judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 8440 of 1983.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.4.83 of the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2388/82.
M.K. Ramamurthy and A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, P.H. Parekh, R.K. Dhillon, Ms. Sunita Sharma and Dr. D. Chandrachud for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J.
The question which arises for consideration in this case is whether the law reports namely, All India Reporter, Criminal Law Journal, Labour and Industrial Cases, Taxation Law Reports, Allahabad Law Journal and U.P. Law Tribune published by the 1st respondent, All India Reporter Limited, are newspapers as defined in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act No. 45 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act ') and whether the employees of the 1st respondent engaged in the production or publication of the said law reports are entitled to the benefits conferred upon the employees of newspaper establishments by the Act.
The Act was enacted on 20th December, 1955 with the object of regulating certain conditions of service of working journalists and other employees employed in the newspaper establishments.
The expression "newspaper" is defined by section 2(b) of the Act as follows: " "Newspaper" means any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on public news and includes such other class of printed periodical work as may, from time to time, be notified in this behalf by the Central Government in the Official Gazette." 779 A "newspaper employee" is defined by section 2(c) of the Act as any working journalist, and includes any other person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment.
"Newspaper establishment" is defined by section 2(d) of the Act as an establishment under the control of any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate.
The expression "working journalist" is defined by section 2(f) of the Act as a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and who is employed as such, either whole time or part time, in or in relation to, one or more newspaper establishments and includes an editor, a leader writer, news editor, sub editor, feature writer, copy tester, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news photographer and proof reader, but does not include any such person who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
A "non journalist newspaper employee" means any person employed to do any work in, or in relation to, any newspaper establishment, but does not include any such person who is a working journalist, or is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity or being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature as stated in section 2(dd) of the Act.
Chapter II of the Act deals with certain conditions of service of the working journalists.
Those provisions relate to the retrenchment, payment of gratuity, hours of work, leave, fixation or revision of wages etc.
Chapter IIA of the Act deals with similar conditions of service of non journalist newspaper employees.
Section 9 of the Act authorises the Central Government to appoint a Wage Board consisting of two persons representing employers in relation to newspaper establishments; two persons representing working journalists; and three independent persons, one of whom shall be a person who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court or of the Supreme Court and who shall be appointed by that Government as the Chairman thereof for the purpose of making recommendations with regard to fixation or revision of wages of working journalists.
Similarly, section 13C of the Act provides for the constitution of a Wage Board for the purpose of making recommendations regarding the fixation or revision of the rates of wages in respect of non journalist news 780 paper employees.
Section 13AA which was inserted by Act 6 of 1979 provides for the constitution of a Tribunal for fixing or revising rates of wages in respect of working journalists where the Central Government is of opinion that the Board constituted under section 9 for the purpose of fixing or revising rates of wages in respect of working journalists under the Act has not been able to function effectively.
That Tribunal has to consist of a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court.
Similarly section 13DD of the Act empowers the Central Government to constitute a Tribunal where it is of opinion that the Board constituted under section 13C of the Act has not been able to function effectively.
Section 13AA and section 13DD of the Act came into force with effect from January 31, 1979.
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 13AA and section 13DD of the Act the Central Government constituted under two separate notifications two Tribunals on 9.2.1979 with Justice Palekar, a former Judge of the Supreme Court, as the member of each of the two Tribunals to make recommendations in respect of fixing or revising wages of working journalists as well as non working journalists.
Justice Palekar made his recommendations on 12.8.1980.
In exercise of its powers under section 12 of the Act the Central Government accepted a part of the recommendations and made an order thereon on 26.12.1980 and accepted the remaining part of the recommendations and made another order thereon on 20.7.1981.
The 1st respondent, All India Reporter Limited, was not served with any individual notice by the Tribunal before it passed its award.
The 1st respondent also did not send a reply to the questionnaire issued by the Tribunal nor it gave any evidence before the Tribunal in respect of the matters referred to therein.
However on 15.7.1981 and 3.8.1981 the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Nagpur wrote to the 1st respondent asking it to file its written statements in the matter of non implementation of the Palekar Award as the orders of the Central Government made under section 12 of the Act were popularly called.
The first respondent submitted its reply in October, 1981 inter alia contending that it was not running a newspaper establishment and publications published by the company were not the newspapers and as such the Palekar Award was not applicable to it.
Again on 18th November, 1982 the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Nagpur wrote a letter to the Manager of the 1st respondent informing him that the 1st respondent was liable to implement the order of the Central Government made on the recommendations of the Palekar Tribunal in respect of its employees since the Ist respondent was a newspaper establishment.
Immediately after the service of the said notice the Ist respon 781 dent filed a writ petition on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench in Writ Petition No. 2388 of 1982 questioning the validity of the notice served on it by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Nagpur calling upon it to implement the orders of the Central Government on the basis of the award of the Palekar Tribunal.
Initially the State of Maharashtra, the Commissioner of Labour and the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Nagpur had been impleaded as respondents.
Thereafter during the pendency of the Writ Petition the Indian Federation of Working Journalists and the All India Reporter Karamachari Sangh were impleaded as respondents in the writ petition.
It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the Ist respondent, All India Reporter Limited, that the law reports publised by it were not newspapers as defined in the Act and therefore the order made by the Central Government on the basis of the recommendations of Justice Palekar were not applicable to its establishment.
The High Court accepted the plea of the Ist respondent and declared that the law reports were not newspapers within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Act and that the demand made by the Deputy Labour Commissioner to comply with the order made by the Central Government on the basis of the recommendations of Justice Palekar was unsustainable by its judgment dated 22nd April, 1983.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court the appellants have filed this appeal by special leave.
The Ist respondent, All India Reporter Limited, publishes in addition to the law reports referred in the first paragraph of this judgment several other books commentaries, digests and manuals.
But we are concerned in this case with the narrow question whether the six law reports which are being published by the Ist respondent are newspapers within the meaning of the Act and whether the employees engaged in their production or distribution are entitled to the benefit of the orders made by the Central Government on the basis of the recommendations of the Palekar Tribunal.
The definition of the expression "newspaper" has already been set out above.
In order to be a newspaper a work must be a (i) printed work; (ii) a periodical; and (iii) should contain public news or comments on public news.
Any other class of printed periodical work as may, from time to time, be notified in this behalf by the Central Government in the Official Gazette may also be a newspaper.
There is no dispute in the present case that the law reports are printed works and that they are periodicals.
The only question which remains to be 782 considered is whether they contain public news or comments on public news.
Entry 39 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution reads thus: "Newspapers, books and printing presses.
" Newspapers and books are no doubt shown as separate items but the distinction between them sometimes becomes very thin or totally vanishes.
In this connection it is necessary to reproduce a passage from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Press (1947 49) appointed by the British Government and presided over by Sir William David Ross.
