judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1947 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.1970 of the Gauhati High Court in Civil Rule No. 1151/69.
section N. Chowdhary for the Appellant.
D. N. Mukherjee for Respondent No. 2.
V. section Desai, B. P.Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi and Miss Asha Jain for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J.
This is an appeal by certificate granted under sub clause (a) of clause (1) of article 133 of the Constitution of India by the High Court of Assam and Nagaland against its judgment dated 17th March, 1970 accepting a petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India which arose in the circumstances that follow.
Land measuring 7.60 acres and situated at Lawshtun, Bishnupur, Shillong, belonged to the 5 respondents when a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 851 Act) was published in respect thereof on 27th March 1967.
Three days later the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector, United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, Shillong.
Proceedings for the award of compensation to the respondents were pending when negotiations took place between the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam and two of the respondents who agreed to the reduction of the cost of acquisition of the land from Rs. 6,17,683.50 to Rs. 4,63,262.57 (inclusive of cost of establishment and contingency amounting to Rs. 22,060.12).
Thereafter the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Home and Political/Department wrote to respondent No. 2 a letter dated 21st February, 1969 detailing the agreement arrived at between the Chief Secretary and the respondents and requesting them "to please submit immediately a written document signed by all the co sharers of the land to the effect that yourself and all other co sharers are agreeable to accept the L. A. cost of Rs. 4,41,202.45 for land at Bishnupur and that you and your co shares will make no further claim for the land thus acquired by Government." The respondents lost no time in sending their reply which was dated 24th February 1969 and in which they stated that the delay in payment had caused to them great hardship and that they had agreed to reduce the cost of the acquisition in the course of their discussion with the Chief Secretary whom they had urged "at the same time that the payment should be made immediately.
" The reply was signed by all the five respondents and was accompanied by an agreement (also signed by all of them), the text of which may be set out in extense: "We, all the co shares interested in the land acquisition case for construction of quarters for Special Branch Staff of Police Department at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong, hereby agree in response to the Government Letter No. 356/ 66/55 dated the 21st February, 1969 to accept the land acquisition cost of Rs. 4,41,202.45P (Rupees four lakhs forty one thousand two hundred and two and forty five paise only) subject to Government making payment within the 31st March, 1969 for our land measuring more or less 7.60 acres at Lawsohtun, Bishnupur, Shillong.
"We further agree that we will make no further claim in regard to compensation for the same land provided actual 852 payment is received within the above period of 31st March, 1969.
" The agreement between the parties was reduced by the Collector to an award dated the 25th March 1969 and on the very next day the sum of Rs. 4,41,202.45 was paid to the respondents.
On 31st March 1969 the respondents made an application to the Chief Secretary claiming interest at the rate of 12 1/2 percent per annum on the amount last mentioned.
As there was no response from the Chief Secretary, the respondents applied to the Collector on 7th July, 1969 requesting him to pay interest On the amount awarded at the rate of 6% per annum for the period from 30th March 1967 to 26th March 1969 under section 34 of the Act which runs thus: "When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited.
" The Collector informed the respondents by a letter dated 31st July 1969 that no action was necessary "at this stage".
It was then that the respondents knocked at the door of the High Court.
The High Court was of the opinion that the agreement between the parties covered only the amount of "compensation" as described in the various sections of the Act including sections 23 and 34 and that interest had to be paid on such compensation by reason of the statutory requirement enacted in that behalf by section 34.
The High Court, therefore, accepted the petition filed before it and held that the Collector was bound to pay to the respondents interest on the amount covered by the award at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 30th March 1967 (being the date on which the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector) to the date of payment, i.e., 26th March 1969.
It directed the Collector to dispose of the petition dated the 7th July 1969 made to him by the respondents in accordance with law.
The short point requiring determination by us is whether the agreement arrived at between the parties in February 1969 embraced only the "Compensation" within the meaning of that term as used in the Act or covered also the payment of interest under section 34 there of.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the interpretation placed on the agreement by the High Court can not be sustained and that the respondent are not entitled to any interest on the sum already paid to them.
853 4.
Although it is true that in the agreement dated the 24th A February 1969 which the respondents signed and sent to the Government along with their letter of that date they stated that they would not make any further claim in regard to "compensation", but that expression, in our opinion, was clearly used by them not in the sense in which it is used in sections 23 and 34 of the Act but more comprehensively, meaning reimbursement in full satisfaction of their claim in respect of the acquisition.
That this was 60 was made clear in the letter addressed to them by the Under Secretary in which he expressly stated that "you and your co sharers will make no further claim for the land thus acquired by the Government.
" The Under Secretary did not use the word "compensation" in his letter nor did the respondents use it in their reply in which, on the other hand, they made a grouse of the hardship which the delay in payment bad caused to them and brought it to the pointed attention of the under Secretary that immediate payment was an essential part of the bargain.
In the agreement signed by them (as pointed out above) they no doubt used the word "compensation" but they added that they would make no further claim in regard to it if actual payment was received by them before the 31st March, 1969.
The condition thus attached by them to the agreement would show that by the acceptance of the quantified sum of Rs. 4,41,202.45 they condoned the delay in payment and also relinquished all future claims to interest.
If it were otherwise, there is no reason why the respondents would not have expressly reserved their right to claim interest under section 34 of the Act.
The tenor of the two letters coupled with the agreement leads to no other conclusion.
In the result the appeal succeeds and is accepted.
The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the respondents ' petition decided by it is dismissed but with no order as to costs.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
Accepting the State appeal, negativing the claim for interest and dismissing the original writ petition, the Court, ^ HELD: The expression "would not make any further claim in regard to compensation" in the agreement dated the 24th February, 1969 was clearly used by the petitioners respondents not in the sense in which it is used in sections 23 and 34 of the Land Acquisition Act but more comprehensively Meaning reimbursement in full satisfaction of their claim in respect of the acquisition.
