judgement:
Appeal No. 236 of 1954.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 9,1953, of the Patna High Court in Misc.
Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953.
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of Bihar, Bhagwat Prasad and section P. Varma, for the appellants.
P. R. Das, A. C. Roy and R. R. Biswas, for the respondent.
April 15.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 79 615 section K. DAS, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna dated October 9, 1953, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953 of that Court.
It relates to a temple commonly known as the Baidyanath temple situate in the town of Deoghar within the limits of Santal Parganas in the State of Bihar.
For the purposes of this appeal it will be necessary to refer to some earlier litigation about this temple.
The history 'of this temple, it is not disputed, goes back to remote antiquity.
According to Hindu tradition referred to in the Siva Purana and Padma Purana, extracts from which, with translations, are given by Dr. Rajendra Lal Mitra in his paper on the Temples of Deoghar (see Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Part 1, 1883, quoted in the Bihar District Gazetteer relating to Santal Parganas, 1938 edition ' pp. 373 376), the origin of the temple is traced to the Treta Yuga, which was the second age of the world by Hindu mythology.
Side by side with Hindu tradition, there is a Santal tradition of the origin of the temple given by Sir William Hunter (see the Annals of Rural Bengal, p. 191 ; Satistical Account of Bengal, Vol.
XIV,, p. 323).
But these materials afford no evidence as to when and by whom the idol was established or the temple was built.
The temple sheltering the " lingam " and dedicated to Mahadeva stands in a stone paved quadrangular courtyard.
The courtyard contains eleven other temples, smaller in size and of less importance than that of Baidyanath.
Pilgrims visit the temples in large numbers and make offerings of flowers and money in silver or gold; rich people offer horses, cattle, palanquins, gold ornaments and other valuables and sometimes, rent free land in support of the daily worship.
There is a high or chief priest (Sardar Panda) who it appears used to pay a fixed rent to the Rajas of Birbhum during the Muhammadan regime, and the administration of the temple was then left entirely in the hands of the high priest.
It may be here stated that about 300 families of " pandas ", who belong to a branch of Maithil Brahmins, were attached to the 627 temple and earned their livelihood by assisting pilgrims in performing the various ceremonies connected with the worship of the God.
When the British rule began, it was decided to take over the management of the temple, and with this object an establishment of priests, collectors and watchmen was organised in 1787 at Government expense.
The revenue soon fell off, as the chief priest beset the avenues to the tem ples with emissaries, who induced the pilgrims to make their offerings before approaching the shrine.
(See the District Gazetteer, ibid, p. 383).
In 1791 Government relinquished its claim to a share of the offerings and entrusted the management of the temple to the head priest on his executing an agreement to keep the temples in repair and to perform all the usual ceremonies.
This agreement was entered into by Ram Dutt (the ancestor of the present respondent), then high priest of the temple and Mr, Keating who was then Collector of the district.
According to Mr. Keating the income of the temple in 1791 consisted of the offerings of the proceeds of 32 villages and 108 bighas of land which he estimated at Rs. 2,000 a year; some years later the total income was estimated at Rs. 25,000 a year.
Under the system introduced by the agreement of 1791, the mismanagement of the temple was a source of constant complaint; the temple and " ghats " were frequently out of repair and the high priest was charged with alienating villages from the temple and treating his situation as a means of enriching himself and his family.
On the death of the high priest in 1820 a dispute over the succession arose between an uncle and a nephew.
The nephew Nityanand was eventually appointed, but neglected to carry out the terms of his appointment.
Finally, Nityanand was charged with malversation of the funds and the uncle Sarbanand was appointed in his stead in 1823.
There was a faction which was opposed to Sarbanand 's retention in office and asked for Government interference in the internal management of the temple.
In 1835 Government declined all interference in the matter and the parties were left to have recourse to the established courts of law.
Sarbanand 628 died in 1837 and Iswaranund Ojha, son of Sarbanand Ojha, was subsequently elected Sardar Panda.
Iswaranund was succeeded by his grand son, Sailajanund Ojha.
There were, however, frequent disputes between the high priest and the " pandas " regarding the control of the temple and in 1897 a suit was filed under section 539 (now section 92) of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan.
This was Suit No. 18 of 1897 which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge of Burdwan by his judgment dated July 4, 1901.
Sailajanund Ojha was dismissed by the order of the court, as he by his conduct and behavior and by causing loss to the Debutter properties rendered himself unfit and disqualified to hold the post of Sardar Panda and trustee of the temple of Baidyanath.
It was further ordered by the learned Additional District Judge in the decree granted by him that some fit person be elected as Sardar Panda by the " pandas " of the temple and that the affairs of the temple be managed under a scheme which was framed by the learned Additional District Judge and formed a part of the decree.
Under this scheme three persons were to be appointed to look after the temple and its properties and for a proper administration of the same.
One of these three persons was to be elected from amongst the descendants of Ram Dutt Jha.
After this Umesbanund Dutt Jha, second son of Iswaranund Ojha, was elected Sardar Panda.
On the death of Umeshanund Dutt Jha, Bhabapritananda Ojha, who was the petitioner in the High Court and is now respondent before us, was appointed Sardar Panda.
Bhabapritananda is the grand son of Sailajanund Ojha, and we.
shall hereinafter refer to him as the respondent.
The scheme which was framed as a result of the decision in Civil Suit No. 18 of 1897 was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court and the decision of the High Court is reported in Shailajananda Dut Jha vs Umeshanunda Dut Jha (1).
This scheme was modified in a subsequent litigation in 1909, when one of the members of the committee applied to the District Judge (1) (19O5) 2 C.L.J. 460.
629 for a modification of the scheme.
The application was first dismissed, but the matter was taken to the Calcutta High Court, and on September 8, 1910, that Court on the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Prayag Doss vs Tirumala (1) and with the consent of counsel on both sides, directed the insertion of two clauses in the decree ; by one of these clauses, liberty was reserved to any person interested to apply to the District Court of Burdwan with reference to the carrying out of the directions of the scheme and by the other clause, liberty was reserved to any person interested to apply from time to time to the Calcutta High Court for any modification of the scheme that might appear necessary or convenient.
Under these two clauses the members of the committee subsequently applied to the District Judge of Burdwan that certain directions might be given to the high priest ; the high priest opposed the application on the ground that it was in essence an application for modification of the scheme and could be entertained only by the High Court.
The learned District Judge overruled this objection.
The matter was again taken to the Calcutta High Court and that Court directed (1) that the committee must prepare ail annual budget of the income and expenditure; (2) that provision must be made for quarterly audit and annual inspection of the accounts; (3) that provision should be made for joint control of the temple funds after they have been realised ; (4) that there must be no undue interference on the part of the committee with the high priest in the internal management of the temple; and (5) that no one who has any pecuniary interest in the temple properties or is a creditor of the endowment should serve on the committee.
The High Court further directed that clauses embodying the aforesaid five directions should be inserted in the scheme.
This decision of the High Court is reported in Umeshananda Dutta Jha vs Sir Ravaneswar Prasad Singh (2).
We now come to more recent events which gave rise to Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953 in the (1) (196) I.L.R. (2) 630 Patna High Court.
The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Act, received the President 's assent on February 21, 1951, and came into force on August 15. 1951.
This Act established the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts to discharge the functions assigned to the Board by the Act.
