judgement:
vil appeal No. 239240 of 1975.
110 From the Judgment and Decree dated 13.3.1974 of the Karnataka High Court in R.F. Appeal No. 103, 111, 120 of 1970 and 11 & 12 of 1971 and 142 of 1972 with Cross objec tions in R.F.A. No. 111 of 1970.
K.N. Bhatt, G. Vishvanatha lyer, T.S. Krishnamurthy, M.K. Pandit, P.H. Parekh, K.R. Nagaraja, M. Veerappa, P.R. Ramasesh, Vineet Kumar, S.S. Javalai, R.B. Datar, and R.S. Hegde, for the appearing parties.
This appeal has been filed in this Court after getting a certificate from the High Court of Karnataka under Article 133(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.
The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellants owned an Industrial concern by the name of Bangalore Fancy Fire Works and with a view to improve the industry and develop it further they sought aid from the GoVernment of Mysore, one of the respondents, under the Mysore State Aid to Industries Act, 1951 (hereinafter re ferred to as the Act) and application for this aid was made to the concerned authorities of the State on 23.1.1953 wherein an aid in the nature of financial assistance to the tune of Rs. one lac was sought.
By the orders of the compe tent authority dated 3.9.1953 the financial assistance of Rs.60,000 by way of loan was sanctioned.
This financial assistance by way of loan was secured from the Bank of Mysore Ltd. and the State Government agreed to stand as surety and also to guarantee the repayment of loan with interest to the Bank of Mysore Ltd.
It was also agreed that the appellants who receive the aid will execute a deed of mortgage in favour of the Government of Mysore of their properties in consideration of their promise to guarantee the repayment of sums to be advanced to them by the Bank of Mysore.
Pursuant to these arrangements the appellant execut ed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of the Government of Mysore dated 14.11.1953.
The Government of Mysore in their turn executed a deed of guarantee dated 20.2.1954 in favour of the Bank of Mysore Ltd. The appellants in addition also executed a pronote in favour of the Bank of Mysore dated 8.12. 1953 for a sum of Rs.60,000 agreeing to repay the said sum together with interest @ 2 1/2 per cent per annum over and above the rate of Reserve Bank of India with a minimum 6 per cent per annum.
111 This amount of Rs.60,000 was given to the appellants as loan by Bank of Mysore according to the directions issued by the Government of Mysore.
It is not disputed that at that time the banks ordinari ly would not have advanced the loan for industry for its further development and would not have advanced on conces sional rate of interest as was done in the present case as admittedly this was an aid arranged by the Government of Mysore under the Act and it was in accordance with the scheme of the Act that the Government of Mysore arranged this loan at a concessional rate from the Bank as an aid under the Act.
This loan was to be repaid in two instalments and it is not in dispute that the appellants did not pay the loan on the due dates of the instalments.
According to the appellants as alleged by them before the Trial Court they were not in a position to pay the loan within the stipulated period as the concern became financially unsound and that the respondent, the State Government of Karnataka started compelling the appellants to pay off the loan to the bank and as it was not paid the Government of Karnataka, the respondent got the plaint schedule properties sold under the proceedings for recovery of land revenue and got the money recovered.
It was contended by the appellants that the respondent defendant State could not got the properties sold by public auction in accordance with the procedure of recov ery for arrears of land revenue.
As they had only a mortgage deed of the property in their favour and that the money could only be recovered from the appellants if the respond ent State had paid the loan of the Bank first and even thereafter the only course open to the respondent State was to file a suit for reimbursement on the basis of the mort gage and it was therefore contended that the sale of the properties was without the authority of law.
The learned trial court and also the High Court came to the conclusion that the Government of Karnataka was entitled to recover the amount which they secured as an aid to the respondents under the scheme of the Act and for that purpose lawfully resorted to the sale of the properties by following the procedure of the recovery of arrears of land revenue as was provided for in Section 19 of the State Act and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff respondent.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant frankly conceded that the facts in the case are not in dispute.
The High Court of Karnataka has taken a view that as this loan was given to the appellant by the State Bank of Mysore but it was secured as an aid under the Act referred to above therefore proceedings under Sec.
19 could be taken but it was contended by learned counsel that the State was only a 112 guarantor and the creditor was the State Bank of Mysore and so long as the loan was not recovered from the guarantor it could not be said that there was anything payable to the State Govt.
and in view of the language of Sec.
19 it was contended that so long as there was nothing payable to the State Govt.
the action under Sec.
19 could not have been taken.
Learned counsel frankly conceded that although the language in Sec. 19 do not refer to the moneys payable to the State but it only refers to moneys payable under the Act but it was contended that in the scheme of the Act and the transactions between the parties, State Govt. could take action to recover the money only if the State Government has paid the loan in favour of the State Bank of Mysore on the terms of the guarantee which was executed by the State Gov ernment.
Learned counsel therefore contended that the view taken by the High Court that if any sum was payable under the Act State Government could take steps under Section 19 is not justified.
The learned counsel for the respondent State and the other respondents who are purchasers of the property in auction contended that the scheme of the Act indicates that in order to industrialise the State this Act was enacted wherein the State took upon itself the responsibility of providing aids in various kinds to the industries and such aids were provided for under the Statutes.
One of the modes of providing this aid was to secure a loan from the bank in favour of the industry which ordinarily was not available and it has been brought to our notice that even in the application which the respondent made for this aid to the State Government clearly admitted that no loan from bank could be available unless the State secured aid under this Act.
It was therefore contended that the aid may have been secured from the bank but it was an aid which was secured under the provisions of this Act and in this view Section 19 clearly comes into operation and hence the moneys were payable under this Act and if it was so the State Government was entitled to realise the amount as arrears of land reve nue as contemplated in Section 19.
The scheme of the Act was to provide aid to industries.
Preamble of the Act itself states: Preamble Whereas it is expedient to regulate the giving of aid by the Government to industries in the State of Mysore.
Under Section 7 of this Act it was provided that the Government could give aid to the industries in the following ways and sub clause (b) provided for cash credit facility, overdraft or fix advance with the bank.
113 Section 7.
Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the rules framed thereunder, the Government shall have power to give aid to an industrial business or enterprise in one or more of the following ways: (a) by granting loan; (b) by guaranteeing a cash credit, overdraft or fixed advance with a bank; It is not in dispute that this loan which was secured to the appellants from the bank was an aid falling under Sub clause (b) of Section 7.
The provisions of the Act indicate the manner in which the loans could be secured, the manner in which it was to be paid and in view of all this it was not disputed that although this loan became payable in favour of the State Bank of Mysore but it may fall within the ambit of the definition of moneys payable under this Act.
The only controversy raised before us that Section 19 could be so interpreted that the Govt.
could use the author ity under Section 19 for recovery only if moneys were pay able to the Government.
As discussed earlier the scheme of the Act indicate that whether the aid has been provided for by the State or has been secured by the State from other financial agencies.
It was contemplated that the State would secure the repayment of the loan or recovery of whatever aid was given and with a view to secure those repayments Section 19 was specifically enacted.
Legislature in its wisdom therefore did not use the words payable to the State but used 'all moneys payable under the Act ' in the Section, it appears with a clear intention that whenever any money becomes payable which was secured to the industry under the scheme of this Act.
It will be open to the State Govt.
to follow the procedure for recovery as has been provided for in clause (1) Section 19.
Section 19 sub clause (1).
All moneys payable under this Act, including any interest chargeable thereon and costs, if any, incurred, if not paid when due, may be recov ered from the person aided and his surety if any, under the law for the time being in force, as if they were arrears of land revenue.
