judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 1004 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.12.1987 of the High Court of Calcutta in Civil Order No. 2506 of 1987.
509 S.N. Kacker, N. Choudhary and Rathin Das for the Appellant.
A.P. Chatterjee, Deepak Mitra and G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J.
The jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, Calcutta to entertain a suit being T.S. No. 520 of 1983 filed by the respondent No. 1 is under challenge in the present appeal, on the ground that the correct value of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.
The plaintiff respondent No. 1 has alleged that he is a partner of a partnership business along with his brothers defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
Originally it was a proprietary business belonging to Abdul Samad, father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and was later converted into a partnership firm by a regular deed.
During his life time the business was under the control of Abdul Samad, but on his death the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have effectively taken charge of the business and excluded the plaintiff.
A suggestion to re constitute and partnership made and repeated by the plaintiff has been ignored.
In reply to the plaintiff 's letter seeking information the defendant No. 2 petitioner has stated in his letter to the plaintiff that he (the plaintiff) has no interest in the firm.
In paragraph 11 of the plaint it is stated that he has on enquiry discovered that the defendants nos.
1 and 2 have been falsely representing before the Income Tax department, inter alia, that a new deed of partnership had been executed on 15.1.1979 to be effective from 1.1.1979 in which the plaintiff has no interest.
The Income Tax Officer passed an order on 26th December 1981 on the basis of the false allegations made by the defendants.
The plaintiff has challenged the aforementioned partnership deed of 1979.
In paragraph 16 of the plaint the amount of profit from the business has been described as "huge".
In the prayer portion of the plaint the plaintiff prayed for declaring the partnership deed of 1979 as illegal and void and for passing a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm and for accounts.
The valuation of the suit was put as Rs.150 being the sum of Rs.50 for declaration, Rs. 50 for rendition of accounts and another sum of Rs. 50 for profit to the share of the plaintiff arising out of the business.
Court fee was accordingly paid.
The defendants No. 1 and 2, besides denying the plaint allegations made by the plaintiff, challenged the valuation given by the plaintiff as grossly undervalued and arbitrary.
The issues relating to the correct valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to enter 510 tain the suit were taken up as preliminary issues and were decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendants challenged the order by a civil revision application before the Calcutta High Court which was dismised.
The defendant No. 2 has now come to this Court against the High Court 's order.
Special leave is granted.
Mr. Kacker, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that it is manifest that relief to the tune of lacs of rupees has been claimed by the plaintiff in the suit.
He said that the plaintiff has laid claim to a sum of Rs.1,26,796.72 besides another sum of over Rs.84,000 as his share in the profit for a particular period by reference to the proceeding of the Income Tax department mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint, and it is, therefore, preposterous on his part to suggest in paragraph 19 of the plaint that it could be tentatively valued at Rs.50 only.
According to the defence case which is challenged as incorrect by the plaintiff, the plaintiff requested for and was allowed a larger share 'in the well established and reputed business of auctioneer known as "Russell Exchange" and its assets and goodwill as well as the amount lying in the Habib Bank, Karachi Branch, solely and absolutely '.
The "Russell Exchange" building is a very valuable property near Park Street in the city of Calcutta.
A copy of the Profit and Loss Account for the calendar year 1979 attached by the plaintiff to the additional affidavit filed on his behalf before this Court mentions figures in lacs.
Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent No. 1, has argued that the suit is governed for the purpose of court fees by section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, and the plaintiff has the absolute right to put on the plaint any value he wishes to and the court has no jurisdiction to examine the matter.
In other words, it is the sweet will of the plaintiff to choose any figure he likes and thus decide finally the court which shall have jurisdiction to entertain the suit without reference to the subject matter of the litigation, the nature and extent of the relief claimed or any other factor.
He has relied upon the decision of this Court in Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, , and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, ; Reference was also made to Krishnaji Hari vs Gopal Narayan, AIR 1936 Bombay 166 and Ishwarappa vs Dhanji, AIR 1932 Bombay 111.
Mr. Chatterjee claimed that the different High Courts in the country have consistently confirmed this right of the plaintiff and he has not discovered any decision to the contrary.
511 5.
We are afraid, the interpretation put by the learned counsel on the decisions of this Court is not correct and cannot be accepted.
None of the two cited judgments relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee helps him.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after taking all the accounts and he may, therefore, put a tentative valuation upon the suit, but he is not permitted to choose an unreasonable and arbitrary figure for that purpose.
At page 392 of the judgment in Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, (supra) this Court while taking note of the plaintiff 's right to give a tentative valuation on the suit, observed: "The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under value the relief." In Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, , the view was reiterated thus at page 70: ". .
The plaintiff however, has not been given the absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on such relief and where the plaintiff manifestly and deliberately under estimates the relief the court is entitled to examine the correctness of the valuation given by the plaintiff and to revise the same if it is patently arbitrary or unreasonable . ." 6.
So far as the opinion of the High Courts is concerned, it is not uniform.
The argument, "that the plaintiff can give an arbitrary valuation in the plaint, and that the court is bound to accept that" made on behalf of the plaintiff before the Allahabad High Court in Aizaz Ahmad vs Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 Allahabad 849, was rejected, after observing that there was some authority for the extreme view as urged in two Calcutta decisions but later a different view was taken by the said Court as also by the Allahabad Court.
In Attar Singh vs Manohar Singh, ILR (1947) Nagpur 933, the plaintiff non applicant before the High Court filed a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts valuing at Rs.150 as has been done in the case before us.
The defendant 's objection to the valuation was rejected by the trial court "on the ground that the court was powerless to challenge the valuation put by the plaintiff on the relief claimed in the suit.
" The Full Bench decision in Mata Ram vs Daulat, ILR (1938) Nagpur 588 (F.B.) was attempted to be distinguished on the basis that it was a case covered by section 7(iv)(c).
of the Court Fees Act and not by section 7(iv)(f).
The 512 High Court while repelling the argument pointed out that the principle underlying both the clauses (c) and (f) of section 7(iv) is substantially the same and the Full Bench decision governed the case.
Accordingly it was held that when the valuation put by the plaintiff appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable the court may reject it and leave the plaintiff to correct the valuation or have the suit rejected.
Similar was the view of the Patna High Court in suits covered by section 7(iv)(c) in Salahuddinhyder vs Dhanoolal, [1945] ILR XXIV Patna 334, and Shama Pershad Shahi vs Sheopershad Singh XLI, I.C. 95 (Patna).
In Gouri Lal and others vs Raja Babu, AIR 1929 Patna 626, the respondent filed a suit praying for accounts from appellant No. 1.
Rejecting his claim to put any valuation under section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act the High Court observed that when a plaintiff is required to place the valuation on his claim he must state a valuation which need only be approximately correct but qualified it by saying that, "it must not be arbitrary or manifestly inadequate.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit.
The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation.
Ordinarily the Court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter.
If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard.
In such a case it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation.
The cases of some of the High Courts which have taken a different view must be held to be incorrectly decided.
The learned counsel for the parties have placed before us the materials on the record at considerable length and we do not have any hesitation in holding that the valuation put by the plaintiff (respondent before us) on the plaint is arbitrary and unacceptable.
We, however, do not propose to examine the matter further and remit this question to be reconsidered by the trial court.
While examining the issue it will be open to the trial court to take into consideration the statement in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ousted from the partnership business.
If the court comes to the conclusion that the tentative valuation of the suit would be beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, it shall pass an appropriate order under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs payable by the plaintiff respondent.
G.N. Appeal allowed.

summary:
The father and brothers of Respondent No. 1 were running a proprietary business, which was later converted into a partnership firm by a regular deed.
On the death of the father, the two brothers had effectively taken control of the business and excluded Respondent No. 1.
The suggestion to reconstitute the partnership made repeatedly by Respondent No. 1 had been ignored.
The two brothers represented before the Income Tax Officer that a new deed of partnership had been executed on 15.1.1979 to be effective from 1.1.1979 in which Respondent No. 1 had no interest and on that basis the Income Tax Officer passed an order.
In the suit filed by Respondent No. 1, he challenged the partnership deed as being illegal and void and prayed for a decree for dissolution of the partnership firm and for accounts.
Valuation of the suit was put as Rs.150 i.e., Rs.50 each for declaration, rendition of accounts, and for profit to the share of the plaintiff.
Court fee was paid accordingly.
The defendants in the suit denied the allegations made in the plaint and also challenged the valuation as being grossly undervalued and arbitrary.
The issue relating to the correct valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court was decided in favour of the plaintiff.
The defendants challenged the order by a Civil Revision Application which was dismissed by the High Court.
