judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 4448 of 1985.
From the Judgment and order dated 26.
1982 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision Case No. 23 of 1978.
WITH Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1986.
From the Judgment and order dated 31.7.1985 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision Case No. 205 of 1985.
T.V.S.N. Chari for the Appellant.
739 R. Ramachandran for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The question of law which arises in these two appeals by special leave being a common, they are disposed of by this common judgment.
The said question relates to the time within which an assessment can be made under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') where the return is not filed by the dealer within the time prescribed in that behalf.
The assessee in Civil Appeal No. 4448 of 1985 is M/s. Nav Swadeshi oil Mills, Jadcharla, Mahboobnagar district.
For assessment year 1968 69 the assessee filed its return relating to the quarter ending 31.3.
,969 on 7.8.1969 before the Commercial Tax Officer of Mahboobnagar under the even though the last date for submission of return prescribed by law was 24.5.
The return filed by the assessee showing a taxable turnover of Rs. 18,25,410.72 was accepted and it was called upon to pay sales tax of Rs.45,424.48 under the Act.
The assessment order was passed on 3.8.1973 beyond four years from 31.3.1969 which was the last day of the assessment year 1968 69.
Aggrieved by the assessment order which had been passed beyond the period of four years from the last day of the assessment year the assessee filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Appeals, Warangal in Appeal No. 5 75 76 and that appeal was dismissed on 14.9.1976.
Against the order of the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Appeals.
Warangal the assessee filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Tribunal Appeal No. 183 of 1977.
That appeal also was dismissed.
The assessee thereafter filed a revision petition in Tax Revision Case No. 23 of 1978 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
The High Court by its order dated October 26, 1982 set aside the order of the Tribunal and also the assessment on the ground that the assessment which had been passed after four years from the last day of the assessment year was not a valid assessment.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the State of Andhra Pradesh has filed this appeal by special leave.
The assessee in Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1986 is M section Nav Swadeshi oil Mills and Refinery at Jadcharla.
In respect of the assessment year 1968 69 the assessee filed an annual return under the provisions of the on 19.8.
1969 after the expiry 740 Of the prescribed period.
The order of assessment was passed on 2.8.1973 beyond four years from the last day of the assessment year 1968 69.
Aggrieved by the assessment order which had been passed by the assessing authority the assessee filed an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Appeals, Warangal on the ground that the asssessment order passed beyond four years from the last day of the assessment year was barred by time.
That appeal was dismissed.
Against the order passed in that appeal the assessee filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh in Tribunal Appeal No. 206 of 1977.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the assessment holding that the assessment had been passed beyond time.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal the State of Andhra Pradesh filed a Revision Petition in Tax Revision Case No. 205 of 1985 on the file of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
That Revision Petition was dismissed in limine by the High Court.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the State of Andhra Pradesh has filed this appeal by special leave.
The only question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the orders of assessment in the above two cases which had admittedly been passed beyond four years from the last day of the assessment year but within the period of six years from that date had been validly passed.
By virtue of section 9 of the the procedure prescribed for making an assessment under the Act is applicable to the assessments to be made under the .
Section 13 of the Act prescribes that every dealer who is liable to get himself registered under section 12 or section 12 A as the case may be under the Act shall submit such return or returns relating to his turnover in such manner within such period and to such authority as may be prescribed.
The material part of section 14 which is relevant for purposes of these cases reads thus: "14.
Assessment of tax: ( I) If the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under section 13 is correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer on the basis thereof, but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer.
An assessment under this section shall be made only within a period of four years from the expiry of the 741 year to which the assessment relates.
. . . . (3) Where any dealer liable to tax under this Act (i) fails to submit return before the date prescribed in that behalf, or (ii) produces the accounts, registered and other documents after inspection, or (iii) submits a return subsequent to the date of inspection, the assessing authority may, at any time within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which assessment relates, after issuing a notice to the dealer and after such enquiry as he considers necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer on his turnover for that year, and may direct the dealer to pay in addition to the tax so assessed penalty as specified in subsection (8).
" It is necessary to analyse sub section (1) and sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act for purposes of determining the issue involved in these cases.
Sub section ( ]) of section 14 of the Act provides that if the assessing authority is satisfied that any return submitted under section 13 is correct and complete, he shall assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer on the basis thereof but if the return appears to the assessing authority to be incorrect or incomplete he shall after giving the dealer reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer.
In both these cases the return contemplated is one which has been filed in accordance with section 13 of the Act within the time prescribed for that purpose.
Such an assessment under sub section ( 1) of section 14 of the Act can be made within a period of four years from the expiry of the period to which the assessment relates.
Sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act authorises the assessing authority to make an assessment to the best of his judgment in three cases: (i) where a dealer under the Act fails to submit return before the date prescribed in that behalf, (ii) where a dealer produces the accounts.
registers and other documents after inspection and (iii) where a dealer submits a return subsequent to the date of inspection.
In these three cases the 742 assessing authority is empowered to make an assessment to the best of '4 his judgment at any time within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates after issuing a notice to the dealer and after such inquiry which he considers necessary to make the assessment.
The crucial question which arises for consideration in these cases is whether in a case where the assessee submits a true and complete return after the prescribed date the assessment should be completed within a period of four years prescribed by sub section ( 1) of section 14 of the Act or within a period of six years permitted under sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act.
Sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act relates to an assessment which may be made on the basis of a return submitted under section 13 of the Act.
Section 13 of the Act as stated above provides that every dealer shall submit such return or returns relating to his turnover in such manner within such period and to such authority as may be prescribed.
The return on the basis of which an assessment is to be made under section 14(1) of the Act is, therefore, a return filed within the prescribed period and in such a case the assessment has to be completed within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
The return referred to in sub section ( 1) of section 14 of the Act cannot be a return filed beyond the prescribed date is emphasised by clause (i) of sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act which refers to a case where a dealer liable to pay tax fails to submit return before the date prescribed in that behalf.
All cases where the return is submitted beyond the prescribed date fall under sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act.
The scheme of the Act regarding the period within which assessments can be made is very simple.
Assessments in cases falling under sub section (1) of section 14 of the Act have to be completed within four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates and assessments in cases falling under sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act may be completed within six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
The two types of cases which fall under sub section (l) and sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act respectively are mutually exclusive.
When once it is established in case that a return has not been filed within the prescribed period such case falls outside section 14 ( l) of the Act and therefore the period of four years prescribed therein becomes automatically inapplicable.
It clearly falls under clause (i) of sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act and assessment can be made in such a case within the expiry of the period of six years.
While a dealer who files a return within the prescribed 743 period acquires immunity against assessment on the expiry of four years from the last day of the assessment year, a dealer who fails to file a return within the prescribed period has to wait for six years to be over to acquire such immunity.
Thus the Act confers a distinct advantage on a dealer who is prompt in filing his return.
We are not impressed by the argument that since the returns in the cases before us had been accepted even though they had been filed beyond the prescribed date the assessments made thereon cannot be considered as best judgment assessment and therefore sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act under which it is permissible to make best judgment assessments would be inapplicable.
