judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1956.
On appeal from the judgment and order dated the 2nd/21st day of September 1955 of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No. 65 of 1955 arising out of the order dated the 5th day of May 1955 of the said High Court in Writ Petition No. 158 of 1955.
G.S. Pathak, B. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant.
M. O. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, B.K.B. Naidu and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2. 1956.
March 15.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J.
This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved two important questions, namely, the powers of the Government under section 64 A of the , as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The appellant and respondent No. 2, had applied for stage carriage permits in the Mayuram Town Service for routes Nos. 1 and 2.
These applications, along with others, were considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore.
By its order dated the 31st of May, 1954, it granted a permit for route No. 1 to the appellant and for route No. 2 to respondent No. 2.
Both the appellant and respondent No. 2 being dissatisfied appealed under section 64 of the Act to the appropriate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), but the appeals were dismissed by its order dated the 18th of August, 1954.
As section 64 A conferred upon the State Government certain powers, which have 258 been described in this case as revisional powers, the appellant and respondent No. 2 filed representations thereunder before the State Government against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Board.
The State Government set aside the orders passed by the aforesaid authorities and directed that permits for both the routes Nos. 1 and 2 be issued to respondent No. 2.
Against this order, the appellant filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari.
The application was heard by a single Judge who issued the requisite writ.
Against his decision there was a Letters Patent appeal by respondent No. 2, which was allowed and the decision of the single Judge was set aside.
The ground upon which the Regional Transport Authority granted the appellant and respondent No. 2 permits for routes Nos. 1 and 2 respectively was that they were experienced and were operating town buses at Kumbakonam.
This opinion was approved by the Board which also thought that a certain amount of healthy competition was required in the Mayuram Town routes.
It also considered that the Regional Transport Authority was within its rights in not considering the aspect of sector coverage by muffassil buses of the appellant and respondent No. 2.
It appears that respondent No. 2 was covering the entire route No. 1 and the appellant was covering a portion of route No. 2.
The State Government in setting aside the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Board passed the following order: "As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Poryar, since he has better facilities for operation and will be able to serve the public better.
The Government of Madras therefore sets aside as improper the order of the Central Road Traffic Board No. R 27792/A2/54 dated the 18th of August, 1954 in so far as it confirms the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore granting one permit of route 259 No. 1 to Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and directs that the two permits in question be granted to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Poryar".
Before dealing with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it would be desirable to make reference to certain provisions of the Act concerning the grant of permits.
Section 42 of the Act prohibits an owner of a transport vehicle from using or permitting it to be used in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted by a Regional Transport Authority.
Section 43 gives certain powers to the State Government to control road transport.
Section 44 authorises the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority as well as a Regional Transport Authority to perform certain functions mentioned therein.
Section 47 sets forth certain matters which a Regional Transport Authority shall bear in mind in deciding to grant or to refuse a stage carriage permit.
Section 64 enables a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority, with respect to matters men tioned therein, to appeal to the prescribed authority.
Section 64 A states: "The State Government may, of its own motion or on application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pay pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit".
Mr. Pathak, for the appellant, contended that having regard to the terms of section 64 A, there were two stages for the exercise of power thereunder by the State Government.
The first stage was the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction for the exercise of that power.
A collateral fact had to be decided, namely whether the order passed by any authority or officer subordinate to the State Government was in fact illegal, irregular or improper.
If the decision was in the affirmative, then and then only would the State Government have jurisdiction to revise the 260 order complained against.
The decision of the State Government both with respect to questions of fact and law could be examined by a court in a proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari and such court in doing so could decide whether the order which was revised by the State Government was or was not illegal, irregular or improper.
In the present case, there was no question of illegality or irregularity in the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Board.
The only question was as to whether these orders were improper.
The propriety of an order does not necessarily mean that it must be correct order.
There must be something extraneous to the order it self which made it improper.
Merely because the State Government took a different view of the facts to that of the authority or officer subordinate to it would not make the order of such authority or officer improper.
The second stage, namely, the passing of an order as the State Government thought fit, 'could only be reached after a decision had been arrived at on the condition precedent conferring jurisdiction on the State Government to revise an order.
The substantial ground upon which the State Government revised the order of the authority subordinate to it was that respondent No. 2 had better facilities for operation and would, therefore, be able to serve the public better.
The authorities subordinate to the State Government, however, had the representations of the appellant and respondent No. 2, as well as other applicants, which fully stated all material particulars in this respect and it could not be said that these matters were not considered by them.
The orders of the subordinate authorities accordingly must be read to mean that as between the appellant and respondent No. 2 both bad equal facilities for operation and that things being equal between them in every way, one permit should be granted for one route to the appellant and another for another route to respondent No. 2.
There could be nothing improper in this.
The condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction to revise the order was therefore absent and the State Government acted in excess of its 261 jurisdiction in revising the orders of its subordinate authorities.
Mr. Pathak further contended that there was an error on the face of the record in the order passed by the State Government as it had refused to consider seniority or experience in motor transport as a factor for the granting of a permit and it thought that it could come to any conclusion it liked and reference was made to paragraph 8 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government in the High Court.
On the basis of that affidavit and that paragraph, it was also urged that the error on the face of the record was that the Government acted on an erroneous idea of its own jurisdiction.
He further contended that section 64 A was an invalid provision.
In the alternative, he urged that a court or authority, in the exercise of its revisional powers, cannot take a contrary view of the facts to that taken by the subordinate court or authority.
Exercise of such revisional power could only be made in cases where the subordinate court or authority had taken a perverse view of the facts and had arrived at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have arrived at.
In support of his first contention, Mr. Pathak relied upon Paragraph 116 at page 59 of Halsbury 's Laws of England, third edition, Vol. 11.
It appears from an examination of that paragraph and paragraph 117 at page 60 of the same Volume that there may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact.
Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try.
In such a case, in certiorari proceedings, a court can enquire into the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal as to the collateral fact and may reverse that decision if it appears to it, on the 262 materials before it, to be erroneous.
There may be tribunals, however, which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the powers to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends.
With respect to them, in such cases, their decision even if wrong on facts or law cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari.
In cases where the fact in question is a part of the very issue which the inferior tribunal has to enquire into, a court will not issue a writ of certiorari, although the inferior tribunal may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it.
In the present case, if there was at all any collateral fact to be decided, it was whether the appropriate authority had in fact passed any order in respect of which powers under section 64 A could be exercised.
It is not disputed that in fact orders were passed by the Regional Transport Authority and the Board, authorities subordinate to the State Government, and that these orders existed when the appellant and respondent No. 2 moved that Government to exercise its powers under section 64 A.
