judgement:
ivil Appeal Nos.896 to 899 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1987 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 2131,2082 of 1984 respectively.
PG NO 257 G. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General, R.K. Jain, P.P. Rao, M.S. Gujaral, section Rangarajan, A.K. Sanghi, Mrs. Madhu Kapur, Arun Kr.
Vijayesh Roy, Sanjay Kr.
Kaul, Sardar Bahadur, V.B. Saharaya, R.K. Khanna, Vishnu Mathur, Ashok Aggarwal, R.N. Keswani and R.S. Sodhi for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH, J.
These four Civil Appeals by Special Leave and the Special Leave Petition arise out of and are directed against the common Judgment dated 2.9.1987, of the High Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No. 2132 and C.W.P. No. 2082 of 1984 in which the principal controversy was whether the Rules prescribing different conditions of eligibility for Diploma Holders and Graduates for promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers to that of Assistant Engineers and from the cadre of Assistant Engineers to that of Executive Engineers in the Public Works Department of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and would, therefore, require to be declared void.
The High Court, in the writ petitions filed by the Diploma Holders, has held that such differential treatment of Diploma Holders and Graduates by the prescription of different standards of service experience for purposes of eligibility for promotion to the higher cadres is unconstitutional.
The D.D.A. which is the appellant in Civil Appeals No.898 of 1988 and No. 899 of 1988 assails the correctness of the view taken by the High Court.
Civil Appeals No. 896 of 1988 and 897 of 1988 are by the Graduate Engineers who were respondents before the High Court and who are, similarly, aggrieved by the decision under appeal SLP 6181 of 1988 is by the DDA Graduate Engineers Association" which seeks to espouse the cause of the Graduate Engineers.
We grant Special Leave in SLP.
All the five appeals are heard and disposed of by this common judgment.
PG NO 258 C.A.899 of of 1988 and SLP 6181 arise out of C.W.P. 2132 of of of 1988 arise out of C.W.P. 2082 of 1984.
The D.D.A. by its resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963 adopted, pro tanto, the rules of the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) in regard to the mode of recruitment both by direct recruitment and by promotion to the posts of Asst.
Engineers.
The rules, so adopted, in substance, stipulate and provide that 50% of the posts be filled by direct recruitment or by deputation and that the other 50% be filled up by promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers.
The cadre of Junior Engineers itself comprises of both Graduates in Engineering and Diploma Holders in Engineering.
The two categories of officers in the cadre of Junior Engineers were provided with promotional opportunities to the post of Asst.
Engineers in the equal ratio (50%:50%) of the promotional posts.
Half of it, i.e., 25% was to be filled up by promotion of Graduate Engineers with three years ' service experience as Junior Engineers; the other 25% to be filled up from Diploma Holder Junior Engineers who were diploma holders who had 8 years ' service experience as Junior Engineers.
By resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971 the DDA similarly adopted the relevant rules in the CPWD in the matter of recruitment to the posts of Executive Engineers.
The Executive Engineers ' post in the DDA thus became purely promotional and Graduate Asst.
Engineers with 8 years ' service experience and diploma Asst.
Engineers with 10 years ' service experience were eligible for promotion.
No inter se quota between the two class of officers was prescribed.
The following table delineates the effect and purport of the rules adopted under resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963 and No. 105 dated 16.6.1971.
The table also indicates the mode of initial recruitment to the cadre of Junior Engineers: PG NO 259 EXECUTIVE ENGINEERS [By promotion] Asst.
Engrs. ' Asst.
Engrs. ' [Degree] + [Diploma] 8 years +10 years service service ASSISTANT ENGINEERS Graduates and Dimploma holders 50%by promotion 50%.By Direct recruitment 25% 25% Jr. Enger.
[Degree] [Diploma] +3 yrs.
+ 8 years service service JUNIOR ENGINEERS [Sectional Officers] Direct recruitment Graduates in Diploma Engineering holders [No prior [with 2 experience years Prescribed] experience In the years 1984 the Diploma Holder in the cadre of Junior Engineers and in he cadre of Asst.
Engineers sought to assail, by means of two writ petitions presented to the Delhi High Court, the Constitutional validity of the prescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement of differential service experiences between the Graduates and Diploma Holders for promotion to the higher cadres viz. of Asst.
Engineers and Executive Engineers respectively.
They also assailed the promotions of Graduate Engineers to the higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules.
2132 of 1984 pertained to the resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963 adopting the relevant CPWD Rules prescribing 3 years ' and 8 years ' service experience for Graduates and Diploma Holders respectively and the discrimination thus brought about between them.
CWP No. 2082 of 1984 pertained to the contitutionality of the analogous provisions in the rules adopted by resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971.
PG NO 260 The High Court heard these two petitions together and by its common judgment dated 2.9.1987 upheld the challenge and declared the different standards of service experience prescribed for Degree Holders and Diploma Holders in respect of both the cadres as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The principal question that arises in these appeals is whether, where, as here, recruitment to a particular cadre of posts is made, from two different sources, different conditions, based on the differences in educational qualifications, can be prescribed conditioning the eligibility for further promotion to a higher cadre in service.
The High Court, by the judgment now under appeal, has held that such prescription of differential standards based even on the differences in technical, educational qualifications is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
In reaching such conclusions as it did on the point, the High Court placed reliance on the pronouncement of this Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali vs UOI and Others,[1975] 1 SCR 449, H. C. Sharma and Ors.
vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., ; and Punjab State Electricity Board,Patiala, and Anr.
vs Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors.
,[1986] 4 SCC 617 and T.R: Kapur and Others vs State of Haryana and Others, ; The High Court distinguished the decision of this (Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir vs Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors., l1974] 1 SCR 771.
The High Court drew a distinction between the situation where diploma holders were wholly excluded from eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre and the situation where, while they were considered eligible for promotion, however, were subjected to more onerous and less advantageous conditions for such promotion.
The High Court distinguished Triloki Nath Khosa 's case observing: "7.
This was a case where diploma holders were found completely ineligible for promotion to the higher post for lack of essential educational qualification but the considerations may vary if they are found eligible for promotion to the higher post but still certain conditions are laid as distinct from degree holders before they become eligible for promotion.
The question then would arise whether such distinction can be justified and is based on any rationality or not . " PG NO 261 Answering this point in favour of the "Diploma Holders" the High Court held: ".
The moment the diploma holders and degree holders are considered to constitute one class for purposes of promotion there cannot be any differentiation between the two vis a vis the qualification for promotion.
