judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 1348 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.7.
1985 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 3144 of 1981.
Tunara, J.A. Karia and M.N. Shroff for the Appellant.
Ashok H. Desai, Solicitor General, U.J. Makhija, B.S. Bisaria.
Mrs. A.K. Verma and Vivek Dholakia for the Respond ents.
V.N. Ganpule, V.N. Patil and A.S. Bhasime for the State of Maharashtra.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J.
1.
The respondent is a statutory body corporate initially constituted under the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 (Bombay Act 6 of 1879), for short 'State Act '.
Under Sec.
26 thereof, the Board has power to acquire and hold movable and immovable property and also has power to lease, to sell or otherwise convey movable and immovable property which may have become vested in or acquired by them.
The respondent has appointed A.J. Mescarnas, 832 Assistant Estate Manager as their power of attorney holder to lease out its properties from time to time or terminate the leases and to lay action for ejectment, etc.
The re spondent owns the Building bearing Old R.R. No. 941 known as 'Frere Land Estate" in which room No. 2 admeasuring 28.27 sq.
meters was leased out to Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora, for short 'Vasantkumar '.
The appellants are his legal repre sentatives.
He was served with a notice under Sec. 106 read with section 111(h) of the terminating the tenancy in terms of the covenants of lease and was asked to deliver possession of the demised property giving one month 's time from 22nd January, 1975.
It was served on Vasantkumar on January 28, 1975.
The notice of termination thereby became effective from 28th February, 1975.
In the meanwhile Major Port Trust Act, 1963 (Act No. 38 of 1963), for short the "Central Act", was made applicable to the Bombay Port Trust by operation of section 133 (2A) with effect from February 1, 1975.
After the expiry of one month, ejectment application was filed under section 41 of the Bombay (Act 15 of 1882) as amended under 1963 Maharashtra Amendment Act, against Vasantkumar and another for delivery of possession.
After 1976 Amendment Act 19 of 1976 came into force suits were laid against three other tenants.
It was pleaded by the respondent that it is a successor in interest of the Board under the State Act and were entitled to eject the tenants and to the possession of the demised portions.
The plea of Vasantkumar in his written statement elaborated by the learned counsel, is that the suit is not maintainable.
Since the State Act ceased to be operative with effect from Febru ary 1, 1975, the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of became ineffective and without determining the tenancy afresh, the suit was not validly laid.
It was also pleaded that the respondent had promised that in deposit of certain amount which the tenant did, Vasantkumar would be given on lease of a portion in the reconstructed building.
Thereby the re spondent is estopped by promissory estoppel to have the tenant ejected.
It may be mentioned at this juncture that one suit was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not duly determined as per law.
Other suits were decreed.
No appellate forum has been prescribed under Amendment Act of 1963 but a substantive suit on original side provided was available.
By Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976 to the principal Act such a right to appeal was incorporated.
Vasantkumar filed writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 and others filed regular appeals to a Bench of two Judges of the Small Cause Court and are stated to be pending.
833 2.
In the writ petition the petitioner challenged the vires of 1963 Amendment Provisions and also 1976 Amendment Provisions to the .
When it came up for heating before Masodkar, J., he referred it to a Division Bench.
The Division Bench by its judgment dated January 17/18, 1982 up held the constitutional validity of those sections and remitted to the learned Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition on merits.
The learned single Judge considered and negatived two points namely, validity of the notice terminating the tenancy; promissory estoppel and dismissed the writ petition.
Vasantkumar had leave of this Court under article 136.
The primary contention of Mr. Turana, learned counsel for the appellant, is that quit notice issued under Sec. 106 read with Sec.
III(h) of the T.P. Act is invalid.
By issue of quit notice no right had accrued to the respondent.
Termination of tenancy became operative only on expiry of one month given thereunder, i.e. February 28, 1975, by which date the State Act became inoperative as from February 1, 1975 the Central Act came into force.
The respondent under the Central Act acquired, by statutory operation, the immov able property including the demised one in Frere Land Estate and thereby became a new landlord.
Termination of tenancy is an act inter vivos by operation of Sec. 106 read with Sec.
III(h) of T.P. Act.
Under Sec.
109 thereof, the respondent, not being a living person, is not entitled to the benefit of the quit notice as its operation is not saved by Sec. 2(d) and Sec.
5 thereof.
The suit, thereby, is not maintainable admittedly no quit notice determining the tenancy was issued after February 1, 1975.
The edifice of the argument was built up on shifting sand and when it was subjected to close scrutiny it crumbled down traceless.
Let us first deal with the arguments on the foot of the provisions of T.P. Act.
Section 2(d) of the provides saving of the previous operation of law.
It states that: " . nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect save as provided by Sec.
57 and Chapter IV of this Act, any transfer by operation of law or by, or in execution of, a decree or order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 106 empowers the landlord to terminate the contract of lease of immovable property, if it is for agricultural or manufacturing purpose by giving six months notice and ter minable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by giving fifteen days ' notice expiring with the end of the month of the tenancy.
Section ill(h) provides that, "on the expira tion of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention 834 to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other".
Section 109 is Rights of lessor 's transferee: "If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transfer ee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, sub ject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to Provisos are not necessary, hence omitted.
Reading of these fascicule of provisions clearly demonstrates that a lessee of immovable property from month to month is terminable by giving fifteen days ' notice or as per the terms of the contract of the lessee.
(In this case the contract provides to give one month 's notice).
On expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the notice the lease shall stand terminated.
The lessor 's right on transfer of the immovable property including the lease hold rights created on the property sold, the transferee, in the absence of contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights and if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabili ties of the lessor as to the property or part thereof so long as he is owner of it.
But by mere transfer the lessor shall not cease to be subject to any liabilities imposed upon him by contract of lease unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him.
Undoubtedly, by issuance of notice to quit automati cally the right created thereunder, namely, cessation of the lease, does not become effective till the period prescribed in the notice or in the statute i.e. Sec.
106 expires.
On expiry thereof the lease becomes inoperative and the lessor acquires right to have the tenant ejected.
When he fails to deliver vacant possession, the lessor would be entitled to have the tenant ejected and taken possession in due process of law.
The successor in interest whether acquires these rights and the rights acquired by lessor would enure for his benefit is the crucial question.
In Halsbury 's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27, paragraph 193 discussed the right accrued to the transferee of the benefit of 835 the notice to quit issued by the predecessor in title thus: "The notice when once given enures for the benefit of the successors in title of the landlord or tenant giving it.
" Hill and Redman in "Law of Landlord and Tenant", 17th Edition, Vol.
I, at page 488, paragraph 405 have stated to the similar fact thus: "The notice when once given enures for the benefit of the successor in title of the landlord or tenant giving it.
