judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1188 of 1976.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated 27 2 1976 of the Industrial Tribunal, Maharashtra in Complaints (I.T.) Nos.
48 53 and 55 63 of 1973 in Ref.
(I.T.) No. 375 of 1972 published in the Maharashtra Govt.
Gazette L dated 3 6 1976.
M. K. Ramamurthi and Naunit Lal for the Appellant.
Sachin Chaudhuri and B. R. Aggarwala for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the common award dated February 27, 1976 of the Industrial Tribunal, 615 Maharashtra, Bombay rejecting as not maintainable complaints Nos.
48 of 1973 to 63 of 1973 made by the appellants against the respondent (hereinafter referred to for brevity as 'the Company) under section 33(A) of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ') in reference (IT) No. 336 of 1972.
The facts material for the purpose of this appeal are: The appellants (hereinafter described as 'Workmen ') were employees of the Company.
During the pendency of the above mentioned reference No. 336 of 1972 before the Second Labour Court, Bombay for adjudication of a dispute, 344 workmen of the Company including the appellants went on an indefinite peaceful strike with effect from August 30, 1972, pursuant to the strike notice given to the Company by their registered union called 'The Association of Chemical Workers ' in support of its demand for re instatement of three of the union leaders who had been dismissed by the Company.
On the even date i.e. August 30, 1972, the Company put up a notice stating that the strike embarked upon by the workmen was illegal and those participating in the said strike were liable to disciplinary action for misconduct as per Company 's certified standing orders Nos.
22(b) and 24(a).
On September 7, 1972, the Company issued notices to the appellants and 10 others asking them to report for duty on or before September 18, 1972, failing which their absence would be construed as voluntary abandonment of service and their names would be struck off from the muster rolls of the Company.
On September 19, 1972, the Company sent separate communications to the appellants and 10 others informing them that since "by not reporting for duty they had confirmed its presumption that they were no longer interested to continue in service of the Company and had totally abandoned the Company 's service" their names had been struck off from the rolls of the Company from that date.
Along with its communication, the Company sent a cheque to each one of the appellants for the amount due to him on account of gratuity, leave salary and one month 's salary.
On September 26, 1972, the appellants wrote to the Company returning the cheques sent by the Company and stating that its letter dated September 7, 1972 which had reached them only on September 20, 1972 had already been replied by letter dated September 21, 1972, that they were interested in the service of the Company and had neither voluntarily abandoned the service of the Company and did they wish to do so, and that they would, report for work the moment the strike was called off 616 by their union.
On October 23, 1972 the Company wrote to the appellants acknowledging their letter dated September 26, 1972 but stating therein that it did not wish to revise its earlier decision under which their names had been struck off the rolls.
It is to be noted that in its letter the Company did not refute the averment made by the appellants in their letter dated September 26, 1972 that the Company 's letter dated September 7, 1972 had reached them only on September 20, 1972.
On the even date i.e., September 26, 1972, the appellants ' union wrote to the Labour Commissioner complaining about the arbitrary termination of service of 25 workmen (including the appellants) and emphasising that they had not abandoned service.
On October 2, 1972, the appellants and other striking workmen addressed letters to the Works Manager of the Company protesting against the action of the Company in removing them from service and asserting that the said action was by way of victimization for their participation in the strike.
On March 30, 1973, the union made a formal demand calling upon the Company to re instate the appellants and others who had been removed from service on the ground that they had abandoned their service.
On May 19, 1973, certain proposals for settlements were made on behalf of the employees whose services were terminated by the Company and requesting the Company for re instatement of the appellants and 10 other workmen.
On July 5, 1973, the union wrote a letter to the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Naupada, soliciting his intervention in the dispute concerning the re instatement of the 16 employees including the appellants.
The Assistant Commissioner thereupon summoned the parties for discussion on July 19, 1973 but his attempts at conciliation did not bear any fruit.
Thereafter, the appellants made the aforesaid complaints before the Industrial Tribunal with the result as stated above.
Appearing in support of the appeal Mr. Ramamurti has vehemently urged that the action of the Company in removing the names of the appellants from its rolls was illegal and arbitrary, that the appellants had not abandoned the Company 's service, that at any rate the termination of their services could only be in terms of the Company 's standing orders and since the standing orders did not provide for treating the workmen as having abandoned service in case they were absent in connection with the notified strike, the Company 's action was manifestly illegal and invalid.
