judgement:
Appeal No. 76 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 26, 1957, of the Election Tribunal, Dharwar, in Election Petition No. 52 of 1957.
G. section Pathak, H. J. Umrigar and G. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
P. Ram Reddy, for respondent No. 1.
G. section Pathak and section, section Shukla, for the interveners.
April 22.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.
This is the 4th of the series of Civil Appeals before us arising out of election petitions and involving the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as " the Act ").
The decision of this appeal turns on the construction of section 97 'of the Act and also on the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunals to allow withdrawal or abandonment of part of the claims before them.
The appellant and respondents 1 to 3 were the contesting candidates for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly from the Dharwar Constituency in the last General Elections.
The appellant was the Congress candidate and the first respondent was the candidate of the Lok Sevak Sangh party.
The result of the election was declared on March 3, 1957, and the appellant was declared elected by a majority of 1,727 votes.
On April 14, 1957, the first respondent pre sented to the Election Commission a Petition, being Election Petition No. 52 of 1957 under section 80 of the Act wherein besides claiming a declaration that the election of the appellant was void he claimed a further declaration that he, the first respondent, had been duly elected as he had secured the next highest number of valid votes.
The Election Petition was published in 613 the official gazette and was then referred to the Election Tribunal for trial. 'The appellant and the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 received a notice from the Election Commission requiring them to appear before the Tribunal on or before July 20, 1957.
On the said date, the first respondent submitted before the Election Tribunal what purported to be an application under 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure to the following effect : " The petitioner hereby abandons part of his claim namely " that it be further declared that the petitioner has been duly elected as the petitioner has secured the next highest number of valid votes.
" The petitioner confines his claim, therefore, to have the election of respondent No. 1 declared void and to have costs of the proceedings awarded to him.
" On July 25, 1957, the appellant filed his objections to the said application contending inter alia, that by reason of the fact that the first respondent had claimed in his Election Petition a declaration that he was duly elected, the appellant and the other respondents to the Election Petition had acquired a right under section 97 of the Act, to file recrimination against the first respondent subject of course to compliance with the necessary statutory provisions in that behalf, and that such right to file recrimination could not be affected by the purported abandonment of the relief by the first respondent.
On July 29, 1957,.
the appellant gave notice of his recrimination under section 97.
The said notice was accompanied by the statement and necessary particulars as required by section 97 read with section 83 of the Act and was given within 14 days from the date of the commencement of the trial, viz., July 20, 1957.
The particulars of corrupt practices under section 123(1) (a) and (b) and section 123(6) of the Act thus given by the appellant comprised corrupt practices of bribery and using of motor vehicles for the conveyance of voters to the poll which if proved would have led to his disqualification for standing as a candidate and from.
being a member of the Legislature for a period of six years counting from the date on which the finding of the Election Tribunal as to such practice took effect under the Act (Vide section 140).
614 On August 1, 1957, the first respondent filed an objection to the above mentioned notice under section 97 wherein he contended inter alia that the appellant was not entitled to give evidence in recrimination as the claim for further declaration had been abandoned by him.
There had been a vacancy for a Legislative Assembly seat from a neighbouring constituency on account of the death of Shri B. R. Tambakad on June 26, 1957, and the first respondent decided to con test the election in the vacancy, filed his nomination paper for the said vacancy on September 17,1957, and was duly elected on October 16, 1957, as a member of the Mysore Legislative Assembly from the Kalaghatgi Constituency.
The application of the first respondent under 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
, the notice of recrimination given by the appellant under section 97 and the objection filed by the first respondent to the same came up for hearing before the Election Tribunal, Dharwar, and the Tribunal framed the following issues: " (1) Whether the 1st respondent is entitled to abandon a part of his claim in the manner he has done ? (2) If so, whether the appellant will be entitled to give notice to the Tribunal of his intention to give evidence to prove that the election of the first respondent would have been void if he had been the returned candidate ? (3) Whether the notice of recrimination given by the appellant is barred by limitation ? " The Tribunal held that by virtue of the provisions of section 90(1) of the Act the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure had been made applicable to proceedings in election petitions and as such under the provisions of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure the first respondent had a right to abandon a part of his claim.
It further held that in view of the abandonment of part of the claim by the first respondent, viz., that he be declared as the duly elected candidate, neither the appellant nor respondents Nos. 2 and 3 would be entitled to give notice of recrimination under 615 section 97 and consequently the appellant would not be entitled to give evidence to prove that the election of the first respondent would have been void if he had been the returned candidate.
It also held that the notice of recrimination given by the appellant was not barred by limitation, inasmuch as under explanation to section 90(4) the trial of the petition was deemed to commence on the date fixed for the appellant and the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to appear before the Tribunal, viz., July 20, 1957, and the notice of recrimination had been given by the appellant within 14 days thereof.
The Tribunal accordingly ordered that the abandonment of a part of his claims aforesaid should be noted on the petition and further ordered that the appellant could not give evidence to prove that the election of the first respondent would have been void if he had been the returned candidate inasmuch as on the abandonment of that part of the claim by the first respondent the recrimination put in by the appellant did not survive.
The appellant applied for and obtained on January 13, 1958, from this Court special leave to appeal under article 136 of the Constitution to appeal against the decision of the Election Tribunal and that is how this Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1958 has come before us.
Section 97 of the Act reads as under : " Recrimination when, seat claimed: (1) When in an election petition a declaration that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected is claimed, the returned candidate or any other party may give evidence to prove that the election of such candidate would have been void if he bad been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election: Provided that the returned candidate or such other party as aforesaid shall not be entitled to give such evidence unless he has, within fourteen days from the date of the commencement of the trial, given notice to the Tribunal of his intention to do so and has also given the security and the further security referred to in sections 117 and 118 respectively.
(2) Every notice referred to in sub section (1) shall 616 be accompanied by the statement and particulars required by section 83 in the case of an election petition and shall be signed and verified in like manner.
Under the terms of this section a right of recrimination accrues to the returned candidate or any other party to the Election Petition where the petitioner besides claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected.
Would it then be open to the petitioner to abandon that part of 'the relief which claimed such further declaration so as to deprive the returned candidate or any other party to the petition of the right of recrimination which has thus accrued to him; or in other words, has the Election Tribunal the power to allow the petitioner to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim as aforesaid thus rendering the exercise of the said right of recrimination nugatory ? It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to understand the nature and scope of an Election Petition.
As has been observed by us in the judgment just delivered in Civil Appeals Nos. 763 & 764 of 1957 and Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1958: " An election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power.
" An election petition is not a matter in which the only persons interested are candidates who strove against each other at the elections.
The public also are substantially interested in it and this is not merely in the sense that an election has news value.
An election is an essential part of the democratic process.". . . . .
An election petition is not a suit between two persons, but is a proceeding in which the constituency itself is the principal party interested.
617 (Vide Jagan Nath vs Jaswant Singh (1), A. Sreenivasan vs Election Tribunal, Madras (2), The Tipperary case (3)).
An Election Petition presented to the Election Commission is scrutinised by it and if the Election Commission does not dismiss it for want of compliance with the provisions of section 81, section 82 or section 117 of the Act, it accepts the same and causes a copy thereof to be published in the official gazette and a copy thereof to be served by post on each respondent.
The respondents to the petition not only get notice of the same but the constituency as a whole receives such notice by publication thereof in the official gazette so that each and every voter of the constituency and all parties interested become duly aware of the fact of such Election Petition having been presented.
A copy of the Election Petition published in the official gazette would also show to all of them that the petitioner in a particular Election Petition, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, has also claimed a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected.
The whole constituency is thus alive to the fact that the result of the election duly declared is questioned on various grounds permitted by law with the likely result that the election of all or any of the returned candidates may be declared void and the petitioner or any other candidate may be declared duly elected, in place and stead of the returned candidate.
The constituency may have an interest in either maintaining the status quo or if perchance the election of the returned candidate is set aside, in seeing that some other deserving candidate is declared elected in his place and stead and not necessarily the petitioner or any other candidate sponsored by him whose election could be challenged on any of the grounds mentioned in section 100(1).
It is this interest of the constituency as a whole which invests the proceedings before the Election Tribunals with a characteristic of their own and differentiates them from (1) ; , 895.
(2) (1955) II E.L.R. 278, 293.
(3) ,23. 618 ordinary civil proceedings.
Once this process has been set in motion by the petitioner he has released certain forces which even he himself would not be able to recall and he would be bound to pursue the petition to its logical end.
It may be that he may not be able to substantiate his claim for a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void.
