title: 78/551/ECSC: Decision of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community, meeting within the Council of 26 June 1978 extending the period of validity of Decision 76/565/ECSC opening tariff preferences for products covered by that Community and originating in Algeria

text:
No L 175/24                          Official Journal of the European Communities                              29 . 6. 78
               DECISION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE
               MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY,
                                        MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL
                                                    of 26 June 1978
               extending the period of validity of Decision 76/565/ECSC opening tariff preferences for
                             products covered by that Community and originating in Algeria
                                                     (78/55 1/ECSC)
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS                          HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS :
 OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COAL
 AND STEEL COMMUNITY, MEETING WITHIN THE
COUNCIL,
                                                                                Article 1
Whereas, pending the entry into force of the
Agreement between the Member States of the                      In Article 4 of Decision 76/565/ECSC, the date '30
European Coal and Steel Community and the                       June 1978 ' is hereby replaced by '30 June 1979'.
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria signed on 26
April 1976, the representatives of the Governments of
the Member States adopted autonomously and
concomitantly Decision 76/565/ECSC opening tariff                                       Article 2
preferences for products covered by that Community
and originating in Algeria ( 1 ), extended by Decision          Member States shall adopt all the measures necessary
77/416/ECSC (2), and applicable until 30 June 1978              for the implementation of this Decision.
at the latest;
Whereas the said Agreement has not yet entered into
force; whereas the period of validity of the
autonomous measures should be extended by one                 . Done at Luxembourg, 26 June 1978 .
year ;                                                                                The President
In agreement with the Commission,                                                                 K. B. ANDERSEN
 i1) OJ No L 175, 1 . 7. 1976, p. 9.
 (2) OJ No L 169, 7. 7. 1977, p. 24.


title: Council Decision of 18 December 2006 appointing Italian, Maltese and Swedish members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for Workers

text:
               28.12.2006

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 320/4

      COUNCIL DECISION

   of 18 December 2006
   appointing Italian, Maltese and Swedish members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for Workers
   (2006/C 320/03)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (1), and in particular Articles 26 and 27 thereof,
   Having regard to the lists of candidates submitted to the Council by the Governments of the Member States,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               By its Decision of 15 September 2006 (2) the Council appointed the members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for Workers for the period from 14 September 2006 to 13 September 2008, with the exception of the Italian and Maltese members and alternate members and the Swedish member in the government representatives category,

               (2)

               The Italian, Maltese and Swedish Governments have submitted candidates for the seats to be filled,

         HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
   Sole Article
   The following are hereby appointed members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Freedom of Movement for Workers for the term of office ending on 13 September 2008:
   I.   GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES

               Country

               Members

               Alternates

               Italy

               Mr Giuseppe Maurizio SILVERI
               Mr Augusto VACCARO

               Ms Lea BATTISTONI

               Malta

               Mr Anthony BUTTIGIEG

               Sweden

               Ms Johanna PEYRON

         II.   WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES

               Country

               Members

               Alternates

               Italy

               Ms Ornella CILONA
               Mr Giuseppe CASUCCI

               Mr Vincenzo COPPOLA

               Malta

               Mr Andrew MIZZI
               Mr Martin BALZAN

               Mr Stephen FAVA

         III.   EMPLOYERS' REPRESENTATIVES

               Country

               Members

               Alternates

               Italy

               Mr Massimo MARCHETTI
               Ms Gaetana PAGANO

               Ms Donata TIRELLI

               Malta

               Mr Joseph MONTEBELLO
               Mr Tonio FARRUGIA

               Mr Joseph FARRUGIA

      Done at Brussels, 18 December 2006.

            For the Council

            The President

         J.-E. ENESTAM

      (1)  OJ L 257, 18.10.1968, p. 2.

      (2)  OJ C 242, 7.10.2006, p. 1.


title: Decision (EU) 2016/2387 of the General Court of 14 September 2016 concerning the security rules applicable to information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure

text:
               24.12.2016

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 355/18

         DECISION (EU) 2016/2387 OF THE GENERAL COURT
   of 14 September 2016
   concerning the security rules applicable to information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure
   THE GENERAL COURT
   Having regard to the Rules of Procedure, and in particular Article 105(11) thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               In accordance with Article 105(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure, a main party to the proceedings may, on his own initiative or following a measure of inquiry ordered by the General Court, produce information or material pertaining to the security of the European Union or to that of one or more of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations. Article 105(3) to (10) of those Rules lays down the procedural rules applicable to such information or material.

               (2)

               In view of the sensitive, confidential nature of the information or material concerned, the application of the body of rules established by Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure requires a suitable security framework to be set up in order to ensure a high level of protection for that information or material.

               (3)

               To this end, the security framework must be applied to all information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure if it is European Union classified information or if the main party producing it has indicated that to communicate it to the other main party would harm the security of the Union or of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations, even when that information or material is not European Union classified information.

               (4)

               In order to guarantee a high level of protection for that information or for that material, the fundamental principles and minimum security rules for the protection of that information or material are based on those applicable for the protection of SECRET UE/EU SECRET classified information according to the rules of the EU institutions on the protection of European Union classified information (EUCI), in particular those adopted by the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission.

               (5)

               Information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure shall be given a mark specific to the Court of Justice of the European Union, called ‘FIDUCIA’, which is to determine the security rules applicable to it throughout proceedings before the General Court and, in the event of an appeal, before the Court of Justice. The affixing and removing of this marking shall have no consequences for the classification of information communicated to the General Court.

               (6)

               Access to FIDUCIA information shall be provided in accordance with the need-to-know principle,

         HAS DECIDED:
   Article 1
   Definitions
   For the purposes of this decision, the following definitions shall apply:

               (a)

               ‘security authority’ means the authority responsible for the security of the Court of Justice of the European Union designated by the latter, which may delegate, in whole or in part, the performance of the tasks provided for by this decision;

               (b)

               ‘FIDUCIA office’ means the office of the Court of Justice of the European Union responsible for the management of FIDUCIA information;

               (c)

               ‘holder’ means a duly authorised person who, on the basis of an established need to know, is in possession of FIDUCIA information and who is, in consequence, required to ensure its protection;

               (d)

               ‘document’ means any information, whatever its physical form or characteristics;

               (e)

               ‘information’ means any written or oral information, whatever its medium or author;

               (f)

               ‘European Union classified information’ (EUCI) means any information or any material identified as such according to the security classification of the European Union under the rules applicable in that respect within the EU institutions, covered by one of the following levels of classification:

                           —

                           TRÈS SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET;

                           —

                           SECRET UE/EU SECRET;

                           —

                           CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL;

                           —

                           RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED.

               (g)

               ‘FIDUCIA information’ means any information bearing the FIDUCIA mark;

               (h)

               ‘handling’ of FIDUCIA information means all treatment which FIDUCIA information could undergo during the proceedings before the General Court and until, at the latest, the expiry of the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Its registration, consultation, creation, copying, storage, return and destruction are accordingly covered.