Three questions arise for consideration in this case, namely: (1) what is the true meaning of the expression 'abandonment of service '; 617 (2) whether in the circumstances of the case it could be said that the appellants had voluntarily abandoned the service of the Company; and (3) whether the action of the Company in removing the names of the appellants from its rolls on the presumption that they had abandoned service would constitute a change in the conditions of service of the appellants ? We will deal with these questions seriatim: Re.
Question No. 1: In the Act, we do not find any definition of the expression 'abandonment of service '.
In the absence of any clue as to the meaning of the said expression, we have to depend on meaning assigned to it in the dictionary of English language.
In the unabridged edition of the Random House Dictionary, the word 'abandon ' has been explained as meaning 'to leave completely and finally; for sake utterly; to relinquish, renounce; to give up all concern in something '.
According to the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1959 edition) 'abandonment ' means 'relinquishment of an interest or claim '.
According to Blacks Law Dictionary 'abandonment ' when used in relation to an office means 'voluntary relinquishment.
It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.
The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention, on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office.
The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question of fact.
Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute an abandonment of office '.
From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same.
In Buckingham Co. vs Venkatiah & Ors.
it was observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service.
Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evi 618 dence in that behalf.
Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case.
Question No. 2: This takes us to the consideration of the second question, namely, whether in the circumstances of the instant case, it could be said that the appellants had voluntarily abandoned the service of the Company.
It may be recalled that the appellants had along with 229 other workmen gone on indefinite and peaceful strike which ended on October 22, 1972) in response to the strike notice given by the union to the Company to press its demand for re instatement of its three dismissed leaders and had not only by their letters dated September 21, 1972 and September 26, 1972 unequivocally intimated to the Company that they did not intend to abandon the service but had also returned the cheques sent to them by the Company on account of their leave salary gratuity etc.
The appellants stand that the letter of the Company dated September 7, 1972 was received by them on September 20, 1972 and not earlier was never denied or refuted by the Company in the correspondence that passed between the parties.
Thus, there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances or the conduct of the appellants indicating or suggesting an intention on their part to abandon service which in view of the ratio of Gopal Chandra Misra 's case, can be legitimately said to mean to detach, unfasten, undo or untie the binding knot or link which holds one to the office and the obligations and privileges that go with it Their absence from duty was purely temporary and could by no stretch of imagination be construed as voluntary abandonment by them of the Company 's service.
In Express Newspaper (P) Limited vs Michael Mark & Anr.,(2) which is on all fours with the present case, it was held that if the employees absent themselves from the work because of strike in enforcement of their demands, there can be no question of abandonment of employment by them.
In the present case also the appellant 's absence from duty was because of their peaceful strike to enforce their demand.
Accordingly, we are of the view that there was no abandonment of service on the part of the appellants.
Re Question No. 3: Let us now advert to the last but the most crucial question, namely, whether the action of the Company in removing the names of the appellants from its rolls during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court in respect of the industrial dispute on the presumption that they had abandoned Company 's service 619 constituted an alteration in the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the said proceedings which prejudiciously affected them.
Although the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has taken us through the certified standing orders as applicable to the appellants, he has not been able to point out anything therein to indicate that the company could terminate the services of the appellants on the ground of abandonment of service because of their going on strike in enforcement of their demands.
Thus, their being no provision in the certified standing orders by virtue of which the Company would have terminated the services of the appellants in the aforesaid circumstance, the impugned action on the part of the Company clearly amounted to a change in the condition of service of the appellants during the admitted pendency of the industrial dispute before the Labour Court which adversely affected them and could not be countenanced.
We are fortified in this view by the aforesaid decision of this Court in Express Newspapers (P) Limited vs Michael Mark & Anr.
(Supra) where repelling an identical contention to the effect that the failure of the workmen to return to work by a notified date clearly implied abandonment of their employment, it was held that the management cannot by imposing a new term of employment unilaterally convert the absence of work into abandonment of employment.
It was further held in that decision that if the strike was in fact illegal, the management could take disciplinary action against the employees under the standing orders and dismiss them.
If that were done, the strikers would not have been entitled to any compensation under standing orders but that was not what the appellants purported to do and the respondents were, therefore, entitled to relief.