The period within which assessments can be made under the Act does not depend upon the answer to the question whether the assessment in question is a best judgment assessment or it is an assessment made treating the return as correct and complete but it depends upon the other conditions mentioned in sub section ( 1) and in sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act.
We may here point out that even in a case falling under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act it is possible for the assessing authority to make a best judgment assessment as can be seen from the latter part of the said sub section which reads: "but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer." Yet such best judgment assessment has to be completed within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
Hence it cannot be held that merely because the assessments in question are not best judgment assessments sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act is inapplicable for best judgment assessments can be made both under sub section (1) and subsection (3) of section 14 of the Act.
That the assessment is a best judgment assessment is not, therefore, decisive of the question involved in these appeals.
The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the State of Andhra Pradesh vs Pyarelal Malhotra 13 S.T.C. 946 and the decision of this Court in the State of Madras vs S.G. Jayaraj Nadar & Sons 28 S.T.C. 700 which dealt with the question as to when a best judgment assessment could be made are not relevant for purposes of deciding the question which has arisen before us.
As we have already pointed out the question whether the assessment made is the best judgment assessment or not has no bearing at all on the period within which an assess 744 ment can be made under the Act.
Neither in the judgment of the High Court against which Civil Appeal No. 4448 of 1985 is filed nor in the judgment of the Tribunal out of which Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1986 arises adequate attention is given to the words 'before the date prescribed in that behalf in clause (i) of sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act.
The High Court and the Tribunal laid emphasis only on the words "fails to submit return" in the said sub clause and it is on this account they arrived at a wrong conclusion.
On a true construction of sub section (I) and sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act we are of opinion that where a return is not filed by a dealer before the date prescribed in that behalf under the Act, the assessing authority has got jurisdiction to complete the assessment within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
Admittedly, in these cases the returns were not filed within the prescribed date and the assessments have been made within six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessments relate.
The orders of the High Court against which these appeals have been filed are therefore liable to be set aside.
In Civil Appeal No. 4448 or 1985 the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the Tribunal is restored.
In Civil Appeal No. 694 of 1986 the order of the High Court and the judgment of the tribunal are set aside and judgment of the Assistant Commissioner (CT) Appeals, Warangal is restored.
The respondent shall pay the costs of the Appellant in both the appeals.
P.S.S. Appeals allowed.

summary:
% Sub section (2) of section 9 of the makes the assessment procedure prescribed under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State applicable to the assessment to be made under the Central Act.
Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 requires the dealer to submit returns in such manner, within such period and to such authority as may be prescribed.
Sub section (1) of section 14 permits the assessing authority to assess the amount of tax due on the returns submitted under section 13 only within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
Sub section (3) permits the assessing authority to make best judgment assessment where a dealer (i) fails to submit return before the date prescribed; (ii) produces the accounts registers and other documents after inspection and (iii) submits a return subsequent to the date of inspection, within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
In the main appeal before this Court the assessee respondent filed its return relating to the quarter ending 31st March, 1969 on 7th August, 1969 under the .
The last date prescribed by law was 24th May, 1969.
The Commercial Tax officer passed the assessment order on 3rd August, 1973, beyond four years from 31st March, 1969, the last day of the assessment year 1968 69.
The assessee 's appeals against that order were dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The High Court in revision, however, held that the assessment made after four years from the last day of the assessment year was not a valid assessment.
737 In the connected appeal the respondent who was the assessee filed the annual return in respect of the assessment year 1968 69 under the A provisions of the Central Act on 19th August, 1969 after the expiry of the prescribed date.
The order of assessment was passed on 2nd August, 1973 beyond four years from the last day of the assessment year 196869.
An appeal against that order was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner.
The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, however, allowed the appeal holding that the assessment had been passed beyond four years from the last day of the assessment year.
The revision petition preferred by the State was dismissed in limine by the High Court.
In the appeals by special leave filed by the State, it was contended for the respondent that since the returns in the cases had been accepted, even though they had filed been beyond the prescribed date, the assessments made thereon could not be considered as best judgment assessments and, therefore, sub section (3) of section 14 of the Act under which it is permissible to make best judgment assessments would be inapplicable.
Allowing the appeals.
D ^ HELD: 1.1 on a true construction of sub section
(1) and sub section (3) of section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 it is apparent that where a return is not filed by a dealer before the date prescribed in that behalf under the Act the assessing authority has jurisdiction to complete the assessment within a period of six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
[744C] 1.2 The two types of cases which fall under sub section
(1) and sub section
(3) of section 14 of the Act respectively are mutually exclusive.
The return on the basis of which an assessment is to be made under section 14(1) is a return filed within the prescribed period and in such a case the assessment has to be completed within a period of four years from the expiry of the period to which the assessment relates.
The Act confers a distinct advantage on such a dealer who is prompt in filing his return inasmuch as he acquires immunity against assessment on the expiry of the said period of four years.
All cases where the return is submitted beyond the prescribed date fall under sub section
(3) of section 14 of the Act.
Assessment in such cases may be completed within six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
When once it is established in a case that a return has not been filed within the prescribed period such case falls outside section 14(1) of the Act and therefore the period of four years prescribed therein becomes automatically inapplicable.
It clearly falls under cl.
(i) of sub section
(3) of section 14 of the Act and assessment can be H 738 made in such a case within the expiry of the period of six years.
In the instant cases the returns were not filed within the prescribed dates.
The assessments have, therefore, been rightly made within six years from the expiry of the year to which the assessments relate.
[742G H; 743A B; 744C] 2.
Whether the assessment made is the best judgment or not has no bearing at all on the period within which an assessment can be made under the Act.
It depends upon the other conditions mentioned in sub section
(1) and (3) of section 14.
Best judgment assessment can be made even in a case falling under sub section
(1), as is evident from the latter part of that sub section which reads: "but if the return appears to him to be incorrect or incomplete he shall after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer." Yet such best judgment assessment has to be completed within a period of four years from the expiry of the year to which the assessment relates.
Therefore, in the instant case merely because the assessments are not best judgment assessments, it cannot be said that sub section
(3) of section 14 is inapplicable.
Neither the High Court nor the Tribunal gave adequate attention to the words 'before the date prescribed in that behalf ' in cl.
(i) of sub section
(3) of section 14.
They laid emphasis only on the words 'fails to submit return ' in the said sub clause to arrive at a wrong conclusion.
[743C, H; 744A B] State of Andhra Pradesh vs Pyarelal Malhotra, (13 S.T.C. 946), and State of Madras vs S.G. Jayaraj Nadar & Sons, 28 S.T.C. 700, distinguished.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 2 107 of 1979.
From the Judgment and order dated 22.9.
1978 of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W. No. 3857 of 1978.
Gobinda Mukhoty, Ali Ahmad, Mrs. Jayshree Ahmad, Tanveer Ahmad, S S Hussain for the appellants.
R.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is a tenant 's appeal by special leave.
After perusing the judgment impugned and grounds urged, we are of the opinion, that there is no substance in this appeal 843 On merit, though there are one or two technical breaches.
This is certainly not a decision which should be interfered with in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution by this Court.
The appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 22nd September, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad The respondent No. 2 herein, Smt.
Murtaza Begum filed an application under section 3 of the U.P Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 being U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947, hereinafter called the old Act, against the appellants Section 3 of the said Act provides that subject to any order passed under sub section (3) of that section, no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any court against any tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on the grounds mentioned therein.
Sub section (2) of section 3 provided for revision to the Commissioner against the order of the District Magistrate Subsection (3) of section 3 empowered the Commissioner to hear the application and if he was not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order or make such other order as might be just and proper.
By sub section (4) of section 3 the order of the Commissioner has been made final subject to any other order passed by the State Government under section 7 of the said Act.
Section 7 F of the said Act empowered the State Government to call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to and authorised him to make such order as appeared to it necessary for the ends of justice.
The application for eviction was granted by the Commissioner in this case on the 17th April, 1971.
The appellants went in revision to the State Government.
The revision was, however, rejected by the State Government on 7th February, 1972 The permission thereafter became final.
In pursuance of the aforesaid permission the respondent landlord filed a suit being suit No 464 of 1972 in the court of Judge, Small Causes, Meerut for eviction of the appellants Thereafter in 1973 the landlord filed an application for withdrawal of the suit on the ground that as U P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act of 972 being U P Act no 3 of 972.
hereinafter called the New Act, had been amended, he would file an application for the enforcement of the permission obtained under section 3 of the old Act.
On that application the court found that as the cause of action on which the suit had been filed was rendered infructuous, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
After the suit was dismissed, the landlord being respondent no 2 herein filed an application under 844 section 43(2)(rr) of the New Act for eviction of the appellants from the premises in question.
It was resisted on the ground that the permission had been dismissed and the application under section 43(2)(rr) was not maintainable.
The Prescribed Authority upheld the said objection of the appellants and rejected the application filed by the landlord on the ground that since permission obtained by the landlord under section 3 of the U.P. Act has been exhausted, the application filed by the landlord was not maintainable.
It appears to us that the Prescribed Authority was clearly in error in so holding because the permission granted had not been exhausted because the suit as dismissed on a technical plea and not on the merit of the contentions Reference may be made to the observations in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Pahlad Das vs Ganga Saran and Another, AIR 1958 Allahabad 774, where the division bench of that court held that the obvious purpose of the permission under section 3 of the old Act was to enable the plaintiff, the landlord to evict the tenant from the premises and as long as that purpose was not fulfilled, the permission could not obviously exhaust itself Where it was not shown that the permission was granted to file a single suit or that it had been specified in it that a second suit could not be filed, the permission could not exhaust itself simply because the first suit filed on its basis was dismissed on some technical ground and the permission obtained could be availed of for filing the second suit.
In that view, the High Court affirmed the previous decision of that court.
It appears, however, that an appeal was filed against the order of the Prescribed Authority and the appeal was allowed by the order of the District Judge dated 28th April, 1978.
Aggrieved thereby the tenants filed a writ petition before the High Court.
The controversy in the High Court was whether the application filed by the landlord under section 43(2)(rr) of the New Act was not maintainable.
The basis of the claim of the tenant was that as the permission had been utilised by filing the suit, another proceeding on the basis of the said permission could not be initiated The High Court noted that section 43(2)(rr) was added by U.P. Act No. 37 of 1972.
By the addition of the new provision, the legislature conferred a right on a landlord who had obtained permission under the old Act and had filed an application under new provision to get the tenant evicted.
Section 43(2)(rr) of the New Act was again amended by the U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976.
By that amendment the words "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted" were inserted.
The amending Act laid down that the amendment in the provision shall be deemed to have always been substituted.
In other words, the amendment caused amendment to be retrospective in operation.
845 It is, therefore, apparent as the High Court in our opinion in the judgment under appeal rightly held that section 43(2)(rr) i.e. in 1973 permitted the landlord to file an application for the enforcement of the permission obtained by him.
After the aforesaid provision was amended, the landlord was not required to file a suit to avail of the permission.
The High Court in the judgment under appeal rejected the contention that once an application for permission had been filed, the second application would not lie.
The High Court held that where the first suit was not decided on merits subsequent action was not precluded.
The High Court noted that merits of the case were not examined by the Court.
The Court in this appeal on this occasion did not find that the permission obtained by the landlord was invalid or illegal.
The judgment of dismissal was thus on technical ground and not on merits.
The High Court held that the landlord had right to file the second application.
In our opinion, the High Court was right for the reasons mentioned hereinbefore.
It is next contended that since the suit was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action did not survive to the landlord, it should be held that the landlord had no right left to file an application under section 43(2)(rr).
This was, in our opinion, rightly rejected by the High Court.
The High Court negatived the contention of the tenant that dismissal of the first action taken by the landlord after obtaining permission under the old Act precluded the landlord from taking the second action under section 43(2)(rr) of the Act.
We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.
It will be appropriate at this stage to refer to the provisions of section 43(2)(rr) or the New Act which are as follows: "Where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in subsection (1) or sub section (2) of Section 21, and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub section, after the commencement of this Act, (whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted), the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under Section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall 846 not be open to appeal under Section 22: Provided that no application under this clause.
shall be maintainable on the basis of a permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act, where such permission became final more than three years before the commencement of the Act: Provided further that in computing the period of three years, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be excluded.
In view of the aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the Prescribed Authority was clearly in error in upholding the objection of the tenant that as the previous suit had been filed by the tenant on the basis of permission and the same had been dismissed, the application under section 43(2)(rr) of the Act 13 of 1972, was not maintainable.
It was clearly erroneous contention.
It would frustrate the very purpose of the express provision of section 43(2)(rr).
Finality of order in judicial proceeding is one of the essential principles which the scheme of the administration of justice, must strive for.
See in this connection the observations of D.K Soni vs P.K. Mukherjee & Ors., (Civil Appeal No. 6626/83 Judgment dated 27.
10. 1987).
It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge.
The High Court accepted this contention.
The High Court finally held that though no appeal lay before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge.
On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge.
It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority could not be set aside.
But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper.
The High Court itself could have set it aside.
Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper.
If we reiterate the order of 847 the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken.
As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, on objection can be taken.
In the premises there is no scope for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court about the power of the State Government under section 7 F of the old Act in Shri Bhagwan and Anr.
vs Ram Chand and Anr.
, [ ; In the view, we have taken of the facts of this case, it is not necessary to deal with this decision in any detail.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we however, make no order as to costs.
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
% Sub section (1) of section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 barred suits without the permission of the District Magistrate against tenants for eviction except on the grounds mentioned therein.
Sub section (2) provided for revision to the Commissioner, and sub section (4) made the order of the Commissioner final.
Section 7 F empowered the State Government to interfere with such orders.
That Act was repealed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
Section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act, inserted therein by U.P. Act 37 of 1972, provided that where any permission obtained under section 3 of the old Act had become final either before the commencement of the Act or in accordance with the provisions of the sub section after the commencement of the Act, the landlord may apply to the Prescribed Authority for tenant 's eviction.
