judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1223 of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 19 8 1969 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 117 D of 1961.
Shyamla Pappu and M. N. Shroff for the Appellants.
D. Goburdhan and R. Goburdhan for Respondent.
BEG, J. The Union of India and the Commissioners of the Rehabilitation Department of the Govt.
of India are the appellants before us after certification of this case, under Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution, if involves a consideration of the meaning of some rules framed under Section 40 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 44 of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').
The respondent Iqbal Singh, a displaced person from Rawalpindi, in West Pakistan, had a verified claim assessed at over Rs. 32 lacs from compensation under the Act.
His uncle, Jai Singh, had also a verified claim assessed at Rs. 26,06,413/ On 21st November, 1952, Jai Singh executed a will under which he gave various legatees, including the respondent, shares in the compensation which was due to be paid to him.
Jai Singh died on 7th February, 1953.
In an inquiry under Section 9 of the Act the respondent was held to be a beneficiary under Jai Singh 's will to the extent of 19% of the amount due to be paid to Jai Singh.
The Assistant Settlement Officer, however, clubbed together the individual claim of over Rs. 32 lacs of Iqbal Singh respondent, and the share of Rs. 4,95,028/ as a legatee in the separate claim of Jai Singh.
He then awarded the maximum compensation of Rs. 2 lacs under Rule 16 which says: "16.
Scale of compensation.
Compensation shall be payable in accordance with the scale specified in appendices VIII or IX as the case may be".
Appendix VIII is the relevant appendix giving percentages of the assessed claims which were to be paid as "compensation" for the verified claims ranging from Rs. 500 to Rs. 18 lacs and above.
The maximum prescribed for Rs. 18 lacs and above is Rs. 2 lacs as "compensation".
Thus, no claimant could get more than that as compensation whatever be the amount at which his claim was assessed.
The result of clubbing together by the Assistant Settlement Officer was that the respondent was not to get more than Rs. 2 lacs even though his own claim as compensation was for that much so that he was, if this decision was correct, to be totally deprived of his share in the legacy left by his uncle.
His case is that he is entitled to Rs. 2 lacs on his claim of Rs.32 lacs, and, in addition, to his share of 19% also as a legatee of the will relating to the amount which was payable to Jai Singh deceased as claimant.
The character of the first was "compensation" and of the second was that of a "legacy" under a will.
990 In appeal, the Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the respondents case, by an order dated 29th July, 1957, and directed that the respondent 's claim be paid separately from the share in the claim he was entitled to as a beneficiary under the will mentioned above.
On 26th April, 1957,, the Regional Settlement Commissioner, however, revised the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and held that the respondent could not, under the existing rules, get any share of compensation separately as a legatee out of the estate of Jai Singh.
The respondent appealed to the Settlement Commissioner who agreed with the Regional Commissioner.
The Central Government also rejected a revision petition of the respondent under Section 33 of the Act.
The respondent then filed a Writ Petition before the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court which came up finally before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and was allowed.
Orders of the Central Government and the Settlement Commissioner were quashed and the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner was restored by the High Court.
It has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the High Court overlooked the scheme of the Act and misinterpreted the relevant rules.
The main contention advanced by Mrs. Shymla Pappu, appearing on behalf of the appellants, is that the whole purpose of the Act was to compensate and rehabilitate individual displaced persons with a maximum limit imposed on what could be awarded to a displaced person for this purpose.
It is urged that the respondent could not obtain more than the maximum amount prescribed by Appendix VIII under Rule 16.
It is submitted that the combined effect of Rules 16 to 21, interpreted in the light of the scheme of the Act, is that the amount of compensation payable to an individual cannot in any case, exceed Rs. 2 lacs.
Rule 21 is especially relied upon.
It says: "21.
Mixed claims.
Where a person holds a number of verified claims in different capacities, the total compensation payable to him shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of rule 18, 19 and 20".
It is true that the Act is intended for payment of compensation for rehabilitation of displaced persons and matters connected therewith.
There is, however, nothing in the Act to prevent a claimant from making a gift or a will in respect of the amount he may be entitled to get.
No provision of the Act takes away rights of transfer of or inheritance to verified claims.
Nothing like an abatement or extinction of a claim by the death of the claimant is provided for by the Act.
Inheritance to and devolution of rights of claimants are clearly beyond the purview or scheme of the Act.
They are untouched by the provisions of the Act and are governed by other provisions of law.
The statutory rights of claimants to compensation, which crystallize on assessment and verification of claims, are separate rights to property of each claimant covered by the wide definition of "property" in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act.
They cannot evaporate or vanish suddenly with the 991 death of a claimant.
Rules framed under Section 40 of the Act have to be and are those reasonably necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act.
They cannot go beyond the objects for which they can be framed.
Those objects are confined to determination and payment of compensation for what was left in Pakistan and do not extend to deprivation of anything acquired in India in capacities other than those relevant for purposes of compensation.
In the instant case, the right of the respondent as a legatee under the will of Jai Singh was recognised separately in proceedings under Section 9 of the Act.
The respondent thus acquired a right which was different in character from his claim as a displaced person.
After having gone through the Rules 17 to 20, we are unable to construe Rule 21 as an authority for clubbing together of a claim as well as a separate right of a claimant as a legatee under a will which is distinct from the displaced person 's claim to Compensation as a displaced person.
The right of such a legatee stands on a different footing from a claim made under Section 4 of the Act for payment of compensation or a rehabilitation grant.
The amount of compensation or a rehabilitation grant is payable to a displaced person under the provisions of the Act.
A dispute decided under Section 9 of the Act is very different in character from a claim for compensation or rehabilitation as a displaced person.
It could relate to a right by inheritance to or by succession under a will of another claimant.
But, each person has to be paid separately as indicated by Rule 17.
Great reliance was placed on Rule 18 on behalf of the appellants.
This rule lays down: "18.
Compensation to be determined on the total value of all claims.
For the purpose of determining the compensation payable to an applicant, the Regional Settlement Commissioner shall,, except as otherwise provided in these rules, add up the assessed value of all claims of the applicant in respect of all kinds of properties, other than agricultural land situated in a rural area, left by him in West Pakistan and the compensation shall be assessed on the total value of all such claims".
This rule shows that only different kinds of claims of each displaced person in properties left by him in West Pakistan which can be clubbed together.
It does not deal with rights or claims of another genus which may devolve upon a claimant in his capacity as an heir or a legatee of another displaced person who may have acquired a separate right of his own as a claimant to compensation under the Act.
Clubbing together of "claims" in different kinds of properties has reference to an individual 's claim to "compensation", and rehabilitation and not to claims of different displaced persons which could, by transfer or devolution, vest separately in an individual.
Rule 19 deals with compensation payable to joint families and Rule 19A prescribes maximum amounts payable in such cases.
Rule 19B refers to compensation ordinarily payable to kartas of joint families.
Rule 20 provides for the assessment of compensation of a co owner.
992 These are the different types of claims of the same displaced person in different capacities as claimant, in each capacity, to compensation due to himself alone.
There is no provision for clubbing together of compensation to different displaced persons each with a right of his own except as members of joint families, which are treated as legal entities by themselves.
The rights of a successor of another displaced person are outside the rule.
There is nothing in the Act or the rules framed thereunder to conflict with this natural and ordinary interpretation of fairly clear and simple language used.
The judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (H. R. Khanna, C.J. and section N. Shankar J.) by which the Writ Petition of the respondent was allowed, shows that it had been conceded in the High Court, on behalf of the Rehabilitation Department, that Rule 18 would not apply to the case of the respondent before us.
The Division Bench had relied upon an earlier decision of the Punjab High Court in Karam Singh vs Union of India & Ors.
(1) where, upon similar facts, it had been held: "It is significant that in Rule 18 it is clearly stated that the compensation has to be determined on the total value of all claims pertaining to properties left by a claimant in West Pakistan.
Therefore it is the property left by a claimant in West Pakistan.
Therefore it is the property left by the petitioner to which he can make a claim.
The property left by his uncle cannot be said to be the property left by him within rule 18.
Properties left by a joint family are properties which the claimant, who claims to be a member of the joint family, can properly be said to have left in West Pakistan.
Though the capacity in which he held those properties and so also in the case of properties held by him as a co sharer with other persons is different from the capacity in which the properties left by him in West Pakistan in his personal and exclusive occupation are concerned.
This cannot be said to be the case where he gets the property of another displaced person by reason of inheritance or by transfer.
The capacities contemplated by Rule 21 are set out in Rule 18, 19 and 20 and in any case have to be analogous to them".
