judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1170 of 1987.
1187 From the Judgment and Order dated 6.4.
1987 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 71 of 1987.
Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, Dr. Roxna Swamy and Bharat Sangal for the Appellant.
A.B. Rohtagi and Miss Bina Gupta for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
What is the true meaning of the expression 'tenant has before or after the commencement of the Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence ' in terms of clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act ') is the question raised in this appeal in the backdrop of interesting set of facts.
This is an appeal by the tenant against the judgment and order dated 6th April, 1987 of the Delhi High Court.
To the facts first, however, we must go to appreciate the point.
The appellant was at all material times since 1968 a tenant of the ground floor of premises No. 2/14, Kalkaji Extention, New Delhi.
The premises had been let out in April, 1968 to the appel lant at a monthly rent of Rs.340 per month by one Shri R.N. Kurra, deceased husband of respondent No. 1 and father of respondents Nos. 2 to 8.
The premises consist of two bed rooms, one drawing room, one dining room, one kitchen, two bath rooms and court yard at the back and porch in the front and one store and also one verandah.
It is the case of the appellant that originally the appellant had occupied these alongwith his wife, his aged mother, his son, daughter, brother and sister in law.
However, the brother and sister in law have since moved out and since 1979 the appellant 's wife Smt.
Santosh Raj was only staying with the family off and on for short periods usually when the appellant was on tour.
In the meantime on or about 20th July, 1977 the land lord filed eviction petition against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement.
On or about 25th September, 1978 the appellant 's wife Smt.
Santosh Raj was allotted Flat No. 93, Sadiq Nagar, i.e., a government quarter was given to her due to her employment as a teacher in the Government Girls Higher Secondary School No. III, Kalkaji, New Delhi.
She goes to live there leaving the rest of her family in the premises in dispute.
It is the case Of the appellant aS made out in appeal before us that one Shri P.R. Arya and his family were asked to share with the appellant 's wife on a joint allotment basis because it was not safe for a lady to live alone.
The case of the appellant was that the relation ship between the appellant and his wife Smt.
1188 Santosh Raj was not very good.
There were differences of opinion.
The appellant wanted the wife to give up her job and concentrate on the upbringing of the children.
The lady was reluctant.
She wanted to pursue her own avocation and career.
It is highlighted before us that in those circum stances the wife of appellant had applied for government accommodation and had gone to live in the said premises.
However, by force of circumstances as the children have grown up and daughters became of marriageable age she was induced to give up her job and allotment and she has come back to the husband 's premises being the premises in dis pute.
On 17th of March, 1986 respondent No. 1 filed in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi a petition on the ground that the wife of the appellant Smt.
Santosh Raj had been allotted on 25th of September, 1978 a residential quarter from the Directorate of Education, Delhi by virtue of her employment in Government Girls Higher Secondary School No. III, Kalkaji, New Delhi.
The appellant therefore came within the mischief of clause (h) of section 14(1) of the Act.
Written statement was duly filed in which it was stated that appellant had not acquired any house but that the landlord had tried to take advantage of the strained relationship between the tenant and his wife.
It was stated that the tenant had strained relationship with his wife and on ac count of the same only she had acquired a separate accommo dation and started staying there and got her ration card prepared at the same address but since the appellant had grown up children and remained on touring job; therefore, in order to provide the required protection and care, the wife of the appellant came to the house in question temporarily.
It was stated that this fact is well within the knowledge of the landlord and other members of the family.
It was denied that Smt.
Santosh Raj.
, the tenant had sublet the quarter No. 93.
On the other hand it was apparent that the depart ment had allotted the house to the wife of the appellant alongwith one other colleague jointly, who had now surren dered the same.
It was further stated that this joint allot ment had been made to the appellant 's wife on compassionate grounds.
The appellant was, therefore, not liable to be evicted from the premises in question it was asserted.
The case was proceeded under section 37 of the Act.
It was the contention of the appellant that he wanted to substantiate by production of evidence both oral and documentary that the flat allotted to his wife was on compassionate grounds in recognition of her special need to live apart from him.
It could not be an alternative accommodation for the appellant and his family.
It was further stated that the wife was allotted Flat No. 93, Sadiq Nagar on 25th September, 1978.
A few months later, the appellant 's wife was all alone in the flat and felt the need for some company, and she arranged one of her colleagues Mrs. P.R Arya alongwith her 1189 family should come to stay with her in this flat.
