judgement:
Appeal No. 577 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 8, 1961 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1120 of 1960.
section G. Patwardhan and M. section Gupta, for the appellant.
N. D. Karkhanis J. B. Dadachanji and A. G. Ratnaparkhi or respondent No. 1.
620 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J.
The appellant took on lease two survey numbers from the respondent, Sholapur Borough Municipality on April 1, 1946 for a period of three years.
The land is situate within the municipal limits.
About November 8, 1946, the Bombay Tenancy Act, No. 29 of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 1939 Act) was applied to this area and section 3 A of that Act provided that every tenant shall on the expiry of one year from the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy (Amendment) Act, (No. XXVI of 1946) be deemed to be a protected tenant unless his landlord has within the said period made an application to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the tenant was not a protected one.
The respondent did not file a suit within one year and therefore the appellant claimed to have become a protected tenant under the 1939 Act.
The 1939 Act was repeated in 1948 by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, No. LXVII of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act).
Section 31 of the 1948 Act provided that for the purposes of this Act, a person shall be recognised to be a protected tenant if such person had been deemed to be a protected tenant under section 3, 3 A or 4 of the 1939 Act.
Ordinarily, therefore, the appellant would have become a protected tenant under this section of the 1948 Act, if he had become a protected tenant under the 1939Act.
But section 88 of the 1948 Act inter alia provided that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the 1948 Act shall apply to lands held on lease from a local authority.
Therefore if section 88 prevailed over section 31, the appellant would not be entitled to the benefit of section 31 and could not claim to be a protected tenant under this section.
The appellant however relied on section 89(2) of the 1948 Act which provided for the repeal of the 1939 Act except for sections 3, 3 A and 4 which continued as modified in Sch. 1 of the 1948 Act.
That sub section provided that nothing in the 1948 Act or any repeal effected thereby shall save as expressly provided in this Act affect or be deemed to affect any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of the 1948 Act.
In the present case the respondent gave notice to the appel lant on May 2, 1955 terminating his tenancy with effect from March 31, 1956.
Subsequently the respondent filed suit No. 42 of 1957 for obtaining possession of the lands and for certain other reliefs.
It was held in that suit that the respondent could not get possession of the lands as the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the 1948 Act and consequently the respondent 's suit for pos 621 session was dismissed.
The respondent then appealed to the, District Court.
During the pendency of that appeal the appellant made an application on September 8, 1958 for a declaration that he was a protected tenant of the lands and also for fixig rent under the provisions of the Tenancy Act.
Further in the appeal filed in the District Court a compromise was arrived at by which the order dismissing the respondent 's suit for possession was set aside and the suit was remanded to the trial court with the direction that the suit be stayed and disposed of after the decision by the Mamlatdar.
The compromise provided that if the appellant was finally held to be tenant by the authorities under the 1948Act the suit for possession would be dismissed.
It also provided that if the decision in the proceedings under the, Tenancy Act went against the appellant, the suit for possession would be decreed.
The Mamlatdar held that the appellant was a tenant and gave him a declaration under section 70 (b) of the 1948 Act.
The respondent then went in appeal to the Collector, and the Collector decided that the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to decide whether the appellant was a tenant.
The appellant then went in revision to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal.
The tribunal held, in view of the amendments that had been made in the 1948 Act by the Amendment Act of 1956 by which section 88 B was introduced in the 1948 Act, that the revenue court had jurisdiction to decide whether the appellant was a tenant.
Finally it remanded the matter to the Collector for decision on the question whether the appellant was a tenant or a protected tenant on the merits.
The respondent had contended before the Revenue Tribunal that the appellant could not have the status of a tenant or protected tenant in view of the provisions of the 1948 Act and therefore the respondent filed a petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court.
Its contention before the High Court was that in view of section 88 of the 1948 Act the appellant could not claim to be a protected tenant within the meaning of section 31 of that Act and therefore the order of the Collector was right.
It was also contended that section 88 B would not apply to the case of the appellant as it came into force on April 1, 1956 after the determination of the tenancy of the appellant by notice.
Both these contention were accepted by the High Court and the order of the Revenue Tribunal was set aside and in its place the order of the Collector dismissing the appellant 's application was restored.
Thereupon there was an application to the High Court under article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution and 622.
the High Court certified the case as a fit one for appeal to this Court; and that is how the matter has come up before us.
This appeal was first heard by a Division Bench of this Court and has been referred to a larger Bench in view of certain difficulties relating to the interpretation and inter relation of sections 31, 88 and 89 of the 1948 Act and in view of two decisions of this Court in Sakharam vs Manikchand(1) and Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari vs Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli (2).
It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that Sakharam 's case(1) fully covers the present case and on the basis of that case the appeal should be allowed.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent contends that on the ratio of Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari 's case, (2 ) the appellant should be held to be not a protected tenant and that considerations which applied to the interpretation of section 8 8 ( 1 ) (d) equally applied to the interpretation of section 88 (1) (a), (b) and (c).
It is further urged on behalf of the respondent that in view of the latter decision, the decision in Sakharam 's case(1) no longer holds the field.
Before we refer to the two decisions on which reliance has been placed on either side, we may refer to the various provisions of the 1948 Act as they were before the amendments of 1956 to decide the inter relation of sections 31, 88 and 89 of the said Act.
It may be mentioned at the outset that section 89 which repealed the 1939 Act did not repeal sections 3, 3 A and 4 of that Act.
These three sections continued as modified in Sch. 1 of the 1948 Act.
A perusal of the modified sections in Sch.
I shows that protected tenants were only those tenants who satisfied these three sections in the Schedule and that no new protected tenants could come into existence under the 1948 Act after it came into force from December 28, 1948.
Further it seems to us obvious that sections 3, 3 A and 4 of the 1939 Act were not repealed and were continued as modified in Sch. 1 of the 1948 Act for the purpose of section 31 of the 1948 Act.
That section provided as follows: "For the purposes of this Act, a person shall be recognised to be a protected tenant if such person has been deemed to be a protected tenant under section 3, 3 A or 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939.
" These sections (sections 3, 3 A and 4) which were continued in a modified form in Sch. 1 of the 1948 Act were so continued only for the purpose of section 31 of the Act and it was not possible for (1) ; (2) ; 623 any tenant to be a protected tenant under the 1948 Act unless he was a protected tenant under the 1939 Act.
The 1948 Act thus recogaised such tenants as protected tenants who were protected tenants under the 1939 Act and even though sections 3, 3 A and 4 of the, 1939 Act were continued as modified by Sch. 1 of the 1948Act The modifications were such as showed that only those tenants would remain protected tenants under the 1948 Act who were protected under the 1939 Act.
Then we come to section 88 of the 1948 Act which is in these terms : " (1).
Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply . (a) to lands held on lease from the Crown, a local authority or a co operative society; (b). . . . . . " Section 8 8 lays down that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the 1948 Act shall apply inter alia to lands held on lease from a local authority, like a municipality.
As section 31 is one of the foregoing sections it will not apply to lands held on lease from a local authority.
In other words, so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned, there will be no provision in the 1948 Act for recognising a protected tenant even if a person was a protected tenant under the 1939 Act.
It is only section 31 which gave recognition to the status of a protected tenant under the 1948 Act and if that provision is in effect omitted so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned, no such lessee can claim to be a protected tenant.
In effect therefore the legislature which had conferred by the 1939 Act the status of a protected tenant on certain persons was taking away that status by enacting section 88 in the 1948 Act so far as inter alia aessees from a local authority were concerned.
If matters had stood only on sq. 31 and 88 there would have been no difficulty in holding that the status of protected tenant conferred by the 1939 Act was taken away from certain lessees including lessees from a local authority under section 88 of the 1948Act.
But the appellant relies on section 89(2)(b) and contends that provision saved his rights as a protected tenant.
We have already mentioned that section 89(1) repealed inter alia the 1939 Act except for sections 3, 3 A and 4 which continued in a modified form 624 in Sch.
1 of Section 89 (2) (b) on which reliance is placed by the appellant is in these terms : "But nothing in this Act or any repeal effected thereby (a) (b) shall, save as expressly provided in this Act, affect or be deemed to affect.
(i) any right, title, interest, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of this Act, or (ii) The argument is that the interest acquired as a protected tenant under the 1939 Act would thus not be affected in view of this provision in the 1948 Act; and it is this argument which we have to examine.
