judgement:
Appeal No. 502 of 1993.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.92 of the Central Ad ministrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 1252 of 1992.
V.C. Mahajan, C.V.S. Rao and V.B. Misra for the Appellant.
S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachhar and Arvind Verma for the Respondent.
ANAND, J. Aggrieved by an order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 1252/1992 on 29th of May, 1992, allowing an application filed by the respondent and directing the petitioner herein to correct the date of birth of the respondent in the service record and not to retire him before 30th of April, 1996, the petitioner Union of India has filed this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
The respondent joined Government service in the Ministry of Finance (Defence) in class IV post as a peon on 22nd of February, 1956.
At the time of entry into the Government service, his service book was prepared and the date of birth was recorded as 20th of May, 1934 and since he failed in the matriculation examination, against the column of educational qualification 'matric failed ' was recorded.
It appears that the respondent later on again appeared in the matriculation examination of the Punjab University under Roll No. 21653 and passed the said examination in May, 1956.
On passing the matriculation examination, the respondent was appointed as LDC in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 9.5.1957.
In the service book of the respondent, an entry was, accordingly, made showing his educational qualification as matric (Punjab University, Roll No. 21653, year 1956).
This entry was made underneath the earlier entry "matric failed" and the changed entry was signed by the SO of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 7.9.1957.
Though, the date of birth of the respondent, as 867 recorded in the matriculation certificate is 7.4.1938 but while amending the entry about his educational qualification, the entry relating to his date of birth was not altered to correspond to the date given in the matriculation certificate and it continued to be recorded as 20th of May, 1934.
In 1963, .the respondent was transferred to the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education.
On being notified about his date of superannuation as 31.5.1992, the respondent realised that he was being retired on the basis of his date of birth as originally recorded in the service record as 20.5.1934, ignoring the date of birth as reflected in the matriculation certificate.
He made a representation in September 1991 for the alteration of his date of birth but the same was rejected on 4.12.1991.
He submitted yet another representation of 3.1.1992, wherein a request was made, the consider his case for the correction of date of birth afresh on the basis of the date of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate.
The request of the respondent was turned down vide O.M. dated 29.1.1992.
The respondent submitted yet another representation on 26.3.1992, wherein he asserted that he had submitted the matriculation certificate on 4.9.1957, when the entry about his educational qualification was altered and that thereafter since he did not hear anything to the contrary, he presumed that the appellants had also corrected his date of birth in the service book.
While making that representation, the respondent had also drawn attention of the Department to an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal in the case of one Darshan Singh, wherein the Department had been directed by the Principal Bench of CAT to correct the date of birth of Darshan Singh on the basis of the date of birth given in the matriculation certificate and it was submitted that his date of birth should also be corrected on the basis of the matriculation certificate.
That representation was rejected on 22.4.1992 by an order which reads thus: Subject:Request for alteration in the Date of Birth of Sh.
Harnam Singh, Asstt.
in the Service Book.
With reference to his representation dated 26th March, 1992 regarding alteration in his date of birth, Sh.
Harnam Singh, Asstt.
is informed that his representation has been considered once again and it has not been found possible to accede to his request for changing his date of birth from 20.5.1934 to 7.4.1938.
As regards his contention that he had submitted a copy of matriculation certificate 868 in 1956, Sh.
Harnam Singh, has already been informed vide OM dated 29.1.1992 about DOP & T 's ruling that furnishing a copy of matriculation certificate does not automatically imply change in date of birth unless the Govt.
servant specifically applies for it within the prescribed time limit and the appointing authority accepts his request.
In so far as CAT 's judgment in the case of Sh.
Darshan Singh, a copy of which has been enclosed by Sh.
Harnam Singh with his representation, it may be stated that in the said judgment the CAT 's order is based on the fact that Sh.
Darshan Singh had not been shown his service book even once during his entire service.
Harnam Singh had seen his service book several times latest being in 1976, and he has signed the Service Book in verification of the Correctness of the entries made therein and he had never pointed out the 'incorrectness ' in his date of birth.
The CAT 's Judgment enclosed by Sh.
Harnam Singh with his representation is thus distinguishable from the case of Sh.
Harnam Singh.
Apart from this Sh.
Harnarn Singh has not furnished any new grounds for reconsideration of his case.
Harnam Singh is also informed that no further representation on the subject will be considered.
unless he furnished any new facts/information.
" The respondent challenged the above order through OA No. 1252/92 dated 29.5.1992 before the CAT.
The application was contested by the appellant on various grounds including the plea of limitation.
It was urged by the appellant that the OA was barred under FR 56 (Note 5) and General Financial Rules 1979 and therefore, did not merit any consideration.
The appellant had further asserted that the respondent knew about the entry of his date of birth as 20.5.1934 in his service record since he had signed his service book on various occasions, ever since he joined the service, but his representation for correction of date of birth was made only in September 1991, much belatedly and even beyond a period of five years from the date of entry into Government service and as envisaged by SO 3997 dated 30th of November, 1979 the same could not therefore be 869 entertained.
The Tribunal, however, did not agree with the appellant and allowed the application filed by the respondent directing the appellant to correct his date of birth in the service record as per the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate.
Mr. V.C. Mahajan, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Union of India, has reiterated the arguments raised before the Tribunal and has further submitted that in view of the law laid down in Amulya Chandrakalita vs Union of India & Ors., the judgment in the present case rendered by only a single member of the Tribunal, is invalid and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside and the case remanded to the Tribunal for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other had argued for dismissal of the appeal and supported the impugned order of the Tribunal.
The fact that the date of birth was recorded on the first sheet of the service book when the respondent joined as a peon as well as in various seniority lists of UDC and LDC issued from time to time as 20.5.1934 is not in dispute.
It also is not disputed that the date of birth of the respon dent in the matriculation certificate issued by the Punjab University is 7.4.1938.
The fact that the matriculation certificate has been produced before the department by the respondent after he had passed the matriculation examination and an alteration of his educational qualification was made in the service book is also beyond controversy.
There is also no doubt that while submitting the matriculation certificate, the respondent had not requested for any alteration in the date of birth and that he had filed the representation for correction of his date of birth for the first time only in September, 1991, just a few months before his notified date of superannuation.
