judgement:
TE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 837. 838 and 839 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.5 1990 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1381, 2994 of 1989 and C.R. No. 954 of 1989.
Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Kapil Sibal, Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma, Ravinder Nath, V.B. Saharya, P.K Jain, Krishna Moorthy Iyer, Prem Malhotra, A.C. Sehgal, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, R.L. Jain, S.K. Tredal, Ms. kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave, Mrs. Sushma Suri, Ms. M. Biswas and Ashok Mathur for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
Leave granted.
These appeals from the decision of the Delhi High Court raise the question with regard to landlord 's right to evict the tenant under Section 14 B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ( 'The Act ') and the corresponding right of the tenant to resist the eviction proceedings.
Section 14 B is a special provision made by the Legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover from their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their occupation.
Mahendra Raj, the common petitioner in S.L.P. Nos.
7146 and 11425/90, is a tenant occupying the premises of the respondent Col. Ashok Puri.
The petitioner in SLP No. 7364 is also a tenant, but occupying the premises belonging to the respondent Brig.
V.N. Channa.
In the action for eviction brought by the respondents on the ground that they need the premises for their occupation, the tenants sought leave to contest the application.
But the Rent Controller was not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in their affidavits and therefore, denied leave to contest the application for eviction.
He considered the affidavits of the parties and accepted the case of the landlord and directed that the tenants shall be evicted.
In the case of Mahendra Raj, the Rent Controller made an order dated 2 September, 1989 inter alia, observing that the landlord is living in a rented house, that he is paying rent of Rs.2,000 p.m., and that he requires the premises for himself and the members of his family.
The eviction order was challenged by the tenant by means of revision petition before the Delhi High Court.
Almost simultaneously, the tenant also filed a writ 370 petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of Section 14 B.
On 10 May 1990, the High Court dismissed the revision as well as the writ petition.
Against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition, the tenant has preferred SLP No. 7146 of 1990.
Against the order dismissing the revision petition, the tenant has preferred SLP No. 11425 of 1990.
The tenant in SLP No. 7364 of 1990 has also challenged the order of eviction in a revision petition before the High Court and we are told that the revision is still pending.
Like the other tenant, he has also questioned the validity of Section 14 B before the High Court under Article 226.
The High Court dismissed that petition following the decision in Mahendra Raj 's case.
It would be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act 'before dealing with the points raised in these cases.
The Act applies to premises which are defined by Section 2(i) as meaning, inter alia, any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any or other purpose.
Section 14 provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant.
This provision is, however, subject to the exceptions provided under several clauses of the proviso.
Section 14(l)(e) allows a decree for ejectment to be passed if the Court or Controller is satisfied that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, provided that the landlord is the owner of the premises and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
The explanation thereunder states that for the purpose of the clause 14(1)(e) "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes.
Section 14(l)(e) is further restricted by sub sections (6) and (7) of Section 14.
Sub section (6) imposes a restriction on the landlord, who has acquired any premises by transfer, not to evict the tenant under Section 14(l)(e) within the period of five years from the date of acquisition.
Sub section (7) imposes an obligation on the Court where an order for eviction is made on the ground specified in Section 14(l)(e) to give the tenant the minimum period of six months for delivery of possession to the landlord.
371 By Act 18 of 1976 the Legislature has introduced certain changes in the Act with effect from 1 December, 1975.
Section 14 A was introduced in Chapter Ill providing certain rights to a person occupying residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any other local authority.
If he is required to vacate such residential accommodation on the ground that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi, a house in his name or in the name of his spouse or dependent children, he could recover immediate possession of his premises let out by him notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law for the time being in force.
Simultaneously, Chapter III A was introduced containing Section 25 A to 25 C providing summary trial of the applications filed landlords classified under Section 14 A and also applications filed by any other landlord for bona fide requirement of their premises under Section 14(l)(e).
By the Amending Act 57 of 1988 some more classes of landlords were carved out from the class of general landlords.
Section 14 B to Section 14 D are the provisions.
The released or retired persons from armed forces or the dependents of the member of armed forces who had been killed in action are covered by Section 14 B. They could recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if they are required for their own residence.
The retired employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14 C.
They could recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if they are needed for their own residence.
The landlords who are widows are covered by Section 14 D with similar right to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them or by their husband.
These classified landlords are also given the benefit of the summary trial under Chapter III A, by introducing Sections 14 B to 14 D in sub section (1) of Section 25 B. The sub section (1) of Section 25 B as it stands provides that every application by a landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14 A or under Section 14 B or under Section 14 C or under Section 14 D shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section.
There are however, no corresponding amendments to sub sections 2 to 5 of Section 25 B. Omission to make corresponding amendments particularly, to sub sections 4 & 5 of Section 25 B has given rise to the arguments for the petitioners that the tenant 's right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14 B to 14 D.
It 372 was also argued that the classified landlords may prove the facts stated in their respective provisions, but the tenant is entitled to contest the application by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order of eviction on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e).
The acceptance of the submissions urged for petitioners would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14 B to 14 D who are carved out from the general landlords.
Indeed, it would render the whole exercise of creating special classes of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them nugatory.
Before the introduction of Sections 14 B to 14 D, Section 14(l)(e) was the only remedy available to all landlords except those covered under Section 14 A to recover possession of their premises.
The Controller shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications, if the tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e).
It is but natural when the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession of the premises covered under Section 14(l)(e), the tenant has the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not qualify under or satisfy the requirements of Section 14(l)(e).
But today the remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only to landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under Sections 14 B to 14 D.
The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under Section 14( 1)(e).
For a proper understanding, we may set out Section 14(l)(e), side by side with Section 14 B. Section 14 (1) (e) Section 14 B 14.
Protection of tenant 14.
B Right to recover against eviction.
immediate possession of premises to accrue to members of the armed forces etc.
(1) Notwithstanding anything (1) Where the landlord: to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, (a) is a released or retired no order or decree for person from any armed the recovery of possession forces and the premises let of any premises shall be out by him are required for made by any Court on his own residence; or 373 Controller in favour of the (b) is a dependent of a landlord against a tenant: member of any armed forces who had been killed in action and the premises let Provided that the Controller out by such member are may, on an application made required for the residence to him in the prescribed of the family of such manner make an order for the member, recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds Such person or, as the case only, namely may be, the dependent may, within one year from the xxx xxx xxx date of his release or retirement from such armed (e) that the premises let forces or, as the case may for residential purposes are be, the date of death of required bona fide by the such member, or within a landlord for occupation as a period of one year from the residence for himself or for date of commencement of the any member of his family Delhi Rent Control dependent on him, if he is (Amendment) Act, 1988, the owner thereof, or for whichever is later, apply to any person for whose benefit the Controller for the premises are held and recovering the immediate that the landlord or such possession of such premises.
person has no other (2) Where the landlord is a reasonably suitable residen member of any of the armed tial accommodation : forces and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any Explanation: For the time, within a period of one purposes of this clause, year before the date of his 'premises let for retirement, apply to the residential purposes ' Controller for recovering include any premises which the immediate possession of having been let for use as a such premises.
residence are, without the consent of the landlord, (2) Where the landlord is a used incidentally for member of any of the armed commercial or other forces and has a period of purposes." less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time, within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(3) Where the landlord referred to in sub section (1) or sub section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him.
