judgement:
vil Appeal No. 62 (N) of 1970 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.10.
1969 of the Madras High Court in W.A. No. 464 of 1967.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, F.S. Nariman.
T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, A.K. Ganguli, B. Sen, L.N. Sinha, R.N. Sachthey, R.B. Datar, R.F. Nariman, K.J. John, H.N. Salve, Praveen Kumar, A.V. Rangam, T.Sridharan, K.D. Prasad, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi, K. Rajendra Choudhary, Ms. Seita Vaidialingam, V. Krishnamurthy, Ms. A. Subhashini, N. Net tar, G.S. Narayan, Badrinath Babu, Anip Sachthey and S.K. Agnihotri for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court were delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
The question involved in these appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions is, whether levy of cess on royalty is within the competence of the State Legislature.
In order to appreciate the question, it is necessary to refer to certain facts.
Civil appeal No. 62/79 is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras, dated 13th October, 1969, in writ appeal No. 464/67.
The appellant is a public limited 698 company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913.
The Company at all relevant times, used to manufacture cement in its factory at Talaiyuthu in Tirunelveli district, and at Sankaridrug in Salem district of Tamil Nadu.
By G.O. Ms. No. 3668 dated 19th July, 1963, the Govt.
of Tamil Nadu sanctioned the grant to the appellant mining lease for limestone and kankar for a period of 20 years over an extent of 133.91 acres of land in the village of Chinnagoundanur in Sankaridrug Taluk of Salem district.
Out of the extent of 133.91 acres comprised in the mining lease, an extent of 126.14 acres was patta land and only the balance extent of 7.77 acres Govt.
The lease deed was in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
The rates of royalty, dead rent and surface rent, were as follows: "Royalty: LIMESTONE Government Lands: Re.O.75 per tonne, but subject to a rebate of Re.O.38 per tonne to be given on Imestone beneficiated by froth flota tion method.
Patta Lands: Re.O.38 per tonne but subject to a rebate of Re.O. 19 per tonne to be given on limestone beneficiated by froth flotation method.
KANKAR Government Lands: Five per cent of the sale price at the pit 's mouth.
Patta Lands: 2 1/2% of the sale price at the pit 's mouth Dead rent: Government lands: Rs.25 (Rupees twentyfive only) per hectare per annum.
Patta lands: Rs. 12/50 (Rupees twelve & naya paise fifty only) per hectare per annum.
Surface rent and water rate: At such rate as the land revenue and cess assessable on the land are paid.
" The appellant started mining operations soon after the execution 699 of the lease deed and has ever since been paying the royal ties, dead rents and other amounts payable under the Deed.
Under section 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act (XXXV of 1958) (hereinafter called 'the Act '), as amended by Madras Act XVIII of 1964 (herein after called 'the amended Act '), as royalty the appellant was required to pay local cess @ 45 paise per rupee.
It may be mentioned that the said imposi tion was with retrospective effect along with local cess surcharge under section 116 of the Act.
The contention of the appellant is and was, at all relevant times, that cess on royalty cannot be levied.
This is the common question which falls for consideration and requires determination in these appeals and petitions.
To complete the narration of events, however, it has to be noted that the Collector sent a communication on 10th April, 1965, demanding cess or royalty payable under the Act on minerals carried on during the period 1.7.1961 to 31.12.1964, and the petitioner was threatened of serious consequences in case of default of payment on receipt of that communication.
Thereafter, writ petition No. 1864/65 was filed in the High Court of Madras.
By the judgment delivered and order passed on 23rd February, 1967.
a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court Justice Kailasam dismissed the writ petition holding that the cess levied under section 115 of the act is a tax on land and, as such, falls under Entry 49 of the State List of the Schedule VII of the Constitution, and was within the competence of the State legislature.
Reliance was placed by the learned single Judge on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy vs Collector of Chittoor & Anr., ; He held that the cess levied under section 115 was a tax on land, though fixed with reference to the land revenue.
In regard to section 116 of the Act, the learned Single Judge held that the maximum limit had been prescribed by the Government by rules flamed under the Act, and, therefore, there was no arbitrariness about the levy.
Sub section 1 of section 115 of the Act enjoins that there shall be levied in every panchayat development block, a local cess at the rate of 45 paise on every rupee of land revenue payable to the Govt.
in respect of any land for every Fasli.
An Explanation to the said section was added and deemed always to have been incorporated by the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964 being Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1964, which provided as follows: "[Explanation.
In this section and in section 116, 'land revenue ' means public revenue due on land and includes 700 water cess payable to the Government for water supplied or used for the irrigation of land, royalty, lease amount or other sum payable to the Government in respect of land held direct from the Government on lease or licence, but does not include any other cess or the sur charge payable under section 116, provided that land revenue remitted shall not be deemed to be land revenue payable for the purpose of this section.]" Sub section 2 of section 115 of the Act provides that the local cess shall be deemed to be public revenue due on all the lands in respect of which a person is liable to pay local cess and all the said lands, the buildings upon the said lands and their products shall be regarded as the security for the local cess.
Sub section 3, 4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 115 of the said Act deal with the application of the cess so collected for various purposes mentioned therein.
In the controversy before us, the said provisions need not be considered.
Section 116 of the Act is as follows: "116.
Every panchayat union council may levy on every person liable to pay land revenue to the Government in respect of any land in the panchayat union a local cess surcharge at such rate as may be considered suitable as an addition to the local cess levied in the panchayat development block under section 115 provided that the rate of local cess surcharge so levied (shall not exceed two rupees and fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue) payable in respect of such land.
" The words "shall not exceed two rupees & fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue" were substituted for the words "shall be subject to such maximum as may be prescribed" by section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats ' (2nd Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970, and these words were substituted for the words "shall not exceed one rupee and fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue" by section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 1972.
There was an appeal from the said decision of the learned Single Judge, to the division bench of the High Court.
The division bench by its judgment and order dated 13th October, 1969, dismissed the writ appeal, and held that local cess authorised by section 115 as aforesaid "was not land revenue but is a charge on the land itself and Section 115 701 merely quantified on the basis of the quantum of land reve nue".
The division bench held that the meaning of the Expla nation added to section 115 was that the cess is levied as a tax on land and is measured with reference to land revenue, royalty, lease amount etc.
as mentioned in the Explanation.
The division bench also relied on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy (supra), and further held that in the aforesaid view of the matter, it was not possible to accept the contention that section 115 of the Act read with the Explana tion contravened in any manner section 9 of the Mines and Miner als (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.
By leave granted by this Court on 12th January, 1970 the appeal has been filed.
The appellant is bound to pay royalty to the Govt.
according to the rates provided in the Second Schedule to the said Act of 1957.
Clause (1) of Part VII of the lease document provides as follows: "The lessee/lessees shall pay the rent, water rate and royalties reserved by this lease at such times and in the manner provided in Part V and VI of these presents and shall also pay and discharge all taxes, rates, assessment and impositions whatsoever being in the nature of public demand which shall from time to time be charged, assessed or imposed by the authority of the Central and State Government upon or in respect of the premises and works of the lessee/lessees in common with other premises and work of a like nature except demands for land revenue.
" As mentioned hereinbefore, there is an obligation of the lessee to pay rent and other charges mentioned in the said Clause, and all other Central and State Government dues "except demands for land revenue".
