judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
5036 39 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.1984 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos.
696,695,694 and 697 of 1982.
G.L. Sanghi, Dhruv Mehta (NP), Aman Vachher and S.K. Mehta for the Appellant.
V.C. Mahajan, Tapash Ray, A. Minocha, K.R. Nagaraja and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, J.
These appeals on special leave are directed against the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Letters Patent Appeal Nos.
694 to 697 of 1982 dismissing the appeals with costs.
The salient facts out of which these appeals have arisen, are as follows: The appellant Trust prepared a development scheme under section 24 read with section 28 of the Punjab Town Improve ment Trust Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in relation to an area of about 60 acres of land at Palani Road.
The lands of the respondents fell within the said area.
On April 9, 1976 a notice under Section 36 of the Act was published in daily Tribune inviting objections till 5th May, 1976.
This notice was published in the three consecu tive weeks of the said newspaper dated 9th April, 15th April and 23rd April, 1976.
The very notice of the said scheme was also published under section 36 of the said Act in the Punjab Government Gazette on three consecutive weeks i.e. 7th May, 14th May and 21st May, 1976 inviting objections till May 5, 1976 against the scheme framed.
In accordance with the provisions of Section 38 of the said Act the Trust also served notice on every person who was occupier or owner of any immoveable property falling within the area proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme within 30 days from the date of publication of the notice under section 36, in order to enable the owners and occupiers of such pre 230 mises to file objections to such acquisition and to state their reasoning in writing within a period of 60 days of service of the notice.
After completion of the acquisition formalities, a notification under section 42 of the said Act was published on March 26, 1979.
The respondent No. 2 and ors.
assailed the appellant 's scheme notified under the Act in CWP No. 2561 of 1979 and CWP Nos. 4075, 36.15, 3654 of 1981 on the ground that they could not file objections against the scheme in terms of Section 36 of the Act till 5th May; 1976 as the notification was published in the Punjab Government Gazette on 7th May, 14th May and 21st May, 1976.
These writ petitions were allowed by order dated 25th February, 1982 and the sanctioned scheme notified under section 42 of the Act was quashed.
It was also mentioned in the said order that the appellant may, however, publish the scheme again either amended or unamended under section 36 of the said Act and proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.
It is against this order the L.F.A. No. 694 to 697 of 1982 were filed.
The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the judgment and order of the learned single Judge and held that the provisions contained in Section 36 of the Act were mandatory and as it had not been complied with in the present cases, the illegality of non compliance of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 36 would not stand cured under Section 101 (1)(d) of the Act.
Hence the Letters Patent Appeals were dismissed.
Against this judgment and order the instant appeals on special leave have been filed in this Court.
Mr. Mahajan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2 and ors.
has very strenuously contended that the provisions of Section 36 of the said Act are mandatory inasmuch as it provides for publication of the notice as to the framing of the scheme under the Act in three consecutive weeks in the official Gazette as well as in the newspaper with a state ment inviting objections.
Though the notice was duly pub lished in the newspaper Tribune ' for three consecutive weeks on 9th, 16th and 23rd April, 1976 notifying the date for filing objections till 5th May, 1976 yet the notification that was published in the Punjab Government Gazette for three consecutive weeks was admittedly after the expiry of period of filing objections i.e. 5th May, 1976.
It has, therefore, been contended by Mr. Mahajan that due to non publication of the scheme in the Government Gazette before the expiry of the period of filing objections against the proposed scheme, the valuable right of the respondents to file objections against the scheme has been done away with.
As such the publication of the scheme was rightly quashed by the courts below as this mandatory requirement had not been complied with by the State.
In this connection, he has referred to the case of Prof. Jodh 231 Singh & Ors.
vs Jullundur Improvement Trust, Jullundur and Ors.
, This case was decided by the full bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana as to whether issuance of a notification under sub section (1) of Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, would bar a challenge to the validity of the scheme or the govern mental sanction thereto for any reason including the reason that the scheme had been framed and sanctioned without compliance of the mandatory provisions particularly those of Sections 36, 38 and sub section (1) of Section 40 of the Act.
It was held that: "Since the given provisions do not merely provide for the framing of the scheme simpliciter but also provide for acquisition of property to enable the execution of the scheme and since no person can be deprived of his property without being heard and one cannot ask for hearing unless he knows that he is being deprived of his property, so, by necessary implication a notice of the intention of the authorities of acquiring a given person 's property is im pliedly necessary to enable him to bring to the notice of the concerned authority his objections against the, acqui sition of his property.
Hence such provisions as provide for notice, raising of objections and personal hearing in sup port of the objection would be mandatory in character.
" In that case a notice under section 38 of the Act was issued on the petitioner who submitted objections in time.
In the return filed on behalf of the Trust it was admitted that due to over sight, the petitioners could not be called for hearing along with other objectors as the objections filed by the petitioners had inadvertently got placed in some other file and that for the same reason their objec tions were neither considered by the Trust nor forwarded to the State Government along with the summary of the objec tions submitted at the time of sanction for the said scheme, It was contended on behalf of the Trust that the infirmity, if any, stemming from the non consideration by the Trust of the objections filed by the petitioners and sanction of the scheme by the Government in ignorance of the said fact stood cured by the provisions of sub section (2) of Section 42 of the Act.
It was in that context the above observation was made by the full bench.
Mr. Mahajan next contended that though admittedly no tices under section 33 of the said Act were issued on the respondent No. 2 and others who are either owners or occupi ers of the lands falling within the improvement scheme of the appellant and the respondent 232 No. 2 and others had filed objections against the proposed acquisition of their lands, yet on the basis of the said individual notices issued under section 38 of the said Act, the respondent No. 2 and others are debarred from raising objections against the proposed improvement scheme.