The condition attached by them to the relinquishment of their claim was that the agreed amount must be paid to them before 31st March 1969, which agreement would show that by the acceptance of the quantified sum of Rs. 4,41,202.45 they condoned the delay in payment and also relinquished all future claims to interest.
If it were otherwise, the respondents would have expressly reserved their right to claim interest under section 34 of the Act.
[853 A B, D F]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 761 of 1980.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20 10 1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc.
Case No. 822 of 1978.
Jagdish Kumar Aggarwal for the Appellant.
Nemo for the Respondent.
The Judgment of Murtaza Fazal Ali & A. Vardarajan JJ was delivered by Fazal Ali, J., A. D. Koshal, J. gave a concurring Opinion.
FAZAL ALI, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated October 20, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) by which a revision filed by the respondent for setting aside an order of maintenance passed by the trial Magistrate was accepted and the said order was quashed.
The facts of the appeal lie within a narrow compass but the case involves a substantial question of law.
Unfortunately, as the respondent did not appear despite service, we had to rely mainly on the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and had also to consider various aspects that could be stressed by the respondent if he had appeared.
The appellant, Mst.
Zohara Khatoon, was a legally married wife of Mohd. Ibrahim.
As Mohd. Ibrahim soon after the marriage willfully neglected her she filed an application before the trial Magistrate on September 17, 1974 under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the '1973 Code ') in order to fix maintenance for her and her minor son.
The Special Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki (U.P.), after hearing the parties, allowed the application by his order dated December 29, 1976 and fixed the maintenance at Rs. 100/ (Rupees one hundred) per month both for the wife and the child.
The Magistrate also accepted the allegation of the appellant that she had been neglected by the husband without reasonable or probable cause.
The order of the Magistrate was upheld by the Sessions Judge in revision.
914 Before the Magistrate, the respondent husband had taken the defence that as the appellant had brought a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and willful neglect which was decreed by the civil court on 15 1 1973 and she was living separately, she ceased to be the wife of the respondent and was, therefor, not entitled to maintenance under section 125 or section 127 of the 1973 Code.
Ultimately, the husband moved the High Court under section 482 of the 1973 Code for quashing the order of the Magistrate as it was vitiated by an error of law.
In the High Court, the argument of the appellant was that in view of clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the 1973 Code, she continued to be the wife despite obtaining a decree for dissolution of marriage and thus her right to maintenance would not be affected by the decree passed by the civil court.
The High Court after hearing the parties was of the view that clause (b) of the Explanation referred to above would apply only if the divorce proceeded from the husband, that is to say, the said clause would not apply unless the divorce was given unilaterally by the husband or was obtained by the wife from the husband.
In other words, the High Court thought that as, in the instant case, the dissolution of marriage was brought about by the wife under the (hereinafter referred to as the '1939 Act ') the decree under the said Act did not amount to a divorce by the husband because the marriage was dissolved by operation of law only.
Hence clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) had no application and the appellant was not entitled to any maintenance under section 125 of the 1973 Code, so far as she was concerned.
The High Court, however, maintained the order of the Magistrate so far as the minor son was concerned and fixed his maintenance at Rs. 40/ per month.
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and is based on a wrong interpretation of clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the 1973 Code.
After having gone through the various provisions of the 1973 Code, particularly sections 125 and 127 we are satisfied that the contentions raised by the counsel for the appellant are well founded and must prevail.
In order to decide the issue in question it may be necessary to give a brief survey of the corresponding provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the '1898 Code ') to show the nature and ambit of the provisions relating to the award of maintenance.
Sections 488 and 489 were the corresponding provisions of the 1898 Code which were couched almost in the same language as 915 sections 125 and 127 of the 1973 Code minus some important additions that have been made under the 1973 Code.
The relevant portion of section 488 of the 1898 Code may be extracted thus: "If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding (five hundred rupees) in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs.
" It is not necessary to refer to the other provisions of section 488 of the said Code as the same are not germane for the purpose of deciding this appeal.
It may, however, be noted that a provision like clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the 1973 Code was conspicuously absent from section 488 and has been added by the 1973 Code.
We shall deal with the legal effect of this provision a little later.
A perusal of section 488 would clearly reveal that it carves out an independent sphere of its own and is a general law providing a summary machinery for determining the maintenance to be awarded by the Magistrate under the circumstances mentioned in the section.
The provisions may not be inconsistent with other parallel Acts in so far as maintenance is concerned, but the section undoubtedly excludes to some extent the application of any other Act.
At the same time, it cannot be said that the personal law of the parties is completely excluded for all purposes.
For instance, where the validity of a marriage or mode of divorce or cessation of marriage under the personal law of a party is concerned that would have to be determined according to the said personal law.
Thus, the exclusion by section 488 extends only to the quantum of the maintenance and the circumstances under which it could be granted.
The scope of section 488 of 1898 Code was considered by this Court in Nanak Chand vs Shri Chandra Kishore Agarwala & Ors.
where the following observations were made: "We are unable to see any inconsistency between the Maintenance Act and section 488 Cr.
P.C. .
The law was substantially similar before and nobody ever suggested that Hindu Law, as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, insofar as it dealt with the maintenance of children, was in any way inconsistent with section 488 Cr.
P.C. 916 The scope of the two laws is different.
Section 488 provides a summary remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties.
Recently the question came be fore the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh vs State (AIR 1963 All. 355), before the Calcutta High Court in Mahabir Agarwalla vs Gita Roy and before the Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan vs Kiran Rani (AIR 1965 Pat. 442).
The three High Courts have, in our views, correctly come to the conclusion that section 4(b) of the Maintenance Act does not repeal or affect in any manner the provisions contained in section 488, Cr.
P.C." It would be seen that this Court approved of the decisions in the cases of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwalla and Nalini Ranjan mentioned in the observations extracted above.
