title: 2008/511/EC: Decision of the European Parliament of 24 April 2007 on the discharge for the implementation of the budget of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005

text:
               15.7.2008

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 187/92

         DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   of 24 April 2007
   on the discharge for the implementation of the budget of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005
   (2008/511/EC)
   THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
   having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005 (1),
   having regard to the Court of Auditors' report on the final annual accounts of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005, together with the Centre's replies (2),
   having regard to the Council's Recommendation of 27 February 2007 (5711/2007 — C6-0080/2007),
   having regard to the EC Treaty, and in particular Article 276 thereof,
   having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (3), and in particular Article 185 thereof,
   having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (4), and in particular Article 12a thereof,
   having regard to Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (5), and in particular Article 94 thereof,
   having regard to Rule 71 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,
   having regard to the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A6-0118/2007),

               1.

               Grants the director of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia discharge for the implementation of the Centre's budget for the financial year 2005;

               2.

               Sets out its observations in the Resolution below;

               3.

               Instructs its President to forward this Decision and the Resolution that forms an integral part of it to the director of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

            The President

         Hans-Gert PÖTTERING

            The Secretary-General

         Harald RØMER

      (1)  OJ C 266, 31.10.2006, p. 46.

      (2)  OJ C 312, 19.12.2006, p. 93.

      (3)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (OJ L 390, 30.12.2006, p. 1).

      (4)  OJ L 151, 10.6.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1652/2003 (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003, p. 33).

      (5)  OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 72.
    ---documentbreak---

               15.7.2008

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 187/93

         RESOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   of 24 April 2007
   with observations forming an integral part of the Decision on the discharge for the implementation of the budget of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005
   THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
   having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005 (1),
   having regard to the Court of Auditors' report on the final annual accounts of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia for the financial year 2005, together with the Centre's replies (2),
   having regard to the Council's Recommendation of 27 February 2007 (5711/2007 — C6-0080/2007),
   having regard to the EC Treaty, and in particular Article 276 thereof,
   having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (3) and in particular Article 185 thereof,
   having regard to Council Regulation EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (4), and in particular Article 12a thereof,
   having regard to Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (5), and in particular, Article 94 thereof,
   having regard to Rule 71 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,
   having regard to the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A6-0118/2007),

               A.

               whereas the Court of Auditors stated that it obtained reasonable assurance that the annual accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 2005 were reliable, and that, the underlying transactions, taken as a whole, were legal and regular,

               B.

               whereas on 27 April 2006 Parliament gave discharge to the director in respect of the Centre's budget for the 2004 financial year (6) and in the Resolution accompanying the discharge Decision Parliament, inter alia,

                           —

                           expressed its concern about the high level of cancelled carry-overs in particular in Title I (staff expenditure),

                           —

                           was concerned by the irregularities noted by the Court of Auditors in contract tendering and awards.

         General points concerning the majority of EU Agencies requiring individual discharge

               1.

               Considers that the ever-growing number of Community Agencies and the activities of certain of them do not seem to form part of an overall policy framework, and that the remits of some Agencies do not always reflect the real needs of the Union or the expectations of its citizens, and notes that in general terms the Agencies do not always have a good image or a good press;

               2.

               Invites the Commission therefore to define an overall policy framework for the setting up of new Community Agencies and to present a cost-benefit study before the setting up of any new Agency, while being careful to avoid any overlap of activities between Agencies or with the remits of other European organisations;

               3.

               Calls on the Court of Auditors to give its opinion on the cost-benefit study before Parliament takes its decision;

               4.

               Invites the Commission to present every five years a study on the added value of every existing Agency; invites all relevant institutions in the case of a negative evaluation of the added value of an Agency to take the necessary steps by reformulating the mandate of that Agency or by closing it;

               5.

               Considers it regrettable, given the growing number of regulatory agencies, that the negotiations on the draft interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory Agencies have not yet been concluded, and calls on the relevant departments of the Commission, in consultation with the Court of Auditors, to do their utmost to ensure that the agreement is brought to a rapid conclusion;

               6.