It could be that for reasons of efficiency in administration the authorities may lay down that diploma holders are not at all eligible for promotion to the higher post and such a bar can be upheld in view of the ratio laid down in the case of Triloki Nath Khosa but after the authorities considered them eligible for promotion there could be no rationale in their making any distinction between the degree holders and diploma holders for granting promotion to them to the higher post. " (Emphasis Supplied) The point of distinction, as apprehended by the High Court, is that in the present case a Diploma, ipso facto, qualifies for promotion.
The real question is whether this assumption is correct and whether the relevant Rules determine the eligibility for promotion on the basis of a Diploma, or for that matter even a Degree, Or whether the eligibility for promotion is determined not with reference merely to the educational attainments but on the basis of educational qualifications plus a measure of service experience, stipulated differently for Graduates and Diploma Holders.
Learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the view that commended itself to the High Court is demonstrably erroneous and is opposed to principles which, by now, should be considered well settled.
They submitted that the High Court fell into an obvious error in its view that in Shujat Ali 's case ( ; , this Court had stuck down the service rule impugned in that case.
Learned Counsel submitted that the fundamental distinction between the two sets of cases, one of which Triloki Nath Khosa 's case is represents, and the other typified by Shujat Ali 's case, was lost sight of by the High Court and the error pervading the judgment is the result of overlooking this essential distinction between the two sets of cases.
It was contended for the appellants that the present case was not one in which the Diploma Holders proprio vigore, and without more, were held eligible for promotion.
If the effect and intent of the rules were such as to treat PG NO 262 Diploma as equivalent to a Degree for purposes of further promotion then, the view of the High Court that having considered both class of officers equally eligible for promotion on the mere strength of their educational qualifications, any further discrimination brought about by subjecting the Diploma Holders alone to a more onerous and less advantageous stipulation for such promotion would violate, the constitutional pledge of equality might have some qualification.
But in the present case, counsel contended, that is not the position.
The educational qualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determining eligibility.
Nor the Degree itself was determinative of eligibility for promotion.
The eligibility for promotion is, it is urged, based on a combination of factors which vary according as the basic educational qualification of the two classes of engineers; that this distinction was germane to the requirements of higher technical and academic quality for the higher posts which involved expertise in structural design etc.
Learned counsel submitted that even where recruitment to a particular cadre was made from different sources, resulting in the formation of single a homogeneous cadre, it was not impermissible to make a further classification amongst the members of such a cadre for purposes of further promotion based on the higher educational qualification of the candidates.
Learned counsel for the respondent diploma holders, while seeking to support the judgment of the High Court urged that this Court had, more than once, cautioned against undue accent, in the matter of promotional opportunities, on academic qualification alone which might lead to elitist preferences and tend to obscure the egalitarian principle and social justice.
It was, therefore, contended that the effect of the distinction, in the ultimate analysis, is really an imperceptible extension or magnification of insubstantial factors sub verting the precious guarantee of equality.
Sri Gujral, learned Senior Counsel, sought to impart to the situation a dimension of social justice and made an impassioned plea that to discriminate between Diploma Holders and Graduates who belong to the same cadre and hold inter changeable posts, both in the present cadre and in the prospective promotional posts, on the mere lack of some higher academic attainment is to place a high premium on those social and economic ills of the society which rendered the further academic pursuits for the economically disadvantaged difficult.
A large number of authorities were cited on either side.
We by first examine the cases relied upon by the High Court in support of its conclusion.
The inherent distinction PG NO 263 between a person with a Degree and one who is merely a Diploma Holder is much too obvious.
But the question that falls for consideration, in the context such as the present one, is whether the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to which the promotion is contemplated.
The idea of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for promotion are drawn from the same source.
If the differences in the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities, that go with and are attendant upon the promotional post, the more advantageous treatment of those who possess higher technical qualifications can be legitimised on the doctrine of classification.
There may, conceivably, be cases where the differences in the educational qualifications may not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one class of candidates as against another.
Whether the classification is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the relevant time.
When the state makes a classification between two sources, unless the vice of the classification is writ large on the face of it, the person assailing the classification must show that it is unreasonable and violative of Article 14.
A wooden equality as between all classes of employees irrespective of all distinctions or qualifications, or job requirements is neither constitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful.
This Court in Central Railway vs
A.V.R. Siddhanti; , at 214 observed: ".
A wooden equality as between all classes of employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run.
Indeed, the maintenance of such a 'classless and undiscerning 'equality ' where, in reality, glaring inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content.
Broad classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in administration, is permissible .
In T. Devadasan vs The Union of India,[1964]4 SCR 680 at 689 & 690 this Court observed: ".
What is meant by equality in this Article is, equality amongst equals.
It does not provide for an absolute equality of treatment to all persons in utter disregard PG NO 264 in every conceivable circumstance of the differences such as age, sex, education and so on and so forth as may be found amongst people in general.
Indeed, while the aim of this Article is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary discrimination shall not be made by the State between a citizen and a citizen who answer the same description and the differences which may obtain between them are of no relevance for the purpose of applying a particular law reasonable classification is permissible.
It does not mean anything more.
But then the process of classification is in itself productive of inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality.
The process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a pre existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of the effects of such pre existent inequality.
But the process cannot in itself generate or aggravate the inequality.
The process cannot merely blow up or magnify in substantial or microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible dif ferences.
The over emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content and end in replacing Doctrine of equality by the doctrine of classification.
The presumption of good faith in and of constitutionality of a classification cannot be pushed "to the point of predicating some possible or hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for a classification rendering the precious guarantee of equality "a mere rope of sand".
"To overdo classification is to undo equality".
The idea of similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons, to justify classification, cannot rest on merely differentia which may, by themselves be rational or logical, but depends on whether the differences are relevant to the goals sought to be reached by the law which seeks to classify.
The justification of the classification must needs, therefore, to be sought beyond the classification.
All marks of distinction do not necessarily justify classification irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought to be achieved by the law imposing the classification.
In Mohd. Sujat Ali 's case the validity of a prescription of the rules of the State of Andhra Pradesh treating Graduate Engineers, on the one hand, and engineers with diploma or equivalent qualification, on the other, differently for purposes of promotion arose for consideration.
Strictly speaking, the High Court was not right in its under standing of the actual result of the PG NO 265 ease.
The High Court, in para 8 of the judgment observed: "The Supreme Court had then struck down this rule as violative of fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. " But it is to be noticed that the writ petitions were ultimately dismissed by this Court.
There are, of course, certain observations which caution against too readily resorting to the expedience of classification.
After referring to Triloki Nath Khosa 's ease it was observed: ". .But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made on the basis of variant educational qualification.
