judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 440 (N) of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 18th June 1969 of the Bombay High Court in Misc.
Civil Appln.
No. 139 of 1968.
290 Naunit Lal, for the Appellant.
A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondents Nos.
M.N. Shroff, for Respondents Nos.
17 19.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court quashing the grant of Nazul land to the appellants on a writ petition filed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 16.
The respondents Nos. 1 to 16 applied on March 15, 1963 for the grant of sixteen plots of land included in Government Nazul Plot No. 31/1 (Sheet No. 49 D) in Yeotmal Town for the purpose of constructing shops thereon.
They alleged that they had not been allotted any land yet for carrying on business at Yeotmal, and inasmuch as land sites were being released to refugees or displaced persons they claimed that having been compelled to migrate from West Pakistan to India during the partition of 1947 they were entitled to the grant of such plots.
The appellants made a similar application on May 16, 1964 and it is their case that they had also applied earlier in the same behalf on February 27, 1962.
There were applications from other claimants also.
The State Government, acting on the report of the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, rejected all the applications.
The appellants say that they sought a review of the order of the Government, and on June 28, 1965 the Government reversed its order and decided to grant plots on permanent lease to the appellants.
The Collector, Yeotmal submitted a report to the Government pointing out that each plot would be 192 sq.
in area and having regard to its market value each allottee should be required to pay a premium of Rs. 960.
The State Government granted the plots to the appellants as shop sites in Bhumidhari right without auction on payment of premium, and the decision was conveyed in a Memorandum dated March 3, 1966.
The allotment was assailed by the respondents, and they represented to the State Government that after further inquiry the land should be reserved for deserving claimants.
The respondents filed a writ petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court challenging allotment made by the Government in favour of the appellants.
They urged that no reason 291 able opportunity had been given to them to press their claims for grant of plots after the Government had reversed its earlier decision not to grant land, that the appellants had been unduly favoured and that the order was bad in law because the plots had been granted without holding an auction.
It was also contended that the power to grant the plots was vested in the Collector and not the State Government.
During the pendency of the writ petition a statement was made on behalf of the State Government that it was prepared to consider the claims of the respondents.
The appellants, however, maintained that they had acquired a right to the land in terms of the order dated March 3, 1966 and that they could not be divested of those rights.
By its judgment dated March 14, 1968 the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order granting plots to the appellants and directed the State Government and its officers to take appropriate action on the several claims for allotment of land.
The High Court held that in view of sub section
(2) section 149 read with sub section
(3) of section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1954, as applied to the Vidharba region of Maharashtra, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code, it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so, and that after initially deciding not to grant the plots the subsequent decision to allot them to the appellants was contrary to law inasmuch as the claims of others had not been considered.
In this appeal, it is urged by the appellants that the High Court erred in applying sub section
(3) of section 164 and rule 26, and therefore in holding that the lease of the plots without auction and without recording any reasons was invalid.
When the Government decided to grant land to the appellants, it thought that the grant should take the form of a permanent lease in their favour.
The Collector was requested to frame suitable proposals and to submit them to the Government.
The Collector submitted a report dated November 23, 1965 suggesting the allotment of plots for the construction of shops on the footing that each plot would measure 192 sq.
and its market value, worked out on the basis of recorded sale transactions, and taking into regard the commercial purpose for which the land was intended, indicated a premium of Rs. 960.
He recommended further that the plots may 292 be granted without auction and in Bhumidhari right on payment of premium for constructing shops thereon for carrying on business.
On March 3, 1966 the State Government made an order accordingly.
Now section 149 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1954 provides: "149.
(1) Subject to rules made under this Code, land belonging to the State Government, not being land herein after mentioned in sub section (2), shall be disposed of in Bhumidhari or Bhumiswami rights by the Deputy Commissioner who may require payment of a premium for such right or sell the same by auction.
(2) The land referred to in sub section (1) shall be the following, namely: (a) land situate in the bed of a river of a tank; (b) land reserved for communal purposes such as common grazing ground and cremation grounds; (c) land given out on favourable terms for the promotion of religious, charitable, educational, public or social purposes; (d) land given out to persons on the condition that it shall be used only for grazing cattle; (e) land given out for temporary purposes or for limited periods or for mining and purposes subsidiary thereto or for industrial or commercial purposes; (f) land given out to persons on favourable terms for rendering service as a kotwar; (g) any other land which the State Government may, by notification issued in this behalf, specify.
" Section 164 of the Code may also be set forth: 293 "164.
(1) Every person who holds land from the State Government or to whom a right to occupy land is granted by the State Government or the Deputy Commissioner and who is not entitled to hold land as a tenure holder shall be called a Government lessee in respect of such land.
(2) The Government lessee shall, subject to any express provision in this Code, hold his land in accordance with the terms and conditions of the grant which shall be deemed to be a grant within the meaning of the .