It is further submitted that under Section 38 the owners and occupiers of the land affected by the said scheme may merely object to the proposed acquisition of their lands but they cannot file objections against the scheme published.
The respondent No. 2 and others are therefore, deprived of their right to file objections against the scheme as provided in Section 36 of the said Act and so in view of the noncompli ance of the provisions of Section 36 of the said Act by the State Government, the development scheme cannot be enforced merely because the State Government notified the sanction of the scheme under section 42 of the Act.
The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the other hand, contended that in compliance of the provisions of Section 36 of the said Act a notice regarding the framing of the development scheme was published in the newspaper 'Tribune ' for three consecutive weeks i.e. on 9th, 16th and 23rd April, 1976 inviting objections till 6th May, 1976.
It is only in the Punjab Government Gazette that the notification was published on 7th, 14th and 21st May, 1976 inviting objections till 5th May, 1976 i.e. the notification was made in the Punjab Government Gazette after the period for filing objections had expired.
It has also been contend ed that individual notices under section 38 of the said Act were served on the owners and occupiers of the immovable property falling under the development scheme intimating them about the acquisition of the land with particulars of the lands failing within the said scheme and inviting their objections to be filed within a period of 60 days from the date of service of the notice.
It has also been submitted that the respondent No. 2 and others i.e. the owners of the lands duly submitted their objections against the acquisi tion of the land as well as against the proposed scheme and the same were heard and considered by the prescribed author ity.
After the hearing of the objections, a notification was made by the State Government sanctioning the said scheme and also that this Trust shall proceed forthwith to execute the said scheme.
It has, therefore, been submitted that in these circumstances, the objections raised by the counsel for the respondent No. 2 and others are wholly unsustainable being devoid of any merit.
It is convenient to mention herein that the award deter mining the compensation was passed in 1980 and the compensa tion to the tune 233 of Rs.32 lakhs had already been paid.
A sum of Rs.2,30,465.08 had been spent for the construction of roads and foot paths.
Another sum of Rs. 1, 12,2 17.24 had been spent for lighting of the streets.
Another sum of Rs.3 lakhs had been paid to the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board for sewerage purposes.
Thus, a sum of Rs.38,42,682.35 had already been spent for implementation of the scheme.
Several plots had already been sold in open auction.
The reference under section 18 of the Act is also pending.
In this context we are to consider the contention raised by the learned counsels for the respondent No. 2 and others.
Under section 24 and 28 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, the impugned development scheme was prepared by the appellant Trust.
The scheme was notified as has been referred herein before in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 of the Act.
In so far as the publication of the scheme in the newspaper 'Tribune ' in three consecutive weeks in April, 1976 inviting objections thereto till 5th May, 1976 is quite in accordance with the provisions of the said section.
The Gazette Notification published in three consecutive weeks was however, made after expiry of the period of filing objections against this scheme.
This has been the bone of contention on behalf of the respondent No. 2 and others that this resulted in violation of the provisions of section 36 of the Act as their right to file objections against the scheme was set at naught.
This contention in our considered opinion is totally devoid of merit inasmuch as admittedly individual notices under section 38 of the said Act were duly served on all the owners and occupiers of the land falling within the said scheme and purported to be acquired and the respondent No. 2 and others admittedly filed objec tions against the proposed acquisition of their land.
The said objections were duly considered after hearing the respondent No. 2 and others and notice was issued sanction ing the scheme by the State Government.
In these circum stances, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 2 and others to challenge the scheme on the mere plea that the Gazette Notification was not duly published.
The legislative intent of provision of section 36 read with section 38 of the said Act is to afford reasonable opportunity to the owners and occupiers affected by the proposed scheme to file objections not only against the scheme but also against the acquisition of their lands falling within the scheme and to achieve this purpose not only notifications in the Govern ment Gazette and newspaper are to be published but also individual notices on each of the person affected are to be served with details of the plots of land failing within the scheme and proposed to be acquired with a view to giving them adequate opportunity to file objections both against the scheme as well as against the proposed acquisition of their lands.
It is, therefore, incomprehensible to contend 234 that non observance of provisions of Section 36 of the said Act by not publishing the notification in the Govern ment Gazette before the expiry of the date for filing the objections renders the publication of the entire development scheme illegal and bad.
The above contention, in our consid ered opinion, is not at all sustainable on the simple ground that the respondent No. 2 and others were duly served with the notices under section 38 and they pursuant to that notice duly filed their objections against the acquisition as well as the scheme.
The decision of the full bench re ported in Prof. Jodh Singh and Ors.
vs Jullundur Improvement Trust, Jullundur & Ors.
(supra) is not applicable to this case inasmuch as in that case the objections filed under section 38 of the said Act having been misplaced were not at all considered and thereafter the Government issued a noti fication under section 42 of the said Act giving sanction to the scheme itself.
In that view of the matter, the said decision has no application to the instant case.
In these circumstances, considering from all aspects we hold that the decision of the courts below is wholly untenable in law and as such they are liable to be set aside.
We, therefore, set aside the decision of the learned single Judge as well as to the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and allow the appeal setting aside the orders of the courts below.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
G.N. Appeals allowed.

summary:
The appellant Trust prepared a development scheme under the provisions of the Punjab Town Improvement Trust Act, 1922 covering certain lands including that of the respond ents.
Notice inviting objections was published in a dally Newspaper on 9th, 16th and 23rd April, 1976.
It was also published in the Punjab Government Gazette on the 7th, 14th and 21st May, 1976.
The last date for filing objections was 5th May, 1976.
Notices were also served on each person whose land was to be acquired in accordance with Section 36 of the Act.
After completion of the acquisition formalities, noti fication under section 42 of the Act was published on 26th March, 1979.
