judgement:
Appeal No. 1769 of 1981 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.1980 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Appln.
No. 952 of 1980.
V.A. Bobde, S.D. Mudliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the Appellant.
U.R. Lalit, A.K. Sanghi, Prakash Khanzodi and Ravinder Bana for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
The story behind this appeal, though not very relevant, reveals interesting facts.
One N.H. Ray of Calcutta either abandoned or disappeared or died since about 1929 and his house being the premises in dispute in Nagpur lay abandoned and his heirs were not known, 404 letters written by authorities in Nagpur and by the tenants in Nagpur to the address 'N.H. Ray, Calcutta ' naturally remained unanswered.
It is alleged that a notice of sale of the premises in question was given in the name of one Tapan Roy in the local newspaper.
But one Bratindranath Roy de scribing himself to be the holder of the power of attorney on behalf of the heirs of late N.H. Ray is alleged to have sold the premises 'in question.
The Southern portion was sold to the respondent D.V. Hingwe and one M. Lapalikar became the allottee of the premises in question in 1960.
He wants to stay on in the premises.
The alleged transferee or alienee of the property from the alleged heirs of N.H. Ray fights this appeal in this Court after the allotment has been cancelled by the House Allotment Officer in favour of the appellant, Lapalikar.
But in this appeal this Court is concerned with a very short question whether the appellant was granted allotment as a government employee or evictee in terms of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter called the said 'Rent Control Order ').
In order to appreciate the point, it is necessary to bear in mind that the appellant previously was residing in another house since 1941 at House No. 546 situated at Dhan toli area at Nagpur.
The landlord of the appellant sued for permission to evict the appellant from the said premises on the grounds of bona fide need of the landlord.
Such permis sion was granted against the appellant in respect of the said house on 23rd May, 1955.
The appeal in respect of the same was dismissed by an order dated 26th November, 1955.
Since then the appellant had been evicted from the premises which was in his occupation and has no residential accommo dation of his own.
He was a Central Government employee being an employee of the Post and Telegraph De partment of the Government of India.
He made an application for allotment of the premises in dispute, namely 406/1 in Nagpur under clause 24 A under the said Control Order.
It is necessary in order to appreciate the controversy in this appeal to refer to certain documents in this connec tion.
On or about 25th January, 1960, Shri Lapalikar, the appellant herein, wrote a letter to the Additional Collec tor, Nagpur.
In the said letter the appellant described himself after stating his name 'Clerk P.M.G. Office, Nagpur and a registered evictee '.
In the said letter, the appellant stated that one Dr. Shirali occupied the premises in ques tion which belonged to one Shri N.H. Ray.
As Shri Shirali proposed to vacate the premises in near future, he had agreed to let it out to the appellant in case permission was granted to him to that effect.
He, therefore, prayed that the said house might be allotted to him in his own name in view of his difficulties and priorities.
This document appears in the Paper Book as 'a copy '.
Thereafter on 27th January, 405 1960, the Additional Deputy Collector, Nagpur, communicated to the appellant at P.M.G. Office, Nagpur that the premises in question has been 'provisionally allotted to you under clause 24 A of the C.P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1948 subject to further orders by the Addi tional Deputy Collector, Nagpur '.
This is also a copy which appears in the Paper Book and which was produced by the appellant.
It is necessary to emphasise this aspect of the production by the appellant in order to consider a conten tion urged by Shri Lalit, the learned advocate on behalf of the appellant.
On the same date, intimation was given to one 'Shri N.H. Ray, Calcutta ' without any further address and intimation was sent that information had been received that the said house belonging to Shri N.H. Ray would fall vacant on or about 15th January.
He was further informed that the house was provisionally allotted to the appellant, P.M.G. Office, Nagpur.
He was informed that in case he had objection, he might submit the same within a fortnight thereof.
This is also a copy produced by the appellant.
Though not relevant for the present purpose, it makes interesting reading as to how Government functioned in the past.
It is not known whether it has improved since then.
It was addressed to one "Shri N.H. Ray, Calcutta '.
How a letter addressed in such manner could ever be conceived by anybody to be received by the addressee is beyond imagination.
It informs on 27th January, 1960 that the house would fall vacant 'on 15th instant '.
What happened to that letter no one knows.
There is a copy of Misc.
Document No. 33/a/71 (6 A) of 59 60.
This is regarding the allotment of the premises in question.
The Order sheet notes that this was an application from Dr. Shirali who proposed to let out the house belonging to Shri N.H. Ray of Calcutta.
She had proposed to let it out to the applicant, employee of the P.M.G. Office.
Further it was stated that he is an evictee.
This sentence was underlined.
The said document indicated that the officer concerned had directed registration of the case and for issue of a provi sional order of allotment and one copy to be addressed to the landlord on address given, another copy pasted on the house.
The copy of the landlord was addressed to N.H. Ray, Calcutta which was naturally returned to the sender for full address.
The order sheet further recorded that on 16th February, 1960, Dr. Shirali had informed that she had handed over the possession to the appellant as per orders of allot ment.
The order further recorded that no objection was received from landlord as invited.
To the same effect there is a copy of a letter from Dr. Shirali to the Additional Collector, Nagpur.
A copy of the certified copy of Record Room Register was also produced by the appellant.
The same reads as follows: 406 Application No. 3615/79 Office of the Collector, Nagpur Name of the Register Rent Controller, Nagpur.
Certified copy of Record Room Register Register No. 10 Form 'C ' Record from register for Kuliyat Papers (Rule 6).
Serial No. of major Name of Name of case Date of Date of number and minor case in with date deposit elimi in head.
