judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
10585 & 10586 of 1983 Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 3rd March, 1983 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No. 2018 of 1981 F.S. Nariman and P.C. Bhartari for the Appellant in CA.10585/83 P.P. Rao and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant in CA.10586/83.
K.G. Bhagat, Addl.
Solicitor General and R. N. Poddar for the State of Haryana.
S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri, M.K. Dua and EMS Anam for Respondents in Both the Appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
These appeals are filed against the judgment dated March 3, 1983 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2018 of 1981 on the file of the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashing the promotion of eight officers of the Class II Engineering Service of the Haryana Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Class II Service ') as Executive Engineers in the Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads Branch) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Class I Service ').
The said officers are S.L. Gupta, I.C. Dewan, S.K. Chopra, Bodh Raj, A.S. Parmar, O.P. Gupta, Sumair Chand Jain and G.L. Sharma.
They entered the Class II Service in accordance with the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Class II Rules ') on the dates mentioned against their names in the following table: . . . . . . . . . . .
Name Date of entry section No. in the into Class II gradation list of Service Class II Service . . . . . . . . . . 1.
S.L. Gupta 19.8.1969 54 2.
I.C. Dewan 29.1.1970 68 3.
S.K. Chopra 29.1.1970 63 4.
Bodh Raj 14.8.1969 65 480 5 A S Parmar 20.2.1970 66 6 O.P. Gupta 14.8.1969 70 7.
Sumair Chand Jain 10.4.1970 71 8.
G.L. Sharma 9.4.
1970 72 They are all holders of diplomats in Engineering.
They do not possess a degree in Engineering.
They were promoted alongwith nine others from the Class II Service to the Class I Service by an order dated May 7, 1981 passed by the Haryana State Government on a temporary basis subject to approval of the Haryana Public Service Commission.
In the case of these officers, the Government of Haryana passed an order relaxing the condition of degree qualification in public 'C interest The above order of promotion in so far as these persons were concerned was questioned by eleven officers in the Class II.
Service, who were below them in the gradation list of the Class.
II Service, having entered that service in 1972 in the writ petition out of which these appeals arise.
The officers who filed the said petition were all holders of degrees in Engineering.
Their principal contention was that an officer in the Class II Service could not be promoted to the Class I Service unless he possessed a degree in Engineering as prescribed by Rule 6(a) of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class 1, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Class [ Rules ') which govern the recruitment to the Class I Service in the State of Haryana and the relaxation of that requirement alleged to have been ordered by the State Government in exercise of the power under the proviso to Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules in the cases of the officers whose promotion had been challenged was illegal and void.
It was, therefore, urged that the promotions of the said persons should be quashed.
The State Government and the officers whose promotions had been challenged stated that the order of relaxation was justified in the circumstances of the case and the promotions were not liable to be annulled.
The question whether the qualification of a degree in Engineering was necessary or not in the case of officers in the Class II Service for promoting them to the Class I Service was, however, not raised before the High Court.
After hearing the parties, the High Court held that the order of relaxation passed by the State Government was unsustainable and hence the impugned promotions were liable to be set aside.
Accordingly the writ petition was allowed quashing the impugned promotions.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, these appeals have been filed by special leave of this Court.
Civil Appeal No. 10585 of 1983 is filed by A.S. Parmar, I.C. 481 Dewan and S.K. Chopra.
Civil Appeal No. 10586 of 1983 is filed by S.L. Gupta, O.P. Gupta and Sumair Chand Jain.
Bodh Raj and G.L. Sharma have already retired from service.
Sumair Chand Jain is stated to have died in May, 1983 after the special Leave Petition was filed.
When the Special Leave Petitions out of which these appeals arise came up for orders on March 23, 1983, a Bench of this Court consisting of three learned Judges (A.P. Sen, Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ) felt that Rule 6(1) of the Class 1 Rules was prima facie not applicable to promotions made from the Class II Service to the Class I Service and, therefore, specifically raised the said question and directed the parties including the State Government to address the Court on it.
Then on November 25, 1983, a Bench of two Judges (A.P. Sen and Venkataramiah, JJ) after hearing all the parties granted special leave to appeal to this Court limited to the question whether this was a case of direct recruitment to the Class I Service and therefore, whether Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules was applicable, on the assumption that if it was a promotion from the Class II Service to the Class I Service, Rule 6(a) would not be applicable It should be mentioned here that this question was not argued before the High Court apparently because of the decision in O.P. Bhatia & Anr.
vs state of Haryana & ors.(1) in which a similar question had arisen under the rules applicable to the Irrigation Branch of the Haryana Public Works Department.
The only point now argued before us relates to the applicability of Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules to the promotions referred to above.
In older to determine the said question it is necessary to refer briefly to some of the provisions of the Class II Rules and of the Class I Rules.
Rule 6 of the Class II Rules provides that recruitment to the Class II Service for cadre and ex cadre posts should be made against a lot of 40 posts in the following proportions: (i) direct recruitment 26 posts, (ii) promotion from the members of Punjab P.W D. (B & R) Sectional officers (Engineering) Service 8 posts, (iii) promotion from draftsmen members of the Draftsmen and Tracers Service 2 posts, (iv) promotion from members of the Punjab P.W.D. (B & R) Sectional officers Engineering Service and the Draftsmen members of the Draftsmen and Tracers Service and possessing qualifications prescribed in Appendix 'B ' of the Class II Rules 4 posts.
Rule 7 of the Class II Rules prescribes the qualifications for entry into Class II Service.
It reads: 482 "(7) Qualifications: No person shall be appointed to the service unless he: (1) in the case of person appointed by direct appointment.
(a) possesses one of the degrees of a recognised university or other qualification prescribed in Appendix 'B '.
(b) obtains from the Standing Medical Board a certificate of mental and physical fitness after being examined in accordance with the regulations prescribed in Appendix 'C ' and is considered by the Medical Authority to be fit in all respects for active outdoor duties; (c) is a person with a satisfactory character and antecedents, verification in respect of which shall be arranged through appropriate Government agency except in case where such verification may have already been made at the time of his entry into Government Service.
(2) In the case of appointment by promotion from sources 2 and 3 under rule 6(1) is a member of the Punjab PWD (B & R) Sectional officers (Engineering) Service, or a Draftsman member of the B & R Branch Draftsmen and Tracers Service and has put in a service of ten years; (3)(i) In case of the appointment by promotion from source 4 under rule 6(1) is a member of the Punjab PWD.
(B & R) Branch Draftsmen & Tracers ' Sectional officers Engineering Service or a Draftsman member of the B & R Branch Draftsmen and Tracers Service.
(ii) Possesses any of the qualifications included in Appendix 'B ' and has put in five years service in case he possesses A.M.I.S. qualifications and two years service in case he is a degree holder.
(4) In case of appointment by transfer, possesses the qualifications prescribed for the members of the service.
(5) Has not more than one wife living or in the case of woman, is not married to a person already having a wife living.
483 Provided that the Government may if satisfied that there are special grounds for doing so, exempt any person from the operation of this clause.
" It is thus seen that in the Class II Service 26 out of 40 vacancies are filled up by direct recruits who are holders of degrees in Engineering of recognised universities or other equivalent qualifications.
10 vacancies are filled up by promotion from sources (2) and (3) of Rule 6(1) of the Class II Rules of members who have put in ten years of service and the remaining 4 vacancies are to be filled up by promotions from the fourth source referred to in Rule 6(1) of the Class II Rules of persons who possess the prescribed qualifications and have put in five years or two years service, as the case may be.
The direct recruitment is made on the basis of a competitive examination held by the State Public Service commission and promotions are made on the basis of recommendations made by a Selection Committee presided over by the Chairman or a Member of the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit and suitability with due regard to seniority.
The members of the Class II Service are designated as Assistant Engineers (See Rule 4 of the Class II Rules) and they are officers incharge of sub divisions or incharge of posts of equal responsibility in the Public Works Department (Building and Roads Branch).
They are Gazetted Officers.
We shall now proceed to deal with the Class I Rules.
The Class 1 Service comprises of four cadres Assistant Executive Engineers, Executive Engineers, Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers (Rule 3).
A member of service ' means an officer appointed substantively to a cadre post and includes (a) in the case of direct appointment an officer on probation cr such an officer who having successfully completed his probation awaits appointment to a cadre post and in the case of appointment by transfer an officer who is on probation or who having successfully completed his probation awaits appointment to a cadre post provided such officer does not have a lien on a substantive post in any Government Department (Rule 2(12)).
Assistant Executive Engineer ' means a member of the service in the junior scale of pay.
(Rule 2(2)).
All others in the Class I Service are in the senior scale or in a higher scale.
Rule 5 of the Class 1 Rules provides that the recruitment to Class I Service shall be made by the Government in any one or more of the following methods (i) by direct appointment, (ii) by transfer of an officer already in the service of a State Government or of he Union or (iii) by promotion from Class 11 Service.
All first direct appointments to the Class I Service can be only to the posts of Assistant Executive Engineer (Rule 5(4)).