         Article 2
   Purpose and scope
   1.   This decision shall define the fundamental principles and minimum security rules for the protection of FIDUCIA information in proceedings before the General Court and until, at the latest, the expiry of the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
   2.   Those fundamental principles and minimum security rules shall apply to all FIDUCIA information, and to any use of it, written or oral, and to any copies of it that may be made in accordance with the security rules laid down in this decision.
   Article 3
   Rules governing lodging and return
   For the purpose of setting up the security framework provided for by this decision:

               —

               the main party shall inform the General Court Registry of the day on which the information or material is lodged in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure;

               —

               the main party, accompanied by a representative of the Registry, shall be required to lodge the information or material provided pursuant to Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure with the FIDUCIA office during the hours the Registry is open to the public;

               —

               the main party producing the information or material in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure shall be required to remove it from the FIDUCIA office in the presence of a representative of the Registry if that party does not authorise its disclosure in accordance with Article 105(4) of those Rules, as soon as it is withdrawn in accordance with Article 105(7) of those Rules or as soon as the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union has expired, unless an appeal has been brought within that period;

               —

               if, within the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal is brought against the decision of the General Court, the information or material produced in that case in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure shall be made available to the Court of Justice. To that end, as soon as the Registrar of the General Court is informed of the existence of that appeal, he shall send a letter to the Registrar of the Court of Justice, informing him of the fact that the information or material concerned is available to the Court of Justice. The Registrar of the General Court shall simultaneously notify the security authority of the fact that the information or material concerned must be made available to the Court of Justice, without that information or material being physically moved. That notification shall be registered by the FIDUCIA office. The main party that produced that information or that material shall be required to remove it from the FIDUCIA office, in the presence of a representative of the Registry of the Court of Justice, as soon as the decision disposing of the appeal has been served, save where the case is referred back to the General Court for a ruling;

               —

               in the event that the case is referred back to the General Court, the Court of Justice shall make the information or material concerned available to the General Court as soon as the decision disposing of the appeal has been served. To that end, the Registrar of the Court of Justice shall send a letter to the Registrar of the General Court informing him of the fact that the information or material concerned is available to the General Court. The Registrar of the Court of Justice shall simultaneously notify the security authority of the fact that the information or material concerned must be made available to the General Court, without that information or material being physically moved. That notification shall be registered by the FIDUCIA office. The main party that produced that information or that material shall be required to remove it from the FIDUCIA office, in the presence of a representative of the Registry of the General Court, as soon as the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union has expired, unless an appeal has been brought within that period.

         Article 4
   FIDUCIA marking
   1.   All information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure shall be given a FIDUCIA mark by the FIDUCIA office.
   2.   Any information reproducing, in whole or in part, the content of information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and every copy of such information or material, shall likewise be given a FIDUCIA mark by the FIDUCIA office.
   3.   Documents and registers drawn up by the FIDUCIA office in accordance with this decision whose unauthorised disclosure could harm the security of the Union or that of one or more of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations shall also be given a FIDUCIA mark by the FIDUCIA office.
   4.   The FIDUCIA mark shall be placed visibly on all FIDUCIA information pages and media.
   5.   The affixing and removing of the FIDUCIA mark, on the conditions set out in Annex III, shall have no consequences for the classification of information communicated to the General Court.
   Article 5
   Protection of FIDUCIA information
   1.   The protection of FIDUCIA information shall be equivalent to that given to SECRET EU/EU SECRET EUCI in accordance with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions.
   2.   The holder of any FIDUCIA information shall be responsible for protecting it in accordance with this decision.
   Article 6
   Security risk management
   1.   The risks threatening FIDUCIA information shall be managed as a process of risk analysis aimed at determining known security risks, defining security measures making it possible to reduce those risks to an acceptable level in accordance with the fundamental principles and minimum standards set out in this decision, and applying those measures. The effectiveness of such measures shall be continuously evaluated by the security authority.
   2.   Security measures for protecting FIDUCIA information throughout the proceedings before the General Court and until, at the latest, the expiry of the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be commensurate with, in particular, the form in which the information or material concerned is presented and its volume, the environment and structure of the FIDUCIA office premises and the locally assessed threat of malicious and/or criminal activities, including espionage, sabotage and terrorism.
   3.   The internal contingency plan of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall take account of the necessity of protecting FIDUCIA information in the event of emergency in order to prevent unauthorised access or disclosure or loss of integrity or availability.
   4.   Preventative and recovery measures to minimise the impact of major failures or incidents on the handling and storage of FIDUCIA information shall be included in the internal contingency plan of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
   Article 7
   Personnel security measures
   1.   Access to FIDUCIA information may be granted only to persons who:

               —

               have a need to know it,

               —

               subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, have been authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information, and

               —

               have been briefed on their responsibilities.

         2.   The Judges of the General Court shall, by reason of their office, be deemed authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information.
   3.   The procedure designed to determine whether an official or other servant of the Court of Justice of the European Union, having regard to his loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability, may be authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information is laid down in Annex I.
   4.   Before being given access to FIDUCIA information and thereafter at regular intervals, all the persons concerned shall be briefed on their responsibilities as regards the protection of FIDUCIA information in accordance with this decision and shall acknowledge their responsibilities in writing.
   Article 8
   Physical security
   1.   ‘Physical security’ means the application of physical and technical protective measures to prevent unauthorised access to FIDUCIA information.
   2.   Physical security measures shall be designed to prevent surreptitious or forced entry into the FIDUCIA office premises by an intruder, to deter, impede and detect unauthorised acts and to enable a distinction to be drawn between persons with and without authority to have access to FIDUCIA information in accordance with the need-to-know principle. Such measures shall be determined on the basis of a risk management process.
   3.   Physical security measures shall be put in place for the FIDUCIA office premises in which FIDUCIA information is handled and stored. These measures shall be designed to ensure protection equivalent to that afforded to SECRET UE/EU SECRET EUCI in accordance with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions. No FIDUCIA information may be stored or consulted outside the FIDUCIA office premises created for that purpose within an area that has itself been secured.
   4.   Only approved equipment or devices in conformity with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions shall be used for protecting FIDUCIA information.
   5.   Provisions for implementing this Article are set out in Annex II.
   Article 9
   Management of FIDUCIA information
   1.   ‘Management of FIDUCIA information’ means the application of administrative measures designed to protect FIDUCIA information throughout the proceedings before the General Court and until, at the latest, the expiry of the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and to control it in order to help deter and detect deliberate or accidental compromise or loss of such information.
   2.   Measures for the management of FIDUCIA information relate to, in particular, the registration, consultation, creation, copying, storage, return and destruction of FIDUCIA information.
   3.   On reception, and before any handling, FIDUCIA information shall be registered by the FIDUCIA office.
   4.   The FIDUCIA office premises shall be subject to regular inspection by the security authority.
   5.   Provisions for implementing this Article are set out in Annex III.
   Article 10
   Protection of FIDUCIA information handled electronically
   1.   The communication and information systems (computers and peripheral devices) used in the handling of FIDUCIA information shall be situated in the FIDUCIA office premises. They shall be isolated from any computerised network.
   2.   Security measures shall be implemented in order to protect the information technology equipment used for the handling of FIDUCIA information against the compromise of that information by unintentional electromagnetic emanations (security measures equivalent to those in place for SECRET UE/EU SECRET EUCI in accordance with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions).
   3.   The communication and information systems shall be subject to accreditation issued by the security authority which shall satisfy itself that they comply with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions.
   4.   Provisions for implementing this Article are set out in Annex IV.
   Article 11
   Security in the event of external action
   1.   ‘Security in the event of external action’ means the application of measures designed to ensure the protection of FIDUCIA information by contractors required to carry out work in connection with the maintenance of communication and information systems isolated from the computerised network or when action has to be taken that entails the urgent removal of FIDUCIA information to a place of safety.
   2.   The security authority may entrust the performance of tasks involving or entailing, under the contract, access to FIDUCIA information to contractors registered in a Member State.
   3.   The security authority shall ensure that the minimum security standards laid down in this decision and mentioned in the contract are observed when contracts are granted.
   4.   Members of a contractor's staff may have access to FIDUCIA information only if they have been authorised for that purpose by the security authority on the basis of personnel security clearance issued by the National Security Authority or any other competent security authority in accordance with national laws and regulations.
   5.   Provisions for implementing this Article are set out in Annex V.
   Article 12
   No digital transmission, communication or exchange of FIDUCIA information
   1.   FIDUCIA information shall in no circumstances be transmitted digitally.
   2.   The General Court shall not send FIDUCIA information to the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union, or to the Member States, or to the other parties to the proceedings or to any third party.
   Article 13
   Breaches of security and compromise of FIDUCIA information
   1.   A breach of security is an act or omission by an individual that is contrary to the security rules laid down in this decision.
   2.   Compromise occurs when, as a result of a breach of security, FIDUCIA information has been disclosed in whole or in part to persons who are not, or are not deemed to be, authorised persons.
   3.   Any breach or suspected breach of security shall be reported forthwith to the security authority.
   4.   Where it is established, or where there are reasonable grounds to assume, that FIDUCIA information has been compromised or lost, the security authority, liaising closely with the President and the Registrar of the General Court, shall take all appropriate measures in accordance with the applicable provisions in order to:

               (a)

               inform the main party that produced the information or material concerned;

               (b)

               request the competent authority to commence an administrative investigation;

               (c)

               assess the potential damage caused to the security of the Union or to that of one or more of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations;

               (d)

               prevent any recurrence; and

               (e)

               inform the competent authorities of the steps taken.

