judgement:
No. 12437 of 1985 etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) Raju Ramachandra, Mukul Mudgal, Mrs. R. Ramachandran, N.J. Mehta, P.H. Parekh, D. Krishnamurthy, K.N. Rai, K.R. Nagaraja, Ms. Malinio Poduval, N.N. Verma, S.K. Bhardwaj and P.D. Sharma for the Petitioners.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, V.P. Sarthy and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
S.K. Sinha and S.K. Verma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, CJ.
I am in entire agreement with the judgment prepared by my learned brother Ranganath Misra, but since the questions involved in these writ petitions are of semi nal importance affecting as they do, the structure of the judicial system and the principle of independence of the Judiciary, I think I would be failing in my duty if I did not add a few words of my own.
There are two questions which arise for consideration in these writ petitions and they have been succinctly set out in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. The first question is whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in service matters specified in section 218of the Administrative Tribu nals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in such service matters in the Administrative Tribunal to be constituted under the impugend Act, subject to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 32 and 136, is unconstitutional and void and in any event, even if the first question be answered against the petitioners and in favour of 441 the Government, the second question required to be consid ered is, whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairmen and members have the effect of introducing a con stitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act.
I agreed with the answers given to these questions in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. I would articulate my reasons as follows: It is now well settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Others vs Union of India and Ors. ; that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can abrogate it or take it away.
If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is.
It is a fundamental principle of our constitu tional scheme that every organ of the State, every authority under the Constitution, derives its power from the Constitu tion and has to act within the limits of such power.
It is a limited Government which we have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to act within the limits of the power conferred upon them under the Con stitution.
Now a question may arise as to what are the powers of the executive and whether the executive has acted within the scope of its power.
Such a question obviously cannot be left to the executive to decide and for two very good reasons.
First, the decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws and this would pre eminently be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action.
So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the law is viola tive of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same rea sons, be left to the determination of the legislature.
The Constitution has, therefore created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the legislature.
The judiciary is constituted the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the extent and scope of the power con ferred on each branch of Government, what are the limits on the exercise of such power under the Constitution and wheth er any action of any branch transgresses such limits.
It is also a basic principle of the rule of law which permeates every provision of the Constitution and which forms its very core and essence that the exercise of power by the executive or any other authority must not only be conditioned by the Constitution but also be in 442 accordance with law and it is the judiciary which has to ensure that the law is observed and there is compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities.
This function is discharged by the judi ciary by exercise of the power of judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for mainte nance of the rule of law.
The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality.
That is why I observed in my judgment in Minerva Mills 'Ltd. case (supra) at pages 287 and 288: "I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the mainte nance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unques tionably, to my mind, part of the basic struc ture of the Constitution.
Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament.
But what I wish to emphasise is that judicial review is a vital principle of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution.
If by a Constitutional amendment, the power of judi cial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subver sion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights meaningless and futile.
So also if a constitutional amendment is made which has the effect of taking away the power of judicial review and providing that no amendment made in the Constitution shall be liable to be.questioned on any ground, even if such amendment is violative of the basic structure and, therefore, outside the amendatory power of Parliament, it would be making Parliament sole judge of the consti tutional validity of what it has done and that would, in effect and substance, nullify the limitation on the amending power of Parliament and affect the basic structure of the Consti tution.
The conclusion must therefore inevita bly follow that clause (4) of the Article 368 is unconstitutional and void as damaging the basic structure of the Constitution.
" 443 It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. case (supra) was a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament by amending the Constitution in exercise of its constituent power, Parliament can certainly, without in any way violat ing the basic structure doctrine, set up effective alterna tive institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review.
The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the compe tence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court.
Then, instead of the High Court, it would be another insti tutional mechanism or authority which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law.
Therefore, if any constitutional amendment made by Parlia ment takes away from the High Court the power of judicial review in any particular area and vests it in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be viola tive of the basic structure doctrine, so long as the essen tial condition is fulfilled, namely that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the parlia mentary amendment is no less effective than the High Court.
Here, in the present case, the impugned Act has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 323A which was introduced in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd Amendemnt) Act, 1976.
Clause (2) (d) of this Article provides that a law made by Parliament under clause (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1).
The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 by any law made by Parliament under clause (1 ) of Article 323A is, there fore, specifically authorised by the constitutional amend ment enacted in clause (2) (d) of that Article.
It is dear from the discussion in the preceding paragraph that this constitutional amendment authorising exclusion of the juris diction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 postu lates for its validity that the law made under clause (1) of Article 323A excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 must provide for an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority for judi cial review.
If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (1) of Article 323A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 without setting up an effective alternative 444 institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the constituent power of Parliament.
It must, therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amend ment that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective insti tutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judi cial review in it.
Consequently, the impugned Act excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 in respect of service matters and vesting such jurisdic tion in the Administrative Tribunal can pass the test of constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of clause (2) (d) of Article 323A, only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is equally efficacious as the High Court, so far as the power of judicial review over service matter is concerned.
We must, therefore, address ourselves to the question whether the Administrative Tribunal established under the impugned Act can be regarded as equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power or judicial review as the High Court acting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
It is necessary to bear in mind that service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act for adjudication involve questions of interpretation and applicability of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases.
These questions require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law.
It is necessary that those who adjudicate upon these questions should have same modicum of legal training and judicial experience because we find that some of these questions are so difficult and complex that they baffle the minds of even trained Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
That is the reason why at the time of the preliminary hearing of these writ petitions we insisted that every bench of the Administrative Tribunal should consist of one judicial member and one administrative member and there should be no preponderance of administrative members on any bench.
Of course, the presence of the administrative member would provide input of practical experience in the function ing of the services and add to the efficiency of the Admin istrative Tribunal but the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input or not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal as compared to the High Court.
Now section 6 provides that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two years held office of Vice Chairman or he should have for at least two years held the post of 445 Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India.
I entirely agree with Ranganath Misra, J. that the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two years held office as Vice Chairman.
If he has held office as Vice Chairman for a period of at least two years he would have gathered sufficient experience and also within such period of two years, acquired reasonable familiarity with the constitutional and legal questions involved in service matters, But substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the Government and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the,High Court.
We cannot afford to forget that it is the High Court which is being supplant ed by the Administrative Tribunal and it must be so manned as to inspire confidence in the public mind that it is a highly competent and expert mechanism with judicial approach and objectivity.