It was contended that ordinarily if the State was the guarantor and the creditor was the Bank of Mysore guarantor State could only recover from the appellants if the amount had been paid to the credi 114 tors so far as the normal legal procedures is concerned.
It may depend upon the terms and the conditions of the guaran tee.
But in the present case we are dealing with aids pro vided for under the scheme of this Act and it is only in respect of the moneys payable under the scheme of this Act that Section 19(1) comes into operation and it appears that it was in accordance with the scheme of the Act that Legis lature in its wisdom chose not to use the further phrase payable to the Government under Section 19(1).
Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision in the case of section Peer Mohammed vs B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, ; This decision in our opinion is not at all relevant as in the present case we are dealing with the enactment where a special procedure has been provided for recovery of moneys payable under this Act.
In this view of the matter therefore in our opinion the High Court was fight in not accepting the contention of the appellant and main taining the dismissal of the suit.
Appeal is therefore dismissed.
In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellants owned an industrial concern and sought aid from the State Government under the Mysore State Aid to Industries Act, 1951 with a view to improve the industry and develop it further.
An application for aid was made to the concerned authorities and the competent authority granted the financial assistance by way of loan.
This financial assistance was secured from the Bank of Mysore and the State Government agreed to stand as surety and also to guarantee the repayment of the loan with interest to the Bank.
The appellants who received the aid executed a deed of simple mortgage in favour of the State Government of their proper ties in consideration of their promise to guarantee the repayment of the loan.
The State Government in turn executed a deed of guarantee in favour of the Bank.
The appellants in addition also executed a promote in favour of the Bank agreeing to repay the said sum with interest.
The appellants were not in a position to pay the loan within the stipulated period as the concern had become financially unsound.
The State Government started compelling the appellants to pay off the loan to the Bank and as it was not paid the State Government got the properties of the appellant sold under the proceedings for recovery of land revenue and got the money recovered.
The appellants filed a civil suit and contended that the sale of the properties was without the authority of law, and that the money could only be recovered from the appellant if the State Government had paid the loan of the Bank first and even thereafter the only course open to the State Government was to file a suit for reimbursement on the basis of the mortgage.
109 The suit was dismissed by the trial court and the order was confirmed by the High Court in appeal.
The Trial Court and the High Court came to the conclu sion that the Government of Karnataka was entitled to recov er the amount which they secured as an aid to the respond ents under the scheme of the Act and for that purpose law fully resorted to the sale of the properties by following the procedure of recovery of arrears of land revenue as provided for in Section 19 of the Act.
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the view taken by the High Court that if any sum was payable under the Act, the State Government could take steps under Section 19 of the Act was not justi fied.
Dismissing the Appeal, HELD: 1.
The scheme of the Mysore State Aid to Indus tries Act, 1951 indicate that whether the aid has been provided for by the State or has been secured by the State from other financial agencies, it was contemplated that the State would secure the repayment of the loan or recovery of whatever aid was given, and with a view to secure those repayments Section 19 was specifically enacted.
[113D E] 2.
Legislature in its wisdom therefore did not use the words 'payable to the State ' but used 'all moneys payable under this Act ' in the Section, it appears with a clear intention that whenever money becomes payable which was secured to the industry under the scheme of the Act, it will be open to the State Government to follow the procedure for recovery as has been provided for in clause (1) of Section 19.
[113E F] 3.
It is only in respect of the moneys payable under the scheme of this Act that section 19(1) comes into operation and it appears that it was in accordance with the scheme of the Act that the Legislature in its wisdom chose not to use the further phrase payable to the Government under Section 19(1).
[114B] section Peer Mohammed vs B. Mohan Lal Sowcer, [1988] 2 S.C.C. 513, referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1843 of 1986 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.
1986 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.A. No. 3909(W) of 1986 in W.P.No. 2042 of 1986.
Anil Dev Singh, S.N. Kacker, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, Umesh Chandra, Krishan Chandra and C.P. Lal for the Appellants.
R.K. Jain, Pradeep K. Aggarwal, Rakesh Khanna, R.P. Singh and R.D. Upadhyay for the Respondents.
These involve common question.
It would, however, be appro priate to deal with the facts of Civil Appeal No. 1845 of 1986 which is an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Writ Petition Nos. 8145 and 8146 of 1985 decided on 20th November, 1985.
The other two Civil Appeals deal with identical questions.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved it would be necessary to refer to certain facts of the case.
Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act was enacted by the U.P. Legislature in 1973.
On or about 11th of September, 1974, Lucknow had been declared to be a develop ment area by a notification.
On or about 24th of September, 1984 Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was made effec tive subsequent to the 24th of September, 1984.
On the 8th of December, 1984 a Notification under section 4(1) and a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme (Gomti Nagar) Phase II was pub lished.
On the 28th December, 1984 Notification under Sec tion 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of L.D.A. Office/Nagar Maha Palika 96 Office and other offices on B.N. Road was published.
On the 2nd January, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and decla ration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Dalibagh Housing Scheme was published.
On the 4th of February, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Sec tion 6 of the Act in respect of Extension of Kursi Road upto Mahanagar through Vishnupun was published.
On 21st February, 1985 Notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Scheme (Somti Nagar), Phase III was published.
In respect of the several of these matters on diverse dates several writ petitions had been moved and orders were passed by the High Court staying taking over of possession of the diverse lands, if not already taken over, in, case notifications under section 4(1) and section 6 of the Act have been passed simultaneously.
As mentioned hereinbefore, we are concerned in these appeals with the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 20th November, 1985 in Writ Petitions Nos. 8145 and 8146 of 1985.
The petitioners before the High Court and the respondents herein are owners of plots situated in village Sonera, Tehsil Kichha, District Nainital.
Their land was being acquired under the provisions of the Act.
A Noti fication under the said Act was issued on 6th of May, 1985 declaring that the land in question including the respond ents ' land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for construction of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kichha.
The Notification further contained a decla ration that since there was urgency for the acquisition, the provisions of Section 17(1 A) and Section 17(4) of the Act shall apply and the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act shall not apply.
On the same day, that is to say, on 6th of May, 1985 another Notification was issued by the State Government under Section 6 of the Act making declaration that the land in dispute was required for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kichha.
That Notification also con tained a direction as contemplated by Section 17(1) and (l A) of the Act authorising the Collector to take possession of the land even before the declaration of the award under Section 11 of the Act.
Both the aforesaid notifications were published on the same day, namely, the 22nd of May, 1985.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed two writ petitions challenging the validity of the said notifications.
It was urged on behalf of the respondents before the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad that in view of the amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amend ment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 97 68 of 1984) the declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act could not have been made on the same day on which the notification under section 4 of the Act was published, it submitted that now after the amendment, the Notification under Section 6 of the Act can only be issued after the Notification under Section 4 was published.
The High Court found substance in the said submission.
According to the High Court, prior to the amendment of the Act by the Amend ing Act No. 58 of 1984 it was permissible for the Government to issue Notification under Section 4 of the Act and to make declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act simultaneously and it was further permissible to publish both the notification simultaneously as held by this Court in Srnt Sornawanti & Ors.
vs State of Punjab, The High Court noted that normally after the issue of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act objections are invited as contemplated by Section 5 A of the Act and after holding enquiry the Collector submits report to the Govern ment and on consideration of the same, the Government makes declaration as contemplated by Section 6 of the Act.
Posses sion of the land is taken after the award is declared.
But in case of urgency where the Government considers it neces sary to acquire the land immediately and to make it possible even prior to the making of the award, it has the power to dispense with the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act.
