judgement:
nch of two members in their reasoned order pointed out what they perceived to be an error of law in the earlier decision and stated the points for the President to make a, reference to a larger Bench.
Accordingly the Bench of two members acted within their power is stating the points of law which required clarification and the President acted equally within the bounds of his power in constituting a larger Bench to hear and decide those points.
[795E; 796C] & CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3955 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.12.1989 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 1060 of 1987.
Dr. V. Gauri Shanker, C.V. Subba Rao, section Rajappa and M. Chandershekharan (N.P.) for the Appellants.
G.L. Sanghi.
Raju Ramachandran, Dhruv Mehta and R.K. Sanghi for the Respondent.
792 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMMEN, J.
Special Leave is granted.
This appeal by the Union of India arises from the Judg ment dated 7.12.1989 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1060 of 1987 setting aside Orders dated 22.10.1986 and 4.3.1987.
The former order was made by a Bench of two mem bers of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called the 'Tribunal ') and the latter order was made by the President of the Tribunal.
By their Order dated 22.10.1986, the Bench of two members of the Tribunal stated that they doubted the correctness of an earlier decision of a Bench of three members of the Tribunal in Bakelite Hylam Ltd. Bombay & Anr.
vs Collector of Cus toms, Bombay & Anr., and directed that the case of the present respondent, Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., be placed before the President of the Tribunal for referring it to a larger Bench of the Tribunal.
The President by his Order dated 4.3.
1987 referred the case to a larger Bench of five members.
These two orders were struck down by the High Court stating that the Bench of two members ought to have followed the earlier decision of the larger Bench of 3 Judges and a reference of the case to a still larger Bench was contrary to judicial precedent and judicial discipline.
In Bakelite Hylam, (supra) a Bench of three members had held that the goods in question fell under Tariff Item 84.60 as claimed by the importer in the Bills of Entry.
In the present case, the importer claimed in its Bills of Entry that the goods imported by it fell under Tariff Item 84.60.
But the customs authorities rejected the contention of the importer and classified the goods under Tariff Item 73.15(2).
The importer appealed to the Collector of Customs, but without success.
In its second appeal before the Bench of two members, the importer relied upon the earlier deci sion in Bakelite Hylam (supra) and contended that an identi cal classification ought to have been adopted by the Customs Authorities for identical goods.
The Bench of two members, however, referred the case to the President of the Tribunal for referring the same to a larger Bench.
The order of the Bench of two members and that of the President have been struck down by the High Court by the impugned judgment for the reasons stated above.
Mr. V. Gauri Shanker, appearing for the appellant Union of India, submits that section 129 C of the contains 793 express provisions enabling the President of the Tribunal to constitute larger Benches to resolve conflicts in opinion arising between members of a Bench or between Benches of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has ample powers to regulate its own procedure, apart from the express provisions of the statute in that behalf.
Counsel contends that the Tribunal has inherent or incidental or ancillary powers to effectuate the statutory powers expressly granted to it.
Counsel submits that the statute must be so construed as to make the confer ment of power efficacious and meaningful.
To deny the power of a Bench of two members to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision and to refer the case to the President for being heard by a larger Bench is to fetter the jurisdiction expressly vested in the Tribunal and thus stifle the growth of law evolving from the decisions of the Tribunal exercis ing judicial powers like a Court, albeit within the statuto ry limits of its jurisdiction.
Mr. G.L. Sanghi, appearing for the respondent (the importer) submits that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute.
Its jurisdiction is limited to the specific powers conferred by the statute.
It has no inherent jurisdiction and its powers are not plenary and are limited to the ex press provisions contained in the statute.
While the powers of a civil court are plenary and unlimited unless expressly curtailed by statute, the powers of a tribunal are the result of express grant and cannot exceed the bounds limited by the constituting statute.
In the present case the powers of the Tribunal are expressly specified in the and those powers, counsel says, do not contain any provision enabling the President to refer a case to a larger Bench whenever a doubt about an earlier decision is ex pressed by another Bench of the same Tribunal.
According to Mr. Sanghi, the Bench should have followed the earlier decision even if the members doubted its correctness, and should have left it to this Court to correct the error, if any.
The Tribunal is constituted by the Central Government under section 129 of the Act.
One of the members of the Tribunal is appointed by the Central Government as its President.
Section 129 C says that the powers and functions of the Tribunal may be exercised and discharged by Benches constituted by the President from amongst its members.
Subject to certain exceptions, a Bench shall consist of one judicial member and one technical member [section 129c(2)].
Sub section (5) of section 129 C provides for a reference of a case by the President in the event of differences in opinion arising amongst members on any point.
This sub section reads: 794 "(5) If the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ and the case shall be referred by the President for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal, and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members of the Appellate Tribunal who have heard the case including those who first heard it: Provided that where the members of a Special Bench are equally divided, the point or points on which they differ shall be decided by the President.
" Sub section (6) Section 129C says that the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate its own procedure.
It reads: "(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of the Benches thereof in all matters arising out of the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its functions, including the places at which the Benches shall hold their sitting.
" Sub sections (7) and (8) of this Section provide that the Tribunal shall, for certain specific purposes, be deemed to be a civil court.
There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction.
It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute.
Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers.
Certain powers are recog nised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised, the powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited.
Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and im pliedly granted.
The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all 795 such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective.
As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, (eleventh edition) "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution.
" See also: Income Tax Officer, Camanore vs M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, ; , 819.
It is true that a Bench of two members must not lightly disregard the decision of another Bench of the same Tribunal on an identical question.
This is particularly true when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger Bench.
The ration ale of this rule is the need for continuity, certainty and predictability in the administration of justice.
Persons affected by decisions of Tribunals or Courts have a right to expect that those exercising judicial functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases on identical matters.
Classification of particular goods adopted in earlier decisions must not be lightly disregarded in subsequent decisions, lest such judicial inconsistency should shake public confidence in the adminis tration of justice.
It is, however, equally true that it is vital to the administration of justice that those exercising judicial power must have the necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings being to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous decision in the earlier case.
In such circum stances, it is but natural and reasonable and indeed effica cious that the case is referred to a larger Bench.
This is what was done by the Bench of two members who in their reasoned order pointed out what they perceived to be an error of law in the earlier decision and stated the points for the President to make a reference to a larger Bench.
That the President has ample power to refer a case to a larger Bench is not in doubt in view of sub section (5) of section 129 C, which we have set out above.
That provision clearly says that in the event of the members of a Bench differing in opinion on any point, and the members are equally divided, the case shall be referred to the President for hearing on any such point by one or more of the members of the Tribunal, and such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members.
It is true that sub section (5) refers to difference of opinion arising amongst members of a Bench in a particular case, and not specifically where the members of a Bench doubt the correctness of an earlier decision.
However, section 129 C confers power of reference upon the 796 President.
That power should be construed to be wide enough to enable the President to make a reference where members of a Bench find themselves unable to decide a case according to What they perceive to be the correct law and fact because of an impediment arising from an earlier decision with which they cannot honestly agree.
In such cases, it is necessary for the healthy functioning of the Tribunal that the Presi dent should have the requisite authority to refer the case to a larger Bench.
That is a power which is implied in the express grant authorising the President to constitute Bench es of the Tribunal for effective and expeditious discharge of its functions.
In our view, the Bench of two members acted within their power in stating the points of law which required clarifica tion and the President acted equally within the bounds of his power in constituting larger Bench to hear and decide those points.
In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.
The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the High Court.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent imported certain goods and claimed in its Bills of Entry that the imported goods fell under Tariff Item No. 84.60.
The Customs Authorities rejected the claim by holding that the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item No. 73.15(2).
The respondents preferred an appeal before the Collector of Customs which was also dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent filed a second appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal con tending that in view of the earlier decision of a Bench of three members of the Tribunal in Bakelite Hylam Ltd. Bombay E.L.T. 240 an identical classification ought to have been adopted by the Customs authorities for identical goods.