               Notes that the Commission's budgetary responsibility calls for closer linking of the Agencies to the Commission; calls on the Commission and the Council to take all necessary steps to give the Commission a blocking minority in the supervisory bodies of the regulatory Agencies by 31 December 2007 and to provide for such a minority from the outset when new Agencies are set up;

               7.

               Invites the Court of Auditors to create an additional chapter in its Annual Report, devoted to all Agencies to be discharged under the Commission's accounts in order to have a much clearer picture of the use of EU funds by Agencies;

               8.

               Recalls the principle according to which all Community Agencies, whether subsidised or not, are subject to discharge by the Parliament, even where a discharge authority exists by virtue of their constitutive texts;

               9.

               Calls on the Court of Auditors to perform performance audits for all Agencies and to report back to the relevant committees of Parliament, including the Committee on Budgetary Control;

               10.

               Notes that the number of Agencies is constantly increasing and that, in accordance with the Commission's political responsibility for the operation of the Agencies, which goes far beyond mere logistical support, there is an even higher need for the Directorates-General of the Commission charged with the setting up and monitoring of Agencies to develop a common approach to the Agencies; considers that a structure similar to the one created by the Agencies for coordination among the DGs concerned would be a pragmatic way forward towards a common approach by the Commission on all matters relating to the Agencies;

               11.

               Invites the Commission to improve administrative and technical support to the Agencies, taking into account the growing complexity of the Community's administrative rules and technical problems;

               12.

               Notes the lack of a disciplinary body in any of the Community Agencies, and calls on the Commission to take the necessary steps to ensure that such a mechanism is rapidly put in place;

               13.

               Welcomes the considerable improvements in the coordination among the Agencies, which allows them to tackle recurring problems and makes cooperation with the Commission and Parliament more efficient;

               14.

               Takes the view that the establishment by a number of Agencies of a shared support service aimed at making their computerised financial management systems consistent with those of the Commission is a measure that should be taken further and extended;

               15.

               Calls upon the Agencies to improve their cooperation and benchmarking with actors in the field; urges the Commission to adopt any measures it considers necessary to help the Agencies enhance their image and raise the profile of their activities;

               16.

               Calls upon the Commission to come up with a proposal to harmonise the format of the annual reporting by the Agencies and to develop performance indicators which would allow a comparison of their efficiency;

               17.

               Invites the Agencies to present at the beginning of every year performance indicators against which they could be measured;

               18.

               Invites all Agencies to increasingly use SMART objectives which should lead to more realistic planning and implementation of goals;

               19.

               Agrees with the Court of Auditors that the Commission also bears responsibility for the (financial) management of the Agencies; therefore, urges the Commission to monitor and where necessary direct and help the management of the different Agencies, especially in relation to the proper application of tender procedures, transparency of recruitment procedures, sound financial management (underspending and overbudgeting) and most importantly the proper application of the rules concerning the internal control framework;

               20.

               Considers that the Agencies' work programmes should express their contributions in operational and measurable terms and that due consideration should be given to the Commission's Internal Control Standards;

         Specific points

               21.

               Notes that although the Centre's rate of commitment for the appropriations for the financial year 2005 was over 90 %, it was found that more than 50 % of the commitments for administrative expenditure were carried over and that in general there was a high rate of cancellation of the appropriations carried over (between 15 % and 25 %, depending on the title); invites the Centre to improve its expenditure planning and the way it monitors the implementation of this expenditure; underlines that transfers between budget headings need to be justified and documented in accordance with the provisions in force;

               22.

               Notes that no activity-based management had been brought in despite the Centre's financial regulation making provision for its introduction on the lines of that applied to the general budget with a view to improving the monitoring of performance; invites the Centre to present a work programme which expresses its contributions in operational and measurable terms;

               23.

               Notes that the Centre had no system for planning and managing its equipment acquisitions and that it did not make any cyclical checks on its inventory, although this would have improved the inventory's reliability; invites the Centre to remedy this situation;

               24.

               Notes that the Centre's internal control system suffered from various shortcomings, such as for instance the fact that the financial circuits set up by the authorising officer had not been described, the systems whereby the authorising officer and his delegates supplied information to the accounting officer had in particular not been validated by the latter and the principle of the segregation of duties was not applied strictly, especially between the duties of initiation and verification; invites the Centre, in relation to commitments, to include sound financial management in the list of matters to be covered by ex ante verifications;

               25.

