judgement:
LLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 296 of 1986.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
with Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1265 of 1986 From the the Judgment and Order dated 27.2.1986 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.
Writ Petition No. 1 of 1986.
R.K. Garg and Sunil K. Jain for the Petitioner.
S.B. Bhasme, A.S. Bhasme and A.K. Khanwilkar for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Writ Petition No. 296 of 1986 and Sepcial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1265 of 1986 are connected and relate to an order of detention of one Rampal Sahu dated 16th December, 1985 under section 3(2) of the (hereinafter called the said 'Act ').
These are dealt with by this judgment.
The said Rampal Sahu (hereinafter called 'the detenu ' was detained by the aforesaid order which was served on him on 17th December, 1985 with the grounds of detention.
According to the writ petition as well as the special leave petition the grounds of detention served on the detenu did not disclose any violation of the Essential Commodities Act or Essential Services Maintenance Act.
In the premises it is the contention of the petitioner that the detention was illegal and unconstitutional.
The State of Maharashtra approved the detention on 24th December, 1985.
The detention order as mentioned hereinbefore was under section 3(2) of the said Act.
The detenu was arrested on 17th December, 1985 and the grounds of detention were served on the same day.
The order alleged, inter alia, that since the year 1979, the detenu had been continuously engaging himself in committing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community i.e., removing of permanent way material stocked along rail lines for 845 maintenance of rail tracks removing parts of carriages, Wagons and Signal Telecommunication materials utilised for repair of Railway Wagons and maintenance of singnals.
It was further alleged that the said detenu used to arrange to remove railway property with the help of his 'gang ' and stock the same in his godown, himself remaining behind the scene.
It was alleged that in a number of cases railway properties were loaded and carried away in truck No. MHG 6302 which was owned by the detenu.
It was stated that he was indulging in removing railway material which was stocked along the rail tracks for the maintenance of the tracks, thus the work of maintenance of the tracks was hampered and quick movement of the wagons loaded with essential commodities such as food grains, arms, ammunition required by the general public and the armed forces could not be made.
Such acts were prejudicial, according to the order of detention, to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
The grounds further indicated six different cases.
The case numbers were: 1.
P.S. Deori Crime No. 69/83 u/s 379, 34 I.P.C. decided by the J.M.F.C. Sakoli vide C.C. No. 50/84.
R.P.E. Post Ajni Crime No. 20/84 u/s 3 R.P. (UP) Act, 1966 An appeal u/s 378 of the code of Criminal Procedure is being filed in the High Court against the order of aquittal dated 24/5/85 passed by the J.M.F.C., Railway Court Nagpur, vide C.C. No. 362/84.
R.P.F. Post Ajni Crime No. 43/84 u/s 3 RP (UP) Act 1966 pending trial before the J.M.F.C. (Rly.).
Nagpur, vide C.C. No. 153/85.
P.S. Kamptee Crime No. 195/84 u/s 379, 411, 34 I.P.C. pending trial before the J.M.F.C., VIII Court, Nagpur, vide C.C. No. 200/84.
P.S. Kamptee Crime No. 53/85 u/s 379, 34 IPC under investigation.
R.P.F. Post Ajni Crime No. 41/85 u/s 3 RP(UP) Act pending trial before the J.M.F.C. (Rly.) Court, Nagpur, vide C.C. No. 212/85.
846 The incident in the first case was alleged to have taken place on 26th December, 1983.
It was alleged that a truck bearing Registration No. MHG 6302 was standing near the iron bridge on the National Highway and some thieves were trying to cut the steel girders meant for constructing road bridge for removing the same.
Other particulars were named therein and the names of two persons were also mentioned.
There was some stealing.
The stolen property including steel girders and the truck mentioned above were seized.
It appears that the truck was owned by the detenu.
The detenu was arrested on 26th February, 1984 and the aforesaid two persons were convicted under section 379 read with section 34 I.P.C.
The detenu, however, was acquitted.
In the second case report had been received that some railway material including 32 Lbs.
CST 9 plates and tie bars were stolen from the railway track in between Borkhedi and Sindi Railway Stations by a gang of culprits who threatended the witness, i.e., the chowkidar on duty and took away the railway property in a Matador.
During enquiry into the above complaint, it transpired that the stolen property was unlawfully kept by the detenu in his godown at Nagpur and a search warrant was obtained and the stolen railway property valued at Rs.25,000 was recovered from the godown of the detenu on 19th June, 1984.
The detenu was acquitted by the Magistrate but an appeal had been preferred in the High Court of Nagpur and the same was pending when the detention order was passed.
It was further stated that the permanent way material was essential for the maintenance of the railway tracks and the safety of the travelling public.
It was normally kept at secure places near the track for ready availability for replacing the broken or unserviceable material in the track.
The trains were required to be detained as a result of theft causing loss to the Government and there was delay in making supplies to the public.
It was further alleged that as many as 28 wagons were marked sick for repairs and were sent to Ajni workshop for repairs, for want of the required spare parts which were seized from the unlawful possession of the detenu.
According to the order of detention, as a result the Government and public indents of Wagons totalling 792 could not be cleared for loading different commodities to be supplied in various parts of the country.
In case No. 3, a report had been received that at a particular point between Buti Bori & Umrer section at some Km.
near the railway crossing gate, 400 fish plates were stolen.
The enquiry had revealed that the stolen property was unlawfully obtained and kept by 847 the detenu at certain place at Nagpur.
A search warrant was obtained and 400 fish plates and carriage and Wagon parts were recovered from the godown of the detenu.
In the premises the detenu was arrested on 14th December, 1984 and the aforesaid case i.e., third case was pending on the date of the order of detention.
It is the case of the Government that due to the unlawful possession of the railway property by the detenu, as many as ten wagons had to be marked sick and could not be made available to the public and the Government for loading different essential commodities to be supplied in different parts of the country in the month of December, 1984.
As a result of this, as many as 3224 indents put up by the Government and the public for the supply of wagons could not be cleared due to shortage of empty wagons.
The fourth case related to an offence under section 379 I.P.C. which was registered against the detenu under sections 379, 411 and 34 I.P.C. and was pending trial in Nagpur.
The complaint was to the effect that 128 CST 9 plates were stolen from five points between Kamptee & Kalmana Railway Line and these were valued at Rs.4608.
The property was loaded in truck bearing No. MHG 6302 owned by the detenu.
The truck driver was arrested and the property was recovered from the godown of the detenu at the instance of the driver.
The detenu was arrested in connection with this case on 3rd December, 1984, and the case was pending on the date of the issue of the detention order.
Regarding the fifth case it may be mentioned that an offence was alleged to have been committed by the detenu under section 379 read with section 34 I.P.C. on the complaint of certain person who was working as a Manager of the Jamshedpur Transport Corporation, Nagpur.
It was reported that three bundles of Aluminium wire weighing about 500 kgs.
valued at Rs.1,60,000 were stolen by some unknown criminals on 21st March, 1985.
During investigation it was disclosed that the culprits belonged to the 'gang ' of the detenu and that they had threatened the chowkidars on duty and forcibly removed the aluminium wire bundles.
It was stated in the detention order that the detenu was the main brain behind this big daring robbery and he used his truck bearing No. MHG 6302 for transporting the stolen property.
The detenu anticipating arrest moved the court and obtained anticipatory bail with a view to avoid arrest by the police.
The case was pending investigation.
It was further stated that the aluminium wire which was stolen was meant for the use of various public and Govt.
departments and due to aforesaid criminal activity as indicated above the supply of 848 the wire could not be maintained as it was broken into pieces and made unserviceable.
In respect of the sixth case it was further alleged that on receiving information that 90 Lbs, rails 31 meters long were received and kept unlawfully by the detenu in his godown at Nagpur, the inspector of the C.I.B. and Railway Protection Force raided the godown on 22nd May, 1985 and seized 90 Lbs.
rails about 30 meters long, break and some new steel sleepers and other materials.
The stolen property was worth Rs.20,000.
The detenu was arrested in this case on 22nd May, 1985.
The case was pending trial on the date of the issue of the detention order in Nagpur.
It is the case of the detaining authority that due to this unlawful possession of break locks by the detenu, four wagons were marked sick and had to be sent to the Railway Carriage and Wagon Workshop at Ajni for repair, as a result was indents put up to the Railway Administration by the Public and the Government to provide the empty wagons for supply of the different commodities in the different parts of country could not be complied with.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid grounds it was further stated that the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
It was further alleged that each of the grounds indicated above individually and collectively was not only germane but also sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority with a view of preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and as such it was necessary to detain him.
