judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1314 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1978 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 782 of 1977.
A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellant.
section Padmanabhan and M. Raghuraman for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NATARAJAN, J.
This appeal by special leave is by a tenant against whom an order of eviction passed under Sec tion 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", by the Rent Controller was restored by the High Court of Madras after setting aside the dismissal of the eviction petition by the Appellate Authority.
The facts are not in controversy and may briefly be set out as under.
A one storeyed building in Wall Tax Road, Madras was originally owned by one Unnamalai Ammal.
She was using the first floor for her residence and had leased out the ground floor to the appellant herein to be used as a godown for storing his business ware.
It is common ground the appellant 's shop is situate in an adjoining building.
The tease was for a period of 10 years with an option for renewal for a further period of 5 years.
Unnamalai Ammal however refused to renew the lease and filed a suit against the appellant for eviction on the ground she bona fide.
required the ground floor also for her residential use.
The suit did not meet with success.
Unnamalai Ammal bequeathed the property to her son in law and grand son who are the respondents herein.
As legatees of the premises the respond ents filed a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act praying for eviction of the appellant on the ground they bona fide required additional accommodation for their resi dential needs.
The Rent Controller upheld their claim, after finding the relevant factors of bona fide need and com 1178 parative hardship in their favour and ordered eviction.
On appeal by the appellant, the Appellant Authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and further held that the respondent were not entitled to recover possession of non residential premises for their residential requirements and dismissed the petition for eviction.
On further revision to the High Court by the respondents Remaprasada Rao, C.J. set aside the order of the Appellant Authority and resorted the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.
The aggrieved tenant has preferred this appeal.
The judgment under appeal is assailed by the appellant on four grounds viz. (1) Since the ground floor constitutes a building by itself within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, the respondents can seek eviction of the appellant only under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(c); (2) Even if the respondents are entitled to invoke Section 10(3)(c) they can seek eviction only if they require the ground floor for non residential purposes and not for residential purposes; (3) In any event the factors of relative hardship be tween the parties weigh more in favour of the appellant than the respondent; and (4) The High Court was in error in interfering with the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority while exercising its revisional powers under Section 25 of the Act.
Before proceeding to examine the merits of the conten tions, it will be relevant to state a few facts.
The ground floor, though used as a godown, is of a residential pattern and consists of two rooms and a hall besides a kitchen and toilet rooms.
The first floor is being used as their resi dence by the respondents, the other members of the family being the wife and daughter of the second respondent.
The first floor consists of only two rooms and it is the case of the respondents that the accommodation in the first floor has become inadequate for their growing residential needs.
It is also their case that the first respondent who is over 65 years of age finds it difficult to climb the stairs on account of his old age and frail health.
Their further plea is that the water supply to the first floor is inadequate in spite of the electric motor and pump set installed in the ground floor to pump up water.
In contrast the appellant is said to have a spacious three storeyed building in Door No. 39 adjoining the leased premises and also to have another godown close by.
1179 One of the contentions of the appellant was that the eviction proceedings were a continuation of the unsuccessful attempt by Unnamalai Ammal herself to get the tenant evicted and, therefore, the eviction petition lacked bona fides.
The High Court has rejected his contention and in our opinion, rightly too, because the respondents who are the legatees of the building cannot be attributed mala fides because of the earlier eviction suit filed by their predecessor in title.
We may also dispose of another contention of the appellant at this juncture itself which had found favour with the Appellate Authority.
The contention was that with the death of Unnamalai Ammal the family had become smaller and hence there was no need for additional accommodation.
This argu ment overlooks the fact that additional accommodation is sought for because of the difficulty experienced by the first respondent in climbing the stairs in his old age and the need for the second respondent 's daughter, growing in years, to have a room all for herself for keeping her books and reading at home.
We will now proceed to consider the legal contentions of the appellant in seriatim.
The first and foremost contention was that under the Act the ground floor constitutes a sepa rate building and as such the respondents can seek recovery of possession of the ground floor only under Section 10(3)(a)(i) and not under Section 10(3)(c).
For dealing with this contention, the relevant provisions of the Act need setting out.
Section 2 which is the definition Section reads as under: "Definitions: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires (2) "building" means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non residen tial purpose and includes (a) . . (b) . .
Section 10 sets out the grounds on which the eviction of a tenant can be ordered.
For our purpose it is enough to refer to the following provisions alone: "Section 10(3)(a): A landlord may, subject to the 1180 provisions of clause (d), apply to the Con troller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the build ing (i) in case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family and if he or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned; (ii) ommitted (iii) in case it is any other non residential building if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own: (b) ommitted.
(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non resi dential, may, notwithstanding anything con tained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in posses sion thereof, it he requires additional accom modation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.
Provided that, in the case of an application under clause (c), the Controller, shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.
" It is no doubt true that under Section 2(2) a building has been.
defined as not building or hut but also part of a building or hut let separately for residential or non resi dential purpose.
That would, however, only mean that a part of a building which has been let out or which is to be let out separately can also be construed as a separate and 1181 independent building without reference to the other portion or portions of the building where it is not necessary to treat the entire building as one Whole and inseparable unit.
A limitation on the definition has been placed by the Legis lature itself by providing that the application of the definition is subject to the contextual position.
Therefore, it follows that where the context warrants the entire build ing being construed as one integral unit, it would be inap propriate to view the building as consisting of several disintegerated units and not as one integerated structure.
Secondly there is vast difference between the words "resi dential building" and "non residential building" used in Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and Section 10(3)(c) on the other.
While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to a building only as residential or non residential Section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a pan of a building, 'whether residential or non residential.
(Emphasis supplied).
Further more, Section 10(3)(c) states that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of evic tion being passed against the tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining pan of the building" (Emphasis supplied).
If as contended by the appellant each portion of a building let out separately should always be construed as an independent unit by itself then there is no scope for a landlord occupying "a part of a building" seeking eviction of a tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building".
It is, therefore, obvious that in so far as Section 10(3)(c) is concerned the Legisla ture has intended that the entire building, irrespective of one portion being occupied by the landlord and the other portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as different entities.
To import the expansive definition of the word "building" in Section 2(2) into section 10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaningless the words "part of a building" occupied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the build ing".
The third factor militating against the contention of the appellant is that if a portion of a building let out to a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a separate and independent building then Section 10(3)(c) will be rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask for additional accommodation since Section 10(3)(a) does not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional accommodation for the landlord either for residential or non residential purposes.
It is a well settled rule of interpretation of statutes that the provisions of the Act should be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to resort to that extreme contingency.
1182 Yet another noteworthy feature to be borne in mind is that Section 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which is not the case when eviction orders are made under any of the sub clauses of Section 10(3)(a).
The first proviso enjoins the Controller to reject the application of a landlord under Section.
10(3)(c) for additional accommodation, even where the need of the landlord is found to be genuine, if the hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord by the said order.
The second proviso empowers the Controller to give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding three months in the aggregate to vacate the portion in his occupation and put the landlord in possession thereof.
Obviously the second proviso has been made to facilitate the tenant to find alternate residential or non residential accommodation elsewhere, since the landlord who is already in possession of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the most.
The above analytical consideration of the relevant provisions bring out clearly the fallacy contained in and the untenability of the contention that the ground floor occupied by the appellant is a distinct and separate unit and as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
This aspect of the matter has been considered in varying degrees in the following decisions and interpreted in ac cordance with our conclusion; vide Saraswathi Sriraman vs
P.C.R. Chetty 's Charities, ; Mohammed Jarfar vs Palaniappa Chettiar, and Chellammal vs Accommodation Controller, Even the Division Bench ruling relied on by Mr. Sampath concedes this position and has observed as follows: "Therefore, if the context in a particular provision requires that the word building should not be understood as defined in Section 22, certainly it is open to the Court to give the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which it is capable of and for that purpose, it is not necessary to rely upon any decision.
(vide page 153 of the report).
" Taking up now for consideration the second contention, there were conflicting decisions in the Madras High Court and this led to a reference of the case in Thirupathi vs Kanta Rao, [1981] Vol.
1 ILR Madras 128 to a Division Bench.
While the Division Bench has taken one view.
a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has 1183 taken a contrary view on the identical issue.
It is perti nent to state here that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act are in pari tnetria with the provisions of the Madras Act in so far as Sections 10(3)(a) and (c) are concerned.
The conflict was with reference to the interpretation of Section 10(3)(c) viz. whether a landlord occupying a part of a building for residential purposes is entitled to seek eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building for non residential purposes for his (landlord 's) residential use and vice versa.
