judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 2137 of 1988.
From the Judgment and order dated 14.3.1986 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. (O.S.) No. 65 of 1986.
Soli J. Sorabjee, S.K. Mehta, P.H. Parekh and M.K.S. Menon for the Appellants.
Rajinder Sachar, K.C. Dua and G.S. Sistan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
Special leave is granted.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
This appeal is at the instance of the defendants and is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the Division Bench affirmed the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that Court rejecting the contention of the appellants that the suit was undervalued by the plaintiff respondent and, accordingly, the plaint should be rejected under clause (b) of Rule 11 of order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The respondent, who is the plaintiff, has filed a suit against the appellants, inter alia, for dissolution of partnership and for accounts.
The suit has been valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and at Rs.500 for the purpose of court fee.
The appellants filed an application wherein a preliminary objection was raised as to the valuation of the suit.
It was contended by them that the relief sought for in the suit had been grossly undervalued 434 and the Court should reject the plaint under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court overruled the said preliminary objection and held that the suit was not undervalued.
On appeal by the appellants, a Division Bench of the High Court took the same view as that of the learned Single Judge.
The Division Bench placed reliance upon and followed a Full Bench decision of the same High Court in Smt.
Sheila Devi & Ors.
vs Shri Kishan Lal Kalra & Ors., ILR 1974 Delhi 491 where it has been observed, inter alia, that paragraph (iv) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act gives a right to the plaintiff in any of the suits mentioned in the clauses of that paragraph to place any value that he likes on the relief he seeks, subject, however, to any rule made under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and the Court has no power to interfere with the plaintiffs valuation.
The Division Bench felt itself bound by the said Full Bench decision and, accordingly, it dismissed the appeal of the appellants.
Hence this appeal.
At the outset, it may be mentioned that in regard to suits for accounts, the Punjab High Court has framed rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act fixing court fee and jurisdictional value of a suit for accounts.
Rule 4 of the Rules framed by the Punjab High Court provides as follows: "4(i) Suits in which the plaintiff in the plaint seeks to recover the amount which may be found to the plaintiff on taking unsettled account between him and defendant; (ii).
suits of either of the kinds described in order XX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Value for the purpose of court fee . as deter mined by the Court Fees Act, 1870.
value for the purposes of jurisdiction for the purpose of and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 as valued by the plaintiff in the plaint subject to determination by the court at any stage of the trial.
" It is not disputed that the above rules framed by the Punjab High Court under section 9 of the are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi.
It is apparent from Rule 4 extracted above that valuation for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction is not the same.
Indeed, in the instant case, the respondent has valued 435 the suit at Rs.25 lakhs for the purpose of jurisdiction.
That valuation has not been challenged by the appellant either in the High Court or in this Court.
The only challenge that has been made by the appellant is the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee.
So far as suits coming under section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act are concerned, the Legislature has left the question of valuation of the relief sought in the plaint or memorandum of appeal to the plaintiff.
The reason is obvious.
The suits which are mentioned under section 7(iv) are of such nature that it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation.
Indeed, the Legislature has not laid down any standard of valuation in the Court Fees Act.
Under Section 9 of the , the High Court may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, frame rules for the valuation of suits referred to in section 7(iv) of the Court fees Act.
Although the Punjab High Court has framed rules under section 9 of the which are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, such rules do not lay down any standard of valuation with regard to suits coming under section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act.
It has already been noticed that under Rule 4(i) of the Punjab High Court Rules, the value of suit for accounts for purposes of court fee will be as determined by the Court Fees Act, which means that the valuation of the relief will have to be made by the plaintiff under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act.
In a suit for accounts it is almost impossible for the plaintiff to value the relief correctly.
So long as the account is not taken, the plaintiff cannot say what amount, if at all, would be found due to him on such accounting.
The plaintiff may think that a huge amount would be found due to him, but upon actual accounting it may be found that nothing is due to the plaintiff.
A suit for accounts is filed with the fond hope that on accounting a substantial amount would be found due to the plaintiff.
But the relief cannot be valued on such hope, surmise or conjecture.
In this connection, we may refer to the provision of order VII, Rule II(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, inter alia, that the plaint shall be rejected where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so.
It is manifestly clear from the provision of order VII, Rule II(b) that a Court has to come to a finding that the relief claimed has been undervalued, which necessarily means that the Court is able to decide and specify proper and correct valuation of the relief and, after determination of 436 the correct value of the relief, requires the plaintiff to correct his valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court.
If the plaintiff does not correct the valuation within the time allowed, the plaint is liable to be rejected.
The question is whether in a suit for accounts simpliciter, the Court can come to a finding as to the proper and correct value of the relief until the final determination is made.
In our opinion, ordinarily it is not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determining the value of the relief in a suit for accounts simpliciter.
If the Court is itself unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is, it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation that has been made by him.
Indeed, in a suit for accounts it is also difficult for the Court to come to a finding even as to the approximate correct valuation of the relief.
In such a case, the Court has no other alternative than to accept plaintiff 's valuation tentatively.
There has been a divergence of judicial opinion on the question as to whether the plaintiff in a suit for accounts is entitled to put any valuation he likes.