(3) The State Government or the Deputy Commissioner may, subject to rules made under this Code, dispose of the right to occupy the land specified in sub section (2) of section 149 on payment of a premium or by auction or on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
" It is apparent that the grant cannot be attributed to clause (c) of sub section
(2) of section 149.
The land was disposed of in Bhumidhari right.
Moreover, it was not given on favourable terms to the appellants; the market value of the plots was taken for fixing the premium.
From the nature of the grant, it is clear that action under sub section
(1) of section 149 was intended.
Now Part III of the Notification No. 1118 1832 55 XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 sets forth the rules framed with reference to sub section (1) of section 149.
These rules provide for the grant of Bhumiswami and Bhumidhari rights in nazul land for dwelling houses and ancillary purposes.
Rule 24 defines the expression "Nazul Land" to mean land belonging to the State Government which is used for building on, or for roads, markets and other public purposes.
Rule 26 applies the provisions of rules 18 to 36 contained in Part V of the Notification No. 1119 1832 55 XXVIII dated May 22, 1956 to the disposal of nazul land under Part III.
The provise to rule 26 declares that where nazul land is put to auction it should normally be granted in Bhumiswami right, and where it is disposed of without auction it should normally be granted in Bhumidhari right.
Rule 22 of Part V defines the power of the State Government and of the Collector to dispose of nazul plots with or without auction.
Rule 22 provides: 294 "22.
Power to dispose of nazul plots with or without auction shall be exercised in accordance with these Rules (1) by the State Government in the case of (i) plots of which the freehold market value is not less than Rs. 5,000; (ii) plots within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of the City of Nagpur, whether or not included in the Schemes of Nagur Improvement Trust; (iii) plots reserved for specific purposes under rule 20; (iv) strips of land not being independent plots to be settled with the occupants of adjoining land where the freehold value of the strip is not less than Rs. 5,000; (v) small strips of land adjacent to occupied plot, which cannot be disposed of as a separate site and in respect of which there is a difference of opinion between the Collector and the Officer in charge, Town Planning and Valuation: (vi) independent plots not included in the approved lists where there is a difference of opinion between the Collector and the Officer in charge, Town Planning and Valuation; (vii) plots granted without auction.
(2) by the Collector, in case of the other plots.
" Sub rule (1) of rule 26 in Part V declares: "26. (1) Leasehold rights in nazul land shall be disposed of by public auction except when in any particular case the State Government or as the case may be, the Collector thinks for reasons to be recorded in writing that there is good reason for granting the land without auction." 295 It seems indisputable that under the Rules as a general principle leasehold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction.
If in any particular case the State Government or, as the case may be, the Collector considers that there is good reason for granting the land without auction the reasons must be recorded in writing.
The existence of good reason for departing from the general principle, and the recording of the reason in writing are essential prerequisites which must be satisfied before leasehold rights are granted without auction.
It is pointed out that under clause (vii) of sub rule (1) of rule 22 the State Government is empowered to dispose of nazul plots without auction.
We have no doubt it can do so, but only after full compliance with sub rule (1) of rule 26.
The sub rule (1) controls the power of the State Government conferred by clause (vii) of sub rule (1) of rule 22.
To hold otherwise would be to confer an arbitrary power on the State Government to dispose of nazul plots.
It would be in the absolute discretion of the State Government to decide whether nazul plots should be granted with auction or without auction.
If that construction is accepted, it is clear that sub rule (1) of rule 26 would be negatived.
The only reasonable construction, it seems to us, is to read the two provisions together.
In the present case there is no evidence that the State Government has recorded any reasons in writing for preferring the mode of disposing of the land without auction and we are not satisfied that it had good reason for favouring that mode.
In the circumstances the grant of land to the appellants has been rightly quashed by the High Court.
There is also sufficient justification in the grievance of the respondents that the State Government did not consider the claims of other persons, including the respondents, when making an allotment of the plots.
The State Government had decided earlier, as a matter of policy, not to allot nazul land to displaced persons, and pursuant to that decision all the applications for allotment were rejected.
The applications were not rejected on the merits of the respective claims set out therein.
Subsequently when the State Government made an allotment of the plots to the appellants, it was consequent to a decision which analytically must be regarded as a composite of two decisions, one, a policy decision to throw open 296 the land to allotment in reversal of the earlier policy and, two, to allot the land to the appellants.
It will be remembered that the applications of the respondents for allotment of plots were rejected on the ground that the land was not available for allotment.
That was a policy decision.
When it was reversed, it was incumbent on the State Government to reconsider those applications or to notify that the land was available for allotment and to invite fresh applications in that behalf.
It was not open to the State Government to allot the plots to the appellants in disregard of the claims of others who had also applied for allotment.
In quashing the order granting plots to the appellants and directing the State Government or its appropriate officers to consider the several claims for allotment the High Court, in our opinion, did that which was plainly right.
