judgement:
Civil Appeals No. 127 130 of 1975.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated 15th October, 1974 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Appln.
1434 1437 of 1973.
V.M. Tarkunde.
Naresh Kumar Sharma and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant.
D.V. Patel, C.V. Subba Rao, Dy.
Advocate, M.N. Shroff, G.N. Desal, R.N. Poddar and R.H. Dhebar for the Respondent (State).
P.H. Parekh for Respondents 1 and 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VARADARAJAN, J.
These appeals by special leave are directed, against the judgment of the learned Chief Justice (B.J. Diwan) of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application Nos. 1434 to 1437 of 1973.
Those Civil Revision Applications (hereinafter referred to as 'Revisions ') were preferred against the judgment of the Civil Judge, (Junior Division) Vijapur as the authority appointed under section 20(i) of the for Vijapur Taluka in Civil Misc.
Applications Nos. 1 and 2 of 1970 and 1 and 2 of 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'applications ').
The four Revisions raised a common question of law and were disposed of by a common judgment.
The applications before the Minimum Wages Authority were filed by the Gujarat Government Labour officer and Minimum Wages Inspector for Mehsana district against the Taluka Development officer, Vijapur Taluka and District Development officer (Panchayat) Mehsana.
The Minimum Wages Inspector contended in those applications that the four employees, Ishwerbhai 324 Prahladbhai, Dayabhai Umeddass, Kanjibhai Shankarbhai and Nathalal Maganlal, working in the Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat as Tube well operators at Delva da and Vihar villages, fall within the (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act ') and had been made to work for more hours than what is prescribed under the Act and they were entitled to over time wages of Rs. 3018.40 and Rs. 3769.05 in respect of Ishwerbhai Prahladbhai and Dayabhai Umeddass respectively for the period from September 1969 to February 1970, and Rs. 3082/ for the period from October 1970 to March 1971 and Rs. 1178.25 for the transitional period of April and May 1971 in respect of Kanjibhai Shankarbhai and Rs. 3962.40 and Rs. 1237.80 for those identical periods in respect of Nathalal Maganlal.
Directions under section 20 of Act for payment of those amounts together with further sums for the period during which the applications were pending were prayed for in the applications.
The respondents in the applications denied that the four employees are working under any District Panchayat and contended that they were work charged employees in the State service and that on the introduction of Panchayat Raj in the State of Gujarat with effect from 1.4.1963 as per the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, the maintenance of tube wells and further extension of tube wells and their maintenance and the work charged establishment relating to the tube wells were transferred to the District Panchayats by Government 's Circular No. MNS/41162/V dated 27.3.1963 and the employees were continued as work charged employees by the District Panchayat and were transferred to and continued as such in the Panchayats.
The respondents in the applications thus contended that the four employees concerned were employees of the State of Gujarat, whose terms and conditions of employment are subject to orders of the State Government and that they are paid out of the IOO per cent grant made by the State Government.
The respondents in the applications further contended that the terms and conditions of service of the work charged employees of the State Government are governed by the P.W.D. Manual and that the four employees concerned are not entitled to the over time wages claimed in the applications.
The Minimum Wages Authority found on the evidence adduced by the parties that the Tube well operators concerned were State Government servants and not the servants of the Panchayats, that Panchayats exercised supervisory control over them and that it was not controverted by the applicant, before him 325 that the Tube well operators were employed by the State Government before 1.4.1963.
Following the decision in G.L. Shukla vs State of Gujarat,(l) the found that Panchayat service is, like any other branch of service, service under the State, and he held that though employment in any District Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat is scheduled employment as per section 2(g) of the Act, the Tube well operators concerned being Government servants in Panchayat service are not entitled to claim minimum wages under the Act.
In that view he dismissed the applications.
The Minimum Wages Inspector took the matter in revision before the High Court.
Diwan, C. J., who heard these Revisions followed the decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 361 of 1972, disposed of on 2.5.1974, in which the ratio of the decision in Shukla 's case was approved and held that Panchayat service was part of the service of the State and the Tube well operators concerned are State Government servants holding civil posts.
In that view the learned Chief Justice agreed with the Minimum Wages Authority that as State Government servants the Tube well operators concerned are not entitled to the benefit of the Act and he dismissed the Revisions.
The point arising for consideration in these civil appeals is simple.
The Minimum Wages Authority and the learned Chief Justice have found that the Tube well operators are Gujarat State Government servants.
That is the contention of the contesting respondents I and 2., viz. Taluka Development officer Vijapur, Taluka Panchayat and District Development officer, Mehsana District Panchayat, in these appeals.
The contention of the State of Gujarat before us in Civil Appeal No. 359 of 1974 was that the employees in the District Panchayats and Taluka Panchayats constituted under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 and Talatis and Kotwals working in Gram and Nagar Panchayats in the local cadre of Panchayats constituted under that Act are Government servants and that the other employees in the local cadre are Panchayat employees and not State Government employees.
I n that appeal we have repelled the contention that employees of the local cadre, namely, Gram and Nagar Panchayat servants barring Talatis and Kotwals are Panchayat servants and not Government servants and held that they also are State Government servants like the District H 326 Panchayat and Taluka Panchayat employees and Talatis and Kotwals working in the Gram and Nagar Panchayats.
Section 3 of the provides for the appropriate government, in the manner provided in.
the Act, fixing minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I and Part II of the Schedule and in any other employment added to either Part by notification under s.27 of the Aet subject to the proviso to section 3(1) (a) and has power to review at such intervals as it thinks fit, such intervals not exceeding S years, the minimum rates of wages so fixed and revise the minimum rates, if necessary, subject to the proviso to clause (b) of sub section (I) of section 3.
Section 2(i) of the Act defines "employee" as meaning "any person who is employed for hire or reward to do any work, skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical, in a scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed and includes an out worker. " "Employer" is defined in section 2 (e) of the Act as "any person who employs, whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum wages have been fixed under the Act and includes, except in sub section (3) of section 26".
(i). . (ii) . . . (iii) in any scheduled employment under any local authority in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under the Act, the person appointed by such authority for the supervision and control of the employees or where no employee is so appointed, the Chief Executive officer of the local authority; and (iv) in any other case where there is carried on any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under the Act, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the employees or for the payment of wages . ".
We are not concerned in these appeals with section 26 (3) of the Act.
Section 2 (g) defines "scheduled employment" as meaning "an employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment".
"Employment under any local authority" is item 6 in the Schedule of the Act.
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the Tube well operators concerned in these appeals are in scheduled employment under the Panchayats.
The question is whether, being Government servants, employed under the local authority, they are not entitled to minimum wages and other benefits under the Act.
"Employer" under the Act being "any person who employs whether directly or through another 327 person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or A more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum wages have been fixed under the Act", the Panchayat or Panchayats under which the Tube well operators concerned are employed in scheduled employment would be "employers" under the Act even though they are Government servants, for under section 102 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 a Secretary of a Gram Panchayat or Nagar Panchayat shall subject to the control of the Sarpanch or Chairman as the case may be, perform certain duties mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) to that sub section and under sub section (3) of that section the other servants of the panchayats shall perform such functions and duties and exercise such powers under the Act as may be imposed or conferred on them by the Panchayat, subject to rules, if any, made in this behalf.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tube well operators concerned in these appeals, even thought State Government servants, are employed in scheduled employment under the local authority or authorities and are consequently entitled to minimum wages and other benefits under the Act, it not being disputed that minimum wages have been fixed by the State Government in respect of Tube well operators generally though that benefit has not been extended to the Tube well operators concerned in these appeals.
The appeals are accordingly allowed with costs.
The applications before the Minimum Wages Authority are allowed as prayed for and the directions shall be issued as prayed for.
H.L.C. Appeals allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The Minimum Wages Inspector of Mehsana District in Gujarat filed applications before the Minimum Wages Authority praying for directions for payment of overtime wages to four tubewell operators working in Taluka and District Panchayats on the ground that they had been made to work for more hours than what was prescribed under the .
The said Authority dismissed the applications holding that though employment in any District Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat was 'scheduled employment ' as per section 2 (g) of the Act, the tubewell operators concerned being Government servants in Panchayat Service were not entitled to claim minimum wages under the Act.
The revisions filed against the orders of the Authority were dismissed by tho High Court.
Allowing tho appeals, ^ HELD: Section 3 of the Act provides for the appropriate government fixing minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in and of the Schedule.
