judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 329 of 1975.
From the Judgment & Order dated the 15th April, 1975 of the Allahabad High Court in Crl.
A. No. 1144 of 1971.
R.L. Kohli and S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellants.
D.P. Uniyal and R.K. Bhatt for the Respondent.
The following Judgments were delivered: FAZAL ALI, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 15.4.1975 of the Allahabad High Court by which the Judges of the High Court while acquitting the accused, Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash from one under sections 302 and 307 read with section 149 I.P.C. to one under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34, I.P.C. and confirmed the sentences of imprisonment for life imposed on these appellants.
The prosecution case has been detailed in the judgment of the High Court as also in the judgment of our learned Brother Varadarajan J. and it is not necessary to repeat the same.
So far as the question of occurrence is concerned that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt as pointed out by Brother Varadarajan, J. as also by the High Court.
We also agree with the appreciation of the evidence by Brother Varadarajan, J. and his conclusion that the two deceased died at the hands of the appellants.
The entire occurrence seems to have been the result of a chronic land dispute between the parties in which several commissions were issued and which ultimately proved futile.
The prosecution has no doubt proved that the two persons were killed at the hands of the accused and that the occurrence had taken place while the Commissioners were present at the spot though they were not able to see the actual assault and were, therefore, not in a position to depose the detailed manner in which the assault had taken place.
The only serious question on which we would like to sound a discordant note from our Brother Varadarajan, J. is as to the actual nature of the offence which had been committed by the appellants, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash.
It would appear from the evidence 398 of CW 1 as also other eye witnesses that the accused were also assaulted with knife and one of them, Chhotey Lal, died as a result of the injuries caused to him.
The medical evidence as also the evidence of CW 1 clearly shows that there was exchange of hot words, followed by the assault on the appellants which, according to the prosecution, was a result of the exercise of self defence by the prosecution party, particularly Dinesh Chandra.
In fact, the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court held that the accused were the aggressors and, therefore, they had no right of private defence.
In order to ascertain whether the accused had the right of private defence, the genesis of the incident has to be traced.
Now, in this case the prosecution witnesses being partisan, the only important injured witness Dinesh Chandra, PW 11 being the son of the deceased, it would be necessary to ascertain with accuracy the genesis of the quarrel as revealed from the evidence of Court witnesses not shown to be partisan.
CW 1, Prem Narain Mathur is the practising advocate and was appointed as a Commissioner.
He was accompanied by Mahesh Chandra, Vakil, CW 3, advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs (accused Ram Karan) in the suit in which Commission was issued and Shri Jafar Imam, CW 2, learned advocate appearing for the defendants in the same suit.
C.W. 1 and C.W. 3 were at the house of accused 1 Ram Karan.
C.W. 1 says that several persons assembled at that time at the house of Ram Karan.
He is a bit vague but he says that at that time after tea was served and he was about to leave that place he saw a person lying on the pavement of the road.
This injured person was lying in front of the house of accused 1 Ram Karan.
This statement has not been questioned in cross examination nor adversely commented upon.
It gives a clue to the genesis of the occurrence.
After measurements were taken as directed by the Court, C.W. 1 and C.W. 3 came to the house of accused 1 Ram Karan.
Some persons collected there.
According to C.W. 1 injured persons were seen lying in front of the house of accused 1 and that was none else than the deceased.
If amongst those who collected at the house were the two deceased and P.W. 11 Dinesh Chandra, another injured witness on the side of the prosecution, it is crystal clear that the prosecution witnesses and the two deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra had come to the house of accused 1 Ram Karan.
How, if one of them was armed with a knife, they must have come with a view to either picking up quarrel or to guard themselves.
The occurrence took place in front of the house of 399 accused 1.
On the side of the prosecution Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra received fatal injuries and Dinesh Chandra was also injured.
However, on the side of the accused Chhotelal, son of accused 1 Ram Karan, suffered six injuries one of which proved fatal and he died.
Accused Ram Karan himself was also injured.
Injuries on both sides appear to have been caused with sharp cutting weapon like knife.
It is easy to infer the genesis of the dispute.
Both the parties were completely exasperated with the litigation.
Accused 1 Ram Karan had summoned Commission on five to six occasions and his attempt to end the litigation was thwarted by objections being taken on the side of Prakash Chandra deceased.
Therefore, both sides were in an exasperated mood.
Suddenly at the spur of the moment there ensued a quarrel.
Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on the side of the prosecution died and Chhotelal on the side of the accused died and each of them met a homicidal death.
On the side of the prosecution Dinesh Chandra was injured, on the side of accused Ram Karan was injured.
From this an irresistible inference ensues that exception 4 to section 300, I.P.C. would be attracted.
The exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder, if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
All the ingredients of Exception 4 are satisfied.
Prakash Chandra and his two sons and others came to the house of accused 1 to protest for the work of the Commissioner.
Dinesh Chandra amongst them was armed with a knife.
May be, he may be usually carrying the same for his safety.
The incident occurred in front of the house of accused 1 upon a sudden quarrel by this confrontation with eyebrows having been raised because of a persistent litigation, the occurrence took place.
There is no clear evidence to show that any one took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
Taking an overall view of the situation, we find no evidence of any intention to kill the two deceased on the part of the accused because the occurrence itself had taken place suddenly when, to begin with, the entire episode started for the particular purpose of partitioning the land by the Commissioners who had visited the village.
In these circumstances we are satisfied that Exception 4 of section 300, I.P.C. is attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of accused Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and, therefore, they would be guilty of committing 400 an offence under section 304(1)/34 I.P.C. and they should be convicted accordingly.
To this extent, therefore, we are unable to agree with Brother Varadarajan, J. that the conviction of the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash under section 302 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. should be confirmed.
We, therefore, allow this appeal to the extent that the conviction of Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash are altered from one under section 302 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. to that under section 304(1)/34 I.P.C. and they are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
Conviction and sentences under section 307/34, I.P.C. are maintained and sentences awarded have already been directed to run concurrently.
We allow the appeal of Ram Karan as indicated by Brother Varadarajan, J. VARADARAJAN, J.
This Criminal Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1144 of 1971, whereby the learned Judges, while acquitting two appellants Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar of the charges, altered the conviction of Ram Karan, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, appellants in this Criminal Appeal, under section 302 and 307, both read with section 149 I.P.C., into one under sections 302 and 307 both read with section 34 I.P.C. and confirmed the sentences of imprisonment for life for each of the two counts of murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and rigorous imprisonment for four years for attempt to murder Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) to run concurrently and set aside the conviction of the appellant Ram Karan under section 147 and the other two appellants under section 148 I.P.C.
The first appellant Ram Karan is the father of other appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and also of Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, who have been acquitted by the High Court as well as of deceased Chhotey Lal.
The learned Sessions Judge who tried the case convicted Ram Karan and all his four sons, Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar, Ved Prakash and Satish Kumar under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. (two counts) and section 307 read with section 149 I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life on each of the two counts under section 302 read with section 149 I.P.C. and to imprisonment for four years under section 307 read with section 149 I.P.C. He convicted Ram Karan under section 147 and his aforesaid four sons under section 148 I.P.C. and sentenced Ram Karan to undergo rigorous imprisonment 401 for one year and his sons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under section 147 and section 148 I.P.C. respectively.
The case of the prosecution was this: The deceased Prakash Chandra was the father of the deceased Umesh Chandra and the injured witness Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) as well as of Gyan Chand (P.W. 1).
Prakash Chandra and his sons were living in Seohara town, Bijnor district.
The appellant Ram Karan and his five sons including the deceased Chhotey Lal were living in another house in the same town as the neighbours of Prakash Chandra and his sons.
Prakash Chandra and his sons built a new house on a vacant land which existed between these two houses about three years prior to the occurrence in this case which has taken place at about 1.00 p.m. on 6.9.1970.
The appellant Ram Karan and five others filed Civil Suit No. 34 of 1967 in the court of the Munsif, Nagina against Prakash Chandra and his brother Gopi Chandra and one Krishna Devi, alleging that while constructing the new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land.