It is not necessary to refer to the decisions of different High Courts on the point, and suffice it to say that they are not uniform, some holding that the plaintiff is free to give his own valuation and others holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to give an arbitrary valuation without having any link or connection with the relief in question.
In this connection, we may refer to a Five Judge Bench decision of this Court in S.Rm.
Sathappa Chettiar vs section Rm.
Ramanathan Chettiar, Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows: "If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the several sub sections of section 7 is considered, it would be clear that in respect of suits falling under sub section
(iv), a departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court fees.
The theoretical basis of 'this provision appears to be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precision or definiteness.
Take for instance the claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to share in any property on the ground that is joint family property.
The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of which a share is claimed is joint family property.
In other words, it is property in which the 437 plaintiff has an undivided share.
What the plaintiff purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property.
Now it would be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff 's alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness.
That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment of court fees.
It really means that in suits falling under section 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of his claim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the court in computing the court fees payable in respect of the said relief.
In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary to consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief.
" In the above decision, this Court took the view that the conversion of the plaintiff 's undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with any precision or definiteness.
It is true that the Court did not consider whether the plaintiff had been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief under the provision of section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, but the difficulty that would be felt by the Court in exercising its power under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure is that if it is unable to determine the correct value of the relief, it cannot direct the plaintiff to correct the valuation.
Order VII, Rule 11(b) contemplates correct valuation and not approximate correct valuation and such correct valuation of the relief has to be determined by the Court.
If the Court cannot determine the correct valuation of the relief claimed, it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation and, consequently, order VII, Rule 11(b) will not be applicable.
But, there may be cases under section 7(iv) where certain positive objective standard may be available for the purpose of determination of the valuation of the relief.
If there be materials or objective standards for the valuation of the relief, and yet the plaintiff ignores the same and puts an arbitrary valuation, the Court, in our opinion, is entitled to interfere under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
for the Court will be in a Position to determine the correct 438 valuation with reference to the objective standards or materials available to it.
In Urmilabala Biswas vs Binapani Biswas & ors., AIR 1938 Cal 161 a suit was instituted for declaration of title to Provident Fund money amounting to a definite sum with a prayer for injunction restraining the defendant from withdrawing the said money.
It was held that there was no real distinction between the right to recover money and the right to that money itself, and that the relief should have been valued at the Provident Fund amount to which title was claimed by the Plaintiff.
Thus, it appears that although in that case the suit was one under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, there was an objective standard which would enable the plaintiff and the Court too to value the relief correctly and, in such a case, the Court would be competent to direct the plaintiff to value the relief accordingly.
In Kishori Lal Marwari vs Kumar Chandra Narain Deo and another, AIR 1939 Patna 572 a question arose as to the valuation of a suit for injunction restraining a decree holder from executing his decree on the ground that the decree was collusive and obtained by fraud and, therefore, void and incapable of execution.
It was held by the Patna High Court that the plaintiff must value his suit according to the amount of decree and must pay ad valorem court fee on such amount.
In this case also, there was a positive objective standard for the valuation of the suit.
We may now refer to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur vs Radhashyam Marwari & Ors., AIR 1940 Cal 482.
But, before we refer to the decision, we may point out that by the Bengal Amendment Act VII of 1935, a new section 8 C has been inserted in the Court Fees Act.
Section 8 C provides that if the Court is of opinion that the subject matter of any suit has been wrongly valued, it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation and may hold such enquiry as it thinks fit for such purpose.
In Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur 's case (supra), it has been observed that although a satisfactory valuation may not be possible in the majority of the cases falling under section 7(iv), when once the Court has formed the opinion that the plaintiff 's estimate is wrong, it becomes the duty of the Court to estimate a correct and reasonable valuation of the relief claimed and it is for the Court to decide on the merits of each particular case whether the provisions of section 8 C should be invoked for the purpose of revising the plaintiff 's valuation.
Further, it has been observed that if the relief claimed is impossible to value, the Court is, of course, not in a position to say that such relief has been wrongly valued and there is consequently no scope for the operation of section 439 8 C, but in a suit where it is sought to set aside a decree, such valuation, although difficult, is not impossible.
In a suit to set aside a decree prima facie the value of the relief claimed by the plaintiff would be the value of the decree and the onus would clearly lie on him to show that the relief should be valued at some smaller amount.
It thus follows from the above decision that if the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff 's estimate is wrong, it becomes the duty of the Court to estimate a correct and reasonable value of the suit.
If, however, the Court is not in a position to decide the correct value of the suit, it has to accept the value that has been put the plaintiff on the relief claimed.
In Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur 's case (supra), there was an objective standard of valuation, namely, the decree which was souyht to be set aside.
Thus, where there are objective standards of valuation or, in other words, the plaintiff or the Court can reasonably value the relief correctly on certain definite and positive materials, the plaintiff will not be permitted to put an arbitrary valuation dehors such objective standards or materials.
Mr. Sorabjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, has strenuously urged that, in the instant case, the respondent has valued the suit most arbitrarily according to her whims.