While it was held in Govindan vs Rajagopal Nadar, that a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant under Section 10(3)(c) for additional residential purposes only if the tenant also is putting the building to residential use and likewise a landlord can seek additional accommodation for business purposes only if the tenant is also putting the building to non residential use, it was held to the contrary in Premchand Motichand vs Hatneed Sultan, ; P.I. Kurian vs Government of Tamil Nadu, 85 L.W. 364 and Saraswathi Sriraman vs P.C.R. Chetty 's Charities (supra).
The latter view was taken by Ismail, J., also, as he then was, in an unreported case viz. Rangaswami Reddiar vs Minor N. Jayaraj (C.R.P. No. 2380 of 1977).
Subsequently in the referred case, the Division Bench consisting of Ismail, C.J. and Rathnam J. rendered judgment in Thirupathi vs Kanta Rao, (supra).
(Ismail, C.J., changing his earlier view) holding that a landlord will be entitled under Section 10(3)(c) to seek additional accommodation for residential purposes only if it is a residential building in the occupa tion Of a tenant and likewise a landlord can seek additional accommodation for non residential purposes only if the building is a non residential one.
The Division Bench has further taken the view that the non obstante clause is only to entitle a landlord to seek eviction even when he is in possession of a portion of a building .belonging to him and nothing more.
In a later decision G.N. Rajaram vs Mukunthu N. Venkata rama Iyer.
MLJ 1985(2) 173 the Division Bench ruling has been followed and eviction was ordered of a tenant occupying a room in the ground floor of a residential building for his business purposes.
On the other hand a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Parasuramaiah vs Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 220 has held that if a landlord satisfies the Controller that he wants additional accommodation in the same building for his residential or non residential re quirements then notwithstanding the user to which the tenant was putting the 1184 leased portion.
the landord is entitled to an order of eviction so that he can re adjust the additional accommoda tion in the manner convenient to him and it is not necessary that the additional accommodation sought for should be used by the landlord for the same purpose for which the tenant sought to be evicted was using it.
In the words of the Division Bench: "Clause (c) makes it twice clear that a land lord who occupies a part of a building, wheth er residential or nonresidential can ask for eviction of a tenant occupying another portion whatever may be his requirements, whether residential or non residential".
For holding so, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the words "notwithstanding anything in clause (a)" as having over riding effect over both the conditions laid down in Section 10(3)(a) and (iii) viz. a landlord (1) not having a building of his own for residential or nonresidential pur poses; and (2) seeking the eviction of a tenant from resi dential premises only for residential purposes; and (3) seeking eviction of a tenant from non residential premises only for nonresidential purposes.
We will now examine for ourselves the interpretation to be given to Section 10(3)(c).
In so doing we will first see the legislative intent behind Section 10(3)(c) before con sidering the thrust given by nonobstante clause in it.
Since Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations viz. a land lord occupying a part of a building which is residential or non residential, the sub clause can be read separately so as to have reference exclusively to a residential building or a non residential building.
In Thirupathy vs Kanta Rao, (supra) the learned Judges have noticed this position and set out Section 10(3)(c) distinctively.
But in so doing they have restricted the relief of additional accommodation to the landlord for residential purposes to residential build ings alone and the relief of additional accommodation for business purposes to nonresidential buildings alone and therein the error has crept in.
In our view.
this restric tion is not envisaged by Section 10(3)(c).
The proper way of distinctively viewing the Section should be as under: "A landlord who is occupying only a part of a residential building may notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession 1185 thereof.
if he requires additional accommoda tion for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be." "A landlord who is occupying only a part of a non residential building may notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.
" If clause (3) is construed in this manner there can be no scope for a contention that a landlord cab seek addition al accommodation for residence only if the building is a residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo dation for business purposes only if the building is a non residential one.
There are several reasons which persuade us to take this view.
In the first place it has to be noted that Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii).
It is not a case of a landlord not occupying a residential or non residential building of his own but a case of a landlord occupying a part of a residential or non residential building of his own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him.
Since the requirement of additional accommodation by the landlord is with reference to the manner of his user of that part of the building which is in his occupation it is the nature of that requirement that should prevail over the manner of user of the tenant of the portion leased out to him.
In other words, the additional accommodation is for extending the user of the building by the landlord to the leased portion for the same purpose for which the portion not leased out is being put to.
Such being the case which the landlord is genuinely in need of additional accommodation for residential or non residential requirements, as the case may be, he can be given relief only it the tenant occupying the other portion of the building is asked to vacate.
If it is to be held that Section 10(3)(c) can be invoked only if the nature of the requirement of the landlord and the nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant coalesce then the landlord will be left without any remedy when the nature of his need and the nature of the user of the leased portion by the tenant do not tally.
Take for example, a case where a landlord has got grown up sons and daughters or there is a married son and growing daughters or there 1186 are old parents who cannot climb stairs etc.
If the landlord is to be refused additional accommodation for residential purposes merely because the tenant is making use of the leased portion for nonresidential purposes the landlord would be placed in an awful predicament.
Similarly.
if a landlord bona fide requires additional accommodation for his business and his business would suffer serious detriment if he cannot secure additional accommodation, it would cause great hardship and gave injustice to the landlord if he is to be denied accommodation merely because the tenant is making use of the leased portion for residential purposes.
It is, therefore, that the Legislature has provided Section 10(3)(c) in its present form so that a landlord bona fide requiring additional accommodation is not confronted with a permanently irremediable situation.
In its anxiety that Section 10(3)(c) should fully serve the purpose for which it has been enacted the Legislature has also added the non obstante clause.
Having regard to the object of Section 10(3)(c) and the terms in which it is worded there is war rant and justification for holding that the non obstante clause has been provided to have overriding effect over both the restrictions placed by Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) viz. landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not be occupying a building of his own and secondly the nature of user of the leased property by the tenant must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
In construing Section 10(3)(c) it is pertinent to note that the words used are "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation.
The word "any" has the following meaning: "Some; one out of many; an indefinite number.
One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity.
" Word "any" has a diversity of mean ing and may be employed to indicate "all" or "every" as well as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute.
It is often synonymous with "either", "every" or "all".
Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black 's Law Dic tionary; Fifth Edition).
Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenants can be asked to vacate by the Rent Controller for providing the.
landlord additional accommodation.
be it for residential or non residential 1187 purposes.
it would not have used the word "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.
Thirdly it is significant to note that there is no reference in clause (c) to the nature of the user of the tenant occupying the leased portion of the building viz. whether he is using it for residential or nonresidential purposes.
If it was the intention of the legislature that only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a building can be asked to vacate for providing additional residential accommodation to the landlord and correspondingly a tenant occupying a portion of a building for non residential pur poses alone being asked to vacate for the nonresidential requirements of the landlord, the legislature would have provided specific stipulations to that effect in clause (c).
On that ground also it must be construed that clause (c) has been provided.
in order to enable a landlord to seek the eviction of any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building for residential or non residential purposes for satisfying the additional needs of the landlord irrespective of whether the need is for resi dential or business purposes.
The words "as the case may be" in sub clause (c) have been construed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court to mean that they restrict the landlord 's right to secure additional accommodation for residential purposes only in respect of a residential building and in the case of additional accommodation for business purpose only to a non residential building.
We are of the view that in the context of sub clause (c).
the words "as the case may be" would only mean "whichever the case may be" i.e. either residential or non residential.
To sum up, the requirement of additional accommodation pertains to the need of the landlord and the manner of user of the portion of the building already in his occupation and consequently the bona fides of his requirement will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by Section 10(3)(a) i.e. nature of the building.
nature of user of the leased portion by the tenant etc.
Even so, the Legislature has taken care to safeguard the interests of the tenant by means of the provi sos to the sub clause.
The first proviso enjoins the Con troller to balance the interests of the landlord and the tenant and to refuse eviction if the hardship caused to the tenant will outweight the advantage to the landlord by reason of the evicton.
The second proviso empowers the Controller to grant adequate time to the tenant upto a maximum of three months to vacate the building and secure accommodation elsewhere.
there.fore.
follows that once a landlord is able to satisfy the 1188 Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accom modation for residential or non residential purposes and that the advantage derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant, then he is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration.
In the light of our conclusion we approve the ratio in K. Prasuramaiah vs Lakshmamma, (supra) and disapprove the ratio in Thirupathy vs Kanta Rao.
(supra).
The third and fourth question posed for consideration do not present any difficulty.
The Rent Controller has gone into the question of comparative hardship and rendered a finding in favour of the respondents.
The High Court has observed that the Appellate Authority.
while reversing the order.
has failed to take due note of relevant materials placed by the respondents.
