judgement:
vil Appeal Nos.6230 and 6231 of 1983.
321 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.6.1983 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. Nos. 237 and 46 of 1983.
F.S. Nariman, A.K. Ganguli, S.N. Kacker, R.F. Nariman, A. Patnaik and M.M. Kshatriya for the Appellants.
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General and R.K. Mehta for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
On December 12, 1967, the State of Orissa granted 'a license for collection of Sal Seeds ' from eleven Forest Divisions to M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited.
The agreement provided for the sale and purchase of Sal Seeds failing on the ground naturally in the forests.
There was a stipulation that the company should establish solvent extraction units in the backward areas of Mayurbhanj and Sambalpur.
There was also an option for renewal of the lease for a further period of ten years.
It was later agreed that the period from October 1, 1967 to September 30, 1969 should be treated as experimental period and the lease should be deemed to have commenced from Octo ber 1, 1969 and to last for a period of ten years.
The Orissa Oil Industries Limited, a public limited company, was floated by the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and it was agreed that the State Government should also contribute to the share capital of the company.
It was agreed that the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limit ed should supply Sal Seeds to the two solvent extraction plants of the Orissa Oil Industries Limited, one set up at Bairangpur in Mayurbhanj District with a capacity to crush 21,000 M.T. Sal Seeds and the other at Sasan in Sambalpur District with a capacity to crush 21,000 M.T. sal seeds.
Thereafter on May 25, 1979, agreements renewing the leases for the purchase and removal of sal seeds from the eleven Forest Divisions for a further period of ten years from October 1, 1979 to September 30, 1989 were entered into by the Utkal Contractors and Joincry Private Limited and the Government of Orissa.
This was followed up by an agreement between the Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and the Orissa Oil Industries Limited for the supply of the entire collection of sal seeds from the eleven Forest Divi sions by the Utkal Contractors to the Orissa Oil Industries.
While so the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Bill 1981 was introduced in the Legislative Assembly of Orissa State.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons was as follows: 322 "Smuggling of various forest pro duces is increasing day by day.
The present provisions of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 for checking, hoarding and transport of forest produce are not adequate to bring the culprits to book.
The said Act is not adequate for imposition of any restrictions of control on trade in forest produce by framing rules thereunder.
Barring few items like sal seeds.
most of the important items of minor forest produce such as Mahua flower, Tamarind, Charmaji, Karanja and the like are grown in private holdings as well as in the forest areas owned by Government.
Unscrupulous trad ers take advantage of this situation and evade the law under the cover that the produce relates to private land and not to forests under the control of Government.
Instances of smuggling in such cases are too many and the smugglers are escaping with impunity because of absence of any legislation providing for State monopoly in forest produce.
Enactment of a separate legislation for the purpose is, therefore, absolutely necessary.
The Bill seeks to achieve the above purpose.
" It appears from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the object of the proposed Act was to prevent smuggling of forest produce like Mahua flowers, Tamarind, Charmaji, Karanja, etc.which were grown both in private holdings and Government forests.
The object of the legislation was to prevent smuggling in such forest produce and to provide for State monopoly therein.
It is seen that the Statement of Objects and Reasons expressly mentions sal seeds as a forest produce which is grown in Government Forests and not in private holdings.
The Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 received the assent of the President of India on August 21, 1981.
Under section 1(3) of the Act, the State Government is empowered from time to time to issue a notification specify ing the area or areas, the forest produce in relation to which and the date with effect from which the Act shall come into force.
Purporting to act under this provision, a notification was issued by the Government of Orissa on December 9, 1982 directing that the Act shall come into force at once in the whole of the State of Orissa in relation to sal seeds.
We are told that this is the only notification issued so far under section 1(3) of the Act, despite the fact that in the very Statement of Objects and Reasons it was expressly 323 recited that sal seeds was not a forest produce grown in Government forests.
In fact, we find that even after the commencement of the Act and before the issue of the Notifi cation, there were negotiations between the Utkal Contrac tors and Joinery Private Limited and the State Government for long term agreements for purchase _and sale of sal seeds in Athagarh and Puri Forest Divisions.
Such agreements were in fact entered into in relation to Parlakhemundi Forest Division between the State of Orissa and Indo East Extraction Limited.
On December 24, 1982, the Government refused to accept royalty from Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited in respect of Dhenkanal and Sambalpur Forest Divi sion on the ground that the Notification dated December 9, 1982 had the effect of rescinding the contract between the company and the Government.
Thereupon Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and Orissa Oil Industries Limited filed a writ petition in the Orissa High Court for a decla ration that the Notification dated December 9, 1982 did not have the effect of rescinding the contracts which they had with the State Government.
The Writ Petition was dismissed by the Orissa High Court.
The Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and Orissa Oil Industries Limited have filed Civil Appeal No. 6230 of 1983.
In another case, on similar facts the Orissa Minor Oil Private Limited have filed Civil Appeal No. 6231 of 1983.
On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted by Shri F.S. Nafiman in Civil Appeal No. 6230 of 1983 and Shri S.N. Kacker in Civil Appeal No. 6231 of 1983 that the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 had no applica tion to forest produce grown in Government forests.
The Act was aimed at creating a monopoly in forest produce in the Government.
Since the Government was already the owner of forest produce in Government forests all that was necessary to create a monopoly in all forest produce in the Government was to vest in the Government the exclusive right to pur chase forest produce grown in private holdings.
That was precisely what was done by the Orissa Forest Produce (Con trol of Trade) Act, 1981 according to the learned counsel.
It was further argued that even otherwise Explanation II to section 5(1) saved such contracts for the purchase of specified forest produce from Government forests also.
It was also brought to our notice that such contracts were entered into in pursuance of the avowed Industrial Policy of the Govern ment of Orissa.
Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional Solic itor General argued that Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 was a comprehensive Act intended to control and regulate trade in forest produce whether grown in Gov ernment forest or land held by private owners.
He urged 324 that the language of section 5(1)(a) was so wide as to be incapa ble of any construction other than to say that all contracts relating to trade in forest produce shall stand rescinded irrespective of whether the contract related to forest produce grown in Government forests or forest produce grown on private lands.
He urged that Explanation II, properly viewed, was an explanation to section 5(1)(b) only and not to section 5(1)(a) He argued that in any event the contract was for the collection and not for the purchase of forest produce and therefore, not saved by the explanation.
He further urged that the agents contemplated by section 4 of the Act were not agents to act on behalf of the Government.
They were "public agents", named as such, to carry on the activity of purchas ing and trading in specified forest produce.
They could purchase from and sell to the Government.
We may straight away say that it was never the case of the Government in the High Court that the character of the agents was as suggested by the learned Additional Solicitor General.
We do not, therefore, propose to consider the submission of learned Additional Solicitor General whatever justification there may be for the submission on the language of section 4.
The learned Additional Solicitor General further submitted that even if the agreement which Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited had with the Government was saved by Expla nation II, the further agreement by which the Utkal Contrac tors and Joinery Private Limited was required to supply sal seeds to Orissa Oil Industries Limited and the latter was required to purchase from the former was not saved by Expla nation II and therefore, no relief could be granted to the appellants.
This submission again is a new point raised for the first time in this Court.
We do not think we will be justified in permitting the Additional Solicitor General to raise the question at this stage.
Such a question was not raised in the High Court probably because the contract between Utkal Contractors and Joinery Private Limited and Orissa Oil Industries Limited appears to have been entered into at the behest of the Government.
The questions for consideration, therefore, are whether purchase of sal seeds grown in Government forests is outside the purview of the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 and whether, in any event, a contract such as the one with which we are concerned is saved by Explanation II to section 5(1).
We have already referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act.
We have noticed that ' the object was to prevent smuggling of those varieties of forest produce as were grown both in Government forests and private lands.
We also notice that it was expressly mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that such varieties of forest 325 produce were unlike sal seeds which were grown only in Government forests.
Even so we notice that the only notifi cation ever issued under the Act was in respect of sal seeds and no other forest produce.
We can only comment that curi ous indeed are the ways of the powers that be.
Section 1(3) of the Act declares that the Act shall come into force in such area or areas and in relation to such forest produce and on such date or dates as the State Gov ernment may, from time to time, by notification, specify in that behalf.
Section 2(c) defines 'forest produce ' and enumerates various items of forest produce.
One of them is sal seeds.