The condition precedent and the existence of a collateral fact in that way for the exercise of powers under that section were therefore present when the State Government exercised its powers.
In order to satisfy itself whether the order of an authority subordinate to it was legal, regular or proper, the State Government was not deciding the existence of a collateral fact but the issue itself as to the legality, regularity or the propriety of the order.
The satisfaction of the State Government in this respect would be an expression of its opinion and not the determination of a fact upon which depended its jurisdiction to exercise its powers under section 64 A.
What is the nature of the functions performed under the Act by the Regional Transport Authority, the Board and the State Government in the matter of granting or refusing to grant a permit may now, be considered.
That they are not judicial is accepted, but, it is said, they are not administrative but quasi judicial and therefore amenable to the jurisdiction of 263 a court possessing the power to issue a writ of certiorari.
In proceedings under sections 47, 64 and 64 A of the Act there is no determination of any individual 's rights and from that point of view the functions of these authorities may be regarded as executive or administrative.
On the other hand, it may be said that a person has the fundamental right to carry on his business of plying buses and therefore has the right to have the statutory functions of these authorities properly exercised in which case they would be quasi judicial functions.
Assuming this to be so, it has yet to be seen whether the State Government acted in excess of its legal authority.
Chapter IV of the Act contains provisions concerning the control of transport vehicles.
The Act authorises the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities, and under section 43, subject to its provisions, it can control road transport.
In the first instance, the authority to grant or refuse to grant a permit is vested in the Regional Transport Authority, but its order is not final as a dissatisfied party can appeal against the order under section 64 to the appropriate authority.
Before section 64 A was inserted into the Act by an Act of the legislature of the State of Madras, it might have been possible to contend that the order of a Regional Transport Authority which bad not been appealed against and the order of the appropriate authority under section 64, where an appeal bad been made, were incapable of interference by the State Government for lack of statutory authority.
By enacting section 64 A, the legislature clearly intended that should not be so and that the State Government should have the powers to intervene, if it was satisfied that the order in question was either illegal, irregular or improper.
In clothing the State Government with such power the legislature clearly intended the State Government to decide the issue as to whether any order in question was illegal, irregular or improper.
It would not be open to a court exercising the power of certiorari to intervene merely be cause it might be of the opinion that the view taken 264 ] by the State Government was erroneous.
The word "propriety" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings.
In the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated to mean.
"fitness; appropriateness; aptitude suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirement, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy".
If the State Government was of the opinion that respondent No. 2 had better facilities for operation than the appellant and their service to the public ' would be more beneficial, it could not be said that the State Government was in error in think ing that the order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Transport Authority was improper.
It is to be remembered that under section 47 of the Act a Regional Transport Authority in deciding whether to grant or to refuse a permit shall have regard, amongst other things, to the interest of the public generally and the advantages to the public of the service to be provided.
Assuming that in the matter of experience there was nothing much to choose between the appellant and respondent No. 2, better facilities for operation of the bus service possessed by respondent No. 2, would be to the interest of the public generally and an advantage to the public Of the service to be provided and therefore was an overriding factor when other things were equal.
As between the appellant and respondent No. 2 neither the Regional Transport Authority nor the Board recorded a finding as to which of them had the better facilities for transport operation or that such faci lities as existed between them were of equal merit.
The State Government did not have, therefore, the advantage of knowing, on the face of the orders of these authorities, what view they took of this matter.
,Even if it is assumed that their orders meant that the facilities for operation as between the appellant and respondent No. 2 were of equal merit, still the State Government was not in a position to know on what material this opinion was based or that it was a reasonable view.
In order to satisfy itself the State 265 Government examined the materials available to it and came to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 bad the better facilities, in other words, it would be unreasonable to hold that respondent No. 2 had not the better facilities.
The learned single Judge.
of the High Court more than once held that he could not find that there was no material before the State Government to justify its finding that respondent No. 2 had the better facilities, and he further held that was a factor which restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution.
That should have concluded the matter so far as the High Court was concerned.
He, however, thought that it could not be said that the conclusion reached by the State Government was the only conclusion possible and a mere disagreement on the conclusions to be drawn from the available materials, where either view was a reasonable one, was not enough to establish that the orders passed by the Board and the Regional Transport Authority were improper within the meaning of section 64 A. The State Government had therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction,.
It seems to us, that the order of the State Government as it stands cannot be said to be in excess of its jurisdiction nor can it be said that in recording a finding that respondent No. 2 had the better facilities for operation and would serve the public better, it went beyond its powers, in the absence of a finding to the contrary by the authorities subordinate to it.
The interests of the public and the advantages to it of the service to be provided were very, it not the most, important factors to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting or refusing to grant a permit.
In the conflicting claims of the appellant and respondent No. 2 concerning the facilities available to them for operation of the bus service, the State Government was bound to decide, in the interests of the public generally, which of these had the better facilities.
It was within the scope of it 's authority to decide this and a court in certiorari proceedings ought not to interfere with that decision.
To hold that the opinion of the Regional Transport Authority and the 266 Board that the facilities for operation were equal as between these persons was a reasonable view would be to constitute the court as the final authority in a matter, in which, by the provisions of the Act, that function was accorded to the State Government.
We are not prepared therefore to say that the State Government acted in excess of its statutory authority.
There is no error on the face of the record so far as the order of the State Government is concerned and reference to paragraph 8 of the State Government 's affidavit in the High Court does not establish any such thing.
That paragraph was in answer to paragraphs 13 and 14 of the appellant 's affidavit and it set out the contentions of the State Government as to its powers.
There is nothing in that paragraph to establish that in fact the State Government had declined to consider seniority or experience in the matter of selection.
No substantial ground was put forward for supposing that section 64 A was an illegal provision.
It was within the competence of the State Legislature to insert section 64 A into the Act.
It was a reasonable provision in keeping with the entire scheme of the Act concerning transport vehicles and control of road transport.
As to the extent of powers of revision in a court or authority we do not intend to express any opinion in this case having regard to the view we take that the order of the State Government cannot be interfered with by the issue of a writ of certiorari.
As regards the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 which is one of the grounds on which the certificate was issued by the High Court, that question has since been considered in the various decisions of this Court, which do not require recapitulation.
In our opinion, this is not a case in which it would be reasonable to hold that the State Government acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs to be paid to respondent No. 2.

summary:
The appellant and respondent No. 2 along with others applied for stage carriage permits for two routes and the Regional Transport Authority granted a permit for one route to the appellant and for the other route to the respondent No. 2.
Both appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board but the appeals were dismissed.
Neither the Regional Authority nor the Board recorded any finding as to which of them had the better facilities for transport operation or that they were of equal merit.