Of course, I must make it clear that when I say this, I do not wish to cast any reflection on the mem bers of the Civil Services because fortunately we have, in our country, brilliant civil servants who possess tremendous sincerity, drive and initiative and who have remarkable capacity to resolve and overcome administrative problems of great complexity.
But what is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to supplant the High Court is legal train ing and experience.
I am, therefore, of the view, in agree ment with Ranganath Misra, J. that clause (c) of section 6 (1) must be struck down as invalid.
I also fail to see why a District Judge or an advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of a High Court should not be eligible to be considered for appointment as Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal.
It may be noted that since the Administrative Tribunal has been created in substitution of the High Court, the Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal would be in the position of a High Court Judge and if a District Judge or an advocate qualified to be a Judge of the High Court, is eligible to be a High Court Judge, there is no reason why he should not equally be eligible to be a Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal.
Can the position of a Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal be considered higher than that of a High Court Judge so that a person who is eligible to be a High Court Judge may yet be regarded as ineligible for becoming a Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal? It does appear that the provisions of the impugned Act in regard to the composition of the Administrative Tribunal are a little weighted in favour of members of the Services.
This weightage in favour of the members of the Services and value discounting of the judi cial members does have the effect of 446 making the Administrative Tribunal less effective and effi cacious than the High Court.
I would therefore suggest that a District Judge or an Advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court should be regarded as eligible for being Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal and unless an amendment to that effect is carried out on or before 31st March, 1987, the impugned Act would have to be declared to be invalid, because the provision in regard to composition of the Administrative Tribunal cannot be severed from the other provisions contained in the impugned Act.
That takes me to another serious infirmity in the provi sions of the impugned Act in regard to the mode of appoint ment of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and members of the Administrative Tribunal.
So far as the appointment of judi cial members of the Administrative Tribunal is concerned, there is a provision introduced in the impugned Act by way of amendment that the judicial members shall be appointed by the Government concerned in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
Obviously no exception can be taken to this provision, because even so far as Judges of the High Court are concerned, their appointment is required to be made by the President inter alia in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.
But so far as the appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairmen and administrative members is con cerned, the sole and exclusive power to make such appoint ment is conferred on the Government under the impugned Act.
There is no obligation cast on the Government to consult the Chief Justice of India or to follow any particular selection procedure in this behalf.
The result is that it is left to the absolute unfettered discretion of the Government to appoint such person or persons as it likes as Chairman, Vice Chairman and administrative members of the Administra tive Tribunal.
Now it may be noted that almost all cases in regard to service matters which come before the Administra tive Tribunal would be against the Government or any of its officers and it would not at all be conducive to judicial independence to leave unfettered and unrestricted discretion in the executive to appoint the Chairman, Vice Chairmen and administrative members, if a judicial member or an adminis trative member is looking forward to promotion as Vice Chairman or Chairman, he would have to depend on the good will and favourable stance of the executive and that would be likely to affect the independence and impartiality of the members of the Tribunal.
The same would be the position vis a vis promotion to the office of Chairman of the ' Admin istrative Tribunal.
The administrative members would also be likely to carry a sense of obligation to the executive for having been appointed members of the Administrative Tribunal and that would have a tendency to impair the independence and objectivity of the members of the Tribunal.
There can be no doubt that the power of appointment and promotion vested in the executive can have prejudicial effect on the 447 independence of the Chairman, Vice Chairmen and members of the Administrative Tribunal, if such power is absolute and unfettered.
If the members have to look to the executive for advancement, it may tend, directly or indirectly, to influ ence their decision making process particularly since the Government would be a litigant in most of the cases coming before the Administrative Tribunal and it is the action of the Government which would be challenged in such cases.
That is the reason why in case of appointment of High Court Judges, the power of appointment vested in the executive is not an absolute unfettered power but it is hedged in by a wholesome check and safeguard and the President cannot make an appointment of a High Court Judge without consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and a healthy convention has grown up that no appointment would be made by the Government which is not approved by the Chief Justice of India.
This check or safe guard is totally absent in the case of appointment of the Chairman, Vice Chairmen and administrative members of the Administrative Tribunal and the possibility cannot be ruled out indeed the litigating public would certainly carry a feeling that the decisionmaking process of the Chairman, Vice Chairmen and members of the Administrative Tribunal might be likely to be affected by reason of dependence on the executive for appointment and promotion.
It can no longer be disputed that total insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference from the coordinate branches of Government is a basic essential feature of the Constitu tion.
The Constitution makers have made anxious provision to secure total independence of the judiciary from executive pressure or influence.
Obviously, therefore if the Adminis trative Tribunal is created in substitution of the High Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in the Administrative Tribunal, the same independence from possibility of execu tive pressure or influence must also be ensured to the Chairman, Vice Chairmen and members of the Administrative Tribunal.
Or else the Administrative Tribunal would cease to be an equally effective and efficacious substitute for the High Court and the provisions of the impugned Act would be rendered invalid.
I am, therefore, of the view that the appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairmen and administrative members should be made by the concerned Government only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and such consultation must be meaningful and effective and ordinarily the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India must be accepted unless there are cogent reasons, in which event the reasons must be disclosed to the Chief Justice of India and his response must be invited to such reasons.
There is also another alternative which may be adopted by the Government for making appointments of Chairman, Vice Chairmen and mem bers and that may be by setting up a High Powered Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice of India or a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or concerned High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of 448 India.
Both these mOdes of appointment will ensure selection of proper and competent persons to man the Administrative Tribunal and give it prestige and reputation which would inspire confidence in the public mind in regard to the competence, objectivity and impartiality of those manning the Administrative Tribunal.
If either of these two modes of appointment is adopted, it would save the impugned Act from invalidation.
Otherwise, it will be outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under Article 323 A.
I would, however hasten to add that this judgment will operate only prospectively and will not invalidate appointments already made to the Administrative Tribunal.
But if any appointments of Vice Chairmen or administrative members are to be made hereafter, the same shall be made by the Government in accordance with either of the aforesaid two modes of ap pointment.
I may also add that if the Administrative Tribunal is to be an equally effective and efficacious substitution for the High Court on the basis of which alone the impugned Act can be sustained, there must be a permanent or if there is not sufficient work, then a Circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal at every place where there is a seat of the High Court.
I would, therefore, direct the Government to set up a permanent bench and if that is not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then at least a Circuit Bench of the Administrative Tribunal wherever there is a seat of the High Court, on or before 31st March, 1987.
That would be neces sary if the provisions of the impugned Act are to be sus tained.