We find ourselves in entire agreement with the view adopted by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and dismiss this appeal with costs.
P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The respondent a displace person from Pakistan had a verified claim of more than Rs. 32 lacs from compensation under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
His uncle Jai Singh had also a verified claim of about Rs. 26 lacs.
Jai Singh executed a will by which a portion of his share in the compensation was bequeathed to the respondent.
Jai Singh died.
The Assistant Settlement Officer clubbed together the individual claim of the respondent and the share of the legacy and awarded the maximum compensation of Rs. 2 lacs under rule 16.
Respondent objected to the clubbing on the ground that the character of the share Jai Singh was that of a legacy and not of compensation.
On an appeal, the Assistant Settlement Commissioner accepted the respondent 's contention.
The Regional Settlement Commissioner, however, revised the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and restored the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer.
The appeal to the Settlement Commissioner filed by the respondent failed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and quashed the orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner.
In an appeal by certificate under Article 133(1) (a) it was contended by the appellant that the purpose of the Act was to compensate and rehabilitate displaced persons subject to a maximum limit.
Combined effect of rules 16 to 21 interpreted in the light of the scheme of the Act was said to be that the amount of compensation payable to an individual cannot in any case exceed Rs. 2 lacs.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD : 1.
There is nothing in the Act to prevent a claimant from making a gift or will in respect of the amount he might be entitled to get.
No provision of the Act takes away rights of transfer of or inheritance to verified claims.
Nothing like an abatement or an extinction of a claim by the death of the claimant is provided for by the Act.
The statutory rights of claimants to compensation are covered by the wide definition of "property" in section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act.
They cannot evaporate or vanish suddenly with the death of a claimant.
Rules framed under section 40 of the Act have to be and are those reasonably necessary for carrying out the purposes of the article They cannot go beyond the objects for which they can be framed.
The objects are determination and payment of compensation and do not extend to deprivation of anything acquired in India.
[990 F H, 991 A] 2.
The right of the respondent as a legatee was different in character from his claim as a displaced person.
There is no provision for clubbing together of compensation to different displaced persons each with a right of his own except as members of joint families which are treated as legal entities by themselves.
The rights of a successor of another displaced person are outside the rule.
The 989 judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of Karam Singh vs Union of India I.I.R. [1964] 1 Punjab 742, approved.
[991 C, 992 A]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 138 of 1971.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd March 1971 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 232 of 1969.
K. C. Kalra, R. C. Verma and section L. Aneja for the Appellant.
982 F. section Nariman, B. P. Maheshwari, N. K. Jain and Suresh Sethi for Respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.
This appeal, by special leave, raises a short and interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of the provisions of the .
The facts giving rise to the appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows.
On 12th July, 1967, a raiding party headed by Dr. A. D. Kumar, the Assistant Health Officer of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and comprising inter alia Shanti Nath, Navnit Lal, H. R. Sood and H. K. Bhanot, Food Inspectors, intercepted a truck bearing No. DLL 1925 near Chandni Chowk, Delhi at about 7 a.m. in the morning.
The truck contained twenty five to thirty cans of cow 's milk which was being carried for sale by the appellant.
The raiding party took the truck inside the compound of the Municipal office and there, samples of cow 's milk were taken from eight cans chosen at random by different Food Inspectors, one sample being drawn from each can.
Each sample was divided into three parts and after carrying out the usual formalities, one part of each sample was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis.
The result of the analysis was that each sample was found to be adulterated under section 2, sub section
(i), cl.
(1) of the Act, in that the percentage of non fat solids was lower than that prescribed by Item A 11.01.01 read with Item A 11.01.11 in Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
The prescribed minimum percentage of non fat solids in cow 's milk in Delhi was 8.5 while the percentage found in each of the samples was below that figure.
In fact, it varied from sample to sample and ranged between 5.47 and 8.06.
On finding, as a result of the report of the Public Analyst, that each sample was adulterated under section 2, sub section
(i), cl.
(1), the Municipal Corporation filed four different complaints against the appellant, one in respect of four samples, the other in respect of two samples and the third and the fourth in respect of each of the remaining two samples.
The cases arising out of the first two complaints were consolidated and a single charge was framed in respect of six samples on the ground that the appellant sold to the Food Inspectors samples of adulterated cow 's milk out of six cans which he was carrying for sale and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 16 read with section 7 of the Act.
Similar charges were framed in the remaining two cases, the charge in one case being for sale of sample of adulterated cow 's milk out of the seventh can and the charge in the other being for sale of sample of adulterated cow 's milk out of the eighth can.
So far as the first case is concerned the learned Magistrate accepted the prosecution case, including the report of the Public Analyst and held that the appellant was guilty of selling to the Food Inspectors samples of adulterated cow 's milk out of six cans carried by him.
But instead of treating the sale of each sample as a distinct and separate offence, the learned Magistrate regarded the sales of the six samples as forming part of the same transaction and constituting only one offence, since all the six samples were taken at the same time from the 983 cans which the appellant was carrying in the truck.
The learned Magistrate, in this view, convicted the appellant of a single offence under section 16 read with section 7 of the Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/ or in default to suffer imprisonment for a further period of three months.
The other two cases also, in view of the report of the Public Analyst and other prosecution evidence, resulted in the conviction of the appellant under section 16 read with section 7 of the Act and in each of those two cases, the appellant was sentenced by the learned Magistrate to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a like period and to pay a fine in a like amount as in the first case.
The sentences of imprisonment in the three cases were, however, directed to run concurrently with one another.
The appellant preferred three appeals to the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, one in respect of conviction and sentence in each case.
So far as the first case is concerned, the learned Additional Sessions Judge maintained the conviction, but taking the view that the only deficiency in the quality of samples of cow 's milk sold by the appellant being in respect of non fat solids and there also, the deficiency being very small, ranging only from 0.45 to 2.85, the sentence awarded to the appellant was rather excessive, the learned Additional Sessions Judge reduced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for three months, leaving the sentence of fine untouched.
The conviction in the second case was also maintained in appeal but the learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the offence in that case would constitute a part of the offence in the first case and hence he did not think that a separate sentence would be called for or justified and in this view he confirmed the conviction of the appellant.
but set aside the sentence imposed on him.
So also in the third case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge made the same order in appeal maintaining the conviction of the appellant but setting aside the sentence passed on him.
It does not appear from the record whether the appellant preferred any revision application against the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the second and third cases in so far as it confirmed the conviction of the appellant or the State preferred any revision application against that order in so far as it set aside the sentence imposed on the appellant.
But so far as the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the first case was concerned, the appellant preferred a revision application against it in the High Court of Delhi.
The first case, as already pointed out above, related to sales of samples of adulterated cow 's milk out of the six cans carried by the appellant.
Both the learned Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge had treated the sales of these six samples as forming part of the same transaction and constituting one single offence.
The High Court, however, took the view that the sale of each sample constituted a distinct and separate offence and the appellant was, therefore, liable to be tried not for one single offence but for six different offences in respect of sales of six samples.
The High Court observed that the sale of each sample was a separate sale and each such sale constituted a separate breach of the provisions of section 7 of the Act leading to a separate offence punishable under section 16 of the Act.
984 The High Court accordingly set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and remanded the case to the learned Magistrate for retrial of the appellant for each of the six different offences constituted by the sales of six samples.
This led to the filing of the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.
The appellant contended that the gravamen of the charge against him was that he had stored for sale adulterated cow 's milk in six cans carried by him in the truck.
The act of storing was one single act and it was immaterial whether the storing was in one can or in several cans.
Merely because samples were taken by the Food Inspectors from different cans, it did not mean that so many different offence were committed by the appellant, for the different samples only confirmed that cow 's milk stored by the appellant in these cans was adulterated.
The offence was one and single and that was storing adulterated cow 's milk for sale, whether in one can or more.
It was alleged on behalf of the appellant that even if the offence charged against the appellant were not storing adulterated cow 's milk for sale, but selling samples of adulterated cow 's milk out of six cans to the Food Inspectors for analysis, taking of sample from each can did not constitute a distinct and separate offence of selling adulterated cow 's milk.
There was only one sale by the taking of sample from six cans, since all the samples were of the same article of food, namely, cow 's milk and were taken at the same place and at the same time.
Otherwise, contended the appellant, the result would be that if the Food Inspector goes on taking samples from the same stock of cow 's milk or other article of food, the sale of each sample would constitute an independent offence and there would be as many offences as the number of samples taken, though the stock of the commodity is the same.
That would be a most startling and unjust consequence.