Explanation: For the purposes of this Section `armed forces ' means an armed force of the Union constituted under an Act of Parliament and includes a member of the police force constituted under Section 3 of the (34 of 1978).
" 374 To make the picture complete we may also read sub sections 6 & 7 of Section 14.
"14(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition.
14(7) Where an order for recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.
" Under Section 14(l)(e), the premises let out for residence could be recovered from the tenant, if the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his own occupation or for any member of his family dependent on him.
The eviction could also be sought for any person for whose benefit the premises are held.
The condition being apart from the requirement must be bona fide, there shall be no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation for the landlord or for whose benefit the premises are held.
The explanation to Section 14(1)(e) provides "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes.
That means if with the consent of the landlord the premises let for residential purposes are used for commercial or other purposes, the landlord will have difficult task to evict such tenant.
Sub section (6) of Section 14 provides protection to the tenant from being evicted from the premises which are transferred to third parties.
The transferee landlord must wait for five years from the date of the transfer or acquisition before he moves the Court for eviction of the tenant already in occupation of the premises.
Sub section (7) is again a protection to the tenant requiring the Court or the Controller to give a minimum period of six months to vacate from the date of order of eviction.
This is a complete code governing the disposal of application filed under Section 14(1)(e).
Under Section 14 B the right to evict the tenant is available to two categories of persons, (i) The person who has let out the premises and, (ii) the dependent of a member of any armed forces who had let 375 out the premises but killed in action.
In the former case, the premises must be required for his own residence and in the latter, for the residence of the family of such member.
It may be noted that Section 14(l)(e) requires that the premises should have been let for residential purposes but the landlord who seeks eviction need not be the person who has let out.
But Section 14 B narrows down such right.
It is he who has let out alone could evict or the dependent of the person who has let out but since killed in action.
Secondly, Section 14 B uses the expression "the premises let out by him" unlike the expression used in Section 14(l)(e) "the premises let out for residential purposes".
The definition of "premises" under sub section (2)(i) means "any building or part of a building which is or intended to be let, separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose . ".
It is clear that Section 14 B does not require that the premises should have been let out for residential purposes and the purpose of letting out seems to be irrelevant.
But he who has let out alone could seek eviction of his tenant or the dependent of , member of any armed forces who had let out but since killed in action.
Section 14 B also provides the period of limitation for claiming possession of such premises, but no such limitation is provided under Section 14(l)(e).
Sub section (3) of Section 14 B imposes further restriction on the landlord who is having more than one premises.
Such a landlord cannot ask for possession of more than one of the premises but he can choose any one of the premises which he has let out.
Here again we find that there is no such restriction to a landlord covered under Section 14(l)(e) provided the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.
Section 14(l)(e) does not preclude the landlord from seeking eviction of more than one premises provided he establishes the need.
Similar are the provisions in allied Sections 14 C and 14 D.
It will be thus seen that Sections 14 B to 14 D are markedly different from Section 14(1)(e).
Notwithstanding these two independent provisions with specified rights to landlords in general and the classified landlords, Counsel for the tenants argued that Section 14(l)(e) is the weapon of defence for the tenant even against the applications under Sections 14 B or 14 C or 14 D.
The tenant is entitled to leave to contest the application by disclosing such facts in his affidavit which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e).
This contention is sought to be supported first, by the retention of sub section 376 (5) of Section 25 B without any amendment, second, absence of amendment to SeCtion 25(C)(2).
It was also contended that sub sections 4 & 5 of Section 25 B are a composite scheme and since that scheme has been left untouched the tenant 's right thereunder cannot be denied.
The submission if taken to logical conclusion leads to obvious anomaly which will be indicated presently.
But before we do that it will be necessary to deal with one other contention.
Sub section (1) of Section 25 B provides that every application for the recovery of possession of any premises belonging to persons referred to in sub section (1) of Section 25 B shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedure prescribed "in this Section" meaning thereby entire Section 25 B.
It was also the submission of Dr. Chitale counsel for one of the tenants in these cases.
Mr. Krishna Moorthy Iyer counsel for the Union of India, however, argued that the procedure contemplated under sub section (5) of Section 25 B need not be followed by the Controller with regard to applications filed under Sections 14 B to 14 D. According to counsel when the tenant is duly served of the application filed under Sections 14 B, 14 C or 14 D he has no right to contest the application unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller.
It is said that sub section (4) itself authorises the Controller to refuse leave if he is satisfied that the grounds set out in the affidavit of the tenant would not disentitle the landlord to seek eviction.
We do not think that this contention could be accepted.
Indeed, sub section (4) itself provides that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller, "as hereinafter provided", which in the context means as provided under sub section (5) the meaning and scope of which will be presently considered.
This is the only sub section under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
The argument that the absence of amendments to sub sections 4 and 5 of Section 25 B preserves the tenant 's right to contest the application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified under section 14(l)(e) would be basically faulty.
If such argument is available in respect of sub sections (4) and (5) of Section 25 B, it must be equally available to sub section (2) of Section 25 B. There is also no corresponding amendment to the summons to be issued under subsection (2) and the form specified in the Third Schedule after the introduction of Section 14 B to 14 D. Third Schedule is in these terms: 377 "The Third Schedule Form of Summons in a case where recovery of possession of Premises is Prayed for on the ground of bona fide requirement or under Section 14 A.
To (Name, description and place of residence of the tenant) Whereas Shri _________________________________has filed an application (a copy of which is annexed) for your eviction from (here insert the particulars of the premises) on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14 A; You are hereby summoned to appear before the Controller within fifteen days of the service hereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller to contest the application for eviction on the ground aforesaid; in default whereof, the applicant will be entitled at any time after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for your eviction from the said premises.
Leave to appear and contest the application may be obtained or an application to the Controller supported by an affidavit as if referred to in sub section (5) of Section 25 B. Given under my hand and seal.
This_________________ day of_____________________ 19_______ Controller" This form specified in the Third Schedule refers only to applications filed under Section 14(l)(e) or under Section.14A.
Does it mean that the unamended form should be used to issue notice to the tenant even in case where application for eviction is not made under Section 14(l)(e) or 14 A? Is the tenant entitled to claim that he must receive the notice in the unamended form only, since there is no corresponding amendment to the form after introduction of Sections 14 B to 14 D? A wooden reading may furnish him positive answers, but it would be ridiculous.
When an application is filed under Section 14 B, a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other 378 references which are not relevant.
If the application is filed under Section 14 B, the summons should state that the application is filed under Section 14 B and not under Section 14(l)(e) or 14 A. Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14 C to 14 D, the summons should state accordingly.