, such classification must be held to be valid irrespective of the nature and purpose of the classification or the quality and extent of the differences in the educational qualifications.
It must be remembered that "life has relations not capable always of division into inflexible compartments".
The moulds expand and shrink.
The test of reasonable classification has to be applied in each ease on its peculiar facts and circumstances . . " (Emphasis Supplied) This echoes what Vivian Bose, J. had earlier said in Bidi ,Supply Co. vs Union of lndia ; "Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of mind,a way of life.
rather than a precise rule of law . ". .In a given case that it falls this side of the line or that and because of that decisions on the same point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of the country and another somewhere else; one decision today and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered and the structure of current social thinking is different.
It is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of the times and Article t4 narrows down to a question of fact which must be determined by the highest Judges in the land as each ease arises. ." Shujat Ali 's ease itself recognised the permissibility and validity of such classification if the nature of the PG NO 266 functions and duties attached to the promotional posts are such as to justify the classification in the interest of efficiency in public service; but, where both graduates and non graduates were regarded as equally fit and eligible for promotion,the denial of promotion to a person otherwise eligible and due for promotion on the basis of a quota was not justified.
On this point it was observed by this Court in Shujat Ali 's case: ". .But where graduates and non graduates are both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,it is difficult to see how, consistently, with the claim for equal opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving preferential treatment to graduates over non graduates in the matter of fixation of such quota.
The result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of the two categories of supervisors would be that when a vacancy, arises in the post of Asst.
Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved for graduate supervisors, a non graduate supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is senior to all other graduate supervisors and more suitable than they.
His opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies available for non graduate supervisors.
That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity to him In the present appeals before us, the Graduates and Diploma Holders were not treated equal in the mattes of eligibility for promotion.
What is, therefore, assailed is not the aspect of the mere fixation of a quota as between the Diploma Holders and the Graduates in the promotional posts, but the very prescription of different standards or conditions of eligibility.
In Shujat Ali 's case the infirmity of the differential treatment stemmed from the fundamental basis that, at that point, both Graduates and Diploma holders were equally eligible but the Rule operated to deny promotion to a Diploma holder on the basis of a quota.
The observations in that case pertained to a stage which arose after the equality of eligibility for promotion between the two classes of persons had been recognised.
But in the present appeals the different prescriptions for conditioning eligibility are themselves questioned which need to be decided on the basis whether the discrimination contemplated and brought about in the matter of promotional opportunities between graduates and non graduates, based on the differences in the quality of their technical qualifications, were relatable to, and justified on the PG NO 267 basis of, the requirements of the promotional posts.
It is relevant to mention here that the different standards and Conditions for eligibility were prescribed with a view to injecting a higher technical quality in the promotions cadre based on the recommendations of a committee, called "Vaish Committee", constituted for the purpose.
H.C. Sharma 's and Punjab State Electricity Board 's cases were also matters where Graduates and Diploma holders were merged into and formed part of a homogenious cadre with equal eligibility for promotion and what fell for consideration was the validity of the further prescription of quotas between them.
Here again, no question of the validity of the different standards prescribed for the very eligibility for promotion fell for consideration.
The present cases, however, are those where, havig regard to the requirements of the promotional posts, different conditions of eligibility for promotion on the differences based on the educational qualifications and service experience were prescribed.
In State of Mysore vs Narasinga Rao,[1968] 1 SCR 40 1 higher educational qualifications were considered relevant for fixation of higher pay scales.
In Union of India vs Mrs. S.B. Kohli, the requirement of a post graduate specialisation in the particular discipline was considered not irrelevant and a classification based on such specialisation was upheld.
Triloki Nath Khosa 's case is more directly in point.
There, Graduate Engineers and Diploma Holders were in a common cadre of Asst.
Engineers.
But for purposes of further promotion to the higher cadre of Executive Engineers only the Graduate were held eligible.
Diploma Holders were barred for promotion.
Repelling the challenge to this provision made by the Diploma Holders, this Court said: "The classification of Assistant Engineers into Degree holders and Diploma holders could not be held to rest on any unreal or unreasonable basis.
The classification was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering services.
If this be the object, the classification is clearly correlated to it for higher educational qualifications are at least presumption evidence of a higher mental equipment." "Classification on the basis of educational qualifictions made with a view to achieving administrative PG NO 268 efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstances and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification." "Though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to then cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications the rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.
" (Emphasis Supplied) In Triloki Nath 's case diploma holders were not considered eligible for promotion to the higher post.
Here, in the present case, the possession of a diploma, by itself and without more, does not confer eligibility.
Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the degree.
This is the point of distinction in the situations in the two cases.
If Diploma Holders of course on the justification of the job requirements and in the interest of maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited only two choices, namely either to consider them "eligible" or "not eligible".
State, consistent with the requirements of the promotional posts and in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility on Diploma Holders conditioning it by other requirements which may, as here, include certain quantum of service experience.
In the present case, eligibility determination was made by a cumulative criterion of a certain educational qualification plus a particular quantum of service experience.
It cannot, in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court, that the choice of the State was either to recognise Diploma Holders as "eligible" for promotion or wholly exclude them as "not eligible".
If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then, the super imposition of further conditions such as a particular period of service, selectively, on the Diploma Holders alone to their disadvantage might become discriminatory.
This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the vary eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service PG NO 269 experience.
It is stated that on the basis of the "Vaish Committee" report, the authorities considered the infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary.
These are essentially matters of policy.
Unless the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one of judicial restraint.
The prescriptions may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their application in some individual cases; but they can not be struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary.
The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in striking down the Rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16.
Accordingly, all the Appeals are allowed, the Judgment of the High Court dated 2.9.1987 set aside and the Civil Writ Petitions No. 2 132 of 1984 and 2082 of 1984 in the High Court dismissed.
However, the parties are left to bear and pay their costs, both here and below.
A.P.J .
Appeals allowed.

summary:
The Rules of the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) adopted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) stipulate and provide that 50% of the posts of Assistant Engineers in DDA be filed up by promotion from the cadre of Junior Engineers comprising of both Graduates in Engineering and Diploma Holders in Engineering in the equal ratio (50%:50%) of the promotional posts.
Half of it, i.e. 25% were to be filled up by promotion of Graduate Junior Engineers with three years ' service experience as Junior Engineers; the other 25% to be filled up from Diploma Holder.
Junior Engineers.
who had X years service experience as Junior Engineers.
The Rules further provide that the Executive Engineers ' post in DDA were purely promotional and Graduate Assistant Engineers with 8 years ' service experience and Diploma Holder Assistant Engineers with 10 years ' service experience were eligible for promotion.