It reads thus: "The newspaper and periodical Press of Great Britain consists of over 4,000 publications ranging from newspapers famous throughout the world to the journals of obscure societies.
Its limits are ill defined, for there is no definition of either `newspaper ' or `periodical ' which enables each to be infallibly distinguished from the other and from publications which are properly speaking neither.
The term `newspaper ' is usually applied (except so far as concerns the important class of trade newspapers) to publications devoted mainly to recording current events, and `periodicals ' to magazines, reviews, and journals which, in so far as they are concerned with current events at all, are concerned to comment rather than to report; but newspapers merge into advertising sheets, periodicals into books and pamphlets, and both into one another; . ." The expression "news" is not defined in the Act.
Several definitions of the expression "news" collected from the different dictionaries and digests have been cited before us.
It is enough if we refer to the meaning of the word "news" given in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for purposes of this case.
It says that "news" means tidings, new information of recent events; new occurrences as a subject of report or talk.
The law reports which are being published by the Ist respondent are reports of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of India and of the High Courts in India which are supplied to it by its agents appointed at New Delhi and other places where High Courts are situated.
It cannot be disputed that these decisions are of public importance.
Article 141 of the Constitution provides that the law declared by Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
Even apart from Article 141 of the Constitution the decisions of the Supreme Court, which is a court of record, constitute a 783 source of law as they are the judicial precedents of the highest court of the land.
They are binding on all the courts throughout India.
Similarly the decisions of every High Court being judicial precedents are binding on all courts situated in the territory over which the High Court exercises jurisdiction.
Those decisions also carry persuasive value before courts which are not situated within its territory.
The decisions of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts are almost as important as statutes, rules and regulations passed by the competent legislatures and other bodies since they affect the public generally.
It is well known that the decisions of the superior courts while they settle the disputes between the parties to the proceedings in which they are given they are the sources of law in so far as all others are concerned.
As soon as a decision is rendered the members of the public would be interested in knowing it.
At any rate lawyers and others connected with courts and judicial proceedings who constitute a substantial section of the public are interested in knowing the contents and the effect of the decisions.
The Ist respondent, All India Reporter Limited, and other publishers of law reports in the interests of their own business vie with each other to publish the judgments of the Supreme Court or of the High Courts as early as possible in their law reports which are published periodically either weekly, fortnightly or monthly.
They believe that faster the decisions are published in their reports, larger will be the number of subscribers.
Infact we have a law report which is published from Delhi which publishes the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court within a day or two.
The contents of these law reports constitute news insofar as the subscribers and the readers of these reports are concerned.
It is by reading these law reports they come to know of the latest legal position prevailing in the country on any question decided in the decisions reported in the said reports.
Hence it is difficult to agree with the submission made on behalf of the Ist respondent that the law reports do not carry any news and that the public is not interested in them.
We are of the view that any decision published in the law reports of the Ist respondent contain information about the recent events which have taken place in the Supreme Court or in the High Courts which are public bodies and these are matters in which the public is interested.
We find it also difficult to agree with the submission made on behalf of the Ist respondent that since the law reports are going to be preserved by the lawyers as reference books after getting them rebound subsequently they should be treated as books.
It may be that the decisions contained in these law reports may cease to be items of news after some time but when they are received by the subscribers they do possess the character of works containing news.
784 Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the Ist respondent on the decision of the High Court of Orissa in P.S.V. Iyer vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, AIR 1960 Orissa 221 in which the question that arose for consideration was whether a law journal Cuttack Law Times, which was a non official monthly journal containing the decisions of the Orissa High Court, the Orissa Board of Revenue and also of the Supreme Court was a newspaper and if it was a newspaper whether it was competent for the Legislature of the State of Orissa to levy sales tax on the sale of the said journal.
The said question arose in that form in view of the language of Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which read as follows: "54.
Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to Entry 92 A of List I." The language of Entry 92 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which conferred on Parliament alone the power to tax sale or purchase of newspapers was in the following terms: "92.
Tax on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published therein.
" After referring to the definition of the expression `newspaper ' in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the Indian Post Offices Act, 1898, the Parliamentary Proceedings (Protection of Publication) Act, 1956, the Delivery of Books and Newspapers Act, 1956 the , etc.
the High Court of Orissa held that the Cuttack Law Times was not a newspaper because according to it the necessary pre requisite of a periodical in order to make it a newspaper was that it should contain mainly publicnews or comments on public news and that books containing authoritative reports for future reference could, by no means, be said to contain news so as to become newspaper.
Accordingly, the High Court of Orissa held that the sale of Cuttack Law Times, which according to it was not a newspaper, could be taxed by the State Legislature under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
We find it difficult to agree with the above decision since the High Court of Orissa omitted to take into consideration that information about recent decisions of courts of record could be news in which the public was interested.
The fact that a law report could be used as a reference book at later stage was not sufficient to hold that the law report did not contain public news when it was received by the subscriber.
785 The High Court of Madras declined to follow the above decision of the Orissa High Court in its decision in T.V. Ramnath and Another vs Union of India and Others, [1975] Labour and Industrial Cases 488 in which the Madras Law Journal, a law report published from Madras, was held to be a newspaper and the establishment in which the said law report was being published was a newspaper establishment which attracted the provisions of that Act.
We agree with the following observations made in the said decision by Ismail, J. (as he then was): "Similarly, the publications of the petitioner in the second writ petition can be said to contain `public news ' or `comments on public news ' since it contains reports of the judgments of the Courts as well as comments on such judgments.
Even though, the same may be primarily intended for that section of the public which is concerned with law and the administration of law, in the present days, nothing prevents any educated individual taking interest in such publications and the news themselves being of interest to such persons.
Therefore I am clearly of the opinion that the expression `public news ' is of sufficiently wide amplitude to cover the publications of both the petitioners in question.
" It is seen that the editor of the law report containing the above decision has appended an editorial comment on this stating that this decision is wrong and that the Orissa High Court 's decision was right.
Justice A.N. Grover, who later became a Judge of the Supreme Court of India and the Chairman of the Press Council, as a Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held in L.D. Jain vs General Manager, Government of India Press and Others, I.L.R. 1967 Punjab and Haryana 193 that the Gazette of India which was the official publication of all kinds of news and information was a newspaper within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 and that it was not essential for a newspaper to conform strictly to the usual pattern of a daily or weekly or monthly newspaper or a magazine containing news which members of the public ordinarily read in order to get reports of recent events, comments on them etc.
In doing so, he distinguished the decision of the Australian Court in Ex Parte Stillwell, in which the Bradshaw 's Guide was held to be a book of reference which lacked every element of what could be called a newspaper on which the Orissa High Court had relied.