Section 2 (i) defines 'employee ' as meaning any person who is employed for hire or reward to do any work in a 'scheduled employment '.
Section 2(g) defines 'Scheduled employment ' as meaning an employment specified in the Schedule and "Employment under any local authority" is included as item 6 of tho schedule.
[326 B G] 'Employer ' under section 2 (e) being "any person who employs whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum wages have been fixed under the Act" the Panchayats under which the tubewell operators concerned are employed in scheduled employment would be 'employers ' under the Act even though the tubewell operators are Government servants, for, under sub section
(2) of section 102 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961, a Secretary of a Gram Panchayat or Nagar Panchayat shall, subject to the control of the Sarpanch or Chairman, as the case may be, perform the duties mentioned in cls.
(a) (b) (c) and (d) thereof and, 323 under sub section
(3) of that section, the other servants of the Panchayats shall perform such functions and duties and exercise such powers under the Act as may be imposed or conferred on them by the Panchayat subject to rules, if any, made in that behalf.
Therefore, there can be no doubt that the tubewell operators concerned in these appeals, even though State Government servants, are employed in 'scheduled employment ' under the local authority or authorities and are consequently entitled to minimum wages and other benefits under the Act.[326 H, 327 A D]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1983 of 1970 From Judgment and Decree dated 29 7 69 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in F.A.O. No. 35/66.
568 Naunit Lal, K. Vasdev and Ms. V. Grover for the appellant.
V.M. Phadke and Harbans Singh for the respondent.
The Judgment of the court was delivered by MISRA, J.
The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 29th July, 1969 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
The dispute in this appeal centres around a religious institution in village Ramgarh (also known a Bhagtuana), tehsil Faridkot, district Bhatinda.
This village was previously in the erstwhile Nabha State which merged with Pepsu and after the reorganisation of the States, became a part of the Punjab State in 1956.
Sixty five persons claiming to be members of the Sikh community moved an application before the State Government under section 7 (1) of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended by the Amendment Act I of 1959, to have the institution declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara.
The State Government notified the said application in the Punjab Gazette in terms of section 7 (3) of the Act on 18th October, 1963.
Upon this the appellant made an application under sections 8 and 10 of the Act claiming that the institution was not a Sikh Gurdwara but an Udasi institution known as Dera Bhai hagtu.
This application was referred by the State Government to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal for adjudication.
It was contended by the appellant that throughout its long history the institution has been an Udasi institution.
This institution was not established for use by Sikhs for public worship.
nor was it founded in the memory of a Sikh Martyr, saint or a historical person.
It has never been used for public worship by the Sikhs.
The institution was the Dera of Udasi Bhekh and the objects of worship are idols of Gola Sahib and of Baba Srichand, and the various samadhs.
The petition was resisted by the respondent Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee on three grounds: (1) that the appellant was not competent to move the petition under s.7 of the Act because he was not a hereditary office holder, (2) that the provisions of the Act are not ultra vires the Constitution, and (3) that the institution in dispute was a Sikh Gurdwara.
On the pleadings of the parties the Tribunal framed three issues: whether the provisions of the Act are ultra vires the Constitution, 569 (2) whether the appellant was a hereditary office holder, and (3) whether the institution in dispute was a Sikh Guradwara.
Issue No. 1 was not pressed and, therefore, the Tribunal in conformity with the previous decisions held the provisions of the Act to be intra vires the Constitution.
On the second issue the Tribunal recorded a finding in favour of the appellant.
On the third issue, the Tribunal held that the disputed institution was a Sikh Gurdwara.
The appellant feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal took up the matter in appeal to the High Court and the High Court in its turn confirmed the findings of the Tribunal and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment.
The appellant has now come to his Court on obtaining special leave and the only issue that survives for consideration by this Court is issue No.3, that is, whether the institution in dispute is a Sikh Gurdwara.
Before dealing with the points urged by the counsel for the parties it would be appropriate at this stage to know the distinctive features of Sikhism and Sikh temples.
Although for the purpose of historical research and analysis on such subject, the forum of a court of law is not ideal yet if the statute enjoins the Court to decide such questions, the Court has got to discharge the responsibility.
Section 16 (1) of the Act provides: "16 (1).
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law in force if in any proceeding before a tribunal it is disputed that a gurdwara should or should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, the tribunal shall, before enquiring into any other matter in dispute relating to the said gurdwara, decide whether it should or should not be declared a Sikh Gurdwara in accordance with the provisions of sub section (2).
" One of the most fascinating aspects of Sikhism is the process which began with human Gurus, continued during the period of duality in which there were human Gurus and a collection of sacred writings and ended with the present situation in which full authority is enjoined by the scripture.
In every respect the scripture is what the Gurus were.
Both the Gurus and the Book deserve respect, which they are accorded because of the Bani which they express, the word of divine truth.
Therefore, it was possible for Guru Arjan, the fifth in the human line, to bow before the collection which he had compiled and installed 570 in the newly built Darbar Sahib in 1604 for he was acknowledged the higher authority of the Banidue to the personal importance and significance which he possessed as Guru.
The Sikh Gurus have much in common with other preceptors in Indian tradition but their history and contribution is distinctive.
They were not Brahmins, they did not see their calling to be that of expounding Vedas, they taught in vernacular not Sanskrit and their message was for everyone.
They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib.
This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
An important characteristic of the teachings of the Sikh Gurus is their emphasis upon the message, the Bani.
It is this stress which made possible the transfer of Guruship to the scripture.
The human Gurus were the instruments through whom the voice of God became audible.
The holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan.
It is the Bible of Sikhs.
After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book.
So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own.
Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs.
Guru means the guide.
Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity.
Wherever a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.
When Guru Gobind Singh felt that his worldly sojourn was near, he made the fact known to his disciples.
The disciples asked him as to who would be their Guru in future.
The Guru immediately placed five pies and a coconut before the holy Granth, bowed his head before it and said "The Eternal Father willed, and I raised the Panth.
All my Sikhs are ordained to believe the Granth as their preceptor.
Have faith in the holy Granth as your Master and consider it.
The visible manifestation of the Gurus.
He who hath a pure heart will seek guidance from its holy words".
571 The Guru repeated these words and told the disciples not to grieve at his departure.
It was true that they would not see his body in its physical manifestation but he would be ever present among the Khalsas.
Whenever the Sikhs needed guidance or counsel, they should assemble before the Granth in all sincerity and decide their future line of action in the light of teachings of the Master, as embodied in the Granth.
The noble ideas embodied in the Granth would live for ever and show people the path to bills and happiness.
Temples are found almost in every religion but there are some difference between the Sikh temples and those of other religions.
The sikh Gurdwaras have the following distinctive features: 1.
Sikh temples are not the place of idol worship as the Hindu temples are.
There is no place for idol worship in a Gurdwara.
The central object of worship in a Gurdwara is Sri Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book.
The pattern of worship consists of two main items: reading of the holy hymns followed by their explanation by some learned man, not necessarily a particular Granthi and then singing of some passages from the Holy Granth.
The former is called Katha and the second is called Kirtan.
A Sikh thus worships the Holy Words that are written in the Granth Sahib, the Words or Shabada about the Eternal Truth or God.
No idol or painting of any Guru can be worshipped.
2 Sikh worship in the Gurdwara is a congregational worship, whereas Hindu temples are meant for individual worship.
A Sikh does the individual worship at home when he recites Gurbani daily.
Some scriptures meant for this purpose are Japji, Jaap, Rehras, Kirtan Sohila.
Sangat is the collective body of Sikhs who meet every day in the Gurdwara.
Gurdwara is a place where a copy of Guru Granth Sahib is installed.
The unique and distinguishing feature would always be the Nishan Sahib, a flagstaff with a yellow flag of Sikhism flying from it.
This serves as a symbol of the Sikh presence.
It enables the travellers, whether they be Sikhs or not to know where hospitality is available.
There may be complexity of rooms in a Gurdwara for the building may also serve as a school; or where children are taught the rudiments of Sikhism as well as a rest centre for travellers.
Often there will.
be a kitchen where food can be prepared though langar itself might take place in the yawning.
Sometimes the Gurdwara will also be used as a clinic.
But its Pivotal point is the place of worship and the main room 572 will be that in which the Guru Granth Sahib is installed where the community gathers for diwan.
The focal point in this room will be the book itself.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh Gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment.