By its order dated 22.10.1986 a Bench of two members of the Tribunal stated that they doubted the correctness of the earlier decision of a Bench of the three members of the Tribunal and they referred the case to the President of the Tribunal for constituting a larger Bench.
By its order dated 4.3.1987 the President of the Tribunal referred the case to a larger Bench of five members.
The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the orders of the Bench of two members and that of the President of the Tribunal, which struck down both the orders by holding that the Bench of two members ought to have followed the earlier decision of the larger Bench of 3 judges and a reference of the case to a still larger Bench was contrary to judicial precedent and judicial discipline.
In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the Union of India that Section 129 C of the empowers the Presi 790 dent of the Tribunal to constitute larger Benches to resolve conflicts in opinion arising between members of a Bench or between Benches of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has ample powers to regulate its own procedure, apart from the express provisions of the statute in that behalf.
On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the Tribunal is a creature of the Statute.
Its jurisdiction is limited to the specific powers conferred by the statute.
It has no inherent jurisdiction and its powers are not plenary and are limited to the express provisions contained in the statute.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a. Court within the limits of its jurisdiction.
It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute.
Further more, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers.
Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised.
[794F G] 1.1 Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution.
[795A] Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh edition and Income Tax Officer, Cannanote vs M.K. Mohammad Kunhi, 15, referred to. 2.
It is true that sub section (5) refers to difference of opinion arising amongst members of a Bench in a particu lar case, and not specifically where the members of a Bench doubt the correctness of an earlier decision.
However, section 129 C confers power of reference upon the President.
That power should be construed to be wide enough to enable the President to make a reference where members of a Bench find themselves unable to decide a case according to what they perceive to be the correct law and fact because of an impediment arising from an earlier decision with which they cannot honestly agree.
In such cases, it is necessary for the healthy functioning of the Tribunal that the President should have the requisite authority to refer the case to a larger 791 Bench.
That is a power which is implied in the express grant authorising the President to constitute Benches of the Tribunal for effective and expeditious discharge of its functions.
[795H; 796A B] 2.1 It is true that a Bench of two members must not lightly disregard the decision of another Bench of the same Tribunal on an identical question.
This is particularly true when the earlier decision is rendered by a larger Bench.
The rationale of this rule is the need for continuity, certainty and predictability in the administration of justice.
Persons affected by decisions of Tribunals or Courts have a right to expect that those exercising judicial functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier cases on identical matters.
Classification of particular goods adopted in earlier decisions must not be lightly disregarded in subsequent decisions, lest such judicial inconsistency should shake public confidence in the adminis tration of justice.
It is, however, equally true that it is vital to the administration of justice that those exercising judicial power must have the necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings bring to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous decision in the earlier case.
In such circum stances, it is but natural and reasonable and indeed effica cious that the case is referred to a larger Bench.
[795B E]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3006 of 1981.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.7.1981 of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in C.W.P. No. 94 of 1981.
M.V. Goswami for the Appellant.
Nemo for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J.
"Nautor land" under Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968 (hereinafter called 'Rules ') means the right to utilize with the sanction of the competent authority, waste land owned by the Government outside the towns, outside the reserved and demarcated protected forests, and outside such other areas as may be notified from time to time by the State Government.
Gopinder Singh applied for the grant of nautor land measuring 14 bighas 12 biswas situated in village Kanal for cultivation.
The Revenue Assistant Chopal vide his order dated June 29, 1972 sanctioned nautor land measuring 11 bighas 1 biswas situated in village Kanal to him on payment of Rs.552.50 as Nazarana.
The Forest Department filed an appeal against the said order before the Deputy Commissioner Simla which was accepted and the order of the Revenue As sistant Chopal sanctioning nautor land in favour of Gopinder Singh was set aside.
Gopinder Singh filed further appeal to Divisional Com missioner, Himachal Pradesh at Simla who accepted the same and vide his order dated September 9, 1974 restored the grant of nautor land to Gopinder Singh.
The Forest Depart ment filed revision petition before the Financial Commis sioner (Revenue Appeals) Himachal Pradesh who accepted the revision petition and set aside the order dated September 9, 1974 of the Divisional Commissioner sanctioning nautor land to Gopinder Singh.
He further ordered that the amount of Nazarana Should.
be refunded to Gopinder Singh and the land resumed to the State.
The Financial Commissioner accepted the appeal on the following two grounds: 799 (1) Gopinder Singh felled the trees on the land without waiting for necessary approval of the Divisional Forest Officer and as such he took the law in his own hands.
(2) Being a teacher in a Government school drawing month ly emoluments of more than Rs.650 p.m. his economic condi tion was reasonably good and as such he was not eligible for the grant of nautor land under the Rules.
Against the order of the Financial Commissioner Gopinder Singh filed Civil Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Simla which was dismissed in limine on July 28, 1981.
This appeal by special leave is by appellant Gopinder Singh against the orders of the Financial Commissioner and of the High Court.
Rule 7 of the Rules lays down the categories of persons eligible for the grant of nautor land.
The said rule is as under: "Eligibility for nautor land.
Save for the widow and the children of a member of an armed force or semi armed force, who has laid down his life for the country (whose widow and children will be eligible for grant anywhere within the Tehsil subject to the conditions mentioned in the Wajib ul arj in respect of the areas where the land applied for is situated) no one who is not the resident in the estate in which the land applied for is situate, shall be eligible for the grant.
Every resident of the estate in which the land applied for lies will be eligible in the following order of preference: (a) Such persons who have less than ten bighas of land, whether as owners, or as tenants, or as lessees, either individually or collectively, or have an income of less than Rs.2,000 per annum from all sources including lands.
Provid ed that in this category a dependent of one who has laid down his life for the defence of the country shall get preference over his counterparts; (b) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes applicants; (c) The dependants of those who have laid down their lives for the defence of the country.
Service for the defence of 800 the country will mean service in a uniformed force as well as in the capacity of civilian, so long as the death occurs on a front, be it military or civil; (d) Serving personnel in the armed forces and Ex servicemen; (e) Panchayats, and (f) others; Provided that a bona fide landless resident of Spite shall be eligible for the grant of land in Nautor within the spiti Sub Division.
" The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied on first part of clause (a) of Rule 7 to show that the appellant was having less than 10 bighas of land and as such as was eligible for the grant of nautor land.
He fur ther contended that even though he may be having an income of more than Rs.2,000 per annum as a teacher, he being eligible under the first part, the second part of clause (a) of Rule 7 is not attracted in his case.
According to him first and the second part of clause (a) of Rule 7 are inde pendent to each other and there being 'or ' in between the two parts these have to be read disjunctively.
He contends that 'or ' has to be given its ordinary meaning and it cannot be read as 'and '.
We have carefully examined the provisions of clause (a) of Rule 7 reproduced above.
The clause reads "such persons who have less than 10 bighas of land . or have an income of less than 2,000 per annum from all sources including lands.
" There is thus inherent evidence in the clause itself to show that the two parts cannot be read disjunctively.
The second part makes it clear that an income of less than Rs.2,000 per annum should be from all sources including lands.
It is thus obvious that a person who has got less than 10 bighas of land but has an income of more than Rs.2,000 from the said land, is not eligible for allotment of nautor land under clause (a).
Even otherwise if we inter pret the clause the way learned counsel for the appellant wants us to do it would produce absurd result.
A person have two bighas of land but otherwise earning Rs.20,000 per annum would be eligible for allotment of nautor land if we accept the appellant 's interpretation.
The object of granting nautor land under the rules is to help poor and unprovided for residents of Himachal Pradesh.
Considering the nature, scope and the clear intention of the framers of the Rules it is 801 necessary to read the word "or" in between the first and the second part of clause (a) as "and".
The appellant 's income was admittedly more than Rs.2,000 per annum and as such his claim for nautor land was rightly rejected.