Officer and purport of case nation Record regis of final or in re with Room ter.
der and abs cord initia Register tract of the room.
ls of order passed elimi in appeal or nating in revision, officer 1220 A 71(6 A) A.G. Applicant: 5.8.60 A. file 33/59 60 Nagpur Shri M.M. destro Lapalikar yed Subject: Allotment of house.
Order: 16.2.60 provisio nal allot ment con firmed.
Sd/illegible 4.2.67 (True translation) Advocate.
On 10th September, 1979, there was an application by one Shri Mude who is one of the respondents in this appeal stating that the appellant was a government servant and had retired two years back and should vacate the premises in dispute.
Written statement was filed on behalf of the appellant wherein he stated after dealing with the facts that the appellant was previously staying at premises No. 406/1 standing on plot number (Sheet No. 20 B) which was in occu pation of one Dr. Shirali with whom the appellant had inti mate relations and who was knowing the evictee position of the appellant herein non applicant therein stated that the appellant came to know from them that they wanted to shift to some other place for their family reasons.
So both of them had approached the Rent Controller, Nagpur and submit ted an application and thereafter the order had been made.
The contention of the appellant was that he was given the premises in question as an evictee though his description included that he was a government servant.
The short question that fails for consideration in this case, is, whether the summary procedure contemplated by clause 25 of the said Rent Control Order was applicable for obtaining possession from the appellant.
The appellant retired indisputably on 1st May, 1978 and the House Allot ment Officer was 407 moved by an application filed by one Vijay Mude, the re spondent herein for taking action under clause 25 of the said Rent Control Order.
The Additional District Magistrate and House Allotment Officer, Nagpur passed an order dated 13th March, 1980 and ordered the appellant to vacate the premises in question within one month from the date of the order.
The said order had been challenged by the appellant by a petition filed before.the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court by its judgment and order upheld the eviction order.
The appellant challenged the same in this Court and special leave was sought for.
In the meantime the appellant was dispossessed by virtue of the order of eviction which was confirmed by the High Court.
In the Special Leave Peti tion on 16th December, 1980, this Court had directed resto ration of possession and had further directed the House Allotment Officer to make a report.
The House Allotment Officer has made a report.
Special Leave was granted and this appeal was expedited.
The documents annexed to the report of the House Allotment Officer are the same which have been noticed herein.
Clause 2(2) of the said Rent Control Order defines 'displaced person ' and 'evicted person ' is defined under sub clause (2 a) of clause 2 of the said Order.
There is no dispute that the appellant is and was an evicted person.
Clause 22 of the Order deals with the collection of informa tion and letting of accommodation.
Clause 23 is important and the relevant part of the same is as follows: "23.
(1) On receipt of the intimation in accordance with clause 22, the Collector may, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the said intimation, order the landlord to let the vacant house to any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or to any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, or to a displaced person or to an evicted person and thereupon notwithstanding any agreement to, the contrary, the landlord shall let the house to such person and place him in posses sion thereof immediately, if it is vacant or as soon as it becomes vacant".
Clauses 24, 24 A and 24 B deal with the power to allot the house in the manner indicated in those clauses of the Order.
Clause 25 is relevant and is as follows.
The tenancy of any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or to any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and placed in 408 possession of a house by an order under clause 23 or 24 A shall terminate on the date of the transfer of, or gram of leave other than casual leave, to such person or on the date from which such person ceases to hold an office of profit under the Union or State Government or ceases to hold a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, as the case may be, and the said person shall vacate the said house within seven days of such date and the landlord and tenant shall give the intima tion prescribed in clause 22 to the Collector in respect of such house; Provided that on sufficient cause being shown to the Collector he may, in his discretion, extend the tenancy by a period not exceeding four months.
The position is that the appellant is both an evictee as well as a Government servant of the category contemplated under clause 23.
The fact that the appellant is an evictee is indisputable.
The fact that the appellant is a government servant of the category contemplated by clause 23 is also indisputable.
The fact that the appellant has retired from government service is also indisputable.
The question, is, whether he could be evicted under the summary procedure contemplated under clause 25.
This will depend upon in what category or in what capacity the appellant was allotted the premises in question.
There is no evidence of the applica tion made by the appellant for the allotment.
No copy is available in the records and no copy was produced by the appellant.
The appellant has produced other documents rele vant to this issue as we have indicated hereinbefore.
Shri Bobde appearing for the appellant contends in this appeal that the appellant was allotted the premises in question as an evictee.
He draws our attention to the documents produced as we have indicated before.
He submits that the appellant was allotted the premises in question as an evictee.
He was not entitled to be evicted on his retirement.
On the other hand, Shri Lalit, advocate for the trans feree of the landlord as supported by Shri Bandra, advocate for the claimant respondent submits that from the order it was apparant that the premises in question was given as a government servant.
The priority in which the appellant was classed was because of his being a government servant.
He drew our attention to the relevant clauses of the Order.
On the scheme of the different clauses, we are of the opinion that it was only when a person was granted an allotment as a government servant, then and then only can clause 25 be invoked for his eviction.
In other cases, clause 13 will be relevant.
The summary procedure of clause 25 could only be available in case of recovery of possession given to a person as a government servant on his retirement.
Indeed the provisions are peculiar.
Even if a government servant goes on earned leave or is transferred even then he becomes disentitled to remain in possession of the premises in 409 question and would be liable to be evicted by virtue of clause 25 of the said Rent Control Order.
Being drastic in nature, therefore, one who seeks allottee 's eviction has to establish that the allotment to thee person whose eviction is sought was made in the capacity contemplated under clause 25.
Shri Lalit contends strenuously that the appellant had the chance to produce all the documents before the Allotment Officer, but he failed to do so.
He had another chance to produce the relevant documents after the Order of this Court when the matter was remanded back for fresh enquiry.
He failed to do so.