The Ist respondent cannot derive any assistance from the deci 786 sion of the High Court of Bombay in Commissoner of Sales Tax vs M/s. Express Printing Press, AIR 1983 Bombay 191 in which the Bombay High Court held that the two publications by name `Jocker ' and `Jabara ' which contained predictions or forecasts of lucky numbers were not newspapers since those publications had nothing to do with any recent event which had taken place.
In the Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, 1957 there is an interesting discussion of certain specific cases in which the question whether the publications involved were newspapers or not.
In the course of the said report it is obversed thus: "In this connection the Press Registrar scrutinised reports published in certain foreign countries regarding their own Press and it was noticed that in the catalogues prepared by them specialised newspapers such as the one under consideration were not excluded from the list of newspapers.
Even technical journals such as medical periodicals, journals related to sciences, arts etc., were included.
A catalogue of Yugoslav newspapers and magazines, for instance, includes publications relating to the following subjects: Political information; economics; law and states administration; education; philology; natural sciences; medicine; agriculture; technology; geography; ethnography history; archives; archaeology; literature; music; applied art; film; chess; photography; tourism; stamp collecting; physical culture and sport; humour and religion.
In a catalogue of Russian papers for 1958 all the above categories of newspapers and periodicals have been included in addition to many others which deal exclusively with party affairs.
" It is significant that the expression `newspaper ' as defined in the Act includes not merely `public news ' but also `comments on public news '.
Every law report contains the editorial note at the commencement of the decisions printed therein and also comments on some of the recent decisions.
Law reports also contain, newly enacts Acts, Rules and Regulations, book reviews and advertisements relating to law books handwriting and finger print experts etc.
, speeches made at conferences in which the legal fraternity is interested etc.
Though the 787 publication of these items by itself may not occupy a substantial part of a law report to make it a newspaper, the publication of the recent judgments itself is sufficient to make a law report a newspaper which may after some time cease to be a newspaper and become a book of reference.
The Act in question is a beneficent legislation which is enacted for the purpose of improving the conditions of service of the employees of the newspaper establishments and hence even if it is possible to have two opinions on the construction of the provisions of the Act the one which advances the object of the Act and is in favour of the employees for whose benefit the Act is passed has to be accepted.
We are of the view that the law reports published by the Ist respondent are newspapers and the employees employed by the Ist respondent in their production or publication of the said law reports should be extended the benefit of the orders passed by the Central Government on the basis of the recommendations made by the Palekar Award.
We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the Ist respondent before the High Court.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

summary:
HELD: The Court was concerned with the narrow question whether the six law reports aforementioned being published by the 1st respondent were newspapers within the meaning of the Act and whether the employees engaged in their production or distribution were entitled to the benefit of the orders made by the Central Government on the basis of the Palekar Award.
[781F] In order to be a newspaper, a work must be (i) a printed work, (ii) a periodical, and (iii) should contain public news or comments on public news.
Any other class of printed periodical work as may, from time to time, be notified in this behalf by the Central Government in the official Gazette, may also be a newspaper.
There was no dispute in this case that the law reports are printed works and that they are periodicals.
The only question which remained to be considered was whether they contained public news or comments on public news, Newspapers and 776 books are no doubt shown as separate items in Entry 39 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but the distinction between them sometimes becomes very thin or totally vanishes.
[781G H;782A B] The law reports being published by the 1st respondent are reports of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of India and the High Courts in India, which are supplied to it by its agents appointed at New Delhi and other places where the High Courts are situated.
These decisions are of public importance.
The law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts in India, as provided by Article 141 of the Constitution.
The decisions of the Supreme Court a court of record constitute a source of law as they are judicial precedents of the highest court of the land.
They are binding on all the courts throughout India.
The decisions of every High Court being judicial precedents are binding on all the Courts situated in the territory under the jurisdiction of the High Court.
The decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts are almost as important as statutes, rules and regulations passed by the competent legislatures and other bodies.
The decisions of the superior courts, while they settle the disputes between the parties to the proceedings, are sources of law in so far as all others are concerned.
As soon as a decision is rendered, the members of the public would be interested in knowing it; lawyers and others connected with the courts and judicial proceedings are interested in knowing the contents and effects of the decisions.
The 1st respondent and other publishers of law reports, in the interests of their own business, vie with each other to publish the judgments of the Supreme Court or the High Courts as early as possible in their law reports, published periodically weekly, fortnightly or monthly.
They believe the faster the decisions are published in their reports, the larger will be the number of subscribers.
The contents of these law reports constitute news in so far as the subscribers and readers of these reports are concerned.
By reading these law reports, they come to know of the latest legal position prevailing in the country on any question decided in the decisions reported in the said reports.
Hence, it was difficult to agree with the submission of the 1st respondent that the law reports did not carry any news and that the public was not interested in them.
Any decision published in the law reports of the 1st respondent contains information about the recent events which have taken place in the Supreme Court or the High Courts which are public bodies and these are matters in which public is interested.
The Court found it also difficult to agree with the submission of the 1st respondent that since the law reports are going to be preserved by the lawyers as reference books after getting them rebound subsequently, they should be treated as books.
The decisions contained in these law reports may 777 cease to be items of news after some time, but when they are received by the subscribers, they do possess the character of works containing news.
[782G H; 783A H] Strong reliance was placed by the 1st respondent on the decision of the High Court of Orissa in P.S.V. Iyer vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, AIR 1960 Orissa 221, but the Court found it difficult to agree with that decision since the High Court had omitted to take into consideration that information about recent decisions of the Courts of record could be news in which the public was interested.
The fact that a law book could be used as a reference book at a later stage was not sufficient to hold that the law report did not contain public news when it was received by the subscriber.
[784A, G H] It is sufficient that the expression 'newspaper ' as defined in the Act includes not merely 'public news ' but also 'comments on public news '.
Every law report contains the editorial note and also comments on some of the recent decisions.
The law Reports also contain newly enacted Acts, Rules and Regulations, book reviews and advertisements relating to law books, handwriting and finger print experts, etc., speeches made at conferences in which the legal fraternity is interested, etc.
Though the publication of these items by itself may not occupy a substantial part of a law report to make it a newspaper, the publication of the recent judgments itself is sufficient to make a law report a newspaper which may after some time cease to be a newspaper and become a book of reference.
[786G H; 787A B] The Act is a beneficient legislation which is enacted for improving the conditions of service of the employees of the newspaper establishments, and even if it is possible to have two opinions on the construction of the provisions of the Act, the one which advances the object of the Act and is in favour of the employees for whose benefit the Act is passed has to be accepted.
[787B C] The Law Reports published by the 1st respondent are newspapers and the employees employed by the 1st respondent in their production or publication should be extended the benefit of the orders passed by the Central Government on the basis of the recommendations made by the Palekar Award.[787C D] The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the writ petition filed by the 1st respondent before the High Court was dismissed.