So far as rest of the points dealt with in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. are concerned, I express my entire agreement with the view taken by him.
RANGANATH MISRA J: The challenge raised to the vires of the , (hereinafter re ferred to as 'the Act ') in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution and the other connected matters has been referred to the Constitution Bench for adjudication.
Indis putably the Act has been framed within the ambit of Article 323A which was brought into the Constitution by the Forty Second Amendment Act in 1976.
In exercise of power vested under Section 1(3) of the Act, the Central Government ap pointed 1.11.1985 as the date from which the Act would come into force.
Thereupon Sampat Kumar and others (W.P. 12460 of 1985) moved this Court and the connected matters were brought before this Court or different High Courts which have since been transferred ' to this Court to be analogously heard.
On 31.10.
1985 a Division Bench of this Court gave certain interim directions including stay of transfer of the pending applications under Article 32 which were liable to be transferred to the Tribunal and also for continuance of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 in regard to disputes covered under the Act notwithstanding the bar provided in Section 28.
449 In the writ applications as presented the main challenge was to the abolition of the Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 in respect of specified service disputes.
Chal lenge was also raised against the taking away of the juris diction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.
It was further canvassed that establishment of benches of the Tribunal at Allahabad, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Gauhati, Madras.
and Nagpur with the principal seat at Delhi would still prejudice the parties whose cases were already pending before the respective High Courts located at places other than these places and unless at the seat of every High Court facilities for presentation of applications and for hearing thereof were provided the parties and their lawyers would be adversely affected.
The interim order made on October 31, 1985, made provisions to meet the working difficulties.
Learned Attorney General on behalf of the Central Government assured the Court that early steps would be taken to amend the law so as to save the jurisdiction under Article 32, remove other minor anomalies and set up a bench of the Tribunal at the seat of every High Court.
By the Administra tive Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, these amendments were brought about and by now an appropriate Act of Parlia ment has replaced the Ordinance.
Most of the original grounds of attack thus do not survive and the contentions that were canvassed at the hearing by the counsel appearing for different parties are these (1) Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of the basic structure of our Constitution and bar of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 as contained in Section 28 of the Act cannot be sustained; (2) Even if the bar of jurisdiction is upheld, the Tribunal being a substitute of the High Court, its constitution and set up should be such that it would in fact function as such substitute and become an institution in which the parties could repose faith and trust; (3) Benches of the Tribunal should not only be established at the seat of every High Court but should be available at every place where the High Courts have permanent benches; (4) So far as Tribunals set up or to be set up by the Central or the State Govern ments are concerned, they should have no jurisdiction in respect of employees of the Supreme Court or members of the subordinate judiciary and employees working in such estab lishments inasmuch as exercise of jurisdiction of the Tribunal would interfere with the control absolutely vested in 450 the respective High Courts in regard to the judicial and other subordinate officers under Article 235 of the Constitution.
After oral arguments were over, learned Attorney Gener al, after obtaining instructions from the Central Government filed a memorandum to the effect that section 2(q) of the Act would be suitably amended so as to exclude officers and servants in the employment of the Supreme Court and members and staff of the subordinate judiciary from the purview of the Act.
In the same memorandum it has also been said that Government would arrange for sittings of the benches of the Tribunal at the seat or seats of each High Court on the basis that 'sittings ' will include 'circuit sittings ' and the details thereof would be worked out by the Chairman or the Vice Chairman concerned.
With these concessions made by the learned Attorney General, only two aspects remain to be dealt with by us, namely, those covered by the first and the second conten tions.
Strong reliance was placed on the judgment of Bhagwati, J (one of us presently the learned Chief Justice) in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; , 287 where it was said: "The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no Government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illu sion and a promise of unreality.
I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
Of course, when 1 say this I should not be taken to suggest that, however effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament.
But what I wish to empha sise is that judicial review is a vital prin ciple of our Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic struc ture of the Constitution.
If by a constitu tional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the Legislature shall not be liable to be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence of the Legislature or is violative of any 451 fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States and render the fundamental rights meaningless and futile.
So also if a constitu tional amendment is made which has the effect of taking away the power of judicial review.
" Article 32 was described by Dr. Ambedkar in course of the debate in the Constituent Assembly as the 'soul ' and 'heart ' of the Constitution and it is in recognition of this position that though Article 323A(2)(d) authorised exclusion of jurisdiction under Article 32 and the original Act had in Section 28 provided for it, by amendment jurisdiction under Article 32 has been left untouched.
The Act thus saves jurisdiction of this Court both under Article 32 in respect of original proceedings as also under Article 136 for enter taining appeals against decisions of the Tribunal on grant of Special Leave.
Judicial review by the apex court has thus been left in tact.
The question that arises, however, for consideration is whether bar of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 affects the provision for judicial review.
The right to move the High Court in its writ jurisdiction unlike the one under Article 32, is not a fundamental right.
Yet, the High Courts, as the working experience of three and a half dec ades shows have in exercise of the power of judicial review played a definite and positive role in the matter of preser vation of fundamental and other rights and in keeping admin istrative action under reasonable control.
In these thirty six years following the enforcement of the Constitution, not only has India 's population been more than doubled but also the number of litigations before the courts including the High Courts has greatly increased.
As the pendency in the High Courts increased and soon became the pressing problem of backlog, the nation 's attention came to be bestowed on this aspect.
Ways and means to relieve the High Courts of the load began to engage the attention of the Government at the Centre as also in the various States.
As early as 1969, a Committee was set up by the Central Government under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Shah of this Court to make recommendations suggesting ways and means for effective, expeditious and satisfactory disposal of matters relating to service disputes of Government servants as it Was found that a sizable portion of pending litigations related to this category.
The Committee recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle the pending cases before this Court and the High Courts.
While this report was still engaging the attention of Government, the Administrative Reforms Commission also took note of the situation and recommended the setting up of Civil Services Tribunals to deal with appeals of Government servants against discipli nary action.
In certain States, Tribunals of this type came into existence and started functioning.
But the Central 452 Government looked into the matter further as it transpired that the major chunk of service litigation related to mat ters other than disciplinary action.
In May 1976, a Confer ence of Chief Secretaries of the States discussed this problem.
Then came the Forty Second Amendment of the Consti tution bringing in Article 323A which authorised Parliament to provide by law "for the adjudication or trial by adminis trative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connexion with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other au thority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation owned or controlled by the Government.
" As already stated this Arti cle envisaged exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of.
the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1).