Now we have already mentioned that sections 3, 3 A and 4 relating to protected tenants in the 1939 Act were not repealed by the 1948 Act.
Therefore that Part of section 89 (2) (b) which says that any repeal effected thereby shall not affect or be deemed to affect any high title, interest etc.
will not apply.
But learned counsel for the appellant relies on the words "nothing in this Act shall affect or be deemed to affect any right, title or interest.
" and his argument is that even though there might not have been a repeal of sections 3, 3 A and 4 of the 1939 Act by the 1948 Act section 89 (2) would still protect him because it provides that nothing in the 1948 Act shall affect or be deemed to affect any right title, interest etc.
acquired before its commencement.
But the clause "nothing in this Act shall affect or be deemed to affect" is qualified by the words "save as expressly provided in this Act".
Therefore, if there is an express provision in the 1948 Act, that will prevail over any right, title or interest etc.
acquired before its commencement.
Further the words "save as expressly provided in this Act" also qualify the words "any repeal affected thereby" and even in the case of repe al of the provisions of the 1939 Act if there is an express provisi on which affects any title, right or interest acquired before the commencement of the 1948 Act that will also not be saved.
The narrow question then is whether there is anything express in the 1948 Act which takes away the interest of a protected tenant acquired before its commencement.
If there is any such express provision then section 89(2) (b) would be of no help to the appellant.
The contention of the respondent is that section 88 is an 625 express provision and in the face of this express provision the interest acquired as a protected tenant under the 1939 Act cannot prevail.
On the other hand, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that section 88 does not in express terms lay down that the interest acquired by a protected tenant under the 1939 Act is being taken away and therefore it should not be treated as an express provision.
Now there is no doubt that section 88 when it lays down inter alia that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the 1948 Act shall apply to lands held on lease from a 'local authority, it is an express provision which takes out such leases from the purview of sections 1 to 87 of the 1948 Act.
One of the provisions therefore which must be treated as non existent where lands are given on lease by a local authority is in section 31.
The only provision in the 1948 Act which recognised protected tenants is section 31 and if that section is to be treated as non existent so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned, it follows that there can be no protected tenants of lands held on lease from a local authority under the 1948 Act.
It is true that section 88 does not in so many words say that the interest of a protected tenant acquired under the 1939 Act is being taken away so, far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned; but the effect of the express provision contained in section 88 (1 ) (a) clearly is that section 31 must be treated as non existent so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned and in effect therefore section 8 8 (1) (a) must be hold to say that there will be no protection under the 1948 Act for protected tenants under the 1939 Act so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned.
It was not necessary that the express provision should in so many words say that there will be no protected tenants after the 1948 Act came into force with respect to lands held on lease from a local authority.
The intention from the express words of section 88(1) is clearly the same and therefore there is no difficulty in holding that there is an express provision in the 1948 Act which lays down that there will be no protected tenant of lands held on lease from a local authority.
In view of this express provision contained in section 88(1) (a), the appellant cannot claim the benefit of section 31 ; nor can it be said that his interest as protected tenant is saved by section 89 (2) (b).
This in our opinion is the plain effect of the provisions contained in section 31, section 88 and section 89(2)(b) of the 1948 Act.
It now remains to refer to Sakharam 's case(1) which certainly supports the contention raised on behalf of the appellant.
With respect, it seems to us that more has been read in that case in section 89 (2) (b) than is justified under the terms of that provision.
It was (1) ; 626 also observed in that case that the provisions of section 88 were entirely prospective and were not intended in any sense to be of confiscatory character, and that section 89(2) (b) showed clearly an intention to conserve such rights as were acquired before the commencement of 1948 Act.
It seems to us, with respect, that in that case full effect was not given to the words "save as expressly provided in this Act" appearing in section 89(2) (b), and it was also not noticed that there could be no new protected tenants after the 1948 Act came into force and that section 88(1) in its application to leases from local authorities will have no meaning unless it affected the rights contained in section 3 1.
It may very well be that the legislature thought that the status of a protected tenant should not be given to lessees of lands from a local authority, in the interest of the general, public and therefore took away that interest by the express enactment of section 8 8 ( 1 ) (a).
The status was after all conferred by the 1939 Act and we can see no difficulty in its being taken away by the 1948Act.
It may be mentioned that section 8 8 (1) (a) applies not only to lands held on lease from a local authority but also to lands held on lease from the State, and one can visualise situations where the State may need to get back lands leased by it in public interest.
It must therefore have been in the interest of the public that a provision like section 88 (1) (a) was made with respect to lessees from a local authority or the State who had become protected tenants under the 1939 Act.
We are supported in the view we have taken by the decision of this Court in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari 's case(1) where it was held that section 88 (1)(d) would be rendered completely ineffective if it was not to be applied retrospectively, though it was added in that case that it did not affect the rights acquired under the earlier Act of 1939.
The latter observation, with respect, does not seem to be correct for their could be no new protected tenants under the 1948 Act to whom even section 88 (1) (d) could have applied.
Further if a notification under section 88 (1) (d) could be retrospective upto the date of the 1948 Act we can see no reason on the language of this section to hold that it was retrospective only upto 1948 and would not affect the rights acquired tinder the 1939 Act.
We may also mention that by an oversight 'it was stated in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari 's case(1) that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 88(1) apply to things as they were at the date of the enactment.
It is however clear that clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 88 (1) also apply in the future.
For example cl.
(a) lays down that nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply to lands (1) ; 6 2 7 held on lease from Government, a local authority or co operative society.
The words "held on lease" in this clause are only descriptive of the lands and are not confined to lands held on lease on the date the Act came into force; they equally apply to lands ceased before or after the Act became law and the distinction that was drawn in Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari 's case(1) that cls.
(a), (b) and (c) applied to things as they were at the date of the enactment whereas cl.
(d) was with respect to future, with respect, does not appear to be correct.
In this view of the matter, the view taken by the High Court in the judgment under appeal that section 88 (1) (a) is an express provision which takes away the interest of protected tenants under the 1939 Act must be held to be correct.
So far as the argument based on section 88 B is concerned, it IS enough to say that we agree with the High Court that section will not protect the appellant for his lease had already been determined before the section came into force on April 1, 1956.
Besides it may be observed that section 4 A which takes the place of section 31 after the amendment of 1956 still does not apply to a case of lands held on lease from a local authority and therefore what we have said with respect to section 31 will equally apply to section 4 A and the appellant cannot claim the benefit of that section and contend that he is a protected tenant under the 1939 Act and therefore cannot be ejected.
In the result we dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances of this case we order the parties to bear their own costs.
Appeal dismissed.

summary:
In 1946, the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 was applied to the respondent Muncipality.
Section 3A of the Act provided that every tenant shall, on the expiry of one year from the date of the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1946, be deemed to be a protected tenant, unless the landlord had within that period, applied to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that the tenant was not protected.
The appellant had taken on lease lands from the respondent, and since the respondents had not applied lo the Mamltdar, the appellant became a protected tenant. 'Me 1939 Act was repealed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, Section 31 of the 1948 Act provided that a person shall be recognised to be a protected tenant, if such person had been deemed to be a protected tenant under section 3, 3A or 4 of the 1939 Act.
But section 88 of the same Act provided that nothing in the foregoing provisions of the 1948 Act shall apply to lands held on lease from a local authority, while section 89(2) provided for the repeal of the 1939 Act except for sections 3, 3A and 4 which continued, is modified in Schedule 1 of the 1948 Act, and also provided.
that nothing in the 1948 Act, or any repeal effected thereby shall save as expressly provided in the 1948 Act, affect or be deemed to affect any right, title, interest, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred before the commencement of the 1948 Act.
In 1955 the respondent gave notice to the appellant terminating his tenancy and subsequently filed a suit for possession.
Pending proceedings arising from the suit, the appellant applied to the Mamlatdar for a declaration that he was a protected tenant of the lads, and the Mamlatdar gave the declaration.
On appeal, the Collector held that the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to decide the question.
The Bombay Revenue Tribunal, in revision, set aside the Collector 's order, and the High Court, in application under article 227, restored Collector 's order.