There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth Sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
It is not necessary that there must be a granthi in a Gurdwara.
Any learned person can read Guru Granth Sahib and explain to the congregation.
With this preliminary about the distinctive features of a Sikh temple we proceed to deal with the contentions of the counsel for the parties.
Shri Naunit Lal, counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court has misread the evidence and that has vitiated its finding.
He referred to the material portions of the judgment and the evidence of the parties to support his contention.
on perusal of the judgment and the relevant evidence we do not find any misreading of evidence by the High Court.
This contention, therefore, has no force.
We, however, find that the High Court proceeded on the assumption that admittedly Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikh saint and that the disputed institution was established in his memory.
This would be evident from the following observation made by he High Court.
"On an overall consideration of this aspect we are inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Shant that admittedly Bhai Bagtu was a Sikh saint and this institution was established in his memory and as such the case of the respondent would also come within the ambit of section 16(2) (iv) of the Sikh Gurudwara Act".
But this observation is not warranted from the pleadings or the evidence of the parties.
Pritam Dass, the appellant, as P.W.S. in his deposition has categorically stated: "Bhai Bhagtu was an Udasi Fahir".
In the pleadings also the appellant set up that Bhai Bhagtu was an Udasi saint and the institution was a Dera of the Udasi sect, 573 while the respondent, on the other hand, in its reply stated that Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikh saint and the institution was established in the memory of that Sikh saint.
In this state of pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties it will not be correct to say that admittedly Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikhsaint and that this institution was established in his memory.
Rather this was the only disputed question to be decided by the Court.
Thus while holding that there is no misreading of evidence we find that there is misreading of the pleadings of the parties.
It was next contended for the appellant that the appellant of udasi set being incharge of the institution in question, the succession to the institution being from Guru to Chela, the institution being recorded as Dera of Udasi sect in some of the revenue records, the existence and worship of various idols and samadhs within the precincts of the institution and the absence of a granthi in the institution are all in compatible with the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara.
Shri M. N. Phadke appearing for the respondent on the other hand has contended that (1) the points which were never urged in the courts below could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court; (2) in any case the existence of samadhs and idols within the precincts of the institution and the worship thereof, and the absence of a granthi and the succession to the institution from guru to chela are not destructive of the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara; (3) the finding of the High Court that the institution in question is a Sikh Gurdwara is fully warranted by the evidence on record, and (4) the nature of the institution has to be decided in the light of sub section
(2) of section 16 of the Sikh Gurdwara Act.
The Court has been called upon to decide whether the institution in question is a Sikh Gurdwara.
While considering this question the Court has to take into consideration all the circumstances which favour or militate against the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara.
In the very nature of things and in view of the requirements of sub section
(2) of section 16 it becomes necessary to consider whether the institution being in charge of an Uadasi saint, the existence of samadhs of Udasi saints and worship thereof, or the existence of the idols and absence of a granthi and succession to the institution from guru to chela are all relevant considerations and the Court has to consider them if there is evidence on the record.
In the instant case evidence has been adduced on behalf of the appellant about the existence of samadhs and the various idols, the absence of a granthi and succession to the institution 574 from guru to chela.
We see no reason why the appellant be prevented from urging the aforesaid circumstances.
On the question whether the existence of samadhs and of the idols and the absence of a granthi or succession to the institution from guru to chela militates against the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara the counsel for the parties have adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions.
The counsel for the parties have also cited cases in support of their respective contentions.
The counsel for the appellant relied on Hem Singh & Ors.
vs Basant Das & Anr(1).
In that case the question for consideration was whether Udasis are Sikhs.
The court held that Udasis are not Sikhs for the purposes of Sikh Gurdwara Act.
Although Guru Nanak founded Sikhism as a new religion by sweeping away idolatry and polytheism, Sri Chand, the son of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Udasis, was himself not a Sikh but a Hindu.
No reconciliation between the Sikhs and the Udasis ever took place.
The Udasis are in consequence not Sikhs, but schismatics who separated in the earliest days of Sikhism and never merged with the followers of the Gurus.
Reliance was next placed upon Bawa Ishar Dass & ors.
vs Dr. Mohan Singh & ors (2) The Court held: ". it has been established that the Mahants have all along been Udasis, that the institution was an Udasi monastery, that the Guru Granth Sahib was read there by the Udasi Mahant and that Sikhs may have attended these readings but that all other ceremonies, observed by Udasis and Hindus, were performed at the institution.
It cannot be held from the mere fact that the Udasis also read the Guru Granth Sahib a book which they do venerate, that the Sikhs should be associated in the management of this genuine Udasis institution.
It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in that the Udasi order constitutes a separate sect, distinct from the orthodox Sikhs and that though they have retained many Hindu beliefs and practices, yet in the wider sense of the term they may also be Sikhs.
They occupy an intermediate position between strictly orthodox Sikhs and Hindus.
The Udasis are in fact a monastic 575 Order in their origin and are followers of Bawa Siri Chand, son of the first Guru though they worship smadhs, etc.
they do reverence the Granth Sahib without completely renouncing Hinduism.
They are often in charge of the village Dharamsala or Gurdwara, which is a Sikh institution but in other cases the Sadh and his chelas constitute a monastery or college.
Owing to their intermediate positions, it is possible for Udasis to be in charge of a Sikh Gurudwara properly so called, but it does not follow that that institution is a sikh Gurudwara and not a true Udasi institution merely because the Granth Sahib is read".
In Harnam Singh vs Gurdial Singh on an analysis of various decisions this Court held: "These decisions clearly indicate the principle that though the Sikh Guru Granth Sahib is read in the shrines managed by the by the members of the Udasi Sect, that was not enough to hold that those shrines were Sikh Gurdwaras.
In the case before us, the more fact that at some stage there was a Guru Granth Sahib in this Dera cannot thus lead to any conclusion that this institutions was meant for, or belonged to, the followers of the Sikh religion.
Clearly, the Dera was maintained for an entirely distinct sect known as the Nirmala Sadhs who cannot be regarded as Sikhs and consequently, in their mere capacity of followers of Sikhs religion residing in village Jhandawala, the plaintiffs/respondents could not be held to have such an interest as could entitled hem to institute the suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Shri Phadke appearing, for the respondent on the other hand his cited Mahant Dharam Das etc.
vs State of Punjab & Ors (2).
Dealing with the tenets of the Sikhs this Court observed: "The Sikhs believe in the ten Gurus the last of whom was Guru Gobind Singh.
They further believe that there is no other Guru after Guru Gobind Singh who enjoined on his followers that after him they should Consider Guru Granth Sahib as the Guru.
They do not subscribe to idol worship and polytheism, nor do they have any Samadhi in their shrines.
The teaching of Sikhs was against asceticism.
They believe in Guru Granth Sahib, which is a Rosary of sacred poems, exhortations, etc.
576 During the time of the Sikh Gurus the Gurdwaras were under their direct supervision and control or under their Masends or missionary agents.
After the death of Guru Gobind Singh the Panth is recognised as the corporate representative of the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed by the Panth through their Granthis and other sewadars who were under direct supervision of the local Sangat or congregation The position of the Gurdwaras changed during British regime.
The mahants who were in charge of the Sikh Gurdwaras could either be a Sikh Mahant or Udasi Mahant.
Though there was no reconciliation between the Sikhs and Udasis, it did not matter if the Mahant of a Sikh Gurdwara was not a Sikh Mahant because the Panth or Sangat exercised control over the Gurdwaras".
Next reliance was placed o Sohan Das vs Bela Singh & Ors.(2) Dealing with section 16(2) of the Sikh Gurudwara Act the Court observed: "The documentary evidence therefore establishes that the dharamsala has been a place of public worship since 1853, and that such worship has been connected with the Granth Sahib I am prepared to accept the evidence of the objectors that the existence of a samadh dates only from recent times, more than probably after the Sikh Gurdwara controversy had become acute and he importance of a samadh had been realized by the Udasi Mahants.
I hold therefore that the evidence supports the conclusion of the majority of the Tribunal that this institution falls within s.16 (2) (iii) of the Act".
In view of the divergent cases cited by the counsel for the parties we have to take into consideration the distinctive features of a Sikh Gurdwara as discussed in the earlier part of the judgment.
So viewed, the existence an worship of Guru Granth Sahib and the existence of Nishan Sahib are the determinative factor.
The Tribunal did not take into consideration the oral evidence adduced by the parties.