They applied to the State Government under section 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act of 1948 and the State Government set aside the orders passed by the said subordi nate authorities and issued permits for both the routes to the respondent No. 2 on the ground that he had better facilities for operation and would serve the public better.
Against this order of the State Government the appellant moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari and a single Judge issued the writ.
On a Letters Patent appeal that decision was set aside.
The appellant contended that the State Government had acted in excess of its powers under section 64 A of the Act in setting aside the orders of the subordinate authorities and that the section itself was invalid.
Held, that the State Government was within its powers in passing the order it did and the appeal must be dismissed.
That it was within the competence of the State Legislature to insert section 64 A into the Act and its legality could not be questioned and the clear intention of the legislation was to empower the State Government to decide the legality, regularity or propriety of any orders passed by the subordinate authorities in the interest of the general public.
That the State Government was the final authority to decide which of the rival applicants had the better facilities for operation of the bus service and where it bad come to a decision in favour of an applicant, its decision could not be interfered with under article 226 of the Constitution merely because its view might be erroneous.


judgement:
t Petition No. 581 of 1979 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) M. K. Ramamurty, Ramesh Chand Pathak for the Petitioner.
(Dr.) L. M. Singhvi, Altaf Ahmed and L. K. Pandey for the Respondents.
The Judgment of R. section Sarkaria and P. N. Shinghal, JJ. was delivered by Shinghal, J. O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. gave a separate Opinion.
SHINGHAL J., This petition of Mohammad Yousuf Rather under article 32 of the Constitution challenges his detention under section 8 (a) (i) of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The order of detention has been made by the District Magistrate of Anantnag on April 12, 1979, and it is not in controversy that it has really been made under sub section (2) of section 8 of the Act on the basis of the satisfaction provided for in sub clause (i) of clause (a) of sub section (1) of that section.
While the petitioner has stated that he did not receive the order of detention, and only the grounds of detention were communicated to him, his learned counsel Mr. Ramamurthi has not raised any controversy on that account.
He has in fact given up several other points on which the writ petition has been filed, and has contended himself by putting his arguments in two ways.
Firstly he has argued that some of the grounds are so vague that the petitioner has not found it possible to exercise his fundamental right of making a representation under article 22 (5) of the Constitution.
Secondly he has argued that some of the grounds are irrelevant for the purpose of making of an order under section 8 of the Act.
We shall therefore confine ourselves to a consideration of these two points of controversy.
The grounds of detention have admittedly been sent to the petitioner by way of an annexure to the District Magistrate 's order No. 49 54/ST dated April 12, 1979.
It has been stated therein that the detention has been ordered on "the grounds specified in the Annexure. which also contains facts relevant thereto," and the peti 261 tioner has been informed that he may make a representation to the Government against the order of detention if he so desires.
We shall refer to the annexure in a while, but it may be stated here that the counsel for the respondents has not found it possible to contend that no part thereof is vague.
He has however tried to argue that the annexure contains a preamble as well as the grounds of detention, and that the vagueness of the preamble could not possibly justify the argument that the grounds of detention are also vague.
Learned counsel has tried to support his argument by reference to the decision of this Court in Naresh Chandra Ganguli vs State of West Bengal and others.
The annexure reads as follows, "You are a die hard Naxalite and you are notorious for your activities which are proving prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
You are in the habit of organising meetings, secret as well as public, in which you instigate the people to create lawlessness which spreads panic in the minds of a common people.
You are also reported to be in the habit of going from one village to the other, with intent to compel the shopkeepers to close down their shops and participate in the meetings.
You are reported to have recently started a campaign in villages, asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and in case they are compelled to do so, they should manhandle the Government officials deputed for the purpose of purchasing shali on voluntary basis from the villagers.
On 9 2 79 you, after compelling the shopkeepers to close down their shops, organised a meeting at Chowalgam and asked the participants to lodge protests against the treatment meted out to Shri Z. A. Bhutto, late Prime Minister of Pakistan by General Zia UI Haq, in fact, you did not have any sympathy for the late Prime Minister, but you did it with the intent to exploit the situation and create lawlessness.
On 23 3 79 you presided over a meeting at Kulgam and delivered a speech.
Among other things, you passed derogatory remarks against Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, the Chief Minister of the State and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan, said that he (the Chief Minister) also wants to become a dictator.
You further stated that the Mulas of Kashmir are preparing for distribution of sweets on the day when Shri Bhutto is sent to gallows.
You also stated that 262 the people of the State have been oppressed and blamed the Chief Minister for their oppression.
You asked the audience to shun the life of dishonour and rise is revolt against oppression.
You went to the extent of saying that India should vacate the forcible occupation of the State, as the Kashmir question has not so far been settled.
These irresponsible utterances of you are likely to create feelings of hatred and enmity which will ultimately disturb the public order.
On 29 3 1979 posters were found pasted on walls in Kulgam area which were got published by the CPI (ML).
It was learnt that there was your hand in pasting these posters, the posters were captioned 'Inqalab ke bager koe hal nahin '.
The contents of the poster, among other things, revealed that it made a mention of plebiscite saying that the demand was given up with ulterior motives.
It further stated that the people should prepare themselves for revolution.
You were also noticed instigating the "Educational" (sic) unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger strike at Anantnag.
On 4 4 1979 and 5 4 1979 after Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was hanged, you were found leading the unruly mobs in different villages and instigating them to set the house of J.E.I. worker on fire.
As a result of this instigation a number of houses were set on fire, property looted and heavy damages caused to the people at village Rarigam.
In this connection a case FIR No. 34/79 U/s 395, 436, 148, 307 etc. has been registered at Police Station Kulgam against you and others.
Property worth thousands has so far been recovered during the investigation of this case.
Your activities are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and I am convinced that unless you are detained, large scale disturbances resulting in wide spread loss to the public and private property and to the safety of peaceful citizens will occur." 'Preamble ' has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary to mean "a preliminary statement, in speech or writing; an introductory paragraph, section, or clause; a preface, prologue, introduction.
" It has further been defined there as "an introductory paragraph or part in a statute deed, or other document, setting forth the grounds and intention of it.
" The preamble thus betokens that which follows.
The respondents ' learned counsel has not however found it possible to point 263 out where the preamble could be said to begin, or to finish, and which of the paragraphs could be said to constitute the grounds of detention as such.
As it is, in very first paragraph, which alone could be said to be in the nature of an introductory paragraph or a preliminary statement, it has been stated, inter alia, that the petitioner was reported to have "recently" started a campaign in villages asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy crop to the Government and to manhandle the Government officials in case they were compelled to do so.
There is however no mention, in any other part of the annexure, of the petitioner 's asking the inhabitants not to sell their paddy crop anywhere else or to manhandle the Government officials deputed for its purchase.