Respondent No. 2 and others challenged the scheme noti fied under the Act by way of Writ Petitions on the ground that they could not file objections by 5th May, 1976 since the notification was published in the Gazette only thereaf ter.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the notification sanctioning the scheme.
However, it ob served that the appellant may publish the scheme again either amended or unamended under section 36 of the Act and proceed further in accordance with law.
Against the said order, Letters Patent Appeals were flied, which were dis missed by the Division Bench.
Appellant has preferred these appeals by special leave.
On behalf of the appellant, it was mainly contended that infirmity, if any, stemming form the non consideration of the objections and the sanction of the scheme by the Govern ment in ignorance of the fact stood cured by the provisions of section 42(2) of the Act.
It was also contended that since Respondent No. 2 and others had flied objections in response to individual notices, they are debarred from raising objec tions against the proposed improvement scheme.
228 On behalf of Respondents if was inter alia contended that due to non publication of the scheme in the Government Gazette before the expiry of the period of filing objections against the proposed scheme, the valuable right of the respondents to file objections against the scheme has been done away with, contrary to the mandatory provision con tained in section 36 of the Act.
Allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
It is incomprehensible to say that non observ ance of provisions of Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improve ment Trust Act, 1922 by not publishing the notification in the Government Gazette before the expiry of the date for filing the objections renders the publication of the entire development scheme illegal and bad.
[234A] 2.
The legislative intent of provision of section 36 read with section 38 of the Act is to afford reasonable opportunity to the owners and occupiers affected by the proposed scheme to file objections not only against the scheme but also against the acquisition of their lands failing within the scheme and to achieve this purpose not only notifications in the Government gazette and newspaper are to be published but also individual notices on each of the person affected are to be served with details of the plots of land failing within the scheme and proposed to be acquired with a view to giving them adequate opportunity to file objections both against the scheme as well as against the proposed acquisition of their lands.
[233G H] 3.
In the instant case, the development scheme was prepared by the appellant Trust, and was notified in accord ance with the provisions of Section 36 of the Act.
In so far as the publication of the scheme in the newspaper 'Tribune ' in three consecutive weeks in April, 1976 inviting objec tions thereto till 5th May, 1976 is quite in accordance with the provisions of the said section.
The Gazette Notification published in three consecutive weeks was however, made after expiry of the period of filing objections against this scheme.
Admittedly individual notices under section 38 of the said Act were duly served on all the owners and occupi ers of the land falling within the said scheme and purported to be acquired and respondent No. 2 and others admittedly filed objections against the proposed acquisition of their land.
The said objections were duly considered after hearing the respondent No. 2 and others and notice was issued sanc tioning the scheme by the State Government.
In these circum stances, it does not lie in the mouth of respondent No. 2 and others to challenge the scheme on the mere plea that the Gazette Notification was not duly published.
[233C F] 229 Prof. Jodh Singh & Ors.
vs Jullundur Improvement Trust, Jullundur and Ors., , distinguished.
[This Court set aside the decision of the Single Judge as well as that of the Division Bench of the High Court.] [234D]


judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.
4890 91 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.1989 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. Nos.
517 & 5 18 of 1989.
section Padmanabhan, P.N. Ramalingam and A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants.
K. Parasaran, section Balakrishnan and Ms. Revati for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
Special Leave granted.
Counsel heard.
These two appeals are filed by Special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Revision Petitions Nos. 5 17 and 5 18 of 1989.
These appeals raise an interest ing question as to whether it is obligatory on the Court, before granting leave to institute a suit as required under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to give an opportunity to the respondents to show cause against the grant of such leave, and whether leave granted without such opportunity having been given is void.
The appellants instituted suit No. O.S. 55 of 1987 in the court of the learned subordinate Judge of Sivaganga in Tamil Nadu against the respondents as a representive suit inter alia praying for framing a scheme for a public char itable trust.
It is common ground that the reliefs prayed for in the suit were such that leave under section 92 of 269 the Civil Procedure Code was required for instituting the suit.
On the same day on which the suit was filed by lodging the plaint in court an application was made praying for leave to institute the suit under section 92 of the Code.
Without issuing any notice to the respondents, the said court granted leave by passing an order reading "permitted" and issued summons to the respondents.
In March, 1988 the respondents filed an interim application before the learned Subordinate Judge for revoking the leave granted inter alia on the ground that the respondents had not been given any opportunity to be heard before leave was granted.
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the said application on the ground that the grant of leave was an administrative act of the court and no notice to the respondents was required before such leave was granted.
The respondents then pre ferred a Civil Revision Petition in the Madras High Court which has been allowed by a judgment delivered by learned Single Judge.
He took the view that an analysis of the provisions of section 92 of the Code shows that in order to institute a representative suit as contemplated in the said section two or more persons must have an interest in the trust and they should have obtained the leave of the court before they institute the suit.
The learned Single Judge held that while the said section enables persons interested in a public trust to file a suit to secure the proper admin istration and management of the trust and its properties by its trustees, it also imposes a check on the institution of such suits by the imposition of certain conditions, one of which is the obtaining of leave from the court.
It was held that it is the grant of leave which confers on the person concerned a right to institute a suit under section 92 of the Code.
If there were any facts which might disentitle the applicants for leave from obtaining the leave of the court, these could be best brought to the notice of the court by the party arrayed on the opposite side.
The learned Judge also referred to the provisions of section 104(1) (ffa) of the Code whereby an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 91 is made appealable.
The learned Judge followed the decision of the High Court of Madras in T.M. Shanmugam and Others vs The Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institu tion and Others, [1984] II MLJ 440; and held that as the leave had been granted without any notice to the respondents, it was void and liable to be set aside.