That would indicate the scope of the defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub section (5) of Section 25 B.
Under sub section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14 A, 14 B, 14 C or 14 D or under Section 14(l)(e).
The tenant can not be allowed to take up defence under Section 14(l)(e) as against an application under Section 14 B. There cannot be any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant.
That would be against our jurisprudence.
It is unlikely that the Legislature intended the result for which the counsel for the tenant contended.
It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose.
Such an interpretation has never found favour with the Courts which have always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes.
Section 14 B and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and subsection (5) of Section 25 B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Section 14 B to 14 D.
It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in Section 14 B to 14 D. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, p. 109).
Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores vs B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ ; at 524 25 where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.
An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.
(See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors.
vs The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, [ at 1299).
The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords.
The fact that there is no 379 reference to the word bona fide requirement in sections 14 B to 14 D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide.
In fact every claim for eviction of a tenant must be a bona fide one.
There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section 25(B) which states "special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.
It was next urged that sub section (6) of Section 14 is also attracted to applications under Section 14 B to 14 D.
This contention overlooks the express wordings of sub section (6).
It refers to premises acquired by transfer and thereby the transferee becoming the landlord.
Such a landlord cannot bring an action for eviction of tenant in possession of the acquired premises within a period of five years from the date of acquisition.
After five years such a landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant under section 14(i)(e).
This is indeed, as we said earlier, a protection to the tenant.
The original landlord who cannot evict the tenant since he has got many houses under his occupation cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a third party who could easily evict such a tenant.
The tenant in occupation of the transferred premises gets a protection from eviction for a minimum period of five years.
Section 14 B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let out and not acquired by transfer.
One may become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to sections 14 B to 14 D.
If the transferee wants to evict the tenant of such premises he must take action only under Section 14(l)(e).
Equally, sub section (7) of Section 14 has no application to eviction under Sections 14 B to 14 D. Nor the amended provisions under Section 25(c)(2) would be attracted since it applies exclusively to tenants of the landlords covered under Section 14 A.
But that does not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14 B to 14 D are not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the premises.
it is always left to the Controller who is a quasi judicial authority to exercise his discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Controller must exercise his judicial discretion in every case of eviction and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.
There is one other aspect which requires elucidation.
In Busching Schmitz Private Limited vs P. T. Meighani and Anr., ; this Court while dealing with the scope of Section 14 A and the corresponding right of the tenant to resist the application thereunder, has inter alia, observed that sub section (5) of Section 25 B cannot be equated with Order 37 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The 380 social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of the subject matter and, above all, the legislative diction which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two provisions.
The Controller 's power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14 A is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in the respective sections.
Needless to state, therefore if an application is filed under Section 14 B or 14 C or 14 D, the tenant 's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections.
He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(l)(e).
We find nothing contrary to our view in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr.
vs Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [ Subsection (5) of Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to play there.
We, therefore, reiterate the views expressed in Basching Schmitz Private Limited case.
The tenant, who is petitioner in SLP No. 11425/90 has suffered an order of eviction which has been confirmed by the High Court in revision.
It is found that his landlord is living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000 p.m. and he requires the premises for himself and the members of his family.
We concur with the view taken by the Controller as affirmed by the High Court.
The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own premises under Section 14 B when he is residing in a rented premises.
Before parting with the case, we have to deal with one other contention which has been specifically raised by Mr. Sanghi.
The counsel argued that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and he has become a part of the society just like any other landlord and Section 14 B was not intended to confer such landlord, the special right to recover immediate possession of the premises.
Obvious answer to this contention is found in Section 14 B(1) which states that the persons who have already retired may within one year from the date of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14 B, whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises.
That is the legislative wisdom.
In this view of the matter, the appeals stand disposed without an order as to costs.
D.R.L. Appeals disposed of.

summary:
The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended by Act 57 of 1988 which introduced Sections 14B to 14D to the Act carving out thereby classified landlords from the general class of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if these are required for their own residence.
The released or retired persons from armed forces or the dependents of the member of armed forces killed in action are covered by Section 14B, the retired employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14C, and the landlords who are widows are covered by Section 14D.
These classified landlords are also given the benefit of summary trial under Chapter IIIA by introducing Sections 14B to 14D in Sub section (1) of Section 25B, but there are no corresponding amendments to sub sections (2) to (5) of Section 25B.
The two petitioners, who are tenants, were in occupation of the premises belonging to two Army Officers (respondent landlords).
In the 365 action for eviction brought by the landlords on the ground that they needed the premises for their occupation, the tenants sought leave to contest the application which the Rent Controller being not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in their affidavits denied.
The Rent Controller accepted the case of the landlords and ordered eviction of the tenants.
The two tenants challenged the eviction orders by filing separate revision petitions in the High Court.
They also challenged the validity of Section 14B of the Act before the High Court by means of two separate writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition and the revision petition filed by one of the tenants who being aggrieved moved this Court by way of special Leave Petition Nos.
7146 Court following its decision in the first case dismissed the writ petition filed by him, though the revision petition filed by him was still pending.
The tenant challenged the decision of the High Court by preferring Special Leave Petition No. 7364 of 1990 to this Court.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the tenant 's right to contest the application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) cannot be denied even as against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14B to 14D.
The tenant is entitled to leave to contest the application by disclosing such facts in the affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e).
This is because of retention of sub section (5) of Section 25B without any amendment and absence of amendment to Section 25C(2).
It was also contended that sub sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B are a composite scheme and since that scheme has been left untouched the tenant 's right thereunder cannot be denied.
It was further contended that sub section (6) of Section 14 is attracted to applications under Sections 14B to 14D.
Dismissing the Petitions, the Court, HELD: 1.
Section 14B is a special provision made by the legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover from their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their occupation.
[369E] 2.1 The Tenant cannot claim right to contest an application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) against the classified landlords falling under Sections 14B to 14D. Acceptance of such a claim would practically obliterate the purpose and object of classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who are carved out from 366 the general landlords; indeed it would render the whole exercise of creating special classes of landlords with specified rights to recover immediate of the premises let out by them nugatory.
[371H 372C] 2.2 The remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only to landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under Sections 14B to 14D.
The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under Section 14(l)(e).
[372E F] 2.3 Sections 14B to 14D are markedly different from Section 14(1)(e).[375E F] 3.1 The argument that the absence of amendments to sub sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B preserves the tenant 's right to contest the application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e) is not sustainable.
Sub section (4) of Section 25B provides that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller "as hereinafter provided", which in the contest means as provided under sub section (5).
This is the only sub section under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises.
[376G, F] 3.2 The form specified in the Third Schedule refers only to application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14A.
Therefore, when an application is filed under Section 14B, a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other references which are not relevant and the summons should state that the application is filed under Section 14B and not under Section 14(l)(e) or 14A. Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14C to 14D, the summons should state accordingly.
That would indicate the scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub section (5) of Section 25B. [377G 378A] 3.3 Under sub section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Sections 14A, 14B, 14C or 14D or under Section 14(l)(e).
