judgement:
Writ Petition No. 237 of 1986 Etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) WITH Civil Appeal Nos.
423536 & 4243/86 304 R.B. Datar, Mrs. Binu Tamta, Mrs. Rani Chhabra and B.S. Chauhan, for the Petitioners/Appellants.
L.M. Singhvi, T.S. Krishnamurthy lyer, S.K. Jain, A.M. Singhvi, C. Mukhopadhyay, B.D. Sharma and section Atreya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The petitioners in the Writ Petitions and appellants in the Civil Appeals are holders of contract carriage permits issued under the provisions of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act) carrying on business in the State of Rajasthan and other adjoining States.
Under the said permits they are entitled to run the contract carriages throughout Rajasthan except on the notified routes.
Some of them also own motor vehicles which are covered by permits issued under section 63(7) of the Act having the privilege of carrying passengers on contract throughout India.
In these Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals they have questioned the validity of the Notifica tion dated 15.7.1975 issued by the State of Rajasthan under section 129 A of the Act empowering certain officers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation) to exercise in respect of all stage carriages and contract carriages on the notified routes under section 68 D(3) of the Act the power that can be exercised under section 129 A of the Act by police of.ricers who are empowered in that behalf.
The Notification reads as follows: "RAJASTHAN RAJPATRA" Dated 7.8.1975 HOME (Cr. X) DEPARTMENT NOTIFICA TION Jaipur, July 15, 1975 O.O.420.
In exercise of the power conferred by section 129 'A of the (Central Act IV of 1939) the State Government hereby further authorises the following persons to exercise the powers and to take or cause to be taken all the proper steps within their respective jurisdic tions under the said scheme in respect of all the stage carriages and contract carriages plying on or in any notified route or in any notified area under section 68 D(3) of the said Act or in any portion thereof, namely: 305 S.No.
Persons authorised Jurisdiction 1.
Deputy General 1.
All Rajasthan Manager (Traffic) 2.
Assistant Depot 2.
Within the jurisdiction Managers of their respec tive depot.
Traffic Inspectors 3.
Within the jurisdiction of their respec tive routes No. F. 1 (6)H / Unit X 75 by order of Governor Sd/ Raj Singh Commissioner for Home/Secy.
to the Government The petitioners/appellants contend that the officers of the Corporation named in the Notification who are very much interested in seeing that the Corporation earns much profit have been over zealous in exercising the powers conferred on them under section 129 A Of the Act and seizing and detain ing the motor vehicles belonging to the petitioners/appel lants contrary to law.
The principal contention urged by the petitioners/appellants is that it was not open to the State Government to appoint persons who are not officers of the Government as persons who could exercise the powers of seizure and detention of property of citizens under section 129 A of the Act.
Relying on the Judgment of this Court in Others, [1985] 3 S.C.C. 711, it is contended that the ap pointment of the officers of the Corporation who are their rivals in motor transport business as officers entitled to exercise powers conferred under section 129 A of the Act was violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
These Writ Petitions/Civil Appeals are opposed by the State Government and the Corporation.
It is contended by the respondents that the impugned notification is issued only to protect the interests of the Corporation and in order to prevent the running of motor vehicles either as stage car riages or contract carriages along the routes over which the Corporation is exclusively entitled to operate its stage carriages under permits issued under Chapter IVA of the Act.
They also contend that the appointment of the officers of the Corporation under section 129 A of the Act is not out side the scope of that section.
In the course of the hearing it was submitted that the said powers would not be used against motor vehicles covered by permits issued 306 under section 63(7) of the Act although it is alleged that even such vehicles had been seized and detained in the past by the officers of the Corporation.
Section 129 A of the Act with which we are concerned in this case reads as follows: "129 A. Power to detain vehicles used without certificate of registration or permit Any police officer authorized in this behalf or other person authorized in this behalf by the State Government may, if he has reason to believe that a motor ' vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of section 22 or without the permit required by subsection (1) of section 42 or in contra vention of any condition of such permit relat ing to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used, seize and detain the vehicle, and for this purpose take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle.
Provided that where any such offi cer or person has reason to believe that a motor vehicle has been or is being used with out the permit required by sub section (1) of section 42, he may, instead of seizing the vehicle, seize the certificate of registration of the vehicle and shall issue an acknowledge ment in respect thereof.
Provided further that where a motor vehicle has been seized and detained under this section for contravention of the provi sions of section 22, such vehicle shall not be released to the owner unless and until he produces a valid certificate of registration under this Act in respect of that vehicle.
Section 129 A was introduced into the Act by section 20 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1942 (Act 20 of 1942).
Section 133 A was introduced by section 21 of the very Amending Act.
Originally section 133 A contained only the first three sub sections.
Sub sections (4) and (5) to section 133 A were added later.
Now section 133 A reads thus: "133 A. Appointment of motor vehicles officer ( 1 ) The State Government may, for the purpose of carrying into effect the provi sions of this Act, establish a Motor Vehicles Department and appoint as officers thereof such persons as it thinks fit.
(2) Every such officer shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
307 (3) The State Government may make rules to regulate the discharge by officers of the Motor Vehicles Department of their functions and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power to prescribe the uniform to be worn by them, the authori ties to which they shall be subordinate, the duties to be performed by them, the powers (including the powers exercisable by police officers under this Act) to be exercised by them, and the conditions governing the exer cise of such powers.
(4) In addition to the powers that may be conferred on any officer 'of the Motor Vehicles Department under subsection (3), such officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf shall also have the power to ( ) (a) make such examination and inquiry as he thinks fit in order to ascertain whether the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder are being observed; (b) with such assistance, if any, as he thinks fit, enter, inspect and search any premises which is in the occupation of a person who, he has reason to believe, has committed an offence under this Act or in which a motor vehicle in respect of which such offence has been committed is kept: Provided that (i) any such search without a warrant shall be made only by an officer of the rank of a gazetted officer; (ii) where the offence is punishable with fine only the search shall not be made after sunset and before sunrise; (iii) where the search is made without a warrant, the gazetted officer concerned shall record in writing the grounds for not obtaining a warrant and report to his immedi ate superior that such search has been made; (c) examine any person and require the production of any register or other document maintained in pursuance of this Act, and take on the. spot or otherwise statements of any person which he may consider necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act; 308 (d) seize or take copies of any registers or documents or portions thereof as he may consider relevant in respect of an offence under this Act which he has reason to believe has been committed; (e) launch prosecutions in respect of any offence under this Act and to take a bond for ensuring the attendance of the of fender before any court; (f) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed: Provided that no person shall be compelled under this sub section to answer any question or make any statement tending to incriminate himself.
(5) The provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) shall, so far as may be, apply to any search or seizure under this section as they apply to any search or seizure under the authority of any warrant issued under section 94 of that Code.
" In Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh vs Sardar Ali, Bus Owner, ; , this Court has while upholding the constitutionality of section in 129 A of the Act explained its scope, manner and the different powers which are exercisable by an officer empowered under that section to exercise the powers mentioned therein.
In that case the appellant was the Transport Commissioner of the State of Andhra Pradesh and not the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation.
Any police officer or other person authorized by the State Government under section 129A of the Act may seize and detain a motor vehicle if he has reason to believe that the motor vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of the provisions of section 22 of the Act, or without the permit required by subsection (1) of section 42 of the Act, or in contravention of any condi tions of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used.
He is also to take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary safe custody of the vehicle.
In the first proviso to section 129 A of the Act such authorised officer may instead of seizing the vehicle seize the certificate of registration of vehicle and issue an acknowledgement in respect thereof.
It further provides that where the motor vehicle has been seized or detained under the said section for contravention of the provisions of section 22 of the Act, such vehicle shall not be released to the owner unless and until he produces a valid certifi cate of registration under that Act in respect of that vehicle.
The said powers can be exercised in respect of any motor vehicle such as an omnibus, a car, an auto 309 rickshaw, a tractor, a lorry etc.
, the expression 'motor vehicle ' having been defined by the Act in sub section (18) of section 2 of the Act thus: "2(18). 'motor vehicle ' means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which 'a body has not been attached and a trailer, but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises.
" Section 22 of the Act requires every person to get his motor vehicle registered under the Act.
It provides that no person shall drive any motor vehicle and that no owner of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit the vehicle to be driven in any public place or in any other place for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods unless the vehicle is regis tered in accordance with Chapter III of the Act and the certificate of registration of the vehicle has not been suspended or cancelled and the vehicle carries a registra tion mark displayed in the prescribed manner.
Section 42 of the Act provides that no owner of a 'transport vehicle ' as defined in sub section (33) of section 2 of the Act shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passen ger or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or the Commission authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used.
A 'transport vehicle ' means a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle.
The different kinds of permits that may be issued in respect of motor vehicles are set out in Chapter IV of the Act.
