judgement:
tition (Civil) Nos.
507 and 1260 of 1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
M.K. Ramamurthy, Rajinder Sachhar, Dr. Francis Julion, Ms. Aruna Mathur, A. Mariarputham, Ms. section Dikshit, section Va sudevan and Pradeep Misra for the Petitioners.
For the Respondents Nemo.
The following Order of the Court was delivered by 496 section RANGANATHAN, J. This order will dispose of a prelimi nary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that these writ petitions should be dismissed because the peti tioners have suppressed certain material facts from this Court and have also tried to abuse the process of court in the manner hereinafter appearing.
Writ Petition No. 507 of 1989 has been filed by the All India State Bank Officers ' Federation (hereinafter called 'the Federation ') through its President.
It was filed in this Court on 21st April, 89 and was supported by an affida vit of Umed Singh, President of the Federation, affirming the contents of the petition to be true to his personal knowledge.
By this writ petition the Federation seeks to impugn a new promotion policy decided upon by the State Bank of India (hereinafter called 'the Bank ').
In paragraph 9(mm) of the petition it is stated that the petitioners are ap proaching this Court in great haste as the Bank is moving with great speed and is likely to constitute Departmental Promotion Committees and declare the results of the inter views in implementation of the new promotion policy within the next two or three days.
In the affidavit of Umed Singh, referred to earlier, it has been stated in para 4 that the petitioners have not filed any other similar writ petition in this Honourable Court or any other High Court.
In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Bank, it is stated that the statement in paragraph 4 of the petition in support of the writ petition is false.
It is pointed out that the Federation through its Deputy General Secretary had filed Writ Petition No. 5286 of 1989 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad along with an application No. 6969 of 1989, seeking stay of the promotion policy.
On 13.4.89 the Andhra Pradesh High Court admitted the writ petition but the learned judge rejected the application for interim stay observing "that he was prima facie satisfied that the selection is going on according to a fair procedure and that there is no need to stay any of the interviews or the appointment".
It is further pointed out that another petition has also been filed by the State Bank of India Officers ' Association (Karnataka) having its office at Bangalore in the Karnataka High Court, being Writ Petition No. 7848 of 1989.
It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioners have suppressed from this Court the material fact that a writ petition has already been filed by them in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that an application for stay had been made and rejected by the said court.
A second objection to the 497 maintainability.
of the petition raised on behalf of the Bank in paragraph 3 of its counter affidavit was that since promotions had already been made they could not be disturbed "as the promoted officers have not been made parties".
It is common ground that 58 officers had been promoted w.e.f.
24th April, 89 but no steps were taken to implead these officers, who would be directly affected as a result of the prayer made in the writ petition.
To these objections, a rejoinder was filed on behalf of the petitioners, supported again by an affidavit of Umed Singh on the 23rd of October, 1989.
The two objections raised by the Bank were sought to be refuted in the follow ing manner: "1.
That the contents of para 1 are denied and it is reiter ated that the writ petition is maintainable as there is clear violation of fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners.
The writ petition filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court has since been withdrawn as per the undertaking given to the Supreme Court during arguments on 24.4.89.
The deponent had no knowledge of the writ petition filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, hence as soon as it came to his knowledge the same has been withdrawn.
Even otherwise the deponent understands that in the said writ petition the stay of interviews was prayed and the same was declined on representation made by the respondent bank.
It is indeed regrettable that even before Hon 'ble High Court the bank made incorrect statements.
A perusal of the order of High Court would show the same.
Regarding the question of making such employees who have been promoted as a party respondent, it is submitted that firstly it is the promotion policy which had been challenged being arbitrary, discriminatory and framed in gross violation of the prescribed procedure and provisions of law, secondly the petitioners even today do not know the names of all such 58 candidates who have been promoted favoured." (emphasis added) It may be mentioned here that Writ Petition No. 507 of 1989 came up for admission before a Bench of this Court on 26th April, 1989.
Apparently, the counsel for the State Bank of India was present and accepted notice on behalf of the bank.
The Bench passed the following order: 498 "Issue notice, Mr. S.S. Sharma, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the State Bank of India.
Counter affida vit shall be filed within four weeks from today.
Reply, if any, shall be filed within two weeks thereafter, the matter will be placed for final disposal on 24.10.1989 subject to overnight part heard.
The promotion if given in the meantime will be subject to the decision in the writ petition.
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel states that the writ peti tion which has been filed before the High Court will be withdrawn." The Writ Petition came on for hearing before us on 5th April, 1990.
Sri G. Ramaswamy, counsel for the Bank, put the above objections in the forefront as preliminary objections.
After hearing him and the counsel for the petitioner, we directed the petitioner federation to file a better affida vit explaining the correct position.
In compliance with the direction given by us, another affidavit has been filed by Sri Umed Singh.
In this affidavit, again, although purport ing to "tender an unqualified apology" for the misstatement in the earlier affidavit, the deponent reiterated "that he did not know on the date of swearing of the affidavit on 21.4.89 that some other office bearer of the petitioner federation has filed such a petition".
He claims to have come to know of it only on the 23rd April, 1989 from a telephonic conversation with the Deputy Secretary and wishes to take credit for the fact that he at once informed his counsel about it who in turn brought it to the notice of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing on 26th April, 1989.
The truth of these allegations is refuted on behalf of the Bank.
It is submitted that the counsel for the petition er did not, even at the time of hearing on 26.4.89, bring to the notice of this Court the fact that he had filed a peti tion in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
On the other hand, it is claimed, it was the counsel for the Bank who was present and who took notice on behalf of the Bank, that brought to the notice of the Court that the petitioner had already moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court in regard to the same relief and it was only thereafter that the counsel for the petitioner made a statement that the petitioner would with drew the petition filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
Even this, it is pointed out, they did not do immediately as stated in Umed Singh 's affidavit for the said petition was withdrawn only much later on 27th of July, 1989.