Eight witnesses were produced on behalf of the appellant while six witnesses were produced on behalf of the respondent.
The High Court also did not give a proper deal to the oral evidence adduced by the appellant.
The only consideration given by the High Court to the oral testimony of the witnesses on behalf, of the appellant was in the following terms: 577 "As regards the oral testimony on the point that the institution was a Dera of an Udasi Sadhu, the same is obviously interested, and hardly credible.
The Tribunal has not attached any weight to the same and we are wholly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal on that point.
" The witnesses on either side have come to depose on oath.
The grounds on which the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant has been discarded may equally apply to the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent.
The Court should have considered the worth of the evidence of each witness and should have given reasons for disbelieving the same on merit.
A bald observation that the witnesses produced on behalf of the appellate are interested must be deprecated.
Even otherwise the courts below have not approached the case from the correct angle.
(The Courts had to decide the question in view of the provisions of sub section
(2) of section 16 of the Act and they had to record a positive finding in the light of sub s.(2) of section 16,) which reads: "16 (2) If the tribunal finds that the gurdwara (i) was established by, or in memory of any of the Ten Sikh Gurus, or in commemoration of any incident in the life of any of the Ten Sikh Gurus and was used for public worship by Sikhs, before and at the time of the presentation of the of the petition under sub section (1) of section 7; or (ii) owing to some tradition connected with one of the Ten Sikh Gurus, was used for public worship predominantly by Sikhs, before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub section (I) of section 7; or (iii) was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship and was used for such worship by Sikhs, before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under Sub section (I) of section 7; or (iv) was established in memory of a Sikh martyr, saint or historical person and was used for public worship by Sikhs, before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub section (I) of section 7; or 578 (v) owing to some incident connected with the Sikh religion was used for public worship predominantly by Sikhs, before and at the time of the presentation of the petition under sub section (I) of section 7; the tribunal shall decide that it should be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, and record an order accordingly".
Unless the claim falls within one or the other of the categories enumerated in sub section (2) of section 16, the institution cannot be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara.
The Court had, therefore, first to consider as pleaded by the parties, as to whether Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi saint or a Sikh saint, and then to decide on the basis of evidence whether the institution in question is one or the of the types indicated.
This was the only question for consideration before the High Court but unfortunately it assumed what was to be proved.
On the foregoing discussion we are satisfied that the High Court has not given a proper deal to the matter and has not considered the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the parties.
Nor has it approached case from the correct perspective of law.
Ordinarily, in a situation as here the matter should have gone back to the High Court for recordings findings on the basis of appreciation of evidence but we are not inclined to remand the matter as it is a very old dispute.
We are, therefore , prepared to take that burden ourselves and finally decide the dispute.
As would appear, parties were aware of the nature claim and the evidence to be led and, therefore, parties concentrated their attention on the aspects which would be, decisive of the points in dispute.
It is unfortunate that the Tribunal and the High Court did not Keep the proper perspective in view whiles dealing with the matter.
On behalf of the appellant Ram Saran Dass, P W 1, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, Chajju Ram, PW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Singh, PW 7 and the appellant, PW 8, were examined.
On behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW 1, Bachan Singh, RW 2, Balbir Singh, RW 3, Balwant Singh, RW 4, Hazura Singh, RW 5, and Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were examined as witness.
579 The finding of the High Court as extracted hereinbefore clearly show that the four important and most relevant aspects of the case as disclosed in the evidence were completely overlooked or side tracked by the High Court, They are: (i) there are Samadhs on the premises of the institution ;(ii) there are idols and photos of Hindu deities; (iii) Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi Saint; and (iv) succession was from Guru so Chela.
The petition filed by the appellant under s.8 of the Act contained a clear averment that the institution had been set up by Bhai Bhagtu who was a Udasi Saint and the presence of three Samadhs of (I) Bhai Bhagtu, (2) Baba Paras Ram Ji and (3) Mahant Sahib Dass Ji, was also asserted.
In the written statement the respondent, after a vague denial, had admitted the institution to have been founded by Bhai Bhagtu.
PW 1, Ram Saran Dass stated that there was an idol of Baba Srichand in the institution and there were pictures of Lord Krishna and other Hindu deities.
This statement was elicited in cross examination made by the respondent.
PW 2 has stated that there is an idol of Baba Srichand and Gola Sahib in the institution and they are objects of worship.
PW 3, Bishan Dass, referred to the idol of Baba Shrichand.
PW 4, Jagral stated that there were three or four samadhs on the premises of the institution and those are objects of worship There was no challenge to this statement in examination in chief by cross examination.
PW 5 was asked in cross examination whether there were Samadhs on the premises of the institution and his answer is revealing.
He stated that there are three Samadhs on the premises of the institution and there is a dome over the Samadhs of Bhai Bhagtu.
He added that there are other pictures of Hindu deities and Hindu Festivals are celebrated in the institution.
PW 7, Surjit Singh, the local Sarpanch stated that the institution was of Udasi Fakirs.
He also stated that there is a Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu on the premises of the institution and it is an object of worship.
He indicated that the Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu was worshipped in a grand scale while the other two Samadhs were not treated on equal basis.
There was no cross examination of this witness on this aspect.
Pritam Dass, the appellant did support his case.
Ordinarily his evidence would have been treated as interested as he happens to be the party but his assertions have well corroborated.
Coming to the respondent 's side, the first witness Hardev Singh in his examination in chief stated that there is a Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu in the institution and another Samadh of his mother.
On the basis of this admission of the principal witness of the respondent there can be 580 on doubt that Samadhs exist within the institution.
At the hearing counsel had pointed out that this witness was a member of the Communist Party.
We do not think that would at all be a proper way of appreciating the evidence of the witnesses.
He was a witness called by the respondent and was not declared hostile, if he made admissions in his examination in chief.
On the other hand, the fact that he does not belong to the groups of either party and is a Communist would lend credence to his evidence as coming from an impartial source.
The next witness, RW 2, Bachan Singh admitted the existence of the Samadhs but denied that the Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu was an object of worship.
RW 3, Balbir Singh, admitted the presence of Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu as also of his mother.
It is in the evidence of this witness that he also belongs to the Communist Party.
What we have said about RW 1 equally applies to this witness.
RW 4, Balwat Singh admitted the presence of Bhai Bhagtu 's Samadh; while RW 5, Hazura Singh stated that there were two Samadhs on the premises one of Bhai Bhagtu and the other of his mother.
The last witness, RW 6, Gurdial Singh in his evidence admitted the existence of the two, Samadhs of Bhai Bhagtu and his mother.
This analysis of the evidence clearly indicates that it has been unquestionably established without the slightest shadow of a doubt that there are at least two Samadhs on the premises of the institution one being of Bhai Bhagtu and the other of his mother.
The existence of the idol of Baba Srichand, the founder of the Udasi sect in the premises also seems to have been fully established.
As already stated, Sikhs would not permit the idol of Baba Srichand in a Gurdwara, while Udasis would ordinarily install such an idol to perpetuate the memory of the founder of their sect.
What emerges from this discussion is that as found by the Tribunal, the succession was from Guru to Chela; that Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi Saint and there are Samadhs on the premises one of Bhai Bhagtu and the other of his mother.
Evidence shows that there are photos of Hindu deities in the institution.
These three facts, without anything more, would be sufficient to reject the case of the respondent that the institution is a Sikh Gurdwara.
We would like to reiterate that existence of Samadhs and succession from Guru to Chela would clearly be destructive of character of the institution as a Sikh Gurdwara because they are inconsistent with the tenets of the Sikh 581 religion.
The issue before the High Court as also the Tribunal was whether the institution Dera Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikh Gurdwara.
Reference to another aspect would be relevant here.
Counsel for the respondent emphasized the feature that there was evidence to show that Guru Granth Sahib was recited and read in this institution.
It is well established that Udasis are mid way between Sikhs on the one hand and Hindus on the other.
Srichand, son of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikhism, had, as already indicated, broken away and set up the Udasi sect.
Udasis while venerating Guru Granth Sahib, retained Hindu practices and also showed their veneration to the Samadhs.
From the very fact that Guru Granth Sahib was recited in this institution, no support can be drawn for the claim that the institution was a Sikh Gurdwara.
On the materials on record, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the Tribunal as also the High Court are wholly unsupportable to satisfy the tests indicated in law for determining the character of the institution.