It is submitted by him that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff cannot put an arbitrary valuation on the relief claimed by him.
Much reliance has been placed by him on a few decisions of this Court which will be referred to presently.
In Meenaakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, ; this Court made the following observation: "The plaintiff is required to state the amount at which he values the relief sought.
In suits for accounts it is not possible for the plaintiff to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to for, as in the present case, when the plaintiff asks for accounting regarding the management by a power of attorney agent, he might not know the state of affairs of the defendant 's management and the amount to which he would be entitled to on accounting.
But it is necessary that the amount at which he values the relief sought for should be a reasonable estimate.
" That observation has been made by this Court with reference to 440 the special provision, namely, section 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and XIV of 1955.
Section 35(1) provides that in a suit for accounts, fee shall be computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint.
Section 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and is different from section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act.
While under section 7(iv), the court fee is payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal, under section 35(1), the court fee shall be computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint.
In Meenakshisundram 's case (supra) the plaintiff had given a detailed estimate in the plaint and this Court was satisfied that the estimate was quite adequate and reasonable.
In Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, it has been laid down by this Court that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the relief sought in the plaint and such valuation both for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted.
Further it has been observed that it is only in cases where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same.
In that case, the plaintiff had valued the lease hold interest on the basis of the rent and such valuation was held to be reasonable and not demonstratively arbitrary.
In making the above observation, this Court has placed reliance upon its earlier decision in Meenakshisundram 's case (supra) which, as noticed above, related to section 35(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and .
But one significant fact that is to be noticed in the case is that there is an objective standard of valuation, that is, the rent of the lease hold interest.
It may be reiterated that when there is an objective standard of valuation, to put a valuation on the relief ignoring such objective standard, might be a demonstratively arbitrary and unreasonable valuation and the Court would be entitled to interfere in the matter.
Another decision of this Court on which much reliance has been placed by the appellants is the case of Abdul Hamid Shamsi vs Abdul Majid & ors, JT It was also a suit for accounts and came under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act.
It has been observed as follows: VINEET 441 "It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit.
The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation.
Ordinarily the Court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chose, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter.
If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard.
In such a case it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation.
The cases of some of the High Courts which have taken a different view must be held to be incorrectly decided.
" We are also of the view that the plaintiff cannot whimsically choose a ridiculous figure for filing the suit most arbitrarily where there are positive materials and/or objective standards of valuation of the relief appearing on the face of the plaint.
These materials or objective standards will also enable the Court to determine the valuation for the purpose of order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Indeed, in Abdul Hamid Shamsi 's case, it has been noticed by this Court that the plaintiff has laid a claim to a sum of Rs1,26,796.72, besides another sum of over Rs.84,000 as his share in the profit for a particular period by reference to the proceeding of the Incom Tax Department mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint.
Further, a copy of the profit and loss account for the calendar year 1979 was annexed by the plaintiff to the additional affidavit filed on his behalf before this Court, which also gave positive indication as to the valuation of the relief.
The plaintiff in that case valued the suit without making any reference whatsoever to those materials or objective standards available to him and in the context of these facts, this Court made the above observation.
But, if there be no material or objective standard, the plaintiff 's valuation has to be accepted.
It is however, urged by Mr. Sorabjee that such an objective standard or positive material appears on the face of the plaint.
Our attention has been drawn to paragraph 33 of the plaint where it has been stated by the plaintiff that on rendition of accounts, the plaintiff estimates that approximately a sum of Rs.25 lakhs to 30 lakhs would become due to her share.
It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that in view of such a statement in the plaint, the respondent should have valued the relief for rendition of accounts at Rs.25 lakhs.
We are unable to accept the contention.
The statement does not, in our opi 442 nion, constitute any objective standard of valuation or a positive material from which it can be said with any amount of certainty that the valuation of the relief for accounts should be at the sum of Rs.25 lakhs.
The respondent was not required to make such a statement in the plaint.
It is the wishful thinking of the respondent that on account being taken, she would be entitled to such a huge amount.
The respondent has not given in the plaint any material in support of the estimate of Rs.25 lakhs to Rs.30 lakhs to her share.
As has been stated already, this is no material at all on which any reliance can be placed for the purpose of valuation of the relief.
In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Lahore High Court in Atma Ram Charan Das vs Bisheshar Nath Dina Nath, AIR 1935 Lahore 689.
In that case also the question was whether the plaintiff had correctly valued the relief for the rendition of accounts.
in the plaint, the plaintiff stated that a sum of Rs.8,000 was due to him from the defendants, but he valued the suit for purposes of jurisdiction and court fee at Rs.5000 tentatively.
It was .
held that the plaintiff could not be prejudiced or damnified merely because he added to the plaint a computation which was unnecessary for him to live.
We have considered the facts and circumstances of the case and also the legal position and, in our view, the valuation of the relief for the rendition of accounts under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act is neither unreasonable nor it is demonstratively arbitrary.
In the circumstances, the appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.5,000.
R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The respondent plaintiff filed a suit in the High Court against the appellants inter alia for dissolution of partnership and for accounts.
The plaintiff valued the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.25 lakhs and for the purpose of court fee at Rs.500.