The High Court has, therefore, held that the Appellate Authority 's findings have been vitiated because of its non advertance to the evidence and the apparent errors noticed in its assessment of the compar ative hardship between the parties.
In so far as the High Court interfering with the findings of the Appellate Author ity is concerned, the High Court has justified its action by pointing out that Appellate Authority had applied wrong tests and had also failed to give effect to unchallenged findings of the Rent Controller and hence the order of the Appellate Authority suffered from manifest errors in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The High Court was, therefore.
entitled to allow the revision and consequently the third and fourth contentions also fail.
In the result we find no merit in the appeal and accord ingly it will stand dismissed.
Mr. Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant made a request that in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the appellant should be given suffi ciently long time to secure another godown and shift his stock of goods to that place.
Mr. Padmanabhan learned coun sel for the respondents very fairly stated that the respond ents are agreeable to give time to the appellant till 31.12.87 to vacate the leased portion.
Accordingly we order that in spite of the dismissal of the appeal the appellant will have time till 31.12.87 to vacate the ground floor premises in his occupation and deliver peaceful and vacant possession to the respondents subject however to the appel lant filing an under taking in the usual terms in this behalf within 4 weeks from today failing which the respond ents will be entitled to recover possession of the building forthwith.
The parties will bear their respective costs.
P.S. S Appeal dis missed.

summary:
Clause (c) of sub section
(3) of section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, enables a landlord occupying only a part of a building, whether resi dential or non residential, to seek eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building, notwithstanding anything contained in cl.
(a), for bona fide requirement of additional accommodation.
The first proviso thereto enjoins the Rent Controller to reject the application of the landlord under that clause even where the need is found to be genuine, if the hardship caused to the tenant would outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
Sub clause (i) of cl.
(a) of section 10(3) enables eviction from residential building if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, while sub cl.
(iii) enable eviction from non residential building if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business a non residential building in the city.
A 'building ' is defined in section 2(2) to mean any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non residential purposes.
The respondent legatees of the landlady, using the first floor of the building for residence sought eviction of the appellant tenant from the ground floor used by him as a godown for storing his business wares on the ground that they bona fide required additional accommodation 1174 for their residential needs.
The Rein Controller upheld their claim.
The Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller but in revision the High Court re stored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller.
In this Appeal by Special leave it was contended that since the ground floor constituted a building by itself within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act.
the respondents could seek eviction of the appellant only under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under section 10(3)(c), that even if the respondents were entitled to invoke section 10(3)(c) they could seek eviction only if they required the ground floor for non residential purposes and not for residential pur poses, that the factors of relative hardship between the parties weighed more in favour of the appellant than the respondents, and that the High Court was in error in inter fering with the findings of fact rendered by the Appellate Authority while exercising its revisional powers under section 25 of the Act.
Dismissing the Appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1 The ground floor of the building in occupation of the appellant did not constitute a distinct and separate unit.
The respondent landlords could.
therefore seek evic tion under section 10(3)(c) of the Act.
1.2 A 'building ' has been defined in section 2(2) of the Act as not only a building or hut but also part of a building or hut, let separately for residential or non residential purposes, which could only means that a part of a building that has been let out or that has to be let out separately can also be construed as a separate and independent building without reference to the other portion or portions of the building where it is not necessary to treat the entire building as one whole and inseparable unit.
A limitation has thereby been placed by the Legislature itself, by providing that the application of the definition is subject to the contextual position.
It follows therefrom that where the context warrants.
the entire building being construed as one integral unit.
It would be inappropriate to view the build ing as consisting of several disintegrated units and not as one integrated structure.
1.3 In enacting section 10(3)(c) the Legislature has intended that the entire building.
irrespective of one portion being occupied by the landlord and the other portion or portions being occupied by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not as different entities.
1175 1.4 There is vast difference between the words "residen tial building" and "non residential building" used in section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and section 10(3)(c) on the other.
While section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to a building only as residential or non residential, section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether resi dential or non residential.
Furthermore, section 10(3)(c) states that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order of eviction being passed against the tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building.
1.5 TO import the expansive definition of the word "building" in section 2(2) into section 10(3)(c) would result in rendering meaningless the words "part of a building" occu pied by the landlord and a tenant "occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building", leaving no scope for such a landlord to seek eviction.
1.6 The provisions of an Act should be interpreted in such a manner as pot to render any of its provisions otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the Court to resort to the extreme contingency.
If a portion of a building let out to a tenant is to be treated in all situations as a separate and independent building then section 10(3)(c) will be rendered otiose because the landlord can never then ask for additional accommodation since section 10(3)(a) does not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of additional accommo dation for the landlord either for residential or non resi dential purposes.
Saraswathi Sriraman vs
P.C.R. Chetty 's Charities, ; Mohammed Jaffar vs Palaniappa Chettiar, [1964] 1 M .L.J. 112 and Cheilaromal vs Accommodation Controller, , approved.
2.1 It cannot be said that a landlord can seek addition al accommodation for residence only if the building is a residential one and likewise he can seek additional accommo dation for business purposes only if the building is a non residential one.
2.2 Section 10(3)(c) provides for both situations, viz. a landlord occupying a part of a building which is residen tial or non residential.
The words used in it arc "any tenant" and not "a tenant" who can be called upon to vacate the portion in his occupation.
Unless the legislature had intended that both classes of tenant i.e. residential or nonresidential, can be asked to vacate by the Rent Control ler for providing landlord the additional accommodation it would not have used the 1176 words "any" instead of using the letter "a" to denote a tenant.
Further, the words "as the case may be" in cl.
(0) only mean "whichever the case may be", i.e. either residen tial or non residential.
They do not restrict the landlord 's right to secure additional accommodation for residential purposes only in respect of a residential building and in the case of additional accommodation for business purposes only to a non residential building.
2.3 Section 10(3)(c) stands on a different footing from section 10(3)(a) (i) and section 10(3)(a)(iii).
The non obstante clause has been added to cl.
(c) to give it an overriding effect over both the restrictions placed by cls.
(a)(i) and (a)(iii), viz., landlord seeking eviction of a tenant should not be occupying a building of his own and secondly the nature of user of the leased property by the tenant must correspond to the nature of the requirement of the landlord.
Thus, the requirement of additional accommodation under cl.
(c) is not a case of a landlord not occupying a residential or non residential building of his own but a case of a landlord occupying a part of a residential or non residen tial building of his own and putting it to such user as deemed fit by him.
If it was the intention of the legisla ture that only a tenant occupying a residential portion of a building can be asked to vacate for providing additional residential accommodation to the landlord and corresponding ly a tenant occupying a portion of a building for non resi dential purposes alone being asked to vacate for the non residential requirements of the landlord.
it would have provided specific stipulation to that effect in cl.
In the instant case.
the requirement of additional accommodation pertains to the need of the landlord and the manner of user of the portion of the building already in his occupation and consequently the bona fides of his require ment will outweigh all the restrictions imposed by section 10(3)(a).
K. Parasuramaiah vs Lakshmamma, (AIR 1965: 220).
approved.
Thirupathi vs Kanta Rao.
[1981] Vol. 1 ILR Madras 128 overruled.
Once a landlord is able to satisfy the Controller that he is bona fide in need of additional accommodation for residential or nonresidential purposes and that the advan tage derived by him by an order of eviction will outweigh the hardship caused to the tenant.
then he is entitled to an order of eviction irrespective of any other consideration.
1177 4.
The Rent Controller has gone into the question of comparative hardship and rendered a finding in favour or the respondents.
The Appellate Authority 's findings have been vitiated because of its non advertance to the evidence and application of wrong tests in assessing the comparative hardship between the parties.
The High Court, was.
there fore, entitled to allow the revision.


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 464 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.6.1986 of the Alla habad High Court in Crl.
Case No. 1320 of 1986.
Anil Kumar Gupta for the Appellant.
U.R. Lalit, K.B. Rohtagi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respond ents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered.
Special leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the order of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, dated 7th June 1986, granting bail to respondent No. 1, Ishtiaq Hasan Khan.
We allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and issued directions that respondent No. 1, Ishtiaq Hasan Khan be taken into custody forthwith.
In that order we had directed that the reasons will follow.
Hence this order articulating our reasons.
Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, respondent No. 1 and three others, namely, Naseem, Shiva Kant Sharma and Asghar are facing trial for the murder of Zaheer Hasan Khan at about 9.00 a.m. on March 3, 1985, in a public place in Mahmood Nagar leather market.
After the occurrence respondent No. 1 absconded and he surrendered in court on April 22, 1985.