Shri Lalit contends that on this ground, adverse presumption should be drawn against the appellant as he has produced other documents in his custody.
It is undis puted that the original records are not available, and are destroyed.
There is nothing on evidence to show that the copy of the original application of allotment made by the appellant was still in possession of the appellant.
That is not in evidence.
It was submitted that he was given an opportunity to give evidence and as such subject himself to cross examination when there was an enquiry ordered by the Enquiry Officer directed by this Court, but the appellant failed to avail of that opportunity.
Therefore adverse presumption,was to be drawn against him.
It is not, however, possible to draw such adverse presumption in the facts and circumstances of this case.
No ground has been made for compelling the appellant to step into the witness box and subject himself to cross examination.
It cannot be presumed simply because some documents or some copies of some docu ments were in the custody of the party, all other documents or all copies relevant for the issue would be in the custody of that person and nonproduction of such documents cannot expose him open to adverse presumption.
Such argument cannot be sustained.
It was submitted before the High Court that clause 25 applies only to the premises which were let out to a person under clauses 23 and 24 A of the Control Order and where the allottee was an evictee, clause 25 had no application.
The High Court was of the view that it is clear from clause 25 that two conditions were required to be fulfilled before the said clause could be applied namely, (i) the allottee must be holding an office of profit under the Union or the State Government, or holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, and (ii) that he was placed in possession of the premises under clause 23 or clause 24 A.
But it is clear that clause 25 read as a whole indicates clearly that the person against whom the clause would be operative must be an allottee of the premises allotted to him in his capac ity as a government servant and was placed in possession of the premises as a government servant.
We are unable to accept the High Court 's view, that the clause does not make any exception in case of a government servant who happened to be an evictee.
These clauses deal with three independent categories of persons and the summary procedure on proper construction of clause 25 was applicable only where allot ment is given to a tenant as a government servant.
The High Court was of the view that even if a government servant happened to be the evictee on his 410 retirement, clause 25 would operate.
We are unable to sus tain this reasoning.
If allotment was made to an allottee in his capacity as an evictee then clause 25, in our opinion, on a proper construction of the said clause, would have no application.
Further on a construction of the various docu ments and the evidence adduced in this appeal under these proceedings, it is clear that allotment was given to the appellant as an evictee who happened to be at the relevant time a government servant.
Therefore, on his retirement from the government service, he did not cease to be an evictee and did not come within the mischief of clause 25 of the said Control Order.
We are further of the opinion that even if allotment is made to a person who is both an evictee as well as a govern ment servant then if one of the grounds of the order namely, that he was a government servant ceases to exist on retire ment, the other reason operates i.e. he was an evictee and still continues to be an evictee then the allotment would continue.
See in this connection the observations of this Court in The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
vs B.K. Takkamore & Ors., ; Where this Court reiterated that an administrative or quasi judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, could not be sustained if it was found that some of the grounds were non existent or irrelevant and there was nothing to show that the authority would have passed the Order on the basis of the other rele vant and existing grounds.
But, an Order based on several grounds some of which were found to be non existent or irrelevant could be sustained if the Court was satisfied that the authority would have passed the Order on the basis of other relevant and existing grounds and the exclusion of the irrelevant or non existent grounds would not have af fected the ultimate opinion or decision.
In this case even if it be held that it cannot be conclusively determined that the order of allotment was made in favour of the appellant only on the ground that the appellant was an evictee but it was made also on the ground that the appellant was a government servant, and after his retirement the other ground namely the allottee still being an evictee remained valid it can be sustained.
In the premises we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error and the appeal must be allowed.
We, however, make it quite clear that this order will not preju dice the rights, if any, of the respondents or whoever may be entitled to get possession to proceed under clause 13 of the said Control Order to evict the appellant.
In the premises this appeal is allowed.
The order and judgment of the High Court are set aside.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties will pay and hear their own costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant who was residing at House No. 546 situated at Dhantoli area at Nagpur was evicted from the said prem ises on the ground of bona fide requirement of its landlord.
Therefore he became an "evicted person" within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Central Province and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949.
Being a Government employee he applied to the House Allotment Officer that he may be allotted House No. 406/1 under clause 24A of the said Control Order simultaneously indicating that he was an "evicted person" also.
The premises came to his occupation on the orders passed by the House Allotment Officer in 1960.
The appellant retired from service on 1.5.1978.
On 10.9.1979 one Vijay Mude, one of the respondents, moved an application before the House Allotment Officer for vacating the appel lant from the premises on the ground that he has retired.
The said application under clause 25 of the Rent Control Order was contested by the appellant that it was not ap plicable as he was an "evicted person" under clause 2(2) of the Control Order.
Having lust before all courts, the appel lant came by way of special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1 On the scheme of the different clauses it was only when a person was granted an allotment as a government servant, then and then only can clause 25 be invoked for his eviction.
In other cases, the clause 13 will be relevant.
The summary procedure of clause 25 could only be available in case of recovery of possession given to a person as a government servant on his retirement.
Indeed the provisions are peculiar.
Even if a government servant goes on earned leave or is transferred even then he becomes disentitled to remain in possession of the premises in question and would be liable to be evicted by virtue of clause 25 of the said Rent Control Order.
Being drastic in nature, therefore, one who seeks allotee 's eviction has to establish that the allotment to the person whose eviction is sought was made in the capacity 403 contemplated under clause 25.
Clauses 23, 24A and 25 of the Rent Control Order deal with three independent categories of persons and the summary procedure on proper construction of clause 25 was applicable only where allotment is given to a tenant as a tenant.
Clause 25 would not operate, if a Gov ernment servant happened to be an evictee and an allotment is made in that capacity.
In the instant case, on a con struction of the various documents and the evidence adduced in this appeal under these proceedings, it is clear that allotment was given to the appellant as an evictee who happened to be at the relevant time a government servant.