In that suit, Ram Karan got Commissioners appointed by the court on five or six occasions for taking measurements of the properties with the object of proving his case of encroachment by Prakash Chandra.
But those Commissioners ' reports were set aside on the objection raised by Prakash Chandra and the other defendents.
The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. 1) visited the spot on 6.9.1970, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for Prakash Chandra and another and Mr. Mahesh Chand (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan.
After the completion of the survey work at about 12.30 p.m. all the three lawyers were standing and talking in front of Ram Karan 's baithak at about 1.00 p.m.
Then Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra came there to talk with the Commissioner.
Ram Karan, who was present there along with his five sons, did not like that interference of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra with the Commissioner.
He stated that he has spent thousands of rupees for taking out the commissions and that the reports of the Commissioners were set aside on the objection of Prakash Chandra.
So saying, he instigated his sons to kill Prakash Chandra and his sons.
Thereupon, Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash attacked Prakash Chandra with knives while Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar and Satish attacked Umesh Chandra with knives.
On seeing Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) who rushed meanwhile from the eastern side to help his father and brother, Ram Karan instigated his sons to attack him and caught hold of him by 402 his waist, and all his five sons attacked him and inflicted injuries.
Then P.W. 11 took out a knife from his pent pocket and wielded it against Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal in self defence and they sustained injuries.
P.W. 11 received injuries and fell down.
Gyan Chandra (P.W. 1), who was seeing the occurrence, ran to his house along with some others and bolted the door when Sunil Kumar, Anil Kumar and Satish chased him for attacking him.
Abdul Wahid, P.W. 10, and others who were witnessing the occurrence raised an alarm, and Ram Karan and his sons ran away.
Gyan Chand, (P.W. 1) came out of his house sometime later and found his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra dead and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) lying with injuries.
He prepared the report, exhibit Ka. 3 and proceeded in a jeep with his brother Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11), to Seohara Police Station situate about half a mile away and handed over that report at 1.30 p.m. Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) was taken to Dhampur hospital after he was given first aid by a Doctor on the way.
He was examined at the Dhampur hospital by Dr. Bagchi, P.W. 3 who found on his person an abrasion and nine incised wounds of which injury No. 7 on the right side of the chest through which blood and air were coming out was serious and the rest were simple.
The dead bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra which were found lying in front of their house where blood also was found, were later sent for autopsy.
Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal went to the Government hospital, Bijnor where they were examined by Dr. Sarin (P.W. 2) at 4 p.m. and 4.15 p.m. respectively on 6.9.1970.
P.W. 2 found one punctured wound and four incised wounds on Chhotey Lal and three incised wounds on Ram Karan.
The injuries on both of them were fresh and those on Ram Karan were simple while injury No. 1 on Chhotey Lal, namely, a punctured wound which was lung deep and anterior to the left nipple, was grievous and the rest were simple.
The injuries on both could, in the opinion of P.W. 2, have been caused by knife.
P.W. 2 issued the wound certificates exhibit Ka. 12 and Ka. 13.
Ram Karan 's report was lodged at the Police Station at 10.30 p.m. on 6.9.1970.
Chhotey Lal died in the District hospital, Bijnor on 10.9.1970.
Dr. Zuber conducted autopsy on the bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on 7.9.1970 and found nine antemortem, injuries, of which six were incised wounds, on the body of Prakash Chandra and six antemortem incised wounds on the body 403 of Umesh Chandra and he opined that the death of both of them was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from the incised injuries.
exhibit Ka. 1 and Ka. 2 are the postmortem certificates relating to Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra issued by Dr. Zuber who was examined as P.W. 1 in the Committing Magistrate 's Court (exhibit Ka. 37).
Dr. Dua (C.W. 4) conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal on 11.9.1970 and found an abrasion and five incised wounds which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The prosecution 's case rests mainly on the evidence of Gyan Chand (P.W. 1), Abdul Wahid (P.W. 10) and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11).
As stated earlier P.Ws 1 and 11 are the sons of deceased Prakash Chandra and brothers of the other deceased Umesh Chandra.
P.W. 11 had received injuries during the occurrence and P.W. 1 is the witness who had lodged the First Information Report (exhibit K. 3) in the Seohara Police Station at the earliest opportunity at 1.30 p.m. soon after the occurrence which had taken place at about 1.00 p.m.
These three witnesses were put forward as eyewitnesses and they have deposed in support of the case of the prosecution.
The accused put forward their version of the case.
According to the accused, after the Commissioner (C.W. 1) finished his work and went to the house of the appellant Ram Karan, Prakash Chandra and his sons Umesh Chandra and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) came to the baithak of Ram Karan and attacked Ram Karan and deceased Chhotey Lal with knives and thereupon they grappled with those three persons and wrested the knives from them and attacked them in self defence.
The accused examined D.W. 1 on their behalf.
The court examined the Commissioner and the counsel of the parties in the civil suit as C. Ws. 1 to 3 and the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of Chhotey Lal as C.W. 4.
The evidence of C.W. 1 is that after he completed taking measurements he went along with Ram Karan 's counsel Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house, that both of them came out of the house 8 or 10 minutes later, that when he advanced from the door of the baithak he saw a person lying injured on the pavement of the road and another injured person standing there, that a third person came and struck the injured person who was standing, and that he and C.W. 3 left the place thereafter.
The evidence of C.W. 3 is that he and C.W. 1 who had gone to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house after C.W. 1 had 404 taken the measurements, came out of the baithak 5 or 7 minutes later, and saw Chhotey Lal grappling with a young man, that in the course of grappling Chhotey Lal fell down bleeding, that Chhotey Lal managed to get up and snatched the weapon of the assailant and struck him with it, that Prakash Chandra came to the rescue of the young man and Chhotey Lal struck him with the same weapon and both the young man and Prakash Chandra fell down after receiving injuries from Chhotey Lal, and that on account of the incident he went away along with C.W. has added that soon after he went and sat in the baithak of Ram Karan 's house, Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) came and said something to C.W. 1 from beyond the door of the baithak.
The evidence of Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) is that after measurements had been taken C. Ws. 1 and 3 went to the baithak of Ram Karan 's house while he sat in the verandah of the old haveli of Prakash Chandra, that he and Prakash Chandra 's son, who is now no more, thereafter went near the Commissioner (C.W 1) and he told C.W. 1 that he may hear what Prakash Chandra wanted to say, that after saying so he got back for meeting another person while Prakash Chandra and his son remained there, that after reaching the verandah of Prakash Chandra he went away with Mehboob Ali who was waiting for him to Mehboob Ali 's house and that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when he was returning to the verandah of Prakash Chandra 's house he heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan 's house.
The learned Sessions Judge has observed in his judgment that the evidence of C.Ws. 1 to 3 is contradictory, unnatural and not truthful.
He found that P.W. 1 's report (Ka. 3) was lodged in the Police Station at 1.30 p.m. soon after the occurrence had taken place at about 1.00 p.m. and that there has been no attempt at concoction in this case.
He rejected the contention that Abdul Wahid, (P.W. 10) had any reason to depose falsely against the appellant Ved Prakash and found his evidence to be reliable.
He observed that though Prakash Chandra had been working as an Engineer in a sugar mill at Seohara and P.W. 10 was employed in the engineering department, P.W. 10 was actually working under one Bachcha Lal and is an independent witness.
P.W. 1 has stated in his evidence that Prakash Chandra, Umesh Chandra and Ram Karan did not have any weapon at the time of the occurrence.
The evidence of the injured witness P.W. 11 is that when he returned home from Moradabad at about 12.30 p.m. on the day of occurrence 405 he saw his father Prakash Chandra and brother Umesh Chandra lying in a pool of blood and that on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he also should be killed and caught hold of him by his waist and that he was attacked with knives by the accused persons including Ram Karan and he wielded in self defence the knife which he had purchased on that day for his work.
The learned Sessions Judge accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10 and 11 and commented upon Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal going to the hospital at Bijnor without arranging for a report being given at the Police Station at Seohara in time and held that the accused were the aggressors and that Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) caused injuries to Ram Karan and the deceased Chhotey Lal in the exercise of the right of private defence.