He applied for bail before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, which was rejected.
He approached the Lucknow Bench of the 37 High Court of Allahabad with an application for grant of bail.
The application was opposed by the complainant and as well as by the Public Prosecutor.
Justice Kamleshwar Nath by his order dated September 18, 1985 refused to enlarge the respondent on bail and rejected the bail application.
After a lapse of two months ' time respondent No. 1, Ishtiaq Hasan Khan filed another bail application before the High Court.
That application was placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath who rejected the same by his order dated January 21, 1986.
Within a few days thereafter respondent No. 1 made another application before Justice P. Dayal.
The learned Judge having regard to the judicial discipline and prevailing practice in the High Court, directed that the bail applica tion be placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath who had passed orders rejecting earlier applications for bail.
In pursuance of that order the bail application was placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath.
Meanwhile, respondent No. 1 made two futile attempts before the trial court for the grant of bail even though his application for bail was pending before the High Court.
On March 18, 1986 Justice Kamleshwar Nath was sitting in a Division Bench and the respondent 's counsel appeared before him seeking his permission for listing the bail application before him.
The learned Judge passed an order releasing the bail application, but it appears that inspite of that order the bail application was not listed before any other Judge, instead it again came up for orders before Justice Kamleshwar Nath on March 24, 1986.
On that date counsel for the respondent No. 1 for some unknown reasons did not press the bail application, on his request the application was dismissed as withdrawn.
Meanwhile, one of the accused Shiva Kant Sharma filed an application for transfer of the trial from the court of the First Additional Sessions Judge to any other court.
The complainant had also filed an application in the High Court for the cancellation of bail granted to Shiva Kant Sharma.
Respondent No. 1 also made an application from jail for the transfer of the case.
All the three miscellaneous cases were heard by D .N.
Jha, J.
By a composite order dated 10.12.
1985, Justice D.N. Jha refused to transfer the case and he further refused to cancel the bail granted to Shiva Kant Sharma.
The learned Judge, however, made observations that the trial should be concluded expeditiously and if necessary the court should hold day to day trial to conclude the same at an early date.
In pursuance to the order of Justice D.N. Jha, the First Additional Sessions Judge fixed several dates for the trial of the case but the accused persons obtained adjournments on one pretext or the other with the result the trial could not be commenced or completed within three months as desired by Justice D.N. Jha.
Mean 38 while, the respondent No. 1 made another application on June 3, 1986 before Justice D.S. Bajpai Vacation Judge for grant of bail.
The learned Judge directed that the application be placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath who was sitting as a Vacation Judge with effect from 23rd June, 1986.
Two days later, another application was made on behalf of respondent No. 1 before Justice D.S. Bajpai for recalling his order dated June 3, 1986, the application was directed to be placed before the Court on June 6, 1986.
On June 6, 1986 when the application was taken up the Assistant Government Advocate appearing for the prosecution and the complainant 's advocate both appeared and filed their appearance.
Justice D.S. Bajpai directed the application to be listed on June 7, 1986.
On that date the complainant 's counsel filed applica tion raising objections against the heating of the bail application on a number of grounds and he further sought three days time to file detailed counter affidavit in reply to the allegations made in bail application.
Justice D.S. Bajpai, did not grant time.
Instead he heard the arguments, he recalled his order dated June 3, 1986 for placing the matter before Kamleshwar Nath and enlarged the respondent No. 1 on bail.
Aggrieved, Shahzad Hasan Khan the complain ant, who is the son of the deceased Zaheer Hasan Khan, has approached this court by means of this appeal.
Normally this court does not interfere with bail matters and the orders of the High Court are generally accepted to be final relating to grant or rejection of bail.
In this case, however, there are some disturbing features which have persuaded us to interfere with the order of the High Court.
The matrix of facts detailed above would show that three successive bail applications made on behalf of respondent No. 1 had been rejected and disposed of finally by Justice Kamleshwar Nath.
In that view it would have been appropriate and desirable and also in keeping with the prevailing prac tice in the High Court that the bail application which was filed in June 1986 should have been placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath for disposal.
In fact on June 3, 1986.
Justice D.S. Bajpai being conscious of this practice and judicial discipline himself passed order directing the bail application to be placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath but subsequently on 7th June 1986 he recalled his order.
We are of the opinion that Justice D.S. Bajpai should not have recalled his order dated June 3, 1986 keeping in view the judicial discipline and the prevailing practice in the High Court.
Justice D.S. Bajpai was persuaded to the view that Justice Kamleshwar Nath had passed orders on March 18, 1986, releasing the bail application, the matter was therefore not tied up to him.
However, the learned Judge failed to notice that when the bail application was listed 39 before Justice Kamleshwar Nath on March 24, 1986 the re spondent No. 1, for reasons known to him only, withdrew his application, as a result of which Justice Kamleshwar Nath dismissed the same as withdrawn.
This fact was eloquent enough to indicate that respondent No. 1 was keen that the bail application should not be placed before Justice Kam leshwar Nath.
Long standing convention and judicial disci pline required that respondent 's bail application should have been placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath who had passed earlier orders, who was available as Vacation Judge.
The convention that subsequent bail application should be placed before the same Judge who may have passed earlier orders has its roots in principle.
It prevents abuse of process of court in as much as an impression is not created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a court depending on whether the court is to his liking or not, and is encour aged to file successive applications without any new factor having cropped up If successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different judges there would be conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the creditability of the court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of courts ' time.
Judicial discipline re quires that such matter must be placed before the same judge, if he is available for orders.
Since Justice Kamlesh war Nath was sitting in Court on June 23, 1986 the respond ent 's bail application should have been placed before him for orders.
Justice D.S. Bajpai should have respected his own order dated June 3, 1986 and that order ought not to have been recalled, without the confidence of the parties in the judicial process being rudely shaken.
As regards merits, for granting the bail, the learned Judge appears to be influenced by two factors, firstly, he observed that the trial could not be commenced or completed as directed by Justice D .N.
Jha by his order dated 10th December, 1985.
In this respect the complainant has filed a detailed affidavit giving the details of the proceedings before the trial court.
On a perusal of the same it is evident that the accused persons obtained adjournment after adjournment on one pretext or the other and they did not allow the court to proceed with the trial.
On June 7, 1986 complainant 's counsel had filed a written application seek ing three days, time to file counter affidavit giving the details of the proceedings pending before the trial court.
We are constrained to observe that Justice D.S. Bajpai refused to grant the prayer and proceeded to grant bail simply on the ground that the liberty of a citizen was involved which is the case in every criminal case more particularly in a murder case where a citizen who let alone losing 40 liberty has lost his very life.
Another ground for granting bail was that trial was delayed therefore the accused was entitled to bail.
This also cannot be helped if a litigant is encouraged to make half a dozen applications on the same point without any new factor having arisen after the first was rejected.
Had the learned Judge granted time to the complainant for filing counter affidavit, correct facts would have been placed before the Court and it could have been pointed out that apart from the inherent danger of tampering with or intimidating witnesses and aborting case, there was also the danger to the life of the main witnesses or to the life of the accused being endangered as experience of life has shown to the members of the profession and the judiciary, and in that event, the learned Judge would have been in a better position to ascertain facts to act judi ciously.
No doubt liberty of a citizen meat be zealously safeguarded by court, nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the court.
Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interest of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institu tion and indulge in private retribution.
Learned Judge was unduly influenced by the concept of liberty, disregarding the facts of the case.
The learned judge also failed to consider the question that there were serious allegations of tampering of evidence on behalf of the accused persons.
Vishram and Jagdish, two eye witnesses had filed written applications before the trial court making serious allegations against Masod and Masroof, brothers of respondent No. 1.
They alleged that they had been kidnapped and their signatures and thumb impressions had been obtained on some blank papers and they were being threatened with dire consequences and they re quested the court for being granted police protection.
One of the salutory principles in granting bail is that the court should be satisfied that the accused being enlarged on bail will not be in a position to tamper with the evidence.
When allegations of tampering of evidence are made, it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself whether those alle gations have basis (they can seldom be proved by concrete evidence) and if the allegations are not found to be con cocted it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction in enlarging the accused on bail.
In the instant case there were serious allegations but the learned Judge did not either consider or test the same.
41 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the learned judge committed serious error in recalling his order dated June 3, 1986 and enlarging the respondent on bail.
The occurrence took place, in the broad day light, in a busy market place and there are a number of eye witnesses to support the case against the respondent who was named as an assailant in the First Infor mation Report.
Immediately after the occurrence be could not be traced (it was alleged that he had absconded for more than a month, attempts were made on his behalf to tamper with evidence.