" In Mulla 's commentary on the , 6th Edition, at page 676 it is also stated thus: "Notice enures for the benefit of the successor in title of the lessor or lessee giving it." In Chitaley 's Transfer Property Act, 4th Edn., 1969:, Vol.
III, Note 35, it is stated thus: "Where the lessor gives notice to quit and then assigns his interest to another the assignee can take advantage of the notice." In N.P.K. Raman Menon vs Collector of Malabar, AIR ,1924 Madras 908 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that:, "English cases recognise that the person who is the landlord and entitled to possession, on the date of the notice to quit, is the proper person to give the notice and :that an assignee within the currency of that notice can take advan tage of the notice sent by his assignor and rely upon it, when he brings a suit for recovering possession.
No doubt Mr, Tunara placed strong reliance on the decision of Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar vs Assaram Hiraman Patil &Ors., [1962] Suppl.
1 SCR 700.
The facts therein are that in 1943 a lease on agricultural land for five years was created Before the expiry thereof Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939 was made applicable to the area where the land was situated and under Sec.
23(1)(b) of that Act the period of lease was statutorily extended to ten years During the subsistence of the contractual tenancy it was statutorily extended and the Bombay of 1948 came into force.
In March 1952 notice was given to the tenant that the tenancy expired on March 31, 1953 and called upon the tenant to deliver possession.
In the meanwhile the Bombay Act 33 of 1952 came into force.
Its effect was that the lease automatically stood extended for ten years from time to time, unless terminated by giving one year 's notice averting that the land was required bona fide by the landlord for personal cultivation and that income would be the main source of income of the landlord.
It was contended that since 1952 Amending Act was not retrospec tive, the technical requirement of notice to quit do not apply.
The question was whether the landlord was entitled to eject the tenant without complying with the statutory re quirement.
In that context it was held by the Constitution Bench that by operation of the statutory provisions the period of lease of 10 years from time to time was automati cally extended unless the tenancy was validly terminated by giving a notice of one year or surrender was made by the tenant as specified in the statute.
The ratio therein has little application to the facts of this case.
In Hitkarini Sabha vs The Corporation of City of Jabalpur & Anr., the lease was granted by the Administrator without authority under the Statute.
Therefore, the lease was held to be void.
The notice as required under T.P. Act was held to be mandatory, but was not done.
Therefore the lease was subsisting and thereby as his land was acquired the tenant was entitled to compensation pro rata under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act.
We are at a loss to understand, how the ratio thereunder will be of any assistance to the appellant.
In Lower vs Sorreli, [ 1963] 1 Queen 's Bench Division 959 the question therein was whether the notice to quit was a valid notice.
Admittedly, second notice was given before the expiry of the first notice.
It was held that when such notice were issued withdrawing the first notice by issuance of the second notice, a new tenancy has been creat ed for the tenant to remain in possession until the expiry of the later notice on September 29, 1961, to which the tenancy sections 2(1) and 23(1) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948 would apply.
Accordingly it was held by the Court of Appeal that there was no valid notice to quit.
The ratio therein also is of no avail to the appellant.
No doubt in Gurumurthappa vs Chickmunisamappa, AIR a Division Bench of Mysore High Court held that the successor in interest is not entitled to avail the notice to quit given by the original landlord.
In the light of the above discussion this view is not good law.
It is no doubt true that per se sec.
109 of T.P. Act does not apply to the facts of this case.
It contemplates transfer of lessor 's right inter vivos.
But when right, title and interest in immovable property 837 stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Sec.
109 per force would apply and successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor.
This is what the learned single Judge of the High Court in the impugned judgment has held and we approve of the view as correct.
We, accordingly, hold that the notice terminating the tenancy of Vasantkumar would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ' ejectment.
The matter could also be gleaned through the statuto ry operation as well.
By operation of Sec. 26 of the State Act, the Board of Trustees acquired and held the demised property which includes lease hold interest therein.
Section 29(1) of the Central Act interposed and from February 1, 1975 the appointed date, in relation to Bombay Port all the movable and immovable property, assets and funds of the predecessor Board shall vest in the Board, i.e. the respond ent.
By operation of Clause (b) thereof all debts, obliga tions and liabilities incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be done, by with or for the Central Govt., or as the case may be, the other authority (i.e. predecessor Board under State Act) immedi ately before such day, for or in connection with the pur poses of the port, "shah be deemed to have been incurred, entered into and engaged to be done by, with or for the Board.
" It further postulates that all rates, fees, rents and other sums of money due to the Central Govt., or as the case may be, the other authority (i.e. the predecessor Board) in relation to the port immediately before such day shall be deemed to be due to the Board, i.e. the respondent.
Other clauses are not necessary.
Hence omitted.
Thereby by operation of Sec.
29(1)(b) the immovable properties, i.e. demised rooms and all contracts in relation thereto includ ing the lease and the right to ejectment pursuant to quit notice stood transferred to the respondent.
Sub section 2(A) of Sec.
133 'Repeal ' of the states that on the application of the Central Act to the Port of Bombay, except the provisions thereof relating to municipal assessment of the properties of the port of Bombay and matters connected therewith, shall cease to have force in relation to that port.
But subclause (c) of sub section (2D) of Sec. 133 provides that notwith standing anything contained in sub section (2A) (2B) and (2C) anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken including . . notice . . issued . shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken on the corresponding provisions of this Act.
By 838 operation of Sec.
29(1)(a) & (b)read with Sec.
133(2A) the quit notice concerning the vested immovable property i.e. the demised rooms vested in the respondent shall be deemed to have been done or taken under Sec.
29(1) and Sec.
133(2A)(C) of the Central Act.
There is no inconsistency between the Central and the State Acts in this regard.
Section 6 of the postulates the effect of repeal thus: 'Where this Act or any (Central Act) or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a dif ferent intention appears, the repeal shall not (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so re pealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ' or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so re pealed; or . . any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced . . as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." Section 17(1) provides under: "In any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commence ment of this Act, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of indicating the application of a law to every person or number of persons for the time being executing the functions of an office, to mention the official title of the officer at present executing the functions of an office, or that of the officer by whom the functions are commonly executed.
" Section 17 of the substitutes the func tionaries under the Central Act to those of the function aries under the State Act.
Section 6 gives effect to the previous operation of anything done or subsists the right acquired or privilege accrued under the Repealed Act and the legal proceedings of remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed.
There fore, the operation, efficacy and effectiveness of the quit notice issued by the power of attorney Agent of the respond ent i.e. the Asstt.
Estate Manager has been acquired by the respondent Board.