On behalf of the Bank it is also pointed out that the statement made in the rejoinder filed by Umed Singh, sup ported by his affidavit, 499 that the addresses of the 58 promotees was not known to the petitioner is again a total falsehood as is demonstrated by two circumstances.
In the first place, in the writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court, the petitioner there has joined all the 58 officers as parties and an application was moved before the said High Court on 27th April, 89, seeking stay of promotion of the said respondents.
That apart, on 1st May, 89, a fortnightly bulletin issued by the State Bank of India Officers ' Association (Mumbai circle), which is admitted to be one of the associations affiliated to the petitioner Federation, carries a message of congratulations to all the 58 officers, who had been promoted w.e.f.
24th April, 89.
The names of all the 58 officers so promoted has been set out in this bulletin.
In this state of the record, learned counsel for the Bank strongly urges that we should dismiss the writ petition straightaway on the ground that the petitioner has not come to Court with clean hands.
We have heard learned counsel on both sides at length.
There is no doubt left in our minds that the petitioner has not only suppressed material facts in the petition but has also tried to abuse judicial process.
The explanation that the President of the Federation when he filed the writ in this Court on 21st April, 89, was not aware that a petition had been filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court (repeated for a second time in the affidavit of 5th April ' 90) is, in our opinion, is totally unacceptable.
Admittedly the federa tion was considerably agitated by the new promotion policy.
The matter was considered to be very urgent and the federa tion was too keen to obtain a stay of implementation of the policy which, it feared.
the Bank might do any day.
In this situation, not even the most gullible of persons would be credulous enough to accept the explanation that the Deputy General Secretary of the Federation had not apprised the President of their failure to obtain the stay order from the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
It is totally unbelievable that between 13.4.89, when the interim application in the Andhra Pradesh High Court was rejected and 21.4.89 when the writ petition was filed, the President was not aware of what had happened in the High Court.
It is deplorable that such an explanation should have been not only put forward in the original rejoinder but should have been repeated again in the latest affidavit.
The petitioner had, in our opinion, deliberately suppressed from the petition this crucial and important fact.
As to the credit sought for having brought this fact to the notice of the Court on 25.4.89.
the circum stances suggest that perhaps they would not have brought it to the notice of the court at all had not counsel on behalf of the Bank been present.
to receive notice 500 when the matter was moved for admission on 26.4.89.
whether, as asserted by the counsel for the petitioner, the petition er considered it prudent, in view of the presence of the Bank 's counsel, to volunteer at the time of the said hearing the information that a petition had been filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and to offer an undertaking that it would be withdrawn or whether, as alleged in a "statement of facts" ' placed before us by Sri S.S Sharma, the learned counsel for the Bank who appeared at the hearing, even this information had to be supplied to the Court by the Bank, is a controversy into which we need not enter.
We shall proceed on the assumption that the statement made by the counsel for the petitioner is correct, but even that does not explain why a reference to the writ petition in the High Court was not made in the writ petition as it had to be made.
The statement in the affidavit of Umed Singh that no petition had been filed in any High Court was clearly and plainly false.
It is equally clear that the statement made in the rejoinder affidavit that "till today (i.e. 23rd October, 1989) the petitioner federation is not aware of the names of the promoted officers" is again an incorrect statement.
These officers had been impleaded in the interim application for the relief sought against them in the Karnataka High Court as early as 27.4.89.
That apart the federation could not have been unaware of the contents of the bulletin issued by the Mumbai circle of the SBI Officer 's Association issued on 1.5.89.
There is no doubt that the petitioner did not deliberately implead the 58 promoted officers.
Sri Sachhar, for the petitioner, sought to contend that these 58 officers may be proper parties but not necessary parties and he referred us to the judgments of this Court in The General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad and Another vs A.V.R. Siddhantti and Ors., and Col. D.D. Joshi & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, [1983] 2 S.C.C. 235.
We are not here concerned with the question whether these officers were necessary or proper parties and, indeed, this issue is no longer alive as, subsequently, the peti tioner itself has undertaken to implead these 58 officers and notices have been issued to them in both the writ peti tions.
What we are concerned here with is the statement, in the rejoinder affidavit that the Federation was not aware of the names of the 58 officers till November 1989 which, in the circumstances is a clear misstatement.
Apart from misstatements in the affidavits filed before this Court, the petitioner Federation has clearly resorted to tactics which can only be described as abuse of the process of court.
The simultane 501 ous filing of writ petitions in various High Courts on the same issue though purportedly on behalf of different associ ations of the Officers of the Bank, is a practice which has to be discouraged.
Sri Sachhar and Sri Ramamurthy wished to pinpoint the necessity and importance of petitions being filed by different associations in order to discharge satis factorily their responsibilities towards their respective members.
We are not quite able to appreciate such necessity where there is no diversity but only a commonness of inter est.
All that they had to do was to join forces and demon strate their unity by filing a petition in a Single Court.
It seems the object here in filing different petitions in different Courts was a totally different and not very laud able one.
Again an attempt was made to obtain a stay in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and when that attempt failed the writ petition here was filed.
In this the petitioners were able to obtain only an order that any promotions made during the pendency of the petition would be subject to the deci sion in the writ petition.
But, having obtained this order on 26.4.89, it is curious and inexplicable that an affiliat ed association should have made an application on 27.4.89 in the Karnataka High Court praying for a stay of the promo tions.
These are only tactics that it will be indulged in by a chronic and compulsive litigant and not by a federation like the petitioner.
We have set out the facts in this case at some length and passed a detailed order because we are deeply grieved to come across such conduct on the part of an association, which claims to represent high placed officers of a premier bank of this country.
One expects such officers to fight their battles fairly and squarely and not to stoop low to gain, what can only be, temporary victories by keeping away material facts from the court.