We, therefore, do not agree with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Clause (a) of Rule 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968 makes every resident of the estate having less than ten bighas of land or having an income of less than Rs.2,000 per annum from all sources including lands, eligi ble for grant of land in nautor.
The grant of nautor land to the appellant teacher was set aside by the Financial Commissioner in revision.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine.
In the appeal by special leave it was contended for the appellant that the word 'or ' occurring in between the first and the second part of cl.
(a) of Rule 7 has to be given its ordinary meaning and it cannot be read as 'and ' that the two parts of the clause were, therefore, independent of each other and had to be read disjunctively, and that he being eligible under the first part, even though having an income of more than Rs.2,000 per annum as a teacher, the second part of cl.
(a) was not attracted.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.
A person who has got less than 10 bighas of land but has an income of more than Rs.2,000 per annum from all sources including the said land is not eligible for allotment of nautor land under cl.
(a) of Rule 7 of the Himachal Pradesh Nautor Land Rules, 1968.
[800G] 2.
The object of granting nautor land under the Rules is to help poor and unprovided for residents of the State.
Considering the nature, scope and the clear intention of the framers of the Rules it is necessary to read the word 'or ' in between the first and the second part of clause (a) as 'and '.
The two parts cannot, therefore, be read disjunctive ly.
The second part makes it clear that an income of less than Rs.2,000 per annum should be from all sources including lands.
[800H; 801A] 798 3.
The appellant 's income in the instant case being more than Rs.2,000 per annum he was not entitled to the grant of nautor land.
[801A]


judgement:
No. 847 of 1987.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Rajinder Sachar, K.R. Nagaraja, P.K. Rao, R.S. Hegde, V.A. Babu and R. Rajappa for the Petitioners.
K.N. Bhat, Vijay K. Verma and Ms. Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J.
This Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the Syndicate Bank Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Employees Association representing the interest of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Employees of the Syndicate Bank all over India as well as by three other Assistant Managers of the Syndicate Bank.
The case as set up in the petition is that Group 'A ' Officers posts which are Class I posts contain different grades called Junior Management Grade Scale I, Middle Man agement Grade Scale II, Middle Management Grade Scale III and like this upto Grade Scale VII.
The criteria for promo tions from Junior Management Grade Scale I to Middle Manage ment Grade Scale II and so on is based on a promotion policy dated 17.9.1985 flamed in this regard by the Bank.
According to the petitioners the Syndicate Bank is a Nationalised Bank owned and controlled by the Central Government.
All the policy decisions and major internal administration are regulated and governed by and under Rules issued by the Central Government from time to time.
In order to implement the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India grant ing benefit to members belonging to Scheduled 716 Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Central Government evolved the concept of quota system in the ratio of 15% and 7 1/2% reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes re spectively both at the time of recruitment as well as at the time of promotions in all Government organisations.
It has been further alleged by the Petitioners that 14 leading banks of the country were nationalised in the year 1969 and the Government ought to have extended the said policy of reservation in the banking sector also w.e.f. 1969.
However, the reservation policy was extended to the banking industry initially in the year 1972, but that re mained restricted in respect of appointments made by direct recruitment only.
Later on by a D.O.
Letter No. 10/24/74 SCT (B) dated 31.12.1977 the Central Government called upon the banks to implement the reservation policy in the matter of promotions posts also.
In the matter of promotions within the Officers cadre, the respondent bank did not maintain any roster and did not follow the reservation policy on an erroneous impression that the reservation in promotional cadres made through selection method is barred.
The peti tioners in this regard have submitted that by an Officer Memorandum issued by the Home Ministry as long back as on 26.3.1970 clearly provided reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Officers for their promotion within Class I posts and also in cases of Officers who drew a basic pay of Rs.2,000 per month or less.
Subsequently Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms also issued an O.M. No. 1/10/ 74 Esstt (SCT) dated 23.12.1974 to all Ministries on.
the same lines as contained in the earlier O.M. issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 26th March, 1970.
The Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) issued a Circular dated 30th May, 1981 addressed to all the 26 Nationalised Banks existing at that time in the matter of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in respect of promo tion.
In the aforesaid letter after making a reference to the Department 's letter D.O. No. 10/24/75 SCT (B) dated 31.12.1977 Ministry of Home Affairs O.M. No. 1/9/69 Esstt (SCT) dated 26.3.1970 and Department of Personnel and Admin istrative Reforms O.M. No. 1/10/74 Esstt (SCT) dated 23.12.74 it was stated that as per the above Government orders there is no reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 'Promotion by Selection ' within the Officers cadre.
It was further stated in the above circular that certain concessions and facilities are to be provided to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Officers in order to improve their chances for selection to the Higher categories of posts in the Officers cadre in accordance with the orders contained in the 717 aforesaid O.Ms of Ministry of Home Affairs.
It was further stated that it has been decided that the concessions men tioned in Para 2 of Home Ministry 's Office Memorandum dated 26.3.1970 would be available to the SC/ST Officers in Public sector Bank/Financial Institutions in 'Promotions by Selec tions ' to posts within the Officers cadre upto Scale III.
All the banks were requested to implement the Government instructions contained in the Officer Memorandums of Minis try of Home Affairs and Department of Personnel and Adminis trative Reforms dated 26.3.1970 and 23.12.1974 respectively in the existing scheme of promotions with such procedural modifications as may be necessary.
The case of the petitioners further is that the Central Government wrongly and erroneously interpreted the above circulars and in taking the view that there was no reserva tion in the promotional posts within the officers cadre.
In identical circumstances the Ministry of Steel and Mines in a letter dated April 8, 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Steel Authority of India Limited and letter dated August 19, 1982 from the Steel Authority of India to the Chief Person nel Manager Bokaro Steel Plant took the view that the Sched uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes personnel were not entitled to the benefit of reservation in the matter of promotion of selection posts within Group 'A '.
The Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad came before this Court by special leave challenging the above view taken by the Steel Authority of India and the Union of India.
This court in Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad vs Union of India & Ors., ; granted special leave.
This Court held in the above case that a close perusal of the directive and in particular paragraph 9 which dealt with the concessions to employees of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions by selection method makes it abundantly clear that the rule of reservation is also applicable to promotions by selection to posts within Group 'A ' which carry an ultimate salary of Rs.2250 per month or less but the procedure is slightly different than the case of other posts.
It was further held in the above case that while the rule of reservation applies to promotions by selection to posts within group 'A ' carry ing a salary of Rs.2250 per month or less, it is prescribed that only those officers belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes will be considered for promotion who are senior be within the zone of consideration.
Thereafter a Select List depending upon the number of vacancies would be drawn up in which also those officers belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would be included who are not considered unfit for promotion.
Their position in the Select List would be that assigned to them by the 718 departmental Promotion Committee on the basis of the record of service.
In other words their inclusion in the Select List would not give them seniority, merely by virtue of their belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes over other officer 's placed above them in he Select List made by Departmental Promotion Committee.
The court bus quashed the List dated April 8, 1982 and August 19, 1982 and directed the respondents to give effect to paragraph 9 of the Presidential directive w.e.f.
the date of the directive.
Subsequently a Miscellaneous Petition No. 3637/86 was also filed in view of a misunderstanding of the above Judgment by the Authorities.
The Court by order dated 21st January, 1987 deciding the above miscellaneous petition and made the following observations: "We wish to clarify the position by stating that the Sched uled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Officers who are senior enough to be within zone of consideration for promotion should be included in the Select List against the vacancies available to the members of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes accord ing to the rosters, provided they are not considered unfit for promotion.
Paragraph 2 of the Presidential Directive should be strictly adhered to and effect shall be given on the basis of scales of pay that obtained prior to 1975 as mentioned in that paragraph.
The officers promoted as a consequence of our order will be entitled to be paid salary and allowances from the respective dates with effect from which they should have been promoted." After the above decision of the Supreme Court which applied in all force to the case of the present petitioners, a meeting took place between the representatives of Syndi cate Bank SC/ST employees Association and the Management of Syndicate Bank on 16th and 17th April, 1986.