They may be stage carriages, contract carriages, or public carriers.
The other kind of transport vehicle is that in respect of which a permit is issued under section 63(7) of the Act which confers the privilege on the holder of the permit to use the vehicle throughout the territories of India.
Every permit issued under Chapter IV of the Act contains a number of conditions which are specified therein.
The contravention of either section 22 or section 42(1) of the Act or any of the condi tions mentioned in the permit would entitle an officer empowered under section 129 A of the Act to seize and detain the vehicle in question and also to provide for its tempo rary safe custody.
A report or complaint, as the case maybe, also may be filed by him before the Magistrate for taking action against the owner of the vehicle for violation of any of the provisions of the Act referred to above.
It is thus seen that the powers are of a drastic nature and have the effect of depriving the owner of a motor vehicle of his property, which sometimes may be of the value of Rs.2 to 3 lakhs.
They also have the effect of depriving the passengers who are travelling in that vehicle of a transport service right in the 310 middle of a route and may expose them to 'hunger and thirst ' as it was widely advertised in a Pamphlet issued by the Corporation itself.
It is against the above background that we have to consider whether it was open to the State Govern ment in this case to authorise some of the officers of the Corporation to exercise the powers under section 129 A of the Act.
Section 129 A of the Act enables the State Government to appoint "any police officer. or other person" under sec tion 129 A of the Act to exercise the powers mentioned therein.
In so far as the appointment of a police officer for the said purpose, there is no room for any doubt because the section expressly mentions that a police officer can be authorised under it to exercise the powers mentioned there in.
The short question which arises for consideration is whether the expression "other person" mentioned in section 129 A of the Act can include persons other than Government officers, such as the officers of the Corporation.
The Corporation is established under the Road Transport Corpora tions Act, 1950 (Act 64 of 1950) hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporations Act ').
The Corporations Act was enacted to provide for the incorporation and regulation of road trans port corporations.
Under section 3 of the Corporations Act, every State Government is authorised to establish a Road Transport Corporation.
The corporation, in question, is one established under that section.
It is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal.
The manage ment of the Corporation vests in a Board of Directors who are appointed for a prescribed period.
It consists of a Chairman and other Directors, being not less than 5 and not more than 17, who may be officials of the State Government or private persons as the State Government may think fit to appoint.
The capital of the Corporation consists of any amount contributed by the Central Government or the State Government.
The Corporation may, whether or not any capital is provided by the State Government or the Central Govern ment, be authorised to raise by the issue of shares such capital as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government.
The authorised share capital of the Corporation may be divided into such number of shares as the State Government may determine and the number of shares which shall be subscribed by the State Government or the Central Government and other persons (including persons whose undertakings have been acquired by the Corporation) is liable to be determined by the State Government in consulta tion with the Central Government.
The allotment of shares to other parties mentioned in subsection (3) of section 23 of the Corporations Act shall be made by the Corporation in such manner as may be prescribed.
Dividends may be paid on the shares issued by it as per law.
The Corporation may at any time, with the previous approval of the State Govern ment, redeem the shares issued to the other parties in such manner as may be prescribed.
The Corporation is under an obligation to obey the directions which may be issued by the State Government.
If the State Government is of the opinion that the Corporation is 311 unable to perform its duties or has persistently made de fault in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under the provisions of the Corporations Act or has exceeded or abused its powers, the State Government may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, supersede the Corporation for such period as may be specified in the notification.
Thus, it is seen that the Corporation is not a department of the Govern ment but it is an independent body corporate established under the statute.
Section 14 of the Corporations Act pro vides that every Corporation shall have a Managing Director, a Chief Accounts Officer and a Financial Adviser, appointed by the State Government.
It further provides that a Corpora tion may appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient per formance of its functions.
The conditions of appointment and service and scales of pay of the officers and employees of a Corporation are dealt with by sub section (3) of section 14 of the Corporations Act.
It provides that the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of the offi cers and employees of the Corporation shall (a) as respects the Managing Director, the Chief Accounts Officer and the Financial Adviser, or, as the case may be, the Chief Ac counts Officer cum Financial Adviser, be such, as may be prescribed and as respects the other officers and employees be such as may be subject to the provisions of section 34, be determined by regulations made under the Corporations Act.
Section 15 of the Corporations Act provides that the Managing Director shall be the executive head of the Corpo ration and all other officers and employees of the Corpora tion shall be subordinate to him.
It is, thus, seen that the officers and servants of the Corporation are not holders of civil posts under the State Government, but they are employ ees of the Corporation.
The functions of the Corporation are set out in section 19 of the Corporations Act.
Subject to the other provisions of the Corporations Act, A Corporation shall have power to operate road transport services in the State and in any extended area, to provide any ancillary service, to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including fair wages,.
establishment of provident fund, living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities, to authorise the issue of passes to its employees and other persons either free of cost or at con cessional rates and on such conditions as it may deem fit to impose, to acquire and held such property, both movable and immovable as the Corporation may deem necessary for the purpose of any of the said activities, and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any property held by it etc.
It may also with the prior approval of the State Government do all other things to facilitate the proper carrying of the busi ness of the Corporation.
There is no provision in the Corporations Act authoris ing the Corporation to permit any of its officers to exer cise the powers under section 129 A of 312 the Act or to spend money on the safe custody of vehicles which are seized and detained under section 129 A of the Act.
The Corporation no doubt is entitled to draw up schemes under section 68 C of the Act and to run motor vehicles in accordance with the said scheme after it is approved by the State Government to the exclusion complete or partial of other operators on any notified route or in notified area.
Section 68 B of the Act provides that the provisions of Chapter IVA of the Act and the rules and orders made there under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsist ent therewith contained in Chapter IV of the Act or any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.
From the reading of the provisions of the Act and of the Corporation Act it is evident that the Corporation is just another operator of motor vehicles which is entitled to run motor vehicles in accordance with law after obtaining permits.
When the Corpo ration applies for permits under Chapter IV of the Act it has to compete with other applicants to obtain permits in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter.
When an approved scheme is brought into operation under Chapter IV A of the Act it is no doubt entitled to get permits to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other operators.
It is also true that when the approved scheme provides that other operators are excluded completely or partially no private operator can operate his motor vehicles along the notified route or in the notified area in question except in accord ance with the approved scheme.
Barring what is stated above and some other liabilities from which the Corporation is expressly exempted under the Act, the Corporation is subject to all the obligations and responsibilities which are im posed on other private operators by the Act.
It is subject to the powers of supervision and control of the transport authorities under the Act and to the rules governing the proper maintenance of transport vehicles.
The Corporation is also subject to the jurisdiction of the Motor Vehicles Department which is established under section 133 A of the Act and its vehicles are liable to be inspected and checked by the officers appointed under that section in the inter ests of the travelling public.
It is thus clear that the Corporation is one of the many operators of the motor vehi cles in the State though the fleet of the motor vehicles owned by it and the magnitude of the operations carried on by it may be very large.
The police officers who are empow ered to exercise certain powers under the Act should exer cise those powers in respect of motor vehicles owned by the private operators and also in respect of the motor vehicles owned by the COrporation.
Negligence on the part of the Transport Authorities, the Motor Vehicles Department and the police officers in exercising their powers of supervision, inspection and control in respect of the motor vehicles of the Corporation leads to grave public suffering and some times to disasters.
They should not take it for granted that the motor vehicles of the Corporation do not need to be checked or inspected only because it is established by the State Government.
Omission on their part in discharging these duties amounts to dereliction of public duty.
313 Section 129 A and section 133 A of the Act, as mentioned earlier, were introduced into the Act by Act 20 of 1942.
Clauses 20 and 21 of the Notes on Clauses found in the Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Bill relat ing to the Amending Act of 1942 read thus: "Clause 20 Although the plying of vehicles without registration or of transport vehicles without a permit is punishable, there is no provision for stopping them from plying and thus continuing their offence.
The clause provides for the grant of power for authorised officers to detain vehicles so as to prevent their being used without being registered or without a permit or in violation of certain conditions of the permit.
Clause 21 The powers under Chapters VI and VII with which police officers have been invested cannot be exercised by officers of other departments of the Provincial Govern ment.
It is desirable that when special de partments are set up for the purpose of admin istering the Act, the officers of these de partments should have the powers entrusted to police officers by the Act.
" Clause 20 relates to section 129 A of the Act and clause 21 relates to section 133 A of the Act.
It is clear from clause 20 that by enacting section 129A of the Act the Central Legislature intended to authorise certain officers to detain vehicles so as to prevent being used without being registered or without a permit or for violation of certain conditions of the permit.
Clause 21 of the Notes on Clauses explains the reason for establishing the Motor Vehicles Department in a State.
