judgement:
tion (Civil) No. 339 of 1986.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) S.P. Pandey and Mrs Rekha Pandey for the Petitioner.
J.R Dass, D.K Sinha, D Goburdhan and R.K. Mehta for the Respondent.
PG NO 308 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
A letter addressed to the learned Chief Justice of this Court from two citizens of Patna in regard to the Mental Hospital at Kanke near Ranchi in Bihar State was considered as a public interest litigation and registered as an application under Article 32 of the Constitution.
On 7.4.1986, this Court called upon the State of Bihar to file its counter affidavit and the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Ranchi or any other Judicial Magistrate nominated by him to visit the hospital and submit a report about the conditions prevailing in the Hospital.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate visited the hospital on 8.6.1986, and on several other occasions thereafter and submitted a detailed report on 15th of July, 1986.
He found that there were 1580 beds.
The Hospital was in the sole management of the Health Department of the State of Bihar.
The State received financial contributions from West Bengal and Orissa.
There is a Managing Committee of the Hospital consisting of 14 members in all with the Commissioner of South Chotanagpur Division as its Chairman.
The sanctioned strength of medical officers was 16 but only 9 had been filled up and there were 7 vacancies.
In the Hospital the male patients wing had 10 blocks in all, apart from the Isolation Ward, the Medical Ward and the Infirmary Ward.
These are in 10 double storied blocks and three single storied wards in charge of separate doctors.
The female patients ' unit consisted of two double storied and two single storied blocks.
Each block had the capacity of 120 patients.
Some of the patients had to pay for their treatment while the treatment to the general category was intended to be free.
All the three residential quarters within the complex meant for the medical officers were occupied by others, one by the suspended Superintendent, the other by the retired Superintendent and the third one was by the Acting Superintendent.
Three doctors were residing in the quarters meant for non gazetted officers and the remaining doctors were staying in private houses at Ranchi about 11 kilometers away.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate found that there was acute shortage of water in the Hospital.
There was only one tubewell within the campus located in the male block.
There were five ordinary wells but there was no motor pumps installed in any one of them.
These wells were the only source of supply of water.
Several representations had been made to the State Government for supplying water on permanent basis to the Hospital but there was no response from the Government.
PG NO 309 The Chief Judicial Magistrate was surprised that none of the toilets within the hospital complex was in order.
The sanitary fittings were not operating having got chocked.
The patients were, therefor, forced to ease themselves in the adjacent open field.
Consequently the environment had become polluted and unhygienic.
Though there were fan points and even electric fans were hanging from the roof in some places, no fan excepting the one in the chamber of the Superintendent was in working condition.
He also found that though there were electric connections with bulbs and tubes yet light was not available and, therefore, total darkness prevailed in the campus between dusk and dawn.
The Superintendent explained to the Chief Judicial Magistrate that the Hospital had no electrician and the Institution had to depend upon the mercy of the State Electricity Board and despite correspondence there was no response.
He found that old iron cots had been provided in the year 1925 and only 300 more had been added by purchase.
The total number of patients were 1580.
Most of the iron cots having been broken were out of use and, therefore, only 300 beds were actually available.
None of the wards had doors and windows in working condition.
The Superintendent pointed to him that he had made repeated requests to the Public Works Department of the State Government but no letter had even been acknowledged.
In the absence of device to close the doors and windows there had been occasions when mentally ill patients had jumped through the windows or had run out from the rooms.
To meet such situations, the broken cots were mostly used to block the passages.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate further found that the mattresses and linen were in very bad shape, he noticed several patients to be lying on the bare floor; some of the patients were using a single blanket both as mattress and cover.
Some patients were naked in the absence of clothing and others were found wearing torn shirts and pants.
Mosquito nets were not available pillows were not provided and the patients were left to their fate.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate noticed marks of buy bitings as also mosquito biting on the body of the patients.
In the absence of clothing the patients were forced to wear the same shirt and pant for four to six weeks without a wash on account of unavailabiliy of water.
The Superintendent told the Chief Judicial Magistrate that Government of Bihar had sanctioned Rs. 3 a day per patient for the two meals and breakfast and it was wholly inadequate.
The Managing Committee had recommended for sanction of Rs. 10 per patient per day but PG NO 310 there had been no response.
The diet as prescribed included an egg, 250 gms.
of milk every day and meat and fish, once in a week, but in the absence of appropriate funds those had been discontinued for years.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate having visited the place on several occasions noticed that there was no account of the stock of medicines; life saving drugs were not stored properly in the absence of a refrigerator.
The instruments were not in working condition and the employees meant for working the instruments were idlying away their time.
The patients were now referred to Medical College Hospital at Ranchi for X ray and E.C.G. as and when necessary.
Many of the patients told the Chief Judicial Magistrate that they had not been getting any medicine for months together.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate had noticed that several doctors were not available in the Hospital for days together.
Some of the patients in the wards complaind to him that the doctor was not visiting the ward even for one hour in a week; he carne across a weak and emaciated patient who told him that he had not been given any food for two days on the plea that he was suffering from diarrhoea and he had not even been given any treatment. C)n the 11th of July, 1980, when he visited the Hospital along with the local Additional District Magistrate? he found not a single doctor on duty though that was the time when all the doctors, were supposed to be on duty within the campus.
Though this was the actual position.
the attendance register showed all the doctors to be present as required according to the duty chart .
The Chief Judicial Magistrate collected the death rate from the Superintendent for the period between 1977 and 1986 which are as per the particulars given below: Year Male Female Total 1977 38 11 49 1978 72 12 84 1979 74 31 l05 1980 66 24 90 1981 39 33 172 PG NO 311 1982 173 50 231 1983 87 44 131 1984 152 94 246 1985 90 69 159 From 1 1 1986 30 6 1986 49 25 74 In Paragraph 28 of the Report the Chief Judicial Magistrate stated: "This chart clearly shows abrupt rise in the graph of death rate after 1980.
1984 was the most unfortunate year for Arogyashala, when maximum escapes and deaths took place.
Mass scale escapes and deaths of patients in 1984 is said to be the result of internal politics in the Arogyashala campus, for which, the then Superintendent and Dr. Durga Bhagat and Deputy Superintendent.
Dr. B.B. Singh are said to be largely responsible.
" The Magistrate further reported that the present acting Superintendent had failed to improve the administration.
He lacked adequate control over his colleagues and the staff.
The out going Superintendent residing within the campus was inciting the people and the acting Superintendent was gradually losing his grip and control over the administration.
The innocent, miserable and vioceless patients were the victims of the situation.
The practice prevailing in the Hospital had been that the Superintendent alone was competent to admit patients and as such the guardians and attendants of the patients seeking admission into the Hospital had been exploited by a group of persons friendly with the Superintendent and those who did not come to terms with the Superintendent had been denied the benefits of the Hospital.
This led to friction and unpleasant relationship.
He recommended that a non medical man, if possible, a retired army officer or a District Judge could be posted as the head of the Hospital to take control and tone up the deteriorating situation.
He found that a large garden was attached to the Hospital but on account of the all pervading mismanagement there was no return but one Dr. Buxy had recently been put in charge of the garden and had improved the same.
Last of all in his report he adverted to the fact that some petients who had recovered and their number he found was about 300, being both men and women were not in a position either to return to their take to any employment in the absence of any facility.
He found that these persons who PG NO 312 no more required treatment should be removed from the Hospital so that there would be room available for patients who required treatment; unnecessary expenditure on such large number of people could be avoided and the standard of discipline within the Institution could be improved and there could be a general toning up of the atmosphere.