We are therefore unable to think that even the first paragraph is in the nature of a preamble to what has been stated in the subsequent paragraphs.
A reading of the first paragraph shows that it is vague in several respects.
It does not state the places where the petitioner is said to have organised the meetings, or the nature of lawlessness instigated by him.
It does not also mention the names of the villages where he is said to be in the habit of going for compelling the shopkeepers to close down their shops and to participate in the meetings.
So also, it does not mention the villages where the petitioner was reported to have "recently" started the campaign asking the inhabitants not to sell their extra paddy, or to manhandle the government officials.
The paragraph is therefore undoubtedly very vague.
But even if the first paragraph is left out of consideration on the pretext that it is in the nature of a preamble, the fifth paragraph is quite vague, for while it states that the petitioner was noticed instigating the educated unemployed youth who had recently gone on a hunger strike in Anantnag, the nature or the purpose of the alleged instigation has not been stated so that it is not possible to appreciate whether it could be said to fall within the mischief of clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8 which defines what is meant by "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" within the meaning of clause (a) (i) of sub section (1) of section 8.
For instance, if it was noticed that the petitioner was instigating the educated unemployed youth to go on hunger strike for the purpose of pressing their demand for employment, that would not amount to acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as it would not be covered by any of the four meanings assigned to that expression in clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8.
264 The sixth paragraph is also vague, for while it states that the petitioner was found leading the unruly mobs in different villages and instigating them to set fire to the house of the worker of Jamaiat e Islami the names of those villages and the name of the owner of burnt house have not been stated.
It is obvious therefore that the above grounds of detention are vague.
This Court has disapproved of vagueness in the grounds of detention because that impinges on the fundamental right of the detenu under article 22(5) of the Constitution to make a representation against the order of detention when the grounds on which the order has been made are communicated to him.
The purpose of the requirement is to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking redress against the order of detention.
But as is obvious, that opportunity cannot be said to be afforded when it is established that a ground of detention is so vague that he cannot possibly make an effective representation.
Reference in this connection may be made to this Court 's decision in State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya where the guarantee of article 22(5) has been characterised as an elementary right of a citizen in a free democratic state, and it has been held that if a ground of detention is not sufficient to enable the detained person to make a representation at the earliest opportunity, it must be held that his fundamental right in that respect has been infringed inasmuch as the material conveyed to him does not enable him to make the representation.
So as the aforesaid grounds of detention are vague, the petitioner is entitled to an order of release for that reason alone.
It is true that, as has been held in Naresh Chandra Ganguli 's case, (supra) "vagueness" is a relative term, and varies according to the circumstances of each case, but if the statement of facts contains any ground of detention which is such that it is not possible for the detenu to clearly understand what exactly is the allegation against him, and he is thereby prevented from making an effective representation, it does not require much argument to hold that one such vague ground is sufficient to justify the contention that his fundamental right under clause (5) of article 22 of the Constitution has been violated and the order of detention is bad for that reason alone.
Reference in this connection may also be made to the decisions in Tarapada De and others vs The State of West Bengal, Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs State of Delhi and other Shibban Lal Saxena vs State of Uttar Pradesh Rameshwar Lal Patwari vs State of 265 Bihar, Motilal Jain vs State of Bihar and others and Pushkar Mukherjee and others vs State of West Bengal.
It has next been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at least five of the grounds of detention are irrelevant.
It has been stated in paragraph 2 of the grounds of detention that after compelling the shopkeepers to close down their shops on February 9, 1979, the petitioner organised a meeting at Chowalgam and asked the participants to lodge a protest against the treatment meted out to Shri Z. A. Bhutto, and that while in fact the petitioner did not have any sympathy for the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, he did it with the intention of exploiting the situation and to create lawlessness.
We have made a reference to clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8 of the Act which defines what is meant by "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" in sub section (1) of that section, but the ground mentioned in the second paragraph does not fall within the purview of any of the four clauses of clause (b) as it does not state that the petitioner promoted, propagated, or attempted to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or region, or that he made preparations for using or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, inciting, provoking, or otherwise abetting the use of force in a manner which disturbed or was likely to disturb the public order within the meaning of sub clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b).
As is obvious, the remaining two sub clauses (iii) and (iv) can possibly have no application to the allegation in paragraph 2.
The ground contained in that paragraph was therefore clearly irrelevant for the satisfaction of the District Magistrate in making an order of detention under section 8(2) of the Act.
Then it has been stated in paragraph 3 that the petitioner presided over a meeting at Kulgam and delivered a speech where, among other things, he passed "derogatory remarks against Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, the Chief Minister of the State and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan, and said that he (the Chief Minister) also wants to become a dictator." That allegation also does not fall within any of the four sub clauses of clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8, as it does not refer to the promoting or propagating or attempting to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community or region or making of preparations for using or attempting to use, or using, or instigating, inciting, provoking or other 266 wise abetting the use of force in any manner whatsoever.
For this allegation also, the remaining two sub clauses are of no relevance.
What has been alleged is that the petitioner stated in his speech at the Kulgam meeting that the people of the State had been oppressed, that he blamed the Chief Minister for their oppression, and that he asked his audience to "shun the life of dishonour and rise in revolt against oppression.
" It has not been stated that the petitioner thereby promoted, propagated or attempted to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or region, or that he instigated or incited or provoked the audience to use force.
Peaceful and lawful revolt, eschewing violence, is one of the well known modes of seeking redress in this country.
A substantial part of the statement of facts mentioned in paragraph 3 of the grounds of detention is therefore irrelevant and can not justify the order of detention under section 8 of the Act.
It has been stated in paragraph 4 that a poster was found pasted on walls in Kulgam area on March 29, 1979, in the pasting of which the petitioner had a hand.
The poster was captioned "Inqilab ke baghair koi hall nahin", and it mentioned that the demand for plebiscite was given up with ulterior motives.
It further said that the people should prepare themselves for revolution.
But even if it were assumed that the petitioner had hand in pasting the poster, which is alleged to have been published by the CPI (ML), it cannot be said that he thereby acted in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, for his alleged action did not fall within the purview of any of the subclauses of clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8 of the Act.
Apart from the fact that it has not been stated that the poster promoted, or propagated or attempted to create feelings of enmity or hatred or disharmony on grounds of religion, race, caste, community etc., it has also not been stated that the poster instigated, incited, provoked or otherwise abetted the use of force so as to amount to acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
As has been stated, a revolution can be brought about by peaceful and lawful means, and asking the people to prepare themselves for it cannot be a ground of detention under section 8.