An 484 officer promoted from the Class II Service has to be recruited to the cadre of Executive Engineers (Rule 5(5)).
The posts of Executive Engineers can be filled up by promotion of Assistant Executive Engineers also (Rule 9). 'Direct appointment ' means an appointment by open competition but does not include (a) an appointment by promotion and (b) an appointment by transfer of an officer already in the service of a State Government or of the Union (Rule 2(7)).
The Explanation to Rule 2(7) provides that a Class II officer who enters the Class l Service by open competitive selection shall, for the purposes of Class I Rules, he deemed to have entered the Class I Service by direct appointment.
This means that a member of the Class II Service can either be recruited directly to the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineers (vide Rule 5(4)) or promoted to the cadre or Executive Engineers.
(vide Rule S(S)).
Now we set out below Rule 6 of the Class T Rules which lays down the qualifications for entering the Class I Service.
Rule 6 reads: "6.
Qualifications No person shall be appointed to the Service, unless he (a) possesses one of the University Degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix B of these rules: Provided that Government may waive this qualification in the case of a particular officer belonging to Class 11 Service, (b) in the case of an appointment by promotion from Class II Service has eight years completed service in Class IT; and has passed the Professional Examination of the Department as provided in rule 15 infra (c) being a person to be appointed to the service by direct recruitment, obtains from the Standing Medical Board a certification of mental and physical fitness after being examined in accordance with the regulations prescribed in Appendix and is considered by the Medical Authority to be lit in all respects r. , active outdoor duties: (d) is a person with a satisfactory character and antecedents, verification in respect of which shall be arranged through appropriate Government Agency except in cases where such verification may have already been made at the time of his entry into Government service; 485 (e) has not more than one wife living or, in the case of a woman is not married to a person already having a wife living; Provided that Government may, if satisfied that there are special grounds for doing so, exempt any person from the operation of this condition.
Clause (a) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules says that no person shall be appointed to the Service unless he possesses one of the University degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix 'B ' of the Class I Rules.
It is further provided therein that Government may waive this qualification in the case of a particular officer belonging to the Class II Service Clause (a) of Rule 6 no doubt applies to all direct recruitments.
If a Class II officer seeks to enter the Class T Service by direct recruitment i.e. by recruitment by open competition as provided by the Explanation to Rule 2(7), he should possess a degree as provided in Rule 6(a) unless under the proviso to Rule 6(a) Government waives the said qualification in his case.
A direct recruit has also to satisfy the condition in clause (c) of Rule 6 which deals with the production of a medical certificate as provided therein and the condition in clause (d) of Rule 6 which provides for the verification of his character and antecedents except where such verification may have already been made at the time of his entry into Government service.
He should also not suffer from the disqualification mentioned in clause (e) of Rule 6.
A direct recruit shall also have to comply with Rule 15 of the Class I Rules which provides that unless he has not already done so, he should pass such departmental examination and within such period as may be prescribed by the Government Rule 6(b) of the Class I Rules provides that ' 'in the case of an appointment by promotion from Class II Service (the officer) has eight years completed service in Class II and has passed the professional examination of the Department as provided in Rule 15".
The question is whether an officer in the Class II Service should satisfy both the qualification mentioned in clause (a) and the qualifications mentioned in clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules or he should satisfy only the qualifications under clause (b) for purposes of promotion to the Class I Service.
If clause (b) of Rule 6 had contained the words 'also ' or in addition to what is contained in clause (a) or any other word cr words conveying that meaning, there would have been no difficulty in construing that clause as then it would have clearly meant that an officer in the Class II Service who seeks promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers should possess a degree as provided in 486 clause (a) unless it has been waived by the Government and should also satisfy the conditions mentioned in clause (b).
But we do not find any such words in clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules.
Clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules opens with the words 'in the case of an appointment by promotion from Class II Service '.
It deals with a separate and distinct class of persons who are to be recruited by promotion from the Class II Service to the cadre of Executive Engineers.
The question whether all the clauses in Rule 6 should be read cumulatively or separately depends upon the structure of the sentences and the contents of the different clauses.
In Rule 6, we do not have the word 'and ' used at the end of any of the clauses (a) to (d), clause (e) being the last one.
Clause (c) of Rule 6 deals with only .
direct recruits and does not apply to promotees and that is clear by its language.
Clause (d) of Rule 6 applies only to direct recruits who enter the service for the first time and those persons who are already in Government service and in whose case the verification of character and antecedents has not already been done.
Clause (e) of Rule 6 can apply only to those who enter the service for the first time and cannot apply to those who are already in the Class II Service before appointment to the Class I Service because there is a corresponding provision even in the Class II Rules creating a similar disqualification for being appointed to the Government service in Rule 7(5) of the Class II Rules.
Now we are left with clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules.
In Rule 7 of the Class II Rules (which is extracted in the earlier part of this judgment) which are analogous Rules dealing with the qualifications for entry into the Class II Service there is no room for doubt for clause (1) begins with the words 'in the case of person appointed by direct recruitment: clause (2) begins with the words 'in the case of appointment by promotion from sources (2) and (3) under Rule 6(1) clause (3) begins with the words 'in the case of the appointment by promotion from source 4 under Rule 6(1) and clause (4) begins with the words 'in the case of appointment by transfer '.
Each of the above clauses is apparently an independent clause.
It means that persons falling under one clause do not fail under any of the other clauses and they start excluded from the other clauses.
Each clause deals with a specific class.
Even though the opening words of Rule 7 cf the Class II Rules are "No person shall be appointed to the Service unless he" as they are found in Rule 6 of the Class I Rules also these words have to be read with each of the clauses (I) to (1) of Rule 7 of the Class II Rules If the same method is adopted in the case of clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules, then there would be no room for ambiguity.
Clause (a) of Rule 6 seems to apply to direct appointments to the 487 Class I Service which ordinarily can be to the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers in view of clause (4) of Rule 5 of the Class I Rules and only in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing to the posts of Executive Engineers.
Clause (b) of Rule 6 which specially deals with appointments by promotion from the Class II Service to the posts of Executive Engineers exhaustively deals with the qualifications of officers to be promoted from the Class II Service.
The special clause excludes the application of the general that appears to be the intention of the rule making authority because clause (a) of Rule 6 deals with educational qualifications and clause (b) deals with the qualification of experience for eight years in the Class II Service and the passing of the departmental examination.
So far as direct recruitment through competitive examination is concerned the minimum educational qualification has to be prescribed in the Class I Rules themselves and it is accordingly prescribed by clause (a) of Rule 6.
So far as recruitment by promotion from the Class II Service to the post of Executive Engineer is concerned it is seen that as regards Class II officers the minimum educational qualifications which they should possess have been fixed in the Class II Rules where 26 out of 40 vacancies are to be filled up by the holders of degrees in engineering of recognised universities and the remaining are to be filled up by promotion from amongst persons with certain educational qualifications and experience of ten years in the lower cadre or such other experience as stated in the Class II Rules.
Rule 6 of the Class I Rule treats the possession of a degree plus the selection at the competitive examination and the passing of the departmental examination after appointment as sufficient for getting into the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineers or to the cadre of Executive Engineers when direct recruitment is made to those posts and the experience in the Class II Service for a minimum period of eight years plus the passing of the departmental examinations before promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class ll Service a sufficient qualification for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers.
We may here note that under Rule 9(3) of the Class I Rules an Assistant Executive Engineer who is recruited directly to the Class I Service would not be eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer unless he was rendered five years service as an Assistant Executive Engineer and has passed the Departmental Professional Examination as provided in Rule 15 of the Class I Rules.
The distinction between the two methods of filling the posts of Executive Engineers by promotion is now apparent.
If that post is to be filled up by promoting an Assistant Executive Engineer, the 488 Assistant Executive Engineer concerned should possess five years experience and should have passed the Departmental Examination prescribed by Rule 15 of the Class I Rules.
If that post is to be filled up by promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service the Assistant Engineer to be promoted should possess eight years experience in the Class II Service and should have passed the Departmental Examination prescribed by Rule 15.
That means that whereas an Assistant Executive Engineer who is a holder of a degree need have only five years ' experience in the Public Works Department, an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service who may or may not possess a degree should have eight years ' experience in the Public Works Department for being promoted to the cadre of Executive Engineers.
This extra experience of three years appears to have been treated as being sufficient to make good the deficiency, if any, that may arise by reason of the Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service possessing only a diploma and not a degree.
It is seriously urged that the expertness of the Class I Service would very much suffer if persons without degrees but with only diplomas are allowed to get into it.
It is not, however, suggested that no diploma holder has ever been promoted to the Class I Service in our country.
While we are aware of the difference between the proficiency of a person with a degree who enters service by direct recruitment and of a person who is promoted after he has acquired certain experience in the same kind of work in a lower cadre, we should state that in administrative and professional services a combination of high educational qualifications and long experience is always preferred so that the services may be efficient by each of them supplementing the other.