         5.   Any person responsible for a breach of the security rules laid down in this decision shall be liable to disciplinary action in accordance with the applicable provisions. Any person responsible for compromise or loss of FIDUCIA information shall be liable to disciplinary and/or legal action in accordance with the applicable provisions.
   Article 14
   Organisation of security within the General Court
   1.   The FIDUCIA office shall put in hand the protection of FIDUCIA information in accordance with this decision.
   2.   The security authority shall be responsible for the proper application of this decision. For that purpose, the security authority shall:

               (a)

               apply the security policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union and review it at regular intervals;

               (b)

               supervise the implementation of this decision by the FIDUCIA office;

               (c)

               where appropriate, cause an investigation to be carried out, on the conditions laid down in Article 13, of any compromise or loss, or suspected compromise or loss, of FIDUCIA information;

               (d)

               periodically inspect the security arrangements intended to ensure the protection of FIDUCIA information on FIDUCIA office premises.

         Article 15
   Practice rules for implementation
   Practice rules for the implementation of this decision shall be laid down by the security authority in agreement with the Registrar of the General Court.
   Article 16
   Entry into force
   This decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Done at Luxembourg, 14 September 2016.

            Registrar

         E. COULON

            President

         M. JAEGER

      ANNEX I

         PERSONNEL SECURITY MEASURES

                  1.

                  This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 7 of this decision.

                  2.

                  The Registrar of the General Court shall be responsible for identifying, so far as concerns him and in so far as strictly necessary, the posts necessitating access to FIDUCIA information and therefore requiring the officials or other servants occupying the posts concerned within the General Court to be authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information.

                  3.

                  With a view to the grant of authority to have access to FIDUCIA information, the FIDUCIA office shall send the security questionnaire, filled in by the official or other servant concerned, to the National Security Authority of the Member State of which the person concerned is a national or to any other competent national authority, identified in the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions (‘the competent NSA’), and request a security investigation for a SECRET UE/EU SECRET level of classification.

                  4.

                  At the end of the security investigation, acting in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the Member State concerned, the competent NSA shall notify the FIDUCIA office of the conclusions of the investigation in question.

                  5.

                  When the result of the security investigation is that the competent NSA is certain that nothing adverse is known that would call into question the loyalty, trustworthiness or reliability of the person concerned, the competent appointing authority ('the appointing authority') may authorise that person to have access to FIDUCIA information.

                  6.

                  When the completed security investigation does not lead to the certainty referred to in paragraph 5, the appointing authority shall inform the person concerned. In such a case, the FIDUCIA office, acting on the instructions of the appointing authority, may ask the competent NSA for any further clarification it is in a position to offer in accordance with its national laws and regulations. If the outcome of the security investigation is confirmed, authorisation shall not be granted for access to FIDUCIA information.

                  7.

                  Authorisation of access to FIDUCIA information shall be valid for a period of five years. It shall be withdrawn when the person concerned leaves the post necessitating access to FIDUCIA information or if the appointing authority considers that there are grounds for withdrawal of authorisation.

                  8.

                  Authorisation of access to FIDUCIA information may be renewed in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraphs 3 to 5.

                  9.

                  The FIDUCIA office shall keep a record of authorisations of access to FIDUCIA information.

                  10.

                  If it is brought to the FIDUCIA office's knowledge that a risk to security is posed by a person holding authorisation for access to FIDUCIA information, the FIDUCIA office shall give notice of this to the competent NSA and the appointing authority may suspend access to FIDUCIA information or withdraw the authorisation of access to that information.

                  11.

                  In an emergency, the appointing authority may, after consulting the competent NSA and subject to the results of preliminary checks to ascertain that no adverse information is known, grant temporary authorisation of access to FIDUCIA information to the officials and other servants concerned. Such temporary authorisation shall be valid until the end of the procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 to 5, but may not, however, exceed a period of six months from the date on which the request for a security investigation is made to the competent NSA.

                  12.

                  Before being granted access to FIDUCIA information, the persons holding that authorisation shall follow a training programme in order to enable them to discharge their responsibility for handling FIDUCIA information. Authorisation of access to FIDUCIA information shall not become effective until that training has been completed and responsibility has been acknowledged in writing.

      ANNEX II

         PHYSICAL SECURITY

      I.   INTRODUCTION

                  1.

                  This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 8 of the decision. It lays down minimum requirements for the physical protection of the FIDUCIA office premises in which FIDUCIA information is handled and stored.

                  2.

                  Physical security measures shall be designed to prevent unauthorised access to FIDUCIA information by:

                              (a)

                              ensuring that FIDUCIA information is properly handled and stored;

                              (b)

                              enabling a distinction to be drawn between persons with and without authorisation to have access to FIDUCIA information, in accordance with the need-to-know principle;

                              (c)

                              deterrence, by preventing and detecting unauthorised acts; and

                              (d)

                              preventing or delaying surreptitious or forced entry into the FIDUCIA office premises.

                  3.

                  Physical security measures shall be chosen in the light of an appraisal of the threats posed to FIDUCIA information. These measures shall take into consideration the environment and structure of the FIDUCIA office premises. The security authority shall determine the degree of security to be attained for every one of the following physical measures:

                              (a)

                              a perimeter barrier defending the boundaries of the area to be protected;

                              (b)

                              an intrusion detection system connected to the security command post of the Court of Justice of the European Union;

                              (c)

                              an access control system exercised by electronic or electro-mechanical means, and operated by a member of the security staff;

                              (d)

                              security staff trained, supervised and holding authorisation to have access to FIDUCIA information;

                              (e)

                              closed-circuit video-surveillance system operated by security staff and connected to the intrusion detection and access control systems;

                              (f)

                              security lighting allowing effective surveillance directly, or indirectly through a video-surveillance system;

                              (g)

                              any other appropriate physical measures designed to deter unauthorised access or to detect it, or to prevent consultation or loss of, or damage to, FIDUCIA information.

            II.   PREMISES IN WHICH FIDUCIA INFORMATION IS STORED AND CONSULTED

         Creation of physically protected premises for storage and consultation

                  4.

                  Secured premises shall be created for the purpose of storage and consulting FIDUCIA information. FIDUCIA information may be stored and consulted only in FIDUCIA office premises which comply in all respects with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions.

                  5.

                  Within those premises, FIDUCIA information shall be kept in security containers also complying in all respects with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions.

                  6.

                  No communications system (telephone or other electronic device) may be brought into the FIDUCIA office premises.

                  7.

                  The FIDUCIA office meeting room shall be protected against eavesdropping. Electronic security inspections of them shall be carried out at regular intervals.

         Access to storage and consultation premises

                  8.

                  Access to the FIDUCIA office premises shall be controlled by an identification security door under video surveillance.

                  9.

                  Persons who have been authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information and persons deemed to be so authorised may gain access to the FIDUCIA office premises in order to consult FIDUCIA information on the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) and (2) of this decision.

                  10.

                  The security authority may in exceptional cases issue access authorisation to persons without FIDUCIA authorisation if it is essential that they should enter the FIDUCIA office premises, provided that access to those premises does not involve access to FIDUCIA information which is to remain protected from sight in security containers. Those persons may gain access only if they are accompanied, and continuously watched, by a member of the FIDUCIA office with authorisation for access to FIDUCIA information.

