judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 8613 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.1981 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 41 of 1981.
P.K.Goswamy and Kailash Vasudev for the Appellant.
V.C. Mahajan, Ashok Bhan and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondent.
This appeal was earlier heared by a Division Bench and was referred to a Constitution Bench for examining the question whether a candidate whose name appears in the merit list on the basis of a competitive examination, acquires indefeasible right of appointment as a Government servant if a vacancy exists.
Reference was made to the decision in State of Haryana vs Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, ; ; Miss Neelima Shangla, Ph.D.v.
State of Haryana and Others, ; and Jitendra Kumar and Others vs State of Punjab and Others.
[1985] 1SCR 899.
570 2.
The appellant was selected in the combined Civil Services Examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for appointment to several services including the Indian Police Service (in short `the IPS ') and the Police Services Group `B '.
The examination had been held in October, 1977 and the result was announced in May 1978.
A combined merit list for the IPS and the Police Services Group `B ' was announced which included the name of the appellant.
Out of the total number of 70 vacancies in the IPS announced to be filled up, 54 were of general category and the remaining 16 reserved for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates.
The position of the appellant in the merit list was not high enough to be included in the IPS and he was offered appointment to the Delhi Andaman and Nicobar police Service (hereinafter referred to as the `DANIP ')in Police Service Group `B ' which he accepted.
On account of several candidates, allotted to Police Services Group `B 'not Joining, the position of the appellant improved and ultimately he was on the top of the list.
In June, 1979, 14 Vacancies arose in the IPS due to selected candidates not joining the service.
Out of the same, 11 were in the general category and 3 in the reserved category.
Three vacancies in the reserved category were filled up by the candidates who had been earlier appointed in DANIP Service, but no appointments were made to general category vacancies.
The appellant, by a representation, prayed that these vacancies also should be filled up.
The request was turned down, and the appellant moved the Delhi High Court by a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution, which was dismissed in limine by the impugned order.
The case of the appellant is that since ultimately several vacancies in the general category of the IPS remained unfilled, he was entitled to be appointed in one of them, and the authorities were not right in rejecting his representation.
It has been contended that after calculating the number of vacancies in the IPS, it was announced that appointments would be made in 54 vacancies of general category, and steps for recruitment were accordingly taken.
The appellant along with others appeared at the elaborate test held for the purpose and he was found qualified for the appointment .In that situation the respondent could not refuse to fill up the vacancies and proceed to appoint the appellant in the Police Services Group `B '.
It has been argued that the correct procedure in similar situation was followed with respect to the reserved category and the three vacancies arising in identical situation were filled up from the candidates selected for DANIP Service, and 571 there was no justification to refuse similar benefit to the appellant in the general category.
According to the case of the Union of India, the process for the recruitment in question started in 1977, and the tentative service allocation for IPS was completed before the commencement of the foundational course in July, 1978.
All the candidates selected for IPS, excepting those who were eligible to appear at the examination for the Indian Administrative Service scheduled to be held in October November, 1978, and such other candidates who had not been finally cleared on account of pending medical examination or character verification had to attend the foundational course.
Candidates allocated to Police Services Group `B ' were not required to undergo this course.
By June, 1978, 7 more vacancies arose on account of candidates not joining IPS due to various reasons, and 7 persons in order of merit from the joint list of the IPS and the Police Services Group `B ' were allowed to fill up these vacancies.
The last one in this list of 7 candidates was Shekhar Singh at serial No. 94.
The appellant could not get a chance as his position was 100th.
This process of final service allocation was closed on 24.10.1978 or at the latest by 4.11.1978, in view of the process for recruitment for the year 1978, which had already started.
The additional vacancies arising later,therefore, remained unfilled.
The entire procedure which is followed for recruitment to the Services has been given in several affidavits of the respondent, and detailed information in this regard was supplemented by a further affidavit during the hearing of the hearing of the appeal filed in the light of observations of the Bench.
6.Dealing with the appointments to reserved category,it has been stated in the counter affidavit that the process which was followed in connection with the general category and which was being earlier followed for the reserved category also, was relaxed in pursuance of a policy decision taken after examining all relevant circumstances and materials in regard to this category including the strength of the reserve category in the IPS, the result of the examinations for the year 1975,1976 and 1977.
The procedure which was being followed in the past was not relaxed in regard to the general category on account of vital differences obtaining in the relevant conditions in the two categories and the appellant 's plea of alleged discrimination does not have any merit.
Similarly the case of one Km.
Vandana Srivastava cited by the appellant has also been distinguished and Mr. Goswami, therefore , did not pursue this plea any further in his final reply.
572 7.
It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied.
Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post.
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies.
However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner.
The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons.
And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted.
This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana vs Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, ; ; Miss Neelima Shangla vs State of Haryana and Others, ; and Jitendra Kumar and Others vs State of Punjab and Others, 8.
In State of Haryana vs Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, (supra) 15 vacancies of Subordinate Judges were advertised, and out of the selection list only 7, who had secured more than 55% marks, were appointed, although under the relevant rules the eligibility condition required only 45% marks.
Since the High Court had recommended earlier, to the Punjab Government that only the candidates securing 55% marks or more should be appointed as Subordinate Judges, the other candidates included in the select list were not appointed.
They filed a writ petition before the High Court claiming a right of being appointed on the ground that vacancies existed and they were qualified and were found suitable.
The writ application was allowed.
While reversing the decision of the High Court, it was observed by this Court that it was open to the Government to decide how MANY appointments should be made and although the High Court had appreciated the position correctly, it had ``somehow persuaded itself to spell out a right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies ' '.
It was expressly ruled that the existence of vacancies does not give a legal right to a selected candidate.
Similarly, the claim of some of the candidates selected for appointment, who were petitioners in Jitendra Kumar and Others vs State of Punjab and Others, was turned down holding that it was open to the Government to decide how many appointments would be made.
The plea of arbitrariness was rejected in view of the facts of the case and it was had that the candi 573 dates did not acquire any right merely by applying for selection or even after selection.
It is true that the claim of the petitioner in the case of Miss Neelima Shangla vs State of Haryana was allowed by this Court but, not on the ground that she had acquired any right by her selection and existence of vacancies.
The fact was that the matter had been referred to the Public Service Commission which sent to the Government only the names of 17 candidates belonging to the general category on the assumption that only 17 posts were to be filled up.
The Government accordingly made only 17 appointments and stated before the Court that they were unable to select and appoint more candidates as the Commission had not recommended any other candidate.
In this background it was observed that it is, of course, open to the Government not to fill up all the vacancies for a valid reason, but the selection cannot be arbitrarily restricted to a few candidates notwithstanding the number of vacancies and the availability of qualified candidates; and there must be a conscious application of mind by the Government and the High Court before the number of persons selected for appointment is restricted.
The fact that it was not for the Public Service Commission to take a decision in this regard was emphasised in this judgment.
None of these decisions, therefore, supports the appellant.
Mr. Goswami appearing in support of the appeal has contended that in view of the relevant statutory rules, the authorities were under a duty to continue with the process of filling up all the vacancies until none remained vacant.
Reference was made to r. 4 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, rr.
3,4,6 and 7 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 and rr., 2(1)(a), 2(1)(c), 8 and 13 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by competitive Examination) Regulations, 1965.
We do not think any of these rules comes to the aid of the appellant.
Rule 3 of the Cadre Rules directs constitution of separate cadres for States or group of States, and r. 4 empowers the Central Government to determine the strength in consultation with the State Governments.
The strength has to be re examined at intervals of 3 years.
Rule 3 of Recruitment Rules deals with the constitution of the Service, and r. 4 the method of recruitment.
Rules 6 and 7 give further details in this regard.
The learned counsel could not point out any provision indicating that all the notified vacancies have to be filled up.
Similar is the position with respect to the Competitive Examination Regulations.
Regulation 2(1)(a) defines available vacancies as vacancies determined by the Central Government to be filled on the results of the examination, described in Regulation 2(1)(a).
Regulation 8 prescribes that the candidates would be considered for appointment to the available 574 vacancies subject to provisions 9 to 12 and Regulation 13 clarifies the position that a candidate does not get any right to appointment by mere inclusion of his name in the list.
The final selection is subject to satisfactory report on the character, antecedent and suitability of the candidates.
We, therefore, reject that the claim that the appellant had acquired a right to be appointed against the vacancy arising later on the basis of any of the rules.
The main contention on behalf of the appellant has been, however, that the authorities in keeping the vacancies arising later unfilled, acted arbitrarily.
Mr. Goswami referred to several documents annexed to the special leave petition and affidavits filed on behalf of the parties and contended that although appointments of many candidates in the other services were made in the later vacancies, the vacancy in the Indian Police Service which subsequently became available to the appellant was refused without any just cause, resulting in illegal discrimination.
