judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 1978.
From the judgment and Order dated 13.4.1977 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1855 of 1975.
Dalveer Bhandari, C.P. Mittal and Pramod Swarup, for the Appellant/Petitioner.
R.K. Garg, S.C. Birla, Mukesh K. Giri, S.C. Patel, Syed Ali 955 Ahmad, Syed Tanweer Ahmad, Shaukat Hussain and Ms. Jayshree Ahmad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by OZA, J.
This appeal has been preferred by the State after obtaining leave from this Court against the acquittal of the respondents recorded by the High Court of Allahabad by its judgment dated 13th April 1977 hearing an appeal against the conviction of the respondents recorded by First Additional Sessions Judge, Etah convicting all the respond ents under Sec.
302 read with and 147 and sentenced to life, 10 years and 2 years rigorous imprison ment respectively to each one of the respondents.
The prosecution case at the trial was that on 27.10.1974 A.S.I. Om Prakash Sharma accompanied by two constables Gauri Shanker, P.W. 2 and Kanauji Lal, P.W. 4 went to village Nidhauli Khurd, which was at a distance of three miles from Kotwali Etah, and arrested one Laturi there at about 1 or 1.30 P.M. Virendra Nath, deceased, had helped them in ar resting the said Laturi.
The A.S.I. and the two constables returned to the Police Station Kotwali Etah with Laturi in custody at 6.50 P.M.
A few minutes later these constables, Gauri Shanker and Kanauji Lal, were given summons for serv ice on one Girish of Village Nidhauli Khurd.
So constables Gauri Shanker and Kanauji Lal returned to the Village Nid hauli Khurd the same evening at about 7.30 P.M. to serve the summons.
It is alleged that at that time the two constables were wearing police uniforms and Gauri Shanker was carrying his personal DBBL gun and a belt of cartridges.
While they were in the village, Virendra Nath, deceased, informed them that a bad character named Dharampuri was staying at the house of Bahori Gir, and it is alleged that the Station Officer Kotwali Etah had earlier told these constables that Dharampuri was a bad character (badmash) belonging to Agra District and that he had to be arrested.
When Virendra Nath informed these constables that 'Dharam puri was at the house of Bahori Gir, they went to the house of Bahori Gir and arrested Dharampuri at about 8.30 P.M. and after arresting him the two constables started for Etah with Dharampuri in custody and Virendra Nath, deceased, also accompanied them.
At about 9 P.M. when the constables accompanied by Virendra Nath, deceased and.
Dharampuri in custody reached near the field of one Matadin adjoining Etah Shikohabad road, the respondents armed 956 with spears, pharsas and lathis reached there with intention to rescue Dharampuri from the custody of the constables.
Seeing this constable Gauri Shanker fired a shot in the air with his private gun in order to scare away the respondents.
When this shot was fired the respondents stopped and the constables proceeded further.
It is alleged that thereafter the respondents also advanced and then `Gauri Shanker fired a second shot, again the respondents stopped for a while and the constables proceeded ahead.
And after a short time the respondents again advanced towards the police party and asked them to release Dharampuri.
It is alleged that at that time they threatened the constables and the constables refused to release Dharampuri and Gauri Shanker fired the third shot in order to deter the respondents.
Hearing the noise, the witnesses and some other persons reached the place, some of whom were carrying torches and flashing them.
It is alleged that it was also a moonlit night.
On this, according to the prosecution, the respondents assaulted the constables causing injuries to them and they rescued Dharam puri from the custody of the constables.
attempted to snatch the gun of the constable Gauri Shanker and it is then Virendra Nath intervened.
He also told them not to snatch the gun and also physically intervened to prevent them from snatching the gun and the belt of cartridges from the con stable.
In this he fell down and the respondents succeeded in snatching the gun and the belt of cartridges and in this scuffle Virendra Nath was assaulted and he received large number of injuries as a result of which he died on the spot.
The respondents, it is alleged, thereafter made good their escape and they also took away Dharampuri, the gun of con stable Gauri Shanker and the cartridges.
After the respondents went away, the brother of Viren dra Nath who had also arrived on the scene got a report written out by his younger brother Satish Chandra and lodged the report at the Police Station Kotwali Etah which was at a distance of about 3 miles at 10.15 P.M. the same night.
Constable Gauri Shanker was medically examined by Dr. R.R. Sharma at the district Hospital, Etah on the same night i.e. 27.10.1974 at 11 P.M. the doctor found 12 injuries on his person consisting of 5 lacerated wounds on the head, 5 contusions and two abrasions on different parts of his body.
Constable Kanauji Lal was medically examined the next morn ing i.e. on 28th Oct. 1974 at 10.15 a.m. and he was found to have two bruises and an abrasion.
Dr. R.P. Yadav performed the postmortem examination on the body of Virendra Nath.
He found two incised wounds, seven stab wounds, five lacerated wounds and sixteen contu sions on various parts 957 of his body.
All the respondents pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution examined 12 witnesses in support of the prosecu tion case, out of whom the informant Rajendra Nath, P.W. 1, Brahma Singh, P.W. 3 and the two constables Gauri Shanker P.W. 2 and Kanauji Lal, P.W. 4 are the eye witnesses.
The learned Judges of the High Court after considering the evidence of the witnesses especially the eye witnesses, the First Information Report, came to the conclusion that the respondents had collected and gone to Matadin 's field with the sole object to rescue Dharampuri and that they had not gone to that place with the intention of assaulting much less murdering Virendra Nath.
It was further found from the recital in the F.I.R. by the High Court that the respondents in the beginning tried simply to rescue Dharampuri from the custody and none of them assaulted either the constables or Virendra Nath and it was only when Constable Gauri Shanker fired 2 or 3 shots with his gun that he was assaulted and his gun and cartridges were snatched.
The learned Judges also observed "it is obvious that at that time when it must have been dark (except for the light of torches which were being flashed and which could not have produced any steady light) the appellants (respondents in this Court) could not have seen the direction in which the shots were fired.
So they may well have thought that they were being fired at and reasonably apprehended serious injuries to themselves." On reading of the F.I.R. the learned Judges rightly came to the conclusion that the respondents assaulted the constables only when one of the constables actually fired.
It was also found that none of the respondents made any attempt on the life of Virendra Nath till he himself intervened to help the constables.
In view of these findings reached by the High Court, it was found that the object of the respondents when they came to the field of Matadin was only to rescue Dharam puri and it was not their object to assault or murder any one.
This conclusion was reached by the learned Judges even after considering in detail the evidence of constables Gauri Shanker and Kanauji Lal.
Consequently the finding of fact reached by the High Court is that the respondents came to the place of occurrence with the sole object of rescuing Dharampuri from the custody of Constables Gauri Shanker and Kanauji Lal.
So far as these facts are concerned they are not much in dispute.
The learned counsel appearing for the appellant State contended that even if the arrest of Dharam puri was illegal the respondents had no right of private defence under Sec.
97 to rescue Dharampuri especially in view of Sec. 99 of the Indian Penal Code.
The learned Judges of the High Court also came to the con clu 958 sion that if arrest of Dharampuri was illegal it could not be said that the respondents when they collected with the object of rescuing him it could be said that they were members of an unlawful assembly or were committing rioting when they used force.
The High Court considered the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of arrest to come to a conclu sion as to whether it could be said that the arrest was lawful.
For that purpose the relevant provisions which has been considered is Sec.
41 of the Code of Criminal Proce dure, 1973.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the relevant provision is Sec.
41 clause (a).
The constables were told by the Police Officer and on that basis it could be suggested that a reasonable suspicion existed that Dha rampuri was concerned in some cognizable offence or that a reasonable complaint has been made.
High Court came to the conclusion that the police offi cer who is said to have told the constables has not been examined.
No material has been produced to indicate that there was any complaint of Dharampuri being involved in a cognizable offence nor any other material produced to indi cate that there was material for reasonable suspicion.
High Court on the basis of the material as it was came to the conclusion that the arrest was absolutely unjustified and not legal and in this view of the matter it was held that the respondents had a right to get Dharampuri rescued from the custody.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant State in view of the material as has appeared in evidence contended that even if it is held that the arrest was not legal he emphasised that in view of Sec.
99 I.P.C. right of private defence was not available to the respondents and it was contended that the judgment of the High Court could not be sustained.
The learned Judges of the High Court came to the conclu sion that as the arrest was not legal it could not be held that the respondents were members of an unlawful assembly when the sole object of theirs was to rescue Dharampuri who was wrongfully arrested by the constables.
They also came to the conclusion that the respondents did not use force till Constable Gauri Shankar fired not one but three shots one after another which was sufficient in the light of the circumstances of case for a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the respondents that their lives may be in danger and it is in this view that the High Court came to the conclusion that they were acting in the right of private defence.
97 I.P.C. reads thus: 959 "Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend First His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence against the human body.