In view of these facts and circumstances the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to bail if the seriousness of the matter was realised and a judicious, approach was made.
We had accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and directed that respondent No. 1, Ishtiaq Hasan Khan shall be taken into custody forthwith and the trial shall proceed in accordance with law expeditiously.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The first respondent and three others were alleged to have murdered the deceased.
The first respondent absconded after the occurrence and surrendered in court later.
The trial court rejected his bail application, and three succes sive bail applications were rejected by a Single Judge of the High Court.
The first respondent made another attempt in the High Court to get bail.
Having regard to the judicial discipline and prevailing practice in the High Court, anoth er Single Judge of the High Court, sitting as a Vacation Judge, ordered that the bail application be placed before the same learned Judge who had dealt with the case on earli er occasions.
However, a few days later, the Judge, after recalling his earlier order, granted bail on the ground that the trial could not be commenced or completed as directed by another Single Judge and because of the delay the accused was entitled to bail, and that the liberty of a citizen was involved.
The complainant has filed an appeal to this Court against the aforesaid order.
Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court granting bail, this Court, HELD: 1.
Normally this Court does not interfere with bail matters and the orders of the High Court relating to grant or rejection of bail are generally accepted to be final but some disturbing features have persuaded this Court to interfere in the instant case, with the order of the High Court.
[38E] 2.
No doubt liberty of a citizen must be zealously safe guarded by 35 court.
Nonetheless, when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit, there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the Court.
Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who reel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the communi ty so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution.
[40C E] 3.
The convention that subsequent bail application should be placed before the same Judge who may have passed earlier orders has its roots in principle.
It prevents abuse of process of court inasmuch as an impression is not created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a court depending on whether the court is to his liking or not, and is encour aged to file successive applications without any new factor having cropped up.
If successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges there would be conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of court 's time.
Judicial discipline re quires that such a matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available for orders.
[39B D] 4.
One of the salutory principles in granting bail is that the Court should be satisfied that the accused being enlarged on bail will not be in a position to tamper with the evidence.
When allegations of tampering of evidence are made, it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself whether those allegations have basis and if the allegations are not found to be concocted it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction in enlarging the accused on bail.
[40FH] 5.
In the instant case, as three successive bail appli cations made on behalf of the first respondent had been rejected and finally disposed of by the same Judge, it would have been appropriate and desirable and also in keeping with the prevailing practice in the High Court that the subse quent bail application also should have been placed before the same Judge for disposal.
In tact, being conscious of the long standing convention and judicial discipline, the Judge himself passed an order directing the bail application to be placed before the other Judge.
The Judge should have re spected his own earlier order and ought not to 36 have recalled it without the confidence of the parties in the judicial process being rudely shaken.
[38E G; 39E] 6.
The Judge was unduly influenced by the concept of liberty, disregarding the facts of the case.
There were serious allegations, but the Judge did not either consider or test the same.
Objections were raised against hearing of the bail application on a number of grounds and time was sought for filing a detailed counter affidavit which was refused.
He granted bail simply on the ground that liberty was involved, which is the case in every criminal case, more particularly in a murder case where a citizen who, let alone losing liberty, has lost his very life, and that because of the delay in the trial the accused was entitled to bail.
The Judge committed serious error in recallint his earlier order and enlarging the first respondent on bail.
[40E; H; 39G H; 41A]


judgement:
vil Appeal No. 2089 of 1985.
(with C.A. Nos.
99 100 of 1986 & 3340 46 of 1984).
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.1983 of the Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. ED (SB) 1255/83 D. 1227 Hemant Sharma, C.V. Subba Rao and K. Swamy for the Appellant.
R.N. Banerjee and K.J. John for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
Each of these appeals under Section 35 L (b) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 is direct ed against the decision of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal.
The short question arising in each of them is as to whether P.V.C. Conveyor Belting manu factured by the different respondents in these appeals comes within the purview of Item 22(3) or would be governed by the residuary entry 68 for purposes of excise duty under the Central Excise Tariff.
According to the respondents the appropriate Item is 68 while according to the Revenue Item 22 squarely covers the commodity.
The Tribunal has accepted the stand of manufacturers.
That is how all these appeals have been carried by the Collector of Central Excise.
The Assistant Collector who initiated the proceeding in the show cause notice reproduced the Departmental Chemical Examiner 's Certificate.
Therein it was stated: "The sample is in the form of cut piece of black coloured Belting of width 10 c.ms.
and thickness 9 m.m.
It is composed of synthetic resin of P.V.C. type, reinforced with textile fabric containing 42.3% by weight of cotton and rest viscose (man made filament yarns of cellulosic origin).
Percentage of textile fabric = 43.3.
Percentage of P.V.C. Compound = 56.7%".
This position has not been disputed at any stage nor even before us.
The Tribunal has recorded a finding that P.V.C. compounding was done simultaneously with the weaving of the fabric from yarn which clearly indicated that the process of manufacture was conversion from yarn to fabric as also the application of the P.V.C. Compound carried on at the same point of time.
Learned counsel for the appellants who ini tially attempted to challenge this fact was ultimately obliged to accept the situation as a finding of fact.
In fact before the Tribunal the departmental representative had relied upon this position as would appear from the judgment of the Tribunal.
1228 It is not disputed that if the commodity would not be covered by item 22, residuary Item 68 of the Schedule would be applicable.
Item 22 provides thus: "MAN MADE FABRICS "Man made fabrics" means all varieties of fabrics manufactured either wholly or partly from man made fibres or yarn and includes embroidery in the piece, in strips or in mo tifs, fabrics impregnated, coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other artificial plastic materials and fabrics covered partially or fully with tex tile flocks or with preparation containing textile flocks, in each of which man made (i) cellulosic fibre or yarn, or (ii) non cellu losic fibre or yaru, predominates in weight: Explanation I: "Base fabrics" means fabrics failing under sub item (1) of this Item which are subjected to the process of embroidery or which arc imprignated ' coated or laminated with preparations of cellulose derivatives or of other plastic materials or which are cov ered partially or fully with textile flocks or with preparations containing textile flocks.
Explanation II: . . . . . . .
Explanation III: Explanation II under Item No. 19 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to this Item as it applies in relation to that item.
" It is accepted that yarn is woven into fabric.
Item 19 deals with cotton fabrics while Item 22 deals with man made fabrics.
On the footing recorded by the Tribunal, it is claimed that there was no preexisting base fabric and the manufacturing process simultaneously brought into existence the commodity by weaving yarn into fabric and application of P.V.C. Compound.
In view of the higher percentage of P.V.C. Compound in commodity, it becomes difficult to treat the ultimate goods as man made fabrics for holding that it is covered by Item 22.
Upon this analysis it follows that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion when it held that the goods were not covered by Item 22 and, therefore, the residuary item 68 applied.
All these appeals are without any merit and are dismissed.
Each of the respondents should be entitled to its costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.

summary:
The respondents, manufacturers of P.V.C. Conveyor Belt ing, contended before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Tribunal that for purposes of excise duty under the Central Excise Tariff this item fell under Item 68.
The Revenue submitted that the commodity was governed by Item 22.
The Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that P.V.C. compounding was done simultaneously with the weaving of the fabric from yarn and held that this item should be governed by the residuary Entry 68 for the purposes of excise duty.
Dismissing the appeals by the Revenue, the Court, HELD: It is accepted that yarn is woven into fabric.
Item 19 deals with cotton fabrics while Item 22 deals with man made fabrics.
The Tribunal recorded a finding that P.V.C. compounding was done simultaneously with the weaving of the fabric from yarn, which clearly indicated that the process of manufacture was conversion from yarn to fabric as also the application of the P.V.C. Compound carried on at the same point.
[1228F; 1227FG] In view of the higher percentage of P.V.C. Compound in the commodity, it becomes difficult to treat the ultimate goods as manmade fabrics for holding that it is covered by Item 22.
Upon this analysis, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the goods were not covered by Item 22 and, therefore, the residuary Item 68 applied.
[ 1228G ]


judgement:
No. 5222 of 1985.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
R.K. Garg, R.S. Singh and S.K. Verma for the Petitioner.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, B. Datta, Additional Solicito General, A.K. Ganguli, Dr. Y.S. Chitale and Dr. Shankar Ghosh 1218 P.P. Singh, Ranjit Kr.
Pramod Dayal, D. Goburdhun, K. Swamy, Ms. Sushma Suri, Probir Mitra.
A.K. Ghose, M.M. Gangadeb, Dhanjay Chandrachud, P.R. Seetharaman, D.K. Sinha, K.R. Narnbiar and A.K. Sil for the appearing parties.