The appellants say that the respondents must be taken to have accepted the rejection of their applications for allotment, and it was only the appellants who pursued the matter and obtained a reversal of the order of the Government and therefore the appellants alone were entitled to the allotment of plots.
The submission would have had force but for the circumstance that the State Government effected what was a change of general policy.
The change of policy altered the situation completely, and all the claimants were entitled to the benefit of that change.
By adopting the new policy, the State Government must be taken to have declared that the land was now open to allotment to the claimants who were found most deserving.
There were several applicants for allotment, and a selection had to be made.
It cannot be contended, as indeed it is urged before us, that the appellants constitute a distinct and separate class from the respondents only because the appellants agitated against the rejection of their applications while the respondents did not.
The controversy which remains is whether it is the State Government or the Collector who has power to dispose of the plots in view of their market value.
That is a matter on which we need express no opinion, having regard to the quashing of the entire allotment proceeding from its inception.
It will be for the Govern 297 ment or the appropriate authority to decide what should be the nature of the rights to be conferred on the allottees and, therefore, what should be the premium to be fixed.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
Respondents Nos. 1 to 16 applied for the grant of plots of land for purposes of constructing shops, alleging that they were displaced persons and entitled to the grant of plots.
The appellants also made a similar application.
There were applications from other claimants.
The State Government acting on the report of the Commissioner rejected all the applications.
Subsequently the Government at the instance of the appellants who had sought a review, reversed its earlier order and decided to grant plots on permanent lease to the appellants.
The decision was conveyed in a memorandum by the State Government, who granted the plots to the appellants as shop sites in Bhumidhari rights without auction on payment of premium.
The allotment was assailed by the respondents and they represented to the State Government that only after further inquiry should the land be reserved for deserving claimants.
The respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the allotment made by the Government in favour of the appellants contending that no reasonable opportunity had been given to them to press their claim for grant of plots, after reversal of the earlier decision not to grant land, that the appellants had been unduly favoured, and that the power to grant plots was vested in the Collector and not in the State Government.
The appellants contested alleging that they had acquired a right to the land that they could not be divested of those rights.
The High Court quashed the order granting plots to the appellants and directed the State Government to take appropriate action on the several claims for allotment of land.
It held that under sub section (2) of section 149 read with sub section (3) of section 164 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, and rules 22 and 26 framed under the Code it was not open to the State Government to dispose of the plots without holding a public auction unless there were reasons recorded in writing for doing so and that after initially deciding not to 289 grant the plots, the subsequent decision to allot them was contrary to law as the claims of others had not been considered.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD :1.
The High Court was right in quashing the order granting plots to the appellants and directing the State Government to consider the several claims for allotment.
[296 C D] 2.
The grant cannot be attributed to clause (c) of sub section (2) of section 149.
The land was disposed of in Bhumidhari right.
It was not given on favourable terms to the appellants, the market value of the plots was taken for fixing the premium.
From the nature of the grant, it was clear that action under subsection (1) of section 149 was intended.
[293 E] 3.
Under Rules 24 to 26 of the Land Revenue Code, lease hold rights in nazul land are to be disposed of by public auction.
If in any particular case the State Government or the Collector considers that there is good reason for granting the land without auction the reasons must be recorded in writing.
The existence of good reason for departing from the general principle and the recording of the reason in writing are essential prerequisites which must be satisfied before lease hold rights are granted without auction.
[295 A C] In the instant case there is no evidence that the State Government has recorded any reasons in writing for preferring the mode of disposing of the land without auction.
It had also no good reason for favouring that mode.
In these circumstances the grant of land to the appellants was rightly quashed by the High Court.
[295 E F] 4.
The State Government had decided earlier, as a matter of policy, not to allot nazul land to displaced persons, and pursuant to the decision all the applications for allotment were rejected.
The applications were not rejected on the merits of their respective claims.
Subsequently, when the State Government made an allotment of the plots to the appellants, it was consequent to a decision, which must be regarded as a composite of two decisions, one a policy decision to throw open the land to allotment in reversal of the earlier policy and, two, to allot the land to the appellants.
The applications of the respondents for allotment of plots were rejected on the ground that the land was not available for allotment.
That was a policy decision.
When it was reversed it was incumbent on the State Government to reconsider those applications or to notify that the land was available for allotment and to invite fresh applications in that behalf.
It was not open to the State Government to allot the plots to the appellants in disregard of the claims of others who had also applied for allotment.[295 G H; 296 A B]


judgement:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 1976.
279 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 29th August 1975/1st Sept., 1975 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1639 of 1972.
Ram Jethmalani, Mrs. section Bhandare, A.N. Karkhanis, T. Sridharan and C.K. Sucharita for the Appellant.
J.L. Nain, and H.R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated 29th August 1975/1st September 1975, of the Bombay High Court convicting the appellant, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani (hereinafter referred to as A 1) under section 326, I.P.C. and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
He was also convicted under section 323 read with section 34 I.P.C. but no separate sentence was awarded.