We allow the appeal, reverse the decision of the Tribunal as upheld by the High Court and declare that Dera Bhai Bhagtu is not Sikh Gurdwara.
In the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
Sixty five persons claiming to be members of the Sikh community moved an application before the State Government under Section 7(1) of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925 to have a religious institution in village Ramgarh (also known as Bhagtuana of Faridkot tehsil, declared to be a Sikh Gurudwara.
The State Government notified the said application in the Punjab Government Gazette in terms of Section 7(3) of the Act on 18th October, 1963.
Upon this the appellant made an application under Section 8 and 10 of the Act claiming that the institution was not a Sikh Gurudwara but an Udasi institution known as Dera Bhai Bhagtu.
The application was referred to the Sikh Gurudwara Tribunal for adjudication.
The petition was resisted by the respondent Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee on three grounds: (i) that the appellant was not competent to move the petition under section 7 of the Act as he was not a hereditary office holder, (ii) that the provisions of the Act are not ultravires the Constitution; and (iii) that the institution in dispute was a Sikh Gurudwara.
The Tribunal held against the respondent and in favour of the appellant on contention(1).
Since the second contention was not pressed and the third question was the only issue, the Tribunal held that the institution was a Sikh Gurudwara.
In appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court confirmed the Tribunal 's findings.
Hence the appeal by Special Leave of the Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: 1.1.
The religious institution, Dera Bhai Bhagtu is not Sikh Gurudwara.
On the materials on record, the findings recorded by the Tribunal as well as the High Court are wholly unsupportable to satisfy the tests indicated in law for determining the character of the institution.
[581D] 1.2.
The findings of the High Court clearly show that the four important and most relevant aspects of the case as disclosed in the evidence were completely overlooked or side tracked by the High Court.
They are: (i) there are Samadhs on the premises of the institution; (ii) there are idols and photos of Hindu deities; (iii) Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi Saint; and (iv) succession was from Guru to Chela.
565 The petition filed by the appellant under s.8 of the Act contained a clear averment that the institution had been set up by Bhai Bhagtu who was a Udasi Saint and the presence of three Samadhs of (1) Bhai Bhagtu, (2) Baba Paras Ram Ji, and (3) Mahant Sahib Dass Ji, was also asserted.
In the written statement the respondent, after a vague denial, had admitted the institution to have been founded by Bhai Bhagtu.
Pritam Dass, the appellant did support his case.
Ordinarily his evidence would have been treated as interested as he happens to be the party but his assertions have been well corroborated.
The same is strengthened by the evidence of all respondent 's witnesses.
The evidence of witnesses clearly indicates: (i) that there are atleast two samadhs in the premises of the institution one being of Bhai Bhagtu and the other of his mother; (ii) the existence of the idol of Baba Srichand, the founder of the Udasi Sect in the premises.
Clearly the Sikhs would not permit the idol of Baba Srichand in a Gurudwara while Udasis would ordinarily install such an idol to perpetuate the memory of the founder of their sect; (iii) the succession was from Guru to Chela; and (iv) there are photos of Hindu deities in the institution.
These facts without anything more would be sufficient to reject the case of the respondent that the institution is a Sikh Gurudwara.
[579A C; G; 580G H] 1.4.
From the very fact that Guru Granth Sahib was recited in the institution no support can be drawn for the claim that the institution was a Sikh Gurudwara.
It is well established that Udasis are midway between Sikhs on the one hand and the Hindus on the other.
Srichand son of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, had broken away and set up the Udasi sect.
[581B C] 2.1.
Although for the purpose of historical research and analysis on the subject like Sikhs and Sikh temples, the forum of a court of law is not ideal, yet, if the statute enjoins the court to decide such questions, the court has got to discharge the responsibility.
[569D] 2.2.
The court has been called upon to decide whether the institution in question is a Sikh Gurudwara.
While considering this question the Court has to take into consideration all the circumstances which favour or militate against the institution being a Sikh Gurudwara.
In the very nature of things and in view of the requirements of sub s.(2) of section 16 it becomes necessary to consider whether the institution being in charge of a Udasi saint, the existence of samadhs of Udasi saints and worship thereof, or the existence of the idols and absence of a granthi and succession to the institution from guru to chela are all relevant considerations and the Court has to consider them if there is evidence on the record.
In the instant case evidence has been adduced on behalf of the appellant about the existence of samadhs and the various idols, the absence of a granthi and succession to the institution from guru to chela.
The appellant cannot, therefore, be prevented from urging the aforesaid circumstances.
[573F H; 574A] 2.3.
Courts cannot discard the evidence of witnesses of one side by simply saying that the oral testimony is interested and hardly any credible, when witnesses on either side have come to depose on oath.
Here, the grounds on which the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant has been discarded may equally apply to the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent.
The Court should have considered the worth of the evidence of each witness and should have given reasons for disbelieving the same on merit.
A bald observation that the witnesses produced on behalf for the appellant are interested must be deprecated.
The courts had to decide the 566 question in view of the provisions of sub s.(2) of s.16 of the Act and they had to record a positive finding in the light of sub s.(2) of s.16.
Unless the claim falls within one or the other of the categories enumerated in sub section(2) of s.16, the institution cannot be declared to be a Sikh Gurudwara [577B D; 578C] 3.1.
One of the most fascinating aspects of Sikhism is the process which began with human Gurus, continued during the period of duality in which there were human Gurus and a collection of sacred writings and ended with the present situation in which full authority is enjoined by the scripture.
In every respect the scripture is what the Gurus were.
[569G] Both the Gurus and the Book deserve respect, which they are accorded because of the Bani which they express, the word of divine truth.
Therefore, it was possible for Guru Arjan, the fifth in the human line, to bow before the collection which he had complied and installed in the newly built Darbar Sahib in 1604 for he was acknowledged the higher authority of the Bani due to the personal importance and significance which he possessed as Guru.
[569H; 570A] The Sikh Gurus have much in common with other preceptors in Indian tradition but their history and contribution is distinctive.
They were not Brahmins, they did not see their calling to be that of expounding Vedas, they taught in vernacular not Sanskrit and their message was for everyone.
They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib.
This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
[570B C] An important characteristic of the teachings of the Sikh Gurus is their emphasis upon the message, the Bani.
It is this stress which made possible the transfer of Guruship to the scripture.
The human Gurus were the instruments through whom the voice of the God became audible.
[570D] The holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib complied by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjun.
It is the Bible of Sikhs After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book.
So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own.
Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs.
Guru means the guide.
Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity.
Wherever a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.
Whenever the Sikhs needed guidance or counsel, they should assemble before the Granth in all sincerity and decide their further line of action in the light of teachings of the Master, as embodied in the Granth.
The noble ideas embodied in the Granth would live for ever and show people the path to blisss and happiness.
[570E F; 571B] 3.2.
Temples are found almost in every religion but there are some differences between the Sikh temples and those of other religions.
The Sikh Gurudwaras have the following distinctive features: [571C] 1.
Sikh temples are not the place of idol worship as the Hindu temples are.
There is no place for idol worship in a Gurudwara.
The central object of worship 567 in a Gurudwara is Sri Guru Granth Sakib, the holy book.
The pattern of worship consists of two main items: reading of the holy hymns followed by their explanation by some learned man, not necessarily a particular Granthi and then singing of some passages from the Holy Granth.
The former is called Katha and the second is called Kirtan.
A Sikh thus worships the Holy Words that are written in the Granth Sahib, the words or Shabada about the Eternal Truth or God.
No idol or painting of any Guru can be worshipped.
[571C D] 2.
Sikh worship in the Gurudwara is a congregational worship, whereas Hindu temples are meant for individual worship.
A Sikh does the individual worship at home when he recites Gurbani daily.
Some scriptures meant for this purpose are Japji, Jaap, Rehras, Kirtan Sohila.
Sangat is the collective body of Sikhs who meet every day in the Gurudwara.
[571E F] 3.
Gurudwara is a place where a copy of Guru Granth Sahib is installed.
The unique and distinguishing feature would always be the Nishan Sahib, a flagstaff with a yellow flag of Sikhism flying from it.
This serves as a symbol of the Sikh presence.
It enables the travellers, whether they be Sikhs or not, to know where hospitality is available.
There may be complexity of rooms in a Gurudwara for the building may also serve as a school, or where children are taught the rudiments of Sikhism as well as a rest centre for travellers.
Often there will be a kitchen where food can be prepared though langar itself might take place in the yawning.
