judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1994 (N) of 1971.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.
70 of the High Court of Allahabad in Second Appeal NO.
4540 of 1964.
O. P. Verma for the appellant.
J. M. Khanna and R. A. Gupta for the Respondents.
section N. Kackar appeared as amicus curiae.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
Matbar Mal, who had Sirdari rights over the disputed land, deposited an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable on the land in order to acquire Bhumidhari rights.
This he could do under sec.
134 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as it then stood.
The deposit was made on October 28, 1961.
On the same day, Matbar Mal sold the land to the present appellant.
On October 30, 1961, a certificate to the effect that he had acquired Bhumidhari rights was issued to Matbar Mal under sec.
137 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.
Thereafter the sons of Matbar Mal filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises for cancellation of the deed of sale executed by Matbar Mal on October 28, 1961 in favour of the defendants.
the suit was dismissed by the court of the Additional Munsif and the appeal by the plaintiffs was also dismissed by court of the Temporaries Civil & Sessions Judge, Deoria.
On second appeal by the plaintiffs, however, a single judge of the High Court of Allahabad allowed the appeal following a Division Bench judgment of the same court in Dhani Ram vs Jokhu (Second Appeal No. 4276 of 1964) arid decreed the suit.
The defendant has preferred this appeal by special leave under article 136 of the Constitution. ' The ground on which the second appeal was allowed by the High Court was that the Sirdar who deposited the requisite amount acquired Bhumidhari rights not from the date of deposit but from the date of the grant of the Bhumidhari certificate, and, therefore, Matbar Mal who executed the sale deed on October 28, 1961 had no right to execute the same on that day as he acquired Bhumidhari rights with effect from October 30, 1961 only, which was the date of the issuance of the Bhumidhari certificate.
921 Before the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, A 1950 was amended in 1962, sec. 134 in so far as it is relevant stood as follows: "134 (1) if a sirdar belonging to the class mentioned in cl.(a) of section 131 pays or offers to pay to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable or deemed to be payable on the date of application for the land of which he is the sirdar, he shall, upon an application duly made in that behalf to an Assistant Collector, be entitled, with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the rights mentioned in sec.
137 in respect of such land. " Section 137 in so far as it is relevant then stood as follows: "137 (1) If the application has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the declaration mentioned in sec.
134 he shall grant a certificate to that effect.
(2)Upon the grant of the certificate under sub sec.
(1) the sirdar shall from the date thereof (a)become and the be deemed to be a bhumidhar of the holing or the share in respect of which the certificate has been granted, and (b). . " There was some conflict of opinion in the Allahabad High Court ON the question whether the tenant depositing the amount equivalent to ten times the land revenue and obtaining a Bhumidhari certificate, obtained Bhumidhari rights from the date of deposit, the date of declaration or the date of certificate The conflict was resolved by the legislature which enacted Act 21 of 1962 which amended sec.
137 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act among other provisions of various other enactments.
In sec.
137 sub sec.
2 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act, for the words "from the date thereof" were substituted the words and figures "from the date on which the amount referred to in sec.
134 has been deposited".
Unfortunately the amending Act, which in the case of certain amendments provided that the substituted words shall be deemed always to have been s:) substituted, did not so provide in the case of the amendment of sec.
137 (2) of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition 922 Act.
The result was that in cases where the amount had been deposited and a certificate obtained On different dates before the coming into force of the 1962 amending Act, the position still was that the tenure holder acquired bhumidari rights with effect only from the date of issuance of the bhumidhari certificate.
It was so held in Dhani Ram vs Jokhu (supra) by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
It was following this decision in Dhani Ram 's case that the learned single Judge of the High Court in the present case allowed the second appeal.
The decision in Dhani Ram vs Jokhu was approved by another Division Bench of the same court consisting of section D. Khare and R. B. Misra, JJ in Ram Swarup vs Deputy Director, Consolidation and Ors.(1) In the latter case the learned judges expressed the further opinion that in a situation like the one before them, there was no reason why recourse should not he had to sec.
43 of the Transfer of Property Act to feed the title as it were, if the necessary conditions were fulfilled.
We agree with the reasoning of the learned judges in Ram Swarup vs Deputy Director, Consolidation ' (supra).
In that case, the matter was remanded to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider the question of the applicability of sec.
43 of the Transfer of Property Act and proceed to dispose of the matter in accordance with law.
In the present case, the facts speak for themselves and we do not think that it is necessary to remand the case to the lower courts for a decision on the question of the applicability of sec.
43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The amount of deposit under sec.
134 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition Act was made on October 28, 1961 and it was on the same day that the sale deed was executed by Matbar Mal.
It is clear that Matbar Mal erroneously represented to the vendee that he was authorised to transfer the property and professed to transfer such property for consideration.
The very execution of the sale dead on the same day as the deposit of the requisite.
amount under sec 134 is significant enough to establish that the sale deed was the result of an erroneous representation by Matbar Mal.
It is also clear that the present plaintiffs who are the sons of the vender, Matbar Mal cannot possibly claim the transferees in good faith which indeed they do not claim to be.
Section 43 clearly applies to the situation.
The learned counsel for the respondents however attempted to disclaim the applicability of sec.
43 of the Transfer of Property Act by referring to Jumma Masjid vs
Kodimaniandra Deviah (2) .
He (1) ALL.698.
; =[1962] SUPP 2 S.C.R. 554. 923 invited our attention to the following observations of the learned judges: "Now the compelling reason urged by the appellant for reading a further exception in sec.
43 is that if it is construed as applicable to transfers by persons who have only spes succession is at the date of transfer, it would have the effect of nullifying sec.
6 (a).
But sec.
6 (a) and section 43 relate to two different subjects and there is no necessary conflict between them.
Sec 6 (a) deals within certain kinds of interests in property mentioned therein, and prohibits a transfer simpliciter of those interests.
43 deals with representations as to title made by a transferrer who had no title at the time of transfer, and provides that the transfer shall faston is self on the title which the transferer subsequently acquires.
Section 6 (a) enacts a rule of substantive law, while section 4.3 enacts a rule of estoppel which is one of evidence.
the two provisions operate on different fields, and under different conditions, and we see no ground for reading a conflict between them or for cutting down the ambit of the one by reference to the other.