Secondly The property whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against.
any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mis chief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
" The first part deals with the body against any offence affecting the human body either on the person himself or any other person and this will include an unlawful arrest also as an unlawful arrest is a offence against human body.
99 on which the emphasis was laid by the learned counsel, reads: "There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strict ly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is rome to have re course to the protection of the public author ities.
The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the pur pose of defence." In fact the first sentence of this section itself makes it clear that this section is only attracted where there is no reasonable apprehension of 960 death or grievous hurt and the emphasis laid by the High Court in its judgment on the fact that the respondents did not use force unless and until the constable shot three rounds which apparently will cause a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt in the minds of the respondents.
Once the circumstances justified such a reasonable apprehen sion the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant (State) that in such a situation even if the arrest was illegal the respondents could have taken recourse to use lawful methods for rescuing Dharampuri rather than resorting to violence.
This contention of the learned counsel could have some weight if the incident had not started after the constable fired three rounds from his gun.
Realising this difficulty an attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant State to contend that this constable, as his evidence discloses, fired shots in air just to frighten the respondents and the learned Judges of the High Court came to the conclusion that it was night and though torches were being flashed but there will not be consistent light and when the constable fired not one but three shots one after another the respondents naturally will have a reasonable apprehension of either death or grievous injury.
In order to contend that this finding reached by the High Court on facts is not justified, it was contended that it was a moonlit night, there were torches flashed but it is significant to see the circumstances which emerged from the evidence that the constables were moving with Dharampuri in custody and the deceased whereas the respondents were moving at some distance.
Even if it is accepted that it was a moonlit night, it could safely be inferred that the light may not be sufficient enough so that from a distance the respondents could notice the direction of the barrel of the gun when constable Gauri Shanker fired the shots.
It also appears from the prosecution evidence that the torches were flashed when there was a melee and other wit nesses reached hearing the shots and in such a situation the conclusion reached by the High Court that when this consta ble fired one after another three shots it was sufficient to cause reasonable apprehension in the minds of the respond ents of death or grievous injury and therefore they were entitled to right of private defence is justified.
The learned Judges of the High Court also considered the other aspects of the matter that if the respondents could not be held to be members of an unlawful assembly as their object at best could only be to rescue Dharampuri from unlawful custody, then even if the right of private defence is not accepted, it is not possible on the basis of the prosecution evidence to find out what respondent caused what injury 961 and it will not be possible to find them guilty for their individual acts.
The same will be the situation even if it is held that they exceeded the right of private defence.
Learned counsel for the appellant State took us through a discussion of evidence by the Sessions Judge and also by the High Court and also referred to relevant portions of the evidence of the prosecution.
Having gone through them, in our opinion, it could not be concluded that the learned Judges of the High Court committed an error in coming to the conclusion that when the respondents used force it was only after 3 shots were fired and therefore they were acting in the right of private defence and in this view of the matter the conclusions reached by the High Court, in our opinion, could not be assailed.
We therefore see no reason to enter tain this appeal.
It is therefore dismissed.
The acquittal recorded of all the respondents by the High Court is there fore maintained.
SLP (Crl.) No. 362/78 is also dismissed for the reasons state,d above.
P.S.S. Appeal dis missed.

summary:
The respondents, said to be armed with spears pharsas and lathis, were alleged to have assaulted the police party returning after apprehending a suspect villager, resulting in the death of the informer and grievous injuries to the constables, and to have secured the release of the suspect.
They were also alleged to have snatched the private gun and belt of cartridges from the constable.
The incident took place at night.
They were convicted by the trial court under section 302 read with section 149, and sections 395 and 147 I.P.C.
The High Court on appraising the evidence and the FIR came to the conclusion; (i) that the sole object of the respondents in going to the place of occurrence was only to rescue the suspect and not to assault or murder anyone; (ii) that the arrest of the suspect by the police was absolutely unjustified and not legal since no material had been pro duced either to indicate his involvement in a cognizable offence or for causing reasonable suspicion, therefore, the respondents had a right to get the suspect rescued from custody; (iii) that the respondents did not use force till one of the constables tried three shots, one after another, which was sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension of either death or grievous hurt in the minds of the respond ents, therefore they were acting in the right of private defence; (iv) that none of the respondents made any attempt on the life of the informer till he himself intervened to help the constable, and held that as such it could not be said that they were members of an unlawful assembly or were committing rioting when they used force.
In the premises, the Court recorded acquittal of the respondents.
954 In the appeal to this Court it was contended for the State: (1) that even if the arrest of the suspect was not legal, in view of section 99 I.P.C. right of private defence was not available to the respondents under section 97 I.P.C. and they could have taken recourse to use lawful methods for rescuing the suspect rather than resorting to violence; and (2) that there was no cause for reasonable apprehension of serious injuries to the respondents, for the constable had fired shots in the air just to frighten the respondents and since it was moonlit night the respondents could have seen the direction in which shots were fired.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: Section 99 of the Indian Penal Code is only at tracted where there is no reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
In the instant case.
the respondents did not use force unless and until one of the constables actual ly fired shots.
Even if it is accepted that it was a moonlit night, it could safely be inferred that the light may not be sufficient enough so that from a distance the respondents could notice the direction of the barrel of the gun when shots were fired.
In such a situation, the conclusion reached by the High Court that it was sufficient to cause reasonable apprehension in the minds of the respondents of death or grievous injury, and, therefore, they were entitled to right of private defence.
was justified.
[959H; 960E G] If the respondents could not be held to be members of an unlawful assembly as their object at best could only be to rescue the suspect from unlawful custody, then even if the right of private defence is not accepted, it is not possible on the basis of the prosecution evidence to find out what respondent caused what injury and it will not be possible to find them guilty for their individual acts.
The same will be the situation even if it is held that they exceeded the right of private defence.
[960G H; 961A]


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2730 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.12.1986 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A No. 1773 of 1986 (0 & M).
K.G. Bhagat and Sunil K. Jain for the Appellants.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The short question which arises for consideration in this case is whether under the provisions of the (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') a step son of a female dying intestate is entitled to claim a share in her property simultaneously with her son.
In other words the question involved is wheth er the word 'sons ' in clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 15 of the Act includes 'step sons ' also.
The facts involved in this Special Leave Petition are thus.
One Battan Singh who was also known as Badan Singh had two wives, namely, Mahan Kaur and Khem Kaur.
Mahan Kaur died during his life time after giving birth to two sons Lachman Singh (petitioner) and Gurdas Singh from the loins of Battan Singh.
Respondent No. 1 Kirpa Singh is the son of Battan Singh and Khem Kaur.
Gurdas Singh died during the life time of Battan Singh leaving behind his widow Gurbux Kaur and his son Amarjit Singh.
Battan Singh died intestate after the Act came into force.
On his death his property devolved on his heirs including his second wife Khem Kaur in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Thereafter Khem Kaur died.
On her death dispute arose between her son Kirpa Singh on the one side and Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbux Kaur on the other.
Kirpa Singh claimed the entire property left behind by Khem Kaur on the ground 936 that he was the only son of Khem Kaur.
Lachman Singh, Amar jit Singh and Gurbux Kaur claimed that Kirpa Singh was entitled to only one third share in the property of Khem Kaur, Lachman Singh was entitled to one third share and Amarjit Singh, who was the son of Gurdas Singh, was entitled to the remaining one third share.
Both the parties relied upon clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act.
While Kirpa Singh contended that the word 'sons ' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act meant only sons born of the body of the Hindu female dying intestate the others contended that the word 'sons ' in that clause included stepsons also.
In view of the above dispute Kirpa Singh filed a suit on the file of the Sub Judge 1st Class, Nakodar in the District of Jalandhar inter alia for a declaration that he was entitled to the entire property belonging to Khem Kaur against Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbux Kaur who contested the suit.
The trial court vide its judgment dated February 18, 1984 de creed the suit declaring that Kirpa Singh was entitled to the property belonging to Khem Kaur.
Lachman Singh preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court in R.C.A. No. 202 of 1985 on the file of the learned Additional Dis trict Judge, Jalandhar.
That appeal was dismissed on Febru ary 19, 1986.
The second appeal filed by him against the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, in R.S.A. No. 1773 of 1986 on the file of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana was also dismissed in limine on December 8, 1986.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court Lachman Singh has filed this petition for special leave under Arti cle 136 of the Constitution of India.
Section 15 of the Act, which is relevant for purposes of this case, reads thus: "15(1).
The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16 (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband; (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband; (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father; (d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
937 (2) Notwithstanding anything con tained in sub section ( 1 ), (a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father in law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daugh ter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified there in, but upon the heirs of the husband.
Section 15 of the Act deals with the general rules of suc cession in the case of female Hindus.