Accordingly he found the accused guilty and convicted them and sentenced them as mentioned above.
The High Court also rejected the defence theory that Chhotey Lal was attacked by three persons armed with knife, chura and khukhri having regard to the fact that he had only one lung deep punctured wound and the other four wounds were only skin deep and of very minor dimensions.
The learned Judges of the High Court found that the name of Anil Kumar is not mentioned in the First Information Report (exhibit Ka. 3) but instead the name of one Virendra is mentioned and that it appears from the evidence of P.W. 1 that Virendra is the name of Prakash Chandra 's brother.
They found that in the statement of P.W. 11 recorded as dying declaration, Sushil Kumar is mentioned instead of Satish Kumar.
In these circumstances the learned Judges found that there is reasonable doubt regarding the participation of the accused Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar and they gave the benefit of that doubt to those two appellants before them and acquitted them.
In other respects, the learned Judges accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10 and 11 regarding the occurrence and rejected the defence version and held the appellants guilty under section 302 read with section 34 in respect of the murder of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and under section 307 read with section 34 in respect of Dinesh Chandra, (P.W. 11) and convicted them accordingly and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for four years under section 307 read with section 34 I.P.C. 406 We perused the records and the judgments of the learned Sessions Judge and of the learned Judges of the High Court and heard the arguments of Mr. R.L. Kohli, Senior Advocate who appeared for the appellants and of Mr. D.P. Uniyal, Senior Advocate who appeared for the respondent State of U.P.
We were taken through the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10 and 11.
The learned Sessions Judge has observed in his judgment that the evidence of the three lawyers C.Ws. 1 to 3 is contradictory, unnatural and not truthful and that if they had given honest evidence it would have been easier for the court to conclude which side was the aggressor.
This observation of the learned Sessions Judge appears to be too sweeping and not correct at least with reference to C.W. 2 who has professed ignorance about the actual occurrence in the case and has stated that he left after asking C.W. 1 from outside the baithak of Ram Karan 's house to hear what Prakash Chandra who had gone with him and his deceased son wanted to tell him because another person Mehboob Ali with whom he later went to his house was waiting for him in the verandah of Prakash Chandra 's house.
The evidence of C.W. 2 that no quarrel took place when he was present there though when he was returning to the verandah of Prakash Chandra 's house he heard some hot words being exchanged near the baithak of Ram Karan 's house, is, in a way, corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 1.
P.W. 1 has stated that when exchange of hot words started the Commissioner and Vakils of the parties moved from there to the road and that just when Ram Karan 's Vakil had gone a short distance from Ram Karan 's house, Ram Karan and others stated that "they have got our thousands of rupees spent over litigation.
We have become tired of getting commissions issued.
Kill them today so that the trouble may be ended for ever.
At that time all the five sons of Ram Karan, Chhotey Lal, Ved Prakash, Satish Kumar, Sunil Kumar and Anil Kumar were present, and when Ram Karan said so all five sons whipped out knives and started assulting. .".
This portion of the evidence of P.W. 1 is to the effect that the lawyers C.Ws. 1 3 were not present at the time of the actual assault on the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra as a well as on P.W. 11.
Even P.W. 10 has stated in his evidence that "when he reached near dharmshala at about 12.45 p.m. he heard the shouts of Ram Karan from his house situate at a distance of 30 paces, that when he reached the end of the road he was in a position to see the house of Ram Karan, that on hearing the shouts he proceeded towards the place from where they came and stood near 407 the wall and found three Vakils present and also Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, that as soon as he reached the place, the Vakils left the place, that Ram Karan then stated that he got the Commissioner appointed 5 or 6 times and spent several thousands of rupees and he should be killed and that when Ram Karan said so his sons Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash began to attack Prakash Chandra with knives, that Sunil Kumar and Ram Karan 's other sons began to assault Umesh Chandra with knives, that during the marpit Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra fell down after receiving injuries, that thereafter Dinesh Chandra, son of Prakash Chandra came from the eastern direction, and on seeing him Ram Karan shouted that he should also be done to death, and he caught hold of Dinesh Chandra by his waist, and that all the four boys and deceased Chhotey Lal began to assault Dinesh Chandra with knives, and Dinesh Chandra wielded his knife in self defence and caused injuries to Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal and thereafter fell down and became unconscious. ".
This portion of the evidence of P.W. 10 also shows that C.Ws. 1 to 3 left the place soon after exchange of hot words began between the two sides.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that there is no reason to reject the evidence of C.W. 2 that no quarrel took place when he was present near about the scene of occurrence.
In the circumstances of the case, it is very probable that before serious trouble started from the exchange of hot words, C.Ws. 1 to 3.
the Commissioner and the counsel for both the parties in the civil suit, left the place and were not present at the time of the actual occurrence as stated by P.Ws. 1 and 10.
Mr. R.L. Kohli drew our attention to some portions of the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court and submitted that the observation of the learned Judges that from the side of the defence it was not suggested to any witness that Abdul Wahid (P.W. 10) was a different man and that he has been introduced because the real Abdul Wahid was not prepared to support the prosecution case is incorrect.
The learned counsel further submitted that the observation of the learned Judges that the presence of Gyan Chand (P.W. 1) at the time of the occurrence does not appear to have been challenged by the defence is also not correct.
This criticism of the learned counsel for the appellants appears to be well founded, for I find that a suggestion has been made to P.W. 10 in cross examination and he has admitted that there is also 408 another person named Wahid son of Abdul Rehman in his mohalla and that that person was an accused in a rioting case.
And in the cross examination of P.W. 1 it has been clearly suggested that he was not present at the spot and that he prepared the report exhibit Ka. 3 afterwards with some consultation.
P.W. 1 has no doubt denied that suggestion and stated that he was present at the spot and that he himself wrote the report exhibit Ka. 3 before he came out of the house by opening the door.
The learned Judges have stated in their judgment that after Ram Karan stated that he has spent thousands of rupees on commissions and every time the report of the Commissioner was set aside on the objection of Prakash Chandra and he instigated his sons to kill Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra, all the five sons of Ram Karan started giving knife blows to Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and both of them fell down.
This portion of the judgment of the learned Judges is to the effect that all the five sons of Ram Karan including the deceased Chhotey Lal attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra whereas it is the case of the prosecution as brought out in the evidence of P.W. 1 that after Ram Karan instigated his sons to open the attack only Chhotey Lal and Ved Prakash attacked Prakash Chandra with knives and only Sunil Kumar.
Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar attacked Umesh Chandra with knives.
It is unfortunate that these inaccuracies have crept into the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court.
But on an overall consideration of the entire material on record and the evidence in the case in the light of the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the appreciation of the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10 and 11 by the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Judges of the High Court in so far as the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash are concerned is correct and that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 10 proves beyond reasonable doubt that these two appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra with knives as a result of which both of them, who had no weapons died on the spot, and the evidence of P.Ws. 10 and 11 proves satisfactorily and beyond any reasonable doubt that these two appellants attacked P.W. 11 with knives with such intention that if he had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him they would be guilty of murder in furtherance of their common intention to murder.
The dead bodies of Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and blood were found in front of the house of both the 409 deceased and P.W. 11.
Both the deceased had no weapons and they had been attacked before P.W. 11 arrived and wield his knife against Ram Karan and Chhotey Lal.
The main occurrence had taken place in front of the house of both the deceased and P.W. 11.
Before the trial court it was not submitted that the attack by the accused persons on both the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra and P.W. 11 was without any pre meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
Nor is it a case in which it could be said that the offenders had not taken undue advantage or had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
No such argument was put forward even before the High Court to bring the main occurrence under section 304 (Part I) I.P.C.
Since I have found that the occurrence has taken place in front of the house of the two deceased and P.W. 11 in this case and that the accused persons were the aggressors neither Exception 2 nor Exception 4 to section 300 I.P.C. would apply to the facts of this case and the offence cannot be brought under section 304 (Part I) I.P.C.