In order to understand the proper scope of section 488 of the 1898 Code which is almost the same as that of section 125 of the 1973 Code, it may be necessary to examine the decisions which were referred to with approval by this Court in Nanak Chand 's case (supra).
In Ram Singh vs State & Anr., Kailash Prasad, J. observed as follows: "There is nothing in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to suggest expressly or by necessary implication that the Act is intended to be a substitute for the provisions of section 488 Cr.
In fact the provisions of sec.
18 of the Act cannot be a substitute for section 488 Cr.
The latter provision is general and is applicable to a wife, irrespective of her religion, but the former is applicable to the case of Hindus only.
It could not, therefore, be intended to be a substitute for section 488 Cr. P. C." To the same effect is the decision of the Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan Chakravarty vs Smt.
Kiran Rani Chakravarty where the following observations were made: "Before the enactment of 1956, it was well settled that the right conferred by section 488 Cr.
P.C. was independent of the personal law of the parties.
The right of maintenance under section 488 was irrespective of the nationality or creed of the parties, the only condition precedent to the possession of that right being in the case of a wife the acceptance of the conjugal relation.
Further, section 488 provided for only 917 a speedy remedy and a summary procedure before a Magistrate against starvation of a deserted wife or child.
This section did not cover the civil liability of a husband or a father under his personal law to maintain his wife and children.
" The Calcutta High Court also took the same view in Mahabir Agarwalla vs Gita Roy where the following observations were made: "An alternative but not inconsistent summary remedy was provided by section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure not only to the Hindu wife but generally to wives irrespective of religion for recovery of maintenance from the husband.
The two remedies were, however, not coextensive." Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is clear that the 1898 Code by virtue of section 488 provided a summary remedy for awarding maintenance to neglected wives irrespective of caste, creed, community or religion to which they belonged.
It was in this context that the Courts referred to above considered the effect of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and other similar Acts.
This, however, does not conclude the controversy.
The important question still remains: Was the Magistrate competent to award maintenance if under the personal law of the Mahomedans the wife had been validly divorced and had completed the period of Iddat ? In fact, section 489 of the 1898 Code, as amended by the 1955 Amending Act, had empowered the Magistrate to make any alteration in the payment of the maintenance on proof of a change in the circumstances.
Similarly, section 489(2), which is extracted below, provided that the Magistrate could cancel the maintenance in consequence of a decision of any competent court: "(2) Where it appears to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under Section 488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly." Thus, considering the scheme of sections 488 and 489 it was generally accepted as good law by all the High Courts that where a woman governed by the Mahomedan law was awarded maintenance, the same would cease from the date of divorce given by the husband and the completion of the period of Iddat.
That this is the Mahomedan law on 918 the subject admits of no doubt and has not been controverted before us.
We would however, refer to a few decisions on this point to support our point of view.
In re Shekhanmian while defining the consequences of a divorce and its impact on section 488 of the 1898 Code a division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed thus: "A talak when it becomes irrevocable puts an end to conjugal relationship which had subsisted between the parties, and the divorced wife would not be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband beyond the period of iddat from the date of such irrevocable divorce.
section 488 Criminal P.C., has in no manner abrogated this part of the personal law of the parties.
The existence of conjugal relations in the case of Mahomedans has to be determined by reference to the provisions of the Mahomedan Law and not by considerations of equity and good conscience as understood in any other system of law.
" To the same effect is the decision of the Madras High Court in Syed Said vs Meeram Bee (2) where in division Bench observed thus: "A Magistrate, however, exercising summary powers conferred on him by section 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, can make or enforce an order to that effect only if the relationship of husband and wife exists between the two, but in order to determine this, and only to that extent, we must ascertain the effect in Mahomedan law of an irreversible divorce on conjugal relations.
" It was further held in that case that a divorce becomes irrevocable after the wife has observed the period of iddat which is usually three months or if she was pregnant, the date of delivery so that she may be free to marry again.
This view was reiterated by the Madras High Court in a later decision in In re Mohamed Rahimullah & Anr.
(3) where Yahya Ali, J. Observed thus: "The foundation upon which Ss. 488 & 489, Criminal P.C. rest, so far as granting of maintenance by the husband to the wife is concerned, is that the relationship of husband and wife subsists between them.
When that relationship is lawfully dissolved and there is no marital tie either in reason or upon any canon of justice or even upon the language of 919 Ss. 488 and 489 how the husband can be directed to continue to maintain his divorced wife.
" The Hyderabad High Court also took the same view in Rahimunissea & Ors.
vs Mohd. Ismail and after considering the entire law on the subject Bilgrami, J. Observed thus: All these grounds can be sufficient or valid for refusal of maintenance to a wife with whom the tie of marriage subsists, but when this tie is dissolved, all these defences cannot be set up and the right of the wife to maintenance during the "iddat" period is absolute under the Mahomedan law; the only obligation which binds a wife during this period is that she should not remarry.
" In a very early case of the Allahabad High Court Din Mahommad 's case (2) Mahmood, J. pointed out that while the enactment regarding maintenance was of a general nature being applicable to Mahomedans as also to Hindus, Buddhists, and other communities yet the legislature never intended to restrict the Mahomedan law of Divorce.
The Judge, further held that the right to maintenance came to an end when the conjugal relationship between the husband and the wife ceased to exist.
In this connection, Mahmood, J. Observed as follows: "The enactment under which that order was made does not relate more especially to Muhammadans than to Hindus, Buddhists, Indo Britons, Europeans, or any other branch of the general community, and the Legislature could never have intended by it to interfere with or restrict the Muhammadan law of divorce.
The whole of Chapter XLI, Criminal Procedure Code, so far as it relates to the maintenance of wives, contemplates the existence of the conjugal relation as a condition precedent to an order of maintenance and, on general principles, it follows that as soon as the conjugal relation ceases, the order of maintenance must also cease to have any enforceable effect.