Experienced administrators have opined that in the higher cadres of services high educational qualifications alone or long experience alone would not be in the interests of the public.
It is true that it is not wise to have only persons with diplomas in all the posts in the Class I Service.
In order to see that there is no lack of proficiency in the higher posts in the Class I Service, Rule 5(2) of the Class I Rules expressly provides that recruitment to the Service shall be so regulated that the number of posts filled by promotion from the Class II Service shall not exceed fifty percent of the number of posts in the Class I Service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers.
It provides for a healthy blend of the two classes.
What is the effect of this clause ? More than fifty percent of the Class I Service posts would always be held by direct recruits because the Strength of promotees from the Class II Service cannot be more than fifty per cent of the total strength of the Class 1 Service minus the 489 number of Assistant Executive Engineers.
The promotees from the A Class II Service will, therefore, always be less than fifty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service.
amongst them 26 out of 40 are graduates because of Rule 6 of the Class II Rules which prescribes the quota of direct recruits who should always be the holders of degrees.
section ) diploma holders who may get into the Class I Service by promotion will be only 14 out of 40 promotees.
It would be easier to ascertain now many non degree holders can get into the Class I Service by the following illustration.
(Note: This illustration is adopted without reference to the actual strength in the Class I Service).
Let us assume that there are 240 Class I posts and out of them 40 are posts of Assistant Executive Engineers.
Then there will be in the Class I Service: 40 Assistant Executive Engineers who are graduates (because of Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules).
80 Being 50% of 200 40 160 degree holders (because of Rule S(2) of the Class I Rules).
52 Degree holders at the rate of 26 out of 40 from amongst 80 promotees (because of Rule 6 of the Class II Rules).
. . . . . . . . . .
Total: 172 . . . . . . . . . . .
The balance of 28 posts alone will be available for diploma holders.
Can it be said that the 28 diploma holders with the minimum length of experience prescribed by clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules who are selected by the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit and suitability (see Rule 8(4) of the Class I Rules) and with the educational qualifications they may possess as prescribed by the Class II Rules would dilute the Class I Service so much that the efficiency of the Class I Service would go down to such an extent that the Class I Service will become unequal to the tasks to be performed collectively by the entire Service ? It has also to be noted that if a Class II officer is found wanting in merit and is otherwise .
unsuitable, he would not be selected by the Public Service Commission.
This is not like a nurse in an operation theatre carrying out surgery.
Nor is it like a laboratory assistant teaching astrophysics.
Who are after all these members of the Class II Service who seek promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers ? They are all Assistant Engineers who have held the office of a Sub Division for eight years, Even 490 amongst these diploma holders who are so selected by the Public Service Commission how many can possibly reach even the cadre of Superintending Engineers, let alone the cadre of Chief Engineers in view of their entering the Government service earlier than the direct recruits ? We are of the view that in the circumstances it could not have been the intention of the rule making authority that no person without a degree should be allowed to enter the Class I Service.
If the construction placed by the petitioners in the writ petition and the Government is accepted every diploma holder who is an Assistant Engineer would have to retire only as a Class II Officer and cannot hope to become an Executive Engineer till his retirement.
If that was the intention, Rule 6(b) of the Class I Rules would have contained necessary words conveying that meaning as it is pointed out earlier.
We feel that clause (b) of Rule 6 appears to be exhaustive of the qualifications of the Assistant Engineers who can seek promotion from the Class II Service to the Class I Service.
So read Rule 6 of the Class 1 Rules will read in so far as the promotees are concerned as 'no person shall be appointed to the Service unless in the case of an appointment by promotion has eight years completed service in Class II and has passed the professional Examination of the Department as provided in Rule 15" and clause (a) of Rule 6 should be read as being applicable to the other mode of recruitment.
Our attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the writ petition out of which these appeals arise to the decision in O.P. Bhatia 's case (supra) in which a rule similar to Rule 6 of the Class I Rules arose for consideration.
That Rule is Rule 6 of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, P.W.D. (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964.
The relevant part of Rule 6 of the said Irrigation Branch Rules reads as follows: "6.
Qualifications No person shall be appointed to the Service unless he (a) possesses one of the University Degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix of these rules; Provided that Government may waive this qualification in the case of a particular officer belonging to Class II Service; (b) in case of an appointment by promotion from Class II Service, has completed in that class of Service, for a period 491 of ten years from the commencement of these rules, six years service and after that period eight years services Provided that if it appears to be necessary to promote an Officer in the public interest, the Government may for reasons to be recorded in writing, either generally or in any individual case reduce the period of six or eight years to such extent as it may deem proper in consultation with the Finance Department.
Explanation For the purposes of this clause in computing the period of six or eight years any service rendered as a temporary Engineer shall be taken into account. . " The High Court held in that case that a member of the Class II Service in the Irrigation Branch of the P.W.D. should possess a degree to be eligible to be promoted as an Executive Engineer in the Class I Service in the Irrigation Branch of the P.W.D.
The High Court was of the view that the omission of the word 'directly which was in .
Rule 7 of the 1956 Rules which were replaced by the Irrigation Branch Rules of 1964 led to the inference that Rule 6(a) of the 1964 Rules was applicable both to the direct recruitment and promotions from the Class It Service.
In order to understand the above reason, we have ourselves looked into the said 1956 Rules.
Rule 7 of the said 1956 Rules which dealt with only direct appointments to the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers read as follows : "7.
Qualifications for appointment.
No person shall be appointed directly to the Service unless he (a) possesses one of the university degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix to these rules; (b) has in the case of a candidate for appointment on the advice of the Commission passed such competitive examination or such other test as the Commission may prescribe for appointment to the Service; and (c) has obtained from a Standing Medical Board in the State of Punjab, a certificate of mental and physical fitness as prescribed by the regulations in Appendix C and is considered by the Board to be fit in all respects for active outdoor duty; 492 Provided that in the case of officers belonging to the Class II Service the State Government may, after consultation with the Commission, waive the qualifications required by clause (a): Provided further that other things being equal, preference will be given to a candidate who has himself worked for the cause of national independence or has rendered some out standing social or public service.
" The above Rule did not contain any reference to recruitment by promotion from the Class II Service to the post of Executive Engineer.
The promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers was dealt with by Rule 15 of the said 1956 Rules.
Sub rule (7) of Rule 15 of the said 1956 Rules read as under.
(7) A member recruited by promotion from Class II.
Service, who is reported to be fully qualified to hold charge of a Division will be promoted as Executive Engineer on completing 10 years qualifying service as in sub rule 4 above, but such promotion shall not establish the right to be placed in charge of a Division or draw pay in the senior scale of pay unless a Divisional charge is available.
" Clause (4) of Rule 15 of the said 1956 Rules laid down the method of determining ten years of service in the Class II Service as follows. "15.
(4) In the case of members promoted from the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, the equivalent length of Service shall determine the seniority.
This will be worked out as under: (a) Service in the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I Full (b) Service in the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II 0.8 (c) Service as Temporary Engineer 0.64 (d) Service as officiating Sub Divisional officer or Assistant Design Engineer (Non gazetted) 0.4" 493 There was no insistence upon the qualification of a degree in the said 1956 Rules in the case of promotees from the Class II Service.
when the 1964 rules of the Irrigation Branch, Class I were promulgated, the pattern of the Rules was changed.
While doing so, in the new Rule 6, the word 'directly ' which was in the old Rule 7 was no doubt omitted but the new Rule 6 referred to both kinds of appointment,.
namely, direct recruitment and promotion from the Class II Service.
It was not a case of just reproducing the old Rule 7 and omitting one word therefrom but the introduction of a new Rule 6 with a different structure.
The High Court also appears to have overlooked while relying upon Rule 9 of the Irrigation Branch Rules of 1964 that the proviso to Rule 6(a) of the said Rules was applicable only to a Class II officer who wanted to get into the Class I Service by direct recruitment as provided in the Explanation to Rule 2(7) of the Irrigation Branch Rules which corresponded to the Explanation to Rule 2(7) of the Class I Rules with which we are concerned.
The High Court has not examined the Irrigation Branch Rules as fully as we have examined the Class I Rules.
The judgment of the High Court is very cryptic.
We do not agree with its conclusion that a degree is a pre requisite for being promoted from the Class II Service to the Class I Service for the reasons we have already given above.
In these cases the State Government having first construed that Rule 6 of the Class I Rules required that a promotee should also have a degree, tried to relax that condition by making orders relaxing it as it found that its construction had led to unjust results.
It did not make any attempt to reconsider its interpretation of Rule 6 even when the matter came up before the High Court.
It only tried to justify the order of relaxation but ultimately failed in its attempt.
It is only in this Court that the question of interpretation of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules was raised.
It is indisputable that if the Government wishes to appoint only holders of degrees to the Class I Service, it may do so by promulgating appropriate Rules.