In his appeal to this Court , the appellant contended that (i) the interest acquired by him as a protected tenant under the 1939 Act would not be affected in view of the provisions of section 89(2) in the 1948 Act; and (ii) the Mamlatdar had jurisdiction to decide the question under section 88B.
HELD : (i) The plain effect of the provisions contained in sections 31, 88 and 89(2) (b), is that, in view of the express provision contained in section 88 (1) (a).
the appellant could not claim the benefit of section 31, nor could it be said that his interest as protected tenant was saved by section 89(2) (b), [625 G] Sections 3, 3A and 4 of the 1939 Act were continued in a modified form in Schedule 1 of the 1949 Act only for the purpose of a. 11 of the 1948 Act and a perusal of those shows that protected tenants were only those tenants who satisfied these three sections and that no 619 new protected tenants could come into existence under the 1948 Act As & 31 is one of the foregoing provisions referred to in section 88, it win not apply to lands held on lease from a local authority.
In effect, therfore, legislature, which had conferred by the 1939 Act, the status of a protected tenant on certain persons, took away that status by enacting section 88 in the 1948 Act so far as lessees from a local authority were concerned.
As far as section 89(2)(b) is concerned, that part of it which says that any repeal effected thereby shall not affect or be deemed to affect any right etc., will not help the appellant because sections 3, 3A and 4 of the 1939 Act were not repealed by the 1948 Act.
Nor will the clause "nothing in this Act, shall affect or be deemed to affect" apply, if there is an express provision in the 1948 Act which takes away the interest of a protected tenant acquired before its commencement, because of the qualifying words, "save as expressly provided in this Act", in the section.
Section 88, of the 1948 Act is such an express provision which takes out leases from a local authority from the purview of sections 1 of 87 of the 1948 Act, including section 31 which is the only provision in the 1948 Act which recognised protected tenants.
It follows that there can be no protected tenants of lands held on lease from a local authority under the 1948 Act.
It is true that section 88 does not in so many words say that the interest of a protected tenant acquired under the 1939 Act is being taken away so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned; but in effect, section 88(1)(a) must be held to say that there will be no protection under the 1948 Act for protected tenants under the 1939 Act, so far as lands held on lease from a local authority are concerned.
The intention from the express words of section 88(1) (a) is also the same.
It may very well be that the legislature thought that the status of a protected tenant should not be given to lessees of lands from a local authority, in the interest of the general public, and therefore, took away that status which was conferred by the 1939 Act.
by the express enactment of section 88(1)(a).
[622 F G; 623 E G; 624 F G; 625 B F; 616 C] Further the appellant could not claim the benefit of section 4A, which takes the place of section 31 after the amendment of 1956, and claim that he is a protected tenant, because, section 4A also does not apply to a case of lands held on lease from a local authority.
[627 D E] Sakharam vs Manikchand, ; , disapproved.
Mohanlal Chunilal Kothari vs Tribhovan Haribhal Tamboli, ; , explained.
(ii) Section 88B will not protect the appellant, for his lease had already been determined before the section came into force on 1st April 1956 [627 C D]


judgement:
Appeal No. 890 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated February 19, 1963 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, New Delhi, in Appeal No. 52 of 1959.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and J. P. Goyal, for the appellant.
Bishan Narain, R. N. Sachthey and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.
652 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, J.
This appeal by special leave raises the short question whether the appellant contravened the provisions of subss.
(1) and (3) of section 4 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (VII of 1947), hereinafter called the Act.
During the years 1951 to 1956 the appellant, Ram Rattan Gupta, visited the Far Eastern countries after obtaining the necessary foreign exchange from the Government of India.
During that period the appellant opened current accounts with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, at Singapur, Hong Kong, Osaka and Tokyo, without the general or the special permission of the Reserve Bank of India.
In the different branches of the said Bank he deposited the unspent part of the foreign exchange given to him.
The balance of the said deposits made at the various branches of the Bank was pound 40 (sterling).
The appellant received payments from those accounts even after he returned to India.
The Director, Enforcement Directorate, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, took proceedings against the appellant under section 19(2) of the Act and, after making the necessary enquiries, found him guilty of contravening the provisions of sub sections
(1) and (3) of section 4 of the Act and imposed on him a penalty of Rs. 2,500/ under section 23 (1) (a) of the Act.
On appeal, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board agreed with the view expressed by the Director of Enforcement that the appellant contravened the said provisions of the Act and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant has preferred the present appeal, by special leave, against the judgment of the said Board.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the total of the amounts kept by the appellant in the branches of the said Bank was a negligible balance of the free quota of foreign exchange given to him, that there was no relationship of creditor and debtor between the appellant and the Bank in regard to the said amounts, that the free quota of foreign exchange was given to him without any condition imposed thereon, and that on the said facts there was no scope to invoke either sub section
(1) or sub section
(3) of section 4 of the Act.
We will read the relevant provisions of the Act in order to appreciate the said contentions.
Section 4.
Restrictions on dealing in foreign exchange (1) Except with the previous general or special permission of the Reserve Bank , no person other than an authorised dealer shall in India and no 653 person resident in India other than an authorised dealer shall outside India, buy or borrow from, or sell or lend to, or exchange with, any person not being an authorised dealer, any foreign exchange.
(2). . . . . (3) Where any foreign exchange is acquired by any person other than an authorised dealer for any particular purpose, or where any person has been permitted conditionally to acquire foreign exchange, the said person shall not use the foreign exchange so acquired otherwise than for that purpose or, as the case may be, fail to comply with any condition to which the permission granted to him is subject, and where any foreign exchange so acquired cannot be so used or, as the case may be, the conditions cannot be complied with, the said person shall without delay sell the foreign exchange to an authorised dealer.
Section 4(1) of the Act was amended in the year 1964, but we are concerned only with the said sub section as it stood before the amendment.
To attract section 4(1), a resident in India other than an authorised dealer shall have lent to any person, not being an authorised dealer, any foreign exchange.
It is not disputed that the said Bank was not an "authorised dealer" within the meaning of the said sub section.
If so, the only question is whether the appellant, in depositing the said amounts in the current account ', of the various branches of the said Bank, lent the said amounts to the Bank.
What is the meaning of the expression "lend" ? It means in the ordinary parlance to deliver to another a thing for use on condition that the thing lent shall be returned with or without compensation for the use made of it by the person to whom it was lent.
The subject matter of lending may also be money.
Though a loan contracted creates a debt, there may be a debt created without contracting a loan; in other words, the concept of debt is more comprehensive than that of loan.
It is settled law 'that tie relationship between a banker and a customer qua moneys deposited in the bank is that of debtor and creditor.
This Court in Shanti Prasad fain vs Director of Enforcement(1) restated the principle in the following words: (1) ; , 324.
6 54 .lm15 "Now the law is well settled that when moneys are deposited in a Bank, the relationship that is constituted between the banker lad the customer is one of debtor and creditor and not trustee and beneficiary.
The banker is entitled to use the monies without being called upon to account for such user, his only liability being to return the amount in accordance with the terms agreed upon between him and the customer.
" But this Court qualified that general statement with the remark that "there might be special arrangement under which a Banker might be constituted a trustee, but apart from such an arrangement, his position qua Banker is that of a debtor, and not trustee".
It follows that ordinarily a deposit of an amount in the current account of a bank creates a debt; but it need not necessarily involve a contract of loan.
Whether a deposit amounts to a loan depends upon the terms of the contract whereunder the deposit is made.
In the context of section 4(1) of the Act, can it be said that the depositor in the present case lent money to the Bank ? When a person deposits free currency in the current account of a bank in order to draw it whenever necessary for the _purpose for which it was given, it is not possible to hold that he enter% into a contract of loan with the bank within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Act.
He only deposits the money for the said purpose.
Should we hold that such a transaction is a loan, many an honest man who deposits foreign exchange in a bank in a foreign country where he is staying for a short time to draw it for his requirements will be committing an offence.
That could not have been the intention of the Legislature.
If such a deposit is not a loan, it follows that the appellant cannot be held to have contravened the provisions of section 4(1) of the Act.
The next question is whether the appellant was guilty of contravening the provisions of sub section
(3) of section 4 of the Act.
Under the relevant part of that sub section, where any foreign exchange was acquired by a person for any particular purpose and where the foreign exchange so acquired cannot be used, the said person shall without delay sell the foreign exchange to an authorised dealer.