                  11.

                  All access to FIDUCIA office premises shall be recorded in an access logbook. This logbook shall be kept at a work station in those premises. The communication and information system used for this purpose shall be compatible with the security requirements laid down in Article 10 of, and Annex IV to, this decision.

                  12.

                  The protection measures governing the written use of FIDUCIA information shall apply in the case of oral use of that information.

            III.   CONTROL OF KEYS AND COMBINATIONS USED TO PROTECT FIDUCIA INFORMATION

                  13.

                  The security authority shall define procedures for managing keys and combination settings for the FIDUCIA office premises and security containers. Such procedures shall protect against unauthorised access.

                  14.

                  Combination settings shall be committed to memory by the smallest possible number of persons needing to know them. Combination settings for security containers storing FIDUCIA information shall be changed;

                              (a)

                              on receipt of a new container;

                              (b)

                              when there is a change in personnel knowing the combination;

                              (c)

                              when compromise has occurred or is suspected;

                              (d)

                              when a lock has undergone maintenance or repair;

                              (e)

                              at least every 12 months.

                  15.

                  Technical equipment intended for the physical protection of FIDUCIA information shall comply with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions. The security authority shall be responsible for the observance of these rules.

                  16.

                  Technical equipment shall be periodically inspected and maintained at regular intervals. Maintenance shall take account of the inspection results in order that the best possible operation of the equipment may be guaranteed.

                  17.

                  At every inspection the efficiency of the various security measures and of the security system as a whole is to be reappraised.

      ANNEX III

         MANAGEMENT OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

      I.   INTRODUCTION

                  1.

                  This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 9 of the decision. It lays down the administrative measures designed to protect FIDUCIA information throughout the proceedings before the General Court and until, at the latest, the expiry of the period referred to in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and to control it in order to help deter and detect deliberate or accidental compromise or loss of such information.

            II.   REGISTER OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

                  2.

                  A register of FIDUCIA information shall be created. This register shall be kept, by the FIDUCIA office, at a work station situated in the FIDUCIA office premises. The communication and information system used to keep this register shall be compatible with the security requirements laid down in Article 10 of, and Annex IV to, this decision.

            III.   REGISTRATION OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

                  3.

                  For the purposes of this decision, registration for security purposes (‘registration’) means the application of procedures keeping track of the life-cycle of FIDUCIA information, including its destruction.

                  4.

                  Registration of FIDUCIA information shall be the responsibility of the FIDUCIA office.

                  5.

                  The FIDUCIA office shall automatically give a FIDUCIA mark to information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure. The FIDUCIA office shall register FIDUCIA information in the FIDUCIA information register.

                  6.

                  The FIDUCIA office shall draw up a report annexed to the FIDUCIA information register, specifying the circumstances in which information is received. The information shall then be handled according to the rules laid down in the previous paragraph.

                  7.

                  FIDUCIA information shall be registered, in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 above, in the FIDUCIA information register without prejudice to the procedural registration performed by persons within the Registry authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information.

            IV.   MANAGEMENT OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

         Marking

                  8.

                  When EUCI or any other information, in respect of which it has been indicated that its communication would harm the security of the Union or that of one or more of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations, is produced under Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure, it shall be given the FIDUCIA mark by the FIDUCIA office.

                  9.

                  The FIDUCIA mark shall be clearly and correctly indicated in every part of the document, irrespective of the form in which the information is presented, whether the format is paper, audio, electronic or other.

         Creation of FIDUCIA information

                  10.

                  Only a person authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information or a person deemed to be so authorised may create FIDUCIA information, as specified in Article 4(2) to (3) of this decision.

                  11.

                  All FIDUCIA information created shall be registered by the FIDUCIA office in the FIDUCIA information register.

                  12.

                  All FIDUCIA information created shall be subject to all the rules on the handling of FIDUCIA information as laid down in this decision and in the annexes thereto.

         Removal of the FIDUCIA mark

                  13.

                  FIDUCIA information shall lose its mark in two cases:

                              (a)

                              when the main party that produced the FIDUCIA information authorises its communication to the other main party, the information originally communicated and all information created on the basis thereof shall lose its FIDUCIA mark;

                              (b)

                              when FIDUCIA information is returned to the main party that produced it.

                  14.

                  The FIDUCIA office shall remove the FIDUCIA mark and record that removal in the FIDUCIA information register.

                  15.

                  Removal of the FIDUCIA mark shall not mean that EUCI has been declassified.

            V.   COPIES OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

                  16.

                  FIDUCIA information shall not be copied unless this is essential. In that case, copies shall be made by the FIDUCIA office which shall number and register them.

                  17.

                  Copies shall be subject to all the security rules laid down in this decision and in the annexes thereto.

            VI.   DESTRUCTION OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION

                  18.

                  When information or material produced in accordance with Article 105(1) or (2) of the Rules of Procedure is returned to the main party that produced it, all information reproducing, in whole or in part, the content of that information or material, and any copies made, shall be destroyed.

                  19.

                  The destruction of FIDUCIA information referred to in paragraph 18 shall be carried out by the FIDUCIA office, using methods complying with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions, in order to prevent that information being reconstructed in whole or in part.

                  20.

                  The destruction of FIDUCIA information referred to in paragraph 18 shall be performed in the presence of a witness authorised to have access to FIDUCIA information.

                  21.

                  The FIDUCIA office shall draw up a destruction certificate.

                  22.

                  The destruction certificate shall be annexed to the FIDUCIA information register. A copy shall be sent to the main party that produced the document concerned.

      ANNEX IV

         PROTECTION OF FIDUCIA INFORMATION HANDLED ELECTRONICALLY

                  1.

                  This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 10.

                  2.

                  FIDUCIA information may be handled only on electronic equipment (work stations, printers, photocopiers) that is not connected to the computerised network and is placed in the FIDUCIA office premises.

                  3.

                  All electronic equipment used in the handling of FIDUCIA information shall comply with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions. The security of this equipment shall be ensured throughout its life-cycle.

                  4.

                  All possible connections to the internet and to other tools (LAN, WLAN, Bluetooth etc.) shall be permanently deactivated.

                  5.

                  Work stations shall be equipped with appropriate anti-virus protection. Anti-virus updates shall be performed using a dedicated CD-ROM or USB stick.

                  6.

                  The memories of printers and photocopiers shall be erased before any maintenance operation.

                  7.

                  Only cryptographic products approved in accordance with the rules on the protection of EUCI applicable within the EU institutions shall be used to handle the requests for investigations referred to in Annex I.

      ANNEX V

         SECURITY IN THE EVENT OF EXTERNAL ACTION

                  1.

                  This Annex sets out provisions for implementing Article 11.

                  2.

                  Contractors may gain access to FIDUCIA information only in connection with the maintenance of the communication and information systems isolated from the computerised network or when action has to be taken that entails the urgent removal of FIDUCIA information to a place of safety.

                  3.

                  The security authority shall draw up guidelines for external action covering, in particular, security clearances for the contractors' staff, and also the content of the contracts referred to in this Annex.

                  4.

                  Documents relating to the tendering procedures and maintenance contracts for the communication and information systems isolated from the computerised network shall be given the FIDUCIA mark when they contain information whose unauthorised disclosure could harm the security of the Union or that of one or more of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations. The security aspects letter annexed to the contract shall contain provisions requiring the contractor to comply with the minimum standards laid down in this decision. Failure to comply with those minimum standards may constitute sufficient grounds for termination of the contract.

                  5.

                  The contract involving action having to be taken that entails the urgent removal of FIDUCIA information to a place of safety shall include the number of security guards who are to have personnel security clearance. It shall be silent with regard to the procedures to be put in hand. This contract shall not be given the FIDUCIA mark.

                  6.

                  The contractor may not sub-contract the activities defined in the call for tenders and in the contract involving or entailing access to FIDUCIA information.