Though the Constitution now contained the enabling power, no immediate steps were taken to set up any Tribunal as contemplated by Article 323A.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in K.K. Dutta vs Union of India, ; observed: "There are few other litigative areas than disputes between members of various services inter se, where the principle that public policy requires that all litigation must have an end can apply with greater force.
Public servants ought not to be driven or required to dissipate their time and energy in court room battles.
Thereby their attention is diverted from public to private affairs and their inter se disputes affect their sense of oneness without which no institution can function effectively.
The constitution of Service Tribunals by State GOvernments with an apex Tribunal at the Centre which in the generality of the cases, should be the final arbiter of controversies relating to conditions of serv ice, including the vexed question of seniori ty, may save the courts from the avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters.
The proceedings of such Tribunals can have the merit Of informality and if they will not be tied down to strict rules of evidence, they might be able to produce solutions which will satisfy many. " In the meantime the problem of the backlog of cases in the High Courts becomes more acute and pressing and came to be further discussed in Parliament and in conferences and seminars.
Ultimately in January 1985, both Houses of Parlia ment passed the Bill and with the Presidential assent on 27th February, 1985, the law enabling the long awaited Tribunal to be constituted came into existence.
As already noticed, the Central Government notified the Act to come into force with effect from 1.11.1985.
453 Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts in service matters and its propriety as also validity have thus to be examined in the background indicated above.
We have already seen that judicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and thus there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought for determina tion or rectification.
Thus exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court does not totally bar judicial review.
This Court in Minerva Mills ' case did point out that "effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review" can be made by Parliament.
Thus it is possible to set up an alternative institution in place of the High Court for providing judicial review.
The debates and deliberations spread over almost two decades for explor ing ways and means for relieving the High Courts of the load of backlog of cases and for assuring quick settlement of service disputes in the interest of the public servants as also the country cannot be lost sight of while considering this aspect.
It has not been disputed before us and perhaps could not. have been that the Tribunal under the scheme of the Act would take over a part of the existing backlog and a share of the normal load of the High Courts.
The Tribunal has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemen tal to the High Court in the scheme of administration of justice.
To provide the Tribunal as an additional forum from where parties could go to the High Court would certainly have been a retrograde step considering the situation and circumstances to meet which the innovation has been brought about.
Thus barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court can indeed not be a valid ground of attack.
What, however, has to be kept in view is that the Tribu nal should be a real substitute of the High Court not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto.
As was pointed out in Minerva 's Mills, the alternative arrangement has to be effective and efficient as also capable of uphold ing the constitutional limitations.
Article 16 of the Con stitution guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
Article 15 bars discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
The touch stone of equality enshrined in Article 14 is the greatest of guarantees for the citizen.
Centering around these articles in the Constitution a service jurisprudence has already grown in this country.
Under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts except those of this Court in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal either Central or State.
Thus the Tribunal is the substitute of the 'High Court and is entitled to exercise the powers thereof.
The High Courts have been functioning over a century and a quarter and until the Federal Court was established under the Government of India Act, 1935, used to be the highest courts within their respective jurisdiction subject to an appeal to the Privy Council in a limited category of cases.
In this 454 long period of about six scores of years, the High Courts have played their role effectively, efficiently as also satisfactorily.
The litigant in this country has seasoned himself to look upto the High Court as the unfailing protec tor of his person, property and honour.
The institution has served its purpose very well and the common man has thus come to repose great confidence therein.
Disciplined, inde pendent and trained Judges well versed in law and working with all openness in an unattached and objective manner have ensured dispensation of justice over the years.
Aggrieved people approach the Court the social mechanism to act as the arbiter not under legal obligation but under the belief and faith that justice shall be done to them and the State 's authorities would implement the decision of the Court.
It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the substitute institution the Tribunal must be a worthy successor of the High Court in all respects.
That is exactly what this Court intended to convey when it spoke of an alternative mechanism in Minerva Mills ' case.
Chapter II of the Act deals with establishment of Tribu nals and Benches thereof.
Section 4 provides for establish ment while Section 5 deals with composition of the Tribunal and Benches thereof.
Section 6 lays down the qualifications of Chairman, Vice Chairman and members.
So far as the Chair man is concerned, sub section (1) requires that he should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has for at least two years, held office as Vice Chairman; or (c) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India.
Sub section (2) prescribing the qualification for Vice Chairman provides that he should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court; or (b) for at least two years, held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Gov ernment carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Secretary to the Govern ment of India; or (bb) for at least five years, held the post of an Additional 455 Secretary to Government of India or any other post carrying equivalent pay; or (c) for a period of not less than three years held office as a judicial member of an Admin istrative Tribunal.
Sub section (3) prescribes the qualification of a judi cial member and requires that: (a) he should be or should have been or qualified to be a Judge of a High Court; or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post in Grade I of that service for at least three years.
Sub section (3 A) provides the qualification for ap pointment as administrative member and lays down that such person should have, for at least two years, held the post of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay not less than that of an Additional Secretary to Government of India; or (b) has, for at least three years, held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or the State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to Government of India.
So far as the Chairman is concerned, we are of the view that ordinari ly a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in office or retired should be ap pointed.
That office should for all practical purposes be equated with the office of Chief Justice of a High Court.
We must immediately point out that we have no bias, in any manner, against members of the Service.
Some of them do exhibit great candour, wisdom, capacity to deal with intri cate problems with understanding, detachment and objective ness but judicial discipline generated by experience and training in an adequate dose is, in our opinion, a necessary qualification for the post of Chairman.
We agree that a Vice Chairman with these qualifications and experience of two years may be considered for appointment as Chairman but in order that the Tribunal may be acceptable to the liti gants who are themselves members of the various services, section 6(1)(c) should be omitted.
We do not want to say anything about Vice Chairman and members dealt with in sub sections (2), (3) or (3A) because so far as their selection is concerned, we are of the view that such selection when it is not of a sitting Judge or retired Judge of a High Court should be done by a high powered committee with a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India as its Chairman.
This will ensure selection of proper and competent people to man these high offices of trust and help to build up reputation and acceptability.
Once the qualifications indicated for appointment of Chair man are adopted and the manner of selection of Vice Chairman and members is followed, we are inclined to think that the manning of the Tribunal would be proper and conducive to appropriate functioning.
We 456 do not propose to strike down the prescriptions containing different requirements but would commend to the Central Government to take prompt steps to bring the provisions in accord with what we have indicated.
