judgement:
Appeal No. 45 of1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 30, 1962, of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 69 of 1962.
G.S. Pathak, M. M. Gharekhan and 1.
N. Shroff, for the appellant.
911 C.K. Daphtary, Attorney General, R. Ganapathy Iyer, Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgments of P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J., K. N. WANCHOO, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. R. MUDHOLKAR JJ. was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR C.J. RAGHUBAR DAYAL J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
Gajendragadkar C.J.
This appeal arises from a writ petition filed by the appellant Navnit Lal C. Javeri in the Bombay High Court in which he challenged the validity of section 12(1B) read with section 2 (6A) (e) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 (No. 11 of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act) as it stood in 1955.
The High Court has rejected the appellant 's contention that the said section is invalid, and the appellant has come to this Court with a certificate granted by the High Court.
The appellant holds 11 out of 845 shares in a private limited company named the Malegaon Electricity Co., (Private) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the company).
The value of each share is Rs. 100.
The business of the company is to supply electricity to the residents of Malegaon.
Some time during 1955, the appellant took a loan amounting to over Rs. 4 lakhs from the company.
A notice was issued to the appellant by the 8th, Income Tax Officer under section 22(2) of the Act calling, upon him to make his return for the assessment year 1956 57.
The Income tax Officer computed his income at Rs. 3,58,460.
This amount included a sum of Rs. 2,83,126 representing the accumulated profits of the company.
The Income tax Officer took the view that under section 2 (6A) (e) the said amount must be deemed to be dividend received by the appellant, and as such, must be included in the total income of the appellant as income from other sources within the meaning of section 12(1B) of the Act.
This order was challenged by the appellant by preferring an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The appeal, however, failed and was dismissed.
The appellant then preferred a second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
Whilst this appeal was pending, before the said Tribunal, the appellant moved the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, and contended that the relevant section under which the department had purported to levy assessment against him on the sum of Rs. 2,83,126, was ultra vires.
That is how the only question which the High Court had to decide in the present writ proceedings was whether section 12 (1B) read with section 2 (6A) (e) was constitutionally valid.
912 in order to deal with this point, it is necessary to read the two relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 2(6C) defines "income" as including dividend.
Section 2 (6A) defines "dividend" in an inclusive manner.
Section 2 (6A) (e) provides "Dividend" includes (e) any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested within the meaning of section 23A, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) by way of advance or loan to a shareholder or any payment by any such company on behalf or for the individual benefit of a shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case, possesses accumulated profits; but dividend does not include (i) (ii) any advance or loan made to a shareholder by a company in the ordinary course of its business where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business ,of the company; (iii) any dividend paid by a company which is set off by the company against the whole or any part of any sum previously paid by it and treated as a dividend within the meaning of sub clause (e), to the extent to which it is so set off." Thus, the inclusive definition of "dividend" takes in the payments to which clause (e) of section 2(6A) refers and makes them dividend for the purpose of the Act.
Section 12(1) provides that the tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head "Income from other sources" in respect of income, profits and gains of every kind which may be included in his total income (if not included under any of the preceding heads).
Section 12(lB) provides : "any payment by a company to a shareholder by way of advance or loan which would have been treated as a dividend within the meaning of clause (e) of subsection (6A) of section 2 in any previous year relevant to any assessment year prior to the assessment year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, had that clause been in force in that year, shall be treated as a dividend received by him in the previous year relevant to the 913 assessment year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, if such loan or advance remained outstanding on the first day of such previous year".
Both these provisions viz., section 2(6A)(e) and section 12(lB) were introduced in the Act by the Finance Act 15 of 1955 which came into operation on the 1st of April, 1955.
It is thus clear that the combined effect of these two provisions is that three kinds of payments made to the shareholder of a company to which the said provisions apply, are treated as taxable dividend to the extent of the accumulated profits held by the company.
These three kinds of payments are: (1) payments made to the shareholder by way of advance or loan; (2) payments made on his behalf; and (3) payments made for his individual benefit.
There are five conditions which must be satisfied before section 12(lB) can be invoked against a shareholder.
The first condition is that the company in question must be one in which the public are not substantially interested within the meaning of section 23A as it stood in the year in which the loan was advanced.
The second condition is that the borrower must be a shareholder at the date when the loan was advanced; it is immaterial what the extent of his shareholding is.
The third condition is that the loan advanced to a shareholder by such a company can be deemed to be dividend only to the extent to which it is shown that the company possessed accumulated profit at the date of the loan.
This is an important limit prescribed by the relevant section.
The fourth condition is that the loan must not have been advanced by the company in the ordinary course of its business.
In other words, this provision would not apply to cases where the company which advances a loan to its shareholder carries on the business of money lending itself ; and the last condition is that the loan must have remained outstanding at the commencement of the shareholder 's previous year in relation to the assessment year 1955 56.
In dealing with the question about the constitutionality of the impugned provisions, it is necessary to bear in mind these respective conditions which govern the application of the said provisions.
There is another material circumstance which cannot be ignored.
It appears that when these amendments were introduced in Parliament, the Hon 'ble Minister for Revenue & Civil Expenditure save an assurance that outstanding loans and advances which are otherwise liable to be taxed as dividends in the assessment year 1955 56 will not be subjected to tax if it is shown that they had been genuinely refunded to the respective companies before the 30th June, 1955.
It was realized by the Government 914 that unless such a step was taken, the operation of section 12(1B) would lead to extreme hardship, because it would have covered the aggregate of all outstanding loans of past years and that may have imposed an unreasonably high liability on the respective shareholders to whom the loans might have been advanced.
In order that the assurance given by the Minister in Parliament should be carried out, a circular [No. 20(XXI 6)/55] was issued by the Central Board of Revenue on the 10th May, 1955.
It is clear that a circular of the kind which was issued by the Board would be binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act under section 5(8) of the Act.
This circular pointed out to all the officers that it was likely that some of the companies might have advanced loans to their shareholders as a result of genuine transactions of loans, and the idea was not to affect such transactions and not to bring them within the mischief of the new provision.
The officers were, therefore, asked to intimate to all the companies that if the loans were repaid before the 30th June, 1955 in a genuine manner, they would not be taken into account in determining the tax liability of the shareholders to whom they may have been advanced.
In other words, past transactions which would normally have attracted the stringent provisions of section 12(lB) as it was introduced in 1955, were substantially granted exemption from the operation of the said provisions by making it clear to all the companies and their shareholders that if the past loans were genuinely refunded to the companies, they would not be taken into account under section 12(lB).
Section 12(1B) would, therefore, normally Apply to loans granted by the companies to their respective shareholders with full notice of the provisions prescribed by it.
Mr. Pathak for the appellant contends that the impugned provision is constitutionally invalid, because it is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.
He argues that Entry 82 in List I of the Seventh Schedule which deals with "taxes on income other than agricultural income" cannot justify the impugned provision, because a loan advanced to a shareholder by the company cannot, in any legitimate sense, be treated as his income; and so, the artificial manner in which such dividend is ordered to be treated as income by the impugned provision is not justified by the said Entry.
He also contends that the said provision offends article 19(1) (f) & (g) and cannot be said to be justified by clause (5) or (6) of the said article.