               Invites the Centre to fully apply the rule whereby members of the selection boards must always be of a grade equivalent to or higher than that of the post to be filled;

               26.

               Notes that the invitations to tender issued by the Centre do not offer much by way of explanation as regards the minimum quality of bids and the weighting of price factors; invites the Centre to apply the rules for tenders strictly.

      (1)  OJ C 266, 31.10.2006, p. 46.

      (2)  OJ C 312, 19.12.2006, p. 93.

      (3)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 (OJ L 390, 30.12.2006, p. 1).

      (4)  OJ L 151, 10.6.1997, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1652/2003 (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003, p. 33).

      (5)  OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 72.

      (6)  OJ L 340, 6.12.2006, p. 80.


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32000D0278

2000/278/EC: Council Decision of 16 March 2000 on the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty

Official Journal L 089 , 11/04/2000 P. 0006 - 0007

Council Decisionof 16 March 2000on the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty(1)(2000/278/EC)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 47(2), 55 and 95 thereof, in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 300(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 300(3),Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(2),Having regard to the assent of the European Parliament(3),Whereas:(1) The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996 under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organisation will help to ensure a balanced level of protection for works and other subject matter, while allowing the public access to material available via networks.(2) The competence of the Community to conclude or accede to international agreements or treaties does not derive only from explicit conferral by the Treaty but may also derive from other provisions of the Treaty and from acts adopted pursuant to those provisions by Community institutions.(3) The subject matter of the WCT and the WPPT falls to a large extent within the scope of existing Community directives in this field.(4) It follows that the approval of the WCT and the WPPT is a matter for both the Community and its Member States.(5) The WCT and the WPPT should therefore be approved on behalf of the Community with regard to matters within its competence.(6) The Community has already signed the WCT and the WPPT, subject to final conclusion.(7) The deposit of the instruments of conclusion of the Community should take place as far as possible simultaneously with the deposit of the instruments of ratification of the Member States,HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:Article 11. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) is hereby approved on behalf of the Community with regard to matters within its competence.2. The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) is hereby approved on behalf of the Community with regard to matters within its competence.3. The texts of the Treaties are attached to this Decision.Article 2The President of the Council is hereby authorised to deposit the instruments of conclusion with the Director-General of the World Intellectual Property Organisation as from the date by which the Member States will have to bring into force the measures adopted by the European Parliament and the Council necessary to adapt the existing Community legislation to the obligations deriving from the WCT and the WPPT.Article 31. The Commission is hereby authorised to represent the Community at the meetings of the Assemblies referred to in the WCT and WPPT.2. On all matters within the sphere of competence of the Community, the Commission shall negotiate in the Assemblies of the WCT and the WPPT on behalf of the Community in accordance with the applicable rules of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 300 thereof.3. The position which the Community may adopt within the Assemblies shall be prepared by the relevant Council working party.Done at Brussels, 16 March 2000.For the CouncilThe PresidentF. Seixas da Costa(1) Two statements relating to this Decision are set out in OJ C 103, 11.4.2000, page 1.(2) OJ C 165, 30.5.1998, p. 8.(3) Assent of 16 February 2000 (not yet published in the Official Journal).


title: 2005/668/EC: Commission Decision of 22 September 2005 declaring operational the Regional Advisory Council for the North-Western Waters under the common fisheries policy

text:
               24.9.2005

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 249/18

         COMMISSION DECISION
   of 22 September 2005
   declaring operational the Regional Advisory Council for the North-Western Waters under the common fisheries policy
   (2005/668/EC)
   THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
   Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
   Having regard to Council Decision 2004/585/EC of 19 July 2004 establishing Regional Advisory Councils under the common fisheries policy (1), and in particular Article 3(3) thereof,
   Having regard to the recommendation transmitted by Ireland on 27 June 2005 on behalf of Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the common fisheries policy (2) and Decision 2004/585/EC provide the framework for the establishment and operation of Regional Advisory Councils.

               (2)

               Article 2 of Decision 2004/585/EC establishes a Regional Advisory Council to cover the North-Western Waters in International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) areas (3) V (excluding Va and only EC waters in Vb), VI and VII.