[787D] 778 P.S.V. Iyer vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa, AIR 1960 Orissa 221; T.V. Ramanath & Anr.
vs Union of India & Ors.
, [1975] Labour and Industrial Cases 488; L.D. Jain vs General Manager, Government of India Press and Others, ILR 1967 Punjab and Haryana 193; Ex Parte Stillwell, and Commissioner of Sales Tax vs M/s. Express Printing Press, AIR 1983 Bombay 191, referred to.


judgement:
Civil Appeal No. 56 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.11.85 of the Allahabad .RM60
PG NO 290 PG NO 291 High Court in W.P. (C) No. 4211 of 1983.
Gopal Subramanium and Mrs. section Dikshit for the Appellants.
Vijay Hansaria and Sunil K. Jain for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.
This appeal by special leave is from a judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dated November 6, 1985 passed in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 4211 of 1983.
The appeal raises a question of considerable importance.
The question is whether it is permissible to have two pay scales in the same cadre for persons having same duties and having same responsibilities.
The High Court has answered the question in the negative.
It is said that it would be violative of the Constitutional right of "equal pay for equal work".
The facts are not in dispute.
They will be found correctly stated in the judgment under appeal and may briefly be stated thus: Prior to 1965, in the High Court of Allahabad, Bench Secretaries were on a higher pay scale than that of Section Officers.
They were in the pay scale of Rs. 160 320 as against the pay scale of Rs. 120 300 to Section Officers.
In 1965 the State Government appointed a Pay Rationalisation Committee with wide ranging reference.
The Committee was asked to consider the duties and responsibilities of different categories of posts.
It was required to consider and recommend changes to reduce the number of then existing pay scales.
It was also asked to recommend as far as possible equal emoluments for identical duties and responsibilities.
The Committee submitted a detailed report, in which Bench Secretaries became casualties.
The Committee recommended for them a pay scale slightly lower than that of Section Officers.
Rs. 150 350 was recommended for Bench Secretaries as against Rs.200 400 for Section Officers.
The State Government accepted the recommendations.
Subsequently, these pay scales were raised to Rs. 200 450 and Rs.5 15 715 respectively.
Being dissatisfied with the down grading, the Bench Secretaries made representation to the Government.
They demanded that they should at least be put at par with Section Officers if not on higher scale.
The High Court supported their case but half heartedly.
The High Court suggested "that in view of financial exigencies the Government may grant for the time being pay scale to 10 PG NO 292 Bench Secretaries as admissible to Section Officers.
" When this matter was pending consideration, the Government appointed the Pay Commission (1971 72) headed by Shri Ali Zahir.
On February 1, 1973, the Pay Commission submitted its report.
The report did not accept the claim of Bench Secretaries for giving them pay scale equal to Section Officers or Private Secretaries.
The report was in fact very much against them.
The following remarks of the Pay Commission would be pertinent: "9 Bench Secretaries (Sakna Suchiv) A memorandum from the Bench Secretaries given to us states that the post which are at present in the scale of Rs. 100 450 are of a great responsibility for which experience and special qualifications are required.
They have claimed that their duties are equivalent to Private Secretaries of Hon 'ble Judges and have demanded the same pay scale which is given to Private Secretaries and the Section Officers.
The Registrar of the High Court while forwarding the memorandum has suggested that they should also be given the same pay scale which is given to Superintendents i.e. Rs.515 40 715 or to the Section Officers i.e. Rs.350 750.
It is not necessary to emphasise that in comparison to Bench Secretaries, the Section Officers of the secretariat has to bear more responsibilities in their Section and have to control over its subordinates.
Section Officers have to prepare a lengthy and original notes in complicated and important matters.
Therefore, the responsibilities of the two posts cannot be said to be equal.
Keeping in view the present scale of pay.
the pay scale recommended by the Pay Rationalisation Committee, the nature of duties and responsibilities and the fact that every Hon 'ble Judge will have one Private Secretary in the scale of Rs.500 1,000 we feel that the Bench Secretaries cannot be given the same scale of pay which is being given to Superintendents or the Section Officers.
Since the Bench Secretaries are promoted from Upper Division Assistants, they should feel satisfied if they are placed in a scale of pay a little above the Upper Division Assistants.
Therefore, we have recommended for them a pay scale of Rs.400 15 475 20 575 25 750.
" It will be seen that the Pay Commission refused to equate Bench Secretaries with Section Officers in view of their differential duties.
It was found that the nature PG NO 293 of work of Section Officers was quite different and more onerous than that of Bench Secretaries.
Section Officers have to bear more responsibilities in their Sections.
They have to exercise control over their subordinate.
They have to prepare lengthy original notes in complicated matters.
The Commission, therefore, recommended Rs.400 750 for Bench Secretaries and Rs.500 1,000 to Section Officers.
The Bench Secretaries again moved the Government reiterating their demand.
The Government appears to have received several such representations against the report of Ali Zahir Commission.
To consider all such grievances.
a Committee called the "Anomalies Committee was constituted.
As the name itself suggests, the Committee was required to examine and remove anomalies in the recommendations of Pay Commission.
The Committee appears to have made some patch work.
So far as Bench Secretaries are concerned, the Committee suggested: "(1) For this post the recommendations made by the Pay Commission need not have any amendments.
(2) It should be appropriate for the Bench Secre taries to accept 10 promotional posts in the pay scale of Rs.500 1,000 as recommended by the Pay Commission.
" The Anomalies Committee also thus rejected the claim of Bench Secretaries for placing them at par with Section Officers.
It however, suggested that ten posts of Bench Secretaries should be upgraded and placed in the pay scale of Rs.500 1,000 The Government accepted that recommendation and issued an order dated July 2,1976 The order inter alia states: Judicial (High Court) Section, Lucknow dated 2nd July, 1976.
Sub: Implementation of decision and proposals of Sub Committee of the Cabinet constituted to consider the anomalies pointed out in the pay scales recommended by the U.P. Pay Commission ( 1971 73) and its way of removal and other connected matters PG NO 294 Sir, In continuation of office memorandum No.
P.C. 395 x 89(M)/74 dated 18th March, 1976 of the Finance (Pay Commission) Section on the above subject, I have been directed to say that the Governor has been pleased to sanc tion the pay scales mentioned in Column 3 to 10 post holders under you mentioned in column 2 in the table given below w.e.f. 1st October, 1975 with this condition that as a result of sanction of this scale, the number of total posts in the concerned cadre will not increase: Sl.
Name Pay No. of No. of No. of Pay No.
Of Scale Permanent Temporary Posts Scale Post Post Posts in higher scale 1. 2. 3.
Bench Rs.400 15 48 3 10 Rs.500 25 Secre 475 EB 20 700 EB 40 tary 575 EB 25 900 EB 50 750 1000 2.