Along with the report he gave various relevant details in the annexures.
Annexure 11 is a list of criminal patients who had come from different jails for treatment and had been declared fit for discharge.
We may refer to the cue of one Rupa Santhal.
This person was admitted to the Hospital on 28.9.1947 at the instance of the Superintendent of Chittagang Hill Tract Jail, where on being convicted by the Deputy Commissioner of Chittagang Hill Tract for an offence punishable under Section 326 IPC, he had been imprisoned for undergoing the sentence.
Obviously he could not have been detained in jail for 41 years for the offence under Section 326 IPC.
Several letters were sent from the Hospital but there was no response.
We may also refer to the case of Madhu Mahanta who was admitted to the Hospital on 15.11.1950 at the instance of the Superintendent, District Jail, Keonjhar in the State of Orissa.
He had been convicted under Section 302 IPC and was languishing in the Hospital for 36 years though he had been cured several years back.
The Magistrate has given a list of 13 persons of this category.
We are astonished that even when prisoners are transferred for treatment from jails where they were undergoing sentences of imprisonment, no follow up action has been taken from the jails on their own and even when the Hospital authorities had required the prisoners to be taken back no response has been made.
This only exhibits total callousness.
We have given sumptuous extracts from the report of the Chief Judicial Magistrate with a view to bringing out as clear a picture as possible of the shocking and savage conditions that prevail in the mental hospital.
There can be no two opinion that the hospital was in a shape a shade worse than Oliver Twist 's Orphanage.
From all accounts, perhaps.
many of zoos housing animals have better conditions than those that prevail in this hospital.
While the mentally ill require a soothing environment for treatment, as psychatrists say, the State of Bihar as converted what was once a prestigious mental hospital Into a den to house about sixteen hundred patients.
The reports of the Chief Judicial Magistrate gives the reader the feeling of a medieval torture house.
On 11.8.1986, the Court noticed the report and observed: PG NO 313 "The report makes a painful reading and shows how badly is this institution managed and in what in human condition the patients are made to live & work there.
It is surprising that the State of Bihar has allowed this institution to de generate into the present condition.
It is necessary that immediate steps should be taken to improve the functioning of this institution in all respects.
We would therefore direct the Chief Secretary and Health Secretary to the Government of Bihar to file affidavit or affidavits putting forth a definite scheme for improving the working of the Institution and for remedying the drawbacks and deficien cies pointed out in the report, including the neglect of patients by the Medical Superintendent attached to the Institution.
This matter must have urgent priority since it concerns the well being of the mentally handicapped.
We would therefore direct that the affidavit be filed within three weeks from today setting out a time bound programme for improving the functioning of the Institution.
We would like to observe that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has made an excellent job of the task assigned to him and we express our sense of appreciation for the work done by him.
These observations may be sent to the High Court of Patna and the Chief Judicial Magistrate".
On 1.9.1986, the Health Secretary filed a short affidavit together with a scheme for the improvement of the Hospital.
The opening words of the scheme have to be quoted to be believed: "The Government of Bihar are aware of the conditions prevailing in the Mansik Arogyashala, Kanke, and the Government for sometime in past have been discussing measures to be taken for improvement of the same.
The subject was discussed by the representatives of the State of Bihar with the members of the Planning Commission at a meeting held at New Delhi in the month of january, 1986, and accordingly it is contemplated to develop the Mansik Arogyashala, Ranchi on the lines of NIMHANS in Bangalore The scheme indicated that a letter had been written to the Director, NIMHANS at Bangalore for information on 17th of April, 1986, i.e. 4 1/2 months before the scheme was filed PG NO 314 in this Court.
There is no indication as to what was received from the Director or as to what further follow up action was taken during the 4 1/2 months.
The scheme indicated that out of 16 sanctioned posts three posts were earmarked for West Bengal Government and were vacant; out of 13 posts, 9 had been filled up and 4 were vacant and were to be filled up by October, 1986.
The scheme admitted with reference to the water supply system that the internal system was choked and was not functioning.
In the year 1985 86, Rs.10 lakhs had been sanctioned for renovation of water supply system and the Public Health Engineering Department could utilise only Rs.61,000 during the financial year; therefore, the balance amount of Rs.9,39,000 was again to be sanctioned in the year 1986 87.
The lavatories and bathrooms were not in working condition as accepted and the scheme proposed that the Superintendent of the Hospital is to supervise the sanitary system.
In regard to electricity it was indicated that the electric fittings, fixtures and other equipments would be replaced by March, 1987 which meant six months beyond the date when the scheme was framed.
It was proposed that a 100 KV Generator set was to be installed.
In regard to cots and mattresses it was stated that 400 of them would be acquired in the year 1986 87 and the remainder in the year 1987 88.
It was stated that the doors and windows required total replacement and it was indicated that Rupees six lakhs were sanetioned during the financial year for repair work.
In regard to diet it was indicated in the scheme: "In the State of Bihar, the rate of the diet per patient for the hospital is Rs.3.00 per day except the T.B. patient to whom the rate of diet is Rs.4.15 per day.
In the year 1986 87, rate of diet per patient has been increased to Rs.3.55.
The Superintendent of Kanke hospital has been directed to improve dietary management".
It was admitted that E.C.G. machine was out of order and efforts would be made to instal the machine in the financial year.
It was also proposed in the scheme that there would be a regular Superintendent posted soon.
In regard to supply of medicines it was stated that the prescribed rate was Rs.1.00 per patient per day and it has been increased to Rs.1.90 per patient per day from 1986.
PG NO 315 On 20th of October, 1986, this Court made the following order: "1.
In respect of each patient in the Ranchi Mansik Arogayashala the daily allocation for diet will be increased from the existing inadequate articles of that value shall be supplied to each patient.
Arrangements should be made forthwith to supply adequate quantity of pure drinking water to the hospital, if necessary, by engaging water tankers to transport potable water from outside.
Immediate arrangements should be made for the restoration of proper sanitary conditions in the lavoratories and bathrooms of the hospital.
All patients in the hospital who are not at present having mattresses and blankets should be immediately supplied the same within 15 days from today.
Such of the patients who have not been given cots should also be provided cots within six weeks from today so that no patient shall be thereafter without a cot.
The ceiling limit at present invogue in respect of cost of medicines allowable for each patient will stand removed, with immediate effect and the patients will be supplied medecines according to the prescription made by the doctors irrespective of the costs.
The State Government shall forthwith take steps to appoint a qualified Psychiatrist and a Medical Superintendent for the hospital and they should be posted and takecharge in the Institution within six weeks from today.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi to whom a copy of this order will be forwarded by the Registry shall visit the hospital once in 3 weeks and submit quarterly reports to this Court as to whether the aforesaid directions given by us are being complied with.
" On 20th of November, 1986, the Health Secretary gave a report as to programme relating to aspects covered by the scheme.
It indicated that no reply had been received from NIMHANS and therefore, an officer had been sent from Bihar PG NO 316 to obtain the information.
The medical officers against the vacant posts had been posted; water supply and electricity were yet to be attended to.
The repair to the building was in progress and other aspects were yet to be attended.
A Superintendent in the rank of Civil Surgeon had been posted.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate furnished a further report in December, 1986.
While he noticed certain improvements, he pointed out that there were 400 female patients and there was only one lady doctor in the Hospital.
There was no lady Psychiatrist or Psychologist.
The Superintendent had written to the Government about it but there has been no response.
On 14th of September, 1987, the Court noticed the fact that the State of West Bengal was in huge arrears in the matter of payment of contribution to the running of the Hospital.