This appeal by special leave is against the High Court 's order.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that while relief to the tune of lakhs of rupees had been claimed, the plaint had been tentatively valued for Rs.50 only, which is preposterous.
The contention of Respondent No. 1 was that a Plaintiff has the absolute right to put on the plaint any 508 value he wishes and the court has no jurisdiction to examine the matter.
Allowing the appeal, this Court, ^ HELD: 1.
It is true that in a suit for accounts the correct amount payable by one party to the other can be ascertained only when the accounts are examined and it is not possible to give an accurate valuation of the claim at the inception of the suit.
The plaintiff is, therefore, allowed to give his own tentative valuation.
Ordinarily the Court shall not examine the correctness of the valuation chosen, but the plaintiff cannot act arbitrarily in this matter.
If a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure it is tantamount to not exercising his right in this regard.
In such a case it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation.
[512D E] 2.
In the instant case the valuation put by the plaintiff on the plaint is arbitrary and unacceptable.
However, the question is remitted to the trial court for reconsideration.
It is open to the trial court to take into consideration the statement in the plaint that the plaintiff has been ousted from the partnership business.
If the court comes to the conclusion that the tentative valuation of the suit would be beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction, it shall pass an appropriate order under Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[512F G] Smt.
Tara Devi vs Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, ; Meenakshisundaram Chettiar vs Venkatachalam Chettiar, ; , relied on.
Aizaz Ahmad vs Nazirul Hasan, AIR 1935 Allahabad 849; Attar Singh vs Manohar Singh, ILR (1947) Nagpur 933; Mata Ram vs Daulat ILR (1938) Nagpur 588 (F.B.); Salahuddinhyder vs Dhanoolal, [1945] ILR XXIV Patna 334; Shama Pershad Sahi vs Sheopershad Singh XLI I.C. 95 (Patna); Gouri Lal and others vs Raja Babu, AIR 929 Patna 626, approved.
Krishnaji Hari vs Gopal Narayan.
AIR 1936 Bombay 166 and Ishwarappa vs Dhanji, AIR 1932 Bombay 111, overruled.


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 537 of 1986.
From the Judgment and order dated 3.9.1986 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 936 of 1983.
Rajinder Singh, Ranjit Kumar, N. Jain, and Wasim A. Qadri for the Appellants.
Uma Datta and T.C. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINGH, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 3.9.1986 setting aside the trial court 's order acquitting the appellants herein and convicting them for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Panel Code and sentencing each of them to undergo imprisonment for life.
The prosecution case in brief is that on 4.1.1982 Ram Pratap Singh deceased resident of village Kharoni P.S. Ajaigarh, District Panna had gone to Collectorate Panna to file reply to a show cause notice issued to him for the cancellation of his gun licence.
While he was at the Collectorate he noticed Om Prakash and Raghvendra who were inimical to him, were shadowing him in the Collectorate.
He requested Rajendra Singh PW 14, Chottey Bhaiya PW 15, and Mohd. Tohid PW 16 to accompany him on his return journey as he sensed danger to his life.
Ram Pratap Singh the deceased sent Tohid to purchase tickets for Bus with a direction that he should meet him at the octroi Toll barrier on the Ajaigarh Road from where he proposed to take the Bus, thereafter the deceased along with Rajendra Singh, PW 14, and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15 proceeded on foot to Chungi Chowki, (octroi Post) situate at about two furlongs away from the Collectorate on the Ajaigarh Road.
While the deceased, Rajendra Singh and 518 Chhotey Bhaiya were waiting for Tohid near the octroi Post one bus arrived, but the deceased told Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya not to travel by that bus as he had apprehension that Raghvendra and his associates may be inside the bus.
While they were waiting for Tohid, the deceased went for drinking water from a well which was near the road at the octroi Post.
After drawing the water from the well while the deceased was in the process of drinking water at that precise moment gun shots were fired towards him from the Northern side from the Bari boundary, causing injuries to him in his chest and hand.
On receipt of injuries the deceased ran towards his associates and fell on a takhat near Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya.
The prosecution further alleged that Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya on hearing the gun shot saw the appellant Brajendra armed with a .315 rifle and Awadhesh armed with a 12 bore gun running away along with an other person named Kailash who was also armed with a gun.
Rajendra Singh PW 14 who was armed with a. 275 rifle and Chhotey Bhaiya was armed with a 12 bore gun fired shots towards the assailants.
The assailants also fired towards them, but they escaped.
On hearing the gun shot fire V.P. Pathak, Sub Inspector of Police PW 20 accompanied by Constable Lakhan Singh PW 12 rushed to the spot.
Rajendra Singh PW 14 gave him information about the incident which was recorded by Pathak, (Dehati Nalishi exhibit P. 12 at 3.10 p.m.).
V.P. Pathak, the Sub Inspector sent the Dehati Nalishi to Kot vali Panna through Lakhan Singh, Constable, for recording the first information report.
After holding inquest, Pathak, the Sub Inspector prepared Panchnama and sent requisition for post mortem examination of the dead body and he also prepared the spot map exhibit P. 17 on the same day.
After completion of investigation a charge sheet was submitted against five accused persons including the two appellants Brajendra and Awadhesh for trial for offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Panel Code.
Kailash one of the accused was shown absconding.
Before the trial court Rajendra Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15 supported the prosecution case as eye witnesses, they claimed to have witnessed the assault, they further claimed that they had recognised the accused persons.
The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved the testimony of these two eye witnesses, be referred to a number of circumstances which made the prosecution story doubtful, therefore, he acquitted the accused.
On appeal by the State Government the High Court disagreed with the reasons recorded by the trial court and placing reliance on the testimony of the eye witnesses, i.e., Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya, it allowed the State 's appeal and set aside the acquittal of the appellants and convicted them under Section 302 519 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and awarded sentence of imprisonment for life to each of them.
The trial court held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and no reliance could be placed on the testimony of the Rajender Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15.
The trial court referred to a number of circumstances creating doubt on the credibility of the prosecution story but the High Court differed from those findings and on appraisal of evidence it came to the conclusion that the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
The High Court referred to a number of decisions of this court in considering the scope of its jurisdiction in interfering with an order of acquittal passed by the trial court but while applying the principles it failed to appreciate that the view taken by the trial court was reasonable and plausible.
Even the High Court has not held that the view taken by the trial court was not a possible view.
The High Court reappraised the evidence and took a different view and it explained the infirmities of the prosecution pointed out by the Sessions Judge.
In G. B. Patel & Anr.
vs State of Maharashtra, ; this Court quoted with approval the principles laid down by Privy Council in Sheo Swarup vs King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 wherein it was held that although the power of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusion, are as extensive as in an appeal against the order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, the High Court should always give proper weight and consideration to matters e.g. (i) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (iv) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
Sarkaria, J. speaking for the court observed "where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should, as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the court below.
In other words, if the main grounds on which the court below based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible, and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal.
" While considering an appeal against acquittal the High Court must keep in mind these principles in appreciating the evidence of witnesses.
If on appraisal of the evidence and on considering relevant attending circumstances it is found that two views are possible, one as held by the trial court for acquitting the accused, and the other for 520 convicting the accused in such a situation the rule of prudence should guide the High Court not to disturb the order of acquittal made by the trial court.
Unless the conclusions of the trial court drawn on the evidence on record are found to be unreasonable, perverse or unsustainable, the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal.
The High Court has in the instant case made an attempt to explain away the infirmities in the testimony of eye witnesses in setting aside the order of acquittal.
The High Court has in our opinion disregarded the rule of judicial prudence in converting the order of acquittal to conviction .
The trial court held that the cumulative effect of the following circumstances made the prosecution case doubtful, these are; (i) first information report was not recorded or lodged at the time it purports to have been lodged, (ii) Rajendra Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15, the two eye witnesses did not give the names of assailants to Tohid, (iii) recovery of two cartridges on 5th January.
1982 one day after the occurrence, (iv) nature and position of injuries on the body of the deceased were not consistent with the testimony of eye witnesses having regard to the local site (v) empty cartridges of .315 rifle which were alleged to have been fixed by Brijesh and 12 bore cartridge was alleged to have been fired by Awadesh accused causing injuries to the deceased, but the same were not sent to ballistic expert for his opinion nor he was examined to support the prosecution case, (vi) unnatural and inconsistent testimony of eye witnesses Rajendra Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15, (vii) a large number of persons were available at the scene of occurrence at the octroi Toll barrier but no independent witness, either employee of the Toll barrier or of Home Guard or any other person was examined to support the prosecution.