Therefore, on his retirement from the government service, he did not cease to be an evictee and did not come within the mischief of clause 25 of the said Control Order.
[408G 409 A 409H 410B] 1.2 Even if allotment is made to a person who is both an evictee as well as a government servant then if one of the grounds of the order namely, that he was a government serv ant ceases to exist on retirement, the other reason operates i.e. he was an evictee and still continues to be an evictee then the allotment would continue.
In this case even if it be held that it cannot be conclusively determined that the order of allotment was made in favour of the appellant only on the ground that the appellant was an evictee but it was made also on the ground that the appellant was a government servant, and after his retirement the other ground namely the allottee still being an evictee remained valid it can be sustained.
[410 C, F] State of Maharashtra & Anr.
B.K. Takkamore & Ors., ; , applied.


judgement:
No. 3958 61 of 1983.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) H. Salve, P.H. Parekh and P.K. Manohar, for the Petitioners.
P.P. Singh, R.D. Agarwala, Ms. section Relan, C.V.S. Rao, L.R. Singhand S.R. Srivastava for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
By these applications under Article 32 of the Constitution Common Cause, a registered Society and three retired Government servants have asked for strik ing down certain provisions of the Communication of Pension Rules applicable to civilian and defence pensioners as they permit the Union of India to recover more than what is paid to the pensioners upon commutation and for a direction that an appropriate scheme rationalising the provisions relating to commutation be brought into force.
The respondent has filed a counter affidavit challenging the maintainability of the petition as also the claim of the petitioners and the matter has been heard at considerable length from time to time.
Parties have filed written submissions supplementing their oral arguments.
The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension), Rules, 1981 are the approximate rules in force so far as civilian employees Under the Government of India are con cerned.
A set of regulations is in force in regard to De fence personnel.
It is not disputed that in the case of civilians the total amount of pension which can be commuted is upto one third while in the case of Defence personnel, commutation is admissible upto 43 per cent in the case of officers 500 and upto 45 per cent in respect of other ranks.
The argument advancement on behalf of the petitioners that there has been a substantial improvement in the life expectancy of the people in India has not been refuted on behalf of the re spondent.
This Court suggested to the respondent in course of the hearing that in the changed situation now prevailing in the country, a new look should be given to the matter.
In deference to the suggestion made by this Court the respond ent took time to consider the various aspects raised in the writ petitions and the oral submissions advanced at the hearing as also the written notes submitted in Court.
II also took into account the fact that several State Govern ments have changed the rule applicable to commutation and have restored full pension to the pensioners who commuted a part of their pension after lapse of fifteen years.
Union of India has now agreed to restore the commuted portion of the pension in regard to all civilian employees at the age of seventy years or after fifteen years, whichever is later, and has agreed to make this effective from April 1, 1986.
This decision of the Respondent was communicated to the learned Attorney General by a letter dated 20.3.1986 reading thus: "I am glad to inform you that Government have taken a decision in the matter of recovery from pension towards commuted value of pen sion.
The decision is as follows: (i) Recovery from pension payable every month towards commuted value of pension will stop on the completion of 15 years from the date of retirement on superannuation or on the pen sioner completing the age of 70 years, which ever is later.
(ii) The formulation will apply to all civil ian pensioners in whose case the age of re tirement on superannuation is 58 years and the personnel of Armed Forces in whose case the retirement age varies in accordance with the colour service prescribed for the rank (at taining the age of 37/38 years or more).
(iii) Government have taken this decision as an act of goodwill to pensioners and to 'extend to them some measure of relief in the evening of their lives.
It is sincerely be lieved that there will be no further demand on this issue and that the pensioners will accept the decision of the Government without dissent or reservation.
(iv) The decision will take effect prospec tively (from April, 1, 1986).
" 501 A distinction has been made in the case of Defence employees on the ground that retirement in their case is at an early age and merely with lapse of a period of fifteen years full pension could not be restored.
It has also been pointed out that the Defence personnel receive in consideration of the exigencies of the service a higher rate of pension as com pared to civilian employees.
As the position now stands, when a pensioner commutes any part of his pension upto the authorised limit his pen sion is reduced for the remaining part of his life by de ducting the commuted portion from the monthly pension.
The petitioners have contended that the commuted portion out of the pension is ordinarily recovered within about 12 years and, therefore, there is no justification for fixing the period at 15 years.
Commutation brings about certain advantages.
The commuting pensioner gets a lump sum amount which ordinarily he would have received in course of a spread over period subject to his continuing to live.
Thus, two advantages are certainly forthcoming out of commutation (1) availability of a lump sum amount, and (2) the risk factor.
Again many of the State Governments have already formulated schemes accepting the 15 year rule.
In this background, we do not think we would be justified in disturbing the 15 year formula so far as civilian pensioners are concerned.
The age of superannuation used to be 55 until it was raised to 58.
It is not necessary to refer to the age of the commuting pensioner when the benefit would be restored.
It is sufficient to indicate that on the expiry of fifteen years from the period of retirement such restoration would take place.
The respondent Government has agreed that this benefit should be extended with effect from 1.4.1986.
The writ applications were filed in 1983.
The matter was placed on board for hearing in February 1984.
The Union Government took some time for responding to the suggestion of the Court and that is how the disposal was initially delayed.
Thereaf ter, the hearing of the matter has again been delayed on account of pressing business in the Court.
In these circum stances, we think it just and equitable that the benefit agreed to be extended in respect of the commuted portion of the pension should be effective from 1.4.1985 so far as the civilian employees are concerned.
The decision of the respondent Government contained in the above communication does not cover all classes of De fence personnel having been confined to personnel of Armed Forces in whose case the retirement age varies in accordance the colour service prescribed for the rank (attaining the age of 37/38 years or more).