It is common knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in petitions and affida vits recklessly and without proper verification not to speak of dishonest and deliberate misstatements.
We, therefore, take this opportunity to record our strong and emphatic disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in this case and hope that this will be a lesson to the present petition er as well as to other litigants and that atleast in future people will act more truthfully and with a greater sense of responsibility.
The question that now remains to be considered is wheth er the petition is liable to be dismissed for this conduct of the President of the Federation.
Sri Rajendra Sachhar, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, sought to get over the Bank 's objections by addressing certain technical argu ments.
He submitted that even if Writ Petition No. 507/ 89 was liable to be dismissed for mis statement and suppression there 502 would be no reason to dismiss C.W.P. No. 1260 of 1989 which has been filed by another association of the same officers.
He also sought to contend that, since it had been brought to the notice of this Court on 26.4.89 that a petition had been filed in a High Court and that it was being withdrawn, the order passed by this Court on 26.4.89 should be taken as having condoned any mis statement or mis conduct or defects in the writ petition.
We are not inclined to accept these submissions.
However, it is not necessary to discuss this aspect further as we do not wish to penalise the various officers who may suffer as a consequence of the new policy, which they wish to challenge, for the misstatements or wrong steps taken by the Officers of the federation perhaps, in their over anxiety to get quick interim relief.
We do not wish to decline them an opportunity to put forward their grievances before the court by dismissing these writ peti tions on the preliminary objections raised by the Bank.
In fact, we should like to place on record our appreciation of the stand taken by Sri G. Ramaswamy, learned counsel for the Bank in this respect.
He fairly stated that, as he is ap pearing for a public sector undertaking, he is quite pre pared to contest the writ petitions on their merits and that his preliminary objections were primarily intended to bring to our notice the conduct of the petitioners in this case.
We are glad he did it as this was a matter which needed serious notice.
We should like to record our dis approval of the way in which the proceedings have been conducted on behalf of the Federation.
However, as mentioned above, we overrule the preliminary objections and will proceed to dispose of the writ petitions on their merits.
The Writ Petitions are adjourned, as per separate order, to 17.7.90 for further hearing.

summary:
The All India State Bank Officers ' Federation filed a Writ Petition in this Court on the 24th April, 1989 seeking to impugn a new promotion policy initiated by the State Bank of India.
The petition was supported by an affidavit of the President of the Federation affirming the contents of the petition to be true to his personal knowledge, and submit ting in paragraph 9(mm) of the petition that the petitioners were approaching this Court in great haste as the Bank was moving with great speed to implement its new promotion policy and was likely to constitute a Departmental Promotion Committee, and declare the results.
In para 4 it was submit ted that the petitioners had not filed any other similar petition either in this Court or any other High Court.
When the writ petition came up for admission before a Bench of this Court on April 26, 1989, counsel for the State Bank of India was present and accepted notice on behalf of the Bank.
The Writ Petition was contested by the Bank which sub mitted in its counter affidavit that the statement in para 4 of the petition in support of the writ petition was false, and pointed out that the Federation through its Deputy General Secretary had filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh along with an application seeking stay of the promotion policy, and that the High Court admit ted the Writ Petition on April 13, 1989 but rejected the application for interim stay, and further pointed out that another petition had been filed by the State Bank of India Officers ' Association (Karnataka) in the Karnataka High Court.
A second objection as regards the maintainability of the 494 petition was raised in para 3 that since the promotions had already been made they could not be disturbed and that no steps were taken to implead those officers, who would be directly affected as a result of the prayer made in the writ petition.
To the aforesaid objections raised by the Bank the petitioner filed a rejoinder supported by an affidavit of the President of the Federation, submitting that the depo nent did not have any knowledge of the writ petition filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, and that as soon as it came to his knowledge it was withdrawn.
and that the peti tioners did not know the names of all the 58 candidates who had been promoted favoured.
When the Writ Petition was taken up for further hearing on April 5, 1990, counsel for the Bank objected to the maintainability of the writ petition on the grounds of suppression of material facts and abuse of the process of court.
The Court directed the petitioner to file a better affidavit, and the petitioner Federation filed a better affidavit explaining the correct position and tendering an unqualified apology for the mis statements in the earlier affidavit, but still reiterated that they came to know of the writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court only on April 23, 1989 and that, at the time of the preliminary hearing, it was brought to the notice of the Court by the Respondent 's counsel.
The respondent pointed out that the statements made in the rejoinder filed by the petitioners that they were not aware of the names of the promoted officers till November, 1989 was a total falsehood because; (i) the writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court made all of them parties to the writ petition, and (ii) the names of the promoted officers were listed in the fortnightly bulletin of the State Bank Officers ' Association dated 1st May, 1989 carry ing a message of congratulations to all of them.
Disposing of the preliminary objections and adjourning the writ petition for further hearing on merits, the Court, HELD: 1.
Apart from mis statements in the affidavits filed before this Court the petitioner federation has clear ly resorted to tactics which can only be described as abuse of the process of court.
The simultaneous filing of writ petitions in various High Courts on the same issue though purportedly on behalf of different associations of the Officers of the Bank, is a practice which has to be discour aged.
[500H; 501A] 495 2.
An attempt was made to obtain a stay in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and when that attempt failed the writ petition here was filed.
In this the petitioners were able to obtain only an order that any "promotions made during the pendency of the petition would be subject to the decision in the writ petition.
But having obtained this order on April 26, 1989, it is curious and inexplicable that an affiliated association should have made an application on April 27, 1989 in the Karnataka High Court praying for a stay of the promotions.
These are only tactics that will be indulged in by a chronic and compulsive litigant and not by a Federation like the petitioner.
[501C D] 3.
One expects that officers fight their battles fairly and squarely and not stoop low to gain what can only be temporary victories by keeping away material facts from the court.