Sub section (3) of section 133 A of the Act provides that the State Government may make rules to regulate the discharge by the officers of the Motor Vehicles Department of their functions and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power to pre scribe the uniforms to be worn by them, the authorities to which they shall be subordinate, the duties to be performed by them, the powers (including the powers exercisable by police officers under the Act) to be exercised by them and the conditions governing the exercise of such powers.
Sub section (4) of section 133 A authorises inter alia the State Government to empower the officers of the Motor Vehicles Department to exercise powers of search without a warrant in certain cases, to examine any person and require the produc tion of any register or other document maintained in pursu ance of the Act, and take on the spot or otherwise state ments of any person which they may consider necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act, to launch prosecutions in respect of any offence under the Act and to take a bond for ensuring the attendance of the offender before any court.
A reading of section 314 129 A and section 133 A of the Act together shows that the "other person" referred to in section 129 A of the Act, who may be empowered to discharge the powers under that section can only mean an officer of the Government, such as the Motor Vehicles Officer appointed under section 133 A of the Act or of any other department.
It could never have been the intention of the Central Legislature, while enacting section 129 A and section 133 A of the Act that the powers exercisa ble under section 129 A of the Act could be conferred on persons who were not officers of the Government.
If the Central Legislature intended that such powers could be entrusted to private persons or employees of any statutory Corporation the section would have expressly provided in that regard.
Ordinarily, whenever a statute empowers the State Government to appoint persons to administer any of the provisions of the statute, the persons who may be appointed by the State Government under such provision can only be persons appointed in connection with the affairs of the State.
In other words they should be or employees officers of the State Government, who are subject to the administra tive and disciplinary control of the State Government di rectly.
The powers of search, seizure and detention of vehicles belonging to private parties and of launching prosecutions are incidental to the soveriegn powers of the State and they cannot ordinarily be entrusted to private persons unless the statute concerned makes express provi sions in that regard.
It is a different matter if a private person on his own files a complaint before magistrate and wishes to establish a criminal charge.
In such a case the private person would not be investigating into the crime with the aid of the powers of search, seizure or detention.
The Magistrate may, if he so desires, direct a police offi cer to investigate into the allegations and report to him.
In order to illustrate the above point reference may be made to section 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
It provides that any private person may arrest or cause to be arrested any person who in his presence commits a non bail able and cognizable offence, or any proclaimed offender, and, without unnecessary delay, shall make over or cause to be made over any person so arrested to a police officer, or, in the absence of a police officer, take such person or cause him to be taken in custody to the nearest police station.
We are of the view that the expression "other person" mentioned in section 129 A of the Act which has to be read ejusdem generis with the words 'any police officer ' which precede that expression in section 129 A of the Act can only refer to an officer of the Government and not to any officer or employee of any statutory Corporation or to any other private person.
We have a similar provision in section 129 of the Act.
That section authorises the State Government to empower any police officer or other person to exercise the powers under that section.
Such police officer or other person may, if he has reason to believe that any identification mark carried on a motor vehicle or any li cence, permit, certificate of registration, certificate of insurance or other document produced to him by the driver or person in charge of a motor vehicle 315 is a false document within the meaning of section 464 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), seize the mark or document and call upon the driver or owner of the vehicle to account for his possession of or the presence in the vehicle of.
such mark or document.
That section also provides that any police officer authorised in that behalf or other person authorised in that behalf by the State Government may, if he has reason to believe that the driver of a motor vehicle who is charged with any offence under the Act may abscond or otherwise avoid the service of a summons, seize any licence held by such driver and forward it to the Court taking cognizance of the offence and the said Court shall, on the first appearance of such driver before it, return the li cence to him in exchange for the temporary acknowledgment given under sub section (3) of section 129 of the Act.
Having regard to the nature of the power, the expression "other person" in section 129 ,also will have to be inter preted as meaning any other person appointed in connection with the affairs of the State Government and not any private person or officer of a Corporation.
It may be that the Corporation is established by the Government with the capital contributed by the Central Government or the State Government and it may also be that for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution the Corpo ration is treated as 'a State '.
Nevertheless the officers of the Corporation cannot be treated as persons falling within the meaning of the expression "other persons" in section 129 or section 129 A of the Act, even though some of them may be officers deputed by the State Government to work as the officers and servants of the Corporation.
In view of the foregoing we hold that the Deputy General Manager (Traffic), the Assistant Depot Managers and the Traffic Inspectors of the Corporation could not have been authorised by the State Government to discharge the powers under section 129 A of the Act.
The impugned Notification has to fail on this account only.
We also hold that the reasons given in support of the decision in Krishna Bus Service case (supra) are equally applicable to this case also.
It was argued that on account of unauthorised use of motor vehicles as stage carriages or contract carriages on the notified routes over which the Corporation has got exclusive right to operate its vehicles, the Corporation is losing a large amount of revenue and therefore it was neces sary to empower the officers of the Corporation to exercise the powers under section 129 A of the Act.
We do not find it as a satisfactory ground to uphold the impugned Notifica tion.
The police officers and the officers of the Motor Vehicles Department are expected to discharge their duties properly and diligently and if they discharge their duties in accordance with law with the amount of diligence which is required of them, there should be no difficulty in plugging any kind of unauthorised running of stage carriages or contract carriages on the notified routes.
We have to im press upon the police officers 316 of the Motor Vehicles Department of the State of Rajasthan not to allow the confidence vested in them to be eroded.
We hope and trust that they would discharge the duties to be performed by them strictly and ensure that the provisions of the Act are obeyed by the motor vehicle operators.
In view of the foregoing, the impugned Notification is liable to be set aside and we accordingly quash it.
Before leaving this case we have to observe that in some of the orders passed by certain magistrates in respect of persons accused of running motor vehicles unauthorisedly on the notified routes it is seen that the fines levied there under have been ordered to be paid over to the Corporation.
We are told that the Corporation has realised several lakhs of rupees under such orders.
Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for payment of compensa tion out of the fine to certain persons.
The orders direct ing payment of compensation to the Corporation may have been passed under clause (b) of that section which provides that the fine recovered may be applied in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court, Prima facie, we feel that the Corporation is not entitled to be paid any compensation under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
It can be paid such compensation only when it is open to the Corporation to file a suit and recover damages in law for such unauthorised operation of stage carriages.
The question whether such unauthorised running will give rise to a claim for damages in a civil court is not free from doubt.
We do not, however, express our opinion on the above question.
This is a matter in which the State is also interested.
We hope that the magistrates before whom such cases are filed hereafter will, before passing an order under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in favour of the Corporation, examine and decide the question in accordance with law.
In the.
result these writ Petitions/Civil Appeals are allowed.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
S.R. Petitions & Appeals allowed.

summary:
The State of Rajasthan issued a Notification No. 7.1(6)H/Unit x 75 Home (Court x) dated 15.7.1975 under section 129A of the empowering certain officers of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation to exercise in respect of all stage carriages and contract carriages on the Notified Routes under section 68 D(3) of the Act, the powers that can be exercised under section 129A of the Act by the police officers who are empowered in that behalf.
The writ petitioners and the appellants are holders of contract carriage permits carrying on business in the State of Rajasthan and other adjoining States.
Under the said permits they are entitled to run the contract carriages throughout Rajasthan, except on the notified routes.
Some of them also own motor vehicles which are covered by permits issued under section 63(7) of the Act having the privilege of carrying on passengers on contract throughout India.
The petitioners/appellants contended (i) that the ap pointment of the officers of the Corporation who are their rivals in motor transport business, as officers entitled to exercise powers conferred under section 129A of the Act was violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; and (ii) that the said officers who are very much interested in seeing that the Corporation earns much profit, have been overzealous in exercising their powers conferred on them and by seizing and detaining the motor vehicles belonging to the petitioners/appellants have acted contrary to law.
Allowing the petitions and appeals, the Court, 301 HELD: 1.1 The Deputy General Manager (Traffic), the Assistant Depot Managers and the Traffic Inspectors of the Corporation could not have been authorised by the State Government to discharge the powers under section 129A of the .
[315 E] 1.2 Ordinarily, whenever a statute empowers the State Government to appoint persons to administer any of the provisions of the statute, the persons who may be appointed by the State Government under such provision can only be persons appointed in connection with the affairs of the State.
In other words they should be employees or officers of the State Government, who are subject to the administra tive and disciplinary control of the State Government di rectly.
1.3 The expression 'other person ' mentioned in section 129A of the Act which has to be read ejusdem generis with the words 'any police officer ' which precede that expression in section 129A of the Act can only refer to an officer of the Government and not to any officer or employee of any statutory corporation or to any other private person.
[314 G] 1.4 A reading of section 129A and section 133A of the together shows that the 'other person ' referred to in section 129A of the Act, who may be empowered to discharge the powers under that section can only mean an officer of the Government, such as the Motor Vehicles Officer appointed under section 133A of the Act or of any other department.