A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless the services are dispersed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein.
The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for the reason that right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record.
A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a 870 request later on for correcting his age.
It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of the irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay.
In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of latches or stale claims, is generally applied to by the courts and tribunals.
It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time limit, in the service rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government servant can be entertained.
A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.
The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire.
Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age.
Indeed, as held by this Court in State of Assam & Anr.
vs Daksha Prasad Deka & Ors., ; a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he can not claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth claimed by him.
This court said: "The date of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(a) must in our judgment, be determined on the basis of the service record, and not on what the respondent claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistent with the appropriate procedure.
A public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record, and may apply for correction of the record.
But until the record is corrected, he cannot claim that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record.
" 871 Note (5) to Fundamental Rule 56 governing correction of date of birth in the service record, substituted by Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms Notification No. 19017/79/Estt A dated 30th November, 1979 published as SO 3997 in the Government of India Gazette dated 15th of December 1979 limits the exercise of the right by the government servant to seek alteration of his date of birth only within the specified period.
The provision reads as under: "Note 5 The date on which a Government servant attains the age of fifty eight years or sixty years, as the case may be, shall be determined with reference to the date of birth declared by the Government servant at the time of appointment and accepted by the appropriate authority on production, as far as possible, of confirmatory documentary evidence such as High School or Higher Secondary or Secondary School Certificate or extracts from Birth Register.
The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not be subject to any alteration except as specified in this note.
An alteration of date of birth of a Government servant can be made, with the sanction of a Ministry or Department of the Central Government or the Comptroller and Auditor General in regard to persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, or an administrator of a Union Territory under which the Government servant is serving if (a) a request in this regard is made within five years of his entry into Government service; (b) it is clearly established that a genuine bonafide mistake has occurred; and (c) the date of birth so altered would not make him ineligible to appear in any School or University or Union Public Service Commission examination in which he had appeared, or for entry into Government service on the date on which he first appeared at such examination or on the date on which he entered 872 Government service.
" According to the above amendment, it is obvious that the request for correction of date of birth is required to be made by the Government servant within five years of his entry into Government service and his date of birth may be corrected if it is established that, a genuine bona fide mistake had occurred while recording his date of birth at the time of his entry into Government service.
The CAT in the instant case was of the opinion that the bar of five years could only apply to such Government servants who joined service after 1979, when the amendment came into force and that the said period of limitation would not apply to Government servants who were in service for more than five years prior to 1979.
The Tribunal while allowing the application filed by the respondent and directing the appellant to correct his date of birth in the service record noticed the objection raised on behalf of the appellant to the effect that the mere filing of the matriculation certificate in 1956 did not imply that the date of birth already recorded in the service record stood altered by the appellants automatically even without the concerned Government servant making a prayer in that behalf or raising the issue at the relevant time after his posting as LDC.
CAT held that there was no period of limitation for the correction of date of birth and in so holding relied upon the judgment in the case of Darshan Singh vs Union of India, decided by the Principal Bench of CAT on 9.8.1990 and observed that only on the basis of coming very late for alteration of the date of birth, the State could not oust the claim of the respondent.
The Tribunal observed: "It is trite that at any time during the service, it is open to an employee to make a request for the alteration of the recorded date of birth and that if the request is supported by cogent evidence to establish that the recorded date is wrong, correction has to be made." The Tribunal also noticed the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the judgment in Darshan Singh 's case (supra) was not applicable because unlike in Darshan Singh 's case, who had no occasion to see his service book even once during his entire service career, the respondent herein had not only seen his service book several times but had also signed the same at various places in verification of the correctness of the entries made therein and had never objected to 873 the date of birth as contained in the first page of the service book or as given in various seniority lists prepared and published form time to time till September 1991.
The Tribunal disposed of the submission by observing: "A perusal of the service record does show that the pages which the applicant has signed is not the first page where the date of birth is recorded, but subsequent pages where other service particulars like pay fixation etc.
are mentioned.
As regards the entry of date of birth in the seniority list, that may be within the knowledge of the applicant, but seeing to the nature of the job on which the applicant is engaged, being ministerial, it is not expected that the seniority would have mattered much as the promotion is made only on the basis of seniority cum fitness in due course.
Moreover, there is no authenticity regarding the date of birth recorded in the seniority list and more emphasis is attached to the position of the person in the lis t vis a vis other similarly placed persons in the cadre.
" The approach of the Tribunal does not commend to us as it tends to create an invidious discrimination, unsustainable in law, by creating two artificial classes of Government Servants between those who joined service before and after 1979.
It is a too simplistic way of looking at the issue, ignoring the ground realities and the intention of the rule making authority to discourage stale claims and non suit such government servants who seek the alteration of their recorded date of birth belatedly and mostly on the eve of their superannuation.
To say that the respondent, even though he signed the service book at a number of places at different times and saw the seniority lists, may not have still come to know as to what his recorded date of birth was, is to ignore human conduct and put premium on negligence.
The observations of CAT quoted above are neither logical nor sound.
Of course, Note 5 to FR 56 (m) was incorporated only in 1979 and it provides for request to be made for correction of date of birth within five years from the date of entry into Service but what is necessary to be examined is the intention of the rule making authority in providing the period of limitation for seeking the correction of the date of birth of the Government Servant viz. to discourage stale claims and belated applications for alteration of date of birth recorded in the service book at the time of initial entry.
It is the duty of the courts and tribunals to promote that 874 intention by an intelligible and harmonious interpretation of the rule rather than choke its operation.
The interpretation has to be the one which advances the intention and not the one which frustrates it.
It would not be the intention of the rule making authority to give unlimited time to seek correction of date of birth, after 1979, to those government servant who had joined the service prior to 1979 but restrict it to the five year period for those who enter service after 1979.
Indeed, if a government servant, already in service for a long time, had applied for correction of date of birth before 1979, it would not be permissible to non suit him on the ground that he had not applied for correction within five years into service, but the case of government servant who applied for correction of date of birth only after 1979 stands on a different footing.