In the afore said meeting the representatives of the management were fully convinced with the stand taken by the representatives of Syndicate Bank SC and ST employees Association and after agreeing in principle, they assured to take up the matter very strongly again with the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Banking Division) for their approval.
The peti tioners thereafter made frantic efforts and also submitted representations but no relief was granted to the petition ers.
It may be mentioned that Minister of State for Finance, Government of India in his letter dated November 22, 1986 addressed to Shri Banwarilal Bairva Member of Parliament clearly admitted as regards the reservation for SC/ST em ployees in Indian Overseas Bank that he had checked up his reply to the Lok Sabha 719 starred question No. 342 answered on 5th August.
1986 and had" ' got further clarifications from the bank of the subject.
It was further stated in the above letter as fol lows: "In respect of promotions.
the bank was maintaining rosters for only such category of posts to which the reservations were being applied by the bank.
Since as per the Brochure on reservations for SCs/STs are available in promotions within the officers cadre only if they are based on seniority, and the bank considered the method of promotions followed by it as one based on selection.
it did not consider maintenance of rosters necessary.
During the course of discussions between the officials of the bank and Banking Division, it was revealed that the procedure followed by the bank for effecting promotions within the officers cadre was the one falling within the categorisation of seniority.
The bank was immediately advised to maintain rosters even for these promotions within the Officers cadre and to provide for reservations for the SCs/STs.
The bank has accepted its mistake and has already agreed to provide for reservations and also to calculate the backlog from 1978 when the reser vations in promotions were first introduced in the banks.
" It may be also mentioned that the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) vide letter No. F. No. 10/72/86 SCT (B) dated 28.11.1986 addressed to all the nationalised banks also clarified the position in regard to reservations for SC/ST in promotions as under: "It may be recalled that instructions were issued by the Government on 3.5.1980 advising bank to apply the provisions of carry forward interchange, and lapsing of vacancies in promotions also because of certain factors even though strictly speaking these provisions are not applicable to promotions by selection.
In doing so, the posts filled by selection method were specifically categorised as those where promotions are made on the basis of a written examina tion followed by interview and/or on the basis of the inter view.
On the other hand promotions based on the assessment of the confidential reports of the officers were classified as those based on seniority, subject to fitness.
The banks are, therefore, requested to review the method 720 of promotions followed by them and ensure that wherever the rosters are to be maintained for determining the number of vacancies reserved for SC/ST.
This is done scrupulously.
The results of the review may be intimated to the Government by 15th December, 1986.
While intimating the information, the methodology adopted for effecting promotions from various cadres/scales should be specifically intimated".
The grievances of the petitioners is that despite the aforesaid unequivocal directions from the Government, the bank failed to make reservations for the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes employees.
The petitioners made representations to the respondents in this regard in which it was reiterated that after decision of the Supreme Court in Bihar State Harijan Kalvan Parishad vs Union Of India & Ors., (supra) and further order of clarification dated 21st January, 1987, the petitioners were entitled to the same treatment.
However the grievances of the petitioners were not redressed and a view was taken by authorities of the respondent/bank that there was no direction for the Govern ment of India for prescribing reservation policy for offi cers cadre and that they were following the selection method or promotion in the case of Officers posts.
The Union of India flied a counter affidavit contesting the stand taken by the petitioners.
So far as the bank is con cerned they did not any separate reply in detail but took the stand that the Syndicate banks was a Nationalised bank and was under the Administrative control of the Government of India, Banking Division as such the bank is guided in the discharge of its functions by any directions issued by B anking Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of India from one to time.
Reference was made to Regulation 17(1) according to which promotions to all grades of officers in the Bank were required to be made in accordance with the policy laid down by the Board from to time having regard to the guidelines of the Government, if any.
in view of these circumstances it was stated in the counter affidavit that they fully adopt all the submissions of fact and law made by the Government of India in its counter affidavit.
We have heard Mr. R. Sachar, Learned counsel for the peti tioner.
K.N. Bhat, for the Syndicate Bank and Mr. R. Rajap pa, for the Union of India.
It may be stated at the outset that though the union of India in its reply had taken several grounds for contesting the petition, but the Learned Counsel appearing for the Union of 721 India conceded before us and made a statement that he was not pressing the grounds taken in the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India and they would abide by any directions given by this Hon 'ble Court.
Mr. Bhat appearing on behalf of the Bank also submitted that the Bank was bound by the decisions taken by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Banking Division and the Bank was not at fault in not granting relief to the petitioners in as much as the Government of India was not clear in its policy of reserva tion.
The attitude of the Government of India is clearly discernible from its counter affidavit filed in the present case.
It was thus prayed that this Hon 'ble Court should not hold the Bank responsible for not granting an appropriate relief to the petitioners at its own end and for dragging the petitioners unnecessarily in this litigation.
Mr. Sachar contended that the Ministry of State for Finance, Government of India in his letter dated November 22, 1986 addressed to Shri Banwari Lal Bairva Member of Parliament made it clear that during the course of discus sions between the officials of the bank and banking division regarding reservations for SC ST employees of the Indian Overseas Bank, it was revealed that the procedure followed by the bank for effecting promotions, within the officers cadre was the one falling within the categorisation of seniority.
The bank was immediately advised to maintain rosters even for these promotions within the officers cadre and to provide for reservations for the SCs STs.
It was further mentioned in the above letter that the bank accepted its mistake and had already agreed to provide for reserva tions and also to calculate the backlog from 1978 when the reservations in promotions were first introduced in the banks.
In another letter issued by the Banking division of the Ministry of Finance dated 28.11:86 addressed to the Chairmen and Managing Directors of 20 nationalised banks it was mentioned as under: "It may be recalled that instructions were issued by the Government on 3.5.80 advising banks to apply the provisions of carry forward, interchange, and lapsing of vacancies in promotions also because of certain factors even though strictly speaking these provisions are not applicable to promotions by selection.
In doing so, the posts filled 'by selection method were specifically categorised as those where promotions are made on the basis of a written examina tion followed by interview and/or on the basis of the inter view.
On the other hand promotions based on the 722 assessment of the confidential reports of the officers were classified as those based on seniority subject to fitness.
" The banks were, therefore, requested to review the method of promotions followed by them and ensure that wher ever the rosters are to be maintained for determining the number of vacancies reserved for SC/ST, this be done scrupu lously.
Mr. Sachar brought to our notice the promotion policy in respect of officers of the Syndicate Bank issued on 17.9.85 annexed with the writ petition as Annexure L at point number 3 follows: 3. "The Promotion Policy identifies the following four factors as relevant for ascertaining the suitability of officers for promotion from one scale to another: (a) Seniority for promotions upto SMGS IV (b) Educational and Professional Qualifications for movement to Middle Management Grade Scale II only.
(c) Performance in the grade/scale.
(d) Potential as identified in the interview for movement to Middle Management Grade Scale III and above".
It was thus submitted that from a reading of the two letters dated 22.11.86 and 28.11.86 together with the promo tion policy issued by the Syndicate Bank it was clear that for promotions from one scale to another upto SMG IV was based on seniority and the Syndicate Bank as such ought to have made promotions upto SMGS IV by giving benefit of reservation to SC/STs in the employment of the bank.
It was also contended by Mr. Sachar that upto 1979, the Syndicate Bank made promotions of officers from one scale to another purely on the basis of officers completing five years of service as on 31st December of previous year.
No promotions were made in 1979, 1980 and 1981.
Since 1982 the promotions within the officers cadre were being made on the basis of the following policy: The minimum eligibility service and factor weightage shall be as follows: 723 Movement Minimum Points Points Maximum Maximum from eligibility for the points points service as senio educa for for on 31st rity tional perfor potential December & Profe mance as iden of Previous ssional in the fied in Year qualifi scale the inter cation view JMGS to 7 years in 60 10 30 Nil MMGS II JMGS I MMGS II 5 years in 50 30 20 to MMGS MMGS II III MMGS III 5 years in 20 50 30 to SMGS MMGS III IV SMGS IV 3 years in 60 40 to TEGS V SMGS IV SMGS V to 2 years in 60 40 TEGS VI SMGS V TEGS VI to 3 years in 60 40 TEGS VII TEGS VI It was contended that from the above policy, it would be clear that there was no written test and interview for promotions from Gr.