Section 17 of the Act confers special power on the Govern ment and the Collector in case of urgency for immediate taking of possession after the issue of the Notification under Section 6 of the Act and without complying with the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act.
Section 17(4) of the Act prior to this amendment conferred power on the Govern ment to direct that the provisions of Section 5 A shall not apply, if in its opinion the provisions of sub sections (1), (l A) and (2) of Section 17 were applicable.
The High Court was of the view that on the issue of such a direction by the Government, a declaration could be made as contemplated by Section 6 of the Act in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act.
According to the High Court, prior to the amendment of Section 17(4) of the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, a declaration as contemplated under Section 6 of the Act could be made at any time along with the publication of the Noti fication under Section 4 of the Act but after the amendment of Section 17(4), a declaration as contemplated by Section 6 of the Act can be made only "after the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1)".
In view of this amendment Notification under Section 6 of the Act had to be made after the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published.
The expression "after the date of publication of the notification" as added to sub section (4) of Section 17 of the Act contemp 98 lated the issue of Notification under Section 6 of the Act only after the publication of Notification and under Section 4(1) of the Act.
The High Court was of the view that prior to the amendment, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act could be made simultaneously with the publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.
But after the amendment, a declaration can only be made "after the date of publication of the Notification" under Section 4.
The High Court came to the conclusion that there must be difference of dates between the date of the publication of the Notifi cation under Section 4 and Section 6.
After the Amendment, according to the High Court, both the notifications cannot be published on the same date.
The publication of the Noti fication under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act on the same date would be contrary to Section 17(4) of the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984 and would render the Notification under Section 6 of the Act invalid.
The High Court found that the Notification under Section 6 of the Act containing declara tion that the land in dispute was needed for a public pur pose was issued on 6th of May, 1985 and published simultane ously along with the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on the same date, namely, May 22, 1985.
This, according to the High Court, was in clear violation of Section 17(4) of the Act.
In this view, the impugned Notification under Section 6 was rendered illegal and as such the appellants were not entitled to take possession of the respondents ' land.
The High Court accordingly quashed the notification dated 6th May, 1985 issued under Section 6 of the Act.
The short question with which these appeals are con cerned is, whether the declaration under Section 6 of the Act could be issued simultaneously along with the notifica tion under Section 4 of the Act in view of the amendment made to Section 17(4) of the Act.
To decide the question it is necessary to appreciate the scheme of the Act after amendment.
Section 4 of the Act envisages publication of preliminary notification where it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, it enjoins in such a situation that a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in certain other daily newspapers and the substance of the notification is to be given at a convenient places in that locality.
It is not necessary to dilate on the subsequent procedure as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act.
Section 5 of the Act enjoins payment of damages on the acquisition.
Section 5 A of the Act provides for hearing of objection which has been notified under Section 4 of the Act and the procedure thereto.
Thereafter comes declaration under Sec tion 6 of the Act.
The sections provide that after consider ation of the report, if any, made 99 under Section 5A that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration in the manner enjoined in section 6 of the Act shah be made.
The provi sions of procedure to be followed on declaration under Section 6 of the Act, are not directly relevant for the purpose of these appeals.
Section 17 of the Act with which we are directly concerned here provides with cases of urgen cy where the Government can dispense with some of the provi sions of the Act especially regarding intiviting objections and hearing of these.
As mentioned hereinbefore, several objections challeng ing the acquisition had been admitted by the High Court of Allahabad and some of these are the subject matter of appeal in this Court and stay orders preventing the taking of the possession of the land pursuant to the acquisition had been granted on the basis that in view of the Division Bench judgment under appeal herein of the Allahabad High Court there could not be any simultaneous notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act even in a case where by virtue by invocation of the emergency provi sions Section 5 A of the Act need not be complied with.
The Government contends that even after the amendment of sub section (4) of Section 17 of the Act it is possible to have such simultaneous notification under Section 4 and declara tion under Section 6 of the Act in cases where the emergency provisions had been invoked.
According to the State, a large number of cases have been filed and stay orders obtained from the Court particulars whereof have been mentioned in the grounds of appeal herein.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the substitution of the words "after the publication of the notification" by the words "after the date of the notification" in sub section (4) of Section 17 of the Act has not made any change in law and as such simul taneous publication on one and the same date of the notifi cation under Section 4 and declaration under section 6 of the Act in case of urgency where Section 5 A had been made inapplicable prior to the amendment by Amending Act No. 68 of 1984 have been upheld in a number of decisions of this Court and this position, it was submitted, continues to be valid even after the amendment by Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984.
In order to appreciate the contentions urged in sup port of this submission, it is necessary to note the signif icant changes that have been made by the Amending Act No. 68 of 1984 in Sections 4 and 6 as well as Section 17 of the Act.
The relevant sub sections of sections prior and subse quent to the amendment are as follows: "Unamended Section 4(1) 100 Whenever it appears to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notifica tion to be given at convenient places in the said locality." "Amended Section 4(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company a notification to that effect shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notifica tion to be given at convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as to the date of publication of the notification." "Unamended Section 6(2) Every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected." "Amended Section 6(2) Every declaration shall be published in the official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration) and such declaration shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, 101 where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected." "Unamended Section 17(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub section (1) of sub section (2) are applicable the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5 A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1)." "Amended Section 17(4) In the case of any land to which in the opin ion of the appropriate Government the provi sions of sub section (1) or sub section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5 A shall not apply and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time (after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub section (1).
" It was contended that the amendment of Section 17(4) by he words "after the date of the publication of the notifica tion" was necessitated because of the change of the expres sion in sub section 1 of the Section (4) which for the first time gave a definition of the date of the publication of the notification.
Similarly, in Section 6(2), the last date of the publication as enjoined in Section 6 and as set out hereinbefore had been defined as the date of publication.
For this purpose, it was necessary to introduce the expres sion "after the date of the publication of the notification" under sub section (4) of Section 17 of the Act.
It was submitted that the proceedings for acquisition of land commenced from the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and under the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may within 30 days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
In ordinary cases after hearing objections, the State Government makes a decision regarding the acquisition of land and in case it is decided by the State Government that the land is 102 needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration to that effect is enjoined to be made by the State Govern ment under Section 6(1) of the Act.
Since in normal course declaration is made after objections under Section 5 A of the Act have been considered and disposed of, the date of the declaration under Section 6(2) of the Act has to be subsequent to the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, but in a case where objections under Sec tion 5 A have been dispensed with, simultaneous publication on one and the same date of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act can be made simultaneously, was the position before the amendment of the Act before 1984.
That this was the position in law, cannot be disputed in view of the decision of this Court in Smt.
Somavanti & Ors.
vs The State of Punjab & Ors., (supra) which conclusively held that in a case where Section 5 A was out of the way, publication of both notifi cations under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 in the same issue of the Gazette is not irregular.
It may be mentioned that in that case it was found that in the offi cial Gazette of 25th August, 1961 a notification as pub lished under Section 4 of the Act to the effect that land belonging to the petitioners was likely to be needed by the Government at public expenses for a public purpose, .namely, for setting up of a factory for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipments.
The Government had directed that action under Section 17 of the Act shall be taken because there was urgency and that the provisions of Section 5 A shall not apply to the acquisi tion.
In the same gazette, another notification under Sec tion 6 of the Act dated August 19, 1961 was published to the effect that the Governor of Punjab was satisfied that the land was required by the Government at public expenses for public purpose.
The notification provided for immediate taking of the possession of the land under Section 17(2)(c) of the Act.
A Bench of, five Judges of this Court inter alia held that simultaneous publication of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act in a situation where section 5 A was out of the way was not bad.