Counsel for State of Bihar had agreed to send details of the arrears to the State of West Bengal within a fortnight and the Court directed the West Bengal Government to pay the same.
The State of West Bengal filed its affidavit through the Joint Secretary in the Department of Health and Family Welfare.
The affidavit while accepting the fact that 38% of the seats in the hospital were reserved for West Bengal alleged that in the absence of furnishing of proper accounts by the State of Bihar, the payment of contribution had not been made in time by the State of West Bengal after 1979 80.
It agreed to pay Rs.20 lakhs during the year and the balance in suitable instalments in future.
The State of Orissa has pointed out in its affidavit that it has been regularly paying its contribution of Rs.3 lakhs and was not in arrears.
The Deputy Director (Medical) Health Services, Government of Bihar filed an affidavit claiming that the rate of diet had been enhanced with effect from 1.12.1986 and in diet all the patients were provided rice, bread, dal, vegetable, egg, milk, loaf, biscutt, tea, fruit .
Fish, meat and chicken were being provided alternatively thrice a week.
Old Pipe lines had been replaced and the flow of water was increased; storage facility for water had been arranged.
Medicine as per requirement is being provided without refering to any ceiling limit.
new X ray machine has been purchased; the old E.C.G. machine has been condemned and a new one has been purchased.
One of the petitioners filed an affidavit denying many of the aforesaid claims.
On 14th of March, 1988, this Court made the following order: PG NO 317 "We have perused the affidavit filed by Shri Subodh Chandhra Naryayan, one of the petitioners, wherein several allegations of mismanagement have been made.
It has also been alleged that in spite of the direction of this Court that the daily diet expenses should be Rs.10 per patient actually Rs.7 is being spent and though this Court had directed that there should be no ceiling of expenses for medicines beyond Rs.2 per patient is not being issued.
We are of the view that copy of the affidavit should be sent to the Chief Secretary, State of Bihar with a direction that he would personally look into the matter and should send a report within four weeks.
" A report, beyond the time indicated in the order dated 14th of March, 1988, was furished by the Chief Secretary and the same was covered by an affidavit of the Joint Secretary of Department of Health and Family Welfare of the State Government.
The Chief Secretary reported: "The entirc hospital complex is spread over a sprawling area.
The buildings are old.
but they have been extensively repaired and white washed.
Many old cots.
matresses linen etc. have been replaced by new ones.
Government has spent several lakhs of rupees on improvements in the running of the Agrogyashala during the last two years.
In course of my visit, l did not find that patients were being given inadequate food or medicine. ' ' He also found that the toilets had not been attended to, the position of water supply was not satisfactory, the automatic boiler had not yet been repaired or replaced.
The Court 's Order of 14th of March, 1988, indicated that the affidavit filed by Subodh Chandra Narayan containing several allegations of mismanagement was to be forwarded to the Chief Secretary and with reference to the allegations therein, he was to send his report.
We do not find that the report of the Chief Secretary covers all the aspects.
The hospital authorities would not, in their own interests, be too ready to expose their own deficiencies during the visit of the Chief Secretary.
Therefore, to have been satisfied and to report that during his visit he did not find any patient being given inadequate food or medicine is no appraisal of the situation.
The fact that lakhs of rupees had been spent on improvement is indeed of no consequence PG NO 318 until the Agorgyashala is restored to acceptable hospital standards.
The report gives us a feeling that the Chief Secretary was more conscious about the expenditure made by the State Government than assessing the actual situation.
From his report, however, it is clear that inspite of several orders made by this Court and assurances held out by the State Government of Bihar, the defects were not being remedied.
The awareness of the governmental authorities of the sordid situation prevailing in the hospital, as admitted in the scheme furnished to this Court, the non compliance in an effective way with the directions made from time to time by this Court and the general lethargy shown in rising from slumber leaves a clear impression in our mind that the institution cannot be run as a mental hospital of that magnitude unless there be change in the administrative set up, the control is altered and a total new service to patient oriented thrust given to the institution.
In a welfare State and we take it that the State of Bihar considers itself to be one such it is the obligation of the State to provide medical attention to every citizen.
Running of the mental hospital, therefore, is in the discharge of the State 's obligation to the citizens and the fact that lakhs of rupees have been spent from the public exchequer (perhaps without or inadequate return) is not of any consequence.
The State has to realise its obligation and the Government of the day has got to perform its duties by running the hospital in a perfect standard and serving the petients in an appropriate way.
The reports and affidavits of the Government of Bihar and its officers (not the reports furnished to the Court by the judicial officers) have not given us the satisfaction of the touch of appropriate sincerity in action.
The scheme which was furnished to the Court was a half hearted one and no attempt therein was made to bring about any improvement except attending to certain obvious deficiencies and shortfalls.
The hospital has been in existence from pre independence period.
There have been epoch making breaks through in the field of psychiatry and treatment of psychiatric patients.
The approach to mental health and the techniques of psychiatry have changed.
Psychologists have developed their art and their tools.
The method of care ar d attention for the mentally ill has also undergone a sea change.
When we had called upon the State of Bihar to give a scheme for improving the conditions of the hospital, this Court had not intended a scheme for removing the deficiencies in the old hospital; we had really intended to look forward to a scheme of re orientation which the scheme did not even remotely touch except to say that NIMHANS at Bangalore has contacted.
PG NO 319 The state Government authorities have not been able to assess the priorities.
Provision of beds, though the scheme indicated had to be fully made by end of March, 1988, the report of the Chief Secretary and the accommpanying affidavit have not cleared that position.
Provision for electricity and water has taken too long, though both are basic necessities of life.
The fact that the existing lavatories have taken more than two years to repair is a slur on the administration.
There does not seem to be the slightest interest on the part of the persons handling the matter, to improve the environment.
In these cir cumstances, it becomes difficult for the Court with any sense of confidence to leave the management to the Health Department of the State of Bihar if the institution has to run as a good and useful hospital.
We are cognizant of the position that it is difficult for the Court to monitor the management of a hospital particularly when it is located a thousand kilometres away; but since there have been some improvements with the Court 's intervention, to get out of the picture at this stage would only mean that the situation will again deteriorate no sooner the Court 's attention is withdrawn.
As we have already pointed out mere restoration of the hospital to its old position would only bring into existence an archaic institution sans modernism.
In our opinion, it will be much better if a Committee of Management is appointed with full powers to look after all aspects of the institution.
It is appropriate to take note of the position that this institution receives contribution from two other States.
38 % of these beds, being about 600, are reserved for the State of West Bengal and the Government of West Bengal is to pay for the same.
Similarly 75 beds are reserved for the State of Orissa and a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs is payable by the Orissa Government.
There is no reason why the management of the hospital should be left exclusively to the Health Department of State of Bihar and the participating Governments should not be associated in such management.
Taking note of the performances of the State administration of Bihar in regard to the hospital we are of the view that association of the States of West Bengal and Orissa in the management is likely to bring about some positive result.
We would, accordingly, constitute a Committee of Management for the Mental Hospital in the manner indicated below.
Chairman A consenting sitting Judge of the Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of Patna High Court.
PG NO 320 Members (1) Commissioner of Ranchi Division.
(2) Station Commander, Ramgarh area, Ranchi.
(3) Secretary of Health, Bihar Government.
(4) Secretary of Health, West Bengal Government.
(5) Secretary of Health, Orissa Government.
(6) Deputy Commission of Ranchi.
(7) Principal of the Ranchi Medical College.
(8) District Judge, Ranchi.
(9) Superintendent of the Hospital.
The Commissioner of Ranchi Division and the Station Commander shall be Vice Chairmen and in the absence of the Chairman, shall in the order indicated act as Chairman when any of them too is absent.