[501E] 4.
It is common knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in petitions and affidavits recklessly without proper verifications not to speak of dishonest and deliber ate misstatements.
Strong and emphatic disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in this case is recorded in the hope that this will be a lesson to the present petitioners as well as to other litigants and that atleast in future people will act more truthfully and with a greater sense of responsibility.
[501F G] 5.
The Court does not wish to penalise the various officers who may suffer as a consequences of the new policy, which they wish to challenge, and decline them an opportuni ty to put forward their grievances before the Court, for the mis statements or wrong steps taken by the officers of the Federation in their over anxiety to get quick interim re lief.
[502B C]


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 27 1 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.1.1989 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No. 34 of 1989.
K.V. Vishwanathan and S.R. Setia for the Appellant.
T.T. Kunhikanna, Udai Lalit and P. Parmeshwaran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.
Leave granted.
519 This is an appeal seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
The appellant who has been detained under Section 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, has challenged the detention order.
The appellant is a native of Panakkad, Malapuram District in Kerala and had been to Jeddah after his Haj pilgrimage and from Jeddah he landed in Bombay on 15.9.87.
Then he started by a bus to go to his native place.
On 17.9.87 the Customs Officials intercepted the bus near Thiruvannoor and in the presence of panch witnesses, a search was conducted on the person of the appellant and the chappals worn by him were inspected and on their being opened up about 13 gold ingots with foreign marking were found and they were duly recovered.
Further some incriminat ing documents were also recovered.
The gold was valued at Rs.4,64,951 and it was found to be smuggled gold.
The appel lant was interrogated by the Superintendent of Customs and a statement of the appellant was recorded.
He confessed that he was introduced to a person who promised to give him remuneration provided he carries the gold to India and appellant agreed and carried these gold biscuits.
Criminal proceedings were initiated.
However, the detaining authori ty, the Home Secretary to Government of Kerala being satis fied passed the detention order dated 21.9.88 against the appellant with a view to preventing him from smuggling activities.
The grounds also were served within time and in the grounds all the above mentioned details are mentioned.
In the grounds the appellant also is informed that if he desires to make a representation to the Advisory Board, he may address it to the Chairman, Advisory Board and that he can also make a representation to the detaining authority or the Central Government.
Questioning the same the present appeal is filed.
It is submitted that the representation was made on 27.9.88 to the Central Government and it was disposed of on 2.11.88.
Therefore there was enormous delay by the Central Government in rejecting the representation and the delay amounts to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
The next submission is that though the alleged smug gling of gold is said to have been taken place on 17.9.87, the detention order was passed on 21.5.88 i.e. after a lapse of eight months and that too it was a solitary instance and because of the delay, the same has become stale and there is no other material to establish any nexus or live connection between the alleged date of smuggling and the date of deten tion.
The next submission is that there was delay in the execution of the detention order which was executed only on 6.8.88 though passed on 21.5.88 and that there is no allega tion that the appellant was absconding.
It is also submitted that the appellant was not given an effective opportunity to represent his case before the 520 Advisory Board inasmuch as the appellant was not permitted to be represented by an advocate or by his next friend.
In the counter affidavit it is stated that the Collector of Customs furnished proposals for the detention of the appellant on 24.3.1988 and the detention order was passed on 21.5.1988 and the appellant was detained on 6.8.1988.
The appellant made a representation to the detaining authority on 27.9.1988 and it was rejected by the State Government on 1.10.1988 and the Central Government rejected the same on 2.11.1988.
Therefore in the counter affidavit it is admitted that there is a delay of one month and five days in consid ering and rejecting the representation by the Central Gov ernment.
It can be seen that so far as the State Government namely the detaining authority is concerned, there is no delay but the submission is that the delay in disposing of the representation by the Central Government also is fatal.
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India lays down that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the au thority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communi cate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
It is well settled that this Clause confers a valuable fight upon the detenu to make a representation and also mandates that the detaining authority should dispose of the same without delay.
Therefore the right under this Clause is two fold, namely that the authority making the order must communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made, as soon as the order is made and secondly that the detenu must also be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
Article 22(5) itself does not say to whom the represen tation is made or who will consider the representation.
By virtue of provisions of the statute under which he has been detained, the appropriate Government is legally obliged to comply with these requirements.
It is obligatory on the appropriate Government to consider the detenu 's representa tion separate from the consideration of the detenu 's case by the Advisory Board.
But what the learned counsel submits is that the Central Government which has the power to revoke the detention order passed by the State authority, is also under legal obligation to dispose of the representation without delay.
Learned counsel relied on some of the deci sions of this Court.
In Khudiram Das vs The State of 521 West Bengal and Others, ; this Court held that one of the basic requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making the order must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order and this requirement will be ineffective unless there is a corresponding obligation to consider the repre sentation of the detenu as early as possible.
It may not be necessary for us to refer to all those decisions which deal with the delay caused by the appropriate Government in considering the representation inasmuch as in the instant case there is no delay in considering the representation by the State Government which is the detaining authority.
Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 deals with the revo cation of detention orders and under Section 11(b) the Cen tral Government may, at any time, revoke or modify an order made by the State Government.
Though strictly speaking the Central Government is not the detaining authority within the meaning of Article 22(5) yet they are under legal obligation to dispose of the representation as early as possible but the question is whether such delay by the Central Government also should be subjected to such a rigorous scrutiny as is done in the case of a delay caused by the appropriate Gov ernment.
namely the detaining authority.
In Tara Chand vs The State of Rajasthan, , this Court held that: "Once a representation is made to the Central Government, it is duty bound to consider the same in order to exercise its discretion either in rejecting or accepting it.if there is inordinate delay in considering the representation that would clearly amount to violation of Article 22(5) so as to render the detention unconstitutional and void." In Shyam Ambalal Siroya vs Union of India and Ors., ; it is held that: "The power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power.