I to Gr.
II and that 60% of the marks had been fixed for seniority.
The above policy further makes it clear that the seniority was considered a predominant factor.
The Government of India in its office memorandum dated 27.11.72 had provided for reservation of 15% and 71/2% for SC and ST candidates respectively, and the Government of India Banking Division, had made the reservation policy applicable in the case of promotional posts also vide its D.O. Letter No. 10/24/74 SCT (B) dated 31.12.77.
Thus, there remains no ambiguity and the respondent bank ought to have given benefit of reservation policy from 1st January, 1978 to the members of SCs/STs in the cadre of officers.
Mr. 724 Sachar also submitted that as already mentioned above in the matter of employees of the Indian Overseas Bank rosters for calculating the vacancies reserved for the SCs/STs had been applied in the case of promotions within the officers cadre.
It was further argued that the principle of contemporanea ex position i.e. interpreting the statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contem porary authority, has to be applied in case of employees of the Syndicate Bank also while effecting promotions within the officers cadre.
Reliance in support of the above conten tion is placed on Desh Bandhu Gupta & Company & Others vs Delhi Stock Exchange Assn.
Ltd.; , We find no force in the above contention of Mr. Sachat.
A perusal of the promotion policy goes to show that for the purpose of promotions in the cader of officers from JMGS to MMGS II and from MMGS II to MMGS III and then upto scale VII, is not based on seniority alone.
Apart from the points for seniority other factors based on selective process were also important and as such it cannot be held that such promotions in the higher scale were based solely on seniori ty.
A perusal of the criteria laid down in the promotion policy already extracted above clearly goes to show that apart from points for seniority, points for educational and professional qualification, points for performance in the scale and points for potential as identified in the inter view have also to be assessed while making appointment by promotion.
Merely because in the case of promotion from JMGS to MMGS II points for seniority being mentioned as 60, it cannot be said that such promotion in scale II may be con sidered as promotion otherwise than by the method of selec tion.
In our view unless the promotion is based on seniority alone and other factors based on merit such as educational and professional qualifications, performance in the scale, written examination or interview have no material bearing it cannot be considered as a promotion based on seniority.
A perusal of the policy shows that it is a hybrid system of promotion in which upon scale IV points are given for sen iority as well as for other factors also which are based on a sort of selection process depending upon the educational qualifications, performance in the scale and interview.
While in the case of promotion from scale IV to scale VII there are no points given for seniority at all.
Thus taking in view the entire scheme of promotion policy, we think that promotions in the officers cadre from JMGS I to Scale VII shall be considered as promotions on selection basis.
Howev er the rule of reservation for SCs/STs will apply to ap pointments made by promotion on selection basis, subject to a procedure somewhat different from usual procedure adopted in filling up 725 posts reserved for SCs and STs on selection basis alone for appointments to be made by direct recruitment.
Mr. Sachar then submitted that in case the above policy of promotion is not considered as based on seniority, or otherwise than by selection, the petitioners are to be governed by the principles already laid down in Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad vs Union of India & Ors., (supra).
It was contended that in identical case though relating to employees of Steel Authority of India Ltd., this Court interpreted paragraph 9 of the Presidential directive in the case of promotions within group 'A ' which provided as under: "In promotions by selection to posts within Group 'A ' which carry an ultimate salary of Rs.2250 per month, or less, the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe officers, who are senior enough in the zone of consideration for promotion so as to be within the number of vacancies for which the Select List has to be drawn up, would be included in that list provided they are not considered unfit for promotion.
Their position in the select list would, however be the same as assigned to them by the Departmental Promotion Committee on the basis of their record of service.
They would not be given, for this purpose one grading higher than the grading otherwise as signable to them on the basis of their record of service".
It was held in the above case that a close perusal of the directive and in particular paragraph 9 which deals with "concessions to employees of SC/ST in promotions by selec tion methods" 'makes it abundantly clear that the rule of reservation is also applicable to promotion by selection to posts within group 'A ' which carry ultimate salary of Rs.2250 per month or less but that the procedure is slightly different than in the case of other posts.
We find force in this alternative submission made by Mr. Sachat.
Even though the promotional posts are based on selection method, the rule of reservation will apply to posts within group 'A ' and the benefit of reservation policy to members of SC and ST cannot be denied on the ground that promotional posts are to be filled by method of selection.
We find no distinction in the case of employees in the officers group in JMGS I of the Bank from the officers falling in group 'A ' under the Steel Authority of India Ltd., for the purpose of applying reservation policy.
Gov ernment of India committed a clear mistake in 726 not applying the principle already decided in Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad 's case (supra) to the employees of the Syndicate Bank and in not giving a clear direction in this regard to the management of Syndicate Bank.
There can be no manner of doubt that the management of the Syndicate Bank was not at fault as they were bound by the instructions and policy laid down by the Banking division of the Finance Ministry of the Government of India and in the absence of a clear direction from the Government of India, it was not possible for them to grant relief to the SC/ST employees of the bank.
As already mentioned above the Union of India had wrongly taken a contrary stand in its counter filed to the present petition, and clearly in derogation to the principle already decided in the case of Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad, (supra) by this Court.
In the result this petition is allowed.
The orders of the respondents dated 15th June, 1987 and 25th June, 1987 are declared as illegal.
It is further decided that though group 'A ' posts are selection posts still the reservation policy is applicable to such posts and the respondents are directed to compute the backlog of untilled reserved quota available to the SC/ST officers in the promotional posts with effect from 1.1.
1978, the date of introduction of reservation policy in the respondent bank.
The respondents are further directed to grant promotion to the SC/ST employ ees of the Syndicate Bank with all consequential benefits of salary and allowances from the respective dates w.e.f. which they should have been promoted, after applying the roster system in their favour.
We grant three months ' time to carry out these directions.
The petitioners would be entitled to costs to be paid by the respondent Union of India.
R.N.J. Petition allowed.

summary:
The Syndicate Bank Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Employees Associated representing the interests of SC/ST employees throughout the country and three Assistant Manag ers of the Bank have filed this petition under article 32 of the constitution of India.
Their case is as follows: That Group 'A ' Officers posts are class I posts with Grade Scale I to Grade Scale VII.
Criteria for promotion from Grade I to the next Grade and onwards is regulated by a promotion policy dated 17.9.1985.
Being a nationalised Bank all policy decisions are controlled and governed by rules framed by the Central Government from time to time.
In order to implement the principles enshrined in the Constitution of granting benefit of members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the Government has evolved the policy of reservation for them in the ratio of 5% and 7 1/2% respectively both at the time of initial recruitment as well as at the time of promo tions in all government establishments.
Though this policy was extended to the Banking Industry in 1972 it remained restricted to appointments by direct recruitment only.
Later the Central Govt.
by its D.C. letter dated 31.12.1977 ad dressed to all the nationalised banks required them to implement the reservation policy to promotional posts also.
But the respondent bank did not follow the policy within the Officers cadre on the mistaken impression that the reserva tion in promotional cadres through selection is barred.
To this the petitioners submitted that the Home Ministry 's O.M. issued as early as on 26.3.1970 clearly provided 714 reservations for SC & ST Officers ' promotion within class I posts including officers drawing a basic pay of Rs.2,000 per month or less.
This was later followed by O.M. dated 23.12.1974 issued by the department of Personnel and Admin istrative Reforms to all the Ministries on the same lines.