The rights and 839 remedy accrued to the respondent under the State Act namely termination of tenancy by issue of quit notice under Sec. 106 and 111(h) of T.P. Act and on expiry of thirty days i.e. on February 28, 1975 the respondent Board became entitled to institute the proceedings in the suits to have the tenants ejected under Sec.
41 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
The contention of Mr. Tunara that the Central Act and the would apply only to the acts done under the Central Act or State Act, by exercise of the statutory power which alone have been validated and they have no application to bilateral acts under Central Act and the notice under Sec. 106 of T.P. Act is not the one either under the Central or the State Act and that the notice issued is not saved, is devoid of force.
The Board of Trus tees under the State Act have merely changed their hats and stand transposed to be functionaries under the Central Act.
The functionaries under both the Acts are the same.
The notice was issued by the Asstt.
Estate Manager by virtue of his official function as power of attorney agent on behalf of the respondent.
The Board of Trustees have the right to terminate the lease under Sec.
26 of the State Act and those rights stood transferred and vested under Sec.
29(1) of the Central Act.
Therefore, the termination of tenancy and laying the action for ejectment are integrally connected with their official capacity.
There is a reasonable connec tion between the impugned acts and official duty.
Thereby, they are the acts done under the Central Act.
In Commission er for the Court of Calcutta vs Abdul Rahim Osman & Co., Sec.
142 of the Calcutta Port Act came up for interpreta tion.
Thereunder it was contended that short delivery of the goods was an omission and not an act done under the Act and though the suit was laid beyond three months, it was not barred by limitation.
Section 142 enjoins that no suit shall be brought in for anything done or purported to have been done beyond three months.
It was held that after the expiry of three months from the day on which the cause of action had arisen for short delivery, which was done or purported to have been done under the Act, the suit was barred by limitation.
It was further held that in order to apply any bar under Sec.
142 it was first to determine whether the act which is complained of in the suit can be said to have been within the scope of the official duty of the person or persons who are sought to be made liable.
This question can be answered in the affirmative where there is a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of the official duty.
Once the scope of official duty is determined, Sec.
142 will protect the defendant not only from a claim based on breach of the ' duty but also from a claim based upon an omission to perform such 840 duty.
The protection cannot be held to be confined to acts done in the exercise of a statutory power but also extends to acts done within the scope of an official duty.
This view was upheld in Trustees of Port of Bombay vs The Premier Automobiles Ltd. & Anr., ; where there was short delivery of one bundle out of 153 bundles consigned from Japan and omitted to be delivered and it was held to constitute an act done within the ambit of Sec. 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 and the bar of limitation pre scribed thereunder would apply.
Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the notice under Sec. 106 and Sec.
111(h) of the is an act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity as Power of Attorney holder/Asstt.
Estate Manager on behalf of the respondent, Board of Trustees; the right to lay the suit on expiry of one month 's period prescribed in the notice, namely, on or after February 28, 1975 had accrued to the respondent.
It is an act done or purported to have been done under the Central Act in exercise of the official function.
The right to lay the suit on determination of the tenancy by notice dated January 20, 1975 under the State Act is a transfer of inter est by operation of Sec.
29(1) of the Central Act, to the respondent under Sec.
109 of the .
Thereby the quit notice is valid.
The suit laid, pursuant thereto, is valid and legal.
Accordingly order of ejectment passed by the Small Cause Court is perfectly legal and unassailable.
The next contention of Mr. Tunara is that the re spondents are estopped from ejecting the appellant and other tenants who are similarly situated on the principle of promissory estoppel.
His contention is rounded upon the fact that the Estate Manager of the respondent in his letter dated April 3, 1972 directed the tenant to deposit Rs. 11,000 and odd for grant of tenancy after reconstruction of the flats therein.
The tenants placing reliance thereon have deposited the amount demanded from them and acted upon the promise to their detriment.
The respondent now shall be declared to be estopped from ejecting them from the demised respective portions leased out to them.
The learned Solici tor General contended that the Estate Manager has no author ity to give a promise.
Even assuming that he has such a power, it is conditional one, namely, approval by the Board.
The Board in its meeting resolved to reject the claim and on reconstruction decided to allot to its own employees out of administrative necessity.
Therefore, the promissory estoppel cannot be applied.
The principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or affect a 841 legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or.
intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon the other party, the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of admin istrative law.
This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice.
It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel.
Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law.
In Union of India vs Indo Afgan Agencies, Shah J., as he then was, speaking for the Division Bench of this Court while upholding the application of promissory estoppel to execu tive acts of the ,State negated the plea of executive neces sity thus: "We are unable to accede to the contention that the execu tive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to theft detriment.
Under our constitutional set up no person may be deprived of his right or liberty except in due course of and by if a member of the Executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the law common or statute the Courts will be competent to and indeed would be bound to protect the rights of the aggrieved citizens.
" It was further held in its summing up thus: "Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, not claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen." In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, [1970] 3 SCR 854 Shah, J. again extended this doctrine of promissory estoppel against public authori ties thus: "This court refused to make distinction between a private 842 individual and a public body so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned." In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs State of Uttar Pra desh; , Bhagwati, J., as he then was, applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the executive action of the State Government and also denied to the State of the doctrine of executive necessity as a valid defence.
It was held that in are public governed by rule of law, no one high or low is above the law.
Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception.
The Govt.
cannot claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estopped.
Equity will, in a given case where justice and fairness demands, present a person from exercis ing on strict legal rights even where they arise not in contract, but on his own title deed or in statute.
It ' is not necesary that there should be some pre existing contrac tual relationship between the parties.
The parties need not be in any count of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin.
The doctrine would apply even where there is no pre existing legal relation ship ' between the parties, but the promise is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal rela tionship which will arise in nature.
It was further held that it is indeed pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned .
The former is equally bound as the latter There fore, the Government cannot claim any immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel and it cannot say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner i.e. fair and just or that it is not bound by the consi derations of honesty and good faith.
In fact, the Government should be held to have a high standard of rectitude while dealing with its citizens.
Since the doctrine Of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield where the equity so re quires.
If it can be shown by the Govt.
that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequita ble to hold the Govt.
or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promise against the Government.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case.
because on the facts, equity would ' not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it.
But the Govt. must be able to show that in view of the fact as have been tran spired, public interest.
would not be prejudiced.
Where the Govt.is required to carry out the promise the Court would have to balance, the public interest in the Government 's carrying out the promise made to the citizens, which helps citizens to act upon and alter his position 843 and the public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government and deter mine which way the equity lies.
It would not be enough just to say that the public interest ' require that the Govt.
should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Govt.
were required to honour it.
In order to resist its liability the Govt. would disclose to the Court the various events insisting its claim to be exempt from liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it equita ble and to enforce the liability against the Govt.