The Superintendent shall act as the Secretary.
We hope and expect that the concerned Governments and authorities would accord the necessary consent/permission to the nominated officers to act on the Committee and the Committee would be able to have its first meeting in the first half of November, 1988.
The Committee should meet every month in the first six months with a view to removing the defects and deficiencies within a time frame say of six months at the most and for reviewing the improvements in the conditions of the hospital.
If it is satisfied that the situation has improved, the meetings thereafter may be quarterly.
The Commissioner of the Ranchi Division shall make a monthly report with in 2 weeks of the end of every month about the state of the hospital during the first year and such reports as and when received by the Registry should be placed before the Court.
The State of West Bengal is in arrears in regard to its contribution for several years.
Though counsel for the State of Bihar had undertaken to furnish accounts, the same has not yet been done.
The Committee shall ensure that the accounts are furnished to the State of West Bengal by the 15th of December, 1988.
In its affidavit, the State of West Bengal has indicated that it would pay Rs.20 lakhs out of the dues during the current financial year and would pay the balance in suitable instalments.
As the improvement to the hospital would involve huge expenditure, we direct the State PG NO 321 of West Bengal to pay Rs.50 lakhs out of its dues by 31st of March, 1989 and the balance amount shall be paid in two six monthly instalments, one by 30th of September, 1989, and the other by 31st of March, 1990.
The Government of West Bengal and the Committee shall ensure that this time frame is adhered to.
The entire arrears collected from the West Bengal Government shall be earmarked for development of the hospital to be expended in the manner approved by the Committee and no portion thereof would be otherwise spent.
We are of the view that if the hospital is transformed into a better one, just as the hospital run by NIMHANS at Bangalore, the quality of the hospital would improve and the patients would have the benefit of modern scientific treatment.
The Committee shall, therefore, take expeditious steps to explore the possibility of transforming the Mental Hospital at Ranchi into the pattern obtaining in the hospital run by NIMHANS at Bangalore by taking such steps as are necessary and furnish a report to this Court by the end of February, 1989 when that question will have to be considered by this Court after hearing the concerned State Governments and the parties.
The State of Bihar shall provide a basic fund of Rs.50 lakhs in the year ending 31st of March, 1989, to be spent for improvement of the Hospital in the manner approved by the Committee and in case the Committee is of the view that further funds are necessary, it would be open to the Committee to make a report to this Court whereupon appropriate directions shall be given.
There have been repeated allegations that the lady patients who have already been cured are not being released from the hospital.
At one stage the explanation offered by the hospital authorities and the State administration was that the relations, even though notified, are not taking them back.
The hospital is not a place where cured people should be allowed to stay.
It is, therefore, necessary that there should be a rehabilitation centre for those who after being cured are not in a position to return to their families or on their own seek useful employment.
The Committee shall, therefore, take immediate steps to have a rehabilitation centre at a convenient place around Ranchi where appropriate rehabilitation schemes may be operated and the patients after being cured, irrespective of being male or female, if they are not being taken back by the members of their families could be rehabilitated.
The funds made available to the Committee may be utilised for such purpose.
PG NO 322 We must reiterate that Court monitoring of an institution like the present one is indeed difficult but we cannot close the proceedings at this stage for the reasons we have already indicated.
Parties including the Committee shall have liberty to move this Court from time to time.
We make it clear that the directions regarding payment of the funds are pre emptory in nature and no application for modification thereof shall be entertained.
This matter shall be deemed to be pending to deal with the various reports from the Committee and for purposes of giving other directions.

summary:
A letter petition in regard to the Mental Hospital at Ranchi was considered as a public interest application under Article 32 of the Constitution, and the Court called upon the State of Bihar to file its counter affidavit.
At the same time, the Court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate to visit the hospital and submit a report about the conditions prevailing there.
The hospital was in the sole management of the Health Department of the State of Bihar.
The State of Bihar received financial contributions from the States of West Bengal and Orissa on the basis of the number of beds reserved for each State.
The report submitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate made a painful reading.
In the affidavit submitted by the State of Bihar it was stated that the Government was aware of the conditions and had since taken some steps to improve the working of the hospital, and had also drawn up a scheme to develop the hospital on the lines of NIMHANS in Bangalore.
From time to time, the Court had issued directions and made specific orders regarding provision of better food.
clothing, medical treatment, housing and improvement of sanitation, etc.
While keeping the matter pending, the Court, HELD: (1) In a welfare State it is the obligation of the State to provide medical attention to every citizen.
The State has to realise its obligation and the Government of the day has got to perform its duties by running the hospital in a perfect standard and serving the patients in an appropriate way.
[318D E] (2) It is clear that inspite of several orders made by this Court and assurances held out by the State Government of Bihar.
the defects were not being remedied.
The awareness PG NO 307 of the governmental authorities of the sordid situation prevailing in the hospital, as admitted in the scheme furnished to the Court, the non compliance in an effective way with the directions made from time to time by the Court and the general lethargy shown in rising from slumber leaves a clear impression that the institution cannot be run as a mental hospital of that magnitude unless there be change in the administrative set up, the control is altered and a new service to patient oriented thrust given to the institution.
[3I8 C] (3) The scheme which was furnished to the Court was a halfhearted one and no attempt therein was made to bring about any improvement except attending to certain obvious deficiencies and short falls.
The Court had looked forward to a scheme of re orientation which the scheme did not even remotely touch.
[318F G] (4) The State Government authorities have not been able to assess the priorities.
There does not seem to be the slightest interest on the part of the persons handling the matter, to improve the environment.
In these circumstances, it is difficult to leave the management exclusively to the Health Department of the State of Bihar if the institution has to run as a good and useful hospital.
Association of the States of West Bengal and Orissa in the management is likely to bring about some positive result.
It would, therefore, be much better if a Committee of Management is appointed with full powers to look after all aspects of the institution.
[319A; B D] (5) The Court accordingly constituted a Committee of Management for the Mental Hospital and gave directions regarding the financial contribution from the participating States, and also laid down guidelines regarding the functioning and management of the hospital.
The Court further directed that the Committee shall take expeditious steps to explore the possibility of transforming the hospital into the pattern obtaining in the hospital run by NIMHANS at Bangalore.
[321C D]


judgement:
Petition No. 28180 of 1988.
IN Writ Petition No. 9 13 of 1988 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) Mrs. K. Hingorani and Ms. Santosh Singh for the Petitioner .
A.K. Sen (Not Present), Dr. L.M. Singhvi, Vivek Gambhi r, Parveen Kumar and B.D. Sharma for the Respondents.
S.P. Singh for the Impleading party.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER This Court on 9.9.1988 after hearing counsel for t he petitioners in the writ petition made an ex parte order to the following effect: "Issue notice returnable on Tuesday, the 13 th September, 1988.
In view of the allegations made in Par a graph 4 of the affidavit given by Vijay Trivedi, the R e spondent No. 2 is prohibited from performing any Chun ri Ceremony within Sri Rani Satiji 's Mandir and the responden ts are directed to enforce this order on the th September, 19 88 and on any other occasion thereafter until further order section The entire collection of money shall be separately account ed for and should be deposited into a nationalised bank, so that appropriate directions after hearing both the parti es may be made by this Court in regard to the same . . " On 10th of September, 1988, the annual Satiji Mela w as scheduled to be celebrated within the said temple premises .