The learned Judge allowed the revision petitions, set aside the leave and held that the suit could not be entertained and was liable to be dismissed.
It is against this decision that these appeals have been peferred to.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that if the court 270 were required to give opportunity to the defendants to be heard before granting leave to under section 92, the grant of leave would entail a great deal of delay and might defeat the ends of justice where some urgent relief was required.
He pointed out that, if a defendant had a grievance against the grant of leave he could always made an application to revoke the leave and no serious prejudice would be caused to the defendant by the grant of leave.
Learned counsel for the respondents contended that leave under section 92 of the Code to institute a suit was a material requirement for maintenance of a suit.
Before granting leave the court was called upon to consider various aspects of the matter, namely, whether the suit was such as contemplated under section 92, whether the persons applying for such leave were fit persons to institute a representa tive suit and so on.
It was submitted by him that the court could not decide whether leave should be granted without giving an opportunity to the defendants to show cause against the grant of leave.
It was submitted by him that the grant of leave was a pre condition for instituting a 'suit under section 92.
Leave granted without giving any opportu nity to the defendant to show cause was void and a suit instituted on the basis of such void leave was not maintain able at all.
It was submitted by him that at the stage of grant of leave what the court is called upon to consider is the plaint and whether, prima facie, the suit proposed to be instituted was of the kind contemplated under section 92 of the Code, that is, whether the reliefs prayed for were such as were set out in section 92 and whether the suit was against a public trust.
It was also necessary for the court to consider whether, the proposed plaintiffs had an interest in the public trust and were fit persons for leave being granted to them.
The Court could also consider whether, prima facie, the allegations in the plaint were baseless or frivolous.
At that stage, it was necessary to give any notice to the defendant because he could point out the reasons why leave should not be granted.
Before considering the merits of the aforesaid conten tions, it would not be out of place to refer to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The relevant part of sub section (1) of section runs as follows: "92.
Public Charities (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charita ble or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court 271 is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Gov ernment within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree (a) removing any trustee; (b) appointing a new trustee; (c) vesting any property in a trustee; (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property; (d) directing accounts and enquiries; (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) settling a scheme; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.
Section 104 provides for appeals against certain orders unless otherwise provided in the body of the Code or by any other law in force.
Clause (ffa) of that section runs as follows: "(ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the nature referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case may be.
" 272 We may mention that prior to its amendment in 1976, section 92 of the Code provided that leave of the Advocate General had to be obtained for the institution of a suit of the kind described in that section and not the leave of the court.
We may now discuss the main cases relied on by the learned Counsel for the respective parties.
Coming first to the cases relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellants, we find that the first decision cited by him was the deci sion of this Court in Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati & Anr.
vs Ramji Tripathi & Anr., ; at p. 796.
In that case it was held that to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of section 92, only the allegations in the plaint should be looked into in the first instance.
But, if, after the evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direc tion of 'the court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation of fact or reason but is made only with a view to bring the suit under the section then such a suit must be dismissed.
Learned Counsel next drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Charan Singh & Anr.
vs Darshan Singh & Ors., ; Section 92 of the Code before its amendment in 1976 was applicable to the case.
The court cited with approval the observations of Mukherjea, J., (as he then was), in Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs Patel Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai and Others, reported in 13 which runs as follows: "A suit under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character.
Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that directions of the court are necessary.
It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought in conformity with the provisions of section 92, Civil Procedure Code . " Neither of the aforesaid decisions of this Court deal with the question as to whether, before granting leave to insti tute a suit under section 92, Advocate General, or later the Court, was required to give an opportunity to the proposed defendants to show cause why leave should not be granted.
What learned counsel for the appellants urged, however, was that these decisions show that at the time when the Advo cate General or the Court is required to consider whether to grant leave to institute a suit as contemplated under sec tion 92, it is only the averments in the plaint which have to be examined and hence, 273 the presence of the defendant is not necessary.
We may now consider the High Court decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants.
In Prithipal Singh vs Magh Singh and Others, AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 137 a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the grant of leave to file a suit is not a mere irregularity which can be cured but is a condition precedent.
The provisions of section 92 are mandatory in nature in that respect.
He further held that in granting leave under section 92 of the Code, the court does not have to write a reasoned order.
It does not even have to give a notice to the defendant of an application for leave to file a suit as the order granting leave is of an adminis trative nature.
The same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Lachhman Dass Udasi (deceased by L.R. 's) and Others vs Ranjit Singh and Others, AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 108 wherein it was held that no notice is necessary to be issued to the defendants prior to the granting or refusing of leave under section 92 of the Code as at that stage it is only the subjective satisfaction of the court that is required and, thus, the order is an order of administrative nature.
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court also took the same view in P.V. Mathew and Others vs K.V. Thomas and Oth ers, AIR 1983 Kerala 5.
In that case it was held that along with the petition for leave the plaintiffs petitioners should produce in court the plaint for the court 's perusal to enable it to pass a proper order under section 92(1).
This does not preclude the court from requiring the produc tion of any other record necessary for a proper decision.
The court, if it is so satisfied, may grant the leave with out issuing notice to the respondents defendants or hearing them.
In coming to this conclusion, the Division Bench relied upon the earlier decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mayer Simon, Perur vs Advocate General of Kerala and Others, which was rendered before the amendment of Section 92 of the Code in 1976.
Learned Counsel referred to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Ambrish Kumar Singh vs Raja Abhushan Bran Bramhshan and Others, AIR 1989 Allaha bad 194.
In that case the learned Judge held that while granting leave the court does not decide the rights of the parties.
No right is adjudicated at this stage.
The court has merely to see whether there is a prima facie case for granting leave to file a suit.
This order does not in any way affect the final decision which will be given on merits after the parties have 274 led evidence in the suit.
