judgement:
Appeal No. 936 of 1963, Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1963, of the Punjab High Court in First Appeal from Order No. 2/3 of 1963.
Purshotham Trikamdas, Rajinder Nath Mittal , R. B. Datar, V. Kumar.
B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
G.S. Pathak, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Hardev Singh, Rajendra Dhawan, Anand Prakash and Y. Kumar, for respondent No. 1. 752 February 12, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was, delivered by: SHAH, J.
At the general elections held in February 1962 five candidates contested the election to the House of the People from the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency.
On February 27, 1962 the appellant Jagdev Singh Sidhanti was declared elected.
Pratap Singh Daulta who was one of the candidates at the election then filed a petition with the Election Commission praying, inter alia, that the election of the appellant be declared void on the ground that the appellant Sidhanti his agents, and other persons with his consent,.
had committed certain corrupt practices in connection with the election.
Daulta stated that the appellant Sidhanti was set up as a candidate to contest the election by the Harding Lok Samiti, that the appellant and six other persons Piare Lal Bhajnik, Ch.
Badlu Ram, Pt.
Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Achilles Bhagwan Dev who were leaders and active workers of the Gurukul Section of the Arya Samaj had organised a political movement called "the Hindi agitation" in 1957 the real object of which was to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the Sikh and the Hindu communities in the State of Punjab " on the ground of religion and language" to promote their prospects in the general elections to be held in 1962.
and for that purpose they held meetings in the Hariana region of the Punjab and appealed to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti 'on the ground of his religion and language".
and used a religious symbol a flag called "Om Dhwaj" in, all these meetings, that the appellant himself made similar appeals to the electorate and appealed to them to refrain from voting for Daulta who was a sitting member of the House of the, People from the constituency stating that he Daulta was an enemy of the Arya Samaj and of the Hindi language, that during the election campaign fifteen meetings were held between December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962 and at all these meetings appeals were made to the electorate on the ground of religion and language of Sidhanti, and attempts were made to, promote feelings of enmity and hatred between Sikhs 'and Hindus of the Punjab.
Allegations about undue influence on the voters in the exercise of their free electoral right were also made in the petition, and details of these 753 alleged corrupt practices were furnished in the schedule annexed to the petition.
Sidhanti denied that the six persons who were named as his agents and supporters ever acted as his agents in his elec tion campaign and submitted that they were merely interested in the success of the candidates set up by the Hariana Lok Samiti and acted throughout "on their own and not as his agents".
He also submitted that the Hariana Lok Samiti had no connection with the Arya Samaj, it being a political organization started by Prof. Sher Singh who was an impor tant political leader in the Hariana region.
Sidhanti admitted, that he had participated in the meetings to canvass votes, but claimed that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches made by others in those meetings, that the Om flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents or the six persons named by Daulta in his petition, except Bhagwan Dev who was accustomed "throughout his career" to carry a pennant with "Om" and his own name inscribed thereon on his motor vehicle, but carrying of such a flag or pennant on Bhagwan Dev 's vehicle during the election was not with his (Sidhanti 's) consent and that it did not amount to commission of a corrupt practice as defined in the Act, that the residents of Hariana area were mainly Hindi speaking, but the Government of Punjab had made Punjabi language in Gurmukhi script a compulsory subject at various levels of school education and this gave rise to a wide spread agitation against the policy of the Government, that to resist the implementation of the policy and the programme of the Government in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to mitigate the hardships of the residents of the Hariana region and to secure redress of their grievances the Hariana Lok Samiti was formed.
, and an appeal to the electorate to secure a reversal of the policies and programme of the Government was not.
it was submitted, an appeal on the ground of language or religion and did not amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Tribunal held, inter alia, that the "Om flag" was not a "religious symbol" of the Arya Samaj, that no satisfactory proof was adduced that Om flag had been used as a 134 159 S.C. 48 754 symbol of Arya Samaj or that an appeal to secure votes with the aid of the flag was made to the electorate by Sidhanti or by any one else with his consent, that there was no satisfactory evidence to establish that appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti or to refrain from voting for the other candidates on the ground of religion or language, and that the applicant Daulta failed to prove that an appeal on the ground of caste, community or religion or language had been made to the electorate to further the prospects of Sidhanti or to prejudicially affect the election of the other candidates.
On these and findings recorded on other issues not material in this appeal, the petition filed by Daulta was dismissed by the Election Tribunal.
Daulta prefered an appeal against that order to the High Court of Judicature for Punjab.
The High Court held that the word "Om" is a religious symbol of the Hindus in general and of the Hindus belonging to the section known as Arya Samaj in particular and that the flag bearing the inscription "Om" is a religious symbol, that "Om Dhwaj" was flown during the election campaign on the election offices of the Hariana Lok Samiti especially at Sampla and Rohtak, that the Samiti office was used by Sidhanti for his election campaign, that Hariana Lok Samiti was generally using the "Om Dhwaj" to further the prospects of its candidates, that out of the agents and supporters of Sidhanti "Bharat Singh at least once and Bhagwan Dev invariably used" the Om flag on their vehicles while attending the meetings convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti in furtherance of the election campaign of Sidhantn.
that the Om flag was flying "on the pandal of the meeting" held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962 when Sidhanti and his agents and supporters delivered speeches in support of the election campaign and that at the meeting held at Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld, that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti and that Pare Lal Bhajnik at the Rohtak town meeting also sang the son in honour of the Om flag with the consent of Sidhanti.
The High Court further held that the appellant had delivered speeches at Majra Dubaldhan in the pandal on which the Om flag was flying, that as even an isolated act of the use 755 of or appeal to the Om flag may constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(3) that corrupt practice by Sidhanti and his agents and by his supporters with his consent was established.
The High Court also held that Sidhanti bad appealed for votes on the ground of his language and had asked the electorate to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of the language of the latter, and such appeals constituted a corrupt practice.
The High Court accordingly allowed the appeal and declared the election of Sidhanti void under section 100 (1) (b) of the Act.
Against the order this appeal is preferred with certificate granted by the High Court.
Two principal questions which survive for determination in this appeal are: (1) Whether a religious symbol was used in the course of election by the appellant, his agents or other persons with his consent in furtherance of the prospects of his election; and (2) Whether appeals were made to the electorate by Sidhanti, his agents or other persons with his consent to vote in his favour on account of his language and to refrain from voting in favour of Daulta on the ground of his language.
In order to appreciate the plea raised by counsel for the parties and their beating on the evidence it may be useful to refer to the political background in the Hariana region and the constituency in particular, in which corrupt practices are alleged to have been committed.
The territory of the State of Punjab is divided into two regions the 'Hindi speaking region ' and the Tunjabi speaking region '.
The Hindi speaking region is very largely populated by Hindus, while in the Punjabi speaking region the population is approximately equally divided between the Hindus and Sikhs.
In the Punjab before the partition, Urdu and English were the 'two official languages.
After the partition a controversy about the official language arose.
The Government of Punjab decided to replace Urdu and English by Hindi in the Hindi speaking region and Punjabi in the Punjabi speaking region, and for that purpose a scheme called the 'Sachar formula ' was devised, the salient feature of which was that every student reading in the Punjab schools, by the time he passed 756 his matriculation examination should be proficient both in Hindi and Punjabi.
Under the scheme two Regional Committees were formed one known, as the Hindi Regional Committee and the other the Punjabi Regional Committee.
The function of the Committees was to advise the local Government in matters of finance and other related matters.
There was great resentment against the formation of the Regional Committees and the implementation of the Sachar formula which resulted in the launching of a movement called "the Hindi agitation".
The agitation against the language policy of the Government gained strength and there was a great mass movement in 1957 in the entire State of Punjab.
In the last week of December 1957 there was a settlement between the organisers of the movement and the State Government and the movement was called off.
It appears that some of the leading figures in this agitation attempted to make political capital out of this movement and set themselves up as probable candidates for the next election.
In the Arya Samaj in the Punjab there are two major sections, one called the 'Gurukul Section ' and the other called the 'College Section '.
The Gurukul Section is again divided into the Hariana Section and the Mahashe Krishna Section.
It is the case of Daulta that it is the Gurukul Section of the Araya Samaj relying upon the religious and linguistic differences which sought to make at the time of the election, appeals to religions and use of religious symbols.
As we have already observed.
Daulta challenged the election on the ground that Sidhanti, his election and other agents committed many corrupt practices.