Mrs. Arya 's husband Mr. P.R. Arya was entitled to such accommoda tion in his own right as a teacher in Government Boys Higher Secondary School, Hari Nagar Ashram, New Delhi and accord ingly the appellant 's wife arranged to have the flat jointly allotted to herself and Mr. P.R. Arya.
Mr. P.R. Arya with his family entered the flat on or about 28th April, 1979 and continued to share the flat with the appellant 's wife for three years only.
In 1982 they moved out of the flat and since then the appellant 's wife has continued in the flat.
In 1978 when she first occupied the flat, the appellant 's wife had a separate ration card giving the flat as her address and had drawn ration on that basis and not with her family in the suit premises.
It was further stated that the appellant should have been permitted to adduce evidence both oral and documentary on all the above facts.
But the learned Additional Rent Controller directed that no evidence need be necessary as the matter could be decided on admitted facts.
In view of the provisions of law as the tenant had acquired vacant possession for residence became disentitled to retain the premises in question, he, therefore, passed an order of eviction.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the appellant went up in appeal being R.C.A. No. 957 of 1986.
The learned Rent Control Tribunal negatived the appellant 's plea that he should have been allowed to produce evidence in support of his averment of strained relations with his wife and that on account of these strained relations he could not in any way avail of the allotment of the flat to his wife.
The Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the appellant.
Being aggrieved thereby the appellant approached the High Court in second appeal.
The High Court by its impugned judgment dated 6th of April, 1987 summarily rejected the appeal.
Being further aggrieved the appellant has come up to this Court as mentioned hereinbefore.
The short question is whether under clause (h) of Sec tion 14(1) of the Act allotment of a house to a wife who is a Government employee in all circumstances disentitled the tenant to retain the tenanted premises.
We are unable to accept the view of the Delhi High Court.
We have noted the provisions.
The purpose of the Act is to control rents and eviction, in other words, to control unreasonable evictions and to ensure that in an atmosphere of acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper enjoyment of available spaces by those who want and deserve.
In other words, to ensure that there is no unreasonable and unnecessary spaces in the hands of one tenant and 1190 other tenants and landlords ' need of occupation of spaces remains unsatisfied; clause (h) of Section 14(1) is an attempt in a way to ration out accommodation between tenants and landlords.
Looked at from that point of view unless acquisition of a premises or a flat or allotment of a prem ises or part of a premises by the tenant in which he has domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use as a substitute for the place he is using in the tenancy it cannot lead to a forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenanted premises.
The case would be otherwise, however, if a tenant comes into possession of a premises or is allotted a piece of residence or acquires vacant possession of the premises then such a tenant cannot prevent, if other condi tions are fulfilled under section 14(1)(h) of the Act being liable to forfeiture of his tenancy.
But counsel for the respondent heavily relied on a decision of this Court in Prem Chand and another vs Sher Singh, [1981] Delhi Rent Judgment 287.
That was a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and section 14(1)(h) of the Act came up for con sideration.
The respondent tenant was out of possession since October 9. 1976.
He was dispossessed during the pend ency of the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal.
The respondent 's son was a business executive, who was, at one time, allotted a flat by his employers.
On December 12, 1980, the respondent 's wife purchased a flat at Saket from the Delhi Development Authority, at a cost of about Rs. 1,20,000.
The flat was available to the respondent though his explanation is that it had been let out by his wife to their son.
The respondent thereafter has now no case to be put back in possession of the flat in dispute.
Chandrachud, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed that the Court had allowed the appellants to amend their applications for possession by pleading that the respondent had acquired possesion of a vacant residence within the meaning of sec tion 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Having considered the averments of the parties on the point at issue it was held in that case that the respondent had through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi and in that view of the matter was held not enti tled to retain old tenanted premises.
Mr. Avadh Bihari Rohtagi, learned counsel strenuously contended before us that this proposition that acquisition of a flat by the wife was acquisition by the tenant and such acquisition in all circumstances would be within the mischief of section 14(1)(h) of the Act and would disentitle the tenant to retain his flat in question.
We are unable to accept this reading of the said Act.
The said decision rested on the facts of that case.
There in that case, this Court found that the respondent 's wife had purchased a flat in Saket and further found that the flat was available to the respondent.