Section 92 of the Code does not contemplate giving of any notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave.
Learned counsel for the respondent.
on the other hand drew our attention to the afore mentioned decision of the Madras High Court in T.M. Shanmugham and Others vs The Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution and Others, which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment.
In that case a learned Judge of the said High Court held that leave granted to the plaintiffs to institute a suit under section 92 of the Code without notice to the defendants is void in law and the logical consequence will be that the institution and the numbering of the suit cannot be validly sustained in law and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed on that technical ground.
However, this will not stand in the way of the plaintiffs, if so desired, to institute fresh proceedings in accordance with law under section 92 of the Code.
In the case of Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee.
Delhi Cantonment and Others vs Amarjit Singh Sabharwal and Others.
a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court has taken the view that an order of District Judge granting or refusing leave must be a reasoned order.
The public trust concerned has right to be heard before the grant or refusal of leave.
It was held by him that if the trust is not given an opportunity of being heard, it would be a material irregularity.
To pass a non speaking order in a judicial proceeding is also a material irregularity and revision would lie against such an irregularity.
The grant ing or refusing leave is a judicial order subject to revi sion or appeal and it must be supported by reasons.
Before such an order is passed both sides must have had an opportu nity of being heard.
As far as the decisions of this Court which have been pointed out to us are concerned, the question as to whether before granting leave to institute a suit under section 92 of the Code, the Court is required to give an opportunity of being heard to the proposed defendants did not arise for determination at all in those cases.
As far as the High Courts are concerned, they have taken different views on this question.
The legislative history of section 92 of the Code indicates that one of the objects which led to the enactment of the said section was to enable two or more persons interested in any trust created for a public purpose of a charitable or religious nature should be enabled to file a suit for the reliefs set out in the said section without having to join all the beneficiaries since it would be highly inconvenient and impractic 275 able for all the beneficiaries to join in the suit; hence any two or more of them were given the right to institute a suit for the reliefs mentioned in the said section 92 of the Code.
However, it was considered desirable to prevent a public trust from being harassed or put to legal expenses by reckless or frivolous suits being brought against the trus tees and hence, a provision was made for leave of the court having to be obtained before the suit is instituted.
A plain reading of section 92 of the Code indicates that leave of the court is a pre condition or a condition prece dent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section: unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit.
if such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all.
Having in mind, the objectives underlying section 92 and the language thereof.
it appears to us that, as a rule caution, the court should normally.
unless it is impractica ble or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under section 92 to insti tute a suit.
The defendants could bring to the notice of the court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless.
Apart from this.
they could, in a given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under section 92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons.
The desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under section 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case.
cause considerable loss to the public trust.
Such a construction of the provisions of section 92 of the Code would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the court even though the circum stances might warrant such relief being granted.
Keeping in mind these considerations, in our opinion.
although, as a rule of caution, court should normally give notice to the defendants before granting leave under the said section to institute a suit.
the court ' is not bound to do so.
If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave, granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non maintainable.
The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law.
We may mention that although clause (ffa) of a section 104(1) of the Code provides that an appeal shall lie against the refusal of grant of 276 leave, that cannot lead to the conclusion that it is obliga tory on the part of the court to give notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave because an appeal lies only against the refusal of leave and not against the grant of leave.
Before refusing leave the proposed plaintiffs are bound to be heard and it is the plaintiffs and not the defendants who could be prejudiced by refusal to grant such leave.
In the result, the appeals are allowed as aforestated.
The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.
The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the application for revocation of leave on merits and in accordance with law.
On the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to cost incurred so far.
R.S. section Appeals allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellants instituted a representative suit in the court of the learned Subordinate Judge against the respond ents inter alia praying for framing a scheme for a public charitable trust.
On the same day, an application was made in the court praying for leave to institute the suit, as required under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Cede.
The Court granted leave without issuing any notice to the re spondents.
Thereupon, the respondents filed an interim application before the Court for revoking the leave granted inter alia on the ground that the respondents had not been given any opportunity to be heard before leave was granted.
The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the said application on the ground that the grant of leave was an administrative act of the Court and no notice to the respondents was re quired before the grant of such leave.
The respondents preferred a Civil Revision Petition in the High Court which was allowed.
The learned Single Judge took the view that as the leave had been granted without any notice to the respondents, it was void and liable to be set aside.
Before this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that if tile court were required to give an opportunity to the defendants to be heard before granting leave under section 92, the grant of leave would entail a great deal of delay and might defeat the ends of justice where some urgent relief was required.
It was also urged that at the time when the court considered whether to grant leave, it was only the averments in the plaint which had to be examined and hence, the presence of the defendant was not necessary.
It was further submitted that if a defendant had a grievance against the grant of leave, he could always make an application to revoke the same and no prejudice would be caused to the defendant by the grant of leave.
267 On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the court could not decide whether leave should be granted or not without giving an opportunity to the defendants who could point out the reasons why leave should not be granted.
Allowing the appeals and directing the Trial Court to dispose of the application for revocation of leave on merits and in accordance with law, this Court, HELD: (1) A plain reading of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code indicates that leaves of the court is a pre condition or a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section, unless all the beneficiaries join in institut ing the suit; if such a suit is instituted without leave it would not be maintainable at all.
[275B C] (2) Having in mind the objectives underlying section 92 and the language thereof, it appears that, as a rule of caution, the court should normally, unless it is impractica ble or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under section 92 to insti tute a suit.
The desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under section 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay, and in a given case, could cause considerable loss to the public trust.
[275C E] (3) If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave granted without notice to the defendants, the suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non maintainable.
The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law.