This section was against amended in 1976 by insertion of the words "whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted", and giving it retrospective operation.
The order of the Prescribed Authority in such cases was made final.
The landlord 's application under section 3 of the 1947 Act for eviction 'of the tenants appellants was granted by the Commissioner in April, 197I.
The revision preferred by them was rejected by the State Government in February, 1972 and the permission became final.
In pursuance 841 Of the said permission the landlord filed a suit for eviction of the appellants.
Thereafter in 1973 he filed an application for withdrawal of the said suit on the ground that as the 1972 Act had been amended, he would file an application for enforcement of the permission.
The Court of Small Causes found that as the cause of action on which the suit had been filed was rendered infructuous, the suit was liable to be dismissed.
The application filed by the landlord under section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act for eviction of the appellants, was rejected by the Prescribed Authority on the ground that since permission obtained under section 3 of the old Act had been exhausted, the application was not maintainable.
An appeal against that order was allowed by the District Judge.
In the writ petition filed by the appellants tenants under article 226 of the Constitution it was contended that the permission obtained by the landlord having been utilised by filing the suit, another proceeding on the basis of the said permission could not be initiated, and that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge.
The High Court held that the landlord had right to file the second application.
It took the view that dismissal of the first action taken by the landlord after obtaining permission under the old Act did not preclude him from taking the second action under section 43(2)(rr) of the Act.
It further held that since the first suit was not decided on merits subsequent action was not precluded.
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, ^ HELD: 1.
Section 43(2)(rr) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 as it stood in 1973, permitted a landlord to file an application for the enforcement of the permission obtained by him under section 3 of the 1947 Act.
After the aforesaid provision was amended in 1976, the landlord was not required to file a suit to avail of the permission.
The amendment was retrospective in operation.
[844G H] 2.
The Prescribed Authority was in error in taking the view that as the previous suit had been filed by the landlord on the basis of permission and the same had been dismissed, the application under section 43(2)(rr) of the 1972 Act was not maintainable.
Such a view would frustrate the very purpose of the express provision of the section which conferred a right on a landlord who had obtained permission under the old Act and has filed an application under the new provision, to get the 842 tenant evicted.
More so, when the permission granted had not been exhausted because the suit was dismissed on a technical plea and not on the merit of the contentions.
[846C D; 845C] Pahlad Das vs Ganga Saran and Another, AIR 1958 Allahabad 774, approved.
3.1 Finality of order in judicial proceeding is one of the essential principles which the scheme of the administration of justice must strive for.
[846D] D.K. Soni vs P.K. Mukherjee & Ors.
C.A. No. 6626 of 1983 decided on October 27, 1987.
referred to. 3.2 In the instant case, through no appeal lay before the District Judge, the High Court came to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper.
On that ground it declined to interfere with the order of the District Judge in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution.
Since justice has been done by setting aside the improper order of the Prescribed Authority, no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court.
There is, therefore, no scope for interference under article 136 of the Constitution.
[847A B] 1 Shri Bhagwan and Anr.
vs Ram Chand and Anr., ; , inapplicable.


judgement:
minal Appeal No. 130 of 1956.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 12, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 52 D of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order dated December 6, 1954, of the Court of the Special Judge at Delhi in Corruption Case No. 1 of 1954.
1038 N. C. Chatterjee and C. V. L. Narayan, for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 130 of 56.
Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal, for the appellant in Cr. A. No. 25 of 56.
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, A.M. Chatterjee, H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in both the appeals.
December 3.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J. A question of law, common ' to these appeals by special leave, requires determination; hence they were heard together.
Special leave in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956 was limited to the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence for want of sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (11 of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 was not so limited and additional points were raised for our consideration, to which reference will be made when that appeal is specifically dealt with.
The question of law, common in both these appeals, is whether there was any necessity for a sanction under section 6 of the Act before a court could take cognizance of an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code or section 5(2) of the Act or both, alleged to have been committed by a person who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance was not a public servant but was so at the time of the commission of the offence.
In Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1956, the appellant was convicted under section 5(2) of the Act and sentenced to six months ' simple imprisonment by the Special Judge, Delhi.
He appealed against his conviction and sentence to the Punjab High Court.
That Court while admitting the appeal issued notice upon the appellant to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced.
The High Court ultimately dismissed his appeal and enhanced the sentence of six months ' imprisonment to two years ' rigorous imprisonment.
As in this appeal special leave has been granted limited 1039 to the question already stated, it is unnecessary to set out the prosecution case against the appellant.
In Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 the appellant had applied to the Allahabad High Court under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the quashing of the proceedings pending against him before the Special Judge.
The application was dismissed.
It is against the order dismissing his application that this appeal has been filed by the appellant.
It is admitted that at the time the Special Judges concerned purported to take cognizance the appellants were not public servants and that no order of sanction under section 6 of the Act by a competent authority was on the record.
At the time that the appellants are alleged to have committed the offence they were public servants.
Section 6 of the Act states: "6.
Previous sanction necessary for prosecution (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), or under sub section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a)in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government, (b)in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State Government, (c)in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.
(2)Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub section (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which 132 1040 would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.
" There is no dispute that if at the time when a court purports to take cognizance of offences punishable under section 161, 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or section 5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant and that person is a public servant, cognizance cannot be taken by a court unless a sanction by the competent authority has been previously accorded.
The real controversy in these appeals is whether such a sanction is required before a court can take cognizance in the case of a person who is not a public servant at the time the court is asked to take cognizance, although the offence alleged against him was committed by him as a public servant.
To determine this question section 6 of the Act requires to be interpreted.
In substance, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that on a proper interpretation of section 6 of the Act the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence alleged against him was the essence of the matter and not his status at the time the court was asked to take cognizance of the offence, in which case a sanction under section 6 of the Act was necessary before a court could take cognizance although at that stage the accused had ceased to be a public servant.
On the other band, the Solicitor General contended that on a proper interpretation of the provisions of section 6 of the Act not only an offence mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant but that that person is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the offence.
Before we proceed to construe the provisions of section 6 of the Act it is necessary to refer to some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants.
It was said that in construing the provisions of a statute a court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature and it must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from the 1041 consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy.
It must supplement the written word so as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature.
Reliance was also placed upon certain decisions construing the provisions of section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Reference was also made to article 361 of the Constitution and section 197A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in aid of the construction which the learned Counsel contended for with reference to the words used in section 6 of the Act.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough.
It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole and taking into consideration other matters and the circumstances which led to the enactment of the statute.
Observations of Denning L. J. as he then was, in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs Asher (1) were relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee.
It is, however, clear that the observations of the learned Judge were made with reference to the provision of a statute which was ambiguous.
We cannot construe the observations to mean that where the language of a statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon the court to do anything more than to give effect to the words used.
Although reference was made to article 361 of the Constitution and section 197A of the Code by Mr. Sethi, we are unable to see how the words used therein assist us in con struing the provisions of section 6 of the Act.
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Nagpur High Court in the case of section Y. Patil vs Vyankatswami (2 ) and the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind in the case of Suganchand vs Seth Naraindas (3), in support of the submission that even if a person had ceased to be a public servant before the prosecution started, such a person was (1)(1949) 2 K. B. 481, 498.