[378B] The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under Section 14(l)(e) as against an application under Section 14B. There cannot be 367 any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant.
That would be against our jurisprudence and would be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose.
The courts have always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes.
[378C D] 3.4 Section 14B and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and sub section (5) of Section 25B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Sections 14B to 14D.
It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 148 to 14D. [378E] 4.
The tenant is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords.
The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in Sections 14B to 14D do not absolve the landlord from proving that the requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide.
In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one.
There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of section 25B which states "special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement".
[378H 379B] 5.
Section 14B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let out and not acquired by transfer.
One may become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D.
If the transferee wants to evict the tenant he must take action only under Section 14(l)(e).
Equally Sub section (7) of Section 14 has no application to eviction under Sections 14B to 14D, nor the amended provisions under Section 25C(2).
But that does not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14B to 14D are not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the premises.
It is always left to the Controller who is a quasi judicial authority to exercise his discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.
[379E G] 6.
The Controller 's power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14A is cribbed by the condition that the 'affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified ' in the respective sections.
Therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14B or 14C or 14D, the tenant 's right to contest the application is narrowed down 368 and is restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections.
He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(l)(e).
Subsection (5) of Section 25B is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to play there.
[38OB C] Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. vs P.T. Menghani & Anr.,[1977] 2 SCC 835, affirmed and reiterated.
Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr.
vs Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, , harmonised.
The landlord in SLP No. 11425/90 is living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000 p.m. and requires the premises for himself and the members of his family.
The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own premises under section 14B when he is residing in a rented premises.
[38OD E] 8.
The contention that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and has become a part of the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was not intended to confer such landlord the special right to recover immediate possession of the premises is not maintainable because Section 14B(l) states that the persons who have already retired may within one year from the date of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14B, whichever is later, apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises.
That is the legislative wisdom.
[38OF G] 9.
True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is permissible to supply the words".
Having regard to the context in which a provision appears and, the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted, the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.
An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.
[378E G] Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, P. 109; Hameedia Hardware Stores V. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, ; at 524 25, and Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors.
vs The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, [1959].1 SCR 1287 at 1299, relied upon.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 710 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.5.1990 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 3257 of 1989.
G.L. Sanghi, Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma, Ravinder Nath, V.B. Saharya, P.K. Jain and Prem Malhotra for the Appellants.
Y.S. Chitale, T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, R.L. Jain, S.K. Tredal, Kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave and Ashok Mathur for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J.
SLP (C) No. 12 1 11 of 1990.
Leave granted.
This appeal raises the question of the validity and interpretation of Section 14 D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").
In companion matters, we have already pronounced upon the validity and interpretation of Section 14 B of the Act.
Hence, it is not necessary to discuss in this judgment the points which are common to both sections.
These points will be deemed to have been concluded by the said decision.
The only point which remains to be dealt with and is peculiar to Section 14 D is whether to claim possession of such premises under the said Section, the landlady must become a widow after the premises are let out either by herself or her husband.
Section 14 D of the Act reads as follows: "14 D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her (2) or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
383 (2) Where the landlord referred to in sub section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to her to make an application under that sub section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her.
The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is to provide for the control of rents and evictions, and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the lease of vacant premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union Territory of Delhi.
The original Act came into force on February 9, 1959 having received the assent of the President on December 31, 1958.
The working of the Act disclosed certain deficiencies, inconveniences and hardships both to the landlords and the tenants.
Their associations, therefore, made representations.
Various committees and commissions also recommended amendments of certain provisions of the Act.
Considering the grievances of the landlords and the tenants as well as the recommendations of the committees/commissions, the Act was amended in 1988 with the object of (a) rationalising the law by bringing out the balance between the interests of landlords and tenants, (b) giving a boost to house building activity and maintaining the existing housing stock in a reasonable state of repairs, (c) reducing litigation between landlords and tenants and of ensuring expeditious disposal of disputes between them.
By this amendment Sections 14 B to 14 D were added.
The object of Section 14 D is obvious.
It is to assist a vulnerable and needy section of the Society to recover possession of the premises as expeditiously as Possible and without the usual trials and tribulations.
We have already held in the accompanying judgment that classified landlords such as the widow landlady under Section 14 D can apply for possession of the premises under the respective provisions even if the premises are not let for residence.
It is not necessary to repeat the said discussion in this judgment.
Section 14 D makes no distinction between the landladies who become widows before and after letting out of the premises.
It merely says that where the landlady is a widow and the premises are let out by her or by her husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
The language of the section in that respect is very clear.
The premises might have been let out by her as a widow or they might have been let out by her husband or even by herself before she had become widow.
The legislature wanted to give a special privilege to the landlady who is a widow notwithstanding whether the premises were let out before or after she became widow.
Such conferment of special benefit on a 384 widow landlady is permissible even under the provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution which is an express exception to the provisions of sub clauses (1) and (2) of that Article.
It states that nothing in the said Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
A widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable person in our society and requires special protection.
We further see no merit in the contention that if the benefit given by Section 14 D is allowed to be availed of by widows, they may make a business of it.
There is no warrant for such apprehension.
For, in the first instance, the right to recover possession under Section 14 D can be availed of by the widow only once.
That is a sufficient guarantee against the abuse of the privilege granted by the section.
Secondly, she has to prove her bona fide need for the occupation of the premises in question for her own residence like any other landlord.
Thirdly, the provisions of Section 19 of the Act come into play in her case also, when the order for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation as residence is made in her favour.
In this view of the matter, we find no substance in this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Writ Petition No. 902 of 1990 7.
In the view that we have taken above, it is not necessary to admit this writ petition.
The authorities under the Act while disposing of the applications under Section 14 D will have to abide by this decision and not by the decision of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 2686 of 1989 in the matter of Dr. P.P. Kapur vs Union of India & Ors.
which was brought to our notice and stands overruled.
R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court whereby the High Court gave the widow landlady the benefit of section 14 D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and accordingly granted her the Possession of the premises in question.
Before this Court it was inter alia contended on behalf of the appellant that the relief under section 14 D was available only to a landlady who had become a Widow after the premises were let out either by herself or her husband.
it was further contended that if the benefit given by section 14 D was allowed to be availed by all widows, they may make a business of it.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: (1) The legislature w anted to give a special privilege to the landlady who is a widow notwithstanding whether the Premises were let out before or after she became widow.
Such conferment of special benefit on a widow landlady is permissible even under the provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution which is an express exception to the provisions of sub clauses (1) and (2) of that Article.
A widow is undoubtedly a vulnerable person in our society and requires special protection.
[383H 384B] (2) Section 14 D can be availed of by the widow only once.
That is a sufficient guarantee against the abuse of the privilege granted by the section.
Secondly, she has to prove her bona fide need for the occupation of the Premises in question for her own residence like any other landlord.
Thirdly, the provisions of section 19 of the Delhi Rent Control Act come to play in her case also, when the order for possession on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation as residence is made in her favour.