The trial court had convicted A 1 under section 326/34 I.P.C. which was altered by the High Court to one under section 326 simpliciter.
The details of the prosecution case are to be found in the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same.
We shall, however, give a brief resume of the important facts which are germane for deciding the short points raised by Mr. Jethmalani, counsel for the appellant.
The occurrence out of which the present appeal arises appears to have taken place on April 2, 1972 at about 11 11.30 p.m.
According to the prosecution while Ishrat Malik Faqih (hereinafter referred to as 'Ishrat ') was returning from a movie in Paradise Cinema, situated at Lady Jamashedji Road, Mahim at about 12 15 a.m. he met Salim, a friend of his, alongwith Shaikh Abdul Kalim alias Pappu (P.W. 4).
He also saw another person standing with Salim and Pappu.
All of them started talking to one another when suddenly they saw a black Fiat car coming from Lady Jamashedji Road and taking a turn to Chotani Road.
The car stopped near the place where the aforesaid persons were talking and A 1, A 2 (Shashi) and A 3 (Kumar) emerged from the car.
According to the informant, Ishrat, all the three accused were known to him before.
These persons were dead drunk and asked Ishrat and party as to who amongst them was their leader.
Some sort of 280 an altercation took place in the course of which A 2 caught hold of the shirt of Shanker Shetty and assaulted him with fists.
He was joined by A 3 and the altercation culminated in a murderous assault said to have been made by A 1 who took out a dagger and stabbed Shetty on the right side of the stomach below the chest.
Shetty fell down.
Thereafter A 1 ran back to his car and sped away leaving behind A 3 who could not get into the car.
Ishrat immediately proceeded to the Mahim police station and lodged an F.I.R. with Sub Inspector Sawant (P.W. 7) at 00.50 hrs.
On April 3, 1972.
According to the prosecution, the informant had rushed to the police station and lodged the F.I.R. within an hour of the occurrence.
Subsequently, it appears that a wireless police van which passed through the place of occurrence having found Shetty lying injured picked him up and removed him to K.E.M. Hospital.
Dr. Heena (P.W. 11) admitted Shetty and made a note of the injuries received by him in the notesheet of the hospital register and also mentioned the fact that the injured had named his assailant as one Tiny.
It was further alleged by the prosecution that Sawant after recording the F.I.R. rushed to the hospital and contacted Shetty and recorded his statement at 1.45 a.m. After the usual investigation, chargesheet was submitted against A 1 to A 3 who were ultimately tried and convicted for an offence under section 326 read with section 34 I.P.C. and A 1 was sentenced as mentioned hereinbefore.
A 2 and A 3 each was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years.
A 1 pleaded innocence and his defence was that he was falsely implicated due to enmity because Ishrat and his friends were carrying on Matka business and the appellant being an informer of the Customs Department had made certain reports against the prosecution witnesses particularly Ishrat who was a smuggler.
We need not refer to the defence of A 2 or A 3 as they have been acquitted by the High Court.
The appellant raised several points before the High Court which after hearing the parties confirmed his conviction but reduced his sentence to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
In support of the appeal Mr. Jethmalani has argued three important points relating to certain circumstances which completely demolish the entire prosecution case against the appellant.
281 In the first place, it was argued that the F.I.R. was not at all lodged at 00.50 hrs.
as alleged by the prosecution but much later.
Secondly, Shetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence and thirdly, Mr. Jethmalani argued, that his version that the name of the appellant was disclosed to him by Salim should not be accepted.
Another important circumstance to which our attention was drawn and which has greatly impressed us is that the hospital register (Ext. 22) shows that when Shetty was taken to the hospital and produced before Dr. Heena (P.W. 11) he gave the name of his assailant as one Tiny or Tony.
The evidence further shows that Tiny or Tony was undoubtedly a known person who was living in a locality near the place of occurrence and was not a fictitious red herring as the prosecution would have us believe.
According to Ext.
22 Shetty made a statement to Dr. Heena at 1.
15 a.m. on April 3, 1972.
Dr. Heena, who appeared as P.W. 11, fully supported the contents of Ext.
It is manifest that once the statement of P.W. 11 is accepted then the entire prosecution case against the appellant falls.
The High Court realising the importance of this document and the evidence of P.W. 11 seems to have explained it away on three main grounds.
In the first place, the High Court laid great emphasis on the fact that where Dr. Heena had mentioned the name of Tiny, there was no particular column where the name of assailant could be given.
We have examined the original document ourselves and we find that the entire part of the register where the statement has been recorded by P.W. 11 is described as Registrar 's note which comprehends everything including the nature of injuries of the injured, any statement made by him or similar other matters.
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court that there was no particular column under which the name of the assailant could be mentioned.
Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence on the record to show that P.W. 11 was in any way friendly with the appellant or had any animus against Shetty which might impel her to make false entries in order to oblige the appellant.
P.W. 11 was an absolutely disinterested and independent witness.
After going through her evidence we find no reason why her evidence should not be accepted in toto.
The High Court further observed that from the hospital register it appears that the word 'Tony ' was first written, then crossed 282 and changed into 'Tiny '.
This may be a mistake in the pronunciation of the name and much significance cannot be attached to this circumstance because P.W. 11 had initialled the change and it is not a case of forgery at all.
Moreover, P.W. 11 was examined as a prosecution witness and if the learned prosecutor had thought that she (P.W. 11) had given false evidence to help the appellant, he could have declared her hostile and sought the permission of the court to cross examine her but no such course was adopted.
Hence, the mere change of the word 'Tony ' to Tiny ' can be explained on the basis of a bona fide mistake.
There is no erasure.
Both names are decipherable.
What may have happened was that the injured may have pronounced Tiny in such a way that P.W. 11 thought it was Tony but on further clarification the injured must have said that it was Tiny.
P.W. 11 in her evidence has clearly stated that she had examined the patient and had given the history of the assault with knife by a person called Tiny and that the patient was fully conscious.
There is nothing in her evidence to show that her statement could be untrue.
The High Court then sought to exclude the evidence of P.W. 11 as being inadmissible as the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act were not complied with.
It was suggested that Shetty had mentioned the name of the appellant in his statement in court but the statement of P. W. 11 shows that he had named Tiny as his assailant and, therefore, Dr. Heena (P.W. 11) should have been cross examined on this point to explain the contradiction.
With great respect, the High Court has erred on this point and has misconstrued the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act which may be extracted thus: "145.
Cross examination as to previous statements in writing.
A witness may be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved, but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.
" 283 It is obvious from a perusal of section 145 that it applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding.
If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statement under section 145.
In other words, where the statement made by a person or witness is contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another prosecution witness, the question of the application of section 145 does not arise.
To illustrate, we might give an instance suppose A, a prosecution witness, makes a particular statement regarding the part played by an accused but another witness B makes a statement which is inconsistent with the statement made by A, in such a case section 145 of the Evidence Act is not at all attracted.
Indeed, if the interpretation placed by the High Court is accepted, then it will be extremely difficult for an accused or a party to rely on the inter se contradiction of various witnesses and every time when the contradiction is made, the previous witness would have to be recalled for the purpose of contradiction.
This was neither the purport nor the object of section 145 of the Evidence Act.
For instance, in the instant case, if P.W. 11 had been examined under section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure or before a committing court and made a particular statement which was contradictory to a statement made in the Sessions Court, then section 145 would have applied if the accused wanted to rely on the contradiction.
Such, however, is not the position because the evidence of P.W. 11 is not only consistent throughout but the earlier statement recorded by her can be taken to corroborate her.
There was no question of contradicting the statement of P.W. 11 by her previous or subsequent statement.
On the other hand, Dr. Heena was a prosecution witness whose statement that Shetty had named Tiny on the earliest occasion, was an admission by a prosecution witness which threw considerable doubt on the complicity of the appellant in the occurrence.
If Shetty stated in his evidence that he named A 1 (Mohanlal) then that would be a statement which was contradictory to that of P. W. 11 and the question will be which of the two statements should be preferred.
If Dr. Heena had made two inconsistent statements then only section 145 would have applied.
284 In Bishwanath Prasad & Ors.
vs Dwarka Prasad and Ors.(1) while dwelling upon a distinction between an admission and a statement to which section 145 would apply, this Court observed as follows: "In the former case an admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfills the requirements of section 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence.
In the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigor: in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by section 145 of the Evidence Act.
" The statement made by P.W. 11 was, therefore, an admission of a prosecution witness and if it was inconsistent with the statement made by another prosecution witness namely Shetty, there was no question of the application of section 145 of the Evidence Act which did not apply to such a case in terms.
Thus, the reason given by the High Court for distrusting the evidence of Dr. Heena is wholly unsustainable.
Moreover, the statement of the injured to Dr. Heena being the first statement in point of time must be preferred to any subsequent statement that Shetty may have made.
In fact, the admitted position is that Shetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence nor did he know his name which was disclosed to him by one Salim.
Therefore, Salim who is now dead, being the source of information of Shetty would be of doubtful admissibility as it is not covered by section 32 of the Evidence Act.
And, once we believe the evidence of P.W. 11, as we must, then the entire bottom out of the prosecution case is knocked out.
Apart from this, there is another circumstance which renders the testimony of Shetty (P.W. 5) valueless.
He admits in para 10 of his evidence (page 35 of the paperbook) that he had not seen the accused before the date of the incident, that he did not know him at all, and that he came to know the name of the accused on the 285 date of the incident and that it was Salim who had given him the name of the accused while he was being taken to the hospital.