There is no doubt that if the impugned provision is beyond the legislative powers of Parliament, it would be bad.
Similarly, it is now well settled that even tax 915 legislation must stand the scrutiny of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and so, there can be no doubt that if the impugned provision invades the fundamental rights of the appellant and the invasion is not constitutionally justified, it would be invalid.
In dealing with this point, it is necessary to consider what exactly is the denotation of the word "income" used in the relevant Entry.
It is hardly necessary to emphasis that the entries in the Lists cannot be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and as observed by Gwyer C.J. in the United Provinces vs Atiqa Begum(1).
" each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.
" What the entries in the List purport to do is to confer legislative powers on the respective Legislatures in respect of areas or fields covered by the said entries .
and it is an elementary rule of construction that the widest possible construction must be put upon their words.
This doctrine does not, however, mean that Parliament can choose to tax as income an item which in no rational sense can be regarded as a citizen 's income.
The item taxed should rationally be capable of being considered as the income of a citizen.
But in considering the question as to whether a particular item in the hands of a citizen can be regarded as his income or not, it would be inappropriate to apply the tests traditionally prescribed by the Income tax Act as such.
In Navinchandra Mafatlal vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City(1), this Court had occasion to consider the question as to whether capital gains could be treated as income within the meaning of item 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.
Section 12 B of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 which had been inserted in the said Act by Act XXII of 1947, had imposed tax on 'capital gains '.
The validity of this provision was challenged on the ground that capital gains cannot be treated as income within the meaning of entry 54.
This plea was rejected by this Court on the ground that the words used in a constitutional enactment conferring legis lative powers ought to be construed most liberally and in their widest amplitude.
Adopting this approach Das J. as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed that the word "income" used in the said entry must be given its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning and that was, income is a thing that comes in.
On this view, the Court found no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that income would include capital gains.
If the traditional (1) (2) [1955]1 S.C.R. 829.
Sup./65 916 sense of income had been accepted, then, of course, capital gains could not be treated as income.
That, in fact, was the argument which was pressed by Mr. Kolah who appeared for the appellant.
"If we hold", observed the learned Judge, "as we are asked to do, that the meaning of the word 'income ' has become rigidly crystallised by reason of the judicial interpretation of that word appearing in the Income tax Act, then logically no enlargement of the scope of the Income tax Act, by amendment or otherwise, will be permissible in future.
" And he has significantly added that a conclusion so extravagant and astounding can scarcely be contemplated or countenanced.
This decision, therefore shows that the word "income" used in entry 54 which corresponds to the present entry 82 in List I of the 7th Schedule to our Constitution, was liberally construed, and capital gains were deemed to be included within its scope.
This aspect of the matter has also been clearly enunciated by Gwyer C.J. in In re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (No. 14 of 1938) (1).
"I conceive", said the learned Chief Justice, "that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it (the Constitution); but I do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interests of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purpose of supplying omissions or of correcting supposed errors".
The next decision to which we ought to refer deals with section 23A of the Act.
In Sardar Baldev Singh vs Commissioner of Income tax, Delhi & Ajmer(1) the validity of the said section was challenged.
Section 23A(1) provides, inter alia, that subject to the provisions of sub sections (3) and (4), where the Income tax Officer is satisfied that in respect of any previous year the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company within the twelve months immediately following the expiry of that previous year are less than sixty per cent of the total income of the company of that previous year as reduced by the amounts specified in clauses (a), (b) & (c) of the said sub section, the Income tax Officer shall, unless he is satisfied that having regard to losses incurred by the company in earlier years or to the smallness of the profits made in the previous year, the payment of a dividend or a larger dividend than that declared would be unreasonable, make an order in writing that the company shall, apart from the sum (1) at p. 37.
(2) ; 917 determined as payable by it on the basis of the assessment under section 23, be liable to pay super tax at the rate specified by the said sub section.
The object of this section is to prevent avoidance of super tax by shareholders of a company in which the public are not substantially interested.
As is well known, the rates,of super tax applicable to companies are much lower than the rates applicable to individual assessees.
The legislature thought that individuals tried to avoid the payment of super tax at a higher rate by transferring to a private limited company it).
return for shares the sources of their income, and then the profits made by the company were allowed to accumulate in the hands of the company, dividends not being declared, and the said profits would ultimately be distributed in a capital form by one device or another.
The object of section 23A was to defeat such attempts.
The main effect of the provisions of section 23A appears to be that a company should not accumulate more than 40 per cent of its net profits to build up reserves or to provide for capital expenditure.
It will be recalled that section 2(6A) has taken within the definition of 'dividend" the accumulated profits of such companies, and so section 23A attempts to reach such accumulated profits for the purpose of taxation.
The argument which was urged before this Court in the cast of Sardar Baldev Singh(1) was that a company and its share, holders are different persons, and so, section 23A was ultra vires inasmuch as it purported to tax the shareholders on the income of the company in which they hold shares.
If the accumulated profits are distributed amongst the shareholders by way of dividends, the shareholders could legitimately be taxed in respect of the dividends received by them; but when section 23A attempts to tax the shareholders for accumulated profits even though they are not distributed as dividends, what, the section purports to do is to tax the share holders for the profits made by the company; and that, according to the appellant, made section 23A invalid.
This argument was repelled by this Court on the ground that the obvious intention of section 23A was to prevent evasion of tax, and it was held that entry 54 should be read not only as authorising the imposition of a tax, but also as authorising an enactment which prevents the tax imposed being evaded; otherwise the power to tax a person on his income might often be made in fructuous by ingenious contrivances.
It would be noticed that section 23A wanted to deal with a situation where shareholders did not deliberately distribute the accumulated profits as dividends amongst themselves.
Section (1) ; 918 23A, therefore, provides that these accumulated profits will be deemed to have been distributed to the shareholders and tax levied against them on that basis.
It is likely that in such a case, hardship may be caused in some honest cases; but this Court made it perfectly clear that considerations of hardship are irrelevant for determining questions of legislative competence.
It is thus clear that the result of the decision of this Court in Sardar Baldev Singh(1) is that the income which technically belonged to the 'company, was treated, as income belonging to the share holders in proportion to the shares they held in the company, and on that footing tax was levied on them; and yet the said tax was held to be constitutionally valid.
There is yet another case in which a similar question was considered.
In Balaji vs Income tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, (2) a person and his wife started business in partnership and admitted their three minor sons to it.
In computing the total income of the said person for the purpose of assessment, the Income tax Officer included the share of the income of his wife and three minor sons under section 16 (3) (a) (i) & (ii) of the Act.
The validity of this provision was challenged on the ground that the impugned section purported to tax a person for the income of other persons, namely, his wife and minor sons.
In rejecting the contention raised against the validity of the impugned section, this Court held that the Entries in the Legislative Lists are not powers but fields of legislation and the widest import and significance should be attached to them.
On this view, the conclusion reached by this Court was that Entry 54 of the Federal Legislative List covered legislation like section 16 (3) (a) (i) & (ii), because it was intended to prevent evasion of tax.