In that event he would of course fail and no question would arise of his obtaining a further declaration that lie himself or any other candidate has been duly elected.
All the grounds urged in the Election Petition against the returned candidates under section 100(1) of the Act would fail and the election would stand.
The voters would thus be vindicated.
If the petitioner, however, succeeds in establishing his first claim and the election of the returned candidate is declared void, the question would necessarily arise when such a further declaration has been claimed by him whether he himself or any other candidate should be declared duly elected.
In that event, the occasion would arise for considering whether the petitioner himself or any other candidate sponsored by him should be declared duly elected.
If the election of the petitioner or such other candidate could have been challenged on any of the grounds mentioned in section 100(1) such election would certainly have been void if he had been a returned candidate and the petition had been presented calling in question his election.
A recrimination could there.
fore be filed by the returned candidate or any other party to the petition under section 97.
The requisite notice under section 97 would be accompanied by the statement and particulars required by section 83 in the case of an election petition and signed and verified in like manner.
, This notice would be, in effect, a counter ' petition presented by the returned candidate or any other party to the petition accompanied by the statement and particulars required by section 83 in the case of ,in election petition and would also be supported by the deposit of security and further security referred to in sections 117 and 118 of the Act.
The election contest would then not only be between the petitioner on the one hand and the returned candidate on the other but 619 also between the returned candidate or any other party to the petition and the candidate who has been sponsored by the petitioner for such election.
An election contest as aforesaid would result in the declaration of the properly qualified candidate as duly elected and the maintenance of the purity of the elections in which the constituency as a whole is vitally interested and no person would get elected by flagrant breaches of the election law or by corrupt practices.
This is the purpose of a recrimination and the right to file a recrimination accrues to the returned candidate or any other party to the petition the moment an election petition is presented containing a claim for a further declaration that the petitioner himself or any other candidate has been duly elected.
The proviso to section 97(1) merely enacts conditions for the exercise of such right of recrimination and states that the returned candidate or such other party is not to be entitled to give such evidence unless he has, within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial, given notice to the Tribunal of his intention to do so and has also given the security and the further security referred to in sections 117 and 118 respectively.
If these conditions are fulfilled in the manner therein specified the returned candidate or such other party will be entitled to give such evidence which right of course would not be capable of being exercised if either of these two conditions has not been fulfilled.
The accrual of this right, however, is not postponed till the fulfilment of these conditions.
It accrues the moment an election petition containing a claim for such further declaration is presented to the Election Commission.
If once such a right has accrued to the returned candidate or any other party to the petition, can that right be affected by the petitioner seeking to withdraw or abandon that part of his claim, viz., a claim for a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected ? If it were permissible for him to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim on the analogy of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 79 620 he would make a virtue of necessity and withdraw or abandon that part of his claim so as to avoid any investigation in the Election Petition itself in regard to himself or any other candidate sponsored by him on any of the grounds mentioned in section 100(1) including corrupt practices within the meaning of section 123 which if proved would entail a disqualification for standing as a candidate or even for voting for a period of 6 years under sections 140 and 141(b).
So far as withdrawal of petitions is concerned there are specific provisions enacted in the Act beginning with section 108.
Section 108 deals with the withdrawal of petitions before the appointment of Tribunals and provides that an election petition may be withdrawn only by leave of the Election Commission if an application for its withdrawal is made before any Tribunal has been appointed for the trial of such petition.
Section 109 deals with the withdrawal of petitions after the appointment of Tribunals and enacts that where an application for withdrawal of an election petition is made after a Tribunal has been appointed for the trial of such petition, the election petition may be withdrawn only by leave of the Tribunal and a notice of such an application fixing a date for the hearing of the application is to be given to all other parties to the petition and is to be published in the official gazette.
Section 110 prescribes the procedure for withdrawal of petitions before the Election Commission or the Tribunal and section 110(2) provides that no application for withdrawal is to be, granted if in the opinion of the Election Commission or of the Tribunal, as the case may be, such application has been induced by any bargain or consideration which ought not to be allowed.
If such an application is granted, notice of the withdrawal is to be published in the official gazette by the Election Commission or by the Tribunal as the case may be; and a person who might himself have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days of such publication apply to be substituted as petitioner in place of the party withdrawing, and upon compliance with the conditions of section 117 as to security, is to be entitled to be so substituted and to continue the proceedings 621 upon such terms as the Tribunal may think fit.
When an application for withdrawal is granted by the Tribunal and no person has been substituted as, petitioner in place of the party withdrawing as above, the Tribunal is to report the fact to the Election Commission and thereupon the Election Commission shall publish the report in the official gazette.
This will ring the curtain on the election contest and the result of the election which has been duly declared will no more be liable to be disturbed.
There are also provisions enacted in the Act which provide for the consequences of the death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of several petitioners or the death or withdrawal of opposition by the sole respondent therein.
Section 112 provides that an election petition shall abate on the death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of several petitioners.
If an election petition thus abates before a Tribunal has been appointed for the trial of the petition, notice of the abatement shall be published in the official gazette by the Election Commission (Vide section 113).
If on the other hand an election petition abates after a Tribunal has been appointed for the trial of the petition, notice of the abatement has to be published in the official gazette by the Tribunal (Vide section 114).
The death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of several petitioners, however, does not spell the termination of the proceedings and section 115 provides that after a notice of the abatement of an election petition is published under section 113 or section 114 any person who might himself have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days of such publication, apply to be substituted as petitioner and upon compliance with the conditions of section 117 as to security shall be entitled to be so substituted and to continue the proceedings upon such terms as the Tribunal may think fit.
The position as it obtains on the death or withdrawal of opposition by a respondent is worked out in section 116 which provides that if before the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the sole respondent dies or gives notice that he does not intend to oppose the petition or any of the respondents dies or gives such notice and 622 there is no other respondent who is opposing the petition the Tribunal shall cause notice of such event to be published in the official gazette, and thereupon any person who might have been a petitioner may, within fourteen days of such publication, apply to be substituted in place of such respondent to oppose the petition, and shall be entitled to continue the proceedings upon such terms as the Tribunal may think fit.
The above provisions go to show that an election petition once filed does not mean a contest only between the parties thereto but creates a situation which the whole constituency is entitled to avail itself of.
Any person who might himself have been a petitioner is entitled to be substituted, on the fulfilment of the requisite conditions and upon such terms as the Tribunal may think fit, in place of the party with drawing and even the death of the sole petitioner or of the survivor of several petitioners does not put an end to the proceedings, but they can be continued by any person who might himself have been a petitioner.
Even if the sole respondent dies or gives notice that he does not intend to oppose the petition or any of the respondents dies or gives such notice and there is no other respondent who is opposing the petition, a similar situation arises and the opposition to the petition can be continued by any person who might have been a petitioner, of course on the fulfilment of the conditions prescribed in section 116.
These provisions therefore show that the election petition once presented continues for the benefit of the whole constituency and cannot come to an end merely by the withdrawal thereof by the petitioner or even by his death or by the death or withdrawal of opposition by the respondent but is liable to be continued by any person who might have been a petitioner.
If, therefore, an election petition duly presented cannot be thus withdrawn by the petitioner, is there any warrant for the contention that even though he may not be able to withdraw his petition in the manner aforesaid he can at least abandon a part of his claim on the analogy of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil 623 Procedure? The whole petition cannot be withdrawn; but would it not be possible for the petitioner to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim as above? The provisions of section 90 of the Act are sought to be relied upon in support of this contention.
Section 90(1) provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits, provided however that the Tribunal shall have the discretion to refuse for reasons to be recorded in writing to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that their evidence is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings.
Under section 90(2) the provisions of the , shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition.
Section 90(4) provides that any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the Tribunal within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to the provisions of section 119, be entitled to be joined as a respondent.
Section 90(5) provides that the Tribunal may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition.
It is clear from the above that the section only provides for the procedure for the trial of election petitions by the Tribunals.
It provides for the examination of witnesses, the rules of evidence to be followed, the joinder of candidates not already respondents as respondents and the amendment or amplification of particulars of a corrupt practice already alleged in the petition.
The powers of a Tribunal are, however, separately dealt with in section 92 624 which enacts that the Tribunal shall have the powers which are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, when trying a suit in respect of the following matters: (a) discovery and inspection; (b) enforcing the attendance of witnesses, and requiring the deposit of their expenses; (e) compelling the production of documents; (d) examining witnesses on oath; (e) granting adjournments; (f) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (g) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses, and may summon and examine suo motu any person whose evidence appears to it to be material; and shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
It will be noticed that the procedure for trial before the Tribunal and the powers of the Tribunal are treated separately thus distinguishing between the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal and the powers to be exercised by it.