This view was reiterated by this Court in Babu Singh & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, AIR 1979 SC 1713.
A Bench of two Judges in that decision held that there is nothing in the provisions of the Act which would come in the way of the Government issuing a notification under Section 6 immediate ly after notification under Section 4 if on applying urgency clause, enquiry under Section 5 A is dispensed with and both could be issued on the same day.
The question is, has the position changed with the changes noted 103 in law hereinbefore.
Mr. S.N. Kacker, learned counsel who argued this case before us had submitted that the use of the words "the date of the publication" under Section 4 as well as Section 6 of the Act has the sequel to the amendment made in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
It was submitted that after enquiry under Section 5 A was dispensed with by application of emergency provisions, there could not be any reason or justification ' for not allowing publication simultaneously of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act especially so where in urgent cases it was vitally necessary for the Government to do so.
It was submitted that where under sub section (2) of Section 17 of the Act there is urgency for acquisition owing to sudden change in various circumstances, immediate possession may have to be taken for the purpose of maintaining either the structure or system or irrigation or water drainage, road communication or electricity, and any delay in taking imme diate possession by not publishing the declaration under Section 6 and notification under Section 4 simultaneously on one and the same date may result in great catastrophe.
It was further submitted that the expression "after the date of the publication of notification" have no bearing on the exercise of power or urgency necessitating simultaneous publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
It was further submitted on behalf of the appellant that the acquisition proceedings commence with the publication of the notifica tion under Section 4 of the Act, besides publication of notice of substance of such notification at convenient places in the locality.
This was required to be done under Section 4(1) of the Act prior to the amendment of Section 4(1) of the Act by Act No. 68 of 1984.
As a result of amend ment of Section 4(1) by Act No. 68 of 1984, it is now laid down that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act that land in a locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in a regional language and the Collector shall also cause public notice of the substance of such notification, the last of the dates of such publication being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification.
Similarly, under Section 6(2) of the Act it has been provided that as a result of amendment by Act No. 68 of 1984 every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situated of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land is situated, the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public.
104 notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration.
Under both Sections 6(2) and 4(1) the date of publication having been specified, amend ment had to be made under subsection (4) of Section 17 of the Act and it was laid down that in case of urgency the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5 A of the Act shall not apply and it so directs that the declaration be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under sub sections (1) of Section 4 and the addition of the words "the date of" have not brought about any change in law at all.
It was a verbal change necessitat ed by the amendment in Section 4 and Section 6 as noted above and the position in law continues as it was before.
Mr. Anil Dev Singh also supported Mr. Kacker appearing in other appeals being Civil Appeal Nos. 1843 and 1844 of 1986.
On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Jain canvassed the view that if the words have changed adherence must be given to the change of the expression used.
Our attention was drawn by Mr. Jain to a decision of this Court in Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad & Anr.
vs Raja Ram Jaiswal, ; There, the facts were, however, slightly different.
In that case the Hindi Sahitaya Sammelan, Prayag had ob tained a large open land from Municipal Board in 1953 for constructing Hindi Sangrahalaya, but the land was lying vacant and unutilised.
In the vicinity of the Sammelan 's campus was the land of the respondent who with a view to construct a sound proof air conditioned cinema theatre thereon sought certificate of approval from the D.M. under Rule 3 read with Rule 7(2) of the U.P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951.
The Sammelan vehemently opposed to that proposal on the ground that a cinema theatre in the vicinity would be destructive of culture and academic environment of the institute.
Overruling the objection, the D.M. granted the certificate to the respondent.
Thereupon, the Sammelan made an application to the Government for acquiring the respond ent 's land as, according to it, the land was needed by it for the purpose of extension of Hindi Sangrahalaya, though later it shifted its stand to need for construction of Natyashala and Rangmanch and ultimately maintained that it would devise schemes for proper utilisation as and when the land is made available.
Although the Collector on whom the statute confers power to initiate proceeding for acquisition himself was satisfied that Sammelan sought acquisition not because it required the land but it wanted to stop or do away with the cinema theatre, but ultimately a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act stating that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely, for extension of Hindi Sangrahalaya of the 105 Sammelan.
The notification was issued in the official ga zette and the substance of the notification was also pub lished in the locality.
But since the plot number of the land was wrongly mentioned in the notification, a corrigen dum was published cancelling and superseding the earlier notification and correcting the plot number.
The notice of the substance of the second notification was not published in the locality.
As the earlier notification had no rele vance to the plot of the respondent, there was admittedly no notice of the substance of the notifications in the locali ty.
Questions for determination were: 1.
Whether the requirement under the second part of Section 4(1) regarding giving public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality is mandatory and its non compli ance is fatal to the acquisition proceedings: 2.
Whether the acquisition proceeding was vitiated by legal mala fides; 3.
Whether the notification under Section 4 was invalid as it had been issued without first complying with Rule 4 of the Land Acqui sition (Companies) Rules, 1963? This Court answered the first two questions in the affirmative and left the third question open.
This Court held that the publication of the notice in the locality as required in the second part of Section 4(1) of the Act was mandatory and unless that notice was given in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the entire acquisi tion proceedings would be vitiated.
The Court further held that the assumption that the sole purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality under Section 4(1) was to give an opportunity to the person interested in land to object to the acquisition under Section 5 A of the Act was not well founded.
Therefore, it could not be said that where such person files his objections the purpose was achieved and that the failure to give public notice in the locality needed not to be treated as fatal to the proceedings.
We have examined the observations of this Court at page 13 of judgment upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent.
We are, however, of the opinion that in view of the significant difference in the set of facts with which this Court was dealing with in that case, the observations therein are not relevant for our present purpose.
Reliance was also placed on certain observations of this Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals vs M.R. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors., [1987] 2 106 SCC 707 where this Court, dealing with the provisions of Section 10(3)(c) of T.N. Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, 1960 observed that it was a settled rule of the interpreta tion of statutes that provisions of an Act should be inter preted in such manner as not to render any of its provisions otiose unless there were compelling reasons for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency.
It was submitted that the use of the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub section (4) of Section 17 would become otiose if it is not construed as holding that simul taneous publication of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are not permissible.
In Raja Satyendra Narayan Singh & Anr.
vs State of Bihar & Ors., this Court had to deal with Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and it was observed that while inter preting statutes plain meaning has to be ascertained and the statute has to be read as a whole and in the context and that statutory rules should be harmoniously read with the statute.
The basic principle, it was reiterated at page 325 of the report, of construction of every statute was to find out what is clearly stated and not to speculate upon latent imponderables.
The scheme of the Act also must be looked into.
In interpreting the statutes it is safer to rely on the obvious meaning rather than to investigate the imponder ables.
It is true that the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" introduced in Section 17(4) can be explained away as making no change from the provi sions of law by reading it along with the amendment made in Section 4 whereby in different situation in section 4, the last date of publication of the notice has been determined as the date of the publication of the notification and similarly in Section 6 a date of the publication of the notice has been provided for.
But the words "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub section (4) of Section 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that decla ration under Section 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification.
1t appears to us that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which mili tates against such a construction.
At times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Lord Howard 107 de Walden vs IRC, ; for the proposition that no alteration in meaning by alteration of language can result unless the requirement of the English language demand it or those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it.
In our opinion, m this case in view of the alteration of the language and meaning and the meaning of the language used and the sense will be in consonance with the interpretation that the change was intended.
Simi larly, in Hopes vs Hopes, , it was the proposition that changes in the word may be because the draftsman wanted to improve the style.
But in this case the style is not improved and the expression 'after the date ' as indicated above, becomes otiose.