In these circumstances, I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that the appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were the aggressors and find that they have been rightly convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of those two persons and under section 307 read with section 34 I.P.C. with reference to P.W. 11.
But I am of the opinion, having regard to the age of appellant Ram Karan, who was about 70 years old at the time of the occurrence that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he would have caught hold of the young man Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) by his waist and whether he would have asked all his sons to attack and kill Prakash Chandra and his son.
I therefore, give the benefit of this reasonable doubt to the appellant Ram Karan and set aside his conviction under section 302 read with s.34 (two counts) and under section 307 read with section 34 and acquit him and direct him to be set at liberty forthwith if he is in custody and his presence is not required in connection with any other case.
In other respects I dismiss the criminal appeal and confirm the conviction of Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash and the sentences awarded to them.
In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed to the extent that the conviction of Ram Karan under section 302 read with section 34 (two counts) and under section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is set aside and he is acquitted and that convictions of the appellants, Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash, are 410 altered from one under section 302/34, I.P.C. to that under section 304(1)/34, IPC and they are sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
Conviction and sentences under section 307/34, I.P.C. are maintained and sentences awarded have already been directed to run concurrently.
S.R. Appeal partly allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The five accused Ram Karan, his sons Sunil Kumar, Ved Prakash, Anil Kumar, Satish Kumar and deceased son Chhoteylal filed a Civil Suit 34 of 1967 against the decased Prakash Chandra, his brother Gopi Chandra and one Krishan Devi, alleging that while constructing their new house Prakash Chandra had encroached upon a portion of their land.
In that suit appellant Ram Karan got Commissioners appointed by the court on five or six occasions for taking measurements of the properties with the object of proving his case of encroachment by Prakash Chandra, the deceased.
But these Commissioners ' reports were set aside on the objection raised by Prakash Chandra and the other defendants.
The last Advocate Commissioner Mr. Mathur (C.W. 1) visited the spot on 6 9 1970, the day of occurrence, accompanied by Mr. Zafar Hussain (C.W. 2) who appeared for deceased Prakash Chandra and Mr. Mahesh Chandra (C.W. 3) who appeared for Ram Karan.
After the completion of the survey work and measurements at about 1 P.M. when all the three lawyers were standing and talking in front of the house of the appellants deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra came there to talk to the Commissioner, which interference was not liked by the appellants.
This resulted in a sudden quarrel, exchange of hot words later followed by assault with knife etc., on the appellants which, according to prosecution, was in the exercise of right of self defence by the prosecution party, particularly Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11).
On the side of the appellants Ram Karan 's son Chhotey Lal (accused) died and on the side of the prosecution Prakash Chandra and his son Umesh Chandra died and Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) was grievously injured.
All the five accused were tried and convicted by the Sessions Judge for offences under sections 302/149 I.P.C. (two counts) and 307/149 I.P.C. and were sentenced to imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for four years respectively.
Ram Karan was also convicted under section 147 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and his four sons were convicted under section 148 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years.
In appeal the 396 High Court acquitted Anil Kumar and Satish Kumar, set aside the conviction and sentence under sections 147 and 148 I.P.C. in respect of the rest and confirmed (a) their sentence of life imprisonment by altering the conviction one under sections 302/34 I.P.C. and (b) their sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment to one under sections 307/34 I.P.C. Hence the appeal by special leave by Ram Karan and his two sons.
Acquitting Ram Karan and allowing the appeal of the other two in part, the Court ^ HELD: Having regard to the age of the appellant Ram Karan who was about 70 years old at the time of the occurrence, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether he would have caught hold of the young man Dinesh Chandra (P.W. 11) by his waist and whether he would have asked all his sons to attack and kill Prakash Chandra and his sons.
The appellant Ram Karan is entitled to be set at liberty.
[409 D E] BY MAJORITY Per Fazal Ali, J. (and on behalf of D.A. Desai, J.) 1:1.
Exception 4 to section 300 I.P.C. provides that culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without pre meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
[399 D] 1:2.
In this case, the incident occurred upon a sudden quarrel and no one took undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner on either side.
Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra on the side of the prosecution died and Chhotey Lal on the side of the accused died and each of them met a homicidal death.
Therefore exception 4 to section 300 Indian Penal Code is clearly attracted and the offence of murder would be reduced to culpable homicide in respect of Sushil Kumar and Ved Prakash and, therefore, they would be guilty of committing on offence under section 304(1)/34 I.P.C. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years would be appropriate; conviction and sentence under sections 307/34 I.P.C. being in order would run con currently.
[399 B C, G H, 400 A] Per Varadarajan, J. (contra).
Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash were the aggressors and they have been rightly convicted under section 302 read with section 34 I.P.C. for the offence of murder of Prakash Chandra land Umesh Chandra and under sections 307/34 I.P.C. with reference to P.W. 11.
Neither Exception 2 nor Exception 4 to section 300 I.P.C. would apply to the facts of the case and the offence cannot be brought under section 304 (Part I) I.P.C.
The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 10 and 11 proves beyond reasonable doubt that these two appellants Sunil Kumar and Ved Prakash attacked the deceased Prakash Chandra and Umesh Chandra with knives as a result of which both of them, who had no weapons died on the spot and these two appellants attacked P.W. 11 with knives with such intention that if he had died as a result of the injuries sustained by him they would be guilty of murder in furtherance of their common intention to murder.
Their conviction under section 307/34 is proper.
[408 F H, 409 C D] 397


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd March, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1906 for 1976.
WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 2436 OF 1981 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th August, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6909 of 1979.
AND CIVIL APPEAL No. 1710 OF 1981 From the judgment and Decree dated the 13th March, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 6167 of 1979.
AND SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.
3573 OF 1979 494 From the judgment and order dated the 3rd January, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 3714 of 1978.
G.L.Sanghi, Mrs. A. Verma and D.N. Mishra for the Appellant in CA.
No. 1314 of 1978.
J.P. Goyal, S.Markandeya and C.K.Ratnaparkhi for the Respondent in CA.
1314 of 1978.
A.K. Srivastava for the Appellant in CA.
1710/80.
R.B. Mehrotra for Respondent in CA.
1710/80.
Pramod Swarup and Mrs. section Markandeya for the appellant in CA.
2436 of 1980.
S.N. Kacker and K.K Gupta for the Respondent in CA.
2436 of 1980.
P.R.Mridul, Praveen Jain and K.B. Rohatgi for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No. 3573 of 1979 R.H. Dhebar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA J.
The first two appeals by special leave and the third by certificate and the special leave petition raise a common question of law and, therefore, we propose to dispose of them by a common judgment.
The pattern of facts in all these cases is similar.
We, therefore set out the facts of Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978 to bring out the point for consideration in these matters.
The appellant Om Prakash Gupta is a tenant of a shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/ .The respondent landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act 13 of 1972 and hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') did not apply to the shop and the tenant was liable to eviction.
The Judge, Small Causes Court, Mainpuri decreed the suit on the finding inter alia that the construction of the shop in suit was completed in the year 1967 and 495 that ten years having not elapsed since then, the provisions of the Act did not apply to the case.
The defendant went up in revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act against the judgment and decree of the trial Court but the same was substantially dismissed.
The defendant thereupon filed a revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in the High Court which came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge who remitted the following issue to the trial court: "On what date was the construction of the building in dispute completed within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and deemed to have been completed as contemplated by Explanation I (a) thereto.
" The Judge Small Causes Court by his order dated 26th of November 1977 returned the following finding: "The construction of the disputed shop will be deemed to have been completed on the date of the first assessment i.e. 1.4.68 within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972.
" The finding returned by the trial court was sought to be challenged on behalf of the tenant on the ground that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the construction of the shop and not the date of the first assessment.
In Tilak Raj vs Sardar Devendra Singh,(1) a learned Single Judge of the same High Court had the occasion to consider section 2 (2) of the Act.
He held: "It is apparent from this provision that for purposes of this Act, a building is to be deemed to be constructed, if it is subject to assessment, on the date with effect from which the first assessment is made.