For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to uphold the impugned action of the Company and the award under appeal which are manifestly illegal.
In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the aforesaid award of the Industrial Tribunal and direct the Company to reinstate the appellants.
The appellants shall also be entitled to the costs of the appeal.
A point which requires to be clarified and has been brought to the notice of the Court after the judgment was delivered relates to back wages from 19 9 72 to the date of reinstatement.
The rule in such cases is that where reinstatement has been directed by the Court, the entire back wages must follow as a matter of course.
Of course there is a discretion in the court having regard to special circumstances if any to modify this normal rule.
In the present case the period stretches over six years and Shri Sachine Chaudhary brings to our notice the fact that 620 back wages have to be computed, if ordered in full, on a much higher scale because of two settlements which have raised the scales of wages substantially.
While there is no case specifically put forward that the workmen concerned have been employed elsewhere during this period, still we take a total view the whole case and direct that for the entire period from 1972 to the date of reinstatement, 75 per cent of the wages will be paid to all the workmen concerned on the scales and revised scales as the case may be.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
In support of their demand for reinstatement of certain dismissed union leaders a number of workmen, including the appellants had gone on an indefinite peaceful strike.
The Company (respondent) put up a notice that the strike was illegal and that the striking workmen were liable to disciplinary action for misconduct.
A week later, the company issued individual notices to the appellants and other workmen calling upon them to report for duty, failing which their absence would be construed as voluntary abandonment of service and that their names would be struck off the muster rolls.
A few days later the company informed the workmen concerned that by not reporting for duty they had confirmed its presumption that they were no longer interested to continue in its service that they had totally abandoned its service.
The names of the appellants had been struck off the rolls.
In final settlement of the workers ' claims for gratuity, leave salary and a month 's salary a cheque was sent to each of the appellants.
But the appellants returned the cheques to the company pointing out that they were interested in the service of the company and that they had neither voluntarily abandoned the service nor did they wish to do so and that they would report for work as soon as the strike was called off.
Thereafter, although there were prolonged negotiations between the union and the company, the company did not take them into its service.
Since a dispute was pending before an Industrial Tribunal application was made under section 33A of the .
The Tribunal rejected the workers ' demand for reinstatement.
In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants, that (i) removing their names from the rolls was illegal and arbitrary; (ii) the appellants had not voluntarily abandoned the company 's service and (iii) since termination of service could only be in accordance with standing orders, and since the standing orders in this case did not provide for treating the workmen as having abandoned the service in case they were absent in connection with a strike, the company 's action in terminating the appellants ' services was illegal.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: The impugned action of the company and the award of the Tribunal were illegal.
[619 E] 1.
To constitute abandonment there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same.
Failure to perform duties pertaining to an office must be with actual or imputed intention on 614 the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office.
The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of a party and is a question of fact which could be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances in each case.
Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute abandonment of office.
[617 D F] Buckingham Co. vs Venkatiah & Ors., ; ; referred to.
The absence of workmen from duty was purely temporary and cannot be construed as their voluntary abandonment of the company 's service.
There was nothing in the surrounding circumstances or the conduct of the workmen indicating or suggesting an intention on their part to abandon service.
To abandon service means to detach, unfasten, undo or untie the binding knot or link which holds one to the office and obligations and privileges that go with it.
[618 C E] In the instant case the workmen went on a peaceful strike.
By their letters they unequivocally intimated to the company that they did not intend to abandon service.
They had returned the cheques sent to them by the company.
Union of India vs Gopal Chandra Misra ; referred to.
Since there was no provision in the certified standing orders, by virtue of which the company could have terminated the services of the workmen, the impugned action amounted to change in the conditions of service of the workmen during the pendency of the industrial dispute which adversely affected them.
[619 A] Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs Michael Mark & Anr., ; applied.
In cases where reinstatement had been directed by the Court it is the rule that the entire back wages must follow as a matter of course.
In the special circumstances of this case the workmen are entitled to wages at 75% for the entire period from the date of termination of their services to the date of reinstatement.


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1978.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 20th April, 1978 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 988 of 1978.
AND WRIT PETITION NO.
4327 OF 1978 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) Ram Jethmalani M. G. Kurnali and Vineet Kumar for the Appellant/Petitioner.
A. V. Rangam for the Respondent.
635 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji whose application for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus was rejected by the High Court of Madras, is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 1978.