It is job of the Court to interpret the intention of the legislature by the words used.
The fairest and the most rational method to interpret the will of the legislature is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs, the most natural and probable, says Blackstone in his 'Commentaries on the Laws of England ' (fascimile of 1st edition of 1765, Univer sity of Chicago Press, 1979) Volume, I, p 59.
And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.
The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification.
If that be so, then the legislature must have had some intention in choosing the expression 'after ' before "date of publication of the notification" in sub section (4) of Section 17 of the Act while making amend ment by Amending Act No. 68 of 1984.
It is true that there were some changes giving the meaning of the date of the publication in Section 4(1) and (2) as well as Section 6(2) of the Act.
But for that, there was no need for the use of the expression 'after the date '.
If that be the position, then we must accept the interpretation put upon the amended clause by the High Court in the judgment under appeal.
It will, however, be upon to the appellants to issue a fresh declaration under section 6, if so advised, within the period contemplated in the proviso to section 6(1) of the Act read with its first explanation.
In that view of the matter the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
In the view that we have taken, Civil Appeals Nos. 1843 and 1844 of 1986 are also dismissed without costs.
N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.

summary:
The U.P. Legislature enacted in 1973 the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act.
On or about 11th Septem ber, 1974 Lucknow had been declared to be a development area by a notification.
The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 was made effective from 24th September, 1984.
Notifications under section 4(1) and a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued on 8th December, 1984 in respect of the Housing Scheme (Gomti Nagar) Phase II on the 28th December, 1984 in respect of Dalibagh Housing Scheme, and on the 21st February, 1980 in respect of the Housing Scheme (Gomti Nagar) Phase III.
The owners of the land which were sought to be acquired by the aforesaid notifications filed writ petitions in the High Court and obtained stay orders in respect of taking over of possession of the diverse lands on the ground that the notifications under section 4(1) and section 6 of the Act have been passed simultaneously.
A Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on the 6th May, 1985 declaring that the lands of the respondents were needed for a public purpose viz., construc tion of market yard for the Krishi Utpadan Samiti.
The Notification further contained a declaration that since there was urgency for the acquisition the provisions of action 17(IA) and section 17(4) of the Act shall apply and the provisions of section 5A shall not apply.
On the same day i.e. on 6th May, 1985 another Notification was issued under section 6 making a declaration 93 that the laud was required for the public purpose viz., construction of a market yard.
That Notification also con tained direction as contemplated in section 17(1) and (IA) authorising the Collector to take possession of the land even before the declaration of the award under section 11.
Aggrieved by the acquisition the respondents filed two writ petitions and contended before the Division Bench of the High Court that in view of the amendments introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the declaration as contemplated under section 6 could not have been made on the same day on which the Notification under section 4 was published, and that after the amendment, the Notification under section 6 of the Act can only be issued after the Notification under section 4 was published.
The High Court was of the view that prior to the amend ment, a declaration under section 6 could be made simultane ously with the publication of the Notification under section 4(1), but after the amendment, a declaration can only be made "after the date of publication of the Notification under section 4(1)" and came to the conclusion that there must be difference of dates between the date of the publica tion of the Notification under section 4 and section 6.
The High Court held that the notification under section 6 was therefore rendered illegal and as such the appellants were not entitled to take possession of the respondents ' land.
It accordingly quashed the Notification dated 6th May, 1985 issued under section 6 of the Act.
In the appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of the State appellants that the amendment of section 17(4) by the words "after the date of the publication of the notification" was necessitated because of the change of the expressions in sub section (1) of section 4 which for the first time gave a definition of the date of the publication of the notification.
Similarly, in section 6(2) the last date of the publication as enjoined in section 6 had been defined as the date of publication.
For this purpose, it was necessary to introduce the expression "after the date of the publication of the notification" under sub section (4) of section 17.
On the question whether the declaration under section 6 of the Act would be issued simultaneously along with a notification under section 4 of the Act in view of the amendment made by section 17(4) of the Act; Dismissing the Appeals, 94 HELD: l(a) The words "after the date of the publication of the notification" in sub section (4) of section 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that declaration under section 6 had to be made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification.
There is nothing in the the scheme of the Act which militates against such a construction.
[106F G] l.(b) No alteration in meaning by alteration of language can result unless the requirement of the English language demand it or those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it.
[107A B] 2.
At times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
[106G H] Smt.
Somawanti & Ors.
vs State of Punjab, Babu Singh & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors., AIR (1979) SC 1713; Collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad & Anr.
vs Raja Ram Jaiswal; , referred to.
The basic principle of construction of every statute is to find out what is clearly stated and not to speculate upon latent imponderables.
The scheme of the Act also must be looked into.
In interpreting the statutes it is safer to rely on the obvious meaning rather than to investigate the imponderables.
[106D] Shri Balaganesan Metals vs M.R. Shanmugham Chetty & Ors., ; ; Raja Satyendra Narayan Singh & Anr.
vs State of Bihar & Ors., referred to.
It is the job of the Court to interpret the intention of the legislature by the words used.
The fairest and the most rational method to interpret the will of the legisla ture is by exploring intentions at the time when the law was made by signs, the most natural and probable.
These signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and the consequence or the spirit and reason of the law.
The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification.
[107C D] Lord Howard de Walden vs IRC, ; ; Hopes vs Hopes.
[1948] 2 AIR 920; referred to.
95 Blackstone Commentaries in the Laws of England, Vol.
1 p. 59 referred to.
It will be open to the appellants to issue a fresh declaration under section 6, if so advised, within the period contemplated in the proviso to section 6(1) of the Act read with its first Explanation.
[107F]


judgement:
Appeal No.321 of 1957.
456 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 13, 1956, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rule No. 80 of 1955.
Ranadeb Chaudhury and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
N. C.Chatterjee, and Naunit Lal, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 1. 1958.
April 7.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. This is an appeal by special leave brought by J. K. Chaudhuri for and on behalf of the Governing Body of Guru Charan College, Silchar (which will be referred to in this judgment as the College) against a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature in Assam dated June 13, 1956, dismissing the appellant 's petition under article 226.
It raised the question as to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the Executive Council of the University of Gauhati in regard to disciplinary action taken by the Governing Body of the College against its Principal, R. K. Datta Gupta, respondent No. 1.
In 1937, respondent No. I was appointed Professor of Mathematics in the college.
He was appointed Vice Principal in 1947 and Principal in 1950.
Due to certain representations made to the Governing Body against respondent No. 1, a committee was appointed by the Governing Body to enquire into the allegations.
This committee held several sittings and made a report after considering which the Governing Body held a prima facie case made out against him, placed him under suspension and called upon him to answer the charges within 15 days.
This he failed to do but later on submitted an explanation which was duly considered.
As fresh material was disclosed after the suspension, respondent No.1 was called upon to give a further explanation.
He then requested for the previous charges being decided before enquiry into fresh charges was made.
The Governing Body held a meeting on November 1, 1953, and after considering 457 the matter found him guilty of moral turpitude and dishonesty and also gross negligence of duty, inefficiency and insubordination and ordered his dismissal as Principal and Professor of Mathematics of the college.
r, On November 30, 1953, respondent No. I filed a suit being Title Suit No. 282 of 1953, in the Court of Munsif Sadar, Silchar, challenging the legality of the proceedings of the committee appointed by the Governing Body and of the proceedings and decision taken by it and prayed for an injunction restraining the Governing Body from appointing another Principal.
He also applied for a temporary injunction.
This suit was transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge U. A. D., at Silchar and was renumbered as Title Suit No. 10 of 1954 which has not yet been decided.