It could never have been the inten tion of the Central Legislature, while enacting section 129A and section 133A of the Act that the powers exercisable under section 129A of the Act could be conferred on persons who were not officers of the Government.
If the Central Legislature intended that such powers could be entrusted to private persons or employees of any statutory Corporation the section would have expressly provided in that regard.
[313 H 314 B] 1.5 Under the Rajasthan State Road established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act LXIV of 1950, the officers and servants of the Corporation are not holders of civil posts under the State Government, so as to fall within the term 'other persons '.
Further, there is no provision in the Corporations Act, authorising the Corpora tion to permit any of its officers to exercise the powers under Section 129A of the or to spend money on the safe custody of the vehicles which are seized and detained under section 129A of the .
[310 C D, 311 H 312 A] From the reading of the provisions of the and of the Corporations Act it is evident that the Corporation is just another operator of motor vehicles which is entitled to run motor vehicles in accordance with law 302 after obtaining permits.
When the Corporation applies for permits under Chapter IV of the Act it has to compete with other applicants to obtain permits in accordance with the provisions of that Chapter.
When an approved scheme is brought into operation under Chapter IV A of the Act it is no doubt entitled to get permits to the exclusion, complete or partial of other operators.
It is also true that when the approved scheme provides that other operators are excluded completely or partially no private operator can operate his motor vehicles along the notified route or in the notified area in question except in accordance with the approved scheme.
Barring what is stated above and some other liabili ties from which the Corporation is expressly exempted under the Act, the Corporation is subject to all the obligations and responsibilities which are imposed on other private operators by the Act.
It is subject to the powers of super vision and control of the transport authorities under the Act and to the rules governing the proper maintenance of transport vehicles.
The Corporation is also subject to the jurisdiction of the Motor Vehicles Department which is established under section 133 A of the Act and its vehicles are liable to be inspected and checked by the officers appointed under that section in the interests of the travel ling public.
It is thus clear that the Corporation is one of the many operators of the motor vehicles in the State though the fleet of the motor vehicles owned by it and the magni tude of the operations carried on by it may be very large.
[312 C F] 1.6 Further every permit issued under Chapter IV of the Act contains a number of conditions which are specified therein.
The contravention of either section 22 or section 42(1) of the Act or any of the conditions mentioned in the permit would entitle and officer empowered under section 129A of the Act to seize and detain the vehicle in question and also to provide for the temporary safe custody.
A report or complaint, as the case may be, also may be filed by.
him before the Magistrate for taking action against the owner of the vehicle for violation of any of the provisions of the Act referred to above.
It is thus seen that the powers are of a drastic nature and have the effect of depriving the owner of a motor vehicle of his property, which sometimes may be of the value of Rs.2 to 3 lakhs.
They also have the effect of depriving the passengers who are travelling in that vehicle of a transport service right in the middle of a route and may expose them to 'hunger and thirst '.
Since the Corporation is only entitled to a preference in the grant of permits as respects the Notified routes or in any NOtified area.
The police officers who are empowered to exercise certain powers under the should exercise these powers in respect of motor vehicles owned by the private operators and also in respect of the motor vehicles owned by the State Road Transport Corporation.
Such a power cannot be granted to the officers of the Corporation by resorting to the term 'other person ' in the .
[309 F 310 A, 312 G, 311 H] 303 Having regard to the nature of the power, the expression 'other person ' in section 129 also will have to be inter preted as meaning any other person appointed in connection with the affairs of the State Government and not any private person or officer of a Corporation.
[315 C] Krishna Bus Service Pvt. Ltd. vs State of Haryana & Ors., [1985] 3 S.C.C. 711, followed.
Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh vs Sardar Ali Bus Owner, ; , referred to.
OBSERVATION: 1.
The police officers and the officers of the Motor Vehicles Department are expected to discharge their duties properly and diligently and if they discharge their duties in accordance with law with the amount of diligence which is required of them, there should no difficulty in plugging any kind of unauthorised running of stage carriage or contract carriages on the notified routes.
Negligence on the part of the Transport Authorities, the Motor Vehicles Department and the police officers in exercising their powers of supervi sion, inspection and control in respect of the motor vehi cles of the Corporation leads to grave public suffering and sometimes to disasters.
They should not take it for granted that the motor vehicles of the Corporation do not need to be checked or inspected only because it is established by the State Government.
Omission on their part in discharging these duties amounts to dereliction of public duty.
[315 G H, 312 G H] 2.
Prima facie, the Corporation is not entitled to be paid compensation under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
It can be paid such compensation only when it is open to the Corporation to file a suit and recover damages in law for such unauthorised operation of stage carriages.
Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for payment of compensation out of the fine to certain persons.
The orders directing payment of compensa tion to the Corporation may have been passed under clause (b) of that section which provides that the fine recovered may be applied in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensa tion is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court.
Magistrates should hereafter pass such orders only after heating all the parties.
[316 D F]


judgement:
tition No. 2662 of 1986 IN Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1061 of 1982 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) M.K. Ramamurthi and M.A. Krishnamurthy for the Petitioner.
Dalveer Bhandari and D.D. Sharma for the Respondents.
J.C. Seth, Secretary and Gen. Attorney for N.T.P.C.
The Court made the following Order: On the basis of a letter received from Banwasi Seva Ashram operating in the Mirzapur District this writ petition under Article 32 was registered.
Grievance was made on several scores in that letter but ultimately the question 339 that required detailed consideration was relating to the claim of the Adivasis living within Dudhi and Robertsganj Tehsils in the District of Mirzapur in Uttar Pradesh to land and related fights.
The State Government declared a part of these jungle lands in the two Tehsils as reserved forest as provided under section 20 of the and in regard to the other areas notification under section 4 of the Act was made and proceedings for final declaration of those areas also as reserved forests were undertaken.
It is common knowledge that the Adivasis and other backward people living within the jungle used the forest area as their habitat.
They had raised several villages within these two Tehsils and for generations had been using the jungles around for collecting the requirements for their livelihood fruits, vegetables, fodder, flowers, timber, animals by way of sport and fuel wood.
When a part of the jungle became reserved forest and in regard to other pro ceedings under the Act were taken, the forest officers started interfering with their operations in those areas.
Criminal cases for encroachments as also other forest of fences were registered and systematic attempt was made to obstruct them from free movement.
Even steps for throwing them out under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unau thorised Occupants) Act, 1972 were taken.
Some of the villages which were in existence for quite some time also came.
within the prohibited area.
The tribals had converted certain lands around their villages into cultivable fields and had also been raising crops for their food.
These lands too were included in the notified areas and, therefore, attempt of the Adivasis to cultivate these lands too was resisted.
On 22.8.1983, this Court made the following order: "The Writ Petition is adjourned to 4th Octo ber, 1983 in order to enable the parties to work out a formula under which claims of adivasis or tribals in Dudhi and Robertsganj Tehsils, to be in possession of land and to regularisation of such possession may be investigated by a high powered committee with a view to reaching a final decision in regard to such claims.
Meanwhile, no further en croachments shall be made on forest land nor will any of the adivasis of tribals be permit ted under colour of this order or any previous order to cut any trees and if any such attempt is made, it will be open to the State authori ties to prevent such cutting of trees and to take proper action in that behalf but not so as to take away possession of the land from the adivasis or tribals.
" On behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh an affidavit was filed by the Assistant Record Officer wherein it was stated: 340 "It is respectfully submitted that for the information of this Court the State Government is already seized with the matter and is trying to identify claims and find out ways and means to regularise the same.
To achieve this aim the Government has already appointed a High Power Committee chaired by the Chairman of Board of Revenue, U.P., Collector, Mirzapur and Conservator of Forest, South Circle, are also members of this Committee.
This Committee has already held two sittings.
In the last meeting held at Pipri on 16/17.8.1983 people of all shades of opinion presented their respective points of view before the Commit tee.
" On 15.12.1983, this Court made another order which indicated that the Court was of the view that another High Powered Committee should be appointed.
The relevant portion of that order was to the following effect: " . the parties will discuss the composi tion and modalities of the High Power Commit tee to be appointed by the Court for the purpose of adjudicating the various claims of the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and other backward classes in Robertsganj and Dudhi Tehsils of Mirzapur District.
Notice will also specify, that the Court proposes to appoint a High Power Committee consisting of retired High Court Judge and two other offi cers for the purposes of adjudicating upon the claims of the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and backward classes in Dudhi and Robertsganj Tehsils of their land entitlements as also to examine the hereditary and custom ary fights of farmers in those tehsils and to adjudicate upon the claims of tribals of their customary fights with respect to fodder fuel, wood, small timber, sand and stones for the houses, timber for agriculture implements, flowers, fruits and minor forest produce.