In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisi tion of vacant possession of a residence and as such section 14(1)(h) of the Act would 1191 be attracted.
It cannot however be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by the wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of fiat by the tenant.
This position has been very properly highlighted in the decision of the Delhi High Court in Smt.
Revti Devi vs Kishan Lal, where Deshpandey, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was; held that the mere occupation of a new residence by the tenant without any legal right to do so would not be covered by proviso (h) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
If he goes to stay in the house of his wife, legally speak ing, he has no right as such to stay and can be turned out from the house at any time by its legal owner, namely, the wife.
There was no law according to which the husband and the wife could be deemed to be one person.
Therefore, where proviso (h) required that the tenant himself should acquire vacant possession of another residence before he can become liable to eviction, the effect of its language cannot be whittled down by arguing that proviso (h) would apply even if it is not the tenant himself but his wife or his other relation were to acquire such other residence.
Therefore, as a general proposition of law, the acquisition of other residence must be by the tenant himself before proviso (h) to sub section
(1) of section 14 of the Act would apply.
The learned Judge dealt with this and observed that in construing the above provision, it has to be borne in mind that the scheme of the Act had to be appreciated.
Tenancy is a right vested in the tenant.
The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from eviction.
The various provisos to sub section
(1) of section 14 laid down the exception to this rule.
The learned Judge observed that when proviso (h) made tenant liable to eviction, its effect was to divest the tenant of his right of tenancy.
The intention of the legislature in divesting the tenant of his right was based upon the fact that the tenant had legally acquired another residence as of right.
There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person.
Therefore, the correct position must be that if a wife or a husband acquires a property and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition and stay there, then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of cl.
(h) of section 14(1), otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated.
In other words if for all practical and real sense the tenant ac quired, built or was allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises.
That is the rationale behind the scheme.
Dr. Roxna Swamy drew our attention to the various as pects of the case where no proper opportunity was given to the tenant to show that in fact the husband would not and did not have any right at all to 1192 come to the premises allotted to the wife which was taken because of the strained relation of the husband and wife regarding the career of the wife.
In such a house the hus band will not come, he will certainly have no legal right or access for either staying or coming in the premises acquired by the wife.
If it defeats the husband 's tenancy then it would be mockery of justice.
Mr. Rohtagi tried to submit that there was no evidence before the trial court as well the High Court of the alleged strained relationship between the parties.
What is necessary is that unless there is a positive evidence, and here there is none, of acquisition of property prima facie in the name of the tenant or allotment of flat to the tenant, it cannot be said to have been ac quired by or allotted to some members of the tenant 's family other than the wife.
That cannot defeat the tenant 's right under clause (h) of section 14(1).
If there is such an acquisition by or on behalf of the tenant then the tenant and members of the tenant 's family would have dominion over the acquired residence.
Such acquisition would bring to the tenant the mischief of section 14(1)(h) of the Act.
In the case of this nature the appellate court had ample power in our opinion to have taken additional evidence.
Our attention was drawn to a decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Raj Kumar vs Vedprakash, [ 1982] Jabalpur Law Jour nal 45 1.
Our attention was drawn at the bar that a judgment can be given on admission, that is to say, in this case that an allotment had been made in favour of the wife or the tenant.
Our attention was drawn to Mulla 's Code of Civil Procedure, Vol.
II, 14th Edition page 1148 which highlights that such oral admission must be definite and unambiguous and must be satisfactorily established.
In our opinion, from the fact that the wife of the tenant was allotted a tempo rary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that there was admission by virtue of which the 'tenant could lose his tenancy that the wife has acquired a house which is avail able to the husband over which the husband has a domain which could be a substitute to the tenanted premises.
In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that there was no admission at all.
Our attention was drawn to certain observations of Bhagwati, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs Chandrakant M. Patel and others; , , where dealing with certain facts wheth er premises given on a licence could be considered in con sidering the bona fide requirement of the landlord to the allotment or acquisition.
In our opinion, this principle is wholly irrelevant for the point in controversy before this Court.
We are not concerned here whether there was ground for bona fide requirement of the landlord for which a suit had been filed and which is pending 1193 appeal.
This fact of acquisition or allotment of flat in the name of wife (which incidentally she has lost having given up her job) can be in certain circumstances a factor in judging the bona fide needs of the landlord; but the same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession or been allot ted residence in terms of clause (h) of section 14(1).