There are also other provisions to be found in the Act which relate to place of trial (section 88); Power of Election Commission to withdraw and transfer Petitions (section 89); appearance before Tribunal (section 91); documentary evidence (section 93); answering of criminating questions and certificate of indemnity (section 95) and expenses of witnesses (section 96).
The effect of all these provisions really is to constitute a self contained Code governing the trial of election petitions and it would appear that in spite of section 90(1) of the Act, the provisions of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, would not be applicable to the trial of election petitions by the Tribunals.
If the withdrawal of a petition cannot be permitted and any person who might have been a petitioner is entitled to continue the proceedings, on a parity of reasoning, the withdrawal of a part of the claim also could not be permitted without allowing another person who might have been a petitioner an opportunity of proceeding with that part of the claim by substituting himself in place and stead of the petitioner who withdraws or abandons the same.
If the constituency as a whole is interested in the petition presented before the Election Tribunal no such withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim could ever be permitted without giving an 625 opportunity to any person who might have been a petitioner to continue the proceedings and pursue the petition to its logical conclusion.
The provisions of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure also contain inherent evidence which militates against this contention.
Order 23, r. 1, sub rule (2), provides for liberty being given by the Court to a party withdrawing or abandoning a part of his claim to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, if so advised.
In the very nature of things such liberty could not be reserved to a petitioner in an election petition.
The provisions above referred to in regard to withdrawal of petitions do not provide for the same and if they do not do so, can it be urged that the provisions of 0. 23, r. 1, sub rule (2), though they may not apply to the cases of withdrawal of petitions may nevertheless apply where the petitioner withdraws or abandons a part of his claim ? If these provisions do not apply to the withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim in the case of an election petition, could it then be urged that nevertheless the other provisions of O. 23, r. 1, would apply and the petitioner would be at liberty to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim ? On a due consideration of all these provisions, we are of opinion that the provisions of O. 23, r. 1, do not apply to the election petitions and it would not be open to a petitioner to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim once an election petition was presented to the Election Commission, more so when such a withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim would have the effect of depriving the returned candidate or any other party to the petition of the right of recrimination which had accrued to him under section 97 of the Act.
This is also the position in England.
Halsbury 's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol.
14, para.
451, p. 258, contains the following passage under the caption Amendment of petition " : " The withdrawal of that portion of a petition which claims the seat cannot, however, be effected by way of amendment because the rights of the electors would be affected by their not having the opportunity of substituting another petitioner.
626 See also the passage at ibid p. 300, para.
541 : " It seems that where the petition prays the seat, recriminatory evidence may be offered, notwithstanding, that the prayer for the seat is abandoned at the trial.
The case of Aldridge vs Hurst (1) elucidates this position.
Grove J. in that case observed as follows: " Numerous provisions of the Act have reference not merely to the individual interests or rights of petitioners or respondents, but to rights of electors, of constituencies, and of the public, in purity of election and in having the member seated who is duly returned by a majority of proper votes.
It appears to us also that the scope of the Act is, that petitions should not be mere pleadings, nor framed for the purpose of intimidating or in any way inducing, the respondent to abandon his seat; still less, of course, should they be collusive; but that they should be real, well considered, and not lightly withdrawn either in whole or part . . . . . . . .
These section show that not mearely may the candidate who is not returned claim the seat, or in other words claim to have been duly elected, but that any other voter might claim the seat for a candidate who has not been returned.
" This right petitioning shows that the Act contemplates, in regard to petitions, not merely the rights of candidates not returned, but the rights of the constituency to insure that the person really elected should be their member; and this without the cost and disturbance of a new election, as the judge 's decision in favour of such claim is final." " It appears to us that it would be an infringement of this right, if, a petition having been presented by one person (in this case a candidate) claiming the Beat, the claim to the seat could be withdrawn by the mere motion of the person presenting it, after the twenty one days, when no other petition could be presented, and thus the voters be prevented from claiming (1) , 413, 414. 415, 417 627 the seat for one who may be the duly elected representative; or, on the other hand, from shewing by means of the recriminative charges which put in issue the claim, that the claimant is not a person entitled to the seat by that election or that he is disqualified for future elections; such withdrawal not being accompanied by the power to substitute another person as petitioner, by means of which the inquiry might be gone into at the trial. " " It appears to us that the withdrawal of this portion of the prayer of the petition is in pari materia with, even if it is not within, the provisions of the Act relative to the withdrawal of a whole petition." " It is also to be observed that, although petitions may be presented at the last moment, it is commonly known in the county or borough that such petitions are likely to be presented ; and if any suspicion exists that they are sham petitions, means are taken by those who are in earnest to lodge petitions; and the entire withdrawal of collusive petitions is guarded against by the provisions of the Act to which we have alluded." " In one point of view it is an argument against our allowing this prayer to be withdrawn, that, if there be no power under the withdrawal clauses to substitute a person for the petitioner as to this prayer, the constituency will be without means of proving either that the petitioner is the duly elected member, or to answer his allegation that he is elected, or to shew that he is unfit to serve in a future parliament, he himself having raised this issue by claiming the seat.
" It is, therefore, clear that there is no power in the Election Commission to allow a petitioner to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim either by having resort to the provisions of 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise.
If that is so, the right of recrimination which has once accrued to the returned candidate or any other party to the petition under section 97 of the Act cannot be taken away, and the returned candidate or any other party to the petition would in 80 628 such circumstances be entitled to give evidence to prove that the election of the petitioner or any other candidate sponsored by him would have been void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition had been presented calling in question his election.
The counter petition which has in effect been thus filed by the returned candidate or any other party to the petition must be allowed to proceed and the right of recrimination should continue to be exercised notwithstanding the attempted abandonment of a part of his claim by the petitioner with the inevitable result that if any corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 were proved against the petitioner or any other candidate sponsored by him it would entail upon him the disqualification for standing as a candidate or even for voting for a period of 6 years under sections 140 and 141(b).
In the present case, such proof on the part of the appellant would have not only entailed upon the lst respondent a disqualification for voting but even for standing as a candidate for a period of six years, with the inevitable consequence that his election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly from the Kalaghatgi constituency on October 16, 1957, would have been void and lie would have been unseated.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the order passed by the Election Tribunal allowing abandonment of a part of the claim by the first respondent and precluding the appellant from giving evidence to prove that the election of the first respondent would have been void if he had been the returned candidate was clearly erroneous and liable to be set aside.
We accordingly allow the appeal and reverse the order passed by the Election Tribunal dated September 26, 1957.
The Election Tribunal shall proceed with the trial of the election petition on the claims as they were originally included in the petition and will also allow the appellant to exercise his right of recrimination under section 97 of the Act.
The first respondent will pay the appellant 's costs of this appeal and the costs thrown away before the Election Tribunal.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
A, the unsuccessful candidate at an election, filed an elec tion petition against B, the successful candidate, claiming a declaration ' that the election of B was void and that lie had been duly elected as he had secured the next highest number of valid votes.
On the first date of the hearing before the Election Tribunal A submitted an application under 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure abandoning the relief claiming the seat.
B objected to the abandonment and filed a notice of recrimination under section 97 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, accompanied by the statement and necessary particulars.
A contended that B was not entitled to give evidence in recrimination as the claim for the seat had been abandoned.
The Tribunal held that section 90(1) of the Act had made the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings in election petitions and as such A had a right under 0. 23, r. 1, of the Code to abandon a part of his claim and that A having abandoned his claim for the seat B was no longer entitled to recriminate Held, that the provisions of the Act constitute a self con tained code governing the trial of an election petition and in spite of section 90(1) of the Act, the provisions 0.
23, r. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to the trial of an election petition by the Tribunal ; and it was not open to A to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim once an election petition had been presented to the Election Commission, particularly when such a withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim would have had the effect of depriving B of the right of recrimination which had accrued to him under section 97 Of the Act.
The right of recrimination accrued to B the moment the election petition was presented to the Election Commission containing the claim for 'the seat, and it was not open to A to defeat this right by withdrawing or abandoning the claim for the seat.
An election petition once filed does not mean a contest only between the parties thereto but continues for the benefit of the whole constituency and cannot come to an end merely by the withdrawal thereof by the petitioner or even by his death or 78 612 by the death or withdrawal of opposition by the respondent but is liable to be continued by any person who might have been a petitioner.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 223 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.88 of the Cus toms Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. E. 12068/84 BI (Order No. 432/88 BI).