Sometime in August 1952 the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts acting under section 59 of the Act asked the respondent to furnish a statement in respect of the Baidyanath temple and the.
properties appertaining thereto.
The respondent wrote back to say that the administration of the temple and its properties was in the hands of a committee constituted under a scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court, and these Courts being outside the jurisdiction of the Bihar Legislature, the Act did not apply to the temple and the respondent was not in a position to carry out the directions of the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts which might be in conflict with those of the Calcutta High Court.
The Board, however, proceeded to assess and demand payment of Rs. 1,684 6 6 as fee payable by the respondent in respect of the Baidyanath temple to it under section 70 of the Act.
The respondent then made an application under article 226 of the Constitution to the High Court of Patna, which application gave rise to Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 181 of 1953.
On various grounds stated therein, the respondent con.
tended that the Act was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature ; he further contended that even if intra vires, the Act properly construed did not apply to the Baidyanath temple and the properties appertaining thereto by reason of the circumstance that the said temple and its properties were administered under a scheme made by the court of the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court both of which are situate outside the territorial 'limits of Bihar.
The State of Bihar, the Bihar State Board of Reli.
gious Trusts and the President thereof, now appellants before us, contested the application.
Relying on the 631 principles (1) that there should be as far as possible no conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities and (2) that no intention to exceed its own jurisdiction can be imputed to the Bihar Legislature and of two possible constructions of the Act, the one that would make it intra vires should be preferred, the High Court came to the conclusion that the expression " religious trust " as defined in section 2 (1) of the Act must be construed not in the plain and grammatical sense but must be cut down so as to exclude such religious trusts as are administered under a scheme made by a court situate outside the territorial limits of Bihar and, therefore, the Act did not apply to the Baidyanath temple and the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction to take any proceedings against the respondent under the provisions of the Act.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the application of the respondent, quashed the proceedings taken against him by the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, and issued a writ prohibiting the said Board from taking any further proceedings against the respondent under any of the provisions of the Act.
The State of Bihar, the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and its President obtained a certificate under article 132 of the Constitution from the High Court and the present appeal has been filed by them in pursuance of that certificate.
We shall hereinafter refer to them compendiously as the appellants.
We have had before us a number of appeals in which the validity of the Act has been challenged on several grounds and in some of these appeals, further questions were raised as to the application of the Act to private religious trusts and even to public trusts some properties of which are situate outside the State of Bihar.
These appeals we put in four categories.
They have been heard one after another and though we are delivering judgment in each category separate ly, it has been made clear that the reasons for the decision on points which are common to all or some of the appeals need not be repeated in each judgment.
In Civil Appeals Nos. 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 632 1955 (1), which fall in the first category, we have con sidered the questions if the Act is bad on the ground that its several provisions infringe the appellants ' fundamental rights guaranteed under article 14, article 19 (1) (f), and/or articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution, or on the ground that it imposes an unauthorised tax.
We have given reasons for our conclusion that the Act is not bad on any of the aforesaid grounds.
These reasons we do not wish to repeat here; they govern the present appeal also in so far as the Act is challenged on the self same grounds.
In Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 (2), which is in the second category, we have dealt at length with the definition clause of the expression " religious trust " in the context of other provisions of the Act, and have come to the conclusion that the Act does not apply to private trusts.
In the appeal under consideration in this judgment the admitted position is that the Baidyanath temple is a public trust; so it was held in the earlier litigation to which we have already referred and the scheme was formulated on that footing in Suit No. 18 of 1897.
In Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955 (3), which is the third category, we have considered the question if the Act suffers from the vice of extra territoriality by reason of the provisions in section 3, which says that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts, whether created before or after the commencement of the Act, any part of the property of which is situate in the State of Bihar.
We have held therein that two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of the Act (a) the religious trust or institution itself must be in Bihar and (b) part of its property must be situated in the State of Bihar.
Those two conditions are fulfilled in this case; the Baidyanath temple is in Bihar and it is admitted that the properties belonging to the temple lie mainly in Bihar though there are some properties in the districts of Burdwan, Murshidabad and Birbhum in the present State of West Bengal.
Now, we come to the points which have been (1) Mahant Moti Das vs section P. Sahi, see p. 563, ante.
(2) Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji vs section P. Sahi, see P. 583, ante.
(3) State of Bihar vs Charusila Dasi, see p. 601, ante.
633 specially raised in this appeal, which is in the fourth or last category.
On behalf of the appellants it has been very strongly contended that the High Court was in error in relying on the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions and cutting down the scope of the Act on such a doctrine.
It has been submitted that the doctrine of comity of jurisdictions has no application to the facts of the present case and there is no possibility of any conflict or clash of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities.
It is pointed out that item 28 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is " Charities and charitable institutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions ".
It is argued that the Bihar Legislature has, therefore, full legislative competence to enact the statute in question, and it has been submitted that if the Act does not suffer from the vice of extra territoriality, then it is good and all courts must obey it.
Under section 4 (5) of the Act, section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has ceased to apply to any religious trust as defined in the Act ; therefore, no action under section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, can be taken, after the commencement of the Act, in respect of religious trusty in Bihar which are governed by the Act and there can be no question of any conflict of jurisdiction in respect of such trusts as between the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts and a court in.
Bihar on one side and the courts outside the State of Bihar on the other.
On these submissions, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the real question for decision is if the Act or any of its provisions suffer from the vice of extra territoriality and if that question is answered in favour of the appellants, then the High Court was in error in cutting down the scope and ambit of the Act by invoking the doctrine of comity of Jurisdictions.
At this stage it is convenient to set out in brief the argument which Mr. P. R. Das, learned counsel for the respondent, has advanced in support of the judgment of the High Court.
In one part of its judgment, the High Court has referred to the principle that every 80 634 statute should be so interpreted and applied, in so far as its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established rules of international law, and has referred to certain decisions in support of that principle.
Mr. P. R. Das has frankly conceded before us that no question of any inconsistency with, ' the comity of nations or with the established rules of international law arises in the present case and he does not contend that the Act or any of its provisions violate any established rule of international law.
Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider this part of the judgment of the High Court.
Before us Mr. P. R. Das has developed his argument in the following way.
He has first submitted that Suit No. 18 of 1897 which was instituted in the court of the District Judge of Burdwan in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties is still pending and the administration of the temple and its properties is being carried on by a committee appointed under a scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and later approved and modified by the Calcutta High Court; therefore, the District Judge of Burdwan and the Calcutta High Court are in full seizin of the trust and its properties, and the Bihar Legislature cannot take away or interfere with the jurisdiction of either the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court.
In this connection he has referred to cl. 39 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, particularly to item (a) of the first proviso thereto.
That clause is in these terms: " And We do further ordain that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal in any matter in which jurisdiction is by these presents given to the High Court of Judicature at Patna ' shall cease from the date of the publication of these presents, and that all proceedings pending in the former Court on that date in reference to any such matter shall be transferred to the latter Court: Provided, first, that the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall continue to exercise jurisdiction (a) in all proceedings pending in that Court on 635 the date of the publication of these presents in which any decree or order, ' other than an order of an interlocutory nature, has been passed or made by that Court, or in which the validity of any such decree or order is directly in question; and (b) in all proceedings (not being proceedings referred to in paragraph (a) of this clause) pending in presents under the 13th, 15th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, presents under the 13th, 15th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 34th or 35th clause of the Letters Patent bearing date at Westminster the Twenty eighth day of December, in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and sixty five, relating to that Court; and (c) in, all proceedings instituted in that Court, on or after the date of the publication of these presents, with reference to any decree or order passed or made by that Court: Provided, secondly, that, if any question arises as to whether any case is covered by the first proviso to this clause, the matter shall be referred to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and his decision shall be final ".