Therefore, said the appellant, though samples were taken by the Food Inspectors from six different cans, there was only one offence of selling adulterated cow 's milk committed by the appellant and the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant was liable to be tried for six different offences.
These were the two contentions urged on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeal.
Neither of these two contentions is, in our opinion, well founded and both must be rejected.
It is clear on a plain reading of section 7 of the Act that the acts prohibited by that section include manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any adulterated article of food.
The law is now well settled that the act of storing an adulterated article of food would be an offence only if storing is for sale.
If adulterated article of food is stored by any person for consumption or for any purpose other than sale, it would not come within the inhibition of the section.
Now, when, out of adulterated article of food stored for sale, a quantity is sold, the sale constitutes an offence distinct and independent from the offence of storing for sale.
Not only is the act of storing for sale an offence but also the act of selling out of the adulterated article of food so stored.
Here in the present case, the charge against the appellant was not of storing adulterated cow 's milk for sale.
It was a charge of selling to the Food Inspector samples of adulterated cow 's milk out of six cans carried by the appellant.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to 985 consider whether storing of adulterated cow 's milk in each of the six cans constituted a distinct and separate offence and we do not express any opinion on it.
The only issue which requires to be considered by us is whether the sale of sample of adulterated cow 's milk from each can constituted a distinct and separate offence or there was only one offence committed by the appellant by selling samples of adulterated cow 's milk from six cans.
Now, the definition of 'sale ' in section 2(xiii) includes within it sale of any article of food for analysis and it would seem that even if several samples are taken by the Food Inspector for analysis from the same stock of adulterated article of food, taking of each sample would constitute a distinct and independent sale and each such sale would be an offending act attracting the penal provisions of the Act.
The position would indeed be beyond doubt where samples are taken from different receptacles.
whether at one and the same time or at different times, because each sample would be taken for determining whether the article of food in a particular receptacle is adulterated or not.
It may be that the article of food in one receptacle is adulterated, while in the other it is not, and even the nature and degree of adulteration may vary from one receptacle to another.
Each sample taken would, therefore, be really and truly for the purpose of analysis.
So also there would be no scope for argument where samples are taken from the same receptacle at different times, because sample, taken at an earlier point of time, if found adulterated on analysis, would merely show that the article of food in the receptacle at that particular point of time was adulterated and it would not dispense with the analysis of the article of food in the receptacle at a later point of time, for at such later point of time, the article of food in the receptacle may not be adulterated or it may consist of different proportions or the adulteration in it may be much more deleterious or injurious to human health.
The taking of each sample would be necessary and justified for the purpose of analysis, and hence each taking of sample would constitute a distinct and independent sale.
It is only where samples are taken from the same receptacle at one and the same time or within reasonable proximity of time that it may not be possible to say that the taking of each of these samples constitutes a distinct and separate sale.
When a sample is once taken from the receptacle for analysis, there cannot be any question of taking another sample for analysis at the same time.
The taking of the second sample would be wholly unnecessary so far as the purpose of analysis is concerned and it would lay itself open to an attack that it is not really and truly for the purpose of analysis.
It is only where a sample is taken for analysis that its taking constitutes a sale.
The taking of the second sample would not, therefore, amount to a sale involving an offence.
But in the other two cases, where samples are taken from different receptacles, though stocked at one place at one time or at different times or samples are taken from the same receptacle at different times, the taking of each sample would constitute a sale and hence a distinct and separate offence.
This view, which we are taking, is clearly supported by the decision of the Queen 's Bench Division in Fecitt vs Walsh(1).
There, while the 986 appellant was delivering at a workhouse milk contained in five cans pursuant to a contract of sale, the respondent, acting under section 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, procured a sample from each of the five cans and on finding that there was a large deficiency of cream in two of the samples, the respondent laid two separate informations against the appellant in respect of those two samples under section 9 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875.
The Justices convicted the appellant in a separate penalty upon each information and on appeal against these convictions, the appellant contended that on the facts, there could not be more than one information against him, since there was only one sale of milk by him and it was being delivered in five cans merely because that was a convenient form of delivery.
Day, J., negatived this argument of the appellant and held that procuring of each sample was a separate offence as to each can in respect of which an information could be laid against him and the convictions of the appellant on the basis of separate informations laid against him were, therefore, right.
The learned Judge observed: "As far as he was concerned there were five transactions; in respect of each of those transactions he must have proceeded under the statute and would then be deemed to have purchased in each case from the seller.
It seems to me that the sergeant in procuring these samples must be deemed to have been the purchaser in each particular case, and that as he was the purchaser of five samples, the purchase of each one was a separate transaction, and that in respect of each of them an information would lie.
As a matter of fact, the respondent only proceeded in respect of two of the samples, obtaining a separate conviction upon separate informations in respect of each of them, and our answer to the first question must be that he was right, and that more than one information could be laid against the appellant.
" The analogy of this decision is striking and it clearly shows that where samples are taken from different receptacles for the purpose of analysis, the taking of each sample would be a separate transaction of sale and each such transaction of sale would constitute a separate offence, if the sample is found to be adulterated.
The appellant leaned heavily on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sanker Lal Agarwalla vs Corporation of Calcutta(1) where it was held by D. N. Das Gupta, J., that where three Food Inspectors visit the godown of an accused dealing in ghee the same day and at the same time and each takes samples of ghee from three different lots of tins and the three samples collected are found adulterated, the offence committed under the by the accused is the same, namely, the offence of storing and selling adulterated ghee at the particular hour of the particular day and it cannot be said that three distinct offences under section 7 of the Act have been committed by the accused and consequently when "three separate prose 987 cutions under section 7 of the Act have been launched against the accused and he is convicted in one of the prosecutions, the other two prosecutions are barred under section 403, Criminal Procedure Code".
But we do not think this decision can be invoked in aid of the contention of the appellant.
It is clear from the facts of this case that the three prosecutions against the accused were not for three different transactions of sale constituted by the taking of samples from three lots of tins of ghee, but were for three different acts of storing adulterated ghee and it was for this reason that D. N. Das Gupta, J., observed that the single act of storing adulterated ghee could not be split up into three different acts according to brands and the launching of three different prosecutions on the ground that three distinct offences have been committed by the accused was not justified or warranted by law.
We are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of this observation as it is not relevant for the purpose of the present case.
It is no doubt true that some of the observations made in the judgment seem to support the contention of the appellant that where samples are taken at the same time on the same day from different receptacles kept at the same place as the six cans in the present case were and each of the samples is found adulterated, there is only one offence committed by the accused and not as many offences as the number of samples taken by the Food Inspectors.
But to the extent to which these observations refer to the offence constituted by the taking of samples, we must express our dissent and hold that they do not represent the correct law on the subject.
We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the sale of each of the samples taken from the six cans constituted a distinct and separate offence and the appellant was liable to be tried for each of the six offences.
We accordingly dismiss the appeal.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Samples of cow 's milk were taken by the concerned officers from 6 out of several cans carried by the appellant in a truck and were sent for analysis.
Finding the samples adulterated, the appellant was prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 16 read with section 7 of the .
Both the trial Court and the first Appellate Court treated the sales of six samples as forming part of the same transaction constituting one single offence.
The High Court, in revision, held that the sale of each sample constituted a distinct and separate offence, that the appellant was, therefore, liable for 6 different offences, and remanded the case for re trial of the appellant for 6 offences.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^ HELD: (a) The acts prohibited by section 7 include manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any adulterated article of food.
Hence, not only is the act of storing for sale an offence, but also the act of selling out of the adulterated article of food so stored.
The definition of "sale" in section 2(xiii) includes sale for analysis.
Therefore, where samples are taken for analysis from different receptacles, whether at one and the same time or at different times, each taking constitutes a distinct and independent sale, because, each sample would be taken for determining, by analysis, whether the article of food in a particular receptacle is adulterated or not.
The taking of each sample would be necessary and justified, because, it may be that the article of food in one receptacle is adulterated while in the other it is not, or, the nature and degree of adulteration may vary from receptacle to receptacle.
It is only where samples are taken from the same receptacle at one and the same time or within reasonable proximity of time that it may not be possible to say that the taking of each of those samples constitutes a distinct and separate sale.
[984 F, H, 985 B G] Fecitt vs Walsh , applied.
(b) In Shankar Lal Agarwalla vs Corporation of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1962 Cal.
611, the 3 prosecutions against the accused were not for three different transactions of sale constituted by taking samples from three tins of ghee, but were for three acts of storing adulterated ghee, and so the decision is not relevant.
But observations contra therein that the taking of sample from different receptacles at the same time from the same place for analysis, constitutes only one offence, are incorrect.