In our opinion, both of them can be given full effect on their own terms, in their respective spheres.
To hold that transfers by persons who have only a spes successions at the date of transfer are not within the protection afforded by section 43 would destroy its utility to a large extent.
" We are unable to see in what manner these observations can possibly assist the respondents.
In the same decision, it has been observed later, referring to the decision of the Madras High Court in Official Assignee, Madras vs Sanpath Naidu(1).
F "This reasoning is open to the criticism that it ignores the principle underlying section 43.
That section embodies, as already stated, a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation.
It is immaterial whether the transferer acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation.
It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled.
It is to be noted that when the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words of section 43 were, (1) 924 "where a person erroneously represents", and now, as amen ded by Act 20 of 1929, they are "where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents", and that emphasises that for the purpose of the section it matters no whether the transferer acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representations and that what is material is that he did make a representation and the transferer has acted on it.
where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferer did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer.
Section 43 would then have no application and the transfer will fail under section 6 (a).
But whore the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in section 43, however, fraudulent the act of the transferer might have been " In the circumstances of the present case, we have no doubt that the provisions of sec.
43 of the Transfer of Property Act are clearly attracted and that is sufficient to non suit the plaintiffs.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs.
The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the lower appellate court restored.
Shri section N. Kacker, Senior Advocate, was kind enough to assist us as amicus curiae.
We are gratefull to him for his assistance.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Section 134(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 provides that if a Sirdar (tenure holder) deposits with the State Government an amount equal to ten times the land revenue payable on the date of application for the land of which he is a Sirdar, he shall be entitled with effect from the date on which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the rights mentioned in sec.
137 in respect of such land.
Sec. 137 as it stood before amendment in 1962 provided that the Sirdar shall become a bhumidhar from the date of grant of a certificate by the Assistant Collector under sub sec.
The vendor Who had Sirdari rights over the disputed land deposited the required amount on 28th Oct. 1961 section 134 of the Act in order to acquire Bhumidari rights over the land.
He sold the land to the appellant on the same day while he was granted certificate of Bhumidari rights section 137 of the Act on 30th Oct. 1961.
Thereafter, the respondents, sons of the vendor, filed a suit before the Additional Munsiff for cancellation of Sale Deed executed by the vendor on 28th October, 1961.
The suit was dismissed and the order was confirmed in first appeal.
Rut, the High Court in second appeal filed by the respondents decreed the suit, holding that the vendor had no right to execute the sale deed on 28th October 1961, since he acquired Bhumidbari rights w.e.f.
30th October 1961 i.e. from the date of grant of Bhumidari Certificate and Dot from the date of deposit of the amount.
919 Allowing the appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: (l) Section 43 of the 'transfer of Property Act embodies a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation.
lt mattes not whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation.
What is material is hat he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it.
Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot b said to have acted on it when taking a transfer.
Section 43 would then have no application and the transfer will fail under s 6(a).
But where the transferee does act on the representation, there is no reason why he should not have the benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in section 43, however, fraudulent the act of the transfer or might have been.
[923 G H; 924 C D] C (2) In the instant case, the amount of deposit under sec.
134 of the Act was made on October 28, 1961 and it was on the same day that the sale deed was executed.
It is clear that the vendor erroneously represented to the vendee that he was authorized to transfer the property and professed to transfer such property for consideration.
the very execution of the sale deed on the same day as the deposit of the requisite amount under sec.
134 is significant enough establish that the sale deed was the result of an erroneous representation by the Vendor.
It is also clear that the respondents who are the sons of the vendor, cannot possibly claim to be transferees in good faith which indeed they do not claim to be.
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly applies to the situation However, the conflict of opinion which rose in the Allahabad High Court on the question whether a tenant obtained Bhumidari rights from the date of deposits, the date of declaration or the date of certificate was resolved by the legislature which amended sec.
137(2)in 1962 and substituted the words "from the data on which the amount referred to in section 134 has been deposited" for the words, '"from the date thereof." Unfortunately the amending Act, which in the case of certain amendments provided that the substituted words shall be deemed always to have been so substituted, did not so provide in the case of the amendment of sec.
137(2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act.
The result was that in cases where the amount had been deposited and a certificate obtained on different dates before the coming into force of the 1962 amending Act, the position still was that the tenure holder acquired bhumidari rights with effect only from the date of issuance of the bhumidari certificate.
[922 E H; 921 F H; 922A] Ram Sawarup vs Deputy Collector, Consolidation & Ors.
I.L.R. 1971 (1) All. 698, approxed.
Jumma Masjid vs Kodimaniandra Deviah, ; Supp. 2 S.C.R. 554, Official Assignee, Madras vs Sanpath Naidu and Dhani Ram vs Jokhu Second Appeal No. 4276 of 1964 [decided by Allahabad High Court referred to. 920


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 200 (N) of 1971.
From the Judgment and Order dated 1. 5.
1970 of the Orissa High Court in O. J. C. No. 10/70.
AND Civil Appeal No. 201 of 1971 From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.70 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 10170.
G. section Chatterjee for the appellants in both the appeals.
Ex Parte for the respondents in both the appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI J.
In these two appeals filed by Special leave against two judgments of the Orissa High Court, the question raised is identical namely, whether an order of suspension from service passed against a Government servant falls within the scope and purview of article 31] of the Constitution.
The judgment appealed against in Civil Appeal No. 201 of 1971 is prior in point of time and in the judgment under challenge in C. A. No. 200 of 1971 the High Court has merely followed the former judgment.
We shall, therefore, refer only to the facts relating to C. A. No. 201 of 1971.
964 The respondent Shri Ram Parshad was appointed as a Forester by the Conservator of Forests, Berhampur, District Ganjam, on 17.7.1952.
Subsequently, while working as a Forester under the District Forest Officer, Ghumsur North Division, the respondent was placed under suspension by an order dated 26 2.1969 passed by the said District Officer, pending enquiry into charges of negligence of duties The respondent thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Orissa under article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of suspension passed against him on the ground that it was made in contravention of article 311 of the Constitution as well as rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called the ' Rules ').
The High Court by its impugned judgment allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of suspension holding the same to be in contravention of article 311 (1) of the Constitution.
The High Court took the view that inasmuch as the respondent had been appointed as Forester by the Conservator of Forests, he could not have been validly suspended from service by the District Forest Officer, who is an authority subordinate to the Conservator of Forests.