The Uttar Pradesh Government had in the meantime indi cated that the tenure of the Committee under the Chairman ship of Shri Maheshwar Prasad was to expire on December 31, 1983 and Government was awaiting the recommendations of that Committee.
In that letter it was specifically stated: "In the opinion of the State Government it would be more fruitful if the Committee pro posed in your letter is constituted after the recommendations and advice of the previous Committee are received.
The Government have agreed in principle that the proposed Commit tee with wide legal powers be constituted for adjudication of disputes.
" 341 Admittedly there had been no survey and settlement in these tehsils and in the absence of any definite record, this Court accepted the representation of the parties that it would be difficult to implement the directions of the Court.
The Court, therefore, directed that survey and record operations in these Tehsils be completed.
But later it was again represented on behalf of the State Government that completion of such operations within a short and limited time would be difficult and particularly, during the rainy and the winter seasons it would not at all be practicable to work.
The Court thereafter did not reiterate its directions in the matter of preparation of the survey and record operations and awaited the report of the Maheshwar Prasad Committee.
Intermittent directions were given on applica tions filed on behalf of tribals when further prosecutions were launched.
From the affidavit of Shri B.K. Singh Yadav, Joint Secretary to the Revenue Depart ment of the State Government, it appears that the Maheshwar Prasad Committee identified 433 villages lying south of the Kaimur Range of the Mirzapur District to be relevant for the present dispute.
Of those 299 were in Dudhi Tehsil and the remaining 134 in Robertsganj Tehsil.
The area involved was 9,23,293 acres out of which in respect of 58,937.42 acres notification under section 20 of the Act has been made declaring the same as reserved forest and in respect of 7,89,086 acres noti fication under section 4 of the Act has been made.
The Committee in its report pointed out that unauthorised occupation related to rough ly one lakh eighty two thousand acres.
In the same affidavit, it has been fur ther stated that the Government by notifica tion dated August 5, 1986, has established a special agency for survey and record opera tions to solve the problems of the claimants in the area and a copy of the notification has also been produced.
While this matter had been pending before this Court and there has been a general direc tion that there should be no dispossession of the local people in occupation of the lands, Government has decided that a Super Thermal Plant of the National Thermal Power Corpora tion Limited (for short 'NTPC) would be locat ed in a part of these lands and acquisition proceedings have been initiated.
NTPC is now a party before us upon its own seeking and has made an application indicating specifically the details of the lands which are sought to be acquired for its purpose.
It has been claimed that the completion of the Project is a time bound programme and unless the lands intended to be acquired are made free from prohibitive directions of this Court, the acquisition as also the consequential dispos session of persons in occupation and takeover of possession by the Corporation are permit ted, the Project cannot be completed.
342 Indisputably, forests are a much wanted national asset.
On account of the depletion thereof ecology has been disturbed; climate has undergone a major change and rains have become scanty.
These have long term adverse effects on national economy as also on the living process.
At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that for industrial growth as also for provision of improved living facilities there is great demand in this country for energy such as electricity.
In fact, for quite some time the entire coun try in general and specific parts thereof, in particular, have suffered a tremendous setback in industrial activity for want of energy.
A scheme to generate electricity, therefore, is equally of national importance and cannot be deferred.
Keeping all these aspects in view and after heating learned counsel for the parties in the presence of officers of the State Government and NTPC and representatives of the Banwasi Seva Ashram, we proceed to give the following directions: ' 1.
So far as the lands which have already been declared as reserved forest under section 20 of the Act, the same would not form part of the Writ Petition and any direction made by this Court earlier, now or in future in this case would not relate to the same.
In regard to the lands declared as reserved forest, it is, however, open to the claimants to estab lish their rights, if any, in any other appro priate proceeding.
We express no opinion about the maintainability of such claim.
In regard to the lands notified under section 4 of the Act, even where no claim has been filed within the time specified in ' the notification as required under section 6(c)of the Act, such claims shall be allowed to be filed and dealt with in the manner detailed below: I.
Within six weeks from 1.12.1986, demarcat ing pillars shall be raised by the Forest Officers of the State Government identifying the lands covered by the notification under section 4 of the Act.
The fact that a notifi cation has been made under section 4 of the Act and demarcating pillars have been raised in the locality to clearly identify the property subjected to the notification shall be widely publicised by beat of drums in all the villages and surrounding areas concerned.
Copies of notices printed in Hindi in abundant number will be circulated through the Gram Sabhas giving reasonable specifications of the lands which are covered by the notification.
Sufficient number of inquiry booths would be set up within the notified area so as to enable the people 343 of the area likely to be affected by the notification to get the information as to whether their lands are affected by the noti fication, so as to enable them to decide whether any claim need be filed.
The Gram Sabhas shall give wide publicity to the matter at their level, Demarcation, as indicated above, shall be completed by 15.1.1987.
Within three months therefrom, claims as contemplated under section 6(c) shall be received as pro vided by the statute.
Adequate number of record officers shall be appointed by 31st December, 1986.
There shall also be five experienced Additional District Judges, one each to be located at Dudhi, Muirpur, Kirbil of Dudhi Tehsil and Robertsganj and Tilbudwa of Robersganj Tehsil.
Each of these Additional District Judges who will be spared by the High Court of Allaha bad, would have his establishment at one of the places indicated and the State shall provide the requisite number of assistants and other employees for their efficient function ing.
The learned Chief JuStice of the Allaha bad High Court is requested to make the serv ices of five experienced Additional District Judges available for the purpose by 15th December, 1986 so that these officers may be posted at their respective stations by the first of January, 1987.
Each of those Addi tional District Judges would be entitled to thirty per cent of the salary as allowance during the period of their work.
Each Addi tional District Judge would work at such of the five notified places that would be fixed up by the District Judge ' of Mirzapur before 20th of December, 1986.
These Additional District Judges would exercise the powers of the Appellate Authority as provided under section 17 of the Act.
After the Forest Settlement Officer has done the needful under the provisions of the Act, the findings with the requisite papers shall be placed before the Additional District Judge of the area even though no appeal is filed and the same shall be scrutinized as if an appeal has been taken against the order of the authority and the order of the Additional District Judge passed therein shall be taken to be the order contemplated under the Act.
344 3.
When the Appellate Authority finds that the claim is admissible, the State Government shall (and it is agreed before us) honour the said decision and proceed to implement the same.
Status quo in regard to possession in respect of lands covered by the notification under section 4 shall continue as at present until the determination by the appellate authority and no notification under section 20 of the Act shall be made in regard to these lands until such appellate decision has been made.
Necessary assistance by way of legal aid shall be provided to the claimants or persons seeking to raise claims and for facilitating obtaining of requisite informa tion for lodging of claims, actual lodging of claims and substantiating the same both at the original as also the appellate stage as con templated, by the claimant.
Legal aid shall be extended to the claimants, without requiring compliance of the procedure laid down by the Legal Aid Board.
The Legal Aid and Advice Board of Uttar Pradesh and the District Legal Aid and Advice Committee of Mirzapur shall take appropriate steps to ensure availability of such assistance at the five places indicat ed above.
For the purpose of ensuring the provision of such legal aid, State of Uttar Pradesh has agreed to deposit a sum of rupees five lakhs with the District Legal Aid Commit tee headed by the District Judge of Mirzapur and has undertaken to deposit such further funds as will be necessary from time to time.
It shall be open to the District Legal Aid Committee under the supervision of the State Legal Aid Board to provide legal aid either by itself or through any Social Action Groups, like the Banwasi Seva Ashram.
The land sought to be acquired for the Rihand Super Thermal Power Project of the NTPC shall be freed from the ban of dispossession.
Such land is said to be about 153 acres for Ash Pipe Line and 1643 acres for Ash Dyke and are located in the villages of Khamariya, Mitahanai, Parbatwa, Jheelotola, Dodhar and Jarha.
Possession thereof may be taken after complying with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, but such possession should be taken in the presence of one of the Commis sioners who are being appointed by this order and a detailed record of the nature and extent of the land, the name of the person who is being dispossessed and the nature of enjoyment of the land and all other relevant particulars should 345 be kept for appropriate use in future.
Such records shall be.
duly certified by the Com missioner in whose presence possession is taken and the same should be available for use in all proceedings that may be taken subse quently.
The NTPC has agreed before the Court that it shall strictly follow the policy on "facilities to be given to land oustees" as placed before the Court in the matter of lands which are subjected to acquisition for its purpose.
The same shall be taken as an under taking to the Court.
It is agreed that when a claim is estab lished appropriate titledeed would be issued to the claimant 'within a reasonable time by the appropriate authority.
The Court appoints the following as a Board of Commissioners to supervise the operations and oversee the implementation of the direc tions given: (i) Mr. P.R. Vyas Bhiman (I.A.S. retired), ExecutiveChairman of the State Board of Reve nue, U.P. now residing at Lucknow; (ii) Dr. Vasudha Dhagamwar; (iii) A representative to be nominated by the Banwasi Seva Ashram.