It is immaterial whether the building was constructed actually prior to that date or it had come into occupation prior to that date.
The law recognised for the purposes of this Act, the date of assessment as the date of the completion of the building.
There is thus no error in the judgment of the court below.
" 496 The learned Single Judge before whom the revision in the instant case came up for hearing doubted the correctness of the above decision.
He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench.
There is no dispute that the first assessment of the shop took place on 1st of April, 1968.
It is also not in dispute that the shop in question was occupied by the defendant on 16th of June, 1967, and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half.
The appellant sought the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the ground that if the date of occupation was taken to be the date of the completion of the construction of the shop, then ten years having elapsed during the pendency of the revision before the High Court, the Act would be applicable.
The Division Bench, however, over ruled the contention of the appellant and held that the construction of the shop in question would be deemed to have been completed on 1st of April 1968 and, therefore, the Act would not be applicable to the building till the date of the decision of the revision on March 23, 1968.
The defendant undaunted by the failure came to this Court to challenge the judgment of the High Court.
Mr. G.L. Sanghi, senior counsel.
appearing for the appellant strongly contended that on a correct interpretation of sub section (2) of section 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question.
It would be appropriate at this stage to extract sub section (2) of section 2 of the Act insofar as it is material for the purposes of the case: "Except as provided in sub section (5) of section 12, sub section (1 A) of section 21, sub section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed: Explanation I.
For the purposes of this sub section: (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof 497 comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time :. " The precise contention on behalf of the appellant is that the exemption created by this sub section does not embrace buildings constructed prior to the enforcement of the Act.
In support of his contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan Lal Shinghal vs Smt.
Murti Devi.(1) The same contention was raised by him in that case also and a Division Bench of this Court accepted the contention and held that Act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to buildings brought into being de novo after the Act came into force.
In that case there is no discussion except this bald observation.
This Court in a subsequent case Ram Saroop Rai vs Lilavati(2) held to the contrary.
It is on this account that the present appeals were referred to a larger Bench.
There is no ambiguity in the language of sub section (2) of section 2 and in the absence of any ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub section.
In plain words the sub section contemplates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed.
It nowhere says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret it in the way the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to interpret it, we would be adding words to the sub section, which is not permissible.
Primarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.
The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore, capable of two interpretations.
In the present case the language of sub section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explicit and unambiguous and it is not capable of two interpretations.
498 As a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this be so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1978.
In order to appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to Explanation I to sub section (2) of section 2 which has already been extracted.
Explanation I provides that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time.
A perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation would be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment, thereof.
If there is an assessment, as in the present case it is, it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten years ' old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court, and therefore there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant.
Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act.
There is yet another reason why section 39 will have no application to the present case.
In view of sub section (2) of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable.
Considered from any angle the Act has no application to the present case and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39.
The suit has, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below.
We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Sanghi.
The counsel for the appellants in the other appeals and 499 the petitioner in the special leave petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi.
For the foregoing discussion the appeals and the special leave petition are dismissed.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
We, however, direct that the order of eviction in each case shall not be executed before 30th of June, 1982 on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition files an undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to the following effect: 1. that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord respondent on or before 30th of June, 1982; 2.
that he will pay to the respondent arrears of rent, if any, within a month from today; 3. that he will pay to the respondent future compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises for each calendar month by the 10th of the succeeding month; and 4. that he will not induct any other person in the suit premises as a sub tenant or licensee or in any other capacity whatsoever.
We further direct that in default of compliance with any one or more of the conditions of the undertaking or if the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated time, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and (Eviction) Act, 1972 provided by sub section (2) of section 2 that except as provided in the Act, the Act was not to apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the date on which its construction was completed.
Explanation I to the sub section provided that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said date, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time.
The appellant tenant was in occupation of a shop from the 16th June, 1967 and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation of another tenant for about a month and a half.
The first assessment of the shop took place on Ist of April, 1968.
The respondent landlord filed a suit for the eviction of the tenant on the ground that the Act did not apply to the shop and the tenant was liable to eviction.
The Trial Judge finding that the construction of the shop was completed in the year 1967 and that 10 years having not elapsed since then, held that the provisions of the Act did not apply and decreed the suit.
The appellant 's 492 petition under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act was dismissed.
In his revision petition to the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant contended that the date of occupation should be taken to be the date of completion of the construction of the shop and not the date of first assessment.
The High Court overruled the contention and held that the construction of the shop would be deemed to have been completed on 1st of April, 1968 the date of the first assessment and ten years not having elapsed, the Act would not be applicable to the building and dismissed the revision petition.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant: (1) that by virtue of sub section (2) of section 2, the Act would be applicable to the shop in question and that the exemption created by the sub section did not embrace buildings constructed prior to the commencement of the Act and (2) that the building should be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment.
and that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1(i) The suit was rightly decreed by the Courts below.
The Act had no application and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39.
[498 G H] (ii) Primarily, the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature.
The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in the words used by the legislature itself.
The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore capable of two interpretations.
[497 F] (iii) The language of sub section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explict and unambiguous and is not capable of two interpretations.
[497 G] In the absence of any ambiguity there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub section.
The sub section contemplates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the date on which its construction is completed.
It no where says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret it in such a way would be to add words to the sub section, which is not permissible.
[497 D F] 2 (i) Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation would be taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment thereof.
If there is an assessment, as in the instant case it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction.
The building had not therefore become more than ten years 's old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court and consequently there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant.
[498 D F] 493 (ii) In order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of the commencement of the Act which was 15th of July, 1972.
[498 F] In the instant case the suit was filed on 23rd of March 1974 long after the commencement of the Act.
[498 F] (iii) In view of sub section (2) of section 2, the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years.
If the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable.
[498 G] Rattan Lal Shinghal vs Smt.
Murti Devi (1980)4 S.C.C. 258 and Ram Saroop Rai vs Lilavati ; , over ruled.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1825 of 1970.
From the Judgment an order dated the 28th August, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Writ No. 365 of 1962.
S.N. Kacker, K. K. Jain, P. Dayal & section K. Gupta for the Appellant.
Badri Das Sharma for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J.
The present appeal by certificate granted under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 28th of August, 1969 dismissing writ petition No. 365 of 1962.
Thakur Sangram Singh, the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur.
His jagir was resumed on Ist of July, 1954 under section 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as 'the Jagirs Act, 1952 '.
The Jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption of his jagir under section 26 of the Jagirs Act.
The compensation was to be determined according to the principles laid down in the second schedule attached to that Act.
He filed his claim for compensation in August, 1954.
He claimed compensation on the basis of rent rates which were in force on the date of resumption.
It appears that settlement operations were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.
The rent rates proposed by the Settlement Officer were published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 23rd of August, 1952.
The final proposals of the Settlement Officer were sanctioned by the Government on 25th of November, 1953.
The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from 1st of July, 1953.
Obviously, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, Ist of July, 1954, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government on 25th November, 1953 were in force.
Sangram Singh, however, challenged the validity of the rent rates fixed under the settlement by means of writ petition No. 308 of 477 1953, which was allowed by the High Court on 23rd of November, 1954, quashing the rent rates as they were in flagrant violation of section 82 (1) (a) and (b) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.
The High Court gave a direction for fresh rates to be proposed in accordance with the said provisions.
Pursuant to the order of the High Court dated 23rd November, 1954 the rent rates were revised and fresh rent rates were fixed by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 and they were applied retrospectively from 1st of July, 1953.
The revised rent rates were substantially lower than the rent rates assessed in 1953.
According to the rent rates of 1953 the total rental income from the jagir was Rs.131,657.48 while according to the revised rent rates the rental income was reduced to Rs. 82,501.50.
The jagirder again filed a writ petition No. 135 of 1955 for a direction to the State Government not to apply the rent rates assessed in 1955 retrospectively with effect from 1st of July, 1953.
The High Court, however, held that it was open to the Settlement Officer to apply rent rates retrospectively under section 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947.