Before the Tribunal he restricted his case to the corrupt practices falling within cls.
(3) and (3A) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
His plea of undue influence falling within cl.
(2) failed before the Tribunal and also before the High Court, and it has not been relied upon before us.
Similarly his plea that Sidhanti, his election and other agents had promoted or attempted to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language was negatived by the Tribunal and also by the High Court and that plea also does not fall to be determined by us.
Daulta had also alleged 757 that appeals were made by Sidhanti and his election and other agents, to the electorate to vote for him or refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of his Sidhanti 's religion and language and that Sidhanti and his agents used and appealed to religious symbols such as the Om flag for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti and for prejudicially affecting the election of Daulta.
It is on this last question about the use of and appeal to religious symbols and appeal to the language of the two candidates for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of Sidhanti that the Tribunal and the High Court have differed.
It may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, before dealing with the matters in dispute.
Section 100(1) sets out the grounds on which an election may be declared void.
In so far as that section is material in the present appeal, it provides: "Subject to the provisions of sub section (2) if the Tribunal is of opinion. (a) * * * * * (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; (c) * * * * * (d) * * * * * the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void." By sub section
(2) if in the opinion of the Tribunal.
a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the Tribunal is satisfied (a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent , (b) * * * * * * (c) that the candidate and his election agent took all reasonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practice at the election; and 758 (d) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agent, the Tribunal may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void.
Section 123 sets out what shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act.
Clause (3) as amended by Act 40 of 1961, which alone is material in this appeal, provides: "The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate." The clause falls into two parts (i) an appeal by a candidate, his agents or by other persons with the consent of the candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language; and (ii) use of or appeal to religious symbols, national symbols or national emblems for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of the candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.
The first part in terms makes it a condition that the appeal is made by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his agent.
There is no reference in the second part to the person by whom the use of, or appeal to, the religious or the national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem may be made, if such use of or appeal to them has been made to further the prospects of the election of the candidate or to prejudicially affect the election of any candidate.
But it is implicit in section 123(3), having regard to the terms of section 100, that the use of or appeal to the national or religious symbols must be made by the candidate of his election agent or by some other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, before it can be regarded as a ground for declaring the election void.
If the evidence on the record fails to establish 759 the responsibility for the use of or appeal to the religious or national symbols by the returned candidate or by his election agent or by any other person with his consent or his election agent, no ground for setting aside the election may be deemed to be made out.
The first question to which we must then turn is, whether the "Om flag" can be regarded as a "religious symbol" within the meaning of section 123 (3).
This question has to be examined in two branches (i) whether the word "Om" has any special religious significance, and, (ii) whether the use of "Om" on a flag or pennant makes it a religious symbol.
If the respondent Daulta establishes that the "Om flag" is a religious symbol, the question will arise whether the use of or appeal to the Om flag was made in the election campaign for furtherance of his prospects by Sidhanti or by his agents or other persons with his consent or the consent of his election agent, The expression "Om" is respected by the Hindus generally and has a special significance in the Hindu scriptures.
It is recited at the commencement of the recitations of Hindu religious works.
Macdonell in his A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary states that "Om" is the sacred syllable used in invocations, at the commencement of prayers, at the beginn ing and the end of Vedic recitation, and as a respectful salutation: it is a subject of many mystical speculations.
In the Sanskrit English Dictionary by Monier William it is said that "Om" is a sacred exclamation which may be uttered at the beginning and end of a reading of the Vedas or Previously to any prayer; it is also regarded as a particle of auspicious salutation.
But it is difficult to regard "Om" which is a preliminary to an incantation or to religious books as having religious significance.
"Om" it may be admitted is regarded as having high spiritual or mystical efficacy: it is used at the commencement of the recitations of religious prayers.
But the attribute of spiritual significance will not necessarily impart to its use on a flag the character of a religious symbol in the context in which the expression religious symbol occurs in the section with which we are concerned.
A symbol stands for or represents something material or abstract.
In order to be a religious symbol, there must be a visible 760 representation of a thing or concept which is religious.
To 'Om ' high spiritual or mystical efficacy is undoubtedly ascribed; but its use on a flag does not symbolise religion, or anything religious.
It is not easy therefore to see how the Om flag which merely is a pennant on which is printed the word 'Om ' can be called a religious symbol.
But assuming that the Om flag may be regarded as a religious symbol, the evidence on the record is not sufficient to establish that by Sidhanti, his election agents or any other person with his consent or the consent of his election agent, Om flag was used or exhibited, or an appeal was made by the use of the Om flag to further the prospects of Sidhanti at the election.
It may be remembered that in the trial of an election petition, the burden of proving that the election of a successful candidate is liable to be set aside on the plea that he was responsible directly or through his agents for corrupt practices at the election, lies heavily upon the applicant to establish his case, and unless it is established in both its branches i.e. the commission of acts which the law regards as corrupt, and the responsibility of the successful candidate directly or through his agents or with his consent for its practice not by mere preponderance of probability, but by cogent and reliable evidence beyond any reasonable doubt, the petition must fail.
The evidence may be examined bearing this approach to the evidence in mind.
Between the months of December 10, 1961 and February 18, 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as a part of the election campaign of Sidhnti.
These meetings were held at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri Madanpur, Sampla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma, Assaudha.
Jhajjar, Badli Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh.
There was, it is claimed by the applicant, one more meeting on February 4, 1962, at Rohtak town which is outside the Jhajjar constituency.
The Tribunal held that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that in the meetings at Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Sampla, Ladpur, Pakasma.
Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh 'Om ' flag was exhibited in furtherance of the election prospects of Sidhanti and with that view the High Court has agreed.
The Tribunal 761 also held that there was no reliable evidence that at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962, and at Rohtak town on February 4, 1962, 'Om ' flag was used as a religious symbol.
On this part of the case, however, the High Court disagreed with the Tribunal.
Rohtak town was not, but Rohtak suburban area was, within the constituency in which Daulta and Sidhanti were contesting the election.
Therefore the only meeting which took place within the constituency where Sidney and Daulta contested the election in which according to the High Court the Om flag was used was at Majra Dubaldhan held on January 19, 1962.
Six witnesses directly spoke about the details of that meeting, beside Sidhanti.
Sidhanti said generally that the evidence given by the wit nesses for Daulta regarding what transpired at Maira Dubal dhan and three other meetings was not true.
The witnesses for Daulta were Roop Ram.
Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki.
The witnesses who supported the case of the appellant were Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal.
It may be observed that the High Court placed no reliance upon the testimony of Ramdhari Balmiki and no arguments have been advanced before us suggesting that his testimony was reli able.
Roop Ram a police constable has deposed that about mid day on January 19, 1962, a meeting was held at Majra Dubaldhan and that at that meeting Piare Lal sang a bhajan about the Om flag and he saw the Om flag flying on the pandal of the meeting which was attended by four to five thousand persons.
According to the witness Nanhu Ram, Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Prof. Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev made speeches, that Acharya Bhagwan Dev in the course of his speech asked people not to vote for Daulta but to vote for the candidate who was seeking election on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket.
In cross examination he admitted that he had been supplied with a copy of the report which he had made to the D.I.G., C.I.D., Chandigarh, and that he had gone through the report two or three times, before he gave evidence.
The Tribunal refused to place reliance upon the testimony of this witness and of another police constable Ganesh Dass who claimed to have remained present in the various political meetings.
It appears that the witness had memorised the so called reports and the same were not made available to counsel for Sidhanti 762 to challenge the truth of the statements made by the wit nesses.
The High Court has not given any adequate reasons for accepting the testimony of the witness, when the Tribunal which had opportunity of seeing the witness and noting his demeanour had refused to accept the testimony.
Sukhi Ram deposed that he was a sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for about two years, and that he was present at the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti on January 19, 1962, for canvassing votes for the candidates of Hariana Lok Samiti, that Prof. Sher Singh and Sidhanti came in a jeep on which there was flying flag with 'Om ' inscribed thereon, that he saw several other vehicles flying the Om flag and that the vehicle in which he went to the meeting also was carrying the Om flag.
The Tribunal was of the view that the facts elicited in the cross examination of this witness disclosed that his recollection about other meetings which he had attended was poor, whereas his recollection about the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan was very clear, and that the reasons given by the witness for specially remembering the details of the proceedings of the meeting in Majra Dubaldhan and not of other meetings could not be accepted.