There fore, we are holding that the doctrine of promissory estop pel would equally apply to a private individual as well as a public body like a Municipal Council.
It was held that it cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law.
It cannot be invoked to compell the Govt.
to do an act prohibited by law.
There may be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative functions.
Legisla ture can never be precluded from exercise of its legislative functions by resorting to doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The plea of executive necessity, though was rejected, its rigour was mellowed down to the above extent indicated above.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel, though doubted in Jeer Ram vs State of Haryana, ; was af firmed and reiterated by a Bench of three Judges in Union of India vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 123 at 144 Bhagwati, the Chief Justice, while; reiterating the law laid down in Motilal 'P ' Sugar Mills ' case (supra) made it clear thus: "there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Govt.
or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition.
It is equally true that promissory estoppel Cannot be used to compel the Gov ernment or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make.
We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts: as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority.
" 844 Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was reiterated by another Bench of three Judges in State of Bihar vs Usha Martin Industries Ltd., [1987] (65) STC 430 and Asstt.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Dharwar Dharmendra Trading Co., etc.
; , 12.
It is equally settled law that the promissory estop pel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public author ity to make.
We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires, and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority, for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Govern ment or public authority to .the promise or representation made by it.
The Court on satisfaction would not, in those circumstances raise the equity in favour of the persons to whom a promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against Government or the public authority.
Equally Promissory estoppel should not be extend ed, though it may be rounded on an express or implied prom ise stammed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the State or public authority when it was obtained play fraud on the constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the constitutional goals.
For instance a fight to reservation either under article 15(4) or 16(4) in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or backward classes was made with a view to ameliorate their status socially, economically and educationally so as to assimilate those sections into the main stream of the society.
The persons who do not belong to those classes, but produce a certificate to mask their social status and secure an ap pointment to an office or post under the State or public employment or admission into an educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State, on later investigation, though belated, was found that the certificate produced was false and the candidate was dis missed from the post or office or debarred or sent out from the institution or from the balance course of the study, the plea of promissory estoppel would always be found favour with the courts and being easily extended in favour of the candidate or party that played fraud on the Constitution.
It would amount not only putting a premium on the fraud on the Constitution, but also a denial to a reserved candidate and the general candidate as well.
Therefore, the plea of prom issory estoppel should not be extended to such areas.
845 Though Executive necessity is not always a good defence, this doctrine cannot be extended to legislative acts or to acts prohibited by the statute.
When it seeks to relieve itself from its application the Government or the public authority are bound to place before the Court the material, the circumstances or grounds on which it seeks to resile from the promise made or obliga tion undertaken by insistence of enforcing the promise, how the public interest would be jeopardised as against the private interest.
It is well settled legal proposition that the private interest would always yield place to the public interest.
The question, therefore, is whether promise, in fact, was made by the Estate Manager on behalf of the re spondent and whether the Estate Manager is competent to make such a promise and whether it binds the respondent.
The letter dated April 3, 1972 written by the Estate Manager is a conditional one, namely, that on fulfilling certain condi tions indicated in that letter he would make recommendation to the Board for grant of lease, condition precedent being that the tenant would deposit the required sum of about Rs. 11,000 and odd with the respondent.
Undoubtedly, the tenants completed that part of the obligation.
Thereafter admittedly it was placed before the Board, who by resolution dated September 10, 1974 which is at page 228 to 237 of the paper book, considered it, but was rejected on the ground that after reconstruction the building would be required to its staff.
Therefore, the decision has stemmed from its execu tive necessity, but that ground by itself would not be sufficient unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that as against the interest of the private tenants the interest of its employees is of such as absolute impor tance that without allotment of the quarters to the staff the work of the Port Trust cannot be carried out.
No such material has been placed before us.
But the crucial circum stance would be whether an unequivocal promise in fact was made and the Estate Manager was competent to make promise.
In Howell vs Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. the facts are that ship repairers in a naval vessel carried out certain work in contravention of para 1 of the Restriction of Repairs of Ships Order, 1940, the Admiralty acting under regulation 55 of the Defence (Gener al) Regulations, 1939 directed that repairs or alteration of ships would not be carried out except under the authority of a licence granted by the Admiralty.
The defence was that work was carried out with the oral permission of the licenc ing authority officer of the Admiralty.
In the Court of Appeal Lord Denning, laid the rule of promissory estoppel that whenever Government Officers in the deal 846 ings with the subject, take on themselves to assume authori ty in a matter with which he is concerned the subject is under entitlement to rely on their having the authority which they assume.
He does not know and cannot be expected to know the limits of their authority and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it.
On further appeal the House of Lords while reversing the view, Lord Simonds stated thus: "I know of no such principle in our law nor was any authori ty for it cited.
The illegality of an act is the same wheth er or not the actor has been misled by an assumption of authority on the part of a Government officer however high or law in the hierarchy.
I do not doubt that in criminal proceedings it would be a material factor that the actor had been thus misled if knowledge was a necessary element of the offence, and in any case it would have a bearing on the sentence to be imposed.
But that is not the question.
The question is whether the character of an act done in face of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it has been induced by a misleading assumption of authority.
In my opinion the answer is clearly No. Such an answer may make more difficult the task of the citizen who is anxious to walk in the narrow way, but that does not justify a differ ent answer being given." Lord Normand stated at page 849 thus: "But it is certain that neither a minister nor any subordi nate officer of the Crown can by any conduct or representa tion bar the Crown from enforcing a statutory prohibition or entitle the subject to maintain that there has been no breach of it." In Attorney General for Ceylon vs A.D. Silva, the Privy Council was called upon to consider whether the Collector of Custom was authorised to create a promise as against the crown.
Considering that question at page 479 it was held that: "All "ostensible" authority involves a representation by the principal as to the extent of the agent 's authority.
No representation by the agent as to the extent of his authori ty can amount to a "holding out" by the principal.
No public officer, unless he possesses some special power, can hold out on behalf of the Crown that he or some other public 847 officer has the right to enter into a contract in respect of the property of the Crown when in fact no such right exists.
Their Lordships think, therefore that nothing done by the Principal Collector or the Chief Secretary amounted to a holding out by the Crown that the Principal Collector had the right to enter into a contract to sell the goods which are subject matter of this action." In Administrative Law by Wade, 6th Edition at page 385 it is stated thus: "If the force of law is given to a ruling from an official merely because it is wrong, the official who has not legal power is in effect substituted for the proper authority , which is forced to accept what it considers a bad decision.
To legitimate ultra vires acts in this way cannot be sound policy, being a negation of the fundamental cannons of administrative law.