The correctness of this view taken by the High Court is called in question by the appellant the State of Orissa in these two appeals.
An order of suspension passed against a Government servant pending disciplinary enquiry is neither, one of dismissal nor of removal from service within article 311 of the Constitution.
This position was clearly laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohammed Ghouse vs State of Andhra(1).
It is unfortunate that this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the High Court.
Clause (l) of article 311 will get attracted Only when a person who is a member of Civil Service of the Union of an All India Service or a Civil Service of a State or one who holds a civil post under the Union or a State is 'dismissed or 'removed ' from service.
The provisions of the said clause have DO application whatever to a situation where a Government servant has been merely placed under suspension pending departmental enquiry since such action does not constitute either dismissal or removal from service.
The High Court was, therefore, manifestly in error in quashing the order of suspension passed against the respondent on the ground that it was violative of clause (1) of article 311 of the Constitution.
Rule 12 of the Rules lays down that the appointing authority (1) ; 965 or any authority to which it is subordinate or authority empowered by the Governor or the appointing authority in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension, where a disciplinary proceeding against him is either contemplated or is pending.
It is not in dispute that under a Notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 11 of the Rules, the District Forest Officer was constituted "the appointing authority" in respect of Foresters with effect from 7.5.1962.
It is therefore clear that on the date on which the impugned order of suspension was passed 26.2.1969, the District Forest Officer under whom the respondent was working in the Ghumsur North Division was fully competent to pass the impugned order of suspension.
Hence the High Court was perfectly right in rejecting the further contention advanced before it by the respondent herein that the impugned action had been taken in violation of the provisions of Rule 12.
We accordingly allow this appeal C A. No. 201 of 1971, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition in O. J. C. No. 10 of 1970.
The parties will bear their respective costs for this Court, In the light of the legal position enunciated above, it follows that C. A. No. 200 of 1971 has also to be allowed.
The judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the Writ Petition filed by the respondent therein O. J. C. No. 101 of 1970 will also stand dismissed.
The parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal also.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent in C.A. No. 201 of 1977, was appointed as a Forester by the Conservator of Forests.
He was placed under suspension pending enquiry into charges of negligence of duties on 26.2.1969 by the District Forest Officer under whom he was working.
He challenged before the High Court under article 226 the validity of the order of suspension on the ground (i) that the order was made in contravention of article 311 of the Constitution; and (ii) that it was also violative of Rule 12 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962.
The High Court while rejecting the second contention held that the order was violative of clause (1) of Art, 311 inasmuch as the respondent could not have been validly suspended from service by the District Forest Officer, who is an authority subordinate to the authority which originally appointed him namely the Conservator of Forests.
The question of law raised in C.A. No. 200 (N)/71 also identical.
Allowing the appeals, ^ HELD: (1) An order of suspension passed against a Government servant pending disciplinary enquiry is neither one of dismissal nor of removal from service within article 311 of the Constitution Clause (1) of article 311 will get attracted only when a person who is a member of Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a State or one who holds a civil post under the Union or a State is 'dismissed ' or 'removed from service.
The provisions of the said clause have no application whatever to a situation where a Government servant has been merely placed under 963 suspension pending departmental enquiry since such action does not constitute either dismissal or removal from service.
[964E G] (2) The High Court was right in rejecting the second contention of the respondent.
Rule 12 of the Rules lays down that any authority empowered by the Governor or the appointing authority in that behalf may place a government servant under suspension, where a disciplinary proceeding against him is either contemplated or is pending.
In the instant case, it is not in dispute that under a Notification issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 11 of the Rules, the District Forest Officer was constituted "the appointing authority" in respect of Foresters with effect from 7.5.1962.
It is therefore clear that on the date on which the impugned order of suspension was passed 26.2.1969, the District Forest Officer under whom the respondent was working in the Ghumsur North Division was fully competent to pass the impugned order of suspension.
[964H; 965A C] Mohammad Ghouse vs State of Andhra Pradesh ; followed.


judgement:
63 and 64 of 1957.
Petitions under Article 71(1) of the Constitution of India for clarification of doubts in connection with the election of the President.
R. V. section Mani and I. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner in Petition No. 63 of 1957.
R. Patnaik, for the petitioner in Petition No. 64 of 1957.
M. C. Setalvad Attorney General for India, G. N. Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (Caveators) in both the petitions.
May 3.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS C. J.
The petitioners in the above petitions have moved this Court to exercise the jurisdiction and power vested in it by and under article 71(1) of the Constitution of India and to inquire into and decide what has been described as a "grave doubt" in connection with the election of the President of India and to direct the Election Commission not to proceed with the polling in connection with the said election which has been fixed for May 6, 1957, but to hold the same after duly completing all the elections to the Lok Sabha and the Legislatures in all the States of the Indian Union including the Union territory.
The first main petition was presented on April 26, 1957, and the second on April 29, 1957.
Along with each of the said petitions has been filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition asking for a stay of the polling for the Presidential election fixed 1083 for May 6, 1957.
In the first main petition the Returning Officer has not been made a party, but in the second petition he has been impleaded as a respondent.
The learned Attorney General has appeared on behalf of the Election Commission and has waived the service of notice.
We can, therefore, dispose of all the petitions before us.
There is no dispute as to the material facts which may shortly be stated as follows: After the general elections in all the States and Union territories of India, except in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, which is to return four members to the Lok Sabha and in two constituencies in the State of Punjab, the old Lok Sabha was dissolved on April 4, 1957 and the New Lok Sabha was constituted on April 5, 1957, under section 73 of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951).
As required by section 4 of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952), the Election Commission issued a notification in the official Gazette appointing April 16, 1957, as the last date for making nominations, April 17, 1957, as the date for the scrutiny of the nominations, April 20, 1957, as the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, May 6, 1957, as the polling date and May 10, 1957, as the date for the counting of the votes and the declaration of the result.
The term of office of the present President is due to expire on the mid night of May 12, 1957.
The reason for fixing the above time schedule obviously was that the Presidential election should be completed before the term of office of the present President expired.
After the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957.
This left a period of five days for the filing of the nomination paper before the Returning Officer at New Delhi.