That power is beyond question and it is not, therefore, necessary to refer to those decisions which lay down that classification on the basis of educational qualifications of officers belonging to a cadre for purposes of promotion to a higher cadre is permissible.
The question, however, in these cases is whether the Class I Rules as they now exist debar the promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service who does not possess a egree to the cadre.
Of Executive Engineers even when he satisfies the requirements of clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules and is selected by the Public 494 Service Commission.
Our answer is in the negative.
Since Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules is not applicable to the Class II officers who are to be promoted to the Class I Service, the question whether the order of relaxation made in the case of the promotes is validly passed or not becomes immaterial.
We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed before the High Court.
Since we have disposed of these appeals on a ground different from the ground urged before the High Court, we express no opinion on the validity of the order of relaxation For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed but in the circumstances of the cases without any order as to costs.
section R. Appeals allowed.

summary:
Eight officers including the appellants entered the class II service in accordance with tho Punjab Service of Engineers class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965.
They are all holders of diplomas in Engineering.
They were promoted alongwith nine others from the class II service to the class I service by an order dated May 7, 1981, passed by the Haryana State Government on a temporary basis subject to approval of the Haryana Public Service Commission.
In the case of these officers, the Government of Haryana passed an order relaxing the condition of degree qualification in public interest.
The above orders of promotion in so far as these persons were concerned were questioned by eleven officers in the class II service, who were below them in the gradation list of the class II service having entered that service in 1972 in the writ petition out of which these appeals arise.
The officers who filed the said petition were all holders of degrees in Engineering.
Their principal contention was that an officer in the class II service could not be promoted to the class I service unless he possessed a degree in Engineering as prescribed by Rule 6(a) of the Punjab Service of Engineers, class I, P.W.D, (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1960 which governed the recruitment to the class I service in the State of Haryana and the relaxation of that requirement alleged to have been ordered by the State Government in exercise of the power under the tho proviso to Rule 6 (a) in the case of the officers whose promotions had been challenged was illegal and void.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court accepted the said contention and dismissed the petition.
Hence the appeals after obtaining special leave of the Court, Allowing the appeals the Court, ^ HELD: 1.1.
A degree is not a pre requisite for being promoted from the class II service to the class I service.
[493 D] 477 1.2.
A comparison between the 1956 Rules and the 1964 Rules makes it A clear that there was no insistence upon the qualification of a degree in the said 1956 Rules in the case of the promotees from the class II service.
When the 1964 Rules of the Irrigation Branch, class I were promulgated, the pattern of the Rules was changed.
While doing so, in the new Rule 6, the word "directly" which was in the old Rule 7 was no doubt omitted but the new Rule 6 referred to both kinds of appointment namely direct recruitment and promotion from the class II service.
It was not a case of just reproducing the old Rule 7 and omitting one word therefrom, but the introduction of a new Rule 6 with a different structure.
[493A B] O.P. Bhatia & Anr.
vs State of Haryana & Ors.
, ILR[1980]1 Punjab & Haryana 470.
Overruled.
In these cases, the State Government having first consumed Rule 6 of the class I Rules required that a promotee should also have a degree, tried to relax that condition by making orders relaxing as it found that its construction had led to injust results.
In view of the fact that the question of interpretation of New Rule 6 of the class I Rules was raised, and service Rule 6 (a) of the class I Rules is not applicable to the class II officers who are to be promoted to the class I service, the question whether the order of relaxation made in the case of promotees is validly passed or not becomes non est.
[493 E; 494B] 2.1.
It is indisputable that if the Government wishes to appoint only holders or degrees to the class I service, it may do so by promulgating appropriate rules.
That power is beyond question, and classification on the basis of educational qualifications of officers belonging to a cadre for purposes of promotion to a higher cadre is permissible.
But, the class I Rules as they now exist do not debar the promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the class II service who does not possess a degree to the cadre of Executive Engineers even when he satisfies the requirements of clause (b) of Rule 6 of the class I Rules and is selected by the Public Service Commission.
[493 G H] 2.2.
Rule 6 of the class I Rules treats the possession of a degree plus the selection at the competitive examination and the passing of the departmental examination af ter appointment as sufficient for getting into the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineers or to the cadre of Executive Engineers when direct recruitment is made to those posts and the experience in the class II Service for a minimum period of eight years plus the passing of the departmental examinations before promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service as sufficient qualification for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers.
[487 E F] 2.3 The distinction between the two methods of filling the posts of Executive Engineer by promotion is clear.
If that post is to be filled up by promoting an Assistant Executive Engineer, the Assistant Executive Engineer, concerned should possess five years experience and should have passed the Departmental Examination prescribed by Rule 15 of the Class I Rules.
If that post is to be filled up by promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the class II Service, the Assistant Engineer to be promoted should possess eight years experience in the Class II Service and should have passed the Departmental Examination prescribed by Rule 15.
That means that whereas an Assistant Executive Engineer who is a holder of a degree needs have only five years ' experience in the Public Works Department, an Assistant Engineer in the Class [ [ Service who may or may not possess a degree should have eight years ' experience in the Public Works Department for being promoted to the cadre of 478 Executive Engineers.
This extra experience of three years appears to have been treated as being sufficient to make good the deficiency, if any, that may arise by reason of the Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service possessing only a. diploma and nota degree.
[487 H; 488 A C] 2.4.
In the circumstances it could not have been the intention of the rule making authority that no person without a degree should be allowed to enter the Class I Service.
If the construction placed by the petitioners in the writ petition and the Government is accepted every diploma holder who is an Assistant Engineer would have to retire only as a Class II officer and cannot hope to become an Executive Engineer till his retirement.
If that was the intention, Rule 6 (b) of the Class I Rules would have contained necessary words conveying that meaning.
Clause (b) of Rule 6 appears to be exhaustive of the qualifications of the Assistant Engineers who can seek promotion from the Class II Service to the Class I Service So Rule 6 of the Class I Rules will read in so far as the promotees are concerned as 'no person shall be appointed to the Service unless in the case of an appointment by promotion has eight years completed service in Class II and has passed the professional Examination of the department as provided in Rule 1 S" and clause (a) of Rule 6 should be read as being applicable to the other mode of recruitment.
[490 B D] 3.
In such a case, it cannot be said that the expertness of the Class I Service would very much suffer if persons without degrees but with only diplomas are allowed to get into it.
In administrative and professional services a combination of high educational qualifications and long experience is always preferred so that the services may be efficient by each of them supplementing the other.
Experienced administrators have opined that in the higher cadres of services high educational qualifications alone or long experience alone would not be in the interests of the public.
In order to see that there is no lack of proficiency in the higher post in the Class I Service, Rule S(2) of the Class I Rules expressly provides that recruitment to the Service shall be so regulated that the number of posts filled by promotion from the Class IT Service shall not exceed fifty per cent of the number of posts in the Class I Service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers.
It provides for a healthy blend of the two classes.
The effect of Rule S(2) is that more than fifty per cent of the Class I Service posts would always be held by direct recruits because the strength of promotees from the Class II Service cannot be more than fifty per cent of the total strength of the class I Service minus the number of Assistant Executive Engineers.
The promotees from the Class II Service will, therefore, always be less than fifty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service.
Even amongst them 26 out of 40 are graduates because of Rule 6 of the Class II Rules which prescribes the quota of direct recruits who should always be the holders of degrees.
So diploma holders who may get into the Class I Service by promotion will be only 14 out of 40 promotees.
Therefore it cannot be said that the 28 diploma holders with the minimum length of experience prescribed by clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules who are selected by the Public Service commission on the basis of merit and suitability (see Rule 8 (43 of the Class I Rules) and with the educational qualifications they may possess as prescribed by the Class II Rules would dilute the Class I Service so much that the efficiency of the Class I Service would go down to such an extent that the Class I Service will become unequal to the tasks to be performed collectively by the entire service.
Further, if a Class II officer is found wanting in merit and is otherwise unsuitable, he would not be selected by the Public Service Commission.
This is not like a nurse in an operation the atre carrying out surgery.
Nor is it like a laboratory assistant teaching stro physics.
[488D H; 489A B;F G] 479


judgement:
ition No. 8991 of 1983.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) Petitioner in person alongwith Mukul mudgal K. Parasran, Attorney General, K. G. Bhagat Addl.
Solicitor General, R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
Shri Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, the petitioner before us in this application under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, retired as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court with effect from February 28, 1978.
At the time of retirement he was drawing salary of Rs. 4,000 per month as provided under Constitution.
This Court in the case of Union of India vs Gurnam Singh(1) decided that under the ( 'Act ' for short), Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement as provided in Rule 20B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 ( 'Leave Rules ' for short).
The Accountant General of Madhya Pradesh authorised the petitioner to draw cash equivalent of leave, salary amount as to Rs. 15,240 by his communication dated July 17, 1982.
The petitioner informed the Accountant General that he was drawing the amount as indicated in the communication without prejudice to his right to claim Rs. 24,000 to which sum under the law he was entitled.