He has also filed Writ Petition No. 4327 of 1978 for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution in which he has raised certain grounds which had not been raised before the Madras High Court.
The appeal and the Writ petition were heard together by us and are disposed of by this common order.
The impugned detention order was made on 19th December, 1974 by the Government of Tamil Nadu and the grounds for the order were contained in a memorandum dated 20th December, 1974 of the Government of Tamil Nadu.
The order of detention could not be executed immediately as the appellant petitioner was absconding and could not be apprehended despite a proclamation made pursuant to Section 7 of the .
The appellant petitioner, however, surrendered himself before the Commissioner of Police, Madras on 1st February, 1978.
First the order of detention and later the grounds of detention were served on the appellant petitioner.
There were two grounds of detention which were as follows: "(i) On 23 2 1972 an inland registered parcel bearing No. 325 emanating from one T. Chowdiah No. 2, Sanjeev appa Lane, Bangalore, and addressed to M/s. Raj Metal House, 77, Mint St. Madras was intercepted by Preventive Officers of the Madras Customs at the Madras General Post Office and it was found to contain Indian currency amounting to Rs.1,20,000/ and the currency was seized under the Customs Act.
Sukanraj, owner of M/s. Raj Metal House on being questioned admitted in a written statement dated 23 2 1972 that the currency was sent by one R. G. Bhandari 's man from Bangalore, to be received by him and handed over to one Bhoormal, a partner of R. G. Bhandari, residing with the latter.
He also stated that he knew well that R. G. Bhandari was dealing in smuggled gold at Ban galore; Sukanraj further stated that within the previous two months, 5 or 6 parcels were received by him and by his brother Motilal.
Motilal also gave an independent statement on the same day corroborating the facts mentioned by his brother that R. G. Bhandari was dealing in smuggled gold and that the currencies in post parcels were the sale proceeds of smuggled gold.
On enquiry at the Park Town 636 Post Office it was found that seven registered parcels had been delivered to M/s. Raj Metal Works between 18 1 1972 and 17 2 1972 and received either by Sukhanraj or Motilal.
At Bangalore, the premises at No. 2, Sanjeev appa Lane the address mentioned on post parcel, was searched on 23 2 1972.
T. Chowdiah, the sender of the said parcel was not there.
But one Ghaverchand Samarthajee was present.
He admitted in his statement dated 24 2 1972 that he was an employee of R. G. Bhandari and on the latter 's instructions he was disposing of smuggled gold in Bangalore on behalf of his master and despatching the sale proceeds to Madras.
The postal receipt bearing the No. 325 Avenue Road Post Office, Bangalore, in respect of the parcel which was seized at Madras was also seized.
This and his confessional statement revealed that he had previously despatched seven registered parcels to M/s. Raj Metal Works containing amounts to the tune of Rs.8,84,000/ using the name of T.Chowdiah and that he had disposed of 3900 bars of smuggled gold valued at Rs.80 lakhs within a short time of less than a month.
Bhawarlal, the servant of Bhoormal in Madras identified Ghaverchand Samarthajee as an employee of R. B. Bhandari used for gold smuggling business at Bangalore.
The case was adjudicated and the currency was confiscated.
personal penalty of Rs.5000/ was imposed on Thiru R. section Bhandari.
(ii) On 20 4 1974, 40 bars of gold weighing 23,274.100 grams valued at Rs.12,75,420/ was seized by Thiru Ramanathan Supdt.
Central Excise, Madras from a secret vacity of an Ambassador can MDE 9399 at the commercial Check Post, Hosur.
T. Ramamurthy of Porayar (driver) and Thiru Ganesan occupied the car.
Their statements revealed that the gold was sent by Sikku Govidaswami of Porayar, a noted transport agent for contraband goods.
Ganesan also admitted that the car with the contraband was to be handed over to one Marwari, at Bangalore at an appointed place.
The intelligence report dt.
17 4 74 and 19 4 74 by the Intelligence officer tc the .
Directorate of Revenue Intelligence which had been received earlier on the basis of which the aforesaid car was intercepted and the seizure was effected, had disclosed that the Marwari referred to was R. G. Bhandari 637 Shri Jethmalani learned Counsel for the detenu submitted that the order of detention which was made more than three years before its execution must be considered to have lapsed or ceased to be effective without a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and circumstances of the case and the necessity for preventive detention.