Soli J. Sorabjee, A.N. Haksar, Ravinder Narain, P.K. Ram and D .N. Misra for the Appellant.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an appeal under section 35 L of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').
against the order dated 31.10.1988 passed by the Customs, ExciSe & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribu nal ').
The issue involved in this appeal mainly relates to the classification of the goods, namely, whether the products of the appellant in this case were end fittings or nuts? The question was whether the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 52 or Tariff Item 68 of the erstwhile First Schedule to the Act.
The appellant applied for requisite central excise licence for manufacture of goods falling under Tariff Item 68 and for the purpose of such goods L 4 licence was also furnished, and also the requisite ground plans of the facto ry showing the requisite sanction of the factory in which the various goods were manufactured.
The excise authorities granted L 4 licence.
The appellant contends that the same was done after verifying the ground plans.
Necessary classi fication list was supplied on 22nd March, 1979 for approval by the excise authorities and the appellant claimed benefit of exemption of notification No. 89/79 Central Excise dated 1.3.79.
The said classification list submitted by the appel lant was approved by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise by his letter dated 25th May, 1979.
For the period from 1.4.79 to 30.6.79, the appellant filed his RT 12 for the assessment, which was also finally assessed without any protest or objection.
Inasmuch as, the appellant claimed that its goods were wholly exempted by virtue of the notifi cation No. 89/79CE dated 1.3.79, the appellant wrote to the Superintendent of Central Excise asking for dispensation from filing RT 12 every month.
The Superintendent by his order informed the appellant that it need not file RT 12, but should inform 874 the Excise Department monthly by means of a simple letter the total clearance effected in the month in question.
Thereafter, the appellant submitted classification lists in 1980, 1981 and 1982 in respect of the said goods and claimed the benefit of the exemption under notification No. 105/80 Central Excise, dated 19.6.80, which was a subsequent noti fication.
The Assistant Collector of Central Excise duly approved the said classification lists.
It is stated that the Central Excise Officers attached to the Preventive Branch visited on or around 13.7.82, the factory of the appellant and examined the products manufactured by the appellant.
The excise authorities once again, it is stated, visited the factory of the appellant on 20th July, 1982.
However, on 17th .January, 1983, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant asking it to show cause as to why excise duty should not be demanded under Tariff Item 52 in respect of 14,88,838 pieces of nuts manufactured and removed by the appellant during the period 1st April, 1981 to 19th July, 1982 without payment of appropriate excise duty there on.
It was further stated in the show cause notice to show cause why penalty should not be imposed on the appellant for failing to obtain the requisite L 4 licence under Tariff Item 52 in respect of the said goods and for failing to file price lists and classification lists in respect thereof and further to show cause why the material seized on 26th Au gust, 1982 should not be confiscated.
The appellant showed cause, and drew attention to the Indian Standard Institution publication for specification of High Pressure Connection meant for lubricating arrangement of oil in Fuel Injection Equipment for Diesel Engines which according to the appel lant, showed that the goods in question were not nuts but end products or connectors for lubricating purposes and as such were integral parts of the Diesel Engine Pipes falling under Tariff Item 68.
On 16th July, 1984, the Collector of Central Excise passed orders holding that fittings were nuts classifiable under Tariff Item 52 and that appropriate duty on the clear ances effected by the appellant during the period 1st April, 1981 to 19th July, 1982 should be paid, and that the seized goods were liable to confiscation but in lieu thereof a redemption fine of Rs.4,000 could be paid within three months, the exports effected indirectly by the appellant were not entitled to benefit of Notification No. 89/79 CE and, therefore, the differential duty in respect of those clearances was payable under Tariff Item 68 and that the show cause notice was not barred by time.
The Collector, accordingly, imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 lac.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant went up in appeal before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal of the appellant and 875 partly upheld the order of the Collector.
So far as the question of classification of the different fittings was concerned, the Tribunal held that the classification should have been as nuts under Tariff item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff.
The Tribunal also held that the appellant was guilty of suppression and therefore rejected the submission of the appellant that the show cause notice was barred by time.
The contention of the appellant in respect of the benefit of exemption being available to the extent of export effected indirectly on the basis of the earlier decision of the Tribunal, was accepted by the Tribunal and the order of the Collector was modified to that extent.
The Tribunal also reduced the amount of penalty imposed by the Collector from Rs. 1 lac to Rs.50,000.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is in appeal before this Court.
The first contention that was agitated before us and which was decided against the appellant in the order of Tribunal is, whether the goods in question involved in this appeal were classifiable under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff or whether these goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 68.
The Tribunal noted that these goods were described as 'nuts ' by the Consultant on behalf of the appellant in the arguments submitted before the Tribunal.
The appellants were purchasing nuts, both threaded and unthreaded, and the latter being threaded, this was to be taken for captive consumption.
Therefore, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the function of such nuts was not merely fastening but also facilitating the flow of oil under high pressure without leakage.
It was emphasised that these nuts were leak proof.
The Tribunal on appraise ment of all the materials, held that these were nuts manu factured by the appellant.
It was evident from the Tribu nal 's judgment that the appellant was itself purchasing, both threaded and unthreaded nuts as such and the unthreaded nuts were threaded by the appellant.
Apart from captive consumption, some of these nuts were also sold as nuts to outside parties.
These facts were found by the Tribunal and recorded in its order.
The Tribunal in those circumstances was of the view that it was difficult to accept the appel lant 's contention.
The impugned goods were commercially known and bought and sold as nuts.
It is true that specifi cation of the Indian Standard Institution was drawn atten tion to.
But there was evidence, as noted by the Tribunal, about the commercial indentify of these goods.
If these goods not being defined as such and are commercially known as nuts, as found by the Tribunal then, in our opinion, such finding cannot be said to be wrong or perverse.
Such finding was arrived at after giving opportunity to both the parties and considering all relevant materials.
Such finding cannot be assailed in this appeal.
876 The functional approach to the identify of the goods as canvassed by the appellant was also duly considered by the Tribunal.
It was contended that the function of the nuts was not only to fasten but also to enable the flow of oil under high pressure without leakage.
But the Tribunal noted that the flow of oil is possible only after nuts are fastened.
To that extent, according to the Tribunal, it can be stated that nuts permit the flow of oil without leakage.
The ques tion is, however, not as to what is the process facilitated as a result of the nuts, but the question which the Tribunal itself posed is whether the nuts are fasteners or do they have any other 'independent function? The Tribunal found that it had not been shown before them that they had any such independent function.
To say that these nuts are leak proof, was only to reiterate the fact of their essential character and quality as fasteners and not to substantiate any argument as regards their independent function.
In that view of the matter, the Tribunal even taking the functional approach to the identity of the goods, came to the conclu sion that the goods in question were properly classifiable as nuts.
That conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be assailed in appeal in view of the evidence on record as noted before.
Certain decisions were referred to before the Tribunal by the appellant in support of its contention that in certain cases goods of these types had not been considered to be nuts.
These goods, as the Tribunal noted, were in the nature of bolts, nuts and rods of special type manufactured by a particular party.
Therefore, these were not classifiable as merely bolts and nuts under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff, but as integral parts of the machine for which they were specifically designed with a distinct and specific function in the operation of the motor cycle of which these were components parts.
It was held in those cases that the components manufactured solely on the orders of the buyers, as per their drawings and specifications, were components of mining and project machinery and, there fore, not classifiable under Tariff Item 52 CET, But the facts involved in these items of goods in the instant case, dealt with by the appellant, are different.
These goods were not manufactured according to any special specifications as integral parts of machinery.
Some of these nuts required were also purchased from market ' while those being manufac tured were also sold to outside buyers as nuts.
Attention of the Tribunal was also drawn to the case of M/s. Precision Fasteners Ltd. vs Collector of Central Ex cise, Bombay II.
In that case, however, the Tribunal did not take any final view on the product.
In view of the type of goods involved in that case, the Tribunal had remanded the matter for re adjudication.
In that view of 877 the matter, the Tribunal was of the view that the commercial identify of the goods in the instant case, was different from the goods involved in the Precision Fasteners Ltd. 's case (supra).
In the light of these submissions, the Tribu nal came to the conclusion that the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff.
It was this finding which is assailed before us in appeal.
We find, however, as noted hereinbefore, no cogent ground to sustain any challenge to the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has considered all the relevant evidence.
The Tribunal has not ignored any relevant piece of evidence.
It had applied the correct principle of law ap plicable to the determination of this question.
It had also applied the test of commercial identity of the goods and examined the matter from the angle of the conduct of the appellant.
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that these findings of the Tribunal cannot be assailed.