When and in what manner a cessation of the conjugal relation takes place, is a question which, ex necessitate rei, must be determined according to the personal law to which the parties concerned are subject.
The right to maintenance conferred by section 536 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a statutory right, which the Legislature has framed irrespective of the nationality or creed of the parties, the only condition precedent to the possession 920 of that right, in the case of a wife, being the existence of the conjugal relation.
" Thus, a review of the decisions referred to above clearly reveals that although a Mahomedan wife had a right to be awarded maintenance by the Magistrate under section 488 of the Code, the said right ceased to exist if she was divorced by her husband and had observed the period of iddat.
This was the undoubted position of law under the 1898 Code as amended by the 1955 Amending Act.
The serious question to be determined in this appeal is as to how far the 1973 Code has made a distinct departure from the previous Code and changed the legal position of a woman after divorce.
Section 125 of the 1973 Code is couched almost in the same language as section 488 of the earlier Code with the important exception that an Explanation has been added after sub clause (1) of section 125 which runs thus: "Explanation For the purposes of this Chapter. (a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) "wife includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried." (Emphasis supplied) We are however not concerned with clause (a) of the Explanation.
Clause (b) has made a distinct departure from the earlier Code in that it has widened the definition of wife and, to some extent, overruled the personal law of the parties so far as the proceedings for maintenance under section 125 are concerned.
Under clause (b), the wife continues to be a wife within the meaning of the provisions of the Code even though she has been divorced by her husband or has otherwise obtained a divorce and has not remarried.
The decision in this case turns upon the interpretation of clause (b).
The High Court has construed the words 'who has been divorced or has obtained a divorce from her husband ' as signifying that in both cases the divorce must proceed from the husband and should be the act of the husband and not that of the wife.
In taking this view, the High Court obviously seems to have been guided by the consideration that a dissolution of marriage brought about at the instance of the wife under the 1939 Act does not amount to a divorce by the husband under the Mahomedan law and hence the second limb of clause (b) also does not apply.
Although there may be some substance in the view taken by the High Court yet what it 921 overlooked was whereas a dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act may not necessarily end in a divorce but other consequences such as declaration that the marriage was a nullity, a decree for judicial separation, etc.
but under the 1939 Act when the marriage is dissolved by the Court at the instance of the wife, the only result that follows is that the wife stands divorced from the husband by operation of law and no other relief can be granted by the court under the 1939 Act after a decree for dissolution is passed.
It follows, therefore, that the divorce resulting from the aforesaid dissolution of the marriage is also a legal divorce under the Mahomedan law by virtue of the statute(1939 Act).
That this is so would be manifest from the circumstances which we shall mention hereafter.
There can be no doubt that under the Mahomedan law the commonest form of divorce is a unilateral declaration of pronouncement of divorce of the wife by the husband according to the various forms recognised by the law.
A divorce given unilaterally by the husband is especially peculiar to Mahomedan law.
In no other law has the husband got a unilateral right to divorce his wife by a simple declaration because other laws, viz., the Hindu law or the , contemplate only a dissolution of marriage on certain grounds brought about by one of the spouses in a Court of law.
Before the enactment of the Act of `1939 a woman under pure Mahomedan law had no right to get a decree for divorce from the husband if he refused to divorce her.
This was unboubtedly the fundamental concept of divorce as laid down by the Mahomedan law.
As, however, some of the Muslim Jurists and Theologists were of the view that where a husband becomes important or disappears for a large number of years or treats his wife with great cruelty, the wife should have some right to approach the Qazi for dissolving the marriage.
Relying on these authorities the legislature intervened and passed the under which the wife was conferred a legal right to move the civil court for a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds specified in section 2 of the Act of 1939.
This is spelt out from the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act of 1939, the relevant portion of which may be extracted thus: "There is no proviso in the Hanafi Code of Muslim Law enabling a married Muslim woman to obtain a decree from the Court dissolving her marriage in case the husband neglects to maintain her, makes her life miserable by deserting or persistently maltreating her or absconds leaving her unprovided for and under certain other circumstances.
The absence of such a provision has entailed unspeakable misery to innumer 922 able Muslim women in British India.
The Hanafi Jurists.
however, have clearly laid down that in cases in which the application of Hanafi Law causes hardship, it is permissible to apply the provisions of the "Maliki, Shafii or Hambali Law".
Acting on this principle the Ulemas have issued fatwas to the effect that in cases enumerated in clause 3, Part A of this Bill (now see section 2 of the Act), a married Muslim woman may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage .
As the Courts are sure to hesitate to apply the Maliki Law to the case of a Muslim woman, legislation recognizing and enforcing the above mentioned principle is called for in order to relieve the sufferings of countless Muslim women.
" One of the grounds was that a suit could be brought if the husband had neglected or failed to provide maintenance for the wife for a period of two years.
After the Act of 1939, a wife thus had a statutory right to obtain divorce from the husband through the Court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.
The Act provided for the wife an independent remedy which could be resorted to by her without being subjected to a pronouncement of divorce by the husband.
It is, therefore, in the background of this Act that the words 'has obtained a divorce from her husband ' in clause (b) of the Explanation have to be constructed.
Thus the High Court in considering the effect of these words seems to have overlooked the dominant object of the statutory remedy that was made available to the wife under the Act of 1939 by which the wife could get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds mentioned in the 1939 Act by petitioning the civil court without any overt act on the part of the husband in divorcing her.
The High Court also failed to consider the legal consequences flowing from The decree passed by the court dissolving the marriage, viz., a legal divorce under the Mahomedan law.
In these circumstances we are therefore, satisfied that the interpretation put by the High Court on the second limb of clause (b) is not correct.
This seems to be borne out from the provisions of Mahomedan law itself.
It would appear that under the Mahomedan law there are three distinct modes in which a muslim marriage can be dissolved and the relationship of the husband and the wife terminated so as to result in an irrevocable divorce.