Otherwise, the learned Counsel submitted the order of preventive detention would change its character and be come an order of punishment for an unproven crime.
In regard to the first ground mentioned in the Memorandum of the Government, the learned Counsel submitted that all the four persons who had made statements on 23rd February, 1972 and 24th February, 1972, and which were the basis of the first ground, had resiled from their statements long before the order of detention was made.
The circumstance that all of them had resiled from their earlier statements was not brought to the notice of the detaining authority and the failure of the detaining authority to consider such vital material before arriving at its subjective satisfaction vitiated the ground and, therefore, the order of detention itself.
Shri Jethmalani urged that the order of detention had necessarily to be struck down even if a single ground out of many was bad since the order had been made at a time when Section 5A of the COFEPOSA had not yet been brought into the Statute Book.
In regard to the second ground of detention the submission of Shri Jethmalani was that it was not based upon any "rationally probative" material The ground was invalid inasmuch as it was based upon an intelligence report.
It was further contended that the ground would be innocuous without the aid of the intelligence report mentioned therein and since no privilege was claimed in respect of the intelligence report, the identity of the author of the report should have been disclosed as also the material on which the report was based.
Failure to do so had resulted in a denial of the petitioner 's fundamental right, under Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
Shri A. V. Rangam, learned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu urged that the appellant petitioner was himself responsible for the long delay in the execution of the order of detention and he could not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
With regard to the first ground of detention he submitted that the circumstance that the persons who had incriminated the detenu had resiled from their former statements had been mentioned in the judication order passed by the Customs authorities and that order had been placed before the detaining authority before the order of detention was made.
In regard to the second ground of detention the learned Counsel argued that it was not based merely on the intelligence 638 report and in any case, since no privilege was claimed, it was always open to the detenu to have asked for more particulars if he so desired, but which he failed to do.
It is true that the purpose of detention under the COFEPOSA is not punitive but preventive.
The purpose is to prevent organised smuggling activities and to conserve and augment Foreign Exchange.
It is true that the maximum period for which a person may be detained under the COFEPOSA is one year.
It is further true that there must be a 'live and proximate link ' between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities.
We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is 'snapped ' if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu.
In such a case we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances.
But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the 'link ' not snapped but strengthened.
That, precisely, is the state of affairs before us.
The order of detention was made on 19th December, 1974.
The detenu was found to be absconding.
Action was taken pursuant to Section 7 of the COFEPOSA and he was proclaimed as a person absconding under Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The proclamation was published in several leading English and local language daily newspapers.
His photograph was exhibited in Cinema halls A reward of Rs. 5.000/ was also announced for his apprehension.
Despite all this effort he could not be arrested until he surrendered on 1st February, 1978.
We do not have any hesitation in over ruling the submission of Shri Jethmalani based on the delay in the execution of the order of detention The second submission made on behalf of the detenu that the detaining authority had not before it the circumstance that the four persons who had made statements implicating the detenu had later, but long before the order of detention, resiled from their statements is also devoid of force.
The proposition that the failure to place before the detaining authority relevant and material facts which may influence the mind of such authority one way or the other will vitiate the order of detention is unexceptionable.
But a perusal of the first ground of detention shows that the detaining authority took into 639 consideration the circumstance that there were 'adjudication ' proceedings, that the currency was confiscated and that a penalty of Rs.5,000/ was imposed on the detenu.
It was not disputed and it was not alleged in the petition that the order of adjudication by which the currency was confiscated and penalty was imposed did refer to the circumstance that persons who had made incriminating statements against the detenu had resiled from those statements.
The circumstance that persons who had earlier incriminated the detenu had later resiled from those statements was therefore before the detaining authority.
There is thus no factual foundation for this submission of the learned Counsel, which we accordingly reject.
We now proceed to consider the last submission of the learned Counsel based on the reference to the contents of the intelligence report in the second ground of detention.
It was pointed out by the petitioner 's learned Counsel that the statement of Ramamurthy and Ganesan merely showed that the contraband was to be delivered to a Marwari at Bangalore at an appointed place.
It was the intelligence report alone that fixed the identity of the Marwari as the detenu.
Without the intelligence report it would be impossible to connect the detenu with the person mentioned as the Marwari in the statements of Ganesan and Ramamurthy.