The appellants raised a preliminary objection as to the valuation of the suit contending that the relief sought for in the suit had been grossly undervalued and the Court should reject the plaint under order VII, Rule 11(b), Civil Procedure Code.
The learned Single Judge overruled the preliminary objection and held that the suit was not undervalued.
The Division Bench in dismissing the appeal; followed a Full Bench decision of the same High Court wherein it was observed that paragraph (iv) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act gave the right to the plaintiff in any of the suits mentioned in the clauses of that paragraph to place any value that he liked on the relief he sought, subject, however, to any rule made under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, and the Court had no power to interfere with the plaintiff 's valuation.
Before this Court, the appellant contended (1) that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff could not value the suit most arbitrarily according to her whims and (2) that an objective standard or positive material 432 appeared on the face of the plaint and the valuation of the relief ignoring such objective standard was demonstratively arbitrary.
Dismissing the appeal it was, ^ HELD: (1) The suits which are mentioned under section 7(iv) are of such nature that it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation.
Indeed, the Legislature has not laid down any standard of valuation in the Court Fees Act.
[435B C] (2) It is apparent from Rule 4(i) of the Rules framed by the Punjab High Court under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, which are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi, that valuation for the purposes of Court Fee and jurisdiction is not the same.
Under these Rules, the value of suit for accounts for purposes of court fee will have to be determined by the plaintiff.
[434G H] (3) It is manifestly clear from the provision of order VII, Rule 11 (b), that a Court has to come to a finding that the relief claimed has been undervalued which necessarily means that the Court is able to decide and specify proper and correct valuation of the relief.
But ordinarily it is not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determine the value of the relief in a suit for accounts simpliciter and the Court has no other alternative than to accept plaintiff`s valuation tentatively.
[435G H; 436B C] (4) Where there are objective standard of valuation or, in other words, the plaintiff or the Court can reasonably value the relief correctly on certain definite and positive materials, the plaintiff will not be permitted to put an arbitrary valuation dehors such objective standards or materials.
[439C D] (5) The plaintiff cannot whimsically choose a ridiculous figure for filling the suit where there are positive materials and/or objective standards of valuation of the relief appearing on the face of the plaint.
These materials or objective standards will also enable the Court to determine the valuation for the purpose of Order VlI, Rule 11(b), of the Code of Civil Procedure.[441C D] (6) The valuation of the relief in the instant case, for the rendition of accounts under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act.
is neither unreasonable nor it is demonstratively arbitrary.[442E] 433 Smt.
Sheila Devi & Ors.
vs Shri Kishan Lal Kalra & Ors., ILR 1974 Delhi 491; section Rm.
Sathappa Chettiar vs section Rm.
Ramanathan Chettiar, 119581 SCR 1024; Urmilabala Biswas vs Binapani Biswas, AIR 1938 Cal 161; Kishori Lal Marwari vs Kumar Chandra Narain Deo, AIR 1939 Patna 572; Nalini Nath Mallik Thakur vs Radhashyam Marwari, AIR 1940 Cal 482; Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar; , ; Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, [1987] 4 SCC; Abdul Hamid Shamsi vs Abdul Majid, JT and Atma Ram Charan Das vs Bisheshar Nath Dina Nath, AIR 1935 Lah 689 referred to.


judgement:
it Petition (Civil) Nos. 455, 597, 635, 636, 777/1986, 1518, 1686/1987, 77, 78 and 395 of 1988.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Govinda Mukhoty and Mrs. Rekha Pandey for the Petitioners.
Madhusudan Rao, Mahabir Singh, M. Satya Narayan Rao and C.V.S. Rao for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 415 SINGH, J.
The petitioners in all these ten writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India have raised grievance of discrimination against the State of Haryana in not following the doctrine of "equal work equal pay".
The petitioners are working as instructors under the Adult and Non formal Education Scheme under the Education Department of Haryana.
The object of the Non formal Education and Adult Education Scheme is to impart literacy (functional and awareness) to the adult illiterates in age group of 15 35 years and to provide literacy to the children in the age group of 5 15 years who are drop outs from the primary and middle school level or who never joined any regular school.
A number of Adult Education Centres have been opened in the State of Haryana, which are maintained under the Rural Functional Literacy Programme/Project (RELP) of the Central Government, administered by the State of Haryana although expenditure in respect of the project is borne by the Central Government.
The petitioners were appointed instructors to impart literacy to adult illiterates at these Centres on different dates.
The students who are taught by the petitioners are permitted to appear at the Vth standard (primary examinations) conducted by the Education Department of the State.
On passing the examination the students are issued a certificate of having passed primary examination.
On the basis of that certificate students are eligible for admission to 6th class in the regular schools maintained by the State Government.
The petitioners were appointed instructors by the District Adult Education officers of each district between 1978 to 1985 on the basis of selection held by a Selection Committee.
Initially the petitioners were paid a fixed salary of Rs. 150 per month but since April 1983 it has been increased to Rs.200 per month.
Minimum qualifications for being appointed an instructor is matric, many of the instructors are graduates while some of them also hold junior basic training certificates.