It would be appropriate and in tune with harmonious construction of the provision to hold that in the case of those government servants who were already in service before 1979, for a period of more than five years, and who intended to have their date of birth corrected after 1979, may seek the correction of date of birth within a reasonable time after 1979 but in any event not later than five years after the coming into force of the amendment in 1979.
This view would be in consonance with the intention of the rule making authority.
The interpretation which we have placed on the provision with regard to the cases of those government servants who were in service prior to 1979 but had not sought the alteration in the date of birth till after the amendment in 1979 is followed by the view which this court has taken earlier.
By way illustration we may refer to the case of New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt.
Shanti Misra, ; where the husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966.
A period of two years was available to the respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages.
In March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation.
The respon dent filed the application in July 1967.
It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal.
So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action.
In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the respondent in approaching the 875 Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso to Section 110 A(3).
Similarly in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs National Insurance Co., ; the precise question which was considered by the Bench was: "The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident.
The difference in the two Acts, which is relevant in the present case, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay.
In view of the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which expired on January 22, 1990.
If the new Act is held to be applicable, the appellant 's petition filed in March had to be dismissed.
The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no such restriction as in the new Act.
The question is as to which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old.
" The Bench opined: "If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different.
Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that hi s right which has accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away.
The present case is different.
The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only the law in force at the time of delay.
Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit.
In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for con donation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law.
Obviously the ground for condonation set 876 up as 'sufficient cause ' also relates to the time after the repeal.
The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient causes a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from ,cause of action ' for the claim itself The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law.
We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned.
" In the instant case, the date of birth recorded at the time of entry of the respondent into service as 20th May 1934 had continued to exist, unchallenged between 1956 and September 1991, for almost three and a half decades.
The respondent had the occasion to see his service book on numerous occasions.
He signed the service book at different places at different points of time.
Never did he object to the recorded entry.
The same date of birth was also reflected in the seniority lists of LDC and UDC, which the respondent had admittedly seen, as there is nothing on the record to show that he had no occasion to see the same.
He remained silent and did not seek the alteration of the date of birth till September 1991, just a few months prior to the date of his superannuation.
Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches on the part of the respondent to seek the necessary correction would in any case have justified the refusal of relief to him.
Even if the respondent had sought correction of the date of birth within five years after 1979, the earlier delay would not have non suited him but he did not seek correction of the date of birth during the period of five years after the incorporation of note 5 to FR 56 in 1979 either.
His inaction for all this period of about thirty five years from the date of joining service, therefore precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of birth in service record was not correct.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in issuing the direction in the manner in which it has been done.
The application for correction of date of birth, entered in the service book in 1956, for the first time made in September 1991, was hopelessly belated and did not merit any consideration.
As already noticed, it had not been made even within the period of five years from the date of coming into force of Note 5 to FR 56 (m) in 1979.
The Tribunal, therefore, 877 fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date of birth and the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained.
Ordinarily, keeping in view of judgment of this Court in Amulya Chandra Kalita 's case (supra), we should have remanded the case to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal because of the fact that the order of the Tribunal was rendered by only one member or to have awaited the decision of some cases pending in this Court in which the validity of the order passed by single member of the tribunal is under consideration but since we have ourselves looked into all the facts and circumstances of the case and given an interpretation to Note 5 to FR 56 (m), we do not consider it.
expedient to adopt either of these course.
In view of the interpretation placed by us, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside.
There shall however, be no order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The respondent in the appeal joined Government Service in the Ministry of Finance in a Class IV post as Peon on 22nd February, 1956.
At the time of entry his service book was prepared and the date of birth was recorded as 20th May, 1934 and since he failed in the matriculation examination against the column of educational qualification 'matric failed ' was recorded.
The respondent later on again appeared in the matriculation examination, passed the said examination in May, 1956, was appointed as LD.C. in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 9th May, 1957 and in his service book an entry was made showing his educational qualification as 'Matric ' underneath the earlier entry 'matric failed ' and this changed entry was signed by the Section Officer of the Ministry of Home Affairs on 7th September, 1957.
Though the date of birth of the respondent as recorded in the matriculation certificate was 7.4.1938, while amending the entry about his educational qualification, the entry relating to his date of birth was not altered to correspond to the date given in the matriculation certificate and continued to be recorded as 20th May, 1934.
The respondent was later transferred to the Ministry of Human Resources Development and on being notified about his date of superannuation as 31.5.1992, he realised that he was being retired on the basis of his date of birth as originally recorded in the service record as 20.5.1934 ignoring the date of birth as reflected in the matriculation certificate.
In view tot the aforesaid position the respondent made a representation in September, 1991 for alteration of his date of birth but the 863 same was rejected on 4.12.1991.
He submitted another representation on 3.1.1992 for correction on the basis of the date of birth as recorded in the matriculation certificate but this request was also turned down by the appellant in view of the Ministry of Home Affairs O.M. dated 29.1.1992.
Yet another representation dated 26th March, 1992 was submitted by the respondent wherein he had drawn the attention of the Department to the order of the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in the case of Darshan Singh vs Union of India, wherein the Tribunal had directed that the date of birth should be corrected on the basis of the matriculation certificate.
This representation was also rejected by the appellant on 22A.1992.
Being aggrieved the respondent challenged the aforesaid order by an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal and this was contested by the appellant on various grounds including the plea of limitation.
It was also urged that the application was barred by F.R. 56 (Note 5) and the General Financial Rules, 1979 and therefore did not merit and consideration.
It was submitted that the respondent knew about the entry of his date of birth as 20.5.1934 since he had signed his service book on various occasions, ever since he joined service, but his representation for correction of the date of birth was made only in September, 1991 much belatedly and even beyond the period of five years from the date of entry into Government Service as envisaged by S.O. 3997 dated 30th November, 1979.
The Tribunal did not agree with any of the aforesaid contentions of the appellant, allowed the application flied by the respondent and directed the appellant to correct the date of birth in the service record as per the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate.
In the appeal by the Union of India to this Court it was contented that in view of the law laid down in Amulya Chandrakalita vs Union of India & Ors., the judgment rendered by only a single member of the Tribunal is invalid and, therefore, the order deserves to be set aside and the case remanded to the Tribunal for fresh disposal.