But the High Court specifically left open the question whether or not the rent rates assessed in 1955 and applied retrospectively from 1st July, 1953 could form the basis for determining compensation payable to the jagirdar under the Act.
When the jagirdar filed his claim for compensation in August, 1954 his writ petition challenging the rent rates enforced by the Government order dated 25th of November, 1953 was pending.
The jagirdar, therefore, based his claim for compensation alternatively under sections 6 and 7 respectively of the Jagirs Act.
As pointed out earlier, on the basis of the settlement of 1953 the rental income from the jagir came to Rs. 1,31,657.48.
If on the other hand the jagir was taken to be unsettled, he was entitled to compensation on the basis of actual rental income for three years which came to about Rs. 3 lakhs.
The Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th of November, 1960 granted compensation on the basis of rent rates assessed in 1955.
The jagirdar preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue but the same was dismissed.
Sangram Singh died in December 1961 and the order of the Board of Revenue was challenged by his son the petitioner appellant in the High Court of Rajasthan.
Two alternative contentions were 478 raised before the High Court on behalf of the petitioner: (1) that the compensation should have been assessed on the basis of rent rates determined in 1953 as they were the rent rates assessed on the jagir lands as entered in the revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6 (3) (a) (i) read with the definition of 'settled village ' contained in section 2 (n) as it stood on the date of resumption; (2) that in the absence of a valid settlement on the date of resumption the jagir should be treated as not being a 'settled village ' and compensation should be assessed on the actual income from rents during the three agricultural years; 1949 50, 1950 51 and 1951 52, as provided in section 7 of the Act.
The High Court declined to accept either of the contentions.
The first contention was rejected by the High Court on the ground that the petitioner was estopped from taking up the position by his own conduct inasmuch as his father had challenged the rent rates assessed in 1953 by means of a writ petition which was allowed and the rent rates assessed in 1953 were quashed, and secondly because the rent rates assessed in 1953 were a nullity and in the eyes of law there were no valid rent rates assessed and entered in the revenue records on the basis of which compensation could have been determined.
The second contention was also negatived on the ground that fresh rent rates in accordance with the directions of the High Court were assessed in 1955 and were applied retrospectively with effect from 1st July, 1953 and, therefore, the jagir could not be taken to be an unsettled village.
The petitioner has now come to challenge the order of the High Court by the present appeal.
It may be pointed out that if the jagir was a settled one the compensation would be assessed on the basis of the rent rates as settled in settlement operations, which were prevalent on the date of resumption and as entered in the revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6 (3) (a) (i) read with the definition of 'settled village ' contained in section 2 (n).
If on the other hand, the jagir was an unsettled one the compensation would have to be assessed on the actual income from the rents during the three agricultural years: 1949 50, 1950 51 and 1951 52 as provided in section 7 of the Act.
Shri S.N. Kacker has contended on behalf of the appellant that the rent rates settled in 1953 having been quashed by the High 479 Court, the jagir would be deemed to be an unsettled village and, therefore, the compensation should be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act and not in accordance with the rent rates determined in 1953.
From the observations made by the High Court itself it is evident that the rent rates notified in 1953 were quashed as invalid.
After the quashing of rent rates determined in 1953 it can by no stretch of imagination be said that the settlement made in 1953 still stood for the purpose of determining the compensation for the jagir in question.
Shri Badri Das Sharma appearing for the State on the other hand has contended that it is true that the determination of rent rates in 1953 had been quashed, but the High Court had directed re determination of the rent rates in accordance with the provisions of section 82 and, therefore, the direction of the High Court was for rectifying the mistake that had cropped in the determination of the rent rates of 1953 and if this be so, the rent rates determined in 1953 were still there and the compensation could be determined on that basis.
Having given our anxious consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the parties we are of the positive view that after the quashing of the settlement made in 1953 it cannot be said that the settlement of the jagir still existed.
It is to be noted at this stage that the settlement of 1953 was quashed by the High Court on the ground that the procedure laid down in the statute had not been followed.
The quashing of such an order only means tabula rasa (clean slate) as if there was no determination of rent rates in 1953.
In this view of the matter the jagir would be taken to be an unsettled village on the date of resumption.
Shri Badri Das Sharma, however, contended that pursuant to the direction of the High Court in Writ No. 308 of 1953 fresh rent rates were assessed in 1955 which were made applicable with retrospective effect from 1st of July, 1953 and that, therefore, the rent rates assessed in 1955 will be taken to be the rent rates prevalent on the date of resumption and as such the Board of Revenue as well as the High Court were fully justified in taking the view that compensation was to be determined on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955.
In support of his contention Shri Sharma referred to the definition of the 'settled village ' in section 2 (n), which reads: 480 "(n) 'Settled ' when used with reference to a village or any other area, means the village or other area to which the rent rates determined during settlement operations have been made applicable whether prospectively or retrospectively, and the whole of such village or other area shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act and the rules and orders made thereunder, to be so settled if such rates have been made so applicable to not less than three fourths of such village or other area.
" On the strength of this definition it is sought to be contended that the jagir in question would be deemed to be a settled village as it is open to the authorities to apply the settlement either prospectively or retrospectively, and it was made applicable by the Settlement Officer retrospectively.
We are afraid, the argument cannot be accepted.
The criterion to determine whether a particular jagir is a settled one or not is to see whether the rent rates determined in settlement operations have been made applicable.
It is only from the date of effectuation of a valid settlement of rent rates in respect of a particular jagir which makes the jagir a settled one.
Reliance was also placed on section 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947, which runs thus: "86.
Any rent fixed by order of the Settlement Officer under this Act shall be payable from the first day of July next following the date of such order, unless the Settlement Officer thinks fit, for any reason to direct that it shall be payable from some earlier date.
" A plain reading of this section indicates that the rent fixed by the Settlement Officer shall normally be payable from 1st of July next following the date of such order.
The section, however, further authorises the Settlement Officer to direct that the same shall be payable from some earlier date.
The realisation of rent from a retrospective date will not make the jagir in question a settled one as from that date.
The settlement of rent rates is one thing and the realisation of rent on the basis of the settlement is quite another.
In case of a settled village the compensation would be determined on the basis of the rent rates settled during a settlement operation recorded in the revenue papers on the date of resumption.
Thus, it is the applicability of the rent rates determined during a settlement made prior to the date of resumption which would make the village a settled village as on that date.
481 There is yet another aspect from which the matter can be looked into.
The jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption and, therefore, we have to examine the position as it stood on the date of resumption.
If the village was an unsettled village on the date of resumption he would be entitled to compensation on the basis of the village being unsettled.
The right of compensation vested in the jagirdar on the date of resumption and he could not be deprived of his right by a subsequent amendment unless the amendment in law specifically or by necessary implication provided or depriving the jagirdar of his vested right.
We do not find anything in the definition of the term 'settled ' under section 2 (n) of the Act or in section 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act to indicate that the legislature intended to affect the vested right.
In this view of the legal position, the jagir Commissioner was not justified in assessing the compensation on the basis of the assessment of rent rates in 1955.
The only correct basis will be to treat the jagir in question as an unsettled one and determine the compensation in accordance with section 7 of the Act.
In the result the appeal is allowed with costs.
The orders of the High Court, the Board of Revenue and that of the Jagir Commissioner are set aside and the case is sent back to the Jagir Commissioner to determine the compensation afresh treating the jagir in question to be unsettled one and in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act.
The appellant will also be entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum on the amount of compensation so determined, from the date of resumption till the date of payment of the compensation.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
Thakur Sangram Singh, the father of the appellant was a jagirdar of Thikana Diggi in the erstwhile State of Jaipur.
His jagir was resumed on 1st of July, 1954 under section 21 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 entitling him to compensation on the date of resumption of his jagir under section 26 of the Jagirs Act.
The compensation was to be determined according to the principles laid down in the Second Schedule attached to the Act.