The petitioners are given a deliberate break of one day after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated temporary in service notwithstanding the fact that they have been continuously working ever since the date of their appointment.
There is another scheme known as Social Education scheme in the State of Haryana for imparting education to illiterates in the villages, the scheme is known as State Adult Education Programme also.
Under that scheme a number of social education centres have been opened.
The teachers employed under that scheme were known as squad teachers who run the centres.
In 1981 the head squad teachers and squad teachers were regularised as head teachers and teachers, and granted the benefit of pay scale applicable to regular 416 head masters and teachers of primary schools maintained by the State A Government.
The petitioners ' grievance is that although they are performing the same nature of functions and duties as performed by the squad teachers but they are denied the same scale of pay instead they are being paid a fixed salary of Rs.200 per month.
The relief claimed by the petitioners in all these petitions is identical in the following terms (a) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any appropriate writ, order or direction that the petitioners continue to be in the service of the respondents from the date of their initial appointment irrespective of their being a deliberate break in their services during the vacation period.
(b) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents to put the petitioners on regular pay scales to that of primary school teachers in the Education Department of Haryana plus other consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment and further direct the respondents to pay the petitioners the difference in arrears of salary accrued to them from the date of their initial appointment.
(c) Issue by appropriate writ, order or direction that the Department of Adult Education and Non formal Education is a permanent department of the State and the petitioners are regularised teachers in the Department appointed against sanctioned posts of instructors.
There is no dispute that the State of Haryana has framed its own scheme for imparting education to Adult illiterates in the villages, this scheme is known as the State Social Education Scheme.
Under this scheme the State of Haryana has opened social education centres in various Districts.
These centres have been functioning under the Department of Education where teachers known as squad teachers have been imparting literacy, functional and awareness among the illiterates.
The State of Haryana by its order dated 20.1.1981 regularised the services of the squad teachers working on ad hoc basis with effect from 1.1.1980 and sanctioned them pay scale of Rs.420 700, the scale applicable to primary school teachers in the State of Haryana.
The petitioners claim that the job and functions of the instructors are similar to squad teachers for running the social educa 417 tion centres, therefore they are also entitled to the same pay scale as granted to squad teachers.
At this stage it is necessary to note that supervisors are appointed to supervise the various centres at which instructors have been working under the Adult Education and Nonformal Education Scheme.
A number of supervisors filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution claiming same scale of pay as granted to head squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme.
Their claim was upheld by this Court in Bhagwan Dass vs State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC 634 and direction was issued sanctioning the same scale of pay to them as has been sanctioned to the head squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme.
The petitioners ' claim that as the supervisors who supervise their work have been granted pay scale applicable to head squad teachers the petitioners are also entitled to the pay scale applicable to squad teachers of the Social Education Scheme .
The main controversy raised on behalf of the respondents is that the instructors do not perform similar duties as performed by the squad teachers.
It was urged that the nature of duties of instructors are quite different than those performed by the squad teachers.
The petitioners have stated that the instructors are full time employees they take regular classes of students in the age group of S 15 years for two and a half hours and they further take classes for adult illiterates in the age group of 15 35 years for one and a half hours.
This is not disputed.
The petitioners further contended that in addition to four hours teaching work they have to motivate the children and the adults to join the centres for getting free education.
They are required to submit survey reports to the department every six months giving details as to how many children in the age group of 5 15 years are not going to the schools and how many adult persons are illiterate in their villages.
The petitioners further assert that adult education and nonformal education programme which is implemented by the instructors is similar to social education programme.
The instructors as well as squad teachers of social education scheme are appointed by the District Adult Education officer and both these class of persons function under the control and supervision of the Joint Director, Adult Education under the Directorate of Education of the State of Haryana.
The duties of instructors as contained in Chapter II of the Informal Education Instructors Guide published by the Haryana Government, Directorate of Education, are specified, a copy of the same has been annexed to the affidavit of Prem Chand one of the petitioners.
The duties of the instructors as prescribed therein are as under: 418 "DUTIES OF THE INSTRUCTOR (A) AS ORGANISER OF THE CENTRE 1.
To contact the villagers and their children who can be given education at the centre; 2.
To survey the villages to know who are the children who can be brought to the centre for teaching; 3.
To tell the villages about the aims and objects of education programme; and (4) To form local co ordinating bodies.
(B) AS A TEACHER 1.
To complete the syllabus in time and to create interest in the children by his teaching; 2.
The instructor must be aware of multiple class and group teaching systems; 3.
He should give examples of village life and to link it with education; and 4.
To make cultural activities a part of education.
(C) AS ADMISTRATOR OF THE CENTRE 1.
To contact such students who are irregular or late comers to the centre and to encourage them/their parents to send their children regularly to the centre; 2.
To keep records of the following: (i) personal details of children and their progress charts; (ii) Their timely evaluation; (iii) The details of admission of children from Informal Education Centre (3rd, 4th and 5th class) to formal school; 419 (iv) Copy of the monthly progress and copies of reports sent to the Supervising and Planning offices and copies of other reports.
" The aforesaid publication issued by the Government further states that Haryana is the first State which has integrated the two schemes, namely, Informal Education Programme and Adult Education Programme.