In regard to those who are excluded it has been contended that the retirement is at too early an age and since a higher rate of 502 pension as compared to civilian employees is admissible, the benefit contained in the Government order cannot be extended to that class.
Previously the retiring age for the lower ranks such as sepoys, used to be after 15 years ' service but now it has been enhanced to 20 years ' service.
A sepoy retiring after 20 years ' service is entitled to five years of weightage, for his pension entitlement.
Similarly a Naik retiring after 22 years of service and a Havildar after 24 years ' service are also given credit of five years.
While a civilian employee ordinarily retires after a full term of service entitling him to full pension, it does not happen in the case of the lower ranks in the Defence services and with the extra advantage by the addition of years of credit, the benefit in terms of money works out in the range of about 75% to 6%.
It has to be remembered that more than 50% of the Defence personnel belong to the lowest rank and about 81% in all retire early.
The weightage factor relied upon by the Respondent to treat the Defence personnel differently is not a tenable feature.
Undoubtedly the Defence personnel are a class by themselves.
In their case, retirement takes effect in certain classes as justified by the exigencies of the service rather early.
Weightage, if any, is intended to cover this so that an equation for other purposes could be established.
There is really no merit in the stand of the Respondent that the early age of retirement is fully compen sated by the higher rate of pension.
In dealing with a matter of this nature, it is not appropriate to be guided by the example of Life Insurance; equally unjust it would be to adopt the interest basis.
On the other hand, the conclusion should be evolved by relating it to the 'years of purchase ' basis.
An addition of two years to the period necessary for the recovery on the basis of years of purchase justifies the adoption of the 15 years rule.
That is more or less the basis which appears to be equitable.
It may be that this would give rise to an addi tional burden on the exchequer but it would not be heavy and after all it would bring some relief to those who have served the cause of the Nation at great sacrifice.
We are, therefore, of the view that no separate period need be fixed for the Armed Forces personnel and they should also be entitled to restoration of the commuted portion of the pension on the expiry of 15 years as is conceded in the case of civil pensioners.
And for them too the effective date should be from 1.4.1985.
We direct the respondent Government to give effect to this order within a period of three months from now.
We place on record our appreciation of the consideration shown by the Union of India to ameliorate the hardship of the pensioners.
There will be no order as to the costs.
A.P.J. Petitions allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981 are the rules applicable to civilian employees under the Government of India.
In regard to Defence person nel a similar set of regulations is in force.
In the case of civilians the total amount of pension which can be commuted is upto onethird, while in the case of Defence personnel, commutation is admissible upto 43% in the case of officers and upto 45% in respect of other ranks.
In petitions under Article 32, the petitioners have asked for striking down certain provisions of the said Rules as they permit the Union to recover more than what is paid to the pensioners upon commutation and for a direction that an appropriate scheme rationalising the provisions relating to commutation be brought into force because there has been a substantial improvement in the life expectancy of the people, and since commutation portion out of the pension is ordinarily recovered within about 12 years, there is no justification for fixing the period at 15 years.
The respondent Union of India challenged the maintain ability of the petitions as also the claim of the petition ers.
On the suggestion of the Court, the Union of India examined the matter and agreed to restore the commuted portion of the pension in regard to civilian employees at the age of 70 years or after 15 years, whichever is later, effective from April 1, 1986.
So far as Defence employees were concerned, it was contended that retirement in their case was at an early age and merely with 1apse of a period of 15 years full pension could not be restored because they receive in consideration of the exigencies of the service a higher rate of pension as compared to civilian employees and the benefit contained in the Government order cannot be extended to all classes of Defence personnel.
Allowing the petitions, 498 HELD: 1.
When a pensioner commutes any part of his pension upto the authorised limit, his pension is reduced for the remaining part of his life by deducting the commuted portion from the monthly pension.
[501 B] 2.
Commutation brings about certain advantages.
The commuting pensioner gets a lump sum amount which ordinarily he would have received in course of a spread over period subject to his continuing to live.
Two advantages are cer tainly forthcoming out of commutation (1) availability of a lump sum amount, and (2) the risk factor.
Many State Govern ments have already formulated schemes accepting the 15 years rule.
This Court would not be justified in disturbing the 15 years formula so far as civilian pensioners are concerned.
[501 C D] 3.
On the expiry of 15 years from the date of retire ment, restoration of commuted value of pension would take place and it would be just and equitable that the benefit of commuted portion of the pension should be effective from 1.4.1985 so far as civilian employees are concerned.[500 E, 501 G] 4.
The decision of the respondent Government does not cover all classes of Defence personnel, having been confined to personnel of Armed Forces in whose case the retirement age varies in accordance with the colour service prescribed for the rank (attaining the age of 37/38 years or more).
Previously the retiring age for the lower ranks such as sepoys, used to be after 15 years ' service but now it has been enhanced to 20 years ' service.
A sepoy retiring after 20 years ' service is entitled to 5 years of weightage, for his pension entitlement.
Similarly a Naik retiring after 22 years ' of service and a Havildar after 24 years ' service are also given credit of five yeats.
While a civilian employee ordinarily retires after a full term of service entitling him to full pension, it does not happen in the case of the lower ranks in the Defence services and with the extra advantage by the addition of years of credit, the benefit in terms of money works out in the range of about 75% to 6%.
[501 H 502 B] 5.
More than 50% of the Defence personnel belong to the lowest rank and about 81% in all retire early.
The weightage factor relied upon by the respondent to treat the Defence personnel differently is not a tenable feature.
The Defence personnel are a class by themselves.
In their case, retire ment takes effect in certain classes as justified by the exigencies of the service rather early.