We must state that unless the same be done, the constitution of the Tribunal as a substitute of the High Court would be open to challenge.
We hasten to add that our judgment shall operate prospec tively and would not affect appointments already made to the offices of Vice Chairman and Member both administrative and judicial.
Section 8 of the Act prescribes the term of office and provides that the term for Chairman, Vice Chairman or mem bers shall be of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office or until he attains the age of 65 in the case of Chairman or Vice Chairman and 62 in the case of member, whichever is earlier.
The retiring age of 62 or 65 for the different categories is in accord with the pattern and fits into the scheme in comparable situations.
We would, however, like to indicate that appointment for a term of five years may occasionally operate as a dis incentive for well qualified people to accept the offer to join the Tribu nal.
There may be competent people belonging to younger age groups who would have more than five years to reach the prevailing age of retirement.
The fact that such people would be required to go out on completing the five year period but long before the superannuation age is reached is bound to operate as a deterrent.
Those who come to be Chair man, Vice Chairman or members resign appointments, if any, held by them before joining the Tribunal and, as such, there would be no scope for their return to the place or places from where they come.
A five year period is not a long one.
Ordinarily some time would be taken for most of the members to get used to the service jurisprudence and when the period is only five years, many would have to go out by the time they are fully acquainted with the law and have good grip over the job.
To require retirement at the end of five years is thus neither convenient to the person selected for the job nor expedient to the scheme.
At the hearing, learned Attorney General referred to the case of a member of the Public Service Commission who is appointed for a term and even suffers the disqualification in the matter of further employment.
We do not think that is a comparable situation.
On the other hand, membership in other high powered Tribu nals like the Income tax Appellate Tribunal or the Tribunal under the Customs Act can be referred to.
When amendments to the Act are undertaken, this aspect of the matter deserves to be considered, particularly because the choice in that event would be wide leaving scope for proper selection to be made.
We hope and trust that within a reasonable period not beyond 31st 457 March, 1987, the amendments indicated shall be brought about so as to remove the defects found in the Act.
Khalid, Oza and Dutt 3.3.
We have read both the Judgments just delivered the main judgment of learned Brother Ranganath Misra and the other of Hon 'ble the Chief Justice.
We agree with both.

summary:
Clause (1) of article 323 A, brought in by Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, authorised Parliament to provide by law for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to re cruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services.
Clause (2)(d) of that Article envisaged exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136 with re spect to the disputes or complaints referred to in cl.
Section 28 of the originally enacted within the ambit of article 323 A, provided for exclusion of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 32.
The Act as amended by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, replaced by Act No. 19 of 1987 now saves the jurisdiction of Supreme Court both under article 32 in respect of original proceedings as also under article 136 for entertaining appeals.
Section 6(1)of the Act which lays down qualifications of Chairman, states that he should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court, or (b) has for at least two years held office of Vice Chairman, or (c) has for at least two years held the post of Secretary to the Govern ment of India.
Sub section (2) provides that a Vice Chairman should be or have been (a) a Judge of a High Court, or (b) for at least two years held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India, or (bb) for at least five years held the post of Additional Secretary to the Government of India, or (c) for a period of not less than three years held office as a Judicial Member of an Administrative Tribunal.
Sub section (3) states that the Judicial Member (a) should or should have been qualified to be a Judge of a High 436 Court, or (b) has been a member of the Indian Legal Service, Grade 1, for at least three years.
Sub section (3A) provides that a person to be appointed as Administrative Member (a) should have for at least two years held the post of Addi tional Secretary to the Government of India, or (b) has for at least three years held the post of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India.
The petitioners in these writ petitions and transfer petitions challenged the vires of the 1985 Act.
It was contended that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 in service matters specified in s.28 of the Act was unconstitutional and void, and that the composition of the Tribunal and mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members was outside the scope of the power conferred on Parliament under article 323 A.
Allowing the petitions in part, the Court, By the Court HELD: It is the High Court which is being supplanted by Administrative Tribunal.
The office of Chairman of the Tribunal, therefore, for all practical purposes should be equated with the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court.
Judicial discipline generated by experience and training in an adequate dose is a necessary qualification for that post.
It is thus essential that he should have been a Judge of the High Court or he should have for at least two years held office as Vice Chairman.
A person who has merely held the post of Secretary to the Government of India and who has no legal and judicial experience if appointed Chair man would not only fail to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effective and efficacious mechanism than the High Court.
Clause (c) of s.6(1) of the Act, therefore, must be struck down as invalid.
[445 C, 455 DE, 445 ABE] Per Bhagwati, CJ.
1.1 Judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can abrogate it or take it away.
It is, however, within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to substitute in place of the High Court another alternative institutional mechanism or ar rangement for judicial review without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, provided it is no less effica cious than the High Court.
Then it would be another authori ty which would be exercising the power of judicial review with a view to enforcing the constitutional limitations and maintaining the rule of law.
[441 B, Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
[1981]1 SCR 206, referred to.
1.2 Clause (2Xd) of article 323 A specifically authorises the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 by any law made by Parliament under cl.(1).
If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 and 227 without sating up an effective alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial review it would be violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the constitutent power of Parliament.
It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the amendment that such a law to be coustitutionally valid must not leave a void but it must set up another equally effective alternative author ity and vest the power of judicial review in it.
[443 F, H, 44 A B] 2.1 What is needed in a judicial tribunal which is intended to supplant the High Court is legal training and experience.
Service matters which are removed from the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 and entrusted to the Administrative Tribunal invariably involve questions of interpretation and applicability of articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 which require for their determination not only judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in this particular branch of constitutional law.
[445 D, 444 D] 2.2 The Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal should be or should have been a Judge of a High Court or he should have for at least two years held office as Vice Chairman.
It is the High Court which is being supplanted by the Adminis trative Tribunal.
Substituting the Chief Justice of a High Court by a Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal who has merely held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India and who has no legal or judicial experience would not only fall to inspire confidence in the public mind but would also render the Administrative Tribunal a much less effec tive and efficacious mechanism than the High Court.
Clause (c) of s.6(1) of the Act, therefore, must be struck down as invalid.
[445 A, C, B, E] 3.
Since the Administrative Tribunal has been created in substitution of the High Court, its Vice Chairman would be in the position of a High Court Judge.
Therefore, a District Judge or an advocate who is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court should be regarded as digible for being Vice Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal.
The provisions of the Act in regard to the composition of the Administrative Tribunal are weighted in favour of members of the Services.