Section 2(d) defines "growers of forest produce" to mean "(i) in respect of forest produce grown on land owned by any person, the owner of such land, and (ii) in all other cases the State Government." Section 2(h) and 2(i) define 'specified area ' and 'specified forest produce ' in the following terms: "(h) "specified area" in relation to a specified forest produce means the area speci fied in the notification under sub section (3) of section 1 for such specified forest produce ;" "(i) "specified forest produce" in relation to a specified area means the forest produce specified in the notification issued under sub section (3) of section 1 for such specified area.
" Section 4 authorises the Government to appoint one or more agents for the purchase of and trade in specified forest produce in respect of one or more subdivisions of a speci fied area.
It is also provided that any person including a Gram Panchayat, a Cooperative Society or the State Tribal Development Corporation may be appointed as an agent.
Sec tion 5 is important and we are particularly concerned with subsections (1) and (3) of section 5 which may be fully extracted here.
They are as follows: "5.Restriction on purchase and transport and rescission of subsisting contracts (1) On the issue of a notification under sub section (3) of section 1 in respect of any area (a) all contracts for the purchase, sale, gathering or collection of specified forest produce grown or found in the said area shah stand rescinded, and 326 (b) no person other than (i) the State Government, (ii) an officer of the State Government autho rised in writing in that behalf, or (iii) an agent in respect of the unit in which the specified forest produce is grown or found shall purchase or transport any specified forest produce in the said area.
Explanation 1 "purchase" shall include pur chase by barter.
Explanation II Purchase of specified forest produce from the State Government or the aforesaid Government Officer or agent or a licensed vendor shall not be deemed to be a purchase in contravention of the provisions of this Act.
Explanation III A person having no interest in the holding who has acquired the right to collect the specified forest produce grown or found on such holding shall be deemed to have purchased such produce in contravention of the provisions of this Act.
(2) . . . . . . . (3) Any person desiring to sell any specified forest produce may sell them to the aforesaid Government Officer or agent at any depot situated within the unit wherein such produce was grown or found: Provided that State Government, the Government Officer or the agent shall not be bound to repurchase specified forest produce once sold.
(4). . . . . . . We notice that though section 5(1)(a) is in general terms and declares that 327 all contracts for the purchase and sale of forest produce shall stand rescinded and clause (b) bans purchase and transport of forest produce by any person other than the State Government or its officers or agents.
Explanation II is clear that purchase of specified forest produce from the State Government or its officers or agents is not to be deemed to be a purchase in contravention of the provisions of the Act.
Explanation III, we see, declares that a person having no interest in the holding but acquires the right to collect the specified forest produce grown or found on such holding shall be deemed to have purchased such produce in contravention of the provisions of the Act.
It is obvious that the reference to holding here is to land held by a person other than the Government and not to land owned by the Government.
We are primarily concerned in this case with the effect of section 5(1)(a) and (b) in the light of Explanation II.
Sub section (3) of section 5 also, we further notice, refers to sale to the officers, or agents of the Government by individuals and not sale by the Government or its offi cers or agents to individuals.
Section 5(2), which we have not extracted, is an excep tion to the ban imposed by section 5(1)(b) on transport of speci fied forest produce.
Section 5(2)(b) provides that notwith standing anything contained in sub section(1), any person may transport any specified forest produce within the prescribed limits from the place of purchase of any such produce to the place where such produce is required for bona fide use or for consumption.
It is further provided that any specified forest produce purchased from the State Government or any Officer or agent or any person for manufacture of goods within the State in which such specified forest produce is used as raw material or by any person for sale outside the State may be transported in accordance with the terms and conditions of a permit issued by the prescribed authority.
Section 6 provides for the constitution of an Advisory Committee in respect of each specified forest produce for each Revenue Division.
The object of the Committee is to advise the Government "in the matter of fixation of fair and reasonable price of each specified forest produce at which such produce may be purchased by the State Government or its authorised officers or agents when they are offered for sale in such division in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
" Section 7 enables the State Government, after consul tation with the Advisory Committee to fix the price at which specified forest produce may be purchased by it or by its officers or agents.
Again we see that the price to be fixed is in regard to authorised produce that may be purchased by the State Government and not forest produce that may be sold by the 328 State Government.
Section 8 enables the State Government to open depots for the convenience of the growers of specified forest produce and section 9 obliges the State Government to purchase at the price fixed under section 7 any specified forest produce offered for sale at the depot.
Section 10 enables growers of forest produce to get themselves registered.
Section 11 enables every manufacturer who uses any specified forest produce as a raw material and every trader or consum er to get himself registered.
Section 12 enables the State Government to dispose of specified forest produce purchased by the State Government or its officers or agents by sale or otherwise as the State Government may direct.
Section 13 bans any person from engaging himself in retail sale of any specified forest produce except under a licence granted under this section.
Section 15 provides for searches and seizures.
Section 16 provides for penalties.
Section 22(1) rovides "Nothing contained in the Orissa Forest Act, 14 of 1972 shall apply to specified forest produce in respect of matters for which provisions are made under this Act.
" In considering the rival submissions of the learned counsel and in defining and construing the area and the content of the Act and its provisions, it is necessary to make certain general observations regarding the interpreta tion of statutes.
A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it.
The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation.
The words of a statute take their colour from the reason for it.
How do we discover the reason for a statute? There are external and internal aids.
The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is presented to Parliament, the reports of Commit tees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamen tary Committees.
Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted.
Internal aids are the preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act.
Having discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead.
No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation.
Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed.
The setting and the pattern are important.
It is again important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily.
Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily.
Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for.
Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation, nor can it be assumed to make pointless legis lation.
Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely 329 to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done.
Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily.
Again, while the words of an enact ment are important, the context is no less important.
For instance, "the fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case falling literally within them should be governed by that statute, and the context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning" (see Halsbury, 4th edn. 44 para 874).
In Attorney General vsH.R.H. Prince Augustus, , Viscount Simonds said, "My Lords, the contention of the Attorney General was, in the first place, met by the bald, general proposition that, where the enacting part of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be cut down by the preamble, and a large part of the time which the hearing of this case occupied was spent in discussing authorities which were said to support that proposition.
I wish, at the outset, to express my dissent from it, if it means that I cannot obtain assistance from the preamble in ascertaining the meaning of the relevant enacting part.
For words, and partic ularly general words, cannot be read in isola tion; their colour and content are derived from their context.
So it is that I conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of a statute in its context, and I use context in its widest sense which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mis chief which I can, by those and other legiti mate means, discern that the statute was intended to remedy."
In Chertsey, U.D.C.v.Mixnam 's Properties, , Lord Reid said that the general effect of the au thorities was properly stated in Maxwell 's Interpretation of Statutes as follows: "General words and phrases ,therefore, however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act.
" Though no reference was made to Maxwell this Court in Em press Mills vs Municipal Committee, Wardha, ; stated the same proposition: 330 "It is also a recognised principle of construction that general words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense, must usually be con strued as being limited to the actual objects of the Act."
In Maunsell vs Olins, , Lord Wilber force observed, " . .I am not, myself, able to solve the problem by a simple resort to plain meaning.
Most language, and partic ularly all languages used in rent legislation, is opaque: all general words are open to inspection, many general words demand inspection, to see whether they really bear their widest possible meaning.
" But we think that when we rely upon rules of construc tion we must always bear in mind ' Lord Reid 's admonition in Maunsell vs Olins (supra) to the following effect: "Then rules of construction are relied on.
They are not rules in the ordinary sense of having some binding force.
They are our serv ants not our masters.
They are aids to con structions, presumptions or pointers.
Not infrequently one 'rule ' points in one direc tion, another in a different direction.
In each case we must look at all relevant circum stances and decide as a matter of judgment what weight to attach to any particular 'rule '.
" Bearing these broad rules in mind, we may now examine the Act and the argument.
The reason for the Act is not far to seek.
Earlier we have set out the Statement of Objects and Reasons.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons is explic it that the Act was proposed to be enacted to prevent smug gling of forest produce grown in Government lands under the guise of produce grown on private lands.
This was sought to be achieved, as stated in the preamble by the creation of a State monopoly.
Since the State was already the owner of the forest produce grown in Government land, what was necessary and sufficient to be done by the proposed legislation was to vest in the Government the exclusive right to purchase forest produce grown on private land.
We may now proceed to examine the scheme and the provisions of the Act to find out whether this was not precisely what was done.
At the outset, we notice that 'grower of forest produce ' is 331 defined to include the State Government but on an examina tion of the remaining provisions of the Act we find that the expression 'grower of forest produce ' is not found in any other provision except sec.5(2)(a) and section 10.
