judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 3504 of 1991.
the Judgment and Order dated 5.10.1990 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 210 of 1990.
Dhruv Mehta, S.K. Mehta and Aman Vachher for the Appellants.
Jitender Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
Special leave is granted.
The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limita tion.
The accident took place on 22.1.1989.
The Motor Vehi cles Act, 1939 was repealed by section 217(1) of the which came into force on 1.7.1989.
The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on 22.7.1989.
The claim petition of the appellant, however, was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with ,a prayer for condonation of delay.
The Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of subsection (3) of section 166 of the new , the delay of more than six months could not be condoned.
The application was accordingly dismissed.
The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the High Court.
915 3.
It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act, and his petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act.
The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident.
The difference in the two Acts, which is relevant in the present case, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay.
In view of the proviso to sub section (3) of section 166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which expired on 22.1.1990.
If the new Act is held to be applicable, the appellant 's petition filed in March had to be dismissed.
The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no such restriction as in the new Act.
The ques tion is as to which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old.
It has been contended by the learned counsel that under the old Act the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of section 6 of the .
Reliance has been placed on clauses (c) and (e).
The relevant portion of the section reads thus: "6.
Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enact ment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a). . (b). . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in 916 respect of any such right, privilege, obliga tion, liability, penalty, forfeiture or pun ishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repeating Act or Regulation had not been passed.
" We are unable to agree.
Clause (e) is not attracted because, by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all.
His right to claim compensa tion by filing the claim within the same period of limita tion has been preserved.
And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the old Act.
So far the applicability of clause (c) is concerned, the question depends on whether the appellant had got an accrued right or privilege under the old law which he could not have been deprived of by the repealing legisla tion.
Even independent of the , it is firmly established that unless a new statute expressly or by necessary implication says so, it will not be presumed that it deprives a person of an accrued right.
On the other hand, a law which is procedural in nature, and does not affect the rights, has to be held to be retrospectively applicable.
The question is whether the appellant has been deprived of an accrued right or privilege in the present case 7.
It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired.
The answer is in the negative.
The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly en forceable as a right.
So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act subject to two, conditions.
If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right.
The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy.
This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustra tion we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt.
Shanti 917 Misra; , The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966.
A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages.
In March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal under section 110 of the was con stituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribing 60 days as the period of limitation.
The re spondent filed the application in July, 1967.
It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal.
So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action.
In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the respondent in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso.to section 110A(3).
The learned counsel strenuously contended that the present case must be considered as one where an accrued right has been affected, because the option to move an application for condonation of delay belatedly filed should be treated as a right.
This cannot be accepted.
There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensa tion and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application.
Liberty to apply for a right is not in it selt an accrued right or privilege.
To illustrate the point, we may refer to some cases.
In Director of Public Works and Another vs Ho Po Sang and Others, ; a Crown lessee in respect of certain premises which were in occupation of tenants and sub tenants entered into an agreement with the appellant Director for developing the site by erecting buildings.
The erection of the new buildings necessitated the demolition of the existing buildings.
Under the provisions of an Ordinance a Crown lessee was entitled to recover vacant possession of the premises if he obtained a re building certificate from the Director.
On the application of the Crown lessee a proceeding for grant of the certificate was started and the Director issued a notice under the Ordinance indicating his intention to grant the re building certificate.
Before the certificate could be finally issued, the relevant provision of the Ordinance entitling the lessee to recover vacant possession of the premises was repealed.
The lessee claimed the right to vacant possession by relying on certain provi sions dealing with rules of interpretation similar in terms to section 6 of our .
The plea 918 was rejected on the ground that although the lessee was entitled to make an application for vacant possession before the Ordinance was repealed, it did not amount to an accrued right or privilege, capable of being preserved after the repeal of the Ordinance, as the right was dependent on the actual issuance of a certificate.
In an earlier case of Abbott vs Minister of Lands, the appellant was entitled to make purchases of Crown land adjoining his holding by virtue of certain statutory provisions, which were repealed before he could effectively enforce his right.
Besides raising other grounds in respect of his claim, he argued that the right which he had under the repealed enactment was a "right accrued" and of which he could not be deprived of by the repeal.
Reject ing the plea, it was observed that the mere right existing in a class of persons to take advantage of an enactment, cannot in absence of any act done by the claimant towards availing himself of that right be deemed a "right accrued".
In Isha Valimohammad & Anr.
vs Haji Gulam Mohammad & Haji Dada Trust, [1975] 1 SCR 720 the respondents let out the premises in question to the appellants in 1951 in a place where, by the Saurashtra Rent Control Act, sub letting by a tenant was prohibited.
The appellants sub let the premises at a time when the Act was in force.
In 1963 the Act was repealed and the Bombay Rent Act was made applica ble, under which there was no such prohibition against sub letting.
In a suit for eviction filed subsequently the High Court assumed that a notice under the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to terminate the tenancy which had not been done before the repeal, but still held that since the respondents had an accrued right within the meaning of section 51 of the Bombay Rent Act (the provisions whereof were similar to those in section 6 of the ) the respondents were entitled to a decree.
The decree was confirmed by the Supreme Court but not on the above ground.
This Court held that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was not necessary and in that view it con firmed the decree of the High Court.
With respect to the finding of the High Court regarding the respondents acquir ing an accrued right even on the assumption that a notice under the Transfer of Properties Act was necessary, it was held that the right of a landlord to recover possession is not an accrued right before the issue of a notice if under any law it was necessary for the landlord to issue the notice to determine the tenancy.
The principle laid down there supports our view.
919 A question, though not identical, but somewhat similar Came up for consideration by this Court in Lalji Raja and Sons vs Firm Hansraj Nathuram, ; The appel lants had obtained a money decree against the respondents in a court in West Bengal in 1949, and got it transferred for execution to the court at Morena in the then State of Madhya Bharat.
On the respondents objection on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the Madhya Bharat Court dismissed the execu tion petition.
The matter was thereafter taken to the High Court and this Court, but without any success.
The decision partly rested on the ground that the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to the State of Madhya Bharat.
Subsequently the Code was extended tO that area which had become a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and a fresh order was passed by the West Bengal Court transferring the decree to Morena Court.
The judgment debtors challenged the jurisdiction of the court on various grounds.
One of the points which was urged was that in view of section 20 clause (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (amendment) Act, 1951 by which the Code was extended to Madhya Bharat and other areas, the Judgment debtors ' right to resist the execution was protected.
Reliance was placed on the proviso to the repeal clause in the section which declared that the repeal would not affect any fight, privilege, obligation or liabil ity acquired accrued or incurred under the repealed clause.
The judgment debtors objection was over ruled by this Court.
Relying on several English decisions including that in Abbott vs Minister for Lands, , it was observed that the mere right existing at the date of the repeal of statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a "right accrued" within the meaning of the usual saving clause.
In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act.
It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay.
His right to claim cOmpensa tion was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another.
Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise.
So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act.
In this background the appellant 's fur ther default has to be considered.
If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different.
Having actual ly initiated the proceeding when the old Act 920 covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away.
The present case is different.
The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay.
Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit.
In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condona tion of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law.
Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause ' also relates to the time after the re peal.
The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause ' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action ' for the claim itself.