No inter se quota between the two class of officers; was prescribed.
The Diploma Holders in the Cadres of .junior Engineers and Assistant Engineers filed separate writ petitions in the High Court assailing the constitutional validity of the prescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement of differential service experiences between the Graduates and the Diploma Holders for promotion to the higher caders of Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineers respectively.
They also assailed the promotion of Graduate Engineers to the higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules.
PG NO 253 PG NO 254 The High Court allowed the writ petitions and declared the different standards of service experience prescribed for Degree Holders and Diploma Holders in respect of both the cadres as violative of Articles 1 1 and 16 of the Constitution.
In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of appellants it was contended; (l) that the view taken by the High Court is demonstrably erroneous and opposed to well settled principles; (2) that the High Court took an erroneous view that in Shujat Ali 's case ; this Court struck down the service rule impugned in that case; (3) that the fundamental distinction between Triloki Nath Khosa 's, case ; and Shujat Ali 's case was lost sight of by the High Court;(4) that the present case was not one in which the Diploma Holders, proprio vigore and without more, were held eligible for promotion.
The educational qualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as equivalent to a Degree for purposes of determining eligibility.
Nor the Degree itself was determinative of eligibility for promotion.
The eligibility of promotion is based on a combination of factors which vary according to the basic educational qualification of the two classes of engineers; (5) that this distinction was germane to the requirements of higher technical and academic quality for the higher posts which involved expertise in structural design.
and (6) that even where recruitment to a particular cadre was made from different sources,resulting in the formation of a single homogeneous cadre it was not impermissible to make a further classification amongst the members of such a cadre for purposes of further promotion based on the higher educational qualification of the candidates.
On behalf of the respondent Diploma Holders it was contended(1) that this Court had, more than once.
cautioned against undue accent, in the matter of promotional opportunities, on academic qualification alone which might lead to elitist perferences and tend to obscure the egalitarian principle and social justice; (2) that the effect of the distinction is really an imperceptible extension or magnification of insubstantial factors subverting the precious guarantee of equality and(3) that to discriminate between Diploma Holders and Graduates who belong to the same cadre and hold inter changeable posts, both in the present cadre and in the prospective promotional posts, on the mere lack of some higher academic attainment is to place a high premium on these social and economic pursuits for the economically disadvantaged difficult.
Allowing the Appeals, PG NO 255 HELD: l.
The inherent distinction between a person with a Degree and one who is merely a Diploma Holder is much too obvious.
But the question for consideration, in the present context, is whether the differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office to which the promotion is contemplated.
The idea of equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the candidates for promotion are drawn from the same source.
If the differences in the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature of duties and responsibilities.
that go with and are attendant upon the promotional post, the more advantageous treatment of those who possess higher technical qualifications can be legitimised on the doctrine of classification.
There may,conceivably, be cases where the differences in the educational qualifications may not be sufficient to give any preferential treatment to one class of candidates as against another.
Whether the classification is reasonable or not must, therefore, necessarily depend upon facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining at the relevant time.
When the State makes a classification between two sources, unless the vice of the classification is writ large on the face of it, the person assailing the classification must show that it is unreasonable and violative of Article 14.
[263A C ] 2.
A wooden equality as between all classes of employees irrespective of all distinction or qualifications, or job requirements is neither constitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful.
[263D] The process of classification is in itself productive of inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality.
The process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a pre existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of the effects of such pre existent inequality.
The the process cannot merely blow up or magnify in substantial or microscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible.
The over emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content and end in re placing doctrine of equality by the doctrine of the classification.[264C D] 4.
The presumption of good faith in and of constitutionality of a classification cannot be pushed to the point of predicating some possible or hypothetical but undisclosed and unknown reason for a classification rendering the precious guarantee of equality "a mere rope of sand".
[264E] PG NO 256 Central Railway vs A.V.R. sidhanti; , at 214 and T.Devadasan V. The Union of India, [1964] 4 SCR at 689 & 690 followed.
5."To overdo classification is to undo equality".
The idea of similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons to justify classification, cannot rest on merely differentia which may, by themselves rational or logical, but depends on whether the differences are relevant to the goals sought to be reached by the law which seeks to classify.
The justification of the classification must, therefore, be sought beyond the classification.
All marks of distinction do not necessarily justify classification irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought to be achieved by the law imposing the classification.
[264F G] State of Jammu & Kashmir vs Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors.,[1974] I SCR 771; Bidi Suppy Co.v.
Union of India; , , relied no; Mohammad shujat Ali vs UOI and others, [1975]1 SCR 449; H.C. Sharma and Ors.
vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors., [1983]3 SCR 372 and Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala, and Anr.v.
Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors.
,[1986] 4 SCC 617 distinguished; State of Mysore vs Narasinga Rao, ; and Union of India vs Mrs. S.B. Kohli, [1973]3 SCR 117, referred to.
In the present case, the possession of a diploma.
by itself and without more, does not confer eligibility.
Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the degree.
[268d] 7.If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as confering eligibility for promotion, then the super imposition of further conditions such as a particular period of service, selectively, on the Diploma Holders alone to their disadvantage might become discriminatory.
This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service experience.[268G H;269A]


judgement:
minal Appeal No. 134 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated ' January 13, 1955, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 1953, arising out of the judgment and order dated May 22, 1953, of the Court of the Special Judge at Gaya in Special Case No. 3 of 1952.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, A. K. Dutta and section P. Varina, for the appellant.
H. J. Umrigar and Ratnaparkhi, A. G., for the respondent.
March 21.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 197 section K. DAS J.
This appeal by special leave has been brought by the State of Bihar from the judgment and order of a learned single Judge of the High Court of Patna, dated January 13, 1955, by which the learned Judge set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the present respondent Basawan Singh and acquitted him of a charge under section 161, Indian Penal Code, on which charge he had been convicted by the learned Special Judge of Gaya by his judgment and order, dated May 22, 1953.
It is necessary to state here very briefly the salient facts of the prosecution case.
One Bhagwan Das (prosecution witness No. 7) had a ration shop at a short distance from police station Arwal in the district of Gaya.
One of the persons entitled to receive rationed articles from the said shop was Mahabir Prasad (prosecution witness No. 10), who was a brother of a businessman named Parmeshwar Prasad (prosecution witness No. 11).
Mahabir Prasad held a ration card for ten units, and on October 4, 1951, he purchased five maunds of wheat on the strength of his ration card from the shop of Bhagwan Das.
A cash memo was issued for the purpose, and the sale was entered in the register of the shop.