It was further stated that these grounds were communicated to the detenu under setion 8 of the aforesaid Act read with article 22(5) of the Constitution of India upon which the detention order had been made.
Copies of the documents mentioned in the said order which were placed before the detaining authority were enclosed with the detention order sent to the detenu.
He was further informed that he had a right to make a representation to the State Government against the order of detention and would be afforded the earliest opportunity to make such a representation.
He was further informed that he should address it in the manner indicated therein.
He was informed that the State Government would within three weeks from the date of detention of the detenu make a reference to and place the requisite material before the Advisory Board constituted under section 9 of the said Act and asking them to make a report of detention within seven weeks.
He was informed that he had a right to make the representation to the Advisory Board and if 849 he wanted, he would be heard in person by the Advisory Board in the course, if it found it necessary.
In this petition under article 32 of the Constitution, it is the case of the petitioner on behalf of the detenu that the grounds of detention were vague, irrelevant and non existent.
It was further urged on behalf of the petitioners that the grounds of detention on which the detenu was detained relating to as far back as 1979.
It was not open to the detaining authority to order detention of the detenu on the said grounds.
It was highlighted that in respect of alleged grounds, criminal cases were pending against the detenu and he had been enlarged on bail.
It was submitted that when a judicial authority was satisfied on the materials placed before it that there were no grounds for keeping the detenu in detention, on the same materials the executive authority namely, the detaining authority could not substitute the judicial judgment and order detention to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the community.
It was submitted by Mr. Garg on behalf of the detenu that in this case in view of the fact that the detenu was on bail, the power of preventive detention was being used to defeat the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and ordinary normal procedure.
It was further the submission of Mr. Garg that the alleged grounds were merely allegations of ordinary criminal cases which either had ended in acquittal or in respect of which appeals were pending or were pending determination and as such the formation of the belief by the detaining authority for the detention order was merely on surmises and on materials which the detaining authority was not competent to take note of.
With reference to the various pending cases, it was submitted on behalf of the detenu that these criminal cases did not disclose any activity of the detenu prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
The connection of the detenu with the alleged offences was not there and as such the satisfaction could not be there of the detaining authority.
The detenu according to the petitioner, was in no manner connected with the alleged theft committed by certain named persons and though the onwership of the truck attributed to the detenu was not denied or disputed but the involvement of the detenu did not follow from that fact, it was submitted on behalf of the detenu.
It is further the case on behalf of the detenu and the submission of Mr. Garg that it was not open to the detaining authority to use the allegations of the criminal cases to justify 'preventive detention '.
It 850 was further his submission that these did not establish proximate relation either with the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the life of the community nor did these involve any violation of relevant laws made by the Parliament dealing with the maintenance of supplies of essential commodities or maintenance of essential services.
It is the case on behalf of the detenu that preventive detention is no substitute for detention under the ordinary criminal law.
According to the petitioner, there was no allegation against the detenu of any violation of Essential Commodities Act or any provision of the Maintenance of Essential Services Act.
The grounds mentioned were cases of ordinary theft and should have been proceeded against under the ordinary law of crimes.
The detenu was released on bail.
The connection of the detenu with the removal of fish plates for the supply of wagons was too remote to be any basis of satisfaction.
In fourth case the detenu was on bail and detenu could not be kept under preventive detnetion in derogation of his liberty granted by bail by the appropriate judicial authority.
Regarding the fifth case, the detenu had already been granted anticipatory bail.
The order of the court could not be defeated by keeping the detenu in preventive detention, it was submitted by Mr. Garg.
It was urged that requisite satisfaction required under section 3(2) of the said Act was not in fact formed and could not have been formed on the grounds alleged nor was there any rational connection for the formation of such satisfaction.
The alleged incidents were denied and it was further submitted that if at all mere infractions of ordinary law could not fall in the category of public order or violation of any law indicated to the maintenance of supply or essential services.
It was open to justify the order of detention even if one or more of the six grounds were found to be relevant.
The documents, further, did not disclose factual connection with the alleged offences.
No statement of the witnesses had been supplied except one related in ground No. 5, it was urged in the petition.
It was further submitted that the provisions of Act 7 of 1980 being Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 could perhaps have application and in view of Explanation to Section 3(2) of the Act, the impugned order was bad.
Our attention was drawn to the provisions of the said Act of 1980.
Section 3(1) and (2) of the said Act reads as follows: "Power to make orders detaining certain persons (1) The Central Government or a State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government specially 851 empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
Explanation For the purposes of this sub section, the expression "acting in any manner, prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" means: (a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the (10 of 1955), or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community; or (b) dealing in any commodity (i) which is an essential commodity as defined in the (10 of 1955), or (ii) with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (a), with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act or other law aforesaid.
(2) Any of the following officers, namely: (a) District Magistrates: (b) Commissions of Police, wherever they have been appointed, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub section 852 (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub section.
In answer to the petition in the affidavit of the opposition filed on behalf of the respondent, it was stated that the detenu Rampal Sahu was detained and a reference had been duly made under section 10 of the said Act to the Advisory Board.
The detenu was interviewed by the Advisory Board on 29th January, 1986 and the Board had submitted its report under section 12(1) of the said Act on 3rd February, 1986 which had been received by the Department on the same day.
As such the report of the Advisory Board was received by the Government within the stipulated period of seven weeks from the date of detention as required by the law.
The detenu had submitted his representation dated 8th January, 1986 to the Advisory Board which was considered by the Board at the time of his interview before the Board on 29th January, 1986.
The said representation was received by the Home Department along with the report of the Advisory Board and was considered together with the report of the Advisory Board by Government and the detention order was confirmed by the Government Order.
All procedural safeguards of law were duly followed.
There was no breach of the same.
It is not necessary to reiterate the affidavit in reply.
As has been mentioned hereinbefore, on the same facts, the petition under article 226 had been filed in the High Court at Nagpur.
The said application was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 27th February, 1986.
The petitioner has come up from the said decision which is the next matter being Special Leave Petition No. 1265 of 1986 and same will be disposed of by this judgment.
The High Court in its judgment referred to the grounds.
It reiterated that permanent way material is essential to the maintenance of railway track and safety of the railway travelling public.
After referring to the various grounds referred to hereinbefore, the High Court has noted that three points were urged before it on behalf of the detenu namely; (1) the order was mala fide, (2) there was total absence of material, and (3) in any event the provisions of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 being Act of 1980 would be attracted.
The High Court referred to the affidavits of the Commissioner of Police who passed the detention order which was filed in the High Court and found that there were good grounds for detention and it was not possible to hold that there were no grounds of detention relevant for the Act.
853 The High Court referred to the expression 'acting in any manner, prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community ' as mentioned in Explanation to section 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.
The High Court was of the view that it was clear that only was attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case.
In view of the Explanation to section 3 of Act 7 of 1980, it appears "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" has certain particular connotation.
But in the instant case the Act under consideration, the conduct of the detenu was prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community in general as contemplated by section 3(2) and not in any particular mode contemplated by Explanation to section 3(1) of Act 7 of 1980 and as such is not excluded by the Explanation to sub section (2) of section 3 of the Act.
In the premises we are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took on this aspect of the matter.
We are also of the opinion that for the same reason, the same contentions urged before us in support of the writ petition cannot be sustained.
As mentioned hereinbefore, before the High Court also the insertion of section 5A of the Act by the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984 was challenged under which even the existence of one ground is sufficient.
Before us no ground was canvassed about the validity of the said Amendment and inclusion of section 5A of the Act.
It must therefore be held that even the existence of one ground was sufficient to sustain the detention order.
Mr. Garg drew our attention to certain observations of Chagla, C.J., in a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Bombay in Maledath Bharathan Malyali vs The Commissioner of Police AIR 1950 Bombay 202.
That was a case under the Bombay Public Security Measure Act being Act No. 6 of 1947.
There was an order of detention under section 2(A1) of the Act for the collateral purpose.
It was held that when the detaining authority had made up his mind to detain a person who was alleged to have committed an offence, then, the detaining authority had made his choice and it would not be permissible, according to that decision, for him to investigate the offence while still keeping the person under detention and not complying with the provi 854 sions of the law with regard to investigation.
If the purpose of detaining a person was a collateral purpose i.e., to deprive him of his rights and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to carry on an investigation without the supervision of the Court then the detention was mala fide and could not be justified.
Chagla, C.J. at page 203 speaking for the Full Bench observed that an order of detention under the Security Act could only be justified in a Court of law provided it was made bona fide; and order of detention could not be made for an ulterior motive or for a collateral purpose.