[384C] 382 Dr. P. P. Kapur vs Union of India & Ors.
Delhi High Court, Civil Writ No. 2686 of 1989 overruled.


judgement:
Appeal No. 177 of 1955.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 28, 1953, of the former Nagpur High Court in First Appeal No. 115 of 1951, arising out of the judgment and decree dated July 25, 1951, of the Court of Additional District Judge, Bhandara, in Civil Suit No. 14 A of 1957.
C. B. Aggarwala and Radheylat Aggarwal, for the appellant.
section P. Sinha and section N. Mukherjee, for the respondent.
December 1.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 700 KAPUR, J.
This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Nagpur reversing the decree of the Additional District judge dismissing the plaintiff 's suit.
The appellant before us is the defendant Kishori Lal who claimed to be the adopted son, adopted by the husband of the plaintiff, Mst.
Chaltibai who is the respondent in this appeal.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by Mst.
Chaltibai, the widow of Lakshminarayan, a Marwari Aggarwal of the District of Bhandara against Badrinarayan defendant No. 1 and his son Kishori Lal defendant No. 2 now appellant for a declaration that properties in sch.
B & C belonged to her as heir to her deceased husband Lakshminarayan and for possession of the property in schedule D.
The facts of the litigation relevant for the purpose of this judgment are these: Badrinarayan and Lakshminarayan were two brothers the former who was elder was carrying on business at Raipur and the latter who was younger carried on business in the ancestral village named Tirora where it is stated Badrinarayan also was doing some business.
Lakshminarayans first wife died in 1919 leaving a son and a daughter.
In 1922 Lakshminarayan married the respondent Mst.
Chaltibai.
His son died sometime after this marriage and therefore the only remaining child of Lakshminarayan was the daughter Mst.
Jamnabai who was married to one Chotteylal.
On January 6, 1936, Lakshminarayan died of a heart disease leaving his estate which is given in schs.
B, C and D and is valued at about Rs. 30,000.
Although the plaintiff Chaltibai, now respondent, had alleged that Lakshminarayan died suddenly and did not suffer from any heart disease previous to his death, the appellant pleaded that Lakshminarayan developed heart trouble in 1934.
He also pleaded that because of this heart trouble Lakshminarayan became despaired of begetting a son and therefore adopted in Jaisth (May June) 1935 the appellant Kishorilal then aged 13 years who was the youngest of the five sons of his brother Badrinarayan, the others being Mohanlal, Gowardhan, Nandlal and Narayan.
He further pleaded that after 701 his adoption he resided with Lakshminarayan as his adopted son and when Lakshminarayan died he performed his obsequies as such adopted son, was placed on the gaddi and the turban was tied on his head in accordance with the custom of the caste; that he was on the thirteenth day (tervi) taken by the respondent Chaltibai in her lap from Badrinarayan with the consent and in the presence of the relations of Lakshmi narayan on the thirteenth day of the death of Lakshminarayan ; that he entered into possession of the estate of the deceased Lakshminarayan and was recognised as his adopted son even by the respondent who continued to accept and treat him as such upto 1946; and in 1942 the respondent performed his (the appellant 's marriage).
After he attained majority he managed the estate himself and there was a partition in the family of Badrinarayan on October 30, 1943, in which the appellant, because of his having been given out in adoption in another family, received no share.
The respondent in the plaint denied both the adoption and the treatment or acceptance of the appellant as an adopted son.
She also stated that she was an illiterate purdanashin woman who was not conversant with the management of business and after the death of her husband she reposed full confidence in Badrinarayan who assured her that he would properly look after her affairs, business and property and consequently Badrinarayan took over the management of the estate and the account books and also looked after court work.
At his instance she (the respondent) signed certain papers without understanding them or without knowing their contents and sometimes she even signed blank papers.
The appellant and his father Badrinarayan then attempted to oust her from the business and the estate of her husband which led to disputes between the parties and proceedings under ss.107 & 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started, a receiver was appointed and the Magistrate by an order dated May 19, 1947, directed the parties to have their rights decided by a civil court.
This order was unsuccessfully challenged by the appellant in revision.
In the criminal case the appellant, it is 702 alleged, asserted that he had been adopted by Lakshminarain six months prior to his death, a fact which the respondent Chaltibai denied in her plaint.
On these pleadings the court framed four issues and the two relevant issues for the purpose of this appeal are : (1)Did the deceased Lakshminarayan validly adopt the defendant No. 2 in the bright fortnight of Jyestha (June), 1935 A. D. ? (b) Was the adoption valid according to law ? (2) Had the plaintiff all along recognised the adoption as valid and legal and had she been treating defendant No. 2 as Lakshminarayan 's son all along ? (b) If so, result ? The trial court dismissed the suit.
It held the adoption proved but found against the appellant on the question of estoppel.
The High Court on appeal reversed the finding as to the factum of adoption but upheld the finding on the question of estoppel.
It was of the opinion that the respondent was not estopped on account of any misrepresentation made by her and that there was no such conduct on her part which deprived her of her right of bringing the present suit and that both parties knew that there was no adoption in fact.
The appeal was therefore allowed.
The defendant Kishorilal has brought this appeal to this Court under a certificate of the High Court and the judgment of the High Court is assailed on several grounds: Firstly, it was urged that the evidence produced in support of the adoption proved that the appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan six months before his death.
Secondly, the doctrine of estoppel was relied upon, estoppel on the ground that the respondent Chaltibai had represented in previous legal proceedings and in various ways by execution of docu ments and by her actions that the appellant was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan.
She had put him in possession as owner of all the estate of Lakshminarayan, and had given up her own claim to heirship to his estate and as a result of this conduct and representations made by the respondent the appellant had 703 altered his possession (i) by being completely transplanted from his real father 's family into another family and (ii) by being deprived of his share of the properties in his natural family.
Thirdly, it was argued that because of her admission that the appellant was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and his heir the burden was on her to show that he was not the adopted son.
And fourthly, it was submitted that having regard to the long course of conduct of the respondent Chaltibai in treating the appellant as the adopted son of Lakshminarayan the evidence produced should be appraised in such a manner as to hold it sufficient for proving the adoption.
There is no formal deed of adoption, the appellant therefore sought to prove it by the evidence of six witnesses who were.
his real brother Mohanlal, his natural father Badrinarayan and two relations Narsingdas and Shankarlal, a neighbour Chattarpatti who is some kind of a physician and Kishorilal himself appeared in support of his case.
A seventh witness Sobharam was produced to prove an admission by Lakshminarayan that he had adopted the appellant.
The story of the adoption as disclosed by the evidence for the appellant was that as Lakshminarayan had no son of his own he asked his brother Badrinarayan to give his youngest son in adoption to which he agreed and the adoption took place at the house of Lakshminarayan at Tirori in the month of Jyaistha 1935 about six months before the death of Lakshminarayan.