The question, therefore, which arises is, is cess on royalty a demand of land revenue or additional royalty? For the appellants and/or petitioners we have heard Mr. Nariman,_ Dr. Chitale and Mr. Salve, and for the interven ers, S/Shri K.D. Prasad, Rajendra Choudhary and Ms. Seita Vaidialingam have made their submissions.
For the State of Tamil Nadu, Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer and Mr. V. Krishnamurthy have made their submissions.
We have had the advantage of the submissions made by learned Attorney General on behalf of Union of India.
The issues are common in the writ peti tions as well as in the appeal and in the special leave petitions.
The question involved in the appeals and the writ petition is about the constitutional validity of Section 115(1) of the Act, in so far as it 702 sought to levy as local cess @ 45 naya paise on every rupee of the land revenue payable to the Government, the meaning of land revenue being artificially expanded by the explana tion so as to include royalty payable under the mining lease.
In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the amendment which stated, inter alia, as follows: "Under the Explanation to section 115 of the Act "land revenue" means public revenue due on land and includes water cess payable to the Government for water supplied or used for the irrigation of land but does not include any other cess or surcharge payable under section 116.
The Explanation does not cover "royal ties", lease amount or other sum payable to the Government in respect of land held direct from the Government on lease or licence which were included in the definition of "land revenue" under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920.
As under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920, certain panchayat union councils contin ued to levy the cess and surcharge under the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 also.
It is con sidered that the levy should be on the same basis as under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920.
It is, therefore, proposed to include "royalty, lease amount and other sums payable to the Government" in the definition of land revenue in the Explanation to section 115 of the Act and also to validate the levy and collection of the cess and surcharge made hitherto on the said basis.
" It is obvious that the said amendment was intended to bring royalty within the Explanation and the definition of land revenue in section 115 as well as section 116 of the Act, and was effected by the Gazette Notification of 2nd Septem ber, 1964 by Act No. 18 of 1964.
In order to appreciate the controversy, it has no be understood that in this case royalty was payable by the appellant which was prescribed under the lease deed, the terms whereof have been noted hereinbefore.
The royalty had been fixed under the statutory rules and protected under those rules.
The royalty was fixed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 which is a Central Act by which the control of mines and minerals had been taken over by the Central Government.
It was an Act for the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the control of Union of India.
That 703 Act was to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union of India.
2 of the Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union of India should take under its control the regulation of mines and the develop ment of the minerals to the extent provided in the Act.
Section 9 of the Act provides as follows: "9.
(1) The holder of a mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force at such commencement, pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub lessee from the leased area after such commencement, at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral.
(2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or after the commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub lessee from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral.
(2A) The holder of a mining lease, whether granted before or after the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Devel opment) Amendment Act, 1972, shall not be liable to pay any royalty in respect of any coal consumed by a workman engaged in a col liery provided that such consumption by the workman does not exceed one third of a tonne per month.
(3) The Central Government may, by notifica tion in the Official Gazette.
amend the Second Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate at which royalty shall be payable in respect of any mineral with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification: Provided that the Central Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral more than once during any period of three years.
" The Act was passed by virtue of the power of the Parliament 704 under Entry 54 of list I of the 7th Schedule.
Since the control of mines and the development of minerals were taken over by Parliament, the question that arises here is whether the levy or the impost by the State Legislature imposed in this case can be justified or sustained either under entry 49, 50 or 45 of list II of the 7th Schedule.
Courts of law are enjoined to gather the meaning of the Constitution from the language used and although one should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same princi ples of interpretation as one applies to an ordinary law but these very principles of interpretation compel one to take into account the nature and scope of the Act which requires interpretation.
It has to be remembered that it is a Consti tution that requires interpretation.
Constitution is the mechanism under which the laws are to be made and not merely an Act which declares what the law is to be.
See the obser vations of Justice Higgins in the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales vs The Brawery Employees Union of New South Wales, ; at 611 2.
In re: C.P. and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, [1939] FCR at p. 1, Chief Justice Gwyer of the Federal Court of India relied on the observations of Lord Wright in James vs Common wealth of Australia, and observed that a Constitution must not be con strued in any narrow or pedantic sense, and that construc tion most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers, must be adopted.
The learned Chief Justice empha sised that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, but they are not free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purposes of supplying omissions or correcting supposed errors.
A Federal Court will not strengthen, but only derogate from, its position, if it seeks to do anything but declare the law; but it may rightly reflect that a Constitution of a country is a living and organic thing, which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be con strued ut res magis valeat guam pereat. 'It is better that it should live than that it should perish '.
Certain rules have been evolved in this period, and it is wellsettled now that the various entries in the three lists are not powers but fields of legislation.
The power to legislate is given by article 246 and other articles of the Constitution.
See the observations of this Court in Calcutta Gas Co. vs State of West Bengal, [1962] Suppl 3 SCR 1.
The entries in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, 705 are legislative heads or fields of legislation.
These demar cate the area over which appropriate legislature can oper ate.
It is well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries, but some of these entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other.
Then, it is the duty of the court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether it fits in one or the other of the lists.
See the observa tions of this Court in H.R. Banthia & Ors. etc.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; at 489 and Union of India vs Shri H.S. Dillon; , at 792.
The lists are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of respective competence of the Union and the States.
These neither impose any implied restriction on the legislative power conferred by Article 246 of the Constitution, nor prescribe any duty to exercise that legislative power in any particular manner.
Hence, the language of the entries should be given widest scope, D.C. Rataria vs Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., ; , to find out which of the meaning is fairly capable because these set up machinery of the Govt.
Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it.
In interpreting an entry it would not be reasonable to import any limitation by comparing or con trasting that entry with any other one in the same List.
It is in this background that one has to examine the present controversy.
Here, we are concerned with cess on royalty.
One can have an idea as to what cess is, from the observations of Justice Hidayatullah, as the learned Chief Justice then was, in M/s Guruswamy & Co. etc.
vs State of Mysore & Ors., where at page 571, the learned Judge ob served: "The word 'cess ' is used in Ireland and_.
is still in use in India although the word rate has replaced it in England.
It means a tax and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense which the name (health cess, education cess, road cess etc.) indicates.
When levied as an increment to an existing tax, the name matters not for the validity of the cess must be judged of in the same way as the validity of the tax to which it is an increment." The said observations were made in the dissenting judg ment, but there was no dissent on this aspect of the matter.
Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr Nariman appearing for the appellant and 706 the petitioners suggested that the impugned levy in this case is nothing but a tax on royalty and is therefore ultra vires the State legislature.
Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer appear ing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the cess in question in the instant case is a levy in respect of land for every fasli.
He urged that the words "a local cess at the rate of 45 naya paise on every rupee of land revenue payable" qualify the words "land revenue".
These words were only intended, according to Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, to mean cess payable.
It is, however, not possible to accept this submission, in view of the obligation indicated by the language of the provisions.
Cess is not on land, but on royalty which is included in the definition of 'land reve nue '.
None of the three lists of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on royalty.
This levy has been sought to be justified under Entry 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule.
Entry 45 deals with land revenue, which is a well known concept and has existed in India before the Constitution came into force.
In N.R. Reddy & Ors.
vs State of A.P. & Ors., [1965] 2 Andhra Law Times 297, Jaganmohan Reddy, J. as the learned Judge then was of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while sitting in a division bench observed that no land revenue Act existed in the composite State of Madras nor had the ryotwari system ever been established by legislative enactment.