Mahabir Prasad carried the wheat in four bags on two ponies.
He himself went ahead on a cycle and the ponies followed him.
A gentleman named Ram Singhasan Singh, stated to be the Secretary of Arwal Thana Congress Committee, sent an information to the police station to the effect that Bhagwan Das had sold the wheat in what was called the " black market ".
On receipt of this information, Basawan Singh, who is respondent before us and who was at that time subinspector of police attached to the said police station, instituted a case under section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, against Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad.
He seized the wheat which was being carried on the two ponies, went to the shop of Bhagwan Das and questioned him about the transaction.
Bhagwan Das denied the charge of blackmarketing and alleged that the transaction was a bona fide sale on the strength and authority of a ration 198 card.
He showed the duplicate copy of the cash memo and the entry in the sale register to the respondent.
The respondent then checked the stock of wheat in thee shop of Bhagwan Das and found that the stock tallied with the relevant entry in the, stock register.
In the meantime Mahabir Prasad who had been sent for also came to the shop with his cash memo and ration card.
These were shown to the respondent who, however, arrested both Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad and took them to the police, station.
It was alleged that at the police station the respondent demanded Rs. 500 as a bribe from Mahabir Prasad.
Mahabir Prasad could not pay the amount, but said that he would consult his brother Parmeshwar Prasad and the latter would come and pay to the respondent whatever sum was thought necessary.
Both Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad were then released on bail.
On the next day Bhagwan Das was called to the police station and a bribe Rs. 500 was demanded from him also.
It was alleged that the respondent told Bhagwan Das that if he did not pay the amount, the respondent would harass him; but if Bhagwan Das paid the amount, the respondent would submit a final report and no case would be started against him.
Bhagwan Das expressed his inability to pay such a, big amount and it was alleged that ultimately the amount was reduced to Rs. 300.
Bhagwan Das, however, did not pay it for some time, and the prosecution case was that the respondent took wheat from the shop of Bhagwan Das, without payment of any price, between the date October 26, 1951, and November 30, 19 1 ;in this way, seven maunds and ten seers of wheat it was alleged, were taken by the respondent from the shop of Bhagwan Das, though the sales were noted in the sale register in the names of various persons.
On December 1, 1951, the respondent, it was stated, agreed to accept Rs. 50 from Bhagwan Das in addition to the wheat already taken by him, in full satisfaction of the demand of Rs. 300.
When Bhagwan Das found that he had no other alternative but to pay the amount demanded by the 199 respondent, he decided to approach the Anti Corruption Department of the Government of Bihar.
One section P. Mukherji, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bihar, was then in charge of the Department.
Bhagwan Das met Mukherji on two dates, December 3, 1951, and December 5, 1951, and filed a written petition to him.
Mukherji sent for his Deputy Superintendent of Police, a gentleman named Dharnidhar Misra, who was also attached to the Anti Corruption Department.
Bhagwan Das produced before Mukherji five Government currency notes of Rs. 10 each, the numbers of which were noted in his written petition.
Mukherji put his initials on these notes and then returned them to Bhagwan Das.
Mukherji then requested the District Magistrate of Patna to depute a first class Magistrate, and one Rudra Dev Sahai was so deputed.
It was settled that on December 8, 1951, at about 7 p.m. the bribe money in the shape of the initialled notes would be paid to the respondent, and it was arranged that Bhagwan Das would meet the officers from Patna on the canal road from Patna to Arwal at some distance from the police station.
Nothing, however, happened on December 8, 1951, because the respondent was away from the police station.
On the next day, that is December 9, 1951, the officers from Patna, namely Mukherji, Misra and Sahai, met Bhagwan Das at the appointed place at about 6.30 p.m.
Bhagwan Das then told the officers that Parmeshwar Prasad had also arrived there for paying Rs. 50 as bribe to the respondent for the release of the wheat which had been seized and which was still at the police station.
Parmeshwar Prasad was then brought to Mukherji at about 7.30 p.m.
Mukherji questioned him and recorded his statement which was endorsed by the Magistrate, Rudra Dev Sahai.
Parmeshwar Prasad then produced five notes of Rs. 10 each, the numbers of which were also noted in the statement.
The notes were then initialled by Mukherji.
After this, the party went to the police station.
The officers who had dressed themselves as ordinary villagers any posed to be relatives of Bhagwan Das squatted on the ground a few feet away 200 from the verandah of the quarters which the respondent occupied, and Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad stood on the steps of the verandah where the respondent met them.
Leaving out details, which are not necessary for our purpose, what happened then was this.
Bhagwan Das paid Rs. 50 in currency notes which the respondent took in his left hand.
Parmeshwar Prasad also paid his amount in notes to the respondent.
The officers were then called.
The Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police disclosed their identity, and the Deputy Superintendent told the respondent that he had received a bribe.
The respondent tried to throw away the currency notes, but the 'Deputy Superintendent of Police caught hold of his left palm and the Magistrate caught hold of his right hand.
There was a scuffle, and the respondent was brought down from the verandah and was taken to an open place south west of the police station.
Nine currency notes were found 'in the hand of the respondent and they tallied with the numbers noted down earlier.
One currency note was not found till a search was made by means of a petromax lantern in the presence of two search witnesses, Ganesh Prasad (prosecution witness No. 5) and Janki Sao (prosecution witness No. 4).
The search was made at about 9 p.m. and the missing note was found in a crumpled condition in the southwestern corner of the verandah.
A report of the whole incident was then prepared by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and handed over to the officer in charge of Arwal police station.
The case was then investigated into by another Deputy Superintendent of Police one Hasan of Aurangabad.
After completion of investigation the Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., accorded sanction to the prosecution of the respondent on April 1, 1952.
Thereafter, the respondent was tried by the Special Judge of Gaya who, by his judgment and order dated May 22, 1953, found the respondent guilty of the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year only.
It may be here stated that the defence of the 201 respondent was that in the case against Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad, he had submitted a final report on October 8, 1951, to the effect that there was a mistake of fact with regard to the allegation of black marketing and that the case should be entered as false ', mistake of fact ", This report was supported by the Inspector of Police, Jehanabad, and accepted by the Sub divisional Magistrate on October 19, 1951.
The respondent denied that he ever demanded any bribe from either of the two aforesaid persons or that he had accepted as a bribe ten currency notes from Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad on December 9, 1951.
It was suggested that the officers did not actually see what had happened on the steps of the verandah and were, deluded into thinking that nine currency notes were recovered from him and, with regard to the crumpled note found on the verandah, it was suggested that Bhagban Das might have planted it, when he bowed down before the respondent The learned Special judge accepted the prosecution evidence as trustworthy and rejected the defences as unworthy of credences.