If the jagir was a settled one the compensation would be assessed on the basis of the rent rates as settled in settlement operation which were prevalent on the date of resumption and as entered in the Revenue records of the village within the meaning of section 6(3) (a)(i) read with the definition of "settled village" contained in section 2(n).
If on the other hand, the jagir was an unsettled one the compensation would have to be assessed on the actual income from the rents during the three agricultural years: 1949 50, 1950 51 and 1951 52 as provided in section 7 of the Act.
Prior to the date of resumption settlement operation were going on under the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 in respect of the jagir.
The rent rates proposed by the Settlement Officer were published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 23rd of August, 1952.
The rent rates fixed were made applicable with effect from Ist of July 1953 and, therefore, on the date of resumption, namely, on Ist July, 1955, rent rates assessed by the Settlement Officer and approved by the Government were in force, for the purpose of payment of compensation under the Jagirs Act.
Sangram Singh challenged the validity of the rent rates fixed under the settlement operation by means of a writ petition No. 308 of 1953.
The High Court quashed the order settling the rent rates being in flagrant violations of sec.
82 (1) (a) and (b) of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 with a direction to settle fresh rent rates in accordance with the said provision.
Pursuant to the order of the High Court fresh rent rates were settled by the Settlement Officer on 6th of June, 1955 with retrospective operation from Ist July, 1953.
According to the new settlement the total rental income from the jagir was reduced from Rs. 1,31,657.48 to Rs. 82,501 50.
475 The Jagir Commissioner by his order dated 25th November, 1960 granted compensation on the basis of the rent rates assessed in 1955.
The Jagirdar unsuccessfully preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue.
Sangram Singh died in the mean time so his son the appellant challenged the order of the Board of Revenue on two grounds: (1) that the compensation should have been assessed on the basis of rent rates determined in 1953 as it stood on the date of resumption.
(2) or in the absence of a valid settlement on the basis of actual income from rents during the three agricultural years.
Treating the Jagir as unsettled, the High Court rejected both the grounds.
Hence the appeal by certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
Allowing the appeal and remanding the case, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
As a result of the quashing of the order of Settlement of rent rates of 1953 by the High Court, the jagir would be taken as an unsettled one on the date of resumption.
The quashing of the order of Settlement only means tabula rasa (clean slate) as if there was no determination of rent rates in 1953.
[479 E F] 2.
The criterion to determine whether a particular jagir is a settled one or not is to see whether the rent rates determined in settlement operations have been made applicable.
It is only from the date of effectuation of a valid settlement of rent rates in respect of a particular jagir which makes the jagir a settled one.
[480 C D] 3.
Section 86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act, 1947 clearly indicates that the rent fixed by the Settlement Officer shall normally be payable from the first of July next following the date of such order and further authorises the Settlement Officer to make the same shall be payable from some earlier date.
The realisation of rent from a retrospective date will not make the jagir in question a settled one as from that date.
The settlement of rent rates is one thing and the realisation of rent on the basis of the settlement is quite another.
In the case of a settled village the compensation would be determined on the basis of the rent rates settled during the settlement operation recorded in the Revenue Papers on the date of resumption.
Thus it is the effectuation of the rent rates determined during the settlement made prior to the date of resumption which would make the village a settled village as on that date.
[480 F H] In the instant case, the jagirdar became entitled to compensation on the date of resumption.
If the village was an unsettled village on the date of resumption he would be entitled to compensation on the basis of the village being unsettled.
The right of compensation vested in the jagirdar on the date of resumption and he could not be deprived of his right by a subsequent amendment unless the amendment in law specifically or by necessary implication provided for depriving the jagirdar of his vested right.
There is nothing in the definition of the term "settled" under sec 2 (n) of the Act or in sec.
86 of the Jaipur State Grants Land Tenures Act to indicate that the Legislature intended to affect the vested right.
[481 A D]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 303 of 1976.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 30th October, 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 247 of 1974.
Y.S. Chitale, Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran & Parveen Kumar for the Appellant.
Badri Das Sharma for the Respondents Nos. 1 & 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J.
This appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellant herein in the High Court of Rajasthan, challenging the legality of the action of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission in issuing of the appellant the Communication Annexure IV dated July 21, 1973, stating that the 446 appellant was not eligible for being considered for recruitment to the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine in the Government Medical Colleges in the state since he lacked the necessary academic qualifications specified in the advertisement and that consequently, the application of the appellant stood rejected.
There were also other incidental prayers in the writ petition for the issuance of an appropriate writ or direction to the Public Service Commission to refrain from finalising the selection without considering the case of the appellant, and for a direction being issued to the State Government of Rajasthan not to accept the recommendations of the Public Service Commission in making appointments to the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine to Medical Colleges in Rajasthan in case the appellant was not called for interview along with the other candidates.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ petition holding that the Public Service Commission had acted illegally in treating the appellant as not possessing the requisite academic qualifications and in rejecting his candidature for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine on the said ground.
The State of Rajasthan and the Rajasthan Public Service Commission carried the matter in appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court.
That appeal was allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated October 30, 1974, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.
Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.
The appellant secured the M.B.B.S. Degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1954 and after undergoing houseman ship for one year, he was substantively appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Rajasthan State Medical Service with effect from May 26, 1956.
In 1962, the Rajasthan Medical Service was bifurcated into two branches, namely, (1) The Rajasthan Medical Service and (2) The Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch).
Separate service rules known as the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called the Rules) were framed for the Collegiate branch and all appointments of teaching staff in the Government Medical Colleges in Rajasthan were thereafter governed by the said Rules.
Under the provisions of the Rules, the post of Lecturer is to be filled up only by direct recruitment.
It is laid down in Chapter IV of the Rules which prescribes the procedure for direct recruitment that the appointments are to be 447 made on the basis of selection by the State Public Service Commission.
Rule 12 lays down that "the candidate for direct recruitment to the post specified in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule shall possess such academic and technical qualifications and experience as is laid down, from time to time, by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges".
The post of Lecturers is included in Part C of the schedule to the Rules.
Hence, for ascertaining the qualifications required for the post of Lecturer under the Rules one has to refer to the Rules relating to technical qualifications and experience laid down by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges.
Clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 occurring in Chapter XX of the Handbook of the University of Rajasthan, Part II, Vol.
I, is the relevant provision wherein the University of Rajasthan has prescribed the academic and technical qualifications and experience required for eligibility for appointment as teachers in Medical Colleges.
That clause is in the following terms: "1.
All teachers must possess a basic University or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the , except in the non clinical departments of Antomy, Physiology, Biochemistry, Pharmacology, Microbiology where non medical teachers, to the extent of 30% of the total posts of the department may be appointed to posts other than that of the Director or Head of the Department, who must necessarily hold a recognised medical qualification.
Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act and non medical persons must be recognised as teachers with the University before appointments are made permanent.
All the teachers in Medical Colleges except Registrars and Demonstrators must possess the requisite post graduate qualification in their respective subjects.
50% of the time spent in recognised research under the Indian Council of Medical Research or a University or a Medical College, after obtaining the requisite Post graduate qualification be counted towards teaching experience for the post of Lecturer in the same or in allied subject 448 provided that 50% of the teaching experience shall be the regular teaching experience.
Equivalent qualification referred to above and in the recommendations below shall be determined by the University of Rajasthan.
In case of specialities under Medicine and Surgery the qualifications and experience should also be as scheduled below but in case the post has been advertised and suitable candidates are not available the qualifications can be reladed.
" This is followed by a tabular statement headed 'Requirements of Special Academic Qualifications and Teaching Experience '.
Column 1 of this table deals with the posts, Column 2 lays down the academic qualifications and Column 3 is about Teaching Experience.
The table has a number of sub headings according to the various specialities.
The speciality of Forensic Medicine is given at page 168 of the Handbook (1971 Edition).
The relevant provision regarding "Lecturer in Forensic Medicine" is as follows: "(d) Assistant M.D. (Path.), Two years Professor/ M.D. (Forensic of Medico Lecturer Medicine), Legal work.