This value discounting of the judicial members does have the effect of making the Administrative Tribunal less effective and efficacious than the High Court.
Unless an amendment to that effect is carried out on or before 31st March, 1987 the Act would have to be declared to be invalid because the 438 provision in regard to the composition of the Administrative Tribunal cannot be severed from the other provisions con tained in the Act.
A, 445 G, 446 B] 4.1 Under the Act the sole and exclusive power to make appointment of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Administrative Members is conferred on the Government.
No obligation is cast on the Government to consult the Chief Justice of India or to follow any particular selection procedure in this behalf.
Total insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference from the coordinate branches of Government is a basic essential feature of the Constitution.
In case of High Court Judges the President cannot make any appointment without consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India.
This check or safe guard is totally absent in the case of appointment of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Administrative Members of the Administrative Tribunal.
If the Tribunal is created in substitution of the High Court and the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 is taken away and vested in it, it is but essential that the same independence from possibility of executive pressure or influence must also be ensured to the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the Tribunal.
[446 D, 447 D, B, E] 4.2 The appointment o[ Chairman, Vice Chairman and Administrative Members, therefore, should be made by the concerned Government only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India and such consultation must be meaningful and effective.
Alternatively, a High Powered Selection Committee headed by the Chief Justice of India or a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or concerned High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India may be set up for making these appointments.
If either of these two modes of appointment is adopted, it would save the impunged Act from invalidation.
Otherwise, it will be outside the scope of the power con ferred on Parliament under article 323 A. [447 F, G, 448 B] 5.
The Government should set up a permanent bench and if that is not feasible having regard to the volume of work, then at least a circuit bench of the Administrative Tribunal wherever there is a seat of the High Court on or before 31st March 1987 so that the provisions of the Act could be sus tained.
[448 D] 6.
Judgment to operate only prospectively and not to invalidate appointments already made.
[448 B] Per Ranganath Misra, J. 1.
The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, as amended by Act No. 19 of 1986 saves jurisdiction of the Supreme Court both under Article 32 in respect of original proceedings as also under Article 136 for entertaining appeals.
There is thus a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought 439 for determination or rectification.
The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, does not totally bar judicial review.
[451 C, 453 A] 2.1 It is open to Parliament to make effective alterna tive institutional mechanisms or arrangements in place of the High Court for providing judicial review.
But such an authority or tribunal must be a worthy successor and real substitute of the High Court not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto so as to be effective and effi cient as also capable of upholding the constitutional limi tations enshrined in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitu tion.
[453 B, 454 C, 453 E] 2.2 The Tribunal under the scheme of the Act has been contemplated as a substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court.
It is not designed as an additional froum from where parties could go to the High Court.
Under sections 14 and 15 of the Act all the powers of the Courts, except those of the Supreme Court, in regard to matters specified therein vest in the Tribunal either Central or State.
Barring of the jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 cannot, therefore, be said to be ultra vires the Constitu tion.
[443 CD, FG, 449 A] Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; , 287 and K.K. Dutta vs Union of India, ; , referred to.
3.1 The Office of Chairman of the Tribunal should for all practical purposes be equated with the office of Chief Justice of a High Court.
Judicial discipline generated by experience and training in an adequate dose being a neces sary qualification for that post, ordinarily a retiring or retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person is not available, a senior Judge of proved ability, either in office or retired should be appointed.
In order that the Tribunal may be acceptable to the litigants, who are them selves members of the various Services, therefore, s.6(1)(c) of the Act, which makes a Secretary to the Government of India also eligible for the post of Chairman, should be omitted.
[455 D F] 3.2 The selection of Vice Chairman and Members, when it is not of a sitting Judge or retired Judge of a High Court, should be done by a high powered committee with a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India, as its Chairman.
This will ensure selec tion of proper and competent people to man these high of fices of trust and help to build up reputation and accept ability.
The Central Government to bring the provisions of the Act in accord within a reasonable time not beyond March 31, 1987.
Or else, the constitution of Tribunal as a substi tute of the High Court would be open to challenge.
[455 G, 456 A, H] 3.3 The judgment to operate prospectively and not to affect the 440 appointments already made to the office of Vice Chairman and Members.
[456 B] 4.
The term of five years prescribed under s.8 of the Act for Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the Tribunal requiting them to retire at the end of it is too short, which is neither convenient to the person selected for the job nor expedient to the scheme.
When amendments to the Act are undertaken this aspect of the matter deserves to be considered.
[456 C, F, G]


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 918 of 1973 From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.1986 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 895 of 1972.
S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua and Aman Vachher for the Appellant.
S.N. Kacker and B.P. Maheshwari for the Re spondent; The Judgment.
of the Court was delivered by B.C. RAY, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order passed on 27th February, 1973 in Civil Revi sion No. 895 of 1972 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby the revision case was allowed reversing the judgment and order of the appellate authority and allowing the application for ejectment.
The tenant appellant was granted three months ' time to vacate the shop and was also directed to deposit arrears of rent, if any within one month from the date of the order.
He was also directed to deposit advance rent for three months on the date of the order failing which he will be evicted on the expiry of one month.
511 The appellant is a tenant in respect of a room forming part of the property unit No. B VI 33(old) and B IX I48(New), Chaura Bazar, Ludhiana, which has been rented on a monthly rental of Rs. 23 by the landlady Smt.
Goran Devi on the basis of rent deed dated 7th July, 1967 for a period of three months.
After the expiry of the term of the tenancy, he contin ued in possession of the suit premises as a statutory tenant under Smt.
Guran Devi.
Guran Devi however, gifted away this property in favour of the Respondent on February 13, 1968 and from that date the appellant became a tenant under the respondent.
The ejectment was sought on the ground of default in payment of rent from 13.2.1968 till the date of filing of the application for ejectment in July, 1969 under Sec. 13 of East Punjab Urban Rent Re striction Act, 1949.
The summons of this application was served on the tenant appellant and the returnable date was fixed for 26.6.1969.
On that date, the appellant ap peared before the Rent Controller, Ludhiana with his counsel and prayed for adjournment for filing written statement.
The case was adjourned to 2.7.1969.
On that date the writ ten statement was filed and the tenant ten dered a sum of Rs. 336 on account of arrears of rent from 13.2.1968 to 12.6.1969 together with Rs. 15 as interest and Rs. 25 as costs as fixed by the Rent Controller.
The landlord accepted the amount under protest.
One of the issues framed in the said case was whether the tender was avalid tender within the meaning of proviso to Sec.