The detaining authority, it was further observed, must only consider the objects for which the Act was passed and the only consideration which must weigh with the detaining authority was public safety, maintenance of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquility in the Province of Bombay.
If in making the order his mind was influenced by any consideration extraneous to the Act, then the order would be bad and could not be upheld.
The question that the Court had to consider in that case was whether in making the order the Commisioner of Police was influenced by any collateral purpose and whether any extraneous factor had weighed on his mind when he made the order.
When we speak of an order being made mala fide, it did not mean that the Court attributed to the detaining authority any improper motive.
An order is mala fide when there is malice in law although there is no malice in fact.
The malice in law is to be inferred when an order is made contrary to the objects and purposes of the Act.
Whether in any particular case this is so or not must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
The fact that the person sought to be detained is in fact under detention is a relevant and material factor but the allegations or the incidents leading to his detention have also to be borne in mind and co related to the object of a particular Act under which preventive detention is contemplated.
In the instant case, the Act was The .
It was an Act to provide for preventive detention in certain cases and for matters connected therewith.
Power has been given under section 3 authorising preventive detention of any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers and of the security of India.
Sub section (2) of section 3 provides that the Central Government or the State Government might, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it was necessary so to do, make an order 855 directing that such person be detained then the same can be done, (emphasis supplied).
The Explanation to this sub section makes it clear that the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" as defined in the Explanation to sub section (1) of section 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, as we have noted before.
Our attention was drawn to several authorities where this Act has been considered.
In a recent decision of this Court, one of us (Ranganath Misra, J) had to consider the effect of passing order for preventive detention where the detenu was in jail.
In Ramesh Yadav vs District Magistrate, Etah and Others it was held that merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under trial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the should not ordinarily be passed.
If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, Court observed, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised.
We respectfully agree with this conclusion.
But this principle will have to be judged and applied in the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where a person accused of certain offences whereunder he is undergoing trial or has been acquitted, the appeal is pending and in respect of which he may be granted bail may not in all circumstances entitle an authority to direct preventive detention and the principle enunciated by the aforesaid decision must apply but where the offences in respect of which the detenu is accused are so inter linked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect continuous maintenance of essential supplies and thereby jeopardize the security of the State, then subject to other conditions being fulfilled, a man being in detention would not detract from the order being passed for preventive detention.
Merugu Satyanarayana Etc.
vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Others ; was a case dealing with an order under section 3(2) of the Act.
There this Court found that the affidavit in opposition supporting the reply to the show cause notice was not from the person who passed the detention order.
There the affidavit was of a sub inspector of police at whose instance the arrest was made and could not therefore satisfy the constitutional mandate 856 that will be treated as nonest.
In the instant case before us a point was made that the counter was made by a desk clerk of the Home Department in writ petition.
This would have been a fatal defect and the government 's view could not have been considered but there was an application under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the identical detention order on the same grounds.
Before the High Court Sree Malhotra and Sree S.K. Seth who were the Commissioners of Police had filed two separate affidavits upholding the issue of the detention order and explaining the grounds and the reasons for the same.
If those affidavits are taken into consideration, as these must be then there is no substance in this ground.
In the aforesaid case assurance was given before this Court in an earlier case that preventive detention would not be resorted to against political opponents.
In the said decision the facts were entirely different.
That was a case affecting the liberty of a subject on political consideration.
For maintaining supplies throughout the country the railways was per se essential, and, therefore, interference with railway lines would be endangering the maintenance of supplies see the observations of this Court in Mohd. Subrati Alias Mohd. Karim.
vs State of West Bangal ; at 992.
This Court in Remeshwar Shaw vs District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr., ; had to deal with preventive detention of a person who was in jail custody.
There the petitioner was detained by an order of the District Magistrate under the provisions of the .
The order recited that the District Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of Public order.
This order was served on the petitioner on the 15th February, 1963, while he was in jail custody as an under trial prisoner in connection with a criminal case pending against him.
It was urged on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the detention of the petitioner was not justified by the provisions of section 3(1) of the .
It was noted by Justice Gajendragadkar at page 925 of the report speaking for the Court that the basis of the order of detention which the authority was empowered to pass against a person under section 3(1)(a) was that if the said order was not passed against him, he might act in a prejudicial manner.
In other words, the authority considered the material brought before it in respect of the person, examined the said material and reached the conclusion that the material showed that the said person 857 might indulge in prejudicial activities if he was not prevented from doing so by an order of detention.
The Court then posed the question how could the authority come to the conclusion that the person who was in jail custody might act in a prejudicial manner unless he was detained.
The learned judge was of the view that the scheme of the section postulated that if an order of detention was not passed against a person, he would be free and able to act in a prejudicial manner.
In other words, at the time when the order of detention was brought into force, the person sought to be detained might have freedom of action.
That alone would justify the requirement of the section that the order of detention was passed in order to prevent a prejudicial conduct, of the person which took place in that case ten years before the date of detention and nothing was known against the person indicating i.e., the tendency to act in a prejudicial manner.
Even if it was ten years old, the authority was satisfied that detention was necessary.
The court also noted that the past conduct or antecedent history on which the authority purported to act should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary.
The court, however, further held that as an abstract proposition of law, there might not be any doubt that section 3(1)(a) of the said Act did not preclude the authority from passing an order of detention against a person while he was in detention or in jail.
But the relevant facts in connection with the making of the order might be different and that might make a difference in the application of the principle that the order of detention could be passed against a person in jail.
The Court, however, was reluctant to lay down any inflexible test.
In that case the petitioner was ordered to be released on the ground that he was served with the order of detention while he was in jail custody.
In the instant case before us, the petitioner is not in jail custody.
In Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs State of Punjab ; the court was concerned more or less with the same facts.
The court observed at p. 937 of the report that the aspect of the matter which was emphasised in the case of Rameshwar Shaw (supra) was the relevance of considerations of proximity of time and concluded that whether an order of detention could be passed against a person who was in detention of in jail would always have to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case.
The order of detention in that case was also set aside in view of the facts mentioned therein.
In Golam Hussain Alias Gama vs The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Others ; the question arose under sec 858 tions 3(1) and 3(2) of the .
There pursuant to an order under section 3(1)(a)(ii) read with section 3(2) of the said Act the petitioner in that case was arrested for hurling soda water bottles, brick bats and bombs indiscriminately on a group of persons on different dates.
The order of detention said that if left free and unfettered the petitioner was likely to continue to disturb maintenance of public order by acting in similar manner.
In an earlier criminal case the petitioner was discharged since no witness deposed against him in open court.
Thereafter the petitioner was detained under the Act.
In a petitioner under article 32 of the Constitution, it was contended that the detention was mala fide because it was after his discharge by the court for want of evidence and secondly, there had been a long interval of nine months between the criminal incidents and the detention order, thirdly the order of detention which did not specify a period as was violative of section 12 of the said Act and lastly the detention was founded on prevention of public disorder while the acts imputed to the petitioner were aimed at a particular person, not the general public.
It was held that merely because the detaining authority had chosen to base the order of detention on the discharge of the petitioner by court for want of evidence it could not be held that the order was bad in law.
This branch of jurisprudence, as interpreted by this Court, has made it futile for a detenu to urge that because the grounds of detention had been the subject matter of criminal cases which had ended in discharge, therefore, the order of detention was mala fide.
The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt did not apply to the component of subjective satisfaction for imprisonment for reasons of internal security.
There might be extreme cases where the court had held a criminal case to be false and the detaining authority for want of evidence claimed to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a court had found to be baseless.
In the present case the order of discharge was made purely for want of evidence on the scope that witnesses were too afraid to depose against to desperate character, cannot come under the exceptions carved out by the court to this category.
It was further emphasised that there must be a live link between the grounds of criminal activities alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention.
This credible chain is snapped if there was too long and unexplained interval between the offending acts and order of detention.
If the detaining authority took the chance of conviction and, when the court verdict went against it, feel back on its detention power to punish one whom the court would not convict, it was an abuse and virtual nullification of the judicial process.
But if 859 honestly, finding a dangerous person getting away with it by overaweing witnesses or concealing the commission cleverly, in authority thought on the material before it that there was need to interdict public disorder at his instance he might validly direct detention.
In the present case, the acts were serious, being bomb hurling and brickbat throwing in public places creating panic.
Involvement of the petitioner was discovered only during the investigation.
It was further held that the argument that detention without defined duration is ipso jure invalid could not be sustained.
No responsible government should or would be unresponsive to the claim of citizen 's freedom.
The nature of the act from the circumstances of its commission, the impact on the people around and such factors constitute the pathology of public disorder.