In the view of the Tribunal the witness was interested in Daulta, and this inference was supported by the fact that Daulta had sent him a copy of his election petition before it was even presented to the Election Commission.
It also appears that the evidence given by this witness was inconsistent with the summary of the meeting given in Sch. 'D ' to the petition and for this reason according to the Tribunal the testimony of the witness "did not carry conviction" and "it was not safe to rely upon it".
The High Court after summarising the effect of the evidence observed that it did not appear from the deposition given by the witness that he was in any manner interested in Daulta.
In so observing the High Court appears unfortunately to have lost sight of the grounds given by the Tribunal.
Witness Piare Lal stated that he was present at the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan and that none of the speakers suggested that the electors should vote on the ground of caste, creed, religion or language.
He also stated that at 763 none of the meetings there was any Om flag either inside or outside the pandal of the meetings.
Prof. Sher Singh who was another witness examined on behalf of Sidhanti deposed that slogans shouted in the meetings were political slogans and that he did not see Om flags in any pandal of the meet ings, and that he 'had instructed all the candidates and the members of the Hariana Lok Samiti not to use any flag or symbol other than the symbol allotted to them.
Jug Lal, another witness examined on behalf of Sidhanti, stated that at the meeting at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19, 1962, there were no Om flags to be seen anywhere either inside or outside the meeting and that there were no Om flags flying on any of the vehicles.
The testimony of the witnesses Piare Lal, Prof. Sher Singh and Jug Lal was discarded by the High Court, because in their view the witnesses were interested in Sidhanti.
Even if this view about the evidence of these three witnesses is accepted, the evidence led on behalf of Daulta of witnesses Sukhi Ram, Ramdhari Balmiki is wholly unreliable and the testimony of police constable Roop Ram is also not such that implicit reliance can be placed upon it.
We are unable, therefore, to agree with the High Court in the conclusion it has reached that it had been proved satisfactorily that Om flag was flown at Majra Dubaldhan where Sidhanti and other .
speakers delivered speeches in furtherance of the election campaign.
The only other meeting at which it is found by the High Court that the Om flag was used in the meeting at Rohtak town on February 4, 1962, which town, it is common ground, is not within the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency from which Sidhanti and Daulta were contesting the election.
It is, however, said that Rohtak suburban area is within the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency and a& there is a grain market in Rohtak town and a large number of voters from the Jhajjar constituency assemble in that town a meeting was held by Sidhanti in which Om flag were exhibited.
The witnesses in support of the case of Daulta are Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katyal and Satyavrat Bedi.
The principal witnesses who were examined by Sidhanti in respect of this meeting were Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev.
764 Ram Nath Sapra who is a correspondent of several newspapers deposed that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town at Anai Mandi 10 or 12 days before the actual polling.
According to the witness there was a big procession taken out before the meeting which carried flags either of the symbol of the 'Rising Sun ' or of 'Om ', that he had made reports about the proceedings of the Rohtak meeting and had sent the report of the same to all the five papers of which he was the correspondent.
The Tribunal was of the view that the testimony of the witness was unreliable, because he did not remember the details of any.
other meeting convened by the other parties, and that he could not speak about the names of the speakers who took part in the meeting convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti.
The testimony of the witness therefore was "far from convincing" and the testimony of Sidhanti, Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh and Bhagwan Dev was more reliable.
In coming to the conclusion that the evidence of the witness was unreliable the Tribunal referred to the details given in Sch. 'D ' annexed to the petition under the heading 'Summary of the meetings ' and observed that the summary was at "complete variance" with the testimony of the witness.
The High Court was of the view that the witness Ram Sapra was "wholly disinterested" and therefore his evidence must be accepted.
The High Court did not refer to the infirmities disclosed in the testimony of the witness, particularly the discrepancies between the statement of Daulta in his petition and the testimony given by this witness.
Witness Dafedar Singh who is a police constable said that he had been deputed to report about the proceedings of the meeting.
His version is also different from the version as given in Sch. 'D ' annexed to the petition.
The High Court has not referred to the testimony of this witness in support of its conclusion and nothing more need be said about him.
K.K. Katyal said that he had attended the meeting at Rohtak town as a special correspondent of the Hindustan Times, Delhi and that he recollected that flags with a symbol of 'Om ' inscribed thereon were seen flying on some 765 vehicles but it was not possible for him to say who owned those vehicles, but from the flags and placards carried on the vehicles it appeared that they were of the Hariana Lok Samiti.
He also deposed that he had gone to the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak and saw a similar flag flying on the building of the office.
He admitted in cross examination that he did not visit any office of the Hariana Lok Samiti either at Bahadurgarh or at Sampla as all his attention was confined to the central office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak.
He also stated that he had seen some shopkeepers in Sampla and Bahadurgarh flying Om flags on their stalls.
In the view of the Tribunal the testimony of this witness was vague and no reliance could be placed thereon.
While generally agreeing with this view,, the High Court observed that the testimony of the witness Katyal that the Om flag was flying at the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak which was the headquarters office and in the procession which was led by Bharat Singh a number of Om flags were seen may be accepted.
Satyavrat Bedi who is staff correspondent of the Indian Express stated that during his survey of the election campaign he visited Sampla, Bahadurgarh and Rohtak in one day, and made his report about his observations to the newspaper Indian Express, in which he had recorded that religious symbols and religion were being frequently used for damaging the chances of success of Daulta, that he had seen a large number of flags fluttering on many house tops.
that the flag on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti was that of Om and the other organisations had their own flags, that he saw the Om flag fluttering on the office of Sidhanti at Sampla but he did not remember whether there was any flag of 'Om ' at his election office at Bahadurgarh.
The Tribunal declined to accept this testimony.
The High Court took a different view and observed that apart from any other infirmity regarding the use of the reports made by the witness, the statement made by him about his observation that he had seen the Om flag flying on the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti and on the motor vehicle of Bharat Singh could not be ruled out.
It must be remembered however that we are concerned at this stage with the 766 question whether in the meeting at Rohtak on February 4, 1962.
Om flags were exhibited.
On that part of the case the evidence of Satyavrat Bedi is not of much use.
Sri Ram Sharma was a candidate for election on behalf of a political party called "the Hariana Front".
He deposed that he had never attended any procession or meeting organised by the Hariana Lok Samiti but he had seen the motorvehicles employed by the Hanana Lok Sanmti carrying Om flags which were used by the candidates of the Hariana Lok Samiti.
He stated that he contributed a number of articles to Hariana Tilak, Rohtak, founded by him in which he had published on January 4, 1962.
an article condemning, the use of the Om flag for the purpose of elections.
The article published on January 4, 1962, can have no bearing on the use of the flag at Rohtak in the meeting dated February 4, 1962.
The High Court did not place any reliance upon the testimony of this witness.
This is all the evidence on behalf of Daulta to which our attention was invited by counsel for the parties that at the meeting at Rohtak on February 4, 1962, Om flags were exhibited and appeals were made to the flag as a religious symbol.
Apart from the general infirmity of the testimony, the Tribunal refused to accept the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that their statements considerably departed from the summary given in Sch. 'D ' by the petitioner Daulta himself.
In view of this inconsistency between the evidence given in Court and the allegations made by the applicant Daulta in the petition, it would be difficult, after discarding the evidence with regard to a very large number of meetings, to 'hold that in the meeting at Majra Dubaldhan which was within the constituency and in the meeting at Rohtak town which was outside the constituency, Om flags were displayed or appeals were made in the name of the Om flag to further the prospects of the election of Sidhanti.
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the conclusion of the High Court that the Om flag was used for election purposes at the time when election speeches were delivered by Sidhanti at Majra Dubaldhan or Rohtak town or that the Om, flag was used on the pandals at those meetings.
767 Two other matters which have a bearing on the use of the Om flag in the course of the election campaign by Sidhanti, and on which the High Court has relied may be referred to.
The High Court has found that Sidhanti used the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti at Rohtak town as his election office, but on this part of the case our attention has not been invited to any definite evidence which directly supports this conclusion.
The High Court merely observed that it was common ground that Sidhanti did not have any office of his own at Rohtak, and inferred from that circumstance that Sidhanti was using the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti for the election campaign.
But the inference is in the face of the evidence not justifiable, especially when Rohtak town was not within the constituency.