Mr. Rohtagi drew our attention to certain observations of this Court in Gajanan Dattatraya vs Sherbanu Hosang Patel and others, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 535, where this Court held that the tenant 's liability to eviction arises when the fact of unlawful subletting is proved.
The fact that subsequently the other tenant had left the premises does not cure the mischief done.
Mr. Rohtagi placing this decision tried to urge before us that the allotment itself of a residence or acquisition of a residence by the tenant or the wife of the tenant was sufficient to attract clause (h) of section 14(1) of the Act.
The fact that subsequently the tenant had left the premises was irrelevant and did not affect the position.
It.was further submitted that the tenant had acquired a premises or allotted a residence which could be considered to be so in terms of clause (h) of section 14(1) but the flat in question allotted to the wife of the tenant could not by any stretch of imagination be considered to be a matrimonial home.
In England the rights of the spouses be husband or wife to the matrimonial home are now governed by the provisions of Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967.
Halsbury 's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol.
22 page 650 deals with the rights of occupation in matrimonial home and paragraph 1047 deals with and provides that where one spouse is enti tled to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of any estate or interest or contract or by virtue of any enactment giving him or her the right to remain in occupation, and the other spouse is not so entitled, then the spouse not so entitled has the certain rights (known as "rights of occupation") that is to say if in occupation, a right not to be evicted or excluded from the dwelling house or any part of it by the .other spouse except with the leave of the court given by an order if not in occupation, a right with the leave of the court so given to enter into and occupy the dwelling house.
But such rights are not granted in India though it may be that with change of situation and complex problems arising it is high time to give the wife or the spouse a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of marriage breaking up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife.
We, however, cannot for the purpose of this case get much assistance from the prin ciple adumbrated in paragraph 1047 of Halsbury 's Laws of England.
In England cases before 1968 established that occupation of the matrimonial home by a tenant 's wife after the tenant had left counts as occupation by the tenant so as to preserve the 1194 statutory tenancy for as long as the marriage itself sub sists.
In those circumstances in England the landlord could not properly be granted an order for possession against the husband unless there were available grounds for possession against both husband and wife.
The tenant cannot abandon his rights while his wife remains; nor can the landlord evict the wife even if the tenant consents or purports to surren der his statutory tenancy.
This is the result of the case law in England and much social awareness and the case laws have been given statutory expression in the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967.
We have no such law.
The premises in ques tion which the wife occupied was indisputably not the matri monial home.
It is nobody 's case.
The husband would not, therefore, have any statutory or legal right against the Government to use and enjoy the allotted premises to the wife of the tenant because of her job.
Looked at from any point of view, the tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy because of wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation.
In the premises we are unable to sustain the judgment under appeal.
To complete the story the wife of the tenant has resigned and has joined the husband at 2/14, Kalkaji Extension, New Delhi.
We hope there will be no more strained relationship in the family.
Hereafter they will live happily provided the landlord permits so.
We shall try to ensure that they so permit.
The appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court and the Courts below are set aside.
The eviction petition under section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is dismissed.
In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties will bear and pay their own costs.
This, however, will not in any manner prejudice the fights, if any, of the parties in the other eviction petition on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord which we are told is still pending.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The premises in question had been let out in April, 1968 to the appellant at a monthly rent of Rs.340 by the husband of respondent No. 1 and the father of respondents Nos. 2 to 8.
In July, 1977 the landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant on the ground of bona fide require ment.
In September, 1978 appellant 's wife was allotted a Government quarter due to her employment as a teacher In the Government school.
In March, 1986 the first respondent filed a petition before the Rent Controller that the wife of the appellant having been allotted a residential quarter came within the mischief of clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act and was, therefore, liable for eviction.
The appellant contended that he had not acquired any house and that the quarter in question was allotted to his wife on joint allotment basis on compassionate grounds and that the same had been surrendered and, therefore, the appellant was not liable to be evicted.
It was further contended that the allotted accommodation could not be treated as alternative accommodation for the appellant and his family.
The Additional Rent Controller held that having regard to the provisions of law, as the tenant had acquired vacant possession for residence, he became disentitled to retain the premises in question and, therefore, passed an order of eviction.
The Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal of the appellant.
The High Court rejected the second appeal.
In the appeal to this Court, the question for considera tion was: whether under clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act allotment of a house to the wife, who was a Government employee, in all circumstances disentitled the tenant to retain the tenanted premises.