The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law.
We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned.
The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
G.N. Appeal dis missed.

summary:
The appellant was injured in a road accident on 22.1.1989, and a claim petition was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, before the Claims Tribunal.
Meanwhile, the was repealed and the came into force with effect from 1.7.1989.
The Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub section (3) of Section 166 of the new Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned, and dismissed the claim.
Before the High Court the appellant challenged the Tribunal 's decision, but was not successful.
Thereafter, he preferred this appeal by special leave.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that since the accident took place when the old Act was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act under which the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of Section 6 of the ; and that his claim could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation under the new Act.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. 'The High Court was right in taking the view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned.
[920D] 2.
The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly en forceable as a right.
So far the 913 period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be gov erned by the new Act subject to two conditions.
If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right.
The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy.
[916F G] New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt.
Shanti Misra, ; , relied on.
There is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application.
Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege.
[917E] Isha Valimohammad & Anr.
vs Haji Gulam Mohammad & Haji Dada Dust, [1975] 1 SCR 720 and Lalji Raja and Sons vs Firm Hansraj Nathuram, ; , relied on.
Director of Public Works and Anr.
vs Ho Po Sang and Ors., ; and Abbott vs Minister of Lands, , referred to.
In the instant case the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was the same viz., six months which expired three weeks after coming into force of the new Act.
It was open to the appel lant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay.
His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitu tion of one Act with another.
Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise.
So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no charge in the position under the new Act.
The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay.
Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enact ment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit.
The occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law.
Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause ' also relates to the time after the repeal.
The 914 benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be avail able simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause ' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from `cause of action ' for the claim itself.
The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law.
[919F H; A C 920A] 5.
Clause (e) of Section 6 of is also not attracted because, by the enactment of the new law, viz., the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all.
Appellant 's right to claim compensation by filing the claim within the same period of limitation has been preserved.
And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege avail able under the old Act.
[916C]


judgement:
Vil Appeal No. 6071 (NM) of 1990.
From the Order dated 31.5.90 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. E/2586/86 C with E/Cross/478/86 C. (Order No. 541/90 C).
M. Gauri Shankarmurthy, K. Swamy and P. Parmeshwaran for the Appellant.
Santosh Hegde and K.R. Nambiar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by V. RAMASWAMI, J.
The short question of law that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to what is the rele vant date for the purpose of calculation of the period of one year provided under section 35E(3) of The Central Ex cises & Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter called the Act).
Briefly stated the question arises in the following circumstances.
By order in Original No. 34 of 1984 dated 28.11.1984, the Collector of Central Excise, Madras as an adjudicating authority within the meaning of the Act, held as barred by limitation the demand from the respondent towards excise duty on biaxially oriental polypropylene films as set out in the show cause notice dated 25.10.1983 and dropped further proceedings against the respondent.
A copy of this order was attested by the Superintendent of the office on 21.12.1984 and despatched to the respondent.
It was received by the respondent on 21.12.1984.
The Central Board of Excise and Customs (hereinafter called the.
Board), after consideration of the order, on 11.12.1985 directed the Collector of Cen tral Excise, Madras under the provisions of Section 35E(1) to apply to the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, for correct determination of the points arising out of the aforesaid order and accordingly the Collector filed the application before the Tribunal 'as provided under Section 35E(4) of the Act.
Before the Tribunal the respondent urged that the rele vant date of the Collector 's (adjudicating authority) order for the purposes of Section 35E(3) should be taken as 28.11.1984 and not 21.12.1984 when it was received by the respondent and on that basis the order of the Board under Section 35E(1) of the Act should be held as beyond the 866 period of one year from the date of the decision or order of the adjudicating authority and therefore the application before the Tribunal was incompetent.
The Tribunal accepted this contention and held that the application was not main tainable.
In this appeal filed under Section 35L of the Act the learned counsel for the appellant contended that mere writ ing an order in file kept in the office is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant and that though the order of the adjudicating authority was made on 28.11.1984 a copy of the same was sent to the respondent only on 21.12.1984 and received by him on the very day and that therefore the limitation would start only at the earliest from 21.12.1984.
He stated that the order was received by the Board also only subsequent to 21.12.1984.
His further submission was that enabling the giving of the direction under Section 35E(1) and the application under Section 35E(4) in pursuance of that direction shall be treated as if a right of appeal given to the department.
On this basis his argument was that the departmental authorities and the private parties are to be treated equally as aggrieved persons for the purposes of calculating the time for making the direction under Section 35E(3) of the Act.
Before we discuss the arguments of the learned counsel, it is necessary to set out some relevant provisions in the Act.
Section 35 of the Act, provides for an appeal to a person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under the Act by a Central Excise Officer lower than a Collector of Central Excise ' and that such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date of the communica tion to him of such decision or order".
Clause 5 of Section 35A requires that on the disposal of the appeal, the Collec tor (Appeals) shall communicate the order passed by him to the Appellant, the adjudicating authority and the Collector of Central Excise Section 35B provides for a right of appeal to any person aggrieved by, among other orders, (1) an order passed by the Collector (Appeals) under Section 35A and (2) a decision or order passed by the Collector of Central Excise as an adjudicating authoritY. Such an appeal will have to be filed "within three months from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicat ed to the Collector of Central Excise or as the case may be the other party preferring the appeal.
" The Appellate Tribu nal also is required to send a copy of the order passed in the appeal to the Collector of Central Excise and the other party to the appeal.
Section 35E(1) authorises the Board "of its own motion, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which a Collector of Central Excise as 867 an adjudicating authority has passed any decision or order under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order and may, by order, direct such Collector to apply to the Appel late Tribunal.
or as the case may be the Customs and Excise Revenues Appellate Tribunal established under Section 3 of the for the determination of such points arising out of the decision or order as may be specified by the Board in its order.
" As sub section (2) is also relevant for considera tion that may also be set here and that reads: "2.
The Collector of Central Excise may, of his own motion, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an adjudi cating authority subordinate to him has passed any decision or order under this Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legal ity or propriety of any such decision or order and may, by order, direct such authority to apply to the Collector (Appeals) for the determination of such points arising out of the decision or order as may be spcified by the Collector or Central Excise in his order.
It may be seen that the direction to file an appeal under these two sub sections by the Board and the Collector, as the case may be, is to the very adjudicating authority who would otherwise be bound by his own order and not ex pected to be aggrieved by the same.
When an appeal is filed on such direction, the appellant will be the adjudicating authority himself and not the authority who gave the direc tion.
Sub Section (3) of Section 35E of the Act which deals with the limitation for exercise of the powers under sub sections (1) and (2) of the Act and which is the relevant provision for consideration in this appeal reads as follows: "No order shall be made under sub section (1) or subsection (2) after the expiry of one year from the date of the decision or order of the adjudicating authority.
" At this stage itself we may state that sub section (4) of the Act provides that the adjudicating authority shall file the application before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order made under sub section (1) or sub section (2)"within a period of.
three months from the date of communication of the order under sub section (1) or sub section (2) to the adjudicating authority.
" 868 The words "from the date of decision or order" used with reference to the limitation for filing an appeal or revision under certain statutory provisions had come up for consider ation in a number of cases.