The High Court made an attempt to explain the circumstances in holding that some times the memory of the witnesses fail and a broad view of the evidence given by the eye witnesses clearly indicated that the prosecution had proved its case.
We have been taken through the entire evidence and we have also closely and carefully considered the judgment of the trial court and the High Court.
We are of opinion that the High Court committed error in interfering with the order of acquittal .
The first information report exhibit P. 12 shows that the occurrence took place on 14.15 hours while the report was lodged at 15.10 hours that is to say within 55 minutes of the occurrence.
The evidence on record and the attending circumstances indicate that the first information report was not lodged at 15.10 hours instead it was lodged at about 521 17.00 hours.
Rajendra Singh, PW 14 stated before the trial court that from the place of occurrence he had accompanied the police to Panna Kotwali where he lodged the report and signed the exhibit P. 12.
In cross examination he stated that he had gone to the Kotwali for lodging report in a police van.
He further stated that the report had been written by the Police clerk on his dictation, and that the police arrived at the scene of occurrence after an hour of his lodging the first information report.
At an earlier stage he had stated that the police had arrived at the place of occurrence at about 3.30 p.m. and thereafter he had accompanied the police to Kotwali for lodging the report.
His testimony regarding lodging of the first information report is contradictory.
V.P. Pathak, PW 20 Sub Inspector of police, the investigating officer, stated that it was wrong to say that the first information report exhibit P. 12 was made by Rajendra Singh at Kotwali.
According to him he was on duty at Collectorate and there he got the news at about 2.30 or 3.00 p.m. that gun shots were fired at Toll barrier on the Ajaigarh Road, he reached there with few minutes along with Lakhan Singh, Constable.
On reaching the spot he wrote Marg intimation drew up panchnama of the dead body and sent the dead body for post mortem examination and thereafter he recorded Dehati Nalishi exhibit P. 12.
He asserted that first information report had been recorded at the place of occurrence.
He further stated that Dehati Nalishi was recorded by him after the dead body of the deceased had been sent by him for post mortem examination which according to the document (exhibit P. 8) was sent at 5.00 p.m.
His statement clearly indicates that the first information report was written after 17.00 hours and it was not recorded at the time it purports to have been lodged.
There are material contradictions in the testimony of Rajendra Singh PW. 14 and the investigating officer.
Since the Sub Inspector, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police had reached the place of occurrence within few minutes of the incident, the delay in lodging the first information report is highly suspicious.
Why this delay when all officers were present, and eye witnesses were present at the spot and the police station was at a distance of two furlongs.
The obvious reason appears to be that the names of the assailants were not known as most likely the alleged two eye witnesses had not seen the assailants and they were not present at the scene of occurrence, at the time the shooting took place, in all likelihood, they like, others arrived at the scene after the incident.
Since names of the assailants were not known the F.I.R. was lodged with delay after deliberation.
This view finds support from testimony of Tohid PW 16 and other circumstances.
According to the prosecution the deceased Ram 522 Pratap Singh had sent Tohid to purchase bus tickets and had directed him to meet him at the Chungi Naka on Ajaigarh Road.
He had further told Tohid PW 16 that he was apprehending danger from the accused persons so he would get into bus at the Toll barrier.
After giving instructions to Tohid he proceeded to Chungi Chowki (Octroi Post) along with Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya.
The prosecution further alleged that after the occurrence took place Ram Pratap Singh 's dead body was lying near Takhat at the Octroi barrier when Thiod arrived at the scene.
He met Rajendra Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15 who were waiting.
Tohid PW 16 testified that when he reached the toll barrier neither Rajendra Singh nor Chhotey Bhaiya disclosed the names of the assailants.
Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15 in his testimony stated that when Tohid arrived at the scene of occurrence he did not enquire from him or from Rajendra Singh as to who had killed Ram Pratap Singh.
At a later stage in cross examination he said that Tohid had asked Rajendra Singh PW 14 who had killed Ram Pratap Singh but Rajendra Singh told him that he would tell him later while going to the police station for lodging the first information report.
According to Rajendra Singh PW 14 when Tohid reached the spot he directed him to proceed to the Collectorate and give information to the police about the murder having taken place.
Tohid proceeded to the Collectorate and from there he contacted the Kotwali on telephone and gave information about the murder having taken place near the Toll barrier.
Rajendra Singh PW 14 has stated that neither Tohid asked nor he told him the names of the assailants.
This conduct is highly improbable and unnatural.
Admittedly Tohid, Rajendra, Chhotey Bhaiya and the deceased were friends of each other and Tohid had been sent by the deceased to bring bus tickets and he had also told him about apprehensions to his life and according to the Rajendra Singh PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya PW 15 when Tohid arrived at the scene he did not enquire about the names of the assailants, although dead body of the deceased was lying at the spot.
This is highly unnatural.
When Tohid was cross examined on this question he tried to explain that while he was proceeding to the police station along with Rajendra Sing PW 14 to lodge the first information report the latter had told him the names of the assailants.
We have noticed earlier that according to investigating officer first information report was recorded at the scene of occurrence and not at the police station.
This indicates that Tohid and Rajendra Singh 's story regarding their going together to Kotwali is highly suspicious.
In view of the material contradiction in the statement of three witnesses Rajendra Singh PW 14, Chhotey Bhiaya PW 15 and Tohid PW 16 and further in view of the discrepancy regarding the delay in lodging the first information report, 523 it is apparent that till the first information report was lodged nobody knew who the assailants were and that is why Rajendra Singh could not disclose the names of the assailants to Tohid on his arrival at the scene of occurrence.
The prosecution relied upon the recovery of the two empty cartridges one of them .315 rifle and the other of 12 bore gun.
By recovery of these cartridges the prosecution tried to connect the appellants with the commission of the crime as Raghvendra Singh was alleged to have fired from .315 rifle and Awadhesh with 12 bore gun.
The recovery of these empty cartridges were not made on 4.1.1982 instead these cartridges were recovered on 5.1.1982, although spot map of the scene of occurrence was prepared on 4.1.1982 itself.
It is interesting to note that the spot where these cartridges were recovered was shown in the spot map prepared on 4.1.1982 although recovery was made on 5.1.1982.
The witnesses in whose presence recovery of the cartridges were made have not supported the prosecution.
Moreover, it is the admitted case of the prosecution that there was exchange of fire from both sides, by the assailants as well as by Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya, but no other cartridges were recovered by the investigating officer.
The investigating officer did not take into possession the licenced rifle of Raghvendra Singh appellant and the 12 bore gun of Awadhesh nor any effort was made to secure the evidence of ballistic expert to prove that the empty cartridges had been fired from the respective weapons.
These circumstances indicate that empty cartridges were not recovered instead investigating officer planted these cartridges to support the prosecution case.
On the evidence on record it is apparent that the Chungi Chowki (Octroi Toll Barrier) was manned by the employees of the Municipal Board and they were present at the spot and in addition to them there was Home Guard Office quite adjacent to the Toll Barrier and there were other residential houses near the Barrier and the place of occurrence was a busy public place.
It has further come into evidence that large number of persons had gathered at the scene of occurrence but surprisingly enough no employee of Toll Barrier, Home Guard or local resident came forward to support the prosecution case.
The District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and other officers had also reached the spot within few minutes of the incident but none of them entered the witness box to support the prosecution case.
The prosecution produced Udai Singh PW 17 and Kali Charan PW 19 who deposed that they had seen the appellants running away with weapons and that they had recognised them.
It is interesting to note that Udai Singh and 524 Kali Charan are residents of Uttar Pradesh and they are close relatives of the deceased, their presence at the scene of occurrence was highly doubtful and their testimony is not free from doubt, as they are highly interested persons.
The Trial Court rightly discarded their testimony as their statement had been recorded by the police after two months of the occurrence without there being any explanation for the delay.
In his testimony Dr. Jain, who carried out the post mortem examination of the dead body of deceased Ram Pratap Singh, stated that he found following gun shot wounds: "Gunshot wound No. 1: (a) Wound of entrance: One circular wound 5 mm.
in diameter present two and a half inch below the left exilla and half inch posterior to left exillary lime.
In the way the bullet had perforated the following organs of the body The bullet had passed through the lateral side of left 5th ribe.
There was a fracture of lateral side of left 5th ribe.
After that the bullet passed through the lower third of left pleura and entered in the left lung and perforated through the lung parindiama.
There was through and through (complete) perforation of lower third of left pleura and lung.
After exit from the lung, it crossed through the past side of right ventricle of heart.
Posterior side of right ventricle of heart was completely lacerated.
After exit from the posterior side of right ventricle of heart the bullet passed through the upper border of liver and the whole upper border of liver was completely lacerated.