Sometimes the Gurudwara will also be used as a clinic.
But its pivotal point is the place of worship and the main room will be that in which the Guru Granth Sahib is installed where the community gathers for diwan.
The focal point in this room will be the book itself.
[571G H; 572A] 3.3.
The sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh Gurudwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the Judgment.
There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth Sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
It is not necessary that there must be a granthi in a Gurudwara.
Any learned person can read Guru Granth Sahib and explain to the congregation.
[572B C] Hem Singh and Others vs Basant Das & Anr.
(1935 36) L.R. 631 IA 180; Bawa Ishar Dass & Others vs Dr. Mohan Singh and Others, Arjan Singh vs Inder Das ; Harnam Singh vs Gurdial Singh ; Mahant Dharam Das etc.
vs State of Punjab & Ors.
; Sohan Das vs Bela Singh & Ors.
AIR 1934 Lah.
180 referred to,


judgement:
ition No. 6816 of 1981.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) Kapil Sibal for the Petitioner.
274 B.D. Sharma for the Respondent.
The following judgments were delivered BHAGWATI, J.
The petitioner is the Director of a social action group called Social Work and Research Centre operating in and around Tilonia village in Ajmer district of the State of Rajasthan.
The Social Work and Research Centre is duly registered society and since February 1972, it has been actively engaged in the work of upliftment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in different areas and particularly in and around Tilonia village.
It operates through various groups and the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for the purpose of remedying gross violations of the which have been discovered by one such group.
These violations, according to the petitioner, have been taking place in the following circumstances and they need to be redressed through judicial intervention.
The Public Works Department of the State of Rajasthan is constructing Madanganj Harmara Road close to village Tilonia and according to the State Government, it is a part of famine relief work undertaken with a view to providing relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions.
The State Government in the Public Works Department has engaged a large number of workers for construction of this road and they include women belonging to Scheduled Castes.
It is common ground that the minimum wage for a construction worker in Rajasthan is Rs. 7 per day and it was asserted on behalf of the petitioner and not disputed on behalf of the State Government that the Notification fixing the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day does not specify any particular quantity of work to be turned out by the worker in order to be entitled to this minimum wage.
Now the practice followed by the Public Works Department for engaging workers for the construction work is to issue an identity card to every resident in the famine affected area who registers himself with the Halka patwari and the identity card would show the number of members in the family of the card holder including males, females and children.
Every resident in the famine affected area would be entitled to be employed in the famine relief work undertaken by the State Government on production of the identity card.
This way a large number of workers including women belonging to Scheduled Castes are engaged in the construction work of the Madanganj Harmara Road.
The workers employed in this construction work are divided into gangs of 20 persons or multiple 275 thereof and there is a separate muster roll for each such gang and the work done by it is measured every fortnight and payment is made by the Public Works Department to the Mate who is the leader of the gang according to the work turned out by such gang during each fortnight.
The Public Work Department has fixed a certain norm of work to be turned out by each gang before the workmen belonging to such gang can claim the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day with the result that if any particular gang turns out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department the Mate would be paid such amount as would on distribution give a wage of Rs. 7/ per day to the workmen constituting such gang, but if less work is turned out by such gang, payment to be made to the mate of such gang would be proportionately reduced and in that event, the wage earned by each member of such gang would fall short of the minimum of Rs. 7 per day.
The petitioner has stated in the writ petition that as a consequence of this practice followed by the Public Works Department workmen belonging to most of the gangs receive a wage very much less than the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day as illustrated by a few instances set out in Annexure I to the writ petition.
The petitioner has also averred that even within the gang itself, deferential payments are made to the workmen without any visible principle or norm and it is not uncommon that a worker who has put in full day 's work throughout the period of the fortnight, may get less than the minimum wage of Rs.7/ per day, while a worker who has put in much less work may get more than the proportionate wage due to him.
This system of payment adopted by the Public Works Department created considerable discontent amongst the women workers belonging to Scheduled Castes who were engaged in this construction work and on 21st August 1981 about 200 to 300 such women workers approached the Social Work and Research Centre seeking advice as to what course of action should be adopted by them for the purpose of eliminating differential payments in wages and securing payment of minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day for each worker.
Mrs. Aruna Roy, the Development Coordinator of the Social Work and Research Centre thereupon contacted Shri Atul Gupta, Asstt.
Collector and both of them immediately proceeded to the site of the construction work.
On their arrival at the site, an impromptu meeting took place where the women workers gave vent to their grievances which included inter alia complaint in regard to the "wide difference in respect of payments made by Mates to several gangs for the same category 276 of work performed" and pointed out that "differentials in payments also existed between the women workers working in the same gang and performing the same category of work.
" Since these differential payments in wages were made by the Public Works Department to the gangs allegedly on the basis of the quantity of work turned out by each such gang and, according to the petitioner, there were even within the gang itself, differentials in payment of wages to the workers resulting in perpetuation of inequality, the petitioner in his capacity as Director of the Social Work and Research Centre filed the present writ petition challenging the system of payment of wages to the workers and seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to "comply with the prescribed rates of minimum wages under the as applicable in the State of Rajasthan.
" When the writ petition reached hearing before us, the State Government produced the Rajsthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Exemption Act) and relying upon this statute, the State Government contended that since the construction work of Madangang Harmara Road was a famine relief work, the was not applicable to employees engaged on this construction work by reason of section 3 of this Act.
The Exemption Act is a Rajasthan statute enacted on 7th September 1964 and it is deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st July 1963.
Section 2 clause (b) of this Act defines "famine relief works" to mean "works already started or which may hereafter be started by the State Government to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions" and "Labour Law" is defined in section 2 clause (c) to mean "any of the enactments as in force in Rajasthan relating to Labour and specified in the Schedule".
The is one of the enactments specified in the Schedule to the Exemption Act.
Then section 3 of the Exemption Act proceeds to enact that "Notwithstanding. .any such law." Section 4 of the Exemption Act excludes the jurisdiction of courts and provides that "no court shall take cognizance of any matter in respect of an employees of famine relief works under any Labour Law", which includes the .
Now if the Exemption Act were a valid piece of legislation, it is obvious that no workman employed in a famine relief work would be entitled to complain that he is paid less than the minimum wage because the applicability of the would be 277 excluded by reason of section 3 of the Exemption Act and the women workers engaged in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road would have to be content with whatever wage is paid to them even though it be less than the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and their only complaint which would then survive would be that there is discrimination by reason of differential payment of wages to workmen doing the same quantity of work.
The petitioner therefore sought leave to amend the writ petition by including a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Exemption Act and on such leave being granted, the petitioner filed an amended writ petition in this Court.
The principal grounds on which the constitutionality of the Exemption Act was challenged were based on Articles 14 and 23 of the Constitution.
I am, for reasons which I shall presently state, of the view that the challenge under Article 23 is well founded and it is therefore not necessary to investigate the facts relating to the violation of Article 14 and I accordingly propose to confine my judgment only to a consideration of the attack based on Article 23.
If the Exemption Act is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates Article 23, it would be out of the way so far as the claim of the workmen for the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day is concerned and the only question then would be whether the workmen are entitled to the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day in any event or any deduction can be made from such minimum wage on the ground that the workmen have not turned out work according to the norm set down by the Public Works Department.
This Court had occasion to consider the true meaning and effect of Article 23 in a judgment given on 18th September 1982 in writ petition No. 8143 of 1981 Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and Ors.
vs Union of India and Ors.
(1) The Court pointed out that the constitution makers, when they set out to frame the Constitution, found that the practice of 'forced labour ' constituted an ugly and shameful feature of our national life which cried for urgent attention and with a view to obliterating and wiping out of existence this revolting practice which was a relic of a feudal exploitative society totally incompatible with new egalitarian socio economic order which "We the people of India" were determined to build, they enacted Article 23 in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.
This Article, said the Court, is intended to eradicate the pernicious 278 practice of 'forced labour ' and to wipe it out altogether from the national scene and it is therefore not limited in its application against the State but it is also enforceable against any other person indulging in such practice.
It is designed to protect the individual not only against the state but also against other private citizens.
The Court observed that the expression "other similar forms of forced labour" in Article 23 is of the widest amplitude and on its, true interpretation it covers every possible form of forced labour begar or otherwise and it makes no difference whether the person forced to give his labour or service to another is remunerated or not.
Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion and the same would be the position even if forced labour supplied by a person has its origin in a contract of service.