The learned Judge at p. 306 of the report observed that in the earlier days, sovereigns had in exercise of their prerogative right claimed a share of the produce of all cultivated land known as 'Rajabhagam ' or by any of the various other names, and had fixed their share or its commuted money value from time to time, according to their will and pleasure.
The learned Judge noted that as long as the share of the sovereign was being paid, the sovereign had no right to the possession of the lands, and the proprietorship of these lands was vested in the occupier, who could not be removed because another offered more.
The right of the sovereign to a share in the produce as observed by the Govt.
of Madras in 1856 "is not rent which consists of all surplus produce after paying the cost of cultivation and the profits of agricultural stock but land revenue only which ought, if possible, to be so lightly assessed as to leave a surplus or rent to the occu pier, when he in fact lets the land to others or retains it in his own hands.
" It was noted that the amount of tax that was levied before the Mohamedan Rule, amounted to 1/8th, 1/6th or 1/12th according to Manu depending on the differ ences in the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it, and it even went up to 1/4th part, in times of urgent neces sity, as of war or invasion.
The later commentators, Yajnav alkya, Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana and Narada, have all asserted not only the right but the extent of the share.
When the British came to India they followed not only the precedent 707 of the previous Mohamedan Rulers who also claimed enormous land revenue, with this difference that what the Mohamedan Rulers claimed they could never fully realise, but what the British Rulers claimed they realised with vigour.
It is not necessary to refer in detail how land revenue developed in India after the advent of the British Rule.
There was an appeal from the said decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and this Court dismissed the appeal in State of A. P. vs N.R. Reddy & Ors., ; It is, however, clear that over a period of centuries, land revenue in India has acquired a connot active meaning of share in the produce of land to which the King or the Govt.
is entitled to receive.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the impugned measure being a tax, not on share of the produce of the land but on royalty; royalty being the return received from the produce of the land, revenue was payable for winning minerals from the land.
In the premises it was contended that it cannot be attributable to Entry 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule, being not a land revenue.
It has, however, to be borne in mind that Explana tion to Section 115(1) was added and there was an amendment as we have noted before.
That very Explanation makes a distinction between land revenue as such and royalty which by amendment is deemed to be land revenue.
It is, therefore, recognised by the very force of that Explanation and the amendment thereto that the expression 'royalty ' in sections 115 & 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue properly called or conventionally known, which is separate and dis tinct from royalty.
It was also contended on behalf of the respondent State of Tamil Nadu of Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that it could also be justified under Entry 49 of List II of the 7th Schedule as taxes on lands and buildings.
This, however, cannot be accepted.
In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State of U.P. & Anr., ; where at p. 229 it was indicated that the expression 'lands ' in Entry 49 is wide enough to include agricultural land as well as non agricultural land.
Gajendragadkar, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that the cardinal rule of inter preting the words used by the Constitution in conferring legislative power was that these must receive the most liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude the construction must accord with it.
If general word was used, it must be so construed so as to extend to all ancil lary or subsidiary matters that can reasonably be included in it.
So construed, there could not be any doubt that the word 'land ' in Entry 48, List II of the 7th Schedule 708 includes all land whether agricultural or non agricultural.
Hence, since the impugned Act imposed tax on land and build ing which was within the competence of the State Legislature and its validity was beyond challenge but the Court observed that as there was Entry 46 in List H which refers to taxes on agricultural income, it is clear that agricultural income is not included in Entry 49.
If the State Legislature pur ports to impose a tax on agricultural income it would not be referable to Entry 49.
Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer relied on the said principle.
But in the instant case, royalty being that which is payable on the extraction from the land and cess being an additional charge on that royalty, cannot by the parity of the same reasoning, be considered to be a tax on land.
But since it was not a tax on land and there is no Entry like Entry 46 in the instant situation like the posi tion before this Court in the aforesaid decision, enabling the State to impose tax on royalty in the instant situation, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax.
There is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land.
The aforesaid decision confirmed the above position.
In New Manek Chand Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & Ors., vs Municipal Corpn.
of the City of Allahabad & Ors.
, ; at 696, this Court after referring to the several decisions observed that Entry 49 of list II of the 7th Schedule only permitted levy of tax on land and building.
It did not permit the levy of tax on machinery contents in or situated on the building even though the machinery was there for the use of the building for a particular purpose.
Rule 7(2) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Rules was held to be accordingly ultra vires in that case.
In S.C. Nawn vs W.T.O., Calcutta & Ors., ; this Court had occasion to consider this and upheld the validity of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that it fell within Entry 86 of List I and not Entry 49 of List II.
Construing the said Entry, this Court observed that Entry 49 list II contemplated a levy on land as a unit and the levy must be directly imposed on land and must bear a definite relationship to it.
Entry 49 of list Il was held to be more general in nature than Entry 86, list I, which was held to be more specific in nature and it is well settled that in the event of conflict between Entry 86, list I and Entry 49 of list II, Entry 86 prevails as per Article 246 of the Constitution.
In Asstt.
Commissioner of Urban Land Tax & Ors.
vs The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. etc.; , at 278, this Court reiterated the principles laid down in S.C. Nawn 's case (supra) and held that entry 49 of list II was confined to a tax that was directly on land as a unit.
In Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore etc.
vs D.H. Nazareth etc.
; , at 200 it was held that a tax on the gift 709 of land is not a tax imposed directly on land but only on a particular user, namely, the transfer of land by way of gift.
In Union of India vs H.S. Dhillon, (supra), this Court approved the principle laid down in S.C. Nawn 's case as well as Nazareth 's case (supra).
In Bhagwan Dass Jain vs Union of India, ; at 816 this Court made a distinction between the levy on income from house property which would be an income tax, and the levy on house property itself which would be referable to entry 49 list II.
It is, there fore, not possible to accept Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer 's sub mission and that a cess on royalty cannot possibly be said to be a tax or an impost on land.
Mr. Nariman is right that royalty which is indirectly connected with land, cannot be said to be a tax directly on land as a unit.
In this connec tion, reference may be made to the differentiation made to the different types of taxes for instance, one being profes sional tax and entertainment tax.
In the Western India Theatres Ltd. vs The Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment, ; at 69 it was held that an entertain ment tax is dependent upon whether there would or would not be a show in a cinema house.
If there is no show, there is no tax.
It cannot be a tax on profession or calling.
Profes sional tax does not depend on the exercise of one 's profes sion but only concerns itself with the right to practice.
It appears that in the instant case also no tax can be levied or is leviable under the impugned Act if no mining activi ties are carried on.
Hence, it is manifest that it is nor related to land as a unit which is the only method of valua tion of land under entry 49 of list II, but is relatable to minerals extracted.
Royalty is payable on a proportion of the minerals extracted.
It may be mentioned that the Act does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be valued.
Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the impugned legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on royalty and not a tax on land.
On behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, learned counsel Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer sought to urge that it can also be sustained under entry 50, list II.
Entry 50 of list II of the 7th Schedule deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral development.
Entry 23 of List II deals with regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of list I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and entry 54 in list I deals with regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest.
Even though minerals are part of the State List they are treated separately, and therefore the principle that the specific excluded the general, must be applied.
See the observations of Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs Raymon & Co. (1) Pvt. Ltd., [1963] 3 710 SCR 209 at 220, where it was held that land in entry 49 of list II cannot possibly include minerals.