[986 G, 987 A D]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2354 of 1968 From the judgment and order dated the 7th March, 1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. 24 of 1969.
C. P. Lal for the appellant.
section T. Desai and D. N. Misra for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, J.
One Deojibhai executed a sale deed on 30 12 1950 in respect of the property in question in favour of the appellant for a sum of Rs. 12,000/ .
No part of consideration was paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed.
The appellant promised to pay the amount by 21 5 1951 and covenanted that in case of non payment, the amount due would be charge upon the property sold.
After the execution of the sale deed, the appellant was put into possession of the 964 property and he paid Rs. 3,100/ in three instalments.
Deojibhai died in 1955 leaving his widow, the respondent and a son who died subsequently leaving his widow Manibai.
Manibai filed a suit in 1956 in the Bombay City Civil Court against Deokabai, the respondent, claiming a share in the property left by her father in law, Deojibhai.
This suit was compromised and Deokabai was appointed receiver of the estate of Deojibhai with a direction by the Court to realise his assets and to pay a certain amount to Manibai.
Deokabai, the respondent, filed the suit from which the appeal arises, on the basis that the appellant defaulted to pay the full purchase money of the property and that she was entitled to the same with interest.
The appellant contended that the charge could not be enforced against the property as it formed part of his occupancy holding and that, besides the sum of Rs. 3,100/ he had made other payments totalling Rs. 9,500/ .
The trial court found that no decree could be passed for enforcing the charge against the property as it was held in occupancy right by the appellant, but the court gave a personal decree against the appellant for Rs. 21,375/ .
The appellant appealed against the decree to the High Court.
The Court found that the respondent was entitled to enforce the charge on the property and granted a decree on that basis, but negatived the claim of the respondent for a personal decree against the appellant on the ground of limitation.
In other respects, the decree of the trial court was confirmed.
It is against this decree that the present appeal, by certificate, has been filed.
Two points were taken on behalf of the appellant.
One was that the Court was not competent to pass a decree creating a charge on the property in view of the fact that the property was held by the appellant as occupancy tenant.
This contention was negatived by the High Court on the ground that the prohibition to pass a decree for sale or for closure of any right of an occupancy tenant in his holding was not in existence in 1952 when the suit was filed.
We think the High Court was right in its conclusion as section 12 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, which contained the prohibition, had been repealed before the decree was passed.
The second point raised by the appellant was that the respondent did not appeal from the decree of the trial court negativing her claim in the suit for a charge on the property.
It was contended that the High Court was wrong in granting a decree for enforcement of the charge as the decree of the trial court became final so far as the respondent was concerned as she did not file any appeal therefrom.
We are unable to accept this contention.
Under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court was competent to pass a decree for the enforcement of the charge in favour of the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree.
Order 41, Rule 33 provides: "The appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only 965 of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection: Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under sec.
35 A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." In Radhika Mohan vs Sudhir Chandra(1), the facts were these: Under an annuity bond, the plaintiff there was granted a certain allowance per month.
In a will executed by the executor of the annuity bond.
It was provided that the annuity was to be a charge on certain properties.
As the annuity allowance fell in arrears, the plaintiff brought a suit to enforce it praying for a charge.
The trial court decreed the suit but did not grant a charge.
The lower appellate court exonerated the defendants from personal liability but held that there should be a charge on the property.
In second appeal by the defendants it was contended by them that the lower appellate court could not create a charge as, in the lower appellate court the plaintiff had failed to take objection to that part of the trial court 's decree.
The High Court held that under 0.41, r.33, Civil Procedure Code, the lower appellate court was competent to vary the decree by providing for enforcement of the charge and that the decree passed by it was right.
In Giani Ram & others vs Ramji Lal and others(2) the Court said that in 0.41, r. 33, the expression "which ought to have been passed" means "what ought in law to have been passed" and if an appellate court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed was in fact not passed by the court below, it may pass or make such further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require.
Therefore, we hold that even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge.
There is no substance in the contention that all the payments made by the appellant have not been given credit to by the respondent in view of the concurrent findings of the courts.
We dismiss the appeal with costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The appellant, who bought property from the respondent 's husband, covenanted that in case of non payment of the consideration, the amount due would be a charge upon the property.
The respondent, on the death of her husband, filed a suit on the ground that the appellant defaulted to pay the full purchase money of the property.
The trial court held that no decree could be passed for enforcing the charge against the property as it was held in occupancy right by the appellant, but gave a personal decree against the appellant for a certain sum.
On the appellant 's appeal the High Court held that the respondent was entitled to enforce the charge on the property but negatived the respondent 's claim for a personal decree.
On appeal to this Court, it was contended (1) that the Court was not competent to pass a decree creating a charge on the property since it was held by the appellant as an occupancy tenant and (2) that as the respondent did not appeal from the decree of the trial court negativing her claim in the suit for a charge on the property, the High Court was wrong in granting a decree for enforcement of the charge.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: (1) The High Court was right in holding that the prohibition to pass a decree for sale or for closure of any right of an occupancy tenant in his holding was not in existence in 1952 when the suit was filed, because, section 12 of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, which contained the prohibition, had been repealed before the decree was passed.
[964 E F] (2)Even if the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree of the trial court, that was no bar to the High Court passing a decree in favour of the respondent for the enforcement of the charge.
Under Order XLI, r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court was competent to pass a decree for the enforcement of the charge in favour of the respondent notwithstanding the fact that the respondent did not file any appeal from the decree.
[964 G, 965 E] Radhika Mohan vs Sudhir Chandra, A.I.R. 1937 Calcutta 10 and Giani Ram & Others, vs Ramji Lal and Others, ; , referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 724 of 1975.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated the 12th September, 1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No. 626.
of 1974) A. Subba Rao for the appellant.
G. C. Sharma and S.P. Nayar for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
The appellant No. 1 is a registered firm and appellants 2 and 3 are the only two partners of that firm.
They are assessees under the Income tax Act.
Their assessments have been made for a number of years in Nellare District in the usual course.
On January 23, 1973, the Central Board) sent a notice to the appellants under section 127 of the Income tax Act, 1961 brietly the Act) proposing to transfer their case files "for facility of investigation" from the respective Income tax Officer at Nellore to the Income tax Officer, B Ward Special Circle Ii, Hyaderabad, By this notice they were also asked to submit in writing if they had any objection to the proposed transfer within 15 days of receipt of the notice.
The appellants made their representation objecting to the transfer and on July 26, 1973, the Central Board passed the impugned order transferring the cases from Nellore to Hyderabad.
There is no provison of appeal or revision under the Act against such orders of transfer.
The appellants, therefore, preferred an application under article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of 886 Andhra Pradesh questioning the validity of the order chiefly on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as no reasons were given nor communicated in the said order.
The learned single Judge after having called for the relevant file found that certain reasons were recorded by the Central Board prior to the passing of the impugned order and held that mere failure to communicate the reasons to the appellants was not fatal to the order.
The writ petition was, therefore, dismissed.
The appellants ' Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court also met with the same fate.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
The short question that arises for consideration is whether failure to record the reasons in the order which was communicated to the appellants is violative of the principles of natural justice for which the order should be held to be invalid.
Section 5(7A) was the corresponding section in the Income tax Act, 1922 (briefly the old Act).
The section may be set out: "The Commissioner of Income tax may transfer any case from one Income tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any one Income tax Officer to another.
Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re issue of any notice already issued by the Income tax Officer from whom the case is transferred".
The successor section under the Income tax Act, 1961 is section 127 and the same may be set out: "Transfer of cases from one Income tax Officer to another: (1) The Commissioner may, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from one In come tax Officer subordinate to him to another also subordinate to him, and the Board may similarly transfer any case from one Income tax Officer to another.
Provided that nothing in this sub section shall be deemed to require any such opportunity to be given where the transfer is from one Income tax Officer to another whose offices are situated in the same city, locality or place.
(2) The transfer of a case under sub section (1) may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re issue of any notice already issue by the Income tax Officer from whom the case is transferred.
887 Explanation: In this section and in sections 121 and 125, the word 'case ' in relation to any person whose name is specified in any order or direction issued thereunder, means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on the date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after the date of such order or direction in respect of any year".
The section was amended by section 27 of Finance (No. , and section 127 since then stands as under: (1) "The Commissioner may, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, where ever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from any Income tax Officer or officers also subordinate to him and the Board may similarly transfer any case from any Income tax Officer or Income tax Officers to any other Income tax Officer or Income tax Officers.