The Court then considered whether there would be any breach of Article 23 when a person provides labour or service to the State or to any other person and is paid less than the minimum wage for it and observed: "It is obvious that ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less than the minimum wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum for the labour or service provided by him.
It may therefore be legitimately presumed that when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some compulsion which drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under the law to receive.
What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour ' that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide and 'force ' which would make such labour or service 'forced labour ' may arise in several ways.
It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may be forced exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution.
Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as 'force 'and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such 279 'force ',it would be 'forced labour '.
Where a person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed his wife and children or even to hide their nakedness where utter grinding poverty has broken his back and reduced him to a state of helplessness and despair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes his way, even if the remuneration offered to him is less than the minimum wage.
He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept what is offered to him.
And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or service provided by him would be clearly 'forced labour '.
There is no reason why the word 'forced ' should be read in a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to physical or legal 'force ' particularly when the national charter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new socialist republic where there will be socioeconomic justice for all and everyone shall have the right to work, to education and to adequate means of livelihood.
The constitution makers have given us one of the most remarkable documents in history for ushering in a new socio economic order and the Constitution which they have forged for us has a social purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or phrase in the constitution must be interpreted in a manner which would advance the socio economic objective of the Constitution.
It is not unoften that in a capitalist society economic circumstances exert much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular course of action than physical compulsion or force of legislative provision.
The word 'force ' must therefore be construed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide labour or service even though the remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage.
Of course, if a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of the minimum wage, it would not be possible to say that the labour or service provided by him is 'forced 280 labour ' because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive.
No inference can reasonably be drawn in such a case that he is forced to provide labour or service for the simple reason that he would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just like any other person who is not under the force of any compulsion.
We are therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words 'forced labour ' under Article 23, Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him ceases to be 'forced labour ' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied.
" I must, therefore hold consistently with this decision that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage,the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the meaning of the words 'forced labour ' and attracts the condemnation of Article 23.
Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the minimum wage is paid to him he can complain of violation of his fundamental right under Article 23 and ask the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the breach of Article 23 may be abated.
If this be the correct position in law, it is difficult to see how the constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the Minimum wages Act 1948 to the workmen employed in famine relief works can be sustained.
Article 23, as pointed out above, mandates that no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage and if the Exemption Act, by excluding the applicability of the , provides that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief work, it would be clearly violative of Article 23.
The respondent however contended that when the State undertakes famine relief work with 281 a view to providing help to the persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions, it would be difficult for the State to comply with the labour laws, because if the State were required to observe the laws, the potential of the State to provide employment to the affected persons would be crippled and the State would not be able to render help to the maximum number of affected persons and it was for this reason that the applicability of the was excluded in relation to workmen employed in famine relief work.
This contention, plausible though it may seem is in, my opinion, unsustainable and cannot be accepted.
When the State undertakes famine relies work it is no doubt true that it does so in order to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions but none the less it is work which enures for the benefit of the State representing the society and if labour or service is provided by the affected persons for carrying out such work, there is no reason why the State should pay anything less than the minimum wage to the affected persons.
It is not as if a dole or bounty is given by the State to the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against drought and scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the affected persons worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of providing work what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give dole or bounty to the affected persons.
The court cannot proceed on the basis that the State would undertake by way of famine relief, work which is worthless and without utility for the society and indeed no democratic State which is administered by a sane and sensible Government would do so because it would be sheer waste of human labour and resource which can usefully be diverted into fruitful and productive channels leading to the welfare of the community and creation of national asset or wear.
It is difficult to appreciate why the State should require the affected persons to provide labour or service on work which is of no use to the society, instead of simply distributing dole or bounty amongst the affected persons.
There is no reason which the State should resort to such a camouflage.
The presumption therefore must be that the work undertaken by the State by way of famine relief is useful to the society and productive in terms of creation of some asset or wealth and when the State exacts labour or service from the affected persons for carring out such work, for example, a bridge or a road, which has utilised for the society and which is going to augment the wealth of the State, there can be no justification for the State not to pay minimum wage to the affected persons.
The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of the 282 helpless condition of the affected persons and extract labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage.
No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions.
The State cannot under the guise of helping these affected persons extract work of utility and value from them without paying them the minimum wage.
Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least, minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23 and the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the to workmen employed on famine relief work and permits payment of less than the minimum wage to such workmen, must be held to be invalid as offending the provisions of Article 23.
The Exemption Act cannot in the circumstances be relied upon by the respondent as exempting it from the liability to pay minimum wage to the workmen engaged in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road.
We must then proceed to consider whether on the facts the labour provided by the workers employed in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road could be said to be 'forced labour on the ground that they received wage less than Rs.7 per day.
Now it was not disputed on behalf of the respondent that the wage paid to a gang of workmen depended upon the work turned out by a particular gang and if it was less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, the wage earned by each member of the gang would fall short of the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day.
But the argument was that this did not involve any breach of Article 23 because if any particular gang turned out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, the amount paid to the Mate of the gang was enough to give to each workman, on distribution, the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and it was only if less work was turned out by the gang that the workmen would receive less than the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and this result would ensue not on account of any default on the part of the respondent but entirely because of the lethargy of the workmen constituting the gang.
The workmen, said the respondent, could always earn the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day by turning out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department but if they did not do so and in consequence received less than the minimum 283 wage of Rs. 7 per day the respondent could not be held responsible for breach of the fundamental right conferred under article 23.
This argument does, at first blush, appear to be attractive, but a closer scrutiny will reveal that it is unfounded.
If we look at the Notification issued under the fixing the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day for workmen employed in the construction work, it will be obvious that the minimum wage is fixed per day and not with reference to any particular quantity of work turned out by the workman during the day.
Nor does the Notification empower the employer to fix any particular norm of work to be carried out by the workman with reference to which the minimum wage shall be paid by the employer.
The minimum wage is not fixed on piece rate basis, so that a particular minimum wage would be payable only if a certain amount of work is turned out by the workman and if he turns out less work, then the minimum wage payable would be proportionately reduced.
Here the minimum wage is fixed at Rs. 7 per day and that is the minimum wage which must be paid by the employer to the workman so long as the workman works throughout the working hours of the day for which he can lawfully be required to work.
The employer may fix any norm he thinks fit specifying the quantity of work which must he turned out by the workman during the day, but if the workman does not turn out work in conformity with such norm, the employer cannot pay him anything less than the minimum wage.
If the norm fixed by the employer is reasonable and the workman does not turn out work according to such norm, disciplinary action may be taken against the workman and in a given case he may ever be liable to be thrown out of employment, but he cannot be paid less than the minimum wage, unless, of course, the minimum wage fixed by the Notification under the is co related with the quantity of work to be turned out by the workman.
Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for the employer to fix an unreasonably high norm which a workman working diligently and efficiently during the day cannot possibly reach and thereby deprive the workman of the minimum wage payable to him.
There can therefore be no doubt that in the present case the respondent was not entitled to pay less than the minimum wage to the workman belonging to a gang on the ground that such gang turned out work less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department.
I must therefore hold that each workman employed in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road was entitled to 284 receive the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day from the respondent and the respondent was not entitled to reduce the wage payable to the workman below the minimum of Rs. 7 per day on the ground that the gang of which the workman was a member had turned out work less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department.
I would accordingly direct the respondent to pay to each workman employed in the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road the difference between the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and the actual wage paid during the period that the workman provided labour on this construction work.
I do not think it should be difficult for the State to carry out this direction since the workman employed on this construction work are all residents of the surrounding area and the muster roll maintained by the Public Works Department would give the particulars of such workmen.
I would direct that the arrears of difference between the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and the actual wage disbursed shall be paid by the respondent to the workmen within two months from today and a report to that effect shall be submitted by the respondent to this Court on or before 30th April, 1983 setting out particulars of the payments made and the names of the workmen to whom such payments are made.
I would also direct that the State shall hereafter pay to each workman employed in any famine relief work including the construction work of Madanganj Harmara Road, minimum wage for the labour provided in such construction work and no deduction in the minimum wage shall be made on the ground that the work turned out by such workman is less than the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, unless and until a notification is issued under the co relating the minimum wage with a particular quantity of work to be turned out by the workman.
Since the petitioners have succeeded in the writ petition, the respondent will pay the costs of the writ petition to the petitioners.
PATHAK J. I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.