The petitioner submits that the time was too short and he was prevented from filing his nomination paper due to want of time.
He 1084 has filed the petition as a citizen of India and as an "intending candidate" for the Presidential election.
The petitioner in the second petition is a member of the Hindu Mahasabha and is contenting the election to the Lok Sabha as an independent candidate from Kangra Parliamentary constituency in the State of Punjab.
He filed his nomination paper on January 28, 1957, as originally the polling was scheduled to commence in that constituency on February 24, 1957.
The polling, however, has since been postponed and fixed for June 2, 1957.
He has filed the petition as a citizen of India and as a prospective member of Lok Sabha and contends that if the Presidential election is held on May 6, 1957, he will be deprived of his right to vote for the election of the President of the Union.
He has also complained of discrimination offending against article 14 of the Constitution.
Under article 56 of the Constitution the President holds office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office.
The present incumbent of the high office entered upon his office on May 12, 1952, and, as already stated, his term is due to expire on the mid night of May 12, 1957.
Article 62(1) peremptorily requires that the election to fill the vacancy caused by the expiration of the term of office of the President shall be completed before the expiration of the term.
It is necessary to bear in mind this clear mandatory provision of the Constitution.
For ascertaining how such election of President is to be held, we have to go back to article 54, which runs thus: " 54.
The President shall be elected by the members of an electoral college consisting of (a) the elected members of both Houses of Parliament ; and (b) the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States.
" On one side it is said that the electoral college is to consist of those members falling under clauses (a) and (b), who are elected at the crucial date, that is to say, the date when the election is to take place.
Suppose, it is said, that the term of the President 's office expires during the currency of the life of Parliament; as it 1085 may well do in cases contemplated by article 62(2) and suppose there are vacancies in Parliament or in the Legislature of one or more States, surely the election of the President required by article 62(1) to be held before the expiry of the term of the outgoing President cannot be held up until the vacancies are filled up. ' On the other hand it is contended that the electoral college must be constituted after the elections in all States and Union territories are completed and should consist of all the elected members falling within both the categories.
Inasmuch as elections have not taken place at all in Himachal Pradesh and in two constituencies of the State of Punjab, the electoral college cannot be constituted until after those members are also elected.
It is pointed out that though on the present occasion only four members of Himachal Pradesh and only two members in the State of Punjab have not been elected, nevertheless, if the objection of the petitioners is not now heeded any party in power may in future arrange for the election of its own nominee as President by postponing the elections in several States, where it may not expect to get a majority of seats.
It is said that on March 28, 1957 some members of the then Lok Sabha had raised a question as to the danger and impropriety of holding the election of the President before the completion of the elections throughout the territory of India.
Both the petitioners share the same view and contend that a " grave doubt " has arisen in connection with the election of the President and that such a doubt must, under article 71, be inquired into and decided by this Court.
The extreme contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners is that it does not matter whether the doubt is well founded or not or whether it is good, bad or indifferent; this Court is bound to inquire into and decide the same as soon as a doubt arises and a citizen brings it before this Court for resolution thereof.
For the purpose of this case it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the merits of the respective contentions for these petitions may well be disposed of on a narrower preliminary ground.
1086 Article 71 (1) Undoubtedly confers jurisdiction and power on this Court to inquire into and decide " all doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election of President or Vice President " and this Court will have to inquire into and decide the same.
But the question is whether there is anything in the Constitution indicating the time at which and the manner in which such doubts and disputes have to be inquired into and decided.
Under article 324 the superintendence, direction and control of the prepa ration of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all election,% to Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the office of President and Vice President held under this Constitution, including the appointment of election tribunals for the decision of doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with elections to Parliament and the Legislatures of States shall be vested in the Election Commission.
It will be noticed that identical words are used, namely, " doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with elections " which are also to be found in article 71 (1).
By article 327, Parliament was authorised to make provision with respect to all matters " relating to or in connection with elections " to Parliament or to the Legislatures of the States.
article 329 provides, amongst other things, that notwithstanding anything in this Constitution no election to either House of Parliament or either House of Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election Petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the proper legislature.
In exercise of powers thus conferred on it, Parliament enacted the Representation of the People Act, 1951, providing how elections are to be held and how and on what grounds such elections may be called in question.
It also set up a special forum called Election Tribunal for the decision of " doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with such elections.
" In N.P. Ponnuswami vs Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency (1) the Returning Officer for that constituency had rejected, the (1) ; 1087 nomination paper of the appellant.
Thereupon the appellant applied to the High Court of Madras under article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and to direct the Returning Officer to include his name in the list of valid nominations to be published.
The High Court of Madras dismissed the petition and the appellant brought an appeal to this Court.
The Full Court held that in view of the provisions of article 329 (b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer.
The main controversy in the appeal centered round the words "no election shall be called in question except by an election petition " occurring in article 329 (b).
The most important question for determination by this Court was the meaning to be given to the word " election " in article 329 (b).
This Court said at page 226: "That word has by long usage in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions, acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning.
In the narrow sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling or a particular candidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll.
In the wide sense, the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in a candidate being declared elected.
" After referring to the cases of Srinivasalu vs Kuppuswami (1) and Sat Narain vs Hanuman Prasad (2 ) and a passage in Halsbury 's Laws of England, 2nd edition, Volume 12, page 237, this Court took the view that the word "election " could be and had been properly used with respect to the entire process which consisted of several stages and embraced many steps some of which might have an important bearing on the result of the process and, therefore, held that in view of the provisions of article 329 (b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the (1) A.I.R. (1928) Mad. 253, 255.
(2) A.I.R. (1945) Lah.
1088 order of the Returning Officer under article 226.
The only way such an order could be called in question was as laid down in article 329 (b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and this could be done only by an election petition presented before the Election Tribunal after the entire process of election culminating in a candidate being declared elected had been gone through.
On such election petition being filed the Election Tribunal would be properly bound to inquire into and decide "all doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election " irrespective of the stage in the entire election process to which the " doubts and disputes relate".
We now approach the construction of article 71 in the light of the decision of this Court.
As already indicated article 71(1) confers jurisdiction and power on this Court to inquire into and decide id all doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice President".
The question is: Is there in this Article or in any other part of the Constitution or anywhere else any indication as to the time when such inquiry is to be held ? In the first place, article 71 postulates an " election of the President or Vice President " and provides for inquiry into doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with such an election.