Section 5(2)(a) provides for the transport of produce by the grower of forest produce from a place within one unit to another place within the unit.
Section 10 requires every grower of specified forest produce to get himself registered in the prescribed manner.
Obviously neither section 5(2)(a) nor section 10 has any application to the Government.
Therefore, the cir cumstance that grower of forest produce is defined so as to include the Government appears to us to be of no consequence in determining whether the Act is applicable to forest produce grown on Government lands.
On the other hand, from the extracts and summary of the other provisions of the Act that we have given earlier, we find that section after section deals with purchase of forest produce which, in the circumstances, can only refer to purchase of forest produce grown on private holdings since there can be no question of or providing for the purchase by the Government of forest produce grown on Government lands.
Section 4 enables the appointment by the State Government of agents for the pur chase of and trade is specified forest produce.
Section 5(1)(b) refers to purchase or transport of specified forest produce by the State Government, its officers and agents.
Section 5(3) refers to sale of forest produce to the Govern ment, its officers or agents.
Section 7 refers to the fixa tion of price at which the Government, its officers or agents may purchase forest produce.
Section 8 enables the opening of depots for the purchase of forest produce by the Government, its officers and agents.
Section 9 deals with the obligation of the State Government, its agents and officers to purchase specified forest produce.
All these provisions, we see, deal with purchase of forest produce by the State Government.
As stated by us earlier, this can only be of forest produce grown in private holdings and not in Government forests.
The only provision which deals with sale of forest produce by the State Government is section 12 and that again is confined to the sale of specified forest produce purchased by the State Government, its officers or agents.
Thus, section 4, section 5(1)(b), section 5(3), section 7, section 8, section 9, section 10 and section 12, all deal with the forest produce grown in private holdings and all these provisions except sections 10 and 12 deal with purchase of forest produce by the Govern ment, its officers or agents.
Section 10, as we have already seen, deals with registration of growers of forest produce and section 12 with sale of forest produce purchased by the Government.
Thus none of these provisions deals with forest produce grown in Government lands nor is there any other provision in the Act which expressly deals with forest produce grown in Government lands.
The scheme of 332 the Act is, therefore, fully in tune with the object set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in the Preamble, namely, that of creating a monopoly in forest produce by making the Government the exclusive purchaser of forest produce grown in private holdings.
It was argued by the learned Additional Solicitor General that section 5(1)(a) was totally out of tune with the rest of the provisions and, while the rest of the provisions dealt with forest produce grown in private holdings, the very wide language of section 5(1)(a) made it applicable to all forest produce whether grown in private holdings or Government forests.
We do not think that it is permissible for us to construe section 5(1) (a) in the very wide terms in which we are asked to construe it by the learned Additional Solicitor General because of its wide language, as that would merely introduce needless confusion into the scheme of the Act.
Having scanned the object and the scheme of the Act, having examined each of the provisions of the Act textually and contextually, we do not think that it is proper for us to construe the words of section 5(1)(a) in their literal sense; we think that the proper way to construe section 5(1)(a) is to give a restricted meaning to the wide and general words there used so as to fit into the general scheme of the Act.
Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) are connected by the conjunction 'and ', and having regard to the circumstances leading to the enactment and the policy and design of the Act, we think that clauses (a) and (b) must be construed in such a way as to reflect each other.
We have no doubt that the contracts relating to specified forest produce which stand rescinded are contracts in rela tion to forest produce grown in private holdings only.
If the very object of the Act is to create a monopoly in forest produce in the Government so as to enable the Government, among other things, to enter into contracts, there was no point in rescinding contracts already validly entered into by the Government.
Again section 5(1) does not bar any future contracts by the Government in respect of forest produce; if so, what is the justification for construing section 5(1)(a) in such a way as to put an end to contracts already entered into by the Government.
Viewing section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) together and in the light of the preamble and the Statement of Objects and Reasons and against the decor of the remain ing provisions of the Act, we have no doubt that section 5(1), like the rest of the provisions, applies to forest produce grown in private holdings and not to forest produce grown in Government lands.
One of the submissions of the learned Additional Solici tor General was that despite noticing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that 'sal seeds ' were grown in Govern ment lands only yet 'sal seeds ' were included in the defini tion of forest produce and this was a clear indication that forest produce grown in Government lands was 333 also meant to be dealt with by the Act.
We do not think that the mere inclusion of 'sal seeds ' in the definition of forest produce can lead to such consequences in the teeth of the several provisions of the Act.
Several species of forest produce were included in the definition of forest produce and among them 'sal seeds ' were also included so as to eliminate even the remote possibility of the existence of some stray private holdings in which sal seeds may have been grown.
In the view that we have taken it is unnecessary for us to consider the further submission that Explanation II to section 5(1) saves the present contract or t, hat Explanation II is an explanation only to section 5(1)(a) and not to section 5(1)(b).
We declare that the Act and the notification issued under the Act do not apply to forest produce grown in Government forests and that it was not therefore, open to the Govern ment to treat the contract dated May 25, 1979 as rescinded.
As a result of the attitude of the Government in treating the contract as rescinded from the date of the notification the appellants were not able to collect and purchase the sal seeds from the Government forests which they have taken on lease for a period of about four years.
The question arises whether any further relief in addition to declaration may be granted by us.
It was suggested on behalf of the appellants that their lease should be extended by another period of four years.
We do not think that it is permissible for us to extend the lease for a further period of four years in that fashion.
We can only leave it open to the parties to work out their rights in the light of the declaration granted by us.
We find that various interim orders were made from time to time.
The rights of the parties will naturally have to be worked out after taking into account the interim orders.
Civil Appeal No. 6231 is an appeal by other persons similarly placed as the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 6230 of 1983 in respect of a different contract.
Both the appeals are allowed with costs in the manner indicated above.
We mentioned at the outset that although several species of forest produce were included in the definition of forest produce under the Act, the only notification issued under the Act in respect of any specie of forest produce was in respect of sal seeds, an item in respect of which no notifi cation whatsoever was necessary if what was stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons was correct.
We are not a little surprised that the only occasion for using the ma chinery of Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 was to issue a notification in respect of sal seeds and not in respect of other forest produce, leaving an uneasy feeling with us that the notification was issued only with the object of putting an end to 334 these contracts solemnly entered into by the Orissa Govern ment for the avowed purpose of encouraging the setting up of certain industries in the State of Orissa.
The allegation of the appellants is that this has been done with a view to help certain industrialists outside the State.
We desire to express no opinion on this allegation.
P.S.S. Appeals allowed.

summary:
Sub section (1) of section 5 of the Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 provides that on the issue of a notification under sub section
(3) of section 1 in respect of an area (a) all contracts for the purchase, sale, gathering or collection of specified forest produce shall stand rescind ed, and (b) no person other than the State Government or its officers or agents shall purchase or transport any specified forest produce in the said area.
Explanation II thereto provides that purchase of specified forest produce from the State Government or its officers or agents is not to be deemed to be a purchase in contravention of the provisions of the Act.
The appellant company was granted a licence for collec tion, sale and purchase of sal seeds from Government forests on the stipulation that it would establish solvent extrac tion units in backward areas.
The appellant company was to supply sal seeds to these extraction plants.
The agreement was renewed for a further period of ten years from October 1, 1979.
The State Government by a notification dated Decem ber 9, 1982 issued under sub section
(3) of section 1 brought the Act into force immediately in the whole of the State in relation to sal seeds.
Thereafter it refused to accept royalty from the appellant on the ground that the notification had the effect of rescinding the contract between the company and the Government.
318 A writ petition filed by the company for a declaration that the abovesaid notification did not have the effect of rescinding their contract with the State Government, was dismissed by the High Court.
In the appeals to this Court it was contended for the appellants that the Act had no application to the produce grown in Government forests, that the Act was aimed at creating a monopoly in forest produce in the Government by vesting in it the exclusive right to purchase forest produce grown in private holdings, and that even otherwise Explana tion II to section 5(1) saved such contracts for the purchase of specified forest produce from Government lands also.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the very wide language of section 5(1)(a) made it applicable to all forest produce whether grown in private holdings or Government forests, and that the contract being for collection and not for purchase of forest produce it was not saved by the Explanation II to section 5(1).
Allowing the appeals, the Court, HELD: 1.
The Orissa Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 and the notification issued under it do not apply to the forest produce grown in Government forests.
It was not, therefore, open to the Government to treat the con tracts with the appellants as rescinded.
[333C] 2.