(b) Wound of Exit: One circular wound in diameter present over posterior and right side of chest at the level of 7th dorsel spine three and a half inch right lateral in the vertibral column.
The margins of the wound were slightly lacerated.
There was fracture of 9th and 10th.
ribe of right posterior side.
The direction of passage of bullet of gun shot in wound No. 1 was antere posteriorly.
Gunshot wound No:2: (a) Wound of entrance 4 mm.
diameter circular wound present over left 6th.
intercostal space 2" lateral to left sterval 525 border.
After passing from the left 6th intercostal space the bullet perforated the upper part of stomach.
After escaping from medial side of stomach it came out from side of chest at the level of 7th dorsal spine from the 8th intercostal space of right posterior side.
(b) Wound of exit one circular wound 5 mm.
in diameter present at the level of 7th dorsal spine 2 and half inch right lateral to spinal column.
The direction of bullet of gunshot in wound No. 2 was entre posteriorly.
Thororic cavity was hugely filled with dark coloured blood.
Gunshot Wound No. 3: (a) Wound of entrance 3 mm.
diameter circular would present 1" above postre lateral aspect of right wrist.
The bullet had passed through the right radius have and the wound of exit was over antro lateral aspect 1" above the right wrist joint.
Wound of exit was circular 5 mm.
in diameter.
" These injuries could not be caused in the manner and from the place where assailants were alleged to be present at the time of firing the gun shots, and the same are inconsistent with the testimony of the eye witnesses and the site plan.
We do not think it necessary to discuss it in detail as the trial court has discussed this question at length and we agree with those findings.
According to the testimony of Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya PWs, when the deceased got gun shot injuries, he was at a higher level at the well whereas the assailants fired the shots from Bari, which was at lower level by one foot from the road and the well was higher than the road by two or two and a half foot.
In this view if shots were fired from Bari, at the deceased who was drinking water in a sitting posture, the injuries in all likelihood would have been from lower part to upper part but Dr. Jain deposed that direction of the injuries caused by bullet was from upper part to lower part and the bullet was ante posteriorly.
In the opinion of the doctor, the person who caused injuries to the deceased was at higher level than the deceased, this is wholly inconsistent with the testimony of eyewitnesses.
Though medical expert 's opinion is not always final and binding, but in the instant case it corroborates other circumstances which indicate that the eye witnesses had not seen the actual occurrence.
526 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances we are satisfied that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt, and the High Court committed error in interfering with the trial court 's order of acquittal.
We accordingly allow the appeal set aside the order of the High Court and the appellants ' conviction and restore the order of the trial court and acquit the appellants.
The appellants are in jail, they shall be set forth to liberty forthwith.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
This appeal was directed against the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, setting aside the order of the trial court acquitting the appellants, and convicting them under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of them to undergo imprisonment for life.
The prosecution case was that on 4.1.1982 Ram Pratap Singh deceased had gone to Collectorate, Panna where he noticed that Om Prakash and Raghvendra, who were inimical to him, were shadowing him in the Collectorate.
He requested Rajendra Singh PW 14, Chhotey Bhaiya.
PW 5, and Mohd. Tohid, PW 16, to accompany him on his return journey as he sensed danger to his life, and sent Tohid to purchase bus tickets with a direction that he should meet him at the octroi toll barrier on the Ajaigarh Road from where he proposed to take the bus.
Thereafter, he alongwith Rajendra Singh, PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya.
PW 15, proceeded to Chungi Chowki (octroi Post) on the Ajaigarh Road.
While they were waiting for Tohid, Ram Pratap Singh went for drinking water from a well nearby.
When he was just in the process of drinking water, gun shots were fired towards him, causing injuries to him.
Upon this, he ran towards his associates and fell down near Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya.
The prosecution further alleged that on hearing the gun shots, Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya saw the appellant Brajendra armed with a.315 rifle and Awadesh armed with a 12 bore gun running away.
Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya, armed with a rifle and a gun respectively, fired shots towards the assailants and the assailants also fired towards them.
On hearing gun fire, V.P. Pathak, Sub lnspector of Police, PW 20, rushed to the spot with Constable Lakhan Singh, PW 12.
Rajendra Singh, PW 14 gave him information about the incident, which was recorded by him (Dehati Nalishi exhibit P. 12 at 3.10 P.M.) V.P. Pathak, 514 sent the Dehati Nalishi to Kotwali Panna through Lakhan Singh, Constable, for recording the first information report.
Pathak, sub inspector then prepared the panchnama and spot map Ex P. 17 on the same day.
A charge sheet was submitted against five accused persons, including the two appellants Brajendra and Awadesh for trial for offences under section 312 read with section 34 and section 307 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The Trial Court disbelieved the testimony of the two eye witnesses, Rajendra Singh, PW 14 and Chhotey Bhaiya, PW IS, and referring to a number of circumstances which made the prosecution story doubtful, acquitted the accused.
On appeal by the State Government, the High Court disagreed with the reasons recorded by the Trial Court, and placing reliance on the testimony of the eye witnesses, i.e. Rajendra Singh and Chhotey Bhaiya, allowed the State appeal, set aside the acquittal of the appellants and convicted them under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and awarded a sentence of life imprisonment to each of them.
The appellants appealed to this court against the decision of the High Court.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^ HELD: The High Court on an appraisal of the evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
It referred to a number of decisions of this Court in considering the scope of its jurisdiction in interfering with an order of acquittal passed by the trial court, but while applying the principles, it failed to appreciate that the view taken by the trial court was reasonable and plausible.
While considering an appeal against acquittal, the High Court must, in appreciating the evidence, keep in mind that if on appraisal of evidence and considering relevant attending circumstances it is found that two views are possible, one held by the trial court for acquitting the accused, and the other, for convicting the accused, in such a situation, the rule of prudence should guide the High Court not to disturb the order of acquittal made by the trial court.
Unless the conclusions of the trial court drawn on the evidence on record are found to be unreasonable, perverse of unsustainable, the High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal.
The High Court in this case made an attempt to explain away the infirmities in the testimony of the eye witnesses in setting aside the order of acquittal.
The High Court disregarded the rule of judicial prudence in converting the order of acquittal to conviction, and committed error in interfering with the order of acquittal.
[519G H; 520A B] 515 The first information report, exhibit P. 12, showed that the occurrence took place at 14.15 hours while the report was lodged at 15.10 hours.
The evidence on record and the attending circumstances indicated that the first information report was not lodged at 15.10 hours; instead it was lodged at about 17.00 hours.
The testimony of Rajendra Singh, PW 14, regarding the lodging of the first information report was contradictory.
The statement of V.P. Pathak, PW 20, the investigating officer, clearly indicated that the first information report was written after 17.00 hours and it was not recorded at the time it purported to have been lodged.
There were material contradictions in the testimony of Rajendra Singh PW 14 and the investigating officer.
Since the Sub Inspector, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police had reached the place of occurrence within a few minutes of the incident, the delay in lodging the first information report was highly suspicious.
Why this delay when all officers and the eye witnesses were present at the spot, and the police station was at a distance of two furlongs? The obvious reason appeared to be that the names of the assailants were not known, as most likely, the eye witnesses had not seen the assailants and they were not present at the scene of the occurrence.
In all likelihood, they arrived at the scene after the incident, and since the names of the assailants were not known, the F.l.
R. was lodged with delay after deliberation.
This view finds support from the testimony of Tohid PW 16 and other circumstances.
There were material contradictions in the statements of the three witnesses Rajendra Singh PW 14, Chhotey Bhaiya, PW 15 and Tohid, PW 16, and in view of the same and, further in view of the discrepancy regarding the delay in the lodging of the first information report, it was apparent that till the first information report was lodged, nobody knew who the assailants were and that was why Rajendra Singh could not disclose the names of the assailants to Tohid on his arrival at the scene of occurrence after he had been sent to bring the bus tickets.
[520H; 521A C. E; 522H; 523A] The prosecution relied upon the recovery of the two empty cartridges to connect the appellants with the commission of the crime.
The recovery of these empty cartridges was not made on 4.1.1982; instead, these cartridges were recovered on 5.1.82, although the spot map of the scene of occurrence was prepared on 4.1.82 itself.
It was interesting to note that the spot where these cartridges were recovered was shown in the spot map prepared on 4.1.82 although the recovery was made on S.1.82.
The witnesses in whose presence the recovery of the cartridges was made had not supported the prosecution.
Moreover, it was the admitted case of the prosecution that there was an exchange of fire from both sides by the assailants and by Rajendra Singh and 516 Chhotey Bhaiya but no other cartridges were recovered by the Investigating officer.