His argument is that the scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and later approved by the Calcutta High Court can be modified only by the Calcutta High Court and that High Court continues to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the scheme under item (a) of the first proviso to clause 39 referred to above, and cl.
41 of the Letters Patent does not empower the Bihar Legislature to amend any of the clauses of the Letters Patent.
He has also submitted that on February 9, 1917, the Calcutta High Court decided that any application for enforcement of the scheme would lie to the District Judge of Burdwan and not to the Deputy Commissioner of Dumka.
It may be stated here that Burdwan is in the State of West Bengal and Dumka in the State of Bihar.
Mr. P. R. Das has contended that in so far as the provisions of the Act interfere with the jurisdiction of courts outside Bihar, they have extra territorial operation and must be held to be bad 636 on that ground; because under article 245 of the Constitution, the Bihar Legislature may make laws for the whole or any part of the State of Bihar, but it cannot make any law which will have extra territorial operation.
He has drawn our attention to the provisions of sections 3, 4 (5) and 28 of the Act, and has laid particular emphasis on the provisions of section 29 of the Act, which provisions, according to him, have extra territorial operation.
Having set out in some detail the arguments which have been advanced before us on behalf of the appellants and the respondent, we proceed now to consider them on merits.
We agree with learned counsel for the parties that no question arises in this case of any conflict or inconsistency with the doctrine of comity of nations or with any established rule of international law.
The question which really arises for decision is if any of the provisions of the Act have extra territorial operation.
This question has two aspects.
First, there is section 3 which says inter alia that the Act shall apply to all religious trusts, any part of the property of which is situated in the State of Bihar.
The argument is that the Bihar Legislature has no power to legislate about trust property which is outside the territorial limits of Bihar and section 3 of the Act in so far as it seeks to operate on trust property outside Bihar makes the Act bad on the ground of extra territorial operation.
This part of the argument has been fully dealt with and rejected in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust, Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955 (1).
The second facet of the argument is what Mr. P. R. Das has specially emphasised before us in this appeal.
His argument in substance is that the Act by some of its provisions seeks to interfere with the jurisdiction of courts which are outside Bihar, and this in effect is the vice of extra territorial operation from which, according to him, the Act suffers.
We are unable to agree with him in this contention.
Section 3 we have already referred to.
Sub section (5) of section 4 states inter alia that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall not apply to any religious trust (1) State of Bihar vs Charusila Dasi, see p. 601, ante.
637 in the State of Bihar as defined in the Act.
We have considered the effect of this sub section in the decision relating to the Charusila Trust (ibid) and have held that the Act applies when the trust itself, temple or deity or math, is situate in Bihar and also some of its property is in Bihar.
We have pointed out therein that the trust being situatedin Bihar, that State has legislative power over it and over its trustees and their servants or agents who must be in Bihar to administer the trust ; therefore, there is really no question of the Act having extra territorial operation.
In our opinion, this reasoning is equally valid in respect of the argument of Mr. P. R. Das.
If, as we have held, it is open to the Bihar Legislature to legislate in respect of relgious trusts situate in Bihar, then that Legislature can make a law which says, as in sub section
(5) of section 4 of the Act, that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to any religious trust in the State of Bihar.
If sub section
(5) of section 4 of the Act is valid as we hold it is, then no question really arises of interfering with the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Burdwan or of the Calcutta High Court in respect of the Baidyanath temple, inasmuch as those courts exercised that jurisdiction under section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, which no longer applies to the Baidyanath temple and the properties appertaining thereto, after the commencement of the Act.
It is true that the Act does put an end to the jurisdiction under section 92, Code of Civil Procedure, of all courts with regard to religious trusts situate in Bihar, but that it does by taking these trusts out of the purview of section 92.
In other words, the Act does not take away the jurisdiction of any court outside Bihar but takes the religious trusts in Bihar out of the operation of section 92 so that a court outside Bihar in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 92 will decline to deal with a religious trust situate in Bihar just as it will decline to entertain a suit under that section regarding a private trust of religious or charitable nature.
Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of the Constitution, is item 13 of the Concurrent List.
It has not been disputed before us that it is open to the Bihar 638 Legislature to amend the Code of Civil Procedure while legislating in respect of religious endowments and religious institutions in Bihar, and the President 's assent having beep received to the Act, the law made by the Bihar Legislature shall prevail in that State, under.
article 254(2) of the Constitution, in respect of all religious trusts situate in Bihar.
In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to consider the further questions if Suit No. 18 of 1897 is still pending, the proper scope and effect of cl. 39 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court, and which authority can amend the Letters Patent.
Even if Suit No. 18 of 1897 is deemed to be still pending, though we do not so decide, any further action under the scheme in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties can be taken either by the District Judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court only if the jurisdiction under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, is still preserved in respect of it.
If that jurisdiction has come to an end in respect of the Baidyanath temple and its properties, then no question of any conflict of jurisdiction between two equally competent authorities arises at all, apart altogether from the more debatable question as to whether the Bihar Legislature on one side and the courts in Bengal on the other can be said at all to be equally competent authorities in respect of a religious trust situate in Bihar.
The question really boils down to this.
Is the Act bad on the ground of extra territorial operation, because it takes certain religious trusts situate in Bihar out of the purview.
of section 92, Code of Civil Procedure ? If the answer to this question is in the negative, then all the hurdles created by the argument of Mr. P. R. Das must disappear; because if the Act is good, it must be bindingonall courts and no question of any conflict of jurisdiction can arise. Learned counsel for the respondent has made a pointed reference to sections 28 and 29 of the Act. Section 28 deals with the general powers and duties of the Board.
We have examined these powers and duties in our decision in connected Civil Appeals Nos.
225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955 (1) and have held that (1) Mahant Moti Das vs S.P. Sahi, see P. 563, ante.
639 there is nothing in these powers and duties which can be said to have extra territorial operation.
Our attention has been drawn to el.
(j) of section 28 (2) which empowers the Board to sanction on the application of a trustee or any other person interested in the religious B trust the conversion of any property of such trust into another property, if the Board is satisfied that such conversion is beneficial for the said trust.
We have pointed out that these powers and duties are really for the fulfillment of the trust and they do not in any way contravene the rights of the trustees.
Section 29 states : " 29(1).
Where the supervision of a religious trust is vested in any committee or association appointed by the founder or by a competent Court or authority, such committee or association shall continue to function under the general superintendence and control of the Board, unless superseded by the Board under subsection (2).
(2) The Board may supersede any committee or association referred to in sub section (1) which in the opinion of the Board, is not discharging its funetions satisfactorily and, if the Board does so, any decree or order of a Court or authority by which such committee or association was constituted shall be deemed to have been modified accordingly: Provided that before making any order under this sub section, the Board shall communicate to the committee or association concerned the grounds on which they propose to supersede it, fix a reasonable period for the committee or association to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanations and objections, if any.