Any petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expe dition . .
It may be permissible for the Central Govern ment to take reasonable time for disposing any revocation petition.
But it would not be justified in 522 ignoring the representation for revocation of the detention as a statutory duty is cast upon the Central Government.
It is necessary that the Government should apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the peti tion, declining to order for revocation." In Sabir Ahmed vs Union of India and Ors., ; dealing with the power of the revocation of the Central Government it is observed that such power is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exer cise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government and that the Central Government should consider the same with reasonable expedition and that what is reasonable expedition depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down.
It is also observed that it certainly does not cover the delay due to negli gence, callous inaction, avoidable red tapism and unduly protracted procrastination.
In Sabir Ahmed 's case as well as in Shyam Ambalal Si roya 's case the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government has been ignored and left unattended for a period of about four months and under those circumstances it was held that there was violation of Article 22(5).
In Rama Dhondu Borade vs
V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police and Others, the detenu made a repre sentation to the Central Government on 26.9.1988 and the decision of the Central Government rejecting the representa tion was communicated to the appellant on 31.10.1988.
The explanation submitted by the Central Government was not accepted on the ground that it is not satisfactory.
In T.A. Abdul Rahman vs State of Kerala and Others, ; there was a delay of 72 days and it was observed that the representation of the detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious consideration and was allowed to lie without being properly attended to.
Bearing these principles in mind we shall examine wheth er the Central Government has expeditiously considered the representation or not.
We have already noted that the repre sentation was made on 27.9.88 and disposed of by the Central Government on 2.11.88, i.e. within a month and five days.
In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Govern ment it is stated that the representation dated 27.9.88 was received in the COFEPOSA Section of the Ministry of Finance on 10.10.88 and the representation was in Malayalam.
It is also 523 stated that there were some allegations regarding the non placement of certain documents and non supply of certain, documents to him.
Therefore a copy of the representation was sent to the sponsoring authority i.e. Collector of Customs, Cochin on that very day and the comments from the Collector of Customs, Cochin dated 25.10.88 were received in the COFEPOSA Section on 27.10.88 and that the Additional Secre tary examined them and with his comments, they were forward ed to the Minister of State for Revenue on 31.10.88, since 29th and 30th October, 1988 were holidays.
The Minister of State for Revenue with this comments forwarded the represen tation on the same day i.e. 31.10.88 to the Finance Minis ter.
The Finance Minister considered and rejected the repre sentation on 1.11.88 and the file was received in the Office on 2.11.88 and on the same day, a memorandum rejecting the representation was sent to the detenu.
From the explanation it can be seen that the representation was considered most expeditiously and there is no "negligence or callous inac tion or avoidable red tapism".
For these reasons we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel.
The next submission of the learned counsel is that the date of search was 17.9.87 and the detention order was passed on 21.5.88 after a long time and therefore there is no nexus between the alleged incident and the detention order and therefore there is no genuine satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority.
The learned counsel submits that there was no live existing connection between the incident and the detention.
In Lakshman Khatik vs The State of West Bengal, it is observed that mere delay in passing a detention order is not conclusive but the type of grounds given have to be seen and then consider whether such grounds could really weigh with an officer after such delay in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the detenu.
In Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah vs State of Gujarat and Others, ; it is held that the mere delay in passing the detention order is not fatal unless the court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the detention.
In Abdul Rahman 's case seizure of the gold biscuits was on 30.11.86 and the detention order was passed 11 months thereafter.
On the ground that there was no satisfactory explanation for this undue, unreasonable and unexplained delay, it was held that the delay throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
In the counter affidavit, in the instant case, filed on behalf of the detaining authority it is stated that the case records relating to the 524 petitioner were received at the office of the sponsoring authority on 1.2.88 and they were processed in the Office and the show cause notice under the Customs Act was issued on 9.2.88 and the proposals were sent for COFEPOSA action on 24.3.88 and they were received by the State Government on 2.4.88.
The matter was considered by the Screening Committee which met on 28.4.88 and thereafter submitted the proposals to the detaining authority.
On 2.5.88 the detaining authori ty ordered to ascertain the reasons for the delay in spon soring the case and accordingly the sponsoring authority at Cochin was addressed on 2.5.88.
He was reminded on 7.5.88 and 12.5.88.
His reply was received on 16.5.88 and thereaf ter the order was passed on 21.5.88.
In our view, the delay has been reasonably explained.
The courts have not laid down that on mere such delay the detention has to be struck down.
In Yogendra Murari vs State of U.P., , it is held that: "It is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay . .
It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each indi vidual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfac torily explained or not.
" That apart, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that because of this delay the necessary nexus got severed and that the grounds have become stale and illusory.
In appreciating such a contention.
the Court also has to bear in mind the nature of the prejudicial activities indulged by the detenu and the likelihood of his repeating the same.
It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into con sideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the detention on that ground.
In Hemla ta Kantilal Shah vs State of Maharashtra, ; it is held that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person.
For these reasons we are of the view that in this case the delay by itself does not invalidate the detention but even otherwise it has been reasonably explained.
Yet another ground urged by the learned counsel is that there was delay in arresting the detenu after the detention order was passed and therefore there is no genuineness in the detention order.
In the counter affidavit it is stated that after the detention order was passed, it was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Malappuram on 23.5.88 for 525 immediate execution and they were passed on to Circle In spector, Malappuram.
On 29.6.88, it was reported that the Circle Inspector had made due enquiries but the detenu could not be apprehended.
Thereupon a special squad was deputed as per the directions of the Superintendent of Police and thereafter he was detained on 6.8.88.
It is further submit ted in the counter affidavit that the delay in execution of the order is caused due to detenu 's deliberate attempt to make himself scarce.