However the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic affairs (Banking Division) issued a circular dated 30.5.1981 to all the nationalised banks that there is no reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 'Promotion by Selection ' within the officers cadre; that the concessions to SC & ST employees mentioned in Home Ministry 's O.M. dated 26.3.1970 would be available to them in ' Promotion by Selection ' to posts within the officers cadre upto scale III only and all the banks were required to implement instruc tions contained in Home Ministry 's O.Ms.
dated 26.3.1970 and 23.12.1974 with such modifications as may be necessary in the light of the circular dated 30.5.1981.
The petitioners have contended that the Central Government wrongly and erroneously interpreted these circulars in taking the view that there was no reservation in the promotional posts within the officers cadre.
Finally they say that despite the unequivocal directions from the Govt.
of India, Ministry of Finance contained in its letter dated 28.11.1986 to all the nationalised banks clarifying the position in regard to reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for promotions and the decision of this Court in Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad vs Union of India & Ors., which applied in all force to the case of the petitioners, the Respondent Bank failed to make reservations within the officers cadre and continues to follow the selection method of promotion which has lead to the filing of this Petition.
Allowing the Writ Petition, this Court, HELD: Even though the promotion posts are based on selection method, the rule of reservation will supply to posts within group 'A ' and the benefit of reservation policy to members of SC and ST cannot be denied on the ground that promotional posts are to be filled by method of selection.
Government of India committed a clear mistake in not apply ing the principle already decided in Bihar State Harijan Kalyan Parishad 's case to the Syndicate Bank and in not giving it a clear direction this regard.
[725G H; 726A] There can be no manner of doubt that the management of the Syndicate Bank was not at fault as they were bound by the instructions and policy laid down by the government of India and in the absence of a clear direction from the Government it was not possible for them to grant relief to the SC/ST employees of the bank.
[726B] 715 Though Group 'A ' posts were selection posts still the reservation policy is applicable to such posts and the respondents are directed to compute the backlog of unfilled reserved quota available to SC/ST officers in the promotion al posts with effect from 1.1.1978, the date of introduction of reservation policy in the respondent bank.
The respond ents are further directed to grant promotion to the SC/ST employees of the Syndicate Bank with all consequential benefits of salary and allowances from the respective dates they should have been promoted, after applying the roster system in their favour.
[726D E] Bihar State Harijan Kalval Parishad vs Union of India & Ors. ; , followed.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1407 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.12.1983 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 2978 of 1981.
G. Ramaswamy and section Srinivasan for the Appellant.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
Applications were invited by the Regional Transport Authority, Pudukkottai (in short 'the R.T.A. ') for grant of one stage carriage permit on the route, Pudukkot tai Kottaipattinam, the total length of the route being 70 kms.
There were in all 15 applicants including the appel lant, S.V. Sivaswami Servai, and respondent No. 1, Hafez Motor Transport (firm).
On 26.10.1979, the R.T.A. took up the case of all the applicants for consideration.
The R.T.A. rejected the application of respondent No. 1 and some other applicants on the only ground that each of them had been granted one other permit in the same sitting and, therefore, the R.T.A. did not deem it fit to consider their claim for grant of the permit.
Out of the remaining applicants who were allotted equal marks, the R.T.A. found the appellant more suitable for the grant.
Accordingly, the R.T.A. granted the permit to the appellant for a period of three years on 26.10.1979.
The respondent No. 1 and some others, feeling aggrieved by the R.T.A. 's Order in appellant 's favour, preferred the appeals to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (in short 'the S.T.A.T. ').
By the Order dated 5.9.1981, the S.T.A.T. set aside the R.T.A. 's Order granting, the permit to the appellant and granted the permit in favour of respondent No. 1.
This led to two civil revi sion petitions in the High Court of Madras (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Court '), one by appellant and the other by another unsuccessful applicant.
The High Court, by an interim Order dated 22.9.1981, stayed operation of the S.T.A.T. 's Order and directed that the appellant as well as respondent No. 1 be allowed to operate on the route.
Ulti mately, the High Court dismissed 805 both the revision petitions by its Order dated 1.12.1983.
The appellant filed a petition for grant of special leave on 7.12.1983 which was allowed giving rise to this appeal.
By virtue of the interim Order of this Court, the situation existing during pendency of the revision in the High Court has been continued with the result that the appellant as well as respondent No. 1 have been continuing to operate on the route throughout obviously on account of renewal being granted to them from time to time because of this Court 's interim Order.
The result is that the permit granted in October 1979 for three years expired long back and yet not merely one of these claimants for the permit, but both of them have been operating on the route all these years.
It is obvious that the grant of permit by the R.T.A. to the appellant refusing to consider the claim of respondent No. 1 and some other applicants on merits solely on the ground that they had been granted one other permit in the same sitting is clearly untenable.
The grant of a permit for another route to the respondent No. 1 and some others could only be a relevant circumstance while assessing the compara tive merits of all the applicants, but by itself it could not be decisive or sufficient to refuse consideration Of their claim.
The S.T.A.T. would have been justified in interfering with the R.T.A. 's Order on this ground and either remanding the matter to the R.T.A. or considering the same itself on merits.
The S.T.A.T. missed this aspect, even though it made a comparison of the merits of all the appli cants.
Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned counsel for the appellant showed that the S.T.A.T. has committed several errors in making the comparison which include a misreading of the past operational record described as 'history sheet ' of the rival claimants.
The High Court, while deciding the revision petitions, has also not proceeded on the correct basis.
Shri A.T.M. Sampath, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 made an attempt initially to support the S.T.A.T. 's Order granting the permit to the respondent No. 1 which was upheld by the High Court.
However, after some arguments, both counsel made a common request to remand the matter to the R.T.A. for a fresh decision on merits taking into account the comparative merits of all the applicants.
They also requested that in view of the remand to the R.T.A. for a fresh decision on merits, no observations need be made herein on the comparative merits of the claimants or the merits of the rival contentions initially advanced to us.
We are of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case, this would be the appropriate course to adopt.
We have, however, some difficulty in accepting the other common request made by both the learned counsel.
Both sides agreed that there is necessity for two permits on the route and, therefore, we may direct that both 806 parties, who have been operating on the route by Orders of the High Court or this Court, should be allowed to ply their stage carriages on the route.
Reliance is placed by them on M. Chinnaswarny vs
Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) Ltd., wherein a similar Order was made on the basis of an agreement of both the sides.
The Order made in this case is a brief order based entirely on the agreement of the parties, the relevant portion of which is as under: "It is represented by Shri M.K. Ramamurthi appearing for the appellant that from about 1960, for the last 16 years, both the parties had been plying their stage carriages on the said route.
Although the permit to be granted was only one, but by orders of court or other authority both the parties had been allowed to ply their buses.
It seems to be so obvious that in public interest if two stage carriages have been plying on the route for the last 16 years there is no reason to confine it to one.
Both sides agree that there is necessity for two permits on the route.
In that view we consider the dispute to be academic.
We direct that the status quo of both parties being allowed to ply their stage carriages on the route taking appropriate permits from the authorities concerned will continue.
With this direction, the appeal is dismissed.
" It was stated at the Bar that this decision was followed in Civil Appeal No. 1133 of 1970 decided on 9.12.1981 wherein the Order made is as under: "We have heard learned counsel for the parties and it seems to us that having regard to the particular circumstances of this case, the order should be that which was passed by this Court in M. Chinnaswamy vs M/s. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 2095.
During the pendency of the appeal in this Court, this Court made an order on April 21, 1970, directing that the appellant and respondent No. 1 should be permitted to ply their stage carriages on the route, and ever since the order of 1970 these two stage carriages have been plying continuously under permits which have been renewed from time to time under the .
There is every justification for permitting the present situation to continue.
In the circumstances, we direct that the status quo shall continue and both the parties will be allowed to ply their stage 807 carriages in accordance with law under appropriate permits issued in their favour pursuant to the interim order dated April 21, 1970." Recently, a similar Order has been passed in Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1980 decided on 13.7.1990 which reads as under: "The authorities concerned will consider the case of the parties herein for grant of permit in accordance with law and also in accordance with the directions in the decision of this Court in M. Chinnaswamy vs M/s. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) Ltd., reported in AIR 1977 SC 2095.