(3) Such committee or association or any other person interested in the religious trust may, within thirty days of any order of the Board under sub section (2), make an application to the District Judge for varying, modifying or setting aside such order, but, subject to the decision of the District Judge on any such application, the order of the Board shall be final and binding upon the applicant and every person interested in such trust.
640 (4) Where such committee or association has been superseded under sub section (2), the Board may make such arrangements as may be necessary for the administration of the religious trust concerned.
" It has been argued that section 29 in terms gives the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts power to interfere with a committee appointed by the founder or by a competent court or authority.
The argument is that the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts can now interfere with the committee appointed under the scheme made by the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court, and can even supersede it.
The answer to this argument is the same as that given before.
Either the Act is bad on the ground of extra territorial operation or it is not.
If the Act is bad on the ground of extra territorial operation, then there is good reason for cutting down the scope and ambit of section 29 of the Act so that it will apply only to committees appointed by a competent court or authority in Bihar.
If, however, ' in respect of a religious trust in Bihar, the Bihar Legislature can amend the Civil Procedure Code and take the trust out of the purview of section 92, Civil Procedure Code, then there is no good reason why the ambit of section 29 should be out down in the manner suggested by the High Court.
It is true that the legislation of a State is primarily territorial and the general rule is that extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur.
There is, however, no departure from that general rule when the trust itself is in Bihar and in legislating about that trust, the legislature lays down what should be done to fulfil the objects of the trust and for that purpose puts an end to an old jurisdiction in the sense explained above and creates a new one in its place.
The doctrine of territorial nexus which arises in this connection has been commented on before us at great length by, learned counsel for the respondent.
That doctrine *and the decisions bearing on it we have considered at some length in our decision relating to the Charusila Trust, Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1955.
We do not wish to repeat what we have said therein.
641 The conclusion at which we have arrived is that the Act and its several provisions do not suffer from the vice of extra territoriality in the sense suggested by B learned counsel for the respondent and there is no such conflict of jurisdiction as learned counsel for the respondent has suggested.
Accordingly, the Act is good and applies to the Baidyanath temple and the properties a pertaining thereto.
The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs.
The judgment and order of the High Court dated October 9, 1953, are set aside and the petition under article 226 of the Constitution made by the respondent must stand dismissed with costs.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
In respect of an ancient temple situate in the State of Bihar, disputes arose in I897 between the high priest and the " pandas " regarding the control of the temple which ultimately led to a suit being filed under section 539 (now section 92) Of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the Court of the District judge of Burdwan and a decree was passed by the Additional District judge, under which a scheme was framed for the proper management of the temple.
The decree was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court and the scheme itself was later modified from time to time by the said High Court.
After the coming into force of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, acting under section 59 of the Act, served a notice on the respondent, who had been appointed Sardar Panda for the temple under the scheme, asking him to furnish a statement in respect of the temple and the properties appertaining thereto.
The respondent made an application under article 226 of the Constitution to the High Court of Patna challenging the validity of the action taken against him on the grounds (1) that the Bihar 625 Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, was ultra vires the Bihar Legislature, (2) that the Bihar Legislature did not have legislative competence to deal with the temple in question as some of the properties appertaining to the temple were situate outside Bihar, and (3) that, in any case, the Act did not apply to the temple by reason of the fact that the temple and its properties were administered under a scheme made by the Court of the District Judge of Burdwan and approved by the Calcutta High Court both of which were situate outside the territorial limits of Bihar, as otherwise the Act by some of its provisions would seek to interfere with the jurisdiction of courts which are outside Bihar and thereby get extra territorial operation.
Held: (1) that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, is intra vires the Bihar State Legislature Mahant Moti Das vs section P. Sahi, [1959] SUPP.
2 S.C.R. 563 followed.
(2) that it is competent to the Bihar Legislature to legislate in respect of religious trusts situate in Bihar though some of the properties belonging to the trust may be outside Bihar; State of Bihay vs Charusila Dasi, [1959] SUPP.
2 S.C.R. 601 followed.
(3) that the provision of law in sub section
(5) of section 4 Of the Act by which section 92 Of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to any religious trust in the State of Bihar, is valid; and (4) that as under section 4(5) Of the Act religious trusts in Bihar are taken out of the purview of section 92 Of the Code of Civil Procedure, the jurisdiction of the District judge of Burdwan or the Calcutta High Court to deal with the temple in question under section 92 comes to an end; consequently the Act and its several provisions do not suffer from the vice of extra territoriality and the Act applies to the temple in question and the properties appertaining thereto.


judgement:
APPEAL NOS. 2107 1 1993.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.3.1992 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos.13587, 13588, 13926 of 1991 and L.P.A. No. II 8 of 1992.
Dipankar Prasad Gupta, Solicitor General, N.N. Goswami and H.K. Puri for the Appellants.
Ranjit Kumar, Deepak Sibal, Ms. Binu Tamta and Tarun Aggarwal for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J.
Leave granted.
All these appeals raise the identical issue as to the interpretation of the Regulations relating to Diploma in Homeopathic Course.
Hence, they are dealt with under one and the same judgment.
We will refer to the facts of C.W.P. No. 13587/91 which will be enough for appreciating the issues involved.
The respondents joints the Homeopathic Medical College, Chandigarh in the year 1987 to secure a diploma in Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery (hereinafter referred to as 'DHMS ').
The said course is of a duration of four years.
It is divided into 3 1/2 years of academic study and six months of internship.
The course of study, their duration and the scheme of examination are regulated by the Homeopathy (Diploma Course) DHMS Regulations, 1983 (hereinafter called the 'Regulations ').
These Regulations have been framed by the Central Council of Homeopathy under Section 20 of the Homeopathy Central Council Act, 1973.
Part VI of the Regulations deals with examination.
Regulations 8 to 10 occurring in part VI are relevant for our purpose.
Regulation 8 talks of first First D.H.M.S. examination.
That examination has to be held at the end of 12 months of the Course.
Regulation 9 deals with second D.H.M.S. examination to be held at the end of second year.
Regulation 10deals with 3rd D.H.M.S examination, 11/2years subsequent to the passing of the second D.H.M.S. examination.
The respondents appeared in the first year D.H.M.S. annual examination in 312 June, 1988.
Since, they did not get required percentage of pass marks two or more subjects, they had to re appear.
They were permitted to join the 2nd year class after June, 1988.
Under the interim orders of the High Court made in C.W.P.No 437510/1990, they appeared in the examination.
The respondents simultaneously took their third chance for the first year D.H.M.S. examination and finally,cleared all the papers.
They also got re appeared in one or more subjects in the 2nd year D.H.M.S. examination and accordingly, took supplementary examination in June, 1990.
They were declared 'pass ' in that examination.
The respondents joined the third year D.H.M.S. examination and completed the course of study.
In view of that, the Principal of the college in August, 1991 recommended and forwarded their examination forms for the third year Examination to the appellant namely, the Council of Homeopathic System of Medicines, Punjab.
The appellant declined to permit the respondents to take the examination since they had not completed one year course of study between passing the first D.H.M.S. examination and appearing in the second one; hence, they were not eligible to appear in the third year examination.
In other words, the examination has not been passed in accordance with the scheme prescribed under Regulations 8 & 9.
It was under these circumstances, the writ petitions came to be preferred before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in C.W.P. No. 13587/91 praying for a direction to permit them to take third year D.H.M.S. examination commencing from 3.9. 1991.
The writ petition came up before a Division Bench.