That apart there is no decision where a court has gone to the extent of holding that a mere delay in arresting the accused renders the detention invalid.
In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only about 2/1/2 months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasona ble.
The learned counsel, however, relied on Abdul Rahman 's case.
In that case the detention order was passed on 7.10.87 and the detenu was arrested on 18.1.88.
The court found that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in the counter affidavit at all.
This ground was taken into consid eration alongwith the other important grounds in quashing the detention.
In SK.
Serajul vs State of West Bengal, it is observed that: "There was delay, both at the stage of passing the order of detention and in arresting him, and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction.
But this must not be misunderstood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arrest ing the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the sub .
jective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable.
Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances.
The detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine.
" It can therefore be seen that on the mere delay in arresting me detenu; pursuant to the order of detention the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be held to be not genuine.
Each case.
depends on its own facts and circum stances.
The Court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably.
As mentioned above, in the instant case, we are satisfied with the explanation for the delay in arresting the detenu.
Therefore this contention is also liable to be rejected.
For all the above mentioned reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Y. Lal Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant after his Haj pilgrimage had been to Jeddah and from Jeddah he landed in Bombay on 15.9.1987.
Thereafter he boarded a bus to go to his native place in Kerala.
On 17.9.1987, the Custom authorities intercepted the bus wherein the petitioner was travelling and in the presence of the panch witnesses, searched his person and the chappals worn by him.
On opening the chappals about 13 gold ingots with foreign markings were found and they were duly recovered.
The appellant confessed that he was introduced to a person who promised to give him remuneration for carrying the gold to India and that is how he brought those gold biscuits.
The detaining authority passed the detention order against the appellant on 21.9.1988, and grounds of detention were served on him within time and he was informed that if he so desired he could make a representation to the Advisory Board, and also that he could make a representation to the detaining authority or the Central Government.
The appellant challenged his detention by means of a writ petition in the High Court and the same having been dismissed, he has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave.
The appellant urged: (i) that the delay in making the detention order and the disposal of his representation by the Central Government are fatal and violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India; and (ii) that the delay in arresting him pursuant to the detention order casts a doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an 518 incident is not fatal to the detention of a person.
In this case the delay by itself does not invalidate the detention but even otherwise it has been reasonably explained.
[524G] From the explanation it can be seen that the representa tion was considered most expeditiously and there is no "negligence or callous inaction or avoidable red tapism ' '.
[523C] It can therefore be seen that on the mere delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be held to be not genuine.
Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances.
The Court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably.
In the instant case, this Court is satisfied with the explanation for the delay in arresting the detenu.
[525G H] Khudiram Das vs The State of West Bengal & Ors.
, ; ; Tara Chand vs State of Rajasthan, ; Shyam Ambalal Siroya vs Union of India & Ors., ; ; Sabir Ahmed vs Union of India & Ors., ; ; Rama Dhondu Borade vs
V.K. Saraf, Commis sioner of Police & Ors., ; T.A. Abdul Rahman vs State of Kerala & Ors.
, ; ; Lakshman Khatik vs The State of West Bengal, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 1; Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah vs State of Gujarat & Ors., ; ; Yogendra Murari vs State of UP.
, ; Hemlata Kantilal Shah vs State of Maharashtra, ; and SK.
Serajul vs State of West Bengal, ; , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1932 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.1989 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 1153 of 1983.
R. Mohan and R. Ayyamperumal for the Appellant.
V. Krishnamurthy for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.
Leave granted.
Heard both the sides.
The right to conduct arrack sale in Tamil Nadu was auctioned on 28.5.1981 for the excise year 1981 82.
Shop No. 49 in Koneripatti village in Sankari Taluk District Salem was auctioned for the excise year 1981 82.
Inrespect of the auction of this shop, the appellant was the successful bidder and the bid amount was Rs.6550 per month.
As per the terms, the appellant paid the caution deposit of Rs.1000 and a half month 's rent on the same day.
Since the bid amount was found to be inadequate there was a re auction on 11.6.1981 but there was no bidder on that day.
Therefore again on 19.6.1981 the same shop was re auctioned and one Mr. Chellamuthu was successful bidder at Rs.6575 per month but he failed to comply with certain requirements.
Therefore it was re auctioned on 27.6.81 but there were no bidders and the shop was re auctioned again on 17.8.1981 when the bid was only Rs.3000 by one Doraisamy.
The appellant was called upon by way of a communication dated 17.4.82 to pay the notional loss.
It was claimed by the department that the bid of the appellant was confirmed on 28.6.81 but the appellant refused to receive the con firmed order and consequently the shop was reauctioned for Rs.3,000 only and therefore the difference amount is recov erable from the appellant.
This impugned order was ques tioned 611 and the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition.
It was observed by the learned Judge that records produced before him were perused and they show that the bid by the appellant was confirmed on 28.6.81 and the appellant can not seek any relief in the writ petition having bidden the auction under certain conditions.
In the writ appeal filed against the order of the Single Judge, the Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge.
It was also cOntended before the Division Bench that his bid was never confirmed validly and that auction in favour of Do raisamy alone was the valid auction.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended before us that the bid by the appellant was not accepted as per the rules and it was not confirmed by the Collector and the very fact that there was subsequent two re auctions obviously on the ground that the bid by the appellant was inadequate, itself shows that the bid was not confirmed as per the rules and therefore the question of recovery of resultant loss from the appellant does not arise.
It is also submitted that Chellamuthu who was successful bidder in the auction that was held on 19.6.81 should be held responsible for the resultant loss, if any, since he was the highest bidder because his bid was higher than that of the appellant.
To appreciate these contentions, it becomes necessary to refer to the relevant rules.
Some of the relevant rules of the Tamil Nadu Toddy and Arrack Shops (Disposals in Auction) Rules, 1981 were framed under the powers conferred by Sec tion 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act.