The arguments raised before the Tribunal were also reiterated before this Court.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD : 1.
A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires 864 the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the, State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless the services are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein.
[869G] 2.
The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record.
[869H] 3.
A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting his age.
It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any un reasonable delay.
[869H 870B] 4.
A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time fixed by the Government, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.
[870C] 5.
Unless altered date of birth as recorded would determine date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging the right to continue in service on the basis of actual age.
[870D] State of Assam & Anr.
vs Daksha Prasad Deka & Ors., ; , referred to.
Note (5) to Fundamental Rule 56(m) governing correction of date of birth in the service record, as amended by Government of India, with effect from 30.11.1979 limits the exercise of the right by the Government servant to seek alteration of his date of birth only within the specified period viz. five years of entry into government service.
[871A B] In the instant case, the CAT was of the opinion that the bar of five years could only apply to such Government servants who joined service after 1979, when the amendment came into force and that the said period of limitation would not apply to Government servants who were in service 865 for more than five years prior to 1979.
The approach of the Tribunal tends to create an invidious discrimination, unsustainable in law, by creating two artificial classes of government servants between those who joined service before and after 1979.
It is too simplistic a way of looking at the issue ignoring the ground realities and the intention of the rule making authority to discourage stale claims and non suit such government servants who seek alteration of their recorded date of birth belatedly and mostly on the eve of their superannuation.
[872C, 873E] 7.
It would be appropriate and in tune with the harmonious construction of the provision if in the case of those government servants who were already in service before 1979, for a period of more than five years, and who intended to have their date of birth corrected after 1979, may seek the correction of date of birth within a reasonable time after 1979 but in any event not later than five years after the coming into force of the amendment in 1979.
This view would be in consonance with the intention of the rule making authority.
[874C D] New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt.
Shanti Misra, ; and Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs National Insurance Co., ; , referred to.
In the instant case, the date of birth recorded at the time of entry into service as 20th May, 1934 had continued to exist, unchallenged between 1956 and September, 1991, for almost three and a half decades.
The respondent had the occasion to see his service book at different places at different points of time.
Never did he object to the recorded entry.
The same date of birth was also reflected in the seniority lists of L.D.C. and U.D.C., which the respondent had admittedly seen.
He remained silent and did not seek alteration till September, 1991 just a few months prior to the date of his superannuation.
Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches on the part of the respondent to seek the necessary correction would in any case have justified the refusal of relief to him.
Even if the respondent had sought correction of the date of birth within five years after 1979 when Note 5 to FR 56 was incorporated the earlier delay would not have non suited him.
His inaction for all this period of about thirty five years from the date of joining service, therefore precludes him from showing that the entry of his date of birth in the service record was not correct.
The Tribunal, therefore fell in error in issuing the direction to correct his date 866 of birth.
[876C F, 876H, 877A] Darshan Singh vs Union of India, decided by Principal Bench of CAT on 9.8.1990, over ruled.


judgement:
Appeal No. 3111 16 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.4.90 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 5627, 6163/88, 1193, 8415, 10360/89 and 1076 of 1990.
WITH Civil Appeal Nos. 580 to 606 of 1993 & 4416 of 1991 E.C. Agrawala, Anant V. Palli, Atual Sharma, Mrs. Purnima B at Kak, Mrs. Rekha Palli and Pradeep Misra for the Appellants.
1039 C.S. Vaidyanathan, R.K. Jain Ms. Bharti Sharma, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, K.B. Rohtagi and Ms. Aparna Rohtagi for the Respondents.
The Judgment of he Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J. Computer Code No. 12964 of 1991.
(In S.L.P. (C) No. of 1991) Delinked.
See separate Order in the concerned file.
Special Leave granted in all the other petitions.
In all the above appeals the short controversy raised is whether gur lauta and raskat and rab galawat and rab salawat are liable to the levy of market fee under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ').
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court referred the question for being considered by a Full Bench.
The Full Bench of the High Court by decision dated 2.4.1990 held that gur lauta and raskat and rab galawat and salawat were not an agricultural produce within the meaning of the Act.
Subsequently other Benches followed the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench.
All the above appeals by grant of Special Leave are directed against the Judgment of the Full Bench dated 2.4.1990 as well as the subsequent decisions following the Full Bench case.
Section 2(a) of the Act defines 'agricultural produce ' and reads as under "2(a) 'agricultural produce ' means such items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulature, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry, or forest as are specified in the Schedule and includes admixture of two or more of such items, and also includes any such item in processed form, and further includes gur, rub, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery".
It may be mentioned that the words gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery were added in the above definition of agricultural produce by U.P. Act No.10 of 1970.
To decide the controversy raised in these cases the definition of agricultural produce has to be taken into consideration after the words added by the aforesaid U.P. Act No.10 of 1970.
Sugarcane is an agricultural produce out of which juice is extracted.
The said juice gets 1040 thickened by dehydration and when it reaches a particular pigment, it takes the form of rab which is a semi solid form of the sugarcane juice.
After the process of boiling this rab is put in a crystaliser where it is allowed to get cooled and crystals are formed when the same is rotated in the crystaliser.
The crystalised rab is then put into centrifugal machines in which through the process of infusion of sulphur, the sugarcane juice is cleaned and whitened.
The rab which is not put into the centrifugal machine but is dehydrated and is.
allowed to be hardened by the open pan process takes the shape of gur which is normally used for home consumption.
The rab which is not allowed to be hardened is also sold in semi solid form but those persons who desire to make further profits put the rab into centrifugal machines and by the process of infusion of sulphur they obtain khandsari in the dry powder/crystalised form and the waste of rab which is obtained in the liquid form is known as molasses.
The residue which is known as molasses is further utilised by many people by boiling in the open pans and the same is again re processed by cleaning and dehydrating and later by sulphitation is taken in powder form.
This first process out of molasses of rab in the semi solid form is also sold in the market because this inferior quality contains less content of sucrose and is called rab galawat.
Rab salawat is also prepared by the same process out of the molasses and is further inferior quality of rab.