We may state that the ratio of the decisions uniformly is that in the case of a person aggrieved filing the appeal or revision, it shall mean the date of communication of the decision or order appealed against.
However, we may note a few leading cases on this aspect.
Under section 25 of the Madras Boundary Act, 1860 the starting point of limitation for appeal byway of suit al lowed by that section was the passing of the Survey Offi cer 's decision and in two of the earliest cases, namely, Annamalai Chetti vs Col.
J.G. Cloete, Mad. 189 and Sesharnrna vs Sankara, Mad. 1, it was held that the decision was passed when it was communicated to the parties.
In The Secretary of State for India in Council vs Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu Guru, ILR 34 Madras 151, construing a similar provision in the Survey and Boundary Act, 1897 the same High Court held that a decision cannot properly be said to be passed until it is in some way pro nounced or published under such circumstances the parties affected by it have a reasonable opporunity of knowing what it contains.
"Till then though it may be written out, signed and dated, it is nothing but a decision which the officer intends to pass.
It is not passed so long it is open to him to tear off what he has written and write something else." In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisi tion Officer & Anr., [1962] 1 SCR 676 construing the proviso to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which prescribed for applications seeking reference to the Court, a time limit of six weeks of the receipt the notice from the Col lector under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector 's award whichever first expires, this Court held that the six months period will have to be calcu lated from the date of communication of the award.
In Asstt.
Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. & Ors.
vs Sri Nand Singh, construing the provision of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, it was held that for an aggrieved party the limitation will run from the date when the order was communicated to him.
The ratio of these judgments were applied in interpret ing section 33A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in Muthia Chettiar vs CIT, ILR with reference to a right of revision provided to an aggrieved assessee.
, Section 33A(1) of the Act on the other hand authorised the Commissioner to suo moto call for the records of any pro ceedings under the Act in which an order has been passed by any 869 authority subordinate to him and pass such order thereon as he thinks fit.
The proviso, however, stated that the Commis sioner shall not revise any order under that sub section" if the order (sought to be revised) has been made more than one year previously".
Construing this provision the High Court in Muthia Chettiar 's case held that the power to call for the records and pass the order will cease with the lapse of one year from the date of the order by the subordinate authority and the ratio of date of the knowledge of the order applicable to an aggrieved party is not applicable for the purpose of exercising suo moto power.
Similarly in another decision reported in Viswanathan Chettiar vs Commis sioner of Income Tax, Madras, construing the time limit for completion of an assessment under section 34(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which provided that it shall be made "within four years from the end of the year in which the income, profit and gains were first assessable," it was held that the time limit of four years for exercise of the power should be calculated with reference to the date on which the assessment or reassessment was made and not the date on which such assessment or reassessment order made under Section 34(2) was served on the assessee.
It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period of limitation prescribed there for.
The order or decision of such authority comes into force or becomes operative or becomes an effective order or decision on and from the date when it is signed by him.
The date of such order or decision is the date on which the order or decision was passed or made: that is to say when he ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a different order and when he ceases to have any locuspaetentiae.
Normally that happens when the order or decision is made public or notified in some form or when it can be said to have left his hand.
The date of communication of the order to the party whose rights are affected is not the relevant date for purposes of determining whether the power has been exercised within the prescribed time.
So far as the party who is affected by the order or decision for seeking his remedies against the same, he should be made aware of passing of such order.
Therefore Courts have uniformly laid down as a rule of law that for seeking the remedy the limitation starts from the date on which the order was communicated to him on the date on which it was pronounced or published under such circumstances that the parties affected by it have a reasonable opportunity of knowing of passing of the order and what it contains, The knowledge of the party 870 affected by Such a decision, either actual or constructive is thus an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be said to have been concluded and binding on him.
Otherwise the party affected by it will have no means of obeying the order or acting in conformity with it or of appealing against it or otherwise having it set.
This is based upon, as observed by Rajamanner, CJ in Muthia Chettiar vs CIT, supra "a salutary and just principle".
The application ' of this rule so far as the aggrieved party is concerned is not dependant on the provisions of the particu lar statute, but it is so under the general law.
In Muthia Chettiar 's case (supra) both these aspects came up for consideration.
The relevant provisions consid ered therein were Section 33A(1) and (2) of the ' Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, which read as follows: "33A. (1) The Commissioner may of his own motion call for the record of any proceeding under this Act in which an order has been passed by any authority subordinate to him and may make such inquiry or cause such. inquiry to be made and, subject to the provisions of this Act, may pass such order thereon, not being an order prejudicial to the assessee as he thinks it: Provided that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under this sub section if (a) x x x (b) x x X x (c) the order has been made more than one year previously." "(2) The Commissioner may, on application by an assessee for revision of an order under this Act, passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, made within one year from the date of the order,. call for the record of the proceeding in which such order was passed, and. . may pass such order thereon. as he thinks fit: Interpreting these provision the Court observed: "In a case falling under sub section (1) the Commissioner acts of his own motion.
There is no question of the 871 aggrieved party invoking his jurisdiction, there can therefore be no occasion to apply the rule enunciated in Secretary of State for India in Council vs Gopisetti Narayanaswami Naidu, Mad, 15 1.
It may be said that the Commissioner 's power to call for the record ceases with the lapes of one year from the date of the order by the subordinate authority.
But in a case failing under sub section (2) the party aggrieved has got to take the step of applying for revision and he is allowed one year from the date of the order.
The provision is, therefore, certainly in the nature of a time limit for the applica tion for revision." The decision in Viswanathan Chettiar 's case (supra) related to the reassessment power under Section 34(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 which read as follows: "No order of assessment under Section 23 or of assessment or reassesment under sub section (1) of this section shall be made after the expiry, in any case to which clause (c) of sub section (1) of section 28 applies, of eight years and in any other case, of four years from the end of the year in which the income, profits or gains were first assessa ble." After referring to some of the provisions in the Act and some of the earlier decisions and in particular Muthia Chettiar 's case (supra) the learned judges observed: "As we have already pointed out, the time limit of four years for which sub section (2) of Section 34 provided was the period within which the Income tax Officer had to complete one stage of the proceedings, that is, the assessment of the income and determination of the tax payable, and that stage could be completed by the Income tax Officer himself, even if the terms of the order of assessment were not communi cated within that period of four years to the assessee.
The rights of the assessee aggrieved by such an order of assessment have been specifically provided for by other sections of the Act.
" Thus if the intention or design of the statutory provision was to protect the interest of the person adverse ly affected, by providing a remedy against the order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as com 872 mencing from the date of communication of the order.
But if it is a limitation for a competent authority to make an order the date of exercise of that power and in the case of exercise of suo moto power over the subordinate authorities ' orders, the date on which such power was exercised by making an order are the relevant dates for determining the limitation.
The ratio of this distinction may also be found ed on the principle that the Government is bound by the proceedings of its officers but persons affected are not concluded by the decision.
Section 35E comes under the latter category of an au thority exercising its own powers under the Act.
It is not correct to equate the Board, as contended by Sri Gaurishan kar Murthy, to one of the two parties to a quasi judicial proceeding before the Collector and the Board 's right under Section 35E to the exercise of the right of appeal by an aggrieved assessee from an order passed to its prejudice.