Sub section (1) of section 15 provides that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16 of the Act firstly, upon the sons and daugh ters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband; secondly, upon the heirs of the husband; thirdly, upon the mother and father; fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
Sub section (2) of section 15 of the Act arises for consideration only when a female Hindu dies intestate leav ing property without leaving behind her any son or daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and in that event any property inherited by her from her father or mother shall devolve not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) of section 15 of the Act in the order specified therein but upon the heirs of the father and any property inherited by her from her husband or from her father in law shall devolve not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) of section 15 in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband, Rule 1 of section 16 provides that among the heirs specified in sub section (1) of section 15 those in one entry shah be preferred to those in the succeeding entry and those includ ed in the same entry shall take simultaneously.
It is not necessary to refer to rule (2) and Rule (3) of section 16 of the Act for purposes of this ease.
The only question which is to be determined here is whether the expression 'sons ' in clause (2) of section 15(1) of the Act includes 938 step sons also, ie., sons of the husband of the deceased by another wife.
In order to decide it, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act.
Section 3(j) of the Act defines 'related ' as related by legitimate kinship but the proviso thereto states that illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and to one another, and their legitimate descendants shall be deemed to be related to them and to one another and that any word expressing relationship or denoting a relative shall be construed accordingly.
Section 6 and section 7 of the Act respectively deal with devolution of interest in coparcenary property and devolution of interest in the property of a tarwad, tavazhi, kutumba, kavaru and illom.
Sections 8 to 13 of the Act deal with rules of succession to the property of a male Hindu dying intestate.
We are concerned in this case with the rules of succession to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate.
Sections 15 and 16 of the Act are material for our purpose.
Ordinarily laws of succession to property follow the natural inclinations of men and women.
The list of heirs in section 15(1) of the Act is enumerated having regard to the current notions about propinquity or nearness of relationship.
The words 'son ' and 'stop son ' are not defined in the Act.
According to Collins English Dic tionary a 'son ' means a male offspring and 'step son ' means a son of one 's husband or wife by a former union.
Under the Act a son of a female by her first marriage will not succeed to the estate of her 'second husband ' on his dying intes tate.
In the case of a woman it is natural that a step son, that is, the son of her husband by his another wife is a step away from the son who has come out of her own womb.
But under the Act a step son of a female dying intestate is an heir and that is so because the family headed by a male is considered as a social unit.
If a step son does not fall within the scope of the expression 'sons ' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fall under clause (b) thereof being an heir of the husband.
The word 'sons ' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act includes (i) sons born out of the womb of a female by the same husband or by different husbands including illegitimate sons too in view of section 3(j) of the Act and (ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inheritance.
Children of any predeceased son or adopted son also fall within the meaning of the expression 'sons '.
If Parliament had felt that the word 'sons ' should include 'step sons ' also it would have said so in express terms.
We should remember that under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act, a step son, i.e., a son of the husband of a female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed to the stridhana of the female on her dying intestate.
In that case the son born out of her womb had precedence over a step son.
Parliament would have made express provision in the Act if it intended that there 939 should be such a redical departure from the past.
We are of the view that the word 'sons ' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act does not include 'step sons ' and that step sons fall in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in clause (b) thereof.
The decision of the Mysore (Karnataka) High Court in Mallappa Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others vs Shivappa and another, A.I.R. ; takes the view which we have expressed above.
According to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rama Ananda Patil vs Appa Bhima Redekar and Others, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 205 the emphasis in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act is on the aspect that the sons or the daughters are of her own body and not so much on the husband who was responsible for their birth and that therefore children of a female though by different husbands inherit her estate simultaneously.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has in Gumam Singh vs Smt.
Ass Kaur and Others, A.I.R. 1977 P & H 103 following the observations in the decisions of the Mysore and Bombay High Courts, referred to above, held that the word 'sons ' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act does not include a 'step son '.
The High Court of Calcut ta has also taken the same view in Smt.
Kishori Bala Mondal vs Tribhanga Mondal & Others, A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta 334.
It is true that the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view in Ram Katori vs Prakash Wati, I.L.R. 1968 (1) Allahabad 697.
In that case the facts were however slightly different, but the point involved was almost the same.
The facts of the case were as follows.
One Chandu Lal had mar ried a woman.
She died during the life time of Chandu Lal leaving behind her a daughter by Ram Katori.
Thereafter Chandu Lal married a second woman by name Ram Kali through whom he got a daughter by name Prakashwati.
Chandu Lal died in 1920 and on his death Ram Kali being his widow succeeded to his estate as a limited owner.
After the coming into force of the Act in 1956 her limited estate ripened into absolute estate and she became the full owner of the estate inherited by her from her husband.
Ram Kali died thereafter.
On her death Ram Katori, the daughter of Chandu Lal by his first wife contended that she was entitled to succeed simul taneously with Prakashwati to the estate of Ram Kali which originally belonged to her father and claimed one half share in it.
Her claim was resisted by Prakashwati stating that the word 'daughters ' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act did not include 'step daughters ' and that Ram Katori would fall under the category of the heirs of the husband and would be entitled to succeed either under clause (b) of section 15(1) or under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the Act and that too in the absence of 940 sons and daughters of Ram kali (including children of prede ceased sons and daughters).
It was further contended by Prakashwati that the fact that the property in question had formerly belonged to the husband of Ram Kali did not matter at all because Ram Kali had left behind her who was a daugh ter of her own body entitled to succeed under section 15(1)(a), and that Ram Katori being a step daughter could not claim under section 15(1)(a) of the Act.
The High Court of Allahabad felt that there was a distinction between clause (a) of section 15(1) and clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) of the Act in that whereas in section 15(1)(a) the words 'sons and daughters ' were unqualified, the words 'son or daughter ' in clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) were qualified by the words 'of the deceased ' and therefore conclusion was irresistible that the unqualified words 'sons and daughters ' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act indicated that they included also the children of her husband by another wife.
The High Court also appears to have been moved by the consideration that the opposite construction would be pat ently unfair to the children by her husband 's another wife since they would be deprived of their share in the property which originally belonged to their father.
We feel that neither of these reasons is correct.
The words 'sons and daughters . . and the husband ' in clause (a) of section 25(1) only mean 'sons and daughters . and the husband ' of the deceased.
They cannot be 'sons and daughters . and the husband ' of any body else.
All relatives named in the different clauses in sub section (1) of section 15 of the Act are those who are related to the deceased in the manner specified therein.
They are sons, daughters, husband, heirs of the husband, mother and father, heirs of the father and heirs of the mother of the deceased.
The use of the words 'of the deceased ' following 'son or daughter ' in clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (2) of section 15 of the Act makes no difference.
The words 'son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) ' in clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) of the Act refer to the entire body of heirs failing under clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act except the husband.
What clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (2) of section 15 of the Act do is that they make a distinction between devolution of the property inherited by a female Hindu dying intestate from her father or mother on the one hand and the property inherited by her from her husband and from her father in law on the other.
In the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter), in a case failing under clause (a) of section 15(2) of the Act the property devolves upon the heirs of the father of the deceased and in a case falling under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the Act the property devolves upon the heirs of the husband of the 941 deceased.
The distinction made by the High Court of Allaha bad on the ground of the absence or the presence of the words 'of the deceased ' in sub section (1) and sub section (2) of section 15 of the Act appears to be hyper technical and the High Court has tried to make a distinction where it does not actually exist.
The second reason, namely, that exclusion of 'step sons ' and 'step daughters ' from clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act would be unfair as they would thereby be deprived of a share in the property of their father is again not well founded.
The rule of devolu tion in section 15 of the Act applies to all kinds of properties left behind by a female Hindu except those dealt with by clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) which make a distinction as regards the property inherited by her from her parents and the property inherited from her husband or father in law and that too when she leaves no sons and daughters (including children of predeceased sons and daugh ters).
If the construction placed by the High Court of Allahabad is accepted then the property earned by the female Hindu herself or purchased or acquired by her would devolve on step sons and stepdaughters also along with her sons and daughters.
Is it just and proper to construe that under clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act her stepsons and step daughters, i.e., children of the husband by another wife will be entitled to a share along with her own children when the Act does not expressly says so? We do not think that the view expressed by the High Court of Allahabad represents the true intent of the law.
When once a property becomes the absolute property of a female Hindu it shall devolve first on her children (including children of the ' predeceased son and daughter) as provided in section 15(1)(a) of the Act and then on other heirs subject only to the limited change introduced in section 15(2) of the Act.
The step sons or step daughters will come in as heirs only under clause (b) of section 15(1) or under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the Act.
We do not, therefore, agree with the reasons given by the Allahabad High Court in support of its decision.
We disagree with this decision.
In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against whose decision this petition is filed was right in affirming the decree passed in favour of Kirpal Singh, Respondent No. 1 herein.
The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed.
A.P.J. Petition dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Battan Singh had two wives, namely, Mahan Kaur and Khem Kaur.
Mahan Kaur died during his lifetime after giving birth to two sons, Lachman Singh (petitioner) and Gurdas Singh.