(2) I. L. R. (3)A. I. R. (1932) Sind.
1042 protected by the provisions of section 197 of the Code and a sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance.
It is true that so far as section 197 of the Code is concerned these two decisions do lend support to the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellants.
It is, however, to be noticed that the decision of the Nagpur High Court, which was of a single Judge, was overruled by a Division Bench of that Court in the case of The State vs Hifzul Rahman (1), where it was held that the person accused must be a public servant at the time of the accusation and section 197 of the Code afforded no protection to a public servant if he had ceased to hold office.
In the case of Prasad Chandra Banerji vs Emperor(2), the Calcutta High Court held that the protection given by section 197.
of the Code applied only to a person who is still a public servant at the time the prosecution is launched and does not extend to a person who is no longer a public servant at that time but was in office when the offence charged was alleged to have been committed.
Accordingly, no sanction under section 197 of the Code was necessary in order to prosecute a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time of the launching of the prosecution.
A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Imperator vs Joshi (3), and by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor vs Suraj Narain Chaube (4).
It would thus appear that the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allababad and Nagpur are agreed that section 197 of the Code affords no protection to a person who is not a public servant at the time he is accused of an offence before a court although at the time he committed the offence he was a public servant.
The decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of The State vs Gurcharan Singh (5), was brought to our notice wherein it was held that in view of the form of wording in the two sections, namely section 197 of the Code and a. 6 of the Act, the same principles would apply to them, having regard to the decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the protection afforded by section 197 of (1)I. L. R. (2) 1.
L. R. (3) I. L. R. (4) 1.
L. R. (1938) All.
(5) A. I. R. (1952) Pun.89.
1043 the Code was available to a person who was a public servant while still in office but was not available to him when he had already been discharged from service before he was prosecuted.
These cases may render assistance in understanding the reason why a public servant, while he is a public servant, cannot be prosecuted without a previous sanction for offences, committed by him as a public servant and thus may, be of some indirect help in construing the words used in section 6 of the Act.
Section 6, however, must be construed with reference to the words used therein independent of any construction which may have been placed by these decisions on the words used in section 197 of the Code.
Before an attempt is made to construe the words contained in section 6 of the Act some reference may be made to the power vested in a court to take cognizance of an offence.
Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers a general power on a criminal court to take cognizance of offences, but the exercise of such power in certain cases is prohibited by the provisions of sections 195 to 199 of the Code unless the conditions mentioned therein are complied with.
Under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952), Special Judges are appointed to try offences under section 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or section 165A of the Indian, Penal Code or section 5(2) of the Act.
They are authorized to take cognizance of these offences without the accused person being committed to them for trial.
The exercise of this general power to take cognizance by them is prohibited with respect to offences committed under section 161, 164 or section 165 of Indian Penal Code or under section 5(2) of the Act by a public servant without the previous sanction of a competent authority.
In our opinion, if a general power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in a court, any prohibition to the exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be confined to the terms of the prohibition.
In enacting a law prohibiting the taking of cognizance of an offence by a court, unless certain conditions were complied with, the legislature did not purport to condone the offence.
It was primarily concerned to 1044 see that prosecution for offences in cases coveted by the prohibition shall not commence without complying with the conditions contained therein, such as a previous sanction of a competent authority in the case of a public servant, and in other cases with the consent of the authority or the party interested in the prosecution or aggrieved by the offence.
There can be little doubt that in the case of a public servant the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove him from service is vitally interested in the matter of his prosecution.
Such authority is directly concerned in the matter as it has to decide whether to accord or not to accord its sanction for the prosecution of one of its servants.
The authority concerned may refuse to accord such sanction on the ground that the prosecution is frivolous or vexatious or on the ground that in the public ;Interest it would be inexpedient to do so.
Without some safeguard of this kind a public servant may find it impossible to carry on his official duties efficiently.
The object of the Act was to suppress bribery and corruption.
Its provisions are severe.
Certain presumptions of guilt of offences committed under sections 161 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code were enjoined by section 4 of the Act unless the contrary was proved by the accused.
Section 5 of the Act created the offence if criminal misconduct on the part of a public servant, an offence unknown to any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with bribery or corruption.
Sub section (2) made such an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to a term of 7 years, or with fine, or with both.
Under sub section
(3) a court shall presume that the accused was guilty of misconduct if it was proved that he or any other person on his behalf was in possession, for which the accused person could not satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.
These provisions of the Act indi cate that it was the intention of the legislature to treat more severely than hitherto corruption on the part of a public servant and not to condone it in any manner whatsoever.
If section 6 had Dot found a place in 1045 the Act it is clear that cognizance of an offence under s.161, 164 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under s.5(2) of the Act committed by a public servant could be taken by a court even if he had ceased to be a public servant.
The mere fact that he had ceased to be a public servant after the commission of the offence would not absolve him from his crime.
Section 6 certainly does prohibit the taking of cognizance of his offence, without a previous sanction, while he is still a public servant but does that prohibition continue after he has ceased to be a public servant ? It is to determine that question which requires us to examine and construe the provisions of section 6 of the Act and to express our opinion thereon.
When the provisions of section 6 of the Act are examined it is manifest that two conditions must be fulfilled before its provisions become applicable.
One is that the offences mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant and the other is that that person is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or is a public servant who is removable from his office by any other competent authority.
Both these conditions must be present to preventa court from taking cognizance of an offence mentioned in the section without the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office.
If either of these conditions is lacking, the essential requirements of the section are.
wanting and the provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a court taking cognizance without a previous sanction.
An offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code can be committed by a public servant or by a person expecting to be a public servant, but section 6 of the Act refers only to an offence committed by a publicservant under that section.
If, therefore, at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, the accused is a public servant but was not so at the time that the offence was committed, but at which time he was 1046 merely expecting to be a public servant, a previous sanction would be unnecessary before a court could take cognizance.
as the provisions of the section would be inapplicable.
Conversely, if an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code was committed by a public servant, but, at the time a court was asked to take cognizance of the offence, that person had ceased to be a public servant one of the two requirements to make section 6 of the Act applicable would be lacking and a previous sanction would be unnecessary.
The words in section 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they must be given effect to.
There is nothing in the words used in section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time the court was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at the time the offence was committed.
It was suggested that el.
(c) in section 6(1) refers to persons other than those mentioned in cls.
(a) and (b).
The words " is employed " are absent in this clause which would, therefore, apply to a person who had ceased to be a public servant though he was so at the time of the commission of the offence.
Clause (c) cannot be construed in this way.
The expressions " in the case of a person " and "in the case of any other person " must refer to a public servant having regard to the first paragraph of the sub section.
Clauses (a) and (b), therefore, would cover the case of a public servant who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government and el.
(c) would cover the case of any other public servant whom a competent authority could remove from his office.
The more important words in cl.
(c) are "of the authority competent to remove him from his office".
A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by a competent authority.
Section 2 of the Act states that a public servant, for the purpose of the Act, means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.