In the counter affidavit of J.K. Tandon, Assistant Director, Adult Education, it is stated that the instructors who are seeking equality with the squad teachers of Social Education Scheme are quite different.
The social education squad teachers are mobile in nature and they move from one village to another, after completing their job in a village whereas in the case of instructors they are employed from the same village and are from the nearby villages, the squad teachers are full time employees and teaching work is carried out by them for full day.
However, in his affidavit Shri Tandon could not dispute the duties as mentioned in the Informal Education Instructors Guide (extracted above).
Another counter affidavit has been filed by Sabira Khosla, Deputy Director, Adult Education, in that affidavit it is stated that the squad teachers are full time employees they work for 6 7 hours and besides working at night during 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. they do social work also.
Another additional affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents by S.R. Kaushal, Assistant Director of School Education.
In his affidavit he has stated that social education squad teachers perform various duties under the Social Education Programme which is divided into various divisions as under: 1.
Education division.
Debate and discussion division.
Sports division.
Cultural activity division.
Social service division.
It is stated that the squad teachers undertake various functions to supplement the programme under the aforesaid divisions.
He has pointed out the difference in the working of the instructors and the squad teachers.
The main point of distinction relied upon by him is 420 that the instructors are appointed part time while squad teachers and JBT teachers are in full time employment.
Social education squad teachers are transferable while instructors are not transferable.
A social squad teacher is required to teach 7 hours daily while an instructor is required to teach for four hours.
The social education scheme is permanent and squad teachers are working under a permanent scheme while the instructors are working under a temporary scheme.
We have given our anxious consideration to the material placed before us.
On a careful analysis of the same we find that the nature of duties and functions performed by instructors are similar to those performed by squad teachers.
The functions and duties of both classes of persons are primarily directed to advance the cause of education to bring social awareness among the people in the rural areas and to create interest in various social economic and educational activities.
Bringing adults to centre for educating them is a difficult task and to impart education to drop outs children is not an easy job.
One of the main duties of the instructors is to motivate the adults and drop out children to participate in the activities and to motivate them for taking education.
The instructors teach four hours a day and thereafter they have to do survey work and motivation work in addition to that the instructors are required to carry out additional duties which are assigned to them by the Department.
This is evident from the circular letter dated 4.3.1987 issued by the Joint Director, Adult Education (Annexure B) to the affidavit of Rajinder Singh petitioner.
The letter was circulated to all the instructors of adult and informal education, it reads as under: "Dear To bring adults in centres is a very difficult task.
This is possible only when our centres are attractive and adults feel happy to come to the centres and forget all their worries after coming to the Centre.
Instructors should behave with the adults in such a way that they think him their friend and guide.
The adults should be told that by hearing, reading the writing, they can know about the Government Scheme made for their benefit and progress.
Every Instructor is supposed to know about all such schemes so that they can guide their students.
The Adults should get the guidance from the instructors as to how they can get loans from various banks and cooperative Societies.
In the com 421 ing year we must equip the instructors with training so that they can fulfil the responsibility given to them.
In a meeting held at Karnal you were told about the facilities being given to widows and old persons.
You have to properly propagate the same.
I will be very grateful to you for circulating this letter to all the instructors and supervisors.
Office Dist.
Adult Education officer Karnal.
Page No. A d 4/3480 659, Karnal dated 13.3.1981.
One copy of the letter to be circulated to all instructors and supervisors of Adult and Informal Education for necessary action.
Dist Adult Education officer Karnal 13.2.1987.
" The aforesaid duties which are required to be performed by the instructors are in addition to their four hour teaching duty.
Further the instructors are required to organise sports like kho kho, kabadi and athletics, and to participate in the local functions and to motivate affluent villagers to give donations for the adult education scheme.
This is evident from a circular letter issued by the District Adult Education officer, Ambala on 12.11.1986 (Annexure to the affidavit of Rajender Singh).
Having regard to these facts and circumstances we are of the view that there is no difference in the nature of duties of the instructors and squad teachers and both of them carry out similar work under the same employer.
The doctrine of equal work equal pay would apply on the premise of similar work, but it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects.
If the two class of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility.
under similar working conditions the doctrine of 'equal work equal pay ' would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate one class with the other in paying salary.
The State is under a Constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work.
The respondents ' contention that the adult education scheme is temporary, as the posts are sanctioned on year to year basis and as such the instructors are not entitled to claim equality with the squad teachers as the scheme under which they work of a permanent nature is misconceived.
This contention was rejected by this Court in the case 422 of Bhagwan Dass (supra) while considering the case of supervisors.
A There is no doubt that instructors and squad teachers are employees of the same employer doing work of similar nature in the same department therefore the appointment on a temporary basis or on regular basis does not affect the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
Article 39(d) contained in Part IV of the Constitution ordains the State to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal work for both men and women.
Though Article 39 is included in the Chapter of Directive Principles of State Policy, but it is fundamental in nature.
The purpose of the Article is to fix certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination amongst the people doing similar work in matters relating to pay.