The investigating officer did not take into possession the licensed rifle and gun of Raghavendra Singh and Awadesh, nor was any effort made to secure the evidence of the ballistic expert to prove that the empty cartridges had been fired from the respective weapons.
These circumstances indicated that the empty cartridges were not recovered; instead, the investigating officer had planted those cartridges to support the prosecution case.
[523B E] On the evidence on record, it was apparent that the Chungi Chowki (octroi toll barrier) was manned by the employees of the Municipal Board, who were present at the spot, and in addition to them, there was Home Guard office adjacent to the toll barrier and there were residential houses near the barrier and the place of occurrence was a busy public place.
It came into evidence that large number of persons had gathered at the scene of occurrence, but no employee of the toll barrier or Home Guard once or local resident came forward to support the prosecution case.
The District Magistrate, the superintendent of Police and other officers had also reached the spot within minutes of the incident, but none of them entered the witness box to support the prosecution case.
The prosecution produced Udai Singh PW 17 and Kali Charan PW 19, who were residents of Uttar Pradesh and close relatives of the deceased.
Their presence at the scene of occurrence as highly doubtful and their testimony was not free from doubt as they were highly interested persons.
The trial court rightly discarded their testimony as their statements had been recorded by the police after two months of the occurrence.
without there being an explanation for the delay.
[523F H; 524A B] The injuries mentioned in the testimony of Dr. Jain who had carried out the post mortem examination of the dead body of Ram Pratap Singh, could not be caused in the manner and from the place where the assailants were alleged to be present at the time of firing, and the same were inconsistent with the testimony of the eye witnesses and the site plan.
The trial court had discussed this question at length and the Court agreed with the findings of the trial Court.
In the opinion of the doctor, the person who caused injuries to the deceased was at a higher level than the deceased; this was wholly inconsistent with the testimony of the eye witnesses.
Though medical expert 's opinion is not always final and binding, in this case, it corroborated the other circumstances which indicated that the eye witnesses had not seen the actual occurrence.
[524B; 525E H] 517 The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and the High Court committed error in interfering with the trial court 's order of acquittal.
Order of the High Court and the appellant 's conviction were set aside and order of the trial court was restored and the appellants were acquitted.
[526A B] G.B. Patel & Anr.
vs State of Maharashtra, ; and Sheo Swarup vs King.
Emperor, A.l.R.


judgement:
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4783 of 1988.
536 From the Judgment and order dated 23.2.88 of the High Court of Gujarat in Civil Rev. Appln.
No. 1737 of 1982.
S.K. Dholakia, D.L. Kothari, R.C. Bhatia and P.C. Kapur for the Petitioners.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
This is an application for leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat dated 23rd February, 1988.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the civil revision application which challenged the award made in this case.
The petitioner is the father of the respondent.
Both of them are established Vaidyas in Rajkot.
They come from a well to do family.
The petitioner is advanced in age and both the father and the son have been fighting between themselves since more than a decade.
The High Court found that the petitioner and the respondent had referred their disputes to one Kantibhai Vaidya (Shri Kantilal Dayaram Jani) who had intervened between them with the good intention to bring their disputes to an end.
He made an award.
The award was produced.
It appears that the award was endorsed and signed by both the parties.
In the award, it was stated by the arbitrator that he had called both the father and the son at his residence on 18th January, 1977.
He had discussed the matter with both of them and had warned them that both of them would ruin themselves in the property disputes, if they did not solve the matter amicably.
In the award, it was stated that the entire responsibility of solving the dispute was entrusted to him and the petitioner and the respondent had agreed to such entrustment.
Accordingly, he made the award on 18th January, 1977.
Below the award, both the parties and the arbitrator had signed.
The endorsement reads, when translated in English, as found by the High Court that the award is agreed to and binding upon both the parties and that the entire responsibility of the arbitrator will lie on Shri Kantibhai Vaidya and that he has taken the responsibility.
Thereafter followed a spell of litigation.
The respondent applied on 20th June, 1977 for filing the award and sought the judgment in terms of the award under section 17 of the (hereinafter called 'the Act ').
A notice consequent upon the filing of the award was issued to the petitioner.
The application was converted into Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977.
It was stated in the application to file the award, that the 537 petitioner had torn off the award and, therefore, the respondent was compelled to rely upon a photo copy of the original award, which was produced with the application.
The petitioner filed his objections to the application but did not file any application within the prescribed limitation of 30 days.
The learned trial Judge rejected the objections filed beyond the period of limitation and for the reasons that (1) the notice was already given to the party concerned about the filing of the award, (2) the time for making an application to set aside the award had expired and no such application was made (3) the award was not set aside under section 30 and (4) that the award was not remitted under section 16(5) of the Act.
The learned trial Judge made a decree in terms of the award.
The petitioner preferred a Civil First Appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 and had also preferred Civil Revision Application No. 655 of 1978.
Both these legal proceedings were, however, withdrawn by the petitioner and thus the judgment of the trial court in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 became final.
The High Court had recorded that the First Appeal and Civil Revision Application were withdrawn in pursuance of an agreement reached between the parties on or about 14th August, 1978.
A copy of the said agreement was also produced before the Court as Exhibit 40.
It was signed by both the parties as well as their respective advocates.
The agreement was in the form of a letter addressed to the arbitrator wherein it was stated that both of them had appointed him as an arbitrator to resolve the disputes between them and that he had given an award dated 20th January, 1977 in respect of which award, there had been continued objections but now they have agreed that both of them should abide by the award dated 20th January, 1977 and that its interpretation should be left to the arbitrator himself.
It was also categorically mentioned therein that its interpretation by the arbitrator would be binding on both the parties.
It was clear, therefore, that both of them had re affirmed the acceptance of the award.
This letter of 14th August, 1978 was replied in the form of a letter dated 4th September, 1978 addressed to the petitioner by the arbitrator, that is Exhibit 137.
The petitioner thereafter filed a civil suit for setting aside the decree passed in Special Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 and had also submitted an application to obtain interim orders.
That application was decided against him, against which he preferred an appeal/revision but later on, he withdrawn the said appeal/revision.
During the course of the execution proceedings, the petitioner 538 preferred a civil revision application against the judgment and order passed by the Civil Judge raising practically all the disputes which had been raised by the petitioner in this civil revision application.
The same was rejected summarily.
The main objection to the award is that there was no written agreement signed by both the parties to refer the disputes to arbitration.
It is clear from the narration of facts that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitrator.
The award was signed by both the parties, about which there is no factual dispute, reiterated the fact that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitration of the said arbitrator and that he made an award.
All these are in writing and signed by all the parties.
This, in our opinion, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case can certainly be construed to be a proper arbitration agreement in terms of section 2(a) of the Act.
In this connection reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Prasun Roy vs The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and another, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 205 where all the relevant authorities on this point have been discussed.
See also in this connection the decision of the Judicial Committee in Chowdhri Murtaza Hossein vs Mst.
Bibi Bechunnissa, [1876] 3 Indian Appeal 209 at 220.
The observations in the said decision were made in different context.
But in the present context, it is clear that the conduct of the parties that there was an arbitration agreement and by signing the award it could be said that the parties had agreed to refer the disputes in writing to the arbitration of the named arbitrator.
This agreement was done twice, firstly by signing an endorsement below the award and secondly, by entering into an agreement in the form of a letter dated 14th August, 1978 (Exhibit 40).
In that view of the matter, we are in agreement with the High Court that on this aspect the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the award.
The High Court has further held that the revision before the High Court suffered from res judicata.
The High Court, in our opinion, was right in doing so.
It was contended that the previous proceedings were without jurisdiction.
We are unable to accept this contention.
The Civil Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the award under sections 14 and 17 of the Act.
This question had come up for consideration before the Judicial Committee in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan vs Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 I.A. 237.
The Judicial Committee held that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them (namely, whether the suit was barred as res judicata) and they did decide it.
It was not relevant according to the Judicial Committee, 539 whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
In this case, there was no such express or implied prohibition nor any inability of the Judge concerned.
In this connection, it may be useful to refer to the observations of this Court in Seth Hira lal Patni vs Shri Kali Nath, ; , where this Court observed that the validity of a decree could be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seizing of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree was passed or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter of the suit or over the parties to it.
In this connection reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, [1971] 1 SCR 66.
Having regard to all these factors, we are of the view that the High Court was right in dismissing the application in the manner it did.
In M/s. Guru Nanak Fundation vs M/s. Rattan Singh and Sons, ; , where this Court observed that interminable, time consuming, complex and expensive court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum, less formal, more effective and speedy for resolution of disputes avoiding procedural claptrap and this led them to the .