Under 1047 cl.
(c), therefore, any one who is a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance, but does not come within the description of a public servant under cls.
(a) and (b), is accused of an offence committed by him as a public servant as specified in section 6 would be entitled to rely on the provisions of that section and object to the taking of cognizance without a previous sanction.
To read cl.
(c) in the way suggested on behalf of the appellants, would be to give a meaning to this clause which is not justified by the words employed therein.
It was further suggested that the provisions of sub section
(2) of section 6 indicate that it was the status of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence which was relevant rather than his status at the time a court was asked to take cognizance.
This sub section was inserted into the Act by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, and it purported to finally settle any doubts which may arise as to which authority should grant the sanction in the case of a public servant who had committed an offence mentioned in section 6(1) and who at the time the court was asked to take cognizance is still a public servant.
For example, it is not difficult to imagine cases where a public servant employed by a State Government is subsequently employed by the Central Government and a question arises as to which of the two Governments is to grant the sanction for his prosecution.
This sub section resolves the difficulty by directing that where a doubt arises, the authority which was to grant the sanction was the one which was competent to remove him from his office at the time of the commission of the offence.
If the provisions of sub section
(1) bear the construction which we place upon them, there is nothing in sub section
(2) which is in conflict with that construction.
Besides, there is nothing in the language of sub section
(2) which carries the meaning suggested on behalf of the appellants or which assists us in construing the provisions of sub section
We cannot construe the words " is employed " and " is not removable" in cls.
(a) and (b) and "competent to remove him from his office" in cl.
(c) as "was employed" and " was not removable " and " would have been I33 1048 competent to remove him from his office ".
To do so would be to substitute our own words for the words of the statute as contained in these clauses.
In Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 1954, dealt with by another judgment, where a similar question bad been raised, the appellant had suggested that two defects appearing in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were intended to be remedied by the Act: (1) that section 197 did not apply to a public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of an offence and (2) that an offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code committed by a public servant was not covered by section 197 of the Code, as such offence could not be said to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, having regard to the decisions of the courts in India and of the Privy Council.
We cannot see how this assists us in construing s.6 of the Act.
Whatever the phraseology of s.197 of the Code may have been in the past, the decisions of the courts in India that section 197 of the Codedoes not apply to a person who had ceased to be a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance were based upon the words used in that section at the time the judgments were pronounced.
These decisions laid emphasis on the words " when any person who is a judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Indian Penal Code. . . . or when any public servant who is not removable from his office . . . " It was held in these decisions that these words meant that the person must be a public servant at the time a court was asked to take cognizance, although be may have been a public servant at the time of the commission of the offence.
It is true that unlike section 197 of the Code, section 6 of the Act does not contain the words " while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty ".
We have to construe section 6 of the Act as we find it and the absence of these words from the section renders us no assistance in its construction.
In our opinion, in giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the words used in section 6 of the Act, the conclusion 1049 is inevitable that at the time a court is asked to take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed by a public servant but the person accused is still a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of section 6 can apply.
In the present appeals, admittedly, the appellants had ceased to be public servants at the time the court took cognizance of the offences alleged to have been committed by them as public servants.
Accordingly the provisions of section 6 of the Act did not apply and the prosecution against them was not vitiated by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority.
Criminal Appeal 25 of 1956.
In this appeal apart from the question that the court could not take cognizance of the offence alleged against the appellant without a previous sanction of a competent authority, additional points had been taken for quashing the prosecution pending against him.
The appellant was appointed Deputy Assistant Director Enforcement in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on March 25, 1949 and was promoted to the office of Assistant Director on July 14, 1949.
It was alleged that he accepted on September 11, 1951, a sum Rs. 10,000 as bribe in part payment out of an agreed amount of Rs. 30,000.
An enquiry under r. 55 of the Civil Service Rules took place and thereafter he was dismissed from service on September 25, 1953.
In the meantime, it appears that correspondence bad ensued between the appellant and the Government.
On September 18, 1952, a final report was submitted to the court under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein it was stated that although a prosecution was recommended, the order of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was that the appellant would be dealt with departmentally.
On September 19, 1952, the Magistrate, by his order, approved of the closing of the investigation, discharged the appellant from his bail and directed that the sum of Rs. 10,000 seized from him, was to be returned to the complainant.
The prosecution of the appellant was, 1050 however, recommenced on February II,, 1954, on the same materials and same allegations but on a fresh complaint.
It, was contended on behalf of the appellant, that once a sanction had been refused then that was the end of the prosecution for all times.
If once the sanction was refused it could not ever be granted later on.
If the prosecution had been dropped, then it could not be revived in a case where a. sanction was necessary prior to a prosecution, and a promise not to prosecute prevented a reconsideration of the matter.
Lastly, it was urged that in the circumstances of the case it was an abuse of the process of the court to allow a prosecution to be recommenced after it had been withdrawn.
We have examined the correspondence which has been referred to in the petition for special leave and which is to be found on the record of this case.
There is nothing in them to establish the allegation that a sanction for the prosecution of the appellant was positively refused.
All that is indicated is that the Government chose to proceed against the appellant departmentally.
It can hardly be said that in doing so the Government had positively refused to grant sanction for the prosecution of the appellant.
Indeed, it may be legitimately said that the Government preferred to &wait the result of a departmental enquiry.
If that enquiry exonerated the appellant the occasion for granting a sanction may not arise.
If, on the other band, the departmental enquiry established the allegation against the appellant, the Government might find itself in possession of more material than that disclosed by the police investigation on which to decide whether a sanction should or should not be granted.
We cannot read into the correspondence, as was suggested on behalf of the appellant, that there was a promise on the part of the Government not to prosecute the appellant.
It is true that there was a final report and a withdrawal of the case before a Magistrate.
At the stage when the withdrawal took place the appellant was still a public servant and the court could not take 1051 cognizance of the offence under s, 161 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 5(2) of the Act without a previous sanction.
The withdrawal of the case at that stage meant no more than this that the appellant was discharged.
A withdrawal of a case resulting merely in a discharge does not prevent the prosecution being recommenced on a fresh complaint.
On February 11, 1954, when the fresh complaint was filed the appellant was not a public servant and therefore the court could take cognizance without a previous sanction.
It is unnecessary for us to say whether once a sanction is positively refused a fresh sanction cannot be granted, because we are satisfied, on the materials before us, that, in fact, there was no positive refusal to sanction the prosecution of the appellant.
We are also satisfied that the circumstances do not establish that there had been any abuse of the process of the court and the provisions of section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply.
As the points urged in these appeals have failed, the appeals must, accordingly, be dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.

summary:
The appellant who was a public servant was dismissed from service after departmental inquiry.
Thereafter he was charged with having committed the offence of criminal misconduct under section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and was convicted.
No sanction under section 6 of the Act was produced, before the trial Court.
It was contended that the Court could not take cognizance of the offence without there being a proper sanction to prosecute : Held, that no sanction under section 6 of the Act was necessary for the prosecution of the appellant as he was not a public servant at the time of the taking of cognizance of the offence.