It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that rab galawat and rab salawat are thus nothing but different forms of rab although a little and/or more inferior in quality.
It has been contended that the main ingredient being sugarcane out of which juice is extracted and when gur, rab, khandsari and shakkar have been added in the definition of agricultural produce, the rab galawat or rab salawat being the inferior forms of rab are necessarily an agricultural produce within the above definition of agricultural produce.
It has also been submitted that so far as gur lauta or other forms of gur like kala gur, gur budha etc., are also prepared from the molasses by re boiling the molasses in the open pans which is allowed to thicken after dehydration in the boiling pans.
Thus it has been submitted that gur lauta or gur raskat is nothing else except inferior form of gur.
On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respon 1041 dents that the Full Bench of the High Court was right in taking the view that molasses are a different product which looses its original character and being a residual article after solidification of the natural article i.e., sugarcane juice, it cannot be said to be an agricultural produce.
It has been contended that molasses itself being not an agricultural produce, gur lauta and raskat prepared from molasses cannot be held to be an agricultural produce.
We have considered the arguments advanced on behalf.
of the parties and have perused the record.
A perusal of the definition of agricultural produce under Section 2(a) of the Act shows that apart from items of produce of agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule the definition further 'includes admixture of two or more such items and thereafter it further 'includes taking any such item in processed form and again for the third time the words used are 'and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery '.
It is a well settled rule of interpretation that where the legislature uses the words 'means ' and 'includes ' such definition is to be given a wider meaning and is not exhaustive or restricted to the items contained or included in such definition.
Thus the meaning of ' agricultural produce ' in the above definition is not restricted to any products of agriculture as specified in the Schedule but also includes such items which come into being in processed form and further includes such items which are called as gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery If we look the matter from another angle, U.P. Krishi Utpadan Adhiniyam is 'a beneficial legislation both for the agriculturists as well as the traders.
It provides for collecting market fee by the mandi samities from the agricultural produce brought for sale and purchase in the market areas.
We find no ground or justification to take the view that the legislature though intended to levy market fee by mandi samities on gur and rab but may have had no intention of charging of market fee on inferior qualities of gur called as gur lauta or raskat and similarly of inferior qualities of rab called rab galawat and rab salawat.
We do not find any good reason to take the view, as contended on behalf of the respondents, that the gur lauta or raskat being prepared from the molasses as such these items should not be considered as agricultural produce.
It cannot be denied that molasses is a syrup drained from the sugarcane juice in the process of manufacturing sugar.
Similarly rab is also a product prepared in the same process and 1042 rab salawat and galawat are inferior forms of rab.
It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that gur lauta or raskat is not fit for human consumption and the same is utilised for animal consumption as such cannot fall within the definition of gur.
Even if for arguments sake it may be admitted that the aforementioned inferior quality of gur is not fit for human consumption and is utilised for animal consumption, we do not see any reason to hold that on account of such use or consumption the item cannot be held as an agricultural produce within the meaning of its definition in Section 2(a) of the Act.
Thus in our view an kinds of rab and gur made from sugarcane or from molasses shall fall within the definition of rab and gur as contained in Section 2 (a) of the Act.
In Rathi Khandsari Udyog etc.
vs State of U.P. & Ors etc.
; , this court while considering the definition of khandsari under Section 2 (a) of the Act held as under : "The Legislature has in terms encompassed 'Khandsari ' within the definition of Section 2(a) of the Act.
And the term 'Khandsari ' is sufficiently wide to cover all varieties of khandsari including the article produced by the factories like those of the petitioners.
Besides the basic premise assumed by the petitioners that the object of the Act is merely to protect the producers from exploitation is fallacious.
of course one of the main objects of the Act is to protect the producers from being cheated by unscrupulous traders in the matter of price, weight, payment, unlawful market charges etc.
and to render them immune from exploitation as indicated by the 'prefatory note ' and by the provisions contained in Section 16(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (viii) etc.
While this is one of the objects of the Act, it is not the sole or only object of the Act.
The Act has many more objects and a much wider perspective such as development of new market areas, efficient collection of data, and processing of arrivals in Mandis with a view to enable the World Bank to give substantial economic assistance to establish various markets in Uttar Pradesh as also protection of consumers and even traders from being exploited 1043 in the matter of quality, weight and price".
In Kishan Lal and Ors.
vs Slate of Rajasthan & Ors.
, ; it was held as under: "The definition of the word 'agricultural produce" in the Act includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule.
The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive, neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil.
Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character.
To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States".
In Bharat Trading vs State of U.P. & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9982 of 1983 decided on 31st March, 1992 it was held that 'raskat ' is nothing more than an inferior quality of gur and the same was held as an agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act.
Thus we hold that gur lauta or raskat and rab galawat and rab salawat fall within the definition of 'agricultural produce ' as contained in Section 2(a) of the Act and are exigible to market fee under the Act and the view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct.
In the result we allow all these appeals., set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and as a result of which the writ petitions riled by tile respondents stand dismissed.
No order as to costs.
N.V.K. Appeals allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Section 2(a) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam of 1964 defined 'agricultural produce '.
The words 'gur, rab, shakkar, Khandasari and jaggery ', were added in the said definition by U.P. Act No. 10 of 1970.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court referred the question whether gur lauta and raskat and rab salawat are liable to the law, of market fee under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam of 1964 to a Full Beach.
The Full Bench held that gur lauta and raskat and rabgalawat and salawat were not an 'agricultural produce ' within the meaning of the Act, and other Benches followed the Full Bench.
In the appeals to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that when gur khandsari and shakkar have been added in the definition of 'agricultural produce ' rab galawat.
or rab salawat being the inferior forms of the rab are necessary an agricultural produced within the definition of agricultural produce.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the Full Bench was right in taking the view that molasses are a different product which looses its original character and being a residual article after solidification of the natural article i.e., sugarcane juice, it cannot be said to be an agricultural produce, that molasses itself being not an agricultural produce, gur lauta and raskat prepared from molasses cannot be held to be an agricultural produce.
Allowing the appeals, this Court, HELD: 1.