Avis juridique important

|

E1995C0106

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 106/95/COL of 31 October 1995 on a tax exemption for glass packaging from a basic tax on non-reusable beverage packaging (Aid No 95-002 (Norway))

Official Journal L 124 , 23/05/1996 P. 0030 - 0040

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 106/95/COL of 31 October 1995 on a tax exemption for glass packaging from a basic tax on non-reusable beverage packaging (Aid No 95-002 (Norway)) THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1) and in particular Articles 61 to 63 thereof,Having regard to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (2), and in particular Article 1 of Protocol 3 thereof,Having, in accordance with the abovementioned Articles, given notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments to it,Whereas:I. FACTS 1. The notification By letter dated 20 January 1995, received by the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 24 January 1995 (reference 95-512 A), the Norwegian Government notified, in accordance with Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, plans to grant a relief for glass packaging from the basic tax (3) on non-reusable packaging of beverages ('Grunnavgift på engangsemballasje for drikkevarer`, Parliamentary decision St. prp. 1 (1994-95)), i.e. any packaging not being used more than once for the same purpose without being processed. The EFTA Surveillance Authority, by letter of 3 February 1995 (reference 95-573 D), requested additional information from the Norwegian Government. The requested information was submitted to the Authority by fax (reference 95-979 A) dated 15 February 1995 and received on 16 February 1995.2. The contents and the aim of the aid measure The Norwegian Government has proposed to exempt glass containers from an indirect tax on non-reusable beverage packaging. The level of taxation is currently Nkr 0,70 per unit of inner packaging. The tax exemption will apply equally to all, both domestically produced and imported, glass containers. The objective of the aid is primarily sectoral, i.e. to ensure continued production at PLM Moss Glassverk A/S. The PLM group had initially decided to close down production in Norway due to non-profitability.The profitability of PLM Moss Glassverk A/S has, according to the Norwegian authorities, been severely affected by the structure of environmental taxes in Norway, notably the taxes imposed on beverage packaging. Norwegian taxes on beverage packaging and energy related taxes are, according to the notification, extraordinarily high compared to other EEA countries. The Norwegian Government has found it necessary to counter these effects by introducing the proposed aid measure.PLM Moss Glassverk A/S is the main user of glass waste collected and processed for recycling and therefore considered by the Norwegian Government to be a vital part of the Norwegian glass recycling system. The Norwegian authorities consider that the glass recycling system will be seriously threatened if the PLM group effectuates a closing down of its Norwegian subsidiary.The Norwegian authorities consider that the aid is justified under the exemption provided for in Article 61 (3) (c) of the EEA Agreement with reference to the importance of maintaining glass production in Norway, the related environmental aspects and the effects the eventual closure of the company would have on employment in a region in industrial decline.3. PLM Moss Glassverk A/S and the market for beverage packaging PLM Moss Glassverk A/S PLM Moss Glassverk A/S is the only Norwegian producer of glass packaging. The company's production facilities are located in Moss, the regional administration centre of the county of Østfold, where it is one of the major employers. The company is a subsidiary to the PLM group, which has its headquarters in Sweden (4). The PLM group acquired Moss Glassverk (5) A/S after the company's default in 1989. PLM Moss Glassverk A/S has experienced deficits since 1992. In 1993 the deficit was Nkr 10,3 million.PLM Moss Glassverk A/S employs a work force of about 285 persons. The production facilities consist of two melting furnaces and four sets of production machinery which can procedure simultaneously along five production lines. The melting furnaces have a wear life of eight years, upon which they must be rebuilt. The wear life of one furnace expires in the course of 1995, while the wear life of the other will expire in 1996. The PLM group therefore had to make a decision either to repair one furnace temporarily at the cost of Nkr 20 million or to invest in a new melting furnace at the cost of Nkr 33 million. In both alternatives further investment in the other furnace would be needed.The first alternative decision was subject to the assumption that production in Norway will be gradually phased out in the period 1995 to 1998 with increased investment and production at the PLM group's factory in Limmared in Sweden. The second alternative will make it possible to continue production in Norway beyond the year 2000. A condition set by PLM for choosing the second alternative is that production in Norway can be deemed profitable.On 5 December 1994 the PLM group decided, initially, to gradually close down production at PLM Moss Glassverk A/S. However, after consultations between the PLM group and the Norwegian Government, the PLM group agreed to the second alternative referred to above.The production statistics for PLM Glassverk A/S for the period 1990 to 1994 show significant fluctuations both in the value and the physical volume of the company's production. The unit value of one-way containers for soft drinks, the company's product category which is expected to be most affected by the exemption from the basic tax, has declined throughout the period of observation.Aid to PLM Moss Glassverk A/S The Norwegian authorities have estimated the financial advantage to PLM Moss Glassverk A/S of the tax exemption on glass packaging to be Nkr 13 million per annum by multiplying the number of non-reusable beverage containers made of glass produced by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S with the tax per item, Nkr 0,70.In 1994 PLM Moss Glassverk A/S benefited from a direct grant of Nkr 11 million awarded by the Norwegian Government (6) in 1993 under a temporary grant scheme to secure the collection and recycling of glass in Norway. Norsk Glassgjenvinning A/S, the company specializing in collection and processing of glass for reuse as a raw material, benefited from an award of Nkr 1 million under the same scheme in 1994. The temporary grant scheme expired on 31 December 1994.Beverage packaging market in Norway The market for beverage packaging cannot be separated from the market for beverages. On the demand side the consumer will normally make a simultaneous choice between different beverages and different forms of packaging. On the supply side, depending on the packaging material, the production of the packaging often takes place simultaneously with production and 'bottling` of the beverage. Glass packaging, however, must be produced in a separate process.The following information, which is derived from a broader material, displays some of the key characteristics of the Norwegian market for beverages and beverage packaging.Beer is normally either sold in refillable glass bottles (market share 72 % in 1993) or as draught beer (market share 27 % in 1993). As concerns non-reusable packaging, metal cans cover only 1 % of the beer market. Plastic containers are apparently only to a very limited extent used for beer.As concerns carbonated soft drinks, refillable plastic packaging has taken over this market at the expense of glass bottles. The market share of refillable glass bottles dropped from 88 % in 1990 to 26 % in 1993, while plastic containers increased their share from 1 % in 1990 to 73 % in 1993 (7). As for beer, metal cans hold a stable market share of 1 %. The market shares for glass packaging of juices and other non-carbonated soft drinks appear to be relatively stable although the available information indicates a slight decrease for glass containers in this market segment also.Total consumption in Norway in 1994 was 219 million litres of beer, 526 million litres of carbonated soft drinks and 200 million litres of non-carbonated soft drinks.Nearly all beer sold in refillable glass is of domestic production, whereas the imported beer is sold mainly in cans and non-refillable glass and to a smaller extent in refillable glass. Half of the brandy, wine and strong beer is sold in refillable bottles, half in non-refillable bottles. Almost all of these beverages sold in refillable glass are domestically produced, whereas those sold in non-refillable glass are all imported. Carbonated soft drinks sold in refillable packaging (glass and PET) are mainly domestically produced, whereas those drinks sold in non-refillable packaging (mainly cans) are exclusively imported.Table 1 below is derived from statistics (8) published by the Norwegian federation of packaging producers (9). The HS classification system does not allow a unique identification of exports and imports of metal or plastic inner packaging for beverages. Such containers have therefore not been included in Table 1. The table reveals a general increase in the export of glass bottles for alcoholic and non-alcoholic products which can only have been produced at PLM Moss Glassverk A/S. This observation is consistent with a decision of the PLM group to close down one of its production plants in Sweden (Hammar) and transfer part of the production to Norway after its acquisition of Moss Glassverk A/S. The importation of glass bottles to Norway increased over the same period, although the volumes are smaller.