It appears from the judgment that the validity of the said section was also challenged on the ground that it contravened Articles 14 and 19(1) (f) & (g) of the Constitution.
This plea was also rejected.
One of the considerations which weighed with the Court in repelling the said plea was that the additional payment of tax made on the income of the wife or the minor children would ultimately be home by them in the final accounting between them.
Having regard to this con sideration and bearing in mind the fact that the mode of taxation authorised by the impugned section, though harsh, was thought to be necessary to prevent evasion of payment of tax, this Court held that the said section was valid.
It is in the light of these decisions that we must proceed to consider Mr. Pathak 's argument that section 12(1B) of the Act is ultra wires.
(1) ; (2) ; In dealing with Mr. Pathak 's argument in the present case, let us recall the relevant facts.
The companies to which the impugned section applies are companies in which at least 75 per cent of the voting power lies in the hands of persons other than the public, and that means that the companies are controlled by a group of persons allied together and having the same interest.
In the case of such companies, the controlling group can do what it likes with the management of the company, its affairs and its profit within the limits of the Companies Act.
It is for this group to determine whether the profits made by the company should be distributed as dividends or not.
The declaration of dividend is entirely within the discretion of this group.
When the legislature realized that though money was reasonably available with the company in the form of profits, those in charge of the company deliberately refused to distribute it as dividends to the shareholders, but adopted the device of advancing the said accumulated profits by way of loan or advance to one of its shareholders, it was plain that the object of such a loan or advance was to evade the payment of tax on accumulated profits under section 23A.
It will be remembered that an advance or loan which falls within the mischief of the 'impugned section is advance or loan made company which does not normally deal in money lending is made with full knowledge of the provisions contained impugned section.
The object of keeping accumulated without distributing them obviously is to take the benefit lower rate of super tax prescribed for companies.
This was defeated by section 23A which provides that in the case distributed profits, tax would be levied on the shareholders on the basis that the accumulated profits will be deemed to have been distributed amongst them.
Similarly, section 12(1B) provides that if a controlled company adopts the device of making a loan or advance to one of its shareholders, such shareholder will be deemed to have received the said amount out of the accumulated profits and would be liable to pay tax on the basis that he hag received the said loan by way of dividend.
It is clear that when such a device is adopted by a controlled company, the controlling group consisting of shareholders have deliberately decided to adopt the device of making a loan or advance.
Such an arrangement is intended to evade the application of a. 23A. The loan may carry interest and the said interest may be received by the company; but the main object underlying the loan is to avoid payment of tax.
It may ultimately be repaid to the company and when it is so repaid, it may or may not be treated as part of 920 accumulated profits.
It is this kind of a well planned device which section 12(1B) intends to reach for the purpose of taxation.
It appears that such a device is adopted by private companies in many countries.
Simon has referred to this device in these words : "Generally speaking, surtax is charged only on individuals, not on companies or other bodies corporate.
Various devices have been adopted from time to time to enable the individual to avoid surtax on his real total income or on a portion of it, and one method involved the formation of what is popularly called a 'one man company '.
He individual transferred his assets, in exchange for shares, to a limited company, specially registered for the purpose, which thereafter received the income from the assets concerned.
The individual 's total income for tax purposes was then limited to the amount of the dividends distributed to him as practically the only shareholder, which distribution was in his own control.
The balance of the income, which was not so distributed, remained with the company to form, in effect, a fund of savings accumulated from income which had not immediately attracted surtax.
Should the individual wish to avail himself of the use of any part of these savings he could effect this by borrowing from the company, any interest payable by him going to swell the savings fund; and at any time the individual could acquire the whole balance of the fund in the character of capital by putting the company into liquidation.
"(1) What Simon says about one man company can be equally true about the controlled company whose affairs are controlled by a group of persons closely knit and having the same interest.
The question which now arises is, if the impugned section treats the loan received by a shareholder as a dividend paid to him by the company, has the legislature in enacting the section exceeded the limits of the legislative field prescribed by the present Entry 82 in List I.
As we have already noticed, the word "income" in the context must receive a wide interpretation; how wide it should be it is unnecessary to consider, because such an enquiry would be hypothetical.
The question must be decided (1) Simon 's Income tax, 2nd Ed.
3, para 592, p. 341. 921 on the facts of each case.
There must no doubt be some rational connection between the item taxed and the concept of income liberally construed.
If the legislature realises that the private controlled companies generally adopt the device of making advances or giving loans to their shareholders with the object of evading the payment of tax, it can step in to meet this mischief, and in that connection, it has created a fiction by which the amount Ostensibly and nominally advanced to a shareholder as a loan is treated in reality for tax purposes as the payment of dividend to him.
We have already explained how a small number of shareholders controlling a private company adopt this device.
Having regard to the fact that the legislature was aware of such devices, would it not, be competent to the legislature to device a fiction for treating the ostensible loan as the receipt of dividend? In our opinion, it would be difficult to hold that in making the fiction, the legislature has traveled beyond the legislative field assigned to it by entry 82 in List 1.
It is, however, urged by Mr. Pathak that while providing for such a fiction, the legislature should have required the Income tax Officer to consider in each case whether the loan was genuine, or was the result of a device; and he argues that since no such provision has been made and a uniform presumption by fiction is, sought to be raised, the legislature has gone beyond its legislative competence.
In support of this argument, Mr. Pathak has referred to the fact that under section 108(1) of the Commonwealth Income tax Act it is provided that the amount paid to the shareholder by way of advance or loan can be taxed if in the opinion of the Commissioner it represents distributions of income, Such a provision would have made the impugned section valid, Mr. Pathak argues that omission of Parliament to exclude from the operation of section 12(lB) genuine loans or advances, and its failure to distinguish between such loans and advances and loans and advances made as a device shows, that it has acted blindly and must, therefore, be held to have exceeded its legislative power.
We are not inclined to accept this argument.
If the legislature thinks that the advances or loans are in almost every case the result of a device, it would be competent to it to prescribe a fiction and hold that in cases of such advances or loans, tax should be recovered from the shareholder an the basis that he has received the dividend.
Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the impugned section is not beyond the legislative competence of the legislature.
922 Then it is argued by Mr. Pathak that the impugned provision contravenes the appellant 's fundamental rights under article 19(1) (f) & (g) and is not saved by clauses (5) & (6) of the said article.
It is not easy to appreciate this argument.
article 19(1) (f) recognises the right of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property and article 19(1)(g) recognises the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
The impugned provision does not contravene either of these rights.
The shareholder 's right to borrow money from his own company cannot be said to be a fundamental right; besides all that the impugned section does is to provide that if a loan is borrowed by a shareholder from a company to which the said provision applies, it will be deemed to be a receipt by him of the dividend.
This provision does not affect the appellant 's right to borrow money from any other source; and his company from which he borrows does not ordinarily do money lending business.
That is why the restriction imposed by the section cannot be said to be unreasonable at all.
In dealing with the question about the reasonableness of this provision, we cannot also overlook the fact that past transactions were excluded from its operation by the issue of a circular to which we have already referred.
There is no element of unfairness in the fiction, because the other shareholders have deliberately agreed to make the loan or the advance and the shareholder to whom the loan is advanced deliberately takes it with a view to assist the company to evade the payment of tax and to have the benefit of the use of, the amount subject to the payment of interest.