1185 Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
The premises in question which the wife occu pied was indisputably not the matrimonial home.
The husband would not, therefore, have any statutory or legal right against the Government to use and enjoy the allotted prem ises to the wife of the tenant because of her job.
The tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy because of the wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation.
[1194C D] 2.1 The purpose of the Delhi Rent Control Act is to control rents and evictions; in other words, to control unreasonable evictions and to ensure that in an atmosphere of acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper enjoy ment of available spaces by those who want and deserve.
[1189G H] 2.2 Unless acquisition of a premises or allotment of a premises or a part of a premises by the tenant in which he has domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use as substitute for the place he is using in the tenancy, it cannot lead to forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenant ed premises.
The case would be otherwise, however, if a tenant comes into possession of a premises or is allotted a piece of residence or acquires vacant possession of the premises then such a tenant cannot prevent, if other condi tions are fulfilled under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act being liable to forfeiture of his tenancy.
[1190B C] 2.3 Tenancy is a right vested in the tenant.
The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from evic tion.
The various provisos to sub section (1) of section 14 laid down the exception to this rule.
The intention of the Legislature in divesting the tenant of his right was based upon the fact that the tenant had legally acquired another residence as of right.
There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person.
[1191E F] 2.4 The acquisition of other residence must be by the tenant himself before proviso (h) of sub section
(1) of section 14 of the Act would apply.
[1191D] 2.5 If a wife or husband acquires a property and the other spouse if he/she is the tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition and stay there, then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of cl.
(h) of section 14(1) of the Act, otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated.
That is the rationale behind the scheme.
[1191F G] 1186 2.6 From the fact that the wife of the tenant was allot ted a temporary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that there was admission by virtue of which the tenant could lose his tenancy that the wife has acquired a house which is available to the husband over which the husband has a domain which could be a substitute to the tenanted premises.
This fact of acquisition or allotment of fiat in the name of wife (which incidentally she has lost having given up the job) can be in certain circumstances a factor in judging the bona fide needs of the landlord; but the same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession or allotted residence in terms of cl.
(h) of section 14(1).
[1192E F, 1193A B] 3.
The rights, if any, of the parties in the eviction petition on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord will not in any manner be prejudicially affected.
[1194F] [In England the rights of the spouses to the matrimonial home are now governed by the provisions of the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967.
Where one spouse is entitled to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of any estate or interest or con tract or by virtue of any enactment giving him or her the right to remain in occupation, and the other spouse is not so entitled, then the spouse not so entitled has the certain rights (known as "rights of occupation"), that is to say, if in occupation, a right not to be evicted or excluded from the dwelling house or any part of it by the other spouse except with the leave of the court given by an order; if not in occupation, a right with the leave of the court so given to enter into and occupy the dwelling house.
[1193D G] Such rights are not granted in India.
But with the change of situation and complex problems arising, it is high time to give the wife or the spouse a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of marriage breaking up or in case of strained relationship between the husband and the wife.] [1193G] Prem Chand and another vs Sher Singh, [1981] Delhi Rent Judgment 287; Smt.
Revti Devi vs Kishan Lal, ; Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs Chandrakant M. Patel and others; , ; Galanan Dattatraya vs Sherbanu Hosang Patel and others, [1976] 1 SCR 535 and Halsbury 's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol.
22 page 650, referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal Nos.
689 90 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.1986 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 3306 of 1984.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.
Sanjay Parekh and Sudershan Menon for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an appeal by the tenant against the judgment and order of the High Court of Tamil Nadu.
By the aforesaid judgment the High Court upheld the landlord 's contention of bona fide requirement of the premises in question for the business of his sons and maintained the order of eviction passed by the courts below.
So far as the question of bona fide need is concerned it has been upheld by the courts below and that finding is not assailed G before us.
But what was contended was that the application itself under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter called the Act was not maintainable.
as the requirement of the land was not for the landlord or members of his family as such but for two sons who were running a leather business in partnership with strangers.
The deed of partnership was H examined by the High Court but it is, however, not before us.
It 67 appears from the evidence that previously the father and the two sons used to carry on leather business from long time.
The sons went into the partnership with others and two of the sons were partners.
They jointly hold half the shares.