The scheme of the Act is fully in tune with the object set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in the Preamble, namely, that of creating a monopoly in forest produce by making the Government the exclusive pur chaser of forest produce grown in private holdings.
Sections 4, 5(1)(b), 5(3), 7, 8 and 9 deal with purchase of forest produce by the State Government.
This can only be of forest produce grown in private holdings and not in Government forests since there can be no question of or providing for the purchase by the Government of forest produce grown on Government lands.
The only provision in the Act which ex pressly deals with sale of forest produce by the State Government is section 12, and that again is confined to the sale of specified forest produce purchased by the State Govern ment.
The Act, therefore, cannot to said to have any appli cation to produce grown in Government forests.
[331H 332A, 331FG, EF, CD, F, 323E] 3.1 The safest guide to the interpretation of a statute is the reason for it, which can he discovered through exter nal and internal aids.
The external aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill is 319 presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary Commit tees.
Occasional excursions into the debates of Parliament are permitted.
Internal aids are the Preamble, the scheme and the provisions of the Act.
[328EF[ 3.2.
No provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be construed in isolation.
Every provision and every word must be looked at generally before any provision or word is attempted to be construed.
The setting and pat tern are important.
Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily.
It is neither expected to use unnecessary expressions, 'nor to express itself unnecessarily.
While the words of an enactment are important, the context is no less important.
The fact that general words are used in a statute is not in itself a conclusive reason why every case failing literally within them should be governed by that statute.
The context of an Act may well indicate that wide or general words should be given a restrictive meaning.
[328F 329B] Attorney General vs H.R.H. Prince Augustus, ; Chertsey, U.D.C.v.
Mixnam 's Properties, , Empress Mills vs Municipal Committee, Wardha, ; and Maunsell vs Olins, , referred to.
4.1 It is not permissible to the Court to construe the wide and general words of section 5(1)(a) in their literal sense as that would not be in consonance with the scheme of the Act.
The proper way to construe that provision is to give a restricted meaning to the wide language there used so as to fit into the general scheme of the Act.
[332B D] 4.2 Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) are connected by the conjunction 'and ', and having regard to the circumstances leading to the enactment and the policy and design of the Act, cls.(a) and (b) must be construed in such a way as to reflect each other.
Viewing section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) together and in the light of the Preamble and the Statement of Ob jects and Reasons and against the decor of the remaining provisions of the Act, it is apparent that section 5(1), like the rest of the provisions, applied to forest produce grown in private holdings and not to forest produce grown in Govern ment lands.
[332D, F G] 5.
The contracts relating to specified forest produce which, therefore, stood rescinded were contracts in relation to forest produce grown in private holdings only.
Since the very object to the Act was to create a monopoly in forest produce in the Government so as to enable the Government, among other things, to enter into contracts and since 320 section 5(1) does not bar any future contracts by the Government in respect of the forest produce, there was no justification in rescinding contracts solemnly entered into by the Govern ment for the avowed purpose of encouraging the setting up of certain industries in the State.
[332E, 334A] 6.
The object of the Act was to prevent smuggling of those varieties of forest produce as were grown both in Government forests and private lands.
It was expressly mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that such varieties of forest produce were unlike sal seeds which were grown only in Government forests.
Even so the only notifica tion ever issued under the Act was in respect of sal seeds and no other forest produce.
The mere inclusion of 'sal seeds ' in the definition of 'forest produce ' cannot in the teeth of the several provisions of the Act lead to the inference that forest produce grown in Government lands was also meant to be dealt with by the Act.
Several species of forest produce were included in the definition of forest produce and among them 'sal seeds ' were also included so as to eliminate even the remote possibility of the existence of some stray private holdings in which sal seeds may have been grown.
[324G 325A, 333AB] 7.
The circumstance that 'grower of forest produce ' is defined so as to include the Government is of no consequence in determining whether the Act is applicable to forest produce grown on Government lands.
The expression 'grower of forest produce ' is not found in any other provision except section 5(2)(a) and section 10.
Section 5(2)(a) provides for the transport of forest produce by the grower from a place within one unit to another place within the unit.
Section 10 requires every grower of specified forest produce to get himself registered in the prescribed manner.
Neither section 5(2)(a) nor section 10 has, therefore, any application to the Government lands.
[331B, A] 8.
It is not necessary to consider the submission that Explanation II to section 5(1) saves the present contract or that Explanation I1 is an explanation only to section 5(1)(a) and not to section 5(1)(b).
[333B] [It is not permissible for the Court to extend the period of lease of the appellants by way of relief for the business lost.
The parties to work out their rights in the light of the various interim orders and the declaration granted by the Court. ] [333E]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2841 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.4.
1986 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil Revision No. 11 of 1981.
359 VM.
Tarkunde, section Atreya, Virendra Bandhu and Indra Makwana for the Appellants.
T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and S.K. Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J.
This appeal on a certificate granted under Article 134A of the Constitution of India is at the instance of the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased judg ment debtor and is directed against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court whereby the learned Judge upheld the order dated December 12, 1980 of the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, holding that in view of Article 136 of the the application of the decree holder auction purchaser for delivery of possession of the property auctioned purchased by him was maintainable and not barred by limitation.
The certificate on the basis of which the appeal is filed is not competent in view of clause (3) of Article 133 of the Con stitution, we have however treated the appeal as one under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The special leave to file the appeal is granted by us.
The mortgagee decree holder in execution of the final decree for mortgage himself purchase the disputed property in the auction sale held on July 14, 1978 at a sum of Rs.30,000.
On September 20, 1978, the judgment debtor Ganpat Singh, since deceased, the predecessorin interest of the appellants, filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the sale.
Two other petitions of objections were filed by one Chiranji Lal and by another judgment debtor, Mst.
Abhey Kanwar.
All these objections including the application of Ganpat Singh under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were dismissed for default and, consequently, the sale was con firmed by the learned district Judge, the executing court, on January 2, 1979.
On July 17, 1980, that is, more than one year after the sale was confirmed, the decree holder auction purchaser filed an application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure for delivery of possession of the property auctioned purchased by him.
The said application was opposed by the judgment debtor Ganpat Singh on the ground that as the application was filed more than one year after the confirmation of sale, it was barred by limitation under Article 134 of the . 360 It was held by the learned District Judge that in view of the provision of Explanation I1 of section 47 which was inserted in the Code by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1974, Article 136 prescribing a period of limitation of 12 years for the execution of the decree and not Article 134 of the would apply.
In that view of the matter, the learned District Judge held that the application was not barred by limitation as contended on behalf of the judgment debtor and directed issuance of the warrant of possession in respect of the disputed property.
Being aggrieved by the said order of the learned Dis trict Judge, the judgment debtor filed a revisional applica tion under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before a learned Single Judge of the High Court.
The view expressed by the learned District Judge commended to the learned Judge of the High Court.
The learned Judge took a similar view that after the insertion of Explanation II to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree would be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree was passed and all questions relating to the delivery of possession of the property to such purchaser of immovable property would be questions relating to the execution of the decree and, as such, Arti cle 136 and not Article 134 of the would apply.
Further, the learned Judge held, inter alia, that after the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 134 and Article 136 of the became so incon sistent that both could not exist and, relying upon the principle that in cases where two articles are equally applicable, the rule that the article which keeps alive the right of the party must be preferred, the learned Judge held that Article 134 stood impliedly repealed of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 136 of the .
In that view of the matter, the learned Judge dismissed the revisional application of the judgment debtor under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The learned Judge, however, granted a certificate to the appel lants for appeal to this Court under Article 134A of the Constitution of India.
Hence this appeal.
At this stage, it may be stated that the parties have settled their disputes after the hearing was concluded, the respondent decree holder having agreed to relinquish all his rights as the auction purchaser upon the appellants paying him a sum of Rs. 1,28,000.
The terms of such settlement will be stated hereafter.
In spite of such settlement, we think we should consider the view expressed by the learned dis trict Judge and the learned Single Judge of the High Court 361 that after the amendment of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code will be governed by Article 136 of the and that, as held by the learned Judge of the High Court, Article 134 stands impliedly repealed by section 47 read with Article 136 of the .
Both the learned District Judge and the learned Judge of the High Court have been greatly influenced by the fact of the insertion of Explanation II under section 47 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976.
Explanation II provides as follows: "Explanation II.
(a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree ' is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execu tion, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.
" Under clause (a) of Explanation II the auction purchaser shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed.