Against his conviction the respondent filed an appeal to the High Court and the learned single Judge, who heard the appeal, acquitted the respondent on the main ground that there was no independent witness to support the testimony of the " raiding party " consisting of the two bribe givers, Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad, and the two Magistrates and the police officer, namely.
Mukherji, Sahai and Misra.
The learned Judge referred to the decision of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pradesh (1), and he expressed the view that that decision laid down an invariable rule that in cases of this nature the testimony of those witnesses who form what is called the "raiding party" must be discarded, unless that testimony is corroborated by independent witnesses.
He then posed the question if there were any independent witnesses in the present case, and observed " There are no independent witnesses on the transaction itself.
It was submitted, however, that there (1) 26 202 are search witnesses and they are independent; indeed they are.
But they have proved nothing except this that at the quarters of the appellant a ten rupee note crushed was found and a few other articles.
They did not prove the transaction nor they were present at the time of the occurrence itself.
The prosecution case depends for all practical purposes on the evidence of the witnesses who are members of the raiding party.
" The principal questions which fall for decision in this appeal are: (1) whether the learned Judge is right in his view that the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh (1), lays down any universal or inflexible rule that the testimony of witnesses who form the raiding party must be discarded, unless corroborated by independent witnesses; (2) if not, what is the correct rule with regard to such testimony in cases of this nature; and (3) whether the learned Judge is right in his view that there is no independent corroboration of the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding party in the present case.
But before we consider these three ques tions, it is advisable to dispose of the findings of fact which have been affirmed on appeal or arrived at by the learned Judge.
In his judgment the learned Judge has observed: " The first point to be determined in this case is whether Bhagwan Das was in fact, arrested in connection with the case under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act.
That has been well proved and it has not been challenged.
It is also established that the appellant did arrest Bhagwan Das as well as Mahabir Prasad and that on that very day Bhagwan Das was released.
It is also well established that Bhagwan Das had gone to Mr. Mukherji at Patna and related an incident and as a result of that a trap was laid and on the alleged date of occurrence the three officers, namely, Mr. Mukherji, Mr. Sahai and Mr. Misra, had gone to the Arwal police station followed by the Gorkha Police.
It is also well established that the appellant on the date of occurrence was in his quarters and that it is also established beyond doubt that Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar were with the appellant in his quarters that evening.
(1) 203 It is also established that the three officers were just near the quarters of the appellant and they were dressed in dhotis, kurtas, etc., like "dehaties".
It is further established that the appellant was caught by Mr. Misra and Mr. Sahai and in his possession were found the nine notes of Rs. 10 each and that it was established that one Rs. 10 note was found in the verandah of the quarters.
It is, therefore, not necessary to discus& the evidence on these points because, as I have said, these facts are well established and admitted before me in the course of the argument.
" It is fairly obvious from the observations quoted above that the learned Judge accepted the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding party as to the essential parts of the prosecution case and in particular, their evidence to the effect that nine initialled notes of Rs. 10 each were found in the possession of the respondent; this finding which is tantamount to accepting the prosecution case as correct militates against his later observation that in the absence of independent corroboration, he cannot accept the testimony of the witnesses of the raiding party.
We say this without meaning any disrespect, but the learned Judge perhaps thought that the witnesses of the raiding party were intrinsically trustworthy and gave true evidence, yet he based his order of acquittal on what he thought was the effect of the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh (1), namely, the adoption of an inflexible rule, in the words of the learned Judge, " that the evidence of the raiding party is necessarily tainted. . and on their evidence alone, it would be difficult to carry the guilt home " to the respondent.
In two respects on questions of fact, the learned Judge expressed a view different from that of the trial Court: first, with regard to the motive or reason for the bribe and secondly, with regard to the purchase of 7 maunds 10 seers of wheat, without payment, between the dates October 26, 1951 to November 30,1951.
As to motive, the learned Judge referred to the circumstance that the respondent had already submitted a final report on (1) 204 October 8, 1951, which was accepted by the Sub divisional Magistrate on October 19, and, therefore, there was no case pending against Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad and the motive for the bribe could not be what was alleged by the prosecution.
The learned Judge then indulged in a highly speculative finding to the effect that the " possession of the nine notes can be reasonably explained by the fact that his (the present respondent 's) advice was sought for a land dispute between the relations " (meaning thereby the two Magistrates and the Deputy Superintendent of Police who posed as relations of Bhagwan Das).
This line of reasoning adopted by the learned Judge completely overlooks certain salient facts and circumstances on which the trial Court had relied.
The trial Court had found, on the evidence given in the case, that Bhagwan Das had no information that the case against him had ended in a final report; besides the wheat seized had not been released and Mahabir Prasad naturally wanted the wheat back.
Then, again, there was nothing to prevent the respondent from demanding a bribe even after the submission of a final report, saying that he would otherwise harass Bhagwan Das and Mahabir Prasad, and, lastly, it was nobody 's case, nor was there any evidence in support of it, that the nine notes were accepted by the respondent for giving legal advice in a land dispute.
The suggestion of a land dispute was made to allay any suspicion as to the pre sence of Mukherji, Sahai and Misra, who were dressed as ordinary villagers; none of the witnesses said that the nine notes were paid for advice in connection with a land dispute.
The respondent himself did not suggest that he had accepted nine notes for giving legal advice; his case was that no notes were found on him.
In this state of the evidence the learned Judge was clearly in error in holding that the motive for the bribe was something other than what was alleged by the prosecution.
His finding on this point is based on no evidence and is mere speculation.
As to the 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat, the learned Judge found that the prosecution had not satisfactorily proved that the respondent was supplied 205 with wheat without payment.
The trial Court pointed out, however, that at least two of the entries in the sale register of Bhagwan Das (exhibit 10/10 and 11/11) stood in the name of the respondent, and it was not the respondent 's case that he had paid for the wheat referred to in the two entries.
Whatever be the correct finding with regard to the sale or supply of these 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat, we agree with the trial Court that the prosecution case is not essentially or vitally dependent on the sale or supply of 7 maunds 10 seers of wheat free of cost to the respondent.
The charge against the respondent is the acceptance of Rs. 100 as a bribe from Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad on December 9, 1951.
That charge does not necessarily depend upon the truth or otherwise of the supply of 7 maunds and 10 seers of wheat between certain earlier dates.
Having dealt with the findings of fact, we proceed now to consider the principal questions which arise in this appeal.
We take first the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh (1).