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to require any such opportunity to be given where the transfer is from any Income tax Officer or Income tax Officers to any other Income tax Officer or Income tax Officers and the offices of all such Income tax Officers are situated in the same city, locality or place: Provided further that where any case has been transferred from any Income tax officer or Income tax Officers to two or more Income tax Officers, the Income taxers to whom the case is so transferred shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the case and shall perform such functions in relation to the said case as the Board or the Com missioner (or any Inspecting Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf) may, by general or special order in writing, specify for the distribution and allocation of the work to be performed".
(2) The transfer of a case under subsection (1) may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the reissue of any notice already issued by the Income tax Officer or Income tax Officers from whom the case is transferred.
Explanation: In this section and in sections 121, 123, 124 and 125, the word 'case ' in relation to any person whose name is specified in any order or direction issued thereunder means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on the date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this 888 Act which may be commenced, after the date of such order or direction in respect of any year.
" Unlike section 5(7A) section 127(1) requires reasons to be recorded prior to the passing of an order of transfer.
The impugned order does not state any reasons whatsoever for making the order of transfer.
It is submitted on behalf of the Revenue by Mr. Sharma that reasons were communicated to the assessees in the notice calling for objection against the proposed transfer.
It is, therefore, manifest that the reasons given in that show cause notice, namely, "facility of investigation" can be read as a part of the impugned order although there is no mention of any reasons therein as such.
We are unable to accede to this submission.
It appears section 5(7A) of the old Act came for consideration in Pannalal Binjraj and Another vs The Union of India and others and this Court observed at page 589 as follows: ". it would be prudent if the principles of natural justice are followed, where circumstances permit, before any order of transfer under section 5(7A) of the Act is made by the Commissioner of Income tax or the Central Board of Revenue, as the case may be, and notice is given to the party affected and he is afforded a reasonable opportunity of representing his views on the question and the reasons of the order are reduced however briefly to writing.
There is no presumption against the bona fide or the honesty of an assessee and normally the Income tax authorities would not be justified in refusing to an assessee a reasonable opportunity of representing his views when any order to the prejudice of the normal procedure laid down in Section 64(1) and (2) of the Act is sought to be made against him, be it a transfer from one Income tax Officer to another within their State or from an Income tax officer with in the State to an Income tax Officer without it, except of course where the very object of the transfer would be frustrated if notice was given to the party affected.
If the reasons for making the order reduced however briefly to writing it will also help the assessee in appreciating the circumstances which make it necessary or desirable for the Commissioner of Income tax or the Central Board of Revenue, as the case may be, to transfer his case under section 5(7A) of the Act and it will also help the Court in deter mining the bona fides of the order as passed if and when the same is challenged in Court as mala fide or discriminatory.
It is to be hoped that the Income tax authorities will observe the above procedure wherever feasible".
This judgment was rendered by this Court on December 21, 1956, and we find that in the 1961 Act section 127 replaced section 5(7A) 889 where the legislature has introduced, inter alia, the requirement of recording reasons in making the order of transfer.
It is manifest that once an order is passed transferring the case file of an assessee to another area the order has to be communicated.
Communication of the order is an absolutely essential requirement since the assessee is then immediately made are of the reasons which impelled the authorities to pass the order transfer.
It is apparent that if a case file is transferred from the usual place of residence or office where ordinarily assessments are made to a distant area, a great deal of inconvenience and even monetary loss is involved, That is the reason why before making an order of transfer the legislature has ordinarily imposed the requirement of a show cause notice and also recording of reasons.
The question then arises whether the reasons are at all required to be communicated to the assessee.
It is submitted, on behalf of the Revenue, that the very fact that reasons are recorded in the file, although these are not communicated to the assessee, fully meets the requirement section 127(1).
We are unable to accept this submission.
The reason for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known to the assessee is to enable an opportunity to the assessee to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution or even this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous condonations Whether such a writ or special leave application ultimately fails is not relevant for a decision of the question We are clearly of opinion that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) is a mandatory direction under the law and non communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee.
Mr. Sharma drew our attention to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Sunanda Rani Jain vs Union of India and others, where the learned single Judge has taken a contrary view.
For the reasons, which we have given above, we have to hold that the said decision is not correct.
The appellant drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Shri Pragdas Umar Vaishya vs
Union of India and Other where rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, providing for exercise of reversional power by the Central Government was noticed.
It was held that under rule 55 the Central Government in disposing of the revision application must record its reasons and communicate these reasons to the parties affected thereby.
It was further held that the reasons could not be gathered from the nothings in the files of the Central Government.
Recording of reasons and disclosure thereof is not a mere formality.
890 Mr. Sharma drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Kashiran Aggarwalalla vs Union of India and other.
It is submitted that this Court took the view that orders under section 127(1) are held in that decision to be purely administrative in nature" passed for consideration of convenience and no possible prejudice could be involved in the transfer.
It was also held therein that under the proviso to section 127(1) it was not necessary to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard and there was consequently no need to record reasons for the transfer.
This decision is not of any assistance to the Revenue in the present case since that was a transfer from one Income tax Officer to another Income tax Officer in the same city, or, as stated in the judgment itself, in the same locality" and the proviso to section 127(1), therefore, applied.
When law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated Mr. Sharma also drew our attention to a decision of this Court in S Narayanappa and Others vs Commissioner of Income tax, Bangalore where this Court was dealing with section 34 of the old Act.
It is clear that there is no requirement in any of the provisions of the Act or any section laying down as a condition for the initiation of the proceedings that the reasons which induced the Commissioner to accord sanction to proceed under section 34 must also be communicated to the assessee.
The Income tax Officer need not communicate to the assessee the reasons which led him to initiate the proceedings under section 34.
The case under section 34 is clearly distinguishable from that of a transfer order under section 127(1) of the Act.
When an order under section 34 is made the aggrieved assessee can agitate the matter in appeal against the assessment order, but an assessee against whom an order of transfer is made has no such remedy under the Act to question the order of transfer.
Besides, the aggrieved assessee on receipt of the notice under section 34 may even satisfy the Income tax Officer that there were no reasons for reopening the assessment.
Such an opportunity is not available to an assesse under section 127(1) of the Act.
The above decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.
We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that non communication of the reasons in the order passed under section 127(1) is a serious infirmity in the order for which the same is invalid.
The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
The appeal is allowed and the orders of transfer are quashed.
No costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellants were assessees under the Income Tax Act under the jurisdiction of the Income Tax officer, Nellore since a number of years on 23 1 1973, the Central Board of Direct Taxes sent a notice to the appellants under section 127(1) of the Income Tax Act proposing to transfer their case files for facility of investigations" from the respective Income.
Tax Officer Nellore to the Income Tax Officer 'B ' Ward, Special Circle.
II, Hyderabad and called for objections, if any, to the proposed transfer within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice.
Despite their representations objecting to the transfer, the Central Board ordered the transfer on 26 7 1973.
The validity of the order was questioned before the Andhra Pradesh High Court by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as neither the reasons were given.
nor communicated in the said order.
The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge holding that mere failure to communicate the reasons which were found by him to have been recorded in the files, to the appellants was not fatal.
The Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench failed.
Allowing the appeal by special leave and rejecting the contentions of the Revenue.
namely.
(a) that the reasons given in the notice under section 127(1) calling for objections, namely, "facility for investigations can be read a part of the impugn ed order.
(b) that recording of the reasons in the file, although not communicated to the assessee, fully meets the requirements of section 127(1) and (c) that the orders under section 127 (1) being "purely administrative in nature, it was not necessary to give the assessee, an opportunity to be heard and there was consequently no need to record reasons for the transfer, the Court ^ HELD:(1) Unlike section 5(7A) of the 1922 Act, section 127(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, requires reasons to be recorded prior to the passing of an order of transfer.
Once an order is passed transferring the case file of an assessee to another area, the order has to be communicated.
Communication of the order is an absolutely essential requirement since the assessee is then immediately made aware of the reasons which impelled the, authorities to pass the order of transfer.
The Legislature has imposed the requirements of show cause notice and also recording of reasons to avoid a great deal of inconvenience and the monetary loss if a case file is transferred from the usual place of residence or office where originally assessments are made to a distant place.
[888A, 889A B] (2) The reason for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known is to enable an opportunity to the assessee to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or even the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground it is mala fide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations, irrespective of the result of such a writ or special leave application.
[889C D] 885 (3) Recording of reasons and disclosure thereof is not a mere formality.
The requirement of recording reasons under section 127 (1) of the Income Tax Act is a mandatory direction under the law and non communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the files although not communicated to the assessee.
[889 E] Pannalal Binjraj and Another vs The Union of India and Others, , applied.