Gurdas Singh pre deceased Battan Singh leaving behind his widow Gurbax Kaur and his son Amarjit Singh.
Respondent No. 1, Kirpa Singh is the son of the Battan Singh and Khem Kaur.
Battan Singh died intestate after the came into force and his property devolved on his heirs including his second wife Khem Kaur.
On her death, Kirpa Singh claimed her entire property on the ground that he was her only son.
Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbax Kaur claimed that Kirpa Singh was entitled to only 1/3rd share in the property of Khem Kaur, Lachman Singh was entitled to 1/3rd share and Amarjit Singh was entitled to the remaining 1/3rd share.
Kirpa Singh filed a suit for declaration that he was entitled to the entire property belonging to Khem Kaur against Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbax Kaur.
The trial Court decreed the suit.
The appeals filed by Lachman Singh before the Additional District Judge and in the High Court were dismissed.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, HELD: 1.
Ordinarily laws of succession to property follow the natural inclinations of men and women.
[938C D] 2.
The list of heirs in section 15(1) of the is enumerated having regard to the current notions about the propinquity 934 or nearness of relationship.
The words 'son ' and 'step son ' are not defined in the Act.
[938C D] 3.
Under the Act, a son of a female by her first mar riage will not succeed to the estate of her 'second husband ' on his dying intestate.
In the case of a woman it is natural that a step son, that is, the son of her husband by his another wife is a step away from the son who has come out of her own womb.
But under the Act a step son of a female dying intestate is an heir and that is so because the family headed by a male is considered as a social unit.
If a step son does not fail within the scope of the expression 'sons ' in cl.
(a) of section 15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fail under cl.
(b) thereof being an heir of the husband.
[938D F] 4.
The word 'sons ' in cl.
(a) of section 15(1) of the Act includes: (i) sons born out of the womb of a female by same husband or by different husbands including illegitimate sons too in view of section 3(j) of the Act, and (ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inheritance.
[938F G] 5.
Under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act, a step son, i.e. a son of the husband of a female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed to the stridhana of the female on her dying intestate.
In that case the the son born out of her womb had precedence over a step son.
Parliament would have made express provi sion in the Act if it intended that there should be such a radical departure from the past.
[938G H; 939A] 6.
The word 'sons ' in cl.
(a) of section 15(1) of Act does not include 'step sons ' and that step sons fail in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in cl.
(b) thereof.
[939A B] Mallappa Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others vs Shi vappa and another, A.I.R. ; Rama Ananda Patii vs Appa Bhima Redekar and Others, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 205; Gumam Singh vs Smt.
Ass Kaur and Others, A.I.R. 1977 P & H 103 and Smt.
Kishori Bala Mondal vs Tribhanga Mondal & Others, A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta 334 approved.
Ram Katori vs Prakash Nati L.L.R., [1968] 1 Allahabad 697, overruled.
The rule of devolution in section 15 of the Act applies to all kinds of properties left behind by a female Hindu except those dealt with by cls.
(a) and (b) of section 15(2) which make a distinction as regards the property 935 inherited by her from her parents and the property inherited from her husband or father in law and that too when she leaves no sons and daughters (including children of prede ceased sons and daughters).
[941B C] 8.
When once a property becomes the absolute property of a female Hindu it shall devolve first on her children (including children of the predeceased sons and daughter) as provided in section 15(1)(a) of the Act and then on other heirs subject only to the limited change introduced in section 15(2) of the Act.
The step sons or step daughters will come in as heirs only under cl.
(b) ors.
15(1) or under cl.
(b) or section 15(2) of the Act.
[941E F]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1278 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.1981 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Service Appeals of the Appellants.
V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Urmila Kapur and Ms. Janki Sriniva san for the Appellants.
Kapil Sibal and Ratbin Dass for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID, J.
1.
The appellants were the employees in the ministerial establishment of the Courts at Ferozepore and Zira having entered into service varying from the year 1952 to 1965.
They are members of the Punjab Civil Courts Clerks Association.
On 24th July, 1980, there was an incident in the Court of Shri N.S. Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Zira.
On that day, one Jagdish Lal, a Senior Ahmad of the Court was slapped.
He is one of the appellants in this appeal.
On the day he was slapped, he presented a represen tation to the District and Sessions Judge Shri Nehra.
An enquiry was directed to be held by the Senior Sub Judge, Ferozepore into the incident.
In this enquiry, it was found that Shri Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, Zira slapped Jagdish Lal.
This incident caused resentment in the Association and the Association, therefore, felt that something should be done to demonstrate this resentment.
Accordingly, it was decided by the Association that a request should be made to the District and Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, to transfer Jagdish Lal from the Court at Zira to any other Court so that calm could be restored.
The appellants among others met the District and Sessions Judge for this purpose on 28 71980.
It is alleged that the Sessions Judge did not accede to the request of the representatives of the Association to plead their case before him.
This aggravated the situation.
Though the association and their representatives including the appellants were keen to resolve the matter, the District and Sessions Judge adopted a hardened attitude.
The matter came to the notice of the High Court.
An enquiry by Justice S.P. Goyal of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was directed to be held and it was scheduled for 9th August, 1980.
He was to reach the Canal Rest House at 4.00 P.M., but he could reach only at 7.30 P.M.
At that time, the District and Sessions Judge, along with other Judicial 1010 officers were present to receive him.
A demonstration was organised by the subordinate Court officials.
There was continued slogan shouting from 4.00 P.M. till 7.30 P.M. before Justice Goyal 's arrival.
The appellants are said to have taken a prominent part in raising objectionable slo gans.
The slogans are: "N.S. Mundra Murdabad; N.S. Mundra Hai Hai; Dakia Mahajan Superintendent Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra naun Chalta Karo; Katal Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murdabad;" The appellants were charge sheeted for this conduct of theirs.
Justice Goyal alighted from his car and went inside the visiting room of the rest house.
He called the represen tatives of the Association.
Some of them met him.
They came out after the meeting.
There were other demonstrators wait ing for the result of the talks.
After they came back, those who raised slogans disbursed.
On 11th August, 1980, the District Judge sent a letter to Shri G.S. Khurana, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepore, to hold preliminary enquiry into the demonstration by the Court officials in front of the Canal Rest House and the slogans raised there.
Mr. Khurana recorded the statements of some officers on the same day and submitted his report on that very day itself.
Ac cording to his report, the appellants had taken a prominent part in raising objectionable slogans in question.
On the basis of this report, the District Judge placed the appel lants under suspension by his order dated 14 8 1980.
On 12th August, 1980, the District Judge had intimated the High Court about the finding in the preliminary report and had sought guidance of the High Court.
The appellants were supplied with the articles of the charges and statements of imputation etc.
They gave their replies.
While admitting that they had taken part in the demonstration on the day in question they denied that they had taken a prominent part in the demonstration as leaders in raising objectionable and defamatory slogans against their superior officers.
A formal enquiry was ordered against these appellants.
After a de tailed enquiry it was found that the appellants had contra vened inter alia Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 19.66.
and had thus acted prejudicially to the public order, decency and morality and thereby contra vened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966.
The District Judge, Ferozepore in his capacity as the punishing authority then served a show cause notice on all the appellants as to why the penalty of dismissal from serv ice be not imposed on them.
The appellants submitted their explanation.
After 1011 considering the replies, the District Judge, by his order dated 17.11.1980, imposed on them punishment of dismissal from service.
The appellants preferred a service appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh.
The High Court considered the various contentions raised by the appellants in detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit.
One of the employees who had also filed appeal before the High Court withdrew his appeal and is now reported to be practis ing law.
This appeal has, therefore, come up before us by special leave under Article 136, against the order of the Single judge in the above mentioned service appeal.
We have given only the bare facts in this judgment for the reason that this Court issued notice on the SLP for consideration of a preliminary point only which will be evident by the orders passed on 3.12.
198 1, 4 1 1982 and 2 4 1982.
"Order of the Court on 3 12 1981: Issue show cause notice on SLP returnable on 4 1 1982, on the question as to whether the High Court in disposing of the appeal of the petitioners was acting in administrative capacity or as a Tribunal or as High Court.
There will be interim injunction restraining the respondents from evicting petitioner No. 2 from Government accommodation held by him on the condition that the said petitioner contin ues to pay rent or compensation at hitherto charged, pending notice." "Order of the Court on 4.
1982: Special leave petition to be heard on the question whether the High Court in disposing of the appeal of the petitioners was acting in an administrative capacity under Article 235 or as a Tribunal or as the High Court.
The special leave petition to be heard on 9.2.1982 on this question.
Stay to continue till then." "Order of the Court on 2.4. 1982: Special leave granted.
Printing of records and filing of statement of case dispensed with.
Security dispensed with.
Appeal will be heard on present papers on the preliminary issue as to whether the High Court in disposal of appeal 1012 was acting in administrative capacity under Article 235 or as Tribunal or as a High Court and the circumstances in which the appeal was maintained, if so.