Admittedly the foreign exchange was acquired by the appellant for the purpose of meeting his expenditure during his tour of the Far East countries; but he had not used the entire foreign exchange for the said purpose.
If so, under the express provisions of sub section
(3) of section 4 of the Act, he should have without delay sold the same to an authorised dealer.
Instead he kept the 655 said amount in the current account of the various branches of the Bank for a number of years.
The tribunals were, therefore, right in holding that the appellant had contravened the said provision.
No other point arises for consideration in this appeal.
As we find the appellant guilty of an offence only under sub section (3) of section 4 of the Act, we think the ends of justice will be met if a fine of Rs. 1,000 only is imposed on him.
We, therefore, reduce the fine of Rs. 2,500/ imposed on the appellant to Rs. 1,000/ .
In the result, the order of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board is modified accordingly.
The parties will bear their own costs.
Order modified.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The appellant visited Far Eastern countries during the years 1951 to 1956 after obtaining from the Government of India the necessary foreign exchange for the purpose of meeting his expenditure during his tour.
He deposited the unspent part of the foreign exchange in different branches of the Chartered Bank in those countries.
The Director, Enforcement Directorate, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, took proceedings under section 19(2) of the Act and found him guilty of contravening section 4(1) and (3).
The order was confirmed on appeal by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board.
In the appeal to this Court.
HELD : (i) The appellant could not be held to have contravened the provisions of section 4(1).
[654 F] To attract section 4(1), the appellant should have lent foreign exchange to a person who was not an authorised dealer.
The Bank, no doubt, was not an authorised dealer, but, when a person deposits free currency in the current account of a bank in order to draw it whenever necessary for the purpose for which it was given, it is not possible to hold that he enters into a contract of loan with the bank, within the meaning of section 4((1).
Ordinarily a deposit of an amount in the current account of a bank creates a debt, but it need not necessarily involve a contract of loan.
[653 E; 654 C. D E] Shanti Prasad Jain vs Director of Enforcement, , followed.
(ii) The tribunals were right in holding that the appellant had contravened section 4(3).
[655 A] Under this sub section, the appellant should have sold the unspent foreign exchange to an authorised dealer without delay.
Since he had kept the amount in the current account of various branches of the Bank for a number of years, he was guilty of contravening the provision.
[654 H; 655 A]


judgement:
XXIX of 1950.
Application under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari and prohibition.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
N.C. Chatterjee (B. Banerji, with him) for the petition er.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, (section M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.
May 26.
The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ.
was deliv ered by Patanjali Sastri J. Fazl Ali J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment, 607 PATANJALI SASTRI J. This is an application under arti cle 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English weekly of Delhi called the Organizer of which the first applicant is the printer and publisher, and the second is the editor.
On 2nd March, 1950, the respondent, in exercise of powers conferred on him by section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which has been extended to the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, issued the following order: "Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied that Organizer, an English weekly of Delhi, has been pub lishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action as is hereinafter mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.
Now there more in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 (1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K.R. Halkani, Editor of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies, viz., Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of America to the Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintend ent of Press Branch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on work ing days.
" The only point argued before us relates to the consti tutional validity of section 7 (1) (c) of the impugned Act which, as appears from its preamble, was passed "to provide special measures to ensure public safety 608 and maintenance of public order.
" Section 7 (1) (c) under which the aforesaid order purports to have been made reads (so far as material here) as follows : "The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is neces sary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a print er, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny." The petitioners claim that this provision infringes the fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression conferred upon them by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitu tion inasmuch as it authorises the imposition of a restric tion on the publication of the journal which is not justi fied under clause (2) of that article.
There can be little doubt that the imposition of precen sorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19 (1)(a).
As pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries "the liberty of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press(1).
The only question therefore is whether section 7 (1)(c) which authorises the imposition of such a restriction falls within the reservation of clause (2) of article 19.
As this question turns on considerations which are essentially the same as those on which our decision in Petition No. XVI of 1950(2) was based, our judgment in that case concludes the present case also.
Accordingly, for the reasons indicated in that judgment, we allow this petition and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commission er, Delhi, dated the 2nd March, 1950.
(1) Blackstone 's Commentaries, Vol.
IV, pp. 151, 152.
(2) Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras, supra p. 594.
609 FAZL ALI J.
The question raised in this case relates to the validity of 'section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 (as extended to the Province of Delhi), which runs as follows : "The Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is neces sary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order in writing addressed to a print er, publisher or editor * * * * (c) require that any matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny;" It should be noted that the provisions of sub clause (c) arc not in general terms but are confined to a "particular subject or class of subjects," and that having regard to the context in which these words are used, they must be connect ed with "public safety or the maintenance of public order.
" The petitioners, on whose behalf this provision is assailed, are respectively the printer (and publisher) and editor of an English weekly of Delhi called Organizer, and they pray for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibi tion to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, with a view ' 'to examine and review the legality" of and "restrain the operation" of and "quash" the order made by him on the 2nd March, 1950, under the impugned section, directing them "to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all communal matter and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies. " The order in question recites among other things that the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the Organizer has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order and that action to which reference has been made is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities 610 prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that notwithstanding these recitals the order complained against is liable to be quashed, because it amounts to an infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expres sion guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
Articles 19 (1) (a) and (2), which are to be read together, run as follows : 19, (1) All citizens shall have the right (a) to freedom of speech and expression; * * * * (2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter which offends against decency or morality or which under mines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.
" It is contended that section 7 (1)(c) of the Act, under which the impugned order has been made, cannot be saved by clause (2) of article 19 of the Constitution, because it does not relate to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.
Thus the main ground of attack is that the impugned law is an infringement of a fundamental right and is not saved by the so called saving clause to which reference has been made.
There can be no doubt that to impose pre censorship on a journal, such as has been ordered by the Chief Commissioner in this case, is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is included in the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitu tion, and the only question which we have therefore to decide is whether clause (2) of article 19 stands in the way of the petitioners.
The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, of which sec tion 7 is a part, was passed by the Provincial Legislature in exercise of the power conferred upon it by section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is 611 read with Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act, which includes among other matters "public order." This expression in the general sense may be construed to have reference to the maintenance of what is generally known as law and order in the Province, and this is confirmed by the words which follow it in Entry 1 of List II and which have been put within brackets, viz., "but not including the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.
" It is clear that anything which affects public tranquillity within the State or the Province will also affect public order and the State Legislature is therefore competent to frame laws on matters relating to public tranquillity and public order.
It was not disputed that under the Government of India Act, 1935 (under, which the impugned Act was passed) it was the responsibility of each Province to deal with all internal disorders whatever their magnitude may be and to preserve public tranquillity and order within the Province.
At this stage, it will be convenient to consider the meaning of another expression "public safety" which is used throughout the impugned Act and which is also chosen by its framers for its title.
This expression, though it has been variously used in different contexts (see the Indian Penal Code, Ch.
XIV), has now acquired a well recognized meaning in relation to an Act like the impugned Act, as a result of a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State.
In this sense, it was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, as well as the Defence of India Act.
and this is how it was judicially interpreted in Rex vs Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs Prison(1).
The headnote of this case runs as follows "By section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, power was given to His Majesty in Council 'during the continuance of the present war to issue regula tions . for securing the public safety and the de fence of the realm ' : (1) 612 Held, that the regulations thereby authorized were not limited to regulations for the protection of the country against foreign enemies, but included regulations designed for the prevention of internal disorder and rebellion " Thus 'public order ' and 'public safety ' are allied matters, but, in order to appreciate how they stand in relation to each other, it seems best to direct our atten tion to the opposite concepts which we may, for convenience of reference, respectively label as 'public disorder ' and 'public unsafety '.
If 'public safety ' is, as we have seen, equivalent to 'security of the State ', what I have designat ed as public unsafety may be regarded as equivalent to 'insecurity of the State '.
When we approach the matter in this way, we find that while 'public disorder ' iS wide enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases where peace is disturbed by, or affects, a small group of persons, 'public unsafety ' (or insecurity of the State), will usually be connected with serious internal disorders and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize the security of the State.
In order to understand the scope of the Act, it will be necessary to note that in the Act "maintenance of public order" always occurs in juxtaposition with "public safety", and the Act itself is called "The East Punjab Public Safety Act.