The doctrine of equal pay for equal work has been implemented by this Court in Ranjit Singh vs Union of India & Ors., ; ; Dhiren Chamoli and ors.
vs State of U.P., and Surinder Singh & Anr.
vs Engineer in Chief, CPWD & Ors.
, In view of these authorities it is too late in the day to disregard the doctrine of equal pay for equal work on the ground of the employment being temporary and the other being permanent in nature.
A temporary or casual employee performing the same duties and functions is entitled to the same pay as paid to a permanent employee.
The respondents ' contention that the mode of recruitment of petitioners is different from the mode of recruitment of squad teachers inasmuch as the petitioners are appointed locally while squad teachers were selected by the subordinate Service Selection Board after competing with candidates from any part of the country.
Emphasis was laid during argument that if a regular selection was held many of the petitioners may not have been appointed they got the employment because outsiders did not compete.
In our opinion, this submission has no merit.
Admittedly the petitioners were appointed on the recommendation of a Selection Committee appointed by the Adult Education Department.
It is true that the petitioners belong to the locality where they have been posted, but they were appointed only after selection, true that they have not been appointed after selection made by the Subordinate Service Selection Board but that is hardly relevant for the purposes of application of doctrine of "equal pay for equal work".
The difference in mode of selection will not affect the application of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" if both the class of persons perform similar functions and duties under the same employer.
Similar plea raised by the State of Haryana in opposing the case of supervisors in the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra) was rejected, where it was observed that if the State deliberately chose 423 to limit the selection of candidates from a cluster of a few villages it will not absolve the State for treating such candidates in a discriminatory manner to the disadvantage of the selectees once they are appointed provided the work done by the candidates so selected is similar in nature.
The recruitment was confined to the locality as it was considered advantageous to make recruitment from the cluster of villages for the purposes of implementing the Adult Education Scheme because the instructors appointed from that area would know the people of that area more intimately and would be in a better position to persuade them to take advantage of the Adult Education Scheme in order to make it a success.
The respondents ' plea that instructors are not transferable does not affect the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
The instructors are appointed locally to implement the Adult and Non formal Education Scheme because they are in a better position to motivate the adults and drop outs children for participating in the scheme.
An outsider may be handicapped in motivating the local residents for participating in the scheme.
As regards the difference in qualification is concerned it is true that the squad teachers possess JBT certificates and many of them are graduates but minimum qualification for squad teachers is also matric.
Similarly minimum qualification for instructors is matric but many of the petitioners are graduates and some of them are trained teachers possessing JBT certificates.
Great emphasis was laid on behalf of the respondent State that instructors are part time employees while squad teachers are full time employees.
Similar arguments were raised on behalf of the State in the case of Bhagwan Dass (supra) in resisting the claim of supervisor but the submission was rejected by this Court on the ground that having regard to the duties and functions which the supervisors are required to perform it was difficult to uphold the plea that he was a part time employee.
In the instant cases also we have already noticed the details of the duties and functions assigned to an instructor which normally say that the petitioners are required to teach at the centre for four hours and in addition to that they are required to motivate adults and drop outs children of the locality and to prepare survey reports, in addition to that they are further required to implement various schemes initiated by the Government, they are further required to organise sports, athletics programme and to persuade local affluent people for making donations.
They are required to educate the local residents with regard to the various welfare schemes initiated by the Government for the welfare of the residents of the rural areas.
Having regard to their duties and functions it is difficult to uphold the respondent 's plea that the instructors are 424 part time employees as they work only for four hours.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the instructors are entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to squad teachers.
We, accordingly, direct that the petitioners ' salary shall be fixed in the same pay scale as that of squad teachers.
The pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service on account of six months fresh appointments.
The petitioners will be entitled to increments in the pay scale in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have taken place.
We further direct that these directions shall be implemented with effect from September 1, 1985 as directed by this Court in the case of Bhagwan Das (supra).
The petitioners ' claim for regularising their services In the department cannot be accepted as admittedlly the project of Adult and Non formal Education is temporary which is likely to last till 1990.
We accordingly allow the writ petitions partly with costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000.
R.S.S. Petitions allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
In the State of Haryana two identical schemes are simultaneously in operation with the object of imparting literacy (functional and awareness) to adult illiterates and to provide literacy to children keeping away from school.
The first scheme, known as the Adult and Nonformal Education Scheme, is financed by the Central Government under its Rural Functional Literacy Programme/Project, but is administered by the State Government.
Under this scheme, a number of Adult Education Centres have been opened to impart literacy to adult illiterates.
The petitioners were appointed as Instructors at these centres on different dates.
They are being paid a fixed salary of Rs.200 per month.
The petitioners are given a deliberate break of one day in their service after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated temporary in service.
The second scheme, known as the State Social Education Scheme, has been framed by the State of Haryana.
Under this scheme Social Education Centres have been opened in the State and teachers known as Squad Teachers appointed at these centres to impart literacy among the illiterates.
The State regularised the services of the Squad Teachers working on ad hoc basis with effect from 1.1.1980 and sanctioned them pay scale of Rs.420 700, the scale applicable to primary school teachers in the State.