>TABLE>4. Taxes on beverage packaging The basic tax ('grunnavgift`) on non-reusable packaging of beverages was introduced on 1 January 1994 (10). The tax rate applying as from 1 January 1995 in Nkr 0,70 per unit. The tax is levied on all non-reusable containers independent of recovery or recycling rates. Non-reusable packaging is defined (11) as all packaging that may not be reused for the same purpose. The basic tax is levied on non-reusable packaging (12) for all beverages except: (a) milk and milk products, (b) beverages based on cocoa, chocolate and concentrates of such products and (c) products in powder form. An exemption for beverages based on tea and coffee was abolished as of 1 January 1995.The tax is levied in the same manner for all packaging either at the time of importing or at the time of filling the beverage into the container/finishing the product. The basic tax is not paid directly by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S. The tax is not levied on beverage packaging which is exported from Norway.This basic tax is currently under scrutiny by the Authority concerning its compatibility with Article 14 of the EEA Agreement.A differentiated environmental tax (13) levied in principle on all beverage containers was introduced in parallel with the basic tax on 1 January 1994. The level of taxation is differentiated according to the recycling performance for each category of container in accordance with the regulations on return systems for beverage packaging. The full tax rate on containers which are not recycled is Nkr 3,00 per unit, while the reduced rate for recycled glass containers is Nkr 1,05. Collection and recycling systems do not exist for other beverage packaging than glass. However, such systems are currently being established (14).5. The Norwegian system for collection and recycling of glass waste The collection and recycling of glass packaging is based on rules laid down in the regulations on the return system for packaging of beverages of 10 December 1993.Collection of glass waste in Norway started in 1988. In 1992 PLM Moss Glassverk A/S took the initiative to establish Norsk Glassgjenvinning A/S (NGG), the company specializing in collection and processing of glass for reuse as a raw material. NGG became operative in 1993 and is approved as a return system by the State Pollution Control Authority pursuant to the regulation referred to above. The expected return rate for NGG's return system is estimated at 65 % for 1995. The cost of this return system is covered by a recycling fee per unit of glass packaging to NGG paid by the members of NGG and the company's proceeds from the sale of processed glass waste. Members of NGG are therefore, depending on the environmental properties of the glass packages in question, liable to pay the basic tax (= Nkr 0,70 per unit), the environmental tax at the reduced rate (35 % of the environmental tax = Nkr 1,05 per unit) in addition to the recycling fee to NGG.NGG buys glass waste from municipalities who collect it separately. The glass waste is processed by NGG before it is sold as raw material to PLM Moss Glassverk A/S or other buyers. NGG takes all glass waste including waste from glass produced at PLM Moss Glassverk A/S and imported glass. This means that more glass is collected (38 000 tonnes in 1995) than can be recycled by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S (25 000 tonnes in 1995). New ways of recycling glass waste have therefore been investigated. In 1995 this resulted in glass waste collected by NGG being used for the production of special quality mineral wool ('glava`). Deliveries from NGG for production of 'glava` are expected to amount to approximately 6 000 tonnes in 1995. A project is being launched by the Norwegian research institute Sintef for investigating the use of glass waste as a raw material in the production of special quality concrete ('glass-betong`). However, this project is still at a very early stage. No application has so far been found for the residual 7 000 tonnes, but export possibilities are being explored.II. THE PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1 (2) OF PROTOCOL 3 OF THE SURVEILLANCE AND COURT AGREEMENT 1. Investigation procedure The EFTA Surveillance Authority decided on 13 April 1995 (Decision No 40/95/COL) to open the formal investigation procedure with regard to the proposed aid. The Norwegian Government was informed of the decision by letter of 18 April 1995 (our reference 95-2478-D) containing a copy of the Authority's decision of 13 April 1995 whereby the Norwegian Government was invited to submit its comments within a period of one month from the receipt of the Authority's decision and to provide the Authority with all the information needed for examining the case. The Norwegian Government was reminded of the obligation not to put its proposed measures into effect until the investigation procedure had resulted in a final decision. The Norwegian Government submitted by letter of 30 May 1995, received on the same date (reference 95-3289 A), its comments to the Authority's decision. The proposed aid was discussed in a meeting with the Norwegian authorities on 12 June 1995.The European Commission was informed, in accordance with Protocol 27 of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of the decision. The gist of the decision was published in the form of a notice in the EEA Section of the Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ No C 212, 17. 8. 1995, p. 6) and the EEA Supplement thereto, thereby informing other EFTA States parties to the EEA Agreement, EU Member States, and interested parties, and inviting them to submit comments within one month from the date of publication.The Authority received comments from the following interested parties: Beverage Can Makers Europe (reference 95-5245 A), Elopak A/S (reference 95-5376 A), Tetrapak A/S (reference 95-5374 A), Prosess- og foredlingsindustriens Landsforening (reference 95-5416 A) and Norges Dagligvarehandels Forbund (reference 95-5618 A). The Authority forwarded by letters of 21 September (reference 95-5504 D) and 4 October 1995 (reference 95-5800 D) copies of the comments from the above interested parties to the Norwegian Government and requested it to submit its observations. The observations from the Norwegian Government were received by fax on 20 October 1995 (reference 95-6092 A).2. Comments from the Norwegian Government The Norwegian authorities emphasize two factors concerning derogation from the general prohibition against State aid according to Article 61 (1) with reference to Article 61 (3) (c) and the derived rules on State aid for environmental protection. The first is the major role played by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S in the Norwegian system for the recycling of glass waste and the second is the negative financial impact of the tax on the company. In combination with other environmental taxes and difficult and rapidly changing market conditions they consider the company to have been seriously affected by the introduction of new environmental taxation on beverage packages.The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that the exemption proposed for glass packaging from the basic tax constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and have therefore notified the proposed aid to the Authority. They also agree that Article 61 EEA Agreement cannot be used to frustrate the rules in the Agreement on the free movement of goods. However, it is held that an exemption for recyclable glass from the basic tax will not have such an effect. The authorities do not find that the tax relief gives rise to any discriminatory effect between domestic and imported products, referring to the fact that all non-reusable glass packages including imports will be exempted from the basic tax.Further, the Norwegian authorities find that the derogation pursuant to Article 61 (3) (c) allows for the possibility of exemption, in the present case, from the general prohibition on aid pursuant to Article 61 (1). Reference is made to paragraph 15 (4) (3) (1) of the State Aid Guidelines (15) which allows for State aid in connection with waste management and temporary relief from new environmental taxes.With reference to the market situation for processed glass waste in Norway and the recycling system for glass waste (16), the Norwegian authorities conclude that the recycling system for glass, is very much based on PLM Moss Glassverk A/S's capacity to recycle such glass as there is, today, no viable alternative. If the only Norwegian glass factory were to close down, this would threaten the entire system.Referring to paragraph 15 (4) (3) (3) of the State Aid Guidelines which allows for a temporary relief from new environmental taxes when necessary in off-setting losses in competitiveness resulting from such taxes and the question raised by the Authority of whether a loss in competitiveness has in fact taken place, the Norwegian authorities find that the competitive disadvantage to PLM Moss Glassverk A/S has to be seen in a broader context. In accordance with their initial notification and as later supplemented by statistics, they find it to be sufficiently documented that PLM Moss Glassverk A/S has faced a sharp decline in the demand for their products, inter alia, because of the introduction of new products (plastic bottles) into the market. This situation was reinforced by the introduction of various environmental taxes, all of which have affected PLM Moss Glassverk A/S within a short period of time.The fact that the basic tax is not levied on exported goods does not mean, according to the Norwegian authorities, that the international competitiveness of PLM Moss Glassverk A/S is not affected. The basic tax is seen as a hindrance with reference to the maintenance and establishing of a solid domestic production base, which is regarded as a prerequisite for being able to compete abroad. On the other hand, as glass is very much a domestic good since it is cheap, but voluminous, so that long distance transporting is not very profitable, it is not seen as appropriate in this case to analyse competitiveness in the context of exporting possibilities. It is however evident, according to the Norwegian authorities, that, put in a broader context, the company has suffered a loss in competitiveness, reinforced by the impact of the basic tax.Finally, the Norwegian authorities emphasize, as in the initial notification, that the difficult employment situation prevailing in the county of Østfold where PLM Moss Glassverk A/S is an important part of the industrial base in Moss, the consequences the decision will have for the only glass producer in Norway and the element of uncertainty this will introduce into the Norwegian glass collection system should be taken into account when reaching a