The fact that Salim disclosed the name of the appellant to Shetty is falsified by the fact that he did not name the appellant to Dr. Heena when he reached the hospital but named one Tiny.
It is also relevant to note that Tiny Advani is not an unknown figure but is a living person as would appear from the evidence of P.W. 3, Shaikh, where he says that he knew Tiny Advani who is also known to Ishrat, Salim and Pappu and they are on greeting terms.
Another important circumstance which discredits the testimony of P.W. 5 (Shetty) is that he admits that although he did not know the accused from before the occurrence yet the accused was shown to him by the police at the police station.
The relevant statement of P.W. 5 may be extracted thus: "I had seen the accused before coming to the Court and after the incident, I had seen the accused ten days after I was discharged from the hospital.
I was shown these accused by the Police at the Police Station." Thus, as Shetty did not know the appellant before the occurrence and no Test Identification parade was held to test his power of identification and he was also shown by the police before he identified the appellant in court, his evidence becomes absolutely valueless on the question of identification.
On this ground alone, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.
It is rather surprising that this important circumstance escaped the attention of the High Court while it laid very great stress in criticising the evidence of Dr. Heena when her evidence was true and straight forward.
For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to place any reliance on the evidence of Shetty so far as the identification of the appellant is concerned.
The other witness who knew the accused is P.W. 1 (Ishrat) who is said to have lodged the F.I.R. at Mahim police station at 12.50 a.m. on 3.4.1972.
There is clear intrinsic evidence in the case to show that the FIR was ante timed and could not have been lodged at 12.50 a.m. P.W. 7, Sawant had clearly admitted in his evidence at page 41 of the Paperbook that the station diary entry which has to contain the contents of the F.I.R. does mention that Ishrat had 286 visited the Police station and lodged the complaint.
The witness further admits that the station diary entry does not also mention anywhere that he (P.W. 7) had left the police station for K.E.M. hospital accompanied by P.W. 1, Ishrat.
He also admits that he knew the accused before the incident.
The witness further admits that although he had come to know the name of the assailant at 12.50 a.m. yet he did not take any step to arrest or cause the arrest of any one of the accused.
He has not given any explanation for this unusual conduct.
It is extremely doubtful if P.W. 1 had actually named the appellant, inspector Sawant would not have arrested him immediately after the F.I.R. was lodged or, at any rate, after he returned from the Hospital.
The evidence, however, shows that A 1 was arrested on 5.4.72, that is to say, two days after the occurrence.
No explanation for this unusual phenomenon has been given by the prosecution.
For these reasons, therefore, the statement of P.W. 1 that he lodged the F.I.R. at 12.50 a.m. on 3.4.72 and disclosed the name of the appellant becomes absolutely doubtful.
If we reject this part of the evidence of P.W. 1, then his evidence on the question of complicity of the appellant in the crime also becomes extremely doubtful.
The only other evidence against the appellant is that of P.Ws. 3 and 4.
So far as P.W. 3 is concerned his evidence also suffers from the same infirmity as that of Shetty.
P.W. 3 (Shaikh) admits at page 22 of the Paperbook that he had not seen the accused or any of the three accused before the date of the incident and that he had seen all the three for the first time at the time of the incident.
He further admits that the names of the accused were given to him by the police.
In these circumstances, therefore, if the appellant was not known to him before the incident and was identified for the first time in the court, in the absence of a test identification parade the evidence of P.W. 3 was valueless and could not be relied upon as held by this court in V.C. Shukla vs State (Delhi Administration)(1) Where this Court made the following observations: "Moreover, the identification of Tripathi by the witness for the first time in the court without being tested by a prior test identification parade was valueless.
" 287 Same view was taken in a Federal Court decision in Sahdeo Gosain & Anr.
vs The King Emperor.(1) This, therefore, disposes of the evidence of P.W. 3.
As regards the evidence of P.W. 4, the High Court itself found at page 129 of the paperbook that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had disbelieved P.W. 4, Shaikh alias Pappu.
Therefore, the evidence of P.W. 4 also goes out of consideration.
The position, therefore, is that there is absolutely no legal evidence on the basis of which the appellant could be convicted.
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him.
He will now be discharged from his bailbonds and need not surrender.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The prosecution case against the appellant was that on the night of occurrence between 11 and 11.30 the informer and two of his friends were standing on a road when suddenly the three accused emerged out of the car and the appellant assaulted and stabbed the injured person with a dagger.
The prosecution alleged that there was enemity between the assailants and the injured person; that the informer lodged a F.I.R. at 00.50 hrs.
and that the injured man was picked up by a Police Wireless Van and admitted in the hospital.
The trial court convicted the accused under section 326/34 I.P.C. and sentenced them variously.
The High Court acquitted two of the three accused.