Sunanda Rani Jain vs Union of India and Others, , overruled.
Shri Pragdas Umar Vaishya vs Union of India and others, [1967] 12 Madhya Pradesh Journal 868, discussed.
(4) When law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interest of any person, who can challenges the order in Court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated.
[890 C] Kashiram Aggarwalla vs Union of India and others, , not applicable.
section Narayanappa and others vs Commissioner of Income tax, Bangalore, , distinguished.
(5) In the insant case, non communication of the reasons in the order passed under section 127(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is a serious infirmity in the order and it is invalid.
[890 G]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 914 of 1968.
(From the judgment and decree dated the 9th April, 1962, of the Allahabad High Court in first Appeal No. 283 of 1950).
Naunit Lal, K. G. Bhargava and Miss Lalita Kohli for the appellant.
G. section Pathak, D. P. Singh and M. G. Goswami for respondents nos.
1(a) to 1(f).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
This appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court raises an important question with regard to the construction of a will.
The respondent Gokul (whose heirs have been impleaded after his death) was the original plaintiff in a suit for declaration that he was the absolute owner under a will of the property in suit and for possession of certain of them.
He also claimed certain movable properties with which we are not concerned in this appeal.
The property in suit was originally in exclusive ownership and possession of Bhola Chaubey, the testator.
Bhola Chaubey, was governed by the Mitakshra School of Hindu Law.
He belonged to the class of priests and was an old man of 67 years at the time when he executed the will on September 21, 1916.
He had then a legally wedded wife, Smt, Jarian, approaching nearly her forty fifth year and they had no issue in wedlock.
The only person whom the testator appeared to have almost treated like a son was the respondent Gokul, doubly related to the testator, being his sister 's son and also his wife 's brother 's son.
Gokul had been with him since childhood and the testator got him married.
Gokul in return had been serving the testator to his satisfaction and was in enjoyment of his full confidence and affection till the testator 's death in 1918.
Gokul was then aged about 23 years.
It was directed in the will that Smt.
Jarian would get the obsequies and other religious rites of the testator performed by Gokul.
After the death of the testator Smt.
Jarian and Gokul continued to live in cordiality for nearly 18 years.
Feelings, however, got 927 estranged some time after that and there was even litigation, criminal and civil, between Smt.
Jarian and Gokul.
It appears Smt.
Jarian, who died in March, 1948, had executed a gift deed and a will in respect of certain properties in suit in favour of the appellant, Navneet Lal.
All this led to the institution of the present suit out of which this appeal has arisen.
The case of the appellant was that Bhola Chaubey had given an absolute estate under the will to his wife, Smt.
Jarian, and she was, therefore, entitled to deal with the property as she liked and hence the deed of gift and the will in favour of the appellant were perfectly valid.
According to the appellant the respondent had no right to file the suit basing upon the will executed by Bhola Chaubey.
According to the respondent the will conferred on Smt.
Jarian only a life estate during her life and after her death an absolute estate of the testator 's entire property on the respondent.
The Civil Judge, Mathura, decreed the respondent 's suit except with reference to the movable property mentioned in Schedule O to the plaint as well as in respect of certain muafi zamindari property in Schedule A to the plaint.
The appellant appealed to the High Court at Allahabad and when the matter came up for disposal by a Division Bench of that court, there was a difference of opinion between the Judges.
Srivastava, J. held that the testator had no intention of conferring a limited life estate only on his wife and that she acquired an absolute estate by virtue of the will.
On the other hand, B. Dayal, J. took a contrary view holding that Bhola Chaubey intended to give merely a life estate to Smt.
Jarian and to make Gokul full owner of the property after her death.
The appeal was then set down for hearing before a third Judge, (Dhawan, J.) who agreed with B. Dayal, J. resulting in dismissal of the appeal.
We are concerned in this appeal only with the construction of the will executed in the year 1916.
From the earlier decisions of this Court the following principles, inter alia, are well established: (1) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered; but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.
[Ram Gopal vs Nand Lal and others(1)].
(2) In construing the language of the will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator 's armchair [Venkata Narasimha vs Parthasarathy(2)] and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than merely the words used.
It must consider the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family 928 relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense. but all this is solely as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document.
[Venkata Narasimha 's case supra and Gnanambal Ammal vs T. Raju Ayyar and Others(1)].
(3) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory [Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh vs Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer(2)].
(4) The court must accept, if possible, such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of the expression inoperative.
The court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his will, such as the state of his property, of his family and the like.
Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator.
Further, where one of the two reasonable constructions would lead to intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which does not create any such hiatus.
[Paerey Lal vs Rameshwar Das(3)].
(5) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the will unless the law prevents effect being given to it, Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a Court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the will.
[Ramachandra Shenoy and Another vs Mrs. Hilda Brite and Other(4)] Bearing in mind the above principles we may now look at the will in question as a whole.
This will is written in the urdu language.
An official translation is placed on the record.
From the contents of the will we find the background and the exact position of relationship of the parties set out earlier.
Gokul was residing with Bhola Chaubey 929 and Smt.
Jarian.
It may bear repetition that Gokul was held in great love and affection by the testator who was keenly anxious for the welfare both of his wife and of Gokul.
There is yet another feature which is prominent in the will.
The testator was apprehensive of his only brother, Ram Raj and his nephew, Kishnu, who "might trouble his wife and Gokul after his death." From such of the aforesaid prefatory recitals as appear in the will, two objects stand out, namely, that he was deeply interested in the enjoyment of his property movable and immovable after his death by his wife and after her death by Gokul.
The second object was that he intended that his property should not fall into the hands of his brother and nephew who had been separate from him since long after some arbitration and even bore ill will against him and his wife.
After the above revelation of his mental attitude in the will there follows the following recitals: "So long as I, the executant, am alive, I myself shall remain the owner in possession (malik wa qabiz) of my entire movable and immovable property and of the income from Birt Jijmani.
After my death Mst.
Jarian, the wedded wife of me, the executant, shall be the owner (malik) of my entire estate, movable and immovable, and of the income from Birt Jijmani and shall have all the proprietary powers (aur usko jamiya akhtiyarat malikana hasil honge).
After the death of Mst.
Jarian, Gokul aforesaid shall be the owner of the entire estate left by me (malik kamil jaidad matruka meri ka hoga), and he shall have all the proprietary powers and the power of making transfer of all sorts (aur usko jamiya akhtiyarat malikana wa inteqalat har qism hasil honge).
If per chance, Mst.
Jarian dies in my life time, then Gokul aforesaid will be the absolute owner (malik kamil) of the estate left by me (matrura meri) and he shall have power of making all sort of transfers (aur usko har quism ke akhtiyarat inteqalat hasil honge).
Gokul aforesaid should go to Jijmana and should continue to give to Mst.
Jarian during her life time the charitable gifts (daan dakshina) which he brings from there.
After her death he might continue to be benefited thereby.
Jarian should get my obsequies, Barsi (annual death ceremony), Chhamchhi etc.
performed through Gokul aforesaid according to the custom prevalent in the brotherhood.
It will be the duty of Gokul aforesaid to obey and serve my wife Mst.
Jarian.
It will be necessary for Mst.
Jarian to keep my heir (waris) Gokul aforesaid and to act in consultation with him.
At present I have the following immovable properties and the Birt Jijmani.
If in addition to these I purchase or get any property the aforesaid persons shall be the owners of that also according to.
the aforesaid conditions".
Mr. Naunit Lal, on behalf of the appellant, submits that since the testator stated in the will that after his death Smt.
Jarian "shall be the 930 owner (malik) of my entire estate. and shall have all the proprietary powers (aur usko jamiya akhtiyarat malikana hasil honge)", it is absolutely clear that he intended to confer upon his wife an absolute estate to his entire property.
Mr. G. section Pathak, on behalf of the respondents, contests the proposition.
In support of his contention, Mr. Naunit Lal draws our attention to several decisions wherein the word `malik ' has been noticed and explained.
The term `malik ' when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full proprietary rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietary rights were not intended to be conferred, but the meaning of every word in an Indian will must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed, the subject to which it is related, and the locality of the testator from which it may receive its true shade of meaning.
[Sasiman Chowdhurain and others vs Shib Narayan Chowdhury and others (1) ].
We find observations to the same effect in Musammat surajmani and others vs Rabi Nath ojha and another(2).
It is, approved therein that in order to cut down the full proprietary rights that the word malik imports something must be found in the context to qualify it.
Similarly counsel has referred to the expression `malik mustakil ' which was noticed in a decision of this Court in Krishna Biharilal vs Gulabchand and Ors.(3), and this Court observed at page 31 as follows: "The meaning of the expression `malik mustakil ' an urdu word, has come for consideration before this Court in some cases.