The Order of the Court was delivered by OZA, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondent, the various financial institutions including the Banks and also counsel for the State of Bihar.
By orders of this Court dated 5.2.86 it was directed that all salaries and wages due to the workers from May 1984 onwards shall be paid to them in 'three instalments: It appears that they have not yet been paid inspite of the directions from this Court.
It was also brought to our notice that notwithstanding that order of this Court, the State of Bihar has issued a Notification dated December 12, 1986, wherein this industry has been declared to be a sick industry under Section 3 of the Bihar Relief Undertakings (Special provisions) Act, 1981 (Bihar Act No. 12 of 1982) and by this Notification the Bihar Government has declared the said Industrial :Undertaking shall be and remain a relief undertakings for one year from the date of issue of the Notification.
On ;the basis of this an attempt was made to suggest that the liability of the industry for payment to the workers can not be enforced.
However, learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar frankly conceded that so far as the liability of payment of wages to the workers is concerned the State Government wants that it should be paid.
As directed by this Court a report had been submitted by the Official Liquidator in the case of this industry.
This report shows that the products produced by this industry which are lying in stocks are of the value of Rs.91,77,000.
This report also discloses that from the month of May, 1984 till 8th July, 1984 when this industry closed down an amount of Rs.89,00,000 remains to be paid to the workers as their salaries and emoluments.
The learned counsel appearing for the State Bank of India ' and other financial institutions attempted to contend that these goods which are the finished products lying in stock are pledged with these Banks and, therefore, they have a prior claim over the sale proceeds of these stocks and it was, therefore, contended that this could not be sold and the workers could not be paid off.
On the other hand it was suggested that in fact a scheme has been drawn up to review the industry in the interests of the workers and the society in general and in that scheme of starting the industry again financial problems may arise and if this stock is sold out and the money collected therefrom are 1219 paid out to the workers then it may create difficulties.
It is no doubt true that these ' products the stock of which have been shown ' in the report and the value of which has been shown by the Liquidator as Rs.91,77,000 is pledged with Banks, is a priority in law in favour of the Banks but: lit also; could not be disputed that these stocks were the products of this industry before its closure and, therefore, the workers also contributed their labour and it is the result of their hard work that these stocks could be pro duced and in our opinion therefore, it could not be said that the wages and emoluments for the period upto closure would not rank in priority.
It is also significant that after the closure in July, 1984,.
till today in spite of the order passed by this ' Court the workers have not been paid.
Their subsistance and living is also perhaps of paramount importance and has to rank with highest priority.
It is in view of this as it appears, that the Government of India is keen to have a scheme for revival of this industry.
Learned counsel for:the State of Bihar also frankly conceded that so far as payment to the workers is concerned the State Govern ment also desires that they should be paid their salaries.
It is no doubt true that at present there are no assets available out of which the whole payment of all the dues to the workers from May 1984 till today could be done but from out of these assets the products which are lying in stocks valued at Rs.91.77,000 the salaries and the dues of the workers from May 1984 tilt the date of closure could be made.
It was contended that in case these stocks are liqui dated and the amount collected are paid off to the workers, difficulty may arise as this asset which has been taken into account will not be available for the scheme of re starting the industry.
Looking to all the circumstances and taking a broad and humane view of the situation we are of the opin ion, that it would be just and proper that these goods which are lying in stock should be sold and out of the sale pro ceeds the workers should be paid their dues upto the date of closure (from May 1984 to July 1984 i.e. 8th July, 1984) so that at least they will get something for subsistance.
Learned counsel for the State Bank of India pointed out that his client has paid for the insurance of certain assets and for loss thereof in whole or in part, the insurance has paid for the loss.
The Official Liquidator may keep that amount separately and allow the State Bank to adjust the same against its insurance.
So far as the pledge and the priority of the financial institutions are concerned, we have no doubt that they have other sufficient securities and proper ties of the Company and, therefore, if this stock of fin ished products are sold to meet the basic requirements of the workers, their interests would not be in jeopardy.
Apart from it, we also hope and trust that if the loss of this amount of Rs.91,77,000 1220 somehow comes in way of the scheme of re starting of the industry, the Government of India would find funds to save the situation and help early revival of the Company.
We therefore direct that these stocks which are lying with the industry valued at Rs.91,77,000 shall immediately be dis posed of and out of this the wages and other dues of the workers for the period from May 1984 till 8th July, 1984, shall be met.
The balance, if any, will be utilised for meeting other pressing demands in the discretion of the Official Liquitator subject to orders of the Court.
We are sure that the Official Liquitator will ensure that the disposal fetches the best of rates.
We may also make it clear that issuance of the notification by the Bihar State Government will not come in the way of sale of these assets and payment to the workers.
We direct that this shall be completed within two months from today.
The case may come for further directions in third week of July.
We expect that by then with the lead taken by the Cen tral Government, the scheme of revival would have made sufficient headway and everyone would be in a position to have an optimistic view of the situation.

summary:
By order dated 5.2.1986 this Court had directed that all salaries and wages due to the workers from May 1984 onwards shall be paid to them In three instalments.
They have not yet been paid.
It was brought to the notice of the Court that the State of Bihar has issued a Notification dated December 12, 1986 declaring the respondent industry a sick industry under section 3 of the Bihar Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1981 and that the said Industrial Undertaking shall be and remain a relief undertaking for one year.
On behalf of the industry it was contended that the liability of the industry for payment to the workers cannot be enforced.
However, counsel for the State conceded that the State Government wants that the wages to the workers should be paid.
According to the Report of the Official Liquidator finished products of the value of Rs.91,77,000 are lying in stocks and that from May, 1984 till 8th July, 1984 an amount of Rs.89,00,000 remains to be paid to the workers as their salaries and emoluments.
On behalf of the financial institution it was contended that the products lying in stocks are pledged with them and they have prior claim over the sale proceeds of these stocks and, therefore, the products could not be sold and the workers could not be paid off.
It was suggested that a scheme has been drawn up to revive the industry and finan cial problems may arise if the stock is sold out and wages paid to the workera out of sale proceeds.
Issuing directions the Court, 1217 HELD: 1.
Though the stock of products is pledged with Banks and they have a priority in law, but it is the result of the hard work of the workers that these stocks could be produced.
Therefore, it could not be said that the wages and emoluments for the period upto closure would not rank in priority.
Their subsistance and living is also of paramount importance and has to rank with highest priority.
For this reason the Government of India is keen to have a scheme for revival of this industry and the State Government also desires that the workers should be paid their salaries.
[1219A D] 2.
Looking to all the circumstances and taking a broad and humane view of the situation it would be just and proper that these goods which are lying in stock should be sold out and out of the sale proceeds the workers should be paid their dues upto the date of the closure (from May 1984 to 8th July, 1984).
The Official Liquidator will ensure that the disposal fetches the best rates.
This shall be completed within two months.
[1219F] 3.
The financial institutions have other sufficient securities and properties of the Company and if the stocks of finished products are sold to meet the basic requirements of the workers, their interests would not be in jeopardy.
[1219G H] 4.
The balance out of the sale proceeds, if any, will be utilised for meeting other pressing demands in the discre tion of the Official Liquidator subject to orders of the Court.
[1220B] 5.
The Official Liquidator may keep the amount of insur ance claim separately and allow the State Bank to adjust the same against its insurance.
[1219G] 6.
Issuance of the Notification by the Bihar State Government will not come in the way of sale of these assets and payment of the workers.
[1220C]


judgement:
ION: Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th August, 1953, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 114 of 1951 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 31st July, 1950, of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge at Allahabad in Criminal Sessions Trial No. 22 of 1949.
section P. Sinha and B. C. Misra, for the appellant.
G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.
October 14.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated August 12, 1953, of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Desai and Beg JJ.), setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Allahabad, dated July 31, 1950, in Sessions Trial No. 22 of 1949.
The appellant bad been charged under sections 408 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code, and tried by jury of 5.
The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the jury and acquitted the accused.
On appeal by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court in a judgment covering about 130 typed pages set aside the order of acquittal and 642 convicted the appellant under the sections aforesaid, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for four years and a fine of ten thousand rupees, in default of payment, further rigorous imprisonment for one year, under section 408, Indian Penal Code, and to rigorous imprisonment for four years under section 477A, Indian Penal Code, the sentences of imprisonment under the two sections to run consecutively.
Out of the fine, if realized, seven thousand rupees was directed to be paid to the Imperial Bank of India, Allahabad, as compensation.
The prayer for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court was refused.