" Thus we have no hesitation to hold that before making the public authority responsible for acts of its subordi nate, it must be established that the subordinate officer did in fact make the representation and as a fact.
is compe tent to make a binding promise on behalf of the public authority or the Government, ultra vires acts do not bind the authority and insistence to abide by the said ultra vires promise would amount to putting premium and legitimacy to ultra vires acts of subordinate, officers.
It is seen from the record that the Estate Manager is merely an inter mediary to collect the material between the respondent Port Trust and its tenants and to place the material for consid eration .to the Board.
Thereby the Estate Manager is not clothed with any authority much less even ostensible author ity to create a promise so as to bind the respondent, that the respondent would allot the rooms on reconstruction to the tenants.
The promise by him is an ultra vires act, though conditional and, therefore, it does not bind the respondent.
Though the executive necessity has not been satisfactorily established, we hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the light of the above facts cannot be extended in favour of the appellant and other tenants.
Sri Tunara further submitted that the tenant did not derive title, namely, lease hold right from the respondent Port Trust under the Central Act.
That the tenant disputed the title and it is a sufficient defence under the explana tion to section 43 to non suit the respondent 848 in the summary proceeding.
It was open to the respondent to file a regular suit.
The Small Cause Court ought to have rejected the application on that ground and the High Court would have gone into the question.
It being a pure question of law, this court may permit the appellant to argue on the point for the first time in this Court.
It is undoubtedly true as held by catena of decisions of this Court that a pure question of law, untraveled by questions of fact, which goes to the roots of the jurisdiction.
could be permitted to be raised for the first time in an appeal under article 136 of the Constitution.
We are afraid.
we cannot permit the appel lant to raise this point for the following reasons: Firstly, except making a bald averment in the written statement that the "suit is not maintainable" nothing has been pleaded in detail in the written statement.
Admittedly this point was neither taken in the writ petition nor argued in the High Court.
It is not even raised in the grounds of appeal in this Court nor even in points raised in the synop sis of the case, It is stated that remotely it was raised in the rejoinder.
Since it is a mixed question of facts and law and not being a pure question of law, we cannot permit to raise the point for the first time, that too, when it would prejudice the respondent of their case at this stage.
We accordingly decline to go into the question.
We would also straighten the record and state that the appellants raised in the writ petition the vires of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Amending Act, 1963 introducing Sec.
42(A) in Chapter VII of the and deleting Sections 45 to 47 from the Principal Act and of an amended Sec.
49 thereof as well as Sec.
46(2) of the Presi dency Small Cause Courts Act as amended by Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1976 as offending article 14 of the Constitu tion, and unsuccessfully argued before the Division Bench of the High Court same point was raised in the grounds of appeal in this court.
Though the appeal was argued for three days, Mr. Tunara did not argue this point across the Bar, nor we had the advantage of hearing the learned Solicitor General.
Even in a written brief running into 44 pages submitted by the counsel, he did not deal with this point.
The counsel, after arguing the two points dealt with earli er, has devoted his time on the question of jurisdiction of the trial court under Sec.
41, despite our repeatedly re minding him that this point was neither raised, nor argued in the High Court, At the end he stated that he had elabo rately argued the point of vires before the Single Judge and the Division Bench and except repetition of the same once over, he could do no better by further arguing here.
There fore, this Court could go through the judgment and deal with the point.
We deprecate 849 this practice.
When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration, unless there is a full dressed argument addressed by either side before this court no satisfactory resolution could be made.
Mere para phrasing the judgment of the High Court in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making.
Therefore, after giving our anxious consideration, we, with great anguish.
decline to go into the point.
Except these.
no other points have been argued.
Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
but in the circumstances with out costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

summary:
The respondent a statutory body corporate constituted under the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 a 'State Act ' who had appointed an Assistant Estate Manager as their power of attorney holder to lease out its property from time to time, terminate the leases and to lay action for ejectment, etc.; leased out the suit property to the appellant.
826 The appellant was served with a notice under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of the terminating the tenancy in terms of the covenants of lease and directing delivery of possession of the demised property giving one month 's time from 22nd January 1975.
The notice was served on the tenants on January 28, 1975 and became effective from 28th February, 1975.
In the meanwhile, the Major Port Trust Act, 1963, a 'Central Act ' was made applicable to the Bombay Port Trust by operation of Section 133(2A) thereof with effect from February 1, 1975.
After the expiry of one month from the suit notice an ejectment application was filed under Section 41 of the Bombay as amended under the Maharashtra 1963 Amendment Act, and a direction was sought for delivery of possession.
After the Maharashtra Amendment Act 19 of 1976 came into force suits were laid against the three other tenants of the demised property.
The respondent pleaded in the said suit that it was a successor ininterest of the Port Trust Board under the State Act, and was entitled to eject the tenants and to take possession of the demised portions.
The appellant contended in his written statement that the suit was not maintainable since the State Act ceased to be operative with effect from February 1, 1975, the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section 111(h) of the became ineffective and without determining the tenancy afresh the suit was not validly laid.
It was further submit ted that the respondent had promised that on deposit of a certain amount which the appellant tenant did, he would be given to lease a portion in the reconstructed building, and consequently the respondent was estopped by promissory estoppel to have the tenant ejected.
One suit was dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was not duly determined as per law, while the other suits were decreed.
No appellate forum had been prescribed under the Maha rashtra Amendment Act of 1963 but a substantive suit on the original side provided was available, but such a right to appeal was incorporated by the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 19 of 1976.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the other tenants filed regular appeals to a Bench of two Judges of the Small Causes Court, which were pending.
827 In the writ petition of the appellant petitioner challenged the vires of sections 2,3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Amending Act, 1963 introducing Section 42(A) in Chapter VII of the and deleting Sections 45 to 47 from the Principal Act and of amendment of SectiOn 49 thereof; as well as Section 46(2) of the as amended by the Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1976 as offending Article 14 of tile Constitution.
When the matter came up before the Single Judge of the High Court it was referred to the Division Bench, which upheld the constitutional validity of the said sections and remitted the matter to the Single Judge for disposal on merits.
The Single Judge considered the matter and negatived the two points raised by the appellant petitioner regarding validity of the notice terminating tile tenancy, and also the plea of promissory estoppel, and dismissed the writ petition.
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave under Article 136.
It was contended on behalf of the appel lant that the quit notice issued under Section 106 read with Section III(h) of the was invalid and that by issue of the said notice no right accrued to the respondents and that the termination of tenancy became operative only on expiry of one month given thereunder i.e. February 28, 1975, by which date the State Act became inop erative, as from February 1, 1975 the Central Act had come into force; that termination of tenancy was an act inter vivos by operation of Section 106 read with Section III(h) of the , and that under Section 109, the respondent not being a living person, was not entitled to the benefit of the quit notice as its operation was not saved by Section 2(d) and Section 5 of the said Act.