On July 19, 1982, the petitioner was authorised to draw a further sum of Rs. 750 thus in all Rs. 15,990 only.
On February 2, 1983, the Union of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs indicated to the several authorities including the Registrars of all the High Courts that while in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, the Central Government were advised that Judges of the High Courts were entitled to payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit, the expression 'earned leave ' does not occur in the Act.
On the analogy of the Leave Rules the cash equivalent of leave salary to be paid would be the cash equivalent of the unutilised leave due on 855 full allowances as defined in sections 3 and 9 (1) of the Act.
In making calculations of the cash equivalent of the leave salary the ceiling of five months mentioned in section 5 (3) of the Act would be applicable.
Relying on the aforesaid letter of the Central Government, the Accountant General of Madhya Pradesh on March 25, 1983, intimated the petitioner that he was entitled to payment of cash equivalent of unutilised earned leave subject to the ceiling of five months; leave and, therefore, he had been paid an excess sum of Rs. 2,220 which should be refunded.
That has led the petitioner to move this Court.
Rule nisi was issued to the Union of India and this Court directed separate notice to the Attorney General.
A return has been made to the rule by the Union of India.
No dispute has been raised to payability of the cash equivalent on the basis of Rule 20B of the Leave Rules Reliance has been placed on the provisions of the Act to justify the circular letter of February 18, 1983.
Learned Attorney General has been heard and he has furnished written submissions also.
The decision of this Court in Gurnam Singh 's case has been accepted by the Union of India and steps have been taken to implement the same.
In that case this Court held: ". . it must be regarded as a provision absorbed by rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956, into the statutory structure defining the conditions of service of a Judge of a High Court.
We may observe that even as a right to receive pension, although accruing on retirement, is a condition of service, so also the right to the payment of the cash equivalent of leave salary for the period of unutilised leave accruing on the date of retirement must be considered as a condition of service".
Two questions require decision, viz., (1) whether in view of the provisions of section 5 (3) of the Act, the limit has to be confined to five months equal to 150 days and not 180 days as in Rule 20B; and (2) whether for calculating the equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge the provisions of section 9 (1) of the Act would apply ? We may now refer to rule 20B of the Leave Rules as also to the two provisions of the Act: 856 "20B Payment of cash equivalent of leave salary The Government shall suo motu sanction to a member of the service who retires from the service under sub rule (1) of rule 16 of the All India Services (Death cum Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, having attained the age of 58 years on or after the 30th September, 1977 the cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at his credit on the date of his retirement subject to a maximum of 180 days.
" Section 5 (3) of the Act reads: "5 (3).
Subject to the provisions of sub section (2) of section 5A, the maximum period of leave which may be granted at one time shall be, in the case of leave on full allowances, five months and in the case of leave with allowances of any kind, sixteen months.
" Section 9 (1) provides: "9 (1).
The monthly rate of leave allowances payable to a Judge while on leave on full allowances shall be for the first forty five days of such leave, a rate equal to the monthly rate of his salary, and thereafter two thousand two hundred and twenty rupees.
Provided that where leave on full allowances is granted to a Judge on medical certificate the monthly rate of leave allowances shall, for the first one hundred and twenty days, of such leave, be a rate equal to the monthly rate of his salary." Chapter II of the Act deals with leave.
Section 3 provides the kinds of leave admissible to a Judge.
Section 4 makes provision for a leave account to be maintained.
Section 5 deals with agree gate amount of leave which may be granted.
Section 5A make provision for commutation of leave on half allowances into leave on full allowances while sections 6, 7 and 8 deal with grant of leave of specific kinds.
These provisions in the Act deal with leave which has to be asked for and taken during the tenure of working as a Judge.
Leave necessarily implies authorised absence from duty or employment (see Webster 's Third New International Dictionary).
Rule 20B makes provision for payment of cash equivalent of leave 857 due under the appropriate provisions but subject to a maximum of 180 days.
We have already indicated that the ratio of Gurnam Singh 's case has not been disputed.
It would necessarily mean acceptance of the position that the Act did not make provision for payment of the retirement benefit contemplated under rule 20B; otherwise rule 20B could not have been applied.
The scheme in rule 20B is that the payment would be made suo motu and without any application for it.
Leave referred to under the Act is one which has to be asked for and is intended to meet a different situation.
For calculating the benefits under rule 20B, section 5 (3) of the Act is not relevant and in case in the leave account maintained under section 4 of Act leave is due, the benefit under rule 20B has to be worked out subject to the upper limit of 180 days, equal to six months.
The claim made by the petitioner that he was entitled to the benefit of six months is, therefore, justified subject, of course, to admissibility of leave to the extent of 180 days in the leave account.
No dispute was raised before us that as a fact petitioner had to his credit more than 180 days of leave.
Once we hold that the benefit under rule 20B is not controlled by Chapter II of the Act, the manner of calculation indicated in section 9 (1) of the Act would also apply.
The petitioner would thus become entitled to cash equivalent of six months ' salary which would work out at Rs. 24,000.
As he has been paid a sum of Rs. 15,990 he is entitled to Rs. 8,010.
A writ in the nature of mandamus be issued to the Union of India to pay him the said amount within one month from today.
Parties are left to bear their own costs before us.
We would like to add that it is manifest that in view of the enunciation of law by us in this judgment, the principles governing the cash equivalent of leave would apply not only to the petitioner but also to Judges who have already retired or who may retire hereafter, from the date from which this facility was made available to the members of the Central Services holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or its equivalent.
H.S.K. Petition allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
In Union of India vs Gurnam Singh ; , this Court decided that under the Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement as provided under rule 20B of the All India Service (Leave) Rules, 1955.
The two question which arose for consideration in this petition under article 32 filed by a retired Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court were (1) whether in view of the provisions of section 5(3) of the Act, the limit has to be confined to five months equal to 150 days and not 180 days as in Rule 20B; and (2) whether for calculating the equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge the provisions of section 9 (1) of the Act would apply ? Allowing the petition and answering the questions in the negative. ^ HELD: The ratio of Gurnam Singh 's case has not been disputed.
It would necessarily mean acceptance of the position that the Act did not make provision for payment of the retirement benefit contemplated under rub 20B; otherwise rule 20B could not have been applied.
For calculating the benefits under rule 20B, section 5 (3) of the Act is not relevant and in case in the leave account maintained under section 4 of the Act leave is due, the benefit under rule 20B has to be worked out subject to the upper limit of 180 days, equal to six months [857 B C] Once it is held that the benefit under rule 20B is not controlled by Chapter II of the Act, the manner of calculation indicated in section 9 (1) of the Act would also not apply.
[857 E] The principles governing the cash equivalent of leave would apply not only to the petitioner but also to Judges who have already retired or who may retire hereafter, from the date from which this facility was made available to the members of the Central Services holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or its equivalent.
[857 E G] 854


judgement:
Appeals No&323 and 324 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and orders dated April 27, and July 13, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeals Nos.
42 and 88 of 1956 arising out of the orders dated March 23, and July 9, 1956, of the said High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 333 and 564 of 1956.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, J. B. Dadachanji, section N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,, R. Gan.
pathy Iyer and R. Gopalkrishnan, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
665 1957.
February 19.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.
These are appeals against the judgment of the High Court of Madras on a certificate given under article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution, and they raise a question of some importance as to the true legal character of a permit when it is renewed under the provisions of the (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to as the Act.
In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to state the material facts leading up to the present dispute.
Towards the end of 1952, the appropriate authorities under the Act decided to grant two additional permits for stage carriages in the Ondipudur Agricultural College route in the town of Coimbatore in the State of Madras,, and invited applications therefor under section 57 of the Act.
There were as many as 39 applicants, and by his order dated December 3, 1952, the Regional Transport Authority granted one permit to applicant No. 24, the Thondamuthur Trading Company Ltd., and another to applicant No. 30, the V.C.K. Bus Service.
There were appeals by some of the unsuccessful applicants to the Central Road Traffic Board, which by its order dated February 19, 1953, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permits, one to Stanes Transports Ltd., and another to Thirumalaiswami Goundar.
Revisions were preferred against this order by the aggrieved applicants under section 64 A of the Act, and by its order dated July 9, 1953, the Government confirmed the grant of the permit to Stanes Transports ,Ltd., but set aside the permit given to Thirumalaiswami Goundar, and granted it instead to Annamalai Bus Transport Ltd. Thereupon, applicants Nos. 24 and 30 moved the High Court of Madras under Aft. 226 for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Central Road Traffic Board dated February 19, 1953 and of the Government dated July 9, 1953; but the applications were dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on March 8, 1954.
Against the orders of dismissal, Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were preferred, and they were 666 dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. on March 21, 1956.
It should be mentioned that the operation of 'the order dated February 19, 1953 was stayed pending the disposal of the revision under section 64 A and the writ proceedings in the High Court, with the result that both Thondamuthur Trading Company Ltd. and V.C.K. Bus Service which had been granted permits by the Regional Transport Authority on December 3, 1952, continued to run their buses notwithstanding cancellation of those permits on February 19, 1953.