Rule 3 lays down that the privilege of selling liquor by retail shall be granted to any person by auction and the period shall be one excise year.
Under Rule 5, a notice has to be given mention ing particulars as required under Rule 6.
The tenders also will be received an hour before the commencement of the auction.
Under Rule 8 every person desiring to bid in such open auction shall deposit a sum of Rs. 1,000 as earnest money and only the bidders who have deposited the earnest money deposit shall be admitted into the place of auction.
Rule 10 provides for refund of such a deposit to the unsuc cessful bidders.
Rule 12 lays down that the Sale Officer can refuse to accept the bid under any one of the conditions specified therein.
Rule 14 similarly lays down that highest of the bid shall be taken into consideration for acceptance.
As per Rule 15 every auction purchaser shall immediately after the announcement or atleast before the close of the day 's sale, deposit half a month 's rental with the Sale Officer.
If he does not do so, the earnest money deposit made by him under Rule 8 shall be forfeited to the State Government.
For the purpose of this case Rule 16 is impor tant and it is in the following terms: 612 "Deposit of advance The Sale Officer, if he accepts provi sionally the bid of an auction purchaser, shall issue a notice to the auction purchaser to pay as advance, in any case within seven days from the date of the sale, an amount equal to three months rental in addition to the earnest money deposit already made under rule 8 but inclusive of the half a month 's rental paid at the close of the sale under rule 15." (emphasis supplied) We will consider the scope of this rule in a detailed manner at a later stage.
Rule 17 lays down that the auction pur chaser shall produce a solvency certificate issued by the Tehsildar for the purpose of creating encumbrances and should also execute a mortgage deed and if does not own any properties he should deposit additional amount towards three months ' rental or should furnish bank guarantee.
Under Rule 18, the Collector should refund the deposits made by the auctionpurchaser in case he refuses to confirm the accept ance of the bid.
Rule 20 is another important rule and it is necessary that it should be fully extracted: "20.
Confirmation of sale by the Collector (1) Every bid provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer shall be subject to confirmation by the Collector and on such confirmation the orders of the Collector shall be final, unless it is revised by the Commissioner for special reasons to be re corded in writing.
The Commissioner may on appeal or revi sion or suo motu, revise any order of the Collector confirm ing a bid provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer, after issuing a show cause notice to the person affected and considering his representations, if any.
Any order of the Collector confirming the sale of a shop in favour of a person may be cancelled by the Commissioner even subse quent to the grant of a licence to him for reasons to be recorded by him and after giving an opportunity to all persons concerned.
(2) On receipt of the order of confirmation and on receipt of an application in Form No. 2 the Excise Officer shall subject to the provisions in rule 17, issue a licence in Form No. 3 under Section 17 C(2) of the Act.
(3) If the Collector considers any bid to be inadequate, he may refuse to confirm the provisional acceptance of the 613 bid, and immediately direct the resale of the shop from the point at which it was last left on such date and at such time and place as may be fixed by him.
The conditions of sale shall remain unaltered unless otherwise directed by the Collector.
Any order passed by the Collector for resale shall be given adequate publicity and shall also be notified at the Taluk Office.
(4) Any resale ordered to be made under sub rule (3) shall begin with the bid provisionally accepted by the sale offi cer at the original sale and in the name of the individual who offered it.
If at such sale a higher bid is offered and is provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer, the bid with which such sale began shall lapse.
But if no higher bid is accepted by the Sale.
Officer, the matter shall be reported to the Collector who may pass orders confirming the bid provisionally accepted at the original sale or may again direct that the sale be continued from the point at which it was left at the original sale, and the order of the Collec tor shall be final unless it is revised by the Commissioner on appeal or revision.
(5) The provision of sub rule (4) shall apply to any sale the re opening of which is directed under that sub rule.
(6) No bid which has been provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer shall be withdrawn before it lapses under subrule (4) or before orders are passed confirming or refusing to confirm it, and if the bidder commits any breach of this condition, he shall be liable to make good the difference between his bid and any lower bid which may be finally accepted," (emphasis supplied) Rule 21 lays down that on the failure of any person to make a deposit or to comply with ' any requisition or to comply with any formality like executing bond etc.
the shop may be resold under the orders of the Collector on a report from the Assistant Commissioner and the same shall be resold under this rule.
It shall be at the risk of the defaulting bidder who shall forfeit all gain, if any, that may secure by the resale in the event of a loss by resale, the default ing bidder shall be required to make good the deficiency between the total amount payable for the whole period under the terms of the original sale and by the total 614 amount payable by the successful bidder at the resale and the deposit already made by the defaulting bidder shall be forfeited.
As already mentioned it is under this last rule the action is taken against the appellant.
At this stage it would be useful to refer to some of the everments in the affidavit and the counter affidavit putting forward the rival.
The appellant in his affidavit has stated that his bid was never confirmed and that he has not received any notice and that on the other hand there was a re auction and there was a higher bid in the re auction, but the said bidder defaulted.
Therefore there was again another re auction but on that day there were no bidders but ultimately during the final re auction on 27.6.1981 the bid was only Rs.3,000 by one Doraisamy and that was confirmed.
The plea of the appellant has been that his bid was not confirmed by the Collector as required under Rule 20 and repeated re auctions would itself go to show that the bid of the appel lant was not confirmed.
In the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is admitted that the petitioner was the highest bidder on 28.5.1981 but the Collector or dered resale as already mentioned and one Chellamuthu was 'the highest bidder offering Rs.6575 but he failed to comply with the conditions.
It is averred that the said Chellamuthu though was the highest bidder in the said re auction but did not comply with the conditions under Rule 15 inasmuch as he failed to deposit half a month 's rental and therefore his bid was not accepted.
Therefore subsequent bids were held.