It was also contended that the respondents were estopped from ejecting the appellant and other tenants who were similarly situated on the principle of promissory estoppel, as the Estate Manager of the respondent in his letter dated April 3, 1972 directed the tenant to deposit Rs. 11,000 for grant of tenancy after reconstruction of the flats therein and placing reliance thereon the tenants having deposited the amount demanded from them and acted upon the promise to their detriment, the respondents shall be declared to be estopped from ejecting the tenants from the demised respec tive portions leased out to them.
The appeal was contested on behalf of the respondents by contending that when right, title, and interest in immovable property stood transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Section 109 of the 828 will apply; and the successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor and that as the Estate Manager had no authority to give a promise, and that even assuming that he had such a power, it was a conditional one, namely, approval by the Board, and that the Board having resolved to reject the claim, and on reconstruction decided to allot to its own employees out of administrative necessity, the principle of promissory estop pel cannot be applied.
Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD: 1.
When right, title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Section 109 of the per force would apply and successor ininterest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor.
This is what the Single Judge of the High Court has held and the view is approved as correct.
The notice terminating the tenancy of Vasantkumar would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ejectment.
[836H; 837A B] N.P.K. Raman Menon vs Collector of Malabar, AIR 1924 Madras 908; Trimbak Damodhar Raipurkar vs Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors., [1962] Suppl.
1 SCR 700; Hitkarini Sabha vs The Corporation of City of Jabalpur & Anr., and Lower vs Sorrell, [ 1963] 1 Queen 's Bench Division 959, referred to.
Gurumurthappa vs Chickmunisamappa, AIR , over ruled.
Halsbury 's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol.
27, p. 193; Hill and Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant, 17th Edition Vol.
I, p. 488, p. 405; Mulla Transfer of Property Act, 6th Edition, p. 676 and Chitaley 's , 4th Edn.
1969, Vol.
III, Note 35, referred to.
2(i) The functionaries under both the State Act and the Central Act are the same.
The notice was issued by the Assistant Estate Manager by virtue of his official function as power of attorney agent on behalf of the respondent The Board of Trustees have the right to terminate the lease under Section 26 of the State Act and these rights stood transferred and vested under Section 29(1) of the Central Act.
Therefore the termination of tenancy and laying the action for ejectment are integrally connected with their official capacity.
There is a reasonable connection between the impugned acts and officials duty.
Thereby, they are the acts done under the Central Act.
[839C E] 829 2(ii) The notice under Section 106 and Section III(h) of the is an act done or purported to have been done in the official capacity as Power of Attorney holder/Assistant Estate Manager on behalf of the respondent, Board of Trustees; the right to lay the suit on expiry of one month 's period prescribed in the notice, namely, on or after February 28, 1975 had accrued to the respondent.
It is an act done or purported to have been done under the Central Act in exercise of the official function.
The right to lay the suit on determination of the tenancy by notice dated January 20, 1975 under the State Act is a transfer of inter est by operation of Section 29(1) of the Central Act, to the respondent under Section 109 of the .
Thereby the quit notice is valid.
The suit laid, pursu ant thereto, is valid and legal.
Accordingly order of eject ment passed by the Small Cause Court is perfectly legal and unassailable.
[840B E] Commissioner for the Court of Calcutta vs Abdul Rahim Osman & Co.; Trustees of Port of Bombay vs The Premier Automobiles Ltd. & Anr., ; , referred to.
3(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel is now well established one in the field of administrative law.
This principle has been evolved by equity to avoid injustice.
It is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel.
Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law.
This doctrine would be displaced in a case where equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it.
But the Government must be able to show that in view of the facts as have been transpired, public interest would not be prejudiced.
Where the Government is required to carry out the promise the Court would have to balance, the public interest in the Government 's carrying out the promise made to the citizens, which helps citizens to act upon and alter ' his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promises were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies.
[841B; 842G H; 843A] 3(ii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel would equally apply to a private individual as well as a public body like a Municipal Council.
It cannot be applied in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law.
It cannot be invoked to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law.
There may be no promissory estoppel against exercise of legislative functions.
[843B C] 3(iii) Promissory estoppel cannot be used for compelling the 830 Government or a public authority to carry out a representa tion or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of the authority or power of the officer of the Government or the public authority to make.
It being an equitable doctrine it must yield place to the equity, if larger public interest so requires and if it can be shown by the Government or public authority, for having regard to the facts as they have transpired that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it.
[844B D] 3(iv) Promissory estoppel should not be extended, though it may be rounded on an express or implied promise stemmed from the conduct or representation by an officer of the State or public authority when it was obtained to play fraud on the Constitution and the enforcement would defeat or tend to defeat the Constitutional goals.
[844D] Union of India vs Indo Afgan Agencies, ; ; Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, [1970] 3 SCR 854; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills vs State of Uttar Pradesh, ; ; Jeet Ram vs State of Haryana, ; ; Union of India vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd., [1985] Supp.
3 SCR 123 at 144; State of Bihar vs Usha Martin Industries Ltd., [1987] 65 STC 430 and Asstt.
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Dharwar vs Dharmendra Trading Co. etc.
; , , referred to.
Before making the public authority responsible for act of its subordinate, it must be established that the subordinate officer did in fact make the representation and as a fact, is competent to make a binding promise on behalf of the public authority or the Government, ultra vires acts do not bind the authority and insistence to abide by the said ultra vires promise would amount to putting premium and legitimacy to ultra vires acts of subordinate officers.
[847D E] Howell vs Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd, and Attorney General for Ceylon vs
A.D. Silva, , referred to.
The letter dated April 3, 1972 written by the Estate Manager is a conditional one, namely, that on fulfilling certain conditions indicated in that letter he would make recommendation to the Board for grant of lease, condition precedent being that the tenant would deposit the required sum of about Rs. 11,000 and odd with the respondent.
Un doubtedly, the tenants completed that part of the obliga tion.
Thereafter it was placed before the Board, who by resolution dated 831 September 10, 1974, considered.
,it, but was rejected on the ground that after reconstruction the building would be required by its staff.
[845C E] 6.
The Estate Manager is merely an intermediary to collect the material between the respondent Port Trust and its tenants and to place the material for consideration to the Board.
Thereby the Estate Manager is not clothed with any authority much less even ostensible authority to create a promise so as to bind the respondent, that the respondent would allot the rooms on reconstruction to the tenants.
The promise of him is an ultra vires act, though conditional and, therefore.
it does not bind the respondent.
Though the executive necessity has not been satisfactorily established, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be extended in favour of the appellant and other tenants.
[847E G] 7.
When a constitutional question has been raised and does arise for consideration, unless there is a fulldressed argument addressed by either side before this Court no satisfactory resolution could be made.