" The prominence thus given to 'public safety ' strongly suggests that the Act was intended to deal with serious cases of public disorder which affect public safety or the security of the State, or cases in which, owing to some kind of emergency or a grave situation having arisen, even public disorders of comparatively small dimensions may have far reaching effects on the security of the State.
It is to be noted that the Act purports to provide "special measures to ensure public safety and maintenance of public order.
" The words "special measures" are rather important, because they show that the Act was not intended for ordinary cases or ordinary situations.
The ordinary cases are provided for by the Penal Code and other existing laws, and 613 with these the Act which purports to be of a temporary Act is not apparently concerned.
It is concerned with special measures which would presumably be required for special cases or special situations.
Once this important fact is grasped and the Act is viewed in the proper perspective, much of the confusion which has been created in the course of the arguments will disappear.
The line of argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that since the Act has been passed in exercise of the power granted by the expression "public order," used in the Government of India Act, which is a general term of wide import, and since it purports to provide for the maintenance of public order, its provisions are intended or are liable to be used for all cases of breaches of public order, be they small or insig nificant breaches or those of a grave or serious nature.
This is, in my opinion, approaching the case from a wrong angle.
The Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the central idea dominating it is public safety and maintenance of public order in a situation requiring special measures.
It was argued that "public safety" and "maintenance of public order" are used in the Act disjunctively and they are separated by the word "or" and not "and," and therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of the Act providing for ordinary as well as serious cases of disturbance of public order and tranquillity.
This, as I have already indicated, is a somewhat narrow and technical approach to the question.
In construing the Act, we must try to get at its aim and purpose, and before the Act is declared to be invalid, we must see whether it is capable of being so construed as to bear a reasonable meaning consistent with its validity.
We therefore cannot ignore the fact that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act and that it is a special Act providing for special measures and therefore it should not be confused with an Act which is applicable to ordinary situations and to any and every trivial case of breach of public order, 614 In my opinion, the word "or" is used here not so much to separate two wholly different concepts as to show that they are closely allied concepts and can be used almost inter changeably in the context.
I think that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as public tranquillity and the words "public safety" and "public order" may be read as equivalent to "security of the State" and "public tran quillity.
" I will now advert once more to clause (2) of article 19 and state what I consider to be the reason for inserting in it the words "matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.
" It is well recognized in all systems of law that the right to freedom of speech and expression or freedom of the press means that any person may write or say what he pleases so long as he does not infringe the law relating to libel or slander or to blasphemous, obscene or seditious words or writings: (see Halsbury 's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Vol.
II, page 391).
This is prac tically what has been said in clause (2) of article 19, with this difference only that instead of using the words "law relating to sedition," the framers of the Constitution have used the words mentioned above.
It is interesting to note that sedition was mentioned in the original draft of the Constitution, but subsequently that word was dropped and the words which I have quoted were inserted.
I think it is not difficult to discover the reason for this change and I shall briefly state in my own words what I consider it to be.
The latest pronouncement by the highest Indian tribunal as to the law of sedition is to be found in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs The King(1) which has been quoted again and again and in which Gwyer C.J. laid down that public disor der, or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is the gist of the offence of sedition and "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or (1) 615 must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that is their intention or tendency.
" For this view, the learned Chief Justice relied on certain observations of Fitzgerald J. in R.v.
Sullivan (1), and he also added that he was content to adopt "the words of that learned Judge which are to be found in every book dealing with this branch of the criminal law.
" There is no doubt that what Gwyer C.J. has stated in that case represents the view of a number of Judges and authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating to the law of sedition JR.
vs Burns(2) said : "The law upon the question of what is seditious and what is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater knowledge of crimi nal law than any other Judge who sits upon the Bench, and what he has said upon the subject of sedition was submitted to the other Judges, who sometime back were engaged with him in drafting a criminal code, and upon their report the Commissioners say that his statement of law appears to them to be stated accurately as it exists at present.
" The decision of Gwyer C.J. held the field for several years until the Privy Council, dealing with a case under the Defence of India Rules, expressed the view in King Emper or vs Sadhashiv Narayan Bhalerao(3) that the test laid down by the learned Chief Justice was not applicable in India where the offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words used in that section.
They also added : "The word 'sedition ' does not occur either in section 124A or in the Rule; it is only found as a marginal note to section 124A, and is not an operative part of the section, but merely provides the name by which the crime defined in the section will be known.
(1) [1868] 11 Cox c.c. 44.
(2) [1886] 16 cox 855.
(8) 74 I.A. 616 There can be no justification for restricting the contents of the section by the marginal note.
In England there is no statutory definition of sedition; its meaning and content have been laid down in many decisions, some of which are referred to by the Chief Justice, but these decisions are not relevant when you have a statutory definition of that which is termed sedition as we have in the present case.
Their Lordships are unable to find anything in the language of either section 124A or the Rule which could suggest that 'the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that this is their intention or tendency.
" The framers of the Constitution must have therefore found themselves face to face with the dilemma as to whether the word "sedition" should be used in article 19 (2) and if it was to be used in what sense it was to be used.
On the one hand, they must have had before their mind the very widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that sedition was essentially an offence against public tranquil lity and was connected in some way or other with public disorder; and, on the other hand, there was the pronounce ment of the Judicial Committee that sedition as defined in the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any inten tion or tendency to incite disorder.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that they decided not to use the word "sedition" in clause (2) but used the more general words which cover sedition and everything else which makes sedi tion such a serious offence.
That sedition does undermine the security of the State is a matter which cannot admit of much doubt.
That it undermines the security of the State usually through the medium of public disorder is also a matter on which eminent Judges and jurists are agreed.
Therefore it is difficult to hold that public disorder or disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State.
617 It will not be out of place to quote here the following passage from Stephen 's Criminal Law of England (Vol. II, pp. 242 and 243) : "It often happens, however, that the public peace is disturbed by offences which without tending to the subver sion of the existing political constitution practically subvert the authority of the Government over a greater or less local area for a longer or shorter time.
The Bristol riots in 1832 and the Gordon riots in 1780 are instances of this kind.
No definite line can be drawn between insur rections of this sort, ordinary riots, and unlawful assem blies.
The difference between a meeting stormy enough to cause well founded fear of a breach of the peace, and a civil war the result of which may determine the course of a nation 's history for centuries, is a difference of degree.
Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other, and are not capable of being marked off by perfectly definite boundaries, All of them have in common one feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and threat of it.
Another class of offences against public tranquillity are those in which no actual force is either employed or displayed, but in which steps are taken tending to cause it.
These are the formation of secret societies, seditious conspiracies, libels or words spoken.
Under these two heads all offences against the internal public tranquillity of the State may be arranged.
" This passage brings out two matters with remarkable clarity.
It shows firstly that sedition is essentially an offence against public tranquillity and secondly that broadly speaking there are two classes of offences against public tranquillity: (a) those accompanied by violence including disorders which 618 affect tranquillity of a considerable number of persons or an extensive local area, and (b) those not accompanied by violence but tending to cause it, such as seditious utter ances, seditious conspiracies, etc.
Both these classes of offences are such as will undermine the security of the State or tend to overthrow it if left unchecked, and, as I have tried to point out, there is a good deal of authorita tive opinion in favour of the view that the gravity ascribed to sedition is due to the fact that it tends to seriously affect the tranquillity and security of the State.
In principle, then, it would not have been logical to refer to sedition in clause (2) of article 19 and omit matters which are no less grave and which have equal potentiality for undermining the security of the State.
It appears that the framers of the Constitution preferred to adopt the logical course and have used the more general and basic words which are apt to cover sedition as well as other matters which are as detrimental to the security of the State as sedition.
If the Act is to be viewed as I have suggested, it is difficult to hold that section 7 (1) (c) falls outside the ambit of article 19 (2).
That clause clearly states that nothing in clause (1) (a) shall affect the operation of any existing law relating to any matter which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.
I have tried to show that public disorders and disturbance of public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State and if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders, it fulfils the requirement of the Constitution.
It is needless to add that the word "State" has been defined in article 12 of the Constitution to include "the Government and Parlia ment of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
" I find that section 20 of the impugned Act provides that the Provincial Government may by notification 619 declare that the whole or any part of the Province as may be specified in the notification is a dangerously disturbed area.
This provision has some bearing on the aim and object of the Act, and we cannot overlook it when considering its scope.