This was emphatically denied on behalf of the respondent.
Since the matter did not appear to be free from ambiguity on the basis of the affidavits before us, we decided to examine the factual aspects more thoroughly by examining the other available materials on the records of the Union of India, and accordingly the learned counsel for the respondent got the relevant departmental files called.
Two further affidavits were also filed along with photostat copies of a large number of documents, which we examined at some length with the aid of the learned advocates for both sides.
From the materials produced before us it is fully established that there has not been any arbitrariness whatsover on the part of the respondent in filling up the vacancies in question or the other vacancies referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant.
The process of final selection had to be closed at some stage as was actually done.
A decision in this regard was accordingly taken and the process for further allotment to any vacancy arising later was closed.
Mr. Goswami relied upon certain appointments actually made subsequent to this stage and urged that by those dates the further vacancies in the Indian Police Service had arisen to which the appellant and the other successful candidates should have been adjusted.
We do not find any merit in this contention.
It is not material if in pursuance of a decision already taken before closing the process of final selection, the formal appointments were concluded later.
What is relevant is to see as to when the process of final selection was closed.
Mere completing the formalities cannot be of any help to the appellant.
We do not consider it necessary to mention all the details in this connection available from the large number of documents which we closely examined during the hearing at considerable length and do not 575 have any hesitation in rejecting the argument of the learned counsel in this regard based on the factual aspect.
So far the decision to adopt a different policy with respect to filling up of the reserved vacancies is concerned the same is justified on account of the special circumstances mentioned in the respondent 's affidavits.
The decision to depart from the confirmed policy was taken after a consideration by the authorities of the position in regard to unavailability of qualified candidates from year to year adversely affecting the desired strength of the reserved candidates in the services and cannot be condemned on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination.
In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
On the basis of the results of the combined Civil Services Examination held by the Union Public Service Commission for appointment to several Services and the position in the combined merit list for the Indian Police Service and Police Services, Group `B ' the appellant was appointed to the Delhi Andaman and Nicobar Police Service,also Known as DANIP.
Subsequently when certain vacancies arose in the Indian Police Service, due to selected candidates not joining the Service, and only the reserved category vacancies were filled up by the candidates, who had been earlier appointed in DANIP Service, the appellant who came to occupy top position, represented to the authorities for filling the general vacancies also, but his request was turned down .Hence the appellant filed writ application before the High Court, which was dismissed in limine .
In the appeal before this Court, on behalf of the appellant it was contended that since ultimately several vacancies in the general category of the IPS remained unfilled, he was entitled to be appointed in one of them, that since 54 vacancies were notified for general category and he was found qualified for the appointment, the respondent could not refuse to fill up the vacancies, and there was no justification to refuse to follow the procedure adopted in similar situation with respect to the reserved category, in regard to the general category vacancies also and that in view of the relevant statutory rules, the authorities were under a duty to continue with the process of filling up the vacancies until nonremained vacant, and by keeping the posts unfilled, they had acted arbitrarily.
568 On behalf of the respondent Union of India it was contended that the tentative service allocation for IPS was completed before the commencement of the foundational course for the IPS, and the process of final service allocation was closed after filling up certain vacancies, which had arisen, since the process for recruitment for the next year had already started, and hence the additional vacancies arising later remained unfilled, that the process followed in connection with the reserved category, was not followed in regard to the general category vacancies on account of vital differences obtaining in the relevant conditions in the two categories, and hence there was no discrimination or arbitrariness, in keeping the general category vacancies unfilled.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD: 1.1 Even if vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates do not acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed.
Ordinarily, the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post.
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies.
However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner.
The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons.
And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted.
[572A C] State of Haryana vs Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others,[1974] 1 SCR 165; Miss Neelima Shangla vs State of Haryana and Others, ; and Jitendra Kumar and Others vs State of Punjab and others, , referred to.
1.2 The appellant had not acquired a right to be appointed against the vacancy arising later on the basis of any of the rules, namely, Rule 4 of the Indian Police Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, Rules 3,4,6 and 7 of the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1954 and Regulations 2(1)(a) and (c), 8 and 13 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Competitive Examination) Regulations, 1955.These Provisions do not indicate that all the notified vacancies are to be filled up.[573G,574B] 1.3 From the materials placed before the Court it is fully estab 569 lished that there has not been any arbitrariness whatsoever on the part of the respondent in filling up the vacancies in question or other vacancies.
The process of final selection had to be closed at some stage as was actually done.
A decision in this regard was accordingly taken and the process for further allotment to any vacancy arising later was closed.
It is not material if in pursuance of a decision already taken before closing the process of final selection, the formal appointments were concluded later.
What is relevant is to see as to when the process of final selection was closed.
Mere completing the formalities dose not give any right to appointment.
[574E G] 1.4 The decision to adopt a different policy with respect to filling up of the reserved vacancies is justified on account of the special circumstances.
The decision to depart from the confirmed policy was taken after consideration by the authorities of the position in regard to unavailability of qualified candidates from year to year adversely affecting the desired strength of the reserved candidates in the services and cannot be condemned on the grounds of arbitrariness and illegal discrimination.
[575B]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2123 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1988 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 1649 of 1988.
WITH WRIT PETITION NO.
1287 OF 1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Rajinder Sachhar, R.K. Agnihotri and S.C. Paul for the Appellant/Petitioner.
K.N. Bhat, Vineet Kumar, Lalit Bhasin and Ms. Nina Gupta for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi, the petitioner in SLP No. 4415 of 1989 has challenged his compulsory retirement and in Writ Petition No. 1287 of 1989 he has questioned the validity of the direction dated 21 July 1984 issued by the Finance Ministry, Government of India.
Since the questions raised in both the cases are inter looked, we grant special leave in the SLP and proceed to dispose of the same along with the writ petition.
The events leading to these cases may briefly be stated.
In 1982, the petitioner was a Manager of the Syndicate Bank (`the Bank ') at East Patel Nagar Branch at New Delhi.
He discounted a cheque of the sum of Rs. 50,000 drawn on Punjab National Bank, Madras, after obtaining, by phone prior approval of the Regional Divisional Manager of the Bank.
The cheque was sent for realisation to the Punjab National Bank at Madras, but it was returned unpaid.
The petitioner did not take prompt action to recover the amount from the person in whose favour he discounted the cheque.
He kept the cheque 580 with him even without reporting to the higher authorities.
In 1983, the Assistant General Manager of the Bank called upon him to explain why the amount due under the discounted cheque has not been recovered.
The petitioner in his reply explained the circumstances under which the cheque was discounted.
He has stated that the credit was given to the account of one Dr. N. Ramakrishnan who was a Senoir Scientist in Indian `Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi but the amount was withdrawn by another person called A. Chandrashekhar who is an officer of the Bank.
He has further stated that A. Chandrashekhar has promised to pay the amount and therefore, he has retained the instrument with him hoping that A. Chandrashekhar would keep up his promise.
On 6 July 1984 a sum of Rs.52,167.15 was deposited with the Bank.
A sum of Rs.36,000 towards principal sum and Rs.16,167.15 towards interest.
A suit was filed to recover a sum of Rs.14,000 out of the principal amount.
And later on, this principal amount was also recovered and credited to the Bank.
However, in 1985 there was a departmental inquiry against the petitioner.
The Commissioner for Vigilance Inquiry from the Central Vigilance Commission conducted the inquiry.
The first charge against the petitioner was that when he was functioning as Manager, he discounted under his discretionary jurisdiction a cheque for Rs.50,000 drawn in the name of Dr. N. Ramakrishnan in order to accommodate A. Chandrashekhar an officer of the Bank or others known to him.
The second charge framed against him, related to the retention of the discounted instrument with him from December, 1982 till January 1984 without taking/causing to be taken any action to realise the amount due under the unpaid cheque.
It was also alleged that the petitioner made available undue financial accommodation to A. Chandrashekhar or others to the detriment of the interests of the Bank.
He was charged with lack of the integrity, honesty devotion to duty, diligence and conduct unbecoming of the status of Bank Officer in contravention of Regulation No. 3(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees ' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976.
The inquiry was held as per the procedure prescribed by Syndicate Bank Officer Employees ' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, (`the Regulations ').
On 16 October 1986, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charges were proved against the petitioner.
He has held that the petitioner has failed to take any effective steps for recovery of the amount paid under the discounted instrument.
He has kept the instrument with himself for unduly long period without even surrendering the same to the custody of the Bank.
It was 581 Only after the Additional General Manager reminded him by letter dated 15 December 1983, the petitioner assured him that he would return the cheque which he finally did on 18 January 1984.