What is the meaning to be given to the word " election " as used in this Article? If we give to the word ,election" occurring in article 71(1) the same wide meaning as comprising the entire election process culminating in a candidate being declared elected, then clearly the inquiry is to be made after such completed election, i.e., after a candidate is declared to be elected as President or Vice President as the case may be.
We see no reason why this accepted meaning should not be given to the critical word.
In the second place, under cl. 3 of article 71, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may by law regulate any matter " relating to or connected with the election " of a President or Vice President.
The words here also are similar to those used in article 327 and are equally wide enough to cover matters relating to or 1089 connected with any stage of the entire election process.
In exercise of powers conferred on it by article 71(3), Parliament has enacted the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952) to regulate certain matters relating to or connected with elections to the office of President and Vice President of India.
A glance through the provisions of this Act will indicate that in the view of Parliament the time for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court to inquire into and decide doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the Presidential election is after the entire election process is completed.
Under section 14 of this Act, which corresponds to section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, no election, meaning the election of the President or Vice President, shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to this Court in accordance with the provisions of Part III of that Act and of the rules made by this Court under article 145.
Section 18, which lays down the grounds for declaring the election of a returned candidate to be void, runs as follows: 18.
Grounds for declaring the election of a returned candidate to be void: If the Supreme Court is of opinion (a) that the offence of bribery or undue influence at the election has been committed by the returned candidate or by any person with the connivance of the returned candidate; or (b) that the result of the election has been materially affected (i) by reason that the offence of bribery or undue influence at the election has been committed by any person who is neither the returned candidate nor a person acting with his connivance; or (ii)by the improper reception or refusal of a vote, or (iii)by the non compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or, orders made under this Act; or (c) that the nomination of any candidate has been wrongly rejected or the nomination of the successful candidate or of any other candidate who has 140 1090 not withdrawn his candidature has been wrongly accepted; the Supreme Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the offences of bribery and undue influence at an election have the same meaning as in Chapter IX A of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).
It is quite clear from the language of the section that any improper reception or refusal of a vote, or any non compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or of any rules or orders made under the Act or the improper acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper may be made a ground for challenging the election.
This means that all doubts and disputes relating to any stage of the entire election process is to be canvassed by an election petition presented to this Court after the election in its wide sense is concluded.
The above stated interpretation appears to us to be in consonance with the other provisions of the Constitution and with good sense.
If doubt or dispute arising out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice President can be brought before this Court before the whole election process is concluded then conceivably the entire election may be held up till after the expiry of the five years ' term which will involve a no compliance with the mandatory provisions of article 62.
The well recognised principle of election law, Indian and English, is that elections should not be held up and that the person aggrieved should not be permitted to ventilate his individual interest in derogation of the general interest of the people, which requires that elections should be gone through according to the time schedule.
It is, therefore, in consonance both with the provisions of article 62 and with good sense to hold that the word "election" used in article 71 means the entire process of election.
That is what Parliament understood to be the meaning of article,, 71 as is apparent from the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act, 1952.
Again this Court has framed rules under article 145 to regulate the 1091 procedure and a perusal of those rules will also indicate that " all doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with the election of a President or Vice President " should be brought before the court after the result of the entire election is declared, that is to say, after a candidate is declared to be elected to the office of President or Vice President.
It is pointed out that if the petitioners are compelled to wait until after the entire election process is concluded and then to file election petitions, they will have to show that the result of the election has been materially affected as required by section 18 of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act, 1952.
It is contended that there is no reason why this extra, burden or hardship, which is not in terms imposed by article 71, should be placed upon the petitioners.
It is not necessary for the purposes of disposing of these petitions to express any opinion as to the validity or otherwise of this requirement of section 18 and we do not do so.
But the plea of alleged hardship brought about by section 18 cannot alter the true meaning and import of article 71.
In our judgment article 71 postulates an election and the word "election " occurring in article 71 means the entire election process culminating in a candidate being declared elected and doubts and disputes arising out of or in connection with any of the stages of such completed election have to be inquired into and decided by this Court which, in point of time, must necessarily be after the completion of the entire process compendiously called the election.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the second petition raised an additional point that the Election Commission by fixing the election on May 6, 1957, has arbitrarily deprived the members representing territorial constituencies like Kangra and Himachal Pradesh of their right to exercise and enjoy other privileges of membership of Parliament.
This argument was raised half heartedly at the fag end of his argument in reply and was not seriously pressed.
In any event he did not advance any cogent argument showing how the petitioner had been deprived of the equal protection of the law.
Elections have to be held in numerous 1092 constituencies and different dates have to be fixed for holding the actual elections in different constituencies according to the various exigencies relating to the particular localities in which the constituencies are situate.
No good ground has been established for holding that there has been any discrimination such as is prohibited by article 14 of the Constitution.
In so far as the alleged discrimination, if any, in breach of the equal protection clause of the Constitution may be said to be calculated to raise any doubt in connection with the election of the President it will, at best, be a noncompliance with the provisions of the Constitution which may or may not, after the conclusion of the entire election, be made a ground, under section 18 of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act, 1952, for calling the election in question as to which we need formulate no final opinion at this stage.
We express no opinion on the merits of any of the controversies between the parties, but, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that the present petitions are premature and cannot be entertained at this stage.
We, therefore, dismiss the petitions Nos. 63 and 64 of 1957.
Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos.
563 and 564 of 1957 will also stand dismissed.
Petitions dismissed.

summary:
The petitioners entertained grave doubts as to the propriety of holding the Presidential election before the general elections had been completed throughout the entire territory of India and, by applications filed under article 71(1) of the Constitution as citizens of India, invoked the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court thereunder to inquire into such doubts and sought for an order restraining the Election Commission from taking the poll in connection with the election of the President, fixed for May 6, 1957, till the general elections in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh and in two Lok Sabha Constituencies of the State of Punjab, which were still to be held, had been completed.
The expiry of the term of office of the then President which caused the Presidential election was to come about on the mid night of May 12, 1957.
One of the petitioners alleged that he was a candidate for the Presidential election and the time intervening between the date when he received his nomination paper and the date fixed for the filing of it was too short to enable him to file it within time and the case of the other was that he was a prospective candidate for election to the Lok Sabha from one of the Punjab Constituencies, where election was yet to be held, and would be prevented from exercising his right to vote for the election of the President.