A persual of the definition of agricultural produce ' under Section 2(a) of the Act shows that apart from items of produce of agriculture, horitculture, viticulture, apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, 1037 1038 animal husbandry or forest as are specified in the Schedule, the definition further 'includes admixture of two or more such items ' and thereafter it further 'includes taking any such item in processed from ' and again for the third time the words used are land further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery.
[1041C] 2.
It is a well settled rule of interpretation that where the legislature used the words 'means ' and 'includes ' such definition is to be given a wider meaning and is not exhaustive or restricted to the items contained or included in such definition.
[1041D] 3.
The meaning of 'agricultural produce ' in the above definition is not restricted to any products of agriculture as specified in the Schedule but also includes such items which come into being in processed form and further includes such items which are called as gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery.
[1041E] 4.
Gur lauta or raskat and rab salawat made from sugarcane or from molasses shall fall within the definition of 'agricultural produce ' as contained in Section 2(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, and are exigible to market fee.
The view taken by the Full Bench of the High Court is not correct [1042C, 1043D] Rathi Khandsari Udyog etc.
vs State of U.P. & Ors. etc.
; , ; Kishan Lal and Ors.
vs State of Rajasthan & Ors.
, [1990) 2 S.C.R. 142; and Bharat Trading vs State of U.P. & Ors., WP (C) No. 9982 decided on 31st March, 1992, referred to.


judgement:
minal Appeal No. 918 of 1981.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.8.81 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Crl.
A. No. 417 DB of 1980.
U.R. Lalit, M. Qmaruddin and Mrs. M. Oumaruddin for the Appellant.
Ranbir Singh Yadav and R.S. Suri (NP) for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N.P. SINGH, J.
The appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, for causing the murder of Paramjit Singh.
It is said that the appellant and the deceased were intimate friends and they used to visit frequently each other 's house.
But Paramjit Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'deceased ') misbehaved with the wife of the appellant and because of that the appellant had nursed a grudge.
On July 8, 1979 in the morning the appellant asked the deceased to accompany him to Chandigarh and Mohali where he wanted to take some suitable shop for his business.
They boarded a bus of the Road Transport Corporation at Patiala for Chandigarh at about 9.59 A.M. Gurcharan Singh (PW 8) also came to Chandigarh by the same bus.
The appellant and the deceased reached Chandigarh at about 11.30 A.M. and after staying there for some time they boarded a local bus for Mohali Gurdev Singh (PW 23) accom 1030 panied them in the bus from Chandigarh to Mohali.
At Mohali after getting down from the bus the appellant went to Raj Kumar Singh (PW 711) brother of his wife and borrowed a bicycle from him.
During this period the deceased was sitting at a shop and taking aerated water.
Shortly thereafter, the appellant arrived with the bicycle at the said shop and both left on the bicycle.
The deceased was pedalling the bicycle and the appellant sat behind on the carrier.
Both were seen going on the bicycle by Jaimal Singh (PW 5) by the side of the Gurdwara, Sahib Singh Sabha, Mohali.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) after taking his meals went to Gurdwara Sahib Singh Sabha at about 2.45 P.M. the same day.
One Om Parkash, came there and told him that a Sikh gentleman was lying on the ground in the campus of the said Gurdwara in an injured condition.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) accompanied by Balwinder Singh, Sewadar, came to the spot and found the victim lying on the ground and bleeding profusely.
He identified him to be the same person whom he had seen earlier on the bicycle.
The victim could not speak.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) left Om Parkash and Balwinder Singh, Sewadar, at the spot and summoned members of the Gurdwara Committee.
Some of the members who were available reached.
But in the meantime the victim succumbed to the injuries.
They searched for the assailant.
Thereafter Jaimal Singh (PW 5) accompanied by Chatter Singh went to the Police Station Mohali and lodged the first information report at 4.00 P.M. the same day.
It is further the case of the prosecution that near about the time of the occurrence the appellant was seen coming from the side of the Gurdwara Sahib Singh Sabha and was noticed on the way by Joginder Singh (PW 9) with blood on his hand.
On being asked the appellant gave out that he had a fight with someone.
and he was going to the hospital to get his injuries dressed.
Gurdev Singh (PW 23) on his way back from the hotel also saw the appellant going on the bicycle and found him puzzled.
He also saw the hand of the appellant stained with blood and blood marks on his clothes as well.
On querry the appellant said that he had got the injury through barbed wire and was going to the doctor to get his wounds dressed.
Last in the chain of events, the appellant reached the house of Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) and returned him his bicycle.
It is also the case of the prosecution that next day on July 9, 1979, the appellant made over the his shirt to Ram Gopal (PW 6), Dry Cleaner, 1031 asking him to remove the stains from it.
A copy of the receipt prepared in connection with the aforesaid shirt was produced during the trial.
The doctor who held the post mortem examination found several incised wounds on the person of the deceased including injury on the abdomen.
There is no dispute that the prosecution case is based solely on the circumstantial evidence.
If at a trial the prosecution adduces direct evidence to prove the charge, the Court is primarily concerned whether the witnesses who have testified about the role of the accused are reliable.
Once the Court is satisfied that the witnesses who are said to have seen the occurrence are trustworthy and inspire confidence, the finding of guilt has to be recorded, if otherwise the accused has to be acquitted.
But in a case based on circumstantial evidence neither the accused nor the manner of occurrence is known to the persons connected with the victim.
The first information report is lodged only disclosing the offence, leaving to the investigating agency to find out the offender.
It is said that men lie but circumstances do not.
Under the circumstances prevailing in the society today, it is not true in many cases.
Sometimes the circumstances which are sought to be proved against the accused for purpose of establishing the charge are planted by the elements hostile to the accused who find out witnesses to fill up the gaps in the chain of circumstances.
In countries having sophisticated modes of investigation, every trace left behind by the culprit can be followed and pursued imme diately.
Unfortunately it is not available in many parts of the this country.
That is why Courts have insisted (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established; (ii) all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one sought to be proved; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature; and (iv) the chain of evidence should not have any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
A note of caution has also been struck regarding the role of imagination.