The power under Section 35E is a power of superintendence conferred on a superior authority to ensure that the subor dinate officers exercise their powers under the Act correct ly and properly.
Where a time is limited for the purposes by the statute, such power, as under Section 33A(2) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 referred to in Muthia Chettiar (supra), should be exercised within the specified period from the date of the order sought to be reconsidered.
To hold to the contrary would be inequitable and will also introduce uncertainties into the administration of the Act for the following reason.
There appears to be no provision in the Act requiring the endorsement, by a Collector, of all orders passed by him to the Board.
If there is such a prac tice in fact or requirement in law, the period of one year from the date of the order is more than adequate to ensure action in appropriate cases particularly in comparison with the much shorter period an assessee has within which to exercise his right of appeal.
If, on the other hand, there is no such requirement or practice and the period within which the Board can interfere is left to depend on the off chance of the Board coming to know of the existence of a particular order at some point of time, however, distant, only administrative chaos can result.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the period of one year fixed under sub section (3) of Section 35E of the Act should be given its literal meaning and so construed the impugned direction of the Board was beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein and therefore invalid and ineffective.
For the foregoing.
reasons we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that the application before them was out of time.
This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
V.P.R. Appeal dis missed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant, an adjudicating authority held the demand from the respondent towards excise duty on biaxially orien tal polypropylene films as set ant in the show cause notice dated 25.10.1983 as barred by limitation and dropped further proceedings.
A copy of the order despatched on 21.12.1984 was received by the respondent on 21.12.1984.
The Central Board of Excise and Customs after considera tion of the order, on 11.12.198S directed the appellant to apply under Section 3SE(1) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944, to the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal for correct determination of the points arising out of the order dated 21.12.1984 and the appellant filed the application under section 35E(4) of the Act.
Before the Tribunal the respondent urged that the rele vant date of the Collector 's (adjudicating authority 's) order for the purposes of Section 35E(3) should he taken as 28.11.1984 and not 21.12.1984 when it was received by the respondent and on that basis the order of the Board under Section 35E(1) of the Act should he held as beyond the period of one year from the date of the decision or order of the adjudicating authority and therefore the application before the Tribunal was incompetent.
863 The Tribunal dismissed the application holding that the application was not maintainable.
In this appeal tided under Section 35L of the Act, the appellant contended that mere writing an order in file kept in the office was no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order was meant and that though the order of the adjudicat ing authority was made on 28.11.1984 a copy of the same was sent to the respondent only on 21.12.1984 and received by him on the very day and that therefore the limitation would start only at the earliest from 21.12.1984; that enabling the giving of the direction under Section 35E(1) and the application under Section 35E(4) in pursuance of that direc tion should he treated as if a right of appeal given to the department; that the departmental authorities and the pri vate parties were to he treated equally as aggrieved persons for the purposes of calculating the time for making the direction under Section 35E(3) of the Act.
On the question, what is the relevant date for the purpose of calculation of the period of one year provided under Section 35E(3) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944, dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
If an authority is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within the period or limitation pre scribed therefore.
The order or decision of such authority comes into force or becomes operative or becomes an effec tive order or decision on and from the date when it is signed by him.
The date of such order or decision is the date on which the order or decision was passed or made; that is to say when he ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a different order and when.he ceases to have any locuspaetentiae.
Normally that happens when the order or decision is made public or notified in some form or when it can he said to have left his hand.
The date of communication of the order to the party whose rights are affected is not the relevant date for purposes of determining whether the power has been exercised within the prescribed time.
[869D F] 2.
If the intention or design of the statutory provi sion was to protect the interest of the person adversely affected, by providing a remedy against the order or deri sion any period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking such remedy shall he read as commencing from the date of communication of the order.
But if it is a limita tion for a competent authority to make an order the date of exer 864 cise of that power and in the case of exercise, of suo moto power over the subordinate authorities ' orders, the date on which such power was exercised by making an order are the relevant date for determining the limitation.
[871H 872B] 3.
Section 35E comes under the latter category of an authority exercising its own powers under the Act.
It is not correct to equate the Board to one of the two parties to a quasi judicial proceeding before the Collector and the Board 's right under Section 35E to the exercise of the right of appeal by an aggrieved assessee from an order passed to its prejudice.
[872B C] 4.
The power under Section 35E is a power of superin tendence conferred on a superior authority to ensure that the subordinate officers exercise their powers under the Act correctly and properly.
Where a time is limited for the purposes by the statute, such power should he exercised within the specified period from the date of the order sought to he reconsidered.
To hold to the contrary would he inequitable and will also introduce uncertainties into the administration of the Act.
[872C E] 5.
The direction to file an appeal under Sections 35E(1)(2) of the Act by the Board and the Collector, as the case may he, is to the very adjudicating authority who would otherwise he bound by his own order and not expected to he aggrieved by the same.
When an appeal is filed on such direction, the appellant will be the adjudicating authority himself and not the authority who gave the direction.
[867D E] 6.
The period of one year fixed under sub section (3) of Section 35E of the Act should he given its literal meaning and so construed the impugned direction of the Board was beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein and therefore invalid and ineffective.
[872G] Annamalai Chetti vs Col.
J.G. Cloete, Mad. 189, Seshamma vs Sankara, Mad. 1; The Secre tary of State for India in Council vs Gopisetti Narayanaswa mi Naidu Guru, ILR 34 Madras 151; Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., [1962] 1 SCR 676; Asstt.
Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. & Ors.
vs Sri Nand Singh, ; Muthia Chettiar vs CIT, ILR and Viswanathan Chettiar vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , referred to. 865


judgement:
No. 119 of 1957.
Writ Petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Achhru Ram, J. P. Goyal and K. L. Mehta, for the petitioners.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India, K.L. Misra, Advocate General for the State of U. P. and Gopi Nath Dixit, for the respondent.
December 17.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
This petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenges the constitutionality of the 117 930 U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (U. P. V of 1954), as amended by U. P. Acts No. XXVI of 1954, No. XIII of 1955, No. XX of 1955, No. XXIV of 1956 and No. XVI of 1957, (hereinafter called the Act).
The applicants are four brothers holding land in village Banat, tahsil Kairana, District Muzaffarnagar.
A notification was issued under section 4 of the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil Kairana, declaring that the State Government had decided to make a scheme of consolidation in that area.
This was followed up by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act resulting in a statement of proposals under section 19.
Objections to these proposals were filed by the petitioners and others, which were decided in April 1956.
The petitioners went in appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which was decided in August 1957.
It was thereafter that the present petition was filed in this Court.
The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds, of which the following five have been urged before us: (1)Section 6 read with section 4 of the Act gives arbitrary powers to the State Government to accord discriminatory treatment to tenure holders in different villages by placing some villages under consolidation while excluding others, thus offending article 14 of the Constitution.
(2)Sections 8, 9 and 10 read with section 49 of the Act provide a procedure for the correction and revision of revenue records for villages under consolidation, which is vitally different from that applicable to villages not under consolidation, and there is thus discrimination which offends article 14 of the Constitution ; (3)Sections 14 to 17 read with section 49, confer arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities under which they can deprive a tenure holder of his land or rights therein and the tenure holder has been deprived of the protection of courts available to other tenure holders in villages not under consolidation, thus creating discrimination which offends article 14. 931 (4)Sections 19 to 22, read with section 49, again create discrimination on the same grounds as sections 14 to 17, and are, therefore, hit by article 14; and (5)Section 29 B, which provides for compensation gives inadequate compensation and is, therefore, hit by article 31(2) of the Constitution.