               (3)

               In accordance with Article 3(1) of Decision 2004/585/EC, representatives of the fisheries sector and other interests groups submitted a request concerning the operation of that Regional Advisory Council to Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

               (4)

               As required by Article 3(2) of Decision 2004/585/EC, the Member States concerned determined whether the application concerning the Regional Advisory Council for the North-Western Waters was in conformity with the provisions laid down in that Decision. On 27 June 2005, the Member States concerned transmitted a recommendation on that Regional Advisory Council to the Commission.

               (5)

               The Commission has evaluated the application by the interested parties and the recommendation in the light of Decision 2004/585/EC and the aims and principles of the common fisheries policy, and considers that the Regional Advisory Council for the North-Western Waters is ready to become operational,

         HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
   Sole Article
   The Regional Advisory Council for the North-Western Waters, established by Article 2(1)(d) of Decision 2004/585/EC, shall be operational as from 26 September 2005.

      Done at Brussels, 22 September 2005.

            For the Commission

         Joe BORG

            Member of the Commission

      (1)  OJ L 256, 3.8.2004, p. 17.

      (2)  OJ L 358, 31.12.2002, p. 59.

      (3)  As defined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3880/91 of 17 December 1991 on the submission of nominal catch statistics by Member States fishing in the north-east Atlantic (OJ L 365, 31.12.1991, p. 1).


Avis juridique important

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E1996C0053

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 53/96/COL of 15 May 1996 on the eighth amendment of the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid

Official Journal L 245 , 26/09/1996 P. 0020 - 0027

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 53/96/COL of 15 May 1996 on the eighth amendment of the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITYhas amended the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid (1), adopted on 19 January 1994 (2), as last amended by Decision No 23/96/COL (3), as follows:Chapter 14 of the State Aid Guidelines shall be replaced by the following:'14. AID FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (1)14.1. Introduction(1) It is widely acknowledged that research and development can contribute to economic growth, improved competitiveness and better employment prospects. The Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement have declared as one of their common objectives to strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry and to encourage it to become more competitive at the international level. To this end Part VI of the Agreement establishes detailed arrangements aimed at strengthening and broadening cooperation in the framework of the Community's activities inter alia in the field of research and technological development (R& TD).(2) EFTA States participate in the implementation of the fourth framework programme of Community activities in the field of research and technological development (1994-98) through participation in its specific programmes. The EFTA States contribute financially to the programmes and in consequence thereof have access to all parts of these programmes and participate fully in the EC committees which assist the EC Commission in the management of the programmes. At the project level, institutions, undertakings, organizations and nationals of EFTA States shall have the same rights and obligations, including with regard to exploitation of results, as those applicable to their partners and counterparts in EC Member States.(3) Measures taken by the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement in support of research and development have to be compatible with the functioning of the Agreement. State aid rules in the EEA Agreement must be applied constructively to encourage cooperation which helps new technology to be developed and disseminated, while observing the rules on intellectual property rights. In the control of State aid, regard must be paid to the need for resources to be made available to those sectors which will contribute to improving the competitiveness of European industry.(4) The EFTA Surveillance Authority has taken a favourable view of State aid for R& D. This favourable attitude is justified on several counts: the aims of such aid, the often considerable financial requirements and risks of R& D operations and, given the distance from the market place of such projects, the reduced likelihood that such aid will distort competition and trade.14.2. Applicability of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to aid for R& D14.2.1. Definitions of the stages of R& D(1) The closer R& D is to the market, the more significant may be the distortive effect of the State aid. In order to determine the proximity to the market of the aided R& D, the EFTA Surveillance Authority makes a distinction between fundamental research, industrial research and precompetitive development activity.(2) The following definitions, which correspond to those laid down in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, are designed to help the EFTA States to formulate their notifications. They are intended to be indicative not normative.- By fundamental research is meant an activity to broaden scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial objectives.- By industrial research is meant planned research or critical investigation aimed at the acquisition of new knowledge, the objective being that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes or services or in bringing about a significant improvement in existing products, processes or services.- By precompetitive development activity is meant the shaping of the results of industrial research into a plan, arrangement or design for new, altered or improved products, processes or services, whether they are intended to be sold or used, including the creation of an initial prototype which could not be used commercially. This may also include the conceptual formulation and design of other products, processes or services and initial demonstration projects or pilot projects, provided that such projects cannot be converted or used for industrial applications or commercial exploitation. It does not include the routine or periodic changes made to products, production lines, manufacturing processes, existing services and other operations in progress, even if such changes may represent improvements.(3) Innovation does not qualify as a separate category of R& D. Aid for activities that could be regarded as innovative but do not correspond to the categories mentioned in point 14.2 can benefit from State aid only if it conforms with the EFTA Surveillance Authority policy on investment aid.14.2.2. R& D by public research establishments and R& D contracts(1) Public financing of R& D activities by public non-profit-making higher-education or research establishments is normally not covered by Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement.(2) Where the results of publicly financed R& D projects carried out by such establishments are made available to European industry on a non-discriminatory basis, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will assume that State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement is not normally involved.(3) Where R& D is carried out by public non-profit-making, higher-education or research establishments on behalf of, or in collaboration with industry, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will assume that State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement is not involved either:(a) where the public non-profit-making higher-education or research establishments contribute to research projects as a commercial firm would, for example, in return for payment at the market rate for the services they provide;(b) or- where the industrial participants in the research bear the full cost of the project, or- where the results which do not give rise to intellectual property rights may be widely disseminated and any intellectual property rights to the R& D results are fully allocated to the public non-profit-making establishments, or- where the public non-profit-making establishments receive from the industrial participants compensation equivalent to the market price for the intellectual property rights which result from the research project and which are held by those industrial participants, and where the results which do not give rise to intellectual property rights may be widely disseminated to interested third parties.