The Inquiry Officer has finally concluded that the transaction connected with the unpaid instrument was of an accommodative nature with a view to assist A. Chandrashekhar by using another person as benami and it was in clear violation of the rules of the Bank.
It is said and indeed not disputed that the Bank referred the matter to the Central Vigilance Commission for advice and the Commission has recommended that the petitioner may be compulsorily retired from service by way of punishment.
The disciplinary authority after considering the inquiry report and affording an opportunity to the petitioner passed an order dated 7 October 1987 imposing on the petitioner the penalty of compulsory retirement.
The petitioner appealed to the General Manager challenging the punishment.
On 27 August 1988 the General Manager dismissed the appeal concurring with the findings recorded and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.
The petitioner thereupon moved the Bombay High Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court has also dismissed the writ petition.
He has now appealed to this Court.
before us that the punishing authorities did not apply their mind and did not exercise their power in considering the merits of his case.
They have imposed on him the penalty of compulsory retirement in obedience to the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission which has been made binding on them by the direction dated 21 July 1984 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division).
They have blindly followed the advice given by the Central Vigilance Commission without regard to the merits of the matter and contrary to the statutory Regulations governing the departmental inquiries.
The subject matter of inquiry was only regarding irregularities in the banking practice and the action complained of has not affected the interests of the Bank.
The petitioner by his own efforts has recovered the money due under the discounted cheque and credited the same with interest to the Bank.
The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on the alleged misdemeanour does not warrant any major penalty like the compulsory retirement.
Reference was also 582 made to certain representations said to have been made by the Bank to the Central Vigilance Commission for approval to impose a lesser punishment.
It is said that the Bank pleaded in the representations that the punishment of compulsory retirement advised by the Commission was too harsh.
SYNDICATE BANK OFFICER EMPLOYEES ' (DISCIPLINE AND APPEAL) REGULATION 1976 These Regulation have been framed under Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer Undertakings) Act, 1970.
They were framed by the Board of Directors of the Syndicate Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
Regulation 4 prescribes penalties for acts of misconduct.
Regulation 5 specifies the authority to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties.
Regulation 6 lays down procedure for imposing major penalties and Regulation 7 provides for action on the inquiry report.
Regulation 7 confers power to the disciplinary authority either to agree or disagree with the findings of the inquiry authority on any article of charge.
The disciplinary authority may reach its own conclusion on the material on record and impose any penalty prescribed under Regulation 4.
Or if it is of the opinion that no penalty should be imposed on the delinquent officer, it may pass an order exonerating the delinquent officer.
Regulation 17 provides for appeals against the order imposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4.
The appellate authority has been given the power to pass any order of penalty or remitting the case to the disciplinary authority or to any other authority for fresh disposal.
Regulation 19 provides for consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission.
It states that "that the Bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle.
" There is no other Regulation requiring consultation with Central Vigilance Commission, or providing that the advice given by the Commission is binding on the punishing authorities.
The Central Vigilance Commission, however, appears to have framed guidelines for Banks to consult the Commission in respect of cases where major penalty is prescribed under the Regulation.
Article 22 of the Central Vigilance Commission Manual reads : "The Scheme of consultation with the Commission in respect of major penalty cases pertaining to such officers envisages consultation with the Commission at two stages.
583 The first stage of consultation arises when initiating disciplinary proceedings while the second consultation is taken at the conclusion of the proceedings.
" Article 23.2 of the C.V.C. Manual Chapter 10 reads: "In all cases where C.V.C. advises initiation of major penalty proceedings, it also nominates simultaneously a Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries to whom the inquiry should be entrusted." THE DIRECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (BANKING DIVISION) On 21 July 1984 Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) has written a letter to all Banking Institution thus : "Recently a case been reported where a bank has revised the punishment awarded to an officer in a disciplinary case contrary to the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission.
The case has figured in the Annual Report of the CVC as a case of non consultation with the Commission and thus created an embarrassing situation.
You will, perhaps, be aware of the Annual Reports of the CVC, which contain cases where the disciplinary authorities had not accepted its recommendations or had not consulted it, are laid on the Tables of both the Houses of Parliament.
This may, thereafter be discussed in the Parliament also.
You will agree that under no circumstances the advice of the CVC should be modified except with the prior concurrence of the commission and this Ministry.
I may mention here that revision of the penalty imposed on a delinquent officer as a result of an appeal filed by him before the appellate authority against the decision of the original disciplinary authority also amounts to non consultation/non acceptance of the advice of the CVC and is included in CVC 's Annual Report.
Kindly circulate these instructions to the concerned officers in your bank for strict compliance.
The receipt of this D.O. letter may please be acknowledged.
A copy of this D.O. letter is being marked to CVO in your bank separately.
" 584 CIRCULARS OF THE BANK On 27 July 1984, A. Krishna Rao, Chairman and managing Director of the Bank, issued a circular to all branches of the Bank as follows : "I am enclosing herewith a photostat copy of the DO letter No.41/3/84 Vig.
dated 21.7.1984 received by me from Shri Ashok Kumar, joint Secretary, ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, (Banking Division), Vigilance Cell, New Delhi, in the above connection for strict compliance of the instructions contained therein.
As the advice in vigilance cases received from Central Vigilance commission is communicated to the authorities concerned by the Chief Vigilance Officer, I advise, that the Chief Vigilance Officer 's advice, as explained in my above referred to DO letter, should be complied with.
Even when a revision of the penalty imposed on a delinquent officer at the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer by of Original Disciplinary Authority were to be considered as a result of an appeal filed by him before the appellate/high authorities, such revision shall be effected only after consulting the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Please acknowledge receipt of this and ensure compliance of the instructions contained herein.
" On 8 September 1986 P.S.V. Mallya, the succeeding Chairman and Managing Director of the bank issued another circular letter to all branches of the bank in the following terms: "All vigilance cases in bank are being investigated/ processed at Vigilance Cell at the HO, under the administrative control of the Chief Vigilance Officer, who is reporting directly to me.
After processing of the reports is concluded, the cases are referred to Central Vigilance Commission as per the existing procedure and the advice received from the commission is being communicated to the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
585 If the advice tendered by the Commission is not accepted/acted upon, it will amount to non acceptance of the advice of the Commission and such instance will figure in the Annual Report of the Central Vigilance Commission placed before the Parliament.
This apart the non acceptance of the advice in vigilance cases is likely to lead to a situation, in which, different types of decisions are possible to be taken in similar cases, which is sure to result in a voidable complications and injustice to certain sections of the Officers/employees community.
Again in such a situation, ensuring uniform stantards in finalising action on vigilance cases will also become a very difficult phenomenon, which is not a desirable trend and does not augur well for the healthy functioning of the vigilance machinery in the Bank.
I therefore, advice all Disciplinary /Appellate Authorities to see that they refer as hitherto all vigilance cases to Chief Vigilance Officer and consult him on such cases and act upon his advice.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx If for any reasons, the authorities concerned feel that the advice needs to be reconsidered or a departure is called for, they may refer back the matter to Chief Vigilance Officer for reconsideration of the advice, with the reasons for such disagreement and the Chief Vigilance Officer will see whether and to what extent such reconsideration is desirable or feasible and will tender advice again on reconsideration.
If the authority concerned is still not disposed to act on the advice, the disinclination on the part of the authority concerned will have to be brought to my notice and the advice given by me in respect of such cases shall be treated as final.
It is also necessary that the authorities concerned should for obvious reasons keep the advice in strict confidence and see that no reference thereof is made in any of the correspondence communication, whether emanating from their end.
" 586 The petitioner being aware of the directions of the Ministry of Finance and the circulars issued by the Bank has in his memo of appeal before the appellate authority inter alia complained that the system and procedure adopted by the Bank in dealing with vigilance cases, is totally against the principles of natural justice.
The Bank has no control over such cases.
The Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority are required to carry into effect the punishment advised by the Central Vigilance commission without change.
He has also pointed out that his appeal could be nothing but an empty formality as the appellate authority would be also bound by the decision of the Central Vigilance commission.
The petitioner has also added post script to his appeal Memo stating thus "This appeal has been filed without prejudice to my contention that this appeal is an exercise in futility as the appellate authority also is not the deciding authority and this appeal also will be decided by the CVO/CVC, who has already decided and whose decision is binding on you.
There is in fact no effective right of appeal.
" Counsel for the Bank however, submits that notwithstanding the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission and the directive dated 21 July 1984 of the Ministry Finance, Department of Economy Affairs (Banking Division), the case of the petitioner has received the fullest consideration from the disciplinary and appellate authorities.
They have independently considered the material on record both on the articles of charges and also on the appropriate punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on the petitioner.
The orders of the authorities do not refer to the circulars of the Bank, nor to the punishment proposed by the Central Vigilance Commission.