Under clause (c), all questions relating to the delivery of possession shall be deemed to be ques tions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of section 47.
Section 47 bars determination of any question relating to the execu tion, discharge or satisfaction of the decree in a suit.
Such question shall be determined by the executing court.
As has been already noticed, in view of clause (a) of Explana tion II, the auction purchaser shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed and under clause (b) of Explanation II all questions relating to delivery of possession shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.
Such questions, therefore, are to be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
Section 47 itself has nothing to do with the question of limitation.
Article 136 prescribes a period of limitation of 12 years for the execution of a decree from the date on which the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making any 362 payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place.
After a decree is out into execution within the period of limitation under Article 136, questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree may arise and such questions including the question as to the delivery of possession shall be determined by the executing court.
When a property is sold in execution of a decree, an application for setting aside the sale may be made under Rules 89, 90 or 91 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Proce dure by the persons and on grounds as mentioned therein.
Such an application has also to be made within the pre scribed period of limitation of sixty days from the date of sale under Article 127 of the .
Article 134 prescribes a limitation of one year for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree.
The limitation of one year will be computed from the date the sale becomes absolute.
Such an application for delivery of possession can be filed only after the decree is put into execution within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the .
The periods of limitation prescribed by Articles 136 and 134 are for two different purposes, the former being for the execution of a decree for possession in respect of which decree is passed and the latter for an application for delivery of possession of immovable property which is purchased in the course of execution of a decree.
The two articles have nothing in common for their operation and it is not readily understandable how the two articles stand in conflict with each other.
An application for deliv ery of possession of immovable property purchased in execu tion cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as an application for execution of a decree for possession of property so as to invoke the provision of Article 136 of the .
Merely because the auction purchaser will be deemed to be a party in the suit in which the decree has been passed, as provided in clause (a) of Explanation II to section 47 of the Code, and by virtue of clause (b) of Explanation II all questions relating to delivery of posses sion of the property shall be deemed to be questions relat ing to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of section 47, an application for deliv ery of possession under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be equated with an application for the execution of a decree for possession so as to apply 12 years ' period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the .
If it is held that Article 136 would apply to an appli cation for delivery of possession under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code, it may lead to an absurdity.
Suppose a decree is put into execution on the last day of limitation of 12 years.
Obviously, the sale of any property in 363 execution of the decree will take place after the expiry of 12 years and, therefore, no application for delivery of possession of the property of the auction purchaser will be maintainable as 12 years have already passed from the date of the decree.
If Article 136 is held to apply to an appli cation for delivery of possession, then for the very same reason it will also apply to an application for setting aside sale.
In other words, an application for setting aside sale can also be made within a period of 12 years from the date of decree irrespective of the date of sale, which is absurd on the face of it.
It appears that the learned Judge of the High Court has misunderstood the scope of the provision of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that of the provisions of Articles 134 and 136 of the .
It may be that before the amendment of section 47 of the Code, an auction purchaser could file a suit for recovery of posses sion of the property within 12 years from the date of sale, but in view of the amendment of section 47 of the Code such a suit cannot be filed.
But that is no ground for holding that Article 136 of the would apply to an application for delivery of possession.
Under the old Limi tation Act of 1908, an application for delivery of posses sion could be made within three years from the date on which sale became absolute as prescribed by Article 180 of that Act, but under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1953 such an application can be made within one year from the date on which sale became absolute.
Thus the period of limitation for delivery of possession of property purchased at the court sale has been reduced to a considerable extent, but that also cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of interpretation of the provisions of the Limitation Act.
It is for the Legislature to prescribe the period and the Court is only to see whether any particular application has been filed within that period.
In the instant case, as stated already, the scope of Articles 134 and 136 and their subject matters being completely different, the question of implied repeal of Article 134, as held by the learned Judge of the High Court, does not at all arise.
We would, accord ingly, hold that Article 134 will apply to an application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the auction purchaser for delivery of possession of the property sold in execution of a decree.
It may be mentioned here that Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the decree holder respondent, has not made any attempt to support the judgment of the High Court on the ground of amendment of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or on the ground of implied repeal of Article 134 of the Limitation Act by 364 the amended section 47 of the Code read with Article 136 of the Limitation Act.
On the contrary, it is contended by him that there can be no doubt that limitation under Article 134 commences from the date when the sale becomes absolute.
He has, however, sought to support the conclusion of the learned Judge of the High Court that the application for delivery of possession of the property is not barred by limitation on another groups which will be stated presently.
Under Order XXI Rule 92 where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91 where such application is made and disallowed, the court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.
It is submitted by the learned Counsel that it is not correct that the sale becomes absolute only under the circumstances as mentioned in Rule 92, and that apart from the provisions of Rules 89, 90 and 91 of Order XXI of the Code, an auction sale can be challenged on grounds other than those mentioned in the said Rules.
Counsel submits that if an application for setting aside sale is made and disposed of, the sale will become absolute after the disposal of such application, even though the application is not one as contemplated by Rules 89, 90 or 91 of Order XXI of the Code.
In this connection, the learned Counsel has drawn our attention to an application for setting aside the sale made by the 4th judgment debtor on January 27, 1979 on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90, or 91.
But the said application was dismissed by the learned district Judge on July 21, 1979.
It is submitted by the learned Counsel that on the disposal of that application on July 21, 1979, the sale became absolute and the decree holder respondent having filed the application for delivery of possession on July 17, 1980, that is, within one year from July 21, 1979, it should be held that the application was quite within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act.
In support of the contention, the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani Saha and others vs Anarjan Bibi and others, AIR 1984 PC 134.
In that case, in interpreting the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in Article 180 of the old Limitation Act, '1908, the Privy Council observed as follows: "Upon consideration of the sections and orders of the Code, their Lordships are of opinion that in construing the meaning of the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in article 180, Lim.
Act, regard must be had not only to the provisions of O. 21.
R. 92(1) of the schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, but also to the other material sections and 365 orders of the Code, including those which relate to appeals from orders made under O. 21, R. 92(1).
The result is that where there is an appeal from an order of the Subordinate Judge, disallowing the application to set aside the sale, the sale will not become absolute within the meaning of article 180, Lim.
Act, until the disposal of the appeal, even though the subordinate Judge may have con firmed the sale, as he was bound to do, when he decided to disallow the above mentioned application.
We may now consider the above contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent decree holder.
It has been al ready noticed that on January 2, 1979 while dismissing the application of the judgment debtor under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned District Judge also confirmed the sale.
The said order of the learned District Judge confirming the sale is binding not only on the judgment debtor, who made the application under Order 21 Rule 90, but also on all other parties to the execution proceedings including the 4th judgment debtor.
Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the application filed by the 4th judgment debtor praying for the setting aside of the sale on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90 and 91, was not maintainable after the confirmation of the sale.
Indeed, by the order dated July 21, 1979 the learned Dis trict Judge while dismissing the application of the 4th judgment debtor observed that after the confirmation of the sale, the court was not authorised to entertain the applica tion.
We do not think that the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani 's case (supra) lends any support to the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent decree holder that an auction sale can be set aside even on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89, 90 and 91.
All that has been ruled in that decision is that in constru ing the meaning of the words "when the sale becomes abso lute" in Article 180 of the old Limitation Act, regard must be had not only to the provision of Order XXI Rule 92(1) of the Code, but also to the other material sections and orders of the Code including those which relate to appeals from orders made under Order XXI Rule 92(1).
No provision of the Code has been pointed out to us under which a sale can be set aside apart from the provisions of Rules 89, 90 and 91 of order XXI of the Code.
There can be no doubt that when an application for setting aside the sale is made, the order passed by the executing court either allowing or dismissing the application will be final and effective subject to an appeal that may be made under the provisions of the Code.
It is inconceivable that even though no appeal has been filed against an order dismissing an applica 366 tion for setting aside the sale, another application for setting aside the sale can be made without first having the order set aside.
Such an application will be barred by the principle of res ludicata.
In the circumstances, there is no merit in the contention made on behalf of the respondent decree holder that the application for delivery of posses sion having been made within one year of the dismissal of the application of the 4th judgment debtor for setting aside the sale, it was within the period of limitation as pre scribed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act.
In Kamakshi Ammal and another vs Arukkani Ammal and another, AIR 1957 Mad. 440, which has been relied on by the learned Counsel for the decree holder respondent, there was an application under Order XX1 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure by one Nagammal who claimed under a possessory mortgage and that claim was allowed on June 14, 19 13.