These acts could not be isolated from their public setting nor was it possible to analyse its molecules as in a laboratory but to take its total effect on the flow of orderly life.
It might be a question of degree and quality of activity of the sensitivity of the question involving people.
To dissect further is to defeat the purpose of social defence which is the paramount purpose of the preventive detention.
If, however, a detention order is malafide then the same is bad.
Reliance was placed for this proposition on the decision of this Court in Sahib Singh Dugal vs Union of India.
[1966] 1 SCR 313.
Mohd. Salim Khan vs Shri C.C. Bose & Another depended upon the particular facts of that case, so is the position with Borjahan Gorey vs State of West Bengal [1972] 2 SCC 550 to which our attention was drawn, where it was highlighted that judicial trial for punishing the accused for the commission of an offence was a jurisdiction distinct from that of detention under the Act which had in view the object of preventing the detenu from acting prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order.
The fields of these two jurisdictions were not co extensive nor were they alternatives.
It must be remembered that the grounds of detention related to past acts on which an opinion as to the likelihood of the repetition of such or similar acts could be based.
It was submitted that in order to invoke the provisions of these Acts for securing preventive detention under the , there must be something imminent.
In Godavari Shamrao Parulekar vs State of Maharashtra & Others ; where referring to several authorities Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Court observed at page 452 of the report that in those cases it was held by this Court that where a person was detained in jail as an under trial pris 860 oner no order of detention either under the or under the Rules could be served on him because one of the necessary ingredients which go to make up the satisfaction of the detaining authority is necessarily absent in such a case.
It was pointed out in Rameshwar Shaw 's case (supra) that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority had to be satisfied that if the person was not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulated freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time.
The Court noted two types of cases.
Those two cases were concerned with the service of an order of detention under the or under the Rules on a person who was in jail in one of two circumstances namely where he was in jail as an under trial prisoner and the period for which he was in jail was indeterminate or where he was in jail as a convicted person and the period of his sentence had still to run for some length of time.
In those cases the service of the order of detention under the or under the Rules in jail would not be legal for one of the necessary ingredients about which the authority had to be satisfied would be absent, namely, that it was necessary to detain the person concerned which could only be postulated of a person who was not already in prison.
But in other types of cases this Court had to deal with G.S. Parulekar 's case.
The appellants were not under detention either as under trial prisoners for an indeterminate time or as convicted persons whose sentences were still to run for some length of time.
They were detained under the by an order dated 7th November, 1962 which had been reported to Government for approval and which order could only remain in force for 12 days under section 3(3) of the said Act unless in the meantime it had been approved by the State Government.
In those cases the principles of the decision referred to in Rameshwar Shaw 's case and other cases could not be applied.
If there was an imminent possibility of the man being set at liberty and his detention coming to an end, then it appears, as a principle, if his detention is otherwise necessary and justified then there is nothing to prevent the appropriate authorities from being satisfied about the necessity of passing an appropriate order detaining the person concerned.
In Gopi Ram vs State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 241 Mudholkar, J. reiterated the principle that law does not permit double detention and referring to Rameshwar Shaw 's case it was reiterated that when a 861 person was in jail custody and the criminal proceedings were pending against him, the appropriate authority might in a given case take the view that criminal proceedings might end very soon and might terminate in his acquittal.
In such a case, it would be open to the appropriate authority to make an order of detention, if the requisite conditions of the Rule or the section were satisfied, and serve it on the person concerned even after he was acquitted in the said criminal proceedings.
Masood Alam Etc.
vs Union of India and Others ; was a case where it was held that if the grounds were relevant and germane to the object of the detaining Act then merely because the objectionable activities covered thereby also attracted the provisions of Chapter VIII, Criminal Procedure Code, the preventive detention could not for that reason alone be considered to be mala fide provided the authority concerned was satisfied of the necessity of the detention as contemplated by the Act.
The jurisdiction of preventive detention sometimes described as jurisdiction of suspicion depended on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
If the detaining authority was of opinion on grounds which were germane and relevant, that it was necessary to detain a person from acting prejudicially as contemplated by section 3 of the Act then it was not for this court to consider objectively how imminent was the likelihood of the detenu indulging in those activities.
There was no legal bar in serving an order of detention on a person who was in jail custody if he was likely to be released soon thereafter and there was relevant material on which the detaining authority was satisfied that if free, the person concerned was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order.
The Court stressed upon the fact that it was always the past conduct, activities or the antecedent history of a person which the detaining authority took into account in making a detention order.
No doubt the past conduct, activities or antecedent history should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary but it was for the detaining authority who had to arrive at a subjective satisfaction in considering the past activities and coming to his conclusion if on the basis of those activities he was to be satisfied that the activities of the person concerned were such that he was likely to indulge in prejudicial activities necessitating his detention.
Where an earlier order of detention was either revoked or had expired, any subsequent detention order could be passed only on fresh facts arising after the expiry or revocation of the earlier order.
862 Golan Hussain Alia Gama vs Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, and Others (supra) highlights the need for causal connection between the grounds and the action proposed.
The jurisprudence dealing with prohibitory detention or preventive detention is well settled and it can no longer be a valid contention that because the accused had been discharged in a criminal case, the ground of charge could not be relied upon by the appropriate authority passing an order of preventive detention.
The former related to the punitive branch of criminal law and relied on the past commissions, the latter to the preventive branch of social defence and protected the community from future injury.
It is not possible to urge that simply because a man has been discharged in a criminal case, those grounds could not be grounds for preventive detention.
But there must be live link between the grounds of criminal activities alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention.
This credible chain would be snapped if there was too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention.
There must be proximity, but no mechanical test of counting months of interval can be laid down it depends on the nature of the acts alleged or relied, gravity of the situation and the reason for the delay.
It is in that background only it can be said that causal connection is broken.
The power to detain and the right to liberty must be harmoniously balanced in the larger interest of the community.
Dulal Roy vs The District Magistrate, Burdwan & Others ; stressed that the scheme of section 3(1) (a) of the presupposed that on the date of the order of detention or in the near future the person sought to be detained had or would have freedom of action.
If a person therefore was serving a long term of imprisonment or was in jail custody as an undertrial and there was no immediate or early prospect of his being released on bail or otherwise, the authority could not legitimately be satisfied on the basis of his past history or antecedents that he was likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities after his release in the distant or indefinite future.
To the similar effect are the observations in Dr. Ramakrishna Rawat vs District Magistrate, Jabalpur and Another.
at 167 and 169.
Mere service of detention order in jail per se is not bad.
In Vijay Narain Singh vs State of Bihar & Ors.
, ; it was highlighted by two learned judges (O. Chinnappa Reddy & E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ) of the three judges bench consisting of O. Chinnappa Reddy, A.P. Sen & E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ.
that the law of 863 preventive detention was a hard law and therefore should be strictly construed.
Care should be taken that the liberty of the person was not jeopardized unless the case fell squarely within the four corners of the relevant law.
The law of preventive detention was not to be used merely to clip the wings of the accused who was involved in a criminal prosecution.
Where a person was enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which was treated on the very same charge which was to be tried by the criminal court.
The Court was considering the expression 'habitual offender ' under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981.
Assuming the facts alleged to be right and there is a causal connection between the facts alleged and the purpose of detention and the formation of the opinion is not mala fide, then the sufficiency of the grounds and the truth of the grounds is not germane.
See the observations of this Court in The Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr.
vs The Company Law Board and Others [1966] Supp.
SCR 311 at 354 and 363.
It has to be borne in mind that having regard to the purpose of the Act, the detaining authority must take into consideration rational, proximate grounds and that should be the basis for the horoscope for the future so as to determine whether the person proposed to be detained comes within the mischief of the Act.
If the person is in detention or is under trial and his conviction is unlikely but his conduct comes within the mischief of the Act then the authority is entitled to take a rational view of the matter.
The grounds must be there.
The decision must be bona fide.
In Prakash Chandra Mehta vs Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala and Others [1985] Supp.
SCC 144 it was noted that preventive detention unlike punitive detention which was to punish for the wrong done, was to protect the society by preventing wrong being done.
Though such powers under those Acts must be very cautiously exercised as not to undermine the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to our people, the procedural safeguards are to ensure that yet these must be looked at from a pragmatic and commonsense point of view.
An understanding between those who exercised powers and the people over whom or in respect of whom such power is exercised is necessary.
The purpose of exercise of all such powers by the Government must be to promote common well being and must be to subserve the common good.
It is necessary to protect therefore the individual rights insofar as practicable which are not inconsistent with the security and well 864 being of the society.