By judgment dated 9.3.1992 allowing that writ petition on the reasoning that if the minimum course of study as provided by Regulations 9 and 10 if held to be mandatory, such a provision would be liable to be struck down in view of the decision of the Court in C.W.P. No. 2307/88, Gurinder Pal Singh vs Punjabi University & Ors. which in turn has followed Single Judge decision reported in Harinder Kaur Chandok (Minor) vs The Punjab School Education Board through its Secretory It is the correctness of this judgment, which has been questioned in all these appeals.
The learned Solicitor General took us through Regulations at length.
Part II deals with course of study.
Regulation 3 states that a Diploma Course in Homeopathy shall be spread over a period of four years.
Those four years include six months compulsory internship after the passing of the final year diploma examination.
When we look at Regulations 8 to 10, three concepts emerge from them: 313 i) Subjects; ii) Time; ii) Marks.
The duration of the examination is, first year: 12 months, Second Year: 12 months; and third year: 18 months.
Regulation 8 states that a candidate may be admitted to the first D.H.M.S. examination.
Similarly, Regulation 9 also states that a candidate shall be admitted to the second D.H.M.S. examination.
Identical language is used under Regulation 10 for Third D.H.M.S. examination.
The submission of the learned Solicitor General is, admission to these examinations is entirely different from 'admission to a course '.
With reference to admission to each of the examination, First, Second and Third year, the respective Regulations 8,9 & 10 prescribe the eligibility.
Unless and until, that eligibility is possessed, admission to an examination is impossible.
The High Court has taken a view that since the duration of the Course is four years, this Regulation must be so construed as to fit in within those four years.
This is wrong.
Regulation 11 talks of re admission to an examination.
That Regulation has nothing to do with the eligibility prescribed under Regulation 8 to 10.
In other words, Regulation 11 cannot control the operation of these Regulations.
Regulation 11 (iv) talks of supplementary examination.
In that supplementary examination, it is open to a candidate to pass in a subject or subjects in which he has failed.
When he so passes, Clause (v) of that Regulation states that he shall be declared to have passed at the examination as a whole.
Even thereafter, if he fails in the subject or subjects at the supplementary examination and he has to appear in the examination in the failed subject or subjects at the next annual examination, Clause (vi) prescribes: i) Production of a certification; ii) In addition, if he had put a necessary attendance, a further course of study in the subject or subjects in which he had failed, the minimum number of chances as per this clause are only four.
If he fails to complete the subjects within these four chances, he will have to prosecute a further course of study in all the subjects of all parts for one year, in other words, he has to start the course afresh and appear for examination in all the 314 subjects.
Thus, it will be clear that all these Regulations talk of re admission to an examination in Order to enable the failed Candidate to undergo supplementary and subsequent examinations.
On completion of subject in any one of those examinations within the four chances, he is declared to have passed the whole examination.
On this count, it is incorrect to hold that passing in the supplementary examination relates back to the original examination.
A careful reading of Regulation 9 requires the satisfaction of the following conditions for appearing in the Second Year D.H.M.S. examination: i) The candidate had passed the First D.H.M.S. examination at the end of one year previously.
This means, there must be a gap of one year between the passing of First year examination and appearing in the Second year examination; ii) Subsequent to the passing of the examination, must have attended the courses of instruction for a period of at least one year.
Therefore, a candidate who fails in the first year examination in a subject or subjects, if he passes any supplementary examination cannot take the Second year examination at the next academic year.
This is because, one year duration had not elapsed between the passing of First year examination in the supplementary examination and taking the Second year examination.
Worse is a case where a candidate passes the First Year examination at the third or fourth attempt.
The High Court has gone wrong in its construction on Regulation 11 that if a candidate passes a supplementary examination, the insistence of one year would require the candidate to wait for one more year.
Therefore, he would inevitably have to study for the next year course from the next academic session.
No doubt, the candidate who passes the supplementary examination will have to sit idle till the next academic session.
That is his own making.
On that score, the attempted harmonious construction by the High Court cannot be supported.
The learned Solicitor General finally submits that none of the Regulations indicate 'a carry forward scheme ' of the subjects.
On the contrary, it is a case of detention every year.
Accordingly, he submits that the Civil Appeals deserve to be allowed.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel in opposition to this, would urge that the interpretation placed by the High court on Regulations 8 to 10 is collect.
Otherwise, no useful purpose would be served by conducting a supplementary examination.
Equally, four chances afforded to the candidate could be rendered nugatory if the interpretation as stated by the learned solicitor General is accepted.
315 Regulation 11 has to be read along with Regulations 8 to 10.
It is not correct to argue that Regulation 11 has nothing to do with admission to an examination.
As a matter of fact, declaration of result of supplementary examination of First D.H.M.S. examination was made on 31.10.1989.
The next annual examination was held in January, 1990 within 2 1/2 months.
The respondents passed the course of First and Second D.H.M.S. examinations.
The result of Second Year D.H.M.S. supplementary examination was declared in January, 1991.
In view of such an inordinate delay in the conduct of examinations, the appellant cannot contend that one year period must elapse between First and Second D.H.M.S. examinations and that the Regulations should have been strictly obeyed.
The Regulations do not say that after First D.H.M.S. examination, a student cannot study for Second D.H.M.S. course and sit for examination provisionally.
The declaration of result for the Second D.H.M.S. course takes place only after he had cleared the First D.H.M.S examination.
As rightly held by the High Court, the word 'supplementary '.
denotes supplementing to or in continuation of the annual examination.
Where , therefore, provisional admission is given for the Second Year D.H.M.S, course, the failure to complete he First D.H.M.S. examination should not be put against the respondent.
If the Regulations are so literally interpreted, that will lead to absurdity.
It will run counter to the object of providing a supplementary examination.
This interpretion is holding the field for a long time.
This was the reason why in Jaininder Mohan and Others vs The council of Homeopathic System of Medicine.Punjab (1992) 1 I.L.R. Punjab 159, the court took a view that passing in the supplementary examination will relate back to the date of annual examination.
Otherwise, as rightly pointed out by the High Court, anamolous results would follow.
In so far as the respondents have completed the examination, equities must weigh in their favour as laid down by this Court in A. Sudha vs University, of Mysore and another ; , Chandigarh Administration & Ors.v Manpreet Singh & Ors. ; , Shirish Govind Prabhudesai vs State of Maharashtra The learned counsel also relies on Orissa Homeopathic Regulations and contends that carry forward is permitted in similar Homeopathic Regulations.
In order to appreciate the respective contentions, we have to analyse the relevant Regulations relating to the Diploma Course in Homeopathy as contained Homeopathy (Diploma course) DHMS Regulations, 1983.
These Regulations are statutory in character in so far as they have come to be framed in exercise of powers conferred under Clauses (i) , (j) & (k) of Section 33 and sub section (1) of Section 316 20 of Homeopathy Central Council Act.
Under Section 20, the Central Council may prescribe the minimum standards of education in Homeopathy required for granting recognised medical qualifications by Universities, Boards and Medical Institutions in India.
Section 33 speaks of powers to make Regulations.
The relevant clauses are (i), (j) & (k).