The management of the temple, respondent No. 2, in t he writ petition has now applied for vacating the ad inter im order and for a 68 direction to the District Magistrate, Jhunjhunu to retu rn the keys of the Bhetpatras of the temple and the box es containing the articles of gold and silver and also for a direction to him not to interfere in the matter of colle c tion of money as also collection of articles of gold a nd silver of deities located in the premises of the temple a nd to make such other orders as may be necessary to meet t he situation.
We have heard Dr. Singhvi in support of the petitio n, Mrs. Hingorani for the petitioners in the writ petiti on asking for sustaining the interim order and Mr. Sharma f or the State of Rajasthan.
An affidavit has been filed by t he District Magistrate of Jhunjhunu in the course of heari ng which has also been placed before us.
Broadly two aspects require consideration: (1) wheth er the 'Chunry ' ceremony should be permitted to be perform ed within the temple and (2) whether out of the amounts whi ch are being deposited in the nationalised bank in terms of t he interim order, the expenses for maintenance of the temp le complex, performance of the daily rites as also the usu al charities should not be made.
Under the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 198 7, glorification of Sati is strictly prohibited and that a ct has been declared to be an offence.
Dr. Singhvi by referri ng to different dictionaries has tried to impress upon us th at Chunry as such is not connected with glorification of Sa ti and is a ceremony connected with the traditional form of offering worship known as Sodash Upachar while Mrs. Hingor a ni and Mr. Sharma do not accept the submission made by D r. Singhvi and have maintained that in the State of Rajasth an Chunry ceremony is always associated with glorifying Sa ti and the celebration is a part of the traditional process of religious offerings in Sati temples.
This certainly is n ot the stage in the proceedings for a final view of the que s tion as to whether performance of Chunry ceremony amounts to glorification of Sati and the determination must be left to the final stage.
We do not think it would be appropriate f or us to express any view beyond this point at this stage as the same may embarrass the bench which would ultimately he ar the matter.
We are, therefore, of the view that the restraint i m posed on holding the Chunry ceremony within the temp le should continue without any variation.
The contention of D r. Singhvi that Chunry is a part of Sodash Upachar will have to be examined at length at the later stage.
69 Now a look at the other aspect.
There can be no t wo opinions that pending disposal of the writ petition, t he temple complex has to be maintained and out of the inco me earned maintenance expense must be met.
The submissi on advanced by Mrs. Hingorani that the temple should be co n verted forthwith into rehabilitation camps for uncared f or ladies is certainly not one requiring any serious consider a tion.
There is no provision in the statute or in any oth er law which would warrant such change of user of the premise section Similarly if out of the income of this institution a ny contribution was being made to sustain some social instit u tions of utility, the support should not die out.
The r e spondent No. 2 is free to move the District Magistrate of Jhunjhunu in regard to these two aspects and in case t he District Magistrate is satisfied that appropriate fun ds should be released out of the deposits in the bank for o ne or both of the purposes indicated above he would be free to direct such money as may be found necessary to be withdra wn from the bank for being utilised for the purposes as may be specified by the District Magistrate m his order to be mad e.
This disposes of the Civil Miscellaneous Petition.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
By an ex parte order made in the writ petition on 9 th September, 1988, the Court prohibited respondent No. 2, t he management of the Sri Rani Satiji 's Mandir, from performi ng Chunri ceremony within the temple and directed the enti re collection of money to be separately accounted for a nd deposited into a nationalised bank.
In this miscellaneous petition, the management soug ht vacation of the ad interim order and lot a direction to t he authorities not to interfere in the matter of collection of money as also articles of gold and silver of deities.
Disposing of the miscellaneous petition, the Court, Ordered: 1.
The restraint imposed on holding the Chunri ceremo ny within the temple should continue without any variatio n. [68G H] 2.1 Pending disposal of the writ .petition, the temp le complex has to be maintained.
Therefore, out of the inco me earned maintenance expenses must be met.
[69A] 2.2 If out of the income of this institution any contr i bution was being made to sustain some social institutions of utility, the support should not die out.
[69B C] 2.3 The respondent No. 2 is free to move the Distri ct Magistrate in regard to these two aspects and in case t he latter is satisfied that appropriate funds should be r e leased out of the deposits in the bank for 67 one or both of the above said purposes, he would be free to make an appropriate order in respect thereof.


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos. 80 & 81 of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26/27.8.1974 of the Gujarat High Court in I.T. Reference Nos. 7 and 29 of 1973.
S.C. Patel for the Appellant.
Dr. V. Gauri Shanker and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
The appellant is an assessee who derives income 867 from various sources, including income from the Shrimati Arundhati Balkrishna Trust, Ahmedabad.
In assessment pro ceedings for the assessment year 1964 65 the Income Tax Officer found that a sum of Rs. 10,880 had been debited to the interest account maintained in the books of the Ahmeda bad Trust as interest paid to the Harivallabhadas Kalidas Estate Account.
Upon further scrutiny, he discovered that substantial debits totalling Rs.2,19,804 included withdraw als from the Estate Account by the Ahmedabad Trust on ac count of the personal expenses of the assessee.
After taking into consideration earlier withdrawals from the Estate Account by the Ahmedabad Trust for the purpose of investment and making adjustments for deposits during the year, the Income Tax Officer concluded that the net withdrawals from the Estate Account for personal expenditure were Rs.3,10,806 He held that the proportionate interest of Rs.6,199 out of the total interest of Rs. 10,880 paid by the Ahmedabad Trust to the Estate Account was referable to such withdrawals, and.
therefore constituted an inadmissible deduction.
Similarly, for the assessment year 1966 67 the Income Tax Officer found that a sum of Rs.25,496 had been shown in the books of account of the Ahmedabad Trust for the relevant previous year as interest paid to the Estate Ac count.
He held that of this sum, an amount of Rs.12,833 was referable to withdrawals for purposes other than investment, and accordingly he disallowed the claim of interest to that extent.
The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Com missioner of Income Tax, and failing there he proceeded in second appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, claiming that the entire amount of interest should have been allowed as a deduction for each year.
An additional question raised in respect of the assessment year 1964 65 related to the point whether the assessee was liable to tax on the net income only received by her from the Trust or the income determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the case of the Trust.
The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals of the assessee.
At the instance of the assessee the Appellate Tribunal referred the following questions of law to the High Court of Gujarat in respect of the assessment year 1964 65: "(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was fight in not holding that out of the interest payment of Rs.10,880, Rs.6,199 was not an admissible deduction against the income from other sources? 868 (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income includible in the total income of the assessee is income determinable as per provisions of the Income Tax, 1961 in the case of the Trust or the income receivable by the assessee from the said trust?" The question referred to the High Court for assessment year 1966 67 was: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that out of the interest payment of Rs.25,496, Rs. 12,833 was not an admissible deduction against the income from other sources?" The High Court held that the question relating to the disallowance of part of the interest for the two assessment years was rightly decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
On the second question in the reference for the assessment year 1964 65, the High Court held that the income includible in the total income of the assessee was income determinable in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the case of the Trust and not the income actually received or receivable by the assessee from the Trust or according to the entries in the books of accounts of the Trust.
In the result that question was also answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
In regard to the question arising in each of the assess ment years 1964 65 and 1966 67 relating to the disallowance of part of the interest claimed as a deduction by the asses see, the High Court relied on the view taken by it earlier in Shrimati Padmavati Jaykrishna vs Commissioner of Income Tax., The judgment of the High Court was considered in appeal by this Court in Padmavati Jaikr ishna vs Addl.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, and this Court affirmed the view taken by the High Court.
For the reasons which found favour with this Court in that case, we must answer the question in the two appeals before us against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
Turning to the additional question referred to the High Court fo r the assessment year 1964 65, it seems to us clear that what is assessable in the hands of the assessee must be the income of the Trust received by it on behalf of the asses see.