13(2) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
The Rent Controller after hearing the parties found that the tenant appellant having failed to tender the arrears of rent and interest at 6% per annum on such arrears together with the costs of the application, on 26.6.1969 which according to him was the first hearing of the application for ejectment, the tenant was not entitled to get the protection of Sec. 13(2)(i) proviso.
The Rent Controller repelled the contention made on behalf of the tenant that the said date was not the date of first hearing and that the cost of the appli cation having not been assessed on 26.6.1969, that day cannot be taken as the first day of heating of the application and the tenant having deposited all the arrears of rent together with interest and costs as assessed on the next date i.e. 2.7.1969 he could not be considered to be a defaulter.
In that view of the matter the Rent Controller allowed the application for ejectment and directed the tenant to vacate the premises and to deliver possession to 'the landlord petitioner in respect of the room in question within one month of the date of the order.
Against this judgment and order the tenant filed an appeal being M.C.A. No. 165/131 of 1970 before the appellate authority Ludhiana under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.
The appellate authority reversed the order of the Rent Controller by holding that as the Rent Controller failed to discharge his duty in assessing the costs to be deposited by the tenant along with the arrears of rent and interest on 26.6.1969, the tenant cannot be 512 penalised for the mistake of the Court and the deposit that has been made by the tenant on the next date i.e. 2.7.1969 when the cost of the application was assessed by the Rent Controller, should be treated as deposit made in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 13 of the said Act.
It has been further held that for the mistake of the Court or its officers nobody could be made to suffer.
The appellate authority further held that the words 'first day of hearing ' presuppose the existence of an occasion enabling the parties to be heard and the court to hear them in respect of the cause.
The tender was accordingly held to be valid tender within the meaning of the provi sions of the said Act.
The appeal was allowed and the order of eviction made by the Rent Controller was set aside.
Against this judgment and order a Revi sion Application being Civil Revision No. 895 of 1972 was filed before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The said Revision Case was allowed by holding that the day of first heating was 26.6.1969 when the tenant appeared before the Rent Controller with his counsel and sought time for filing written statement and the tender of the arrears of rent together with interest and costs of the application being not made on that date, the subsequent tender of the same on 2.7.1969 was not a valid tender within the meaning of proviso (i) to sub Sec. 2 of Section 13 of the said Act.
An order was made directing the tenant appellant to vacate the premises within three months.
The tenant was also directed to deposit the.
rent for three months within one month from the date of this order, in default he will suffer eviction after expiry of one month.
It is against this judgment and order the instant appeal on special leave has been preferred before this Court.
The only question that poses itself for consideration in this appeal is whether the date of appearance as mentioned in the summons i.e. 26.6.1969 is the date of first hearing of the application for ejectment and non payment or non tendering of arrears of rent together with interest and costs of the application on that very date will make the tenant liable for eviction from the rented premises on the ground of default.
In the instant case on the returnable day of the summons the tenant defendant appeared with his counsel i.e. on 26.6.1969 and prayed for an adjournment for filing written statement.
The case was accordingly a djourned to 2.7.1969.
It is also pertinent to note that on the re turnable day i.e. 26.6.1969 the Rent Controller did not make any order assessing the costs of the application which was required to be deposited along with arrears of rent and interest at 6% per annum on such arrears.
It is on 2.7.1969, the Rent Controller assessed the cost of the application and the tenant appellant deposited the arrears of rent up to date together with interest at the rate of 6% on such ar rears and the costs assessed by the Rent Controller on that date.
The said amount tendered in the Court was accepted by the landlord under protest.
513 The day mentioned in the summons i.e. 26.6.1969 in our considered opinion cannot be treated to be the day of first hearing of the ejectment application but it is the day for appearance of the defendent as on that day the Court does not take up the hearing or apply its mind to the hearing of the application.
It is only after written statement is filed, the issues are framed and hearing commences.
We draw inspiration and support from a decision of this Court ren dered in Ved Prakash vs Vishwa Mohan , wherein this Court was concerned with the same expression viz. 'first hearing ' employed in Sec.
20(4) of the U.P. Rent Act of 1972 (prior to the amendment of U.P. Act XXVIII of 1976) which is in pari materia with the corresponding provi sion in the Punjab Rent Act.
The analogous provisions in these two Rent Acts in so for as material are reproduced in juxtaposition hereunder.
20(4) of U.P. Urban Buildings Sec. 13 of the East (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Punjab Urban Rent Eviction) Act,1972 Restriction Act,1949 "In any suit for eviction on the "Eviction of tanants (1) ground mentioned in clause (a) of xxx(2)xxxx If the Contr Sub Sec.(2) if at the first heari oller,after giving the ng of the suit the tenant uncondi tenent a reasonable opp tionally pays or tenders to the ortunity of showing cau landlord the entire amount of rent se against the applicat and damages for use and occupation ion, is satisfied: of the building from him (such) (i) that the tenant has damages for use and occupation not paid or tendered the being calculated at the same rate rent due by him in resp as rent) together with interest ect of the building or thereon at the rate of nine per rented land. provided cent per annum and the landlord 's that if the tenant on costs of the suit in respect there the first hearing of the of. the court may,in lieu of pass application for ejectme ing a decree for eviction on that nt after due service,pay ground pass an order relieving the or tenders the arrears tenent against his liability for of rent and interest at eviction on that ground." (Emphasis six per cent per annum added).
on such arrears together with the cost of applicat ion assesed by the Contro ller, the tenent shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent with in the time aforesaid.
(ii) X X X (iii) X X X (iv) X X X (v) X X X the controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in po ssession of the building or granted land. " (Emphaise added) 514 This Court whilst interpreting the critical expression "first hearing" enunciated the law as under: "The question of law raised before us may perhaps be pronounced upon as it is of general importance.
Section 20(4) of the Act which we have excepted above fixes the crunical date for deposit of rent as "at the first hearing of the suit.
" What is "the first hearing of the suit"?.
Certain decisions have been cited before us of the Allahabad High Court which indicate that "the first hearing of the suit" is when, after framing of issues, the suit is posted for trial, that is, production of evidence .
We see none here and therefore, adopt as correct the decision of the High Court regarding the meaning of the expression "at the first hearing of the suit".
We may however add that the expression "at the first hearing of the suit" is also to be found in Order 10, Rule 1, Order 14 Rule 1(5) an Order 15, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
These provisions indicate that "the first hearing of the suit" can never be earlier than the date fixed for the preliminary examination of the parties (Order 10 Rule 1 ) and the settlement of issues (Order 14, Rule 1(5).