We have made a reference to paragraph 5 of the grounds of detention, which states that the petitioner was noticed instigating the educated unemployed youth who had gone on hunger strike at Anantnag, to show the vagueness of that ground.
It may further be stated that it is quite an irrelevant ground also, because any such instigation could not be said to fall within the purview of clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 8. 267 It is well settled that a ground is said to be irrelevant when it has no connection with the satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention under the appropriate law.
It nevertheless appears that the aforesaid irrelevant grounds were taken into consideration for making the impugned order, and that is quite sufficient to vitiate it.
Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions in Keshav Talpade vs The King Emperor, Tarapada De and others vs State of West Bengal (supra), Shibban Lal Saxena vs State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), Pushkar Mukherjee and others vs State of West Bengal (supra), Satya Brata Ghose vs Mr. Arif Ali, District Magistrate, Sibasagar, Jorhat and others and to K. Yadava Reddy and others vs The Commissioner of Police, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, and another.
It has been held there that even if one of the grounds of detention is irrelevant, that is sufficient to vitate the order.
The reason is that it is not possible to assess in what manner and to what extent that irrelevant ground operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to provide the satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
It is obvious that the detention of the petitioner was illegal, and that is why we made an order on August 3, 1979 for his release.
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. A good deal of vehement argument was advanced by Dr. Singhvi to sustain the order of detention and this has led me to add this brief note to the opinion of my brother Shinghal, J., with whose conclusions I agree.
The Constitution of India recognizes preventive detention as a necessary evil, but, nonetheless, an evil.
So we have, by constitutional mandate, circumscribed the making of laws providing for preventive detention.
While Article 22 Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) expressly deal with preventive detention, Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law and Article 19(1) (d) guarantees to citizens the right to move freely throughout the territory of India subject to reasonable restrictions made in the interests of the general public as mentioned in Article 19(5).
At one time it was thought that Article 22 was a complete code in regard to laws providing for preventive detention and that the validity of an order of detention should be determined strictly according to the terms and "within the four corners of that 268 article".
It was held in A.K. Gopalan vs State of Madras, that a detenu may not claim that the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1) (d) was infringed by his detention, and that the validity of the law providing for preventive detention was not to be tested in the light of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby on the freedom of movement, nor on the ground that his right to personal liberty was infringed otherwise than according to procedure established by law.
A theory was evolved that the nature and extent of the Fundamental Rights was to be measured by the object and form of the State action and not by the operation of the State action upon the rights of the individual.
This has now been shown to be wrong.
In R.C. Cooper vs Union of India the Full Court opted for a broader view and it was held that it was not the object of the authority making the law impairing the right of the citizen, nor the form of action taken that determined the protection the citizen could claim; it was the effect of the law and of the action upon the right which attracted the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief.
So, in that case, they rejected the submission that Article 31(2) was a complete code in relation to the infringement of the right to property by compulsory acquisition and the validity of the law was not to be tested in the light of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed thereby.
So it follows that a law providing for preventive detention and action taken under such a law, to pass muster, have now to satisfy the requirements of both Articles 19 and 22 of the Constitution.
We are primarily concerned in this case with Article 22(5) which is as follows: "When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order".
The extent and the content of Article 22(5) have been the subject matter of repeated pronouncements by this Court (Vide, State of Bombay vs Atmaram, Dr. Ramkrishna Bharadwaj vs State of Delhi, Shibbanlal Saxena vs State of Uttar Pradesh, Dwarkadas Bhatia vs 269 State of Jammu & Kashmir.
The interpretation of Article 22(5), consistently adopted by this Court, is, perhaps, one of the outstanding contributions of the Court in the cause of Human Rights.
The law is now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution: (1) To be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.
The inclusion of an irrelevant or non existent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights.
In either case there is an invasion of the Constitutional rights of the detenu entitling him to approach the Court for relief.
The reason for saying that the inclusion of even a single irrelevant of obscure ground among several relevant and clear grounds is an invasion of the detenu 's constitutional right is that the Court is precluded from adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the grounds and it cannot substitute its objective decision for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
Dr. Singhvi very strenuously submitted that the first paragraph of the 'grounds ' supplied to the petitioner was of an introductory nature, that Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 referred to the events which furnished the background and that the penultimate paragraph alone contained the grounds of detention as such.
He submitted that it was permissible to separate the introduction and the recital of events constituting the background from the grounds of detention and if that was done it would be apparent that the order of detention suffered from no infirmity.
He sought to draw support for his submission from the decision in Naresh Chandra Ganguli vs State of West Bengal and others.
It is impossible to agree with the submission of Dr. Singhvi.
The annexure to the order of detention detailing the grounds of detention has been fully extracted by my learned brother Shinghal, J. we are unable to see how factual allegations such as those contained in the paragraphs 1 to 5 of the grounds of detention can be said to be merely introductory or as constituting the background.
In Naresh Chandra Ganguly vs State of West Bengal what was read by the Supreme Court as the 'preamble ' was the recital in terms of Section 3(1) 270 clauses (a) and (b) of the Preventive Detention Act, namely, that the detenu was being detained in pursuance of a detention order made in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act on the ground that the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the particulars given thereafter.
The particulars given in the subsequent paragraphs, the Court said, constituted the grounds.
We do not understand Naresh Chandra Ganguly vs The State of West Bengal as laying down that it is permissible to dissect or trisect the grounds of detention into introduction, background and 'grounds ' as such.
There is no warrant for any such division.
The distinction made in Naresh Chandra Ganguly 's (supra) case between the 'preamble ', meaning thereby the recital in terms of the statutory provision and the 'grounds ' meaning thereby the conclusions of fact which led to the passing of the order of detention does not justify any distinction being made between introductory facts, background facts, and 'grounds ' as such.
All allegations of fact which have led to the passing of the order of detention are 'grounds of detention '.
If such allegations are irrelevant or vague the detenu is entitled to be released.
The attempt of Dr. Singhvi was to treat that allegation which according to him was the immediate cause of the order of detention as the only ground of detention and all other allegations earlier made as were introductory and background facts.
We are unable to so dissect the factual allegations mentioned in the document supplied to the detenu as furnishing the grounds of detention.
The last straw which breaks a camel 's back does not make weightless the other loads on the camel 's back.
The grounds of detention begin with the statement that the detenu is a 'die hard Naxalite '.
Dr. Singhvi described a Naxalite as a 'votary of change by resort to violence ' and urged that as the meaning ascribed to the expression by the daily press (Marxist Exclamation: the Capitalist Press !).
Many may not agree with Dr. Singhvi.
Some think of Naxalites as blood thirsty monsters; some compare them to Joan of Arc.
It all depends on the class to which one belongs, one 's political hues and ideological perceptions.) At one stage of the argument Dr. Singhvi himself described a Naxalite as an 'ideological revolutionary '.