Mere paraphrasing the judgment of the High Court in particular when it relates to the local laws is no proper decision making.
[849A B]


judgement:
vil Appeals Nos.
1002 & 1003 of 1976.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.10.1972 and 18.9.
1975 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No. 2726 of 1970 and Civil Misc Writ Petition No. 9943 of 1975.
Satish Chander, S.N. Singh, T.N. Singh and H.L. Srivas tava for the Appellants.
J.P. Goyal, M.R. Bidsar and S.K. Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FATHIMA BEEVI, J.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgments of the High Court of Allaha bad.
The land in plots Nos.
6385 and 6386 measuring 5 bighas and 4 biswas had been in the possession of Ram Dayal as mortgagee under Baijnath who was the original tenant.
Re spondents 1 to 3 are the descendants of Ram 960 Dayal.
They made an application under section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 before the Consolidation Officer.
They claimed tenancy fights on the basis of the deed dated 30.7.1945 and they stated that their names had been recorded in the Khatauni of 1359 Fasli; they are in cultivatory possession and have become adhivasis and subse quently sirdars.
They alleged that the names of the appel lants herein have been wrongly entered in the Khatauni of 1353 Fasli and that the appellants have no right or posses sion over the land.
The respondents prayed for entering their names as sirdars and scoring off the names of the appellants.
This application was allowed by the Consolidation Offi cer by order dated 23.7.1967.
The order was reversed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation).
The Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the respond ents.
However, the writ petition filed by the respondents as C.M.W.P. No. 2726 of 1970 was allowed by the High Court by its judgment dated 3.10.1972 and the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities were quashed thereby main taining the order of consolidation Officer.
Civil Appeal No. 1002 of 1976 is directed against the judgment dated 3.10.1972 of the High Court.
The appellants had filed a Special Appeal on 30th Novem ber, 1972 against the judgment dated 3.10.1972 of Single Judge of the High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 2726 of 1970.
Howev er, the said Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable and ultimately dismissed in view of the U.P. High Courts (Aboli tion of Letters Patent Appeal Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 which came into force on 30th June, 1972.
This completes the narration of the fate of the writ petition No. 2726 of 1970 which finally culminated in favour of the respondents by order dated 3.10.72.
The appellants did not challenge the order of the High Court dated 3.10.72 by taking any further steps of filing any special leave petition before this Court.
On the con trary, on some mistaken and totally wrong advice of some counsel the appellants again initiated fresh proceedings by moving an application on 6.7.73 before the Settlement Offi cer Consolidation.
That application was rejected on 30.10.74.
A revision was filed against that order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was also rejected by order dated 21.7.75.
Thereafter the appellants filed C.M.W.P. No. 9943 of 1975 before the High Court on 7.8.75 against the order of the Deputy Director Consolidation.
This writ petition came to be dismissed by 961 order dated 18.9.
This judgment of the High Court is challenged in Civil Appeal No. 1003 of 1976.
When the High Court in the earlier Writ Petition No. 2726 of 1970 on the same subject matter had finally decided the matter in favour of the respondents by order dated 3.10.
1972, there was no question of giving any advice by any counsel in good faith to start proceedings afresh by moving a fresh application before the Consolidation authorities.
No counsel could have given such advice in good faith to start proceedings afresh before the Consolidation authorities and then to claim benefit of such period under section 14 of the .
It was elementary for any counsel of whatever standing to have known that none of the authorities of the Settlement or Consolidation department could have any right or juris diction to set aside the order of the High Court dated 3.10.1972.
The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as such was justified in dismissing the application by his order dated 30.10.
1974, and thereafter the revision by the Deputy Director (Consolidation) by order dated 21.7.
The appellants then under the same mistaken advice not in good faith filed C.M.W.P. No. 9943 of 1975 which came to be dismissed by the High Court on 18.9.
The second judg ment of the High Court is now challenged in Civil Appeal No. 1003 of 1976.
Both the appeals had been filed after the expiry of the period of limitation.
The appellants had applied for condo nation of delay on the ground that the appellants had been prosecuting the prior proceedings in good faith on legal advice and the period of more than three years taken in prosecuting the proceedings is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation under the provision of section 14 of the .
The respondents had filed counter to the application and opposed the same.
This Court granted special leave vide order dated 2.9.
1976 in both matters subject to the right of the respondents to argue the question of limitation and the applicability of section 14 of the at the hearing of the appeals.
The first question that we have to decide is that of limitation.
The delay of 1198 days according to the appel lants had occurred unwillingly and the appellants had been prosecuting with due diligence the earlier proceedings before the appellate and the revisional authorities and on the basis of the advice given by their counsel.
There is no proper affidavit of either the appellants or the counsel in support of the application for condonation of delay.
There is also no other material to indicate that the appellants had exercised due diligence in work 962 ing out their remedies and sought proper advice in the matter.
When the party had no right of appeal, the proceed ings instituted before the High Court challenging the judg ment in the writ petition cannot be considered to be one in good faith.
The subsequent proceedings are also not legal or valid.
When the decision of the High Court in the writ petition was one quashing the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities, the party could not proceed on the basis that the matter was restored to the lower authori ties for fresh decision.
We are therefore not satisfied that there is any merit in the ground urged by the appellants for getting over the bar of limitation.
The appeals are liable to be dismissed as time barred.
We find that even on the merits, the appellants cannot succeed.
The respondents based their claim on the patta in their favour under the deed of 30.7.1945.
The Consolidation Officer accepted the genuineness of the deed and found title with the respondents.
The appellants had claimed right under the subsequent document of 2.8.
1945 in continuation of an earlier deed of 23.11.
The land was admittedly in the possession of Baijnath, the original tenant and he was dispossessed in execution of the decree obtained by the landlord in 1944.
The tenancy in favour of Baijnath was subsisting when the deed of 23.11.
1943 was executed.
The creation of a tenancy during the subsistence of the earlier one could not confer any right.
Before the deed of 2.8.
1945 patta was already granted in favour of the respondents.
The circumstances under which the same was granted also weighed in finding title in favour of the respondents.
The landlord had obtained a decree against Baijnath when the land was mortgaged in favour of Ram Dayal.
The mortgagee later on obtained the decree against the landlord for an amount of Rs.214 being the value of the crops in the land.
An agree ment was subsequently entered into between the landlord and the respondents settling the claim under the decree and granting patta in favour of the respondents.
These facts have been found in favour of the respondents by the Consoli dation Officer.
The High Court in quashing the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities was of opinion that there was apparent error on the face of the record.
The appellate authority was found to be wrong in its conclusion that the respondents lost their right by the continued possession of the appellants.