Held, that the present petitions were premature and must be dismissed. ^ The jurisdiction and power conferred on the Supreme Court by article 71(1) of the Constitution to inquire into and decide doubts and disputes arising out of and in connection with the election of the President can be exercised only after a particular candidate has been declared elected and on an election petition filed under section 14 of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election Act of 1952.
The word 'election ' in article 71 of the Constitution is used in the wider sense to denote the entire process of election culminating 139 1082 in a candidate being declared elected and doubts and disputes arising out of and in connection with such election must include all doubts and disputes relating to any particular stage of it.
N. P. Ponnuswamy vs Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, ; , referred to.
It is a well recognised principle of the law of election that an election cannot be held up to facilitate the ventilation of individual grievances in derogation of the interest of the people in general and article 62 Of the Constitution, which requires that the election of President must be completed within the time fixed by it and has been conceived in such interest, is mandatory in character,


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 338 of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 30th January, 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 437 of 1967.
R. K. Jain, Pramod Dayal, A. D. Sangar and Ajay K. Jain for the appellant.
B. Datta.
Rishi Kesh, B. P. Singh and Ajit Puddiserry for the respondent.
H. R. Puri and C. L. Sahu for the lnterveners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
The first respondent is a company engaged in the manufacture of sugar and employing over 1100 workers, 300 of them on a permanent basis and 800 on a seasonal basis.
The permanent employees are those employed on the clerical side and in the operation and maintenance of machines.
The other 800 employees are seasonal employees who are so employed because the factory itself does not work through out the year but works during a certain season every year from December when the sugarcane crop is ready for crushing until the crushing is over.
The employer refused to pay bonus to the seasonal employees during the year 1964 65 on the ground that they were not employed through out the year.
A dispute arose between the management and the Mazdoor Sangh which was referred to the Industrial Court Madhya Pradesh, Indore for arbitration under sec.
49 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act.
The Industrial Court decided in favour of the workers, but on a writ petition filed by the company, the award of the arbitrator was quashed and it was held that the workers were only entitled to proportionate bonus and not the minimum bonus 960 guaranteed by sec.
10 of the .
This appeal has been filed by the Mazdoor Sangh under a certificate granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
To our minds the question is a simple one and is capable of only one answer.
Sections 10 and 13 of the , as they stood at the relevant time, were as follows: "Section 10.
PAYMENT OF MINIMUM BONUS Subject to the provisions of ss 8 and 13 every employer shall be bound to pay to every employee in an accounting year a minimum bonus which shall be four per cent of the salary or wage earned by the employee during the accounting year or forty rupees, whichever is higher, whether there are profits in the accounting year or not: Provided that where such employee has not completed fifteen years of age at the beginning of the accounting year, the provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to such employee as if for the words 'forty rupees ', the words 'twenty five rupees" were substituted." "Section 13 PROPORTIONATE REDUCTION OF BONUS IN CERTAIN CASES Where an employee has not worked for all the working days in any accounting year, the minimum bonus of forty rupees or, as the case may be, of twenty five rupees, per cent, of his salary or wage for the days he has worked in that accounting year shall be proportionately reduced.
" The High Court has interpreted the words "working days in any accounting year" as meaning all those days of the year except holidays.
While such an interpretation may be alright in the case of a factory which works all through the year, it would be hardly appropriate in the case of a factory which works during a particular season every year.
In the case of a factory which works seasonally during an accounting year, ' working days in any accounting year" can only mean those days of the year during which the employee concerned is actually allowed to work.
That was the interpretation which was placed upon the expression by the Industrial Court and 961 we think it is the proper interpretation.
Having regard to the scheme and the purpose of the Act, we (30 not think that the High Court was justified in placing a different construction on the meaning of the expression "working days in any accounting year".
We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the award of the Industrial Court.
The bonus payable to the employees will carry interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum.
from the day when the bonus became due until the date of payment.
appeal is allowed with costs.
N.V.K Appeal allowed.

summary:
The first respondent.
a Company engaged in the manufacture of Sugar, employed workers both on a permanent basis as well as on a seasonal basis.
The employer refused to pay bonus to the seasonal employees on the ground that they were not employed throughout the year, and the consequential dispute that arose between the management and the appellant union was referred to the Industrial Court under section 49 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act.
The Industrial Court decided in favour of the workers and held that they were entitled to payment of the minimum bonus.
The Writ Petition filed by the company was allowed and the award of the Industrial Court was quashed.
The High Court interpreted the words "working days in any accounting year" in section 13 of the as meaning all those days of the year except holidays, and held that the workers were only entitled to proportionate bonus and not the minimum bonus guaranteed under section 10 of the Act.
Allowing the Appeal of the Union to this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
In the case of a factory which works seasonally during an accounting year, working days in any accounting year" can only mean those days of the year during which the employee concerned is actually allowed to work.
Having regard to the scheme and purpose of the , the High Court was not justified in placing a different 959 construction on the meaning of the expression "working days in any A accounting year".
[960H; 961A] 2.
The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the award of the Industrial Court is restored.
The bonus payable to the employees will carry interest at nine per cent per annum, from the date bonus became due until date of payment.
[961B]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 562 of 1985 From the Judgment and Order dated the 28th January, 1985 of the Calcutta High Court in F. M. A. T. No. 970 of 1984.
Somnath Chatterjee, H. K Puri for the Appellants.
section N. Kacker, ,4.
K Ganguli for the Respondents.
The West Bengal State Electricity Board is the principal appellant in this appeal by special leave which we have just now granted.
The first respondent, a permanent employee of the West Bengal State Electricity Board, filed the writ petition out of which the appeal arises in the Calcutta High Court to quash an order dated march 22, 1984 of the Secretary, West Bengal State Electricity 1016 Board terminating his services as Deputy Secretary with immediate effect on payment of three month 's salary in lieu of three month 's notice.
The order gave no reasons for terminating the services of the respondent and there was nothing in the order which could possibly be said to attach any stigma to the respondent.
Apparently the order was made under Regulation 34 of the Board 's regulations which enables the Board to terminate the services of any permanent employee 'by serving three months ' notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu there of '.