Before we take these points seriatim, it is useful to refer to the background of this legislation.
As far back as 1939, the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act No. VIII of 1939, was passed.
It was, however, of little effect, because it could only be applied when more than one third of the proprietors of the cultivated area of a village applied for an order of consolidation of the village.
It was, therefore, felt that some kind of compulsion would be necessary in order to achieve consolidation of holdings in villages.
That consolidation would result in improving agricultural production goes without saying and it was with the object of encouraging the development of agriculture that consolidation schemes with a compulsory character were taken up in various States, after the recommendation of The Famine Inquiry Commission, 1944, in its Final Report; (Seepage 263).
The State of Bombay.
was the first to pass an Act called the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, (Bom.
LXII of 1947).
This was followed by the impugned Act in Uttar Pradesh.
The object of the Act is to allot a compact area in lieu of scattered plots to tenure holders so that large scale cultivation may be possible with all its attendant advantages.
Thus ' by the reduction of boundary lines saving of land takes place and the number of boundary disputes is reduced.
There is saving of time in the management of fields inasmuch as the farmer is saved from travelling from field to field, which may be at considerable distances from each other. ' Proper barriers such as fences, hedges and ditches can be erected around a compact area to prevent trespassing and thieving.
It would further be easier to control irrigation and drainage and disputes over water would be reduced considerably where compact areas are allotted to tenure holders.
Lastly, the control of pests, insects 932 and plant disease is made easier where farmers have compact areas under cultivation.
These advantages resulting from consolidation of holdings are intended to encourage the development of agriculture and larger production of food grains, which is the necessity of the day.
With these objects in mind, the Act was passed by the U. P. Legislature in 1953 and received the assent of the President on March 4, 1954.
It was published in the gazette on March 8, 1954, and declarations under section 4 were made for the major part of the State of Uttar Pradesh, including the petitioners ' village, in July, 1954.
The scheme of the Act is as follows: When consolidation of a village is taken up, the first thing that is done is to correct the revenue records, and sections 7 to 12 deal with that.
Then comes the second stage of preparing what are called statements of principles ; (see sections 14 to 18).
Objections to these principles are entertained and decided and thereafter the principles are confirmed under section 18.
Then comes the third stage (vide sections 19 to 23), which deals with the preparation of the statement of proposals.
Objections to this are also invited and disposed of, and then proposals are confirmed under section 23.
After the proposals have been confirmed, we come to the last stage in which the confirmed proposals are enforced; (see sections 24 onwards).
It will be clear therefore from the objects of the Act and the advantages that accrue from its implementation that it is a piece of legislation, which should be a boon to the tenure holders in a village and should also lead to the development of agriculture and increase of food production.
It is in this setting that we have to examine the attack that has been made on the constitutionality of the Act.
Re. 1 : Section 6 of the Act gives power to the State Government at any time to cancel the declaration made under section 4 in respect of the whole or any part of the area specified therein.
When such declaration is made the area ceases to be under consolidation operations and section 5 which provides for the effect of a declaration ceases to operate.
It is urged that section 4 933 gives arbitrary power to the State Government to cancel the declaration, even with respect to a part of the area covered by it and thus discriminates between villages which are under consolidation and those which are not under consolidation.
The learned Additional Solicitor General counters this argument in two ways: (i) Section 6 is nothing more than a restatement of the power which the State Government otherwise possessed under the General Clauses Act; and (ii) the high status of the authority to whom the power is given, namely, the State Government, and the rules framed under the Act laying down a standard for the Government to follow, remove any flavour of arbitrariness which the terms of the section might import.
It is not necessary to express any opinion in this case on the said contention, for, even if it be accepted, the result would be only that section 6 would be struck down.
The petitioners would be in the same position with section 6 on the Statute or without it.
It may be that, if a citizen in whose favour an order of consolidation has been made but subsequently cancelled, comes to court with a grievance that the order of consolidation was for his benefit but was cancelled in exercise of a power under a void section, this question might arise for consideration.
It may also be that the petitioners ' right might be infringed if section 6 were not severable from the other provisions of the Act which enable the Government to direct consolidation of holdings.
The power of cancellation cannot be said to be so inextricably mixed up with the power to order consolidation as to prevent the operation of one section without the other.
Nor can it be said that the Legislature would not have conferred the power on the Government to consolidate holdings without at the same time conferring on them the power to cancel the said order of consolidation.
The said provisions are clearly severable.
In the circumstances, as the petitioners ' case is not affected by section 6 of the Act, we leave this open to be decided in an appropriate case.
Re. 2: This deals with the first stage of revision and correction of maps and records, which has to take place before the actual consolidation scheme is put 934 into force.
Section 7 provides for the examination of the revenue records by the Assistant Consolidation Officer and he is enjoined to test the accuracy of the village map, khasra and the current annual registers by making a partal in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed.
After he has done the partal, he is to prepare a statement showing the mistakes discovered in the map, khasra and khatauni, 'and the number and nature of disputes pertaining to land records under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.
Then under section 8 he submits a report to the Settlement Officer (Con solidation) in this connection with his opinion whether any revision of such maps and records is needed.
On receipt of this report, the Settlement Officer may either order the Assistant Consolidation Officer to proceed with the correction of maps and records, which we presume he will order when there are not too many mistakes, or recommend to the State Government for revision of maps or records in accordance with the provisions of Ch.
IV of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, which he will presumably do if there are too many mistakes found.
If the Assistant Consolidation Officer is ordered to make the corrections he will make a further partal, if necessary, and correct the map or the entries in annual register in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed.
The procedure is prescribed in r. 22 and among other things it lays down that the Assistant Consolidation Officer shall issue a notice to all persons affected by the provisional entries proposed by him; objections are invited and parties are examined and heard and their evidence taken and then the Assistant Consolidation Officer makes the corrections.
His order is open to appeal within twentyone days under section 8(4) to the Consolidation Officer, and the order of the latter is made final.
It is urged that this procedure is vitally different from the procedure prescribed under the U. P. Land Revenue Act and that under section 49 of the Act the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts with respect to any matters arising out of consolidation proceedings is barred, thus depriving those affected by the orders of the Consolidation Officer the right to file a suit as they 935 could have done under the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act; (see sections 40, 41, 51 and 54).
There is no doubt that there is some difference between the procedure provided under the Act and that which the tenure holders 'Would have been entitled to if their village was not under consolidation.
But if consolidation is a boon to the tenure holders of a village, as we hold it is, and if it is to be put through within a reasonable period of time, it is necessary to have a procedure which would be shorter than the ordinary procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act or through a suit in a civil or revenue court.
The procedure that has been provided cannot by any means be said to be arbitrary or lacking in the essentials of principles of natural justice.
The Assistant Consolidation Officer gives notice to the persons affected, hears their objections and gives them an opportunity to produce evidence.
Thereafter he decides the objections and one appeal is provided against his order.