The basic pay in the pay scale mentioned in aforesaid column 7 of the concerned employee will be fixed according to the guiding principles of para 4 under fundamental rule 22 of the Financial Handbook Part II Volume 2 4 and the appointments in the pay scale of Rs.500 1000 will be made according to seniority subject to unfit.
In this connection, I have also been directed to say that the nomenclature of posts of 10 Bench Secretaries appearing in column 5 of the said table shall be Bench Secretaries Grade I and the nomenclature of rest Bench Secretaries of equal pay scale will be Bench Secretaries Grade II and the posts of Bench Secretaries Grade I and Grade II will be of the same duties and responsibilities.
Sd/ (Ramesh Chandra Deo Sharma) PG NO 295 Joint Secretary" It was then the turn of Bench Secretaries Grade II, They complained that there was no valid reason to give higher pay scale only to ten Bench Secretaries and step motherly treatment to the rest of their colleagues.
The High Court as usual supported their claim, but the Government did not.
In order to give effect to the said Government order the Chief Justice framed rules called the Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 ("The Rules ).
The Rules were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 229(2) of the Constitution and brought into force from July 13,1976.
Thereunder Bench Secretaries Grade I and Grade II were classified as Class II and Class III posts respectively.
Rule 8(E) provides procedure for appointment of Bench Secretaries Grade II.
It is by selection through competitive examination to be conducted by appointing authority.
Permanent Upper Division Assistants and permanent Lower Division Assistants having not less than ten years service are made eligible for selection.
Preference shall however, be given to candidates possession a Law Degree.
Rule 16 provides that the posts of Bench Secretaries Grade I shall be filled up by promotion from amongst permanent Bench Secretaries Grade II.
Rule 18 deals with method of selection for all promotional posts.
It shall be made by selection committee appointed by the Chief Justice.
The criterion of selection shall be merit with due regard to seniority.
The entitlement to higher pay scale of Grade I Bench Secretary was therefore, not on the basis of seniority alone, but on the basis of selection by merit cum seniority.
In 1979, the State Government appointed another Pay Commission.
That Pay Commission also did not disturb the categorisation of Bench Secretaries into Grade I and Grade II.It however, gave marginal benefits by increasing the number of posts of Grade I from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of the total cadre strength.
The reason given by the Pay Commission is as follows: "Bench Secretary 26.38 Fifty two posts of Bench Secretaries are in the pay scale of Rs.400 750 and ten posts in the scale of Rs.500 1,000.
For appointment on these posts a limited competitive examination is held from amongst Upper Division Assistants, PG NO 296 Lower Division Assistants with ten years of service preferably Law Graduates.
We have received a representation stating that the Bench Secretaries play a very important role in smooth running of the proceedings of the Court.
The minimum pay scales of the Bench Secretaries is comparatively higher than the pay scale of Upper Division Assistants though they are appointed through a competitive examination.
It is limited to only Upper Division Lower Division Assistants of the High Court.
Keeping in view the fact that vacancies in Upper Division/Lower Division Assistants are filled up by promotion from Routine Grade Assistants, it is clear that this is a second promotion for those who come directly from Lower Division Assistants and a third promotion for those who are promoted first to Upper Division Assistant and then a Bench Secretary.
Even then we give importance to the fact that only best from Upper Division/Lower Division Assistants are preferred for the post.
The work of the Bench Secretary is of a great importance.
We, therefore, recommend: "(1) 30% of the total posts of Bench Secretaries in the pay scale of Rs.770 1000;and (2) Two posts in the scale of Rs.1420 1900 as is admissible to Assistant Secretaries of the Secretariat." Finally the Bench Secretaries Grade I moved the High Court on judicial side with an application under Article 226 of the Constitution.
They challenged the validity of bifurcation of one cadre into Grade I and Grade II.
The sheet anchor of their case was that in the same category of posts with similar duties and responsibilities there cannot be two grades with different pay scales.
It would be violative of principles of equal pay for equal work.
It was also contended that Bench Secretaries was a well recognised class that existed over the years and indeed superior to Section Officers.
Rejection of their demand for equating at least with Section Officers would be ignoring that historical fact.
The High Court accepted all these contentions and granted the relief prayed for.
As to the Pay Commission recommendations the High observed: "Rejection of petitioner 's demand for equating them PG NO 297 at least with Section Officers by comparing them with absence of administrative control exercised by Section Officer in the Secretariat was ignoring history of Bench Secretaries being a different class both before and after independence and the nature of duties performed by them .
" As to the decision of the Anomalies Committee the High Court remarked: "Curiously enough when Anomaly Committee redressed the wrong by granting pay scale equivalent to Section Officers, it created an artificial division by drawing a line between first ten and others.
A Bench Secretary or for that matter any officer who puts in longer years of service gets more salary than his juniors but if a senior performing the same duty as his juniors is put in different higher scale then it results in invidious classification in the same group.
And that violates the concept of equality which visualises that whatever condition are guaranteed and secured by law to one shall be guaranteed to owners who are of the same group or class.
It only denies enactment of a rule or law which attempts to deal differently with persons situated similarly.
The Government order by which the classification was done itself provided that duty and responsibility of Bench Secretary of Grade II be the same as of Grade I shall be seniority.
No other basic or qualification or test or be it was laid down.
The effect of the order was that those who were senior entered into an altogether different Grade.
That is senior Bench Secretary although doing the same work as his junior became entitled to higher grade.
And that clearly violated the principle of equal pay for equal work.
" In support of these conclusions the High Court relied upon two decisions of this Court: [i] Randhir Singh vs Union of India; , and [ii] P. Savita vs Union of India, [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR 101.
With regard to rule framed by the Chief Justice for the purpose of promotion to Bench Secretary Grade I, thee High Court said: "Rules were made not because the Court agreed with the classification of Bench Secretaries in Group I and Group II PG NO 298 but because of the Government order dated July 2, 1976.
The vice is not in the method of selection but in creation of two different groups without any intelligible differentia.
If Bench Secretaries of Group I would have been required to do any work different than Bench Secretaries Grade II, it could be described as promotional avenue.
Promotion from one post to another is associated with advancing to a higher office, climbing one more ladder in service career.
But the different grade for persons of same even on seniority cum merit with same work and responsibility cannot amount to promotion.
" With these conclusions, the High Court quashed a part of the notification dated July 4, 1976 which created Bench Secretaries Grade I.
The High Court did not quash the Rules relating to promotion to that cadre.
The High Court directed that all Bench Secretaries irrespective of their grades should be given the pay scale admissible to Bench Secretaries Grade I with effect from October 1, 1975.
The State of U.P. being aggrieved by the decision has appealed to this Court.
On the submissions made by counsel on both sides, two questions arise for our consideration: (i) Whether Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad are entitled to pay scale admissible to Section Officers?; and (ii) Whether the creation of two Grades with different pay scales in the cadre of Bench Secretaries who are doing the same or similar work is violative of the right to have "equal pay for equal work"? The first question regarding entitlement to the pay scale admissible to Section Officers should not detain us longer.