It was conceded by Sidhanti that Bhagwan Dev Sharma an Arya Samaj leader had been accustomed for many years past to carry on his motor vehicle a pennant bearing the Om mark and his name.
Witness Bhagwan Dev Sharma stated that he had attended the meetings of the Hariana Lok Samiti and had addressed them because he agreed with their ideology and thought that the institution was for the benefit of the Hindu religion, that he had never been asked to remove the Om flag from his jeep when he reached those meetings and that he had not attended those meetings either on account of Prof. Sher Singh or Sidhanti but "in his independent capacity as a citizen of India having a right to vote", and that he approved of the candidature of Sidhanti in preference to that of his opponent.
But if the witness was accustomed to use a pennant with Om mark on it for many years past, in the absence of clear evidence to show that he was an agent of Sidhanti or that he acted with the consent of Sidhanti and made an appeal to the flag, it would be difficult to hold from the circumstances that during the days of the election campaign the witness did not remove the flag from the motor vehicle, that Sidhanti made an appeal to the electorate by using a religious symbol to further his prospects at the election.
The evidence about the user of the Om flag by Bharat Singh when he is alleged to have taken out a procession does not appear to be reliable.
768 On a careful survey of the testimony of the witnesses we are unable to agree with the conclusions recorded by the High Court that: (a) Sidhanti "had used an office of the Hariana Lok Samiti on which the "Om flag" was flying for election purposes and further that he gave election speeches at a pandal where the Om flag was fluttering in furtherance of his prospects at the election"; (b) "the agents and supporters delivered speeches about the "Om flag" at the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on January 19.
1962, that Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song, the purport of which was that the honour of the Om flag should be upheld"; and (c) "the Hariana Lok Samiti, the party to which Sidhanti belonged, was using the Om flag for the purpose of election campaign", and thereby committed corrupt practices.
It is true that the use of the Om flag by Bhagwan Dev on his conveyance is admitted but that again is for reasons already set out not sufficient to enable the Court to hold that it was for the purpose of furthering the prospects of election of Sidhanti.
In considering whether appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language or to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of Daulta 's language, it is necessary in the first instance to ascertain the true meaning of the expression "on the ground of his language".
By section 123(3) which was introduced for the first titne in its present form by Act 40 of 1961, appeal by a candidate or his agent to vote or refrain from voting for a person on the ground of language is made a corrupt practice.
This clause must be read in the light of the fundamental right which is guaranteed by article 29(1) of the Constitution, for in ascertaining the true meaning of the corrupt practice, the area of the fundamental right of citizen must be steadily kept in view.
The clause cannot be so read as trespassing upon that fundamental right.
article 29(1) provides: "Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct 769 language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
" The Constitution has thereby conferred the right, among others, to conserve their language upon the citizens of India.
Right to conserve the language of the citizens includes the right to agitate for the protection of the language.
Political agitation for conservation of the language of a section of the citizens cannot therefore be regarded as a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act.
That is clear from the phraseology used in section 123(3) which appears to have been deliberately and carefully chosen.
Unlike article 19(1), article 29(1) is not ' subject to any reasonable restrictions.
The right conferred, upon the section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof to conserve their language, script or culture is made by the Constitution absolute and therefore the decision of this Court in Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya and others vs Lachhi Ram and others(1) on which reliance was placed by the High Court is not of much use.
In that case sections 123(3) and 124(5) of the Representation of the People Act as they then stood were challenged as infringing the fundamental freedom under article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution, and the Court in negativing the contention held that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act did not stop a man from speaking: they merely prescribed conditions which must be observed if a candidate wanted to enter Parliament.
The right to stand for an election is, it was observed, a special right created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute, and if a person wants to stand for an election he must observe the rules.
These observations have no relevance to the protection of the fundamental right to conserve language.
The corrupt practice defined by cl.
(3) of section 123 is committed when an appeal is made either to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of a candidate 's language.
It is the appeal to the electorate on a ground personal to the candidate relating to his language which attracts the ban of section 100 read with section 123(3).
Therefore it is only when the electors are asked to vote or not to vote because of the (1) [19551 1 S.C.R. 608.
134 159 S.C. 49 770 particular language of the candidate that a corrupt practice may be deemed to be committed.
Where however for conservation of language of the electorate appeals are made to the electorate and promises are given that steps would be taken to conserve that language, it will not amount to a corrupt practice.
It is in the light of these principles, the correctness of the findings of the High Court that Sidhanti was guilty of the corrupt practice of appealing for votes on the ground of his language and of asking the voters to refrain from voting_ for Daulta on the ground of the language of Daulta may be examined.
The petition filed by Daulta on this part of the case was vague.
In paragraph 1 1 of his petition it was averred that Sidhanti and his agents made a systematic appeal to the audience to vote for Sidhanti and refrain from, voting for Daulta "on the ground of religion and language", and in paragraph 12 'it was averred that in the public meetings held to further the prospects of Sidhanti in the election, Sidhanti and his agents had made systematic appeals to the electorate to vote for him and refrain from voting for Daulta "on the ground of his religion and language".
A bare perusal of the particulars of the corrupt practice so set out in paragraphs 1 1 & 12 are to be found in Schs. 'C ' & 'D ' clearly shows that it was the case of Daulta that Sidhanti had said that if the electorate wanted to protect their language they should vote for the Hariana Lok Samiti candidate.
Similar exhortations are said to have been made by the other speakers at the various meetings.
It is stated in Sch.
'D ' that resolutions were passed at the meetings urging upon the Government to "abolish Punjabi from Hariana", that many speakers said that the Hariana Lok Samiti will fight for Hindi for Hariana and that they were opposed to the teaching of Punjabi in Hariana.
These exhortations to the electorate to induce the Government to change their language policy or that a political party will agitate for the protection of the language spoken by the residents of the Hariana area do not fall within the corrupt practices of appealing for votes on the ground of language of the candidate or to refrain from ' voting on the ground of language of the contesting candidate.
771 Speeches made at political meetings held for canvassing votes must be examined in the context of the atmosphere of a Political campaign and the passions which are generally aroused in such a campaign.
In adjudging whether an appeal is made to the language of the candidate, a meticulous examination of the text of the speech in the serene atmos phere of the Court room picking out a word here and a phrase there to make out an offending appeal to vote for or against a candidate on the ground of language would not be permissible.
A general and overall picture of the speeches delivered by Sidhanti and other speakers at the meeting disclosed nothing more than a tale of political promises, exhortations and inducements to vote at the forthcoming election for Sidhanti.
It is not disputed that in 1957 there was a wide spread agitation in the State of Punjab against the enforcement of the education policy of the State, incorporated in the "Sachar formula".
Many persons were imprisoned or detained in the cause of the agitation for individual acts done by them.
But the movement was not and could not be declared illegal.
It is common ground that in the Harriana region, Hindi is the predominant language of the people and if a section of the people thought that compelling the students in the Hariana region to learn Punjabi was not in their interest and in the election campaign such a view was advocated and votes were canvassed on the promise that the candidate if elected will take steps to conserve the language of the region, it would be difficult to hold that appeal as amounting to a corrupt practice.
It is open to a candidate in the course of his election campaign to criticise the policies of the Government including its language policy and to make promises to the electorate that if elected he will secure a reversal of that policy or will take measures in the Legislature to undo the danger, real, apprehended or even fancied, to the language of the people.
The object of the Hariana Lok Samiti was evidently to resist the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana region and that object appears to have been made the platform in the election campaign.
Thereby it could not be said that the voters were asked not to vote for Daulta on the ground of his language, assuming that it was other than 772 Hindi.
Nor can it be said that it was an appeal to the voters to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language.
The evidence which has been referred to by the High Court regarding the speeches made by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on December 10, 1961, at Beri on the face of it shows that the speeches were an attack against Daulta in respect of his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs.
The speeches made at the meetings at Sampla, Ladpur and Majra Dubaldhan read like political harangues addressed to the electorate to vote for the candidate who would protect the language of the people of Hariana.
At Bahadurgarh also Sidhanti is stated to have claimed that he was opposed to the Government and its supporter Daulta in the matter of the language movement.
The evidence also showed that Sidhanti had appealed to the voters to vote for him because he was actively associated with the Hindi agitation movement and that he was championing the cause of Hindi and ' resisting the imposition of a rival language Punjabi and thereby suggesting that Daulta was hostile to the cause of Hindi language and was supporting the Punjabi language.