Weightage, if any, is intended to cover this so that an equation for other purposes could be established.
There is no merit in the stand of respondent that the early age of retirement is fully compensated by the higher rate of pension.
[502C D] 6.
No separate period need be fixed for the Armed Forces personnel and 499 they should also be entitled to restoration of the commuted portion of the pension on the expiry of 15 years as is conceded in the case of civil pensioners, and for them too the effective date should be from 1.4.1985.
[502 F G] 7.
In dealing with a matter of this nature it is not appropriate to be guided by the example of Life Insurance; equally unjust it would be to adopt the interest basis.
The conclusion should be evolved by relating it to the 'years of purchase ' basis.
An addition of two years to the period necessary for the recovery on the basis of years of purchase justifies the adoption of the 15 year rule, which appears to be equitable.
[502 E]


judgement:
Appeal No. 5032 of 1985 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.8.1985 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. Nos.
1643 and 2552 of 1980.
P.S. Poti and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant.
G. Vishwanath lyer, P.K. Pillai and K. Dileep Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This appeal by special leave from the decision of learned single judge of the High Court of Kerala is disposed of on a short question of law.
The appellant is a tenant.
The High Court had reversed the concurrent findings and the decisions of three courts below it and ordered eviction of the appellant.
The dispute relates to a portion of the ground floor of a three storeyed building situated in one of the busiest commercial areas Pazhavangadi of the city of Trivandrum.
where the appellant had been conducting a tea shop by 488 name 'Sourashtra Hotel '.
In the adjacent rooms on the ground floor, the landlord was conducting a business in textiles namely 'Sarada Textiles '.
The tenancy began on 12th June, 1965.
The tenancy was taken by the husband of the appellant.
The rent was Rs. 140 per month.
The husband of the appellant died.
Thereafter the appellant had been conducting the business from there.
On or about 15th April, 1976, the respondent purchased.a three storeyed building.
The petition schedule premises is a portion of the ground floor of the said three storeyed building.
It is the case of the appellant that there were seven rooms on the first floor of the said building out 'of which four were in the possession of the respondent and three rented out as aforesaid.
The premises on the second floor were used by the respondent landlord as a lodge.
On 9th April, 1977, the respondent filed an application under section 17 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter called the Act) for permission to convert the non residential building to a residential build ing.
On 30th November, 1977, the Accommodation Controller rejected the said application.
On 2nd June, 1978, the respondent filed the petition for eviction of the appellant on the ground of bona fide need of the premises in question for his residence.
Arrears of rent was also one of the grounds taken against the appellant.
The tenant duly filed his objection.
On 31st October, 1978, the Rent Control Court dismissed the respondent landlord 's petition for eviction.
It was found that the landlord had other buildings in his own possession and therefore.
no order of eviction could be passed by virtue of the first proviso to section 11(3) of the Act.
The Rent Control Appel late Authority on or about 2nd July, 1979 dismissed the respondent landlord 's appeal.
On 28th March, 1980, the revision petition filed by the respondent was also dismissed by the District Court.
The High Court was moved by the respondent landlord under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The husband of the appellant died on 8th May, 1985.
She was therefore impleaded as the legal representative and she is conducting the business since the death of her husband; By the order dated 20th August, 1985, the High Court by its impugned order has set aside all the orders of the courts below.
The tenant, the appellant herein has come up in appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitu tion.
489 Several questions were posed before us in this case, inter alia, (i) whether the revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to the High Court from a revision order passed under section 20 of the said Act? (ii) whether the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under section 115 in setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below in ordering eviction of the appellant from the premises in question reversing the findings of facts? (iii) whether eviction of a tenant from a non residential building could be ordered for the user of the building for residence of the landlord, if the Accommodation Controller had refused permission under section 17 of the Act to convert the build ing from non residential to residential? (iv) where the Accommodation Controller refused the permission to convert the building from non residential to residential, does the claim to the building by the landlord for a residential purpose become illegal and not recognised by law and whether the claim of the landlord can still be held to be bona fide? (v) whether in ordering eviction the special reasons relied on by the High Court on a reappreciation of facts are borne out from the evidence in this case and whether the facts stated by the High Court constitute "special reasons" re quired under the first proviso to section 11 (3) in ordering eviction and setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below.
For the present purpose, it is relevant to refer to section 11(3) of the Act which provides as follows: "11 (3).
A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the build ing for his own occupation or for the occupa tion by any member of his family dependent on him; Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so: Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business; Provided further that no landlord whose right to recover 490 possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument; Provided further that if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in posses sion transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family depend ent on him.
" In the view we have taken on the question that no revi sion lay to the High Court, it is not necessary to refer to other provisions of the Act or to the details of the facts of this case.
It is, however, necessary to refer to sections 18 and 20 of the Act which are as follows: "18.
Appeal (1) (a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authori ties not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.
(b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction.
In computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.
(2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal.
(3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Con trol Court, shall decide the appeal.
Explanation: The appellate author ity may, while confirming the order of evic tion passed by the Rent Control 491 Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building.
(4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent.
(5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in ques tion in any Court of law, except as provided in section 20. 20.
Revision: (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered under sec tion 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any ag grieved party, call for and examine the re cords relating to any order passed or proceed ings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under Sub section (1 ) shall be in its discretion.
" It has further to be borne in mind that the Act in question was an Act to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the State of Kera la.
It was contended by Shri Poti, learned counsel for the appellant, that no revision lay to the High Court.
He sub mitted that section 18(5) read with section 20 of the Act has completely ousted the High Court 's jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Under the scheme of the Act it appears that a landlord who wants eviction of his tenant has to move for eviction and the case has to be disposed of by the Rent Control Court.
That is provided by sub section (2) of section 11 of the Act.