It should also be mentioned that in June 1954 the business of the V.C.K. Bus Service which was the grantee of one of the permits under the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated December 3, 1952, was taken over by a Company called the V.C.K. Bus Service Ltd., which is the appellant before us, and by an order of the Regional Transport Authority dated July 7, 1954, it was recognised as the transferee of the permit granted to V.C.K. Bus Service.
To continue the narrative, the permit which was the subject matter of the litigation aforesaid was for a period of one year and a half, and it expired on June 30, 1954.
Before its expiry, the appellant applied on April 15, 1954, for a renewal thereof for a period of three years.
This application was duly notified under s.57, and objections to the grant were preferred by both Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai Bus Transport Ltd. On September 5, 1954, the Regional Transport Authority granted a permit to the appellant for a period of one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955, obviously in the expectation that Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 would by then have been decided.
On March 19, 1955,the appellant again applied for a renewal of the permit, and that was also notified under section 57, and no objections having been filed to the grant thereof, the Regional Transport Authority by his order dated June 23, 1955, renewed the permit for a period of three years from July 1, 1955 to June 30, 1958.
It is this permit that forms the subject matter of the present litigation.
It has been already stated that Writ Appeals Nos. 31 and 32 of 1954 were dismissed on March 21, 1956.
667 Apprehending that the Regional Transport Authority might, in view of the judgment of the High Court, cancel the permit which was renewed on June 23, 1955, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 for a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Regional Transport Authority from Cancelling the permit, and that was dismissed by Rajagopala Ayyangar J. on the ground that when the original permit was set aside, the renewal thereof fell to the ground.
The appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 against this order, and that was heard by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar J. who by their judgment dated April 27, 1956, held, following a previous decision of that Court in K. Muthuvadivelu vs Regional Transport Officer(1) that the renewal having been obtained on the basis of a permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it could not be regarded as a fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it must be taken to be non est for all purposes, and that the renewal must therefore be held to be a nullity.
In the result, they dismissed the appeal, but granted a certificate under article 133(1)(c), observing that the case raised a point of general importance, which was stated by them in these terms: When an application for renewal of a permit is made and granted and eventually it is held that the original permit was itself wrongly granted, does the renewed permit subsist for the period for which it was renewed, or does it automatically cease to be in force when it is finally decided that the original permit was not granted validly ? This matter now comes before us in Civil Appeal No, 323 of 1956.
After the High Court delivered its judgment in Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 on April 27, 1956, the respondents herein, viz., Stanes Transports Ltd., and Annamalai Bus Transport Ltd., applied to the Regional Transport Authority to grant them permits in accordance with the decisions of the High Court, and on May 5, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority cancelled the permit granted by him on June 23, 1955, in favour (1) A.I.R. 1956 Mad.
86 668 of the appellant, and granted permits instead to the respondents.
Thereupon, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 554 of 1956 for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated May 5, 1956, on the grounds which had been put forward in Writ Petition No. 333 of 1956 and Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956.
That petition was dismissed by Rajagopalan J. on July 9, 1956, and the Writ Appeal No. 88 of 1956 filed against that order was dismissed by Rajamannar C. J. and Panchapa kesa Ayyar J. on July 13, 1956.
Leave to appeal against that judgment was also given under article 133 (1) (c), as the subject matter thereof was the same as that of Writ Appeal No. 42 of 1956 in respect of which leave had already been granted.
Civil Appeal No. 324, of 1956 relates to this matter.
Thus, both the appeals relate to the same matter, and raise the same point for determination.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel who appeared in support of the appeals, contends that the view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court that when a permit is set aside by higher authorities, it should be treated as wholly non existent, and that, in consequence, a renewal thereof must be held to be void, is not sound, that on a correct interpretation of sections 57 and 58, a renewal is practically in the nature of a new grant, that the permit which was granted to the appellant for the period July 1, 1955 to June 30, 1958, though styled a renewal, was in substance a fresh permit, and that the fact that the old permit was set aside did not therefore affect the rights of the appellant under this permit.
He also argues that the Act and the rules framed thereunder contain elaborate provisions as to when a permit could be cancelled, forming in themselves a complete code on the subject, that the cancellation of the original permit is not one of the grounds on which a renewed permit could be set aside, and that the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated May 5, 1956, was therefore ultra vires.
The contention of the learned Solicitor General for the.
respondents is that when a permit is renewed, the renewal is, on a true construction of the provisions of the Act, in substance as in name a continuation of the 669 previous permit, and that, in consequence, when the, grant of a permit is set aside by a higher authority, the renewal thereof must also stand automatically set aside, and that further even if a renewed permit is not to be regarded as a continuation of the original permit,, seeing that it is granted on the basis of that permit it should be held to be subject to an implied term that it should cease if the original permit is cancelled.
The two points that arise for decision on these contentions are: (1) when a permit is renewed, is it a continuation of the original permit, or is it, in fact, a new one? and (2) if a renewed permit is not a continuation of the original permit, is the grant of it subject to the implied condition that it is liable to be cancelled, if the original permit is cancelled ? On the first question, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Act material thereto.
Section,57 prescribes the procedure to be followed in the grant of stage carriage permits.
Under sub section
(2), applications therefor have to be made not less than six weeks before the date appointed by the Regional Transport Authority therefor.
Sub section (3) requires that they should be: published in the prescribed manner, and provision is made for representations being made in connection therewith.
When any representation is so received, sub section
(5) provides that the person making it is to be given an.
opportunity of being heard thereon in person or by a, duly authorised representative, and that the application for permit is to be disposed of at a public hearing.
Section 58 deals with renewals, and is as follows: (1) " A permit other than a temporary permit issued under section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may in its discretion specify in the permit: Provided that in the case of a permit issued or renewed within two years of the commencement of this Act, the permit shall be effective without renewal for such period of less than three years as the Provincial Government may prescribe.
670 (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: Provided that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits.
" The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant based on section 58 (2) is that under the Act an application for renewal is to be dealt with exactly as an application for a new permit, that it is to be notified under section 57 and representations have to be called for in connection herewith and considered at a public hearing, that though the grant of the previous permit furnishes a ground of preference, it is subject to the limitation that the other conditions are equal and is thus only one of several factors to be taken into account, and that therefore when a renewal is actually granted, it is on an independent consideration of the merits and it cannot be distinguished from a fresh grant.
It was further argued that the proviso to section 58(2) meant little, because it was well established that the grant of a permit was not a matter of right, and the authorities under the Act would be acting within their powers if they refused an application for renewal and granted a fresh permit to a new applicant.
It was also contended that though the statute spoke of a renewal of a permit, that expression did not accurately bring out the true position, because in legal terminology, renewal imports that the transaction which is renewed, as for example, a lease, is to operate for a further period but on the same terms, but that when a permit was renewed, it was open to the authorities to impose new conditions, to alter the period during which it was to operate and generally to modify its terms, and that therefore the use of the word ,renewal " should not lead to the.
inference that it was the original permit that was being continued.
There is force in these contentions, but there are other provisions bearing on this question, and when they are reviewed as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the intention of the legislature was to treat a renewal as a continuation of the previous permit.
To 671 start with, section 58(1) enacts that a permit shall be effective for the period specified therein, but this is qualified by the words " without renewal ".
Therefore, when there is a renewal, the effective period is not the original period specified, but the period up to which the renewal is granted.
That indicates that the life of a renewed permit is one and continuous.
The matter is placed beyond doubt when we turn to the rules which have been framed under the Act.
Rule 184 (1) provides that when a renewal is granted, it shall be endorsed on the permit itself, and Form No. 33, which is prescribed therefor is as follows: " This permit is hereby renewed up to the day of. . 19 Thus, what is renewed is " this permit".
In this connection, reference must be made to the definition of " permit " in section 2(2) of the Act 'as " the document issued by a Provincial or Regional Transport Authority Rule 1985 is very material for the purpose of the present discussion, and it runs as follows: If an application for the renewal of a permit has been made in accordance with these rules and the prescribed fee paid by the prescribed date, the permit shall continue to be effective until orders are passed on the application or until the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the application whichever is earlier.
If orders on the application are not passed within three months from the date of receipt of the application, the permit holder shall be entitled to have the permit renewed by the Transport Authority for the period specified in the application or for one year whichever is less and the Transport Authority shall call upon the permit holder to produce the registration certificate or certificates and Part B or Parts A and B of the permit, as the case may be, and endorse the renewal in Parts A and B of the permit accordingly and return them to the permit holder ".
Under this rule, when an application for renewal is made, the permit already granted is to be in force 'until an order is passed thereon, and what is more important, if no order is passed within three months, 672 the permit 'becomes automatically renewed for the ,,period mentioned in the rule.
This goes a long way to support the contention of the respondents that on the scheme of the Act, renewal is a continuation of the original permit.
It should also be mentioned that the rules provide for different forms for an application for fresh permit and one for renewal, and the fee to be paid along with those applications is also different.