(1) Where the husband unilaterally gives a divorce according to any of the forms approved by the Mahomedan law, viz, Talaq ahsan which consiss of a single pronounce 923 ment of divorce during tuhar (Period between menstruations) followed by abstinence from sexual intercourse for the period of iddat; or Talak hasan which consists of three pronouncement made during the successive tuhrs, no intercourse taking place between three tuhrs; and lastly Talak ul bidaat or talalk i badai which consists of three pronouncements made during a single tuhr either in one sentence or in three sentences signifying a clear intention to divorce the wife, for instance, the husband saying 'I divorce thee irrevocably ' or 'I divorce thee, I divorce thee, I divorce thee '.
The third form referred to above is however not recognised by the Shiah law.
In the instant case, we are concerned with the appellant who appears to be a Sunni and governed by the Hanafi law (vide Mulla 's Principles of Mahomedan Law, Sec. 311, p. 297).
A divorce or talaq may be given orally or in writing and it becomes irrevocable if the period of iddat is observed though it is not necessary that the woman divorced should come to know of the fact that she has been divorced by her husband.
(2) By an agreement between the husband and the wife whereby a wife obtains divorce by relinquishing either her entire or part of the dower.
This mode of divorce is called 'khula ' or Mubarat.
This form of divorce is initiated by the wife and comes into existence if the husband gives consent to the agreement and releases her from the marriage tie.
Where, however, both parties agree and desire a separation resulting in a divorce, it is called mubarat.
The gist of these mode is that it comes into existence with the consent of both the parties particularly the husband because without his consent this mode of divorce would be incapable of being enforced.
A divorce may also come into existence by virtue of an agreement either before or after the marriage by which it is provided that the wife should be at liberty to divorce herself in specified contingencies which are of a reasonable nature and which again are agreed to be the husband.
In such a case the wife can repudiate herself in the exercise of the power and the divorce would be deemed to have been pronounced by the husband.
This mode of divorce is called 'Tawfeez ' (vide Mulla 's Mohmedan Law, Sec. 314.
p. 300.
(3) By obtaining a decree from a civil court for dissolution of marriage under section 2 of the Act of 1979 which also 924 amounts to a divorce (under the law) obtained by the wife.
For the purpose of maintenance, this mode is governed not by clause (b) but by clause (c) of sub section (3) of section 127 of the 1973 Code; whereas the divorce given under modes (1) and (2) would be covered by clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 127.
These are the three distinct modes in which a dissolution of marriage can be brought about.
It is, therefore, manifest that clause (b) Explanation to section 125 envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or where she obtains divorce S under mode numbers 2 and 3, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under section 125 of the 1973 Code.
In these circumstance the High Court was not at all justified in taking the two separate clauses 'who has been divorced ' and 'has obtained a divorce from her husband ' conjunctively so as to indicate a divorce proceeding from the husband and the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce.
We might like to mention here that the 1973 Code has by extending the definition of wife, not excluded the various modes of divorce but has merely abrogated that part of the Mahomedan law under which the wife ceased to get maintenance if the conjugal relationship of the husband and wife came to an end.
Nevertheless, the personal law is applied fully and kept alive by clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 127 which may be extracted thus: "(b) the woman has been divorced by her husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of the said order, the whole of the sum which, under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties, was pay able on such divorce, cancel such order: (i) in the case where such sum was paid before such order, from the date on which such order was made, (ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually paid by the husband to the woman.
" This clause refers to Mode No. 1, that is to say, where the husband unilaterally divorces his wife.
For the application of clause (b) two conditions are necessary (1) that an application for cancellation of the maintenance is made by the husband under section 127(2), and 925 (2) that after the wife has been divorced by the husband she has received the whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law applicable to the parties was payable on divorce.
In other words, under the Mahomedan Law the husband could still get the maintenance cancelled after divorcing his wife according to personal law if he paid the entire dower specified at the time of marriage.
We would however? Like to point out one peculiar aspect of the provisions of section 127.
While clause (b) of sub section (3) of section 127 does provide for cancellation of the maintenance on payment of dower if a woman has been divorced, the said clause does not contemplate cancellation of maintenance where a woman obtains divorce from her husband through a civil court under the provisions of the Act of 1939.
In this connection clause (c) of sub section (3) of section 127, which is extracted below, clearly provides that where a woman obtains a divorce from her husband the amount of maintenance cannot be cancelled until she voluntarily relinquishes or surrenders her rights to the same: "the woman has obtained a divorce from her husband and that she had voluntarily surrendered her rights to maintenance after her divorce, cancel the order from the date thereof." Thus, a clear distinction has been made between dissolution of marriage brought about by the husband in exercising his unilateral right to divorce and the act of the wife in obtaining a decree for the dissolution of marriage from a civil court under the Act of 1939.
We might further add that our conclusion that the second limb of clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125 applies also to a situation, where a dissolution of marriage resulting in a decree for divorce brought about by the Act and at the instance of the wife, is fortified and reinforced by the language of clause (c) of sub section (3) of section 127 under which maintenance cannot be cancelled on the application of the husband unless the wife voluntarily surrenders her rights to maintenance or relinquishes the same and not otherwise.
Thus, tho two limbs of clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) have separate and different legal incidents one is reflected in clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 127 and the other in clause (c) of sub section (3) of section 127.
In view of the reasons given and the circumstances discussed by us, it is manifest that in the instant case section 127 does not at all 926 because the husband has not given any application for cancellation of the maintenance on the grounds enshrined in section 127(3)(b) of the 1973 Code but this case is squarely covered by clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the 1973 Code as a result of which the appellant in the eye of law continues to be the wife of the respondent, despite the decree for dissolution of marriage.
The Magistrate was, therefore, fully justified in granting maintenance to the appellant.
The High Court, therefore, erred in quashing the order of the Magistrate, we, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Magistrate granting maintenance of a consolidated amount of Rs. 100/ per month for the appellant and her minor child.