From the Rent Control Court, an appeal lies to the Appellate Authority under the conditions laid down under sub section (1)(b) of section 18 of the Act.
From the Appel late Authority a revision in certain circumstances lies in case where the appellate authority is a Subordinate Judge to the District Court and in other cases to the High Court.
In this case as mentioned hereinbefore the appeal lay from Rent Control Court to the 492 appellate authority who was the Subordinate Judge and there fore the revision lay to the District Judge.
Indeed it is indisputed that the respondent has in this case taken resort to all these provisions.
After the dismissal of the revision by the District Judge from the appellate decision of the Subordinate Judge who confirmed the order of the Rent Con troller, the respondent landlord chose again to go before the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Proce dure.
The question, is, can he have a second revision to the High Court? Shri Poti submitted that he cannot.
We are of the opinion that he is fight.
This position is clear if sub section (5) of section 18 of the Act is read in conjunc tion with section 20 of the Act.
Sub section (5) of section 18, as we have noted hereinbefore, dearly stipulates that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Controller 'shall be final ' and 'shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law ', except as provided in section 20.
By section 20, a revision is provided where the appellate authority is Subordinate Judge to the District Judge and in other cases, that is to say, where the appellate authority is District Judge, to the High Court.
The ambits of revisional powers are well settled and need not be re stated.
It is inconceiv able to have two revisions.
The scheme of the Act does not warrant such a conclusion.
In our opinion, the expression 'shall be final ' in the Act means what it says.
In Kydd vs Watch Committee of City of Liverpool.
[1908] Appeal Cases 327 at 331 332.
Lord Loreburn L.C., construing the provisions of section 11 of the Police Act, 1890 of England which provided an appeal to quarter sessions as to the amount of a constable 's pension, and also stipulated that the Court shall make an order which would be just and final, observed: "Where it says, speaking of such an order, that it is to be final, I think it means there is to be an end of the business at quarter sessions . . " The said observation could most appropri ately be applied to the expression used by the legislature in sub section (5) of section 18 of the Act in question.
It means what it says that subject to the decision of the appellate authority, the decision of the Rent Controller shall be final and could only be questioned in the manner provided in section 20 and in no other manner.
The intention of the legislature in enacting the said Act is clear and manifest from this section and the scheme of the Act, that is to say, to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings and to provide a tier of courts by themselves for eviction of the rented premises.
This is writ large in the different provisions of the Act.
This Court, referring to the aforesaid observations of Lord Loreburn, L.C. in the case of South Asia Industries Private Ltd. vs
S.B. Sarup Singh and Others.
observed at 493 page 766 of the report that the expression "final"prima facie meant that an order passed on appeal under the Act was conclusive and no further appeal lay.
This Court was con struing sections 39 and 43 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the effect thereof in the context of Letters Patent Appeal.
There sections 39 and 43 provided as follows: "Section 39.
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub section (2), an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order made by the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of such order.
(2) No appeal shall lie under sub section (1), unless the appeal involves some substantial question of law.
Section 43.
Save as otherwise ex pressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings.
" This Court observed at page 766 that a combined reading of the said two sec tions made it clear that subject to the fight of appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law, the order passed by the Controller or an order passed on appeal was final and could not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.
The use of the expression "shall be final" will have to be understood in the proper context and keeping in view the purpose of the different sections.
On behalf of the respondent, Shri Iyer relied on a decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on which the High Court had rested its decision in Ouseph Vareed vs Mary, in repelling the submission by the appellant on this aspect.
There the High Court was concerned with the identical Act.
Balakrishna Eradi, J. speaking for the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court on this contention after referring to several decisions observed at pages 588 589 of the report as follows: "The contention of the respondent that the decision of the District Court rendered under section 20(1) is not amenable to revisional juris diction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is based mainly on the provision for 494 finality contained in section 18(5) of the Act.
That Section is in the following terms: "The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in section 20.
" What is to be noted here is that there is nothing in the Section which says that the decision of the revisional authority under section 20 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any higher court.
" The learned judge referred to the decision of the Judi cial Committee in the case of Maung Ba Thaw and Another Insolvents vs Ma Pin, AIR 1934 P.C. 111.
The learned judge also referred to a decision of this Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. vs S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors.
(supra).
The learned judge concluded that so long as there was no specific provision in the statute making the determi nation by the District Court final and excluding the super visory power of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it had to be held that the decision rendered by the District Court under section 20(1) of the Act being a decision of a court subordinate to the High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court was liable to be revised by the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In that view of the matter, the Full Bench rejected the view of the division bench of the Kerala High Court in Kurien vs Chacko, With re spect, we are unable to sustain the view of the Full Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter.
In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of subsection (5) of section 18 of the Act.
Sub section (5) of section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appel late authority as mentioned in section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under section 20 of the Act.
There was thereby an implied prohibi tion or exclusion of a second revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revi sion has been provided under section 20 of the Act in ques tion.
When section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided under section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order once again after revision under sec tion 20 of the Act.
That would mean there would be a trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme mani fest in the different sections of the Act in question.
Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law 's delay and justice demands finality within quick dis posal of 495 case.
The language of the provisions of section 18(5) read with section 20 inhibits further revision.
The courts must so construe.
Judicial Committee in Maung Ba Thaw vs Ma Pin (supra) was dealing with the Provincial Insolvency Act and the Judicial Committee observed that when a right of appeal was given to any of the ordinary courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court would be gov erned by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore an appeal to Privy Council was maintainable from the decision of the High Court.
Here in the instant case the right of appeal has been given under the Act not to any ordinary court of the country under the Code of Civil Proce dure but to the courts enumerated under the Rent Act.
In that view of the matter, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied in aid of the submission for respondent in this case.