The formalities of adoption, according to this evidence, consisted of placing the appellant as a son not in lap of the adoptive mother but of Lakshminarayan who put a tilak on the appellant 's forehead and tied a turban on his head.
This was followed by distribution of pansupari to the persons assembled who were Narasingdas and Shankarlal who were from outside Tirora, Raman and Jivan Singh who were servants of Lakshminarayan, Chhatarpatti a neighbour and Bhaiyalal who has not been examined and there was also present Mohanlal a real brother of the appellant.
Some other persons were also present by the appellant but they are not witnesses in the case and Badrinarayan and Mohanlal did 704 not mention their presence.
No religious ceremony was performed and there was no priest though witness Narsingdas stated that a priest was present at the adoption ceremony and ganesh puja was performed.
The evidence also shows that no invitations were sent to the brotherhood, friends or relations and besides the persons mentioned above no one else was present and thus no publicity was given to the adoption.
None of the relations of the respondent were invited or were present although she had brothers and sisters and they were married.
Even the respondent Chaltibai was not present at the ceremony of adoption.
It is stated that she was in some inner room.
And after the formalities of adoption Lakshminarayan himself put the adopted son in the lap of the respondent Chaltibai.
The adoption was not followed by any feast nor was any photograph taken and no presents were given to the adopted son.
Lakshminarayan did not consult any priest as is usual for fixing an auspicious day for adoption.
Although the defendants were allowed to amend their written statement they gave no details of the adoption by Lakshminarayan beyond saying that it was in the month of Jyaistha 1935 but what date it was not mentioned.
The parties are Aggarwals and belong to a commercial community who maintain complete and detailed accounts.
Although Badrinarayan who was defendant No. 1 chose to put in accounts of January 20, 1936, in connection with what he expended on the tervi (thirteenth) day ceremony after the death of Lakshminarayan yet he filed no such accounts showing the date when he and his son the appellant came to Tirora from Raipur for the purposes of adoption or when they went back.
No contemporary document of any kind has been produced to show when the adoption took place or what was expended by Badrinarayan nor have the accounts of Lakshminarayan who ac cording to the appellant himself maintained account books been produced to show as to the expenses of whatever little ceremony was observed on the date of the adoption.
The account produced by Badrinarayan shows the amount expended on the occasion of 705 thirteenth day ceremony after the death of Lakshminarayan on betel leaves, milk, betelnuts and also what was paid at the house of Lakshminarayan including the amount paid for the turban for the reading of the garud puran or what was paid to Kesu (which we are told is a pet name of Kishorilal) for touching the feet of the elders.
The significance of this fact has not been explained by the appellant.
I As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, depriving wives and daughters of their rights and transferring properties to comparative strangers or more remote relations it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave DO occasion for doubting its truth.
Failure to produce accounts, in circumstances such as have been proved in the present case, would be a very suspicious circumstance.
The importance of accounts was emphasised by the Privy Council in Sootrugun vs Sabitra (1) ; in Diwakar Rao vs Chandanlal Rao (2) ; in Kishorilal vs Chunilal (3); in Lal Kunwar vs Charanji Lal (4) and in Padamlal vs Fakira Debya (5).
The oral evidence of witnesses deposing to the factum of adoption is both insufficient and contradictory.
Beyond their being agreed on the question of taking the appellant in adoption by Lakshminarayan the witnesses are not in accord as to the details of the adoption or as to the ceremonies or as to the usual feast following it.
The giving of presents is the only detail on which they are agreed, they all deposed that no presents were given.
As to what happened in regard to the taking of the appellant in her lap by the respondent after the death of Lakshminarayan the witnesses are not in accord.
There is disagreement as to its date how it came about and why.
The adoption during the lifetime of Lakshminarayan is contradicted by a document dated January 24, 1938, a sale deed by the respondent Chaltibai in favour of the (1) (1834) 2 Knapp.
(2) Calcutta 201 (P.C.).
(3) (1908) 36 I.A. 9.
(4) (1909) 37 I.A. 1, 7.
(5)A.I.R. 193, (P.C.) 84.
89 706 Firm Ganeshram Fatteh Chand the family firm of witness Narsingdas.
Therein the adoption of the appellant is stated to have taken place after the death of Lakshminarayan and was by (Chaltibai respondent under the authority of her deceased husband and with the consent of the whole family.
This document was witnessed by the natural father Badrinarayan.
No satisfactory explanation of this wholly different adoption being mentioned in a deed executed only two years after the death of Lakshminarayan has been given by the appellant, except this that whether he was adopted by Lakshminarayan in his lifetime or after his death by the respondent Chaltibai, he would be the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and therefore this discrepant recital in the sale deed was of little consequence.
This argument ignores the case set up by the appellant in his written statement and the utter lack of evidence of the authority of the husband or of the assent of his kinsmen which was neither pleaded nor proved.
Another circumstance which casts a great deal of doubt on the adoption set up by the appellant is that after the adoption the appellant went back to Raipur where his natural father was residing.
Although Badrinarayan stated that after the adoption the appellant lived with his adoptive father, this is negatived by the evidence produced by the appellant himself which is to the effect that he went back to school at Raipur and returned to Tirora on the day Lakshminarayan died.
The High Court also found that he left for Raipur after the obsequies and returned three or four months later.
The school leaving certificate shows that he was a student in the school at Tirora from June 22, 1936 to June 30, 1937, and there he was entered as the son of Badrinarayan.
Taking all these facts into consideration the High Court, in our opinion, has cor rectly held that the factum of adoption by Lakshminarayan has not been established.
It was next argued on behalf of the appellant that even though the evidence produced in support of the adoption might be unsatisfactory and not sufficient to establish the factum of adoption the respondent in this 707 case was estopped from setting up the true facts of the case inasmuch as she represented in the former document and legal proceedings and in various other ways that the appellant was the adopted son of the deceased Lakshminarayan and thereby caused him to change his position by being transferred from the family of Badrinarayan to that of Lakshminarayan.
These documents will be discussed later.
In this case both the parties were aware of the truth of the facts and consequently the doctrine of estoppel was inapplicable.
It cannot be said that the respondent by her own words or conduct wailfully caused the appellant to believe the existence of a certain state of things i.e. adoption by Lakshminarayan and induced him to act on that belief so as to alter his position and therefore she could not be concluded from averring a different state of things as existing at the same time.
See Pickard vs Sear (1) and Square vs Square (2 ).
The Privy Council in Mohori Bibi vs Dhurmdas Ghogh (3 ) held that there can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both the parties.
Therefore when both the parties are equally conversant with the true facts the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable.
The documents giving rise to the plea of estoppel were four and the appellant also relied on the acts of the respondent which will be referred to later.
The first document was an application dated March 21, 1936, for a succession certificate which was filed by the respondent as " guardian mother " of the appellant Kishorilal.
The necessity for this application arose because in order to get insurance money on a policy taken out by the deceased Lakshminarayan a succession certificate had to be obtained.
The High Court came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to show that the respondent Chaltibai 's signatures were obtained on the document after it was explained to her, the document was in English and she was not conversant with that language.