Observance of written law about the procedural safeguards for the protection of the individual is normally the high duty of public official but in all circumstances not the highest.
The law of self preservation and protection of the country and national security may claim in certain circumstances higher priority.
In Shiv Ratan Makim s/o Nandlal Makim vs Union of India and Others ; it was stressed that the jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention was different from that of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences.
Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide.
A fortiori therefore the mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention.
If an order of detention is made only in order to bypass a criminal prosecution which may be irksome because of the inconvenience of proving guilt in a court of law, it would certainly be an abuse of the power of preventive detention and the order of detention would be bad.
But if the object of making the order of detention was to prevent the commission in future of activities injurious to the community, it would be a prefectly legitimate exercise of power to make the order of detention.
The court would have to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine on which side of the line the order of detention falls.
In view of the aforesaid principles that emerged, it is necessary to consider the grounds and determine whether there are causal connections.
The fact that a man is not in jail per se would not be determinative of the factor that order of peventive detention could not be passed against him.
The fact that a man was found not guilty in a criminal trial would not also be determinative of the factors alleged therein.
All these factors must be objectively considered and if there are causal connections and if bona fide belief was formed then there was nothing to prevent from serving an order of preventive detention even against a person who was in jail custody if there is imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty if the detaining authority was duly satisfied.
Before us no substantial point was made of infraction of any procedural safeguard engrafted in the Act.
The documents relied on were duly supplied.
We have examined that question from the records and materials available before us.
Proper opportunity to make a rep 865 resentation was given and the representation made to the Advisory Board was duly considered by the Advisory Board.
Their recommendations were also duly considered by the State Government.
In the premises there is no substance in the grievance that the procedural safeguards had not been followed.
It further appears to us that there was rational subjective satisfaction arrived at bona fide on the basis of the materials available to the detaining authority and the materials had rational nexus with the purpose and object of the detention as contemplated by the Act.
Judged by the standards laid down by various decisions mentioned hereinbefore and in view of the fact that procedural safeguards had been observed, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in the challenge made in the writ petition.
We are further of the opinion that the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition before it.
Special leave application from the said decision therefore must fail and the writ petition filed in this Court also fails for the reasons indicated before.
A.P.J. Petitions dismissed.

summary:
The detenu was arrested on December 17, 1985 pursuant to a detention order dated December 16, 1985 passed under section 3(2) of the and the grounds of detention were served on him the same day.
It was alleged in the order that since the year 1979 the detenu had been continuously engaging himself in committing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the communiy, i.e., removing of permanent way material stocked along rail lines for maintenance of rail tracks, removing parts of carriages, wagons and signal telecommunication materials utilised for repair of railway wagons and maintenance of signals; that he used to arrange to remove railway property with the help of his 'gang ' and stock the same in his godown, himself remaining behind the scence; that in a number of cases railway properties were loaded and carried away in a truck owned by the detenu and, thus, the work of maintenance of the tracks was hampered and quick movement of the wagons loaded with essential commodities such as foodgrains, arms, ammunition required by the general public and the armed forces could not be made.
The grounds indicated six different cases in which the detenu was involved, out of which in two cases he was acquitted and four cases were pending against him on the date of the passing of detention order.
Each of the grounds indicated in the detention order individually and collectively was not only germane but also sufficient to satisfy the detaining authority with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and as such it was necessary to detain him.
838 The grounds were communicated to the detenu under section 8 of the Act read with article 22(5) of the Constitution.
Copies of the documents mentioned in the detention order and placed before the detaining authority were enclosed with the detention order sent to the detenu.
The detenu was informed that he had a right to make a representation to the State Government against the order of detention, that he should address it in the manner indicated therein, that the State Government would within three weeks from the date of detention make a reference to the Advisory Board constituted under section 9 of the Act to make a report of detention and that he had right to make the representation to the Advisory Board and if he wanted he would be heard in person by the Advisory Board if necessary.
A reference under section 10 of the Act was made to the Advisory Board and the Advisory Board considered the representation dated January 8, 1986 of the detenu at the time of interviewing him on January 29, 1986.
The Board submitted its report under section 12(1) of the Act on February 3, 1986, which was received by the Government within the stipulated period of 7 weeks from the date of the detention, and the Government after considering the representation of the detenu and the report of the Advisory Board confirmed the defention order.
The detenu challenged the detention order under Article 226 of the Constitution alleging: (i) that the order was mala fide; (ii) that there was total absence of material; and (iii) that in any event the provisions of were not attracted but the provisions of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 would be attracted.
A Division Bench dismissed the petition holding that permanent way material is essential to the maintenance of railway track and safety of the railway travelling public; that there were good grounds for detention and it was not possible to hold that there were no grounds of detention relevant for the Act; that only was attracted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
In the Special Leave Petition and the Petition under Article 32, on behalf of the detenu it was contended; (i) that the grounds of detention were vague, irrelevant and non existent; (ii) that the grounds of detention related to as far back as 1979 and, therefore, it was not open to the detaining authority to order detention on those grounds because in respect of the alleged grounds criminal cases were pending against him 839 and he had been enlarged on bail; (iii) that when a judicial authority was satisfied on the materials placed before it that there were no grounds for keeping the detenu in detention, on the same materials the executive authority could not substitute the judicial judgment and order detention to prevent to detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the community; (iv) that in view of the fact that the detenu was on bail, the power of preventive detention had been used to defeat the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (v) that the alleged grounds were merely allegations of ordinary criminal cases which either had ended in acquittal or in respect of which appeals were pending or were pending determination and as such the formation of the belief by the detaining authority for the detention order was merely on surmises and on materials which the detaining authority was not competent to take note of; (vi) that the pending criminal cases did not disclose any activity of the detenu prejudicial to the maintenance of supplied and services essential to the community.
The connection of the detenu with the alleged offences was not there and as such the satisfaction could not be there of the detaining authority.
The detenu was in no manner connected with the alleged theft committed by certain named persons and though the ownership of the truck attributed to the detenu was not denied or disputed but the involvement of the detenu did not follow from that fact.
Dismissing the Writ Petition and the Special Leave Petition, ^ HLED: (1) There was no infraction of any procedural safeguard engrafted in and that there was rational subjective satisfaction arrived at bona fide on the basis of the materials available to the detaining authority and the materials had rational nexus with the purpose and object of the detention as contemplated by the Act.
The detention order was therefore valid.
[865A B] (2) In view of the Explanation to section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies Act, 1980, (Act 7 of 1980) the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the communities" has certain particular connotation.
But in the instant case, the conduct of the detenu was prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community in general and contemplated by section 3(2) of the and not in any particular mode contemplated by the Explanation to section 3(1) of Act 7 of 1980 and as such is not excluded by the Explanation to sub section
(2) of section 3 of the Act.
Therefore the High Court was right in the view it took on this aspect of the matter.
[853B D] 840 (3) Even the existence of one ground is sufficient to sustain the detention order.
[853F] (4) An order is mala fide when there is malice in law although there is no malice in fact.
The malice in law is to be inferred when order is made contrary to the objects and purposes of the Act.
Whether in any particular case this is so or not must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
The fact that the person sought to be detained is in fact under detention is a relevant and material factor but the allegations or the incidents leading to his detention have also to be borne in mind co related to the object of a particular Act under which preventive detention is contemplated.
[854E F] (5) The provides for preventive detention in certain cases.
Power has been given under section 3 authorising preventive detention and sub section
(2) thereof provides that the Central Government or the State Government might, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it was necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained then the same can be done.
The Explanation to this sub section makes it clear that the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" as defined in the Explanation to sub section
(1) of section 3 of the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980.
[854F H; 855A B] (6) Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under trial prisoner is likely to get bail, an order of detention under the National Securuity Act should not ordinarily be passed.
If the apprehension of the detaining authority is true, the bail application has to be opposed and in case bail is granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum has to be raised.
But this principle will have to be judged and applied in the facts and circumstances of each case.
Where a person accused of certain offences whereunder he is undergoing trial or has been acquitted, the appeal is pending and in respect of which he may be granted bail may not in all circumstances entitle an authority to direct preventive detention and the said principle must apply but where the offences in respect of which the detenu is acused are so inter linked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect 841 continuous maintenance of essential supplies and thereby jeopardise the security of the State, then subject to other conditions being fulfilled, a man being in detention would not detract from the order being passed for preventive detention.
[855D G] Ramesh Yadav vs District Magistrate, Etah and Others followed.
(7) For maintaining supplies throughout the country, the railways is per se essential and, therefore, interference with railway lines would be endangering the maintenance of supplies.