The appellant moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal by order dated December 15, 1953.
In the view we take of the legality of the trial in this case, it is not necessary to go into the details of the prosecution case except to state that the appellant was charged under the sections aforesaid, for having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of valuable securities amounting to Rs. 7,410 odd of the Imperial Bank at Allahabad, while in the employment of the Bank as a clerk, and had in that capacity, " with intent to defraud, destroyed, altered, mutilated and falsified accounts and other papers " during January to July, 1946.
A number of contentions were raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellants, but it is necessary to notice only two of them, namely, (1) that the appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh, to the High Court, should not have been entertained as the memorandum of appeal did not comply with the requirements of law as laid down in sections 418 and 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) that the trial in the Sessions Court was no trial at all in the eye of law.
In respect of the first contention, it is enough to say that though the memorandum of appeal filed in the High Court was wholly inadequate, the defect was not such as to render it null and void so as to entitle the High Court to reject it in liming.
The point arises in this way: Apart from the prayer, the only ground taken in the petition of appeal is " that the order of acquittal is against the weight of evidence 643 on the record and contrary to law.
" The argument is that under section 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where a trial is by jury, "the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only ", and as no particular error of law is set out in the memorandum of appeal, the consequence of this serious omission, it is further contended, is that in the eye of law, this was no petition of appeal at all, which could have been entertained by the High Court.
This contention was raised before the High Court by way of a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal.
The High Court overruled that objection on the ground that section 419 which is the specific provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to petition of appeal, only requires that it shall be in writing and accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, and in cases tried by jury, a copy of the heads of the charge recorded under a. 367 of the Code.
The High Court observed that there is no provision in the Code which required that the petition of appeals should specify the matters of fact or of law, on which the appeal is based.
The Court also referred to the prevailing practice in that Court according to which no specific grounds are taken either on fact or on law.
According to the High Court, there was no difference between an appeal based on facts and an appeal based only on questions of law, as in the case of a jury trial.
In view of these considerations, the High Court held that the preliminary objection was not well founded in law.
Assuming that the High Court was correct in its appreciation of the legal position, even so, we must express our disapproval of any such practice as has been referred to in the judgment below.
A memorandum of appeal is meant to be a succinct statement of the grounds upon which the appellant proposes to support the appeal.
It is a notice to the Court that such and such specific grounds are proposed to be urged on behalf of the appellant, as also a notice to the respondent that he should be ready to meet those specific grounds.
A memorandum of appeal with a bald ground like the one quoted above is of no help to any of the parties or to the Court.
It may have the 644 merit of relieving the person responsible for drawing up the ground of appeal, of applying his mind to the judgment under appeal and its weak points, but this slight advantage, if it is so, is very much out weighed by the serious disadvantage to the parties to the litigation and the Court which is to hear the appeal.
Such a bald statement of the grounds leaves the door wide open for all kinds of submissions, thus, tending to waste the time of the Court, and taking the respondents by surprise.
It is a notorious fact that courts, particularly in the part of the country from where this appeal comes, are over burdened with large accumu lations of undisposed of cases.
The parties concerned and their legal advisers should concentrate and focus their attention on the essential features of cases so as to facilitate speedy, and consequently, cheap administration of justice.
It may be that a bald ground like the one noticed above, was responsible for the inordinately long judgment of the High Court.
Such a practice, if any, deserves to be discontinued and a more efficient way of drawing up grounds of appeal has to be developed.
If counsel for the parties to a litigation concentrate on the essential features of a case, eliminating all redundancies, the argument becomes more intelligible and helpful to the Court in focussing its attention on the important aspects of the case.
As the appeal succeeds on the second ground, as will presently appear, we need not say anything more on the first ground.
The second ground on which, in our opinion, the appeal must succeed, is based on the findings of the High Court itself This case involved a consideration of a large volume of documentary evidence almost all in English.
The oral evidence was directed mainly to connect those documents and to explain their bearing on the charges framed against the accused, of criminal breach of trust and falsification of relevant accounts and entries in the registers maintained by the Bank.
Mr. Ganguli, prosecution witness No. 26 Agent of the Bank was examined at great length, and be gave his evidence on 12 days between October and December, 1949, It runs into about 45 typed pages.
This 645 evidence appears to have been given by him in English because he put in an application that he had given the evidence in English and that he was not in a position to say whether the Hindi version as recorded by the deposition writer was the correct version, as he was not familiar with Hindi.
The High Court had made the following observations as to the nature of the case and the requisite qualifications of the members of the jury necessary for a proper under.
standing of the case: " We consider that the instant case was not fit to be tried by a jury at least by any ordinary jury.
It was a very complicated case in which a mass of documents was produced.
The decision of the case rested upon the question by whom the various documents were written or prepared.
Those documents are all in English and nobody could decide the case satisfactorily unless he had a good knowledge of English and was in a position to judge the writing.
The offences with which the respondent was charged were under a Government order triable by a jury and the case had to be tried by a jury unless the Government thought fit to revoke or alter the order.
The Government did not revoke or alter the order and did not even declare that the case should be tried by a special jury under section 269(2), Criminal Procedure Code.
" In our opinion, the remarks of the High Court quoted above give a correct impression of the proceedings in the Court of Session.
It further appears from the judgment of the High Court that the learned Advocate General who argued the case in support of the appeal on behalf of the State, urged that the jurors were not equal to the task involved in a proper determination of the controversy.
The High Court directed the trial court to hold an inquiry and report on this aspect of the case.
On a consideration of the report submitted by that court, the High Court recorded its finding to the following effect: "Out of the five jurors selected by the learned Sessions Judge, three had sufficient knowledge of English, fourth knew very little English and could not 646 read the documents produced in the case and the fifth also had not sufficient knowledge of English; he could understand a letter written in English with some difficulty and could not read English newspapers.
This is what we find from a report made by the learned Sessions Judge after summoning the jurors and examining them on a letter issued by us.
We are satisfied that the two jurors, Shri Sheik Ashique Ali and Shri Farman Ali, were not in a position to decide the question of authorship of the forged documents satisfactorily.
It was not merely a question of under standing the contents of the documents produced in the case the jurors also had to decide whether they were written or signed by the respondent as deposed by the prosecution witnesses or not.
They did not possess sufficient acquaintance with English to decide that question satisfactorily.
" On that finding, it is clear that the appellant 's contention that it was a trial coram non judice is well founded.
This case is analogous to the case of Ras Behari Lal vs The King Emperor (1), which went up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, from a judgment of the Patna High Court confirming the conviction and the sentences of the accused persons on a charge of murder and rioting.
In that case, the trial was by a jury of 7.
The jury by a majority of six to one found the accused guilty.
The learned trial judge accepted the verdict and sentenced some of the accused persons to death.
The High Court overruled the accused persons ' contentions that there was no legal trial because some of the jury did not know sufficient English to follow the proceedings in Court.
The Judicial Committee granted special leave to appeal on a report made by the High Court that one of the jurors did not know sufficient English to follow the proceedings in Court.
Before the Judicial Committee, it was conceded, and in their Lordships ' view, rightly, by counsel for the prosecution that the appellants had not been tried, and that, therefore, the convictions and sentences could not stand.
Lord Atkin, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, made the following 1) (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 354, 357.
647 observations upon the concession made by counsel for the respondent: " In their Lordships ' opinion, this is necessarily the correct view.
They think that the effect of the incompetence of a juror is to deny to the accused an essential part of the protection accorded to him by law and that the result of the trial in the present case was a clear miscarriage of justice.
They have no doubt that in those circumstances the conviction and sentence should not be allowed to stand.
" In our opinion, the legal position in the instant case is the same.
It was., however, argued on behalf of the State Government that in the instant case, the jury had returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty and that, therefore, there was no prejudice to the accused persons.
It is true that the incompetence of the jury empanelled in this case was raised by the counsel for the State Government in the High Court but in view of the findings arrived at by the High Court, as quoted above, the position is clear in law that irrespective of the result, it was no trial at all The question of prejudice does not arise because it is not a mere irregularity.
but a case of "mis trial", as the Judicial Committee put it.
It is unfortunate that a prosecution which has been pending so long in respect of an offence which is said to have been committed about eleven years ago, should end like this but it will be open to the State Government, if it is so advised, to take steps for a retrial, as was directed by the Judicial Committee in the reported case referred to above.
The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the convictions and the sentences are set aside.
We do not express any opinion on the question whether it is a fit case for a de novo trial by a competent jury or by a Court of Session without a jury, if the present state of the law permits it.