They are to the following effect. "(i) The courses and period of study of practical training to be undertaken, the subjects of examination and the standards of proficiency therein to be obtained, in any University, Board or Medical institution for grant of recognised medical qualification; (j)the standards of staff, equipment, accommodation, training and other facilities for education in Homeopathy; (k)The conduct of professional examinations, qualifications of examiners and the conditions of admissions to such examinations;" Therefore, the Central council constituted under Section 3 of the Act has power to make Regulations under Section 33 (k) regarding the conditions of admission to the examination.
The very object of this Act is to prescribe minimum standards for admission, duration of course of training, details of curriculum and syllabus of study and the title of degree or diploma.
Since they very from State to State and even from Institute to Institute within a same State, it had become necessary to constitute a Central Council.
The Advisory Committee prescribed a course of four years.
Accordingly, in Regulation 3(i), it is provided that a Diploma Course in Homeopathy shall comprise a course of study, spread over a period of four years.
This includes the compulsory internship of six months duration after passing the final Diploma examination The Regulations contain eligibility to admission, the curriculum, the syllabus etc.in the various parts.
Part VI deals with examination.
Regulation 8 talks of First D.H.M.S. examination.
It is stated in clause (i) : "A candidate may be admitted to the First D.H.M.S. examination provided that he has regularly attended the following course of instruction, theoretical and practical for a period of not less than 12 months at a Homeopathy College to the satisfaction of the head of the college".
317 From the above, it is clear for admission to the First D.H.M.S. examination: i)a student must have regularly attended the courses of instruction, theoretical and practical; ii) for a period of not less than 12 months; iii) to the satisfaction of the head of the College.
As regards the Second D.H.M.S. examination, Regulation 9 takes care.
That states in Clause (i) : "No candidate shall be admitted to the Second D.H.M.S examination unless: a) he has passed First D.H.M.S. examination at the end of one year previously, and b) he has regularly attended the following courses of instruction both theoretical and practical in the subjects of examination for a period of at least one year subsequent to his passing First D.H.M.S. examination from a recognised Homeopathic College to the satisfaction of the head of the college.
" Here again, eligibility for admission to Second D.H.M.S. examination is based on two conditions: i) A student has passed his First D.H.M.S. examination at the end of one year previously.
This means one year must elapse between the passing of the First year examination and taking of Second Year Examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing the First year a) he must have regularly attended the courses both theoretical and practical; (b) for a period of at least one year; (c) to the satisfaction of the head of the College.
Thus, unless and until, these two conditions are satisfied, a student is 318 ineligible for admission to the Second D.H.M.S. examination.
Clause (iii) states that the Second D.H.M.S. examination shall be held at the end of two years of D.H.M.S. course.
The Third D.H.M.S. course is provided for under Regulation 10.
That reads as follows: "No candidate shall be admitted to the Third D.H.M.S. examination unless: (a) he has passed the second D.H.M.S. examination at the end of 1 1/2 years previously, and (b) has regularly attended the following courses of instructions both theoretical and practical in subjects of examination for a period of at least 11/2 years subsequent to his passing the Second D.H.M.S examination in a recognised Homeopathic College to the satisfaction of the head of the College.
" Here again, the conditions for eligibility for admission to Third D.H.m.s examination are: i) After passing the Second D.H.M.S. examination,one and a half years must have elapsed before taking the Third D.H.M.S examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing of the Second D.H.M.S. examination: a) he must have regularly attended the courses both theoretical and practical" b) for a period of 11/2 years; c) to the satisfaction of the college.
Thus, it will be clear that the pattern of the examination is as rightly urged by the learned Solicitor General : 12 months for First D.H.M.S. examination, 12 months for Second D.H.M.S. examination and 18 months for Third D.H.M.S examination.
These put together with six months of compulsory internship, make up the four years prescribed for the Course in Regulation 3.
One thing that carefully requires to be noticed is that all the three Regulations 319 8 to 10 speak of admission to an examination, First, Second and Third year respectively.
This is entirely different from admission to a course we find great force in this submission of the learned Solicitor General.
The course of study may consist of four years, but that has nothing to do with the scheme of examination.
Now, we come to Regulation 11.
That requires to be reproduced in full: "(i) Every candidate for admission to an examination shall send to the authority concerned his application in the prescribed form with the examination fee at least 21 days before the date fixed for the commencement of the examination.
(ii)As soon as possible after the examination the examining body shall publish a list of successful candidates arranged in the following manner: (a)the names and roll numbers of the first ten candidates in order of merit, and (b) the roll number of others arranged serially.
(iii)Every candidate shall on passing the examination receive a certificate in the form prescribed by the examining body concerned.
(iv) A candidate who appears at the examination but fails to pass in a subject or subjects may be admitted to supplementary examination in the subject or subjects of that part of the examination in which he has failed to be held ordinarily after six weeks from the publication of result of the first examination on payment of the prescribed fee along with an application in the prescribed form.
(v) If a candidate obtains pass marks in the subject or subjects at the supplementary examination or the subsequent examination, he shall be declared to have passed at the examination as a whole, (vi) If such a candidate fails to pass in the subject or subjects at the supplementary examination in the subject or subjects concerned, he may appear in that subject or subjects at the next annual examination on production of a certification in addition to the certificate required under the regulations, to the effect that he had attended to the satisfaction of the Principle,a further course of study for a period 320 of next academic year in the subject or subjects in which he had failed, provided that all the parts of the examination shall be completed within four chances including the supplementary one, to be counted from the date when the complete examination becomes due for the first time.
(vii)If a candidate fails to pass in all the subjects within the prescribed four chances, he shall be required to prosecute a further course of study in all the subjects of all parts for one year to the satisfaction of the head of the college and appear for examination in all the subjects.
Provided that if a student appearing for the Third D.H.M.S. Hom.examination has only one subject to pass at the end or prescribed chances, he shall be allowed to appear at the next examination in that particular subject and shall complete the examination with this special chance.
(viii)All examinations shall be held on such dates, time and places as the examining body may determine.
(ix) The examining body may under exceptional circumstances partially or wholly cancel any examination conducted by it under intimation to the Central Council of Homeopathy and arrange for conducting reexamination in those subjects within a period of thirty days from the date of such cancellation."
This Regulation deals with results and readmission to an examination.
A close reading of the above brings out the following: In clause (iv) as to what is to happen in the event of a candidate failing to pass in a subject or subjects is spoken to.
He may be admitted to the supplementary examination.
Such a supplementary examination is to ordinarily take place after six weeks from the publication of result of First Examination.
Supposing he passes in that subject or 'subjects in the supplementary examination he is declared to have passed at the examination as a whole.
This should obviously be so; because once he completes all the subjects, he has to necessarily be declared to have passed.
Merely on this language, "declared to have passed at the examination as a whole", we are unable to understand as to how the 321 "doctrine of relation back" could ever be invoked.
The invocation of such a doctrine leads to strange results.
When a candidate completes the subjects only in the supplementary examination, then alone, he passes the examination.
It is that pass which is declared.
If the "doctrine of relation back" is applied, it would have the effect of deeming to have passed in the annual examination, held at the end of 12 months, which on the face of it is untrue.
With this, we pass on to clause (vi) which deals with the stage where the candidate had failed in the First Annual Examination in a subject or subjects and he had not passed in that subject or subjects in the supplementary examination also.
The next annual examination arrives.
The appearance in that examination is conditioned upon production of two certificates: i)A certificate required under the Regulations to the effect that he had attended to the satisfaction of the Principle; ii)A certificate to the effect that he had undergone a further course of study for a period of next academic year in subject of subjects in which he had failed.