The criticism by 'Sidhanti in his appeal to the electorate related to the political leanings of Daulta, and his support to the policy of the Government and wag not personally directed against him.
Nor did Sidhanti appeal to the voters to vote in his favour on account of his language.
Such political speeches espousing the cause of a particular language and making promises or asking the people to protest against the Government of the day in respect of its language policy is not a corrupt practice within the description of corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act.
We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that Sidhanti was guilty of any corrupt practice under section 123 (3) by appealing for votes on the ground of his language or by asking the voters to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of his language.
The appeal will therefore be allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal restored with costs in this Court and the High Court.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant was declared elected to the House of the People from a parliamentary constituency.
The respondent No. 1 challenged the election of the appellant on the ground that the appellant, his election and other agents committed many corrupt practices falling within section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The main grievance of respondent No. was that the appellant and his agents had made appeals to the electorate to vote for him or to refrain from voting for Daulta (Respondent No. 1) "on the ground of his religion and language", and that the appellant and his agents use a religious symbol a flag called "Om Dhwaj" in all the election meetings.
The case of the appellant was that the flag was not a religious symbol and denied that it was used on any occasion by him or his agents and submitted that it was used only by one person who was always accustomed to carry it on his motor car.
The appellant also pleaded that an appeal to the electorate on the ground of language or religion did not amount to a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 of the Act.
The Tribunal dismissed the election petition of respondent No. I but the High Court allowed the appeal and declared the election of the appellant void under section 100(1)(b) of the Act.
Hence the appeal.
Held (i) The use of or appeal to the national or religious symbols to be a corrupt practice must be made by the candidate or his election agent, or by some other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, before it can be regarded as a ground for declaring the election void.
(ii) 'Om 'is regarded by Hindus as having high spiritual or mystical efficacy:it is used at the commencement of the recitations of religious prayers.
But the attribute of spiritual significance will not necessarily impart to its use on a flag the character of a religious symbol within the meaning of section 123.
A symbol stands for or represents something material or abstract.
To be a religious symbol, there must be a visible representation of a thing or concept which is religious.
To 'Om ' high spiritual or mystical efficacy is undoubtedly ascribed, but its use on 751 a flag does not symbolise religion or anything religious.
The High 'Court errd in holding that the 'Om ' flag was a religious symbol and its use in an election comes within the purview of cl.
(3) of section 123 of the Act.
(iii)Clause (3) of section 123 of the Act must be read in the light of the fundamental right which is guaranteed by article 29(1) of the Constitution; the clause cannot be read as trespassing upon The fundamental right under article 29(1).
Article 29(1) of the Constitution has conferred the Tight, among others, to conserve their language upon the citizens of India.
Right to conserve the language of the citizens includes the right to agitate for protection of the language.
Political agitation for conservation of the language of a section of the citizens cannot therefore be regarded a a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(3) of the Act.
Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Ors.
vs Lachhi Ram and Ors., [1955]1 S.C.R. 608, distinguished.
(iv)The corrupt practice defined by cl.
(3) of section 123 is committed when an appeal is made either to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of a candidate 's language.
It is the appeal to the electorate on a ground personal to the candidate relating to his language which attracts the ban of section 100 read with section 123(3).
Therefore it is only when the electors are asked to vote or not to vote because of the particular language of the candidate that a corrupt practice may be ,deemed to be committed.
Where, however, for conservation of language of the electorate appeals are made to the electorate and promises are given that steps would be taken to conserve that language, making of such appeals or promises will not amount to a corrupt practice.


judgement:
Appeal No. 491 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 17, 1961 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 226 of 1960.
B. Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant.
section T. Desai, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder 4Narain, for the respondent.
February 19, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J.
Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. hereinafter called 'the Company ' was incorporated under the Companies Act of the former Indian State of Bhopal.
In 1953 the State of Bhopal which was then a Part 'C ' State under the Constitution of India enacted "The Bhopal State Agricultural Income tax Act, IX of 1953" providing for imposition and levy of tax on agricultural income.
The Act was applied to the territory of the entire State of Bhopal and was brought into force on July 15, 1953.
By the (No. 67 of 1956), territory of the Part 'C ' State of Bhopal was incorporated with effect from November 1, 1956, into the newly formed State of Madhya Pradesh.
Section 119 of the , enacted that by the constitution of the reorganized State, no change in the laws in force which immediately before November 1, 1956, extended or applied to any constituent regions, was effected, and territorial references in the laws to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority be construed as meaning, the territories within that State immediately before November 1, 1956.
By the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, promulgated by the 849 Government of the State, all laws in force in the regions which were newly incorporated into the reorganised State St,, of Madhya Pradesh were, with certain adaptations and modifications specified in the Order, to remain in force in those areas until altered, repealed or amended, and by that Order the Bhopal Act IX of 1953 continued to remain applicable in the territory of the former Bhopal State, in the new State of Madhya Pradesh.
Later the Legislature of the Madhya Pradesh State enacted the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, extending several Acts Central as well as State to the entire territory of the State, but no alteration was made in the territorial operation of Bhopal Act IX of 1953.
It is common ground that in the remaining territory of the State of Madhya Pradesh there was no law providing for levy of tax on agricultural income.
The Company paid and continued to pay tax assessed under the Bhopal State Agricultural Income tax Act, 1953, till some time in 1960.
On August 4,1960, the Company presented a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur for a writ declaring that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 was unconstitutional and void as being discriminatory and for appropriate directions, writs or orders restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from giving effect to the Act.
It was claimed by the Company that Bhopal Act IX of 1953 deprived the residents of the territory to which it applied, of the protection of article 14 of the Constitution.
The High Court upheld the plea of the Company and issued a writ restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the provisions of Bhopal Act IX of 1953, observing that the Act was "in clear contravention of the petitioner 's right under article 14 of the Constitution and must be declared void".
Authority of the Part C State of Bhopal to enact the Act, as it originally stood, is not in dispute, nor are the provisions of section 119 of the and the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, challenged as incompetent.
The plea that there is infringement of article 14 of the Constitution is advanced on the sole ground that in the reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh formed under the 134 159 S.C. 54 850 , agricultural income tax is ,,levied within the territory of the former State of Bhopal and not in the rest of the territories of Madhya Pradesh.
Prima facie, a differential treatment is accorded by the State of Madhya Pradesh to persons carrying on agricultural operations in the Bhopal region, because the State subjects them to pay tax on agricultural income, which is not imposed upon agricultural income earned in the rest of the State.
But that by itself cannot be a ground for declaring the Act ultra vires.
The State is undoubtedly enjoined by article 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory, but a proper classification bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute does not on that account become impermissible.
All persons who are similarly circumstanced as regards a subject matter are entitled to equal protection of the laws, but it is not predicated thereby that every law must have universal application irrespective of dissimilarity of objects or transactions to which it applies, or of the nature or attainments of the persons to whom it relates.
The Legislature has always the power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is intended to operate.
Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute.
This Court has held in several cases, that where application of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on those historical reasons would be upheld: Bhaiyalal Shukla vs State of Madhya Pradesh(1): The State of Madhya Pradesh vs The Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and others(2): Maharaj Kumar Prithvi Rai and another vs The State of Rajasthan and others ( 3 ) and Anand Prasad Lakshminiwas Ganeriwal vs State of Andhra Pradesh(4).
The decision of this Court in The State of Rajasthan vs Rao Manohar Singhji(5) does not lay down (1) [1962] Suppl.
2 section C. R. 257.
(2) (3) C.A. Nos.
327 328 of 1956 decided on Nov. 2, 1960.
(4) AIR 1963 section C. 853.
(5) ; 851 any contrary principle.
In that case the Court accepted that historical reasons may justify differential treatment of separate geographical regions provided it bears a reasonable and just relation to the matter in respect of which it is proposed, but the differentiation in that case was regarded as infringing the equal protection of the laws because members of the same class were treated in a manner ex facie discriminatory, and no attempt was made by the State to justify the treatment as founded upon a rational basis having a just relation to the impugned statute.
It is necessary to bear in mind that the various adminis trative units which existed in British India were the result of acquisition of territory by the East India Company from time to time.
The merger of Indian States since 1947 brought into the Dominion of India numerous Unions or States, based upon arrangements ad hoc, and the constitu tional set up in 1950 did not attempt, on account of diverse reasons mainly political, to make any rational rearrangement of administrative units.
Under the Constitution as originally promulgated there existed three categories of States, beside the centrally administered units of the Andaman and Nicobar islands.