In the case of Reg vs Hodge, (1838) 2 Lewin 227, it was said: "The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one 1032 connected while; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matter, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete. ' It has been impressed that suspicion and conjecture should not take place of legal proof It is true that the chain of events proved by the prosecution must show that within all human probability the offence has been committed by the accused, but the Court is expected to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts along with the motive suggested by the prosecution which induced the accused to follow a particular path.
The existence of a motive is often an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in cases depending on circumstantial evidence.
Coming to the facts of the present case, Pritam Kaur (PW 12), mother of the deceased, has deposed that the appellant went to her house in the morning and took the deceased with him saying that he win be accompanying him to Mohali because the appellant had to select a suitable shop.
Thereafter both of them left together.
There does not appear to be any reason on the part of the mother of the victim to falsely state about the deceased going along with the appellant in the morning of July 8, 1979.
Gurcharan Singh (PW 8) has testified that at 9.30 A.M. he saw the appellant and the deceased at the bus stand.
He exchanged greeting with them.
They told him that they were going to Chandigarh or Mohali.
The deceased purchased two bus tickets for Chandigarh in his presence.
Gurcharan Singh (PW 8) travelled in the same bus with the appellant and the deceased and all the three came out from the bus at Chandigarh together.
Sahib Chand (PW 24), an employee of the Punjab Roadways Transport Corporation, had sold two tickets.
The yard control register was produced before the Court to prove in respect of sale of the two tickets which were recovered from the person of the deceased at the time to the post mortem examination.
The two tickets were recovered on July 8, 1979, on the date.
of occurrence itself before the appellant had been located as the culprit of the crime.
The two tickets recovered from the person of the deceased 1033 establish that the deceased had travelled from Patiala along with one another person who was close to him because the deceased was keeping both the tickets in his pocket.
This circumstances corroborates the evidence of Pritam Kaur (PW 12) as well as of Gurcharan Singh (PW 8).
The other circumstance in the chain of events, according to the prosecution, is that the appellant and the deceased boarded a local bus at Chandigarh for Mohali reaching there at about 1.30 P.M. Gurdev Singh (PW 23), who was then employee in Colonization Department, Sector 22, Chandigarh, and residing at Badheri, also travelled in the same local bus.
He belonged to Patiala.
Gurdev Singh (PW 23) saw the appellant and the deceased getting down from the local bus at Mohali.
They also exchanged greetings with him and on being asked the appellant told him that they were going to select a shop.
They walked together for a short distance and thereafter Gurdev Singh (PW 23) went to take his meals at a dhaba.
Thereafter the appellant asked the deceased to wait at a shop and he himself went to his wife 's brother Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) and borrowed a bicycle from him.
Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) although a close relation of the appellant has testified that the appellant took his red bicycle from his house at about 1.30 P.M. Jaimal Singh (PW 5) saw the deceased taking aerated water at the shop and later saw the appellant and the deceased both going together on a red bicycle.
The deceased was pedalling the bicycle and the appellant was sitting on the carrier.
Gurdev Singh (PW23) aforesaid who had left the appellant and the deceased while going to the dhaba for taking his meals, after taking his meals, at about 2.30 P.M. again saw the appellant coming on the same bicycle alone.
The appellant appeared to be puzzled and his hands were stained with blood.
There were also blood spots on his clothes.
Gurdev Singh (PW 23) asked him.
as to what had happened to him.
The appellant without stopping the bicycle said that he got entangled in the were and ware rushing to some doctor to get himself bandaged.
Yet another witness Joginder Singh (PW 9) who had gone to Mohali in search of some plot saw the appellant at about 2.15 P.M. coming on a red colour bicycle.
He also noticed the hand of the appellant stained with blood.
On query the appellant told Joginder Singh (PW 9) that he had a fight with some person and was going to hospital for dressing of his wounds.
Thereafter the appellant went to Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) his brother in law to hand over the bicycle aforesaid.
1034 It may be mentioned that in the Court Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) stated that this appellant had gone to his house at about 1.30 P.M. and taken his red colour bicycle which he returned the same day later.
But he denied that he had stated during investigation that he had seen injuries on the hand of the appellant.
He also denied that he had told the police during investigation that the appellant was mentally agitated.
Still the fact that the appellant had taken from him his red colour bicycle at about 1.30 P.M. which the appellant returned to him later the same day has been testified by him.
If this part of the evidence of Raj Kumar Singh (PW 11) is accepted which we find no reason to doubt then his evidence corroborates the evidence of Jaimal Singh (PW 5) and Gurdev Singh (PW 23) that the appellant was going with the deceased on a red colour bicycle at about 1.30 P.M. and about 2.30 P.M. the appellant was seen coming on the bicycle alone.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) has also stated that be had seen the accused and the deceased going on the bicycle at a place which was 500 yards from the local Gurdwara Singh Sabha.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) later went to the said Gurdwara and in the Gurdwara premises while he was talking with Balwinder Singh Sewadar, at about 2.45 P.M. one Om Parkash came there and informed that a Sikh gentlemen was lying on the ground in an injured condition.
All of them went towards the place where the injured was lying.
Jaimal Singh recognised the victim to be the same person whom he had seen earlier taking aerated water at the shop and later on the bicycle along with the appellant.
Blood was coming out from his abdominal region.
The victim was not in a position to speak.
Jaimal Singh (PW 5) went to call the members of the Gurdwara Committee.
Two members of the Gurdwara reached the spot.
But by that time victim had succumbled to his injuries.
Therefore they went to the Police Station Mohali where Jaimal Singh (PW 5) lodged the first information report at 4.00 P.M. Jaimal Singh (PW 5) did not know either the name of the appellant or that of the deceased but he stated in the first information report that he had gone to Dhaba and at about 1.30 P.M., while taking meals he saw a fair complexioned Sardar taking aerated water in the adjoining 'shop.
After taking meals when he was going on the road, again he saw the same Sardar pedalling a cycle going towards Gurdwara Singh Sabha Mohafi and behind him a young Hindu Mona was sitting on the cycle.
Then he gave the details as to how then at the Gurdwara, at about 2.45 P.M., one Om Parkash told him that one Sardar was lying in a comer of Gurdwara in an injured 1035 condition.