It may be incidentally mentioned that we have been informed that, under this section, Delhi Province has been notified to be a "dangerously disturbed area.
" It must be recognized that freedom of speech and expres sion is one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a citizen by the Constitution and should be jealously guard ed by the Courts.
It must also be recognised that free political discussion is essential for the proper functioning of a democratic government, and the tendency of modern jurists is to deprecate censorship though they all agree that "liberty of the press" is not to be confused with its "licentiousness.
" But the Constitution itself has pre scribed certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression and this Court is only called upon to see whether a particular case comes within those limits.
In my opinion, the law which is impugned is fully saved by article 19 (2) and if it cannot be successfully assailed it is not possible to grant the remedy which the petitioners are seeking here.
As has been stated already, the order which is impugned in this case recites that the weekly Organizer has been publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to public law and order" and that the action which it is proposed to take against the petitioners "is necessary for the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudi cial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.
" These facts are supported by an affidavit sworn by the Home Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among other things that the order in question was passed by the Chief Commissioner in consultation with the Central Press Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by the All India Newspaper Editors ' Conference and is composed of 620 representatives of some of the leading papers such as The Hindustan Times, Statesman, etc.
In my opinion, there can be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act in this case within the sphere within which he is permitted to act under the law, and it is beyond the power of this Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners.
In these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners ' application.
Petition allowed.
Agent for the petitioners: Ganpat Rai.

summary:
Section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that "the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by order in writing addressed to a a printer, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to a 606 particular subject or class of subjects shall before publi cation be submitted for scrutiny.
" Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ. (FAZL ALI J. dissenting) that inasmuch as section 7 (1) (c) authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by article 19 (1.) (a) of the Consti tution for the purpose of preventing activities prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of public order, it was not a law relating to "a matter which undermines the security of or tends to overthrow, the State" within the meaning of the saving provisions contained in cl.
(9.) of article 19 and was therefore unconstitutional and void.
Romesh Thappar vs The State ([1950] S.C.R. 594) followed.
Per FAZL ALI J.
The expression "public safety" has, as a result of a long course of legislative practice acquired a well recognised meaning and may be taken to denote safety or security of the State; and, though the expression "public order" is wide enough to cover small disturbances of the peace which do not jeopardise the security of the State yet, prominence given in the Act to public safety, the fact that the Act is a piece of special legislation providing for special measures and the aim and scope of the Act in gener al, show that preservation of public safety is the dominant purpose of the Act, and "public order" may well be para phrased in the context as "public tranquillity".
Public disorders which disturb the public tranquillity do undermine the security of the State and as section 7 (1) (c) of the im pugned Act is aimed at preventing such disorders it is difficult to hold that it falls outside the ambit of article 19 (2) of the Constitution.
Held by the Full Court.
The imposition of pre censor ship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by article 19 (1)(a).
Black stone 's Commentaries referred to.


judgement:
No. LIX of 1949.
Appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.) dated 6th September, 1943 in First Appeal No. 3 of 1940.
P.L. Banerjee (B. Banerjee, with him), for the appel lant.
768 S.P. Sinha (N.C. Sen, with him), for the respondents.
November 14.
The court delivered judgment as follows : MUKHERJEA J.
This appeal is directed against an appel late judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated September 6, 1943, by which the learned Judges reversed a decision of the Civil Judge, Etawah, made in Original Suit No. 28 of 1936.
The suit was one commenced by the plaintiff, who is respondent No. 1 in this appeal, for recovery of possession of two items of immovable property one, a residential house and other, a shop both of which are situated in the town of Etawah.
The properties admittedly formed part of the estate of one Mangal Sen who died sometime towards the end of the last century, leaving behind him, as his heirs, his two widows, Mst.
Mithani and Mst.
Mangal Sen had a son named Chhedi Lal and a daughter named Janki Kuar born of his wife Mst.
Rani, but both of them died during his lifetime.
Chhedi Lal had no issue and he was survived by his widow Mst.
Meria,while Janki left a son named Thakur Prasad.
Janki 's husband married another wife and by her got a son named Babu Ram.
On Mangal Sen 's death, his properties devolved upon his two widows, and Mst.
Rani having died subsequently, Mst.
Mithani came to hold the entire estate of her husband in the restricted rights of a Hindu widow.
On 27th November 1919, Mst.
Mithani surrendered the whole estate of her husband by a deed of gift in favour of Thakur Prasad who was the nearest reversioner at that time.
Thakur Prasad died in 1921, leaving a minor son named Nand Lal who succeeded to his properties and this Nand Lal is the plain tiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises.
On 27th October 1921, there was a transaction entered into between Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as guardian of infant Nand Lal on the One hand and Mst.
Meria, the widow of Chhedi Lal, on 769 the other, by which two items of property which are the subject matter of the present litigation were conveyed to Meria by a deed of transfer which has been described as a Tamliknama; and she on her part executed a deed of relin quishment renouncing her claims to every portion of the estate left by Mangal Sen.
It is not disputed that Meria took possession of the properties on the basis of the Tam liknama and on 10th April 1923 she executed a will, by which these properties were bequeathed to her three nephews, who are the sons of her brother Sunder Lal.
Meria died on 19th June 1924.
One Ram Dayal had obtained a money decree against Sunder Lal and his three sons, and in execution of that decree the properties in suit were attached and put up to sale and they were purchased by Ram Dayal himself on 30th January 1934.
On 1st June 1936, the present suit was insti tuted by Nand Lal and he prayed for recovery of possession of these two items of property on the allegation that as they were given to Mst.
Meria for her maintenance and resi dence, she could enjoy the same only so long as she lived and after her death, they reverted to the plaintiff.
Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, was made the first defendant in the suit, and his three sons figured as defendants Nos.
2 to 4.
Defendant No. 5 is a lady named Chimman Kunwar in whose favour Sunder Lal was alleged to have executed a deed of transfer in respect of a portion of the disputed proper ty.
Ram Dayal, the decree holder auction purchaser, died in May 1935 and his properties vested in his daughter 's son Ram Gopal under a deed of gift executed by him in favour of the latter.
On 1st September 1938, Ram Gopal was added as a party defendant to the suit on the plaintiff 's application and he is defendant No. 6.
The two other defendants, namely, defendants 7 and 8, who were also made parties at the same time, are respectively the widow and an alleged adopted son of Ram Dayal.
The suit was contested primarily by defendant No. 6, and the substantial contentions raised by him in his written statement were of a two fold character.
770 The first and the main contention was that Mst.
Meria got an absolute title to the disputed properties on the strength of the 'Tamliknama ' executed in her favour by the guardian of the plaintiff and after her death, the properties passed on to the three sons of Sunder Lal who were the legatees under her will.
Ram Dayal, it was said, having purchased these properties execution of a money decree against Sunder Lal and his three sons acquired a valid title to them.
The other contention raised was that the suit was barred by limitation.
The trial Judge decided both these points in favour of the contesting defendant and dismissed the plain tiff 's suit.
On appeal to the High Court, the judgment of the Civil Judge was set aside and the plaintiff 's suit was decreed.
The defendant No. 6 has now come up on appeal to this court and Mr. Peary Lal Banerjee, who appeared in support of the appeal, pressed before us both the points upon which the decision of the High Court has been adverse to his client.
The first point raised by Mr. Banerjee turns upon the construction to be placed upon the document executed by Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as on behalf of Nand Lal then an infant, by which the properties in dispute were trans ferred to Mst.
Meria by way of a 'Tamliknama '.
The question is whether the transferee got, under it, an absolute inter est in the properties, which was heritable and alien able or was it the interest of a life tenant merely.
The documentis by no means a complicated one.
It begins by a recital of the events under which Nand Lal became the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen and refers in this connection to the obligation on the part of both Babu Ram and Nand Lal to "support, maintain and console" Mst.
Meria, the widow of the pre deceased son of Mangal Sen.
The document then proceeds to state as follows: "I have therefore, of my own accord and free will without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double storied pucca built shop . and a house 771 and a kothri in Etawah . . worth Rs. 8,000 for purposes of residence of the Musammat, owned by the minor aforesaid . which at present stands let out on rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst.
Meria aforesaid . . in favour of Mst.
Meria aforesaid, widow of Chhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik).