Part 'A ' States were the former Governors ' Provinces, with which were merged certain territories of the former Indian States to make geographically homogeneous units : Part 'B ' States repre sented groups formed out of 275 bigger Indian States by mutual arrangement into Unions : Part 'C ' States were the former Chief Commissioners ' Provinces.
These units were continued under the Constitution merely because they formerly existed.
Later an attempt was made under the to rationalize the pattern of administration by reducing the four classes of units into two States, and Union territories and by making a majority of the States homogeneous linguistic units.
But in the States so reorganized were incorporated regions governed by distinct laws, and by the mere process of bringing into existence reorganized administrative units, uniformity of laws could not immediately be secured.
Administrative reorganization evidently could not await adaptation of laws, so as to make them uniform, and 852 immediate abolition of laws which gave distinctive character to the regions brought into the new units was politically inexpedient even if theoretically possible.
An attempt to secure uniformity of laws before reorganisation of the units would also have considerably retarded the process of reorganisation.
With the object of effectuating a swift transition, the made a blanket provision in section 119 continuing the operation of the laws in force in the territories in which they were previously in force notwithstanding the territorial reorganisation into different administrative units until the competent Legislature or authority amended, altered or modified those laws.
The reorganized State of Madhya Pradesh was formed by combining territories of four different regions.
Shortly after reorganisation, the Governor of the State issued the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order, 1956, so as to make certain laws applicable uniformly to the entire State and later the Legislature by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, made other alterations in the laws applicable to the State.
But Bhopal Act IX of 1953 remained unamended and unaltered : nor was its operation extended to other areas or regions in the State.
Continuance of the laws of the old region after the reorganisation by section 119 of the was by itself not discriminatory even though it resulted in differential treatment of persons, objects and transactions in the new State, because it was intended to serve a dual purpose facilitating the early formation of homogeneous units in the larger interest of the Union, and maintaining even while merging its political identity in the new unit, the distinctive character of each region, till uniformity of laws was secured in those branches in which it was expedient after full enquiry to do so.
The laws of the regions merged in the new units had therefore to be continued on grounds of necessity and expediency.
Section 119 of the was intended to serve this temporary purpose, viz., to enable the new units to consider the special circumstances of the diverse units, before launching upon a process of adaptation of laws so as to make them reasonably uniform, keeping in view the special needs 853 of the component regions and administrative efficiency.
Differential treatment arising out of the application of the laws so continued in different regions of the same reorga nised State, did not therefore immediately attract the clause of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination.
But by the passage of time, considerations of necessity and expediency would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified classification of geographical regions for historical reasons may cease to be valid.
A purely temporary provision which because of compelling forces justified differential treatment when the Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assume permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without a rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity have disappeared.
The High Court observed that even though the State had enacted the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, and had removed diversity in some of the laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal State and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural income tax.
This in the view of the High Court was unlawful because the State had since the enactment of the sufficient time and opportunity to decide whether the continuance of the Bhopal State Agricultural Incometax Act in the Bhopal region would be consistent with article 14 of the Constitution.
We are unable to agree with the view of the High Court so expressed.
It would be impossible to lay down any definite time limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution.
That initially there was a ' valid geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted.
But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful discrimination in view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into the continuance of the grounds on which the inequality could rationally be founded, and the change of circumstances, if any.
which obliterated the compulsion of expediency 854 and necessity existing at the time when the.
Reorganisation Act was enacted.
Unfortunately there was no clear perception by the parties of what has to be pleaded and proved to establish a plea of denial of equal protection of the laws.
The Company merely assumed that the existence of a law relating to taxation which imposed agricultural income tax in the Bhopal region, there being no similar levy in the rest of the State, was in law discriminatory.
That is clear from the petition of the Company which merely asserted that the Act discriminated between the Company and other owners of sugarcane farms in the State of Madhya Pradesh, because it singled out the Company and other agriculturists in the Bhopal region from other agriculturists and sugarcane farm owners in the State of Madhya Pradesh and subjected them to liability without any reasonable basis for classification.
The Company therefore baldly submitted that after the incorporation of the Bhopal region in the reorganised State, the State of Madhya Pradesh ought to have suitably modified the Act so as to make it applicable to all residents alike and by allowing the Act to operate without any modification, the State had violated the fundamental right of the Company under article 14 of the Constitution.
The State of Madhya Pradesh did not file any affidavit in reply before the High Court, and chose to defend the petition as if its decision depended on a pure question of law, that if for historical reasons the Act in operation in a region incorporated in the new State was not discriminatory at the date when the reorganisation took place, it can never become discriminatory thereafter.
The assumptions made by both the parties appear to be erroneous.
The High Court was of the view that after expiry of a reasonable period during which the State has the opportunity of making necessary adaptations ,so as to make the Act applicable to the entirety of the new State, if the State fails to adapt the law, historical considerations which initially justified the classification must be deemed to have disappeared.
That assumption without further enquiry may not be accepted as correct.
It was necessary for the High Court to investigate whether at the date when the petition was filed, special treatment of the 855 Bhopal region in the matter of levy of agricultural income tax had a rational basis.
That necessitated an enquiry into the structure of tax burden imposed directly or indirectly on or in respect of agricultural land or income from it in the different regions constituting the State.
If for instance, on account of disparity in the impost of land revenue and related taxes on land and income from land in other regions, the ultimate burden on persons in the Bhopal region who were subjected to agricultural income tax and agricultural land owners in the rest of the State did not disclose a pattern of wide variations, the mere existence of agricultural income impost in one region, and absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination.
It was therefore necessary to ascertain the difference in the overall tax liability between persons similarly situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of levy of agricultural tax.
For that purpose an investigation was necessary whether the incidence of total burden on agriculturists was so desparate that an inference of unlawful discrimination may reasonably be made.
The High Court had to ascertain the impact of diverse land taxes imposed on agricultural land in the four regions of the State, and whether the burden between persons similarly circumstanced was substantially dissimilar.
and whether continuance of dissimilar levies was justified.
If upon a thorough examination of the pattern of land taxes in different regions of the State, it appeared to the Court that an unreasonably larger burden was sought to be continued upon this region, without any apparently justifiable ground, an inference of discrimination may arise.
In adjudging reasonableness of classification for the purpose of taxation, the Courts recognise greater freedom in the Legislature and if the statute discloses a permissible policy of taxation, the Courts will uphold it.
The Courts undoubtedly lean more readily in favour of the presumption of constitutionality of a taxing statute, but that is not to say that they will not strike down a statute unless it appears that the tax was imposed deliberately with the object of differentiating between persons similarly circumstanced.
We may state that the observations to the contrary that it 856 matters of taxation a statute may not be struck down "unless the Court finds that" the tax "has been imposed with a deliberate intention of differentiating between individual and individual" in The State of Madhya Pradesh vs The Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and another(1) was not strictly necessary for deciding that case, and was not intended to lay down any special test applicable to taxing statutes in their relation to article 14 of the Constitution.
To arrive at a conclusion adverse to the State it was therefore necessary to decide whether the differentiation arising from the continuation of the levy of the agricultural income tax was unfair and not supported by a reasonable standard, and the State having the requisite information and opportunity to make the imposts reasonably uniform, had failed or neglected to do so.
No set formula can be devised for solving a problem of this character.
It cannot be said that because a certain number of years have elapsed or that the State has made other laws uniform, the State has acted improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon a class of citizens more harshly than upon others.
The petition filed by the Company was singularly deficient in furnishing particulars which would justify the plea of infringement of article 14 of the Constitution.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that to make out a case of denial of the equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient.
An applicant pleading that equal protection of the laws has been denied to him must make out that not only he had been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made.
A mere plea that the Company and other agriculturists within the region of the former Bhopal State had to pay the agricultural income tax, whereas the agriculturists elsewhere had not to pay such tax, is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of the funda mental right under article 14 of the Constitution.
The State also did not place evidence before the High Court, which would in the very nature of things be in its (1) 857 possession, showing a rational relation between the differ ential treatment and the classification and has also not placed any material before the Court throwing light on the question whether the continuance of the tax was justified : it merely chose to plead its case as on a demurrer.
Both the State and the Company have by inadequate appreciation of the true position in law contributed to the manner in which the trial of the petition has proceeded.
We would in the circumstances not be justified in dismissing the petition on a technical view of the burden of proof.