[856D] Mohd.
Subrati Alias Mohd. Karim vs State of West Bengal ; at 992 followed.
(8) The past conduct or antecedent history on which the authority purport to act should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary.
[861F] Rameshwar Shaw vs District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr. ; followed.
(9) Whether an order of detention could be passed against a person who was in detention or in jail would always have to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case.
[864E] Makhan Singh Tarsikha vs State of Punjab ; followed.
(10) Merely because the detaining authority had chosen to base the order of detention on the discharge of the detenu by Court for want of evidence it could not be held that the order was bad in law.
This branch of jurisprudence, as interpreted by this Court, has made it futile for a detenu to urge that because the ground of detention had been subject matter of criminal cases which had ended in discharge, therefore, the order of detention was mala fide.
The basic imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt did not apply to the component of subjective satisfaction for imprisonment for reasons of internal security.
There might be extreme cases where the Court had held a criminal case to be false and the detaining authority for want of evidence claimed to be satisfied about prospective prejudicial activities based on what a Court had found to be baseless.
There must be a live link between the 842 grounds of criminal activities alleged by the detaining authority and the purposes of detention.
This credible chain is snapped if there was too long and unexplained interval between the offending acts and order of detention.
If the detaining authority took the chance of conviction and, when the Court verdict went against it, fell back on its detention power to punish one whom the Court would not convict, it was an abuse and virtual nullification of the judicial process.
But if honestly, finding a dangerous person getting away with it by over awing witnesses or concealing the Commission cleverly, an authority thought on the material before it that there was need to interdict public disorder at his instance he might validly direct detention.
[862A D] (11) It was always the past conduct, activities or the antecedent history of a person which the detaining authority took into account, in making a detention order.
No doubt the past conduct, activities or antecedent history should ordinarily be proximate in point of time and should have a rational connection with the conclusion that the detention of the person was necessary but it was for the detaining authority who had to arrive at a subjective satisfaction in considering the past activities and coming to his conclusion if on the basis of those activities he was to be satisfied that the activities of the person concerned were such that he was likely to indulge in prejudicial activities necessitating his detention.
Where an earlier order of detention was either revoked or had expired, any subsequent detention order could be passed only on fresh facts arising after the expiry or revocation of the earlier order.
[861F H] Masood Alam Etc.
vs Union of the India and Others ; followed.
(12) Mere service of detention order in jail per se is not bad.
(13) The law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore should be strictly construed.
Care should be taken that the liberty of the person was not jeopardised, unless the case fell squarely within the four corners of the releyant law.
The law of preventive detention is not to be used merely to clip the wings of the accused who was involved in a criminal prosecution.
Where a person was enlarged on bail by a competent criminal Court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which was treated on the very same charge which was to be tried by the criminal Court.
[863A B] Vijay Narain Singh vs State of Bihar & Ors. ; followed.
843 (14) Having regard to the purpose of the Act, the detaining authority must take into consideration rational, proximate, reasonable past and present and that should be the basis for the horoscope for the future so as to determine whether the person proposed to be detained comes within the mischief of the Act.
If the person is in detention or is under trial and his conviction is likely but his conduct comes within the mischief of the Act then the authority is entitled to take a rational view of the matter.
The grounds must be there.
The decision must be bona fide.
[863D F] (15) The fact that a man is not in jail per se would not be determinative of the factor that order of preventive detention could not be passed against him.
The fact that a man was found not guilty in a criminal trial would not also be determinative of the factors alleged therein.
All these factors must be objectively considered and if there are casual connections and if bona fide belief was formed then there was nothing to prevent from serving an order of preventive detention even against the person who was in jail custody if there is imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty if the detaining authority was duly satisified.
[864E G] Ramesh Yadav vs District Magistrate, Etah and Others , Rameshwar Shah vs District Magistrate Burdwan & Anr. ; and Makhan Singh Tarsikka vs State of Punjab ; distinguished.
Maledath Bharathan Malyali vs The Commissioner of Police AIR 1950 Bombay 202, Merugu Satyanarayan Etc.
vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Others ; , Golam Hussain Alias Gama vs The Commissioner of Police Calcutta and Others ; , Sahib Singh Dugal vs Union of India, [1966] 1 SCR 313, Mohd. Salim Khan vs Shri C.C. Bose Bengal [1972] 2 SCC 550, Godavari Shamrao Parulekar vs State of Maharashtra & Others ; , Gopi Ram vs State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 241, Masood Alam Etc.
vs Union of India and Others ; , Dulal Roy vs The District Magistrate, Burdwan & Others ; , Dr. Ramakrishna Rawat vs District Magistrate, Jabalpur and Another, at 167 and 169, The Barium Chemicals Ltd. & Anr.
vs The Company Law Board and Others [1966] Supp.
SCR 311 at 354 and 363, Prakash Chandra Mehta vs Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala and Others [1985] Supp.
SCC 144 and Shiv Ratan Makim s/o.
Nandlal Makim vs Union of India and Others ; considered.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1284 of 1973.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.
1973 of the Kerala High Court in transfer petition No. 45 of 1972.
G. Vishwanath Iyer and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant.
P.K. Pillai and Miss Lily Thomas for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment dated 18 1 1973, passed by the High Court of Kerala in Writ Appeal No. 45 of 1972.
This appeal involves the correct interpretation and the scope and effect of Rule 51(A) of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules.
The Rule reads as follows: "51 A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rules 49 or 52 or on account of termina tion of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Education Agency, provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency.
" This Rule gives a teacher, discharged for want of vacancy or relieved as per Rule 49 or 52, a right to reappointment when a future vacancy comes into existence.
It is usual for managers of schools to appoint teachers to leave vacancies.
Sometimes more than one teacher get so appointed when there are more than one vacancies.
When such vacancies cease to exist by the permanent incumbent coming back, the temporary appointees go out.
When thereafter a permanent vacancy arises, those who had temporarily worked in leave vacancies get pre 439 ference to be appointed to that vacancy.
The question in this appeal is whether the Manager who has to appoint a teacher to a permanent vacancy has to go by the rule of "last come first go", to use the usual industrial jargon, in reverse, or whether the Manager has a right to choose between the temporary teachers, ignoring the principle usually accepted that a person who gets a right to a post by virtue of earlier appointment should not be ignored in preference to a person who gets such title later.
Before dealing with this case it will be useful to take note of a Note to Rule 51(A) which reads as follows: "If there are more than one claimant under this rule the order of preference shall be according to the date of first appointment.
If the date of first appointment is the same, then preference shall be decided with refer ence to age, the older being given the first preference.
In making such appointment, due regard should be given to requirement of subjects and to the instructions issued by the Director under sub rule (4) of Rule 1 as far as High Schools are concerned.
" This note gives the correct guideline based on justice and fair play.
Now, we will briefly state the facts.
The appellant is a B.A., B .Ed.
degree holder.
She is fully qualified to be appointed as a teacher in any Government or aided school in the State of Kerala.
She was appointed in a temporary vacan cy in the school of the first respondent, from 13 1 1970 to 16 3 1970, in the academic year 1969 70.
The appointment has to be approved by the District Educational Officer, the second respondent herein, which was duly done.
Since the vacancy in which the petitioner was working ceased to exist.
She went out of the job on 16 3 1970.
A further vacancy arose on 22 8 1970 and it continued till 17 12 1970.
She worked in this vacancy also.
She went out of service when this vacancy ceased.
Respondent No. 4 is another teacher who worked in the same school in another leave vacancy, from 1 91970 to 26 11 1970.
The appellant thus had a total service of six months and one day while the 4th respondent had 2 months and 25 days of service, under the 1st respondent.
A permanent vacancy arose in the school for the academic year 1971 72, for Social Studies when the Head Master in that school retired.
The appellant made a representation to the Manager for being appointed against that vacancy.
The 1st respondent appointed the 4th respondent.
The appellant is a Social Studies teacher.
She thereupon 440 complained to the second respondent.
The second respondent found the appointment of the 4th respondent irregular and held that the legitimate claimant for the permanent post was the appellant.
On this finding he did not approve the ap pointment of the 4th respondent.
The management took the matter in appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction, respondent No. 3, who by his order dated 9 11 1971, allowed the appeal.
Aggrieved by this order the appellant moved the High Court of Kerala by filing Original Petition No. 5064 of 1971, challenging the validity of the order passed by the 3rd respondent, inter alia, contending that as per Rule 51(A), of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules, she had a preferential claim and that the appointment of the 4th respondent was illegal.