The decree holder filed a suit to set aside this claim as she was entitled to do under the Code before it was amended in 1976.
The suit terminated in a compromise decree on August 15, 1944 and the application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code was made by the decree holder on August 14, 1947, that is, within three years from the date when the claim suit was disposed of.
It was held by the Madras High Court that the sale could not be said to have become absolute till the claim suit was finally disposed of on August 15, 1944.
In holding that, the Madras High Court has placed reliance upon the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani 's case (supra) to the effect that though the third column of Arti cle 190 of the old Limitation Act refers to the date when the sale becomes absolute, that clause must be read not only with the provision of Order XXI Rule 92(1) of the Code, but also with the other material provisions and orders of the Code.
In our opinion the above decision of the Madras High Court in Kamakshi Ammal 's case does not support the conten tion of the respondent decree holder.
Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code is a material provision relating to any claim that may be preferred or any objection that may be made to the attachment of any property in execution of a decree.
Any sale that is held would, undoubtedly, be subject to the order that may be passed under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code and, thereafter, as provided in the Code before its amend ment in 1976, the result of a suit that may be filed chal lenging such order passed by the executing court under Order XXI Rule 58.
But after a sale becomes absolute on the dis missal of the application of the judgment debtor 's claim for setting aside the sale, another application for setting 367 aside the sale by the judgment debtor is not maintainable and the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 134 of the Limitation Act cannot be computed from the date of the dismissal of the second application for setting aside the sale.
The decision of the Madras High Court in Dadrabahu Nainar vs Devendra Nainar, ILR , relied on by the respondent decree holder, does not appear to be of any assistance to him.
In that case, the Madras High Court has only followed the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani 's case (supra).
In an earlier decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Muthu Korakkai Chetty vs Madar Ammal, ILR 43 Mad.
185 FD, also relied on by the respondent decree holder, what happened was that after an auction sale had been confirmed without opposition on April 26, 1918, an application was made on January 13, 19 18 to set it aside on the ground of fraud, and it was set aside on June 25, 19 18 in respect of a part of the properties sold.
The auction purchaser applied on February 17, 1917 for delivery of the remaining properties.
It was held by the Full bench that the application was not barred under Article 180 of the old Limitation Act as time should be computed from the date of the order disallowing the petition to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud and not from the date of the first confirmation.
This decision has been strongly relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent de cree holder and it is submitted that even though the appli cation for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud was made after the sale was confirmed, the Full Bench took the view that the period of limitation under Article 180 of the old Limitation Act should be computed from the date of the order disallowing the application to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud and not from the date of the first confirmation.
On the basis of this decision, it is urged that in the instant case also the period of limitation under Article 134 should be computed from the date of dismissal of the second application for setting aside the sale.
We are enable to accept the contention.
In the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court the application for setting aside the sale was made by the sons of a deceased judgment debtor and the remaining judgment debtors, and the application in so far as it was made by the sons of a de ceased judgment debtor was admitted out of due time on the ground of fraud.
In our opinion the High Court was justified in entertaining the application on the ground of fraud by the sons of a deceased judgment debtor who were not brought on the record as the legal representatives of their deceased father.
The application was, therefore, quite maintainable and, even though the sale was confirmed 368 and became absolute under Order XXI Rule 92, it was subject to the disposal of the application for setting aside the sale on the ground of fraud.
The facts of this decision are quite different from those of the instant case before us.
The application by the judgment debtor not being maintain able in law, the respondent decree holder was not entitled to compute the period of one year under Article 134 of the Limitation Act from the date of dismissal of the second application by the 4th judgment debtor.
The contention made on behalf of the respondent decree holder is without sub stance and is overruled.
In view of the discussion made above, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court and that of the learned District Judge.
As stated already, the parties have settled their dis putes, the respondent decree holder having decree to relin quish all this rights as the auction purchaser upon the appellants paying him a sum of Rs. 1,28,000.
We are told that said sum has been deposited in this Court in the above appeal and, as prayed for by the parties, we by our order dated May 5, 1987 set aside the execution sale and directed that the amount of Rs. 1,28,000 lying in this Court would be paid to the respondent decree holder or to his Counsel in full settlement of the mortgage decree.
By the said order we have also recorded full satisfaction of the mortgage decree passed in S.C. No. 10/73 on the file of the District Judge, Jaipur City, obtained by the respondent decree holder against the appellants and others.
It has also been recorded in the order that the decree holder auction purchaser has no sort of claim against the appellants under the mortgage deed in question or the decree passed thereon.
The two suits which have been filed by the decree holder auction purchaser against the Posts & Telegraph Department for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the suit premises have, on the prayer made on behalf of the decree holder auction purchas er, been directed to be dismissed by the Trial Court without costs, since the money payable thereunder has been deposited in this Court by the Posts & Telegraph Department.
The Posts & Telegraph Department has been directed to pay the rent of the premises in suit in their occupation including arrears, if any, which may have accrued subsequent to the period for which rent has already been deposited in this Court, to the appellant treating them as landlords.
Even though the matter has been settled between the parties as above, we felt the necessity of laying down the correct legal position and, hence, this Judgment.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The mortgagee decree holder in execution of the final decree for mortgage, himself purchased the disputed property in the auction sale held on July 14, 1978.
On September 20, 1978 the judgment debtor, the predecessor in interest of the appellants, filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the aforesaid sale.
Two other petitions of objections were filed, one of these being by another judgment debtor.
All these objections including the application under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure were dismissed for default.
Conse quently, the sale was confirmed by the District Judge, the executing Court on January 2, 1979.
On July 17, 1980 more than one year after the sale was confirmed the decree holder auction purchaser filed an application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure for delivery of possession of the property auc tioned purchased by him.
This application was opposed by the judgment debtor on the ground that as the application was filed more than one year after the confirmation of sale it was barred by limitation under Article 134 of the .
The District Judge held that in view of Explanation II of Section 47 which was inserted in the Code of Civil Proce dure, by Section 20 of 356 the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1974, Article 136 prescribing a period of limitation of 12 years for the execution of the decree and not Article 134 of the Limita tion Act would be applicable, and held that the application was not barred by limitation and directed issuance of the warrant of possession in respect of the disputed property.
The judgment debtor filed a revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the revision application.
The High Court held that after the insertion of Explanation II to Section 47 of the Cede of Civil Procedure, the pur chaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree would be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree was passed, and all questions relating to the delivery of pos session of the property to such purchaser of immovable property would be questions relating to the execution of the decree and, as such, Article 136 and not Article 134 of the would apply.
It was also held after the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 134 and Article 136 of the Limitation act became so inconsistent that both could not exist and that Article 134 stood im pliedly repealed by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Proce dure read with Article 136 of the .
A certificate for appeal to this Court under Article 134A of the Constitution, was granted by the Single Judge.
As the certificate on the basis of which the appeal was filed was not competent in view of clause III of Article 133, the appeal was treated as one under Article 136.
After conclusion of the hearing, the parties settled the dispute, the respondent decree holder agreeing to relinquish all his rights as the auction purchaser upon the appellants paying an agreed amount.
In spite of such settlement the Court felt the necessity of laying down the correct legal position.
Setting aside the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court and that of the District Court, HELD: 1.
Article 134 of the would apply to an application under Order XXI Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the auction purchaser for delivery of possession of the property sold in execution of a decree.
[363G] 357 2.
The Single Judge of the High Court has misunderstood the scope of the provision of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that of the provisions of Articles 134 and 136 of the .
It may be that before the amendment of section 47, an auction purchaser could file a suit for recovery of the possession of the property within 12 years from the date of the sale, but in view of the amendment of Section 47 of the Code such a suit cannot be filed.
But that is no ground for holding that Article 136 of the would apply to an application for deliv ery of possession.
[363C D] 3.
It is for the Legislature to prescribe the period of Limitation, and the Court is only to see whether any partic ular application has been filed within that period.
[363F] 4.
When a property is sold in execution of a decree an application for setting aside the sale may be made under Rule 89, 90 or 91 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Proce dure by the persons and on the ground mentioned therein.
Such an application has also to be made within the pre scribed period of limitation of 60 days from the date of the sale under Article 127 of the .
Article 134 prescribes a limitation of one year for an application for delivery of possession by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree.
The limitation of one year will be computed from the date the sale becomes absolute.
Such an application for delivery of possession can be filed only after the decree is put into execution within the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the .
[362B D] 5.