It is therefore, illegitimate, to contend that the punishment imposed on the petitioner has been vitiated by extraneous influences.
We are not even remotely impressed by the arguments of counsel for the Bank.
Firstly, the Bank itself seems to have felt as alleged by the petitioner and not denied by the Bank in its counter that the compulsory retirement recommended by the Central Vigilance Commission was too harsh and excessive on the petitioner in view of his excellent performance and unblemished antecedent service.
The Bank appears to have made two representations; one in 1986 and another in 1987 to the Central Vigilance Commission for taking a lenient view of the matter and to advise lesser punishment to the petitioner.
Apparently, those representations were not accepted by the Commission.
The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority therefore have no choice in the matter.
They had to impose the punishment of com 587 puslory retirement as advised by the Central Vigilance Commission.
The advice was binding on the authorities in view of the said directive of the Ministry of Finance, followed by two circulars issued by the successive Chief Executive of the Bank.
The disciplinary and appellate authorities might not have referred to the directive of the Ministry of Finance or the Bank circulars.
They might not have stated in their orders that they were bound by the punishment proposed by the Central Vililance Commission.
But it is reasonably foreseeable and needs no elaboration that they could not have ignored the advice of the Commission.
They could not have imposed a lesser punishment without the concurrence of the Commission.
Indeed, they could have ignored the advice of the Commission and imposed a lesser punishment only at their peril.
The power of the punishing authorities in departmental proceedings is regulated by the statutory Regulations.
Regulation 4 merely prescribes diverse punishment which may be imposed upon delinquent officers.
Regulation 4 does not provide specific punishments for different misdemeanours except classifying the punishments as minor or major.
Regulations leave it to the discretion of the punishing authority to select the appropriate punishment having regard to the gravity of the misconduct proved in the case.
Under Regulation 17, the appellate authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or completely setting aside the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority.
He has also power to express his own views on the merits of the matter and impose any appropriate punishment on the delinquent officer.
It is quasi judicial power and is unrestricted.
But it has been completely fettered by the direction issued by the Ministry of Finance.
The Bank has been told that the punishment advised by the Central Vigilance Commission in every case of disciplinary proceedings should be strictly adhered to and not to be altered without prior concurrence of the Central Vigilance Commission and the Ministry of Finance.
We are indeed surprised to see the impugned directive issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division).
Firstly, under the Regulation, the Bank 's consultation with Central Vigilance Commission in every case is not mandatory.
Regulation 20 provides that the Bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle.
Even if the Bank has made a self imposed rule to consult the Central Vigilance Commission in every disciplinary matter, it does not make the Commission 's advice binding on the punishing authority.
In this context, reference may be made to Article 588 320(3) of the Constitution.
The Article 320 (3) like Regulation 20 with which we are concerned provides that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a civil servant including memorials or petitions relating to such matters.
This Court in A.N. D 'Silva vs Union of India, [1962] Suppl; 1 SCR 968 has expresed the view that the Commission 's function is purely advisory.
It is not an appellate authority over the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority.
The advice tendered by the Commission is not binding on the Government.
Similarly, in the present case, the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission is not binding on the Bank or the punishing authority.
It is not obligatory upon the punishing authority to accept the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission.
Secondly, the Ministry of Finance, Government of India has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned directive to Banking institutions.
The government may regulate the Banking institutions within the power located under the banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.
So far as we could see, Section 8 is the only provision which empowers to the Government to issue directions.
Section 8 reads: "Every corresponding new bank shall, in the discharge of its function, be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve bank, give." The corresponding new bank referred to in Section 8 has been defined under Section 2(f) of the Act to mean a banking company specified in column 1 of the First Schedule of the Act and includes the Syndicate Bank.
Section 8 empowers the Government to issue direction in regard to matters of policy but there cannot be any uniform policy with regard to different disciplinary matters and much less there could be any policy in awarding punishment to the delinquent officers in different cases.
The punishment to be imposed whether minor or major depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved.
the authorities have to exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or of the Central Government.
No third party like the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government could dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise 589 their power and what punishment they should impose on the delinquent officer.
(See: De Smith 's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, p. 309).
The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance, is therefore, wholly without jurisdiction, and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters.
For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and the writ petition quashing the directive issued by the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs, (Banking Division) dated 21 July 1984.
We also issue a direction to the Chairman of the Syndicate Bank to withdraw the circular letters dated 27 July 1984 and 8 September 1986.
We further set aside the impugned orders of the disciplinary authority and appellate authority with a direction to the former to dispose of the petitioner 's case in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made.
The petitioner is entitled to costs which we quantify in both the cases at Rs. 15,000 which shall be paid by the Central Government.
G.N. Appeal and petition allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant was a Manager in one of the branches of the Respondent Bank.
In 1985, there was a departmental enquiry against him on the charges that he discounted a cheque for Rs.50,000 drawn in the name of some other person to accommodate one of his colleagues and when the cheque returned unpaid, he retained the same for about two months without taking action for realisation of the amount.
An enquiry was conducted by the Commissioner for Vigilance Inquiry from the Central Vigilance Commission, following the procedure prescribed by the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees ' (Disciplinary & Appeal) Regulations.
The Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the charges were proved against the appellant.
The Respondent Bank referred the matter to the Central Vigilance Commission for advice and the Commission recommended the punishment of compulsory retirement.
After considering the Inquiry Report and after affording opportunity to the appellant, the Disciplinary Authority imposed on him the 577 penalty of compulsory retirement.
On appeal, the appellate authority concurred with the findings recorded and the punishment imposed.
The appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the order of his compulsory retirement.
The High Court declined to interfere with the order.
Hence the present appeal, by special leave.
The appellant also filed a Writ Petition before this Court challenging the validity of the direction dated 21.7.1984 issued by the Finance Ministry, following which the Respondent Bank has imposed on him the penalty of compulsory retirement.
On behalf of the appellant/petitioner it was contended that the advice given by the Central Vigilance Commission was blindly followed by the Respondent Bank as it was made binding on it by virtue of the directions dated 21.7.84 issued by the Ministry of Finance and in that process the merits of the case and the statutory regulations governing departmental inquiries were ignored.
It was also contended that the subject matter of the inquiry was only regarding irregularities in banking practice and since the interest of the Bank was not affected as he had the money recovered and credited to the Bank with interest thereon, the alleged misdemeanour did not warrant any major penalty like compulsory retirement, which even according to the Respondent Bank, was too harsh.
On behalf of the Respondent Bank it was contended that it had independently considered the material on record notwithstanding the advice given by the Central Vigilance Commission and since the orders did not refer to the circulars or to the advice of Central Vigilance Commission, the punishment imposed on the appellant/petitioner was not vitiated by extraneous influences.
Allowing the matters, this Court HELD: 1.
The Respondent Bank itself felt that the compulsory retirement recommended by the Central Vigilance Commission was too harsh and excessive on the appellant/petitioner in view of his excellent performance and unblemished antecedent service.
The Bank made two representations, one in 1986 and another in 1987 to the Central Vigilance Commission for taking a lenient view of the matter and to advise lesser punishment.
Apparently, those representations were not accepted by the Commission.
The disciplinary authority and the appellate authority therefore had no choice in the matter.
They had to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement as advised by the Central Vigi 578 lance Commission.
The advice was binding on the authorities in view of the directive of the Ministry of Finance issued on 21.7.1984, followed by two circulars issued by the successive Chief Executives of the Bank.
The disciplinary and appellate authorities might not have referred to the directive of the Ministry of Finance or the Bank circulars.
They might not have stated in their orders that they were bound by the punishment proposed by the Central Vigilance Commission.
But it is reasonably foreseeable and needs no elaboration that they could not have ignored the advice of the Commission.
They could not have imposed a lesser punishment without the concurrence of the Commission.
Indeed, they could have ignored the advice of the Commission and imposed a lesser punishment only at their peril.
[586F H; 587 A C] 2.1 But for the Finance Ministry 's directive dated 21.7.1984, the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission is not binding on the Bank or the punishment authority; it is not obligatory upon the punishing authority to accept the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission.
[588C] 2.2 The Ministry of Finance has no jurisdiction to issue such a directive to Banking institutions.
The Government may regulate the Banking institutions within the power located under the .
Even though Section 8 thereof empowers the Government to issue directions in regard to matters of policy, there cannot be any uniform policy with regard to different disciplinary matters and much less there could be any policy in awarding punishment to the delinquent officers in different cases.
The punishment to be imposed depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved.
The authorities have to exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or of the Central Government in the exercise of their power and the imposition of punishment on the delinquent officer.
Therefore the directive of the Ministry of Finance is wholly without jurisdiction and contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters and is quashed.