The answer to the question depends upon several factors.
It does not just depend upon either the nature of work or volume of work done by Bench Secre taries.
Primarily it requires among others.
evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts.
More often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be difference in degrees in the performance.
The quantity of work may be the same, but quality may be different that cannot be determined by PG NO 299 relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties.
The equation of posts or equation of pay must be left to the Executive Government.
It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission.
They would be the best judge to evaluate the nature of duties and responsibilities of posts.
If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the court should normally accept it.
The court should not try to tinker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration.
In the present case, it is true that at one time, Bench Secretaries were paid more emoluments than Section Officers.
But it is not known on what basis they were paid in the higher pay scale and treated as a superior class to Section Officers.
The Successive Pay Commissions and even Pay Rationalisation Committee, however, found no support to their superior claim.
The Commissions and Committee have evaluated the respective duties and responsibilities of the two posts.
It was found that the Section Officers perform onerous duties and bear greater responsibilities than Bench Secretaries.
We cannot go against that opinion and indeed, we must accept that opinion.
The Bench Secretaries, therefore, cannot claim as of right the pay scale admissible to Section Officers.
The second question formulated earlier needs careful examination.
The question is not particular to the present case.
It is pertinent to all such cases.
It is a matter affecting the civil services in general.
The question is whether there could be two scales of pay in the same cadre of persons performing the same or similar work or duties.
All Bench Secretaries in the High Court of Allahabad are undisputedly having same duties.
But they have been bifurcated into two grades with different pay scale.
The Bench Secretaries Grade 1 are in a higher pay scale than Bench Secretaries Grade II.
The entitlement to higher pay scale depends upon selection based on merit cum seniority.
Can it be said that it would be violative of the right to equality guaranteed under the Connstitution? It was argued for the respondents that it offends the constitutional principle of "equal pay for equal work".
Several decisions of this Court were relied upon in support of the proposition. "Equal pay for equal work for both men and women" has been accepted as a "constitutional goal" capable of being achieved through constitutional remedies.
In Randhir Singh vs Union of India & Others [I982] 3 SCR 298 Chinnappa Reddy, J. said (at 304): PG NO 300 "It is true that the principle of `equal pay for equal work ' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right.
But it certainly is a constitutional goal.
Art.39(d) of the Constitution proclaims `equal pay for equal work for both men and women ' as a Directive Principle of State Policy.
`Equal pay for equal work for both men and women ' means equal pay for equal work for every one and as beween the sexes.
Directive Principles,as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation.
article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointments to any office under the State.
These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to every one.
To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get.
To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay." The learned Judge however, observed that a differential treatment in appropriate cases can be justified when there are two grades based on reasonable grounds: "It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualification for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade.
The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay.
The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting article 14 if sought to be applied to them.
" In Randhir Singh, the petitioner was a driver constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration.
It was found that the petitioner and the other drivers in the Delhi Police Force per formed the same functions and duties as other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government.
Indeed, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileges of PG NO 301 a police officer ', their duties and responsibilities were found to be more arduous.
It was also admitted by the Delhi Administration in that case that the duties of driver constable of the Delhi Police Force were onerous.
Therefore, learned Judge said that there was no reason for giving them lower scale of pay than other drivers.
It was directed that the driver constables of Delhi Police Force should be given the scale of pay at least on par with that of drivers of the Railway Protection Force.
The principle enunciated in Randhir Singh was followed in Ramachandra vs Union of India, ; and P. Savita vs Union of India, [ 1985] Supp.
I SCR 10l.
In the former, the arbitrary differential treatment in the pay scale accorded to some professors was struck down.
The petitioners therein were holding the posts of Professors in the Indian Veterinary Research Institute under the Indian Council of Medical Research.
The pay scale of professors underwent revision.
The new recruits got the benefit of revision of scales, but not the petitioner.
He was allowed to continue in the old scale.
He challenged that discrimination in this Court as being violative of the right to have equal pay for equal work.
This Court accepted the contention and observed (page 163): "The case in hand is a glaring example of discriminat tory treatment accorded to old, experienced and highly qualified hands with an evil eye and unequal hand and the guarantee of equality in all its pervasive character must enable this Court to remove discrimination and to restore fair play in action.
No attempt was made to sustain the scales of pay for the post of Professor on the doctrine of classification because the classification of existing incum bents as being distinct and separate from newly recruited hand with flimsy change in essential qualification would be wholly irrational and arbitrary.
The case of the petitioners for being put in the revised scale of Rs. 1100 1600 from the date on which newly created posts of Professors in sister disciplines in IVRI and other institutes were created and filled up in revised scale is unanswerable and must be cunceded " In P. Savita vs Union of lndia, the artificial division of senior draftsmen in the Ministry of Defence Production with unequal scales of pay for the same work was struck down.
In Dhirendra Chamoli and Anr.
vs State of U.P., , this Court found fault with the Central Government for not giving the casual workers engaged in Nehru Yuvak the same salary and conditions of service as enjoyed by class IV employees regularly appointed against sanctioned posts.
It was observed (at 628): PG NO 302 "It must be remembered that in this country where there is so much unemployment,the choice for the majority of people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative terms are offered by the employer.
The fact that these employees accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid only daily wages and they will not get the same salary and conditions of service as other class IV employees, cannot provide an escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality enshrined in article 14 of the Constitution.
This article declares that there shall be equality before law and equal protection of the law and implicit in it is the further principle that there must be equal pay for work of equal value.
These employees who are in the service of the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras in the country and who are admittedly performing the same duties as Class IV employees, must therefore get the same salary and conditions of service as Class IV employees.
It makes no difference whether they are appointed in sanctioned posts or not.
So long as they are performing the same duties, they must receive the same salary and conditions of service as class IV employees.
" In Surinder Singh vs Engineer in Chief, CPWD, , the case of poor daily wage workers employed for serveral years by the Central Public Works Department CPWD came up for consideration before this Court.
They demanded parity in their wages, and allowances with those of regular and permanent employees of the Department on the basis of performing similar work.
This Court while granting relief to the workmen observed (at 642) : "The Central Government, the State Government and likewise, all public sector undertakings are expected to function like model and enlightened employers and arguments such as those which were advanced before us that the principle of equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine which cannot be enforced in a court of law should ill come from the mouths of the State and State Undertakings.