The company receives interest, the shareholder enjoys the use of the money, and in the process the payment of due tax is evaded.
That is the assumption made by the legislature in making this provision.
How can it be urged that either the shareholder who is taxed, or the other shareholders who deliberately make the advance to a colleague of theirs, are unfairly dealt with by the impugned provision.
In our opinion, there is no scope for arguing that the fundamental rights of the shareholder under article 19 (1) (f ) & (g) have been contravened by the impugned provision.
Therefore, we must reject Mr. Pathak 's argument that the impugned provision is invalid on the ground that it contravenes article 19(1)(f) & (g).
There is obviously no scope for suggesting that the impugned provision contravenes article 14; and in fact Mr. Pathak has not raised this point before us.
In that connection, he himself fairly invited our attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in K. M. section Lakshmana Aiyar vs Additional Income tax Officer, Special 923 Circle, Madras, (1) where the challenge to the validity of the impugned section on the ground that it contravened article 14 has been repelled.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Raghubar Dayal J.
I am of opinion that the appeal should be allowed as sections 12 (1B) and 2 (6A) (e), of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, as they stood in 1955, are void.
The two provisions were enacted by Parliament in view of Entry 82, List 1, Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which reads : "Taxes on income other than agricultural income".
It is not disputed that whatever wide connotation the word 'income ' in this Entry may have, the item taxed should really be capable of being considered as income, that there be some rational connection between the item taxed and the concept of "income" and that it is not open to Parliament to choose to tax, as income, an item which in no rational sense can be regarded as income.
It is also not disputed that Parliament can enact a law dealing with the evasion of payment of income tax.
In Navinchandra Mafatlal vs The Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City(1) this Court had to consider the content of the word "income" as used in Entry 54, List 1, Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 (which is identical with Entry 82.
List 1, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution), in determining whether the imposition of a tax under the head "capital gains" by the Central Legislature, was ultra vires.
Section 12 B inserted in the Income tax Act by the Indian Income tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act XXII of 1947) provided for the imposition of a tax on capital gains arising from certain transactions mentioned in the section.
This Court said that "income", according to the dictionary, means "a thing that comes in" and that in the United States of America and Australia, the word "income" was used in a wide sense so as to include "capital gains".
It referred to certain cases of those countries in which a very wide meaning was ascribed to the word "income" as its natural meaning and held that "its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain which is actually received".
In the United States, the word "income" was first defined in Stratton 's Independence vs Howhert(3) decided on December 1, 1913, as "gain derived from capital, from labour, or from both (1) (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829.
(3) L. Ed. 285.
924 combined".
The court had to construe the word "income" as used in section 38 of the Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, which imposed an excise tax "equivalent to one per centum upon the entire net income . received by it from all sources during the year".
In Eisner vs Macomber(1) referred to by this Court in Mafatlal 's case(1), the court had to construe the word "income" as used in the XVI Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which is : "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." and observed, at p. 206: " Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term 'income, ' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the Amendment; and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.
After examining dictionaries in common use we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of August 5, 1909. 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labour, or from both combined, ' provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets.
to which it was applied in the Doyle case Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute of income, essential for a correct solution of the present controversy.
" The definition of "income" given in this case has been followed in the other two cases referred to in Mafatlal 's case(2) ViZ., Merchants ' Loan & Trust Co. vs Smietanka(3) and United States (1)252 U.S. 189=64 L. Ed. 521.
(2) [19551 1 S.C.R. 829.
(3) ; L. Ed. 751.
925 vs Stewart(1), cases which dealt with the taxation of gains from the sale of capital assets.
The question in the Australian case viz., Resch vs The Federal Commissioner of Taxation(1) was about the validity of the provinces in the income tax legislation to the effect that distribution of profits in the course of winding up of a company would be treated on the same footing as the distribution by the company as a going concern.
The provision was held valid as Parliament possessed power to bring to charge in an income tax Act all profits and gains accruing to a tax payer, without distinguishing whether the profit or gain should be regarded as a receipt on capital or on income or revenue account.
The word "income" has been interpreted in a natural sense in these cases and the definition given in Eisner 's case($) is much narrower and limited in content than the widest meaning which is now sought to be given to it by the respondent.
In Mafatlal 's case (4) too, this Court has not given such a wide meaning to the word "income" as to include "anything which comes in" and therefore to include the amount of a loan which may be said to come in the hands of the borrower.
Loans borrowed by a shareholder from the company do not, as such, come within the above general definition of "income".
They do not represent gains from his labour or capital or profits gained through sale of capital assets.
The borrower has to repay them.
If a shareholder is really paid his share of the profits ostensibly as a loan, such a nominal loan but really a share of profits can be taxed as "income" under an appropriate enactment.
We may now consider the nature of what had been taxed in this case and to which objection has been taken on the ground that sections 2 (6A) (e) and 12 ( 1 B) are invalid.
The appellant holds 11 out of 845 shares in a private limited company.
The value of each share is Rs. 100.
In 1955 he took a loan of over Rs. 4,00,000 from the company.
Rs. 2,83,126, the amount of accumulated profits the company had then, have been added to the appellant 's total income for the relevant assessment year, in view of sections 2(6A)(e) and 12(1B) of the Act.
He appellant 's share in the accumulated profits, if distributed as dividend would be 11/845the of Rs. 2,83,126 i.e., Rs. 3,686.
Rs. 2,79,440, the balance, would then be the dividend payable to the other co sharers.
The appellant contends that Rs. 2,79,440 (1) ; = 85 Ed 40 (3) ; L. Ed. 521.
(2) ; (4) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829.
926 is not his income and that Parliament was not competent to enact sections 2 (6A) (e) and 12 ( 1B) which treat it as his "income" from dividend.
Before dealing with the contention, reference may be made to what the impugned sections provide.
Section 2 (6A) (e) defines "dividend", in the circumstances mentioned in that clause, to include any payment by a company of any sum by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, or any payment by any Such company on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits.
Section 12(1B) provides that any such payment to a shareholder made by way of advance or loan in certain circumstances would be treated as dividend received by him in the previous year relevant to the assessment year ending March 31, 1956, if such loan or advance remained outstanding on the first day of such previous year.
Now, the contention for the appellant is that though Parliament can enact a law dealing with evasion of payment of income tax, it cannot tax what is not "income", that the amount in excess of his proportionate share in Rs. 2,83,126, if it had been actually distributed as profits by the company, could not have been his income from dividend, that he could not have evaded payment of income tax on this amount from its being not distributed as dividend and that therefore Parliament could not enact that such excess amount be treated as dividend paid to him and, consequently, as his "income".
The contention has force.
The essence of an amount paid as dividend is that it has to represent the proportionate amount a particular shareholder is to get on the basis of the shares held by him out of the profits of the company set apart for payment of dividend to shareholders.
Any ad hoc payment of money to a shareholder as advance or loan unrelated to his share in the accumulated profits cannot rationally come within the expression "dividend".