Now the submission of the learned Counsel was that the identity of the author of the intelligence report as well as the report and the material on which the report was based ought to have been disclosed to the detenu if the detenu was to effectively exercise his fundamental right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and to make a representation against the order of detention We agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in order to make a representation against the order of detention and thus to exercise the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(5) of the Constitution, a detenu is entitled to be furnished with all essential particulars forming the basis of the grounds of detention.
so it is that where insufficient particulars are mentioned in the grounds, the detenu is entitled to call for better particulars.
That is a right which flows from the Constitutional right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to make representation.
Of course, where the grounds are vague.
no question would arise of the detenu asking for better particulars.
But the present case is not a case of a vague ground.
The ground is specific enough.
If the detenu wanted any more particulars such as the name of the intelligence officer or other information, he could have well asked for the particulars before making his representation.
That he never did.
It was not as if any privilege had been claimed by the Government in respect of the 640 intelligence reports.
In fact, we find that the intelligence reports were produced before the learned Judges of the High Court at the hearing of the Writ Petition there.
There was no complaint before us that the detenu or his Counsel wanted to peruse the reports and were denied the opportunity of doing so.
We do not think that the detenu could be said to have been denied a reasonable opportunity of making a representation merely because particulars which he neyer desired in respect of a ground which was not vague were not furnished to him.
We are unable to see any force in any of the submissions advanced on behalf of the detenu.
In the result, we reject the appeal and the writ petition.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
An order of detention under the was passed in December 1974 against the appellant.
But it could not be executed because the detenu was absconding and could not be apprehended 'despite a proclamation made under section 7 of the Act.
More than three years after the order was passed, the appellant surrendered in February, 1978.
His application for a writ of habeas corpus was rejected by the High Court.
In his appeal against the judgment of the High Court as well as in a petition under article 32 of the Constitution raising grounds not raised before the High Court, the appellant contended that ( I ) the detention order made more than three years before its execution must be considered to have lapsed without fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the facts and circumstances of the case, (2) all the four persons who had made statements against the detenu had resiled from their earlier statements long before the order of detention and the failure of the detaining authority to consider such vital material vitiated the order of detention.
and (3) the detention order was not based upon any "rationally probative" material, inasmuch as it was based upon an intelligence report, not disclosed to the detenu and that this had resulted in denial to the detenu of his fundamental right under article 22(5) of the Constitution Dismissing the appeal and writ petition, ^ HELD: 1.
It is well settled that the purpose of detention under the COFEPOSA is not punitive but preventive, that is to say, its purpose is to prevent organised smuggling activities and to conserve and augment Foreign Exchange, that the maximum period of detention under the Act is one year, and that there must be a 'live and proximate link ' between the grounds of detention and the avowed purpose of detention.
But in appropriate cases the Court can assume that the link is 'snapped ' if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the 634 detenu.
Where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the detenu 's recalcitrant or refractory conduct in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the 'link ' not snapped but strengthened.
[638 B D] In the instant case, the order was made in December, 1974.
He was absconding, a proclamation was published in several leading newspapers that he was a person absconding and a reward was of offered for his apprehension.
Despite all this he could not be arrested until he surrendered in February, 1978.
Therefore the submission pseud on delay had no force.
[638 E F] 2.
There is no force in the contention that material facts which might influence the mind of the authority one way or the other, were not placed before it and that this vitiated the order of detention.
The detaining authority took into consideration the circumstance that there were 'adjudication ' proceedings, that the currency which the appellant was carrying was confiscated and that a penalty of Rs.5,000/ was imposed on him.
The order of adjudication by which the currency was confiscated and penalty was imposed did refer to the circumstance that persons who had made incriminating statements against the detenu had resiled from those statements.[638 H 639B] 3.
It cannot be said that the detenu had been denied a reasonable opportunity of making a representation merely because particulars which he never desired in respect of a ground which was not vague were not furnished to him.
The ground was specific enough.
If the detenu wanted any more particulars such as the name of the intelligence officer or other information, he could have asked for them before making his representation.
That he never did.
It was not as if any privilege had been claimed by the Government in respect of the intelligence reports.
The intelligence reports were produce before the High Court at the hearing of the writ petition.
There was no complaint that the detenu wanted to peruse the reports but was denied the opportunity of doing so.
[649 B, 639 H 640 A]