Whatever it is, a candidate has to complete all the subjects within four chances.
Should he fail to do so, he will have to undergo the course in all subjects for one yea, unless of course, he gets the exemption as stated in proviso to Clause (vii).
Nowhere do, we find in Regulation 11 system of carry forward '.
On the contrary, it is detention every year.
The High Court was moved by the fact that if a candidate were to pass in supplementary examination after passing the examination, he will have to remain at home till the next annual examination.
So, he is allowed to undergo a course for next academic year provisionally.
On this line of reasoning, clause (iv) & (vi) of Regulation II are sought to be "harmoniously construed '.
We are unable to accept this line of reasoning or the so called harmonious construction because it does violence to the language of the Regulation.
It clearly violates the mandatory requirements of Regulation 9.
It has already been noted as to what those requirements are.
To repeat: i) The lapse of one year period between the passing of First D.H.M.S. examination and taking the Second D.H.M.S. examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing of the First D.H.M.S. examination to undergo the course of study for one year.
Therefore, if a candidate passes in the supplementary examination, the requirement of one year cannot be enforced.
Worse still is 322 a case of a student who passes only at the next annual examination.
Could he be allowed to take the Second D.H.M.S. examination without even completing the First?
Should he by chance pass the Second D.H.M.S. and not complete the First, since he is still one more chance to take this examination, what is to happen? The situation is absurd.
The same principle should apply to Regulation 10 where the lapse is one and half years.
The word 'supplement ' is defined in Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, page 1072: "think added to remedy deficiencies; part added to book etc, with further information, or to periodical for treatment of particular matter(s) of an angle,(Math.)its deficiency from 180(of.COMPLEMENT); hence Al, ARY, (mem) adjs.(supplementay benefit).
[ME,f.L. sup (plementum f plere fill; see ment]" Therefore,the adjective 'supplementary ' means and examination to makeup the deficiencies.
it stands to reason only when deficiencies are made up, the whole becomes complete.
On this score to say that passing the supplementary examination would relate back to the annual examination will be totally incorrect.
What counts is when the whole is made up.
From that time of making up one year or one and half years must elapse for second or Third D.H.M.S. examinations as the case Amy be.
The stand of the appellants counsel as seen from letter dated 12.12.1989 is as follows: "From: Dr. P.L. Verma, Secretary, Central Council of Homeopathy, 10, Community Centre, Basant Lok, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi 110037.
TO The Chairman, The Council, Homoeopathic Systems of Medicine, 3027 28, Sector 22 D, Chandigarh.
323 Sub:Enforcement of D.H.M.S (Diploma Course) Regulation 1983 w.e.f.1983 84 Academic Sessions students demand for grant of provisional promotion with reappearance in only one subject to the next higher class even beyond supplementary examination even prior to his passing the lower class examination as a whole.
With reference to your letter No. CHSM PV 134 /89/1253 dated 29/ 30 November, 1989 on the subject noted above.
I am to say that the question of permitting to appear simultaneously for two examinations i.e. lower reappear subjects and complete subjects of the next higher class does not arise as no candidate has to be admitted to the Second D.H.M.S. examination unless he had passed the first D.H.M.S. examination at the end of one year previously and has regularly, attended the course for one year.
Similarly, no candidate shall be admitted to the Third D.H.M. section examination unless he has passed the second D.H.M.S. examination 1 1/2 years previously and has also attended the course for a period of 1 1/2 years subsequent to his passing of the Second D.H.M.S. Examination.
COUNCIL OF HOMOEOPATHIC SYSTEM OF MEDICINE 3027 28, Sector 22 D CHANDIGARH (UT) No. CHCH PV 9134/89/AT 198 200 Dated 5.2.90 Copy forwarded to the Principal, Lord Mahaveera Homeopathic Medical College, Ludhiana/Abohar/Chandigarh for information and necessary action.
This may please be notified for information of all the students under intimation to the undersigned.
The above guidelines/directions of the Central Council may please be strictly followed and observed in respect of matters indicated therein.
sd/ (R.K. Sharma) Registrar, No.CHMS/PV/134/89/AI 201 210 Dated 5.2.90.
" This stand in our opinion is correct.
If a student were to sit idle at home after passing the supplementary 324 examination that is his own making.
To avoid such a situation, the Regulation cannot be construed causing violence to the language.
These Regulations are plain enough and are susceptible only to literary interpretation.
In 'Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes ' 12th Edition, it is stated at page 29 as under: "Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise.
"The decision in this case," said Lord Morris of Borth y Gest in a revenue case, "calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found.
The desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision." (Shop and Store Developments Ltd. vs I.R.C. (1967) 1 A.C. 472).
Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be.(Cartledge vs E. Jopling & Sons, Ltd.)
The interpretation of a statue is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just and expedient: (Gwynne vs Burnell Words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded.
(Whitehead vs James Stott Ltd. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, and to "leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others." (Sutters vs Briggs We construe the Regulations as they stand without introducing any element of ambiguity or absurdity.
The manner in which the respondents have passed the examination is set out in the following tabulated statement: "C.W.P. No. 13926 of 1991 Miss Kamaljit & eight others of L.M. Homoeopathic Medical College, Ludhiana.
1st prof.Annual/88 Supp/88 Annual/89 Respondent No. Re appear Re appear Pass 325 1, Miss Kamaljit in 3 in 2 Contd.d/o Sawam subjects subjects Singh (Admitted in 1987) Resp.2, Re appear pass Sh.Narinder in 2 Contd Kumar s/o subjects Satya Pal Goyal (Admitted in 1987)  Resp.No. 3 Shri Re appear pass Contd.Mohd Ramzan in 3 Thind s/o SH. subjects Moh. Yousaf (Admitted in 1987) Resp No.4 Shri Re appears Re appears pass " Naresh Kumar in 3 subjects in 2 subjects Resp.No.5 Shri Re appear Re appear pass " Jaininder Mohan in 2 in 1 s/o Shri Sham Lal subjects subject (Admitted in 1987) Resp.No. 6 Shri Re appear Re appear pass " Kulbir Singh s/o in 3 in 2 Sh.
Tattan Singh subjects subjects (Admitted in 1987) Res.No. 7 Re appear pass " Narinder Singh in1 s/o Sh.Sant subject Singh (Admitted in 1987) Res.
No. 8 Inderjit Mehta d/o Anant Ram Mehta (Admitted in 1987) Resp.No. 9 Fail Re appear pass
Tejvinder Singh, in1 s/o Jaswant Singh (Admitted in 1987) 326 Continued Part IInd Prof. (CWP No. 481of 1991)
3rd Prof. (CWP No: 13926/91) Suppl./89 Annual/90 Suppl/91 Re appear Re appear Re appear Allowed to appear in 3 in 3 in1 as per court subjects subjects subject order dt.6.9.91 by the Principal of L. Homoeopathic Medical College.
Re appear Re appear pass As per court in 3 in1 order dt.6.9.91 subjects subject (without court order)
Re appear Re appear pass Not appeared in 4 in 1 subjects subject
Re appear Re appear pass As per court in 3 in1 orderdt 6.9.91 Fail
Re appear pass As per court in 2 order subjects dt.6.9.91 Re appear Re appear pass
As per court in 1 pass Order subject dt.6.9.91 Re appear Re appear pass Allowed to in 2 in 2 appear as subjects subjects per Court order dt.6.9.91"
Mr. Ranjit Kumar pleads before us that equities must weigh in favour of students.