This should, in our opinion, be enough in the special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to those who object to the correction of records.
All that has happened is that the number of appeals is out down to one and that in our opinion is not such a violent departure from the ordinary procedure as to make us strike down the provisions contained in Ch.
II of the Act as discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances arising out of a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has to be of any value, be put through within a reasonable period of time.
Whatever difference there may be may well be supported as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Further section 12 provides that where there is dispute as to title and such question has not already been deter.
mined by any competent Court, the Consolidation Officer has to refer the question for determination to the Civil Judge who thereafter will refer it to the arbitrator.
The arbitrator then proceeds in the manner provided by r. 73 and gives a bearing to the parties and takes evidence both oral and documentary before making his award; and section 37 of the Act makes the 936 Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator in the matter of procedure.
Taking, therefore, the scheme of Ch.
11 and remembering that if consolidation is to be put through there must be a more expeditious procedure, there is in our opinion rational basis for classification which justifes the procedure under Ch.
11 of the Act read with the Rules in villages where consolidation scheme is to be effective.
The attack, therefore, under article 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch.
II fails.
Re. 3 and 4: The contentions on these heads may be taken together.
They attack the provisions of Ch.
III dealing with the Statement of Principles and Statement of Proposals.
The statement of principles is first published and objections are invited.
Under section 17 the Assistant Consolidation Officer decides the objections after hearing the parties, if necessary, and taking into account the view of the Consolidation Committee.
He then submits a report to the Consolidation Officer who after hearing the objectors and taking such evidence as may be necessary passes final order and confirms the statement of principles; (see r. 43 B).
Similarly, when statements of proposals are published, objections are invited to them, and the same procedure is followed in the decision of these objections as in the case of the objections to the statement of principles.
In the case of the statement of proposals also, there is similar provision to refer disputed question of title to the Civil Judge, who, in his turn, refers it to the arbitrator.
Section 22 also provides that where such question has been referred to the arbitrator, all suits or proceedings in the court of first instance, appeal, reference or revision, in which the question of title to the same land has been raised, shall be stayed.
Section 22(3) makes the decision of the arbitrator final.
There is no provision for appeal in Ch.
III though in fact two persons hear the matter, namely, the Assistant Consolidation Officer and the Consolidation Officer.
But the main attack is on the provisions of section 22(2) on account of which it is said that even where a party has obtained a decree which might be under appeal, the jurisdiction of the ordinary 937 courts is taken away and the decision of the arbitrator is made final.
That is undoubtedly so.
But if the consolidation scheme has to be put through in a reasonable period of time such a provision is, in our opinion, necessary; but for it the consolidation schemes may never be really put through for there will be little purpose in making consolidation where a large number of disputes are pending in the courts.
Reasons which we have given in dealing with the second point apply with equal force to these two points also, and we are of opinion that there is a rational basis for a classification which has a nexus with the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack under article 14 on the provisons of Chapter III also must fail.
Re. 5.
Under this head,, the inadequacy of compensation provided under section 29 B of the Act is raised.
It may be mentioned that the Act, as originally passed, did not contain any provision for compensation.
There were a number of writ applications in the Allahabad High Court and that court held that inasmuch as some property was taken away under section 14(1) (ee) for public purposes and no compensation was provided, that provision was void under article 31 (2) as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Fourth Amendment,).
Appeals by the State Government from that decision of the Allahabad High Court are pending before us and we shall deal with them separately.
The legislature then enacted section 29 B laying down the principles on which compensation would be paid for lands taken away under section 14 (1) (ee) after the decision of the Allahabad High Court.
This section was put by Act XVI of 1957 in the original Act with retrospective effect from the date from which the original Act was enforced.
It is urged that the compensation provided therein is inadequate, and, therefore, the provision should be struck down under article 31 (2), as it was before the Fourth Amendment.
Arguments were also addressed on the question whether section 29 B would be saved by the 118 938 Fourth Amendment.
We, however, think it unnecessary to go into these arguments for we have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case the compensation provided under section 29 B is adequate.
Assuming that the case is governed by article 31 (2) as it was before the Fourth Amendment, section 29 B provides for payment of cash compensation equal to four times the value determined at hereditary rates to a bhumidar and two times the value to a sirdar.
The difference between the two rates has not been attacked for the rights of a bhumidar are much higher than the rights of a sirdar.
The bhumidar is the owner of the land while the sirdar is merely a tenant; but the argument is that the amount provided is inadequate, and that it is certainly not the fair market value of the land.
Let us see what section 14 (1) (ee) provides.
It lays down the basis on which the tenure holder will contribute towards the land required for public purposes and the extent to which vacant land may be utilised for the said purpose.
We are here concerned with the first part, namely, the contribution of tenure holders towards land required for public purposes.
In this case the petitioners had lands in one chak of the rental value of Rs. 20 6 0 and they have been allotted lands of the rental value of Rs. 20 5 0 instead.
In another chak, in place of land the rental value of which is Rs. 148 10 0 they have been allotted land of the rental value of Rs. 147 13 0.
Thus out of the land valued at Rs. 169 0 0, they have been allotted land of the value of Rs. 168 2 0, and land valued at Annas 0 14 0 has gone to the common pool.
The percentage is just over a half per cent.
it hardly ever exceeds one per cent.
Thus the land which is taken over is a small bit, which sold by itself would hardly fetch anything.
These small bits of lands are collected from various tenure holders and consolidated in one place and added to the land which might be lying vacant so that it may be used for the purposes of section 14 (1) (ee).
A compact area is thus created and it is used for the purposes of the tenure holders themselves and other villagers.
Form CH 21 framed under r. 41 (1) shows the purposes to which this land would be applied, 939 namely, (1) plantation of trees, (2) pasture land, (3) manure pits, (4) threshing floor, (5) cremation ground, (6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school, (8) playground, (9) panchayatghar, and (10) such other objects.
These small bits of land thus acquired from: tenure holders are consolidated and used for these purposes, which are directly for the benefit of the tenure holders.
They are deprived of a small bit and in place of it they are given advantages in a much larger area of land made up of these small bits and also of vacant land.
The question then is whether in these circumstances it can be said that the tenureholders have been given adequate compensation by.
section 29 B for the small bits of land acquired from them for public purposes.
This case must be distinguished from other cases where lands are acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, for here the benefit is direct to the tenure holders while in ordinary cases of land acquired for public purposes, if there is any benefit to the person from whom the land is acquired, it is indirect and remote.
It is contended on behalf of the State in the circumstances that the compensation which the tenure holders get is not merely the cash compensation which they receive under section 29 B but also the advantage which they receive by these small bits taken from them being consolidated into a larger area of land in which they will have benefits, the nature of which is indicated in form CH 21, over and above the advantage of having their scattered holdings consolidated into a compact block.
The question, therefore, is whether in these circumstances the provision of actual cash compensation under section 29 B can be said to be inadequate.
We are of opinion that taking into account the peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and remembering that the land taken from each individual tenure holder may be a small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area by adding some other lands taken from other tenure holders, and the whole is then used for the advantage of the whole body of tenure holders, it cannot be said that the cash compensation, added to the advantages which the tenure holders get in the 940 large area of land thus constituted and on account of getting a compact block for themselves, is inadequate.