Two other drafts were made for the application for this succession certificate which (1) ; ; (2) (3) (1902) 30 I.A. 114.
708 are both on the record.
In these two drafts Badrinarayan is shown as " guardian uncle " of the appellant Kishorilal.
Although Badrinarayan was reluctant to do so he had to admit the existence of these two drafts but added that he had instructed Jivan Singh a servant of Lakshminarayan not to file the application till after he had consulted a Mr. P. section Deo, a pleader and after he had consulted him the application was filed but with Chaltibai as guardian.
This document in para.
3 sets out the names of the relations of the deceased.
They were the widow Chaltibai, the daughter Jamnabai, the brother Badrinarayan and the four sons of Badrinarayan.
In this column the appellant Kishorilal was not shown as a relative of the deceased.
In a later paragraph it was stated that the petitioner i. e. the appellant Kishorilal claimed the certificate as the adopted son of the deceased Lakshminarayan.
On the finding of the High Court that the document was not explained to the respondent Chaltibai it cannot be said that it established any admission, much less estoppel.
This document did not contain any admission which would necessarily show that Kishorilal appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan during his lifetime.
The next document relied upon is a bahi entry in a Mathura Panda 's book dated July 21, 1944.
The story is that the respondent Chaltibai visited Mathura on her way back from Badrinarayan and the Panda of the family made an entry in his bahi after making enquiries from her showing the appellant Kishorilal as the adopted son.
The entry is signed by her.
This document is contradicted by another entry in the same Panda 's bahi which is stated to have been made at the instance of Mohanlal, the eldest brother of the appellant on March 2, 1947, about 2 1/2 years after the pre vious entry.
In the later entry the appellant Kishorilal was shown as the son of Badrinarayan and not the adopted son of Lakshminarayan.
Whether the document the previous Bahi entry was at the instance of the respondent Chaltibai or not is not material because it does not advance the case of the appellant.
This document also does not show that the appellant 709 was adopted by Lakshminarayan.
Then there is a document adhikar patra dated May 4, 1946, by which a dispute between the appellant and the respondent was referred to the arbitration of 7 persons.
It was signed by the appellant and the respondent and it was therein recited: " Relations between us mother and son have become strained in connection with some matters.
it is very necessary to remove the same".
In another portion of the document also words used are "between us the mother and the son".
This document also was not accepted by the High Court as containing an admission because even at the time of its execution the respondent Chaltibai was denying the adoption of Kishorilal which was proved by the testimony of two of the panches (arbitrators) themselves.
It cannot be said therefore that this document represented correct state of affairs but even if it did it cannot be treated as an admission by the respondent that the appellant was adopted by Lakshminarayan.
Lastly there is the deed of sale dated January 24, 1938, wherein the respondent had recited that the appellant Kishorilal was adopted by her husband ,in accordance with his wishes and consent of the entire family ".
This recital negatives the whole case of the appellant as set up in his written statement that he was adopted by Lakshminarayan during his lifetime.
In his written statement he bad only pleaded his having been placed in the lap of the respondent Chaltibai as confirmatory of his adoption by Lakshminarayan.
The documents mentioned above do not support the plea that the appellant had been led.
to alter his position through a belief in any misrepresentation made by the respondent Chaltibai as to his having been adopted by Lakshminarayan.
And he cannot be allowed to set up a case different to his case in the written statement nor can he be allowed to prove his title as an adopted son on such different case.
See Tayammaul vs Sashachalla Naiker (1), Gopeelal vs Mussamat Chandraolee Buhajee (2 ).
The correct rule of estoppel applicable in the case of adoption is that it (1) (1865) 10 M.I.A. 429.
(2) (1872) SUPP.
I.A. 131.
710 does not confer status.
It shuts out the mouth of certain persons if they try to deny the adoption, but where both parties are equally conversant with the true state of facts this doctrine has no application.
Two further facts which the appellant 's counsel relied upon to support his plea of estoppel were: (1) his being allowed to perform the obsequies of Lakshminarayan and (2) the performance of his marriage by the respondent Chaltibai as his adoptive mother.
If the adoption itself is disproved these two facts will not add to the efficacy of the plea of estoppel which otherwise is inapplicable: Dhanraj vs Sonabai (1).
The appellant relied on Rani Dharam Kunwar vs Balwant Singh (2) which was a case where the adoptive mother, the Rani had herself in a previous proceeding pleaded that she had authority to adopt and the Privy Council were of the opinion that the question could be decided on its own facts without recourse to the doctrine of estoppel, although they did not differ from the view of the courts below as to the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel.
That was not a case of the parties being equally conversant with the true facts and further there was a finding that the person claiming to be the adopted son was as a matter of fact adopted.
In our view there is no substance in the plea of estoppel raised by the appellant.
Whatever the acts of the respondent Chaltibai, what.
ever her admissions and whatever the course of conduct she pursued qua the appellant Kishorilal they could not amount to estoppel as both parties were equally conversant with the true facts.
In none of the four documents which are signed by her, is there any admission that Kishorilal was adopted by her husband during his lifetime.
On the other hand in the sale deed dated January 24, 1938, she recited an adoption by herself which is not the adoption that the appellant relied upon in support of his case.
The other documents i. e. the application for succession certificate and the arbitration agreement and the entry in the Panda 's bahi are all consistent with the recital in the sale deed and do not establish the case (1) (1925) 52 I.A. 231, 243.
(2) (1912) 39 I.A. 142, 148.
711 of the appellant as to the adoption by Lakshminarayan himself.
It was then argued for the appellant that the course of conduct of the respondent and her various acts of admission and the treatment of the appellant as an adopted son by the respondent and other members of the family gave rise to a strong inference that he (the appellant) was adopted as aleged by him and the evidence should have been so appraised as to support that inference.
Particular emphasis was placed by counsel for the appellant on the fact that soon after the death of Lakshminarayan it was given out that the appellant was his adopted son and this assertion was continuously made in many transactions and documents.
These documents, the course of conduct of Chaltibai respondent in treating the appellant as the adopted son of Lakshminarayan and the length of the appellant 's possession of Lakskminarayan 's estate, it was contended, showed that he was the adopted son of Lakshminarayan.
It was also submit ted that the admissions shifted the onus on to the respondent on the principle that what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so and until the presumption was rebutted, the fact admitted must be taken to be established: Chandra Kunwar vs Narpat Singh (1).
The question of onus loses its efficacy because it was never objected to in the courts below and evidence having been led by the parties, at this stage the court has to adjudicate on the material before it.
And admissions are not conclusive, and unless they constitute estoppel, the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue: Trinidad Asphalt Company vs Coryat (2).
Admissions are mere pieces of evidence and if the truth of the matter is known to both parties the principle stated in Chandra Kunwar 's case (1) would be inapplicable.
And in this case there is no admission by the respondent of the appellant 's adoption by her husband in his lifetime.
Such admissions that there are cannot help the case of the appellant or support a different appraisal of the evidence of the factum of (1) (1906) 34 1.