With reference to that plea, we hold that he students who had completed the whole course, attended all the courses of study for the three sessions of 12 months, 12 months and 18 months respectively and had passed all the examinations in all the subjects, though not in the sequential order required by the 327 regulations, it appears to us that the submission of the counsel for the respondents that they being required to go through the courses all over again and take the examinations after attending the courses afresh, might lead to hardship and might require consideration.
In the words of Anne Sophie Swetchine: "The world has no sympathy with any but positive griefs; it will pity you for what you lose, but never for what you lack.
We think that their cases may perhaps have to be examined from the point of these equities by the Council of Homeopathic System of Medicines.
The candidates who, as on today, have attended all the courses and have passed all the examinations might make an appropriate representation to the Council of Homeopathic System of Medicines (the appellant) to consider their cases.
The representation shall be filed within a period of four weeks from today.
The Council of Homeopathic System of Medicines (the appellant) will take appropriate decision within one month thereafter.
The Council in doing so shall bear in mind all the relevant circumstances, including, perhaps the spirit of the corresponding regulations under the Bihar Act, in which such sequential purpose is not insisted upon.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The respondents appeared in the first year D.H.MS (Diploma in Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery) annual examination in june,1988.They had to re appear as they did not get the required percentage of pass marks in two or more subjects.
They were permitted to join the second year class after June, 1988.
Under the interim orders of the High Court, they appeared in the second year annual examination.
Simultaneously, the respondents appeared in the first year D.H.MS.
examination and cleared all the papers.
After re appearing in one or more subjects in the second year Supplementary examination in June, 1990, they were declared passed in the 2nd year D.H.M.S. examination.
The respondents joined the third year D.H.M.S. course and completed the course of study.
When their examination forms were forwarded to the appellant Council, they declined to permit the respondents to appear in the 3rd year D.H.M.S. annual examination, because they did not complete one year course of study between passing the first D.H.M.S. examination and appearing in the second year course.
The respondents preferred a writ petition before the High Court to direct the appellants to permit them to appear in the third year DHMS examination, commencing from 3.9.1991.
Following the view taken in the decision of the Court in C.W.P. No 2307/ 88.
Gurinder pal Singh vs Punjabi University & Ors., which was followed in Harinder Kaur Chandok (Minor) v The Punjab School, Education Board through its Secretary, , the High court allowed the writ petition of the respondents.
Against that order of the High Court, the appeal (C.A.No. 2107/93) was filed by special leave.
The appellants submitted that the High Court was wrong in its construction on regulation 11 of the Homeopathy (Diploma Course) DHMS Regulations, 1983; that if a candidate passed on supplementary examination, he would have to wait till the next academic session; that none of the Regulations indicated carry forward scheme of the subjects, but on the contrary,it was a case of detention every year.
The respondents urged that the interpretation placed by the High Courts on Regulations 8 to 10 was correct; that four chances afforded to the 308 candidate could be rendered nugatory, if the interpretation as stated by the appellants was accepted; that the Regulations did not say that after First D.H.M.S. examination, a student could not study for Second D.H.M.S. course and sit for examination provisionally; that the declaration of result for the Second D.H.M.S. course took place only after a student cleared the First D.H.M.S. examination; that if the Regulations were literally interpreted, that would lead to absurdity and it would run counter to the object of providing a supplementary examination.
As the other appeals (C.A.Nos.
2108 10/93) contained identical issue, all the appeals were heard and decided together.
Allowing, the appeals, this Court, HELD:1.1.
The Regulations 8 10 of the Homeopathy (Diploma Course) DHMS Regulations, 1983 are plain enough and are susceptible only to literary interpretation.
Maxwell:Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, Page 29, referred to.
1.2.For admission to the First D.H.M.S. examination: i)a student must have regularly attended the courses of instruction, theoretical and practical; ii) for a period of not less than 12 months; iii) to the satisfaction of the head of the College.
(317 B) 1.3.
Eligibility for admission to Second D.H.M.S. examination is based on two conditions: i) A student has passed his First D.H.M.S. examination at the end of one year previously.
This means one year must elapse between the passing of the First year examination and taking of Second Year Examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing the First year 309 a) he must have regularly attended the courses both theoretical and practical; b) for a period of at least one year; c) to the satisfaction of the head of the College.
(317 F G) Thus, unless and until, these two conditions are satisfied, a student is ineligible for admission to the Second D.H.M.S. examination.
(317 H, 318 A) 1.4 The conditions for eligibility for admission to Third D.H.M.S examination are: i) After passing the Second D.H.M.S examination, one and a half years must have elapsed before taking the Third D.H.M.S. examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing of the Second D.H.M.S. examination: a) he must have regularly attended the courses both theoretical an practical; b) for a period of 11/2 years; c) to the satisfaction of the college.
(318 F G) 1.5.
Mandatory requirements of Regulation 9 are; i) The lapse of one year period between the passing of First D.H.M.S. examination and taking the Second D.H.M.S. examination.
ii) Subsequent to the passing of the First D.H.M.S. examination to undergo the course of study for one year.
(321 G) 1.6.
Therefore, if a candidate passes in the supplementary examination, the requirement of one year cannot be enforced.
Worse still is a case of a student who passes only at the next annual examination.
Could he he allowed to take the Second D.H.M.S. examination without even completing the First? Should he by chance pass the Second D.H.M.S. and not complete the First, since he has still one more chance to take this examination, what is to happen? 310 The situation is absurd.
The same principle should apply to Regulation 10 where the lapse is one and half years.
(321 H, 322 A) 1.7.The pattern of the examination is: 12 months for First D.H.M.S. examination, 12 months for Second D.H.M.S. examination and 18 months for Third D.H.M.S examination.
These put together with six months of compulsory internship, make up the four years prescribed for the Course in Regulation 3.
(318 G) 1.8.When a candidate completes the subjects only in the supplementary examination, then alone, he passes the examination.
It is that pass which is declared.
If the "doctrine of relation back" is applied, it would have the effect of deeming to have passed in the annual examination, held at the end of 12 months, which on the face of it, is untrue.
(321 A) 1.9.Whatever it is, a candidate has to complete all the subjects within four chances.
Should he fail to do so, he will have to undergo the course in all subjects for one year unless of course, he gets the exemption as stated in proviso to Clause (vii).
In Regulation 11 there is no 'system of carry forward '.
On the contrary, it is detention every year.
Harmonious construction violates the mandatory requirements of Regulation 9.
(321 E F) 1.10.If a student were to sit idle at home after passing the supplementary examination that is his own making.
To avoid such a situation, the Regulation cannot be construed causing violence to the language.
(323 H, 324 A) 1.11.The candidates who, as on the day of Judgment of these appeals, have attended all the courses and have passed all the examinations might make an appropriate representation to the Council of Homeopathic System of Medicines (The appellant) to consider their cases.
The representation shall be filed within a period of four weeks.
The Council of Homiopathic System of Medicines (the appellant) will take appropriate decision.
(327 C) 2.
The adjective 'supplementary ' means an examination to make up the deficiencies.
Thus, it stands to reason only when deficiencies are made up, the whole becomes complete.
(322 D) Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, page 1072, referred to.
(322 B)