The next question that has to be determined is whether the claim for duty is only to be confined to the period of six months because it was contended, in view of the facts and the circumstances narrated hereinbefore, that there was no suppression of any fact.
It may be relevant in this connection to refer to Section 11 A of the Act, which pro vides as follows: "When any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded, a Central Excise Officer may, within six months from the rele vant date, serve notice on the person charge able with the duty which has not been levied or paid or which has been short levied or short paid or to whom the refund has errone ously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount speci fied in the notice: Provided that where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded by reason of fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty, by such person or his agent, the provisions of this sub section shall have effect, as if for the words "Central Excise Officer", the words "Collector of Central Excise", and for the words "six months", the words "five years" were substituted.
878 Explanation: Where the service of the notice is stayed by an order of a Court, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid period of six months or five years, as the case may be.
" Therefore, we have to find out whether there was any fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts for the Department to be justified to claim duty beyond a period of six months.
This is a question of fact.
It was found by the Tribunal that it was not possible for the appellant to contend that the appellant had made a correct statement.
The Tribunal noted that the appellant could hardly contend that it discharged the onus of making correct declaration if it had withheld the description which was commonly used in respect of the goods not only by it self, but also by those from whom it bought or to whom it sold the products.
The appellant itself was both buying and selling these nuts and as such there was no conceivable reason why these nuts were described as end fittings in the declaration to the Department.
It may be noted that in the declaration it was so described.
The Tribunal was of the view, and it cannot be said not without justification that these goods should have been described as nuts because the appellant itself had treated these as nuts.
Therefore, from this conduct suppression is established.
The fact that the Department visited the factory of the appellant and they should have been aware of the production of the goods in question, was no reason for the appellant not to truly and properly to describe these goods.
As a matter of fact, not only did the appellant, as found by the Tribunal, not de scribed these goods properly but also gave a misleading description.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in classifying the goods under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff and in upholding the demand of the duty for a period beyond six months as contemplated by Section 11 A of the Act.
The Tribunal duly gave benefit of the exemption notification in respect of the goods which had been exported.
This part of the order is not challenged and cannot be challenged.
The Tribunal, however, reduced the penalty from Rs. 1 lac to Rs.50,000.
Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that this was not right.
There should not have been any penalty imposed.
We are, however, unable to accept that position.
Having come to the conclusion that there was deliberate suppression of wrong statement, it follows auto matically that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the imposition of penalty.
The quantum of penalty, however, was a matter which the Tribunal was free to fix as they thought fit, as the justice of the case demanded.
879 Nothing has been shown to us that the conclusion of the Tribunal was bad.
In that view of the matter, the order of the Tribunal is upheld.
The appeal must, therefore, fail and is accordingly dismissed.
N.V.K. Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant company applied for a requisite central excise licence for manufacture of goods falling under Tariff Item 68 and for the purpose of such goods L 4 licence was also furnished and also the requisite ground plans of the factory in which the various goods were manufactured.
The excise authorities granted L 4 licence.
The appellant claimed benefit of exemption of Notification No. 89/79 CE dated March 1, 1979.
The classification list submitted by the appellant was approved by the Assistant Collector by his letter dated May 25, 1979.
For the period April 1, 1979 to June 30, 1979 the appellant filed his RT 12 for assessment which was also finally assessed without any protest or objection.
As the appellant claimed that his goods were wholly exempted by virtue of notification No. 89/79 CE dated March 1, 1979, the appellant wrote to the Superintendent asking for dispensation from filing RT 12 every month.
The Superintendent informed the appellant that it need not file RT 12, but should inform the excise authorities monthly by means of a simple letter the total clearance effected in the month in question.
Thereafter, the appellant submitted classification list in 1980, 1981 and 1982 and claimed benefit of exemption under notification No. 105/80 CE dated June 19, 1980.
The Assistant Collector approved the classification list.
The Central Excise Officer attached to the preventive branch visited the factory in July 1982 and examined the products manufactured by the appellant.
In January 1983, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant asking it to show cause as why excise duty should not be demanded under Tariff Item 52 in respect of the piece of nuts manu 871 factured and removed by the appellant during the period April 1, 1981 to July 19, 1982 without payment of appropri ate excise duty thereon, and also to show cause why penalty should not be imposed for failure to obtain the requisite L 4 licence under Tariff Item 52 and to show cause why the material seized on August 26, 1982 should not be confiscat ed.
The appellant showed cause and drew the attention of the authorities to the fact that the goods in question were not nuts but end products or connectors for lubricating purposes and as such were integral parts of Diesel Engine Pipes failing under Tariff item 68.
The Collector of Central Excise passed orders on July 16, 1984 holding that fittings were nuts classifiable under Tariff Item 52, and that appropriate duty on the clearance effected by the appellant during the period April 1, 1981 to July 19, 1982 should be paid and the seized goods were liable to confiscation but in lieu thereof a redemption fine of Rs.4,000 could be paid.
The Collector also imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh.
The appellant went up in appeal before the Tribunal, which partly allowed the appeal and partly upheld the order of the Collector.
With regard to classification of the different fittings was concerned, it was held that the classification should have been as nuts under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff.
It further held that the appellant was guilty of suppression and therefore rejected the submission of the appellant that the show cause notice was barred by time.
It, however, reduced the amount of Penalty imposed by the Collector from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs.50,000.
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave.
In the appeal to this Court, on the question whether the goods manufactured by the appellant were end products or connectors for lubricating purposes and as such were inte gral parts of the Diesel Engine Pipes failing under Tariff Item 68 as claimed by the appellant or nuts classifiable under Tariff Item 52.
Dismissing the appeal, HELD: 1.
The Tribunal was right in classifying the goods under Tariff Item 52 of the Central Excise Tariff and in upholding the demand of the duty for a period beyond six months as contemplated by section 11 A of the Act.
The Tribunal duly gave benefit of the exemption notification in respect of the goods which had been exported.
[878F] 872 2(a) The Tribunal was right in upholding the demand of duty for a period beyond six months as contemplated by section 11 A of the Act.
[878F] 2(b) Whether there was any fraud, collusion, wilful mis statement, or suppression of fact, for the department to be justified to claim duty beyond a period of six months under the proviso to section 11 A of the Act is a question of fact.
[878B] 2(c) The appellant.
was both buying and selling these nuts and as such there was no conceivable reason why these nuts were described as end fittings in the declaration to the Department.
In the declaration it was so described.
[878C D] 2(d) The fact that the officers of the Department visit ed the factory of the appellant and they should have been aware of the production of the goods in question, was no reason for the appellant not to truly and properly describe these goods.
[878D E] 2(e) Not only did the appellant, as found by the Tribu nal, not described these goods properly, but also gave a misleading description.
[878E] 3.
The Tribunal on appraisement of all the materials, held that these were nuts manufactured by the appellant.
Such finding cannot be said to be wrong or perverse.
It was arrived at after giving opportunity to both the parties and considering all relevant materials.
There is no cogent ground to sustain any challenge to the findings of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has considered all the relevant evidence, and not ignored any relevant piece of evidence.
It had applied the correct principle of law applicable to the determination of the question.
It has also applied the test of commercial identity of the goods and examined the matter from the angle of the conduct of the appellant.
These find ings of the Tribunal cannot be assailed in appeal under section 35L of the Act.
[875E; 877B C] 4.
The Tribunal having come to the conclusion that there was deliberate suppression or wrong statement, it follows automatically that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the imposition of penalty.
The quantum of penalty was a matter which the Tribunal was free to fix as it thought fit, as the justice of the case demanded.
Nothing has been shown that the conclusion was bad.
[878G H; 879A] 873


judgement:
No. 1325 of 1987.
937 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) P. Rangaswamy, K.K. Gupta and Capt.
Virendera Kumar for the Petitioners.
K.R. Nagaraja and R.S. Hegde, for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER Thirty two petitioners in this application under article 32 of the Constitution are Bus Conductors in the employment of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, respondent No. 1.
They have alleged that the respondent Corporation is a statutory organisation and is 'State ' within the meaning of article 12.
The normal practice prevalent in the Corporation is to initially appoint Conductors on daily wage basis and regularise them in due course.
According to them, 19 daily wage Conductors as mentioned in Annexure 'A ' to the petition were regularised and brought on the time scale of pay with effect from the original date of their employment as daily wage Conductors, while though the petitioners have served for quite a long period they have not yet been regularised.
They have alleged discrimination and claimed relief on the basis of article 14.