decision in the case.3. Comments from interested parties Beverage Can Makers Europe (17) (BCME) expresses that Norway already discriminates between reuse and recycling, as the basic tax penalizes those marketing beverages in non-reusable containers, irrespective of whether or not containers are recycled and that this penalty is exacerbated by the imposition of an additional differentiated environmental tax on recyclable containers according to the degree to which they are recycled. The proposed aid would therefore further discriminate against the beverage can as well as making recycling systems for glass more viable without facilitating recycling of other packaging materials by an equivalent exemption. BCME finds the aid proposal to be illogical as it threatens to distort competition and, consequently constitutes a barrier to trade.Elopak A/S and Tetra Pak A/S) (18) consider that the proposed tax exemption for one-way glass packaging should not be allowed as it would discriminate against other types of beverage packaging and thereby be against the letter and the intention of the EEA Agreement. The basic tax as such is considered to be in conflict with the EEA Agreement and not defendable on environmental grounds. It is claimed that the basic tax penalises particularly beverage cartons, as more than two-thirds of the packaging on which the tax is imposed today, is of this category. The companies state that several life-cycle analyses document that beverage cartons are environmentally preferable to other forms of beverage packaging - including reusables for drinks like milk and juices. The fillers and producers of beverage cartons in Norway have now also established an industry financed collection and recovery system, Norsk Returkartong A/S, which solves the waste problems related to beverage cartons.A tax relief for glass bottles could have a substantial negative impact on the sales and use of beverage cartons, as glass bottles are the most likely substitute for beverage cartons for juice packaging. A discrimination of Nkr 0,70 per item in favour of glass bottles could easily lead to a shift in demand for packaging of juice. As one-way glass bottles are substantially heavier (10 to 30 times) than cartons, the waste problems would increase dramatically with such a shift, even with a high rate of return. The consequences would thus be quite the opposite of the Norwegian Government's purpose of the basic tax.Elopak A/S and Tetra Pak A/S find that the statistics presented by the Norwegian authorities are outdated. If 1994 figures had been presented, they would, according to the companies, have documented an increase in the use of one-way packaging based on the success of new drinks such as Snapple and Fruitopia, which are both sold in disposable glass bottles.Prosess og foredlingsindustriens Landsforening (PIL) (19) holds the principal view that a tax policy which discriminates between different materials for beverage packaging has no environmental justification. PIL has recently (20) in cooperation with other industry organizations established agreements (21) for increased waste recycling with the Ministry of Environment and industry. The agreements concern return arrangements to be financed by private fees paid by the industry itself. PIL finds the present tax system for beverage packaging to constitute a hindrance for establishing a recycling system for all beverage packaging materials in line with systems for other packaging waste and incompatible in principle with the agreements referred to above.Norges Dagligvarehandels Forbund (DF) (22) refer to the problems the suppliers of commodities for household use have experienced in establishing a return system for glass, metal and PET waste due to the Norwegian tax system for beverage packaging. Reference is made to the so-called 'Resirk-group` (23) where DF participates. The group has submitted an application to the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT (24)) for establishing a return system for one-way packaging. This return system for packaging waste may be approved by SFT. However, beverages contained in non-reusable packages, will still be subject to a per unit taxation of Nkr 1,30 plus VAT (25). The tax system for beverage packaging is considered by DF to undermine the economic viability of the 'Resirk`-system, thereby demonstrating that the Norwegian tax system for beverage packaging has the effect of discriminating against competition from imported goods.The Norwegian Government did not make any specific observations with regard to the above comments.III. APPRECIATION The proposed measure constitutes State aid The Norwegian authorities have by the notification of 20 January 1995 fulfilled their obligation pursuant to Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to notify plans to grant or alter aid.Since the aid is to be awarded in the form of a relief from a tax levied by the Norwegian Government it shall be granted by the State through State resources. Although the relief from the basic tax on non-reusable packaging for beverages will apply equally to both domestic and imported products and not favour the only Norwegian producer of glass packaging, PLM Moss Glassverk A/S, vis-à-vis other producers of glass packaging within the EEA, it may still be concluded that the measure constitutes State aid. A relief for glass containers from the basic tax will primarily benefit PLM Moss Glassverk A/S as the dominant producer of glass for the Norwegian market. The company's production will benefit from the relief of the basic tax on its production of non-reusable glass containers for beverages. The remaining economic benefits from the tax relief for glass packaging are likely to be distributed on a wide number of glass packaging producers or other operators in the beverage markets. However as the PLM Moss Glassverk A/S is facing actual and potential competition from close substitutes in other packaging material than glass within the EEA, the aid threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the territory covered by the EEA Agreement. It is therefore concluded that the proposed measure constitutes aid in the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement. This conclusion is confirmed by the comments submitted to the Authority by interested parties and the Norwegian authorities.Derogations from the general prohibition on State aid The Authority assessed as part of the decision to open the investigation procedure whether any of the derogation clauses pursuant to Article 61 (2) and (3) of the EEA Agreement were applicable in order that the aid may be exempted from the general prohibition of aid pursuant to Article 61 (1). It was concluded that the exemptions referred to pursuant to Article 61 (2) (a) to (c) and Article 61 (3) (a), (b) and (d) are inapplicable in the case at hand.The notification and the comments from the Norwegian authorities emphasize, as an additional justification for the proposed aid, the difficult industrial and employment situation in the county of Østfold where the company is an important part of the industrial base in Moss. The Authority has found that the derogations pursuant to Article 61 (3) (a) and (c) to allow regional aid are not applicable for the case at hand as the county of Østfold is not covered by the Norwegian map of assisted areas (26) eligible for regional aid, and the Norwegian authorities have neither proposed any amendment to the existing map of assisted areas nor is the aid granted under a general system of regional aid.The notification and the comments submitted to the Authority by Norway during the investigation procedure seek to justify the proposed aid primarily with reference to the need to relieve PLM Moss Glassverk A/S from the negative economic effects of the basic tax on non-reusable beverage packaging in order to secure the Norwegian recycling system for glass waste. Therefore, and in accordance with the decision to open the investigation procedure, Article 61 (3) (c) in so far as it provides for the possibility of authorizing 'aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities . . . where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest`, in particular in connection with the rules on aid for environmental protection as set out in Chapter 15 of the State Aid Guidelines, is considered as the only relevant derogation clause under which to examine the proposed aid.In order to benefit from any of the exemption clauses, the measure must not conflict with other provisions of the EEA Agreement, such as the provisions relating to the free movement of goods.The aid would primarily improve the financial performance of PLM Moss Glassverk A/S and/or allow the company to hold a higher market share in the packaging market. The aid would not be linked to initial investment, job creation or any other project limited in time and would, thus, constitute operating aid.Operating aid on environmental grounds According to paragraph 15 (4) (3) (1) of the State Aid Guidelines, the EFTA Surveillance Authority will normally not approve operating aid which relieves firms of costs resulting from the pollution and nuisance they cause. However, the Authority may make an exemption to this principle in certain well-defined circumstances. The European Commission has done so in the fields of waste management and relief from environmental taxes. Such cases are assessed on their merits and in the light of the strict criteria to be applied in the two fields just mentioned. These are that the aid:1. must only compensate for extra production costs by comparison with traditional costs;2. should be temporary and degressive, so as to provide an incentive to reduce pollution or introducing more efficient use of resources more quickly;3. must not conflict with other provisions of the EEA Agreement and in particular those relating to the free movement of goods and services.As regards the first of the above three criteria, the Authority notes that the extra costs of producing beverages in non-reusable glass packages caused by the basic tax are compensated by the proposed relief. Therefore, the proposed aid seems to meet the first condition.As to the second condition, the Norwegian Government has made a commitment to 'follow developments in the market for recycled glass closely and if necessary reconsider the need for granting an exemption for recycled glass from the basic tax.