It is apparent from section 161(1) of the 869 Income Tax Act, 1961 that a representative assessee, that is to say a trustee, as regards the income in respect of which he is representative assessee, is subject to the same du ties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the income were income received by or accruing to or in favour of him bene ficially, and he is liable to assessment in his own name in respect of that income; but any such assessment is deemed to be made upon him in his representative capacity only, and the tax is levied upon and recovered from him in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him.
And section 166 of the.
Act clarifies that the provisions relating to the liability of a representative assessee will not prevent either the direct assessment of the person on whose behalf or for whose benefit income is receivable, or the recovery from such person of the tax payable in respect of such income.
The Income Tax Officer has the option to proceed either against the trustee or against the beneficiary, but in either case the income to be assessed must be in the same figure.
What the trustee receives as the income pertaining to the beneficiary is received by him under an obligation to pass on that income to the beneficiary.
However, in most cases administration charges and expenses have to be met out of the Trust 's income and it is only the net income which reaches ' the beneficiary.
If the income had to pass directly to the beneficiary and not under trust through a trustee the beneficiary would have equally to meet those outgoings, leaving a net income in his hands which for the purposes of the Income Tax Act would have been computed after reducing the gross income by the deductions admissible under the Act.
It seems to us clear that it is not the income shown in the books of account of the Ahmedabad Trust actually paid to the assessee after deduction of the outgoings from the income received in the hands of the Ahmedabad Trust, but the real income of the Ahmedabad Trust has to be included in the total income of the assessee after taking into consideration the different items of permissible deductions in relation to that income.
We are of opinion that the High Court is right in the view which it has taken.
In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.
H.L.C. Appeals dismissed.

summary:
The appellant was an assessee who derived income from a Trust.
For assessment years 1964 65 and 1966 67 the Income Tax Officer disallowed deduction of two mounts claimed as interest paid by the Trust for amounts withdrawn from an Estate Account for investment on the ground that a portion of the amounts withdrawn from the Estate Account had been utilized for personal expenditure by the assessee.
The appellants appeals to the Assistant Commissioner having been rejected, she preferred second appeals to the Appellate Tribunal raising an additional question in respect of the assessment year 1964 65 that she was liable to tax on the net income only received by her from the Trust and not on income determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the case of the Trust.
The Tribunal dis missed the appeals but at the instance of the appellant referred the two questions of law arising therein to the High Court which answered both of them against the assessee.
Dismissing the appeals, HELD: It is not the income shown in the books of account of the Trust actually paid to the assessee after deduction of the outgoings from the income received in the hands of the Trust, but the real income of the Trust has to be in cluded in the total income of the assessee after taking into consideration the different items of permissible deductions in relation to that income.
[869E F] It is apparent from section 161(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 that a representative assessee, that is to say a trus tee, as regards the income In respect of which he is a representative assessee, is subject to the same duties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the income were income received by or accruing to or in favour of him bene ficially, and he is 866 liable to assessment in his own name in respect of that income; but any such assessment is deemed to be made upon him in his representative capacity only, and the tax is levied upon and recovered from him in like manner and to the same extent as it would be leviable upon and recoverable from the person represented by him.
And section 166 of the Act clarifies that the provisions relating to the liability of a representative assessee will not prevent either the direct assessment of the person on whose behalf or for whose bene fit income is receivable, or the recovery from such person of the tax payable in respect of such income.
The Income Tax Officer has the option to proceed either against the trustee or against the beneficiary, but in either case the income to be assessed must be in the same figure.
What the trustee receives as the income pertaining to the beneficiary is received by him under an obligation to pass on that income to the beneficiary.
However, in most cases administration charges and expenses have to be met out of the Trust 's income and it is only the net income which reaches the beneficiary.
If the income had, to pass directly to the beneficiary and not under trust through a trustee, the beneficiary would have equally to meet those outgoings, leaving a net income in his hands which for the purposes of the Income Tax Act would have been computed after reducing the gross income by the deductions admissible under the Act.
[868H; 869A E] (ii) The High Court was right in deciding the question relating to the disallowance of part of the interest claimed as a deduction against the assessee.
[868F] Padmavati Jaikrishna vs Addl.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, , referred to.


judgement:
ition (Criminal) No. 1 45 1 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. ) R.K. Jain and Yogeshwar Prasad, R.K. Khanna, R.K. Bha tt and Dalveer Bhandari for the Petitioner.
V.C. Mahajan, Tapas Ray, A.S. Nambiar, S.B. Bhasm e, Kapil Sibal, R.B. Misra, A. Subhashini, Y.P. Rao, Ms. section Janani, Ms. Urmila Kapur, D.K. Sinha, J.R. Dass, P.K. Man o har, Ms. section Vasudevan, M. Veerappa, Uma Nath, R.K. Mehta, V. Krishnamurthy, A.S. Bhasme, K.R. Nambiar, B.D Sharma, Ka i lash Vasudev, D.N. 62 Mukherjee, D. Goburdhan, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, T.V.S.N. Char i, Mahabir Singh, Probir Chowdhry, M.N. Shroff, A. Subba Ra o, R.S. Suri, G. Probhakar, K. Ram.
Kumar, S.K. Bhattachary a, L.R. Singh, A.K. Sanghi, C.V. Subba Rao, R. Venkataraman i, Salman Khurshid, Gopal Singh, Mrs. Vimla Sinha and Mrs. H. Wahi for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER This writ petition filed in 1985 has been heard on different occasions and several orders and directions ha ve been made from time to time with a view to providing reli ef to delinquent children detained in jails.
On August 2 9, 1988, this Court made an order wherein so me such directions have been excerpted and it is not necessa ry to make any detailed reference to those directions now.
In 1986 the District Judges of the entire country in response to the directions made by this Court supplie d, inter alia, the particulars of under trial and convict ed children found in regular jails within their respecti ve jurisdiction.
On the basis of the said reports it was fou nd that in Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Punjab and West Bengal, t he number of such children in regular jails was 64, 247, 60, 63 and 437 respectively.
There was no such child in any regul ar jail of Gujarat but in varying numbers not exceeding 30 to 35 they were found in other States.
Thereafter some of t he States have filed affidavits indicating release from custo dy or transfer of such children from jails and have stated th at the position at present is very different and the number is either nil or negligible.
With the lapse of two years ' time since such reporti ng was done there is every likelihood of a change in th at position.
Even otherwise, in the intervening period t he Juvenile Justice Act, 53 of 1986, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act ') has come into force in the whole of the cou n try excepting the State of Jammu & Kashmir with effect fr om 2.10.1987.
The Act provides for setting up of juveni le homes, special homes and observation homes by the Sta te Governments.
Chapter IV provides for dealing with delinque nt juveniles.
In this back drop it is necessary to get fre sh detailed reports from the District Judges and update t he figures as to the exact number of delinquent juveniles, as defined in section 2(a) of the Act, still detained in regul ar jails.
At the same time it is necessary that a report as to whether juvenile 63 Courts as required under section 5 of the Act have been set up and juvenile homes, special homes and observation homes ha ve been established as required by sections 9, 10, and 11 should be obtained.
Every District Judge is, therefore, directed by this order to report within 4 weeks from today to the Regi s try of this Court through the Registrar of the appropria te High Court as to the exact position obtaining on 28.2.
19 89 in regard to the particulars indicated above.
We would li ke to place on record that on the earlier occasion response to directions by this Court had taken more than six month s; repetitive adjournments had become necessary and complian ce was effected by indicating coercive steps.