They have asked for a direction to the Transport Corporation to bring them on the time scale by regularisation from the date each of them came to be em ployed by the Corporation, as stated in Annexure 'B '.
The Corporation in its return to the rule has accepted the position that it is a statutory body created under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act of 1950.
There is no challenge to the allegation of the petitioners that initial appointment is on daily wage basis and as and when regular vacancies arise the daily rated employees are brought on time scale of pay and services are regularised.
Paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit specifically challenged the asser tion of the petitioners that 19 similarly placed employees were confirmed on the date of initial employment on daily rated basis.
The plea in paragraph 9 is as follows: "The information furnished in Annexure A showing that 19 persons who were working in different divisions have been appointed on time scale on the same date is absolutely wrong and misleading.
The petitioners have sworn 938 false affidavit without making any effort to verify the factual position.
The date of confirmation in majority of the cases has been shown in Annexure A as the date of their appointment just to prejudice this Court.
" Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Daily Rated Casual Labour vs Union of India & Ors., and an order made on 14th of July, 1988 in Writ Petition No. 8307 11/83 which is still awaiting final disposal.
The facts of the reported decision were very different.
It would be sufficient to refer to paragraph 2 of the judgment: "The principal complaint of the petitioners is that even though many of them have been work ing for the last ten years as casual labour ers, the wages paid to them are very low and far less than the salary and allowances paid to the regular employees of the Posts and Telegraphs Department belonging to each of the categories referred to above and secondly no scheme has been prepared by the Union of India to absorb them regularly in its service and consequently they have been denied the bene fits, such as increments, pension, leave facilities etc.
which are enjoyed by those who have been recruited regularly.
They allege that they are being exploited by the Union of India " Petitioners have not made these allegations and their sole grievance is of discrimination on the basis that while they have not been regularised though they have been serving for a good number of years in some cases about 14 years the 19 persons named in Annexure 'A ' have been regu larised from the date of initial employment.
It is, there fore, not necessary to refer to the decision.
The order in the pending writ application is also on a different set of facts and, therefore, need not be further referred to.
At the hearing of the writ application, petitioners relied upon a draft seniority list published by the Corpora tion in support of their stand while the Corporation on the basis of a document appended to the counter affidavit main tained that the particulars were wrong and since the docu ment was only at the draft stage and mistakes appearing therein were yet to be corrected, no reliance can be placed on the particulars appearing therein and the original record should be referred to.
939 In view of the pointed question raised by the petition ers and the denial in the return, we made an order on 28.2.1989 to the following effect: "The dispute has arisen before us regarding the identity of all the persons.
The Registrar General is directed to assign an Officer to examine the photostat copy of the Original Record in possession of learned counsel for the respondents for the purpose of determining whether there is any discrepancy between that record and the printed list which has been furnished before us in relation to the 34 petitioners as well as the 19 employees set out in Annexure 'A ' annexed to the Writ Peti tion.
" The report dated 2nd of March, 1989 on the basis of the printed document and the photostat copies of records made available at the time of examination to the Officer shows that there are discrepancies.
The original record, however, is not available in the Court.
It is not disputed before us by counsel for the respond ents that in case benefit of regularisation has been con ferred on daily rated employees from the date of initial employment and such benefit has not been extended to the petitioners, the grievance grounded upon article 14 of the Constitution would be valid.
The matter to be examined, therefore, is with reference to factual position as to when the 19 persons in Annexure 'A ' were initially employed and when they have been regularised as against the initial employment of each of the petitioners.
This can be done only by reference to appropriate records.
We direct that a senior officer of the Corporation shall be named by respondent No. 1 to look into these allegations and at the time the ques tion is examined by such officer the petitioners shall be given appropriate opportunity of being heard, if asked for through counsel also, and all relevant documents should be looked into to ascertain whether the claim of the petition ers that they have been discriminated against in the facts indicated in their writ petition particularly with reference to Annexure 'A ' is correct; and in case it is found that the petitioners have not been given the benefit which has been given to the 19 daily rated Conductors specified in Annexure 'A ', petitioners may be conferred the same benefit as has been extended to those 19 persons unless the respondent is able to assign satisfactory and cogent reasons and states as to why petitioners are not entitled to the same benefit.
This would be so on the footing that regularisation does not require a specified period of service to have been put in.
The respondent 940 Corporation shall designate the authority within two weeks and the enquiry by him in the manner directed above shall be completed within three months.
On the basis of the report furnished by such authority the respondent is directed to take a final decision within two months thereafter.
There shall be no direction as to costs.

summary:
The petitioners who had served the respondent Corpora tion for long periods on daily wage basis prayed for regu larisation of services and grant of time scale pay from their dates of initial appointment on the ground that others similarly placed had been granted these benefits.
The Court, after noticing that there were discrepancies in the factual position adopted by the parties, DIRECTED: The matter to be examined is with reference to factual position as to when the 19 persons in Annexure 'A ' were initially employed and when they have been regularised as against the initial employment of each of the petition ers.
This can be done only by reference to appropriate records.
We direct that a senior officer of the Corporation shall be named by respondent No. 1 to look into these alle gations and at the time the question is examined by such officer the petitioners shall be given appropriate opportu nity of being heard, if asked for through counsel also, and all relevant documents should be looked into to ascertain whether the claim of the petitioners that they have been discriminated against in the facts indicated in their writ petition particularly with reference to Annexure 'A ' is correct; and in case it is found that the petitioners have not been given the benefit which has given to the 19 daily rated Conductors specified in Annexure 'A ', petitioners may be conferred the same benefit as has been extended to those 19 persons unless the respondent is able to assign satisfac tory and cogent reasons and states as to why petitioners are not entitled to the same benefit.
This would be so on the footing that regularisation does not require a specified period of service to have been put in.
[939E H]


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
2809 2812A of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.2.1986 of the Alla habad High Court in Civil Misc.
W.P. Nos. 2274, 2983, 3860, 4558 and 3202 of 1984.
Rajinder Sachher and Bharat Sanghal for the Appellants.
Harbans Lal, Dr. Meera Agarwal, R.C. Misra and Arun Madan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by section RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J.
These five appeals by Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India are preferred against the Judgment and Or, let dated 6.2.86 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 2274/84 connected with Civil Misc.
Writ Peti tion Nos.
2983/84, 3860/84, 4558/84 & 3202/84 directing the respondents (appellants herein) to re determine the cost of the appellants ' (respondents herein) flats and instalments payable by them after hearing their grievances.
Since identical contentions are urged in all the ap peals, we are rendering a common judgment.
As it is said that Civil Appeal No. 2809/86 arising out of Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 2274/84 is more comprehen sive and the facts alleged therein may be taken as represen tative in character, the facts relating to this appeal are briefly stated.
The Bareilly Development Authority (hereinafter re ferred.
as 'BDA '), the first appellant was constituted under Section 4 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 by the State Government 747 for the purposes of development in the District of Bareilly., With a view to casing the acute housing problem in the said District, the BDA has undertaken construction of dwelling units for people belonging to different income groups styled as 'Lower Income Group ', 'Middle Income Group ', 'High Income Group ' and the 'Economically Weaker Sections ' (hereinafter referred as LIG, MIG, HIG and EWS respectively).
The BDA issued ' an advertisement offering to register names of intending applicants desirous of purchas ing dwelling houses/flats in any one of the different income groups intended to be constructed by the BDA.
In this appeal i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2809/86, the respondents 1 to 17 and 20 got themselves registered for allotment of flats in MIG scheme and respondents 18 and 19 in HIG scheme with the BDA in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the brochure issued by the Authority.
The following table of the brochure shows the necessary details inclusive of the esti mated cost for the different types of flats under various categories: Type of Range of Cost Initial Interest Approx House Income payment monthly instalment MIG Rs. 1000 to Rs.64,000 Rs.5000 12% Rs.551 p.m. for Rs. 1500 p.m. 15 yrs.
HIG Rs. 1500 and Rs. 1, 15,000 Rs.7000 12% Rs. 1440 above p.m. p.m. for 10 yrs.
LIG Rs.351 to Rs.35,000 Rs.2000 11% Rs.345 p.m. for Rs. 1000 p.m. 15 yrs.
EWS Rs.350 p.m. Rs. 11,000 Rs, 100 7% Rs.89 p.m. for 20 yrs.
The note under the 'General Information Table ' given in the said brochure states that the cost shown therein is only estimated cost and it would increase or decrease according to the rise or fail in the price at the time of completion of the houses/flats.
All the respondents registered.their names ' for MIG, HIG and 748 EWS flats as the case may be and made the initial deposit.