Hearing of appeal will be fixed on second Tuesday in July 1982 pre emptorily subject to overnight 's part heard.
" From the above orders it is clear that the question that is to be decided in this appeal is whether an appeal under Article 136 lies to this Court from the order under chal lenge.
That being so, it is necessary to consider the nature of the appeal before the High Court and the rules governing that appeal, before discussing the questions of law raised by the appellant 's counsel with reference to various author ities of this Court, to contend that article 136 was at tracted.
The appointment of the ministerial officers of the District Courts and Courts of Small Causes and their suspen sion and removal are provided under Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
That Section reads as follows: "35(1) The ministerial officers of the District Courts and Courts of Small Causes shall be appointed and,may be suspended or removed by the Judges of those Courts respec tively.
(2) The ministerial officers of all Courts controlled by a District Court, other than Courts of Small Causes, shall be appointed, and may be suspended or removed by the Dis trict Court.
(3) Every appointment under this section shall be subject to such rules as the High Court may prescribe in this behalf, and in dealing with any matter under this Section, a Judge of a Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the control of the District Court.
(4) Any order passed by a District Judge under this section shall be subject to the control of the High Court.
The High Court framed rules under this section for the subordinate services attached to or controlled by Dis trict Courts.
These rules apply to subordinate services attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court, namely to ministerial and menial establishment of District and Sessions Judge, Sub Judge and Courts of Small Causes.
Chap ter 1013 18 A of the rules is the one relevant for our purpose.
A close study of the scheme and the various provisions of Chapter 18 A would make it abundantly clear that the ap pointments, promotions, punishments etc.
of the ministerial officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court, were fully within the powers of the District and Sessions Judge subject to the control of the High Court.
Chapter 18 A is captioned 'control '.
Though there were changes effected by notifications issued by the State of Punjab regarding ap pointments, promotions in other services, after the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935, it is enough to note for our purpose that the appointment, promo tion and punishment of ministerial officials in the District or other Civil Courts continued to be governed by the rules in Chapter 18 A of the High Court Rules and Orders.
Control in chapter 18 A is the same as control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India deal with the High Courts ' control over the subordinate judiciary.
Article 227 deals with the power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court.
Its predecessor section in the Government of India Act, 1935 was Section 224 which dealt with administra tive functions of the High Court.
Article 233 deals with the appointment of District Judges and Article 234 with the recruitment of persons other than the District Judges to the judicial service.
Article 235 deals with the control over subordinate courts and the control under this Article is wider than the control under the corresponding provision of the Government of India Act.
For our purpose, it is suffi cient to note that Chapter 18 A contains provisions relating to the control of the High Court over the subordinate judi ciary.
For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only with Rules IX and X of the rules in Chapter 18 A. Rule IX deals with punishment.
We extract the entire section since it would be profitable to have a correct look at this sec tion.
"IX Punishment (1) The following penalties may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed upon members of the ministerial staff: (i) Censure, (ii) Fine of an amount not exceeding one month 's salary for misconduct or neglect in the performance of duties, 1014 (iii) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Govern ment by negligence or breach of orders, (iv) Withholding of increments or promo tion including stoppage at efficiency bar, (v) Suspension, (vi) Removal, and (vii) Dismissal.
(2)(a) Any of the above penalties may be inflicted by the District Judge on the minis terial officers of his own Court of any Court subordinate to him other than a Court of Small Causes, and on the menials of his own Court.
(b) The Judge of a Court of Small Causes may inflict any of the above penalties on the ministerial officers or menials of his own Court.
(c) The District Judge may, with the previous sanction of the High Court, delegate to any Subordinate Judge the power to inflict penalties given in clause (a) to be exercised by the Subordinate Judge in any specified portion of the district subject to the control of the District Court.
Note: This delegation has been made to the Senior Sub Judge,.
1st Class, in each district in regard to the proc ess serving establishment of all Courts in the district except that of the District Judge 's Court and the Court of the Judge, Small Causes, Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.
(d) Any Subordinate Judge may fine, in an amount not exceeding one month 's salary, any ministerial officer of his own Court for misconduct or neglect in the performance of his duties.
(e) The Senior Subordinate Judge may inflict any of the above penalties on menials of his own Court or the Courts of other Subordinate Judges in the same district.
" In Sub Rule (1), eight penalties are categorised.
Sub Rule (2) enables the District Judge to inflict any of the penalties mentioned in Sub Rule (1).
Rule IX(2)(c) enables the District Judge, with the previous sanction of the High Court, to delegate to any Subordinate Judge 1015 the power to inflict penalties given in clause (a).
Then comes the important section that deals with appeals i.e. Rule X.
We think it useful to extract the Rule in full.
"X. Appeals. (1) The District Judge may on appeal or otherwise reverse or modify any order made under rule IX(2) by any Court under his control including a Court of Small Causes, and his order shall be final: Provided that nothing in this rule shall preclude the High Court from altering where it deems fit any such appellate order of a District Judge on petition by an aggrieved person or otherwise: Provided further that the District Judge shall not enhance any punishment but should, if he considers enhancement desirable, refer the case to the High Court for orders.
(2) Appeals against penalties in flicted by a District Judge shall lie to the High Court in the following cases only: (a) Penalties mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to (viii) in respect of ministerial servants, holding permanent and pensionable posts; (b) Orders of substantive appointment by promotion or otherwise to a permanent and pensionable post the maximum pay of which is Rs.75 or more per mensem; (c) Orders of temporary appointment which is to last more than three months or has in fact lasted more than three months in respect of posts the maximum pay of which is Rs.75 or more per mensem.
(3) Persons appealing to the High Court under this rule shall do so by petition.
Such petition, accompanied by a copy of the order complained against, shall be presented to the District Judge who passed the order within one month of the date of such order (the period between the 1016 date of application for the copy and the date on which it is supplied being excluded).
The District Judge will forward the petition to the Registrar of the High Court without unnec essary delay, and in forwarding the same he will be at liberty to record any remarks which he may wish to make concerning any matter stated in the petition.
After reading the petition, the High Court may either (a) Summarily reject it without hear ing the petitioner; (b) refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt of such report reject the petition without hearing the petitioner; or (c) hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are held to be concerned in the subject of the petition, such other person in open Court.
Nothing in these rules shall debar the High Court or a District Judge, from altering, if deemed fit, any order of punish ment or appointment not provided for above which may be passed by a District Judge, Senior Subordinate Judge OF the Judge of a Small Causes Court in respect of ministerial or menial establishment when an aggrieved person petitions or otherwise.
District and Sessions Judges should not, therefore, with hold any petition addressed to the High Court whether an appeal lies to it in the case or not under these rules.
In a case in which no appeal lies the District and Sessions Judge should forward it without any comments and relevant documents unless he wishes to do so or is so required by the High Court.
(4) Petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at the High Court unless summoned to do So.
Orders on their petitions will be communicated to them through the District Judge concerned.
(5) In order that a dismissed offi cial may be able to exercise his right of appeal, the charge against him should be reduced to writing, his defence should either be taken in, or reduced to writing and the decision on such defence 1017 should also be in writing.
The record of the charge, defence and decision should in all cases be such as to furnish sufficient infor mation to the appellate authority to whom the dismissed official may prefer an appeal.
(6) Establishment orders, in which an appeal lies to the High Court as a matter of right, should state briefly the claims of the persons appointed as well as those of their seniors, if any, who are considered unfit for the appointments in question, and where the order of seniority has not been followed the reasons for departure from it should be stated.
Rule X(1) deals with the powers of the District Judge to reverse or modify any order made under Rule IX(2) passed by any Court under his control.
This sub section contains two provisos.
The first proviso gives the High Court an absolute power to alter when it deems fit any order passed by the District Judge in appeal when an aggrieved person moves the High Court or even suo moto.
The second proviso restricts the powers of the District Judge to enhance any punishment imposed and makes it subject to the orders of the High Court when such a case is referred to the High Court for orders.
Rule X(2) deals with appeals against penalties inflicted by District Judge as in the case on hand.
This section provides that appeals shall lie to the High Court from orders imposing penalties by the District Judge, but not in all cases.
Appeals lie only against orders imposing penalties mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to IX(viii).
In other words, an appeal does not lie when the District Judge passes an order imposing a penalty of censure or of fine of not more than one month 's salary for misconduct or neglect in the performance of duties.
We are not concerned here with the orders mentioned in Rule X(2)(b) and (c).
Sub rule (3) of Rule X deals with the procedure in filing appeals to the High Court.
It states that appeals shall be by a petition.
It obligates presenta tion of the petition to the District Judge who passed the order within the time prescribed therein.
The District Judge is directed to forward the petition to the Registrar of the High Court without unnecessary delay.
The District Judge is given powers to record his remarks which he may wish to make concerning any matter stated in the petition.