A reading of the relevant provisions of the Act and of the rules leads indubitably to the conclusion that a renewal is a continuation of the permit previously granted.
The fact that the grant of renewal is not a matter of course, or that it is open to the authorities to impose fresh conditions at the time of renewal does not, when the permit is in fact renewed, alter its character as a renewal.
We shall now consider the authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant as supporting the view that a renewal under the Act is in the same position as a fresh permit.
In Mahabir Motor Co. vs Bihar State(1), the point for decision was whether an appeal lay under section 64 (f) against an order granting a renewal of a permit.
The contention before the Court was that the Act made a distinction between the grant of a permit and a renewal thereof, and that as section 64 (f), provided only for an appeal against an order granting a permit, no appeal lay against an order granting a renewal.
In repelling this contention the Court observed "Both grant.
and renewal stand more or less on the same footing by reason of sections 47, 57 and 58 of the . .
This observation has reference to the procedure to be followed in the renewal of a permit and the right of appeal given under a. 64 as part of that procedure.
It has, no bearing on the character of a permit when it is renewed.
Another decision on which the appellant strongly relied is Anjiah vs Regional Transport Officer, Guntur There, the, facts were that an order of suspension had been passed for breach of one of the (1) Patna 429.
(2) [1956] Andhra Law Times 347. ] 673 conditions of the permit.
The correctness of the order was challenged before higher authorities, but without success.
Meantime, the period fixed in the permit had expired, and it had been renewed.
The question was whether the period of suspension could be enforced against the renewed permit.
It was held by the Andhra High Court that it could not be, because the renewal was, in essence, a new permit and not a mere continuance of the old one.
The reason for ' this decision was thus stated in the judgment: " There is no right of renewal as such and when a permit is renewed, there is no right either, on the part of the permit holder to insist upon the continuance of the old terms.
It would be undesirable that there should be any such restrictions upon the right of the authorities to grant the permit to anybody they choose or subject to any conditions that they think it to be necessary to impose, provided that they are acting all the time in the public interest and subject to the provisions of the and the.
Rules made thereunder.
" These considerations, though not without force, can.
not, in our opinion, outweigh the inference to be drawn from the other provisions to which we have made reference and for the reasons already given, we are unable to agree with this decision.
In the view that we have taken that under the provisions of the Act and the rules, a renewal is a continuation of the original permit, there can be no doubt as to what the rights of the appellant are.
When the proprietor of V. C. K. Bus Service was granted a permit by the Regional Transport Authority on December 3, 1952, that grant was subject to the result of the decision of the higher authorities.
On September 5, 1954, when the permit was renewed in favour of the appellant, that was subject to the decision of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954, which was then pending.
When the renewed permit dated September 5, 1954, was again renewed on June 23, 1955, that was likewise subject to the result of the decision in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954.
When the High Court by its judgment dated March 674 21, 1956, passed in the said Writ Appeal upheld the cancellation of the permit which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority on December 3, 1952 to V. C. K. Bus Service, the permit renewed on June 23, 1955, became ineffective at least as from that date.
The Regional Transport Authority was therefore right in treating it as having become void, and granting by his order dated May 5, 1956, permits to the respondents.
The second question arises on the alternative contention advanced by the respondents that even if the renewal is to be regarded, not as a continuation of the original permit but as an independent grant, it must be held to have been subject to an implied condition that if the original permit is ultimately set aside, the renewal thereof should come to an end.
Mr. Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, disputes the correctness of this contention.
He argues that when there is a document embodying the terms ' of a contract, it is not permissible to imply therein a condition, if that will contradict or vary any terms contained in it, that to read into the permit a condition that it is to cease if the decision of the High Court went against the appellant, ' would be to modify the terms contained therein that it is to be effective upto June 30, 1958, and that it could not therefore be implied.
He also relies on the following observation of Lord Parker in P. A. Tamplin Steamship Company Limited vs AngloMexican Petroleum Products Company Limited (1) : " This principle is one of contract law, depending on some term or condition to be implied in the contract itself and not on something entirely dehors the contract which brings the contract to an end.
It is, of course, impossible to imply in a contract any term or condition inconsistent with its express provisions, or with the intention of the parties as gathered from those provisions.
" It is undoubted law that when the terms of a contract or grant are reduced to writing, no condition can be implied therein, which will be inconsistent with its express terms.
But the contention of the respondents (1) , 422. 675 involves no conflict with this principle.
They do not seek to obtain any modification or alteration of the terms of the permit, leaving it to operate subject to such modification or alteration.
They want that the whole permit with all its terms as to duration and otherwise should be held to have become inoperative.
What they are pleading is a condition subsequent on the happening of which the permit will cease, and to that situation the observation quoted above has no application.
Reference may be made in this connection to the following observation occurring later in the speech of Lord Parker in F. A. Tamplin Steamship Company Limited vs Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Company, Limited (supra): " Moreover, some conditions can be more readily implied than others.
Speaking generally, it seems to me easier to imply a condition precedent defeating a contract before its execution has commenced than a condition subsequent defeating the contract when it is part performed." Thus, there is no legal obstacle to implying a condition that the renewal should stand cancelled if the right of the appellant to the original permit was negatived by the High Court.
That brings us on to the question of fact, whether on an examination of the permit and of the circum.
stances under which it came to be granted, we can infer that it was the intention of the Regional Transport Authority to renew the permit subject to the result of the decision of the High Court in the appeal which was then pending before it.
The permit granted to the V. C. K. Bus Service on December 3, 1952, had been cancelled on February 19, 1953, and it was only by reason of the stay orders that the bus was permitted to run.
When the appellant applied for renewal on April 15, 1954, there was opposition to the grant thereof from both the respondents herein, based on the decision of the Government dated July 9, 1953, and it was in view of their objection that the Regional Transport Authority renewed the permit for one year from July 1, 1954 to June 30, 1955.
It is true that 87 676 when the appellant applied again for renewal on March 19, 1955, the respondents did not raise objection thereto, but as the appeals in the High Court were still pending, they had good reason to believe that the renewal would not affect whatever rights might be declared in their favour by the High Court.
As all the papers relating to the grant of the original permit and the subsequent proceedings were part of the record before the Regional Transport Authority when he renewed the permit on June 23, 1955, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that he really intended to renew the permit only subject to the decision of the High Court.
It is of the utmost importance in this connection to bear in mind that the appellant applied not for a fresh permit but for a renewal, and in sanctioning it, the Regional Transport Authority expressly acted in exercise of his powers under Rule 134 A read with section 58 of the Act, and if he did not expressly provide that it was subject to the decision of the High Court, it must be because he must have considered that that was implicit in the fact of its being only a renewal.
That that is how the appellant understood it is clear beyond doubt from the proceedings taken by it immediately after the High Court pronounced its judgment.
But it is argued for the appellant on the strength of the decision in Veerappa Pillai vs Raman & Raman Ltd.(1) that the mere knowledge on the part of the authorities that the rights of the parties were under litigation is not a sufficient ground to import a condition in the permit that it is subject to the result of that litigation, when in its terms it is unconditional.
We do not read that decision as authority for any such broad contention.
There, the question related to five permits, which had been originally granted to one Balasubramania.
Raman and Raman Ltd. obtained a transfer of the relative buses, and applied to the transport authorities for transfer of the permits to itself.
Then, Veerappa having subsequently obtained a transfer of the same buses from Balasubramania, (1) ; 677 applied to have the permits transferred in his name.
On October 3, 1944, he also instituted a suit in the Sub Court, Kumbakonam, to establish his title to the buses against Raman and Raman Ltd., and that was decreed in his favour on May 2, 1946.
Raman and Raman Ltd. appealed against this decision to the Madras High Court, which by its judgment dated September 2, 1949, reversed the decree of the Sub Court and held that it was entitled to the buses.
While these proceedings were going on, the transport authorities suspended on March 28, 1944, the permits which had been granted to Balasubramania and instead, they were issuing temporary permits from time to time to Veerappa, who had been appointed receiver in the suit in the Sub Court, Kumbakonam.
On March 29, 1949, the Government decided to discontinue the policy of granting temporary permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent permits, to Veerappa.
Then on October 14, 1949, Veerappa applied for renewal of these permanent permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority on January 3,1950.
The question was whether this order was bad on the ground that it was inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that it was Raman and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a valid title to the buses.
This Court held that the ownership of the buses was only one of the factors to be taken into account in granting the permits, and that as the Regional Transport Authority granted the renewal on an appreciation of all the facts, his decision was not liable to be questioned in proceedings under article 226.
It should be noted that the renewal which was granted on January 3, 1950, was of permanent permits granted in pursuance of the, order of the Government dated March 29, 1949, which had quite plainly declared as a matter of policy that notwithstanding the pendency of litigation between the parties, permanent permits should be granted to Veerappa.
There can be no question of implying thereafter a condition that they were subject to the decision of the Court.