The learned Single Judge dismissed the original petition by his Judgment dated 1 2 1972, on the short ground that Rule 51(A) conferred a right on the appellant for appoint ment in the future vacancies in the school and it did not restrict the right of the management to make his own choice among the thrown out teachers.
The appellant pursued the matter by filing Writ Appeal 45 of 1972.
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal agreeing with the learned Single Judge that the management had a discretion to choose among the thrown out teachers.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
Though long years have passed by since this dispute arose wherefore we would have normally declined interference with the Judgment under appeal, we think it necessary to lay down the law correctly to avoid injustice in cases like this and to prevent abuse of power of those in whom right is conferred under Rule 51(A).
Now, both the appellant and the 4th respondent are working in the same school.
Though the subject to be taught by the appellant and the 4th respondent figured at one stage as an additional plea before the learned Single Judge, it is inconsequential for this Judg ment, though the learned Single Judge held in favour of the appellant on the question of the subject.
Let us read the rule in question.
This rule speaks of qualified teachers.
Both the appellant and the 4th respond ent satisfy this requirement.
It speaks of teachers being relieved as per Rule 49 or Rule 52 or on account of termina tion of vacancies.
Rule 49 speaks of termination of teachers after vacation, when the vacancy in which they work extend over summer vacation and Rule 52 speaks of teachers relieved on account of reduction in the number of posts under orders of the department.
We are not concerned with these rules.
Here, both the teachers were relieved on account of termina tion of vacancies.
The 441 Rule states, that such teachers shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency.
A future vacancy has arisen.
The school where appointment is sought is under the same Educational Agency.
The proviso is not material in this case.
All the conditions for application of this Rule are satisfied.
The only question that has to be answered is whether a teacher who had worked in a vacancy earlier has a preferential right over a teacher who worked later in the same school.
It is true that the rule does not in terms, mandate that the one who worked earlier should be preferred to the one who worked later.
But would it be in accord with justice and fair play, to prefer the one who worked later to the one who worked earlier? In the absence of anything in the Rule giving to the management a right to choose between the two, on the ground of suitability, merit or effeciency.
The Judgment of the Division Bench under appeal was delivered on 18 1 1973.
The note quoted above was inserted on 4 7 1972.
This note leaves no doubt as to how Rule 51(A) has to be construed.
The Rule states that preference will be given with reference to the date of appointment.
When the date of appointment is the same, age should prevail; the eider being given the first preference.
Of course, it contains a rider that due regards should be given to the requirements of subject as far as High Schools are concerned.
The Division Bench did not choose to accept the clarification contained in the note.
The learned Judges held against the appellant, on the wording of the Rule that, in terms, it did not provide for any preference between two or more persons and did not consider it proper to read more into this Rule by consider ing the note to Rule 5 in the same chapter.
Although we do not say that a note to a Rule has any binding effect, it does indeed have a persuasive force.
It cannot be ignored that this note has come as an appendage to Rule 51(A) for clarificatory purposes though it does not form a part of the Rule.
The learned Judges held that propriety and fairness required a decision in favour of the appellant, when they observed: "It would be proper no doubt to give an earlier appointee preference.
But seeing the rule as we ought to see every rule and every section in the Kerala Education Rules and the Kerala Education Act as restrictions or regulations in the matter of the free right of the manager to choose and appoint, it is impossible to read more into the rule.
" With respect, we feel that the learned Judges were influenced more by the words in the abstract contained in the rule and not with the fairness behind the rule.
The learned Judges of the Division Bench had before them 442 another Division Bench Judgment where the identical rule fell for consideration.
The relevant portion of that Judg ment was extracted by learned Judges.
We also find it useful to extract it here: "5.
Very recently, in Writ Appeal No. 44 of 1970, we had occasion to construe Rule 51 A.
And we then observed that despite its unhappy wording, in particular, the use of the words, "preference for appointment" to mean "right to appointment," we had little doubt that what the rule meant was that a person discharged for want of vacancy had a right to be appointed in future vacancies, provided, of course, he had not by word or deed given up that right or, we might now add, disqualified himself meanwhile.
And we added that the present tense of the words, "are relieved" appearing in the rule was the present tense of logic, not of time, so that, in effect, the rule should be read as if it said "qualified teachers who stand relieved" shall have pref erence.
In that view, it is, no doubt.
true that the petitioner 's appointment 's between 1957 and 1961 furnished here with a title to re appointment notwithstanding that they were made before the rule came into force, and it is at least arguable that where no priority in preference is prescribed by the rule, priority should be determined by priority of title.
The question, then, is whether the plea of aban donment to donment taken by the 3rd respondent is well founded.
" The above observation was got over by the Division Bench with the observation that "it was obiter and are certainly not intended to be conclusive observations in the matter.
If so, we would have referred this case to a Full Bench.
" We would have been happy if the appellate Bench had referred this question to a full Bench and resolved the controversy since the High Court felt that the appellant 's contention carried with it the element of fair play and justice and was at least, to put it mildly, in some measure supported by another Division Bench of the same Court.
We agree that the preference in Rule 51 A should be based on priority of title.
In this case, we do not have a plea of abandonment or other disqualification.
The learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice how this Rule was understood by the Manager of the same school when another vacancy arose earlier.
At that time also the present appellant applied to the Manager, seeking appointment in the vacancy conse 443 quent on the retirement of a Head Master.
The Manager de clined the request and sent a reply to the appellant, the relevant portion of which, eloquent in favour of the appel lant, reads as follows: "Rule 51(A) Chapter XIV A K.E.R. lays down that qualified teachers who are relieved on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointments to future vacancies.
When two persons apply for a post by virtue of the concession laid down in Rule 51 A, it is the natural justice to select the persons who has earlier and longer period of previous service.
Hence considering all the aspects of the question, the management has appointed Smt.
P.E. Sosamma in the said vacan cy.
" The Manager then understood the rule correctly, but later incorrectly.
That is why we said earlier in our Judg ment that the interpretation given by the High Court to this Rule can result in abuse of this discretionary power with the Manager.
If the Government wanted to clothe the Manager the power to choose among rival contenders to a future vacancy, the rule should be suitably amended.
The rule as it stands clearly confers priority to the earlier appointee.
The appellant, therefore, is entitled to succeed.
We set aside the order of the Division Bench under appeal and allow this appeal.
The appellant will be entitled to all the benefits as though she was appointed when the vacancy in question arose.
We would like to make it clear that this direction of ours will not enable her to draw salary for the period she had not worked but only other benefits such as seniority, increments etc.
The first respondent will pay costs of the appellant.
A.P.J. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Rule 51(A) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules provided that qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rules 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Education Agency.
A Note was appended to this Rule on 4.7.1972 which provided that if there are more than one claimant under this Rule the order of the preference shall be according to the date of first appoint ment.
If the date of first appointment is the same, then preference shall be decided with reference to age, the older being given the first preference.
In making such appoint ment, due regard should be given to requirement of subjects and to the instructions issued by the Director under sub Rule(4) of Rule 1 as far as High Schools are concerned.
The appellant, who was duly qualified, was appointed as a teacher in a temporary vacancy in the school of the first respondent from 13.1.1970 and her appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer, the second respondent.
On the vacancy being ceased to exist she went out of job on 16.3.1970.
She again worked in a further vacancy from 22.8.70 to 17.12.1970.
She went out of service when this vacancy ceased.
Respondent No. 4, another teacher, worked in the same school in another leave vacancy from 1.9.1970 to 26.11.1970.
In the academic year 1971 72 a permanent vacancy arose for Social Studies.
The appellant being a Social Studies teacher made a representation claiming appointment against that vacancy.
But the first 437 respondent appointed the 4th respondent.
On a complaint being made by the appellant, the second respondent found the appointment of the 4th respondent irregular and held that the legitimate claimant for the permanent post was the appellant and, therefore, did not approve the appointment of the 4th respondent.
The Regional Deputy Director of Public Instructions, respondent No. 3, allowed the appeal of the management.
The appellant filed a petition under Article 226 challenging the validity of the order passed by the third respondent, inter alia, contending that she had a preferen tial claim and that the appointment of the 4th respondent was illegal.
A Single Judge dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 51(A) conferred a right on the appellant for appointment in the future vacancies in the school and it did not restrict the right of the management to make his own choice among the thrown out teachers.
The Division Bench also dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant.
On the question whether a teacher who had worked in a vacancy earlier has preferential right over a teacher who worked later in the same school, allowing the appeal, HELD: l. Rule 51(A) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules does not mandate that the one who worked earlier should be preferred to the one who worked later.