It would be open to the appellant to apply to the Magistrate for a warrant to realise the arrears of maintenance, if any KOSHAL, J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned brother Fazal Ali, J., with whom I find myself in general agreement.
However, as I would like to highlight a particular aspect of the matter, I am appending a short note of my own.
Sub section (1) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) confers on a Magistrate of the First Class the jurisdiction, inter alia, to order maintenance to be paid by a husband to his wife or his minor or destitute children.
The case propounded by the wife in the present proceedings is that in spite of the decree of dissolution of marriage passed in her favour by a Civil Court on the 15th January, 1973, she continues to be the wife of the respondent for the purposes of the said sub section (1) by reason of the definition of the term "wife" contained in clause (b) of the Explanation appended to that sub section.
That clause runs thus: "Explanation: For the purposes of this chapter, '(a). . . . . . '(b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not re married.
" The claim of the wife has been turned down by the High Court on the ground that this clause is inapplicable to her case inasmuch as (i) the appellant has obtained only a decree of dissolution of marriage and not a divorce, and (ii) the expression "from the husband" as used in the clause extracted above envisages divorce by voluntary action of the husband which is missing in this case, the dissolution of marriage having been obtained from the court, and, therefore, not from the husband.
927 3.
The word 'divorce ' is not defined in the Code and may legitimately be regarded as having been used in clause (b) above extracted in the dictionary sense.
Webster 's Third New International Dictionary states it to mean, amongst other things, "(a) legal dissolution in whole or in part of marriage relation usually by a court or other body having competent authority; "(b) an absolute dissolution in a valid marriage made by decree of court for lawful cause arising after the marriage (distinguished from annulment); "(c) a formal separation of man and wife by the act of one party or by consent according to established custom.
" As ordinarily understood, therefore, divorce is nothing more nor less than another name for dissolution of marriage, whether the same results from act of parties or is a consequence of proceedings at law, and it would, in our opinion, be wrong to regard the two terms as not being synonymous with each other, unless the legislature makes a direction to the contrary.
We need hardly point out that section 125 of the Code contains no such direction.
Deacock vs Deacock, supports the view just expressed.
In that case the English Court of Appeal was called upon to interpret sections 16(1) and 19(3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 which posed a similar problem.
The relevant portions of those provisions are reproduced below: "16(1) Any married person who alleges that reasonable grounds exist for supposing that the other party to the marriage is dead may present a petition to the court to have it presumed that the other party is dead and to have the marriage dissolved, and the court, if satisfied that such reasonable grounds exist, may make a decree of presumption of death and of dissolution of the marriage.
"19(3) On any decree for divorce or nullity of marriage, the court may, if it thinks fit, by order direct the husband to pay to the wife, during their joint lives, such monthly or weekly sum for the maintenance and support of the wife as the court may think reasonable. " An argument was raised that a decree for dissolution of marriage as envisaged in section 16(1) does not amount to a decree for divorce mentioned in section 19(3) and that, therefore, there was no jurisdiction in the Court to direct the husband to any the wife any main 928 tenance in pursuance of the latter section.
Hodson, L.J., with whom Morris, L.J., and Vaisey J., fully agreed, repelled the argument thus: 'It is said (and I confess that this argument does not produce very much impact on my mind) that there is a distinction between the words "dissolution of marriage" and "divorce", and that, as section 19 contains the word "divorce" and section 16 does not, there is no statutory power to apply for maintenance at 811 in the case of presumption of death.
In my view the word "dissolution relates to the marriage bond itself, whereas the word "divorce" relates to the parties to tile marriage bond; and it is apt to refer to "divorce" when speaking of parties "and dissolution" when speaking of the bond. 'As the decree in this case shows, what has been done, or what has been purported to be done, by the court was to dissolve the marriage; and the word "dissolved" is used in this and in all other decrees, as it has been used for years: the word "divorce" is not used".
Thus according to the Court of Appeal the expressions "divorce" and "dissolution" were really two facets of the same situation.
The matter may be looked upon from another angle in so far as section 125 of the Code is concerned.
According to its provisions a full fledged wife is obviously entitled to maintenance.
By reason of clause (b) above extracted, even a divorced wife has that right provided that she has not re married.
Could then it be argued with any plausibility that a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by a Civil Court but has not been divorced by a voluntary act of her husband was intended by the legislature not to be entitled to the benefit of clause (b)? The answer must be an emphatic no and this answer follows from the terms of clause (b) itself.
If that clause envisaged only decree by voluntary action of the husband, the second limb of the clause which makes the definition of "wife" inclusive of a woman who has 'obtained a divorce from the husband ' would be rendered otiose.
The word obtained ' may well be used in the sense of 'procured with effort ' and would certainly describe correctly a situation where something is achieved by a person through his exertion in spite of opposition from others.
According to Webster, again the word 'obtain ' signifies: "(a) to gain or attain possession or disposal of, usually by some planned action or method, "(b) to bring about or call into being, etc.
" 929 If a person sues another person for the recovery of property and the suit is resisted but ultimately decreed and the plaintiff recovers possession of the property from the defendant he may properly be described as having obtained the property from the defendant although this result has come about not because the defendant obliged the plaintiff but because of the coercive process of the court.
Similarly information contained In a statement brought about by coercive methods used against a helpless person would still be information obtained from him even though he is not a willing party to the statement.
There is another good reason why the narrow interpretation placed by the High Court on clause (b) above extracted cannot be accepted.
Divorce by the act of the husband is, broadly speaking, not recognised by any system of law except that applicable to Muslims (barring variations of personal law by custom).
Members of the other main communities inhabiting India, i.e., Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc., have perforce to go to courts in order to obtain divorce.
If clause (b) was intended to embrace only cases of divorce brought about by the act of the husband, its applicability would be limited, by and large, only to Muslims, which per se appears to us to be an absurd proposition.