In Dhyan Singh and anr.
vs Jugal Kishore & Anr.(4), this Court ruled that the words `malik mustakil ' were strong, clear and unambiguous and if those words are not qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the same document, the courts must hold that the estate given is an absolute one We are, however, not required to consider the words `malik mustakil ' in this case.
But it is clear that even those words can be qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the same document.
It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the intention of the testator will have to be gathered from all the relevant and material contents in the entire will made in the situation in which the testator was placed in life in the back ground of his property, his inclinations, wishes, desires and attitudes as can be clearly and unambiguously found either from the recitals from the instrument or from absolutely undoubted contemporaneous legally admissible evidence.
931 Reading the present will as a whole and if every disposition has to be rationally harmonised, we find that the testator intended a life estate for his wife so long as she lived.
This is consistent with his description of Gokul as "my heir (waris)" after his death.
It is further consistent with the recital that "if per chance, Mst.
Jarian dies in my life time, then Gokul aforesaid will be the absolute owner (malik kamil) of the estate left by me (matruka meri) and he shall have power of making all sorts of transfers (aur usko har quism ke akhtiyarat inteqalat hasil honge)".
In obvious contrast even though Smt.
Jarian was made the malik of his entire estate after his death "having all the proprietary rights" nothing is stated about her "power of making all sorts of transfers" which power is expressly mentioned as belonging to him and also exclusively conferred upon Gokul after Smt.
Jarian 's death.
While describing his own "proprietary powers" the testator made reference to his "power of making transfers of all sorts".
This power of making transfer which was prominent in the mind of the testator at the time of execution of the will is conspicuous by total omission in relation to Smt.
Jarian 's enjoyment of the property.
We have to give due importance to the lexicon in the will and we find that the testator has made a definite distinction between mere ownership of property and ownership of the same coupled with powers of transfer "in every way".
Ordinarily, however, without such clear evidence from the recitals in the will itself it may not be possible to hold that ownership of property, which is devised, without any thing more, would not connote absolute ownership of the same with the power of alienation.
There is another significant feature in the recitals, when reference is made in the will to acquisition of future property.
Says the testator "if in addition to these I purchase or get any property the aforesaid persons shall be the owners of that also according to the aforesaid conditions".
The testator thus unerringly conceives of any future property being owned by both, by the widow during her life time and by Gokul after her death in the same manner as the property that had already been bequeathed.
The expression "according to the aforesaid conditions" is, therefore, very significant in the context.
We also find that during her life time Gokul would be collecting "daan dakshina" of the jijmani to Smt.
Jarian and after her death Gokul would enjoy the same.
There is no contemplation of any possibility to deprive Gokul of the enjoyment of the property in any event.
All the above features run counter to the theory of an absolute estate in favour of Smt.
Jarian.
There is still another clinching factor.
It is clear from the will that the testator had misunderstanding and quarrels with his brother regarding ancestral property and the matter had to be settled by arbitration leading to partition and separate enjoyment of property as far back as 1889.
It also appears from the recitals in the will that he had grave apprehension that after his death his only reversioners, his brother and nephew, "might trouble and harass my wife Mst.
Jarian and my sister 's son Gokul.
" One thing was, therefore, clear that the testator never intended that his property should pass to his brother and nephew.
This intention of the testator would 932 best be achieved by holding that there was a devise of a life estate to his wife and an absolute estate thereafter to Gokul indicating a different line of inheritance in the will.
On the other hand, if any absolute estate would have been conferred on the widow, then on her death the property would have passed on by inheritance to her husband 's heirs who were none else than the brother and the nephew of the testator.
There was no other heir of Mst.
Jarian to inherit the property after her death.
A Plenitude of absolute estate in favour of the wife will make the absolute bequest to Gokul void in law.
No such repugnant interpretation detrimental to the interest of Gokul can be made in the light of the entire tenor of the instrument.
Having regard to the context and the circumstances apparent from the will, we are clearly of opinion that the testator intended to bequeath in favour of his widow only a life estate and after her death an absolute estate to Gokul.
That being the position the will by Smt.
Jarian in favour of the appellant fails and her gift in favour of the appellant also similarly fails on her death.
The respondent 's suit is rightly decreed by the courts below.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
We will, however, make no order as to costs.
S.B. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
One 'BC ', governed by the Mitakshra School of Hindu Law, being issueless and apprehending the claim to his property after his death as reversioners by his only brother 'RR ' and his nephew 'K ' who were inimical to him since the partition of their ancestral property in 1899, and possible harassment of his wife and 'G ', the respondent, executed a Will on September 21, 1916, in the Urdu script.
The respondent 'G ' being the son of the testator 's sister married to testator 's wife 's brother was doubly related.
As per the Will, 'G ' was to perform the obsequies and other annual death ceremonies etc.
, being his 'waris ' and the "Malik Kamil ' absolute owner" having all the proprietary powers and the power of making transfers of all sorts", while his wife was to be in possession and enjoyment of the property during her life time.
From the date of death of the testator in 1918 for about 18 years the widow and 'G ' lived in cordiality but got estranged later due to estrangement of feelings resulting in several civil and criminal litigation between them.
The widow died in 1948 executing a gift deed and a Will in respect of certain properties in favour of the appellant 'NL '. 'G ' filed a civil suit claiming his rights under the Will dated 21 September, 1916, and the appellant defendant contested it on pleas that the widow of 'BC ' having an absolute right over the property under the said Will validly made the gift deed and the Will of 1948 in his favour and that the respondent plaintiff had no locus standi to file the suit.
The suit was decreed.
On appeal to the Allahabad High Court, as there was a difference of opinion between the Judges of the Division Bench on the nature of the widow 's estate, one opining as the Will conferring a "limited estate" and the other opining as conferring an "absolute estate" the appeal was set down to a third Judge who agreed with the view that the Will conferred only a "limited estate" upon the widow and dismissed the appeal.
Confirming the decree of the courts below and dismissing the appeal by certificate, the Court, ^ HELD : (1) The following are the established principles for construing the language of the Will.
(a) In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words used; the surrounding circumstances being considered to find out the intended meaning of such words employed therein.
[927F G] (b) In construing the language of the Will the court is entitled to put itself into the testator 's armchair and is bound to bear in mind also other matters than merely the words used like the surrounding circumstances, the position of the testator, his family relationship, the probability that he would use words in a particular sense all as an aid to arriving at a right construction of the Will, and to ascertain the meaning of its language when used by that particular testator in that document.
[927G H, 928A] (c) The true intention of the testator has to be gathered not by attaching importance to isolated expressions but by reading the Will as a whole with all its provisions and ignoring none of them as redundant or contradictory.
[928B] (d) The court must accept, if possible, such construction as would give to every expression some effect rather than that which would render any of 925 the expression inoperative.
The court will look at the circumstances under which the testator makes his Will, such as the state of his property, of his family and the like.
Where apparently conflicting dispositions can be reconciled by giving full effect to every word used in a document, such a construction should be accepted instead of a construction which would have the effect of cutting down the clear meaning of the words used by the testator.
Further, where one of the two reasonable constructions would lead to intestacy, that should be discarded in favour of a construction which does not create and such hiatus.
[928C E] (e) It is one of the cardinal principles of construction of Wills that to the extent that it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the Will unless the law prevents effect being given to it.
Of course, if there are two repugnant provisions conferring successive interests, if the first interest created is valid the subsequent interest cannot take effect but a court of construction will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the Will.
[928E G] Ram Gopal vs Nand Lal and others ; Venkata Narasimha vs Parthasarathy, 42 Indian Appeals 51/72; Gnanambal Ammal vs T. Raju Ayyar and others, ; Raj Bajrang Bahadur Singh vs Thakurain Bakhtraj Kuer, ; Pearey Lal vs Rameshwar Das [1963] Supp.
SCR 834/839/842 and Ramachandra Shenoy and Anr.
vs Mrs. Hilda Brite and others. , applied.
(ii) The term "malik" when used in a Will or other document as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full proprietary rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietary rights were not intended to be conferred, but the meaning of every word in an Indian Will must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed, the subject to which it is related and the locality of the testator from which it may receive its true shade of meaning.
The intention of the testator will have to be gathered from all the relevant and material contents in the entire Will made in situation in which the testator was placed in life in the background of his property, his inclinations, wishes, desires and attitudes as can be clearly and unambiguously found either from the recitals from the instrument or from absolutely undoubted contemporaneous legally admissible evidence.