Indeed this view, in our opinion, is concluded by the decision of this Court in the case of Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad; , where this Court was concerned with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the amendments made therein which superseded the bifur cation of the revisional jurisdiction between the High Court and the District Court.
The High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction from an order of District Judge disposing of revision petition.
This Court observed that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure conferred on the High Court of a State power to remove any jurisdictional error committed by a subordinate court in cases where the error could not be corrected by resort to its appellate jurisdiction.
There after tracing the history of the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act, 1976, this Court observed that the amendment superseded the scheme of bifurcation of revisional jurisdiction with effect from 1 st February, 1977.
Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was amended from time to time in its application to the State of U.P.
The two questions that fell for consideration before this Court were (i) whether the High Court possessed the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an order of the District Court under section 115 disposing of a revision petition and (ii) whether the High Court possessed revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of C.R.C. against an order of District Court under section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
It was held that the High Court was not vested with that.
revisional jurisdiction.
This Court was of the view that an order under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was not of a court of District Court and was not amena ble of revisional jurisdiction.
This COurt 'further observed that an examination of the several provisions of the Provin cial Small Cause Courts Act indicated that it was self sufficient code so far as the enquiry covered by that Act was concerned.
All the indications in the Act were to that effect.
After 496 analysing the scheme and referring to the decisions of this Court, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was excluded.
In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to inter fere in this matter under section 115 of C.P.C.
It was urged that in case we are of the opinion that a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not lie, the case should be remitted to the High Court for consideration as a petition under article 227 of the Constitution.
We are unable to accede.
A petition under article 227 of the Constitution is different from revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The two procedures are not interchangeable though there are some common features.
It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
We are con cerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
We reiterate that to vest the High Court with any such jurisdiction would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, would be contrary to the public policy, and would be contrary to the legislative intent as manifest from the different sections of the Act.
In that view of the matter, the appeal must be allowed on that ground alone and it is not necessary for us to refer to the other grounds.
We must necessarily overrule the decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court referred to hereinbefore.
Before we conclude, we must, however, note that Shri Poti appearing for the tenant has conceded that rent should be increased to Rs. 500 per month for the premises in ques tion, as the existing rent is too low.
The appeal is accord ingly allowed and we direct on the concession of Shri Poti that rent would be Rs. 500 per month from this date.
The judgment and order of the High Court are set aside.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, by section 13(3) provides that a landlord 's petition for eviction of his tenant from a premises on the ground of bona fide personal need, has to be disposed of by the Rent Control Court.
Section 18(1)(b) makes provision of an appeal to the Appellate Authority against the order of the Rent Control Court.
Sub s.(5) of section 18, stipulates that the decision of the appellate authority and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Controller 'shall be final ' and 'shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law ', except as provided in section 20.
By section 20, a revision is provided where the appellate authority is Subordinate Judge to the District Judge and in other cases, that is to say, where the appellate authority is District Judge, to the High Court.
The respondent landlord filed an eviction petition against the appellant 's husband tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need.
The Rent Controller passed an order dismissing the petition.
The order was confirmed in appeal filed by the respondent before the Appellate Authority.
Thereafter, the respondent preferred a revision petition before the District Judge.
That petition having been dis missed, he moved the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
During the pendency of the second revision, the appellant 's husband died and she was brought on record as the legal representative.
The High Court set aside all the orders of the courts below and ordered eviction of the appellant.
486 In appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant tenant that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgments and orders of the courts below, since no revision lies to the High Court against the order of the District Judge in view of section 18(5) read with s.20 of the Act which has completely ousted the High Court 's jurisdiction to interfere section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Allowing the appeal, HELD: (1) The High Court had no jurisdiction to inter fere in the matter section 115 of C.P.C. Therefore, the judg ment and order of the High Court are set aside.
The ambits of revisional powers are well settled and need not be restated.
It is inconceivable to have two revisions.
The scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not warrant such a conclusion.
[492 D] 2(ii) Sub section
(5) of section 18 of the Act says that subject to the decision of the appellate authority, the decision of the Rent Controller shall be final an,] could only be ques tioned in the manner provided in section 20 and in no other manner.
The expression 'shall be final ' in the Act means what it says.
The intention of the legislature in enacting the said Act is clear and manifest from section 18(5) and the scheme of the Act, that is to say, to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings and to provide a tier of courts by themselves for eviction of the rented premises.
This is writ large in the different provisions of the Act.
[492 G] 2(iii) When section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that "shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law" except in the manner provided under section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a court of law and which is a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order on again after revision under section 20 of the Act.
That would mean there would be a trial by four courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the Act in question.
Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law 's delay and justice demands finality within quick dis posal of case.
The language of the provisions of section 18(5) read with section 20 inhibits further revision.
The courts must so construe.
[494 G 495 A] Kydd y. Watch Committee of City of Liverpool, (1908) Appeal Cases 327 at 331 332; South Asia Industries Private Ltd. vs S.B. Sarup Singh and 487 Others, & Vishesh Kumar vs Shanti Prasad, [1980]3 SCR 32, relied upon.
Ouseph Vareed vs Mary, , over ruled.
Maung Ba Thaw and Another Insolvents vs Ma Pin, AIR 1934 P.C. 81, distinguished.
Kurien vs Chacko, , approved.
In the instant case, the appeal lay from Rent Control Court to the appellant authority who was the Subordinate Judge and therefore the revision lay to the District Judge.
After the dismissal of the revision by the District Judge from the appellate decision of the Subordinate Judge who confirmed the order of the Rent Controller, the respondent landlord chose again to go before the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But, he could not have a second revision to the High Court, since the jurisdiction of the High Court section 115 of the C.P.C. was excluded by the Act.
[491 H 492 B, D]