In this connection, learned Attorney General appearing for the Union of India submitted before us that in order to sustain the levy, the power of the State Legislature has to be found within one or more of the entries of list II of the 7th Schedule.
The levy in question has to be either a tax or a fee or an impost.
If it is neither a tax nor a fee then it should be under one of the general entries under List II.
The expression 'land ' according to its legal significance has an indefinite extent both upward and downwards, the surface of the soil and would include not only the face of the earth but everything under it or over it.
See the obser vations in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs State of Gujarat & Ors., [19751 3 SCR 220 at 249.
The minerals which are under the earth, can in certain circumstances fall under the expres sion 'land ' but as tax on mineral rights is expressly cov ered by entry 50 of list II, if it is brought under the head taxes under entry 49 of list II, it would render entry 50 of list II redundant.
Learned Attorney General is right in contending that entries should not be so construed as to make any one entry redundant.
It was further argued that even in pith and substance the tax fell to entry 50 of list II, it would be controlled by a legislation under entry 54 of list I.
On the other hand, learned Attorney General submitted that if it be held to be a fee, then the source of power of the state legislature is under entry 66 read with entry 23 of list II.
Here also the extent to which regulation of mines and mineral development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, to the extent such legislation makes provi sions will denude the State Legislature of its power to override the provision under entry 50 of list II.
In view of the Parliamentary legislation under entry 54, list I and the declaration made under section 2 and provisions of section 9 of the Act, the State Legislature would be overridden to that extent.
section 2 declares that it is expedient in the public interest that Union should take under its control the regu lation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided therein.
In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs The State of Orissa & Ors., ; See also the observations in State of Orissa vs M.A. TuIloch & Co., ; and Baijnath Kedia vs State of Bihar & Ors., ; at 111 115.
Our attention was drawn to the decision of the division bench 711 judgment of the High Court of Mysore in M/s. Laxminarayana, Mining Co., Bangalore vs Taluk Der.
Board.
, AIR There speaking for the court, one of us, Venkataramiah J of the Mysore High Court, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that a combined reading of entries 23 and 50 in list II and entry 54 of list I, establishes that as long as the Parliament does not make any law in exercise of its power under entry 54, the powers of the State Legisla ture in entries 23 & 50 would be exercisable by the State Legislature.
But when once the Parliament makes a declara tion by law that it is expedient in the public interest to make regulation of mines and minerals development under the control of the Union, to the extent to which such regulation and development is undertaken by the law made by the Parlia ment, the power of the State Legislature under entries 23 & 50 of List II are denuded.
There the court was concerned with the Mysore Village Panchayats & Local Boards Act, 1959.
Thus, it was held that it could not, therefore, be said that even after passing of the Central Act, the state legislature by enacting section 143 of the Act intended to confer power on the Taluk Board to levy tax on the mining activities carried on by the persons holding mineral concessions.
It followed that the levy of tax on mining by the Board as per the impugned notification was unauthorised and liable to be set aside.
At p. 306 of the said report, it was held that royal ty under section 9 of the Mines and Minerals Act was really a tax.
To the similar effects are the observations of the High Court of Patna in M. Lal & Ors.
vs The State of Bihar & Ors.
, AIR 1965 Patna 491 at 494.
Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, referred to the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy 's case (supra).
There under the terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron ores in a tract of land in a village in Chittor district and bound himself to pay a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, to pay a royalty on iron ore if it were used for extraction of iron and in addition to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used.
In the said decision the legislative competence of sections 78 & 79 of the Madras District Boards Act was upheld by which land cess was made payable on the basis of royalty.
This Court proceeded on the basis that other cess related to land and would therefore be covered by entry 49 of list II.
It was held that land cess paid on royalty has a direct relation to the land and only a remote relation with mining.
This, with respect, seems to be not a correct approach.
It was further observed that it was not necessary to consider the meaning of the expression 'tax on mineral right ' follow ing under Entry 50 of List II in as much as according to this Court, Parliament has not made any tax on mineral rights.
This is not a correct basis.
712 In H.R.S. Murthy 's case (supra), at p. 676 of the re port, it was observed by this Court as follows: "When a question arises as to the precise head of legislative power under which a taxing statute has been passed, the subject for enquiry is what in truth and substance is the nature of the tax.
No doubt, in a sense, but in a very remote sense, it has relationship to mining as also to the mineral won from the mine under a contract by which royalty is payable on the quantity of mineral extracted.
But that, does not stamp it as a tax on either the extraction of the mineral or on the miner al right.
It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to examine the question as to what exactly is a tax on mineral rights seeing that such a tax is not leviable by Parliament but only by the State and the sole limitation on the State 's power to levy the tax is that it must not interfere with a law made by Parlia ment as regards mineral development.
Our attention was not invited to the provision of any such law created by Parliament.
In the context of sections 78 and 79 and the scheme of those provisions it is clear that the land cess is in truth a "tax on lands" within Entry 49 of the State List.
" It seems, therefore, that attention of the Court was not invited to the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957 and section 9 thereof.
section 9(3) of the Act in terms states that royalties payable under the 2nd Sched ule of the Act shall not be enhanced more than once during a period of 4 years.
It is, therefore, a clear bar on the state legislature taxing royalty so as to in effect amend 2nd Schedule of the Central Act.
In the premises, it cannot be right to say that tax on royalty can be a tax on land, and even if it is a tax, if it falls within entry 50 will be ultra vires the State legislature power in view of section 9(3) of the Central Act.
In Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. vs The State of Orissa (supra), Wanchoo J. in his dissenting judg ment has stated that a tax on mineral rights being different from a duty of excise, pertains only to a tax that is levi able for the grant of the right to extract minerals, and is not a tax on minerals as well.
On that basis, a tax on royalty would not be a tax on mineral rights and would therefore in any event be outside the competence of the state legislature.
The Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat and Orissa High Courts have held that royalty is not a tax.
Bherulal vs State of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR ; Dr. S.S. Sharma & Anr.
vs State of 713 Pb.
& Ors., AIR at 84; Saurashtra Cement & Chemicals India Ltd. vs Union of India & Anr., AIR 1979 Guj.
180 at 184 and L.N. Agarwalla & Ors.
vs State of Orissa & Ors.
, AIR 1983 Orissa 210.
It was contended by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that the State has a right to tax minerals.
It was further contended that if tax is levied, it will not be irrational to corre late it to the value of the property and to make some kind of annual value basis of tax without intending to tax the income.
In view of the provisions of the Act, as noted hereinbefore, this submission cannot be accepted.
Mr. Krish namurthy Iyer also further sought to urge that in entry 50 of list II, there is no limitation to the taxing power of the State.
In view of the principles mentioned hereinbefore and the expressed provisions of section 9(2) of the Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957, this submis sion cannot be accepted.
This field is fully covered by the Central legislation.
In any event, royalty is directly relatable only to the minerals extracted and on the principle that the general provision is excluded by the special one, royalty would be relatable to entries 23 & 50 of list II, and not entry 49 of list II.
But as the fee is covered by the Central power under entry 23 or entry 50 of list II, the impugned legisla tion cannot be upheld.
Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Peti tion No. 410/83 M/s Hiralal Rameshwar Prasad & Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., which was delivered on 28th March, 1986 by a Division Bench of the High Court.