I am therefore of opinion that it is not open to the legislature to describe any payment of money by a company to a shareholder by the word "dividend" and then provide that such payment (called dividend) will come within the expression "income" for the purposes of any law enacted by virtue of Entry 82, List 1, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
The definition of "dividend" must have rational connection with the concept of "dividend" in the context of the profits of a company and its distribution amongst shareholders at any time after the profits have been earned.
Clauses (a) to (d) of section 2 (6A) may be said to have such a connection.
927 It is conceivable, and not disputed for the appellant, I that attempts are made by persons to evade payment of income tax and that one mode of such attempts is that companies accumulate profits, do not use them for payment of dividends and later pay the amount to shareholders by way of profits but in the form of advance of moneys or loans to some shareholders who pass on the ratable share of the remaining shareholders and the shareholders thus escape payment of super tax at a higher rate as their receiving such amounts could not be treated as "dividends" and so could not be added to their "income '.
At the same time, it is not disputed for the respondent that there can be genuine cases of loans taken by shareholders from a company when the company was in a position to lend money out of its funds.
In fact, after the enactment of section 2(6A)(e), the Central Board of Revenue issued a Circular directing its officers to intimate to all companies that if loans advanced by them were repaid before June 30, 1955, in a genuine manner, they would not be taken into account in determining the tax liability of the shareholders to whom they had been advanced as it was likely that some companies might have advanced loans to their shareholders as a result of genuine transactions of loans and the idea was not to affect such transactions and not to bring them within the mischief of the new provision.
The provisions of section 2 (6A) (e) take into account all cases of advances or loans made by companies to their shareholders, be they bona fide or be they for the purpose of evading payment of super tax, and make the borrower liable for the tax on even such amount of the loan as be in excess of his proportionate share in the accumulated profits up to the amount of the loan.
Reference may be made to the fact that in other countries too, notice has been taken of attempts to evade payment of income tax by similar devices, and that enactments to defeat the devices have been made by the legislatures of those countries.
We have been referred to section 108 of the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936 53 (of the Commonwealth of Australia) which deals with loans to shareholders.
Its provisions materially differ in one respect from those of the impugned sections.
Only so much of the advances or loans are deemed to be dividends paid by the company as in the opinion of the Commissioner represents distributions of income.
The entire amount of advance of loan is not treated as dividend received by the borrower shareholder.
Imposition of a tax is a restriction on the, right of an assessee 928 to hold property and a particular tax can be justified only as a reasonable restriction on the exercise of that right in the interests of the general public.
The shareholder who takes a loan or advance from a company which possesses accumulated profits is, under the impugned provisions, treated to have received the amount of the loan or advance to the extent of the accumulated profits, as dividend.
As already stated, the amount of profits set apart for dividends is to be proportionately distributed among the various shareholders.
If any enactment provides that certain profits of the company, though not distributed as dividend, be treated as used for the payment of dividends, it should necessarily follow that a particular shareholder be deemed to have received a proportionate amout of such profits as dividend.
It would be unreasonable to provide that a particular shareholder should be deemed to have received an amount in excess of his proportionate share as dividend.
The other shareholders should, in the circum stances, be deemed to have received their proportionate shares of the profits deemed to have been distributed as dividends.
A reasonable law may provide for their assessment as wan on the amount of dividends deemed to have been distributed to them.
It appears to me unreasonable that a particular shareholder who receives a loan or advance from a company be deemed to have received that entire amount as dividend when his proportionate share be much less.
I would, for this reason also, consider the provisions of the impugned sections to amount to imposing unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to hold property under article 19(1)(f).
I would now refer to certain cases on which reliance is placed for the proposition that this Court has held valid laws made to cover attempts for evasion of income tax and that therefore the impugned provisions enacted with the same object to cover attempts to evade payment of super tax should be held valid.
These case are : Mafatlal 's case(1), already referred to; Sardar Baldev Singh vs Commissioner of Income tax, Delhi & Ajmer (2) ; and Balaji vs Income tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle(a).
Mafatlal 's case(1) dealt with the validity of the tax on capital gains under section 12B of the Act.
In that case what was taxed was what had been gained by the assessee as a result of some dealing in capital assets.
The capital gain was to be computed after making certain deductions including the actual cost to the assessee of (1)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 829.
(3) ; (2) ; 929 The capital assets, and did not represent the entire amount that came in as a result of the transaction.
This case is therefore an authority for the simple proposition that the word "income" in Entry 82, List 1, Seventh Schedule 'to the Constitution, has wide connotation and is not to be restricted to have the same content as judicial decisions had given to that word as used in the Act.
"Income", in the Act, has been construed in the context of the scheme of the Act and has been considered to mean generally what one earns mostly in a recurring form from some existing sources.
The profits that one earns from the transfer of a capital asset could be rationally considered, as held by this Court, to be income, as it represented the amount in excess of what the transferor assessee had spent in acquiring that asset.
Baldev Singh 's case(1) was concerned about the validity of the provisions of section 23A of the Act which authorised the Income tax Officer to order in writing that the undistributed portion of the ostensible income of a company calculated as profit therein shall be deemed to have been distributed as dividends amongst the shareholders as at the date of the general meeting aforesaid and that thereupon the proportionate share thereof of each shareholder shall be included in the total income of such shareholder for the purpose of assessing his total income.
The Income tax Officer was to make such an order only when he was satisfied that the profits and gains distributed as dividends by any company up to the end of the sixth month after its accounts for the previous year are laid before the company in general meeting, were less than 60% of the assessable income of the company and that payment of a larger dividend would not be unreasonable keeping in view the losses incurred by the company in the earlier years and of the smallness of the profits made.
It will be noticed that the order of the Income tax Officer could not be to the effect that the undistributed profits would be deemed to be the dividend paid to any particular shareholder or shareholders but could be to the effect that they were distributed as dividends amongst all the shareholders.
The validity of this provision was not questioned in the case.
What was questioned in the case was that the proportionate share of Baldev Singh, assessee, in such undistributed profits, could not be added to his total income of the particular year to which it was added.
It was held that in view of the deeming provision with respect to the distribution of profits as dividends amongst shareholders, the proportionate share of the dividends would be deemed to be (1) [1961]1 S.C.R. 482. 930 income of the assessee and that therefore, when it was not taxed, would be deemed to have escaped assessment for the purposes of section 34 of the Act.
The case is distinguishable on several grounds.
One is that the Income tax Officer is to make the order when he is satisfied that a larger dividend could have been justifiably distributed, a view necessarily leading to the inference that a lower dividend was distributed in order to escape payment of super tax by shareholders liable to pay such tax.
The other is that the Income tax Officer was given power to make the order only when profits less than 60% of the assessable income were distributed as dividend.
This indicates that the company could accumulate profits up to 40% of the assessable income for reasons which would be deemed to be genuine.
This should lead to the inference that the accumulation of profits with respect to which no action has been taken under section 23A was justified and that therefore if in case a company could spare the money to advance to a shareholder for his needs, that alone should not lead to the inference that the advance was made to evade the payment of super tax by the shareholder.
The third point of distinction, and of signi ficance, is that no individual shareholder is made liable for tax on an amount of the undistributed profits in excess of his proportionate share in those profits.
The shareholder is not thereby prejudiced.