The Committee shall be provided by the State Government with transport facilities and the appropriate infrastructure.
This should be completed before 31st December, 1986.
In the affidavit filed by Shri Yadav, Joint Secretary to the State Government on November 7, 1986, certain instruc tions of the State Government have been detailed.
To the extent the instructions are not superseded by the Court 's directions in to day 's order the same shall remain effec tive.
We must express our satisfaction in regard to the co operation shown by the parties.
Mr. Gopal Subramaniam ap pearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh has taken considera ble pains to give shape to the matter.
Mr. Ramamurthi for the petitioner has also done considerable work in evolving the ambit of the 346 guidelines which we have adopted.
We hope that all parties concerned with the matter would exhibit the proper spirit necessary to successfully complete the assignment.
We give liberty to parties to move for directions as and when neces sary.
The Board of Commissioners shall also be at liberty to approach this Court for directions when necessary for implementing the present arrangements.
P.S.S. Petition disposed of.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Consequent upon the State Government declaring a part of the jungle lands in two tehsils of the District of Mirzapur as reserved forest under s.20 of the and notifying other areas under s.4 of the Act for final declaration as reserved forests, the forest officers started interfering with the operations of the Adivasis living for generations in those areas.
Criminal cases for encroachments as also other forest offences were registered against them and systematic attempts were made to obstruct their free movement, and even steps were taken under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 for throwing them out of the villages raised by them, and in existence for quite some time.
Their attempts to cultivate the lands around these villages, converted by them into cultivable fields and on which they had been raising crops for food, were also resisted.
On the basis of a letter received from the petitioner Ashram, a writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution was registered by this Court with regard to the claims of these Adivasis to land and related rights.
By its order dated August 22, 1983 the Court directed the claims of Adivasis or tribals, to be in possession of land and to regularisation of such possession, to be inves tigated by a high powered committee with a view to 337 reaching a final decision.
The committee has since identi fied 433 villages relevant for the present dispute, and roughly one lakh eighty two thousand acres in unauthorised occupation.
On December 15, 1983 the Court directed appointment of a high powered committee consisting of a retired High Court Judge and two officers for the purpose of adjudicating upon the claims of the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and backward classes.
The Government by notification dated August 5, 1986 has established a special agency for survey and record operations.
While the matter had been pending before the court the Government decided to locate a super thermal power plant of the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) in a part of these lands and acquisition proceedings were initiated.
NTPC, now a party before the Court, is seeking dispossession of person in occupation and takeover of lands sought to be acquired for its propose.
The Court gave the following directions: 1.
The lands which have already been declared as re served forest under section 20 of the Act not to form part of the writ petition.
[342 C] 2.
Forest Officers to demarcate and identify the lands notified under s.4 of the Act within six weeks from 1st December, 1986.
The matter to be widely publicised.
Claims as contemplated under s.6(c) of the Act to be received within three months from 15th January, 1987.
[342 F 343 A] 3.
Adequate number of record officers to be appointed by December 31, 1986.
Five Additional District Judges to be located at five notified places in the area and to exercise the powers of the Appellate Authority as provided under section 17 of the Act.
[343 C F] 4.
After the Forest Settlement Officer has dealt with the matter, the findings with the requisite papers to be placed before the Additional District Judge of the area, even though no appeal is filed.
These to be scrutinized by him as if an appeal has been taken.
The order of the Addi tional District Judge passed therein to be taken to be the order contemplated under the Act.
[343 G] 5.
When the Appellate Authority finds that the claim is admissible, the State Government to honour the said decision and proceed to implement the same.
[344 A] 338 6.
Assistance by way of legal aid to be provided to the persons seeking to raise claims and for facilitating infor mation for lodging of claims and processing them both at the original as also the appellate stage.
State Government to provide the necessary funds.
[344 C] 7.
The land sought to be acquired by the NTPC to be free from the ban of dispossession.
However, provisions of the Land Acquisition Act to be complied with.
Necessary record to be maintained, as indicated, for use in proceedings that may be taken subsequently.
Facilities to be given to land oustees as undertaken before the Court.
[344 F] 8.
A Board of Commissioners to supervise the operations and oversee the implementation of the directions.
[345 C D] Forests are a much wanted national asset.
On account of the depletion thereof ecology has been disturbed; climate has undergone a major change and rains have become scanty.
, These have long term adverse effects on national economy as also on the living process.
At the same time, the court cannot lose sight of the fact that for industrial growth as also for provision of improved living facilities there is great demand in this country for energy such as electricity.
A scheme to generate electricity, therefore, is equally of national importance and cannot be deferred.
[342 AB]


judgement:
Appeal No. 222 (N) of 1973.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.1972 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 731 of 1971.
M.K. Dua, Aman Vachher and S.K. Mehta for the Appellants.
B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, G.D. Gupta and Mr. C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID, J.
1.
This appeal by certificate is directed against the Judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in C.W. No. 731 of 1971.
The prayer in the Writ Petition is for the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring (a) the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act No. 33 of 1966 (for short the Act) as ultra vires the Constitution, (b) the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Rules 1966 and Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Amendment Rules, 1970 (for short the Rules) ultra vires of Act 33 of 1966 and the Constitution of India, (c) that the Circular dated 1st April, 1971 as invalid, illegal, ultra vires, null and void and (d) for a declara tion that the Delhi Police Non Gazetted Karmchari Sangh, petitioner No. 1 in the Writ Petition, is a legally and validly constituted service organisation.
350 2.
The first appellant is the Non Gazetted Karmachari Sangh (for short the 'Sangh ') and the appellant Nos. 2 to 7, its members.
The High Court dismissed the petition holding that the challenge was not sustainable and that neither the Act nor the Rules violated any provisions of the Constitu tion.
The High Court dealt at length with the preliminary objections that a challenge based on the violation of any fundamental right was not permissible in view of the emer gency declared by the President of India, in December, 1977.
This need not detain us now in this Judgment.
The appellants ' case is that the Act referred above violates Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India and that the restrictions imposed by it., being arbitrary, violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Non Gazetted members of the Delhi Police Force wanted to form an organi sation of their own and for that purpose constituted the Karmachari Union in 1966 and applied for its registration under the Trade Union Act, 1926.
Initially the registration asked for was declined.
Then Act 33 of 1966 was enacted.
It came into force on 2nd December, 1966.
An application for recognition was again made on 9th December, 1966.
Recogni tion was granted by the Central Government on 12th December, 1966.
The Non Gazetted members of the Delhi Police Force were permitted to become members of the Sangh.
On 12th December, 1966, the Central Government made rules under the Act which were amended in December, 1970.
The Circular in question was issued under these rules.
The Circular attempts to derecognise the Sangh.
This occassioned the filing of the writ petition.
Before considering the rival contentions urged before us, it would be useful to refer to the salient features of the Act to appreciate its ambit and the restrictions imposed by its provisions.
The Act was enacted to delineate the restrictions imposed of the rights conferred by part III of the Constitution, in their application to the members of the forces charged with the maintenance of public order so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties ' and the mainte nance of discipline among them.
The Parliament obviously has this power under Article 33 of the Constitution of India.
The provisions of the Act seek to place certain restrictions on members of the police force in exercise of their funda mental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) to form Associ ation or Unions.
Section 3 of the Act reads as follows: "3(1) No member of a police force shall with out the express sanction of the Central Gov ernment or of the prescribed authority (a)be a member of, or be associated in any way with, any trade union, labour union, political association or with any class of trade unions, labour unions or political 351 associations; or (b) be a member of, or be associated in any way with, any other society, institution, association or organisation that is not recognised as part of the force of which he is a member or is not of a purely social, recretional or religious nature; or (c) communicate with the press or publish or cause to be published any book, letter or other document except where such communication or publication is in the bona fide discharge of his duties or is of a purely literary, artistic or scientific character or is of a prescribed nature.
Explanation: If any question arises as to whether any society, institution, association or organisation is of a purely social, recre tional or religious nature under clause (b) of this subsection, the decision of the Central Government thereon shall be final.
(2) No member of a police force shall partici pate in or address, any meeting or take part in any demonstration organised by any body of persons for any political purposes or for such other purposes as may be prescribed.
" Section 4 of the Act provides for penalties if Section 3 is contravened by any person.
Section 5 gives power to the Central Government by notification in the official gazette, to amend the schedule by including therein any other enact ment relating to a force charged with the maintenance of public order or omit therefrom any enactment already speci fied therein.
Section 6 gives the rule making power to the Central Government.
The only contention that now survives is whether the impugned statute, rules and orders are violative of the fights of the appellants guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India.
This appeal could be disposed of by a short Order.
