] Seth Nand Lal vs State of Haryana.
[1980] 3 SCR p. 1181 followed.