For the reasons stated I would interpret the expression "a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband" as including a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by the Court.
That such is the case here is admitted on all hands.
In the result, therefore, the appeal is accepted, the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the learned Magistrate granting an amount of Rs. 100/ per month as maintenance to the appellant and her minor child is restored.
N.K.A. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant was the legally married wife of the respondent.
As he willfully neglected her, she filed an application before the Magistrate for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
The Magistrate accepted the allegation of the appellant that she had been neglected by the respondent without reasonable or probable cause and awarded maintenance at Rs. 100/ per month for the appellant and the minor child.
The High Court held that clause (b) of the explanation to Section 125(1) of the Code had no application to the facts of the case and that so far as the appellant was concerned, she was not entitled to any maintenance.
It however affirmed the order of the Magistrate fixing Rs. 40/ per month as maintenance for her minor son.
In the appeal, it was contended that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and is based on wrong interpretation of clause (b) of the explanation to Section 125(1) of the Code.
Accepting the Appeal, (Per Fazal Ali & Vardarajan, JJ.) ^ HELD: 1.
In the instant case Section 127 does not apply at all because the respondent has not filed any application for cancellation of the maintenance on the grounds mentioned in Section 127(3)(b) of the 1973 Code but this case is squarely covered by Clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(i) of that Code as a result of which the appellant in the eye of law continues to be the wife of the respondent, despite the decree for dissolution of marriage.
[925 H, 926 A B] 2.
It is clear that the 1898 Code by virtue of section 488 provided a summary remedy for awarding maintenance to neglected wives irrespective of the caste, creed, community or religion to which they belonged.
Sections 488 and 489 were the corresponding provisions of the 1898 Code which were couched almost in the same language as sections 125 and 127 of the 1973 Code having some important additions that have been made under the 1973 Code.
A provision like clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the 1973 Code was conspicuously absent in section 488 of the old Code and has been added by the 1973 Code.
[914 H, 915 A, D, 917 C D] 911 Nanak Chand vs Shri Chandra Kishore Agarwala & Ors. ; , Ram Singh vs State & Anr.
AIR 1963 All.
355, Nalini Ranjan Chakravarty vs Smt.
Kiran Rani Chakravarty AIR 1965 Pat.
442, Mahabir Agarwalla vs Gita Roy , referred to.
The Mohomedan Law on the subject was that where a woman governed by the Mohomedan Law was awarded maintenance, the same would cease from the date of divorce given by the husband and the completion of the period of Iddat.
[917 G H] In re Shekhanmian AIR 1930 Bombay 178, Syed Said vs Meera Bee , Mohamed Rahimullah & Anr.
AIR 1947 Madras 416, Aahimunnissa & Ors.
vs Mohd. Ismail AIR , Din Mohmmad 's V.I.L.R. 1883 226, referred to.
Although a Mohomedan wife had a right to be awarded maintenance by the Magistrate under section 488 of the old Code, the said right ceased to exist if she was divorced by her husband and had observed the period of Iddat.
This was the undoubted position of law under the 1898 Code as amended by the 1955 Amending Act.
[920 A B] 5.
Clause (b) has made a distinct departure from the earlier Code in that it has widened the definition of wife and, to some extent, over ruled the personal law of the parties so far as proceedings for maintenance under Section 125 are concerned.
Under Clause (b), the wife continued to be a wife within the meaning of the provisions of the Code even though she has been divorced by her husband or has otherwise obtained a divorce and has not remarried.
It follows, therefore, that the divorce resulting from the aforesaid dissolution of the marriage is also a legal divorce under the Mohomedan Law by virtue of the statute (1939 Act).
[920 E F, 921 B] 6.
Under the Mohomedan Law the commonest form of divorce is a unilateral pronouncement of divorce of the wife by the husband according to the various forms recognised by the law.
A divorce given unilaterally by the husband is especially peculiar to Mohomedan Law.
In no other law has the husband got a unilateral right to divorce his wife by a simple declaration because other laws, viz., the Hindu Law or the , contemplate only a dissolution of marriage on certain grounds brought about by one of the spouses in a court of law.
[921 C D] 7.
A wife thus had a statutory right to obtain divorce from the husband through the court on proof of the grounds mentioned in the Act.
The Act provided for the wife an independent remedy which could be resorted to by her without being subjected to a pronouncement of divorce by the husband.
It is, therefore, in the background of this Act that the words 'has obtained a divorce from her husband ' in clause (b) of the Explanation have to be construed.
Thus the High Court in considering the effect of these words seems to have over looked the dominant object of the statutory remedy that was made available to the wife under the Act of 1939 by which the wife could get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds mentioned in the 1939 Act by petitioning the civil court without any overt act on the part of the husband in divorcing her.
The High Court also failed to consider the legal consequences flowing from the 912 decree passed by the Court dissolving the marriage, viz., a legal divorce under the Mohomedan law.
[922 D F] 8.
The interpretation put by the High Court on the second limb of clause (b) is not correct.
This seems to be borne out from the provisions of Mohomedan law itself.
It would appear that under the Mohomedan law there are three distinct modes in which a Muslim marriage can be dissolved and the relationship of the husband and wife terminated so as to result in an irrevocable divorce.
[922 F G] 9.
It is, therefore, manifest that clause (b) of Explanation to section 125 envisages all the three modes, whether a wife is divorced unilaterally by the husband or whether she obtains divorce under the mode numbers 2 and 3, she continues to be a wife for the purpose of getting maintenance under section 125 of the 1973 Code.
In these circumstances the High Court was not at all justified in taking the two separate clauses 'who has been divorced ' and 'had obtained a divorce from her husband ' conjunctively so as to indicate a divorce proceeding from the husband and the husband alone and in not treating a dissolution of marriage under the 1939 Act as a legal divorce.
[924 B D] 10.