It is not necessary to recapitulate all the facts of that case; it is sufficient to state that in the trap that was laid in that case, the most important witness was one Nagindas who offered the sum of Rs. 25,000, and the two important witnesses of the raiding party were Pandit Dhanraj, Superintendent, Special Police Establishment, Delhi, and Shanti Lal Ahuja, Additional District Magistrate, Delhi.
Nagindas, who was acting on behalf of his master Sir Chinubhai did not have the money to offer as a bribe, and the money was provided by the police authorities which money was offered by Nagindas in that case.
The first point for consideration in the case was whether Nagindas and one Pannalal, who was also a servant of Sir Chinubhai and who accompanied Nagindas, were accomplices and, therefore, their evidence should be treated on that basis.
This was answered in the negative, on the ground that neither of them was a willing party to the giving of the bribe and, therefore, they did not have the necessary criminal intent to be treated as abettors or accomplices.
(1) 206 This brings out the first distinction which has to be made: the distinction between a witness who is an accomplice and one who is not.
How the evidence of an accomplice is to be treated is no longer open to any doubt; the matter has been dealt with in a large number of decisions, and as was observed by this Court in Rameshwar vs The State of Rajasthan (1), the rule laid down in Rex vs Baskerville (2), with regard to the admissibility of the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is also the law in India.
The rule is that such evidence is admissible in law; but it has long been a rule of practice, which has virtually become equivalent to a rule of law, that the judge must warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the un corroborated testimony of an accomplice.
In Rameshwar 's case(l) it was pointed out: " The only clarification necessary for purposes of this country is where this class of offence is sometimes tried by a judge without the aid of a jury.
In these cases it is necessary that the Judge should give some indication in his judgment that he has had this rule of caution in mind and should proceed to give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration on the facts of the particular case before him and show why he considers it safe to convict without corroboration in that particular case.
" If the witnesses are not accomplices, what then is their position ? In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's case (3) it was observed, with regard to Nagindas and Pannalal, that they were partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the appellant in that case, and it was further observed: " A perusal of the evidence. . leaves in the mind the impression that they were not witnesses whose evidence could be taken at its face value.
" We have taken the observations quoted above from a full report of the decision, as the authorised report does not contain the discussion with regard to evidence.
It is thus clear that the decision did not lay down any universal or inflexible rule of rejection even with regard to the evidence of witnesses who may be called partisan or interested witnesses.
It is plain and obvious (1) ; 385 (3) (2) 207 that no such rule can be laid down; for the value of the testimony of a witness depends on diverse factors,, such as, the character of the witness, to what extent and in what manner he is interested, how he has fared in cross examination, etc.
There is no doubt that the testimony of partisan or interested witnesses must be scrutinised with care and there may be cases, as in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's case (1), where the Court will as a matter of prudence look for independent corroboration.
It is wrong, however, to deduce from that decision any universal or inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded, unless independent corroboration is available.
With regard to the other two witnesses, Pandit Dhanraj and Shanti Lal Ahuja, it was observed that the former was a willing tool in the hands of Nagindas, and the latter reduced himself to the position of a police witness; therefore, their evidence " was not such as to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court ".
Here again no universal or inflexible rule is being laid down.
It should be noticed that in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's case (1) the police authorities provided the money, and that was taken into consideration in assessing the value of the testimony of Pandit Dhanraj and Shantilal Ahuja.
In the case before us, no such consideration arises, because the money was provided by Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad, and the officers went there to see what happened.
We must make it clear that we do not wish it to be understood that we are deciding in this case that if the money offered as a bribe is provided by somebody other than the bribe giver, it makes a distinction in principle.
That question does not arise for decision here.
All that we say and have said so far is that in assessing the value of the testimony of a witness, diverse factors must arise for consideration and the comparative importance of this or that factor must depend on the facts or circumstances of each case.
No standard higher or stricter than this can be laid down, or was laid down in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's decision (1).
We must advert here to two other aspects of that decision.
It was observed there in clear and emphatic (1) 208 words that it is the duty of the police authorities to prevent crimes being committed; but it is no part of their business to provide the instruments of the offence.
With these observations we are in agreement.
In Brannan vs Peck (1), a police officer went inside a public house and made a bet on a horse, which act amounted to an offence.
The motive in making that bet was to detect the offence under the Street Betting Act, 1906, which was being committed by the accused person in that case.
In these circumstances, Goddard C. J. made the following observations: " I hope the day is far distant, when it will become a common practice in this country for police officers to be told to commit an offence themselves for the purpose of getting evidence against someone ".
We also express the same hope for our country, but must hasten to add that in the case before us no offence was committed by any of the three officers, Mukherji, Sahai and Misra, in order to get evidence against the respondent.
This point was again emphasised in a later decision of this Court in Ramjanam Singh vs The State of Bihar (2).
It was therein observed: " The very best of men have moments of weakness and temptation, and even the worst, times when they repent of an evil thought and are given an inner strength to set Satan behind them and if they do, whether it is because of caution, or because of their better instincts, or because some other has shown them either the futility or the wickedness of wrongdoing, it behaves society and the State to protect them and help them in their good resolve; not to.
place further temptation in their way and start afresh a train of criminal thought which had been finally set aside.
This is the type of case to which the strictures of this Court in Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pradesh, ; at p. 334 apply.
" The other aspect of the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's case (3) is the employment of Magistrates as witnesses of police traps.
Here again, we are in full agreement with the view that the independence and impartiality of the judiciary requires that Magistrates (1) (3) (2) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 643,651.
209 whose normal function is judicial should not be relegated to the position of partisan witnesses and " required to depose to matters transacted by them in their official capacity unregulated by any statutory rules of procedure or conduct whatever At the same time it is necessary to make some distinctions.
In a large part of the country now, the directive principle laid down in article 50 of the Constitution has been implemented, and there has been a separation of the judiciary from the executive.
The principles on which the employment of Magistrates as witnesses of police traps has been condemned have hardly any application where the Magistrates concerned are executive Magistrates who perform no judicial functions or where the officers concerned are officers of the Anti Corruption Department whose duty it is to detect offences of corruption.
In the case before us, Mukherji and Misra belonged to such a department.
Moreover, however inexpedient it may be to employ Magistrates as trap witnesses, their evidence has to be judged by the same standard as the evidence of other partisan or interested witnesses, and the inexpediency of employing Magistrates as trap witnesses cannot be exalted into an inflexible rule of total rejection of their evidence, in the absence of independent corroboration.
The learned Solicitor General referred in the course of his arguments to the difficulty of detecting corruption cases and of securing conviction in such cases.
We do not think that such a consideration should influence the mind of a judge.