The detenu himself apparently thought that it meant no more than that he was a believer in the Marxist Leninist ideology and so he affirmatively declared that he was a firm believer in that ideology and was proud of that fact.
Though he did urge that the expression 271 Naxalite connoted a person who sought change through violent means, Dr. Singhvi had, ultimately, to confess that the expression 'Naxalite ' was as definite or as vague as all words describing ideologies, such as democracy etc., were.
It is enough to say that it is just a label which can be as misleading as any other and is, perhaps, used occasionally for that very purpose.
In the third paragraph of the grounds of detention it is said that the detenu made a speech in which he asked his audience to shun the life of dishonour and rise in revolt against oppression.
In the fourth paragraph he is stated to be responsible for posters bearing the caption "No solution without revolution".
It is also stated that the posters asked the people to prepare themselves for revolution.
Now, expressions like 'revolt ' and 'revolution ' are flung about by all and sundry in all manner of context and it is impossible to attach any particular significance to the use of such expressions.
Every turn against the establishment is called 'revolt ' and every new idea is labelled as 'revolutionary '.
If the mere use of expressions like 'revolt ' and 'revolution ' are to land a person behind the bars what would be the fate of all our legislators ? It all depends on the context in which the expressions are used.
Neither paragraph three nor paragraph four of the grounds of detention specifies the particular form of revolt or revolution which the detenu advocated.
Did he incite people to violence ? What words did he employ ? What, then, is the connection between these grounds and "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order" ? There is no answer to be gleaned from the grounds recited in paragraphs three and four which must therefore, be held to be both irrelevant and vague.
In paragraph five it is said that the detenu instigated educated unemployed youth to go on a hunger strike.
A hunger strike, in our country, is a well known form of peaceful protest but it is difficult to connect it with public disorder.
We consider this ground also to be vague and irrelevant.
The allegation that the detenu made derogatory remarks about Shri Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Chief Minister of Kashmir, and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan appears to us, again, to be entirely irrelevant.
I do not think it is necessary to refer to all the grounds in any further detail as that has been done by my brother Shinghal, J. N. K. A. Petition allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The petitioner challenged his detention under the Jammu were sent to him by way of an annexure to the District Magistrate 's order of detention.
The petitioner was informed that, if he so desired, he could make a representation to the Government against the alleged order of detention.
It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that some of the grounds of detention were so vague that he did not find it possible to exercise his fundamental right of making a representation under article 22(5) of the Constitution and that some of the grounds were irrelevant for the purposes of making an order under section 8. ^ HELD: The argument that only the "preamble" of the order of detention was vague but not the grounds is not tenable.
[264B] "Preamble" has been defined "as an introductory paragraph or part in a statute deed, or other document setting forth the grounds and intention of it".
The preamble thus betokens that which follows.
The respondents ' counsel did not, however, find it possible to point out where the preamble could be said to begin, or to finish, and which of the paragraphs could be said to constitute the grounds of detention as such.
[262 G H, 263A] This Court has disapproved of vagueness in the grounds of detention because that impinges on the fundamental right of the detenu under article 22(5) of the Constitution to make a representation against the order of detention when the grounds on which the order has been made or communicated to him.
The purpose of the requirement is to afford him the earliest opportunity of seeking redress against the order of detention.
But, as is obvious, that opportunity cannot be said to be afforded when it is established that a ground of detention is so vague that he cannot possibly make an effective representation.
Reference made to paragraphs which were held to be vague.
[263E, H, 264 B D] State of Bombay vs Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya ; , Tarapada De and Ors.
vs The State of West Bengal, ; , Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj vs State of Delhi and Ors. ; , Shibban Lal Saxena vs State oj Uttar Pradesh ; , Rameshwar Lal Patwari vs State of Bihar and Ors., ; , and Pushkar Mukherjee and Ors.
vs State of West Bengal, ; 259 It is equally well settled that a ground is said to be irrelevant when it has no connection with the satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention under the appropriate law and taking any such ground into consideration vitiates the order of detention.
It was held that irrelevant grounds were, nevertheless, taken into consideration for making the impugned order, and that was quite sufficient to vitiate it.
[267A B] Keshav Talpade vs The King Emperor, , Satya Brata Ghose vs Mr. Arif Ali, District Magistrate Shibsagar, Jorhat and Ors, , and K. Yadava Reddy and Ors.
vs The Commissioner of Police, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and Anr., I.L.R. 1972 Andhra Pradesh 1025, affirmed.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. (Concurring) ^ HELD: A law providing for preventive detention and action taken under such a law, to pass muster, have to satisfy the requirements of both Articles 19 and 22 of the Constitution.
[268D E] The interpretation of Article 22(5) consistently adopted by this Court is, perhaps, one of the outstanding contributions of the Court in the cause of Human Rights.
The law is now well settled that a detenu has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution (1) to be informed as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain relief to him.
The inclusion of an irrelevant or non existent ground among other relevant grounds is as infringement of the first of the rights and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second of the rights.
In either case there is an invasion of the Constitutional rights of the detenu entitling him to approach the Court for relief.
The reason for saying that the inclusion of even a single irrelevant or obscure ground among several relevant and clear grounds is an invasion of the detenu 's constitutional right is that the Court is precluded from adjudicating upon the sufficiency of the grounds and it cannot substitute its objective decision for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
[269A D] The argument that only that allegation which was the immediate cause of the order of detention was to be treated as the ground of detention and all other allegations recited in the order of detention were to be treated as introductory and background facts cannot be accepted.
The factual allegations contained in the document supplied to the detenu as furnishing the ground of detention cannot be so dissected.
The last straw which broke the camel 's back does not make weightless the other loads on the camel 's back.
[269 G H, 270E] The expression 'Naxalite ' conveys different meanings to different persons depending on the class to which one belongs, his political hues and ideological perceptions.
It is as vague or as definite as all words describing ideologies such as "democracy" etc.
It is a label which may be as misleading as any other.
[270F G, 271A] Expressions like 'revolt ' and 'revolution ' are flung by all and sundry in all manner of context and it is impossible to attach any particular significance to 260 the use of such expressions.
Every turn against the establishment is called 'revolt ' and every new idea is labelled as 'revolutionary '.
Without specification of the particular form of revolt and revolution which was advocated, the ground of detention must be held to be irrelevant and vague.
[271 C D] A. K. Gopalan vs State of Madras, ; R. C. Cooper vs Union of India, ; distinguished.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1592 of 1969.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 12th March, 1969 of the Madras High Court in Civil Rev. Petition No. 1791/67.