The period of limitation prescribed by Articles 136 and 134 are for two different purposes, the former being for the execution of a decree for possession in respect of which the decree is passed, and the latter for an application for delivery of possession of immovable property which is pur chased in the course of execution of a decree.
The two articles have nothing in common for their operation.
They do not stand in conflict with each other.
[362D E] 6.
The scope of Articles 134 and 136 and the subject matter being completely different, the question of implied repeal of Article 134, does not at all arise.
[363F] 7.
Merely because Explanation II to Section 47 CPC was inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act 1976, an application for delivery of possession under Order XXI Rule 95 C.P.C. cannot be equated with an application for the execution of a decree for possession so as to apply 12 358 years period of limitation as prescribed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act.[362F G] 8.
An application for delivery of possession of immova ble property purchased in execution cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as an application for execution of a decree for possession of property so as to invoke the provision of Article 136 of the .
[362E] 9.
After a sale becomes absolute on the dismissal of the application of the judgment debtor 's claim for setting aside the sale, another application for setting aside the sale by the judgment debtor is not maintainable and the period of limitation as prescribed by Article 134 of the cannot be computed from the date of the dismissal of the second application for setting aside the sale.
[366H; 367A] 10.
In the instant case, on January 2, 1979 while dis missing the application of the judgment debtor under Order XXI Rule 90 the District Judge confirmed the sale.
The said order confirming the sale is binding not only on the judg ment debtor, who made the application under Order XX1 Rule 90, but also on all other parties to the execution proceed ings including the 4th judgment debtor.
Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the application filed by the 4th judg ment debtor praying for setting aside of the sale on grounds other than those mentioned in Rules 89 to 91 was not main tainable after the confirmation of the sale.
By the order dated July 21, 1979 the District Judge while dismissing the application of the judgment debtor observed that after the confirmation of the sale the Court was not authorised to entertain the application.
The application of the judgment debtor not being maintainable in law, the respondent decree holder was not entitled to compute the period of one year under Article 134 of the from the date of dismissal of the second application by the 4th judgment debtor.
[365C E; 368B] Chandra Mani Sahai & Ors.
vs Anarjan Bibi & Ors., AIR 1934 PC 134 Kamakshi Ammal & Anr.
vs Arukkani Ammal & Ors., AIR 1957 Madras 440 explained and distinguished.


judgement:
URISDICTION: Writ Peti tion Nos.
30(1 and 30 1 of 1986.
( Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
WITH Criminal Appeal Nos.
374 A and 411 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31 3 1986 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Nos. 1448 and 1405 of 1986.
A.K. Gupta for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 300 and 301 of 1986.
S.A. Syed and Shakil Ahmed for the Appellants in Crl.
A. Nos. 374A and 411 of 1986.
A.D. Singh, Ms. Rachna Joshi and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, C.J.
I. The petitioners Fazal Ghosi and Wahid in the two writ petitions before us and the appellants Ayaz Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad in the two Criminal Appeals are ag grieved by the orders of detention made respectively in respect of them under sub s.(2) of section 3 of the .
The petitioners Fazal Ghosi and Wahid filed writ petitions in the High Court of Allahabad against the detention orders concerning them and those writ peti tions were dismissed.
They have now filed the present peti tions under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The appellants Ayaz Ahmad and Riaz Ahmad filed writ petitions in the High Court of Allahabad against the detention orders concerning them, and those writ petitions having been dismissed they have appealed here by special leave.
All the four cases have been heard together.
It is agreed between the parties that although separate orders of detention were made under sub section
(2) of section 3 of the against the various petitioners and appellants the grounds raised in this court against their detention orders are identical.
It appears that consequent upon the opening of the Ram Janam Bhumi temple at Ayodhya, Faizabad, there was consider able agitation 473 among the Muslim community.
According to the State Govern ment, several members of the community were returning from the mosque after their afternoon prayers, and at Bholanath Ka Kuan, Abdul Aziz Road, Lucknow they were addressed by Fazal Ghosi and his son Wahid in language inciting them to beat the police and the Police Armed Constabulary.
At anoth er place, Sarkata Nala, a large number of the Muslim commu nity are said to have been similarly addressed by the appel lants, Ayaz Ahmd and Riaz Ahmad.
It is alleged that in consequence the crowd commenced pelting stones and dis charged fire arms on the Government officials and the police personnel assembled there as a result of which they received injuries.
The petitioners and the appellants were arrested along with other persons, and a First Information Report was lodged in respect of each of them for offences under sec tions 147/148/149/307 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code.
The petitioners and the appellants applied for grant of bail, and while the bail applications were pending the District Magistrate, Lucknow, purporting to act under sub section
(3) of section 3 of the , served a detention order on February 20, 1986 on each of the four detenus.
This was followed on February 21, 1986 by service of the grounds of detention.
Learned counsel for the detenus challenges the detention orders on several grounds.
In our opinion, it is not neces sary to consider all the points raised because it appears to us that the cases can be disposed of on a short ground.
The contention on behalf of the detenus is that there was no material before the District Magistrate on the basis of which he could form the opinion that the detenus would act in future in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
It is pointed out that the provides for preventive detention.
and preventive deten tion is intended where it is apprehended that the person may act prejudicially to one or more of the considerations specified in the statute.
There is no doubt that preventive detention is not intended as a punitive measure, as a cur tailment of liberty by way of punishment for an offence already committed.
Section 3 of the Act clearly indicates that the power to detain thereunder can be exercised only with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner which may prejudice any of the considerations set forth in the section.
In the present case, we are unable to discover any material to show that the detenus would act in the future to the prejudice of the maintenance of public order.
Even if it is accepted that they did address the assembly of persons and incited them to lawlessness there is no material to warrant the inference that they would repeat the miscon duct or do anything else which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The District Magistrate, it is true, has stated that the detention 474 of the detenus was effected because he was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent them from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order, but there is no reference to any material in support of that satisfaction.
We are aware that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is subjective in nature, but even subjective satisfaction must be based upon some pertinent material.
We are concerned here not with the sufficiency of that material but with the existence of any relevant material at all.
In the circumstances.
the detention orders in respect of the four detenus must be quashed.
The writ petitions and the appeals are allowed, the order of detention in respect of each detenu is quashed, and the detenus are entitled to be set at liberty unless their detention is required in connection with other cases.
N.P.V. Petitions and appeals allowed.

summary:
Consequent upon the opening of the Ram Janam Bhumi Temple at Ayodhya, there was considerable agitation among the Muslim Community.
The Petitioners and appellants were arrested for inciting the members of the community to in dulge in violence and charged for offences under sections 147/148/149/307/332 of the Indian Penal Code.
While their bail applications were pending; the District Magistrate, purporting to act under sub.s.
(3) of section 3 of the , served detention orders on them.
Writ Petitions challenging the detention orders filed by the appellants were rejected by the High Court.
The Petitioners and appellants contended that the deten tion orders were bad for the reason that there was no mate rial before the District Magistrate on the basis of which he could form the opinion that they would act in future in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order.
Allowing the petitions and appeals, this Court, HELD: The power to detain under the Act can be exercised only with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner which may prejudice any of the considerations set forth in Section 3 thereof.
Preventive detention is not intended as a punitive measure, as a curtailment of liberty by way of punishment for an offence already committed.
No doubt the satisfaction of the District Magistrate making the detention order is subjective in nature, but, even subjec tive satisfaction, must be based upon some pertinent materi al.
[473F G; 474A B] In this case there is no material to show that the detenus would act 472 in the future to the prejudice of the maintenance of public order.
Even if it is accepted that the detenus did address the assembly of persons and incited them to lawlessness, there is no material to warrant the inference that they would repeat the misconduct or do anything else which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
[473G H]


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2794 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.1.1985 of the Calcutta High Court in E.M.A.T. No. 19 of 1983.
Appellant in person.
G.B. Pai, P.R. Seetharaman and Ms. Deepa Chhabra for the Respondents.
477 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court affirming on appeal the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court declaring that the reference made by the Government of West Bengal in the dispute raised by the appellant is incompetent and invalid.
The appellant is a working journalist employed by the respondents, Messrs. Bennett Coleman and Company Limited.
The registered office of the company is at Bombay and its press is located in Calcutta.
The sales office of the compa ny is situated in Calcutta.
On 1 November, 1961 the appel lant was appointed a staff correspondent in the Calcutta office of the company.
The letter of appointment dated 9 November, 1961 was issued by the company from its registered office at Bombay.