A reading of this sub rule makes it abundantly clear that the appeal to be heard by the High Court is something which it has to do in 1018 exercise of its powers of control over the subordinate courts on the administrative side.
The appeal has to be by a petition.
It is to be routed through the District Judge who sends it to the Registrar of the High Court.
These are the procedural formalities which normally govern appeals pre ferred before the High Court, on the administrative side.
The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to record his own remarks which he wishes to make concerning his own order is further proof of the fact that what the High Court has to consider is not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of control and superintendence over the subordinate courts.
Appeals under the general law have their own procedure, which is different from the proce dure detailed for the appeals under these rules of the deciding authority forwarding the appeal through the proper channel to the controlling authority and of the freedom of the deciding authority to give its own remarks over and above the order already passed.
This procedure robs the appeal to the High Court of the characteristics of the normal appeal culminating in judicial orders.
The matter will be further clear when we look at the procedure that is to be followed by the High Court in disposing of the appeals contained in this subsection itself.
Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject the appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt of such report reject the petition without hearing the petitioner; secondly to hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are held to be concerned in the subject of the petition, such other person in open court.
The procedure contained in this rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings.
Under these rules it is not obligatory for the High Court to hear the peti tioner.
It can go into the papers and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.
It can also refer it to the District Judge for report.
The second method of disposal of this petition is to get a report from the District Judge and on receipt of such a report to dismiss it without hearing the petitioner and thirdly to give a hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affected by the disposal of the petition.
The manner of disposal of the petition under this rule makes it abundantly clear that this petition which the appellants call an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involv ing a lis between two adversaries and the decision thereon is not a judicial decision.
It has all the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative decision.
1019 Sub clause (4)gives further insight into the nature of the appeal.
It reads: "(4) Petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at the High Court unless summoned to do so.
Orders on their petitions will be communicated to them through the District Judge concerned.
" This again marks a complete departure from the normal judi cial proceeding before a court.
The petitioners are forbid den to attend personally at the High Court.
They can do so only when summoned to do so.
In a judicial proceeding, the party has a right to appear personally or through his coun sel.
Here that right is denied to him.
This denial also robs the appeal of its character of a judicial proceeding.
Orders passed by the High Court on such petitions will be communi cated to the parties through the District Judge concerned.
A close study of these rules leaves no doubt in our mind that in deciding the appeal under Rule X, the High Court exercises only a supervisory administrative control and does not act as a Tribunal disposing of an appeal in volving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision.
As indicated above Rule X is in Chapter 18 A which deals with control.
This gives the administrative shade to the proceeding under this rule.
Section 35(3) contains the rule making power.
Section 35(4) stipulates that any order passed by the District Judge under this section shall be subject to the control of the High Court, thus fortifying our conclusion that the proceedings under this section and the decisions made thereunder are not judicial in nature.
This appeal can be disposed of with this conclusion and it is not necessary to refer to the various authorities cited before us.
However, for the completeness of the judgment, we think it proper to briefly refer to the various authorities cited before us, for and against the position that the High Court, while deciding this appeal, acted as a Tribunal whose order can be challenged before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, though in our view the decisions cited dealt with situations different from the one we are dealing here.
In Durga Shankar Mehta vs Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others, [1955] 1 SCR 267 a Constitution Bench of this Court was considering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an election case.
It is not necessary for our purpose to state the facts of the case here.
It was contended that the special jurisdiction that was conferred in the Election Tribunal could be in 1020 voked by an aggrieved party only by means of an election petition, whose decision was final and conclUsiVe and that therefore a challenge to the order of the Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution was not maintainable.
To support this contention Article 329 and the nonobstante clause therein were called in to aid.
This Court repelled that contention as untenable though apparently attractive.
This Court held that the expression 'Tribunal ' as used in Article 136 did not mean samething as 'Court ', but included in its ambit all adjudicating bodies provided they were constituted by the State and were invested with the judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions.
This decision has been pressed into service by the appellants ' counsel to contend that the High Court in the case on hand having been constituted by the State and invested with judicial power was a Tribunal and therefore, its decision could be examined by this Court under Article 136.
In our view, this decision cannot help the appellants because this decision clearly held that if the power exer cised was administrative in nature it would exclude such a Tribunal from the ambit of Article 136.
In Bachhittar Singh vs The State of Punjab, [1962] Suppl.
3 SCR 7 13, an employee in PEPSU was dismissed by the Revenue Secretary.
Against this order he preferred an appeal to the State Government.
The Revenue Minister, PEPSU felt that the order of dismissal was too harsh and instead, he should be reverted and made an endorsement to that effect on the file, but no written order was served on the employee.
After the merger of PEPSU with Punjab, the Revenue Minister, Punjab, sent the file to the Chief Minister for his advice.
The Chief Minister passed an order confirming the order of dismissal and the order was duly communicated to the employ ee.
This order was challenged by him before the High Court.
It was contended before the High Court by the State of Punjab, with success, that the order of dismissal started with proceedings beginning with the enquiry and culminating in punishment and that the first part involved a decision on evidence while the second part of taking action an adminis trative one.
This dichotomy was ingeniously put forward before this Court to render the appeal not maintainable by contending that the order of dismissal was not a judicial order.
This Court repelled that contention.
This Court held that departmental proceedings taken against a Government servant were not divisible in the sense in which the High Court understood it.
There is just one continuous proceeding though there are two stages in it.
Mudholkar, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed thus in repelling this contention: 1021 " . .
There is just one continuous pro ceedings though there are two stages in it.
The first is coming to a conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant are established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established.
That stage deals with the action to be taken against the Government servant concerned.
The High Court accepts that the first stage is a judicial proceeding and indeed it must be so because charges have to be framed, notice has to be given and the person concerned has to be given an opportunity of being heard.
Even so far as the second stage is concerned, Article 311(2) of the Constitution requires a notice to be given to the person concerned as also an opportunity of being heard.
Therefore, this stage of the proceeding is no less judicial than the earlier one.
Consequently any action decided to be taken against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct is a judi cial order and as such it cannot be varied at the will of the authority who is empowered to impose the punishment.
Indeed, the very object with which notice is required to be given on the question of punishment is to ensure that it will be such as would be justified upon the charges established and upon the other attend ant circumstances of the case.
It is thus wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of action against a person found guilty of any charge at a departmental enquiry as an admin istrative order." This judgment will not help us in this case.
It only lays down a general principle that a departmental enquiry and a decision is one continuous process consisting of the enquiry part and the decision making part, both the aspects of which are judicial in nature, and the decisions taken therein are in exercise of judicial power.
The counsel for the appellants placed strong reliance on the decision of a Constitution Bench in the case of Asso ciated Cement Companies Ltd. vs P.N. Sharma and another; , , to contend that the decision of the High Court in this case was a judicial decision of a Tribunal within the scope of Article 136.
In that judgment this Court considered most of its previous decisions relating to the scope of Article 136.
What fell to be decided in that case was whether the State Government was a Tribunal when it exercised its authority under Rule 6(5) and 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Serv ice Rules, 1952.
It is necessary to 1022 briefly state the facts of the case.
The employer company appointed the first respondent as a Welfare Officer as re quired by the Factories Act.
1984 and as per the rules men tioned above.
The letter of appointment stated that the first respondent was liable to be transferred from one unit of the company to another and that his services could bet terminated by one month 's notice or with one month 's pay in lieu thereof.
The Welfare Officer was not prepared to go 10 a place to which he was transferred.
Thereupon the company terminated the services of the 1st respondent with one month 's salary.
He appealed to the State of Punjab under Rule 6(6).
The State of Punjab ordered his reinstatement.
As the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, as required by rule 6(3), proviso (2) was not obtained, the company brought the matter to this Court under Article 136(1) of the Constitution.
A preliminary objection was raised before this Court that the appeal to this Court was incompetent because the second respondent was not a Tribunal when it decided the appeaL.within the meaning of Article 136(1) of the Constitution.
Rule 6(6) read as follows: "6(6) A welfare officer upon whom the punish ment mentioned in clause (v) of sub rule (3) is imposed may appeal to the State Government against the order of punishment within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order by him.
The decision of the State Government shall be final and binding.
" It was by virtue of this rule that the State Government got the powers of appeal.
Dealing with the preliminary objection the Constitution Bench speaking through Gajendragadkar, CJ referred to this Court 's earlier decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Shyam Sundar Jhun jhunwala and oth ers; , , and observed as follows: " . .
On the preliminary question as to whether the appeals were competent, the learned Judge agreed with the majority deci sion that the Central Government was a tribu nal within the meaning of Article 136(1).
Construing Article 136(1), the learned Judge observed that courts and tribunals act judi cially in both senses which he had earlier discussed and in the term 'tribunal ' are included all others, which are not so includ ed.