It is further averred by the Government that the bid offered by the appellant was confirmed by the Collector as per the proceedings of the Collector dated 28.6.81 but the appellant refused to receive the order of confirmation and therefore he has to make good the resultant loss.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Chellamu thu was the highest bidder and he should be held to be a defaulter and consequently be liable for the resultant loss.
In order to see whether the appellant 's liability in any manner continued consequently making him liable for the resultant loss, we have to examine Rules 20(3) and 20(4) carefully, in the context of the facts of this case.
As extracted above Rule 20(3) states that if the Collector considers any bid to be inadequate, he may refuse to confirm the provisional acceptance of the bid and immediately direct the resale of the shop from the point it was last left.
As per sub Rule 4 any resale ordered to be made under sub rule (3) shall begin with the bid provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer at the original sale and if at such 615 sale a higher bid is offered and is provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer, the bid with which such sale began shall lapse.
This part of the rule is very significant.
If the record shows that the bid offered by Chellamuthu has been provisionally accepted by the Sale Officer, the bid with which the sale began, i.e. the bid offered by the appellant lapses but if, on the other hand, such a bid during the re auction is not ' accepted by the Sale Officer then the subsequent steps for further reauction or for confirmation of the original bid i.e. that of the appellant would take place.
In this context it is once again necessary to note that as per the Department, bid of Chellamuthu was not even provisionally accepted.
As laid down in Rule 16 if the record shows that his bid has been provisionally accept ed by the Sale Officer then as provided under Rule 20(4) the bid of the appellant gets automatically lapsed.
For our own satisfaction we called for the record and perused the file concerning the auction.
So far as the bid made by Chellamu thu is concerned, we find a document in the record which authentically shows that his bid being highest was provi sionally accepted and announced by the Sale Officer.
This document reads as under: "Second resale of toddy/arrack shops in Sankari Taluk.
(1.7.1981 to 30.6.1982) Shop No. 49 Place: Koneripatti Name and full address of Tender amount the tenderer.
Nil Highest tender amount Rs. nil by Thiru Highest bid amount Rs.6575 by Thiru The highest of these two, that is Rs.6575 (Rupees Six Thou sand five hundred seventy five only) by Thiru Sellamuthu s/o Nachimuthu of Kumaranpalayam Village the highest bidder/tenderer is provisionally accepted and announced.
Sd/ 19/6/81 Sale officer & Sub Collector/Sankari.
" 616 As per Rule 16 when there is such provisional acceptance then the Sale, Officer issues a notice to the highest bidder to pay as advance three months rental.
But according to the respondents namely the Department, the said Chellamuthu though was the highest bidder, did not deposit half a month 's rental as required under Rule 15, therefore the question of accepting his bid did not arise even provision ally.
Consequently the highest bid of the appellant was subse quently confirmed.
Since we find a genuine doubt about the liability of the appellant, we went through the rest of the file also.
No doubt there is a note here and there to the effect that Chellamuthu did not deposit the |5 days rental on that day.
But in view of the document mentioned above it must be deemed that the Chellamuthu 's bid was accepted provisionally by the Sale Officer and by virtue of Rule 20, sub rule (4) when once the bid of Chellamuthu was accepted provisionally as the highest bid, the bid with which such sale began namely the bid of the appellant, got lapsed.
We do not want to go into the question whether under Rule 16 the provisional acceptance of the bid by the Sale Officer should necessarily be preceded by the fulfilment of the condition of deposit of half a month 's rental by the auc tion purchaser under Rule 15.
Perhaps normally it may be correct to say that the Sale Officer under Rule 16 accepts provisionally the bid after there is compliance of Rule 15; but in the instant case we are concerned with the re auction and about the liability of the original highest bidder in the light of Rule 20(4).
The document mentioned above clear ly shows that the Chellamuthu 's bid was provisionally ac cepted and therefore Sub Rule (4) of Rule 20 comes into force and consequently the bid of the appellant lapsed.
At any rate after a due consideration of the contents of the declaration issued by the Sale Officer accepting the bid of Chellamuthu provisionally, a genuine doubt arises about the liability of the appellant.
Having given our earnest consid eration, we are of the view that the bid by the appellant got lapsed by virtue of the acceptance of the bid by Chella muthu provisionally by the Sale Officer and consequently the appellant cannot be held liable for the resultant loss.
The appeal is accordingly allowed.
T.N.A. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant gave the highest bid at the auction of an arrack shop but his bid was considered inadequate.
The shop was re auctioned and the bid of 'C ' was provisionally ac cepted.
'C ' failed to comply with certain requirements and the shop was again re auctioned in which the bid offered was lower than that offered by the appellant in the original sale.
The respondent sought recovery of the difference between the original sale amount and the resale amount from the appellant, under Rule 21 of the Tamil Nadu Toddy and Arrack Shops (Disposal in Auction) Rules, 1981.
The appel lant challenged the recovery by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and the decision was confirmed by a Division Bench on appeal.
In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since his bid was not confirmed under the rules, no recovery can be made from him and that 'C ', whose bid was provisionally accepted, was liable for the notional loss.
The respondent however contended that since 'C ' failed to comply with Rule 15, his bid was not provi sionally accepted and hence he was not liable for the re sultant loss.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
Normally it may be correct to say that the sale officer under Rule 16 accepts provisionally the bid after there is compliance of Rule 15; but in the instant case, the Court is concerned with the re auction and about the liabil ity of the original highest bidder in the light of Rule 20(4).
[616D E] 610 2.
In view of the document dated 19th June, 1981 it must be held that the bid of 'C ' was accepted provisionally by the Sale Officer and by virtue of Rule 20 sub Rule (4) when once the bid of 'C ' was accepted provisionally as the high est bid, the bid with which the sale began namely the bid of the appellant, got lapsed and consequently the appellant cannot be held liable for the resultant loss.
[616C D]