Thereafter, the respondents in MIG group received indentical notices dated 19/20.1.84 from the Secretary, Bareilly Devel opment Authority (second appellant) intimating that the revised cost of houses/flats of MIG group as well as the amount of monthly instalment would be as follows: 1.
No. of houses available 77 2.
Cost of the house Rs. 1,27,000 3.
Down payment to be made/ Rs.35,000 paid on allotment 4.
No. of monthly instalment 180 fixed for the payment of remaining amount 5.
Rate of yearly interest 13.5% 6.
Amount of monthly instalment Rs. 1,031.50 with interest.
By the said notice, the respondents in MIG group were informed that 40% of the houses/flats mentioned in the notice would be given to the allottees who would deposit the entire cost in one cash payment and that the other allottees who intend to buy houses/flats on the above revised price/instalments must send by 28.1.84 their written accept ance on the annexed proforma to the Registration Section of the office of the BDA otherwise their claims would not be included in the lots to be drawn on 31.1.1984.
Except the respondents Nos. 13, 17, 18 and 20, all other respondents in reply to those notices gave their unequivocal and uncondi tional written consent.
Hence their names were included in the draw and on being lucky in the draw, the respondents barring the above 4 were allotted their respective houses.
After allotment, they were asked to complete the other formalities and make down payments in accordance with the notice.
dated 19/20.1.1984, by a further notice dated 3.2.1984 (Annexure 'F ').
Similar notices were issued to all the registered allottees for all types of houses and the respondents were also intimated that in case any of the registered persons does not want to purchase the house, his name would not be included in the draw but he would have his choice later on.
749 At this stage, all the respondents in these appeals approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu tion of India challenging the revised terms and conditions of the BDA on the ground that the petitioners were estopped from changing the conditions subject to which the respond ents applicants had applied for registration and deposited the initial payment in the year 1980; that the enhancement of cost of the house/flat amounting almost double of the estimated cost as shown in the brochure while inviting the applications and the increase of the monthly instalments are much beyond the means of the respondents and that this arbitrary and unilateral stand of the petitioners is to the prejudice of the respondents.
On the above contentions, the respondents prayed in their respective petitions for issue of writ of mandamus directing the petitioners to maintain the allotment of the flats in their favour on the original terms and conditions, to hand over the possession of the same and further to restrain the petitioners from cancelling the original allotment.
The above plea was resisted by the petitioners strongly relying on certain conditions contained in the brochure especially of clauses 12 and 13 as per which the BDA has reserved its discretion to change, alter or modify any of the terms and/or conditions of the allotment given in the brochure; that its decision would be final with regard to any matter concerning the registration and allot ment and that the BDA has right to relax any condition in its discretion.
It has been further contended that respond ents barring 13, 17, 18 and 20 have given their written acceptance to the changed conditions as mentioned in the notice dated 19/20.1.1984 and as such they are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in the writ petition.
According to the petitioners the increase in the cost and the interest demanded from the respondents is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and the High Court is not the proper forum for examining in detail the terms regarding payment of instal ments in the circumstances of the present case, and if the respondents were not agreeable to the changed terms and conditions, they could as well resile from their consent.
Finally, it was contended that the respondents are estopped from challenging the varied terms and conditions of the allotment after having consented.
The High Court though repelled the contention of the respondents (allottees) based on the principle of promissory estoppel, made the following observations with regard to the case of the respondents in the MIG category: "In the circumstances of the present case the fixation of monthly instalment to the tune of Rs.1031.50 from the 750 petitioners of MIG group whose income is hardly Rs. 1500 per month appears to us smack ing of arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the contesting opposite party (petitioners herein)"; "In the circumstances of the present case, we are not satisfied that the contesting opposite party has succeeded in establishing its demand of double the estimated cost by facts and figures.
The end of justice demands that the authority should refix the cost of the peti tioner 's flats after hearing their grievance.
" The High Court answered the objections taken by the petitioners herein that the respondents have consented for the changed terms and conditions observing, "We think that the consent obtained from the petitioners was also not reasonable act on the part of the contesting opposite par ties (appellants herein)".
Finally, the High Court adopting the above reasoning in respect of the cases of other re spondents also falling under various categories directed the appellants herein in all the writ petitions "to re determine the cost of the petitioners ' (respondents herein) flats and instalments payable by them after heating their grievances." Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment the appellants have filed these appeals by special leave.
Shri Rajinder Sachher, St. Adv.
after taking us through the relevant documents and the additional affidavit filed by the second respondent and the reply affidavit assailed the reasonings given by the High Court contending that the said Court has erroneously held that the BDA has failed to justi fy the demand of the enhancement in the cost of houses/flats as well as the increase of the monthly instalments in dis proportionate to their income, because the income of the applicant was relevant only to determine the category of the scheme in which the applicant had to be included for eligi bility to get a house/flat under the scheme but not for enhancement of the cost of the houses/ flats and monthly instalments.
According to him since the declared policy of the BDA being 'No Profit No Loss ', it had fixed the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of instalments after taking into consideration of the escalation of the building materi al, labour charges, cost of transport and the allied valu able factors which all enter into the price fixation, and as such the High Court is not correct in going into the ques tion of computation of cost of the construction of houses/flats and 751 the plea of clerical mistakes exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
He further submits that the High Court has gone wrong in importing the principle laid down in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs The Interna tional Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1628 to the present facts and circumstances of the case in view of the fact that in price fixation the execu tive has a wide discretion and it is only answerable provid ed there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the High Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy.
It has been vehemently urged that after the parties have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer covered by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se.
The fact that all respondents had applied for registra tion only on acceptance of terms and conditions contained in the brochure inclusive of Clauses 12 & 13 as well as the conditions mentioned in the Notes 1 and 2 of the 'General Information Table ' of the said brochure, and further the respondents barring respondents Nos. 13, 17, 18 and 20 in MIG group gave their reply accepting the changed terms and conditions as per letter dated 19/20.1.1984 cannot be chal lenged in view of the unassailable documentary evidence namely Annexures 'A ', 'D ', 'E ' and 'F '.
Now, we shall reproduce some of the relevant conditions of the brochure as well as the changed conditions contained in the letter dated 19/20.1.1984.
Clauses 12 and 13 of the brochure issued by the BDA and the notes 1 and 2 of the General Information Table thereto read thus: Clause 12 For allotment by lottery all the above men tioned terms and rules given in the booklet would ordinarily be followed but the Develop ment Authority will have the right to change, enhance or amend any of the terms and/or condition as and when it thinks necessary and at its discretion.
Clause 13 The decision of the Development Authority in regard to any matter in relation to the regis tration application will be final.
It would have the right to relax any of the conditions at its discretion.
The fight to sell by auc tion the Middle 752 Income Group and Higher Income Group plots/houses or any portion thereof, of the various schemes, will also vest in the Devel opment Authority.
General Information Table Note: (1) The cost shown in the column 4 is only estimated cost.
It will increase or decrease according to the rise or fall in the price at the time of completion of the property.
Note: (2) The data given in the above mentioned table can be amended as felt neces sary.
The last paragraph of the letter dated 19/20.1.84 (Annexure 'D ') reads thus: "If you want to buy the house on the above price/instalment then you must send by 28.1.1984 your written acceptance on the annexed proforma to the Registration Section of this office.
" It may be mentioned here that in this letter (Annexure 'D '), the BDA has informed the allottees of MIG about the enhancement of the cost of the houses/flats as well as the increase of the monthly instalment and the rate of yearly interest etc.
and requested the allottees to give their written acceptance so that their names could be included in the list.
The respondents except the four above have sent their written acceptance to the letter (Annexure 'D ').
For a better appreciation of the case of the appellants, we think that as an example the letter (Annexure 'E ') of the first respondent in this case namely Shri Ajay Pal Singh may be reproduced: "I, Ajay Pal Singh, S/o Shri Sujan Singh want to take a Middle Income Group house in the Housing Scheme No. 2 situated at Tibrinath of the Bareilly Development Authority on payment by instalment.
I have seen the house and am satisfied.
I accept the rules of the Bareilly Development Authority.
" 753 Only on the basis of the written acceptance, the name of the first respondent was included in the draw and he has successful in getting the allotment of House No. 37 in MIG type which fact if clearly borne out by the letter from the second respondent (Annexure 'F ').
In this connection, it is worthwhile to note that the first respondent, Shri Ajay Pal Singh is the Principal of Shri Guru Govind Singh Inter College and his educational qualifications are M.A. (Econ. & Hist.), B.Sc., B.Ed., LL.B.