" PG NO 303 The right to have equal pay for equal work was also accepted by this Court in R. D. Gupta and Others vs Lt. Governor of Delhi, ; Bhagwan Dass and Others vs State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC 634; National Museum Non Gazetted Employees Association and Anr.
vs UOI, WP No. 1230 of 1987 disposed of dt. 10.2.1988; Jaipal and Ors.
vs State of Haryana, WP No. 455 and connected petitions of 1987 of DD 2.6.1988 and Y.K. Mehta vs UOI, WP No. 1239 of 1979 and connected petitions DD 26.8.1988.
Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work" .
This article and other like provisions in the Directive Principles are "conscience of our Constitution.
" They are rooted in social justice.
They were intended to bring about a socio economic transformation in our society.
As observed by Hegde and Mukherjee, JJ.
in Keshavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225 at para 712: "The Constitution seeks to fulfil the basic needs of the common man and to change the structure of society.
" In the words of Shelat and Grover, JJ (at para 596): "The dominent objective in view was to ameliorate and improve the lot of the common man and to bring about a socio economic justice." In matters of employment the Government of a socialist State must protect the weaker sections.
It must be ensured that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant.
It is the duty of the State to see that the under privileged or weaker sections get their dues.
Even if they have voluntarily accepted the employment on unequal terms, the State should not deny their basic rights of equal treatment.
It is against this background that the principle of "equal pay for equal work has to be construed in the first place.
Second, this principle has no mechanical application in every case of similar work.
It has to be read into article l4 of the Constitution.
article l4 permits reasonable classification founded on different basis.
It is now well established that the classification can be based on some qualities or characteristics of persons grouped together and not in others who are left out.
Those qualities or charcteristics must, of course, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved.
In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration.
He or she learns also by experience as much as by other means.
It cannot be denied that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is superior than the work of newcomers.
Even in Randhir Singh 's case, this principle has been recognised.
O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed that the classification of officers into two grades with different scales of pay based either on academic qualification or experience on length of service is sustainable.
Apart from that, higher pay scale to avoid stag PG NO 304 nation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service.
There is selection grade for District Judges.
There is senior time scale in Indian Administrative Service.
There is super time scale in other like services.
The entitlement to these higher pay scales depends upon seniority cum merit or merit cum seniority.
The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination.
The classification based on experience is a reasonable classification.
It has a rational nexus with the object thereof.
To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the interest of the service itself.
In All lndia Customs and Central Excise Stenographers Recognised) and Others vs Union of India and Others, [1988] 2 Judgments Today SC p. 5 19, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. said: "There may be qualitative difference as regards relia bility and responsibility.
Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference.
One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service.
So long as such value judgment emphasise that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution.
But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right." And said: "The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive.
some requiring more tact, some less it varies from nature and culture of employment.
The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula.
If it has a rational nexus with the object to be sought for, as reiterated before a certain amount of value judgment of the administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the pay scales has to be left with them and it cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived mala fide either in law or in fact.
" PG NO 305 In the present case, all Bench Secretaries may do the same work, but their quality of work may differ.
Under the rules framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, Bench Secretaries Grade I are selected by a Selection Committee.
The selection is based on merit with due regard to seniority.
They are selected among the lot of Bench Secretaries Grade II.
When Bench Secretaries Grade II acquire experience and also display more merit, they are appointed as Bench Secretaries Grade I.
The rules thus make a proper classification for the purpose of entitlement to higher pay scale.
The High Court has completely overlooked the criterion provided under the Rules The merit governs the grant of higher pay scale and that merit will be evaluated by a competent authority.
The classification made under the Rules, therefore, cannot be said to be violative of the right to have equal pay for equal work.
After the argument was concluded in this appeal, counsel on both sides brought to our attention that the State Government has granted uniform pay scale of Rs.1600 2950 to both the grades of Bench Secretaries with effect from January 1, 1986.
We may make it clear that this decision of ours shall not affect the Bench Secretaries to get that pay scale accordingly with effect from January 1, 1986.
In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court.
S.L. Appeal allowed.

dataset_name: IN-Abs

summary:
Prior to 1955, the Bench Secretaries in the Allahabad High Court were on a higher pay scale than that of the Section Officers.
In 1965, the State Government appointed a Pay Rationalisation Committee to consider the duties and responsibilities of different categories of posts and recommend changes.
The Committee recommended for the Bench Secretaries a pay scale lower than that of the Section Officers.
The Bench Secretaries made a representation to the Government that they be put at par with the Section Officers if not on a higher scale.
The Government appointed Pay Commission (l971 72).
The Pay Commission did not accept the claim of the Bench Secretaries.
The Bench Secretaries again moved the Government reiterating their demand, whereupon an "Anomalies Committee" was constituted.
The Committee rejected the claim of the Bench Secretaries for placing them at par with the Section Officers, but suggested that ten posts of Bench Secretaries be upgraded.
The Government accepted the recommendation and issued orders upgrading ten posts of Bench Secretaries to be called Bench Secretaries grade I, giving the nomenclature of Bench Secretaries grade Il to the rest of Secretaries.
The Bench Secretaries grade II moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the bifurcation of their cadre into grade I & grade 11.
The High Court quashed the notification which created Bench Secretaries grade 1.
The State of l, '.P., aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, appealed to this Court.
PG NO 288 PG NO 289 Two questions arose for consideration (i) whether the Bench Secretaries were entitled to pay scales admissible to Section officers, and (11) whether the creation of two grades with different pay scales in the cadre of Bench Secretaries doing the same or similar work was violative of the "equal pay for equal work".
Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD:(I) It requires of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts.
Functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar, but there may be a difference in the performance.
Quantity of work may be the same but quality may be different.
The equation of posts of equation of pay must be determined by expert bodies, like pay commissions.
If there is any determination by a Commission or Committee, the Court should normally accept it and not tinker with it unless it is shown to be made with extraneous consideration.
[298G H;299A B] The Bench Secretaries were paid more emoluments than the section Officers, but it was not known on what basis and how they were treated superior to Section Officers.
The Successive Pay Commission and the Pay Rationalisation Committee found no support to their superior claim.
The Court could not go against that opinion.
The Bench Secretaries could as of right the pay scale admissible to the Section Officers.
[299C D] (2) The second question formulated affected the civil services in general.
All the Bench Secretaries concerned were indisputably having the same duties.
They had been bifurcated into two grades with different pay scales grade I with higher pay scale and grade II which was said to offend the constitutional principle of "equal pay for equal work".
[299E G] Article 39(d) of the Constitution, which proclaims "equal pay for equal work" and other like provisions in the Directive Principles, are rooted in Social Justice, intended to bring about a socio economic trans formation in society.
In matters of employment, it must be ensured that there is no exploitation of the poor and ignorant.
It is the duty of the State to see that the under privileged or weaker section get their dues.
Against this background the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has to be construed.
This principle has no mechanical application in every ca8e of similar work.
It has to be read into Article 14 of the Constitution, which permits reasonable classification founded on different basis.