In the meantime, status quo as on today will continue.
Both the parties will ply their vehicles on the route in question.
Counsel for both the parties are present here and they have no objection to the order passed above.
The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
No costs.
" With respect, we are unable to accept this common re quest made to us in the present case.
It is obvious from the above quoted orders on which the common request is based that in none of them, any point of law was considered or decided and the Order permitting both the claimants to operate on the route, even though the permit to be granted was only one, was made without adverting to the legal impli cations of such an Order.
In the first place, grant of a permit is to be made primarily with reference to the object of serving the interests of the general public and it cannot be treated as a dispute relating to grant of a permit be tween the rival claimants only.
It is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of conflicting interests of private individuals alone It is, therefore, not a matter which can be decided merely on the basis of an agreement between the two rival claimants who alone out of several claimants remain in the lis at this stage.
The question of grant of permit is to be decided primarily by the R.T.A. having regard primarily to the interests of the general public and other prescribed relevant factors.
That apart, under Section 47(3) of the , the R.T.A. is first required to determine the number of stage carriages for the route and then to grant permits according to that determina tion made earlier.
Grant of any permit in excess thereof was not permissible without first making a fresh determination and increasing the number, if necessary.
It is, therefore, obvious that an order of this kind cannot be made unless the grant of a permit to both the rival claimants would be within the limit fixed by 808 the R.T.A. at the relevant time.
There is nothing in any of these above quoted orders to indicate that this aspect was even adverted to or that there was material to indicate that the consent order so made was within.
the limit fixed by the R.T.A. If at all the indication is to the contrary that a permit which could be granted was for plying only one stage carriage on the route whereas the consent order made had the effect of permitting two stage carriages instead of one.
Moreover.
if the claimants had the benefit of plying their stage carriages for several years on the basis of interim orders of the Court or other authorities long after the period of the permit had expired, that does not appear to us to be a valid reason for perpetuating that act and confining the grant only to the litigants before us when claimants for the permit were many and are likely to be many in case the question of grant at this point of time is decided afresh.
With respect, we are, therefore, unable to accede to this common request and to confine the operation of this route only to the two claimants before us in a lis between them which commenced more than a decade earlier.
Admittedly, the applicants for permit before the R.T.A. were many more and when the matter is to be considered afresh by the R.T.A., everyone of them is entitled to a fresh consideration of his claim on merits.
As already stated, our inability to pass a consent order in terms of the above quoted orders is for some of the reasons already indicated.
For the reasons given by us, the above quoted consent orders cannot be treated as precedents for such a situation.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the impugned Orders of the R.T.A., the S.T.A.T. and the High Court are set aside and the matter is remanded to the R.T.A., Pudukkottai, for a fresh consideration and decision of the claim of all the applicants for grant of the permit on merits in accordance with law.
The interim orders, permitting the appellant and the respondent No. 1 to ply their stage carriages on the route, stand vacated.
However, it would be expedient that the R.T.A. decides the matter afresh at an early date and it also makes arrangement for operation of the route during the intervening period in accordance With law to avoid any inconvenience to the travelling public.
No costs.

summary:
The appellant and 14 others, including respondent No. 1 applied for grant of a stage carriage permit.
The R.T.A. rejected the applications of respondent No. 1 and some others on the only ground that each of them had been granted one other permit in the same sitting, and granted the permit to the appellant for a period of three years.
On appeal by respondent No. 1 and some others, the State Transport Appel late Tribunal, set aside the R.T.A. 's order and granted the permit in favour of respondent No. 1.
The appellant and another unsuccessful applicant filed two civil revision petitions.
The High Court, by an interim order, stayed the Tribunal 's order and directed that the appellant as well as respondent No. 1 be allowed to operate on the route, but ultimately dismissed both the revision petitions.
The appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court.
By virtue of this Court 's interim order, the appel lant and respondent No. 1 were continuing to operate on the route throughout; as a result, though the permit granted for three years expired long back, both the claimants had been operating on the route all these years.
On behalf of the parties common request was made for remanding the matter to the R.T.A. for fresh decision on merits and for a direction to allow both the parties to ply their stage carriages on the route on the ground that there was necessity for two permits on the route.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.1 The grant of a permit is to be made by the R.T.A. primarily with reference to the object of serving the interests of the general public and other relevant factors.
It cannot be treated as a dispute relating to grant of a permit between the rival claimants only.
It is not in the nature of a lis for adjudication of conflicting interests of 803 private individuals alone.
That apart, under Section 47(3) of the , the R.T.A. is first re quired to determine the number of stage carriages for the route and then to grant permits according to that determina tion made earlier.
Grant of any permit in excess thereof was not permissible without first making a fresh determination and increasing the number, if necessary.
[807E G] 1.2 Therefore, an order allowing two claimants, to ply their stage carriages on a single route on the basis of agreement between them that there is necessity for two permits cannot be made unless the grant of a permit to both the rival claimants would be within the limit fixed by the R.T.A. at the relevant time.
The grant of a permit is not a matter which can be decided merely on the basis of an agree ment between the two rival claimants who alone out of sever al claimants remain in the lis at this stage.
[807H & F] M. Chinnaswamy vs M/s. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) Ltd., ; Civil Appeal No. 1133 of 1970 decid ed on 9.12.1981 and Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1980 decided on 13.7.1990, distinguished.
1.3 The fact that the claimants had the benefit of plying their stage carriages for several years on the basis of interim orders of the Court or other authorities long after the period of the permit had expired, is not a valid reason for perpetuating that act and confining the grant only to the litigants before the court when claimants for the permit were many and are likely to be many in case the question of grant at this point of time is decided afresh.
Admittedly, the appellants for permit before the R.T.A. were many more and when the matter is to be considered afresh by the R.T.A. everyone of them is entitled to a fresh consider ation of his claim on merits.
[808B D] 1.4 The grant of permit by the R.T.A. to the appellant refusing to consider the claim of respondent No. 1 and some other applicants on merits solely on the ground that they had been granted one other permit in the same sitting is clearly untenable.
The grant of a permit for another route to the respondent No. 1 and some others could only be a relevant circumstance, while assessing the comparative merits of all the applicants, but by itself it could not be decisive or sufficient to refuse consideration of their claim.
The orders of the R.T.A. the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside and the matter remanded to the R.T.A. for a fresh consideration and decision of the claim of all the applicants on merits in accordance with law.
[805C D; 808F1 804 [The Court vacated the interim order permitting the appellant and respondent No. 1 to ply their stage carriages on the route and directed the R.T.A. to make arrangement for operation of the route till the matter is decided afresh, to avoid inconvenience to the traveling public.] [808F G]


judgement:
tion (Criminal) No. 687 of 1990.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Mehta, Ms. Shalini Soni and P.H. Parekh for the Peti tioner.
929 D.A. Dave, A. Sachthey, C.B. Nath, B.K. Jad, Ashish Verma and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.
We allowed the Writ Petition vide our Order dated 7.8.90 and released the detenu for the reasons to be given later.
We accordingly proceed to give the reasons.
The petitioner was detained under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 ( 'Act ' for short) by an Order dated 13.3.90 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City.
The grounds were served within time.
The said order is challenged in this Writ Petition.
It is mainly contended that the detaining authority has not applied his mind in passing the detention order inasmuch as the relevant material has not been taken into account at the time of passing the order.
Even other wise, according to the learned counsel, there are absolutely no grounds which warrant detention.
It is also further submitted that the provisions of the Act are not attracted even if all the averments in the grounds are accepted.
To appreciate this contention it becomes necessary to refer to the contents of the grounds in brief.
The detenu is a resident of Ahmedabad City.
There is a reference in the grounds to about three crimes registered in various police stations and they are Crime Nos.
122/86, 70/88 and 96/90.