[441B] 2.1 Although a Note to a Rule does not have any bind ing effect, it does indeed have a persuasive force.
[441E] 2.2 It cannot be ignored that the Note has come as an appendage to Rule 51(A) for qualificatory purposes though it does not form a part of the Rule.
[441F] 3.
The preference in Rule 51(A) should be based on priority of title.
[442G] 4.
The High Court while interpreting Rule 51(A) was influenced more by the words in the abstract contained in the Rule and not fairness behind the Rule.
The interpreta tion given by the High Court to this Rule can result in abuse of discretionary power with the management.
If the Government wanted to clothe the Manager with the power to choose among rival contendors to a future vacancy, the Rule should be suitably amended.
[443C D] 438 5.
The Rule as it stands clearly confers priority to the earlier appointee.
The appellant, therefore, is entitled to succeed.
The appellant will be entitled to all the benefits as though she was appointed when the vacancy in question arose.
However, this will not enable her to draw salary for the period she had not worked but only other benefits such as seniority, increments etc.
[443D F]


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1743 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.11.
1986 of the Rajasthan high Court in S.B. Civil Misc.
Appeal No. 59 of 1980.
WITH Civil Writ Petition No. 197 of 1877 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
section Rangarajan, B.P. Singh and ,Sanjay Parikh for the Peti tioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The petitioner M/s. Hindu Jea Band, Jaipur which is a partnership firm carrying on the business of playing music on occasions, such as, marriages and other social functions questioned its liability to pay the contri bution under the provisions of the Employees ' State Insur ance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') in a petition filed under section 75 of the Act before the Em ployees ' State Insurance Court, Jaipur principally on two grounds (i) that the place where it was carrying on business was not a shop and (ii) that its business being one of intermittent or seasonal character the Act could not be extended to its business.
The Employees ' State Insurance Court rejected the petition filed by the petitioner and directed it to pay the amount which had been computed as the arrears by the Regional Director of the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation, Jaipur.
An appeal filed against the decision of the Employees ' State Insurance Court, Jaipur by the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court of Rajasthan.
This petition under Article 136 of the Constitution is filed against the judgment of the High Court.
The petitioner has also filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitu tion questioning the validity of sub section (5) of section 1 of the Act and the notification issued by the State Gov ernment under it to which reference will be made hereafter.
The Act did not apply to shops and such other establish ments straight away on the Act coming into force in the State of Rajasthan.
But by the notification dated September 20, 1975 issued under subsection (5) of section 1 of the Act the Government of Rajasthan extended all the provisions of the Act to certain classes of establishments 380 and areas in the State notification.
Item 3 (iii) in the Schedule to the said notification brought within the purview of the Act shops in which 20 or more persons had been em ployed for wages on any day of the preceding 12 months and appointed on October 26, 1975 as the date from which the said notification would come into force.
The petitioner as held by the Employees ' State Insurance Court, had employed 23 persons on wages during the relevant period.
Since the petitioner did not comply with the provisions of the Act the authorities of the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation, Jaipur called upon the petitioner to make contributions as required by the Act with effect from October 26, 1975.
The petition before the Employees ' State Insurance Court was filed by the petitioner on such a demand being made on it questioning the validity of the said demand.
The first contention urged in support of the petition is that since the petitioner was not selling any goods in the place of its business but was only engaged in arranging for musical performances on occasions such as marriages etc.
its business premises cannot be called a 'shop '.
We do not agree with the narrow construction placed by the petitioner on the expression 'shop ' which appears in the notification issued under section 1(5) of the Act which is a beneficient legis lation.
The word 'shop ' has not been defined in the Act.
A shop is no doubt an establishment (other than a factory) to which the Act can be extended under section 1(5) of the Act provided other requirements are satisfied.
In Collins Eng lish Dictionary the meaning of the word 'shop ' is given thus: "(i) a place esp.
a small building for the retail sale of goods and services and (ii) a place for the performance of a specified type of work; workshop.
" It is obvious from the above meaning that a place where services are sold on retail basis is also a shop.
It is not disputed that the petitioner has been making available on payment of the stipulated price the services of the members of the group of musicians employed by it on wages.
We, therefore, hold that the place where the petitioner has been carrying on business is a shop to which the Act is applicable by virtue of the notification referred to above.
The first contention, there fore, fails.
We do not find much substance in the second contention too.
The fact that the services are rendered by the employ ees engaged by the petitioner intermittently or during marriages does not entitle the petitioner to claim any exemption from the operation of the Act.
The petitioner cannot rely on sub section (4) of section 1 of the Act which refers to factories only in support of its case.
We are concerned in this case with a shop and not a factory as defined under section 2(12) of the 381 Act.
Moreover the services of the employees of the petition er are not confined only to marriages.
It cannot also be said that marriages take place only during a specified part of the year.
Nowa days marriages take place throughout the year.
The petitioner provides music at several other social functions also which may take place 'during all seasons.
The definition of an 'employee ' under the Act has a wider mean ing.
The employees who worked outside the business premises but those whose duties are connected with the business are also 'employees ' within the meaning of section 2(9)(i) of the Act.
(see Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd. vs Regional Director Employees State Insurance Corporation Etc.), Even those employees who are paid daily wages or those who are part time employees are employ ees for purposes of the Act.
Hence we do not find any merit in this special Leave Petition.
The petition, therefore, fails and it is dismissed.
Along with the Special Leave Petition the petitioner has presented before this Court a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the notifi cation issued by the State Government on the ground that the power conferred under the Act on the State Government by sub section (5) of section 1 authorising the State Govern ment to extend all or any of the provisions of the Act to other establishments in the State suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative powers.
It is also contended that the application of the Act to businesses like the one which is being carried on by the petitioner during certain seasons only of the year is violative of Article 14, Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitu tion.
Having carefully considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner we find no merit in any of the contentions urged in the writ Petition.
The Writ Petition is also, therefore, dismissed.
S.R. Petition dismissed.

summary:
All the provisions of the were extended with effect from 26.10.1975, to certain classes of establishments and areas in the State of Rajas than, by virtue of a Notification dated September 20, 1975 issued under sub section (5) of section 1 of the Act.
Item 3(iii) in the Schedule to the said Notification brought within the purview of the Act shops in which 20 or more persons had been employed for wages on any day of the pre ceding 12 months.
M/s Hindu Jea Band, Jaipur had employed 23 persons on wages during the relevant period, but did not comply with the provisions of the Act.
The demand made by the authori ties of the Employees ' State Insurance Corporation to make contributions as required under the Act with effect from 26.10.1975 was questioned by M/s Hindu Jea Band by a peti tion under section 75 of the Act before the Employees State Insurance Court on two grounds; (i) that the place where it was carrying on business was not a shop; and (ii) that its business being one of the intermittent or seasonal character of the Act could not be extended to its business.
Having lost the case before the E.S.I. Court and in appeal 378 before the High Court, the petitioner has come in appeal before the Supreme Court.
The petitioner also filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the Notification as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution, and section 1(5) of the Act itself as suffering from the vice of excessive delegation of legis lative powers.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD:1.
The place, where the petitioner has been carry ing on business of making available on payment of the stipu lated price the services of the members of the group of musicians employed by it on wages is a shop, to which the Act is applicable by virtue of the Notification dated 20.9.1975 issued under section 1(5) of the Act which is a beneficient legislation.
Though the word 'shop ' has not been defined in the Act.
a shop is no doubt an establishment (other than a factory) to which the Act can be extended under section 1(5) of the Act provided other requirements are satisfied.
[380D E] 2.
The fact that the services are rendered by the em ployees ' engaged by the petitioner intermittently or during marriages does not entitle the petitioner to claim any exemption from the operation of the Act.
as much as the place of business of the petitioner is a "shop" and not a "factory" as defined in section 2(12) and section 1(4) refers only to the factories.
Further, the services of the employees of the petitioner are not confined only to mar riages which now a days take place throughout the year but also to provide music at several other social functions also which may take place during all seasons.
[380G H; 381A] The definition of an "employee" under the Act has a wider meaning.
The employees who worked outside the business premises but those whose duties are connected with the business are also 'employees ' within the meaning of section 2(9)(i) of the Act.
Even these employees who are paid daily wages or those who are part time employees are employees for purposes of the Act.
[381B] Nagpur Electric Light & Power Ltd. vs Regional Director Employees State Insurance Corporation etc., , referred to.
The power conferred upon the State under section 1(5) does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of essential legislative powers.
Nor does the application of the Act to businesses like the one which is being carried on by the petitioner cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 or 19(1 )(g) or section 21 of the Constitution.
[381D E] 379