J.S. Verma, Acting Chief Justice, as His Lordship then was, held that development cess by section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1982 is ultra vires.
It is not necessary in the view taken by us, and further in view that the said decision is under appeal in this Court, to examine it in detail.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State Legislature because section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State Legislature is denuded of its competence under entry 23 of list II.
In any event, we are of the opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under entry 49 of list II as being a tax on land.
Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land.
Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, submitted that in any event, the decision in H.R.S. Murthy 's case (supra) was the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court.
Cess has been realised on that basis 714 for the organisation of village and town panchayats and comprehensive programme of measures had been framed under the National Extension Service Scheme to which our attention was drawn.
Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer further submitted that the Directive Principle of State Policy embodied in the Consti tution enjoined that the State should take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self Government and as the amounts have been realised on that basis, if at all, we should declare the said cess on royalty to be ultra vires prospectively.
In other words, the amounts that have been collected by virtue of the said provisions, should not be declared to be illegal retrospec tively and the State made liable to refund the same.
We see good deal of substance in this submission.
After all, there was a decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy 's case (supra) and amounts have been collected on the basis that the said decision was the correct position.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that we will be justified in declaring the levy of the said cess to be ultra vires the power of the State Legislature prospectively only.
In that view of the matter, the appeals must, therefore, be allowed and the writ petitions also succeed to the extent indicated above.
We declare that the said cess by the Act under section 115 is ultra vires and the respondent State of Tamil Nadu is restrained from enforcing the same any fur ther.
But the respondents will not be liable for any refund of cess already paid or collected.
The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
The special leave petitions and writ peti tions are also disposed of in those terms.
In the facts and the circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs.
OZA, J.
While I agree with the conclusions reached by my learned brother Hon ' Mukharji, J. I have my own reasons for the same.
The main argument in favour of this levy imposed by the State Legislature is on the basis of Entry 49 in List II of the Seventh Schedule conferring jurisdiction on the State Legislature.
The question therefore to be determined is whether the jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Item 49 of List II could be so exercised to impose a cess on the royality prescribed under Section 9 of the .
The entries which are relevant for the purpose of deter mining this questions are: Entry 54 List I reads: 715 "Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
" Entry 23 List II reads: "Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.
" Entry 49 List II reads: "Taxes on lands and buildings.
" Entry 50 List II reads: "Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limi tations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
" The language of Entries 23 and 50 in List I1 clearly sub jects the authority or jurisdiction on the State Legislature to any enactment made by the Parliament.
Entry 23 talks of regulation and Entry 50 talks of taxes on mineral rights.
It therefore could not be disputed that if the cess imposed under section 115 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act is a cess or tax on mineral rights then that jurisdiction could be exercised by the State Legislature subject to the law enacted by the Parliament.
The Parliament in Section 9(1) of the has fixed the limits of royality on the mining rights.
It was therefore contended on behalf of the State that in fact what is imposed under Section 115 is not a cess on the mining rights or on royality but is a tax on land which clearly falls within the authority of the State legislature in Entry 49 of List II.
Section 9 of the reads: "9(1) The holder of a mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force at such commencement, pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his gent, manager, employee, contractor or sub lessee from the leased area 716 after such commencement, at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral.
(2) The holder of a mining lease granted on or after the commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub lessee from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral.
(2A) The holder of a mining lease, whether granted before or after the commence of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Develop ment) Amendment Act, 1972 shall not be liable to pay any royalty in respect of any coal consumed by a workman engaged in a colliery provided that such consumption by the workmen does not exceed one third of a tonne per month.
(3) The Central Government may, by notifica tion in the Official Gazette, amend the Second Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate at which royalty shall be payable in respect of any mineral with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification.
Provided that the Central Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral more than once during any period of three years.
" It is clear that by this Act alongwith Schedule limits on royality has been fixed and the authority has been given to Parliament alone to vary it and that too not more than once in a period of three years.
Admittedly royality as not based on the area of land under mining but per unit of minerals extracted.
Section 115 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act reads as under: "(1) There shall not be levied in every pan chayat development block, a local cess at the rate of 45 naye paise on every rupee of land revenue payable to the Government in respect of any land for every Fasli.
Explanation: In this Section and in section 116, 'land revenue ' means public revenue due on land and includes water cess payable to the Government for water supplied 717 or used for the irrigation of land, royalty, lease amount for other sum payable to the Government in respect of land held direct from the Government on lease or licence, but does not include any other cess or the surcharge payable under Section 116, provided that land revenue remitted shall not be deemed to be land revenue for the purpose of this Section.
(2) The local cess payable under this Sub section (1) shall be deemed to be public revenue due on the lands in respect of which a person is liable to pay local cess and all the said lands, the buildings upon the said lands and their products shall be regarded as the security for the local cess.
(3) The provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Madras Act II of 1864) shall apply to the payment and recovery of the local cess payable under this Act just as they apply to the payment and recovery of the revenue upon the lands in respect of which the local cess under this act is payable.
(4)(a) Out of the process of the local cess so collected in every panchayat development block, a sum representing four ninths of the proceeds shall be credited to the Panchayat Union (Education) Fund.
(b) Out of the proceeds of the local cess collected in every panchayat town in a pan chayat development block, a sum representing two ninths of the said proceeds shall be cred ited to the town panchayat fund.
(c) Out of the balance of the local cess credited in the panchayat development block, such percentage as the panchayat union council may fix shall be credited to the village panchayat fund, and the percentage shall be fixed so as to secure as nearly as may be that the total income derived by all the village panchayats in the panchayat union does not fall short of an amount calculated at 20 naye paise for each individual of the village population in the panchayat union.
(d) The balance of the proceeds of the local cess collected in the panchayat develop ment block shall be cre 718 dited to the funds of the panchayat union council.
" The explanation to sub clause I is the subject matter of controversy in this case.
Sub clause I provides for levy of 45 naye paise for every rupee of land revenue payable to the Government in the explanation a fiction is created thereby even the royalty payable have been included within the definition of "land revenue".
As it provides "royalty, lease amount or any other sum payable to the Government in respect of land.
" This phraseology has been incorporated by an amendment in 1964 by the Madras Village Panchayat Amendment Act, 1964 Section 13 wherein the explanation to Section 115 was substituted and substituted retrospectively wherein this royalty has also been included in the definition of 'land revenue ' and it is on this ground that it was mainly con tended that land revenue being a tax on land is within the authority of the State Legislature under Item 49 of List II and therefore the cess which is a tax on land revenue itself or an imposition on the land revenue and hence could not be anything else but a tax falling within the ambit of tax on land as provided by entry 49 List II and it was therefore contended that it would not fall within the ambit of entry 50 List II as if it falls within the ambit of entry 50 of List II, it would be beyond the authority of the State legislature as by passing the Parliament has denuded the State Legislature of its authority to levy any tax on mining rights.
Whether royality is a tax is not very material for the purpose of determination of this question in this case.
It is admitted that royality is charged on the basis of per unit of minerals extracted.
It is no doubt true that mineral is extracted from the land and is available, but it could only be extracted if there are three things: (1) Land from which mineral could be extracted.
(2) Capital for providing machinery, instruments and other requirements.
(3) Labour It is therefore clear that unit of charge of royalty is not only land but land + Labour + Capital.
It is therefore clear that if royalty is a tax or an imposition or a levy, it is not on land alone but it is a levy or a tax on mineral (land), labour and capital employed in extraction of the mineral.