K. Jayaram and K. Ramkumar for the Appellant.
A. V. Rangam for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
This appeal by special leave is filed against the order dated March 12, 1969 passed in Civil Revision Petition No. 1791 of 1967 on the file of the High Court of Madras.
398 On the date of the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') i.e. April 6, 1960, the appellant owned approximately 47 acres of agricultural lands.
He was required to file a statement under section 8 of the Act within 90 days from the date specified in the Notification issued by the Government in that behalf in respect of all lands held or deemed to have been held by him furnishing the particulars mentioned in that provision to the Authorised Officer within whose jurisdiction his holding or major part thereof was situated.
Accordingly, he filed his return.
In the course of the enquiry, the Authorised Officer found that under a will made by Sivagami Achi, the mother of the appellant, who died on April 20, 1962, the appellant became entitled to 4.99 standard acres and his wife, Devika got 8.81 standard acres of agricultural land.
The Authorised Officer after ascertaining the true extents of the several bits of agricultural land held by the appellant on April 6, 1960, exempted 2.21 acres of land under section 73 of the Act and determined the extent of surplus land which had to be surrendered by the appellant under the Act at 12.803 standard acres on the basis that the appellant 's family which included his wife was holding 44 46 acres as also the land which the appellant and his wife got under the will of Sivagami Achi.
On the above basis, he directed the final statement to be published under section 12 of the Act.
Aggrieved by the order of the Authorised Officer, the appellant filed an appeal before the Land Tribunal i.e. the Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur under section 78 of the Act contending inter alia that the extent of 8.81 standard acres which had been bequeathed in favour of his wife, Devika by his mother Sivagami Achi under the will referred to above was stridhana land and had to be dealt with accordingly as required by section 5 (4) (a) of the Act.
The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the case of the appellant that the extent of 8.81 standard acres acquired by Devika on the death of Sivagami Achi should be allowed to be retained by her in addition to 30 standard acres.
The case was, however, remitted back to the Authorised Officer for making a fresh determination of the surplus extent of land in accordance with the order passed in appeal.
The State of Tamil Nadu filed a revision petition under section 83 of the Act before the High Court against the appellate order.
The High Court allowed the revision petition holding that the extent of 8.81 standard acres acquired by Devika was not 'stridhana land ' as defined under section 3 (42) of the Act and could not be treated as such while determining the surplus land.
The High Court further held that the land acquired by Devika was governed by section 21(1) read with section 10(2) (b) of the Act.
This appeal is filed against the said order.
399 In order to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the parties before us, it is necessary to refer briefly to some of the provisions of the Act.
The Act was passed to provide for the fixation of ceiling on agricultural land holdings and for certain other matters connected therewith in the State of Tamil Nadu.
Having regard to the limited extent of the area of agricultural land available for cultivation in that State, the great disparity in the ownership of agricultural land leading to the concentration of such land in the hands of certain persons, the need for reduction of such disparity in the ownership of agricultural land in that State and the necessity for fixing a ceiling on the Agricultural land holdings, provisions were enacted in the Act fixing a ceiling on the agricultural land holdings and providing for acquisition of agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area and distribution of such land amongst the landless and other persons among the rural population.
Section 3(11) of the Act defined the expression "date of the commencement of this Act" as the date on which the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Bill, 1960 was published in the Fort St. George Gazette, namely, the 6th day of April, 1960.
Section 3(34) of the Act defined the expression "person" as including any trust, company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.
Under section 3(14) of the Act, 'family ' in relation to a person meant the person, the wife or husband as the case may be, of such person and his or her minor sons and unmarried daughters and minor grandsons and unmarried grand daughters in the male line, whose father and mother were dead.
Section 3(7) of the Act defined "ceiling area" as the extent of land which a person was entitled to hold under section 5.
Section 3(42) of the Act defined "stridhana land" as any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of a female in her own name.
During the period in question, the relevant part of section 5 of the Act read as follows: "5.
(1)(a) Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and, subject to the provisions of sub sections (4) and (5) and of Chapter VIII the ceiling area in the case of every family consisting of not more than five members, shall be 30 standard acres. . 400 (4)(a) Subject to the provisions of sub section (5), where the stridhana land held by any female member of a family together with the other land held by all the members of that family, is in excess of 30 standard acres, the female member concerned may hold, in addition to the extent of land which the family is entitled to hold under sub section (1), stridhana land not exceeding 10 standard acres. . " Section 7 of the Act read as follows: "7.
On and from the date of the commencement of this Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area: Provided that in calculating the total extent of land held by any person, any extent in excess of the ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall, irrespective of the assessment of such land, be excluded.
" Section 21 of the Act read as follows: "21.
Ceiling on future acquisition by inheritance, bequest or by sale in execution of decrees, etc. (1) If, on or after the date of the commencement of this Act (a) any person acquires by inheritance or bequest from any person; . . . . . any land, which, together with the land, if any, already held by him, exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area, then he shall, within ninety days from the notified date or from the date of such acquisition, whichever is later, furnish to the authorised Officer within whose jurisdiction his holding or the major part thereof is situated, a return containing the following particulars, namely . . . " The lands which were bequeathed by Sivagami Achi, the mother of the appellant under a will were held by her on the date of the commencement of the Act i.e. April 6, 1960.
The appellant married Devika on June 29, 1960.
Sivagami Achi died on April 20, 1962 and on her death, the appellant and Devika became entitled to the land bequeathed in their favour by her.
The draft statement relating to the holding of the appellant was published on May, 30, 1965 and the Authorised Officer passed his order on March 14, 1966 treating the lands bequeathed by Sivagami Achi in favour of the appellant and his 401 wife as part of the holding of the family consisting of the appellant and his wife.
The case of the appellant before the Authorised Officer, the Subordinate Judge and the High Court was that in view of section 5 (4) (a) of the Act, the ceiling area should have been fixed in his case at 30 standard acres plus the extent of land bequeathed in favour of his wife i.e. 8.81 standard acres.
In this Court also, the very same contention is urged.
We are of the view that there is no substance in this contention.
The expression "stridhana land" used in section 5(4) (a) has been given a restricted meaning by section 3(42) of the Act which defines it as any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name.
Admittedly on the date of the commencement of the Act i.e. April 6, 1960, Devika was not the owner of the land in question.
She acquired title to it only on April 20, 1962 on the death of the testatrix.
The appellant cannot, therefore, claim any benefit under section 5(4) (a) of the Act.
Section 21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female acquired after the commencement of the Act by inheritance or bequest from any person and any other property held by her family.
From a reading of the definition of the expression "stridhana land" in section 3(42) of the Act and the provisions of section 5(4) of the Act, we are of opinion that the State Legislature intended to extend the concession available under section 5(4) of the Act only to the stridhana property held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to property acquired by her thereafter.