The High Court noticed that even before the Consolidation Officer, the appellants did not press their claim on the basis of the patta of 1943 and has also found that the deed of 23.11.1943 was not a valid settlement inasmuch as the land was in the possession of the sitting tenant.
It was also noticed that soon after the deed of 2.8.1945, dispute arose regarding possession, that the 963 appellants had been dispossessed on the basis of the decree obtained by the respondents setting aside the order of a criminal court.
Before the decree became final pending litigation, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act came into force.
In view of the subsequent legislation, the respond ents have proceeded under the U.P. Consolidation Act and the proceedings culminated in the present appeals.
In the light of the definite findings of the competent authority that the respondents have derived valid title as tenants under the deed of 30.7. 1945 and the apparent mis take in the proceedings of the appellate and the revisional authorities as found by the High Court, it is not now open to the appellants to contend that they are rightful tenants entitled to possession of the land.
Though the claim based on deed of 23.11.1943 had not been pressed before the lower authorities, it has been contended before us that the appel lants have a case on the principle contained in section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The learned counsel for the appellants maintained that even if the deed of 23.11.
1943 was inoperative or was not valid for the reason that the landlord had no possession since they obtained possession on 30.6.1944, the appellants acquired tenancy right and that has been confirmed by the deed of 2.8.
The argument, though attractive, is not acceptable.
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act embodies the rule of estoppel by deed.
The section enables the transferee to whom a transfer is made on fraudulent or erroneous repre sentation to lay hold at his option of any interest which the transferor may subsequently acquire in the property provided by doing so he does not adversely affect the right of any subsequent purchaser for value without notice.
Thus when a lessor erroneously represents that he is authorised to lease a property and creates a lease of it and afterwards acquires that property, the lessee is entitled to have the property from the lessor.
This principle has no application if the transfer is invalid.
The transfer under the deed of 23.11.
1943 became inoperative not on account of any fraudu lent or erroneous representation.
The settlement was invalid and inoperative on account of the subsisting lease in re spect of the land and as the landlord could not super impose a second lease in respect of the tenanted property, no interest could be created in favour of the appellants under that document and, therefore, there is no question of feed ing the estoppel.
The execution of the deed dated 30.7.
1945 in favour of the respondents negatives the claim of the appellants having acquired any right after the property was taken delivery of in 1944.
We therefore reject the conten tion.
964 We accordingly hold that there is no valid ground to interfere with the decision of the High Court.
We therefore dismiss the appeals.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
S.B. Appeals dismissed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The land in plots Nos.
6385 and 6386 had been in posses sion of Ram Dayal as mortgagee under Baijnath who was the original tenant.
Respondents No. 1 3 are the descendants of Ram Dayal.
They made an application under section 9 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 before the Consolidation Officer claiming tenancy rights on the basis of the deed dated July 30, 1945, stating that their names had been recorded in Khatauni of 1359 Fasli.
They are in cultivatory possession and have become adhivasis and subsequently sir dars.
They further contended that the appellants have no right of possession over the land and their names have been wrongly entered in the Khatauni No. 1353 Fasli.
The respond ents prayed for entering their names as sirdars.
This application was allowed by the Consolidation Offi cer vide order dated July 23, 1967.
The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) reversed the order and the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision filed by the re spondents.
Subsequently the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the same and quashed the orders of the appellate and the revisional authorities, and maintained the order of the Consolidation Officer in its judgment dated 3rd October, 1972.
The appellants filed a special leave on 30th November, 1972 against the judgment of the High Court dated 3rd Octo ber, 1972 under letters patent.
It was not maintainable in view of the U.P. Courts (Abolition of Letters Patent Appeal Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 which came into force on 30th June, 1972.
Thus Writ Petition finally culminated in favour of the respondents by High Court order dated 3rd October, 1972.
958 The appellants instead of challenging the order of the High Court by way of filing any Special Leave Petition before this Court, initiated fresh proceedings by moving an application on 6th July, 1973 before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) which was rejected on 30th October, 1974.
A revision was filed against the said order before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was also rejected on 21st July, 1975.
Thereafter the appellants moved the High Court again, and the Writ Petition filed by them was dismissed by its order dated 18th September, 1975.
Since the subject matter had been finally decided by the High Court judgment of 3rd October, 1972 so to start pro ceedings afresh was not in good faith as none of the author ities of the Settlement or Consolidation could have any right or jurisdiction to set aside the order of the High Court.
The second judgment of the High Court dated 18th September, 1975 was challenged in C.A. No. 1003 of 1976 in this Court.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court, HELD: Both the appeals had been filed after the expiry of the period of limitation.
The appellants had applied for condonation of delay on the ground that they had been prose cuting the prior proceedings in good faith and on legal advice so the period of more than three years be excluded in computing the period of limitation under section 14 ' of the .
The Respondents filed counter to the application and opposed the same.
[961D E] Special leave was granted by this Court on 2nd Septem ber, 1976 subject to the rights of the respondents to argue the question of limitation and applicability of section 14 of the at the hearing of the appeals.
[961F] The appellants as to the question of limitation submit ted that the delay of 1198 days had occurred unwillingly though they had been prosecuting with due diligence before the appellate authorities but there is no proper affidavit either of the appellants or the Counsel in support of the application for condonation of delay.
There is also no other material to indicate that the appellants had exercised due diligence in working out their remedies and sought proper advice in the matter.
There was no right of appeal against the judgment of the High Court as it quashed the orders of the appellant and the revisional authorities so the proceed ings instituted by the party by restoring to the lower authorities for fresh decision are not legal or valid.
Hence the appeals are liable to be dismissed as time barred.
[961G H; 962A B] 959 Even on merits, the appellants cannot succeed.
Admitted ly the original tenant was Baijnath but was dispossessed in execution decree obtained by the landlord in 1944.
Thereaf ter the land was mortgaged in favour of Ram Dayal and the mortgagee obtained the decree against the landlord.
The respondents subsequently entered into an agreement setting the claims under the decree and granting patta in favour of the Respondents in deed dated 30th July, 1945.
These facts have been accepted by the Consolidation Officer and the deed and title were found to be in favour of the,respondents.
The tenancy in favour of Baijnath was subsisting when the deed of 23rd November, 1943 was executed.
The creation of a tenancy during the subsistence of the earlier one could not confer any right and even before the deed of 2nd August, 1945 patta was already granted in favour of the respondents.
[962D G] Even the contention of the appellants that they have a case under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, which embodies the rule of estoppel by deed, is not applicable because the transfer under the deed of 23rd November, 1943 became inoperative because the settlement was invalid on account of the subsisting lease in respect of the Land and the landlord could not super impose a second lease in re spect of the tenanted property, so no interest could be created in favour of the appellants under that document of 2nd August, 1945 and therefore, there is no question of feeding the estoppel.
[963E G]