[588D H; 589A] A.N.D 'silva vs Union of India, [1962] Suppl.
S.C.R. 968, relied on.
De Smith 's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn.
p. 309, referred to.
579 3.
the Chairman of the Respondent Bank is directed to withdraw the circular letters dated 27.7.1984 and 8.9.1986 issued in furtherance of the Finance Ministry 's directive dated 21.7.1984.
[589C] [Setting aside the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, this Court directed the disciplinary authority to dispose of the case in accordance with law and observations made in the judgment.]


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.
2486 87 (N) of 1978.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.1978 of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal Nos. 293 and 361 of 1972.
P.H. Parekh for the Appellant.
section Padumanabhan, Amicus Curiae, R.A. Perumal and G. Narasimhulu for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.M. SAHAI, J.
Litigation, between two sisters, by way of cross suits, one, for permanent injunction by the appellant basing her claim on gift deed executed in 1954 by her mother, a Hindu widow, of the entire estate inherited by her from her husband, and another for declaration and partition by respondent assailing validity of the gift deed and claiming reversioner 's right after death of the mother in 1968, has reached this Court by grant of special leave against judgment of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal raising a legal issue of seminal importance as to nature of right and title of female donee of Hindu widow 's estate after coming into force of Hidnu Succession Act (hereinafter refferred to as the Act).
Facts are simple.
Stakes, also, are not substantial, but the issue is of far reaching consequence.
Could a Hindu widow alienate by gift the entire estate inherited from the husband, in favour of one of the female reversioners prior to enforcement of Act 20 of 1956.
In case answer to issue is in the affirmative then what was the nature of right that the donee got under law? Did she become an owner of a widow 's 605 estate, a limited owner, an owner with some right or title, so as to acquire rights of absolute ownership under section 14 of Act or a trespasser and if trespasser then whether she acquired rights by adverse possession by perfecting her rights against the donor only or it was essential to prescribe rights against reversioners as well? Shorn of details, and various issues raised in the suits, suffice it to mention that even though the trial court found the gift deed to have been duly attested and executed after obtaining permission from the appropriate authority the claim of appellant, for permanent injunction, was decreed not on Section 14 of the Act as the widow who had executed the gift deed in 1954 was, `incompetent to alienate widow 's estate by gift permanently ' under Hindu Law but on adverse possession and estoppel.
The appellate court while affirming the finding on section 14 of the Act allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit as `adverse possession against the widow is not adverse against reversioners, and the next reversioner is entitled to recover the possession of the property or his share in it within 12 years from the date of the death of the widow '.
It was further held that the appellant could not acquire, any right by, `estoppel under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act against the reversioners by reason of the widow 's conduct '.
In view of the concurrent findings of two courts below on section 14 of the Act the High Court appears to have been invited to adjudicate, only, on the question if the appellate court was justified in reversing the finding on adverse possession wich it disposed of, treating it as finding of fact, and observing that possession of appellant, `must be deemed to be on behalf of other co sharers in the absence of any evidence before ouster of the other sisters '.
Wheher the High Court was justified in not examining the question of adverse possession is not necessary to be gone into as the appellant can succeed, only, if the finding recorded by the first appellate court that the appellant could not acquire any rights against reversioners during lifetime of the widow is found to be erroneous in law.
But before doing so the claim of the appellant that she became an absolute owner under section 14 of the Act, reiterated, once again, in this Court, may be examined as it is a question of law.
A full bench of the Delhi High Court in Smt.
Chinti vs Smt.
Daultu, AIR 1968 Delhi 264 held that possession of a female donee in pursuance of gift deed executed by her mother could not be characterised as illegal or of trespasser, therefore, she being a female Hindu `possessed ' of the property on the date came into force became an absolute owner under section 14 of the Act.
When more or less similar 606 matter came up before Patna High Court in Sulochana Kuer vs Doomati Kuer, AIR 1970 Patna 352 the court, held that, "a Hindu woman 's estate as such is not capable of transfer either by sale or gift.
The mere concept of such an estate is not transferred on the transfer of properties attaching to the estate".
In Anath Bandhu vs Chanchala Bala, AIR 1976 Calcutta 303 the Calcutta High Court, specifically, dissented from the Delhi decision and held that, "Section 14 wanted to benefit those female Hindus who were limited owners in then existing Hindu Law before the commencement of the Act.
In the present case the limited owner Motibala having transferred the limited interest to Chanchala before the passing of the Act, it cannot be said that Chanchala 's limited interest,if any, ripened into absolute interest in terms of section 14 of the Act".
A full bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Parmeshwari vs Santokhi, AIR 1977 Punjab 141 too, did not agree with Delhi High Court.
It went into the background of legislation, the original form of the bill, ambit of the explanation, anomalies that would result if, even, female alienee was deemed to be a limited owner and held, " that section 14 of the Act was not intended to benefit the alienees of a limited Hindu owner".
Similar view was taken by Andhra Pradesh and Madras, High Court in AIR 1957 AP 280 and AIR 1958 Madras, Gaddam Venkayama vs Gaddam Veeryya, and Marudakkal vs Arumugha.
Thus according to Delhi Court a donee of even entire Hindu widow 's estate became absolute owner under section 14 of the Act whereas according to Patna, Calcutta, Punjab, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, rights of a female donee under Hindu Law, prior to coming into force of the Act did not get enlarged under section 14 of the Act and it did not preclude reversioners from assailing validity of the gift deed.
To ascertain which view accords more to the objective sought to be achieved by the Act it appears necessary to extract section 14 which reads as under: (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
Explanation In this sub section, "property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance, or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner what 607 soever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.
(2) Nothing contained in sub section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.
Needless to emphasise that the section was a step forward towards social amelioration of women who had been subjected to gross dis crimination in matter of inheritance.
Even when the Hindu Women 's Rights to Property Act XVIII of 1937 was enacted it succeeded partially only.
While providing for inheritance and devolution to widow and even widow of predeceased son the Act could not go beyond creating limited interest or a Hindu woman 's estate.
Absolute ownerships or female heir by effacing inequality and putting male an female heirs at par in matter of inheritance was achieved by the Succession Act.
A female Hindu inheriting property under the Act, also, became a stock of descent.
In Eramma vs Verrupana, , this Court observed, "The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called `limited estate ' or `widow 's estate ' in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman, who under the old law would have been only a limited owner, a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder".
But did the legislature intend to extend same benefit, namely, enlarge the estate, held, on the date the Act came into force by any or every female Hindu into full and absolute estate irrespective of whether she was a limited owner or not.
According to learned counsel for appellant the answer should be given in affirmative.
He urged that since the age long traditional limitation on inheritance and disposition by a female was removed and the section was widely worded by using broad and comprehensive expressions such as, `and property, `possessed ', `acquired before or after the commencement of the Act ' and each of these expressions have received expansive of the Act ' and each of these expressions have received expansive interpretations by the Court there was no reason not to give similar interpretation to the word female Hindu.
The learned counsel submitted that there was no warrant to confine scope of the section to limited owners.
He argued that if the argument of the respondent was accepted it shall result in substitution of the word ` female Hindu ' with `limited owner ' which 608 would be contrary to legislative intention, the social philosophy on which the section was founded and the principle of interpretation.
Relying on the explanation, to the section, it was urged that it not only explained meaning of the word `property ' but it left no room for doubt that a female Hindu possessed of any property, which satisfied the extended meaning on the date the Act came into force, became an absolute owner.
It was further argued that the expression `limited owner ' has been used in the section not to whittle down the otherwise simple and plain meaning of the words `female Hindu ' by introducing narrow concept of widows ' estate or limited owner but to put beyond doubt the nature and status of rights of females after the Act.
Support was also drawn from the marginal note of the section and it was urged that the words, `property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property ', was yet another indication to interpret the word `female Hindu ' widely, so as to include in its ambit a donee from a limited owner.
That the section is not very happily worded, does not admit of any doubt.
It was commented upon by this Court in V. Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy, ; and it was observed that the section was, "a classic instance of statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship has created endless confusion for litigants".
May be so but the answer to the issue must emerge from the section, its background, purpose of its enactment and the reason for use of such wide expression.
Nothing turns on the marginal note as it is usually not restored to for construing meaning of a section, particularly, when the language is plain and simple.
It is well settled that a section has to be read in its entirely as one composite unit without bifurcating it or ignoring any part of it.
Viewed from this perspective the section, undoubtedly, comprises of two parts, one descriptive, specifying the essential requirements for applicability of the section, other consequences arising out of it.
One cannot operate without the other.
Neither can be read in isolation.
Both are integral parts of the section.
Mere provision that any property possessed by a female Hindu on the date the Act came into force shall be held by her would have been incomplete and insufficient to achieve the objective of removing inequality amongst male and female Hindus unless it was provided that the otherwise limited estate of such a female would become enlarged into full or absolute estate.