His income is increased by an amount which he could have legitimately got from the company if the persons in control had acted reasonably and had retained such profits undistributed as were necessary for the purposes of the company.
Another objection taken in Baldev Singh 's case(1) was about the constitutionality of section 23A on the ground that it purports to tax the shareholders on the income of the company in which they held shares, especially when it does not give a right to the shareholders to realise from the company the dividend which by the order is deemed to have been paid to them.
The section was held to be constitutionally valid as it was enacted for preventing evasion of tax in view of the conditions of its applicability.
In the circumstances of the cases covered by section 23A, there was a reasonable connection between the amount deemed to be distributed as dividend and the possible attempt for evading payment of super tax.
The assessee could not have been prejudiced if the persons in control of the management of the company had acted reasonably or actually distributed that amount as profits subsequent to the order of the Income tax Officer.
(1) ; 931 In Balaji 's case(1), the validity of section 16(3) (a), clauses (i) and (ii), came up for consideration.
These clauses provide that in computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment there shall be included so much of the income of his wife or minor child as arises directly or indirectly from the membership of the wife in a firm of which her husband is a partner or from the admission of the minor to the benefits of partnership in a firm of which such individual is partner.
These provisions were held valid.
The Court left open the question whether A could be taxed on the income of B and formulated the question for decision as whether section 16(3) (a), clauses (i) and (ii), is a provision made by the Legislature to prevent evasion of tax and answered it in the affirmative, as the husband or the father could nominally take his wife or minor child, in partnership with him, so that the tax burden may be lightened and as this device enabled the assessee to secure the entire income of the business and yet evade income tax which he would otherwise have been liable to pay.
It was said at p. 999: "The scope of the provisions is limited only to a few of the intimate members of a family who ordinarily are under the protection of the assessee and are defendants of him.
The persona selected by the provisions, namely, wife and minor children, cannot also be ordi narily expected to carry on their business independently with their own funds when the husband or the father is alive and when they are under his protection.
" It is therefore clear that the basis for holding section 16(3) (a), clauses (i) and (ii), valid was that in effect the husband or the father was the real person who ran the firm and that the others were made partners nominally and therefore the partnership was not genuine.
In this view, there could be no question of the provisions affecting the husband or the father prejudicially or including in his income amounts which were not his income.
This, however, cannot be said in the present case or in cases which come within the purview of the impugned sections.
In dealing with the contention that the provisions of section 16 (3) (a), clauses (i) and (ii), contravened article 14 of the Constitution, it was said at p. 991 : "We have held that the object of the legislation was to prevent evasion of tax.
A similar device would not ordinarily be resorted to by individuals by entering (1) [1962) 2 S.C.R. 983.
1/65 932 into partnership with persons other than those mentioned in the sub section, as it would involve a risk of the third party turning round and asserting his own rights.
The Legislature, therefore, selected for the purpose of classification only that group of persons who in fact are used as a cloak to perpetrate fraud on taxation.
" Such a risk is always involved in a company making payments as advances or loans to a shareholder when it possesses accumulated profits as the other shareholders run the risk of not getting their proportionate share of profits which they would have got if they had been really distributed as dividends.
This consideration, again, points to the conclusion that the probability of such an advance or loan being genuine would be dependent not so much on the existence of accumulated profits but on the number of shareholders in the company and the proportion of the number of shares the borrower has to the total number of shares held by the shareholders of the company.
The lesser the proportion, the greater is the chance of the advance or loan being genuine, as there would in that case be greater risk of the other shareholders losing their share in the profits deemed to be distributed as dividends.
I am therefore of opinion that the impugned sections viz., sections 2(6A) (e) and 12(1B) of the Act are void and that this appeal should be allowed.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The assessee was a share holder in a private limited company whose ordinary business was not money lending business.
He took a loan amounting to over Rs. 4 lakhs from a company.
The Income tax Officer computed the assessee 's income at Rs. 3 lakhs and odd, under section 12(1B) read with section 2 (6A) (e) of the Income tax Act, 1922.
That amount included a sum of over Rs. 2 lakhs representing the accumulated profits of the company.
The assessee 's share in the accumulated profits, if distributed as dividend, would be an amount proportionate to the number of shares held by him.
He therefore contended, that the balance of the accumulated profits was not his income and that the Legislature was not competent to enact the two sections according to which that amount was also treated as his income.
His writ petition in the High Court challenging.
the constitutional validity of the two sections was dismissed.
He appealed to the Supreme Court.
HELD (Per Gajendragadkar, C. J., Wanchoo, Hidayatullah and Mudholkar JJ.) : (i) The sections are not beyond the legislative competence of Parliament.
The companies to which section 12(1B) applies are companies in which at least 75% of the voting power lies in the hands of persons other than the public.
They are controlled by a group of persons allied together and having the same interest.
The controlling group can determine whether the profits made by the company should be distributed as dividends or not.
When they deliberately refused to distribute the accumulated profits as dividends but adopted the device of advancing the profits by way of loan to one of the shareholders, it was with the object of evading the payment of tax by the company on the accumulated profits.
Section 12(1B) provides that if a controlled company adopts the device of making a loan to one of its shareholders, he will be deemed to have received the amount out of the accumulated profits as dividend and would be liable to pay tax on his income.
The word "income" in Entry 82 in List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution must receive a wide interpretation depending on the facts of each case.
Having regard to the fact that the Legislature was aware of the devices to evade tax, it would be within its competence to devise a fiction for treating an ostensible loan as the receipt of the dividend.
[919 A H. 920 H; 921 C D] (ii) The absence of a provision enabling the income tax officer to consider in each case whether the loan was genuine or the result of a device does not make the section go beyond the competence of the Legislature.
[921 D E] If the Legislature thought that in almost every case the advances or loans were the result of a device to evade tax, it would be competent to 910 it to prescribe a fiction and hold that in cases of such advances or loans, tax should be recovered from the shareholder on the basis that he had received a dividend.
[921 G H] (iii) Section 12(lB) does,not impose an unreasonable restriction on the appellant 's fundamental rights under article 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution.
[922 A] The section does not affect the appellant 's right to borrow money.
There is no element of unfairness, because the other shareholders have deliberately agreed to make the loan or the advance and the shareholder to whom the loan is advanced deliberately takes it with a view to assist the company to evade the payment of tax and to have the benefit of the use of the amount subject to the payment of interest.
The company receives interest, the shareholder enjoys the use of the money and in the process the payment of tax is evaded.
Further, past transactions were excluded from the operation of the sections by the issue of a circular by the Central Board of Revenue.
[922 B F] Per Raghubar Dayal J. (dissenting) : (i) Sections 2(6A) (e) and 12(lB) of the Income tax Act, 1922 as they stood in 1955 are void.
[923 B] It is not open 'to the Legislature to describe any payment of money by a company to a shareholder by the word "dividend" and then provide that such payment will come within the expression "income" in item 82, List I of Schedule 7.
The definition of dividend must have a rational connection with concept of dividend in the context of the profits of the company and its distribution amongst the shareholders.
The essence of an amount paid as dividend is that it has to represent the proportionate amount a particular shareholder is to get on the basis of the shares held by him out of the profits of the company set apart for payment of dividend to shareholders.