" The Punjab and Haryana High Court itself in Mangat Rai vs Ved Prakash ( 1969 Vol. 1 Rent control Reporter p. 96) has expressed the same view in paragraph 15 of the judgment: "15.
The principles that can be deduced from the plethora of case law on the point, including the authorities referred to above, are consistent with the literal meaning of word 'hearing ' which in its Dictionary sense means 'the listening of evidence and pleading in Court of law, the trial of a cause '.
It seems to be abundantly clear that in order to constitute, 'first hearing ' within the meaning of Sec. 13(2)(i) proviso, the following prerequisites must co exist: (i) There should be a 'hearing ' which presupposes the existence of an occasion enabling the parties to be heard and the court to hear them in respect of the cause.
(ii) Such hearing should be the first in point of time after due service of the summons/notice on the tenant.
Both these essentials are positive, and in the absence of either of them, there can be no "first hearing" It appears that there is consensus in regard to the interpretation of the expression 'first day ' in the context of the rent legislations of several other 515 states, for instance, the Gujarat High Court in Shah Ambalal Chhotalal and others.
vs Shah Babal Das Dayabhai and Ors., AIR [1964] (Gujarat) p. 9, dealing with the identical ques tion as to the meaning of the words "the first day of the hearing of the suit" as provided in sub Sec.
3(b) of Sec. 12 of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 has observed after considering several decisions that "the words 'the first day of hearing ' as meaning not the day for the return of the summons or the returnable day, but the day on which the Court applies its mind to the case which ordinarily would be at the time when either the issues are determined or evidence taken.
" Similar view was also taken by the High Court of Bombay earlier in the case of Khanderao Malkarjun Dhotre vs
Anandrao Laxmanrao Mashalkar.
AIR [1959] (Bombay) p. 47| It has been observed in this case as follows: "I am of opinion that "the first day of hearing" in S.12(3)(b) means, not the day fixed for return of the sum mons or what is sometimes called the returnable day, but the day on which the learned Judge applies his mind to the case, which ordinarily he would do at the time when the issues are determined, is the day mentioned and that is the day before which the rent should have been paid.
" It was tried to be contended that these decisions being rendered in connection with the 'suit ' cannot be taken into consideration in the case of a 'proceeding ' before the Rent Controller.
We do not find 'any substance in this contention which seeks to draw a distinction without a difference in substance.
It is appropriate to point out in this connection that the object of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act as stated in the Preamble to the Act is to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and eviction of tenants therefrom.
From the objects of this Act it is abundantly clear that this Act was enacted with the object of affording protection to the tenants against arbitrary increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas as well as from eviction of the tenants from the rented premises.
In this context, it is imperative that the word "the first hearing of the application" have to be interpretted in a manner which promote the object of this beneficial legislation.
Viewed from this aspect we cannot but hold that the words "first hearing of the application" as used in provise (i) to sub section 2 of Section 13 of the said Act does not mean the day fixed for return of the summons or the returnable day but the day when the Court applies its mind to the case.
In the premises aforesaid, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of eviction passed by the High Court and confirm the judgment and order of the lower appellate court dismissing the application for eviction.
There will however be no order as to costs in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
S.R. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant is a tenant in respect of a room forming part of the property Unit No. B IX 148 (New), Chaura Bazar, Ludhiana, which has been rented on a monthly rental of Rs. 23 by the landlady Smt.
Guran Devi on the basis of rent deed dated 7th July, 1967 for a period of three months.
After the expiry of the term of the tenancy, he continued in possession of the suit premises as a statutory tenant under Smt.
Guran Devi.
Guran Devi, however, gifted away this property in favour of the Respondent on February 13, 1968 and.
from that date the appellant became a tenant under the respondent.
The ejectment was sought on the ground of default in payment of rent from 13.2.1968 till the date of filing of the application for ejectment in July, 1969 under Section 13 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restric tion Act, 1949.
The summons of this applica tion was served on the tenant appellant and the returnable date was fixed for 26.6.1969.
On that date, the appellant appeared before the Rent Controller, Ludhiana with his counsel and prayed for adjournment for filing written statement.
The case was adjourned to 2.7.1969.
On that date the written statement was filed and the tenant tendered a sum of Rs. 336 on account of arrears of rent from 13.2.1968 to 12.6.1969 together with Rs. 15 as interest and Rs. 25 as costs as fixed by the Rent Control ler.
The landlord accepted the amount under protest.
One of the issues framed in the said case was whether the tender was a valid tender within the meaning of proviso to section 13(2) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
The Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition being of the view that since on the first day of appearance the tenant did not tender payment he was in default.
On appeal, the appellate authority reversed the finding holding that the next date fixed by the Rent Controller for filing written statement and on which date the payment was tendered ,and received by the landlord under protest was the "first day of hearing" contemplated by proviso to section 13(2Xi) of the Rent Act.
In Revi sion, the High Court restored the order of the Rent Controller.
Hence the appeal by special leave.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, 510 HELD: The day mentioned in the summons i.e. 26.6.1969, in the instant case, cannot be treated to be day of first hearing of the ejectment application but it is the day for appearance of the defendent as on that day the Court does not take up the hearing or apply its mind to the hearing of the application.
It is only after written statement is filed, the issues are framed and hearing commences.
[513A] The object of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act as stated in the Preamble to the Act is to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas and eviction of tenants therefrom.
From the objects of this Act it is abundantly clear that this Act was enacted with the object of affording protection to the tenants against arbitrary increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas as well as from eviction of the tenants from the rented premises.
In this context, it is imper ative that the word "the first hearing of the application" have to be interpreted in a manner which promote the object of this bene ficial legislation.
Viewed from this aspect it must be held that the words "first hearing of the application" as used in proviso (i) to sub section 2 of section 13 of the said Act does not mean the day fixed for return of the summons or the returnable day but the day when the Court applies its mind to the case.
[515E G] Ved Prakash vs Vishwa Mohan, , followed.
Mangat Rai vs Ved Prakash, 1969 Vol. 1 Rent Control Reporter p. 96; Shah Ambalal Chhotalal & Ors., vs Shah Babal Das Dayabhai & Ors., AIR 1964 (Gujarat) p. 9 and Khanderao Malkarjun Dhotre vs Anandrao Laxmanrao Mashal kar, AIR 1959 (Bombay) p. 471, approved.