Among the powers of the State, said Hi dayatullah, J. is included the power to decide controversies between parties.
This is un doubtedly one of the attributes of the State and is aptly called the judicial power 1023 Of the State.
Broadly speaking, certain spe cial matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature.
Their procedure ', may dif fer, but the functions are not essentially different (pp.
362 63).
Thus, it would be noticed that all the learned Judges who heard this case, were agreed in taking the view that the essential power which was exercised by the courts and tribunals alike was the judicial power of the State.
This Court then referred to its decision in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Lakshmichand and Others, [1963] Suppl.
1 SCR 242 in which the finding that an appeal under Article 136(1) against the order of a Conciliation Officer was incompetent, was considered.
Under clause 29 of the order promulgated in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
1947, the Conciliation Officer could grant or refuse permis sion to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the instance of the employer.
This Section did not suit the employer.
That was challenged before this Court.
This Court held that the Conciliation Officer was not a Tribunal be cause he was not invested with the judicial power of the State as he was empowered merely to lift the ban statutorily imposed on the employers ' rights and was not authorised to pronounce a final and binding decision in any dispute.
Regarding the conclusion in that case this Court observed as follows: " . .
The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136, observed Shah, J., who spoke for the Court, 'is that it should be constituted by the State ' and he added that a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial func tions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties.
After examining the scheme of the relevant provi sion, it was observed that 'in deciding wheth er an authority required to act judicially when dealing with matters effecting rights of citizens may be regarded as a tribunal ' though not a court, the principal incident is the investiture of the 'trappings of a court 'such as authority to determine matters in cases initiated by parties.
sitting in public, power to compel attendance of witnesses and to examine them on oath, and others . .
Some, though not necessarily all such trap pings, will ordinarily make the authority which is under a duty to act judicially, a 'tribunal '.
" 1024 17.
Then dealing with the question whether the State Government when it exercised its authority under rule 6(5) and rule 6(6) was a tribunal or not, this Court observed as follows: "The question which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether the State Government is a tribunal when it exercises its authority under Rule 6(5) or Rule 6(6).
No rules have been made prescribing the procedure which the State Government should follow in dealing with appeals under these two sub rules, and there is no statutory provision conferring on the State Government any specific powers which are usually associated with the trial in courts and which are intended to help the court in reaching its decisions.
The requirements of procedure which is followed in courts and the possession of subsidiary powers which are given to courts to try.
the cases before them, are described as trappings of the courts, and so, it may be conceded that these trappings are not shown to exist in the case of the State Government which hears appeals under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6).
But as we already stated, the consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive.
The presence of some of the trappings may assist the determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the authority which possesses the said trappings, is the judicial power of the State or not.
The main and the basic test however, is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as part of the State 's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial functions.
Applying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State Govern ment exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6), is a part of the State 's judicial power.
It has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory Rule and it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and its Welfare Officers.
There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation by one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves the rights and obligations of the parties to it.
The order which the State Government ultimately passes is described as its decision and it is made final and binding.
Besides, it is an order passed on appeal.
Having regard to these distinctive features of the power conferred on the State Government by Rule 6(5) and Rule 1025 6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article 136( 1).
" What follows from this case and the authorities referred therein is this: The State is invested in Some cases with a power to decide controversies between parties.
This power is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State and that is called the judicial power of the State.
What has to be remembered is that this power is exercised to resolve con troversies between parties.
In Associated Cement 's case also this Court took notice of the fact that a dispute existed between the management and its welfare officer.
It was held that there existed a lis the decision of which lis was rendered by the State in exercise of its judicial power.
This was the test that has to be applied to find out whether an order is a judicial order or not.
In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha vs Hind Cycles Limited, Bombay, [1963] Suppl.
1 SCR 625 the question considered by a Constitution Bench was whether the decision of an arbitrator to whom industrial disputes were voluntarily referred under Section 10 A of the .
was quasi judicial in character and his decision amounted to a determination or order under Article 136(1) of the Constitu tion of India.
This Court held that for invoking Article 136(1), two conditions must be satisfied (1) The proposed appeal must be from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order, that is to say, it must not be against a purely executive or administrative order.
If the determina tion or order giving rise to the appeal is a judicial or quasi judicial determination or order, the first condition is satisfied.
(2) The second condition imposed by the Arti cle is that the said determination or order must have been made or passed by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India.
These conditions, therefore, require that the order complained against must have a judicial or quasi judicial character and the authority whose order is complained against must be a Court or a Tribunal.
Unless both the conditions are satisfied, Article 136(1) cannot be invoked.
The decision of the arbitrator, it was held, could be cha racterised as quasi judicial one, but the power of the arbitrator is not in exercise of the sovereign power or one by conferment of a statutory power by the State.
He gets the power to adjudicate by virtue of the authority given by the parties.
It was held that an appeal from the order of the arbitrator did not lie under article 136(1) of the Constitu tion.
In Indo China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. vs Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and Others, ; the question 1026 debated was whether the Central Board of Revenue exercising its appellate power under Section 190 of the Sea Customs Act or the Central Government exercising its revision jurisdic tion under Section 191 could be held to be a Tribunal under Article 136.
This Court repeated the principle laid down in the earlier decisions that two conditions have to be satis fied before an appeal could be entertained in this Court under Article 136: the order impugned must be an order of a judicial or quasi judicial character and should not be purely an administrative or executive order; and that the said order should have been passed either by a Court or a Tribunal in the territory of India.
After examining the earlier decisions and the tests laid down therein and also after examining the procedure prescribed in the Act in relation to the adjudication of disputes under these sec tions, it was held that the Central Board of Revenue and the revisional authority, the Central Government, had the char acter of a Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution and thus the preliminary objection that the appeal was not maintainable was overruled.
Since great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellants on this authority, we would like to extract the relevant portion on which such reliance was placed to distinguish it from the facts of our case. " .
The fact that the status of the Customs Officer who adjudicates under Section 167 (12A) and section 183 of the Act is not that of a Tribunal, does not make any differ ence when we reach the stage of appeal or revision.
A period of limitation is prescribed for the appeal, a procedure is prescribed by Rule 49 that the appeal or revision must be accompanied by a copy of the decision or order complained against, and the obvious scheme is that both the appellate and the revisional authorities must consider the matter judicial ly on the evidence and determine it in accord ance with law.
It is obvious that heavy fines are imposed in these proceedings and the confiscation orders passed may affect ships of very large value.
By his appeal or revisional application the ship owner naturally contends that the order of confiscation is improper or invalid and he sometimes urges that the fine imposed is unreasonable and excessive.
Where disputes of this character are raised before the appellate or the revisional authority, it would be difficult to accede to the argument that the authority which deals with these disputes in its appellate or revisional juris diction is not a tribunal under Article 136.
These authorities are constituted by the legislature and they are empowered to deal with the 1027 disputes brought before them by aggrieved persons.
Thus, the scheme of the Act, the nature of the proceedings brought before the appellate and the revisional authorities, the extent of the claim involved, the nature of the penalties imposed 'and the kind of enquiry which the Act contemplates, all indicate that both the appellate and the revisional authori ties acting under the relevant provisions of the Act constitute Tribunals under Article 136 of the Constitution, because they are invested with the judicial power of the State, and are required to act judicially.
Therefore, we must over rule the preliminary objection raised by the Additional Solicitor General and proceed to deal with the appeal on the merits.
" This judgment can be easily distinguished from the case on hand on the finding that the High Court in this case, as already indicated by us, was acting purely administratively and was not making a judicial decision and the procedure adopted was totally different from the procedure in a Court.
This decision, therefore, cannot create any hurdle for our conclusion against the appellants.
In APHLC vs M.A. Sangma, ; this Court was dealing with the jurisdiction of the Election Commission to decide the question of a symbol to the parties contesting the election.
It was held that the decision from the Elec tion Commission was amenable to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India since the powers were conferred on the Election Commission by rules, that the Election Commis sion was dealing with the matter between two rival parties and that the decision taken was a judicial decision.
Here again, the Court reiterated the several tests to determine whether a particular body or authority was a Tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 or not.
These tests are not exhaus tive.
The two necessary pre requisites for that authority to come within Article 136(1) are that it must be constituted by the State and invested with some judicial power of the State.
These two tests, it was held, were unfailing one, while some of the other test or tests may not be present.
At pages 409 and 410 the matter is made abundantly clear in the following statement of law by the Court: " .
There is thus a lis between two groups of the Conference.
The Commission is undoubtedly the specified and exclusive adju dicating authority of this lis.
The Commission is created by the Constitution and the power to adjudicate the dispute flows from Article 324 as well as 1028 from Rule 5 and is thus conferred under the law as a fraction of judicial power of the State.
The Commission has prescribed its own procedure in the Symbols Order, namely, to give a hearing to the parties when there is a dispute with regard to recognition or regard ing choice of symbols . . " " . .