Appellants No. 2 to 7 are no longer in service.
They have been dismissed.
As such they do not have the necessary locus standi to sustain this petition.
But the appellants ' counsel submitted that the first petitioner the Sangh, was still interested in pursuing this appeal and that persuaded us to hear the appeal on merits.
It is true that recognition was given to the Sangh originally.
Subsequently by order dated 1 st April, 1971, the Sangh was derecognized.
This was pursuant to the amended rules.
Rule 3 provided that "no member of the police forces shall participate in, or address, any meeting or take part in any demonstration organised by any body of persons (a)for the purpose of protesting against any of the provisions of the Act or these rules or any other 352 rules made under the Act; or (b)for the purpose of protest ing against any disciplinary action taken proposed to be taken against him or against any other member of a police force; or (c)for any purpose connected with any matter pertaining to his remuneration or other conditions of serv ice or his condition of work or living condition, or the remuneration, other conditions, of any other member or members of a police force. "Provided that nothing contained in clause(c) shall preclude a member of a police force from participating in a meeting convened by an association of which he is a member and which has been accorded sanction under sub section (1) of section3 of the Act, where such meeting is in pursuance of or for the furtherance of, the objects of such associa tion.
" The above rules were amended by a notification dated 19th December, 1970 the material change for our purpose being an amendment in the proviso to clause (c) of rule 3.
The original proviso to clause(c) was substituted by another proviso which reads as follows: "Provided that nothing contained in clause (c) shall preclude a member of a police force from participating in a meeting (i) which is convened by an association of police officers of the the same rank of which he is a member and which has been granted recognition under clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 3 of the Act; (ii) which has been specifically provided for in the articles of association or/and has been, by general or special order, permitted by the Inspector General of Police having regard ' to the object of such meeting and other relevant factors; and (iv) which has been convened to consider the agenda circulated to all concerned according to the relevant provisions of the articles of association, after giving intimation in ad vance to the ' Inspector General of Police or an officer nominated by him." (Emphasis sup plied).
Rule 5 was added to the Rules by virtue of which minutes had to be recorded of the meetings of a recognised associa tion.
The Inspector General of Police could send observers by virtue of rule 6 to such meetings.
Outsiders were prohib ited from attending the meetings of the association without permission of the Inspector General of Police by Rule 7.
Rules 8, 9 & 11 may also be usefully read: 353 "8.
Recognition: Members of police force belonging to the same rank desiring to form an association may make an application for the grant of recognition under clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 3 and such application shall be in writing under the hand of a repre sentation of such association addressed to the Inspector General of Police who shall be the authority to grant, refuse or revoke such recognition; Provided that before refusing or revoking recognition, the Association shall be given a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed action." "9.
Suspension of recognition: The Inspector General of Police may in the interests of the general public or for the maintenance of discipline in the police force and with the prior approval of the Central Government, the State Government or as the ease may be the Administrator of the Union Territory suspend the recognition granted under rule 8 for a period not exceeding three months which may be extended for a further period of three months by the Central Government, State Government or as the case may be the Administrator of the Union Territory so however that the total period for which such recognition may be suspended shall, not, in any case, exceed six months." "11.
Special provision regarding recognition already granted: Recognition granted prior to the commencement of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Amendment Rules, 1970, to any association the articles of association of which are not in conformity with these rules shall, unless the said artides of association are brought in conformity with the provisions of these rules within a period of thirty days, stand revoked on the expiry of the said peri od.
It is the change effected by the new Proviso to Rule 3(c) which has come in for attack at the hands of the appel lants.
Previously all non gazetted officers of the Delhi Police Department could be members of the Sangh.
Now, the amended proviso to rule 3(c) mandates that only members of the Police Force having the same rank could constitute themselves into one Association.
The effect of this amended rule is that the Sangh will have to be composed of various splinter associations consisting of members holding differ ent ranks.
This according to the appellants violates not only Article 19(1)(c) which protects freedom of association, but also the provisions of the Act.
354 The immediate provocation for filing the writ petition was the Circular by which the recognition granted to the Sangh was revoked.
The operative part of the Circular reads as follows: "Rule 11 of the Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Amendment Rules, 1970 published vide extraordinary Gazette of India notifica tion No. GSR 2049 dated 19 12 70 lays down that recognition granted prior to the com mencement of these rules, to any association the articles of which are not in conformity with these rules shall unless the articles are brought in conformity with the provisions of these rules within a period of 30 days, stand revoked on the expiry of the said period.
Whereas the Constitution of the Delhi Police NonGazetted Karmchari Sangh which was granted recognition vide Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs letter No.8/70/66 P.I., dated 12 12 66 and which contains a number of provisions not in con formity with the above rules, the recognition already granted to the Delhi Police Non Gazet ted Karmachari Sangh, stands revoked.
This may be brought to the notice of a11 ranks.
A copy of this circular may be published in the Delhi Police Gazette.
" The appellants ' counsel Submits that recognition of the association carries with it the right to continue the asso ciation as such.
It is a right flowing from the fact of recognition.
To derecognise the association in effect of fends against the freedom of association.
It is urged that once the Government had granted recognition to the Sangh and approved its constitution neither the Parliament nor any delegated authority can take away that recognition or dic tate to the association who could be its members.
The right available to the members of the association at the commence ment should continue as such without any hindrance.
Before considering the questions of law raised by the appellants ' counsel with reference to the decided cases, it would be useful to bear in mind the fact that this associa tion consists of members of Police Force who by virtue of this fact alone stands on a different footing from other associations.
The Constitution of India has taken care to lay down limitations on such, associations from exercising rights under Article 19(1)(c).
Article 33 read with 355 Article 19(4) of the Constitution offers an effective reply to the contention raised by the appellants.
Article 33 reads as follows: "Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to the mem bers of the Armed Forces or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, be restricted or abroagated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them.
" Article 19(4) reads as follows: "Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restric tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
" That the Sangh and its members come within the ambit of Article 33 cannot be disputed.
The provisions of the Act and rules taking away or abridging the freedom of association have been made strictly in conformity with Article 33.
The right under Article 19(1)(c) is not absolute.
Article 19(4) specifically empowers the State to make any law to fetter, abridge or abrogate any of the rights under Article 19(1)(c) in the interest of public order and other considerations.
Thus the attack against the Act and rules can be successful ly met with reference to these two Articles as members of the Police Force, like the appellants herein, are at a less advantageous position, curtailment of whose fights under Article 19(1)(c) comes squarely within Article 33 in the interest of discipline and public order.
This conclusion of ours is sufficient to dispose of this appeal.
However, we will deal with the submissions made before us for the com pleteness of the Judgment.
The scope of Article 19(1)(c) came up for considera tion before this Court in Damyanti Naranga vs The Union of India & Ors., ; The question related to the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, a Society registered under the .
The Parliament enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act under which outsiders were per mitted to become members of the Sammelan without the voli tion of the original members.
This was challenged and this Court held that any law altering the composition of the Association compulsorily will be a breach of the right to form the association because it violated the composite right of forming an association and the right to continue it as the original members desired it.
356 10.
Here we have an entirely different situation since we are dealing with a group distinct in its nature and composition from others.
Here we are dealing with a force that is invested with powers to maintain public order.
Article 33 enables Parliament to restrict or abrogate the fundamental rights in their relation to the Armed Forces including Police Force.
In Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair & Ors., vs Union India & Ors., ; this Court had to consider two questions; whether the employees of the defence establishment such as cooks, barbers and like civil employees were "members of the Armed Forces" and if so whether they could be validly deprived of their right to form unions in violation of Article 19(1)(c).
This Court held that they fell within the category of members of the Armed Forces and that the Central Government was competent by notification to make rules restricting or curtailing their right to form associations, Article 19(1)(c) not withstanding.
In Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash vs The Union of India and Ors., ; this Court had to deal with this question in relation to the functions of an incorporated body the objects of which were, interalia, to regulate forward transactions in the sale and purchase of various commodities, Freedom of association is a fundamental right.
It was contended that if a law regulated the recognition of an association under certain conditions subject to which alone recognition could be accorded or continued, such conditions were bad.
This Court had to consider whether the freedom of association implied or involved a guaranteed right to recognition also.
The contention was that if the object of an association was lawful, no restriction could be placed upon it except in the interest of public order and that freedom to form an association carried with it the right to determine its internal arrangements also.
Repelling this contention this Court held that restrictions cannot be imposed by statute for the purpose of regulating control of such associations.
While the right to freedom of association is fundamental, recognition of such association is not a fundamental right and the Parliament can by law regulate the working of such associations by imposing conditions and restrictions on such functions.
It cannot be disputed that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) can be claimed by Government servants.
A Government servant may not lose its right by joining Government service.