A clear distinction has been made between dissolution of marriage brought about by the husband in exercising his unilateral right to divorce and the act of the wife in obtaining a decree for dissolution of the marriage from a civil court under the Act of 1939.
[925 E F] 11.
The two limbs of clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) have separate and different legal incidents one is reflected in clause (b) of sub Section (3) of section 127 and the other in clause (c) of sub section (3) of section 127.
[925 G H] (Per A. D. Koshal, J. concurring) 1.
The word 'divorce ' is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and may legitimately be regarded as having been used in clause (b) of sub section 1 of Section 125 in the dictionary sense.
As ordinarily understood, 'divorce ' is nothing more nor less than another name for dissolution of marriage, whether the same result from the act of parties or is a consequence of proceedings at law.
It would be wrong to regard the two terms as not be synonymous with each other, unless the legislature makes a direction to the contrary.
[927A, C D] 2.
According to Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a full fledged wife is entitled to maintenance.
By reason of clause (b) even a divorced wife has that right provided that she has not re married.
If that clause envisaged only divorce by voluntary action of the husband, the second limb of the clause which makes the definition of 'wife ' inclusive of a woman who has 'obtained a divorce from the husband ' would be rendered otiose.
The word obtained may well be used in the sense of 'procured with effort ' and would certainly describe correctly a situation where something is achieved by a person through his exertion in spite of opposition from others.
[928 E, F G] 3.
Divorce by the Act of the husband, is not recognised by any system of law except that applicable to Muslims.
Members of the other main communities inhabiting India, i.e. Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc.
have perforce to go to courts in order to obtain divorce.
If clause (b) was intended to 913 embrace only cases of divorce brought about by the Act of the husband, its applicability would be limited, by and large, only to Muslims, which per se appears to be an absurd proposition.
[929 C D] 4.
The expression 'a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband ' has therefore to be interpreted as including a wife who has been granted a decree of dissolution of marriage by the Court.
[929 E] Deacock vs Deacock referred to.


judgement:
: Criminal Appeal No. 23 of 1976.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21 11 1973 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 396/72.
O.P. Sharma and M.S. Dhillon for the Appellant.
K.K. Manchanda and B. Datta for the Respondent.
990 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
The respondent was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Ludhiana, of an offence under Sec.
5(1)(d) read with Sec.
5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs. One hundred.
On appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court acquitted the respondent on the ground that there was noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934.
An application for the grant of a Certificate under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution was moved before the learned Single Judge and was granted.
The learned Single Judge observed that when the case was argued before him, an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hoshiar Singh vs The State was not brought to his notice and that had the decision been brought to his notice he would not have allowed the appeal merely on the ground that there was no compliance with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court was clearly wrong in acquitting the respondent on the ground that there was noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38.
A perusal of Chapter XVI of the Punjab Police Rules shows that the provisions of the Chapter deal with Departmental punishments and the procedure to be followed in imposing such punishments.
Guidance is given as to how Police Officers guilty of misconduct and criminal offences may be dealt with.
The Chapter begins with Rule 16.1, the first clause of which is as follows: "No police officer shall be departmentally punished other wise than as provided id these rules".
Thereafter the rules refer in some detail to the various punishments which may be imposed and provide for suspension, subsistence etc.
Rule 16.24 makes exhaustive provision for the procedure in Depart mental enquiries.
Provision for review and appeal is made in the sub sequent rules.
Rule 16.38 prescribes more correctly we may say Rule 16.38 lays down the guide lines of the procedure to be followed when a Superintendent of Police receives any complaint about the commission of a criminal offence by a police officer "in connection with his official relations with the public".
The Superintendent of Police is enjoined to give immediate information to the District Magistrate who is thereupon to decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a Police Officer or by a Magistrate.
It is stated that though 'a judicial prosecution shall normally follow ', the matter may be disposed of departmentally if the District Magistrate so orders, 991 for reasons to be recorded.
The further Departmental procedure is prescribed by the remaining clauses.
It is clear that Rule 16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecution in a Criminal Court; it is in the nature of instructions to the Department and is not meant to be of the nature of a sanction or permission for a prosecution.
Nor can it override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act.
We agree with the observations of Dua and Mahajan JJ.
in Hoshiar Singh vs The State (supra) where they said: ".
I do not think Rule 16.38 was intended or could have the effect of imposing as a condition precedent to the trial of a police officer in a Court of law, a sanction or an order by the District Magistrate, as contemplated therein.
The language appears to me to be confined only to depart mental enquiries.
The investigation for establishing a prima facie case is merely meant to guide the District Magistrate, uncontrolled by the opinion of the Superintendent of Police, whether or not a departmental proceeding should be initiated against the guilty party, and it is the procedure and the punishment controlling the departmental proceedings alone, which appear to have been prescribed by this rule".
We have, therefore, no option but to set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
It is so ordered.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The Punjab Police Rules, 1934 lay down the procedure to be followed in imposing punishment on police officer found guilty of mis conduct or a criminal offence and make an exhaustive provision for departmental inquiries.
Rule 16.38 lays down the guidelines to be followed by the Superintendent of Police in dealing with a complaint about the commission of a criminal offence by a Police officer in connection with his official relations with the public.
It enjoins upon the Superintendent to give immediate information to the District Magistrate who thereupon has to decide whether investigation of the complaint should be conducted by a police officer or by a Magistrate.
The respondent, a police officer, was convicted of an offence under section 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
On the ground that there was non compliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Rules a single Judge of the High Court acquitted the respondent.
Setting aside the order of acquittal and remanding the case to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. ^ HELD: The High Court was wrong in acquitting the respondent.
[990 D] Rule 16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecution in a Criminal Court.
It is in the nature of instructions to the department and is not meant to be of the nature of a sanction or permission for a prosecution; nor can it override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act.
[991 A B] Hoshiar Singh vs The State LXVII 1965 Punjab Law Reporter 438 @ 442, approved.