Therefore, assuming that article 31 (2) applies as it was before the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be said that the compensation which the tenure holders will get under section 29 B is inadequate in the circumstances.
This ground of attack also therefore fails.
There is no force in this petition and it is hereby dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.

summary:
The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U .
P. V of 954), as amended by the amending Acts, which was intended to encourage the development of agriculture by the allotment of compact areas to tenure holders in lieu of scattered plots so that large scale cultivation might be possible with all its attendant advantages.
A notification was issued under section 4 Of the impugned Act declaring the decision of the State Government to formulate a scheme of ' consolidation in respect of the area where the petitioners held their lands.
This was followed up by a statement of proposals under section 19.
The petitioners objected to these proposals and thereafter appealed to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) but to no effect.
It was contended, inter alia, on their behalf that (1) the provisions of sections 8, 9 and 10 read with those Of s 49 Of the impugned Act were discriminatory in that they laid down a procedure for correction and revision of revenue records for 929 villages under consolidation that was vitally different from that applicable to other villages under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901; (2) that sections 14 to 17 as also sections 19 to 22 read with section 49 conferred arbitrary powers on the consolidation authorities in respect of the lands of the tenure holder and his rights therein and deprived him of the protection of courts available to other tenure: holders and that (3) section 29B which provided for compensation, by giving inadequate compensation, offended article 31(2) Of the Con stitution.
Held, that the contentions must fail.
Although the procedure laid down by the impugned Act was to some extent different from that under the U.P. Revenue Act, 1901, it was by no means arbitrary or devoid of natural justice.
Regard being had to the advantages that consolidation conferred on the tenure holder such difference was supportable as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia reasonably connected with the object of the Act.
The expeditious procedure for effectuating consolidation laid down by ch.
II of the Act read with the Rules, therefore, could not be said to violate article 14 Of the Constitution.
Nor could for similar reasons the provisions of ch.
III of the Act be said to violate article 14 Of the Constitution.
The provision Of section 22(2) Of the Act which made the decision of the arbitrator final by ousting the jurisdiction of ordinary courts even where a party had obtained a decree which might be under appeal, was necessary in the interest of expedition.
Having regard to the peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and the advantages a scheme of consolidation offered to the entire body of tenure holders, it could not be said that the cash compensation for tenure holders provided by section 29B of the impugned Act was inadequate, even assuming that article 31(2) applied to the case.


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
3236 39 of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.2.
1983 of the Bombay High Court in F.C.A. Nos.
35/B, 36/B, 37/B & 38/B of 1981.
Ashok H. Desai, Solicitor General, Ravinder Narain, Aditya Narain, Rajan Narain, section Sukumaran, D.N. Mishra and Pallav Sishodia for the Appellant.
G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J.
The above four appeals on special leave by the appellant were filed against the judgment and order dated February 7, 1983 made by the Panaji Bench of the Bombay High Court in First Civil Appeal Nos.
35/B to 38/B of 1981 dis posing of all the four appeals field by the appellant against the judgment and order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa dated 26.8.1981 confirming four different awards by an arbitrator appointed in pursuance to the agreement between the parties.
Appeal No. 35 of 1981 relates to the award, awarding to the respondent against the appellant Rs.2,75,091.13.
Appeal No. 36 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent a sum of Rs.1,88,968.36.
Appeal No. 37 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent Rs.3,36,230.36 and Appeal No. 38 of 1981 relates to an award, awarding to the respondent Rs.46,321.32.
The facts leading to these appeals are as follows: The appellant Goa, Daman & Diu Housing Board entered into two contracts on 15.3.72, and one contract each on 11.7.73 and on 4.7.73 with the respondent for the construc tion of tenements at Vasgoda Gama, Goa.
The appellant ac cepted two tenders of the respondent on 9.3.72 and remaining two on 24.2.73.
There was a time limit in all the aforesaid four contracts for the completion of the work referred to therein.
Several extensions were granted to the respondent for completing the work out the respondent failed to com plete the construction 907 work undertaken by him under the said four contracts.
On July 1, 1975 the appellant issued a notice to the respondent under clause 3 of the said contract for exercising the right of termination in view of the fact that the respondent was unable to fulfil the contractual obligation of completing the construction work in spite of the various extensions granted to the respondent.
On July 14, 1975, the Engineer in Charge of the appellant Board exercised its unilateral right of terminating the contract under clause 3 of the agreement in view of the fact that the respondent did not complete the work of construction undertaken by him in spite of various extentions granted to him.
On July 31, 1975, the Chairman of the appellant board confirmed that all the four contracts stood rescinded.
On May 17, 1976, the respondent served a notice to the appellant on the ground that the appellant had rescinded the work contracts.
The respondent stated therein various reasons why the work could not be completed.
Thereafter in April, 1978, the appellant filed a suit claiming damages for a sum of Rs.4,38,786.96 with interest against the respondent in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa.
Subsequently, an application was filed by the respondent under section 34 of the for stay of the suit.
Respondent also made another application to the Court under section 20 of the for directing the Housing Board to file the arbitration agreement in Court and in pursuance of clause 25 of the agreement to appoint an arbitrator.
Accord ingly, the Court by its order dated 28.2.1979 had the agree ment between the parties filed in court and directed the Housing Board to appoint an arbitrator.
On March 29, 1979 Shri J.S. Pinto, retired Superintending Engineer w.as ap pointed as Arbitrator.
The Arbitrator on March 23, 1981 submitted four awards granting the claims of the respondent as stated hereinbefore on the basis that the appellant was responsible for the slow progress and non completion of work and the work could not be completed as the contract was terminated by the appel lant, the Housing Board.
The said award was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, by the Arbi trator on 31st March, 1981 for making the award Rule of the Court.
The appellant submitted his objections for setting aside the awards on April 27, 1981 on the grounds inter alia that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself by not framing the main issue i.e. whether or not the claimant abandoned the work and thereby committed breach of the agreement.
The Arbitrator misconducted himself by ignoring the letter of termination wherein it Was clearly stated that the termina tion has been done on account of the abandonment of the work by the claimants; the learned Arbitrator failed to decide upon the 908 question of the abandonment of work and has wholly side tracked the issue; the learned Arbitrator misconducted himself by not giving reasons for the award as required under the agreement under which he was appointed.
The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji by his Order dated 26th August, 1981 rejected all the objections raised on behalf of the appellant against the said awards and confirmed the same.
All the four impugned awards have been made Rule of the Court.
The appellant thereafter filed the aforesaid First Civil Appeal Nos. 35/B, 36/B, 37/B and 38/B of 1981 against the said Order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, Goa on the ground that the Civil Judge did not consider that the Arbitrator misconducted himself in making the awards without recording any reasons for the same, even though the claim was Rs.50,000 and above as provided in clause 25 of the agreement between the parties and as such the awards should have been set aside by the Court.
The High Court held that having regard to the clause 25 of the terms of the agreement specifically providing that in all cases where amount of claim in dispute is Rs.50,000 and above the arbitrator was bound to give reasons for his award.
The statements that has been made by the Arbitrator while giving his findings could not be considered to be the reasoning for his finding of the award.
The Court also held that: "The award no where contains any reasoning for the same nor does it even obliquely mentions that in giving his findings the Arbitrator has even sought to adopt the reasoning of either of the parties.