(4) Public authorities may commission R& D from firms or buy the results of R& D directly from them. If there is no open tender procedure, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will assume that State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement may be involved. If these contracts are awarded according to market conditions, in particular after an open tender procedure in accordance with the act referred to in point 5b of Annex XVI to the EEA Agreement (2), it will normally be assumed that no State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement is involved.14.3. Assessment of aid for R& D under Article 61 of the EEA Agreement(1) Where it satisfies the tests of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement and therefore has to be examined by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, aid granted to firms for R& D may be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement by virtue of one of the derogations provided for in Article 61 (3).(2) In all cases where, after examination, the EFTA Surveillance Authority concludes that the purpose of the aid in question is to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest, that aid may qualify for the derogation contained in Article 61 (3) (b).(3) The common European interest must be demonstrated in practical terms: for example, it must be proved that the project represents a major advance over specific Community or European R& D programmes.(4) In the past, the European Commission has applied the derogation contained in Article 92 (3) (b) of the EC Treaty (which corresponds to Article 61 (3) (b) of the EEA Agreement) in a limited number of cases. It has transpired that, as regards R& D, this derogation may apply particularly to transnational projects of major qualitative and, in principle, quantitative significance (e. g. projects related to the formulation of industrial standards that could enable European industries to secure the full benefit of the single market and the EEA Agreement) (3).(5) If State aid for R& D does not qualify for the derogation provided for in Article 61 (3) (b), it may nevertheless be compatible with the EEA Agreement by virtue of Article 61 (3) (c), which provides a derogation for aid that facilitates the development of certain economic activities as long as it does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.(6) When examining whether or not Article 61 (3) (c) of the EEA Agreement is applicable, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will pay special attention to the type of research carried out, the beneficiaries, the aid intensity, the accessibility to the results and other relevant factors as mentioned in Sections 14.5 to 14.7.14.4. Specific notification requirements(1) State aid for R& D has to be notified to the EFTA Surveillance Authority pursuant to Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. Annex I to these guidelines contains a checklist of the information to be supplied in State aid notifications. Section II of Annex I lists additional information to be provided concerning aid for R& D. Furthermore, paragraph 14.4 (8) contains additional requirements for major R& D projects and paragraphs 14.4 (6) and (7) provide derogation from the general rule concerning notification of budget increases and extension in time of existing aid schemes.(2) The EFTA Surveillance Authority aims to achieve the highest possible degree of transparency in the application of aid schemes. This means that there must be a clear statement of objectives to be achieved, the beneficiaries, etc. The different categories of costs which the aid is designed to reduce must be specified and the aid must be granted in such a form that the intensity of the aid in relation to these costs, as listed in Section 14.6, can be calculated.(3) In the case of R& D projects, all types of aid may be be authorized. The EFTA States must nevertheless make it possible for the EFTA Surveillance Authority to calculate the grant equivalent of the aid if the latter is not paid in the form of an outright grant and must consequently provide sufficient information to enable the Authority to do this.(4) Where an EFTA State is of the opinion that Article 61 (3) (b) of the EEA Agreement is applicable, it must examine whether the relevant conditions are met and demonstrate to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in its notification, that they are met.(5) The provisions of Chapter 11 of these guidelines, on the accelerated clearance of new aid schemes for SMEs and of modifications of existing schemes, applies in full to State aid for R& D, as does the de minimis rule set out in Chapter 12 of these guidelines.(6) The EFTA Surveillance Authority also considers that a notification of the increase in the annual budget of an authorized R& D scheme is not necessary if, expressed in ecus, it is not more than 100 % (in nominal terms) of the initial annual amount, provided that the scheme is of unlimited duration or that the increase takes place within the period of validity of a scheme of limited duration.(7) Extensions with or without a budgetary increase (up to the abovementioned limit of 100 %), without changes in the conditions for implementing the previously approved aid schemes and consistent with the present rules need be renotified only from the fifth year following the expiry of the validity of the original scheme. The EFTA States, however, are obliged to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority of such refinancings/extensions in advance and to continue to submit an annual report to it on the application of the schemes in question.(8) Individual grants of aid under an R& D scheme that has been authorized by the EFTA Surveillance Authority do not, in principle, need to be notified. However, in order to allow the Authority to assess significant amounts of aid under approved schemes and the compatibility of such aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority requires prior notification of any individual research project costing more than ECU 25 million (ECU 30 million for Eureka projects (4)) and for which it is proposed to provide aid with a gross grant equivalent of more than ECU 5 million.