Subsequently, the appellant was promoted to the post of Industrial Correspondent, Pune and was trans ferred from Calcutta to Pune from 16 February, 1976.
Upon transfer to Pune the appellant received his remuneration and allowances from the Pune office of the company, and he was under the direct control and supervision of the registered office of the company situated in Bombay.
While the appellant was in Calcutta and before his transfer on promotion to Pune the appellant applied to the Labour Department, Government of West Bengal on 29 April, 1975 under sub section
(1) of section 17 of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages relating to the period April, 1968 to February, 1973 from the employer company.
On 14 May, 1975 the Government of West Bengal initiated conciliation proceedings.
The employer company participated in the conciliation proceedings and a joint conciliation meeting was held before the Conciliation Officer, Calcutta.
The appellant was transferred to Pune while the report of the conciliation proceedings was still awaited.
On 16 November, 1976 the Conciliation Officer reported failure of the conciliation proceedings and recom mended that the dispute be referred to the Labour Court under sub section (2) of section 17 of the Act.
Accordingly, the Government of West Bengal made a reference on 23 August, 1977 to the First Labour Court, West Bengal for the adjudi cation of the dispute between the parties.
An objection was raised by the employer company before the First Labour Court that the reference was incompetent as the Government of West Bengal had 478 no power to make the reference.
On 11 July, 1980 the First Labour Court rejected the objection.
The order was chal lenged by the employer company by a writ petition filed in the High Court.
By his judgment and order dated 5 August, 1982, the learned Single Judge held that the reference was incompetent.
That view was affirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal.
And now this appeal by special leave.
The question whether the Government of West Bengal was empowered to make a reference of the dispute between the appellant and the employer company must be determined by the provisions of the Act in their application to the facts of this case.
Section 17 of the Act makes provision for the recovery of money due to a newspaper employee from his employer.
Sub section
(1) requires that an application by the newspaper employee complaining that an amount due to him has remained unpaid by the employer should be made to the State Government, and provides that if the State Government is satisfied that any amount is so due it is empowered to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and there upon the Collector must proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
Which is the State Government to which such application lies is indicated by Rule 36 of the Rules made under the Act.
Rule 36 provides that an application under section 17 of the Act shall be made to the Government of the State where the Central Office or the Branch Office of the newspaper establishment in which the newspaper employee is employed is situated.
It is the loca tion of the Central Office or the Branch Office in which the newspaper employee is employed which determines which State Government it will be.
The Rule works in favour of the convenience of the newspaper employees.
Sub sections (2) and (3) of section 17 provide: "(2) If any question arises as to the amount due under this Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may, on its own motion or upon application made to it, refer the question to any Labour Court constituted by it under the ( 14 of 1947) or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State and the said Act or law shall have effect in relation to the Labour Court as if the question so referred were a matter referred to the Labour Court for adjudication under that Act or law.
479 (3) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the State Government which made the reference and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided in sub section (1).
" When all the provisions of section 17 are considered together it is apparent that they constitute a single scheme.
In simple terms the scheme is this.
A newspaper employee, who claims that an amount due to him has not been paid by his employer, can apply to the State Government for recovery of the amount.
If no dispute arises as to the amount due the Collector will recover the amount from the employer and pay it over to the newspaper employee.
If a question arises as to the amount due, it is a question which arises on the application made by the newspaper employee, and the applica tion having been made before the appropriate State Govern ment it is that State Government which will call for an adjudication of the dispute by referring the question to a Labour Court.
When the Labour Court has decided the ques tion, it will forward its decision to the State Government which made the reference, and thereafter the State Govern ment will direct that recovery proceedings shall be taken.
In other words the State Government before whom the applica tion for recovery is made is the State Government which will refer the question as to the amount due to a Labour Court, and the Labour Court upon reaching its decision will forward the decision to the State Government, which will then direct recovery of the amount.
Turning to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the application under sub section
(1) of section 17 was made on 29 April, 1975 when the appellant was employed at the Cal cutta Branch of the employer company.
He made the applica tion to the Labour Department of the Government of West Bengal for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages.
When the question arose as to the amount due to the appellant, the Government of West Bengal made the reference for adjudi cation to the First Labour Court, West Bengal.
Upon the construction of sub section
(2) of section 17 which has found favour with us, it is beyond dispute, we think, that the Government of West Bengal is competent to make the reference.
In our opinion the High Court erred in holding that the reference was without jurisdiction and that it was the State of Maha rashtra which was competent to make the reference.
The application for recovery was rightly made by the appellant before the Government of West Bengal because he was then employed by the Branch Office of the employer company, Calcutta.
Once we hold that the application was rightly made before the Government of West 480 Bengal, the further conclusion must necessarily follow that it was the Government of West Bengal which possessed the power to refer the question for adjudication.
It seems to us that the High Court omitted to appreciate the inter rela tionship between the different provisions of section 17 and the fact that if the proceeding under sub section
(1) of section 17 was commenced rightly before a State Government it was that State Government alone which should make a reference to a Labour Court for adjudication.
A number of cases have been placed before us, but we do not consider it necessary to refer to them having regard to the view taken by us upon a plain analysis o.f the statutory provisions.
We may note that the fundamental question before us is whether the Government of West Bengal was competent to make the reference.
We do not consider it appropriate to decide any other questions arising upon the reference since the reference must, pursuant to this judgment, be considered to be pending still and those questions can be raised there.
Our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the employer company to an award of the Labour Court of West Bengal where, it is said, the question covered by the im pugned reference has already been concluded on its merits.
That is a submission which is open to the employer company during the proceedings before the Labour Court upon the impugned reference.
We are concerned with a limited point and we need go no further.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order dated 18 January, 1985 of the Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment and order dated 5 October, 1982 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the employer company is dis missed.
The Labour Court will now proceed to dispose of the reference expeditiously.
The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal and of the entire proceedings before the High Court.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The appellant, a working journalist who was appointed on November, 1961 as a Staff Correspondent in the Calcutta Office of the respondent company while working as such at Calcutta, applied on 29 April, 1975 to the Government of West Bengal under sub section
(1) of section 17 of the Working Jour nalists and Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages relating to the period April 1968 to February 1973.
While the conciliation proceedings were on, he was promoted and transferred to Pune on 16 February, 1976.
The Conciliation Officer reported the fail ure of the proceedings before him on 16 November, 1976 and the Government of West Bengal made a reference under sub section
(2) of section 17 of the Act to the First Labour Court, West Bengal on 23 August, 1977 for the adjudication of the dis pute between the parties.
The preliminary objection raised by the respondent company that the Government of West Bengal was not competent to make the reference was rejected by the Labour Court.
The respondent company 's writ petition chal lenging 'the order of the Labour Court was allowed by a Single Judge whose decision was affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court.
Allowing the appeal by special leave and dismissing the writ petition of the respondent company, this Court.
HELD: (i) Sub section
(1) ors.
17 of the Act requires that an application by the newspaper employee complaining that an amount due to him has remained unpaid by the employer should be made to the State Government.
Which is the State Govern ment to which such application lies is 476 indicated by r: 36 of the Rules made under the Act and that rule provides that an application under section 17 of the Act shall be made to the Government of the State where the central office or the branch office of the newspaper estab lishment in which the newspaper employee is employed is situated.
It is the location of the central office or the branch office in which the newspaper employee is employed which determines which State Government it will be.
The rule works in favour of the convenience of the newspaper employ ee.
[478C E] (ii) Sub section
(2) of section 17 provides that if any question arises as to the amount due under the Act to a newspaper employee from his employer, the State Government may refer the question to any Labour Court, constituted by it under the or under any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State.
If a question arises as to the amount due, it is a question which arises on the appli cation made by the newspaper employee, and the application having been made before the appropriate State Government, it is that State Government which will call for an adjudication of the dispute by referring the question to a Labour Court.
The State Government before whom the application for recov ery is made is the.
State Government which will refer the question as to the amount due to a Labour Court.
[478F G; 479C D] In this case, the appellant was employed at the Calcutta branch of the respondent company.
He made the application to the Labour Department of the Government of West Bengal for recovery of the unpaid portion of his wages.
When the ques tion arose as to the amount due to the appellant, the Gov ernment of West Bengal made the reference for adjudication to the First Labour Court, West Bengal.
Upon the construc tion of sub section
(2) of section 17 as indicated at (ii) above, it is beyond dispute that the Government of West Bengal is competent to make the reference.
The High Court erred in holding that the reference was without jurisdiction and that it was the State of Maharashtra which was competent to make the reference.
[479E G]