However, the way in which the proceedings under the Act are conducted and without an exception challenged in Courts, has made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep.
This Court further observed that experience shows and law reports hear ample testimony that the proceedings under the Act have become highly technical accompanied by unending prolixity, at every stage providing a legal trap to the unwary.
With respect, we could not agree more in the facts and the circumstances of this case.
In the view, however, we have taken of the matter indicated above, we decline to interfere with the order of the High Court.
The special leave petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
N.P.V. Petition dismissed.

summary:
The Petitioner and the respondent father and son respectively referred certain disputes, which arose between them to the Arbitrator, who made the award.
The award, duly signed by the parties and the Arbitrator, contained an endorsement to the effect that the award was agreed to and binding upon both the parties.
The respondent filed an application, which was later converted into special civil suit, for filing of the award, and sought a judgment in terms of the award under section 17 of the .
Consequent upon the filing of the award, notice was issued to the petitioner, who filed objections.
The trial court rejected the objections and passed decree in terms of the award.
The petitioner preferred a first appeal against the aforesaid decree and also filed a revision application, but later withdrew them in pursuance of an agreement reached between the parties on August 14, 1978, reaffirming the appointment of the arbitrator and the award made by him and the trial court judgment became final.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a suit for setting aside the decree passed by the trial court which was dismissed.
The revision/appeal against the aforesaid decision was withdrawn.
During the execution proceedings, the petitioner filed a civil revision application, which was summarily rejected.
The High Court held 535 that the petitioner was not entitled to challenge the award and the revision before it suffered from res judicata.
Hence the Special Leave Petition to this Court.
The main objection to the award was that there was no written agreement signed by both the parties to refer the disputes to arbitration.
It was also contended that the previous proceedings were without Jurisdiction.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, ^ HELD: 1.1 It is clear from the conduct of the parties that there was a proper arbitration agreement in terms of section 2(a) of the .
By signing the award it could be said that the parties had agreed to refer the disputes in writing to the arbitration of the named arbitrator.
This agreement was done twice, firstly by signing an endorsement below the award and secondly, by entering into an agreement in the form of a letter dated 14th August, 1978.
[538E] 1.2 Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908 provides that the Courts shall, subject to the provisions contained in the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
[539B] In the instant case there was no such express or implied provision nor any inability of the Judge concerned.
The Civil Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the award under sections 14 and 17 f the [538G] The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the application of the petitioner.
[539E] Rajah Amir Hassan Khan vs Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 I.A. 237; Seth Hira Lal Patni vs Shri Kali Nath, ; ; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and others, [1971] 1 SCR 66; M/s. Guru Nanak Foundation vs M/s. Rattan Singh and Sons, ; ; Prasun Roy vs The Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and another, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 205 and Chowdhri Murtaza Hossein vs Mst.
Bibi Bechunnissa, [1876] 3 Indian Appeal 209 at 220, referred to.


judgement:
No. 12311 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
Gobind Mukhoty and S.K. Bhattacharya for the Petitioners.
M.S. Gujral, Madhu Sudan Rao, I.S. Goel, C.V. Subba Rao, and Ms. Kitty Kumarmanglam for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J.
The alleged violation of "Equal work equal pay" doctrine is the principal grievance of the petitioners.
The petitioners 102(1) in number holding the degrees of B.A., B.Ed.
and M.A., B.Ed. were appointed as Supervisors by a competent selection committee constituted by the Education Department of Haryana from time to time since October 2, 1978.
They have instituted the present petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate reliefs in the context of two grievances, one that the petitioners are given a deliberate break of one day after the lapse of every six months and have thus been treated as temporary Govern ment servants notwithstanding the fact that they have been continuously working eversince the dates of their respective appointment subject to the aforesaid break of one day at intervals of six months instead of absorbing them as regular employees in regular pay scales.
And secondly, though the petitioners performed their duties as Supervisors in the Education Department and do the same work as is being done by their counterparts, respondents 2 to 6 who are discharg ing similar duties as Supervisors in the Education Depart ment who are absorbed as regular government servants they are paid less.
The relief claimed by the petitioners is in the following terms: (1) To declare by appropriate writ that the petitioners continue to be in the service of the respondents from the date of appointment irrespective of their being a deliberate break in service after every six months by the respondents in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; 1.
Originally there were 91 petitioners.
Subsequently 11 more were added as per the order of the Court dated September 18, 1986 in Civil Misc.
Petition Nos. 23014 and 25722 of 1986.
718 (2) To declare by appropriate writ or direction that the petitioners are in continu ous service since their respective date of appointments since the National Adult Educa tion Programme was introduced and further issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the respondent that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of notification dated 15 9 1982 issued by respondent State of Haryana and accordingly the petitioners be put on similar pay scales and service conditions as that of Masters (B. A., B. Ed. ) in the State of Haryana, and, (3) To issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent nos.
2 and 4 to put the peti tioners on regular pay scales along with other consequential benefits of a permanent employee from the date of initial appointment.
Before dealing with the grievances made by the petition ers, it would be appropriate to portray the factual back ground.
The Education Department of State of Haryana has constituted an Adult Education Scheme under the overall control of Joint Director, Adult and non formal Education Department, respondent No. 3 herein in the context of the National Adult Education Scheme sponsored by the Government of India the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi in 1978 (October 2, 1978).
The aim of adult education under this scheme is to provide functional literacy to the illiterates in the age group of 15 35.
The State Government has also framed another Scheme for the non formal education under the overall control of the same official.
The objective of this scheme is to impart learning by special contact courses to the students in the age group of 6 15, who are dropouts from schools.
The petitioners are appointed as Supervisors.
There are hundreds of such Adult Education Centres and Non formal Education Centres.
One supervisor is provided for a group of 30 centres.
Thus each of the petitioners is in charge of 30 centres under one scheme or the other.
He is paid remuneration at the rate of Rs.500 p.m. as fixed sal ary.
Each one of them was, prior to March, 1984 also paid a sum of Rs.60 as fixed travelling allowance which allowance has been increased to Rs. 150 per month from March 7, 1984 onwards.
The Adult Education Centres are run under the Rural Functional Literacy Programme/Project (RFLP) of the Central Government.
The project is however administered by the respondent, the State of Haryana.
According to the respond ent the expenditure in respect of remuneration payable to the petitioners under RFLP is 719 borne by the Central Government.
With regard to the centres functioning under the State Adult Education Programme/Project (SAEP) to those of the petitioners who are employed under the Scheme are paid remuneration on the same pattern by the State Government as and by way of honorarium.
The functions and duties discharged by the petitioners in their capacity as Supervisors under the Adult Education Scheme as per the communication dated April 8, 1985 (Annex ure R 2) addressed by respondent No. 3 to the District Officers and Project Officers, are as under: "The supervisors of the adult education has been given the status equivalent to masters of formal schools and their functions are also like the Block Education Officers of the formal schools.
Thus the functions of the supervisors working under Adult Education Scheme are inspection and to impart knowledge.
The general duties of the supervisors will be: to make educational survey of his own village and nearby villages under the Rural Functional Literacy Programme for starting adult educa tion and non formal education centres, to locate and recommend for appointment suitable instructors for these centres from these very villages, to give active co operation in their training, to give guidance in their reading and writing material, to give proper direction to instructors in his cluster the latest techniques of adult education, to give guid ance continuously in latest technique of teaching methods, inspection of centres and making arrangements for their reading, writing material, to give model lessons, to hold discussions in the Mohallas/ houses of the community cultivating friendship and personal relationship with the community, create awareness and awakening in them in the matter of literacy, functionality and awareness.
" The controversy as to whether the Supervisors were full time Supervisors like Respondents 2 to 6 or whether they were part time Supervisors as has been contended by the State of Haryana in its affidavit in reply has to be re solved in favour of the petitioners inasmuch as the documen tary evidence placed on record establishes that the peti tioners were full time (and not part time) Supervisors.
At An 720 nexure 'C ' has been produced a document entitled 'Revised financial pattern of the Project with 100 Educational cen tres . . ".
The cadre of Supervisors has been de scribed as full time cadre in this document, as evidenced by the following extract: "C. Supervision (a) Full time Supervisors one supervisor for a clus ter of 30 centres (3 supervisors for 100 centres each in the rank of Assistant Inspector of Schools with an average salary of Rs. 500 per month) Rs.18,000.00 (b) TA cost on supervision (Rs. 150 per month per supervisor) Rs. 5,400.00 Total Rs.23,400.00" (Emphasis added).