It therefore is clear that royalty if is imposed by the Parlia 719 ment it could only be a tax not only on land but no these three things stated above.
It is not in dispute that the cess which the Madras Village Panchayat Act proposes to levy is nothing but an additional tax and originally it was levied only on land revenue, apparently land revenue would fall within the scope of entry 49 but it could not be doubted that royalty which is a levy or tax on the extracted mineral is not a tax or a levy on land alone and if cess is charged on the royalty it could not be said to be a levy or tax on land and therefore it could not be upheld as imposed in exercise of jurisdic tion under Entry 49 List II by the State Legislature.
Thus it is clear that by introducing this explanation to Section 115 clause (1) widening the meaning of word 'land revenue ' for the purposes of Section 115 and 116.
When the Legislature included Royalty, it went beyond its jurisdic tion under entry 49 List II and therefore clearly is without the authority of law.
But this also may lead to an interest ing situation.
This cess levied under Section 115 of the Madras Village Panchayat Act is levied for purposes indicat ed in the scheme of the Act and it was intended to be levied on all the lands falling within the area but as this cess on royalty is without the authority the result will be that the cess is levied so far as lands other than the lands in which mines are situated are concerned but lands where mines are situated this levy of cess is not in accordance with that law.
This anomaly could have been averted if the Legislature in this explanation had used words 'surface rent ' in place of royalty.
Even if the lands where mines are situated and which are subject to licence and mining leases even for those lands there is a charge on the basis of the surface of the land which is sometimes described as surface rent or sometimes also as 'dead rent '.
It could not be doubted that if such a surface rent or dead rent is a charge or an impo sition on the land only and therefore will clearly fall within the purview of entry 49 List H and if a cess is levied on that it will also be justified as tax on land falling within the purview of entry 49 and it will also be uniform as this cess would be levied in respect of the lands irrespective of the fact as to whether the land is one where a mine is situated or land which is only used for other purposes for which land revenue is chargeable.
R.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant company used to manufacture cement and was granted mining lease for limestone and kankar by the Govern ment of Tamil Nadu in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.
The royalty was fixed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 which is a Central Act by which the control of mines and minerals had been taken over by the Central Government for the regulation and development of minerals.
Sub section 1 of section 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 enjoins that there shall be levied in every pan chayat development block, a local cess at the rate of 45 paise on every rupee of land revenue payable to the Govern ment in respect of any land for every Fasli.
An explanation to the said section was added, and was deemed always to have been incorporated by the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964.
In this explanation a fiction was created whereby even the royalty payable had been included within the definition of "land revenue".
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the competence of the State legislature to levy cess on royalty.
A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that the cess levied 693 under section 115 of the Madras panchayats Act was a tax on land and, as such, fell under Entry 49 of the State List of Schedule VII of the Constitution.
The Division Bench dis missed the appellant 's appeal and held that local cess authorised by section 115 was not land revenue but was a charge on the land itself, and section 115 merely quantified the basis of the quantum of land revenue.
The learned Single Judge, as well as the Division Bench, relied on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy vs Collector of Chittoor, ; Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the levy of cess on royalty in this case was nothing but a tax on royalty and was therefore ultra vires the State legislature.
On the other hand, it was contended that the cess in the present case was a levy in respect of land and could be justified or sustained either under entry 49, 50 or 45 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitu tion.
It was further submitted that the cess having been realised on the basis of the decision of this Court in "H.R.S. Murthy" case, if at all, the Court shall declare the said cess on royalty to be ultra vires prospectively.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (E.S. Venkataramiah, C J, Sabyasachi Mukharji, Ranganath Misra, B.C. Ray, K.N. Singh and section Natarajan, JJ. per Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) (1) Courts of law are enjoined to gather the meaning of the Constitution from the language used, and although one should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretation as one applied to an ordinary law but these very principles of interpretation compel one to take into account the nature and scope of the Act which requires interpretation.
It has to be remembered that it is a Constitution that requires interpretation.
Constitution is the mechanism under which the laws are to be made and not merely an Act which declares what the law is to be.
[704B C] The Attorney General for the State of New South Wales vs The Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales; , , referred to.
(2) A Constitution must not be construed in any narrow or pedantic sense, and construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers, must be adopted.
A broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, but 694 they are not free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purposes of supplying omissions or correcting supposed errors.
[704D E F] In re. ' C.P. Berar Sales of Motor Spirit & Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, [1939] FCR p. 1 and James vs Common wealth of Australia, , referred to.
(3) It is well settled now that the various entries in the three lists are not powers but fields of legislation.
The power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other articles of the Constitution.
[704G] Calcutta Gas Co. vs State of West Bengal, [1962] Suppl.
3 SCR 1, referred to.
(4) It is well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries, but some of these entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other.
Then, it is the duty of the court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether it fits in one or the other of the lists.
Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it.
[705A B & D] H.R. Banthia & Ors. etc.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; ; Union of India vs H.S. Dhillon, ; and D.C. Rataria vs Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., ; , referred to.
(5) It is clear that over a period of centuries, land revenue in India has acquired a cannot active meaning of share in the produce of land to which the King or the Gov ernment is entitled to receive.
[707B] N.R. Reddy & Ors.
vs State of A.P., [1965] 2 Andhra Law Times 297 and State ofA.P.v.
N.R. Reddy & Ors., ; , referred to.
(6) There is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land.
[708C] Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State of U.P. & Anr.
, ; , referred to.
695 (7) Explanation to section 115(1) itself makes a dis tinction between land revenue as such and royalty which by amendment is deemed to be land revenue.
It is, therefore, recognised by the very force of that explanation and the amendment thereto that the expression 'royalty ' in sections 115 & 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue property called or conventionally known, which is separate and dis tinct from royalty.
[707D E] (8) In the instant case, cess is not on land, but on royalty, which is included in the definition of 'land reve nue ', None of the three lists of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on royalty.
(9) Royalty which is indirectly connected with land, cannot be said to be a tax directly on land as a unit.
Royalty is payable on a proportion of the mineral extracted.
The Act does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be valued.
Hence, there cannot be any doubt that the impugned legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on royalty and not a tax on land.
[709E] New Manek Chand Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Allahabad & Ors.
, ; ; S.C. Nawn vs W.T.O. Calcutta & Ors., ; ; Asstt.
Commissioner of Urban Land Tax & Ors.
vs The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. etc.; , ; Second Gift 'Fax Officer, Mangalore etc.
vs D.H. Nazareth etc.
; , ; Bhagwan Dass Jain vs Union of India, ; and The Western India Theatres Ltd. vs The Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment, ; , referred to.
(10) Royalty is directly relatable only to the minerals extracted and on the principle that the general provision is excluded by the special one, royalty would be relatable to entries 23 & 50 of List II, and not entry 49 of List II.
[713D] (11) Royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State Legislature because section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State Legislature is denuded of its competence under entry 23 of List II.
In any event, cess on royalty cannot be sustained under entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land.
Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land.
[713F G] 696 Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. vs Raymon & Co. (1) Pvt. Ltd.; , ; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs State of Gujarat & Ors., ; The Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors.
vs The State of Orissa & Ors., ; ; State of Orissa vs M.A. Tulloch & Co., ; ; Baijnath Kedia vs State of Bihar & Ors., ; M/s. Laxminarayana Mining Co. Bangalore vs Taluk Dev Board, AIR ; M. Lal & Ors.
vs The State of Bihar & Ors.