We think that this is a case in which the parties should be given an opportunity to plead their respective cases adequately and to go to trial after the requisite evidence which has a bearing is brought before the Court.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order and remand the case for retrial to the High Court.
The High Court, will, if the Company so desires, give opportunity to the Company to amend its petition so as to adequately plead its case of infringement of the fundamental right to equal protection of the laws supported by necessary particulars.
The High Court will also give opportunity to the State to file its affidavit in reply and to place all such materials as it may rely upon the plea set up by the Company.
After the pleadings are completed and the evidence is brought on the record, the High Court will proceed to decide the case according to law.
Costs in this Court will be the costs in the petition before the High Court.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The respondent, a company incorporated in the former State of Bhopal, presented a petition in August 1960 under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for a writ restraining the State of Madhya Pradesh from enforcing the Bhopal State Agricultural Income tax Act, 1953, claiming that the Act contravened the respondent 's right under article 14 of the Constitution.
By the the territory of the State of Bhopal was 847 incorporated from November 1, 1956 into the newly formed State of Madhya Pradesh.
The by section 119 continued the operation of the laws in force in the territories in which they were previously in force until the competent legislature or authority amended, altered or modified these laws.
Shortly after the reorganisation.
the Madhya Pradesh Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 was issued so as to make certain laws applicable uniformly to the entire State and later the Legislature by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958 made other alterations in the laws applicable to the State.
But Bhopal Act 11 of 1953 remained unamended or unaltered: nor was its operation extended to the other areas or regions in the State with the result that Agricultural Income tax was levied within the territory of the former State of Bhopal and not in the rest of the territory of the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The High Court held that the provisions of Bhopal Act 11 of 1953 contravened article 14 of the Constitution and observed that though the State had removed diversity in some of the laws of the component regions, no attempt was made to remove discrimination between the territory of the former Bhopal State and the rest of the territories of the State of Madhya Pradesh with respect to this law.
Held: (i) Where application of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical classification founded on those historical reasons would be upheld.
The legislature has always the power to make special laws to attain particular objects and for that purpose has authority to select or classify persons, objects or transactions upon which the law is intended to operate.
Differential treatment becomes unlawful only when it is arbitrary or not supported by a rational relation with the object of the statute.
Bhaiyalal Shukla vs State of Madhya Pradesh, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257, The State of Madhya Pradesh vs The Gwalior Sugar Co., , Maharaj Kumar Prithivi Rai vs State of Rajasthan, C.A. Nos.
327 328, dated 2 11 1960 and Anand Prasad Lakshminivas Ganeriwal vs State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 853.
relied on.
State of Rajasthan vs Rao Manohar Singhji, [1954] S.C.R. 996, explained.
(ii) It would be impossible to lay down any definite time limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution.
It cannot be said that because a certain number of years have elapsed or that the State has made other laws uniform, the State has acted improperly in con tinuing an impost which operates upon a class of citizens more harshly than upon others.
(iii) To make out a case of denial of the equal protection of laws under article 14, a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient.
An applicant pleading such denial must make out that not only he 848 had been treated differently from others but he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment is Unjustifiably made.


judgement:
Appeal No. 119 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 16, 1961 of the Deputy Custodian General, New Delhi in Appeal No. 172 A /SUR/ 1960.
M. C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant.
C. K. Daphtary, Attorney General, K. section Chawla and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.
February 19, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Deputy Custodian General, and the question involved is whether the appellant is liable to pay Rs. 85,000/ to the Custodian.
The matter has a long history behind it which it is necessary to set out in order to understand the point now in dispute in the present appeal.
The money in question was deposited with the appellant by his sister as far back as January 1946.
The total amount deposited was Rs. 90,000/ , but the appellant 's sister took back Rs. 5,000/ , with the result that the balance of Rs. 85,000/ remained deposited with the appellant.
The appellant 's sister thereafter migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to August 840 1949.
Sometime later, the Assistant Custodian General called upon the appelant to pay this sum lying in deposit under section 48 of the , No. XXXI of 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
The appellant contested the matter on the ground that the money had been given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January 1949 long before his sister had migrated to Pakistan, and therefore the amount could not be recovered from him.
The Assistant Custodian however directed the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue under section 48 of the Act, as it then stood.
The matter was taken in appeal before the Custodian, Saurashtra, but the appeal failed.
The appellant then went in revision to the Custodian General, and the revision also failed.
Then followed a writ petition by the appellant before the Saurashtra High Court in 1955.
The writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge; but on Letters Patent Appeal the appellant succeeded, the High Court holding that the amount was not recoverable under section 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.
This decision was given on December 9, 1957.
In the meantime, section 48 had been amended on October 22, 1956 and we shall refer to this amendment in due course.
After the appellant had succeeded in the High Court, another notice of demand was served on him by the Assistant Custodian on January 22, 1958, and after hearing the objec tions of the appellant, the Assistant Custodian again directed the amount to be recovered.
The appellant then took the matter in appeal to the Custodian General.
The Custodian General allowed the appeal in August 1958 and remanded the proceedings for further enquiry as directed by him.
The Custodian General then held that section 48 as amended applied to the fresh proceedings which began on the notice issued by the Assistant Custodian in January 1958.
He further held that the amount was recoverable under the amended section 48 provided it was due to the evacuee on the date the property of the evacuee vested in the Custodian.
He was therefore of opinion that it would have to be determined when the sister of the appellant migrated and whether the amount was due to her on the date of her migration and had.
not become barred by the law of Iimitation on that date.
Ho was further 841 of opinion that the question whether the transaction amounted to a loan or a deposit had to be determined as there were different periods of limitation for these two types of transactions.
He therefore remanded the matter for disposal after finding the facts in accordance with the directions given by him.
After the remand further evidence was taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appellant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when the property vested in the Custodian.
Thereupon the appellant again went in appeal to the Custodian General and that appeal was dismissed on February 6, 1961.
Then the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
Two questions have been urged before us on behalf of the appellant.
The first is whether the amended section 48 can be applied to the present case.
The second is whether the claim of the Custodian is barred even on the basis of the transaction between the appellant and his sister being a deposit and not a loan.
The amended section 48 came into the Act by Act No. 91 of 1956 from October 22, 1956 and runs as follows: "48.
Recovery of certain sums as arrears of land revenue: (1) Any sum payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of any evacuee property, under any agreement, express or implied, lease or other document or other#vise howsoever, may be recovered in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
(2) If any question arises whether the sum is payable to the Government or to the Custodian within the meaning of sub section (1), the Custodian shall, after making such inquiry as he may deem fit, and giving to the person by whom the sum is alleged to be payable an opportunity of being heard, decide the question; and the decision of the Custodian shall, subject to any appeal or revision under this Act, be final and shall not be called in question by any court or other authority 842 (3) For the purpose of this section, a sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force relating to limitation of action.
" It will be seen that this is mainly a procedural section replacing the earlier section 48 and lays down that sums payable to the Government or to the Custodian can be recovered thereunder as arrears of land revenue.
The section also provides that where there is any dispute as to whether any sum is payable or not to the Custodian or to the Government, the Custodian has to make an inquiry into the matter and give the person raising the dispute an opportunity of being heard and thereafter decide the question.
Further, the section makes the decision of the Custodian final subject to any appeal or revision under the Act and not open to question by any court or any other authority.
Lastly the section provides that the sum shall be deemed to be payable to the Custodian notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by the Indian Limitation Act or any other law for the time being in force relating to limitation of action.
Sub sections (1) and (2) are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act.
It is well settled that procedural amendments to a law apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an anterior date.
Therefore, when the Assistant Custodian issued notice to the appellant on January 22, 1958 claiming the amount from him, the recovery could be dealt with under sub sections
(1) and (2) of the amended section 48, as they are merely procedural provisions.
But it is urged on behalf of the appellant that sub section
(1) in terms does not apply to the present case, and if so, sub section
(2) would also not apply.
The argument is that under sub section
(1) it is only any sum payable to the Government or to the Custodian in respect of any evacuee property which can be recovered as arrears of land revenue.
843 Therefore, the argument runs, evacuee property itself cannot be recovered under sub section
(1), for that sub section only provides for recovery of any sum payable in respect of any evacuee property.