Speciality Board of Pathology (USA), M.D./M.R.C.P./ F.R.C.P. (with Diploma D.F.M.), M.R.C.P. (with Forensic Medicine as Special Subject) or equivalent qualification or Post graduate degree or equivalent qualification in Medicine or Surgery.
" On March 3, 1972, the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short, the Commission) issued advertisements inviting appli 449 cations for the recruitment of two Lecturers in Forensic Medicine for Medical Colleges, Medical & Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules.
The appellant had, by then, obtained the M.D. Degree in Forensic Medicine from the University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur in 1970 and had been functioning as Lecturer in Forensic Medicine in one of the Government Medical Colleges in Rajasthan on a temporary and ad hoc basis from December 31, 1970 on wards.
In response to the aforesaid advertisement published by the Commission, the appellant applied for appointment to one of the two posts.
However, by the impugned letter (Annexure IV) dated July 21, 1973, issued by the Secretary of the Commission, the appellant was informed that his application for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected since he did not possess the necessary academic qualification.
A representation made by the appellant to the Public Service Commission for reconsideration of the matter did not meet with any favourable response and hence the appellant approached the High Court by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution out of which this appeal has arisen.
During the pendency of the writ petition, the Commission conducted the interview of the remaining candidates and selected respondents Nos. 3 and 4 for appointment to the two posts and on the basis of the said selection the State Government appointed respondents 3 and 4 as lecturers.
The appellant thereupon amended the writ petition by incorporating a further prayer that the High Court should issue an appropriate writ or direction cancelling the interview and selection conducted by the Commission as well as the consequential appointments given by the State Government to respondents 3 and 4 as Lecturers in Forensic Medicine.
The short point to be considered is whether the Commission was right in law in excluding the appellant from consideration on the ground that he did not possess the academic qualification prescribed by clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine.
The qualifications prescribed for the said post by clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 are: (1) A basic University (Degree ?) or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the .
450 (2) Registration under the State/Central Medical Registration Act.
(3) Post graduate qualification in the concerned subject.
(4) Two Years ' experience of Medico legal work.
The appellant is admittedly the holder of the basic Degree of M.B.B.S. from the Rajasthan University, which is a qualification entered in the First Schedule to the .
It is also not in dispute that he is duly registered under the Medical Registration Act.
The sole ground on which the appellant was treated by the Commission as ineligible for consideration was that the Post graduate degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by the appellant is not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and the said Degree has also not been recognised by the University of Rajasthan as an equivalent qualification.
The University of Bihar at Muzaffarpur is one duly established by statute and it is fully competent to conduct examinations and award degrees.
The Degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) M.D. (Forensic Medicine) of the University of Bihar is included in the Schedule to the as a degree fully recognised by the Indian Medical Council which is the paramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise the medical qualifications granted by any University or Medical Institution in India.
A Post graduate Medical Degree granted by a University duly established by statute in this country and which has also been recognised by the Indian Medical Council by inclusion to the Schedule of the Medical Council Act has ipso facto to be regarded, accepted and treated as valid throughout our country.
In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other Universities in any State in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in such a State.
The Division Bench of the High Court was, in our opinion, manifestly in error in thinking that since the Post graduate degree possessed by the appellant was not one obtained from the University of Rajasthan, it could not be treated as a valid qualification for the purpose of recruitment in question in the absence of any specific order by the University of Rajasthan recognising the said degree or declaring it as an equivalent qualification.
It is common ground before us that the University of Rajasthan does not 451 conduct Post graduate examinations in the subject of Forensic Medicine and it does not award the degree of M.L. (Forensic Medicine).
In order that there should be scope for declaration of 'equivalence ' of a qualification obtained from another body, there should be a corresponding qualification that can be earned by virtue of passing an examination or test conducted by the concerned University.
There can be declaration of equivalence only as between a degree etc.
awarded by the concerned University and one obtained from a body different from the concerned University.
When the University of Rajasthan does not conduct any examination for the award of the degree of M.L. (Forensic Medicine), there cannot be any question of declaration of 'equivalence ' in respect of such a degree awarded by any University.
Unfortunately, the State Public Service Commission as well as the Division Bench of the High Court failed to notice this crucial aspect.
We may also point out that the declaration of 'equivalence ' referred to in Section 23A of the Rajasthan University Act as well as in clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances can only be in respect of qualifications other than basic or Post graduate degrees awarded by other statutory Indian Universities in the concerned subjects.
In the case of a Post graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University, no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other University is called for.
This is all the more so in the case of a medical degree basic as well as Post graduate that is awarded by a statutory Indian University and which has been specifically recognised by the Indian Medical Council.
Though a contention was taken by the respondents in the High Court as well as before us that the appellant did not also satisfy the requirement regarding "two years of Medico legal work", we don 't find any force in the said plea.
The certificates from the Principal and Heads of Departments of Forensic Medicine in the concerned Medical Colleges produced by the appellant in the High Court as annexures in his affidavit dated July 27, 1973 which are at pages 31 and 33 of the printed Paper Book, establish beyond doubt that the appellant had put in more than two years of Medico legal work in Dr. section N. Medical College and in the Dharbhanga Medical College, prior to the last date fixed by the Commission for receipt of the applications.
The conclusion that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is that the appellant was fully qualified for being considered for 452 appointment to the two posts of Lecturers in Forensic Medicine advertised by the Commission on November 16, 1972, and that the Commission acted illegally in treating the appellant as not being possessed of the requisite academic qualification and excluding him from consideration on the said ground.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge, subject to the modification that in carrying out the directions contained in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Commission should treat the appellant as a fully qualified candidate in the light of the finding recorded by us that at the relevant time the appellant possessed not merely the prescribed academic qualification but also the requisite experience of two years ' Medico legal work.
The appellant will get his costs throughout from respondents 1 and 2 in equal shares.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The qualifications prescribed for the post of lecturer in Forensic Medicine under the Rajasthan Medical Service were (i) a basic university degree or equivalent qualification entered in the schedules to the ; (ii) Registration under the State Central Medical Registration Act; (iii) Post Graduate qualification in the concerned subject and (iv) two years experience of medico legal work.
The appellant was the holder of a M.B.B.S. degree from the Rajasthan University which was a qualification entered the first schedule to the .
He was registered under the Medical Registration Act.
He possessed a post graduate degree in Forensic Medicine from the University of Bihar.
The respondent 's application for the post of lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected by the State Public Service Commission on the ground that the post graduate degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by him was not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and that the degree which he possessed had also not been recognised by the University of Rajasthan.
A single Judge of the High Court allowed the appellant 's writ petition impugning the order of the State Public Service Commission.
On appeal by the State a Division Bench of the High Court held that the post graduate degree in Forensic Medicine which the appellant possessed could not be treated as a valid qualification for recruitment to the post of lecturer because, firstly, it was not a degree from the University of Rajasthan and secondly, neither had the University of Rajasthan recognised it nor had the University declared it as a qualification equivalent to the post graduate degree in Forensic Medicine.
Allowing the appeal, 445 ^ HELD: 1.
A post graduate medical degree granted by a university duly established by statute in this country and which had been recognised by the Indian Medical Council by inclusion in the schedule of the Medical Council Act has ipso facto to be regarded, accepted and treated as valid throughout the country.
In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other universities in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for appointment in any post in a State.
[450 F G] In the instant case the University of Bihar was duly established by statute.
It is fully competent to conduct examination and award degrees the degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) of the University of Bihar is included in the schedule to the as a degree recognised by the Medical Indian Council, the peramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise medical qualifications granted by any university or medical institution in India.
[450 D E] 2.
There can be declaration of equivalence only as between a degree etc.
awarded by the concerned university and a qualification obtained from a body different from the concerned university.
When the University of Rajasthan does not conduct any examination for the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) there cannot be any question of declaration of 'equivalence ' in respect of such a degree awarded by any university.
[451 B C] 3.
In the case of a post graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other university is called for.
This is all the more so in the case of a medical degree awarded by a statutory Indian University and which has been specifically recognised by the Indian Medical Council.
[451 D E]