But while he has found substance in the contention that the case is one of "forced labour" within the meaning of article 23 of the Constitution, I prefer to rest my decision on the ground that there is a breach of article 14 of the Constitution.
It appears that in order to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions in the area, employment has been offered in the construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road 285 Payment of wages for the day is determined by the Public Works Department on the basis of a standard norm of work, the wage for completing the daily standard norm being fixed at Rs. 7.
It may be noted that the minimum wage prescribed under the in respect of such work is also Rs. 7 per day.
The Public Works Department has declared that if the quantum of work turned out during the day is less than the fixed standard norm the workers will be paid a mere proportionate amount of the wage of Rs. 7 per day, that is to say they will be entitled to a reduced wage only.
Sanction for not adhering to the prescribed minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day and making payment of a lesser wage has been drawn from section 3 of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964, which in provides, inter alia, that the will not apply to famine relief works or the employees thereof.
The being thus out of the way, it is open to the Public Works Department to prescribe whatever wages norms it considers appropriate for payment to persons, employed by way of relief, who are affected by drought and scarcity conditions.
It is apparent that in the matter of wages such persons have been treated as a class different from that to which workers from other areas belong.
While the latter are entitled under the to the prescribed minimum wage, the former must be content with a lesser wage if the work turned out is less than the norm.
To my mind, there is no justification for such discrimination.
The circumstance that employment has been given to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions provides only the reason for extending such employment.
In other words, the granting of relief to persons in distress by giving them employment constitutes merely the motive for giving them work.
It cannot affect their right to what is due to every worker in the course of such employment.
The rights of all the workers will be the same, whether they are drawn from an area affected by drought and scarcity conditions or come from elsewhere.
The mere circumstance that a worker belongs to an area effected by drought and scarcity conditions can in no way influence the scope and sum of those rights.
In comparison with a worker belonging to some other more fortunate area and doing the same kind of work, is he less entitled than the other to the totality of those rights? Because he belongs to a distressed area, is he liable in the computation of his wages, to be distinguished from the other by the badge of his misfortune? The prescription of equality in Art, 286 14 of the Constitution gives one answer only, and that is a categorical negative.
It is urged for the respondents that employment is provided to all able bodies inhabitants of the area as a measure of relief in their distress and it has been considered desirable to provide employment to all, even though at a wage below the prescribed minimum wage, than to provide employment to some only at the prescribed minimum wage.
The argument evidently proceeds on the assumption that the wages are drawn from a fund too limited to provide for payment of a minimum wage to all.
I see no justification for proceeding on that assumption.
When the State employs workers for doing work needed on its development projects, it must find funds for such projects.
And the fund must be sufficient to ensure the prescribed minimum wage to each worker, and this is particularly so having regard to the concept of a "minimum wage.
" It seems to me that by prescribing the criterion which it has, the Public Works Department has effected an invidious discrimination bearing no reasonable nexus to the object behind the employment.
In my judgment, the workers employed in the construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road as a measure of relief in a famine stricken area are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and that wage cannot be reduced by reference to the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exception from Labour Laws) Act, 1964 because in so far as the provisions of section 3 OF that Act countenance a lesser wage they operate against Art 14 of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.
S.R. Petition allowed.

summary:
The respondent State in the public Works Department has engaged a large number of workers for the construction of Madanganj Harmara Road, close to Tilonia village with a view to providing relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions.
The workers employed in this construction work are divided into gangs of 20 persons or multiple thereof and for each gang one muster roll is maintained.
The work done by each gang is measured every fortnight and payment is made by the Public Works Department to the Mate who is the leader of the gang according to the work turned out by such gang during each fortnight.
The Public Works Department has fixed a certain norm of work to be turned out by each gang before the workmen belonging to such gang can claim the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day with the result that if any particular gang turns out work according to the norm fixed by the Public Works Department, the Mate would be paid such amount as would be on distribution give a wage of Rs. 7 per day to the workmen constituting such gang, but if less work is turned out by such gang, payment to be made to the mate of such gang would be proportionately reduced and in that event, the wage earned by each member of such gang would fall short of the minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day.
Further, this system of proportionate distribution of the wages adopted without any visible principle or norm enabled a workman who has put in less work to get more payment than the person who has really put in more work.
Hence the public interest writ petition filed by the Director of the Social Work and Research Centre, complaining violation of the provisions of the , Articles 14 and 23 of the Constitution, and the vires of section 3 of the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption from Labour Laws) Act, 1964.
Allowing the Petition, the Court ^ HELD: 1.
Where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the meaning of the words 'forced labour ' and attracts the condemnation of Article 23.
Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the minimum wage is paid to him, he can complain of violation of his 272 fundamental right under Article 23 and ask the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the breach of Article 23 may be abated.
[280 D F] 2: 1.
The constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the providing that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief work, cannot be sustained in the face of Article 23.
Article 23 mandates that no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage.
Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least, minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23.
[280 F G, 282 B C] 2: 2.
When the State undertakes famine relief work, it is no doubt true, that it does so in order to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions but, none the less it is work which enures for the benefit of the State representing the society and if labour or service is provided by the affected persons for carrying out such work, the State cannot pay anything less than the minimum wages to the affected persons.
It is not as if dole or bounty is given by the State to the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against drought and scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the affected persons worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of providing work what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give dole or bounty to the affected persons.
The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons and extract labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage.
No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions.
[281 B E, H, 282 A] 2: 3.
In the instant case, the Notification issued under the makes it clear that the minimum wage of Rs. 7 is fixed per day and not with reference to any particular quantity of work turned out by the workmen during the day.
The Notification does not empower the employer to fix any particular norm of work to be carried out by the workman with reference to which the minimum wage shall be paid by the employer.
The minimum wage is not fixed on piece rate basis, so that a particular minimum wage would be payable only if a certain amount of work is turned out by the workman and if he turns out less work, then the minimum wage payable would be proportionately reduced.
Here the minimum wage is fixed at Rs. 7 per day and that is the minimum wage which must be paid by the employer to the workman so long as the workman works throughout the working hours of the day for which he can lawfully be required to work.
The employer may fix any norm he thinks fit specifying the quantity of work which must be turned out by the workman during the day, but if the workman does not turn out work in conformity with such norm, the employer cannot pay him anything less than the minimum wage.
If the norm fixed by the employer is reasonable and the workman does not turn out work according to such norm, disciplinary action may be taken against the workman and in a given case he must even be liable to be thrown out of employment, but he cannot be paid less than the minimum 273 wage, unless, of course, the minimum wage fixed by the Notification under the is correlated with the quantity of work to be turned out by the workman.
Otherwise, it would be the easiest thing for the employer to fix an unreasonably high norm which a workman working diligently and efficiently during the day cannot possibly reach and thereby deprive the workman of the minimum wage payable to him.
[283 B G] Peoples Union for Democratic Rights & Other vs Union of India &.
Others [1983]1 S.C.R. 456 followed.
PER PATHAK, J. 1.
The workers employed in the construction of the Madanganj Harmara Road as a measure of relief is a famine stricken area are entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 7 per day, and that wage cannot be reduced by reference to the Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees (Exemption and Labour Laws) Act 1964, because in so far as the provisions of section 3 of that Act countenance a lesser wage they operate against Article 14 of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.[286 D E] 2:1.
By prescribing the criterion which it has, the Public Works Department has effected an invidious discrimination bearing no reasonable nexus to the object behind the employment.
[286 C D] 2:2 The circumstance that employment has been given to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions provides only the reason for extending such employment.
In other words, the granting of relief to persons in distress by giving them employment constitutes merely the motive for giving them work.
It cannot affect their right to what is due to every worker in the course of such employment.
The rights of all the workers will be the same, whether they are drawn from area affected by drought and scarcity conditions or come from elsehwere.
The mere circumstance that a worker belongs to an area affected by drought and scarcity conditions can in no way influence the scope and sum of those rights.
In comparison with a worker belonging to some other more fortunate area and doing the same kind of work, he is not less entitled than the other to the totality of those rights nor liable to be distinguished from the other by the badge of his misfortune.
[285 E G] 2: 3.
When the State employs workers for doing work needed on its development projects, it must find funds for such projects.
And the fund must be sufficient to ensure the prescribed minimum wage to each worker and this is particularly so having regard to the concept of a "minimum wage".
Therefore, the argument that the wages are drawn from a fund too limited to provide for payment of a minimum wage to all is not justified.
[286 B C]