To repeat, the power to decide this particular dispute is a part of the State 's judicial power and that power is conferred on the Election Commission by Arti cle 324 of the Constitution as also by rule 5 of the rules.
The principal and non failing test which must be present in order to deter mine whether a body or authority is a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136(1), is ful filled in this case when the Election Commis sion is required to adjudicate a dispute between two parties, one group asserting to be recognised political party of the State and the other group controverting the proposition before it, but at the same time not laying any claim to be that party . . 21.
We have considered the above decisions carefully.
In our view, the principles laid down in these cases cannot help the appellants in support of the plea that the High Court While disposing of the appeal was acting as a tribunal.
The relevant provisions quoted in the earlier part of the judgment relating to the appeal in question, in our judgment, clearly establish that the High Court acted on the administrative side in deciding the ap peal.
There is a clear distinction between courts of law exercising judicial powers and other bodies.
Decisions by courts are clearly judicial.
That is not the case with bodies exercising administrative or executive powers.
In certain matters even Judges have to act administratively and in so doing may have to act quasi judicially in dealing with the matters entrusted to them.
It is only where the authorities are required to act judicially either by express provisions of the statute or by necessary implication that the decisions of such an authority would amount to a quasi judicial proceeding.
When Judges in exercise of their administrative functions decide cases it cannot be said that their decisions are either judicial or quasi judicial decisions.
Every decision or order by an authori ty which has a duty to act judicially is not subject to appeal to this Court.
Article 136 contemplates appeals to this Court only from adjudications of courts and tri 1029 bunals.
Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial.
This does not mean that every au thority which is required to act judicially, either by its constitution or by virtue of the authority conferred upon it, is necessarily a tribunal for the purpose of Article 136 A tribunal, whose adjudication is subject to appeal, must besides being under a duty to act judicially, be a body invested with the judi cial power of the State.
In the appeal before the High Court, the High Court was following its own proce dure, a procedure not normally followed in judicial matters.
The High Court was not resolving any dispute or controversy between two adversaries.
In other words, while decid ing this appeal there was no |is before the High Court.
The High Court was only exercising its power of control while deciding this appeal.
We have.
therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appeal is not maintainable.
However, we do not propose to dismiss it without leaving any remedy to the appellants.
We direct the Registrar to transfer the re cords of the case to the Punjab and Haryana High Court requesting the High Court to take this petition on its file as a petition under Article 226 and dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible on the available pleadings and documents.
There will be no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
Sub section (2) of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 confers power of appointment of ministerial officers of all courts controlled by a District Court and their suspen sion and removal on the District Court.
Sub section (3) makes every appointment subject to such rules as the High Court may prescribe in this behalf, while sub section (4) makes orders passed by the District Judge subject to the control of the High Court.
Chapter 18 A of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under Section 35(3) controls the appointments, promotion and punishment of ministerial officials in the District and other civil courts, other than the High Court.
Sub rule 2(a) of Rule IX in that Chapter enables the District Judge to inflict any of the penalties mentioned in sub rule (1): censure, fine, recovery of any pecuniary loss, withholding of increments or promotions, suspension, removal and dis missal of the ministerial officers of his own court or any court subordinate to him other than the Court of Small Causes.
Sub rule (2) of Rule X provides 'for appeals to the High Court against penalties.
Sub rule (3) requires the persons appealing to the High Court to do so by a petition to the District Judge, who shall forward the same to the Registrar of the High Court with remarks that he may wish to make.
After reading the petition the High Court may either (a) summarily reject it without hearing the petitioner; (b) refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt of such report reject the petition without hearing; or (c) hear the petitioner, and where other persons are held to be concerned such other person in open court.
1006 Sub rule (4) forbids the petitioners to attend personally at the High Court unless summoned and provides for communica tion to them of orders on their petitions through the Dis trict Judge.
The appellants, who were the employees in the ministeri al establishment of the courts at Ferozepur and Zira, were alleged to have taken a prominent part in raising objection able slogans against the Judicial Magistrate and the Dis trict Judge, in a demonstration organised by the subordinate court officials, to protest against the slapping of a subor dinate by the Judicial Magistrate, Zira.
They were charge sheeted for their misconduct.
After enquiry it was found that they contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966 by acting prejudicially to the public order, decency and morality and were dismissed from service by the District Judge in his capacity aS the punishing authority.
The appellants preferred a service appeal before the High Court which was dismissed.
While granting the special leave on 2nd April, 1982 this Court made the following order: "Appeal will be heard . . on the prelim inary issue as to whether the High Court in disposal of appeal was acting in administra tive capacity under article 235 or as a Tribunal or as a High Court and the circumstances in which the appeal was maintained, if so.
" It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the decision of the High Court in this case was the judicial decision of a tribunal which could be examined by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1 The appeal is not maintainable.
Every decision or order by an authority which has a duty to act judicially is not subject to appeal to this Court.
Article 136 contem plates appeals only from adjudications of courts and tribu nals.
Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial.
if the power exercised was administrative in nature it would ex clude such a tribunal from the ambit of Article 136.
[1029C; 1028H; 1020D] 1.2 Every authority which is required to act judicially either by its constitution or by virtue of the authority conferred upon it is 1007 not necessarily a tribunal for the purposes of Article 136.
A tribunal, whose adjudication is subject to appeal must besides being under a duty to act judicially, be a body invested with the judicial power of the State.
[1029A] 1.3 There is a clear distinction between courts of law exercising judicial powers and other bodies.
Decisions by courts are clearly judicial.
That Is not the case with bodies exercising administrative or executive powers.
In certain matters even judges have to act administratively and in so doing may have to act quasi judicially in dealing with matters entrusted to them.
It is only where the authorities are required to act judicially either by express provisions of the statute or by necessary implication that the decision of such an authority would amount to a quasi judicial pro ceeding.
When Judges in exercise of their administrative functions decide cases it cannot be said that their deci sions are either judicial or quasi judicial decisions.
The test that has to be applied to find out whether an order is a judicial order or not is the existence of a lis between the parties.
[1028F; 1025C] In the instant case, the High Court while disposing of the appeal was not acting as a tribunal.
It was acting purely administratively.
It was not resolving any dispute or controversy between two adversaries but only exercising its power of control over the subordinate judiciary which is the same as control under Article 235 of the Constitution of India.
[1028E; 1027C; 1029B; 1013C] Durga Shankar Mehta vs Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Ors., [1955] 1 SCR 267; Bachhittar Singh vs The State of Punjab, [1962] Snppl.
3 SCR 713; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs P.N. Sharma & Anr, ; ; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, ; ; Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Lakshmichand and others, [1963] Suppl.
1 SCR 242; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha vs Hind Cycles Limited, Bombay, [1963] Suppl.
1 SCR 625; Indo China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. vs Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs & Ors., ; and APHLC vs M.A. Sangma, ; , referred to.
2.1 In deciding the appeal under Rule X in Chapter 18 A the High Court exercises only a supervisory administrative control over the subordinate courts and does not act as a tribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision.
[1019D] 1008 2.2 The appeal under Rule X(3) has to be by a petition, to be routed through the District Judge who sends it to the Registrar of the High Court.
These are procedural formali ties which normally govern appeals preferred before the High Court on the administrative side.
The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to record his own remarks which he wishes to make concerning his own order is further proof of the fact that what the High Court has to consider is not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of control and superintendence over the subordinate courts.
[1018A] 2.3 The procedure contained in Rule X(3) of hearing the petition not similar to the procedure followed in regular judicial proceedings.
It is not obligatory for the High Court to hear the petitioner.
It can go into the papers and reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an oppor tunity to be heard.
Alternative, it could get a report from the District Judge and on receipt of such a report dismiss it without hearing the petitioner.
Thirdly, it could give a hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affect ed.
This manner of disposal of the petition makes it appar ent that it is not strictly a judicial proceeding but has all the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an administrative decision.
[1018E H] 2.4 Sub rule (4) of Rule X again marks a complete depar ture from the normal judicial proceeding before a court.
The petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at the High Court.
They can do so only when summoned.
In a judicial proceeding, the party has a right to appear personally or through counsel.
This denial also robs the appeal of its character of a judicial proceeding.
[1019C] 2.5 The fact that Rule X is found in Chapter 18 A, which deals with control, also gives the administrative shade to the proceeding under this Rule.
Section 35(4) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, which stipulates that any order passed by the District Judge under this section shall be subject to the control of the High Court, further fortifies the view that the proceedings under Rule X(3) and the decisions made thereunder are not judicial in nature.
[1019E] It cannot, therefore, be said that in the instant case the High Court while deciding the appeal acted as a tribunal whose order can be challenged before this Court under Arti cle 136 of the Constitution.
[1019F] [The Registrar to transfer the records of the case to the High Court.
The latter to take the petition on its file as a petition under 1009 Article 226 and dispose of the matter expeditiously.] [1029D]