He went and identified that he was the same young man whom he had seen taking aerated water at the shop and then on the bicycle.
The first information report was lodged within one and a half hours of the occurrence giving the aforesaid details.
The statements made in the first information report corroborate fully the testimony of Jaimal Singh (PW 5) in Court.
Once the evidence of Jaimal Singh is accepted, it supports and corroborates the evidence of Gurdev Singh (PW 23) who had travelled with the appellant and deceased in local bus from Chandigarh to Mohali and had got down at Mohali at 1.30 P.M.
He later saw the appellant at about 2.30 P.M. returning on the bicycle with injuries on hand and blood on clothes.
Gurdev Singh (PW 23) knew the appellant as well as deceased from before.
Apart from the evidence of the witnesses, who have proved the different links in the chain of events, the shirt which the appellant was wearing and on which blood had been noticed by witnesses as already mentioned above was recovered from the laundry of Ram Gopal (PW 6).
According to Ram Gopal (PW 6) on July 9, 1979 the appellant had given that shirt to remove certain stains.
He had issued a receipt to the appellant and one chit was tagged with the shirt for identification.
The third was kept by way of record.
The shirt was seized and sent to the chemical examiner who found human blood on the said shirt.
The shirt as well as the bicycle were produced as exhibits before the Trial Court and have been identified by the witnesses who were examined on behalf of the prosecution.
None of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution appear to have been set up or planted by any inimical source.
They are neither interested in the deceased nor have any bias against the appellant.
So far the motive which impelled the appellant to commit the murder, it has been suggested on behalf of the prosecution that the appellant and the deceased were intimate friends but the appellant had a suspicion that the deceased was misbehaving with his wife, for which the appellant had a resentment.
The resentment was never allowed to be surfaced by the appellant by way of strong protest or confrontation.
However, he had mentioned this to Darshanjit Singh (PW 13), Kanwaljit Singh (PW 14) and Sarup Lal (PW 15). 'rile three witnesses aforesaid have deposed as to how the appellant was carrying a suspicion and was tense from inside in respect of the conduct of tile deceased.
There is nothing on the record to show that the aforesaid three witnesses were either inimical to the appellant or 1036 interested in the deceased because of that they could have concocted a motive for commission of the crime by the appellant.
According to us the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is clear, unambiguous and in unmistakable terms establish that the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing has been brought to our notice which leaves any gap in the circumstances to establish the guilt of the appellant.
The facts of the case stands the scrutiny and tests as laid down by this Court in the cases of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343; Deonandan Mishra vs The State of Bihar, ; ; Govinda Reddy vs State of Nysore, AIR 1960 SC 29; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra, ; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 1890 and State of UP vs Ashok Kumar Srivastava, The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
V.P.R. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The prosecution case was that the appellant and the deceased were intimate friends.
The appellant nursed a grudge against the deceased, as he misbehaved with the wife of the appellant.
On July 8, 1979 in the morning the deceased accompanied the appellant to Mohali, where the appellant wanted to do business.
At Mohali, the appellant went to the brother of his wife (P.W. 11) and borrowed a bicycle, leaving the deceased at a shop.
later both left the shop on the bicycle.
The deceased was pedalling the bicycle while the appellant was sitting behind on the carrier of the bicycle.
P.W. 5 saw them going by the side of the Gurdwara, Sahib Singh Sabha.
At about 2.45 P.M. on the same day, P.W. 5 when went to the Gurdwara, one Om Parkash came there and told P.W.5 that an injured Sikh gentleman was lying on the ground in the campus of the Gurdwara.
P.W. 5 accompanied by one Balwinder Singh came to the spot.
He identified the victim lying on the ground bleeding profusely.
The members of the Gurdwara Committee were summoned.
The members who were available reached.
The victim succumbed to the injuries in the meantime.
P.W. 5 accompanied by one Chatter Singh lodged the First Information Report at 4.00 p.m., the same day.
The prosecution case was based solely on the circumstantial evidence and it could prove the chain events beyond reasonable doubt by the evidences of its witnesses.
The appellant was convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life by the trial Court.
1027 1028 Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD : 1.01.
It is said that men lie but circumstances do not.
Under the circumstances prevailing in the society today, it is not true in many cases.
Sometimes the circumstances which are sought to be proved against the accused for purpose of establishing the charge are planted by the elements hostile to the accused who find out witnesses to fill up the gaps in the chain of circumstances.
[1031D] 1.02.
In countries having sophisticated modes of investigation, every trace left behind by culprit can be followed and pursued immediately.
Unfortunately it is not available in many parts of this country.
That is why Courts have insisted (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established; (ii) all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one sought to be proved; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature; and (iv) the chain of evidence should not have any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.
[1031E F] 1.03.
If at a trial the prosecution adduces direct evidence to prove the charge, the Court is primarily concerned whether the witnesses who have testified about the role of the accused are reliable.
Once the Court is satisfied that the witnesses who Pre said to have seen the occurrence are trustworthy and inspire confidence, the finding of guilt has to be recorded, if otherwise the accused has to be acquitted.
But in a case based on circumstantial evidence neither the accused nor the manner of occurrence is known to the persons connected with the victim.
[1031B C] 1.04.
Suspicion and conjecture should not take place of legal proof.
It is true that the chain of events proved by the prosecution must show that within all human probability the offence has been committed by the accused, but the Court is expected to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts along with the motive suggested by the prosecution which induced the accused to follow a particular path.
The existence of a motive is often an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in cases depending on circumstantial evidence.
[1032C D] 1.05.
The evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is clear, 1029 unambiguous and in unmistakable terms establish that the appellant is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing has been brought to Court 's notice which leaves any gap in the circumstances to establish the guilt of the appellant [1036B] Reg vs Hodge, (1838) 2 Lewin 227; Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1952 SC 343; Deonandan Mishra vs The State of Bihar, ; ; Govinda Reddy vs State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 29; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra, ; Ashok Kumar Chatterjee vs State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 1890 and State of U. P. vs Ashok Kumar Srivastava, , referred to.