Moreover, the renewal was granted on January 3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2, 1949, and any attack on that order could only be by 678 way of appeal against it, and that had not been done, We are of opinion that the decision in Veerappa Pillai vs Raman & Raman Ltd. (1) is of no assistance to the appellant.
In the result, we affirm the decision of the High Court both on the ground that the renewal dated June 23, 1955, is a continuation of the permit granted on December 3, 1952, and must fall to the ground when that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March 21, 1956, and on the ground that it was an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and that in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be effective.
These appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs in Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.
Appeals dismissed.

summary:
The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage by the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the , but on appeal to the appellate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, by the unsuccessful applicants the order granting the permit was set aside and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was approved by the Government in revision.
The appellant, thereupon, moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings of the Central Road Traffic Board and the Goverment.
During the pendency of these proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside the grant of the permit to the Appellant, with the result that be continued to run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of his permit.
Before the expiry of the period fixed in the original 664 permit, he applied for and got a renewal of the permit from the Regional Transport Authority under section 58 of the Act.
The High Court finally dismissed the application for a writ of certiorari and 'the question arose as to the validity of the renewal of the permit in view of the High Court 's decision.
The matter was raised before the High Court once again by proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court held that the renewal having been obtained on the basis of a permit which had been subsequently cancelled, it could not be regarded as a fresh permit, that when the original permit was set aside, it must be taken to be non est for all purposes, and I that the renewal must therefore be held to be a nullity.
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held:(1) Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1949 and the rules framed thereunder, a renewal is a continuation of the original permit.
When the original permit was renewed in favour of the appellant it was subject to the decision of the High Court in the proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution which were then pending and, therefore, when the order granting the original permit was fin ally set aside the renewed permit became void.
Anjiah vs Regional Transport Officer, Guntur, 1956 Andhra Law Times, 347, disapproved.
(2)When the appellant applied for a renewal of his permit under section 58 of the Act and not merely for a fresh permit the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the renewal must be held to have been made subject to the implied condition that the right of the appellant to the original permit is recognized by the High Court and that accordingly, in the event that had happened, the renewed permit ceased to, be effective.,.
Veerappa Pillai vs Raman & Raman Ltd., ; , explained and distinguished.


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11868 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 16th July, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Application No. 53 of 83.
Soli J. Sorabjee, V.R. Reddy, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
This petition for special leave is directed against an interlocutory Order dated July 16, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rejecting the application of the petitioner for dismissing the election petition of the respondent in limine under section 86 of the Representation of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as the `Act '.) The petition arises out of an election to the Siddipets Assembly Constituency in Andhra Pradesh which took place on January 5, 1983.
The petitioner was declared elected to the said Assembly.
The respondent filed an election petition in the High Court alleging certain corrupt practices.
The short point for consideration before us is as to whether or not the election petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under section 86 of the Act as the copies of the documents and schedules, which formed an integral part of the election petition, were not supplied to the petitioner which amounted to a clear breach of the mandatory provisions contained in section 81 (3) of the Act.
The High Court after hearing both the parties dismissed the application of the petitioner for throwing out the election petition of the respondent in limine We have heard counsel for the parties at length and it seems to us that the matter is no longer res integra and is covered by a decision of this Court is Sahodrabai Rai vs Ram Singh Aharwar (1) to which we shall refer hereafter.
896 On the findings of the High Court three facts are clearly proved: (a) that when the election petition was filed, it was accompanied by as many copies as were the respondents, (b) that the election petition was duly verified and the copies thereof were accompanied by the necessary schedules containing the details of corrupt practices, and (c) that the schedules or the annexures to the petition were also signed by the election petitioner (respondent).
The only complaint of the petitioner was that the copy of the election petition served on him was not accompanied by copies of the schedules and hence there was a clear breach of the provisions of section 81 (3) of the Act.
Section 81(3) may be extracted thus: "81.
Presentation of petitions XX XX XX (3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition." An analysis of the above reveals (a) that the petition should be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents, (b) that every such copy should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.
It is not disputed in this case that both these conditions were fully satisfied.
Section 83 of the Act contains four requirements, viz., (a) that the election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts relied upon by the petitioner, (b) that the petitioner should set forth the full particulars of the corrupt practices alleged, 897 (c) that the petition should be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure and where a corrupt practice is alleged the petition should also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, giving the particulars of the corrupt practice, and (d) any schedule or annexure to the petition should also be signed and verified by the petitioner.
These conditions have also been fulfilled in the present case.
The counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that as the schedules and other documents formed an integral part of the petition, the same should have been served on the petitioner (respondent in the High Court) before it could be said that the provisions of sections 81 and 82 of the Act had been complied with.
It was further argued that in the absence of such a compliance, the petition was liable to be rejected in limine under section 86 of the Act.
We are, however, unable to agree with this contention which does not at all flow from the plain and simple requirements of sections 81 and 82.
As indicated above, all that was necessary was done in this case and there was no requirement that the documents or the schedules should also have been served on the petitioner because if they were filed in the Court it was always open to the petitioner to inspect them and find out the allegations made in the petition.
We are unable to hold that the documents or the schedules formed an integral part of the petition.
An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Sahodrabai 's case (supra) where while repelling a similar argument the following observations were made: "The only provision to which our attention has been drawn is sub section
(3) of section 81 and sub section
(2) of section 83.
The first provides that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and that every such copy shall be an authenticated true copy.
The words used here are only "the election petition.
" There is no mention of any document accompanying the election petition. .
Assistance is however taken from the provisions of sub section
(2) of section 83 which provides that any schedule or any annexure to the 898 petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition.
It is contended that since the pamphlet was an annexure to the petition it was not only necessary to sign and verify it, but that it should have been treated as a part of the election petition itself and a copy served upon the respondents.
In this way, non compliance with the provisions of section 86 (1) is made out.
In our opinion, this is too strict a reading of the provisions.
We have already pointed out that section 81 (3) speaks only of the election petition. .
Even if this be not the case, we are quite clear that sub section
(2) of section 83 has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures. .
But what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with the election petitions.
They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof.
The pamphlet therefore must be treated as a document and not as a part of the election petition in so far as averments are concerned. .
It would be stretching the words of sub section
(2) of section 83 too far to think that every document produced as evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the election petition proper.
" It is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute that wherever a statute contains stringent provisions they must be literally and strictly construed so as to promote the object of the Act.
As extracted above, this Court clearly held that if the arguments of the appellant (in that case) were to be accepted, it would be stretching and straining the language of sections 81 and 82 and we are in complete agreement with the view taken by this Court which has decided the issue once for all.
The learned counsel relied on a latter decision of this Court in the case of M. Karunanidhi vs H. V. Hande(1) where a Division 899 Bench while considering a similar question made the following observations: "The Preliminary issue and the appeal turn on a short point of construction.
The question that arises is whether the words "copies thereof" in sub section (3) of Section 81 comprehend the election petition proper or do they also include a schedule or annexure in terms of sub section (2) of Section 83 or merely a document only in proof of the allegations in paragraph 18 (b) must turn on a construction of sub section (3) of Section 81 read with sub section (2) of Section 83.
It now appears to be well settled by Sahodrabai 's case; , that sub section (2) of section 83 applies only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the election petition and not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition.
" This decision in no way departs from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai 's case (supra).
The aforesaid case however, rested on the ground that the document (pamphlet) was expressly referred to in the election petition and thus became an integral part of the same and ought to have been served on the respondent.
It is, therefore, manifest that the facts of the case cited above are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
Furthermore, the decision in M. Karunanidhi 's case (supra) has noticed the previous decision and has fully endorsed the same.
For these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court was correct and no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court.
As the matter was clearly concluded by authorities of this Court we did not think it necessary to grant special leave and hearing the parties at length we disposed of and dismiss the petition in terms of the aforesaid observations.
P.B.R. Petition dismissed.

summary:
The respondent filed an election petition in the High Court alleging that the returned candidate (petitioner herein) had committed corrupt practices which rendered his election void.
The returned candidate made an application stating that the respondent had committed breach of the mandatory provisions of section 81 (3) in that with the copy of the election petition served on him, copies of documents and schedules which formed an integral part of the election petition, had not been enclosed and that for this reason the election petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under section 86.
The High Court dismissed his application.
In the special leave petition the returned candidate has urged the same argument advanced by him before the High Court.
Dismissing the petition, ^ HELD: There is no requirement of law that the documents or schedules to the election petition should also be served on the candidate because if they were filed in Court it is always open to the returned candidate to inspect them and find out the allegations made in the petition.
Documents or schedules do not form an integral part of the election petition.
[897E F] In the instant case all that was necessary to be done by the election petitioner had been done.
The election petition was accompanied by as many copies as there were respondents.
It was duly verified and copies thereof were accompanied by necessary schedules containing the details of corrupt practices and the schedules were also signed by the petitioner.
[897E F] 895 Sahodrabai Rai vs Ram Singh Aharwar, [1968 3 SCR and M. V. Hande, , held inapplicable.