On November 11, 1953, respondent No. I made a representation to the Vice Chancellor of the Gauhati University against his dismissal and prayed that the Governing Body be directed not to fill up the post of Principal pending the disposal of his appeal which was filed on November 30, 1953, and which was a reiteration of the allegations made by him in the plaint in the suit in the Court of Munsif Sadar.
The Executive Council of the University, i. e., respondent No. 2 thereupon appointed under para.
3(h) of the Statutes framed under section 21(g) of the Gauhati University Act (Assam XV1 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act) a committee, respondent No. 3, consisting of the Vice Chancellor, the Director of Public Instruction and the Legal Remembrance of the State of Assam to report on the propriety of the action taken.
After considering the matter and giving full opportunity to both sides respondent No. 3 on March 30, 1955, made a report to respondent No. 2 that: " there was no reasonable ground justifying the dismissal of Shri R. K. Datta Gupta from the post of the Principal, Guru Charan College Silchar.
" On April 20,1955, this report was accepted by respondent No. 2 and it passed the following resolution : ". . .
Resolved that the findings of the Committee be accepted and in view of the facts that Sri R. K. Datta Gupta was not dismissed on any 458 reasonable grounds, the Governing Body be directed to reinstate him before 31st July, 1955.
" Against this order the Governing Body of the college filed a petition under article 226 in the High Court of Assam but the petition was dismissed on June 13,1956.
Although in the High Court the appellant challenged the power of the University to interfere with the decision of the Governing Body of the college removing respondent No. I both from Principalship and from Professorship of Mathematics, in this Court the arguments were confined to the former only.
The two categories, it was submitted, were distinct and were dealt with in the Act and the Statute made thereunder separately.
The Principal was merely the administrative head of the 'College and a teacher solely engaged in imparting instructions.
The Act therefore contemplates their discharging different functions.
To support this contention, various provisions of the Act and the Statutes made under the Act were referred to.
The words " Principal " and " Teacher" ' are defined in section 2 of the Act : " 2 (h) I Principal ' means the head of a College, and includes where there is no Principal, the person for the time being duly appointed to act as Principal, and, in the absence of the Principal, a Vice Principal duly appointed as such.
. . . . . . . 2(k) 'Teacher ' includes Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other persons imparting instructions in the University or in any College or Hall The distinction finds further support from other provisions of the Act which maintain a clear distinction between a Principal ' and a ' Teacher '.
Section 9 of the Act deals with the constitution of the Court which has three classes of members: Ex Officio members, Life Members and Other Members.
Principals fall under class I and are mentioned in sub section
(vii).
Teachers come under the heading I Other Members ' enumerated in class 111.
In sub section
(xiv) representation is given to 'Teachers ' elected from their own body who are not Professors or Readers of the University.
459 Similarly in the constitution of the Executive Council contained in section 12, a distinction is maintained between Principals who are in class 1, i. e., Ex officio members and Professors of the University who are in,; class 11, i. e., Other members.
Amongst the former have to be included two Principals of recognised colleges elected from their own body and in Class 11 representation is given to Professors of the University and none to the teachers.
Therefore wherever the provisions of the Act mention the word a 'Principal ' or a 'Teacher ' two distinct entities are indicated and one is not to be included in the other.
The Statutes made under section 21(g) of the Act also maintain this distinction in their various clauses and where the word 'principal ' occurs it is used in its distinctive and restrictive sense and where the word I teacher ' or the phrase 'member of the teaching staff , or any other similar word or phrase is used the reference is to a teacher and not to a principal.
Clause I of the Statute requires the existence of a Governing Body for each college not maintained by the University.
Clause 2 (a) gives its constitution which includes the Principal and the Vice Principal as ex officio members and so also two representatives of the teaching staff to be elected annually showing that a Principal as such is distinct from a member of the teaching staff which must necessarily mean employees of colleges engaged in the teaching of various subjects.
Clause 2 (c) nominates the Principal as the Secretary of the Governing Body.
Sub cls.
(a), (b), (c) and (d) of el.
3 deal with a teacher 's appointment, pay, scales of pay, probation and period of appointment.
Sub el.
(e) deals with increments.
It provides: " An increment according to the pay scale will be drawn as a matter of course. . . .
The increment may be withheld on the ground of unsatisfactory work of an employee. . . . " The word 'employee ' here must necessarily refer to a teacher because it provides for increments according to pay scales and the withholding of increments for unsatisfactory work of an employee dealt with in the first four sub clauses which in terms apply to a teacher.
460 Sub cl.
(f) deals with the period of service.
Sub cls (i) and (ii) are as follows: " (i) The services of a permanent employee shall not be determined except on reasonable grounds.
(ii) The services of a permanent employee shall not be terminated in the course of an academic session except on very special grounds, such as moral turpitude, proved incapacity and inefficiency.
If the Governing Body of a college considers it advisable that the services of a permanent employee should be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (g) (ii), the matter shall be forthwith reported to the Executive Council ".
The use of the phrase 'academic session ' indicates that the 'Permanent employee ' must be a person connected with teaching for otherwise it lacks meaning.
The language of sub cl.
(g) (iii) which is as follows: "A teacher whose services are dispensed with on grounds other than those mentioned in clause (g) (ii) shall be paid compensation equal to as many months ' pay as the number of completed years of his service, subject to a maximum of twelve months ' pay " further supports this interpretation that a 'permanent employee ' mentioned in sub el.
(g) (ii) refers to a teacher and to no one else.
This is further strengthened by the use of the word 'teacher ' in sub cl.
(g) (iv) which provides for the procedure for an enquiry where a teacher has to be dismissed, suspended or reduced in pay.
Sub cl.
(g) (v) reserves to the Executive Council of the University the power to enquire into causes of dismissal of a teacher whether on its own motion or on an appeal by the teacher.
Sub el.
(h) which is in the following words: "All cases of dismissal, suspension, or any other serious grievance of the teaching staff will be considered by a Committee of the following members uses the words " teaching staff " and this again shows that the reference is to the teacher and not to a Principal because el. 3 taken as a whole clearly deals with the conditions of service of a teacher, compensation to be paid to him and the procedure to be followed 461 in cases of disciplinary action taken against him.
These words cannot in the context in which they appear in the Statutes or in the context of the language of the Act itself have reference to anybody other than a member of the teaching staff, i. e., teacher.
It shows therefore that in cl. 3 of the Statute where the expression used is " permanent employee " or the "teacher" or " teaching staff " the reference is to members of the college who are teachers as such and it hag no application to any other employee of the college such as a Principal.
Deka J. was of the opinion that as respondent No. I held two capacities that of the Principal and membership of the teaching staff, respondent No. 2 could order his restoration to both the offices because the two capacities could not be separated.
As shown above the two capacities are distinct with separate functions and have been separately dealt with in the Act and the Statutes under the Act and the learned judge was in error in holding otherwise.
Sarjoo Parshad C. J. gave to the phrase I permanent employee ' used in the Statutes an extended meaning so as to include a Principal as well as a college teacher.
This again is an interpretation which is contrary to the interpretation which stems from the analysis we have given above and is therefore erroneous.
Relying on sub el, 3(h) of the Statutes counsel for respondent No. 2 contended that as respondent No. I was a so a member of the teaching staff being a Professor of Mathematics his case fell within the wordsor any other serious grievance of the teaching staffThese words refer to grievances which a memberof the teaching staff may have in his capacity of ateacher and not in any other capacity and these words cannot be extended to include the grievances of a teacher in connection with something which is dehors the words of the clause and would not therefore include his grievances which he may have if he is also the Principal.