We hope and tru st there would be no repetition.
Section 62 of the Act empowers the State Governments to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The sche me of the Act is such that it cannot be properly enforc ed unless apropriate rules are framed and brought into forc e. Counsel appearing before us for the different States are n ot in a position to make a definite statement that the Stat es they represent have framed rules and brought them in to force.
We, therefore, direct that the District Judges whi le making their reports shall also indicate whether rules ha ve been framed and whether such rules are already in forc e. Counsel appearing before us are also directed to inform t he Registry by written memorandum about the framing of rul es and bringing them into force in the respective States.
If such rules have not been framed in any State, by this ord er we direct such State or States to frame the same on or before 7th of April, 1989 and to bring them into for ce without any further delay thereafter.
Section 2(h) defines 'juvenile ' to mean: "a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years.
" Official reports indicate that 35 to 40 per cent of t he total population of the country would be covered by t he definition.
As such about 30 crores of young boys and gir ls come within the purview of the Act.
There can be no t wo opinions that these children of today are the citizens of tomorrow 's India and the country 's future would necessari ly depend upon their proper hygiene physical and mental.
T he problem is, therefore, gigantic; at the same time, there is demand for immediate attention.
Several counsel appeari ng before us have told us and we agree with their submissio ns that unless the importance of the matter is properly pe r ceived and the response is adequate both in 64 regard to sufficiency of actions and immediacy of attentio n, the purpose of the Act cannot be fulfilled.
Children requi re the protective umbrella of society for better growth a nd development as they are not in a position to claim the ir entitlement to attention, growing up, food, education a nd the like.
It is the responsibility of the society and is o ne of the paramount obligations of those who are in charge of governance of the country today to attend to the children to make them appropriate citizens of tomorrow.
We are of the view that in the setting indicated t he matter perhaps requires overseeing by the Court.
For coord i nation between the Union Government and the State Governme nt and between authorities within the State, at the initi al stage and it would be in the interest of children that t he matter is obverseen by this Court and when the machinery is properly geared the responsibility of overseeing may be entrusted to the respective High Courts.
With a view to working out the modality and to ma ke overseeing convenient, it is necessary that a scheme shou ld be evolved.
Counsel appearing before us have suggested th at a group of advocates should be entrusted with the work of making a draft scheme and place it before the Court for i ts consideration.
We accordingly nominate Messrs V.C. Mahaja n, Yogeshwar Prasad, R.K. Jain, Tapas Roy and Mukul Mudgal w ho are advocates appearing for some of the States to draw up a scheme and file it in the Registry of the Court by 7 th April, 1989.
As we pointed out earlier from the reports it has be en found that the number of children in regular jails were t he highest in West Bengal and Bihar.
Mr. Tapas Roy representi ng the State of West Bengal relies upon an affidavit fil ed before this Court to contend that the position has substa n tially changed subsequent to the reports and at prese nt perhaps the number of children in regular jails is eith er nil or very small.
He has personally undertaken to colle ct the particulars and furnish the same by way of the memora n dum to the Registry on or before 7th of April, 1989.
So f ar as the State of Bihar is concerned, Mr. Goburdhan is not in a position to make any statement.
From the analysis prepar ed based upon the report of the District Judges, it appea rs that there were 27 children in the District Jail of Deogar h, about 13 in the jails at Patna and 17 in the jails at Bh a galpur.
We are of the view that Mr. A.S. Nambiar, Sr.
Adv o cate of this Court should be appointed as Commissioner to visit these jails in the three districts of Bihar and co l lect the necessary particulars of juvenile delinquents 65 housed in those jails and report to this Court on or befo re 7th of April, 1989.
He shall be provided all facilities by the State Government and its officers as may be deem ed reasonable and necessary for implementing this direction.
He shall also be entitled to reimbursement of his expenses.
It becomes necessary that the Registry should ha ve appropriate funds to meet the expenses from time to tim e. We, therefore, direct that the Union of India shall depos it a sum of Rs.50,000 while each of the States of Bihar a nd West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh is directed to deposit a s um of Rs. 15,000.
Such deposits shall be made on or before 15 th of April, 1989.
The expenses have of course to be met by a ll the States but in due course an order directing other Stat es to pay to the fund and final apportionment, if necessar y, shall be ordered.
Notice be issued to the learned Attorney General to appear and assist the Court in this proceeding.
The directions indicated above must be worked out with in the time frame as we are fixing the case for further heari ng at 2.00 P.M. on 24th of April, 1989.

summary:
Pursuant to the directions made by the Supreme Cour t, with a view to providing relief to delinquent childr en detained in jails, in 1986 the District Judges of the enti re country supplied the particulars of under trial and convic t ed children found in regular jails within their jurisdi c tion.
With the passage of time and the coming into force of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 it became necessary to g et fresh detailed reports for updating the information.
The Supreme Court issued directions and, HELD: 1.
Children require the protective umbrella of society for better growth and development as they are not in a position to claim their entitlement to attention, growi ng up, food, education and the like.
It is the responsibili ty of the society and is one of the paramount obligations of those who are in charge of governance of the country tod ay to attend to the children to make them appropriate citize ns of tomorrow.
[64A B] 2.
Every District Judge is directed to report to th is Court the figures as to the exact number of delinque nt juveniles still detained in regular jails and whether juv e nile courts, juvenile homes, special homes and observatio ns homes as provied in the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 have be en established.
[62H; 63A] 61 2.1 A Senior Advocate of this Court is appointed as Commissioner to visit the jails in the three Districts of the State of Bihar, viz. Deogarh, Patna and Bhagalpur a nd collect the necessary particulars of juvenile delinquen ts housed in those jails and report to this Court.
He shall be provided all facilities by the State Government and sha ll also be entitled to reimbursement of his expense section [64H;65A B] 3.
Section 62 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 empowe rs the State Government to make rules to carry out the purpos es of the Act.
The scheme of the Act is such that it cannot be properly enforced unless appropriate rules are framed a nd brought into force.
The District Judges while making the ir reports shall also indicate whether rules have been fram ed and whether such rules are already in force.
Counsel for t he respective States are directed to inform this Court by written Memorandum about the framing of rules and bringi ng them into force in the respective States.
If such rul es have not been framed in any State, such State or States a re directed to frame the same and bring them into force witho ut any further delay.
[63C E] 4.
For facilitating the monitoring of the implementati on of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a group of nominat ed advocates is entrusted with the work of making a dra ft Scheme and placing it before the Court for its consider a tion.
[64D E] 5.
The Registry of this Court should have appropria te funds to meet the expenses from time to time.
The Union of India is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.50,000 while ea ch of the States of Bihar and West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.15,000.
[65B C]


judgement:
78 and 79 of 1950.
Application under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of mandamus.
G.N. Joshi, for the petitioners.
S.M. Sikri, for the respondent.
November 8.
The judgment 0 the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J.
These two applications for enforcement of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India have been made by a proprietor and an employee respectively of a bidi manufacturing concern of District Sagar (State of Madhya Pradesh).
It is contended that the law in force in the State authorizing it to prohib it the manufacture of bidis in certain villages including the one 761 wherein the applicants reside is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and is conse quently void.
The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufac ture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, was passed on 19th October 1948 and was the law in force in the State at the commencement of the Constitution.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are in these terms; " 3.
The Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural season with respect to such villages as may be specified therein.
(1) The Deputy Commissioner may, by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season.
(2) No person residing in a village specified in such order shall during the agricultural season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis.
" On the 13th June 1950 an order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Sagar under the provisions of the Act for bidding all persons residing in certain villages from engag ing in the manufacture of bidis.