(9) Individual grants of aid outside the scope of authorized R& D schemes are to be notified in the normal manner pursuant to Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement unless they constitute de minimis awards.14.5. Aid intensity14.5.1. Basic rules(1) The allowable intensity of aid will be determined by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on a case-by-case basis. The Authority's assessment in each case will take into consideration the nature of the project or programme, overall policy considerations relating to the competitiveness of European industry, the risk of distortion of competition and the effect on trade between the Contracting Parties. A general evaluation of such risks leads the Authority to consider that fundamental research and industrial research and industrial research may qualify for higher level of aid than precompetitive development activities, which are more closely related to the market introduction of R& D results and, if aided, could therefore more easily lead to distortions of competition and trade.(2) The public financing of fundamental research that is normally independently carried out by non-profit-making higher-education or research establishments does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement.(3) In exceptional cases where fundamental research is carried out by or for firms, the aid would fall within Article 61 (1) of the Agreement but, since this type of research is far from from the market and its results are, in principle, widely available for exploitation on a non-discriminatory basis and at market rates, it may be awarded at a gross aid intensity of up to 100 %.(4) To qualify as fundamental research, the work should not be linked to any industrial or commercial objectives of a particular enterprise, and a wide dissemination of the results of the research must be guaranteed.(5) As a general rule, the gross aid intensity for industrial research must not exceed 50 % of the eligible costs of the project (as defined in Section 14.6).(6) Technical feasibility studies preparatory to industrial research activities may qualify for aid amounting to 75 % of study costs, while such studies preparatory to precompetitive development activities may qualify for support amounting to 50 % of study costs; these ceilings have been set in the light of the negligible impact of such aid on competition and trade conditions.(7) Precompetitive development activities are close to the market and there is a greater risk that any such aid will distort competition and intra-EEA trade. The permissible gross aid intensity for such activities is fixed at 25 % of the eligible costs (as defined in Section 14.6).14.5.2. Intensities in certain specific circumstances(1) As stated in point 14.4 (3), the EFTA States are free to use all instruments of aid to support R& D. In the case of advances that are repayable only in the event of a successful outcome of research activities, the permissible aid intensity (in gross grant equivalent) is that stipulated by this framework for the various stages of research. In the event of failure of the research concerned, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may allow a higher level of aid intensity since the project's failure reduces the risk of competition and trade being distorted.(2) When notifying reimbursable aid, the EFTA States are required to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority of the amounts and exact procedures for repayment, with the proposed conditions being assessed by the Authority on a case-by-case basis.(3) With a view to encouraging dissemination of research results, the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers that aid in support of patent applications and renewals by SMEs (as defined in Chapter 10 of these guidelines) may be granted up to the same level as that for the research activities which first led to the patents concerned.(4) In the case of State aid for an R& D project being carried out in collaboration between public research establishments and enterprises, the combined aid deriving from direct government support for a specific research project and, where they constitute aid (see points 14.2.2 (1) to (3) above), contributions from public research establishments to that project may not exceed the abovementioned aid ceilings.(5) In cases of R& D activity spanning industrial research and precompetitive development activities, the permissible aid intensity will not normally exceed the weighted average of the permissible aid intensities applicable to the two types of research.14.5.3. Additions to the basic intensities(1) Without prejudice to the case-by-case assessment, which, as indicated in point 14.5.1 (1), will normally be made, the aid intensities specified in points 14.5.1 (5) to 14.5.2 (4) may be exceeded in the following situations:- where the aid is to be given to SMEs (5): an extra 10 percentage points,- where the research project is carried out in an Article 61 (3) (a) region: an extra 10 percentage points,- where the research project is carried out in an Article 61 (3) (c) region: an extra 5 percentage points.(2) The abovementioned regional bonuses may be exceeded, taking into account the ceilings applicable to regional investment aid and the need to stimulate intangible investment, without however exceeding the limits set out in point 14.5.3 (7) below.(3) Where the research project is in accordance with the objectives of a specific project or programme undertaken as part of the European Community's current framework programme for R& D, it will qualify for an extra 15 percentage points.(4) That figure will rise to 25 percentage points where the project also involves effective cross-border cooperation between firms and public research bodies or between at least two independent partners in two States parties to the EEA Agreement and where its results are widely disseminated and published, while observing intellectual and industrial property rights.(5) Where the research project is not in accordance with the objectives of a specific project or programme undertaken as part of the European Community's current framework programme for R& D, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will allow increases of up to 10 percentage points provided that at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:(a) the project involves effective cross-border cooperation between at least two independent partners in two States parties to the EEA Agreement, particularly in the context of coordinating national R& TD policies;(b) the project involves effective cooperation between firms and public research bodies, particularly in the context of coordination of national R& TD policies;(c) the project's results are widely disseminated and published, patent licences are granted or other appropriate steps are taken under conditions similar to those for the dissemination of European Community R& TD results.(6) The EFTA State concerned must provide the EFTA Surveillance Authority with sufficient information to enable it to assess whether these criteria are met.