A. 27.
(2) 712 adoption or establish an adoption which is otherwise disproved.
In order to properly appreciate the effect of these admissions it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which these various documents were executed and the acts done or the admissions made.
At the death of Lakshminarayan the respondent was 24 or 25 years old surrounded by the family of Badrinarayan whose interest it was to foist an adoption on her.
Her own relations do not seem to have taken much interest in her or her affairs.
She was thus a widow, lonely and dependent upon her husband 's relations.
The trial Court described her as a pardanashin woman.
Although Badrinarayan himself denied that he was managing the estate of Lakshminarayan, Narsingdas one of the appellant 's witnesses stated that Badrinarayan was doing so and Badrinarayan admitted that he looked after the court cases though at the request of the respondent.
It is with this back.
ground that the evidence has to be considered and weighed.
Any admission made by a widow situated as the respondent was would necessarily carry very little weight: Padamlal vs Fakira Debya (1).
Besides the four documents above mentioned the appellant Kishorilal relied on the following facts as instances of admissions and conduct of the respondent Chaltibai.
The first is the performance of obsequies by the appellant and the subsequent taking of the appellant in her lap by the respondent.
The mere fact of performance of these funeral rites does not necessarily support an adoption.
The performance of these rites frequently varies according to the circumstances of each case and the view and usage of different families.
The evidence led by the appellant him self shows that in the absence of the son, junior relations like a younger brother or a younger nephew performs the obsequial ceremonies.
As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Tayamal 's case (2) the performance of funeral rites will not sustain an adoption unless it clearly appears that the adoption itself was performed under circumstances as would render it (1) A.I.R. 1931 (P.C.) 84.
(2) (1865) 10 M.I.A. 429.
713 perfectly valid.
But then it was submitted that the taking by the respondent of the appellant in her lap coupled with the performance of obsequies was a clear proof of her acceptance of the appellant 's adoption by her deceased husband.
This again is slender basis for any such inference as Badrinarayan himself stated that it was not customary amongst them for the widow to take the adopted son in her lap and in this particular case it was only done as she desired it.
As proof of adoption by Lakshminarayan this piece of evidence has no value because that is not the case of the appellant; and as showing confirmatory process it is valueless in the absence of evidence sufficient to establish the adoption by Lakshminarayan which in this case is lacking.
The appellant 's residing with Lakshminarayan after his adoption and after the death of Lakshminarayan with the respondent was next relied upon by counsel for the appellant As we have already said the appellant had not proved that he was residing with Lakshminarayan after his adoption; on the contrary the evidence shows that he left Tirora soon after his alleged adoption and did not return till after the death of Lakshminarayan.
And then again he returned to Raipur and returned to Tirora after about four or five months.
The mere fact that he continued to reside with the respondent since would not in this case prove adoption, because in the school register he was shown as the son of Badrinarayan and continued to be so shown upto June 30, 1937, and mere residence of a young nephew with a widowed and young aunt is no proof of adoption by her husband in the absence of satisfactory evidence of the factum of adoption.
The appellant, it was next contended, was in possession of the properties of Lakshminarayan after the latter 's death and his name was brought on the record in all civil and revenue proceedings.
As we have said above, Badrinarayan took over the management of the estate of Lakshminarayan and was looking after the conduct of the court cases.
If in those circumstances the mutations were made in the name of the 90 714 appellant or suits were brought in his, name or even if he took out licences in his name would be matters of small consequence.
It is not shown that at the time of the mutations the respondent was present or was represented or the suits were brought with her knowledge and it appears that all this was done because the management of the estate as well as the conduct of the cases in courts was in the hands of Badrinarayan.
Then the fact that after he attained majority, the appellant was managing the estate and was recognised by everybody as its owner also is of little consequence because as far as the respondent was concerned somebody had to manage the property, whether it was Badrinarayan or the appellant Kishorilal to her it made no difference.
It may also be mentioned here that in the mutation order passed by the Tehsildar on April 8, 1936, which related to 3As.
share of Mouza Jabartola the mutation entry was made in favour of the respondent and not in the name of the appellant and in the jamabandi papers relating to different holdings in some places the appellant is shown under the guardianship of his mother Chaltibai and in other places under the guardianship of Badrinarayan as his uncle.
A great deal of stress was laid by the appellant on the fact that his marriage was performed by the respondent Chaltibai and she purported to do so as his adoptive mother.
The performance of the marriage itself does not prove adoption, which is otherwise disproved, and as a circumstance supporting the inference of adoption set up by the appellant it is wholly neutral.
At the most the circumstances relied upon by the appellant may be acts of acquiescence attributed to the respondent but they would be important only if they were brought to bear upon the question which depended upon preponderance of evidence.
If the facts are once ascertained, presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts themselves disprove: See Tayamal 's case (1) at p. 433.
Presumptions cannot sustain an adoption even though (1)(1865) 10 M.I.A. 429.
715 it might have been acquiesced in by all concerned when as in the present case, the evidence shows that the adoption did not take place.
Another fact on which the appellant relied was that on October 30, 1933, Badrinarayan, his wife and his sons partitioned their family property.
That is not an act of the respondent and cannot affect her rights if they are otherwise enforceable.
On the whole we are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court is sound and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The respondent filed a suit for declaration and possession of certain properties left by her deceased husband L.
The appellant contested the suit on the grounds that L had adopted him as his son six months before his death In addition to the oral evidence of adoption the appellant alleged that he performed the obsequies of L as such adopted son, that on the thirteenth day after the death of L he was taken by the respondent in her lap, that he entered into possession of the estate of L, that the 699 respondent performed his marriage and that he was recognised as the adopted son of L even by the respondent.
The appellant further pleaded that the respondent was estopped from challenging his adoption by her representations in previous legal proceedings and in documents and on account of the fact that the appellant had by this adoption lost his share of the properties in his natural family.
The respondent denied both the adoption and the treatment of acceptance of the appellant as the adopted son of L.
The trial Court dismissed the suit holding the adoption proved.
On appeal the High Court held the adoption was not proved and decreed the suit.
Both Courts held that the respondent was not estopped from challenging the adoption.
Held, that the High Court.
had correctly held that the adoption of the appellant by L had not been established.
As an adoption results in changing the course of succession, the evidence to support it should be such that it should be free from all suspicion of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth.
Held further, that the.
respondent was not estopped from disputing the adoption.
The correct rule of estopped applicable in the case of adoption is that it does not confer status; it only shuts the mouths of certain persons if they try to deny the adoption.
But where both parties are conversant with the true state of facts the doctrine of estopped has no application.
Admissions made by a party are not conclusive, and unless they constitute estopped, the maker is at liberty to prove that they were mistaken or were untrue.
Presumptions arising from the conduct of a party cannot sustain an adoption even though it might have been acquiesced in by all concerned when the evidence shows that the adoption did not take place.
Mohori Bibi vs Dhurmdas Ghosh, (1902) 30 I.A. 114, relied upon.