It was urged by Mr. K. Jayaram, learned counsel for the appellant that the Act was an expropriatory one and therefore, we should construe section 5 (4) (a) of the Act as being applicable to agricultural land acquired by a female even after the commencement of the Act.
We do not think that there is any room for construing the said provision in that way.
The object of the legislation as mentioned earlier was to acquire agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area from the holders thereof and to distribute the same amongst the landless among the rural population.
If the construction urged by the appellant is placed on section 21 of the Act, the very object of the statute would be defeated.
If really the Legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with section 5(4), it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act.
" It has also to be 402 borne in mind that the expression 'stridhana ' is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu Law.
The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal laws.
It is, therefore, reasonable to construe the expression 'stridhana land ' as referring only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to lands inherited by her or acquired by her as a bequest at any subsequent point of time.
The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the High Court of Madras in Valliammal vs The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Coimbatore in which a contention similar to the one urged before us on behalf of the appellant in this case had been accepted.
The facts of that case were more or less similar to the facts in the case before us.
The petitioner in that case was the wife of one Palanisami Gounder who was in possession of an extent of 44.061 standard acres, after excluding the exempted lands, on the commencement of the Act.
She inherited 11.075 standard acres on the death of her son on March 25, 1962.
In the return filed by him, the husband of the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to retain 30 standard acres as holding of the family and that his wife, the petitioner in that case, was entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property.
The Land Tribunal, Coimbatore held that since the Act defined "stridhana land" as meaning any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of the family in her own name and since the petitioner therein had inherited the land on the death of her son only on March 25, 1962 i.e. subsequent to the commencement of the Act, she was not entitled to retain any land as stridhana property in addition to the extent of land which the family could retain under section 5(1).
The petitioner questioned the correctness of the order of the Tribunal before the High Court of Madras in C.R.P. No. 916 of 1971.
That petition was dismissed by Ganesan, J. on the ground that in view of the definition of stridhana land in section 3 (42) of the Act, the petitioner therein was not entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property, in addition to the 30 standard acres allowed to the family consisting of herself and her husband.
Thereafter a petition was filed before the High Court by the petitioner therein to review the order passed by Ganesan, J.
The review petition came up for decision before another learned Judge who allowed the same by his order dated November 2, 1972.
It is on the decision rendered on the review petition the reliance is placed by the appellant before us.
In paragraph 6 of that decision, it is observed as follows: 403 "The learned Judge, who heard the civil revision petition, mainly relied on the definition of 'stridhana property ' for holding that no woman is entitled to hold any stridhana property if the same was acquired or inherited subsequent to the commencement of the Act.
Of course, section 3(42) defines stridhana land as meaning any land held on the date of commencement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name.
But that meaning is to be adopted 'unless the context otherwise requires '.
It has been repeatedly held that the word in the section will have to be interpreted and understood in the context in which it is used in the section and the definition given for that word in the definition section of the Act could not always govern the interpretation without reference to the context.
In the context of sections 5, 7 and 21 and with reference to the scope and object of the Act, I am of opinion, that the properties inherited by females as stridhana property subsequent to the commencement of the Act are also entitled to the benefit of sub section (4) of section 5 of the Act.
" It is true that the above passage supports the case of the appellant but we are of the view that in the context of section 21 of the Act it is not necessary to give a meaning to the expression 'stridhana land ' different from what is stated in section 3(42) of the Act.
For the reasons already stated by us we hold that the aforesaid decision does not lay down the law correctly.
It is also to be observed that the earlier decision of the High Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case.
We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in this case in holding that section 5 (4) of the Act was not applicable to the land in question.
It was lastly urged by Mr. K. Jayaram that in view of certain subsequent amendments made to the Act, the case has to be examined afresh by us in the light of the amended law.
We do not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage.
It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings in order to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law.
Liberty is also reserved to the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act.
In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The Tamilnadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 by section 3 (42) defined "stridhana land" as any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act (April 6, 1960) by any female member of a family in her own name, and section 5 (4)(a) of the Act enabled such a female member to hold, in addition to the extent of land which the family is entitled to hold, stridhana land not exceeding 10 standard acres.
The mother of the appellant had bequeathed to the appellant and his wife certain agricultural lands by a will.
The appellant being married on June 29, 1960 and his mother having died on April 20, 1962 i.e. after the Act came into force, the Authorised Officer passed orders treating the lands bequeathed in favour of the appellant 's wife as part of the holdings of the family consisting of the appellant and his wife, and determined the extent of the surplus land to be surrendered.
The appellant 's contention in his appeal under section 78 of the Act before the Land Tribunal, that the land which was bequeathed in favour of his wife by his mother under the will was stridhana land, was accepted by it and the Land Tribunal allowed the wife of the appellant to retain the land as stridhana land under section 5 (4)(a) of the Act and remitted back the case to the Authorised Officer for making a fresh determination of the surplus extent of the land.
The respondent 's revision petition under section 83 of the Act was allowed, the High Court holding that the land held by the wife was not 'stridhana land ' as defined under section 3 (42) of the Act, and could not be treated as such while determining the surplus land.
On the question whether the land in question was 'stridhana land ' and could be treated as such under section 5 (4) of the Act while determining the surplus land.
^ HELD: (1) The High Court was right in holding that section 5 (4) of the Act was not applicable to the land in question.
[403 F] (2) The expression "stridhana land" used in section 5 (4) (a) has been given a restricted meaning by section 3 (42) of the Act which defines it as any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name.
[401C] 397 In the instant case on the date of the commencement of the Act i.e. April 6, 1960 the wife was not the owner of the land in question.
She acquired title to it on April 20, 1962 on the death of the testatrix her mother.
The appellant cannot therefore claim any benefit under section 5 (4) (a) of the Act.
[401C] (3) section 21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female acquired after the commencement of the Act by inheritance or bequest from any person and any other property held by her family.
[401D] (4) A reading of the definition of the expression "stridhana land" in section 3 (42) of the Act and the provisions of section 5(4) of the Act, indicate that the State Legislature intended to extend the concession available under section 5 (4) of the Act only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to land acquired by her thereafter.
[401E] (5) The object of the legislation is the acquisition of agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area and distribution of the same amongst the landless among the rural population.
If the construction urged by the appellant is placed on section 21 of the Act, the very object of the statute would be defeated.
There is also no room for construing section 5 (4) (a) of the Act as being applicable to agricultural land acquired by a female even after the commencement of this Act.
[401G, F] (6) If the Legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with section 5(4), it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act." [401H] (7) The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal laws.
This indicates that the expression 'stridhana ' is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu law.
[402A] Valliammal vs The Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Coimbatore , over ruled.