Hence, even the words "malik muakkil" can be qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the document.
[930 B C & G H] Sasiman Chowdhurain and others vs Shib Narayan Chowdhury and others, 49 Indian Appeals 25/35; Musammat Surajmani and others vs Rabi Nath Ojha and another, 35 Indian Appeals 17; Krishna Biharilal vs Gulabchand and others, (1971) Supp.
SCR 27 and Dhyan Singh and anr.
vs Jugal Kishore and anr.
, [1952] SCR 478, discussed.
(iii) In the instant case, the testator intended a life estate for his wife so long as she lived as is clear from the reading of the present Will as a whole.
This is consistent with his description of Gokul as "my heir (waris)" after his death.
It is further consistent with the recital that "if per chance, Mrs. Jarian dies in my life time, then Gokul, aforesaid will be the absolute owner (malik kamil) of the estate left by me (matruka meri) and he shall have power of making all sorts of transfers (aurusko har qism ke aktiyarat inteqalat hasil honge)".
In obvious contrast even though Smt.
Jarian was made the malik of his entire estate after his death "having all the proprietary rights" nothing is stated about her "power of making all sorts of transfers" which power is expressly mentioned as belonging to him and also exclusively conferred upon Gokul after Smt.
Jarian 's death.
While describing his own "proprietary powers" the testator made reference to his "power of making transfers of all sorts".
This power of making transfers which was prominent in the mind of the testator at the time of execution of the Will is conspicuous by total omission in relation to Smt.
Jarian 's enjoyment of the property.
The testator has made the distinction between mere ownership of property and ownership of the same coupled with a transfer in every way.
[931 A D] 926 Further, from the recitals in the Will about his only reversioners viz., his brother and nephew "might trouble and harass my wife Mst.
Jarian and my sister 's son Gokul", it is clear that the testator never intended that his property should pass to his brother and nephew.
This intention would be achieved by holding that there was a devise of a life estate to his wife and an absolute estate thereafter to Gokul indicating a different line of inheritance in the Will on the other hand, if any absolute estate would have been conferred on the widow, then on her death the property would have passed on by inheritance to her husband 's heirs who were none else than the brother and the nephew of the testator.
There was no other heir of Mst.
Jarian to inherit the property after her death.
[931 G H, 932 A B] A plenitude of absolute estate in favour of the wife will make the absolute bequest to Gokul void in law.
No such repugnant interpretation detrimental to the interest of Gokul can be made in the light of the entire tenor of the instrument.
The testator intended to bequeath in favour of his widow only a life estate and after her death an absolute estate to Gokul.
[932B C]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 1971 Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 10th March 1971 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 1969.
D. Mookerjee and R. L. Kohli for the appellant.
H. section Marwah and R. N. Sachthey for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana affirming the conviction of the appellant under section 165A, Indian Penal Code.
The facts briefly are that the appellant, Bhagwan Singh, is a C.I.D. police constable and would be naturally familiar with Head Constable, Jagat Singh (P.W. 1).
Jagat Singh had detected a case under section 411, I.P.C., on April 25, 1968.
In that case one 922 Rameshwar Dass of Ambala City was arrested by Jagat Singh at Murthal Bus Stand after searching his person and recovering from him 20 gold coins and 47 gold bangles weighing 101 tolas.
Rameshwar Dass was produced in court on April 27, 1968 and was remanded to judicial custody till April 29.
In order to help Rameshwar Dass, Om Parkash and Sulekh Chand, who were co accused with the appellant (since acquitted) apparently took the help of the appellant to approach Jagat Singh to save Rameshwar Dass from the criminal case.
The appellant suggested to Jagat Singh to substitute the seized gold coins by 20 other gold coins which he would be supplied with and if he would do that he would be paid Rs. 1000/ for this help in the criminal case.
When this was proposed to Jagat Singh, the other two accused were with him.
At first Jagat Singh refused to accede to this unusual request but later on asked him to see him at Dogra Hotel the same day at 5.30 P.M.
While Jagat Singh gave that hope to the appellant and the two co accused, the former also immediately approached the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gurbhaksh Singh (P.W. 6) and informed him about this matter.
The D.S.P. recorded his statement which is marked as Ext.
The D.S.P. sent for the Station House Officer of the Police Station, Sonepat, and directed him to go to the Dogra Hotel and arrange for the detection of the crime.
Jagat Singh was also directed to go to the Hotel and meet the appellant and others as previously suggested by him.
The D.S.P. along with the Sub Inspector, Ram Singh (P.W. 4), waited in a shop near the Dogra Hotel and after the appellant had passed the money to Jagat Singh a signal, as arranged, was given on which the raiding party rushed to the Hotel and found Jagat Singh and the appellant sitting on a table facing each other.
At that time currency notes of the value of Rs. 1000/ were in the hands of Jagat Singh and these were taken possession of by the police and on search of the appellant 20 gold coins having hook marks were recovered from his pocket.
The above story of the prosecution was sought to be established by the evidence of P.W. 1, Jagat Singh, P.W. 2, Ajit Singh, P.W. 4, Ram Singh, S.H.O., and P.W. 6, D.S.P., Gurbhaksh Singh.
One of the witnesses of the raiding party was given up as being won over by the appellant.
Nathuram (P.W. 3), proprietor of the Hotel, also did not fully support the prosecution case and was declared hostile by the prosecutor.
The Special Judge, Rohtak, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and acquitted the other two co accused, as stated earlier.
The High Court on appeal maintained the conviction and sentence.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and are unable to find any infirmity in the conviction.
It is clear that the two co accused being interested in Rameshwar Dass took the help of the appellant to influence Jagat Singh for substitution of the stolen exhibits 923 in order that the case under section 411 IPC against Rameshwar Dass would absolutely fail.
Jagat Singh was definitely approached by the appellant in view of his belonging to the same force and he attempted to bribe Jagat Singh by paying Rs. 1000/ which must have been supplied by the two co accused interested in Rameshwar Dass to ruin the prosecution case.
Once the stolen gold coins were substituted, the identity would be lost and the accused would be entitled to acquittal and even the accused in that event might be able to claim the gold coins.
The appellant thus attempted to bribe Jagat Singh in order to show favour to Rameshwar Dass by accepting the bribe.
In this case the Public Prosecutor obtained permission from the court to cross examine P.W. Jagat Singh since he did not specifically refer to the two co accused in his examination in chief.
Mr. Debabrata Mukherjee, on behalf of the appellant, submits that since the prosecution case rests principally upon Jagat Singh 's testimony, the whole edifice is destroyed on that witness being declared hostile and the appellant is entitled to an acquittal.
We have carefully perused the evidence of Jagat Singh, who was examined in the trial after more than a year of detection of the case.
The prosecution could have even avoided requesting for permission to cross examine the witness under section 154 of the Evidence Act.
But the fact that the court gave permission to the Prosecutor to cross examine his own witness, thus characterising him as, what is described as a hostile witness, does not completely efface his evidence.
The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence.
We are satisfied in this case that the evidence of Jagat Singh, but for whose prompt assistance the case would not have seen the light of day and whose statement had immediately been recorded by the D.S.P., is amply corroborated by other evidence mentioned above to inspire confidence in his testimony.
Apart from that the fact of recovery of the gold coins in the pocket of the appellant gave a seal of finality to the truth of the charge against the appellant.
If Jagat Singh had accepted the bribe he would have been guilty under section 161 I.P.C. There is, therefore, clear abetment by the appellant of the offence under section 161 I.P.C. and the ingredients of section 165A I.P.C. are established against him.
There is thus no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
"B" the appellant/Head Constable with a view to help the accused not only to get an acquittal but get back the seized coins approached "J" a constable who was in charge of an investigation of a case under section 411 I.P.C. to substitute the J seized gold coins with different markings offering a bribe of Rs. 1,000/ .
J reported the matter to the D.S.P. concerned and as per the directions, the raiding party arrested 'B ' and the other accused in a hotel and also recovered from him the gold coins of different markings.
The currency notes of Rs. 1,000/ in the hands of 'J ' offered by 'B ' were also recovered.
The Special Judge convicted 'B ' and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for one year which was maintained by the High Court.
On appeal by special leave, the appellant contended that since the prosecution case rested principally on the testimony of 'J ', the whole edifice is destroyed on that witness being declared 'hostile '.
Rejecting the contention and dismissing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD: The prosecution could have even avoided requesting for permission to cross examine the witness u/s 154 evidence Act.
But the fact that the court gave permission to the prosecutor to cross examine him as what is described as "hostile witness", does not completely efface his evidence.
The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to have a conviction upon his testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence.
[923D E]