In construing the provisions of a statute it is essential for a Court, in the first instance, to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used therein, if those words are clear enough.
It is only in the case of any ambiguity that a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature.
Where a general power to take cognizance of an offence is vested in a Court, any prohibition to the exercise of that power, by any provision of law, must be confined to the terms of the prohibition.
The words in section 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and must be given effect to.
The more important words in cl.
(c) of section 6(1) are " of the authority competent to remove him from his office ".
A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is not a person removable from any office by competent authority.
The conclusion is inevitable that at the time a Court is asked to take cognizance not only must the offence have been committed by a public servant but the person accused must still be a public servant removable from his office by a competent authority before the provisions of section 6 can apply.


judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos. 850 of 1973 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.
1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Miscellaneous (ITR) No. 461 of 1961.
With CIVIL APPEAL No. 941 of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.5.
1972 of the Allahabad High Court in I.T. Reference No. 236 of 1969.
Raja Ram Agarwal and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellants.
B.B. Ahuja and Ms. A Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J.
CA.
No. 850 of 1973 This appeal is by certificate and is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad.
Assessee and five of his brothers constituted a Hindu Joint Family.
The relevant assessment year is 1953 54 corresponding to the accounting period ending on 30th June, 1952.
The Joint Family which owned inter alia a sugar factory at Bijnore.
In 1930 there was partition in the family and the members of the erstwhile Joint Family constituted themselves into a partnership firm which took over the sugar factory and operated the same.
In the year ,1944, Sheo Prasad, one of the brothers who was a partner of the firm instituted a suit in the Lahore High Court for dissolution of the firm.
Partition of the country followed and after the parties shifted over to India a fresh suit was instituted at Bijnore for purposes of partition.
The properties were put in charge of a receiver appointed by the Court.
So far as the sugar factory is concerned, the arrangement was that at five yearly rest an auction was to be held confined to the partners and the highest bidder would be given lease to operate the factory for that period under the receiver.
On 16th July, 1948, Sheo Prasad trans ferred his 1/6th share to Banarsi Dass at a stated valuation of Rs.4,50,000.
On 3rd May, 1950, another brother, Devi Chand, leased out his 1/6th share to Banarsi Dass on an annual payment of Rs.50,000.
On 13th July, 1950, yet another brother, Kanshi Ram, similarly leased out his 1/6th share to Banarsi Dass for a similar sum.
In 1951, Kanshi Ram sued for cancellation of the lease.
On 6th April, 1954, the dispute was compromised and the lease was 104 terminated.
Kanshi Ram undertook to pay to Banarsi Dass at the rate of Rs. 16,000 for the first three years and at the rate of Rs. 10,000 for the subsequent two years.
Devi Chand 's 1/6th share was also returned on mutual arrangement and he agreed to pay a sum of Rs.39,000 and odd annually to Banarsi Dass for the lease period.
During the assessment proceedings, the nature of these receipts came to be debat ed the assessee maintained that these were in the nature of capital receipt lieu of the lease hold interest and the Income tax Officer maintained that those were revenue re ceipts.
In due course, the Tribunal ultimately upheld the view of the Revenue.
One more question that arose was the admissibility of a claim of expenditure being payment of interest on a loan taken for purchase of shares in the sugar factory.
The Income tax Officer had allowed the claim of Rs.75,211.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner gave notice to the assessee and disallowed the same.
The Appellate Tribunal reversed the finding of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in regard to the admissibility of the claim.
Thus the assessee as also the Revenue applied to the Tribunal to refer the case to the High Court.
As far as relevant, the following questions were referred for the opinion of the High Court under section 66(1) of the Act at the instance of the assessee.
Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, the sums of Rs. 16,000 and Rs.39,262 received from Kanshi Ram and Devi Chand respectively were assessable as income of the assessee? 2.
Whether on the facts and in the circum stances of the case, depreciation is allowable on the 1/6th share in S.B. Sugar Mills, Bij nore which the assessee had acquired from Seth Sheo Prasad? So far as the first question is concerned, the High Court referred to the arrangement entered into by the parties as also the terms of compromise and referred to certain deci sions and came to the conclusion that the sum of Rs. 16,000 received as a part of the total sum of Rs.68,000 constituted an assessable receipt.
On the same reasoning, the High Court held that the amount of Rs.39,262 received from Devi Chand was also liable to tax.
So far as the other question is concerned, the High Court held: "The question, however, remains whether the assessee is 105 entitled to claim depreciation on the ground that it has acquired 1/6th share in the S.B. Sugar Mills.
It is to be noted that the asses see does not claim to be full owner of the property.
All that the assessee claims is 1/6th share in S.B. Sugar Mills." "The assessee claims allowance under clause (vi) of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Indian Income tax Act of 1922.
Clause (vi) is: 'In respect of depreciation of such buildings, machinery, plant or furniture being the property of the assessee . . " "In order to qualify for an allowance under clause (vi), the assessee has to make out that the building, machinery, plant or furniture is the property of the assessee.
Mr. Shanti Bhushan appearing for the assessee urged that clause (vi) is attracted even where an asses see owns a fractional share in the machinery.
On the other hand, Mr. Brij Lal Gupta appear ing for the Department urged that ownership of a fractional share in machinery does not attract clause (vi).
The point is not free from difficulty.
" The High Court ultimately came to hold: "In order to qualify for an allowance under clause (vi), the claimant must make out that the machinery is the property of the assessee.
That test is not satisfied by the present assessee.
The assessee does not claim to be the full owner of the machinery in question.
All that is claimed for the assessee is 1/6th share in the machinery.
Such a fractional share will not suffice for granting an allow ance for depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) of the Act.
" We have heard learned counsel for the assessee appellant at length.
He has referred to several authorities in support of the assessee 's stand of admissibility of the claim ' on both scores.
According to him, the proper test to be adopted should have been to find out whether the arrangement consti tuted an apparatus to earn profit.
whether the arrangement was one in course of business activity, and whether what was received constituted a part of the circulating capital or was a part of the fixed asset.
We have considered the sub missions of 106 the learned counsel for the appellant but are not in a position to accept the same.
There is hardly scope to doubt that the benefit of section 10(2)(vi) of the Act would be admissible only where the assessee is the owner of the property.
It too is not admissible in respect of a fraction al claim.
Similarly, we are of the view, in agreement with the High Court.
that the amounts which the assessee received under the compromise or by amicable arrangement was in the nature of profits to be received by the assessee for the interest held in the business and, therefore, constituted taxable income.
No other point was canvassed before us.
This appeal has to fail and is hereby dismissed.
Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
A. No. 233 of 1976 This appeal between the parties is also by certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court and relates to the assessment year 1955 56 for the accounting period ending on 30th June, 1954.
Leave has been confined to two questions as would appear from the order granting the certificate, namely, as to whether one of the instalments received by the assessee out of the said amount of Rs.68,000, as referred to above, in respect of an earlier assessment year constituted a taxable receipt.
The second question relates to acquisition of the 1,6th share under a deed of exchange from Devi Chand under the exchange deed dated 16th July, 1948, which indicated that the valuation of that interest was shown to be Rs.4,50,000 and depreciation was claimed in regard to it.