What is more, the matter has been placed beyond the pale of controversy by a Circular issued by the State Government to all Adult Education Officers as per Annexure 'D ' dated April 9, 1985.
The relevant extract from the Circular deserves to be quoted: "1.
Headquarter of the supervisor: (a) The headquarter of each supervisor shall be established in the middle of the village.
(b) Each supervisor will be present at his Headquarter on a fix day once in a week between 9.30 A.M. to 4.00 P.M.
The information of the fix day will be given to all the in structors and adult education officers.
(c) The monthly tour programme of each Supervisor will be got sanctioned by the Assistant Project Education Officers and made his tour according to this plan as far as possible.
(d) The Supervisor will stay whole day in the village and will inspect informal educa tion centres in the day and adult education centre in the night.
(e) He will call the meeting of respected persons of the 721 village on the date of meeting and discuss about the progress of the centre.
This meeting can be called before or after the time of the centre.
(f) If any supervisor leaves the head quarter without permission or does not perform his duties properly the necessary action may be taken against him.
" It is therefore futile to contend that the petitioners in their capacity as Supervisors were required only to perform part time work.
As per clause (d) of the aforesaid extract, the supervisors were required to stay for the whole day in the village and were required to visit the Informal Education Centre and the Adult Education Centre in the night.
They were also required to go on tour and to remain at the headquarter once a week from 9.30 A.M. to 4.00 P.M.
The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the petitioners were not part time functionaries but were whole time func tionaries.
The matter may now be examined in this background.
The respondent State has resisted the claim of the petitioner for granting them pay in accordance with the pay scales applicable to Respondents 2 to 6, who are Supervisors in the regular cadre discharging similar functions, on four grounds viz: (i) that the petitioners are not full time employees; (ii) the mode of recruitment of the petitioners is different from the mode of recruitment of respondents 2 to 6.
(iii) the nature of the functions dis charged by the petitioners are not similar to the functions discharged by respondents 2 to 6; and (iv) appointments are made on six month ly basis and there is a break in service having regard to the fact that the posts are sanctioned on year to year basis in view of the temporary nature of the Scheme.
With regard to the first ground for not granting salary on the same basis as of respondents 2 to 6, viz. that they are part time employees whereas respondents 2 to 6 are full time employees, having examined the aforesaid records placed before the Court, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention.
722 With regard to the next contention viz. that the mode of recruitment of the petitioners is different from the mode of recruitment of respondents 2 to 6, we are afraid it is altogether without substance.
The contention has been raised in the following terms (paragraph 4(d) of the Counter affi davit dated 6 1 1986 filed on behalf of Respondents 1 to 13): It is absolutely incorrect that the Petition ers are similarly placed as the employees under the Social Education Scheme, as alleged.
The latter are whole time employees selected by the subordinate services Selection Board after competing with candidates from any pan of the country.
In the case of Petitioners, normally the selection at best is limited to the candidates from the Cluster of a few villages only.
The contention made by the Petitioners has no justifiable basis." (Emphasis added).
We need not enter into the merits of the respective modes of selection.
Assuming that the selection of the petitioners has been limited to the cluster of a few villages, whereas Respondents 2 to 6 were selected by another mode wherein they had faced competition from candidates from all over the country.
, we need not examine the merits of these modes for the very good reason that once the nature and functions and the work are not shown to be dissimilar the fact that the recruitment was made in one way or the other would hardly be relevant from the point of view of "Equal pay for equal work" doctrine.
It was open to the State to resort to a selection process whereat candidates from all over the country might have competed if they so desired.
If however they deliberately chose to limit the selection of the candi dates from a cluster of a few villages it will not absolve the State from treating such candidates in a discriminatory manner to the disadvantage of the selectees once they are appointed, provided the work done by the candidates so selected is similar in nature.
It was perhaps considered advantageous to make recruitment from the cluster of a few villages for the purposes of the Adult Education Scheme because the Supervisors appointed from that area would know the people of that area more intimately and would be in a better position to persuade them to take advantage of the Adult Education Scheme in order to make it a success.
So also it was perhaps considered desirable to make recourse to this mode of recruitment of candidates because candidates from other parts of the country would have found it incon venient and onerous to seek employment in such a Scheme where they would have to 723 work amongst total strangers and it would have made it difficult for them to discharge their functions of persuad ing the villagers to avail of the Adult Education Scheme on account of that factor.
So also they might not have been tempted to compete for these posts in view of the fact that the Scheme itself was for an uncertain duration and could have been discontinued at any time.
Be that as it may, so long as the petitioners are doing work which is similar to the work performed by respondents 2 to 6 from the stand point of 'Equal work for equal pay ' doctrine, the petition ers cannot be discriminated against in regard to pay scales.
Whether equal work is put in by a candidate, selected by a process whereat candidates from all parts of the country could have competed or whether they are selected by a proc ess where candidates from only a cluster of a few villages could have competed is altogether irrelevant and immaterial, for the purposes of the applicability of 'Equal work for equal pay ' doctrine.
A typist doing similar work as another typist cannot be denied equal pay on the ground that the process of selection was different in asmuch as ultimately the work done is similar and there is no rational ground to refuse equal pay for equal work.
It is quite possible that if he had to compete with candidates from all over the country, he might or might not have been selected.
It would be easier for him to be selected when the selection is limited to a cluster of a few villages.
That however is altogether a different matter.
It is possible that he might not have been selected at all if he had to compete against candidates from all over the country.
But once he is select ed, whether he is selected by one process or the other, he cannot be denied equal pay for equal work without violating the said doctrine.
This plea raised by the Respondent State must also fail.
Turning now to the contention that the nature of the duties are different,, the Respondent State has failed to establish its plea.
In the regular cadre, the essential qualification for appointment is B.A., B.Ed.
Petitioners also possess the same qualifications viz. B.A., B.Ed.
In fact many of them even possess higher degrees such as M.A.M.Ed.
In what manner and in what respect are the duties and functions discharged by those who are in the regular cadre different? The petitioners having discharged the initial burden showing similarity in this regard, the burden is shifted on the Respondent State to establish that these are dissimilar in essence and in substance.
We are unable to uphold the bare assertion made in this behalf by the State of Haryana (in paragraph 21 of the Counter affidavit dated November 23, 1985).
In fact the communication dated April 8, 1985 (Annexure R 2) addressed by the respondent State of Haryana to the District Officers which 724 has been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment supports the contentions of the petitioners and belies the plea raised by the Respondent State.
Lastly we have to deal with the contention that the Scheme is a temporary Scheme and the posts are sanctioned on an year to year basis having regard to the temporary nature of the Scheme.
We are unable to comprehend how this factor can be invoked for violating. 'Equal pay for equal work ' doctrine.
Whether appointments are for temporary periods and the Schemes are temporary in nature is irrelevant once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions discharged and the work done is similar and the doctrine of 'Equal pay for equal work ' is attracted.
As regards the effect of the breaks given at the end of every six months, we will deal with this aspect shortly hereafter.
That however is no ground for refusing aspect the 'Equal pay for equal work ' doctrine.
Be it realized that we are concerned with the 'Equal work Equal pay ' doctrine only within the parameters of the four grounds and the fact situation discussed herei nabove.
We are not called upon, and we have no need or occasion to consider the applicability or otherwise of the said doctrine outside these parameters.
For instance we are not required to express any opinion in the context of em ployment of similar nature under different employers, or in different cadres under the same or different employers.
Nor are we concerned with questions required to be dealt with by authorities like the Pay Commissions such as equa tion of cadres or determination of parity differential between different cadres or making assessment of work loads or qualitative differential based on relevant considerations and such other matters.
We are concerned in the present matter with employees of the same employer doing same work of same nature discharged in the same department but ap pointed on a temporary basis instead of in a regular cadre on a regular basis.
We have therefore decided the questions raised before us in the backdrop of facts of the present case.
On the other dimensions of the doctrine we remain silent as there is no need or occasion to speak.
In the result we are of the opinion that the petitioners are entitled to be paid on the same basis of same pay scale as per which respondents 2 to 6 who are discharging similar duties as Supervisors just like the petitioners, are being paid.
We are now faced with the problem arising in the context of the fact that appointments of the petitioners were ini tially made for six months and after giving a break of a day or two they were reappointed 725 to the same posts by fresh order.
The counter affidavit filed on 23rd November, 1985 by the State of Haryana and the documents placed on record go to show that the petitioners ' contention that this is done deliberately with a view to deny to them the benefits enjoyed by the employees similarly situated and discharging similar duties and functions as Supervisors in the regular cadres.
We find it difficult to accept the contention of the petitioners that this is being done deliberately and with mala fides attributed to the Respondent State.