Any ad hoc payment of money to a shareholder as advance or loan unrelated to his share in the accumulated profits cannot rationally come within the expression dividend.
[926 E H] (ii) The provisions of the impugned sections impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to hold property under article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
[928 E] If any enactment provides that certain profits of the company, though not distributed as dividend, be treated as used for the payment of dividends it should necessarily follow that a particular shareholder be deemed to have received a proportionate amount of such profits.
It would be unreasonable to provide that a particular shareholder should be deemed to have received an amount in excess of his proportionate share as dividend.
It is unreasonable that a particular shareholder who receives a loan or advance from a company be deemed to have received that entire amount as dividend when his proportionate share would be much less.
[928 B E] Navinchandra Mafatlal vs Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829, Sardar Baldev Singh vs Commissioner of Income tar, Delhi and Agra [1961] 1 S.C.R. 482 and Balaji vs Income tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle, ; , referred to.


judgement:
Appeal No. 954 of 1963.
On appeal.
from the judgment and decree dated March 9, 1964, of the Allahabad High Court in Income tax Miscellaneous Case No. 143 of 1954.
991 K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Z. section Meeratwal, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad holding that the Income tax Officer, in the circumstances of the case, went wrong in initiating proceedings under section 34(1) of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, in respect of the assessment year 1942 43.
The facts may briefly be stated.
The assessee was a holder of an impartible estate in the district of Ajmer.
On March 25, 1944, the Income tax Officer assessed him to income tax for the year 1942 43.
On April 5, 1945, on the ground that two items of the assessee 's income, namely, s year (forest) income and interest income, were not included in the original assessment, a notice under section 34 of the Act was issued to him.
In response to the said notice, the assessee filed a return wherein he disclosed fully and completely the particulars of his interest income, but raised the plea that his forest income was not taxable.
The Income tax Officer, by his order dated July 12, 1945, made a revised assessment including both the incomes.
The respondent eventually,took the matter on appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, which, by it , order dated April 25, 1949, held that the Income tax Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 34 of the Act in respect of the forest income on the ground that the Income tax Officer had knowledge that the assessee had such income when he made the original assessment.
Though the Tribunal only dealt with the question of forest income, by inadvertence or by mistake, it set aside the entire order of reassessment dated July 12, 1945, made by the Income tax Officer and restored the original order passed by him.
The Income tax Department did not take any steps to rectify the mistake under section 35 of the Act or make any attempt to have the question of the illegality referred to the High Court.
Having allowed the order to become final, on January 3, 1950, the Income tax Officer after obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner initiated proceedings under section 34 of the Act with respect to the interest income.
On January 19, 1950, the Income tax Officer issued to the assessee a fresh notice under the said section.
On September 25, 1950, a 992 revised assessment order was made in regard to the assessment year 1942 43 in which the respondent 's interest income was also included.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the said order.
On further appeal, the 'Income tax Appellate Tribunal held that since the assessee had failed to disclose his interest income in the return filed by him under section 22(2) of the Act in connection with the original assessment the said income had escaped assessment and, therefore, the provisions of section 34 (1 ) (a) of the Act were attracted.
On application filed by the assessee, the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court under section 66(1) of the Act: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the provisions of section 34(1) were applicable in respect of the assessment year 1942 43 on 19th January, 1950, when the notice under that provision was issued for the purpose of assessing the escaped interest income." The High Court came to the conclusion that the Tribunal in its order dated April 25, 1949, committed a clear error in setting aside the assessment of tax on the interest income without going ,into the correctness of the imposition of tax thereon, but that order had become final; it further held that the said order ,did not invalidate the entire proceedings taken under section 34 of the Act and, therefore, the Income tax Officer could not take proceedings afresh under section 34 of the Act.
In the result the High Court answered the question in the negative.
Hence the appeal.
Mr. Rajagopala Sastri, learned counsel for the Revenue, con tended that the interest income had escaped assessment and, therefore, the Income tax Officer was competent to initiate proceedings under section 34(1) (a) of the Act for assessing the same.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that the assessment made by the Income tax Officer pursuant to the notice issued under section 34 of the Act was in its entirety set aside by the Tribunal on the ground that there was no "discovery" within the meaning of section 34 of the Act and that order had become final and, therefore, the Income tax Officer could not initiate fresh proceedings under that section on the ,principle of res judicata.
To appreciate the contentions of the parties it is necessary to ,notice the scope of the order of the Tribunal dated April 25, 1949.
Before the Appellate Tribunal it was contended on behalf of the assessee that the Income tax Officer who issued the said notice had 993 no definite information which led to the discovery that the said income had escaped assessment within the meaning of the said section.
Adverting to the said argument the Tribunal observed: "We do not agree with the contention of the department that the Income tax Officer who made the original assessment did not apply his mind to this fact, as there is no evidence to show that at the material time such income was considered taxable by the Department.
Ordinarily one would expect that when an Income tax Officer makes the assessment he does according to law and on the facts as produced before him.
If the fact is before him he refused to take it into account thinking that it was immaterial or even inadvertently takes no notice of it, it cannot be said that the Income tax Officer came in possession of a definite information within the meaning of section 34.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that proceedings.
under section 34 could not be initiated against the assessee for the four assessment years under reference.
The orders passed by the Income tax Officer in respect of these four years are therefore set aside and the original orders under section 23(3) are restored.
" We have extracted the order in extenso as the argument really turns upon the scope of the said order.
The Appellate Tribunal in considering the validity of the notice under section 34 of the Act only discussed the question of the escape of the year income; it did not advert to the interest income at all.
It came to the conclusion, having regard to the fact that the Income tax Officer at the time he made the original assessment had knowledge of the existence of the syar income, that the Income tax Officer did not come into possession of definite information within the meaning of section 34 of the Act.
Though the finding was arrived at on the basis of the syar income alone the Tribunal set aside the entire order of reassessment and restored the original order of assessment made by the Income tax Officer under section 23 (3) of the Act.
The legal effect of the order was that the are assessment of the entire income, including the syar income and interest income, was set aside on the ground that the Income tax Officer did not come into possession of definite information leading to a "discovery" and, therefore, he could not initiate proceedings under section 34 of the Act.
It is true that the Tribunal had committed a mistake in setting aside the reassessment order in respect of the interest income 994 also; but, so long as that order stands, it comprehends both the incomes.
The Income tax Officer did not take any further proceedings by way of reference to the High Court on any question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal; nor did he take any proceedings under section 35 of the Act to have the order corrected on the ground of mistake.
With the result the order has become final.
The question, therefore, is not whether the order of the Tribunal in so far as it related to the interest income was made by inadvertence or under a mistake, but whether the Income tax Officer could initiate proceedings over again under section 34 of the Act in derogation of the finding given by the Tribunal that the Income tax Officer did not "discover" that the income had escaped assessment.
The Income tax Act is a self contained one.
It creates a hierarchy of tribunals with original, appellate and revisional jurisdictions.
Section 31 gives, inter alia, right of appeal against some orders of the Income tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner; section 33 provides for a further appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal; and sub section
(6) of section 33 says that save as provided in section 66 orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal shall be final.