Article 33 which confers power on the Parliament to abridge or abrogate such rights in their application to the Armed Forces and other similar forces shows that such rights are available to all citizens, including Government servants.
But it is, however, necessary to remember that Article 19 confers fundamental rights which are not absolute but are subject to reasonable restrictions.
What has happened in this case is only to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of discipline and public order.
357 13.
The validity of the impugned rule has to be judged keeping in mind the character of the employees we are deal ing with.
It is true that the rules impose a restriction on the right to form association.
It virtually compels a Gov ernment servant to withdraw his membership of the associa tion as soon as recognition accorded to the said association is withdrawn or if, after the association is formed, no recognition is accorded to it within six months.
In other words, the right to form an association is conditioned by the existence of the recognition of the said association by the Government.
If the association affairs recognition and continues to enjoy it, Government servants can become mem bers of the said association; if the said association does not secure recognition from the Government or recognition granted to it is withdrawn, Government servants must cease to be members of the said association.
That is the plain effect of the impugned rule.
These rules are protected by Articles 33 and 19(4) of the Constitution.
Besides, it is settled law that the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) to form associations does not involve a guaranteed right to recognition also.
The main grievance of the appellants is that the first appellant Sangh when recognised, comprised of Police Officers of various ranks, the common factor being that all its members were non gazetted police officers.
This composi tion was changed by the impugned rules.
Not only is the composition changed; the entire Sangh stood derecognised for failure to alter its constitution complying with the new rules.
This attack cannot be sustained.
Section 3 of the Act permits the rule making authority to define any group of Police Force that can form an Association.
It also gives power to prescribe the nature of activity that each ' such association of members can indulge in.
It, therefore, fol lows that if rules can be framed defining this aspect, a rule can also be framed enabling the authorities to revoked or cancel recognition once accorded, if the activities offended the rules.
The further grievance of the appellant is that non gazetted officers who once formed one block have been fur ther divided with reference to ranks and that this again is an inroad into their right under Article 19(1)(c).
This submission has been already met.
Besides, this classifica tion based on ranking has its own rationale behind it.
We are dealing with a Force in which discipline is the most important pre requisite.
Non gazetted officers consist of men of all ranks; the lowest cadre and officers who are superior to them.
If all the nongazetted officers are grouped together irrespective of rank, it is bound to affect discipline.
It was perhaps, realising the need to preserve discipline that the changes in the rule were effected.
We are not satisfied that there has been violation of any law in doing so.
358 On a careful consideration of the questions involved in this appeal, we hold that the High Court was right in its decision.
We accordingly dismiss the appeal.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The non gazetted members of the Delhi police Force wanted to form an association of their own and for that purpose constituted the Karmachari Union in 1966 and applied for its registration under the Trade Union Act, 1926 and this was refused.
After the coming into effect from 2.12.1966 of the Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Act, 33 of 1966 another, application for recognition was again made on 9.12.1966 which was granted on 12.12.1966.
The non gazetted members of the Delhi Police Force were permitted to become members of the Sangh.
The Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Rules, 1966 made by the Central Government on 12.12.1966 were amended by the Amendment Rules of 1970.
Rule 11 thereof provides for revocation of the recognition grant ed to an association, if the said associations articles are not in conformity with the Rules or are not brought in conformity with the provisions of the amended Rules within a period of 30 days.
Since the Articles of Association of the appellant Sangh contained a number of provisions not in conformity with the rules and since the Sangh failed to bring the same in conformity, by a circular dated 1.4.1971 the recognition granted was revoked.
The appellants, there fore, filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, Rules and the impugned circular.
The writ petition having been rejected the appellants have come by way of special leave.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, 348 HELD: 1.1 The Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Act (33 of) 1966, the Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Rules 1966 (as amended by the 1970 Rules) and the circular dated 1.4.1971 are all constitutionally valid.
They do not offend the provisions of Articles 14 and 19(1)(c) of the Constitu tion.
[350 C, 355 E F] 1.2 The right under Article 19(1)(c) is not absolute.
Article 19(4) specifically empowers the State to make any law to fetter, abridge or abrogate any of the fights under Article 19(1)(c) in the interest of public order and other considerations.
While the right to freedom of association is fundamental, recognition of such association is not a funda mental fights and the Parliament can by law regulate the working of such associations by imposing conditions and restrictions on such functions.
[355 E, 356 F] 1.3 The fundamental fights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) can be claimed by Government servants.
A government servant may not lose his right by joining government serv ice.
Article 33 which confers power on the Parliament to abridge or abrogate such rights in their application to the Armed Forces and other similar forces shows that such fights are available to all citizens, including government serv ants.
What has happened in this case is only to impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of discipline and public order.
[356 G H] 1.4 Rule 11 read with Rule 3(c) of the Amended Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Rules, 1966 has to be judged keeping in mind the character of the employees to whom it applies.
It is true that the rules impose a restriction on the right to form association.
It virtually compels a gov ernment servant to withdraw his membership of the associa tion as soon as recognition accorded to the said association is withdrawn or if, after the association is formed, no recognition is accorded to it within six months.
In other words, the right to form an association is conditioned by the existence of the recognition of the said association by the government.
If the association obtains recognition and continues to enjoy it, government servants can become mem bers of the said association, if the said association does not secure recognition from the government or recognition granted to it is withdrawn, government servants must cease to be members of the said association.
That is the plain effect of the impugned role.
These rules are protected by Articles 33 and 19(4) of the Constitution.
Besides, it is settled law that the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) to form associations does not involve a guaranteed right to recognition also.
[357 A C] 1.5 Section 3 of the Police Force (Restriction of Rights) Act permits the rule making authority to define any group of Police Force that can form an Association.
It also gives power to prescribe the nature of activity that each such association of members can indulge in.
It, therefore, follows that if rules can be 349 framed defining this aspect, a rule can also be framed enabling the authorities to revoke or cancel recognition once accorded, if the activities offended the rules.
Besides the classification based on ranking has its own rationale behind it.
The Court is dealing with a Force in which disci pline is the most important prerequisite.
Non gazetted officers consist of men of all ranks; the lowest cadre and officers who are superior to them.
If all the non gazetted officers are grouped together irrespective of rank, it is bound to affect discipline.
It was perhaps, realising the need to preserve discipline that the changes in the rule were effected.
[357E, G ] Damyanti Naranga vs The Union of India & Ors., ; ; Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair & Ors., vs Union of India & Ors., ; ; and Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash vs The Union of India & Ors., ; fol lowed.


judgement:
tition For Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 2448 Of 1985 From the Judgment and Order dated 10.7.84 of the High court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No. 1267/84.
B. Datta, ASG.
and Ms. section Relan for the Petitioner.
The following Order was delivered This Special Leave Petition has been filed beyond the period prescribed by the Rules for filing a special leave petition.
The petitioner has flied an application for condo nation of delay in filing the special leave petition.
There are no grounds made out in the application for condonation of delay and the only material set out in the application is the list of dates as starting from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment upto the dates of filing of the Special Leave Petition.
It appears from the list of dates that the certified copy was received by the Collector of Central Excise on 22nd July, 1984 (wrongly 368 mentioned as 22nd July, 84) and it was after a period of two months, on 29th September, 1984 that the certified copy was despatched by the Collector of Central Excise to the Minis try of Finance.
The Ministry of Finance referred the Case to the Central Agency Section on 15th October, 1984.
But the Central Agency Section sent back the case to the Ministry of Finance with the remark that the same should be sent to the Ministry of Law.
This process of realisation that the case should have been referred to the Ministry of Law and not to the Ministry of Finance took about 24 days and thereafter, again, some time was taken up at the subsequent stages.
The learned Additional Solicitor General gave his opinion on 18th December, 1984 that the special leave petition should be filed.
But even thereafter, there was a delay of more than a month and a half and on 7th July, 1985, a special leave petition was filed without offering any explanation for this delay at three stages.
The Learned Additional Solicitor General requested us to give him an opportunity to file a supplemental affidavit explaining the delay at the three stages.
But we do not see why any further time should be granted to the petitioners to file a supplemental affida vit.
The application for condonation of delay was made on 7th January, 1985 and we are now in November 1986 and the petitioners thus had a period of about one year and nine months to rectify the defect by filing a supplemental affi davit but the petitioners have failed to do so.
We do not under the circumstances find any justification for condoning the delay and the application is therefore rejected and so is the Special Leave Petition.
S.R. Petition dismissed.

summary:
Dismissing the SLP and CMP, the Court, HELD: In the absence of any ground having been made out in the application for the condonation of delay in filing the Special Leave Petition, filed on 7.1.85, excepting the listing of dates on which different departments took steps in passing on the file, the Supreme Court cannot exercise its inherent powers under Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules read with section 5 of the and condone delay.
Nor would it grant permission upon oral request to file a supplemental affidavit after a lapse of nearly two years.
[368C D]