The matter will go back to the High Court for such directions as may be necessary if the High Court is moved by the Government in that behalf.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant was tried by a Sessions judge and a jury for offenses under sections 477 A and 408, Indian Penal Code.
A large volume of documentary evidence was in English and the statement of one of the principal witnesses was given in English.
The main question for decision was the authorship of the forged documents.
It was found that the jurors were not well versed in English and were not in a position to decide the main question.
The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty and accepting the verdict the Sessions judge acquitted the appellant.
The State appealed to the High Court.
In the memorandum of appeal only one ground was taken, "that the order of acquittal is against the weight of evidence on the record and contrary to law.
" The High Court accepted the appeal and convicted the appellant.
The appellant contended that the appeal before the High Court was incompetent as no particular errors of law, upon which alone an appeal lay under section 418, Code of Criminal Procedure, were set out in the memorandum of appeal and that the trial in the Session Court was no trial in the eye of law.
641 Held, that a memorandum of appeal is meant to be a succinct statement of the grounds upon which the appellant proposes to support the appeal.
The practice prevailing in the Allahabad High Court of not taking specific grounds either of law or fact is to be disapproved even assuming that section 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not in terms require the setting out of such grounds.
Held further, that the trial before the Session judge was coram non judice on account of the incompetence of the jury to decide the question of the authorship of the forged documents.
In such a case the question of prejudice does not arise as it is not a mere irregularity, but a case of "mis trial." Ras Behari Lal vs The King Emperor, (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 354 followed.


judgement:
Criminal Appeal No. 221 of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.3.1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 1975.
A.N. Mulla, R.L. Kohli, Harjinder Singh and R.C. Kohli for the Appellants.
R.S. Sodhi for the Respondent.
Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. This is yet another unfortunate instance of gruesome murder of a young wife by the barbaric process of pouring kerosene oil over the body and setting her on fire as the culmination of a long process of physical and mental harassment for extraction of more dowry.
Whenever such cases come before the Court and the offence is brought home to the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it is the duty of the Court to deal with it in most severe and 1223 strict manner and award the maximum penalty prescribed by the law in order that it may operate as a deterrent to other persons from committing such anti social crimes.
Amandeep Kaur, deceased, was married to Avtar Singh who figured as the first accused in the case in the Sessions Court.
Kailash Kaur, the appellant, is the mother in law of the deceased and Mahinder Kaur who figured as the third accused in the case is the sister of Avtar Singh.
The hus band and his parents were allegedly unhappy about the quan tum of dowry brought by the deceased and she was being subjected to severe harassment and maltreatment with a view to extract more dowry from her parents.
Exhibit PK is a letter written by the deceased to her father Avtar Singh (P.W. 3) in which she has set out the details of the harass ment and maltreatment and expressed her grave apprehension that unless she was immediately taken back to the father 's house, her life itself was in imminent danger.
On may 30, 1974, in the evening.
Kailash Kaur and Mahinder Kaur started quarreling with the deceased and severely abused and threat ened her.
Thereupon, the deceased went to her room and bolted its door from inside.
Sometime later Avtar Singh, husband of the deceased, came to the house and started knocking at the door of the said room with great force because of which the door got unbolted.
It would appear that after the door was opened Avtar Singh went away from the house.
It is the prosecution case that immediately thereaf ter Mahinder Kaur caught hold of the deceased and Kailash Kaur (appellant) poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.
The deceased started screaming on hearing which the people residing in the locality rushed to the house.
Avtar Singh, the husband also reached there in the meantime, As she was engulfed in flames, somebody put a blanket on Aman deep Kaur and extinguished the flames.
Thereafter she was carried to the Civil Hospital, Hoshiarpur.
Dr. Har Parkash Bhatia (P.W. 2), who examined her sent information to the local police station on receipt of which Head Constable Naranjan Singh (P.W. 7), went over to the hospital.
The doctor sent everybody other than the Head Constable out of the room where the patient was lying.
He told the deceased that he would put her questions about the cause of her death.
On the basis of the questions put by the doctor, Head Constable Naranjan Singh (P.W. 7) recorded her statement, on the basis of which formal First Information Report was lodged at Police Station, Hoshiarpur.
Amandeep Kaur expired on June 1, 1974.
At the trial the prosecution relied on exhibit PF/3, the dying declaration made by the deceased Amandeep Kaur, the letter exhibit PK writ 1224 ten by her to her father Atar Singh (P.W. 3) and the evi dence of P.W. 3 wherein he stated that the appellant, her son and daughter were dissatisfied about the quantum of dowry brought by Amandeep Kaur and on that account they had been torturing her.
The learned trial Judge acting on the aforesaid evidence convicted Kailash Kaur and Mahinder Kaur of the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and acquitted Avtar Singh, the husband, accused giving him the benefit of doubt.
Kailash Kaur and Mahinder Kaur carried the matter in appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellant herein namely, Kailash Kaur, but acquitted Mahinder Kaur giving her the benefit of doubt.
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has preferred this appeal before this Court after obtaining special leave.
Notwithstanding the learned and persuasive arguments advanced before us by Shri A.N. Mulla, Senior Counsel ap pearing on behalf of the appellant, we find absolutely no merit in this appeal.
There is no reason whatever not to act upon the dying declaration of the deceased wherein she has given a clear and vivid account of the pouring of kerosene oil over body and her being set on fire by the appellant.
She had also implicated Mahinder Kaur as the person who held her while the kerosene oil was being poured on her body by the appellant.
We have very grave doubts about the legality, propriety and correctness of the decision of the High Court in so far as it has acquitted Mahinder Kaur by giving her the benefit of doubt.
But since the State has not preferred any appeal, we are not called upon to go into that aspect any further.
In addition to the dying declaration there is also clear circumstantial evidence furnished by the fetter exhibit PK and the testimony of Atar Singh (P.W. 3) father of the deceased regarding the demands for dowry and the harassment and torture inflicted on the deceased by the accused as part of the endeavour to extract more dowry.
The dying declaration made by the deceased has the ring of truth and the testimony of the doctor P.W. 2 and of the Head Constable P.W. 7 clearly establishes that she was in a fit condition to make the statement.
The conviction of the appellant by the High Court was, therefore, fully justified and there is absolute ly no ground for interference with the same by this Court.
We only express our regret that the Sessions Judge did not treat this as a fit case for awarding the maximum penalty under the law and that no steps were taken by the 1225 State Government before the High Court for enhancement of the sentence.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
The bail bond of the appellant will stand cancelled and she will be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining portion of her sentence.
P.S.S. Appeal dis missed.

summary:
The prosecution alleged that on the evening of May 30, 1974 the appellant 's daughter caught hold of the deceased, and the appellant poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.
On hearing deceased 's screams the neighbours rushed to the house and extinguished the flames.
Thereafter, she was taken to the hospital where on the basis of questions put by the doctor (P.W. 2), Head Constable (P.W. 7) recorded her statement.
She expired on June 1, 1974.
It was further alleged that the husband and his parents were unhappy about the quantum of dowry brought by the deceased and she was, therefore being subjected to severe harassment and maltreat ment.
In a letter written by the deceased to her father she had set out the details of the iII treatment meted to her and expressed grave apprehension that her life was in immi nent danger.
The trial court convicted the appellant and her daughter of the offence under section 302 I.P.C. acting on the dying declaration made by the deceased, the letter written by her to her father and his evidence as to the demands for dowry and the torture inflicted on his daughter.
The husband was given benefit of doubt and acquitted.
The High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellant but acquitted the daughter giving her benefit of doubt.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1.
The conviction of the appellant by the High Court was fully justified.
The dying declaration made by the deceased wherein 1222 she has given a clear and vivid account of the pouring of kerosene oil over her body and being set on fire by the appellant, has the ring of truth.
The testimony of the doctor (P.W. 2) and the Head Constable (P.W. 7) clearly establishes that she was in a fit condition to make the statement.
There was, therefore, no reason whatever not to act upon it.
[1224D; G] 1.2.
In addition, there was also clear circumstantial evidence furnished by the letter written by the deceased to her father and the testimony of the father regarding the demands for dowry and the harassment and torture inflicted on the deceased as part of the endeavour to extract more dowry.
[1224F G] 2.
Whenever a case of gruesome murder of a young wife by the barbaric process of pouring kerosene oil over the body and setting her on fire as the culmination of a long process of physical and mental harassment for extraction of more dowry comes before the court and the offence is brought home to the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it is the duty of the court to deal with the case in the most severe and strict manner and award the maximum penalty prescribed by the law in order that it may operate as a deterrent to other persons from committing such anti social crimes.
[1222H; 1223A]