The petitioners have been appointed in the context of a Scheme which is by the very nature of things transient and temporary.
Annexure R 1 to the aforesaid counter affidavit shows that the Scheme was expected to function for ten months.
No doubt it has been extended from year to year.
But by the very nature and scope of the Scheme, once the objective of Adult Education is accom plished in the sense that the illiterate adults of the cluster of villages become literate pursuant to the educa tion imparted at the centres, the need for adult education would diminish progressively and ultimately cease.
As dis closed in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the aforesaid counter affidavit the targets were expected to be achieved latest by 1990.
It was in this background that the posts were sanc tioned on year to year basis (paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit).
Having regard to these facts and circumstances we do not think that the Respondent State can be accused of making appointments on a temporary six months basis with any ulterior or oblique motive.
In our opinion, therefore, the prayer of the petitioners to absorb them as regular employ ees on a permanent basis from the date of theft initial appointment has no justification.
That however does not mean that the petitioners should be deprived of the legitimate benefits of being fixed in a pay scale corresponding to the one applicable to respondents 2 to 6 by treating them as employees who have continued from the date of initial ap pointment by disregarding the breaks which have been given on account of the peculiar nature of the Scheme.
While, therefore, the petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right to be absorbed as permanent and regular employees from the inception, they would be justified in claiming pay on the basis of the length of service computed from the date of their appointment depending on the length of service by disregarding the breaks which have been given for a limited purpose.
If this is not done the anomaly such as the one highlighted by the petitioners in their rejoinder affidavit dated December 13, 1985 will arise.
As stated by the peti tioners in paragraph 4(c) of the aforesaid rejoinder affida vit, while a Peon in the regular service would be drawing Rs.650 the petitioners would be getting only Rs.500 as fixed salary notwithstanding the nature and importance of the functions discharged by them and the role played by 726 them in the important field of advancement of literacy in the State.
And finally we must deal with the question of date with effect from which the petitioners should be paid the difference in salary.
In our opinion having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case ends of justice would be met if the petitioners are paid the differ ence in salaries with effect from the date of the institu tion of the Writ Petition viz. September 18, 1985.
But it will be convenient to direct the implementation with effect from September 1, 1985.
We accordingly allow the Writ Peti tion partly and direct as under: I The Petitioners shall be fixed in the same pay scale as that of Respondents 2 to 6.
II The pay of each of the petitioners shall be fixed having regard to the length of service with effect from the date of his initial appointment by ignoring the break in service arising in the context of the fact that the initial appoint ment orders were for 6 months and fresh appointment orders were issued after giving a break of a day or two.
III The fixation shall be made as per the general principles adopted whenever pay revisions are made.
In case upward revision has been effected in respect of the 'supervisors in the regular, cadre such revision should be taken into ac count in refixing the pay of the petitioners.
IV The amount representing the difference in pay of the petitioners computed as per the present order shall be paid to each petitioner preferably latest by Mahatma Gandhiji 's birthday which falls on 2nd October, 1987 or latest by November 1, 1987.
The petitioners will be entitled to incre ments in the pay scale in accordance with law notwithstand ing the break in service that might have been given.
V We hope and trust that the State of Haryana will not show displeasure at the petitioners who have approached this Court in order to 727 vindicate their right to claim equal pay and that service of no petitioner would be terminated except on reaching the age of superannuation or by way of appropriate disciplinary action, or on abandonment of the Scheme.
For the sake of abundent caution we direct accordingly.
VI Fresh appointment orders will have to be issued reap pointing the petitioners who have continued in service on the expiry of the six months period from time to time in order to give effect to the direction contained in clause V hereinabove.
VII In case the amounts of difference in pay cannot be computed within the time limit granted by this order, provi sional and approximate calculations should be made and payment should be made on such basis subject to final ad justment within the time granted.
The petitioners shall be paid the cost of the Writ Petition quantified at Rs.5 ,000.
Ordered accordingly.
H.L.C. Petition allowed.

summary:
The Education Department of the State of Haryana which was administering Adult Education Centres for providing functional literacy to illiterates in the age group of 15 35 years and Non Formal Education Centres to impart learning by Special Contact Courses to student drop outs from schools in the age group of 6 15 years, appointed the petitioners as supervisors from time to time since the years 1978 on a fixed salary and continued to treat them as temporary gov ernment servants by giving them a deliberate break in serv ice of one day after the lapse of every six months.
Contend ing that this was violative of articles 14 and 16 since they were discharging similar duties as other Supervisors such as respondents 2 6 in the Education Department who had been absorbed as regular government servants, the petitioners prayed for issue of a Writ directing the State Government to give them the same scale of pay and benefits of continuous service, etc.
by declaring them to be permanent government servants.
The State Government contended that the petitioners were not full time employees, that their mode of recruitment was different from the mode of recruitment of regular Supervi sors, that the nature of functions discharged by them was different from those of the latter and that they had been appointed on six monthly basis as the posts were sanctioned from year to year in view of the temporary nature of the schemes.
The documentary evidence placed on record established that the petitioners were functioning as full time Supervi sors and had been 715 given the status equivalent to masters of formal schools and their functions were also like the Block Education Officers of formal schools.
Allowing the petition partly, HELD: The petitioners are entitled to be paid on the same basis of same pay scale as per which respondents 2 to 6 who are discharging similar duties as Supervisors just like the petitioners, are being paid.
(i) The Respondent State has failed to establish its plea that the nature of the duties are different.
In the regular cadre, the essential qualification for appointment is B.A. B.ED.
Petitioners also possess the same qualification viz., B.A., B.ED.
In fact many of them even possess higher degrees such as M.A., M.ED.
In what manner and in what respect are the duties and functions discharged by those who are in the regular cadre different? The petitioners having discharged the initial burden of showing similarity in this regard, the burden is shifted on the Respondent State to establish that these are dissimilar in essence and in substance.
We are unable to uphold the bare assertion made in this behalf by the State of Haryana in its Counter affidavit.
[723F G] (ii) So long as the petitioners are doing work which is similar to the work performed by respondents 2 to 6, from the stand point of 'Equal work for equal pay ' doctrine, the petitioners cannot be discriminated against in regard to pay scales.
Whether equal work is put in by a candidate, select ed by a process whereat candidates from all parts of the country could have competed or whether they are elected by a process where candidates from only a cluster of a few vil lages could have competed is altogether irrelevant and immaterial, for the purpose of the applicability of 'Equal work for equal pay ' doctrine.
A typist doing similar work as another typist cannot be denied equal pay on the ground that the process of selection was different inasmuch as ultimately the work done is similar and there is no rational ground to refuse equal pay for equal work.
It is quite possible that if he had to compete with candidates from all over the country, he might or might not have been selected.
It would be easier for him to be selected when the selection is limited to a cluster of a few villages.
That however is altogether a different matter.
It is possible that he might not have been selected at all if he had to compete against 716 candidates from all over the country.
But once he is select ed, whether he is selected by one process or the other, he cannot be denied equal pay for equal work without violating the said doctrine.
[723B E] (iii) Whether appointments are for temporary periods and the Schemes are temporary in nature is irrelevant once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions discharged and the work done is similar and the doctrine of 'Equal pay for equal work ' is attracted.
[724B C] (iv) The petitioners have been appointed in the context of a Scheme which is by the very nature of things transient and temporary.
No doubt it has been extended from year to year.
But by the very nature and scope of the scheme, once the objective of Adult Education is accomplished in the sense that the illiterate adults of the cluster of villages become literate pursuant to the education imported at the centres, the need for adult education would diminish progressively and ultimately cease.
Having regard to these facts and circumstances we do not think that the Respondent State can be accused of making appointments on a temporary six months ' basis with any ulterior or oblique motive.
In our opinion, therefore, the prayer of the petitioners to absorb them as regular employees on a permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment has no justification.
That however does not mean that the petitioners should be deprived of the legitimate benefits of being fixed in a pay scale corre sponding to the one applicable to respondents 2 to 6 by treating them as employees who have continued from the date of initial appointment by disregarding the breaks which have been given on account of the peculiar nature of the Scheme.
While, therefore, the petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right to be absorbed as permanent and regular employees from the inception, they would be justified in claiming pay on the basis of the length of service computed from the date of their appointment depending on the length of service by disregarding the breaks which have been given for a limited purpose.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, ends of justice would be met if the petition ers are paid the difference in salaries with effect from the date of the institution of the Writ Petition viz. September 18, 1985.
But it will be convenient to direct the implemen tation with effect from September 1, 1985.725B G; 726A B] 717