Any other construction would result in not only ignoring the expression, `and not as a limited owner ' which would be against principle of interpretation but also against the historical background of enactment of the section.
Whereas if it is read in its entirety with one part throwing light on another then the conclusion is irresistible that a limited owner became a full owner provided she was 609 in possession of the property on the date of enactment of the Act.
Property acquired by a female Hindu before the Act came into force comprised, broadly, of inherited property or stridhana property acquired by her from a male or female.
Nature of her right in either class of property, unlike males, depended on the school by which she was governed as well as whether it came to her by devolution or transfer from a male or female.
This invidious discrimination was done away with after coming into force of 1956 Act and the concept of Hindu widows ' estate or limited estate or stridhana ceased to exist by operation of section 14 read with section 4 of the Act which has an overriding effect.
A female Hindu who but for the Act would have been a limited owner become full owner.
But the section being retrospective in operation the meaning of female Hindu prior to 1956 has to be understood in the light of Hindu Law as it prevailed then.
The section enlarged the estate of those female Hindu who otherwise would have been limited owners.
This result follows by reading the first part with the last which uses the expression, 'held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner '.
To put it differently a limited owner become a full owner provided she was a female Hindu who was possessed of any property acquired before the commencement of the Act.
Therefore, mere being female Hindu was not sufficient.
She should have been of that class of female Hindus who could on existence of other circumstances were capable of becoming full owners.
Further the Act being applicable by virtue of section 2 to not only Hindus by religion but also to Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs and to any person who was not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew it was but necessary to use an expression of such wide connotation as female Hindu because by virtue of sub section (3) of the section the word `Hindu ' in any portion of the Act, which includes section 14, the word had to be understood as including not only a person who was Hindu by religion but even others.
However, the objective being to remove disparity and injustice to which females were subjected under Hindu Law the section limits its operation to such female Hindus who were limited owners.
Reference to the explanation by the learned counsel was also not very apposite.
It was appended to widen the meaning of property by adding to it the inherited property, and the property which came to be possessed by a female Hindu in manner mentioned in it.
Its effect was that a female Hindu became absolute owner not only in respect of inherited property but even of property received by way of gift or on partition or in lieu of maintenance etc.
provided she was a limited owner.
And not that it enlarged the estate of even those who were not limited owner.
Any other construction would militate against the, otherwise, clear meaning of sub section (1).
610 Although this section has come up for interpretation, by this Court, on various occasions in different context but in none of these cases the Court had occasion to examine the ambit of expression female Hindu and whether it extended to females other than limited owner.
Since in every case whether it was decided for or against it was the widow who was alive on the date the Act came into force and she being a limited owner the decision turned on if she was `possessed ' of the property so as to become full owner.
For instance in Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva & Ors., [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 968=AIR the widow was held to have acquired rights as the adoption made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to be in constructive possession and thus `possession ' of the property on the date the Act came into force.
Mangal Singh vs Smt.
Rattno, ; was another case where widow 's constructive possession enured to her benefit as she having been dispossession by her collaterals in 1954 and filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Act came into force was held to be `possession ' of the property so as to entitle her to become full owner.
Munna Lal vs Raj Kumar, AIR 1962 SC 1495 was a case where the share of the widow was declared in preliminary decree.
No actual division of share had taken place, yet the court held that it was property `possessed ' by her on the date the Act came into force.
In Sukhram vs Gauri Shankar, ; it was held that a widow was full owner in joint Hindu family property as she became entitled to the interest which her husband had by virtue of Hindu Women Right to Property Act.
The Court ruled that even though a male was subject to restrictions qualienation on his interest in joint Hindu family property, but a widow acquiring an interest by virtue of the Act did not suffer such restriction.
V. Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy; , and Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai, were cases where the widow was `possessed ' of the property in lieu of maintenance, and therefore, she was held to be full owner.
In all these cases since the widow was in possession, actual or constructive, on the date the Act came into force she was held to be a female Hindu `possessed ' of the property, and consequently, her limited ownership stood converted into full ownership by operation of law.
Even in Eramma vs Verupana (supra) and Kuldeep Singh vs Surain Singh, [1988] Andhra law Times, where the benefit was denied under section 14 the female Hindu were widows but they were not held to be `possessed ' of the property because their possession was not backed by even the remotest vestige of title.
in Eramma 's case (supra) the benefit was denied as Hindu Women 's Right to Property Act being not applicable on the date the succession opened she could not be held to be possessed of the property.
And in 611 Kuldeep Singh 's case (supra) she had been divested of her interest as a result of transfer made by her.
Contest in all these cases was between reversioner and the widow herself or the person claiming through her.
Review of these decisions indicates that this Court has consistently taken the view as stated in Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai,: "For the applicability of sub section, two conditions must co exist, namely, (i) The concerned female Hindu must be possessed of property; and (ii) Such property must be possessed by her as a limited owner.
" mention is necessary to be made in this connection about observation in Gulwant Kaur vs Mohinder Singh, ; that the Court in Bai Vijia 's case did not support, to lay down, that, "what was enlarged by sub section (1) of section 14 into a full estate was the Hindu woman 's estate known to Hindu Law.
When the Court uses the word, `limited estate ', the words are used to connote a right in the property to which possession of the female Hindu may be traced, but which is not a full right of ownership".
Gulwant Kaur 's case was concerned with acquisition of right by wife, on entrustment of property in lieu of maintenance, after 1956, when the concept of widows ' estate or limited estate or even stridhana had ceased to exist.
Therefore, what was necessary was being possessed of property, actual or constructive, by female Hindu under some right or title.
Whereas Bai Vijia 's case was concerned with acquisition of right in property held in lieu of maintenance before 1956.
Therefore a female Hindu could become absolute owner only if she was limited owner.
Sub section of section 14 deals with right of female Hindu both before and after the Act came into force.
Female Hindu could become absolute owner of property possessed by her on the date the Act came into force only if she was a limited owner whereas she would become absolute owner after 1956 of the property of which she would otherwise have been a limited owner.
Reference may be made to Maharaja Pallai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai T. Pilllai, ; where this Court while examining right of wife put in exclusive possession of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenance was held to have become full owner under section 14(1) as she entered into possession after the death of her husband in 1955 and was in possession in 1956.
612 The Court held that the right to utilise income for her maintenance must be "presumed to have resulted in property being given to her in lieu of maintenance".
On this finding the property being possessed on the date the Act came into force as contemplated in the explanation, the widow being a limited owner became a full owner and the gift executed by her in favour of her daughter after 1956 was unexceptionable.
The Court, however, while repelling the submission advanced on superficial conflict in Gulwant Kaur and Bai Vijia reiterated what was observed in Gulwant Kaur 's case.
As already discussed Gulwant Kaur 's case related to acquisition of property after 1956 whereas in Bai Vijia it was acquired before 1956.
The observations made in the two decisions must be understood in that context.
Moreover in Gulwant Kaur 's case the ratio was founded on Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai, ; a decision which shall be adverted to later.
But it too was concerned with acquisition after 1956.
And the bench while discussing scope of section 14(1) observed.
"that the limited estate or limited ownership of a Hindu female would enlarge into an absolute estate or full ownership of the property in question in th following fact situation: `Where she acquired the limited estate in the property before or after the commencement of the Act provided she was in possession of the property at the time of the coming into force of the Act on June 17, 1956 '.
" None of these decisions, namely, Gulwant Kaur (supra) or Maharaja Pillai (supra ) or Jagannathan Pillai purported to lay down that the Section 14(1) contemplated enlargement of estate prior to 1956 of even those females who were not limited owners.
According to Mulla 's Hindu Law (sixteenth edition, paragraph 174) every female who took a limited or restricted estate was known as limited heir.
And according to every school except Bombay every female who succeed as an heir whether to a male or female took a limited estate in the property.
Even in Bombay a female who by marriage entered into Gotra (family) of the deceased male inherited a limited estate only.
And in paragraph 176 it is stated that incident of estate taken by every limited owner was similar to incident of widow 's estate.
Mayne 's Hindu Law, (12th edition, paragraph 671) too brings out the same by stating that the typical form of estate inherited by a woman from a male was compendiously known as the widow 's estate.
And the limitation which applied to such estate applied to all estate derived by a female by 613 descent from a male or female whether she inherited as daughter, mother, grandmother, sister or as any other relation.
Even stridhana property according to Mulla created limited interest in its successors, except in Bombay in certain circumstances and a female inheriting stridhana took a limited interest in it and on her death it passed not to her heirs but to the next stridhan heirs of the female from she inherited.
Thus on plain reading of the Section, and its interpretation by this Court in various decisions a female possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force could become absolute owner only if she was a limited owner.