On the 19th June 1950 these two petitions were presented to this Court under article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the order as it prejudicially affected the petitioners ' right of freedom of occupation and business.
During the pendency of the petitions the season mentioned in the order of the 13th June ran out.
A fresh order for the ensuing agricultural season 8th October to 18th November 1950 was issued on 29th September 1950 in the same terms.
This order was also challenged in a supplementary petition.
Article 19 (1) (g) runs as follows : "All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or busi ness.
" 762 The article guarantees freedom of occupation and busi ness.
The freedom guaranteed herein is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by clause (6) of article 19.
That clause is in these terms : "Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restric tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any pro fession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business.
" The point for consideration in these applications is whether the Central Provinces and Berar Act LXIV of 1948 comes within the ambit of this saving clause or is in excess of its provisions.
The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned Act does not impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right in the interests of the general public but totally negatives it.
In order to judge the validity of this contention it is neces sary to examine the impugned Act and some of its provisions.
In the preamble to the Act, it is stated that it has been enacted to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas.
Sections 3 and 4 cited above empower the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season.
The contravention of any of these provisions is made punishable by section 7 of the Act, the penalty being imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.
It was enacted to help in the grow more food campaign and for the purpose of bring ing under the plough considerable areas of fallow land.
The question for decision is whether the statute under the guise of protecting public interests arbitrarily 763 interferes with private business and imposes unreasonable and unnecessarily restrictive regulations upon lawful occupation; in other words, whether the total prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacture of bidis within the agricultural season amounts to a reasonable restriction on the fundamental rights mentioned in article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.
Unless it is shown that there is a reason able relation of the provisions of the Act to the purpose in view, the right of freedom of occupation and business cannot be curtailed by it.
The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.
The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.
Legisla tion which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.
Clause (6) in the concluding paragraph particularizes certain instances of the nature of the restrictions that were in the mind of the constitution makers and which have the quality of reasonableness.
They afford a guide to the interpretation of the clause and illustrate the extent and nature of the restrictions which according to the statute could be imposed on the freedom guaranteed in clause (g).
The statute in substance and effect suspends altogether the right mentioned in article 19 (1) (g) during the agri cultural seasons and such suspension may lead to such dislocation of the industry as to prove its ultimate ruin.
The object of the statute is to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province and it could well be achieved by legislation restraining the employment of agri cultural labour in the manufacture 764 of bidis during the agricultural season.
Even in point of time a restriction may well have been reasonable if it amounted to a regulation of the hours of work in the busi ness.
Such legislation though it would limit the field for recruiting persons for the manufacture of bidis and regulate the hours of the working of the industry, would not have amounted to a complete stoppage of the business of manufac ture and might well have been within the ambit of clause (6).
The effect of the provisions of the Act, however, has no reasonable relation to the object in view but is so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object.
Not only are the provisions of the statute in excess of the requirements of the case but the language employed prohibits a manufacturer of bidis from employing any person m his business, no matter wherever that person may be residing.
In other words, a manufacturer of bidis residing in this area cannot import labour from neighbouring places in the district or province or from outside the province.
Such a prohibition on the face of it is of an arbitrary nature inasmuch as it has no relation whatsoever to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and as such cannot be said to be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right.
Further the statute seeks to prohibit all persons residing in the notified villages during the agricultural season from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis.
It cannot be denied that there would be a number of infirm and disabled persons, a number of children, old women and petty shop keepers residing in these villages who are inca pable of being used for agricultural labour.
All such persons are prohibited by law from engaging themselves in the manufacture of bidis; and are thus being deprived of earning their livelihood.
It is a matter of common knowledge that there are certain classes of persons residing in every village who do not engage in agricultural operations.
They and their womenfolk and children in their leisure hours supplement their income by engaging themselves in bidi business.
There seems no reason for prohibiting them from carrying on this occupation, The statute as 765 it stands, not only compels those who can be engaged in agricultural work from not taking to other avocations, but it also prohibits persons who have no connection or relation to agricultural operations from engaging in the business of bidi making and thus earning their livelihood.
These provi sions of the statute, in our opinion, cannot be said to amount to reasonable restrictions on the right of the appli cants and that being so, the statute is not in conformity with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.
The law even to the extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agricultural labour cannot be held valid because the language employed is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right.
So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Consti tution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.
Mr. Sikri for the Government of Madhya Pradesh contends that the legislature of Madhya Pradesh was the proper judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the statute, that that legislature alone knew the conditions prevailing in the State and it alone could say what kind of legislation could effectively achieve the end in view and would help in the grow more food campaign and would help for bringing in fallow land under the plough and that this Court sitting at this great distance could not judge by its own yardstick of reason whether the restrictions imposed in the circumstances of the case were reasonable or not.
This argument runs counter to the clear provisions of the Con stitution.
The determination by the legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final or conclu sive;it is subject to the supervision by this Court.
In the matter of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court watches and guards the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and in exercising its functions it has the power to set aside an Act of the Legislature if it is in violation of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
We are therefore of opinion 98 766 that the impugned statute does not stand the test of reason ableness and is therefore void.
The result therefore is that the orders issued by the Deputy Commissioner on 13th June 1950 and 26th September 1950 are void, inoperative and ineffective.
We therefore direct the respondents not to enforce the provisions con tained in section 4 of the Act against the petitioners in any manner whatsoever.
The petitioners will have their costs of these proceedings in the two petitions.
Petitions allowed.
Agent for the petitioners in Nos. 78 and 79: Rajinder Narain.
Agent for the respondent in Nos. 78 and 79: P.A. Mehta.

summary:
The Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Manufac ture of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act, LXIV of 1948, a law which was in force at the commencement of the Constitu tion of India, provided that" the Deputy Commissioner may by notification fix a period to be an agricultural season with respect to such villages as may be specified therein" and that "the Deputy Commissioner may by general order which shall extend to such villages as he may specify, prohibit the manufacture of bidis during the agricultural season.
" The Act provided further that" no person residing in a, village specified in such order shall during the agricultur al season engage himself in the manufacture of bidis, and no manufacturer shall during the said season employ any person for the manufacture of bidis." An order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Act forbid ding all persons residing in certain villages from engaging in the manufacture of bidis during a. particular season.
A manufacturer of bidis and an employee in a bidi factory residing in one of the said villages applied under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus alleging that since the Act prohibited the petitioners from exercising their fundamental right to carry on their trade or business which was guaranteed to them by cl.
(1) (g) of article 19 of the Constitution, the Act was void: Held, (i) that the object of the statute, namely, to provide measures for the supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes in bidi manufacturing areas of the Province could well have been achieved by legislation re straining the employment of agricultural labour in the manufacture of bidis during the agriculrural season without prohibiting altogether the manufacture of bidis.
As the provisions of the Act had no reasonable relation 760 to the object in view, the Act was not a law imposing "reasonable restrictions" within the meaning of cl.
(6) of Art 19 and was therefore void.
(ii) The law even to the extent that it could be said to authorize the imposition of restrictions in regard to agri cultural labour cannot be held to be valid because the language employed was wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissi ble legislative action affecting the right, and so long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanc tioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly void.
The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.
The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates.
Legisla tion which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guarnteed in article 19 (1) (g) and the social control permit ted by el.
(6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.
Held also, that the determination by the Legislature of what constitutes a reasonable restriction is not final and conclusive.
The Supreme Court has power to consider whether the restrictions imposed by the Legislature are reasonable within the meaning of article 19, cl.
(6) and to declare the law void if in its opinion the restrictions are not reasonable.