, AIR 1965 Patna 491; Bherulal vs State of Rajasthan, AIR ; Dr. S.S. Sharma & Anr.
vs State of Punjab & Ors., AIR ; Saurashtra Cement & Chemi cals India Ltd. vs Union of India & Anr., ; L.N. Agarwalla & Ors.
vs State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Orissa 210 and M/s Hira lal Rameshwar Prasad & Ors.
vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., M.P. High Court Misc.
Petition No. 410/83, referred to.
H.R.S. Murthy vs Collector of Chittoor & Anr., ; , overruled.
(12) The amounts of cess have been collected on the basis of the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy 's case.
The Court is therefore justified in declaring the levy of the said cess under section 115 to be ultra vires the power of the State legislature prospectively only.
The respondents will not be liable for any refund of cess already paid or collected.
[714C D & E] Per G.L. Oza, J. (1) Sub clause (1) of Section 115 provides for levy of 45 naya paise for every rupee of land revenue payable to the Government.
In the explanation a fiction is created whereby even the royalty payable has been included within the defi nition of 'land revenue '.
[718A] (2) The language of Entries 23 and 50 in List II clearly subjects the authority or jurisdiction on the State Legisla ture to any enactment made by the Parliament.
Entry 23 talks of regulation and Entry 50 talks of taxes on mineral rights.
It therefore could not be disputed that if the cess imposed under section 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act is a cess or tax on mineral rights then that jurisdiction could be exer cised by the State Legislature subject to the law enacted by the Parliament.
[715D E] (3) Unit of charge of royalty is not only land but land + labour + capital.
It is therefore clear that if royalty is a tax or an imposition or a levy, it is not on land alone but it is a levy or a tax on mineral (land), 697 labour and capital employed in extraction of the mineral.
It therefore is clear that royalty if it is imposed by the Parliament it could only be a tax not only on land but on the three things stated above.
[718H; 719A] (4) When the Legislature included royalty, it went beyond its jurisdiction under Entry 49 of List II and there fore clearly is without the authority of law.
[719D] (5) This may lead to an interesting situation.
As this cess on royalty is without the authority, the result will be that the cess is levied so far as lands other than the lands in which mines are situated are concerned but lands where mines are situated this levy of cess is not in accordance with the law.
This anamoly could have been averted if the Legislature had used words 'surface rent ' in place of royal ty.
Even if the lands where mines are situated and which are subject to licence and mining leases, even for those lands there is a charge on the basis of the surface of the land which is Sometimes described as surface rent or sometimes also as 'dead rent '.
[719E F]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4494 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.5.88 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad in O.A. No. 427/1986.
B. Dutta, ASG.
(N.P.), C.V. Subba Rao, A. Subba Rao and P. Parmeshwaran for the Appellants.
Harbans Lal and A.K. Mahajan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
Special leave is granted.
Heard learned counsel for both parties.
The respondents were holding the posts of Junior Scien tific Officers (Group 'B ' posts) in the Defence Research & Development Service.
They were promoted to the posts of Scientists 'B ' with effect from October 16, 1985 or from the date they would actually assume charge of the posts.
The respondents filed an application before the Central Adminis trative Tribunal, Allahabad, claiming that they should have been promoted to the posts of Scientists 'B ' with effect from July 1, 1984.
The Tribunal rejected the prayer of the respondents that their promotions should have been made with effect from July 1, 1984.
The Tribunal, however, directed that their promotions should be with effect from the date on which the promotional posts were created.
753 The short question involved in this appeal is whether the Tribunal was justified in directing that the respondents ' promotion should be with effect from the date the promotion al posts were created.
Under rule 8(1)(a) of the Defence Research & Development Service Rules, 1970, hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules ', all those who have been recruited before the promulgation of the Rules as Junior Scientific Officers in the Defence Research & Development Organisation on regular basis and possess the educational qualifications and experience as laid down for direct recruits, shall be eligible, till they are wasted out, for promotion to the post of Scientist 'B ' up to 50 per cent of the vacancies in the grade.
Under the first proviso to rule 8(1)(a), the total number of posts filled in that grade shall at no time exceed 50 per cent of the total sanctioned strength for the grade on the date of promulgation of the Rules, and that this concession shall also be admissible to those persons who are appointed or promoted as Junior Scientific Officers on regular basis on or after the promulgation of the Rules.
There were a total number of 512 posts available in the grade of Scientists 'B ' in 1979.1n view of rule 8(1)(a) of the Rules, the Junior Scientific Officers were entitled to be promoted to the 50 per cent of these posts, that is to say to 256 posts.
These 256 posts were filled up by promo tion of the Junior Scientific Officers between the period 1979 and 1983.
According to the respondents, the posts of Scientists 'B ' to which they have been promoted with effect from October 16, 1985, were created between 1984 and 1985 and that, accordingly, the respondents should have been promoted to these posts with effect from 1st July, 1984.
It was the contention of the respondents that on previous occasions up to the year 1983, promotions were given effect from 1st July of the year in which the promotions were granted.
It has been already noticed that the Tribunal has overruled the said contention of the respondents and has directed that their promotions should be with effect from the date the said promotional posts of Scientists 'B ' were created.
At the same time, it has been found by the Tribunal that the flexible complementing scheme or SITU promotions, as provided in rule 8(2)(f) of the Rules, were not available to the Junior Scientific Officers.
It is not disputed that the promotions of the Junior Scientific Officers to the posts of Scientists 'B ' are vacancy based and such promo tions are granted after the assessment by the Assessment Board as provided in the Rules.
It has also been observed by the Tribunal that normally the promotions will take effect from the date of the order granting such promotions.
The only ground on which the Tri 754 bunal has directed that the promotions of the respondents should take effect from the date the posts of Scientists 'B ' were created, is that up to 1983 such promotions were given effect from 1st July of the year in which the promotions were granted.
There is no statutory provision that the promotion to the post of Scientist 'B ' should take effect from 1st July of the year in which the promotion is granted.
It may be that, rightly or wrongly, for some reason or other, the promotions were granted from 1st July, but we do not find any justifying reason for the direction given by the Tribu nal that the promotions of the respondents to the posts of Scientists 'B ' should be with effect from the date of the creation of these promotional posts.
We do not know of any law or any rule under which a promotion is to be effective from the date of creation of the promotional post.
After a post falls vacant for any reason whatsoever, a promotion to that post should be from the date the promotion is granted and not from the date on which such post falls vacant.
In the same way when additional posts are created, promotions to those posts can be granted only after the Assessment Board has met and made its recommendations for promotions being granted.
If on the contrary, promotions are directed to become effective from the date of the creation of addi tional posts, then it would have the effect of giving promo tions even before the Assessment Board has met and assessed the suitability of the candidates for promotion.
In the circumstances, it is difficult to sustain the judgment of the Tribunal.
For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the Tribunal directing that the promotions of the respond ents should be not from the date of the orders of promotion, but from the date the posts were created.
The orders of the appellants promoting the respondents with effect from Octo ber 16, 1985 will stand.
The appeal is allowed.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
N .P.V.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Under Rule 8(1)(a) of the Defence Research & Development Service Rules, 1970, Junior Scientific Officers in the Defence Research & Development Organisation were eligible for promotion to the posts of Scientists 'B ' upto 50 per cent of the vacancies in the grade.