In regard to the appellant, disbelieving the evidence of the doctor on the ground that the name of the assailant was first written by her as "Tony" but later changed to read as "Tiny" and that secondly there was no particular column in the register where the name of the assailant could be written, the High Court altered the conviction to one under section 326 I.P.C. and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
On appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that (1) the F.I.R. was not lodged at 00.50 hrs.
as claimed by the prosecution; (2) the injured did not know the appellant before the occurrence; (3) the version of the injured that the name of the assailant was disclosed to him by a friend of the informer should not be accepted and (4) the discrepancy in the name of the assailant recorded by the doctor was not such as to completely discredit her evidence.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: (a) The change of name "Tony" into "Tiny" in the hospital register might be due to mis hearing of the name in the first instance and correcting it later.
Much could not be made of this circumstance.
The doctor had initialled the alteration.
The prosecution has not made any attempt to declare 278 the doctor a hostile witness and to cross examine her.
Therefore the change in the name could be a bona fide mistake.
That apart, the injured was fully conscious at the time he made the statement to the doctor.
[282 A C] (b) The High Court was in error in stating that there was no particular column in the hospital register in which the name of the assailant could be mentioned.
The entire part of the register where the statement had been recorded by the doctor is described as the "Registrar 's note" which comprehends everything including the nature of injuries to the injured, any statement made by him or similar other matters.
[281 E F] (c) There is no evidence on record to show that the doctor was in any way friendly with the appellant or inimical towards the injured man; she was an absolutely disinterested and independent witness.
[281 G] 2 (a) The High Court had erred in holding that the doctor 's evidence was inadmissible in that the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act had not been complied with.
[282 F] (b) Section 145 applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding.
If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statements under section 145, that is to say, where the statements made by a person or a witness is contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another prosecution witness the question of application of section 145 does not arise.
[283 A C] (c) The doctor 's statement was an admission of a prosecution witness.
If it was inconsistent with the statement made by another prosecution witness there was no question of application of section 145 of the Evidence Act.
[283 C] In the instant case the statement of the injured to the doctor being first in point of time it must be preferred to any subsequent statement made by the injured.
There is much evidence to show that the injured did not know the appellant before the date of the incident.
No test identification parade had been held.
The appellant was shown by the police before he identified him.
If the accused was not known to the injured and his friends before the incident and was identified for the first time in the court, this evidence has no value and cannot be relied upon in the absence of a test identification parade.
[285 E,C,F] V.C. Shukla vs State (Delhi Administration), ; and Sahdeo Gosain & Anr.
vs The King Emperor , referred to.


judgement:
ition No. 4676 of 1978, (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India) M.S. Ganesh for the Petitioner.
N.C. Talukdar, R.N. Poddar and Miss A. Subhashini, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
'Equal pay for equal work ' is not a mere demagogic slogan.
It is a constitutional goal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies by the enforcement of constitutional rights.
So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts.
Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle, the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women '.
Articles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the fundamental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment and article 32 provides the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.
So the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under article 32 and has asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given others like him.
True, he is the merest microbe in the mighty organism of the State, a little clog in a giant wheel.
But, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to a directly approach the highest Court in the land for redress.
It is a matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so.
Hitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory ' distribution of the buttered leaves amongst themselves.
Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence, and the forward looking posture of this Court, the underprivileged also are clamouring for their rights and are seeking intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the Court.
The judges of the Court have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the five star hotel.
301 The petitioner is a Driver Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and he demands that his scale of pay should atleast be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration.
The scale of pay of a Driver Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210 270 in the case of non matriculates and Rs. 225 308 in the case of matriculates.
The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the non Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 326.E B 8 350.
The scale of pay of drivers in the Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 290 EB 6 326 8 366 EB 8 8 8 390 10 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260 350.
The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330 480.
The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he discharges more onerous duties than the others.
He complains that there is no reason whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver Constables merely because he and his ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force.
It appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head "the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads.
After considering the qualifications etc.
possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisations with large fleet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc.
The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non availability of adequate promotional avenues and such other usual considerations.
The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of the scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel.
The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay Commission failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have, therefore, prevailed in the case of driver constables also.
302 The drivers constables were not only required to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they were appointed as driver constables in the police force.
Their duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments.
Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant exposure to security risks.
The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments.
As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issue of a Writ under Art, 32 of the Constitution.
Among the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, it was suggested that the petitioner was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force and that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force.
The hollowness of this submission is exposed by a reference to the facts relating to the individual petitioner.
The petitioner who was an ex gunner (driver) in the artiliary corps of the Indian Army and who was experienced in the driving, operation and maintenance of jeeps, trucks and heavy armoured vehicles was allowed to retire from the Army on compassionate grounds.
He held an Army driving licence as also a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence.
After he was discharged from the Army his nominal roll was forwarded by the Director General Resettlement, Ministry of Defence to the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi.
The question of his employment as a driver in the Delhi Police Force was considered and he was informed that a test of proficiency in driving would be held.