[275G] T.N. Shanmugam and Others vs The Periyar Self Respect Propaganda Institution and Others, [1984] II MLJ 440; ; Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati & Anr.
vs Ramji Tripathi & Anr., ; , 795; Charan Singh & Anr.
vs Darshan Singh and Ors.
, ; ; Mahant Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji vs Patel Ishwarlal Bhai Narsibhai and Others, ; ; Prithipal Singh vs Magh Singh and Others, AIR 1982 Punjab & Haryana 137; Lachhman Dass Udasi (deceased by L. RS.) and Others vs Ranjit Singh and Others.
AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 108; I. V. Mathew vs K.V. 268 Thomas.
AIR 1983 Kerala 5; Mayer Simon Perur vs Advocate General of Kerala, ; Ambrish Kumar Singh vs Raja Abhushan Bran Bramhshan and Others, AIR 1989 All 194 and Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Delhi Cantonment and Others vs Amarjit Singh Sabharwal and Others, , referred to.
(4) Although clause (ffa) of section 104(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal shall lie against the refusal of grant of leave, that cannot lead to the conclusion that it is obligatory on the part of the court to give notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave because an appeal lies only against the refusal and not the grant of leave.
[275H; 276A]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1731 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.
1985 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No. 1729 of 1984.
Avadh Behari and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.
330 Rameshwar Nath, V.S. Dabir, Rajinder Narain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J.
S.P. Dubey, employed with the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, was retired from service on his attaining the age of 58 years.
He claims that the age of superannuation was 60 years and as such his retirement at 58 was illegal.
We may state the necessary facts.
Dubey joined service as a junior clerk with the Central Provinces Transport Service Limited (hereinafter called the company) in the year 1947.
The Board of Directors of the company by a resolution dated July 30, 1954 fixed the age of superannuation of all its employees except the drivers as 60 years.
The company was purchased and taken Over by the State of Madhya Pradesh by a notification dated August 31, 1955.
The relevant part of the said notification is as under: "The undertaking will as from the 31st August, 1955 be entitled 'The Central Provinces Transport Services (under Government Ownership)".
So far as the public is concerned there will be no change or interruption in the course of business and the continuity of operation will not be dis turbed and the existing staff will not be adversely affected with regard to terms and conditions of their services.
The statutory instrument to be made in due course will provide, among other things that all the rights and liabilities of the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. will become the rights and liabilities of the Central Provinces Trans port Services (Under Government ownership) and from a legal point of view the staff, customers and contractors can look to the Central Provinces Transport Services (Under Govern ment ownership) to discharge all the obligations and exer cise all the rights that at present rest with the Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Rules for the conduct of business of the above constituted Board of Management are being published separately.
" It is thus obvious that the Government continued to maintain the Central Provinces Transport Services as a separate entity.
The conditions of service, of the staff of the taken over company, were specifically protected.
331 The State of Madhya Pradesh was recoganised under the .
The Central Government, by a notification dated February 28, 1961, extended the provi sions of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act ') to the State of Madhya Pradesh with effect from April 1, 1961.
Thereafter the Madhya Pradesh Government acting under Section 3 of the Act established the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called Corporation) with effect from May 21, 1962.
The Madhya Pradesh Government issued two memorandums on May 4, 1962.
By one memorandum the services of the concerned employees including Dubey were transferred to the Corporation and by the second it was clarified that the said transfer was subject to the conditions that their service would be treat ed as uninterrupted and their pay scales and conditions of service would not be affected.
On the same day and Board of Directors of the Corporation passed a resolution to the following effect: "Resolved that the services of the employees employed under M.B.R. and C.P.T.S. on 31.5.1962 are transferred to the Corporation temporarily until further orders from 1.6.1962 on the following conditions: 1.
The pay scale and conditions of service are not affected by the transfer.
The transfer will not be considered as interruption of services.
In case of employees coming under the category of workman as defined under the , the Corporation in the event of retrenchment will pay compensation on the basis that the services had been contin ued and had not affected by transfer.
" The State Government issued directions dated October 29, 1963 to the Corporation under Section 34 of the Act.
Rele vant part of the directions is as under: "The members of the staff of the Madhya Bharat Roadways and Central Provinces Transport Services, who have opted to serve under the Corporation in pursuance of the notices issued to them by the Commerce and Industry Department or any authority of the Madhya Bharat Road 332 ways and Central Provinces Transport Service shall be em ployed by the Corporation subject to such regulations as may be made by it under Section 45(2)(c) of the 'Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 '(Central Act LXIV of 1950), and subject to 'such assurance as may have been given to them by the State Government.
" The Corporation framed regulations called The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations, 1964.
" Regulation 59 which provided the age of superannuation was as under: "Employees of/he State Transport are liable to compulsory retirement on the date of their completion of fifty eight years of age unless specifically permitted by the Corpora tion to continue in service for a specified period thereaf ter, but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years, without the sanction of State Government.
" The corporation issued a notice dated May 25, 1983 to Dubey informing him that he was due to retire from service on June 30, 1984 on attaining the age of 58 years.
He chal lenged the said notice by way of a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, The High Court by its judgment dated April 26, 1985 dismissed the writ petition.
The present appeal by way of special leave petition is against the judgment of the High Court.
The High Court, following its earlier Division Bench judgment, came to the conclusion that on August 31, 1955 when the appellant became State Government employee his age of superannuation came to be governed by the statutory rules under Article 309 of the Constitution of India operating in respect of the Government employees of the State of Madhya Pradesh and the age of retirement of the State servants under the said rules being 58 years the appellant was right ly retired.
The appellant was in service of the company from 1947 to August 30, 1955.
Admittedly, the age of superannuation of the company employees was 60 years.
The Government of Madhya Pradesh took over the company with effect from August 31, 1955 by a notification of the same date.
The notification specifically stated that the existing staff of the company would not be adversely affected with regard to 333 their conditions of service.