If any portion or the whole of the property made a Tamlik of for the purpose mentioned above passes out of the possession of the Musammat aforesaid on account of the claim of Nand Lal minor aforesaid, I and my property of every sort shall be responsible and liable for the same.
" This document has got to be read along with the deed of relinquishment, which is a contemporaneous document execut ed by Meria renouncing all her claims to the property left by Mangal Sen.
The deed of relinquishment like the Tamliknama recites elaborately, with reference to previous events, particularly to the deed of gift executed by Mst.
Mithani in favour of Thakur Prasad, the gradual devolution of the entire estate of Mangal Sen upon Nand Lal.
It states thereafter that Babu Ram, as the guardian of the minor and also in his own right, "has under a Tamliknama dated this day made a 'Tamlik '.
in my favour of a shop alongwith a Balakhana and a kota for my maintenance and a house . . for purpose of my residence which are quite sufficient for my maintenance." "I have therefore, of my own accord ", the document goes on to say, "made a relinquishment of the entire property aforesaid mentioned in the deed of gift . worth Rs. 25,000.
I do covenant and do give in writing that I have and shall have no claim to or concern with the property . . belonging to the minor afore said, nor has the property aforesaid remained subject to my maintenance allowance nor shall I bring any claim at any time.
" The schedule to the instrument, it may be noted, gives a list of all the properties of Mangal Sen in respect to which Mst.
Mithani executed a deed of gift in favour of Thakur Prasad, including the two items of property covered by the 'Tamliknama ' mentioned aforesaid.
772 In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the inten tion from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered, but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed(1).
In the present case the instru ment of grant has been described as a 'Tamliknama ' which means a document by which ' Maliki ' or ownership rights are transferred and the document expressly says that the grantee has been made a ' Malik ' or owner.
There are no express words making the gift heritable and transferable; nor on the other hand, is there any statement that the transferee would enjoy the properties only during her life time and that they would revert to the grantor after her death.
It may be taken to be quite settled that there is no warrant for the proposition of law that when a grant of an immovable property is made to a Hindu female, she does not get an absolute or alienable interest in such property, unless such power is expressly conferred upon her.
The reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Mitter of the Calcutta High Court in Kollani Koer vs Luchmee Parsad(2) which was ap proved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable.
It was held by the Privy Council as early as in the case of Tagore vs Tagore( '3) that if an estate were given to a man without express words of inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry, by Hindu Law, an estate of inheritance.
This is the general principle of law which is recognised and embodied in section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu Law a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist in a 'widow 's estate ', there is no justification for departing from this principle.
There is certainly no such provision in Hindu Law and no text could be supplied in support of the same.
(1) Vide Rajgndra Prasad vs Gopal Prasad.
57 I.A. 296.
(2) (3) L.R.I.A. Supp.
47 at 65.
773 The position, therefore, is that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given; it is enough if words are used of such ampli tude as would convey full rights of ownership.
Mr. Banerjee naturally lays stress upon the description of the document as 'Tamliknama ' and the use of the word ' Malik ' or owner in reference to the interest which it pur ports to convey to the transferee.
The word ' Malik ' is of very common use in many parts of India and it cannot cer tainly be regarded as a technical term of conveyancing.
In the language of the Privy Council, the term 'Malik ' when used in a will or other document "as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full pro prietory rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surround ing circumstances to indicate that such full proprietory rights were not intended to be conferred(1). ' ' This I think to be a perfectly correct statement of law and I only desire to add that it should be taken with the caution which the Judicial Committee uttered in course of the same observa tion that "the meaning of every word in an Indian document must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed, the subject to which it is related and the locality of the grantor from which it receives its true shade of meaning.
" The question before us, therefore, narrows down to this as to whether in the present case there is anything in the context of these two connected instruments or in the sur rounding circumstances to cut down the full proprietory rights that the word 'Malik ' ordinarily imports.
The High Court in reaching its decision adverse to the appellant laid great stress on the fact that the grant was expressed to be for maintenance and residence of Mst.
Meria.
This, it is said, would prima facie indicate that the grant was to enure for the lifetime of the grantee.
It is pointed out by the learned (1) Vide Sasiman Chowdhurain vs Shib Narayan, 49 I.A, 25.
99 774 Judges that the language of the document does not show that anybody else besides the lady herself was to be benefited by the grant and the indemnity given by Babu Ram was also given to the lady personally.
It is further said that if Meria was given an absolute estate in the properties comprised in the 'Tamliknama ', there was no necessity for including these two properties again in the deed of relinquishment which she executed at the same time.
I do not think that the mere fact that the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the donor, that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life time.
The extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention of the donor as expressed by the language use, d, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the purpose of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest.
The desire to provide maintenance or residence of the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a meas ure of the extent of the gift.
This was laid down in clear terms by the Judicial Committee in a comparatively recent case which is to be found reported in Bishunath Prasad vs Chandrika(1).
There a Hindu executed a registered deed of gift of certain properties in favour of his daughter in law for the" support and maintenance" of his daughter in law and declared that the donee should remain absolute owner of the property (malik mustaqil) and pay Government revenue.
There were no words in the document expressly making the interest heritable or conferring on the donee the power of making alienation.
It was held by the Judicial Committee that the donee took under the document, an absolute estate with powers to make alienation giving title valid after her death.
In course of the judgment, Lord Blanesburgh quoted, with approval, an earlier decision of the (1) 60 I.A 56 775 Judicial Committee, where the words "for your maintenance" occurring in a deed of gift were held insufficient to cut down to life interest the estate taken by the donees.
These words, it was said, "are quite capable of signifying that the gift was made for the purpose of enabling them to live in comfort and do not necessarily mean that it was to be limited to a bare right of maintenance.
" On behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Ram Buksh vs Arjun(1)in support of the contention that in a maintenance grant it is the prima facie intention of the gift that it should be for life.
In my opinion, the decision cited is no authority for the general proposition as is contended for by the learned Counsel for the respondent, and it is to be read in the context of the actual facts of the case which relate to grants of a particular type with special features of its own.
It was a case where a Talukdar made a grant of certain villages to a junior member of the joint family for mainte nance of the latter.
The family was governed by the law of primegeniture and the estate descended to a single heir.
In such cases the usual custom is that the junior members of the family, who can get no share in the property, are enti tled to provisions by way of maintenance for which assign ments of lands are generally made in their favour.
The extent of interest taken by the grantee in the assigned lands depends entirely upon the circumstances of the partic ular case, or rather upon the usage that prevails in the particular family.
In the case before the Privy Council there was actually no deed of transfer.
It was an oral assignment made by the Talukdar, and the nature of the grant had to be determined upon the recitals of a petition for mutation of names made to the Revenue Department by the grantor after the verbal assignment was made and from other facts and circumstances of the case.
The case of Woodoya ditta Deb vs Mukoond(2), which was referred to and relied upon in the judgment of the Privy Council, was (1) 28 I.A, 1.
(2) 22 w.
R. 229.
776 also a case of maintenance or khor phos grant made in favour of a junior member of the family, where theestate was im partible and descended under the rules of primogeniture.
It was held in that case that such grants, the object of which was to make suitable provisions for the immediate members of the family, were by their very nature and also under the custom of the land resumable by the zemindar on the death of the grantee, as otherwise the whole zemindary would be swallowed up by continual demands.
This principle bas obviously no application to cases of the type which we have before us and it was never so applied by the Privy Council, as would appear from the decision referred to above.
The learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent drew our attention in this connection, to the fact that the properties given by the ,Tamliknama ' were valued at Rs. 8,000, whereas the entire estate left by Mangal Sen was worth Rs. 25,000 only.
It is argued that the transfer of nearly one third of the entire estate in absolute right to one who was entitled to maintenance merely, is, on the face of it, against probability and common sense.
I do not think that, on the facts of this case, any weight could be at tached to this argument.
In the first place, it is to be noted that whatever might have been the actual market value of the properties, what the widow got under the Tamliknama was a residential house and a shop, and the shop was the only property which fetched any income.
This shop, it appears, was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, and the rent, which he paid or promised to pay in respect of the same, was only Rs. 12 a month.
So from the income of this property it was hardly possible for Meria to have even abate maintenance, and this would rather support the inference that the properties were given to her absolutely and not for enjoyment merely, so long as she lived.