In this connection reference has been made to section 9 of the Act, which lays down that if any person in possession of any evacuee property refuses or fails on demand to surrender possession thereof to the Custodian, the Custodian may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary for taking possession of such property and may, for this purpose, after giving reasonable warning and facility to any woman not appearing in public to withdraw, remove or break open any lock, bolt or any door or do any other act necessary for the said purpose.
The argument is that the Custodian can only take action for recovery of evacuee property under this section.
We are of opinion that the argument is misconceived.
Section 9 deals with the recovery of immovable property or specific movable property which can be physically seized; it does not deal with incorporeal evacuee property which may vest in the Custodian and which, for example, may be of the nature of an actionable claim.
So far as actionable claims are concerned, they are dealt with by section 48 as amended read with section 10 (2) (i).
It is also a misconception to think that the amount of Rs. 85,000/ which is involved in this case is actually evacuee property.
It is true that under section 48 as amended, the Custodian can take action for recovery of such sums as may be due in respect of any evacuee property and if the sum of Rs. 85,000/ which was deposited with the appellant is actually evacuee property, the Custodian may not be able to take action under section 48 (1) and (2) in respect of the same.
But the property which vested in the Custodian was not the actual money in specie lying with the appellant who must be treated as a banker with respect to the property with him , on the other hand the property which vested in the Custodian would be the right of the appellant 's sister to recover the amount from the appellant and that would be incorporeal property in the form of an actionable claim.
It is in respect of that actionable claim that the Custodian can proceed under section 48, sub sections
(1) and (2), to recover the sum payable to him in respect of that property, namely, the actionable claim.
The contention of the appellant that section 48 (1) will not apply to the recovery of this sum of money must 844 therefore fail and the Custodian would have the right to recover this sum of money as it is payable in respect of the evacuee property of the appellant 's sister, namely, the right which she had to recover the sum from the appellant, and it is this right which vested in the Custodian.
The Custodian could not take action under section 9 by physically seizing the amount because the amount cannot be treated as specific property which is liable to be seized under that section.
If the appellant 's sister had the right to recover this amount from the appellant that right would be incorporeal property which would vest in the Custodian and in respect of which action could be taken under section 48 as amended and not under section 9 of the Act.
The contention of the appellant that section 48, (1) and (2) do not apply to this case must therefore fail.
The next contention is that in any case treating the amount as a deposit the right to recover it had become barred and therefore the Custodian could not recover it under this section and that sub section
(3) of section 48 would not apply as it affects vested rights and is not procedural in nature and therefore could not be applied retrospectively.
Some dates would be relevant in this connection.
On the findings of the authorities concerned, it appears that the deposit was made sometime in January 1946.
The appellant 's sister migrated sometimes between June to August 1949.
According to the law in force in that area at the relevant time, on the date of migration of the appellants sister, she became an evacuee and her property would vest in the Custodian on such date.
So her right to recover this amount from the appellant would vest in the Custodian sometime between June to August 1949, if it was still alive under the law of limitation, even apart from the question that in such cases only the remedy is barred though the right remains.
Further as this was a deposit, limitation would run at the earliest from the date of demand and there is no evidence that any demand was made by the appellants sister for the return of the money before she migrated to Pakistan.
Therefore, the period of limitation had not even begun to run on the date the appellant 's sister migrated to Pakistan, assuming article 60 of the Limitation Act, No. 9 of 1908 applied.
Consequently the right of, the appel 845 lant 's sister to recover the amount vested in the Custodian and was not barred by limitation at the time when she became an evacuee.
The demand was made for the first time on January 10, 1952 by the Assistant Custodian and time would run from that date, at the earliest.
Then it is urged that even if the actionable claim vested in the Custodian, the demand in this case was made for the first time on January 10, 1952, and therefore under article 60 of the Limitation Act, the right to recover the amount would be barred in January 1955, and consequently no proceeding could be taken under section 48 to recover the same after January 1955.
It is further urged that the amended Act came into force on October 22, 1956 and sub section
(3) would only apply to such cases where the limitation had not expired before that date.
We do not think it necessary for purposes of the present appeal to decide the effect of sub section
(3) of section 48, for the appellant never contested before the authorities concerned that recovery could not be made tinder section 48 even if the amount was treated as a deposit.
What the appellant had contended before the authorities concerned was that the recovery would be barred as the amount was given to him.
, as a loan.
The appellant therefore cannot Dow for the first time in this Court take the plea that recovery could not be made under section 48 and sub section
(3) thereof would not apply even if the amount is treated as a deposit.
This contention thus raised in this Court for the first time raises a question as to the effect of sub section
(3) of section 48.
Besides the effect of section 48 (3), it is contended for the respondent that if this question had been raised before the proper authorities evidence might have been led to show that the recovery was not barred, for the case proceeded on ,he assumption that At. 60 of the Limitation Act applied and proper defences could have been raised as for example the conditions on which the deposit was made i.e. whether on demand or other wise and acknowledgements of liability made by the appel lant.
Such defence would have raised questions of fact which have never been investigated.
Therefore it is urged that the appellant should not be allowed to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was treated is a deposit and should be confined to his case 846 that this was a loan and not a deposit, for he never pleaded at any time before the authorities concerned that even if it was a deposit the recovery would be barred by time.
We are of opinion that there is force in this contention on behalf of the respondents and we are not prepared to allow the appellant to raise the question whether the recovery would be barred even if the amount is treated as a deposit.
In this view of the matter, it would not be necessary to consider the exact effect of section 48(3) and to decide whether it will apply even to cases where the recovery had become barred under the Limitation Act before October 22, 1956.
We therefore do not allow the appellant to raise the point that the recovery would be barred even if the amount was a deposit.
The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary:
Rupees 85,000/ was deposited with the appellant by his sister in January 1946.
The appellant 's sister migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to August 1949.
The Assistant Custodian called upon the appellant to pay this sum lying in deposit under section 48 of the .
The appellant pleaded that the amount could not be recovered from him because the money had been given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January 1949.
The Assistant Custodian rejected the contention of the appellant and directed him to pay the amount under section 48 of the Act, as it then stood.
This decision was affirmed in appeal as well as in revision.
Then the appellant moved a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the single Judge.
On Latters Patent Appeal the High Court held that the amount was not recoverable under section 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.
This decision was given on December 9, 1957.
In the meantime, section 48 had been amended on October 22, 1956.
On January 22, 1958 another notice of demand was served on the appellant by the Assistant Custodian.
The Assistant Custodian again directed the amount to be recovered The appellant preferred an appeal before the Custodian General.
The Custodian General allowed the appeal and remanded the proceedings for further enquiry as directed by him.
After the remand further evidence was taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appellant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when the property vested in the Custodian.
Thereupon the appellant preferred an appeal to the Custodian General and that appeal was dismissed.
Then the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which was granted.
Hence the appeal.
Held: (i) Sub sections 1 and 2 of the amended section 48 of the are clearly procedural and would apply to all cases which have to be investigated in accordance therewith after October 22, 1956, even though the claim may have arisen before the amended section was inserted in the Act.
It is well settled that procedural amendments to a law apply, in the absence of anything to the contrary, retrospectively in the sense that they apply to all actions after the date they come into force even though the actions may have begun earlier or the claim on which the action may be based may be of an anterior date.
In the present case when the Assistant Custodian issued notice to the appellant on January 22, 1958, claiming the amount from him, the recovery could be dealt with under sub sections
(1) and (2) of the amended a. 48, as they are merely procedural provisions.
(ii) In the present case the property which vested in the Custodian was not the actual money in specie lying with the appellant who must be treated as a banker with respect to the property with him; on the other hand the property which vested in the Custodian would be the right of the appellant 's sister to recover the amount from the appellant 839 and that would be incorporeal property in the form of an actionable claim.
It is in respect of that actionable claim that the Custodian can proceed under section 48 sub sections
(1) and (2), to recover the sum payable to him in respect of that property, namely, the actionable claim.
The Custodian could not take action under section 9 by physically seizing the amount because the amount cannot be treated as specific property which is liable to be seized under that section.
(iii) As this amount was a deposit, limitation would run at the earliest from the date of demand and there is no evidence that any demand was made by the appellant 's sister for the return of the money before she migrated to Pakistan.
Therefore, the period of limitation had not even begun to run on the date the appellant 's sister migrated to Pakistan, assuming article 60 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908 applied.
Consequently the right of the appellant 's sister to recover the amount vested in the Custodian and was not barred by limitation & the time when she became an evacuee.