(7) The combination of the increases described at points 14.5.3 (1) to (5) with the percentages specified at points 14.5.1 (5) and 14.5.2 (4) may not exceed a maximum gross intensity of 75 % for industrial research and 50 % for precompetitive development activities. These limits must be respected in all cases.14.5.4. Application of aid ceilings of the WTO rules(1) Where State aid for R& D qualifies for the derogation laid down in Article 61 (3) (b) of the EEA Agreement, the gross aid intensity must not exceed the limits authorized by the WTO Subsidies Code (75 % for industrial research, 50 % for precompetitive development activities).(2) The ceilings laid down above in respect of R& D aid apply to State aid. However, when examining R& D aid, the EFTA Surveillance Authority must take into account the effect on competition and trade of a combination of State aid with financing obtained through participation of EFTA States in Community programmes, according to the arrangements in Part VI and Protocols 31 and 32 of the EEA Agreement. When new aid measures foresee the possibility of such co-financing, the EFTA States shall inform of this in their notifications to the EFTA Surveillance Authority as well as of the arrangement made to ensure that the overall aid ceilings are not exceeded.(3) Where co-financing according to point 14.5.4 (2) and State aid are combined, total official support may not exceed 75 % in the case of industrial research and 50 % in the case of precompetitive development activities.(4) Gross intensities of 75 % for industrial research and 50 % for precompetitive development activities (maximum intensities authorized by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures for non-actionable subsidies) may be authorized if similar projects or programmes of competitors located outside the territory covered by the EEA Agreement have received (in the last three years), or are going to receive, aid of an equivalent intensity for the two types of research.(5) The EFTA State concerned will provide the EFTA Surveillance Authority with sufficient information to enable it to assess the situation, in particular regarding the need to offset the competitive advantage enjoyed by a third-country competitor.14.6. Eligible R& D costs for the purpose of calculating the aid intensity(1) The costs set out below will be regarded as eligible for the purposes of calculating the intensity of R& D aid (where generated by other activities as well in particular other R& D activities they must be broken down by type of activity):- personnel costs (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed solely on the research activity),- cost of instruments, equipment, and land and premises used solely and on a continual basis (except where transferred commercially) for the research activity,- cost of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, including the research, technical knowledge and patents, etc. bought from outside sources,- additional overheads incurred directly as a result of the research activity,- other operating expenses (e.g. costs of materials, supplies and similar products) incurred directly as a result of the research activity.14.7. Incentive effect of R& D aid(1) State aid for R& D should serve as an incentive for firms to undertake R& D activities in addition to their normal day-to-day operations. It may also encourage firms not carrying out research and development to undertake such activities. Where this incentive effect is not evident, the EFTA Surveillance Authority may consider such aid less favourably than it usually does.(2) In order to verify that the planned aid will induce firms to pursue research which they would not otherwise have pursued, the EFTA Surveillance Authority must take particular account of quantifiable factors (such as changes in R& D spending, in the number of people assigned to R& D activities and in R& D spending as a proportion of total turnover), market failures, additional costs connected with cross-border cooperation and other relevant factors indicated by the EFTA State that made the notification. Proposed aid may also be permitted if it contributes towards expanding the scope of research or speeding it up.(3) Accordingly, the EFTA Surveillance Authority calls on the EFTA States, both when notifying R& D aid and when submitting annual reports on the implementation of approved aid schemes, to demonstrate that the aid is necessary as an incentive, and is on no account operating aid.(4) The EFTA Surveillance Authority may assume that the aid provides a necessary incentive if the recipient is an SME within the meaning of the definition laid down in Chapter 10 of these guidelines.(5) The EFTA Surveillance Authority will attribute particular importance to the conditions at points 14.7 (2) and (3):- in the case of individual, close-to-the-market research projects to be undertaken by large firms,- in all cases in which a significant proportion of the R& D expenditure has already been made prior to the aid application.14.8. Annual reports(1) For each authorized aid scheme, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will generally request an annual report on implementation. On the basis of these reports, the Authority will be in a position to monitor the allocation of aid and, if necessary, propose appropriate measures if it considers that the scheme is distorting, or is likely to distort, competition contrary to the common interest, for example, by undue concentration on specific sectors or firms.(2) These reports have to be in accordance with the requirements set out in Annexes III and IV to these guidelines.14.9. Implementation and duration(1) State aid for R& D activities in the shipbuilding and ship repair sector is governed by the rules stipulated in the relevant act on aid to shipbuilding referred to in Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.(2) The EFTA Surveillance Authority will review the present rules in five years' time. It may also decide to amend them at any time, in cooperation with the EFTA States, should it prove necessary for reasons connected with competition policy or to take into account developments in the European Union.(1) This chapter corresponds to the Community framework for State aid for research and development (OJ No C 45, 17. 2. 1996, p. 5).(2) Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (OJ No L 209, 24. 7. 1992).(3) Thus, the Commission has decided to regard a number of Eureka projects in the field of electronics (EU 127 Jessi, EU 102 Eprom, EU 147 DAB, EU 43 ESF) or high-definition television (EU 95 HDTV) as being of common European interest.(4) The Authority aims to amend the notification procedure for Eureka projects at a later stage and may propose appropriate measures to that effect.(5) See definition in Section 10.2 of these guidelines.`Done at Brussels, 15 May 1996.For the EFTA Surveillance AuthorityKnut ALMESTADThe President(1) Hereinafter referred to as the State Aid Guidelines.(2) OJ No L 231, 3. 9. 1994, p. 1.(3) OJ No L 140, 13. 6. 1996, p. 54.