This being the legal position it may now be seen if a Hindu widow could transfer or alienate widow 's estate by way of gift prior to 1956 and if so to what extent.
And in such alienation what right or interest was created in the alienee.
Did she become a limited owner so as to become a full owner under Section 14 of the Act? A Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow of predeceased son, held limited interest known as Hindu women 's estate, prior to coming into force of 1956 Act, under the Hindu Women 's Right to Property Act, 1937.
Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu Law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose the holder of the estate was known as limited owner.
The expression `limited owner ' thus could not be understood, except as it was interpreted and understood in Hindu Law.
Could the same be said of a female donee or alienee? The Delhi High Court assumed that a female donee was a limited owner, consequently, of she was possessed of the property on the date the Act came into force and her possession was not `without title ', she became an absolute owner.
Basis for the decision was construction of the word `possessed ' by this Court in Gummalapura Taggina 's case (supra) wherein it was held that the word was used in widest connotation so that a widow, even if in constructive possession, was entitled to absolute ownership under Section 14 of the Act.
Support was also drawn from converse case of Eramma (supra) this Court negatived the claim of widow under Section 14 as her possession on the date the Act came into force was not legal but that of a trespasser.
What the High Court lost sight of was that the claim of widow in Gummalapura 's case (supra) was upheld because the adoption made by her having been found to be invalid she was deemed to be in constructive possession on the date the ACt came into force.
And Eramma 's case (supra) was concerned with a widow, who claimed to have inherited through son in State of Hyderabad where Hindu Women 's Rights to Property Act did not apply on the date the son died.
Consequently, it was held that ``the 614 provisions of Section 14 of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property ' '.
The High Court overlooked the vital observation made in earlier part of the judgment to the effect.
``In other words, Section 14(1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who in absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this Section. ' ' Limited owner commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights.
In relation to property absolute, complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to posses, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying, right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc.
Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership.
For instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation.
Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument.
The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu Law arose as a matter of law.
A Hindu widow, according to different schools, Banaras, Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only.
Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council in Janki Ammal vs Narayanaswami, [1916] p. 43 I. A. p. 207 to be, ``her right is of the nature of a right to property, her powers in that character are limited ' '.
In Jaisri vs Raj Diwan Dubey, it was observed by this Court that ``when a widow succeeds as heir to her husband the ownership in the property both legal and beneficial vests in her ' '.
And the restriction on her power to alienate except for legal necessity is imposed, ``not for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of estate ' '.
Thus a Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband.
Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity.
In Kamala Devi vs Bachu Lal Gupta, this Court after reviewing various authorities extended this principle to female donee.
A gift made within reasonable limits, in favour of daughter even two years after the marriage but in pursuance of promise made at time of the marriage was upheld and 615 the reversioners claim was repelled on permissible alienation under Hindu Law.
But what right or title is acquired by the alienee if transfer is against legal necessity or contrary to law? The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but voidable could be avoided by reversioners including Govt.
taking by escheat Collector of Masulipatam vs Cavaly Vencata, [1861] 8 M.I.A. 529.
But the widow was held bound by the transfer.
In Natwalal Punjabhai & Anr.
vs Dadubhai Manubhai & Ors., ; , the Court held as under: "The Hindu Law certainly does not countenance the idea of a widow alienating her property without any necessity merely as a mode of enjoyment as was suggested before us by Mr. Ayyangar.
If such a transfer is made by a Hindu widow it is not correct to say that the transferee acquires necessarily and in law an interest commensurate with the period of the natural life of the widow or at any rate with the period of her widowhood.
Such transfer is invalid in Hindu Law, but the widow being the grantor herself, cannot derorate from the grant and the transfer cannot also be impeached so long as a person does not come into existence who can claim a present right to possession of the property." Thus if prior to 1956 any alienation was made by a Hindu widow of widow 's estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits, it stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under section 14.
And so far as alienees were concerned it could utmost create temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioner 's interest.
Her possession may be good against the world, her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor of transferor.
It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor.
So far as the male alienees from limited owners, that is female Hindu prior to 1956, are concerned, it was held by this Court in Radhey Krishan Singh & Ors.
vs Shiv Shankar Singh & Ors., that, the alienation could be challenged by the reversioner as there was nothing in the which has taken away such a right.
A female alienee did not enjoy better or different status as the Hindu Law applied universally and uniformaly 616 both to male and female alienees.
She did not become limited owner or holder of a limited estate as understood in Hindu Law.
And the alienation without legal necessity could be assailed by the reversioner.
No change was brought about in this regard by the Act.
If the alienation was valid i.e., it was for legal necessity or permitted by law then the donee became an owner of it and the right and title in the property vested in her.
But if it was contrary to law, as in this case the gift being of entire widow 's estate, then it did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow.
And the appellant cannot claim to have acquired title to the property under the gift deed.
Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu Law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force.
In fact such possession was not backed any title as against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration.
Reliance was placed on observations in Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai & Ors., ; that, ``To obviate hair splitting, the legislature has made it abundantly clear that whatever be the property possessed by a Hindu female, it will be of absolute ownership and not of limited ownership notwithstanding the position under the traditional Hindu Law ' ', and it was submitted that the appellant satisfied the criteria to entitle her to claim that her estate irrespective of its nature Hindu Law got enlarged under section 14 of the Act.
An observation without reference to facts discloses neither the law nor the ratio de cedindi which could be taken assistance of.
Factually, the issue was the effect of re transfer by the alienee in favour of the widow after 1956.
And the answer was that, ``When the transaction was reversed and what belonged to her was retransmitted to her, what the concerned Hindu female acquired was a right which she herself once possessed namely, a limited ownership (as it was known prior to the coming into force of the Act) which immediately matures into or enlarges into a full ownership in view of Section 14(1) of the Act on the enforcement of the Act.
The resultant position on the reversal of the transaction would be that the right, title and interest that the alienee had in the property which was under `eclipse ' during the subsistance of the transaction had re emerged on the disappearance of the eclipse ' '.
Truely speaking, the interpretation of sub section (1) of section 14 was no different from the other decisions as is clear from the extracts quoted earlier.
It is thus clear that an alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire limited estate or widow 's estate nor she was a limited owner who could get any benefit under section 14 of the Act.
It was not even a life estate except loosely, as the right to continue in possession was not related with her span of life but of the 617 transferor that is the Hindu widow.
The decision of Delhi High Court, therefore, does not lay down the law correctly.
The other view taken by Patna, Calcutta and Punjab and Haryana Courts that sub section (1) of section 14 did not extend the benefit of full ownership to female alienees brings out the objective of the section appropriately and correctly.
Nor is the decision in Badri Pershad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, ; of any assistance.
It was a case where the widow entitled to the interest of her husband got certain property prior to 1956 as a result of arbitration with specific stipulation and she shall have only life interest.
This was ignored asnd she was held, rightly, to be the absolute owner whose rights were governed by section 14(1) and not 14(2).
Further did not obliterate Hindu Law.
What has ceased to be operative after coming into force of the Act under section 4 is text or rule etc.
for which privision is made in the Act.
And under section 4(2) any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ceased to have effect if it was inconsistent with any provision of the Act.
Therefore except to the extent provision has been made in section 14, that is, enlargement of the estate of limited owner, the Hindu Law in other regards remained opearative.
There is no provision in the Act which deprives reversioners of their rights except to the extent mentioned in section 14.
In Radha Rani vs Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 216 this Court overruled the decisions of the Allahabad and Patna High Courts that there were no reversioners or reversionary rights after 1956 and held, ``it is open to reversioner to maintain a suit for declaration that an alienation made by a Hindu female limited owner before the coming into force of was without legal necessity and was not binding upon reversioners ' '.
Coming now to the issue of adverse possession the High Court was not justified in concluding that it was a question of fact.
Possession under a gift deed which was found to be invalid, as it was not permitted under Hindu Law was on general principle contrary to law, and as such could be adverse.
When did it become adverse to the donor and what circumstances constitute adverse possession against the donor is an aspect which does not arise for consideration as, even assuming in favour of the appellant, the question is, if adverse possession against donor was sufficient to clothe her with right or title in the property so as to deprive the reversioners of their right to claim the property after the death of the widow? In Radha Rani 's case (supra) this Court held.
618 ``In the case of an alienation by Hindu widow without legal necessity, the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow.
They could wait till her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property trating the alienation as a nullity. ' ' Therefore, it is obvious that the appellant could not acquire any right by adverse possession against reversioner during lifetime of her mother.
Her claim was rightly negatived.
Before parting with this case, we express our thanks to Sri Padmanabhan, Senior Advoacate who, on our request rendered valuable assistance.
We are thankful to Sri Parekh and Sri Narasimhulu also for their assistance.