The High Court contrasted Regulation 34 with Regulation 33 which provides for the termination of services of both permanent and temporary employees of the Board on attaining the age of superannuation, as a result of the disciplinary action etc.
For the sake of convenience we extract below Regulation 33 and the first paragraph (which alone is relevant) of Regulation 34: "33 (1) Unless otherwise specified in the appointment order in any particular case, the services of a permanent employee of the Board may be terminated without notice (i) On his attaining the age of retirement or by reason of a declaration by the competent medical authority that he is unfit for further service; or (ii) as a result of disciplinary action; (iii) if he remains absent from duty, on leave or other wise, for a continuous period exceeding 2 years.
(2) In the case of a temporary employee, his service may be terminated by serving of (a) one month 's notice on other side or on payment of` a month 's salary in lieu thereof; or (b) notice on either side for the period specified in the appointment order or contract or on payment of salary in lieu thereof, as the case may be.
(c) the service of a temporary employee shall also be deemed to have been terminated automatically if the period of extraordinary leave without pay and/or of unauthorized absence from duties exceeding(s) a maximum period of 90 days.
1017 "34.
in case of a permanent employees, his services A may be terminated by serving three months ' notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding period in lieu thereof.
" Contrasting Regulations 33 and 34 the High Court came to the conclusion that Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination.
The High Court, therefore, struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 34 and as a consequence quashed the order terminating the services of the first respondent.
The learned counsel for the West Bengal State Electricity Board submitted that Regulation 34 did not offend article 14 of the Constitution, that sec.
18A and 19 of the Electricity Supply Act laid down sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power under Regulation 34 and in any case the power to terminate the services of a permanent employee was vested in higher ranking officials and might be expected to be exercised in a reasonable way.
We are not impressed with the submission of the learned counsel for the Board On the face of it, the regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination It is a naked 'hire and fire ' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer employee relationship is fast approaching.
Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII class so familiar to administrative lawyers In Moti Ram Deka vs North East frontier Railway(l) Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code were challenged on the ground that they were contrary to article 311 (2) of the Constitution.
The challenge was upheld though no opinion was expressed on the question whether the rule offended art 14 of the Constitution.
Since then article 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of this Court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down (2) 1018 as Regulation 34 confers on the Board in the present case.
The learned judge struck down Regulation 48 (a) and we agree with his reasoning and conclusion.
In Workman, Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs Hindustan Steel Ltd.(l) this Court had occasioned to hold that a Standing Order which conferred such arbitrary, uncanalised and drastic power to enable the employer to dispense with an inquiry and to dismiss an employee, without assigning any reason, by merely stating that it was expedient and against the interest of the security to continue to employ the workman was violative of the basic requirement of natural justice.
The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Manohar P. Kharkhar vs Raghuraj(2) to contend that Regulation 48 of the Air India Employee 's Service Regulations was valid.
It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Delhi High Court that because of the complexities of modern administration and the unpredictable exigencies arising in the course of such administration it is necessary for an employer to be vested with such powers as those under Regulation 48.
We prefer the reasoning of Sawant, J. Of the Bombay High Court and that of the Calcutta High Court in the judgment under appeal to the reasoning of the Delhi High Court.
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
M. L. A. Appeal dismissed.
(1) ; (2) [1981] II L.L.J. 459.

summary:
First Paragraph of Regulation 34 of West Bengal State Electricity Board Regulations provides that in case of a permanents employee his services may be terminated by serving 3 months notice or on payment of salary for the corresponding Period in lieu thereof.
The Secretary of the appellant Board terminated the services of first respondent, a permanent employee with immediate effect on payment of three months ' salary in lieu of three months notice without giving any reasons under Regulation 34 of the Board 's Regulations.
There was nothing in the order which could possibly be said to attach any stigma to the respondent The respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court for quashing the impugned order.
The High Court came to the conclusion that Regulation 34 was arbitrary in nature and suffered from the vice of enabling discrimination and therefore it struck down the first paragraph of Regulation 34 and as a consequence quashed the order terminating the services of the first respondent.
In an appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that section 18A and 19 of the Electricity Supply Act laid down sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power under Regulation 34 and in any case the power to terminate the services of a permanent employee was vested in higher ranking officials and might be expected to be exercised in a reasonable way and therefore Regulation 34 did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution.
1015 Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: Article 14 has been interpreted in several decisions of the Court and conferment and exercise of arbitrary power on and by the State or its instrumentalities have been frowned upon and struck down by this Court as offending Article 14.
[1017G] In the instant case, on the face of it the Regulation is totally arbitrary and confers on the Board a power which is capable of vicious discrimination.
It is a naked 'hire and fire ' rule, the time for banishing which altogether from employer employee relationship is fast approaching Its only parallel is to be found in the Henry VIII class so familiar to administrative lawyers.
[10 1017E F] Workman, Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs Hindustan Steel Ltd., ; followed section section Muley vs J. R. D. Tata and Ors., [1979] 2 section L. R. 438, approved.
Moti Ram Deka vs North East frontier Railway; , , referred to.
Manohar p. Kharkhar vs Raghuraj, [1981] II L L J. 459, overruled.


judgement:
TION: Civil Appeal Nos.
1 3 & 14 Of 1971 From the Judgment & Order dated 2.
68 of the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam in Writ Petition NOS.
107 & 108/68.
F A. section Nabiar and P. Parmeswaran, for the Appellant.
N. Sudhakaran.
P. K. Pallai, V. J. Francis, N. M. Popli A. C. Pudissary for the respondents.
DESAI, J.
The respondents in these two appeals filed Original Petitions Nos.
2892 3073 of 1965 challenging the validity of the licence fee levied by the appellant 'The City Corporation of Calicut ' to be paid for use of the land or premises for soaking of coconut husks.
The appellant Corporation by its resolution dated January 25.
1963 levied licence fees in respect of various items set out in 1010 Schedule IV of the Calicut City Municipal Act, 190l subsequently restyled as Kerala Municipal Corporation Act, 1964 ( Corporation act ' for short) including for use of premises and land for soaking coconut husks.
The respondents are admittedly carrying on the trade of soaking coconut husks and they had not taken out a licence for carrying on the trade.
The Commissioner of the appellant Corporation issued a notice to each of the respondents calling upon him to show cause why within three days of the receipt of the notice, the respondents should not be prosecuted for using premises for soaking coconut husks without obtaining a licence as required by law.