From the evidence it appears that the sons used to take active part even before the partnership started in the leather business carried on by the father.
Thereafter, the partnership firm with the other partners carried on the business.
We must proceed on the basis that the partnership deed was silent as to what role the sons of the landlord would perform in this.
The only question which was urged before us was that the application for eviction under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners and it is not in conformity with the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the said Act.
Partnership, as is well settled has a compendious way of describing those who constitute the firm under section 4 of the Partnership Act.
Now, if that is the position, in our opinion, if a person carries on a business alongwith other partners and it was the other partner who actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been entirely different.
If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different.
On the contrary, here having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to the shares this was their only application where sons were carrying on the business along with other partner.
If that is the position in our opinion under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act as the sons and members of the family carrying on the business in terms of the section will be entitled to the benefit of eviction.
Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in D.N. Sanghavi & Sons vs Ambalal Tribhuvan Das, ; where the meaning of the expression 'his business ' under section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came up for consideration.
The said section was in pari materia with the present section.
Therefore this court held that the meaning of the expression 'his business ' under section 12(1)(f) of the said Act is to be determined by the examination of the object of the Act and setting of the phrase 'his business '.
There Dwivedi, J. speaking for the court found that before the partnership, it was stated that the father was to run the shop.
Father died during the pendency of the suit and neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the facts during the pendency had stated that on the terms of the partnership they were entitled to manage the partnership business or even that would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his other partners on obtaining possession 68 from the appellant was not stated that the other partners have agreed to shift the business.
The court observed that if the deed of partnership had excluded the son expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm 's business and had made him a sleeping partner it could not be held that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of his business.
The firm is carrying on the business in the premises in respect of which the eviction was asked for the said firm.
But here there is no evidence that the sons were sleeping partners.
On the contrary, there is evidence that they were in the leather business and had carried on the business previously before shifting to the premises in question.
If that is the position, it cannot be accepted that they were sleeping partners.
On the contrary, having regard to the number, they were active partners in the business and as such the sons needed the accommodation with others would be for sons ' business under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Act.
We may mention that in the subsequent decision of this Court in Shantilal Thamordas & Ors.
vs Chimanlal Maganlal Telware, ; this question did not directly arise but there this Court noted that some of the High Courts have taken the view that occupation by partner who was a member of the family would be the occupation of the landlord.
This Court felt that they should not express any opinion in that regard, but doubt was expressed as to whether the requirement of the premises by the landlord for the occupation of the partnership firm in which he was a partner would tantamount to the occupation by landlord.
It appears that the attention of this Court was not drawn to the earlier decision referred to hereinbefore.
In any event, the court had no occasion to express any opinion where the sons are active partners in a partnership firm whether such business carried on by the sons would not come within the provisions of section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
In the aforesaid view of the matter we uphold the order and judgment of the High Court and we are unable to accept the challenge to the order.
The appeal must therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed.
In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The landlord was carrying on leather business in which his two sons used to take active part.
Thereafter they went into a partnership with others to carry on the business and jointly held half the shares.
The landlord needed the demised premises bona fide for the business of his sons.
The High Court maintained the order of eviction passed by the courts below.
In the appeal, it was contended for the appellant that an application for eviction under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord had chosen to file it to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers were partners, which was not in conformity with the provisions of the section.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: If the deed of partnership excludes the son expressly or impliedly from the management of the firm of business and makes him a sleeping partner it cannot be said that the accommodation is needed directly or substantially for his occupation by way of his business.
[68A] D.N. Sanghavi & Sons vs Ambalal Tribhuvan Das, ; , applied.
Shantilal Thamordas & Ors.
vs Chimanlal Maganlal Telware, ; , distinguished.
Partnership is a compendious way of describing those who constitute the firm under section 4 of the Partnership Act.
If a person carries on a business alongwith other partners and it was the other partner who 66 actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been entirely different.
If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different.
[67CD] In the instant case, the partnership deed was silent as to what role the sons of the landlord would perform in it.
There is, however, evidence that they were in the leather business and had carried on the business previously before shifting to the premises in question.
If that is the position, it cannot be said that they were sleeping partners.
Having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to their shares in the partnership it can be said that the sons were carrying on business actively along with other partners.
As such, the sons needing the accommodation with others would be for the sons ' business in terms of section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
The landlord was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of eviction.
[67B, 68BC, 67DE, 68C, 67E]