Section 66 provides for reference to the High Court on a question of law; and section 66 A provides for appeals in certain cases to the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the said provisions that the order of the Tribunal made within its jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of section 66 of the Act, is final.
Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the subject matter under appeal before it is final and cannot be reopened by the assessee or the Department.
The Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income tar, Bombay & Aden vs Khemchand Ramdas(1) succinctly stated the legal position thus : "But it is not true that after a final assessment under those sections (sections 23 and 29) has been made, the Income tax Officer can go on making fresh computations and issuing fresh notices of demand to the end of all time. .
But when once a final assessment is arrived at, it cannot in Their Lordships ' opinion be reopened except in the circumstances detailed in (1) , 424, 426.
995 Sections 34 and 35 of the Act and within the time limited by those sections.
" Later on the same idea is restated thus "In Their Lordships opinion the provisions of the two sections are exhaustive, and prescribe the only circumstances in which and the only time within which such fresh assessments can be made and fresh notices of demand can be issued.
" The Judicial Committee again in Commissioner of Income tax, West Punjab vs The Tribune Trust, Lahore(1), after noticing the relevant sections of the Act, reaffirmed the same position and held that assessments once made would be valid and effective until they were set aside in the manner prescribed by the Act and that, if not so set aside, they were final.
If so, it follows that the order of the Tribunal on the said question, namely, that the whole order of reassessment under section 34 of the Act was invalid as there was no "discovery" that the relevant income escaped assessment, had become final.
The only two sections that enable the Income tax Officer to reopen final assessments are sections 34 and 35.
If the Appellate Tribunal committed a mistake, under section 35 it can be rectified within four years from the date of the order.
In the present case it was a clear case of mistake, for the Tribunal set aside the order of reassessment in respect of the interest income, though its validity to that extent was not disputed.
But, for one reason or other, the Revenue did not resort to the obvious remedy and allowed the mistake to remain uncorrected.
In the se circumstances, can section 34 of the Act be resorted to ? Learned counsel for the Revenue says that section 34(1) (a), as amended in 1948, confers such a power on the Income tax Officer.
The material part of section 34, before amendment, read: "(1) If in consequence of definite information which has come, into his possession the Income tax Officer discovers that income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment in any year Section 34 (1 ) (a), as amended in 1948, reads : "If the Income tax Officer has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of in assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year.
(1) 996 income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment for that year. he may in cases falling under clause (a) at any time. . . . serve on the assessee a notice. . . " It is said that the words "has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income profits or gains chargeable to income tax have escaped assessment" are more comprehensive than the words "the Income tax Officer discovers that income etc., have escaped assessment in any year" and, therefore, though there was a finding by the Tribunal that the Income tax Officer did not "discover" that there was escape of assessment,.
the Income tax Officer under the amended section 34 can initiate proceedings in spite of that finding.
We cannot accept this argument.
It could not have been the intention of the Legislature by amending the section to enable the Income tax Officer to reopen final decisions made against the Revenue in respect of questions that directly arose for decision in earlier proceedings.
The Tribunal held in the earlier proceedings that the Income tax Officer knew all the facts at the time he made the original assessment in regard to the income he later on sought to tax.
The said finding necessarily implies that the Income tax Officer had no reason to believe that because of the 'assessee 's failure to disclose the facts income has escaped assessment.
The earlier finding is comprehensive enough to negative "any such reason" on the part of the Income, tax Officer.
That finding is binding on him.
He could not on the same facts reopen the proceedings on the ground that he had new information.
If he did so, it would be a clear attempt to circumvent the said order, which had become final.
We are not concerned in this appeal with a case where the Income tax Officer got new information which he did not have at the time when the Tribunal made the order.
The finding of the Tribunal is, therefore, binding on the Income Officer and he cannot, in the circumstances of the case, reopen the assessment and initiate proceedings over again.
If that was not the legal position, we would be placing an unrestricted power of review in the hands of an Income tax Officer to go behind the findings given by a hierarchy of tribunals and even those of the High Court and the Supreme Court with his changing moods.
The decisions: cited by the learned counsel for the Revenue do not countenance such a contention.
Chakraverti C.J., in 997 R. K. Das & Co. vs Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal(1), speaking for the Division Bench, only decided that the Income tax Officer could not make a reassessment unless he issued the prescribed notice and issued it in a valid form.
As the notice under section 34 of the Act issued therein was held to be bad inasmuch as the Income tax Officer did not take the sanction of the Commissioner, the learned Chief Justice held that the returns filed pursuant to such notice was also bad.
We are not here concerned with that aspect of the case.
The judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income tax, Bihar & Orissa vs Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur of Gidhaur(2) held that, as the earlier notice issued under section 34(1) of the Act without the sanction of the Commissioner was bad, the entire proceedings for are assessment were illegal.
There was an observation 'at the end of the judgment to the effect that "there was time enough for fresh notices to have been issued, and we fail to see why the old notices were not recalled and fresh ones issued".
The point now raised before us, viz., how far and to what extent a final order made in earlier proceedings under section 34 of the Act would be binding on the Income tax Officer in subsequent proceedings under the said section was neither raised nor decided in that case.
The said decisions, therefore, have no bearing an the question raised before us.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it is correct.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The Income tax Officer issued a notice to the assessee under section 34 on the ground that two items of the assessee 's income, namely forest income and interest income, were not included in the original assessment for the year 1942 43.
In response the assessee filed a return fully disclosing his interest income but raised the plea that his forest income was not taxable.
The, Income tax Officer however, assessed both items to tax.
On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal in its order dated April 25, 1961, although dealing only with the forest income and holding that the Income tax Officer had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 34 in respect of such income, by inadvertence or by mistake, set aside the entire order of reassessment both in respect of forest income, as well as the interest income.
The Department did not take any steps to rectify the mistake under section 35 or to have the question of illegality referred to the High Court.
Having allowed the order of the Tribunal to become final, the Income tax Officer initiated fresh proceedings under section 34 in respect of the interest income and made a revised assessment order which included this income.
The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the assessment but the High Court, on a reference to it under section 66(1), took the view that fresh proceedings under section 24 could not be taken for the reason, inter alia, that the Tribunal 's order dated April 25, 1949 had become final.
HELD : The Tribunal had committed a mistake in setting aside the reassessment order in respect of interest income also, but the income tax Officer did not resort to the obvious remedy of having the mistake rectified as provided for under section 35 and allowed the Tribunal 's order dated April 25, 1949 to become final.
He could not in the circumstances, reopen the assessment by initiating proceedings under section 34, as otherwise there would be an unrestricted power of review in the hands of the Income tax Officer to go behind the findings of a hierarchy of Tribunals and Courts.
[995 E F; 996 F H] C.I.T. Bombay and Aden vs Khemchand Ramdas, (1938)6 I.T.R. 414 and C.I.T. West Punjab vs The Tribune Trust, Lahore, (1948)16 I.T.R. 214, referred to.
R. K. Das & Co. vs C.I.T., West Bengal, (1956)30 I.T.R. 439 and C.I.T., Bihar & Orissa vs Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur of Gidhaur, distinguished.