The respondents challenged the validity and legality of the afore mentioned notices issued by the Corporation and served upon them in the afore mentioned two writ petitions on diverse grounds, inter alia contending that if the licence fee Is levied as a fee, no service is rendered or special advantage or favour is conferred by the Corporation on the respondents for collecting such fee and that there is no quid pro quo and that the relevant provisions of the Act do not enable the Corporation to levy such a fee.
Alternatively, it was contended that if it is levied as a tax, it is beyond the taxing powers of the Corporation.
The Corporation filed its counter affidavit and sought to justify the fee as a licence fee or in the alternative it was contended that the Corporation had the power to levy a tax of the nature levied by it.
Both the petitions came up before a learned Single Judge of the high Court who held that the levy of the impugned licence fee is not legal in the absence of conferment of special benefit on the petitioners and other persons who soak coconut husks.
The alternative submission that the Corporation had the power to levy it as a tax was negatived observing that the power to levy the various taxes conferred on the Corporation under Chapter V of the 1964 Act does not comprehend the impugned levy and accordingly held that as a tax it was not valid and legal.
Accordingly both the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned notices were quashed.
The Corporation after unsuccessful Writ Appeals Nos.
107 108 of l967 filed these Appeals by special leave.
Mr. A. section Nambiar, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant Corporation urged that the levy of licence fee as fee is fully justified and the High Court was In error in rejecting it as 1011 such on the ground that the respondents do not enjoy any special A service or benefit for paying the fees on the traditional view of law more or less than prevailing that for a fee there must necessarily be quid pro quo.
He submitted that the trend revealed by recent decisions of this Court would show that traditional view about fee has undergone a sea change and that the demarcating line between tax and fee has become so blurred as to become almost invisible.
It w s alternatively submitted that even according to traditional view the Corporation has placed enough evidence on record to show that the respondents have been and are receiving special service or benefit in return for the fees levied and paid It is not necessary to examine the alternative submission save saying in passing that the respondents do enjoy certain benefits from the functions discharged by the Corporation.
The first limb of the contention must prevail in view.
of the three resent decisions of this Court.
in Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.
vs Mohd Yasin & Anr.1) after a review of the earlier decisions it was observed as under: "What do we learn from these precedents? We learn that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee, though broadly a tax is a compulsory exaction as part of a common burden, without promise of any special advantages to classes of tax payers whereas a fee is a payment for services rendered, benefit provided or privilege conferred.
Compulsion is not the hallmark of the distinction between a tax and a fee.
That the money collected does not go into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make a levy a tax.
Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough.
Further, neither the incidence Or the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform.
that others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee.
In fact, the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest.
Nor is the court to assume the role of a cost accountant.
It is neither necessary nor expedient to weigh too meticulously the coat of the services rendered etc.
against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two.
A broad co relationship is all (1) 1012 that is necessary quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee; nor is it necessarily absent in a tax This view was reaffirmed in Sreenivasa General Traders and Others vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Others(l) observing that it is increasingly realized that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee.
However, co relationship between the levy and the services rendered or expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude.
All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable co relationship between the levy of the fee and the services rendered.
In a very recent decision in M/s Amarnath Om Prakash and Others vs State of Punjab & Ors.
(2) the Court reiterated the principle laid down in Mohd. Yasin 's case.
It is thus well settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is under going a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough.
It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid.
If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee.
Applying the ratio of these decisions it is incontrovertible that the appellant corporation is rendering numerous services to the persons within its areas of operation and that therefore the levy of the licence fee as fee is fully justified Soaking coconut husks emit foul odour and contaminates environment.
The Corporation by rendering scavenging services, carrying on operations for cleanliness of city, to make habitation tolerable is rendering general service of which amongst others appellants are beneficiaries.
Levy as a fee is thus justified.
(1) ; (2) [1985] I S.C.C. 345. 1013 In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the A alternative submission that the levy as a tax is legal.
Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and the decision of the learned Single Judge as well as the decision of the Division Bench in writ appeals are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are dismissed with no order as to costs.
N. V. K. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant Corporation levied licence fee for use of premises and land for soaking coconut husks under Schedule IV of the Calicut City Municipal Act 1961, Subsequently restyled as the Kerala Municipal Corporation Act 1961.
The respondents were carrying on the trade of soaking coconut husks, and as they had not taken out the requisite licence, the Commissioner of the Corporation issued notices to show cause why they should not be prosecuted.
The respondents challenged the validity and legality of the notices in Writ Petitions to the High Court, contending that if the licence fee is levied as a fee, no service is rendered or special advantage or favour is conferred by the Corporation for collecting such fee and that there is DO quid pro quo and that the relevant provisions of the Act do not enable the Corporation to levy such a fee.
It was further contended that if the levy is treated is a tax, it is beyond the taxing powers of the Corporation.
The Corporation contested the Writ Petitions justifying the fee as licence fee and that it had the power to levy a tax of the nature levied by it.
A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions, and quashed the impugned licence fee as not legal in the absence of conferment of special benefits in respect of persons who soak coconut husks.
It was further held that the power to levy the various taxes conferred on the Corporation under Chapter V of the 1961 Act did not comprehend the impugned levy and consequently the tax was not valid and legal.
The writ appeals of the Corporation were dismissed.
1009 Allowing the Appeals, this Court ^ HELD: By numerous recent decisions of this Court it is well settled that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough.
It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services tendered for which the fee is being paid.
If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied.
It is not necessary that the persons liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee.
[1012E F] In the instant case, it is incontrovertible that the appellant Corporation is rendering numerous services to the persons within its areas of operation and that therefore the levy of the licence fee as fee is fully justified.
Soaking coconut husks emit foul odour and contaminates environment.
The Corporation by rendering scavanging services, carrying on operations for cleanliness of the city, to make habitation tolerable is rendering general service of which amongst others respondents are beneficiaries.
a The decisions of the Single Judge and of the Division Bench are set aside and the Writ Petitions of the respondents are dismissed.
[1012 G H] Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.
vs Mohd. Yasin Others vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Others ; & M/s Amarnath Om Prakash and Others vs State of Punjab & Ors.
(1985) I SCC 345 referred to.