From the above, it is clear that all the respondents who have sent their applications for registration with initial payment only after having fully understood the terms and conditions of the brochure inclu sive of the Clauses 12 and 13 and Notes 1 and 2 of the General Information Table as per which the BDA has reserved its right to change, enhance or amend any of the terms and/or conditions as and when felt necessary, and also the right to relax any of the conditions at its discretion, and that the cost shown in the column 4 of the brochure was only estimated cost subject to increase or decrease according to the rise or fail in the price at the time of completion of the property.
This is not only the case of the applicants of MIG scheme but also of the other applicants falling under the other categories i.e. HIG, LIG and EWS.
So it cannot be said that there was a mis statemennt or incorrect statement or an fraudulent concealment in the information supplied in the brochure published by the BDA on the strength of which all the applicants falling under the various categories applied and got their names registered.
In such a circum stance the respondents cannot be heard to say that the BDA has arbitrarily and unreasonably changed the terms and conditions of the brochure to the prejudice of the respond ents.
More so, the respondents barring respondent Nos. 13, 17, 18 and 20 after having given their written consent accepting the changed and varied terms and conditions as shown in the letter dated 19/20.1.84 are not justified in contending that the BDA has gone back on its original terms ' and conditions and has substituted new conditions to their detriment.
It is quite un understandable that the persons like the first respondent who is highly educated, occupying the post of the Principal of a College and who has accepted the changed terms and conditions by his letter is making these allega tions against the BDA.
The respondents were under no obligation to seek allot ment of houses/flats even after they had registered them selves.
Notwithstanding, they voluntarily registered them selves as applicants, only after fully understanding the terms and conditions of the brochure inclusive of Clauses 12 and 13 and Notes 1 and 2 of the General Information 754 Table which we have reproduced above, they are now trying to obtain the houses/flats at the price indicated in the bro chure at the initial stage conveniently ignoring the other express conditions by and under which the BDA has reserved its right to change the terms and conditions as and when felt necessary, evidently depending upon the escalation of the prices.
One should not loose sight of the fact that the BDA did not compel anyone of the applicants to purchase the flat at the rates subsequently fixed by it and pay the increased monthly instalments.
On the contrary, the option was left over only to the allottees.
In fact, the respond ents in Civil Appeal No. 2809 of 1986 except the four above mentioned have unconditionally accepted the changed terms and conditions.
Thus the factual position in this case clearly and unambiguously reveals that the respondents after voluntarily accepting the conditions imposed by the BDA have entered into the realm of concluded contract pure and simple with the BDA and hence the respondents can only claim the right conferred upon them by the said contract and are bound by the terms of the contract unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory obligations on the part of the BDA in the contractual field.
In the case before us, the contract between the respondents and the BDA does not con tain any statutory terms and/or conditions.
When the factual position is so, the High Court placing reliance on the decision in Ramana Dayaram Shetty case ; has erroneously held: "It has not been disputed that the contesting opposite party is included within the term 'other authority ' mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the contesting opposite parties cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily with the principle which meets the test of reason and relevance.
Where an author ity appears acting unreasonably this Court is not powerless and a writ of mandamus can be issued for performing its duty free from arbitrariness or unreasonableness.
" This finding, in our view, is not correct in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case because in Ramana Dayaram Shetty case there was no concluded contract as in this case.
Even conceding that the BDA has the trap pings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authori ty ' for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority ' or its agent after 755 entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity.
Thereafter the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se.
In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the authority (i.e. B.D.A. in this case) in the said contractual field.
There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors.
vs State of Bihar & Ors.
, ; ; Premji Bhai Parmar & Ors. etc.
vs Delhi Development Authority & Ors, ; and D.F.O. vs Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., In view of the authoritative judicial pronouncements of this Court in the series of cases dealing with the scope of interference of a High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in cases of non statutory concluded contracts like the one in hand, we are constrained to hold that the High Court in the present case has gone wrong in its finding that there is arbitrariness and unreasonableness on the part of the appel lants herein in increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly instalments and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and accordingly allow all the appeals.
There will be no order as to costs.
Before parting with the judgment, we would like to observe that it is open to the respondents to approach the appellants for correction of any clerical mistakes in the calculation, if any and they are at liberty to move any proper authority for any remedy if they are otherwise legal ly entitled to.
P.S.S. Appeals al lowed.

summary:
The appellant Authority offered to register names of intending applications desirous of purchasing LIG, MIG, HIG and EWS type houses/flats.
The 'General Information Table ' given in the brochure indicated the type of houses, corre sponding income groups, cost, initial payment to be made, rate of interest and approximate monthly instalments.
Note (1) under the said table stated that the cost shown therein was only estimated cost and it would increase or decrease according to the rise or fail in the price at the time of completion of the houses, while Note (2) stated that the date given therein could be amended as felt necessary.
By clauses 12 and 13 contained in the brochure the Authority reserved its discretion to change, alter or modify any of the terms and/or conditions of the allotment as and when necessary.
All the respondents registered their names for allotment of the flats in accordance with the terms and conditions in the brochure and made the initial deposit.
Subsequently, they received notices from the Authority intimating the revised cost of houses and the amount of monthly instalment rates which were almost double of those initially stated in the 'General Information Table '.
The respondents were fur ther informed that those who intend to buy houses on the revised price/instalments must send their written acceptance by the date specified other wise their claims would not be included in the lots to be drawn.
Except a few, all other respondents gave their unequivocal and unconditional written consent.
Hence their names were included in the 743 744 draws and on becoming lucky in the draw, they were allotted their respective houses.
At this stage.
all the respondents approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the revised terms and conditions on the ground that the appel lants were estopped from changing the conditions subject to which the respondents had applied for registration and deposited the initial payment, that the enhancement of cost of the house amounting to almost double of the estimated cost as shown in the brochure and the increase of the month ly instalments were much beyond their means and that this arbitrary and unilateral stand of the appellants was to the prejudice of the respondents.
These petitions were resisted by the appellants by contending that the respondents were estopped from challenging the varied terms and conditions of the allotment after having consented.
The High Court found the action of the Authority in fixing the revised cost and instalments arbitrary and unrea sonable and directed the appellant Authority to re determine the cost of the flats and instalments payable by them after hearing the parties.
In these appeals by special leave it was contended for the appellant Authority that the income of the applicants was relevant only to determine the category of the scheme in which they had to be included for eligibility to get a house under the scheme but not for enhancement of the cost of the house and monthly instalments, that it had fixed the cost of the houses and the rate of instalments after taking into consideration the escalation in the price of building mate rial, labour charges, cost of transport and allied valuable factors which all enter into the price fixation, that in price fixation the executive has a wide discretion and it is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation, and that after the parties had entered into the field of ordinary contract, as in the instant case.
the relations were no longer covered by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se Allowing the appeals, HELD: 1.
Where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as 745 to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple.
[755C] Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors.
vs State of Bihar & Ors.
, ; ; Premji Bhai Parmar & Ors. etc.
vs Delhi Development Authority & Ors. ; and D.F.O.v.
Biswanath Tea Company Ltd., referred to.
The respondents in the instant case had voluntarily registered themselves as applicants only after fully under standing the terms and conditions of the brochure, inclusive of cls.
12 and 13 and Notes 1 and 2 of the General Informa tion Table under which the Authority had reserved its right to change the terms and conditions as and when felt neces sary evidently depending upon the escalation of the prices.
The Authority did not compel anyone of the applicants to purchase the flat at the rates subsequently fixed by it and pay the increased monthly instalments.
On the contrary the option was left over only to the allottees.
All the same, the respondents gave their written consent unconditionally accepting the changed and varied terms and conditions.
[753H;754A C] The respondents after accepting the conditions imposed by the Authority had thus entered into the realm of a con cluded contract pure and simple with the Authority and hence they could only claim the right conferred upon them by the said contract and were bound by the terms of the contract unless some statute stepped in and conferred some special statutory obligations on the part of the Authority in the contractual field.
The contract between the respondents and the Authority did not contain any statutory terms and/or conditions.
[754C E] Even conceding that the Authority had the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority ' for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the 'authority ' or its agent after entering into the field of ordinary contract had acted purely in its executive capacity.
Thereafter the relations were no longer.
governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determined the rights and obligations of the parties inter se.
In this sphere, they could only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the Authority in the said contractual field.
[754G H; 755A B] Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs The International Airport Authority 746 of India & Ors., ; The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution had, therefore, gone wrong in its finding that there was arbitrariness and unreasona bleness on the part of the appellants in increasing the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of monthly instalments, and giving directions in the writ petitions as prayed for.
[755D E]