The Petitioners ' grievance is that although they are performing the same nature of functions and duties as performed by the Squad Teachers, they are denied the same scale of pay.
The petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ, order or direction to the respondents (i) to treat them in continuous service irrespective of the deliberate breaks in their service, (ii) to grant them regular pay scales of the Primary School Teachers plus consequential benefits from the date of their initial appointment, and (iii) to treat the Department of Adult Education and Non formal Education as a permanent department and to regularise the 412 services of the petitioners in that Department.
The claim of the petitioners is based on the doctrine of 'equal work equal pay '.
The petitioners contend that (i) the two schemes are similar and the nature of duties and functions performed by instructors are similar to those performed by squad teachers, (ii) the instructors as well as the Squad Teachers are both appointed by the District Adult Education officer and function under the supervision of the Directorate of Education, (iii) the instructors are full time employees and take regular classes of students in the age group of 5 15 years for two and a half hours and of adult illiterates in the age group of 15 35 years for one and a half hours.
In addition, they have to motivate the children and the adults to join the Adult Education Centres.
They are further required to submit regular survey reports.
The respondents, on the other hand, urge that the functions and duties of the instructors and the squad teachers are quite different.
The main points of distinction relied upon are that (i) the instructors are appointed part time while squad teachers are in full time employment, (ii) the squad teachers are transferable while instructors are not, (iii) the squad teachers are required to teach 7 hours daily while instructors are required to teach for four hours, (iv) the social education scheme is permanent and squad teachers are working under a permanent scheme while the instructors are working under a temporary scheme, and (v) the qualifications and the mode of recruitment of instructors are different; while the instructors are appointed locally, the squad teachers are selected by the Subordinate Service Selection Board after competing with candidates from any part of the country.
It is emphasized that if a regular selection was held, many of the Instructors may not have been appointed.
Earlier, this court had in Bhagwan Das vs State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC 634 upheld the claim of the Supervisors appointed to supervise the centres at which instructors have been working under the Adult and Non formal Education Scheme for the grant of the same scale of pay as has been sanctioned to the Head Squad Teachers of the Social Education Scheme.
In partly allowing the writ petitions, this Court, ^ HELD: (1) There is no difference in the nature of duties of the instructors and squad teachers and both of them carry out similar work under the same employer.
The functions and duties of both classes of 413 persons are primarily directed to advance the cause of education to bring social awareness among the people in the rural areas and to create interest in various social, economic and educational activities.
Bringing adults to centres for educating them is a difficult task and to impart education to dropout children is not an easy job.
One of the main duties of the instructors is to motivate the adults and dropout children to participate in the activities and to motivate them for taking education.
The instructors teach four hours a day and thereafter they have to do survey work and motivation work.
In addition to that, the instructors are required to carry out additional duties which are assigned to them by the Department.
Further, the instructors are required to organise sports like kho kho, kabadi and athletics, and to participate in the local functions and to motivate affluent villagers to give donations for the adult education scheme.
[420C E; 421D E] (2) Having regard to their duties and functions, it is difficult to uphold the respondents ' plea that the instructors are part time employees as they work only for four hours.
[421E] (3) If the two class of persons do same work under the same employer, with similar responsibility, under similar working conditions, the doctrine of 'equal work equal pay ' would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate one class with the other in paying salary.
[421F G] (4) The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work.
Article 39(d) contained in Part IV of the Constitution ordains the State to direct its policy towards securing 'equal pay for equal work ' for both men and women.
Though Article 39 is included in the Chapter of Directive Principles of State Policy, but it is fundamental in nature.
The purpose of the article is to fix certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination amongst the people doing similar work in matters relating to pay.
[421G; 422B C] (5) The doctrine of 'equal work equal pay ' would apply on the premise of similar work, but it does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects.
[421F] (6) A temporary or casual employee performing the same duties and functions is entitled to the same pay as paid to a permanent employee.
[422D] (7) The plea that instructors are not transferable does not affect 414 the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
The instructors are appointed A locally because they are in a better position to motivate the adults and dropout children for participating in the scheme, while an outsider may be handicapped in motivating the local residents.
[423C D] (8) Minimum qualification for the Instructors as well as the Squad Teachers is Matric, though many among both are graduates and some of them are trained teachers.
Though the Instructors belong to the locality where they have been posted, but they are appointed only after selection.
The difference in mode of selection will not affect the application of the doctrine of `equal work equal pay ' if both the class of persons perform similar functions and duties under the same employer.
[423D E] (9) The instructors are entitled to the same pay scale as sanctioned to squad teachers.
The pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service on account of six months fresh appointments.
The petitioners will be entitled to increments in the pay scale in accordance with law notwithstanding the break in service that might have taken place.
These directions shall be implemented with effect from September 1, 1985.
[424A C] 10.
The petitioners ' claim for regularising their services in the departments cannot be accepted as admittedly the project of Adult and Non formal Education is temporary.
[424C D] Bhagwan Dass vs State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC 634; Ranjit Singh vs Union of India, ; ; Dhiren Chamoli vs State of U.P., and Surinder Singh vs Engineer in Chief CPWD, & Ors., referred to.