He was required to produce his Civil Heavy transport driving licence at the time of the test.
It is of interest to note that the subject of the communication sent by the Delhi Police establishment to the petitioner was "Employment of ex servicemen in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Const)".
He appeared at the test.
By a communication dated March 29, 1968, he was informed by the Commandant, Delhi Armed Police, Delhi that his name had been "approved for enlistment as driver in the Delhi Police".
Thereafter a certificate in the prescribed form was issued to him vesting him with the powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer.
It is clear and it cannot be seriously disputed that the petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi 303 Police Force.
He was designated as constable, because, for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force, he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force.
The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.
The main defence taken by the respondents is, in the words of the deponent of the counter affidavit, as follows : "It is submitted that there can be no comparison between the different departments of the Government of India for the purpose of fixation of pay scale.
A pay scale has been fixed upon consideration of various factors.
The pay scales of the drivers of the Delhi Police has been fixed after duly considering all the circumstances.
The drivers in the other departments are not similarly situated as the petitioner and there is no question of any hostile discrimination.
It is, however, denied that the drivers have been treated as a separate class.
It is also denied that the designation of the petitioner is N. T. Driver (Constable) ' The counter affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them.
Apparently in the view of the respondents, the circumstance that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstance to justify different scales of pay irrespective of their identity of their powers duties and responsibilities.
We cannot accept this view.
If this view is to be stretched to its logical conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers duties and responsibilities are identical.
We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments.
Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, 304 duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.
Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukerjee vs Union of India, Makhan Singh vs Union of India & Ors.
where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs Union of India describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with article 14.
We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.
Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service.
It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.
The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay.
The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting article 14 if sought to be applied to them.
It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work ' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.
But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.
article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women ' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes.
Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation.
article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under 305 the State.
These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone.
To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get.
To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.
Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched.
Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them.
The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic.
Again the word 'Socialist ' must mean something.
Even if it does not mean 'To each according to his need ', it must atleast mean 'equal pay for equal work '.
The principle of 'equal pay for equal work ' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour.
Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code.
Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western labour codes too.
Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements.
In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265).
The preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value ' as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled".
Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and article 39(d) we are of the view that the principle 'Equal pay for Equal work ' is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based 306 on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government.
If anything, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of a police officer ', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous.
In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous.
What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none.
The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon.
We have shown that the answer is unsound.
The clarification is irrational.
We, therefore, allow the Writ Petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the drivers constables of the Delhi Police Force atleast on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force.
The scale of pay shall be effective from 1st January, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.
S.R. Petition allowed.

summary:
The petitioner is a driver constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration.
The scale of pay in the Delhi Police Force is for non matriculate drivers Rs. 210 270 and for matriculate drivers 225 308.
The scale of pay of a driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260 400.
The scale of pay of driver in the non secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 326 EB 8 350, while that of Secretariat offices in Delhi is Rs. 260 6 290 EB 6 326 8 366 EB 8 8 8 390 10 400.
The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260 300 while the drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs. 330 480.
The petitioner and other driver constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Third Pay Commission and that their pay scales should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments.
As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with success, the present application has been filed by the petitioner for the issue of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Allowing the petition, the Court ^ HELD: 1:1.
The petitioner was appointed as a driver in the Delhi Police Force.
After his discharge from the army question of his employment as a driver in Delhi Police Force was considered, he was asked to appear for a test of proficiency in driving, directed to produce a Civil Heavy Transport Driving Licence, selected thereafter as a driver in Delhi Police Force under the category "Employment of Ex serviceman in Delhi Police as N.T. Driver (Constable).
" He was designated as Constable, because for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force.
The investiture of the petitioner with the "powers, functions and privileges of a police Officer" was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.
[302 H, 303 A C] 1:2.
The petitioner and other drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government.
If anything, by reason of their investiture with the "power, functions and privileges of a police Officer", their duties and responsibilities are more arduous.
The clarification that the drivers of the 299 Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon is irrational.
[306 A, B, C, D] 2:1.
No doubt, equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the Executive Government and expert bodies and not for the courts, but where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments.
Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.
[303 G H, 304 A] 3:1.
The principle "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance.
There can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.
The higher qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay.
The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Article 14 if sought to be applied to them.
[304 C E] 3:2.
It is true that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.
But it certainly is a Constitutional goal.
Article 39 (d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men aud women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy.
"Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" means equal pay for equal work for every one and as between the sexes.
Directive Principles have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation.
Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone.
To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get.
To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay.
Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them.
The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic.
Again the word 'Socialist ' must mean something.
Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need ', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work '.
[304 E H, 305 A D] 3:3.
From a construction of Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), it is clear that the principle "equal pay for equal work" is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal 300 scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.
[305 G H, 306 A] Kishori Lal Mohan Lal Bakshi vs Union of India, A.I.R. , distinguished.