Both the questions raised here are covered by our aforesaid judgment.
The appeal of the assessee has therefore to fail.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
C.A. No. 1101 of 1975.
The relevant assessment year in this case is 1954 55 corresponding to the accounting period ending June 30, 1953.
Three questions survive for consideration: One relating to the receipt of Rs. 16,000 and Rs.42,957 in the same manner as already indicated, and the other depreciation in regard to the 1/6th share, said to have been valued at Rs.4,50,000.
Both the questions have to be answered against the assessee for the reasons already indicated.
In this case, there is a third question which is relevant, namely, whether in the facts and circumstances of the case.
the unabsorbed carried forward loss of Rs.78,084 was liable to be set off against the share of the rent received by the assessee from the Receiver.
Dealing with this question, the High Court ob served:.
107 "During the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1953 54, the assessee had suffered a loss in sugar business.
After setting off the loss against other heads of income there remained an unabsorbed loss of Rs.78,084.
In the assessment year in dispute the assessee claimed that the unabsorbed loss of the preceding year should be brought for ward and set off against its share in lease money received from the Receiver in respect of S.B. Sugar Mills.
This claim of the assessee has been disallowed and the question arises as to whether the assessee was entitled to carry forward and set off the loss as claimed by it.
" The High Court referred to section 24 of the Income tax Act of 1922 and indicated that two conditions had to be ful filled before the claim of set off of carried forward loss could be admitted, firstly, the income against which the loss has to be set off should be income from business and secondly, the business should be same in which the loss was suffered.
The High Court referred to certain decisions including the one of this Court in and ultimately negatived the claim of the assessee by saying that the question would not arise because the letting out of the sugar mill was not the business of the assessee.
In fact the receiver was appointed for dissolution of the firm and the main reason.
as found by the High Court.
for allowing the sugar factory to work was to dispose it of as a running mill so that proper price would be fetched.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that there is no merit in the assessee 's stand and the same has got to be dismissed.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
C.A. No. 941 of 1975 This appeal is by certificate from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court.
The assessee is the sugar mill which during the relevant assessment year 1960 61 corresponding to the accounting period ending 30th June, 1959, was in the hands of a Court Receiver.
The sugar mill was being assessed as an Association of Persons.
Banarsi Dass.
a partner, had 1/6th share therein.
He had acquired under a deed of ex change dated 16th July, 1948 1/6th share of Sheo Prasad in exchange of shares held by Banarsi Dass in Lord Krishna Sugar Mills valued at Rs.4,50.000.
In this assessment year, the receiver claimed that for the purposes of computing the depreciation allowance, the written down value of the busi ness assets be enhanced so as to reflect the sum of Rs.4,50,000 in place of 1/6th share representing the share of 108 Sheo Prasad.
Similar claim had been raised by Banarsi Dass in his own assessment.
The Income tax Officer rejected the claim and such rejection has been upheld throughout.
We have already turned down the claim of Banarsi Dass.
This claim has, therefore, to be rejected.
We may additionally point out that under the scheme of the Act, it is the assessee who alone is entitled to maintain such claim of depreciation and it would indeed be difficult, within the framework of the scheme contained in the statute, to maintain a separate value of the part of the asset to work out depreciation.
The book value as shown must be applicable to the entire assets of the firm including the 1/6th share which Sheo Prasad had given to Banarsi Dass.
The claim has rightly been rejected in the forums below including the High Court.
The appeal has no merit and is dismissed.
Parties will bear their own costs.
P.S.S. Appeals dis missed.

summary:
'A ', a partner in a firm running a sugar factory, insti tuted a suit for its dissolution in 1948 and a Receiver was appointed by the Court.
The arrangement arrived at for the factory was that it would be leased out for a term of five years to the highest bidder from amongst the six partners.
In July, 1948, 'A ' transferred his 1/6th share to the appel lant for Rs.4,50,000.
The appellant had taken a loan against shares of that value held by him in another sugar mill for purchase of the share.
In May, 1950, another partner 'B ' leased out his 1/6th share to the appellant on an annual payment of Rs.50,000.
In July, 1950 yet another partner 'C ' leased out his 1/6th share to the appellant for a similar sum.
In 1951 'C ' sued for cancellation of the lease.
In April, 1954 the dispute was compromised and the lease termi nated. 'C ' undertook to pay the appellant at the rate of Rs. 16,000 for the first three years and at the rate of Rs. I0,000 for the subsequent two years. 'B 's 1/6th share was also returned on mutual arrangement and he agreed to pay the appellant a sum of Rs.39,000 and odd annually.
During the assessment proceedings for the year 1953 54 the nature of these receipts came to be considered.
The assessee appellant maintained that these were in the nature of capital receipts in lieu of the lease hold interest.
The assessee also claimed depreciation on the 1/6th share in the sugar mill that he had acquired from 'A '.
Similar questions also arose for the assessment years 1954 55 and 1955 56.
The assessee had suffered a loss in the sugar business in the assessment year 1953 54, a part of which remained unab sorbed, and claimed set off of that unabsorbed loss against the share of the rent received by him from the Receiver in the assessment year 1954 55.
Since the sugar mill was being assessed as an association of persons, for the assessment year 1960 61 102 the Receiver claimed that for the purpose of computing depreciation allowance, the written down value of the busi ness assets be enhanced so as to reflect the sum of Rs.4,50,000 in place of 16th share representing the share of 'A '.
The Revenue negatived the assessee 's contentions, which view was upheld by the High Court.
Dismissing the appeals by certificate, the Court, HELD: 1.
The amounts the assessee received under the compromise or by amicable arrangement from other partners were in the nature of profits to be received by the assessee for the interest held in the business and, therefore, con stituted taxable income.
[106B] 2.
The benefit of section 10(2)(vi) of the Income tax Act, 1922 would be admissible only where the assessee is the owner of the property.
It too is not admissible in respect of a fractional claim.
[106A] In the instant case, all that is claimed for the asses see is 1/6th share in the machinery.
Such a fractional share does not suffice for granting an allowance for depreciation under section 10(2)(vi) of the Act.
[105F] 3.
Two conditions had to be fulfilled under section 24 of the Incometax Act, 1922 before the claim for set off of carried forward loss could be admitted, firstly, the income against which the loss has to be set off should be income from business and secondly, the business should be same in which the loss was suffered.
[107C] In the instant case, the letting out of the sugar mill was not the business of the assessee.
The Receiver was appointed for dissolution of the firm and the main reason for allowing the sugar factory to work was to dispose it of as a running mill so that proper price could be fetched.
[107DE] 4.
Under the scheme of 1922 Act, it is the assessee who alone is entitled to maintain claim of depreciation.
Within the framework of that scheme it is difficult to maintain separate value of a part of the asset to work out deprecia tion.
The book value, as shown must in the instant case, therefore, be applicable to the entire assets of the firm including the 1/6th share which 'A ' had given to the appel lant.
The claim of the Receiver for depreciation cannot, therefore, be sustained.
[108B] 103