It is no doubt correct that on August 31, 1955 rules were operating in respect of the State Government employees according to which the age of superan nuation was 58 years but the persons who were service with the company were taken into Government serving with a spe cific assurance that their conditions of service were. not to be adversely affected.
When the.
State Government takes over a private company and gives an assurance of the types it is but fair that the State Government should honour the same.
Thus, the State Service rules which fixed the age of superannuation at 58 years could not be made applicable to the appellant and other employees of the taken over company.
We, therefore, do not agree with the reasoning of the High Court.
It was then urged that on the transfer of appellant 's service to the Corporation he was governed by the Regula tions framed by the Corporation under the Act and Regulation 59 provided 58 years as the age of superannuation.
We do not agree with the contention.
The State Government issued directions under Section 34 of the Act which we have repro duced above.
The said directions are binding on the corpora tion.
This Court in The General Manager, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs Devraj ors and another, interpreting Section 34 of the Act held as under: "Directions given by the State Government are binding on the corporation and it cannot depart from any general instruc tions issued under sub section (1) of Section 34 except with the previous permission of the State Government.
Such in structions have the force of law .
Therefore breach of the directions given by State Government in the matter of disciplinary action against the respondents was a breach of the statutory duty and made the action of the corporation amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution".
The State Government and also the Corporation had given assurance to the appellant and other employees who were transferred to the Corporation that their conditions of service would not be adversely affected.
The said assurance was incorporated in the directions issued under the Act.
The Corporation cannot frame regulations contrary to the direc tions issued by the State Government under Section 34 of the Act.
The age of superannution which the appellant was enjoy ing under the State Government could not be altered to his disadvantage by the 334 Corporation.
We are, therefore, of the view that Regulation 59 flamed by the Corporation was not applicable to the appellant.
He was entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years.
We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
The appellant has already attained the age of 60 years.
He is only entitled to two years emoluments.
The respondents are directed to pay the same to the appellant within three months from today.
We quantify the costs as Rs.5,000.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The age of superannuation for the employees of the private transport company in which the appellant was ini tially employed was 60 years.
When the said company was taken over by the State on August 31, 1955, the notification specifically provided that the existing staff would not be adversely affected with regard to terms and conditions of service.
Again, when the services 01 the staff of the taken over company were transferred to the respondent Corpo ration established under section 3 of the Road Transport Corpora tion Act, 1950, the memorandum dated May 4, 1962 recited the same assurance.
A resolution passed by the Board of Direc tors of the Corporation on the same day also reiterated the said assurance.
Subsequently, when the State Government issued directions on October 29, 1963 to the Corporation under section 34 of the Act the said assurance was embodied therein too.
However, Regulation 59 of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations, 1964 framed by the Corporation under section 45(2)(c) of the Act provided that the employees of the Corporation were liable to compulsory retirement on the date of their completion of 58 years of age unless specifically permitted to continue.
When the appellant was sought to be retired from service in terms of Regulation 59 of the said Regulations on attain ing the age of 58 years with effect from June 30, 1984 by a notice dated May 25, 1983, he challenged it by a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
It was dismissed by the High Court on the view that on August 31, 1955 when the appellant became State Government employee his age of superannuation came to be governed by the statutory rules under Article 309 of the Constitution and the age of retire ment of the State servants under the said rules being 58 years the appellant was rightly retired.
329 Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.
The appellant was entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years.
2.1 When the State Government takes over a private company and gives an assurance that conditions of service of the existing staff would not he adversely affected, it is but fair that the State Government should honour the same.
2.2 In the instant case, the appellant was in service of the company from 1947 to August 30, 1955 in which the age of superannuation of the employees was 60 years.
The company was taken over by the State Government with effect from August 31, 1955 by a notification of the same date which specifically stated that the existing staff of the company would not he adversely affected with regard to their condi tions of service.
The State Service Rules which fixed the age of superannuation at 58 years could not thus he made applicable to the appellant and other employees of the taken over company.
Furthermore, the said assurance was also incorporated in the directions issued by the State Government to the Corporation under section 34 of the Act.
The Corporation could not frame regulations contrary to the said directions and the age of superannuation which the appellant was enjoying under the State Government could not he altered to his disadvantage by the Corporation.
Regulation 59 framed by the Corporation was, therefore, not applicable to the appellant.
The General Manager, Mysore State Road Transport Corpo ration vs Devraj Ors and Anr., , referred to.
Since the appellant had already attained the age of 60 years, he was only entitled to two years emoluments.
The respondents are directed to pay the same to him within three months.
[334B]


judgement:
ontempt Petition No. 71 of 1990.
AND Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 1990.
IN Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1 1222 of 1983.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Shanti Bhushan, Bashant Bhushan, Bohla Prasad Singh for the Petitioner.
Kapil Sibal, Additional Solicitor General, Ashok H. Desai, Solicitor General, Tapas Roy, Ratin Das and D.K. Sinha for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA, J.
Seth Mannalal Surana Memorial Trust is the owner of a building situate at 7/ID, Lindsay Street, Calcut ta, one of the busiest streets in Calcutta where the New Market is situated.
The petitioner is the lessee of the said building from the said Trust.
On February 25, 1958, a por tion of the ground floor premises in the said building admeasuring 4198 Sq.
(referred to hereinafter as "the said premises") was requisitioned by the Government of West Bengal under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Con trol (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as "the West Bengal Act").
The purpose for which the said premises were requisitioned was establishing the main show room of West Bengal Handicraft Development Corporation Limited, a West Bengal Government Undertaking.
The said show room is called "Manjusha" and has become a landmark in Calcutta.