The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed.
But there shall be no order as to costs.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
A Hindu widow executed a gift deed in 1954 of the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of the appellant, one of her daughters.
This led to the filling of two cross suits one by the appellant for permanent injunction basing her claim on the gift deed and the other by the respondent, another daughter of the widow 's for declaration and partition assailing the validity of the gift deed and claiming reversioners ' right after death of the mother in 1968.
The trial court decreed appellant 's suit on adverse possession and estoppel, but not on section 14 of the , as in its view the widow who executed the gift deed in 1954, was incompetent to alienate widow 's estate by gift permanently.
The appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court on section 14 of the Act, but opined that the appellant could not acquire any right by `estoppel under section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, against the reversioners by reasons of the widow 's conduct '.
It allowed the appeal of the respondent and dismissed the suit of the appellant holding that adverse 600 possession against the widow was not adverse against reversioners, and the next reversioner was entitled to recover the possession of the property or his share in it within 12 years from the date of the death of the widow.
In second appeal the High Court, treating the finding of the trial court on adverse possession as a finding of fact, held that possession of the appellant must be deemed to be on behalf of the other co sharers in the absence of any evidence before ouster of the other sister.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed the appeals by special leave to this Court.
On the questions whether: (1) a Hindu widow could alienate by gift the entire estate inherited by her from her husband in favour of one of the female reversioners prior to enforcement of Act 30 of 1956, and if so, what was the nature of right that the donee got under law? and (2) the donee became an owner of the widow 's estate, a limited owner, an owner with some right or title so as to acquire rights of absolute ownership under section 14 of the Act or a trespasser and acquired rights for adverse possession by perfecting her rights against the doner only or it was essential to prescribe rights against reversioners as well? Dismissing the appeals, this Court HELD: 1.1 Prior to the coming into force of Act 30 of 1956 a Hindu widow succeeding or inheriting any property from her husband or as widow of predeceased son, held limited interest known as Hindu women 's estate, under the Hindu Women 's Right to Property Act, 1937.
However, she had the right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose of the property or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband.
Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee or alienee, and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity.
Since such an estate could not be alienated under Hindu Law except in certain circumstances and for specific purpose, the holder or the estate was known as limited owner.
{613C D;614F G] 1.2 The expression `limited owner ' could not be understood except as it was interpreted and understood in Hindu Law.
The term commonly means, a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights.
In relation to property, absolute or complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to 601 possess, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is, to determine manner of use extending even to destroying, right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc.
Any restriction or limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership.
For instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation.
Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument.
The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu law arose as a matter of law.
A Hindu widow, according to different schools, Benaras, Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only.
[613D; 614B D] Janaki Ammal vs Karayanaswami, [1916] p. 43 I.A. p. 207 and Jaisri vs Raj Diwan Dubey,, [1961] 2SCR 559, referred to.
1.3 Prior to 1956, any alienation made by a Hindu widow or widow 's estate prohibited by law or being beyond permissible limits could utmost create in the alienee temporary and transitory ownership precarious in nature and vulnerable in character open to challenge if any attempt was made to cloud reversioners ' interest.
The alienee 's possession may be good against the world and her right in property may not be impeachable by the widow, but her interest qua the reversioner was to continue in possession at the maximum till the lifetime of her donor or transferor.
It was life interest, loosely, as the duration of interest created under invalid transfer came to an end not on death of donee or transferee but donor or transferor.
Such transfer stripped the widow of her rights and she could not acquire any rights under section 14, and being voidable, and not void, could be avoided by reversioners including government taking by escheat; but the widow was bounded by it.
[615A, E F] Kamala Devi vs Bachu Lal Gupta, ; Collector of Masuli Patam vs Cavoly Venoata, [1861] 8 M.I.A. 529; Natwalal Punjabhai & Anr.
vs Dadubhai Manubhai & Ors., ; and Radhey Krishan Singh & Ors.
vs Shiv Shankar Singh & Ors., , referred to.
2.1 An alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire limited estate or widow 's estate, nor was she a limited owner who could get any benefit under section 14 of the Act.
It was not even a life estate except loosely, as the right to continue in possession was not related with her span of life but of the transferor that is the Hindu widow.
[616G H;617A] Smt.
Chinti vs Smt.
Daultu, AIR 1968 Delhi 264, disapproved.
602 Sulochana Kuer, vs Doomati Kuer, AIR 1970 Patna 352; Anath Bandhu vs Chanchala Bala, AIR 1976 Calcutta 303; Parmeshwari vs Santokhi, AIR 1977 Punjab 141; Gaddam Vankayama vs Gaddam Veerayya, AIR 1957 AP 230 and Marudakkal vs Arumugha., AIR 1958 Madras, referred to.
Badri Pershad vs Smt.
Kanso Devi, ; held inapplicable.
2.2 In the instant case the alienation by gift of entire widow 's estate being contrary to law did not bind the reversioner who could file a suit after the death of the widow.
The appellant could not claim to have acquired title to the property under the gift deed.
Nor had she become a limited owner under Hindu Law which could mature into full ownership when the Act came into force.
In fact such possession was not backed by any title as against reversioner which could preclude her from bringing the suit for declaration.
[616B] 3.
As regards the adverse possession, the High Court was not justified in concluding that it was a question of fact.
Possession under a gift deed which was found to be invalid as it was not permitted under Hindu Law was on general principle contrary to law and as such could be adverse.
The appellant could not acquire any right by adverse posession against reversioner during life time of her mother.
Her claim was rightly negatived by the first appellate court.
Even assuming that the alienee had perfected adverse possession against the donor, it was not sufficient to clothe her with right or title in the property so as to deprive the reversioners of their right to claim the property after the death of the widow, inasmuch as in the case of an alienation by Hindu widow without legal necessity, the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow.
They could wait till her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property treating the alienation as a nullity.
[617F H;618A B] Radha Rani vs Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 216, relied on.
4.1 Being retrospective in operation section 14(1) deals with rights of female Hindus both before and after the Act came into force, and the meaning of female Hindu prior to 1956 has to be understood in the light of Hindu Law as it prevailed then.
The section enlarged the estate of those female Hindus who would otherwise have limited owners.
This result flows by reading the first part with the last which uses the expression `held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited 603 owner '.
A limited owner became a full owner provided she was a female Hindu who was possessed of any property acquired before the commencement of the Act.
Therefore, mere being female Hindus was not sufficient.
She should have been of that class of female Hindus who could on existence of other circumstances were capable of becoming full owners.
Female Hindu could become absolute owner of property possessed by her on the date the Act came into force only if she was a limited owner whereas she would become absolute owner 1956 of the property of which she would otherwise have been a limited owner.
[609B E;611F] Bai Vijia vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai, ; , relied on.
4.2 On a reading of section 14(1) the conclusion is irrisistible that a limited owner became a full owner provided she was in possession of the property on the date of enactment of the Act.
Effect of Explanation appended to the section was that a female Hindu became absolute owner not only in respect of inherited property but even of property received by way of gift or on partition or in lieu of maintenance etc.
provided she was a limited owner.
And not that it enlarged the estate of even those who were not limited owner.
Any other construction would militate against the otherwise clear meaning of sub section (1).
[608G H;609F H] 5.
did not obliterate Hindu Law.
What has ceased to be operative after coming into force of the Act under section 4 is text or rule etc.
for which provision is the Act.
And under section 4(2) any law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act ceased to have effect if it was inconsistent with any provision of the Act.
Therefore, except to the extent provision has been made in section 14, that is, enlargement of the estate of limited owner, the Hindu Law in other regards remains operative.
There is no provision in the Act which deprives reversioners of their rights except to the extent mentioned in section 14.[617C D] 6.
Marginal note is usually not resorted to for construing meaning of a section, particularly, when the language is plain and simple.
A section has to be read in its entirety as one composite unit without bifurcating or ignoring any part of it.
[608D E] V. Tulsamma vs Shesha Reddy, ; , referred to.
Eramma vs Verrupana, ; Gummalapura Taggina 604 Matada Kotturuswami vs Setra Veeravva & Ors., [1959] Supp ; 1 SCR 968, ; Mangal Singh vs Smt.
Rattno, ; Munna Lal vs Raj Kumar., AIR 1962 SC 1495 Sukhram vs Gauri Shankar, ; ; Kuldeep Singh vs Surain Singh, [1988] Andhra Law Times, Gulwant Kaur vs Mohinder Singh; , ; Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal vs Maharaja Pillai T. Pillai, ; and Jagannathan Pillai vs Kunjithapadam Pillai.
, ; , referred to.
Mulla 's Hindu Law, 16th Edn.
para 174, and Mayne 's Hindu Law, 12th Edn. para 671, referred to.