As has been pointed out above the relevant provisions of the Act and of the Statutes made under 59 462 s.21(g) of the Act show the separate capacities of the Principal and the Teacher.
The jurisdiction of respondent No. 2 to interfere with the action taken by the Governing Body arises only in the case of a teacher and would not extend to a case where the same person holds these two offices, as there is no provision in the, Act or the Statutes giving the University such power to interfere.
Consequently so far as Respondent No. 2 interfered with the action taken by the Governing Body against respondent No. 1 in his capacity as the Principal of the college it acted without jurisdiction and therefore that part of the order of respondent No. 2 and the judgment of the High Court to that extent cannot be sustained and must be set aside as respondent No. 2 there acted in excess of jurisdiction.
We would, therefore, allow this appeal, modify the order of the High Court and hold that the order of respondent No. 2 in regard to respondent No. I qua his office as Principal was without jurisdiction and the order of reinstatement of respondent No. 1 by the University to the post of Principal must be set aside.
As the special leave was directed against the judgment of the High Court both in regard to the office of Principal and the office of teacher of the college and it was at the stage of arguments that the case was confined to the ' Principal ' of the college, the proper order for costs should be that the parties do bear their own costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
R was appointed Professor of Mathematics in a College affiliated to the Gauhati University.
He was later appointed Principal of the College.
On complaints being made against R the Governing Body of the College held an enquiry and ordered his dismissal as Principal and Professor of Mathematics.
R made representations to the Vice Chancellor of the Gauhati University and the Executive Council of the University appointed a committee to report on the propriety of the action taken.
Upon the report of the committee that there was no reasonable ground justifying the dismissal of R, the Executive Council passed a resolution directing the Governing Body to reinstate R : Held, that the Executive Council acted without jurisdiction in so far as it interfered with the action taken against R as the Principal of the College.
The Gauhati University Act, 1947, and the Statutes framed under section 21(g) thereof made a distinction between a Principal and a teacher.
Clause 3(g)(v) Of the Statutes empowered the Executive Council to interfere only with the action taken by the Governing Body of an affiliated College against a teacher and not with action taken against a Principal.


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 2 147 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.
1984 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. ED(SB) No. 425/82 C (Order No. 15 1 of 1984).
J. Sorabjee, M.A. Rangaswamy and Ms. Radha Rangas wamy for the Appellant.
A.K. Ganguli, K. Swami and C.V. Subba Rao for the Re spondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 217 VENKATACHALIAH J.
This appeal under Section 35 L of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, (ACT) by Messrs Siddesh wari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., preferred against the appellate order dated 16.3.1984, of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, raises a short question whether the appellant, which manufactures cotton fabric on power looms which is otherwise exempt from duties of excise and the additional duties of excise respectively under Notification No. 230/77 and 231/77 dated 15.7.1977, looses the benefit of exemption by process of 'calendering ' on a calendering plant situated in the appellant 's premises.
The Notification 230/77.
CE dated 15.7.1977 issued by Central Government under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, exempts from the whole of the duty of Excise, 'unprocessed ' cottonfabric, falling under sub item (1) of item No. 19 of the First Schedule to the Act, which is manufactured on power looms (without spinning or processing plants) installed and worked with the permission of the Textile Commissioner.
Likewise, Notification No. 231/77.
CE dated 15.7.1977 exempts such cotton fabric from payment of the additional duties of excise.
The question in the appeal is whether such cotton fabric ceases to be "unprocessed" cotton fabric if it is subjected to calendering.
The Tribunal has held in the affirmative and has upheld the levy of duty imposed on the appellant.
We have heard Sri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri A,K. Ganguly, learned Senior Counsel for the Revenue.
The facts which are not in dispute may briefly be stated.
The Central Excise authorities held appellant to have contravened the provisions of the relevant rules by manufacturing and removing, between 14.5.
1981 and 19.9.1981.6,09,848.47 Sq.
Metres of calendered cottonfabric falling under item 19 l(b) of the First Schedule to the Act without payment of Rs.2,62,767.04 leviable thereon as excise duty.
The Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta, directed the appellant to pay the said duty and also imposed on the appellant a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 under rule 173 Q. The Central Board of Excise and Customs, by its order dated 24.8.1982, partly allowed the appellant 's appeal and while 218 affirming the levy of the duty, however, set aside the imposition of the penalty.
The further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal preferred by the appellant against the confirmation of the levy and the duty came to be dismissed by the Tribunal 's order dated 16.3.1984 now under appeal.
Before the Appellate Tribunal it was contended for the appellant that the process of plain calendering to which the cotton fabric was subjected, though might, in itself, be a process in the larger and general sense of that term, would not, however, fall under "any other process ' within the meaning of Sec.
2(f)(v) the Act.
It was contended that even after the calendering, the cotton fabric remained an "unproceased" cotton fabric and the expression "any other process" in Sec.
2(f)(v) must be considered ejus dem gener is, so as to partake of the nature and character of the processes and belong to the same genus as those envisaged in the preceding expressions in that clause.
2(f)(v ') reads: "in relation to goods comprised in Item No. 19 I of the Schedule to the , includes bleaching, merce rising, dyeing, printing, water proofing, rubberising, shrink proofing, organdie proc essing or any other process or any one or more of these processes;" The Appellate Tribunal did not accept this contention.
It held: " .
There is prima facie nothing in the language employed in Section 2(f) and item 19 1 of the CET to suggest that the words "any other process" will take within sweep only such processes as are of the same class or genus as the specifically enumerated process es.
It may be that for the enumerated process es some extreneous substance may be required.
That, however, would 'not make the processes a class.
They enumerated processes from a group of disparate and dissimilar processes for example, bleaching and rubberising or dyeing and organdie processing.
Sigficantly, what follows the enumerated process is not an expression like "any other like process or any such process", in which case it could be argued that the non enumerated process should of the same genus or class as the enumera 219 ted ones. ." " . .
Admittedly, calendering is a fin ishing process.
The machine employed may be a simple or complex one.
The effect ought to be brought about may be simple or not.
That, however, would not mean that calendering is not a process.
In fact, from the sample pro duced by the appellants before us it was seen that the appellants had stamped cotton sarees as calendered.
It was stated before us that the sarees were sold as calendered.
Saree calendering will thus fail within the ambit of the expression "any other process" occurring in Section 2(f) and Item 19 I CET particularly when sub item (b) of Item 19 1 is read in juxta position with sub item (a) which covers cotton fabrics not subjected to any process.
In this view of the matter; the Appellate Tribunal did not accept the contention that though "calendering" might be a "process", it is not any 'process ' that satisfies the requirement of "any other process" occurring in sec.
2(f)(v), but only those processes that partake of the same common characteristic of and belong to same genus as the processes such as bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, waterproofing, rubberising, shrink proofing, or organdie processing occurring in Section 2(f)(v).
The Appellate Tribunal held that it was not necessary for the "process" , process of calendering in ' the present case to be a process which belongs to the same genus as those enumerated in sec.
2(f)(v) to take the cotton fabric out of the exemption and that it would be sufficient that if calendering is a "process" of cotton fabric even if it does not partake of the other processing specifically enumerated in the preceding expressions in Section 2(f)(v).
According ly, the Appellate Tribunal did not specifically examine the alternative position whether the process of calendering of the type and kind adopted by the appellant really shared the common element or characteristic possessed by the other processes specifically enumerated.
Therefore, if it is to be held that the expression "any other process" in Sec.
2(f)(v) must be understood and construed ejus dem generis, then the question whether the "process" of calendering employed in the present case belongs to the same genus as the processes envisaged in the preceding expressions in the section would have to be examined afresh.