Whatever be the difficulties, admissible evidence given in a case must be judged on its own merits, with due, regard to all the circumstances of the case.
In some of the cases which have been cited at the bar a distinction has been drawn between two kinds of 'traps ' legitimate and illegitimate as In re M. section Mohiddin (1), and in some other cases a distinction has been made between tainted evidence of an accomplice and interested testimony of a partisan witness and it has been said that the degree of corroboration necessary is higher in respect of tainted evidence than for partisan (1) 27 210 evidence (see Ram Chand Tolaram Khatri vs The, ,State (1)).
We think that for deciding the questions before us, such distinctions are somewhat artificial, and in the matter of assessment of the value of evidence and the degree of corroboration necessary to inspire confidence, no rigid formula can or should be laid down.
For the aforesaid reasons, we think that the learned Judge of the High Court did not correctly appreciate the effect of the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh 's case (2 ) and he was in error in thinking that that decision laid down any inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The correct rule is this : if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of diverse considerations which must vary from case to case, and in a proper case, the Court may even look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person.
If a Magistrate puts himself in the position of a partisan or interested witness, he cannot claim any higher status and must be treated as any other interested witness.
This brings us to the last question: if in the present case, there is any independent corroboration.
We have pointed out that the two search witnesses Janki Sao and Ganesh Prasad (prosecution witnesses 4 and 5) were independent witnesses, who had nothing to do with the raiding party.
They found one crumpled ten rupee note, one of the series initialled by Mukherji and the numbers of which were noted in the statements of Bhagwan Das and Parmeshwar Prasad, at the southwestern corner of the verandah, where the respondent when seized by the raiding party tried to throw away the notes.
In our view, the evidence of the two search (1) A.I.R. 1956 Bom.
(2) 211 witnesses does provide independent corroboration, in a material particular, to the testimony of the raiding, party.
The crumpled note, one of the series testified ' to by the raiding party, could not come of itself to the verandah ; it could be found where it was actually found only if the testimony of the raiding party was true.
The learned Judge said that the search witnesses came later and did not see the actual transaction, that is, the giving and taking of the bribe.
That is correct; but independent corroboration does not mean that every detail of what the witnesses of the raiding party have said must be corroborated by independent witnesses.
As was observed by Lord Reading in Baskerville 's case (1) even in respect of the evidence of an accomplice, all that is required is that there must be " some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it ".
In Rameshwar vs The State of Rajasthan (2), to which we have referred in an earlier paragraph, the nature and extent of corroboration required, when it is not considered safe to dispense with it, have been clearly explained and it is merely necessary to reiterate that corroboration need not be by direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient even though it is merely by circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.
While referring to the findings of fact we have pointed out that the learned Judge himself accepted as correct the prosecution case in its essential parts.
There is in our opinion no difficulty in accepting the testimony ' of the raiding party in this case, supported as it is by the independent testimony of the two search witnesses.
Learned counsel for the respondent has urged before us, as a last resort, that we should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court by article 136, in a case of acquittal by the High Court, unless exceptional or special circumstances are shown to exist or substantial and grave injustice has been done.
He has drawn attention to our decision in The (1) (2) ; , 385. 1 212 State Government, Madhya Pradesh vs Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey and others (1).
In this case, the learned Judge accepted as correct all the essential facts constituting the offence with which the respondent was charged, but he passed an order of acquittal on a misconception as to the effect of a decision of this Court.
We have no doubt whatsoever that this is a fit case for the exorcise of our jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution.
In view of the findings of fact arrived at by the learned Judge, the only reasonable conclusion is that the respondent is guilty of the offence with which he was charged and the order of acquittal is clearly erroneous.
A point about the validity of the order sanctioning prosecution of the respondent was urged before the learned Special Judge, who held that the sanction was in order.
This point was not dealt with in the High Court.
But learned counsel for the respondent has frankly conceded before us that he cannot successfully urge that point here.
It is, therefore, un necessary to remand the appeal for a further hearing on merits.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal is allowed.
The judgment and order of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Patna, dated January 13, 1955, are set aside; the respondent is convicted of the offence under section 161, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year, namely, the same sentence as was passed by the learned Special Judge of Gaya.
The respondent must now surrender to serve out his sentence.
Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
The respondent, a sub inspector of police, was charged with acceptance of Rs. 100 as a bribe from two persons, B and P, for dropping a case which he had instituted against B under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.
The prosecution case was that when the demand for the bribe made by the respondent could not be avoided, B and P approached the Anticorrosive Department, and it was arranged that the respondent should be paid at the police station the bribe money in the shape of currency notes produced by B and P and initialled by M, who was in charge of the Anti Corruption Department, and that M, along with a Deputy Superintendent of the Department and a first class Magistrate, should be at the police station at the time of payment, dressed as ordinary villagers ; that as soon as the amounts in notes were received by the respondent the officers disclosed their identity, that thereupon the respondent tried to throw away the currency notes but that as a result of the officers catching hold of his hands the notes were found in his hand except one which was missing and that as a result of a search made in the presence of two search witnesses later the missing note was also found.
The respondent was tried by the Special judge who accepted the prosecution evidence and found him guilty of the offence under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
On appeal to the High Court the learned single judge who disposed of the appeal held that the respondent could not be convicted because (1) there was no independent witness to support the testimony of the " raiding party " consisting of the two bribegivers and the three officers, (2) the search witnesses did not prove the transaction nor were they present at the time of the occur rence, and (3) the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pradesh, , had laid down an invariable rule that in cases of this nature the testimony of those witnesses who form what is called " the raiding party " must be discarded, unless that testimony is corroborated by independent witnesses.
The State appealed by special leave : Held, (1) that the evidence of the two search witnesses provided independent corroboration in a material particular to 196 the testimony of the raiding party, because the missing currency note, one of the series testified to by the raiding party, could be found where it was actually found only if the testimony of the raiding party was true.
(2)that corroboration need not be by direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient even though it is merely by circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.
Rameshwar vs The State of Rajasthan, ; , followed.
(3)that the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs State of Vindhya Pradesh, , has not laid down any inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded in all cases in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The correct rule is that if any of the witnesses are accom plices, their evidence is admissible in law but the judge must warn the jury of the danger of convicting the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice ; if the case is tried without the aid of a jury, the judge should indicate in his judgment that he had this rule of caution in mind and give reasons for considering it unnecessary to require corroboration; if, however, the witnesses are not accomplices but are merely partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other interested evidence is tested, and in a proper case, the Court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person.
If a Magistrate puts himself in the position of a partisan or interested witness, he cannot claim any higher status and must be treated as any other interested witness.