In H.D. Vora vs State of Maharashtra and Others, ; this Court held that the provisions for, 248 requisition could be resorted to only where premises were required for a temporary purpose but not where they were required for a permanent purpose.
If premises were required for a permanent purpose, they have to be acquired in accord ance with law.
Following upon this decision, the petitioner filed the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1 1222 of 1983 in this Court praying for a mandatory order directing that the premises should be derequisitioned and handed over to the petitioner.
Certain interim applications were made in this Court and orders were passed thereon to which it is not necessary to refer in this Judgment.
By an order dated January 16, 1990, certain directions were given to respondent No. 4 in the writ petition.
The relevant portion of the said order runs as follows: "In view of the earlier orders, we direct respondent No. 4 to hand over the possession of the premises in question to the petitioner within nine weeks from today subject to their obtaining any order from the Calcutta High Court in the appeal pending in that Court against the decision of a learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 2063 of 1987 or acquiring any independent right to retain possession of the suit premises within that period.
It is contended by Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned coun sel for the petitioner that as the respondents have not succeeded in obtaining any order from the Calcutta High Court in the said appeal or in acquiring any independent right to retain possession of the said premises within the period of nine weeks from January 16, 1990, as set out in the said order, they were bound to hand over the possession of the said premises to the petitioner and have committed contempt as they have deliberately failed to do so.
We find that it is not possible to accept the submis sion set out hereinabove.
On February 21, 1990, the Govern ment of West Bengal issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as applicable to the State of West 'Bengal, declaring its intention to acquire the said prem ises.
On February 27, 1990, the said declaration was duly published.
By the beginning of March 1990 the declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the said premises was duly made and published and on 1st of March.
1990 the Government of West Bengal authorised the First Lanisition Collector to take possession of the said premises under section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Public notices were given on 9th March, 249 1990.
A few days later, the trustees of the said trust which owned the said building filed a writ petition in the Calcut ta High Court challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said premises which had been initiated consequent upon the amendment of the Land Acquisi tion Act as applicable to the State of West Bengal and on 20th March, 1990, the Calcutta High Court directed the status quo to be maintained regarding possession.
It is clear that unless the said order dated March 20, 1990, is vacated, it is not possible for the respondents to proceed with the acquisition and acquire title to the prem ises.
The contention of the learned counsel for the peti tioner is that the acquisition is patently bad in law as it is not open to the Government to acquire the said premises on the ground floor of the said building without acquiring the corresponding area on the upper floors.
It was submitted by him that such acquisition would be clearly bad in law in spite of the amendment carried out to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act as applicable to the State of West Bengal by the insertion of Section 49 A therein by Land Acquisition (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1986, which came into force on February 14, 1990, after obtaining the consent of the Presi dent of India.
Section 49A permits acquisition of a part of a house.
In our view, the question whether the acquisition is valid or not is pending for decision in the Calcutta High Court in the said writ petition filed by the said trust as owner of the building challenging the validity of the said amendment.
In our opinion, before a party can be committed for contempt, there must be a wilful or deliberate disobedience of the orders of the Court.
In the present case, we do not find that any such wilful or deliberate or reckless disobe dience of our order dated January.
16, 1990, has been com mitted by the respondent to the contempt petition.
Hence, the contempt petition is dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
We hope that the Calcutta High Court will be able to dispose of the said writ petition challenging the validity of the said amendment as early as possible.
Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 1990 in writ petition No. 11222 of 1983 is not pressed and is allowed to be with drawn with liberty to renew the same if any occasion arises.
Although we are of the view that the respondent has not commit 250 ted contempt, we do realise that in case the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition, the respondent would have remained in possession of the said premises for a long time after they should have handed over the possession of the same to the petitioner.
We find that the respondent has already been directed to pay compensation for the use of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 15,000 per month by an order of this Court passed over two years earlier.
We direct that the respondent shall deposit, in addition, an amount of Rs. 10,000 per month commencing from 1st October, 1990, in the Court, the first of such deposits to be made on or before 20th October, 1990, and deposits for each succeeding month to be made by 15th day of each succeeding month.
The amounts deposited shall be invested by the Registrar General at suitable intervals in a nationalised bank in fixed depos it after consulting the parties.

summary:
By its order dated January 16, 1990 in the writ petition, the Court had directed respondent No. 4 to band over possession of the premises requisitioned under the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provi sions) Act, 1947, within nine weeks subject to their obtain ing any order from the High Court or acquiring any independ ent right within that period to retain possession.
In the meantime, the Land Acquisition (West, Bengal Amendment) Act, 1986, which inserted section 49A in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as applicable to the State, came into force on February 14, 1990 permitting acqusition of a part of a house.
A week thereafter the State Government initiated acquisition process in respect of the said premises.
Notifi cations under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued, and the Land Acquisition Collector authorised to take possession under section 17(1) of the Act.
However, on March 20, 1990 in a writ challenging the validity of the acquisi tion proceedings the High Court directed the status quo to be maintained regarding possession.
In this contempt petition, the petitioner alleged that the respondent had deliberately failed to hand over possession in terms of the order dated January 16, 1990.
The acquisition was also assailed as being patently bad in law.
HELD: 1.
Before a party can be committed for con tempt, then must be a wilful or deliberate disobedience of the orders of the Court In the instant case, no such wilful or deliberate or reckless disobedient, of the order dated January 16, 1990 has been committed by the respondent to the contempt petition.
[249F] 2.
The question whether the acquisition is valid or not is pending 247 for decision in the High Court.
In case the petitioner succeeds the respondent would have remained in possession of the said premises for a long time after they should have handed over the possession.
They are, therefore, directed to deposit an amount of Rs. I0,000 per month commencing from 1st October, 1990 in the Court in addition to Rs.15,000 per month they are already paying under the earlier directions.
[250A C]