[303C E] PG NO 290 The classification can be based on some qualities or characteristics of persons grouped together and not in others left out.
Those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object to be achieved.
In service matters, merit or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency.
It cannot be denied that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is Superior to the work of new comers.
Higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional evenues is common in career service.
Entitlement to higher pay scales depends upon seniority cum merit or merit cum seniority.
The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination.
Classification based on experience is a reasonable classification having a rational nexus with the object thereof.
To hold otherwise, would be detrimental to the interest of the Service itself.
[303F H; 304A B] The Bench Secretaries might do the same work, but their quality of work might differ.
The Rule framed by the Chief Justice of the High Court make a proper classification for the purpose of entitlement to higher pay scale.
The High Court overlooked the criterion provided under the Rules.
Merit governs the grant of higher pay scale.
Classification made under the Rules could not be said to be violative of the right to have equal pay for equal work.
[305A C] Randhir Singh vs Union of India & Ors.
, ; ;Ram Chandra vs Union of lndia; , ; P. Savita vs Union of India, [1985] Suppl.
(1) SCR 101; Dhirendra Chamoli & Anr.
vs State of U.P., ; Surinder Singh vs Engineer in Chief, CPWD, ; R.D. Gupta & Ors.
vs Lt. Governor of Delhi, ; ; Bhagwan Das & Ors.
vs State of Haryana, [1987] 4 SCC 634; National Museum Non Gazetted Employees Association & Anr.
vs Union of India, (WP No. 1230 of 1987 disposed of by the Supreme Court on 10.2.1988); Jaipal & Ors.
vs State of Haryana, (WP No. 455 and connected petitions of 1987 disposed of by the Supreme Court on 2.6.1988); Y.K. Mehta vs Union of India, (W P No. 1239 of 1979 and connected petitions disposed of bay supreme Court on 26.8.1988); Keshavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, [1973] 4 SCC 225 at para 712; All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and Others vs Union of India & Ors., [1988] (2) Judgments Today SC p. 519, referred to.


judgement:
ivil Appeal No. 4031 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4.1988 of the Patna High PG NO 867 PG NO 868 Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1923 of 1988.
R.K. Jain, R.P.Singh and Y.D.Chandrachud for the Appellant.
U.S. Prasad for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.
Special leave granted.
The order dated 25th March, 1988 of the Collector is under challenge in this appeal.
The same reads as follows: "Shri Raghu Nath Thakur S/o Late Gorakh Thakur, Village Repura, P.S. Puksha, District Samastipur had bid for Rs.11,900 (Rupees eleven thousands only) per month Dak in an auction of Beni Country liquor shop held on 27.3.88 and he as given the shop of Beni Country liquor but after signing in Bandobasti Register he did not deposit dak amount.
The name of Shri Raghu Nath Thakur S/o Late Gorakh Nath Village Repura, P.S. Pusa, Distt.
Samastipur is therefore placed in the black list for future under the orders passed by the Collector, Samastipur.
" This order was passed pursuant to the order of the Collector.
The letter dated 25th March, 1988, states as follows: "The Collector of the district after perusal of the said office note passed order on 25.3.88 which is produced in verbatim below: Ist bidder chunki defaulter hai atah security prapt kar len tatha bhavishya ke liae Black list karen.
" Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of black listing the appellant.
It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before black listing any person.
In so far as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right.
But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the PG NO 869 principles of natural justice.
It has to be realised that black listing any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event.
Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order.
In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order in so far as it directs black listing of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law.
In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside.
So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected.
This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do so in accordance with law, i.e. giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation.
After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor.
We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant.
The appeal is thus disposed of.
Appeal disposed of.

summary:
The appellant has bid in an auction of Beni Country Liquor Shop in the District of Samastipur and was given the shop being the highest bidder but he failed to deposit the bid money in time.
The Collector, Samastipur by an order cancelled the bid and black listed the appellant.
He then moved the High Court against the order of the Collector.
The High Court upheld the order of the Collector.
The appellant appealed to this Court by special leave.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.
It is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequences should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice.
Black listing any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequences for the future business of the person concerned in any event.
[868H; 869A] 2.
Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order.
[869B] In the instant case, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the black list in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside.
So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected.
[869B C]


judgement:
cellaneous Petition No. 32937 of 1988.
345 IN Writ Petition No. 12 183 of 1985.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
K.K. Venugopal, Mrs. Jayashree Wad and Mrs. Aruna Mathur for the Petitioners.
K. Parasaran, Attorney General, A.K. Ganguli, P. Parmes waran and K. Swamy for the Respondents.
The following Order of the Court was delivered: ORDER In respect of the civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of this Court 's judgment dated 4th November, 1988, it is made clear that the assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatev er these may be, which will either be included in the price at the factory gate or deemed to be the price at the factory gate for the processed fabric.
The factory gate here means the "deemed" factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor.
In order to explain the position it is made clear by the following illustration: if the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor is Rs.20 and the value of the job work done is Rs.5 and the manufacturing profit and expenses for the processing be Rs.5, then in such a case the value would be Rs.30, being the value of the grey cloth plus the value of the job work done plus manufac turing profit and expenses.
That would be the correct as sessable value.
If the trader, who entrusts cotton or man made fabric to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, that would be taken by the Excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabric and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis provided that the declaration as to the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, would include only the price or deemed price at which the processed fabric would leave the processor 's factory plus his profit.
Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 346 enjoins that when goods owned by one person are manufactured by another the information is required relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all the liabil ities under the said Act and the rules made thereunder.
The price at which he is selling the goods must be the value of the grey cloth or fabric plus the value of the job work done plus the manufacturing profit and the manufacturing expenses but not any other subsequent profit or expenses.
It is necessary to include the processor 's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but it is not necessary to include the trader 's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post manufacturing profits.

summary:
On a civil miscellaneous petition for clarification of this Court 's judgment dated 4th November, 1988, the Court.
HELD: The assessable value of the processed fabric would be the value of the grey cloth in the hands of the processor plus the value of the job work done plus manufacturing profit and manufacturing expenses whatever these may be, which will either be included in the price at the factory gate or deemed to be the price at the factory gate for the processed fabric.
[345D E] The factory gate means the "deemed" factory gate as if the processed fabric was sold by the processor.
[345E] If the trader.
who entrusts cotton or man made fabric to the processor for processing on job work basis, would give a declaration to the processor as to what would be the price at which he would be selling the processed goods in the market, that would be taken by the Excise authorities as the assessable value of the processed fabric and excise duty would be charged to the processor on that basis.
Such a declaration would include only the price or deemed price at which the processed fabric would leave the processor 's factory plus his profit.
It is necessary to include the processor 's expenses, costs and charges plus profit, but not the trader 's profits who gets the fabrics processed, because those would be post manufacturing profits.
[345G H; 346B C]