In our view as the obligation of the Arbitrator under Clause 25 of the agreement stands, the reasons should appear to be so in this case.
" It was further held that as the arbitrator failed to give reasons for the award it would be a misconduct on his part and the award was liable to be vitiated on that ground.
The Court allowed all the appeals.
The order of the lower court was set aside and the awards were remanded back to the arbitrator for giving reasons for the same as required under clause 25 of the arbitration agreement and thereafter to file the same in the court of Civil Judge, Panaji, within eight weeks after the order is served on him.
909 Against this judgment and order the impugned appeals by special leave were filed.
The learned counsel on behalf of the appellants has contended that the High Court acted illegally in not consid ering at all that the arbitrator did not record any reasons for making awards allowing the claims each of which exceeds Rs.50,000 as provided under clause 25 of the arbitration agreement and as such the arbitrator has misconducted him self in the proceedings and instead of sending the awards made by the arbitrator to him for recording his reasons ought to have set aside the awards under section 30 of the .
It has also been contended that the High Court though it held that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct and the awards made by him were liable to be vitiated on that ground yet inspite of setting aside the awards they were sent to the arbitrator for recording rea sons which is totally unwarranted by law.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respond ent, on the other hand, submitted that the awards made by the arbitrator after hearing the parties cannot be said to be illegal or unwarranted as the same were made after con sidering all papers and documents filed by the parties and after duly hearing the parties.
As such there was no ille gality nor any misconduct committed in making the awards.
The arbitrator has fairly considered the issues and made the awards in question.
The misconduct, if any, on the part of the arbitrator does not concern with the probity and impar tiality of the arbitrator.
The only allegation against the arbitrator is that he has not recorded the reasons for the awards made by him as per term of clause 25 of the arbitra tion agreement.
It has, therefore, been contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent that the order of the High Court in remanding the awards to the arbitrator for recording reasons clearly fails within the purview of section 16(1)(c) of the as the objec tion to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it.
It does not fail within the provision of section 30 of the said act in as much as the arbitrator has not miscon ducted himself or the proceedings and the awards in question have not been improperly procured.
Several decisions have been cited at the bar in support of the respective conten tions advanced by the counsel for the parties.
Before considering the question whether the directions made by the High Court in remitting the award to the Arbi trator for giving reasons do fall within the purview of Section 16 of the , it is appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of section 16(1): 910 "Sec.
16(1): The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit (a) where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separat ed without affecting the determination of matters referred; or (b) where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; or (c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it.
" Section 16 empowers the Court to remit the award to the Arbitrator for reconsideration only in three cases specified therein.
Clause (c) of Section 16(1) provides that the award shall be remitted to the Arbitrator by the Court where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it.
Of course, the High Court has come to a finding that the Arbitrator was guilty of misconduct for his failure to give reasons as required.
There is, however, nothing to show that the Arbitrator misconducted himself or the pro ceedings in any other manner nor there is anything to show that the awards have been improperly procured.
There is no allegation, far less, any finding, that the Arbitrator was biased or unfair or he has not heard both the parties or he has not fairly considered the submissions of the parties in making the awards in question.
In our opinion, it is evident from the four awards made by the Arbitrator that the Arbi trator has considered all the specific issues raised by the parties in the arbitration proceedings and came to his finding after giving cogent reasons.
The above awards cannot under any circumstances be considered to be made by the Arbitrator without recording any reasons for the same.
Therefore, in such circumstances, it is not proper to hold that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or in the proceedings in the matter of giving the awards.
In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the four awards made by the Arbitrator are bad for not recording reasons.
We, therefore, uphold the said awards and we do not think it necessary to decide the question as regards the scope of Section 30 or Section 16of 911 the .
The decision of the High Court remit ting the awards back to the Arbitrator for giving reasons is set aside and the awards made by the Arbitrator are upheld.
Let these awards be made rule of the Court.
The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dis missed.

summary:
The appellant Housing Board, which had entered into four contracts with the respondent for construction of tenements within a certain time limit, terminated them after giving notice on the ground that the respondent had failed to complete the construction work despite several extensions granted to him, and filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge claiming damages of over Rs.4 lakhs.
The respondent filed appllcations under Sections 34 and 20 of the , for stay of the suit and for directions to the appellant Board for filing the arbitration agreement in the Court and also for appointing arbitrator in terms of clause 25 of the agreement.
As per Court 's order, the appellant filed the agreement in the Court and appointed the Arbitra tor.
The Arbitrator made four awards granting the claims of the respondent to the extent of over Rs.8 lakhs and filed them in the Court for making them Rule of the Court.
The appellant 's objections for setting aside the awards on the ground that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself by not framing the main issue, viz., whether or not the claimant abandoned the work and thereby committed the breach of the agreement, by ignoring the letter of termination where in it was clearly stated that the termination had been done on account of the abandonment of the work by the claimant, and failed to decide upon the question of the abandonment of work and wholly side tracked the issue and also by not giving reasons for the award as required under the agree ment, under which he was appointed, were rejected by the Civil Court, which confirmed the awards and made them the Rule of the Court.
The appellant 's appeals against this decision was allowed by the High Court, which set aside the Civil Court 's order and sent back the awards to the arbitra tor for giving reasons, as required under clause 25 of the agreement which specifically provided that in all cases where amount of 905 claim was Rs.50,000 and above, the Arbitrator was bound to give reasons.
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant Housing Board it was contended that having held that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct and the awards were liable to be vitiated on that ground, the High Court ought to have set aside the awards instead of sending them back for recording reasons, which was totally unwarranted by law.
On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the High Court 's order remanding the awards for recording rea sons clearly fell within the purview of Sec. 16(1)(c) of the , as the objection to the legality of the award was apparent on the face of it, and not within the provisions of Sec.
30 of the Act, inasmuch as the arbitrator had not misconducted himself or the proceedings and the awards in question had not been improperly procured.
Dismissing the appeals and confirming the awards, this Court, HELD: 1.1 Section 16 empowers the Court to remit the award to the Arbitrator for reconsideration only in three cases specified therein.
Clause (c) of Sub Section (1) provides that the award shall be remitted to the Arbitrator by the Court where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it.
[710D] 1.2 No doubt, in the instant case, the High Court has come to a finding that the Arbitrator was guilty of miscon duct for his failure to give reasons as required but there is nothing to show that the Arbitrator misconducted himself or the proceeding in any other manner, nor is there anything to show that the awards have been improperly procured nor any allegation, far less, any finding, that the Arbitrator was biased or unfair or he had not heard both the parties or he had not fairly considered the submissions of the parties in making the awards in question.
[710E] 1.3 It is evident from the four awards made by the Arbitrator that the Arbitrator has considered all the spe cific issues raised by the parties in the arbitration pro ceedings and came to his finding after giving cogent rea sons.
The awards cannot under any circumstances be consid ered to be made by the Arbitrator without recording any reasons for the same.
In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or in the proceedings in the matter 906 of giving the awards.
The decision of the High Court remit ting the awards back to the Arbitrator for giving reasons is set aside and the awards made by the Arbitrator are upheld and made Rule of the Court.
[710F G, 711A]