The respondents who were holding the posts of Junior Scientific Officers, and were promoted to the posts of Scientists 'B ' with effect from October 16, 1985 or from the date they actually assumed charge of the posts filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, contending that since the posts to which they had been promoted were created between 1984 and 1985, they should have been promoted with effect from July 1984, as was done on previous occasions upto 1983, when promotions were ef fected from 1st July of the year in which promotions took place.
The Tribunal rejected the prayer of the respondents and directed that the promotions should be effective from the date on which the promotional posts were created.
The Union of India being aggrieved appealed to the Court.
On the question whether the Tribunal was justified in directing the promotions to be effective from the date the promotional posts were created.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD: After a post fails vacant for any reason whatsoev er, a promotion to that post should be from the date the promotion is granted and not from the date on which such post falls vacant.
Similarly, when additional posts are created, promotions to those posts can be granted 752 only after the Assessment Board has met and made its recom mendations for promotions being granted.
If, however, promo tions are directed to become effective from the date of creation of additional posts, then it would have the effect of giving promotions even before the Assessment Board has met and assessed the suitability of the candidates for promotion.
[754C E] In the instant case, there is no statutory provision that the promotion to the post of Scientist 'B ' should take effect from 1st July of the year in which the promotion is granted.
There is also no law or rule under which a promo tion is effective from the date of creation of the promo tional posts.
The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that the promotions should be effective from the date the promotional posts were created.
The orders of the appellants promoting respondents from October 16, 1985 will stand.
[754B C & F]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4552 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.
1988 of the Rajasthan High Court in C.W.P. No. 13 of 1987.
G.L. Sanghi and Y.P. Rao for the Appellant.
C.S. Vaidyanathan, S.R. Setia and K.V. Mohan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
Special leave granted.
Having heard counsel on both sides and having perused the material on record, we are of opinion that the matter requires reconsideration by the Provident Fund Commissioner.
The Food Corporation of India has depots located at various places in Rajasthan for handling storing and trans porting food grains and other articles.
It has appointed contractors for execution of such works and the contractors in turn engaged some workers.
In respect of such workers, the Provident Fund Commissioner called upon the Corporation to deposit contribution payable under the Employees, Provi dent Fund Act and the scheme framed thereunder.
When there was non compliance, the Commissioner made an order under section 7A of the said Act determining amount payable by the Corporation.
Being aggrieved by that determination, the Corporation moved the 757 High Court for relief under article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court has dismissed the petition.
Hence the Corpo ration has appealed to this Court.
The grievance complained of by the Corporation is that it was denied of reasonable opportunity to produce material in proof of identification of the workers in respect of whom the contribution was payable.
It is urged that the contrac tors are in possession of the relevant lists and the Commis sioner has not even given notice to contractors nor made them parties to the proceedings in spite of repeated re quests made by the Corporation.
Counsel for the Union of Workmen, however, contended that under the provisions of the the Corporation being the principal employer has to maintain list of workers; that it has failed to produce such list and, therefore, it cannot throw the burden on the contrac tors to prove the case.
We have carefully perused the Commissioner 's order and also the order of the High Court.
The total amount ordered to be payable comes to about Rs.22,48,000 in respect of the employees of depots namely: Udaipur, Jaipur, Ajmer, Badmer and Sawai Madhopur.
The Commissioner has also directed the Divisional Officer, Jaipur to deposit the Provident Fund Contribution i.e. Rs. 18,72,194 to the Fund being maintained by the trustees of the establishment.
It is indeed a large amount for the determination of which the Commissioner has only depended upon the lists furnished by the workers, Union.
It is no doubt true that the employer and contractors are both liable to maintain registers in respect of the workers employed.
But the Corporation seems to have some problems in collating the lists of all workers engaged in depots scattered at different places.
It has requested the Commissioner to summon the contractors to produce the re spective lists of workers engaged by them.
The Commissioner did not summon the Contractors nor the lists maintained by them.
He has stated that the Corporation has failed to produce the evidence.
The question, in our opinion, is not whether one has failed to produce evidence.
The question is whether the Commissioner who is the statutory authority has exercised powers vested in him to collect the relevant evidence before determining the amount payable under the said Act.
It is of importance to remember that the Commissioner while conducting an inquiry under section (7A) has the same powers as are 758 vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for trying a suit.
The section reads as follows: "section 7(A) Determination of Moneys due from Employer (1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, any Deputy Provident Commissioner or any Regional Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order determine the amount due from any em ployer under any provision of this Act (the scheme or the Family Pension Scheme or the Insurance Scheme as the case may be) and for this purpose may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary.
(2) The Officer conducting the inquiry under sub section (1) shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.
and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial pro ceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purpose of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code.
" It will be seen from the above provisions that the Commissioner is authorised to 'enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath.
He has the power requiring the discovery and production of documents.
This power was given to the Commissioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contribution and other dues by identifying the workmen.
The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion.
That is the legal duty of the Commissioner.
It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particu lar person.
759 We, therefore, allow the appeal and reverse the order of the Commissioner and that of the High Court.
The matter stands remitted to the Commissioner to dispose it of afresh and in accordance with law and in the light of the observa tion made.
The parties shall appear before the Commissioner to receive further orders on December 12, 1989.
The Commission er, shall dispose of the matter within three months thereaf ter.
N .P.V.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
Respondent No. 1 the Provident Fund Commissioner called upon the appellant Food Corporation of India to deposit contribution payable by it under the Employees ' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the scheme thereunder, in respect of workers employed by the contrac tors appointed by the appellant for handling storing and transporting food grains and other articles in its depots in Rajasthan.
On appellant 's non compliance, Respondent No. 1 made an order under Section 7A of the Act determining the amount payable by the appellant.
Against the aforesaid order, the appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which dismissed the same.
Hence the appeal, by spe cial leave, by the appellant Corporation.
It was contended that the appellant was denied a reason able opportunity to produce actual proof of identification of workers in respect of whom contribution was payable inasmuch as Respondent No. 1 neither gave notice to contrac tors, who were in possession of the relevant lists of work ers, nor made them parties to the proceedings, despite its repeated requests.
Allowing the appeal, HELD: The Commissioner, while conducting an inquiry under Section 7A of the Employees, Provident Fund and Mis cellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 has the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure for trying a suit.
Thus, the Commissioner is authorised to enforce attendance in person and also to examine any person on oath.
He has the power requiring the discovery and pro duction of documents.
This power was given to the Commis sioner to decide not abstract questions of law, but only to determine actual concrete differences in payment of contri bution and other dues by identifying the 756 workmen.
The Commissioner should exercise all his powers to collect all evidence and collate all material before coming to proper conclusion.
That is the legal duty of the Commis sioner.
It would be failure to exercise the jurisdiction particularly when a party to the proceedings requests for summoning evidence from a particular person.
[757H; 758A; F H] In the instant case, the appellant Corporation had some problems in collating the lists of all workers engaged in depots scattered at different places.
It requested the respondent Commissioner to summon the contractors to pro duce the respective lists of workers engaged by them.
Howev er, the appellant Commissioner did not summon the contrac tors, nor the lists maintained by them.
The matter is, therefore, remitted to the Commissioner for fresh disposal.
[757F; 759A]