220 6.
The definition of "manufacture" obtaining in Sec.
2(f) of the Act was amended by Act 5 of 1986 giving it an extended meaning.
In repelling the contention that the extended meaning was introduced as an artificial concept of "manufacture" not belonging to, but outside, Entry 84 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, this Court in Empire Industries vs Union of India, [1985] Suppl.
1 SCR 292 held: "As has been noted, processes of the type which have been incorporated by the impugned Act were not so alien or foreign to the con cept of "manufacture" that these could not come within that concept." (p.323) If, accordingly, the processes such as bleaching, merce rising, dyeing, printing, water proofing, rubberising, shrink proofing, organdie processing, are not unrelated to the concept of manufacture and bring .about such a change in the cotton fabric as to render it a commercially different product, then by parity of reasoning, "any other process" in Sec.
2(f)(v) which is a part of the scheme of the extended meaning of "manufacture" must also share the same character istic of those other expression.
That apart, even if the amendment is beyond Entry 84 of List 1 and is supportable under or referrable to the residuary Entry 97 of List 1, on the principles of construction appropriate to the provision in Sec.
2(f)(v), is "any other process" in Sec.
2(f)(v), though otherwise of wide import, must share the characteris tics of and be limited by the preceding expressions.
The expression ejus dem generis, 'of the same kind or nature ' signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the test with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding.
If a list or string or family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.
In 'Statutory Interpretation ' Rupert Cross says: " .
The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted . . " (Page 116) 221 The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extent to objects of a wholly different kind.
This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication.
But the preceding words or expressions of re stricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class.
If no class can be found, ejus dem gener is rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured.
As a learned author puts it: " . . if a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class, then rejec tion of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unneces sary; if, however, the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary.
" [See: Construction of Statutes by E.A. Driedg er p.95 quoted by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction page 829 and 830].
Francis Bennion in his Statutory Construction observed: "For the ejus dem generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indication of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment.
Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the words it is said to regulate.
The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it . " [p . 830] " It is necessary to be able to formulate the genus; for if it cannot be formulated it does not exist. 'Unless you can find a catego ry ', said Farwell L J, 'there is no room for the application of the ejus dem generis doc trine '." [p. 831] In SS.
Magnild (Owners) vs Macintyre Bros. & Co., Mc Cardie J said: 222 "So far as I can see the only test seems to be whether the specified things which precede the general words can be placed under some common category.
By this I understand that the speci fied things must possess some common and dominant feature.
" In Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar vs Union of India, ; the Court said: " . .
This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words, in view of the other rules of interpretation, that all words in a statute are given effect if possible, that a statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be super fluous . " [p. 740] In U.P.S.E. Board vs Hari Shanker, ; it was observed: " . .
The true scope of the rule of "ejus dem generis" is that words of a general nature (following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified.
But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far" . . " [p . 73] 8.
The preceding words in the statutory provision which, under this particular rule of construction, control and limit the meaning of the subsequent words must represent a genus or a family which admits of a number of species or members.
If there is only one species it cannot supply the idea of a genus.
In the present case the expressions bleaching, merceris ing, dyeing, printing, water proofing, rubberising, shrink proofing, organdie processing ' which precede the expression 'or any other process ' contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process ' in the section must, share one or the other of these incidents.
The expression "any other process" is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression "unprocessed" in the exempting notification draws 223 its meaning from that context.
The principle of construction considered appropriate by the Tribunal in this case appears to us to be unsupportable in the context in which the ex pression "or any other process" has to be understood.
It was then contended by Sri Sorabjee that "plain calendering" process neither adds anything to the cotton fabric nor the effect brought about by it is lasting.
It is, according to learned counsel, nothing more than pressing the cotton fabric by running it between plain Rollers to improve its appearance.
Learned counsel submitted that it was purely a temporary finish and that having regard to the nature of the process it is plainly manifest that it does not impart to the fabric either of the two ingredients necessary to bring the process into the family of processes envisaged by the preceding expressions in the section.
Sri A.K. Ganguly, learned counsel for Revenue, however, submitted that this aspect requires investigation of the factual aspects and that since the Appellate Tribunal had not specifically exam ined this aspect and recorded its finding thereon, it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh disposal of the appeal in the light of the pronouncement of this Court on the proper rule of construc tion to be applied in the understanding of the expression "any other process" in Sec.
2(f)(v) and to consider whether the particular process of calendering adopted by the appel lant would satisfy that requirement.
We think we should accept this submission of Sri Ganguly.
In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order under appeal is set aside, and the appeal No. 151 of 1984 before the Appellate Tribunal is remitted to it for a fresh disposal in accordance with law.
There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant manufactures cotton fabric on power looms.
By virtue of two notifications issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules 1944 unprocessed cotton fabric was exempt from excise duty as also additional duties.
Since the appellant was using the process of 'calendering ', the Cen tral Excise authorities held that the cotton fabric manufac tured by it ceases to be "unprocessed".
The collector of Central Excise, directed the appellant to pay levy on the manufacture of the calendered cotton fabric, and also levied a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 under Rule 173.
On appeal, the Central Board of Excise and Customs affirmed the levy of duty, but set aside the imposition of penalty.
The appellant preferred an appeal before the Cus toms, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that calendering is a finishing process and it was not necessary for the process of calendering to be a process which belonged to the same genus as those enumerated in Sec.
2(f)(v) to take the cotton fabric out of the exemp tion.
It would be sufficient that of calendering is a "process" of cotton fabric even if it does not partake of the other processes specifically enumerated in the preceding expression in section 2(j)(v)2.
In that view of the matter the Tribunal 215 dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant.
This appeal under Sec.
35L of the Act is against the Tribunal 's Order.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that "plaincalendering" process neither adds anything to the cotton fabric nor the effect brought about by it is lasting; it was purely a temporary finish and that having regard to the nature of the process it is plainly manifest that it does not impart to the fabric either of the two ingredients necessary to bring the process into the family of processes envisaged by the preceding expressions in Sec. 2(f)(v).
On behalf of the Revenue it was submitted that since the Tribunal had not specifically examined this aspect and recorded its finding thereon, it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the Tribunal.
Allowing the appeal, and remitting the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for a fresh disposal, the Court, HELD: 1.
The expression ejus dem generis 'of the same kind or nature ' signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class are genus as preceding them.
If a list or string or family of genus describing terms are followed by wider or residuary or sweeping up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.
But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class.
If no class can be found, ejus dem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured.
[220F; 221A B] S.S. Magnhild (owners) vs Mc Intvre Bros. & Co., ; Tribhuban Parkash Nayyar vs Union of India, [1970] 216 2 SCR 732 and U.P.S.E. Board vs Hari Shankar, ; relied on.
Statutory Interpretation by Rupert Cross; Statutory Construction by Francis Bennian, relied on.
The definition of "manufacture" obtaining in Sec. 2(f) of the Central Excise Act was amended by Act 5 of 1986 giving it an extended meaning.
[220A] Empire Industries vs Union of India, [1985] Suppl.
1 SCR 292 relied on.
In the present case the expressions 'bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, water proofing, rubberising, shrink proofing, organdie processing ' which precedes the expression 'or any other process ' contemplate processes which impart a change of a lasting character to the fabric by either the addition of some chemical into the fabric or otherwise. 'Any other process ' in the section must, share one or the other of these incidents.
The expression "any other process" is used in the context of what constitutes manufacture in its extended meaning and the expression "unprocessed" in the exempting notification draws its mean ing from that context.
[222G H; 223A]