In all these cases it is alleged that the detenu and his associates armed with deadly weapons like Swords, Dhariya and fire arms committed offences punishable under Sections 307, 45 1, 143, 147, 148 I.P.C. and Section 25(1) of the Arms Act.
So far as the first two crimes are concerned admittedly the detenu was acquitted.
In Crime No. 96/90, in which investigation is pending, bail was granted.
Then there is a reference to 8 crimes under the provisions of the Prohibition Act registered in Kagdapith Police Sta tion on the basis whereof he is described as a 'bootlegger ' within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act.
Some ended in conviction and some are pending in trial but admittedly the detenu does not figure in any one of these cases.
Thereafter it is stated in the grounds in general that the detenu was having dangerous weapons and with the aid of his associates, has been subjecting innocent citizens to physical beating causing physical injuries and that he and his associates have been threatening and beating the peace loving citizens and people residing and doing their business in the said area are afraid and an atmosphere of fear, danger and terror prevails and 930 that the detenu comes within the meaning of 'dangerous person ' as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act The detain ing authority has also referred to an earlier detention order dated 20.8.85 passed against the detenu and noted that he was released by the High Court.
Then the detaining au thority proceeds to mention that taking action under Section 59(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is not possible and also is not appropriate under the circumstances.
In the concluding paragraph it is particularly mentioned that the detenu was a strong headed 'dangerous person ' and he was using the dangerous weapons creating an atmosphere of ter ror.
Towards the end it is specifically mentioned that in respect of Crime No. 96/90 registered with the Sattelite Police Station.
the Chief Judicial Magistrate had remanded him to the judicial custody till 15.3.90 and there are chances of his being released, therefore to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order, the detention was ordered.
Section 2(b) of the Act defines 'bootlegger ' which reads thus: "bootlegger" means a person who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contra vention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, (Bom.
XXV of 1949) and the rules and orders made thereunder, or any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any recepta cle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described above by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing;" Unless there is material to show that the detenu committed any one of the acts mentioned in the definition, he can not come within the meaning of 'bootlegger '.
Though in the grounds there is a reference to 8 crimes under the provi sions of the Prohibition Act, the detenu, as already men tioned, does not figure in any one of these cases.
There is no material whatsoever of his involvement in any manner in any of these prohibition cases.
Therefore, he can not be said to be a bootlegger.
Now we shall consider whether he comes within the mean ing of 'dangerous person ' as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act which reads as under: 931 "2(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the (54 of 1959)".
As per this definition, a person, who 'habitually ' commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences mentioned therein either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang is a "dangerous person".
The expression 'habitually ' is very significant.
A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force of habit or inward disposi tion is accustomed to commit crimes.
It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be a continuity in the commission of those offences.
In Vijay Narain Singh vs State of Biharand Ors., the majority explained the meaning of the word 'habitually ' thus: "The expression 'habitually ' means 'repeatedly ' or 'persist ently '.
It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts.
Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated.
individual and dissimilar acts are neces sary to justify an inference of habit.
It connotes frequent commission of acts or commissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub clauses or an aggregate of simi lar acts or commissions".
Rashidmtva (C) Chhava Ahmedmiya Shaik vs Police Commission er, Ahmedabad and Another, [1989] 3 SCC 321 is yet another case where the scope of Section 2(c) of the Act came up for consideration before this Court and it is held that: "Therefore, this solitary incident would hardly be suffi cient to conclude that the detenu was habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of of fences.
" It is submitted that in the instant case except Crime No. 96/90 there is no other case pending and the other two crimes which are referred to in the grounds ended in acquit tal and the definition of 'dangerous person ' in Section 2(c) does not include cases under the Prohibition Act.
Therefore the detenu is not a habitual offender so as to come 932 within the meaning of 'dangerous.person '.
We find considera ble force in this submission.
We have gone through the entire record.
The learned counsel appearing for the State could not place any material from which it can be inferred that the petitioner was a habitual offender.
No doubt a lengthy counter is filed in which it is repeatedly averred in general that the detenu was indulging in prejudicial activities but as already mentioned, only Crime No. 96/90 is pending investigation and from this alone we can not infer that the petitioner is a dangerous person ' within the mean ing of Section 2(c) of the Act.
To satisfy ourselves we have also carefully perused the FIR in Crime No. 96/90 and the complaint annexed to the same.
The main allegation against the detenu was that he, out of sudden excitement, fired the revolver and as a result of which one Mehbub Khan received injury on his leg and again he fired a shot into the air and that he and his associates were moving around in a jeep threatening the people in the area.
But in the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 13.3.90 while releasing the petitioner on bail, it is noted that the said Mehbub Khan had no fire arm injury at all and as a matter of fact, the public prosecutor conceded the same.
The learned Sessions Judge has also noted that no medical evidence is produced to prove that any one was injured during the alleged occur rence.
If such is the only crime pending in which the detenu is alleged to have participated in, it can by no stretch of imagination be said that he comes within the meaning of 'dangerous person ' and the conclusions drawn by the detain ing authority are bereft of sufficient material as required under Section 2(c) of the Act.
This betrays non application of mind by the detaining authority.
Consequently, the grounds on which the detention order is passed, are irrele vant and non existing.
These are the reasons which weighed with us for not upholding the detention.
G.N. Petition allowed.

summary:
The Petitioner was detained under section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985.
The grounds were served within time and referred to 3 crimes registered in various police stations, on the allegation that the petitioner and his associates armed with deadly weapons committed offences punishable under sections 307,451,143, 147 and 148 IPC, and section 25(1) of the Arms Act.
The grounds also referred to 8 crimes under the provi sions of the Prohibition Act where he was described as a bootlegger.
Earlier detention under the Act and release by the High Court were also mentioned.
It was specifically mentioned that in one of the three cases, the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody and since there were chances of his being released, the detention was ordered to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintainance of public order.
In this Writ Petition, the Petitioner has challenged the validity of the detention order passed by the Commissioner of Police.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the detaining authority has not applied his mind inasmuch as relevant material has not been taken into account and there were absolutely no grounds warranting detention.
This Court allowed the Petition on.
7.8.1990 for reasons to be given later.
Giving reasons for allowing the Writ Petition, HELD: 1.
A person is said to be a habitual criminal who by force 928 of habit or inward disposition is accustomed to commit crimes.
It implies commission of such crimes repeatedly or persistently and prima facie there should be a continuity in the commission of those offences.
[931C D] Vijay Narain Singh vs State of Bihar and Ors., and Rashidmiya @ Chhava Ahmedmiya Shaik vs Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad and Anr., 1, relied on.
Unless there is material to show that the detenu committed any one of the acts mentioned in the definition, he can not come within the meaning of 'Bootlegger '.
Though in the grounds there is a reference to 8 crimes under the provisions of the Prohibition Act, the detenu, does not figure in any one of these cases.
There is no material whatsoever of his involvement in any manner in any of these prohibition cases.
Therefore, he can not be said to be a bootlegger.
[930F G] 3.
Admittedly, the detenu was acquitted in two of the three criminal cases against him.
The third case, viz., Crime No. 96/90 was pending investigation and the detenu was granted bail.
this is the only case pending against him, and the main allegation was that he, out of sudden excitement, fired the revolver and as a result of which one Mehbub Khan received injury on his leg and again he fired a shot into the air and that he and his associates were moving around in a jeep threatening the people in the area.
But in the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on 13.3.90 while releasing the petitioner on bail, it is noted that the said Mehbub Khan had no fire arm injury at all and as a matter of fact, the public prosecutor conceded the same.
The learned Sessions Judge has also noted that no medical evi dence is produced to prove that any one was injured during the alleged occurrence.
If such is the only crime pending in which the detenu is alleged to have participated in, it can by no stretch of imagination be said that he comes within the meaning of 'dangerous person ' and the conclusions drawn by the detaining authority are bereft of sufficient material as required under Section 2(c) of the Act.
This betrays non application of mind by the detaining authority.
Conse quently, the grounds on which the detention order is passed.
are irrelevant and non existing.
[932B E]