But what is more important is, that the object of creating these two documents, as the surrounding circumstances show, was not merely to make provision 777 for the maintenance of Mst.
Meria; the other and the more important object was to perfect the title of Nand Lal to the estate left by Mangal Sen and to quiet all disputes that freight arise in respect of the same.
It may be that Mst.
Meria could not, in law, claim any.
thing more than a right to be maintained out of the estate of her deceased father in law.
But it is clear that whatever her legal rights might have been, Nand Lal 's own position as the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen was not altogeth er undisputed or free from any hostile attack.
As has been said already, Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, was in occupation of the double storied shop from long before the Tamliknama was executed and Meria got any legal title to it.
It appears from the record that in 1920 a suit was institut ed on behalf of the infant Nand Lal for evicting Sunder Lal from the shop and the allegation in the plaint was that Sunder Lal was occupying the property as a tenant since the time of Mst.
Mithani by taking a settlement from her.
Sunder Lal in his written statement filed in that suit expressly repudiated the allegation of tenancy and also the title of Nand Lal and openly asserted that it was Mst.
Meria who was the actual owner of Mangal Sen 's estate.
The suit ended in a compromise arrived at through the medium of arbitrators and the result was that although Sunder Lal admitted the title of the plaintiff, the latter had to abandon the claims which were made in the plaint for rents, costs and damages.
Sunder Lal continued to be in occupation of the shop and executed a rent agreement in respect of the same in favour of Nand Lal promising to pay a rent of Rs. 12 per month.
A few months later, the Tamliknama was executed and this shop along with the residential house were given to Meria in maliki right.
The recitals in both the Tamliknama and the deed of relin quishment clearly indicate that the supreme anxiety on the part of Babu Ram, who was trying his best to safeguard the interests of the minor, was to put an end to all further disputes that might be raised by or on behalf of Mst.
Meria with regard to the rights of Nand Lal to the properties 778 of Mangal Sen and to make his title to the same absolutely impeccable.
That seems to be the reason why Meria was given a comparatively large portion of the properties left by Mangal Sen which would enable her to live in comfort and her interest was not limited to a bare right of mainte nance.
It is significant to note that the shop room, which was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, was included in this Tamliknama and soon after the grant was made, Sunder Lal executed a rent agreement in respect of the shop in favour of Mst.
Meria acknowledging her to be the owner of the property.
It is true that the document does not make any reference to the heirs of Meria, but that is not at all necessary, nor is it essential that any express power of alienation should be given.
The word "Malik" is too common an expres sion in this part of the country and its meaning and impli cations were fairly well settled by judicial pronouncements long before the document was executed.
If really the grantee was intended to have only a life interest in the properties, there was no lack of appropriate words, per fectly well known in the locality, to express such inten tion.
The High Court seems to have been influenced to some extent by the fact that in the Tamliknama there was a guarantee given by Babu Ram to Meria herself and to no one else agreeing to compensate her in case she was dispossessed from the properties at the instance of Nand Lal.
This covenant in the document was in the nature of a personal guarantee given by Babu Ram to Mst.
Meria for the simple reason that the property belonged to an infant and it was as guardian of the minor that Babu Ram was purporting to act.
It was too much to expect that Babu Ram would bind himself for all time to come and give a guarantee to the future heirs of Meria as well.
Probably no such thing was contem plated by the parties and no such undertaking was insisted upon by the other side.
But whatever the reason might be which led to the covenant being expressed in this particu lar form, I do not think that it has even a remote bearing on the 779 question that arises for our consideration in the present case.
It is of no assistance to the plaintiff in support of the construction that is sought to be put upon the , docu ment on his behalf.
I am also not at all impressed by the other fact re ferred to in the judgment of the High Court that if the properties were given to Meria in absolute right, there was no necessity for including them again in the schedule to the deed of relinquishment which Meria executed.
I fail to see how the inclusion of the properties in the deed of relin quishment would go to indicate that Meria 's rights to these properties were of a restricted and not an absolute charac ter.
It is after all a pure matter of conveyancing and the two documents have to be read together as parts of one and the same ' transaction.
Under the ' Tamliknama ', Meria got two properties in absolute right out of the estate of Mangal Sen.
By the deed of relinquishment, she renounced her claim for maintenance in respect of all the properties left by Mangal Sen including the two items which she got under the 'Tamliknama '.
After the ' Tamliknama ' was executed in her favour, there Was no further question of her claiming any right of maintenance in respect of these two items of property.
She became the absolute owner thereof in exchange of her rights of maintenance over the entire estate and this right of maintenance she gave up by the deed of relinquish ment.
On a construction of the entire document, my conclu sion is that there is nothing in the context of the docu ment, or in the surrounding circumstances which would dis place the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the word "Malik" is apt ordinarily to convey.
The first contention of the appellant, therefore, succeeds and in view of my decision on this point, the second question does not arise for determination at all.
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and those of the trial Judge restored.
The defendant No. 6 will have his costs from the plaintiff in all the courts.
There will be no order for costs as regards the other parties: 780 FAZL ALI J.
I agree with the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Mukherjea J. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.
During the hearing of the appeal I entertained doubts whether the view taken by the High Court was not correct.
But on further consideration, I find that it cannot be maintained, having regard to the terms of the ' Tamliknama ' (deed of transfer) in favour of Musammat Meria and the context in which it came into exist ence.
The name of the document or deed does not very much matter.
Though the word ' malik ' is not a term of art, it has been held in quite a large number of cases, decided mostly by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, that the word, as employed in Indian documents, means absolute owner and that unless the context indicated a different meaning, its use would be sufficient to convey a full title even without the addition of the words, ' heirs ', or ' son ', ' grandson ' and ' great grandson '.
Of course, if there are other clauses in the document which control the import of the word and restrict the estate to a limited one, we must give the narrower meaning; otherwise the word must receive its full significance.
Especially is this so, when the rule of interpretation laid down in Mohammed Shamsul vs Sewak Ram( ') has come to be regarded as unsound.
The language employed in the ' Tamliknama ' (exhibit II) is almost similar to the language of the deeds construed in Bhaidas Shivdas vs Bai Gulab & Another( '2) and Bishunath Prasad Singh vs Chandika Prasad Kumari and Others(s) where it was held that an absolute estate was conveyed.
I agree that the judgment and decree of the High Court should be set aside and that the decree of the trial Judge should be restored with costs to the appellant in all the Courts.
Appeal allowed.

summary:
In construing a document whether in English or in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the inten tion from the words used; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed.
To convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given; it is enough if words of such amplitude are used as would convey full rights of ownership.
The term 'Malik ' when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to held, has been held apt to describe in owner possessed of full proprietory rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietory rights were not intended be conferred to 767 The mere fact that a gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could not be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the donor, that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life time.
The extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention of the donor as ex pressed by the language used, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the purpose of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest.
The desire to provide maintenance or rcsidence of the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of the gift.
Where a Hindu died leaving two widows, a widowed daugh terin law and a daughter 's son, and a relative of the family acting as guardian of the daughter 's son 's son who was then the nearest reversioner got a relinquishment deed from the daughter in law renouncing all her claims to the estate and in return executed a deed of 'tamlikhama ' to her with re spect to certain properties which ran as follows: "I have therefore, of my own accord and free will, without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double storied pucca built shop . . and a house and a kothri in Etawah . . worth Rs. 8,000 for purposes of residence of the Musammat (the daughter in law) owned by the minor aforesaid . . which present stands let out on out on rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst.
Meria aforesaid . . in favour of Mst.
Meria aforesaid, widow of Chhedi Lal and made her the owner (Malik) " ' Held, that there was nothing in the context of the document or in the surrounding circumstances which would displace the presumption of full proprietory rights which the use of the words 'Malik ' is apt ordinarily to convey and the daughter in law obtained under the gift deed a full heritable and transferable title to t, he properties con veyed thereby.
Rajendra Prasad vs Gopal Prasad (57 I.A. 296), Kollani Koer vs Luchmee Parsad , Tagore vs Tagore (I.A. Supp.
Sasiman Chaudhurain vs Shib Narayan (49 I.A. 25), Biswanath Prasad vs Chandrika (60 I.A. 56) relied on.
Baja Ram Baksh vs Arjun (60 I.A. 56), Woodayaditta Deb vs W.R. 229) distinguished.