` The Authority considers that this commitment is not sufficient to limit the period of availability of the aid. Therefore, the aid would not be temporary because it is to be granted for an indefinite period of time. Furthermore, the aid is not degressive and could even increase over time in the event that the rate of the basic tax, from which the relief is to be granted, is raised. Consequently, the second condition for allowing operating aid is not met.Regarding the third condition, the Authority finds that the proposal to exempt glass from the basic tax, would lead to a different tax burden, as far as the basic tax is concerned, for recyclable glass containers as compared to other recyclable containers such as containers made of PET or metal. The differentiation seems to be motivated by rendering a recycling system for glass viable while recycling of other packaging material is not facilitated by an equivalent exemption from the basic rate. It must therefore be assumed that waiving of the basic tax on recyclable glass containers amounts to a different taxation of similar or competing domestic products. Furthermore, some of those containers which would continue to be subject to the basic tax, such as aluminium cans, are widely used for non-domestic products while those products exempt from the basic tax, be it due to their reusability or because of the exemption of glass bottles from the basic tax, would be typically used for domestic products. Thus the proposed exemption seems to lead to imposing a tax burden on certain imported products in excess of that imposed on similar or competing domestic products.The observations in the preceding paragraph are to a wide extent confirmed by the comments submitted to the Authority by interested parties. The comments from the interested parties indicate also that the basic tax may be a hindrance to establishing recycling systems for packaging materials other than glass. The comments received from the Norwegian authorities do not contest this view. Therefore, the Authority cannot conclude that the proposed exemption of glass from the basic tax would result in a tax system which would be compatible with Article 14 of the EEA Agreement. Consequently the third condition above for allowing operating aid is not met.Relief from environmental taxes According to paragraph 15 (4) (3) (3) of the State Aid Guidelines temporary relief from new environmental taxes may be authorized where it is necessary to off-set losses in competitiveness, particularly at the international level. It should be noted that in the present case, this requirement must be seen as constituting an additional requirement to the conditions discussed above for granting operating aid on environmental grounds.The present tax from which an exemption is proposed seems to have been intended to reduce the use of non-reusable beverage packages for environmental reasons as the Norwegian authorities in accordance with the concept of a waste hierarchy, give reuse a higher priority than material recycling and energy recovery. An inevitable consequence of this is that the producers and importers of such packages will suffer from the tax. In its decision to open the investigation procedure, the Authority stated that it appeared that PLM Moss Glassverk A/S should be able to at least partly compensate for losses in the non-reusable packages market by increased demand in the reusable packages market and, furthermore, that the tax on non-reusable glass packages applies to all such packages whether produced by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S or imported to Norway. On the other hand, the tax is not levied on the glass packages exported from Norway. Therefore, the international competitiveness of the production by PLM Moss Glassverk A/S appears not to be affected by the tax on non-reusable glass packages.The Norwegian authorities argue that the question of loss of competitiveness, particularly at the international level, must be seen in a wider perspective, as the company has also been negatively affected by the introduction of other environmental taxes and has experienced a decline in the demand for its products, mainly because of the introduction of new products (plastic bottles). The Norwegian authorities state further that the fact that tax is not levied on exports, does not mean that the international competitiveness of the company is not affected, as it is evident that the company has suffered a loss and the basic tax is a hindrance in the maintaining and establishing of a sufficient domestic production base.The Authority does not question in principle the argument that a certain domestic production base may be a requirement for competing at international level. However, the Norwegian authorities have not provided any estimates of additional losses the company has experienced due to other environmental taxes than the basic tax. The Authority does not question that the company has suffered a loss by the introduction of the basic tax. This is evident as it follows from the intended incentive effect of the basic tax, i.e. to reduce the demand for all non-reusable beverage packaging independent of the material. However, the demand for non-reusable beverage packaging or by developing new non-reusable beverage packaging, which in itself would be contrary to the Norwegian model of a waste hierarchy. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have not provided any evidence suggesting that glass packaging has any less damaging effects on the environment compared to other packaging materials. Therefore the Authority concludes that the company's loss in competitiveness is primarily of a structural nature due to the introduction of competing substitutes. Consequently, also, this additional condition for granting a relief from environmental taxes is not met.Conclusion For the reasons above, and independently of what may be the final outcome of the Authority's examination of the compatibility of the basic tax with Article 14 of the EEA Agreement, it must be concluded that the proposed aid does not meet the requirements for an exemption pursuant to Article 61 (3) (c) for 'aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities . . . where such aid does not adversely affect the trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.` Norway must therefore not put the proposed measure into effect,HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:1. The EFTA Surveillance Authority has decided not to authorize the notified aid to PLM Moss Glassverk A/S in the form of an exemption for glass packaging from the basic tax on non-reusable beverage packaging (Aid No 95-002).2. The Norwegian Government must not put the proposed measure referred to in Article 1 into effect.3. The European Commission is informed, in accordance with Protocol 27 (d) of the EEA Agreement, by a copy of the Decision.4. Other EFTA States parties to the EEA Agreement, EC Member States and interested parties are informed by the publication of the decision in the EEA Section of and the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities.5. This Decision, which is authentic in the English language, is addressed to Norway.Done at Brussels, 31 October 1995.For the EFTA Surveillance AuthorityKNUT ALMESTADPresident(1) Hereinafter referred to as the EEA Agreement.(2) Hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.(3) The term basix tax ('grunnavgift`) is applied, inter alia, in order to distinguish this tax from the differentiated environmental tax according to recycling performance levied on recyclable containers.(4) PLM is one of the leading packaging producers in Europe. PLM manufacturers and markets a range of consumer packaging in metal, glass and plastic.(5) Established 1898.(6) Budsjettinnstilling S II (1993-94), Chapter 1442, post 70.(7) According to the Ministery of Industry and Energy the market share for refillable plastic packaging further increased to approximately 93 % in 1994 at the expense of glass packaging.(8) Source: NOS Utenrikshandel.(9) Den Norske Emballasjeforening - Emballasjeindustriens Landsforening (EIL).(10) St.prp. nr. 1 (1994-95) Skatter og avgifter til statskassen, Grunnavgift på engangsemballasje for drikkevarer.(11) Paragraph 2 point (b) of 'Forskrifter om grunnavgift på engangsemballasje for drikkevarer fastsatt av Finansdepartementet 30. desember 1993`.(12) Volume less than four litres.(13) The environmental tax and the regulations on return systems for beverage packaging are described in more detail in the Authority's decision of 13 April 1995 to open the investigation procedure (OJ No C 212, 17. 8. 1995, p. 6).(14) Norwegian industry on 14 September 1995 concluded four agreements with the Ministry of Environment on recycling of other packaging materials.(15) Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid adopted by the Authority on 19 January 1994.(16) See point I.5 of this Decision.(17) Beverage Can Makers Europe, founded in 1990, describes itself as a non-profit organization representing the European beverage can making industry.(18) Elopak A/S and Tetra Pak A/S are Norwegian producers of beverage packaging based primarily on carton.(19) Prosess- og foredlingsindustriens Landsforening counts most Norwegian producers of beverage packages, including PLM Moss Glassverk A/S, among its members.(20) The agreements were concluded on 14 September 1995.(21) The agreements lay down targeted collection/recycling levels for plastic, metal, carton and brown paper.(22) Norwegian federation of suppliers of general comodities for household use (groceries).(23) The 'Resirk-group` is formed by representatives of retailers and, inter alia, breweries and mineral water producers.(24) Statens forurensningstilsyn.(25) Value added tax.(26) Decision of 16 November 1994 on the map of assisted areas (Norway), 157/94/COL (OJ No C 14, 19. 1. 1995, p. 4).


title: 2008/261/EC: Council Decision of 28 February 2008 on the signature, on behalf of the European Community, and on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis

text:
               26.3.2008

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 83/3

      COUNCIL DECISION

   of 28 February 2008
   on the signature, on behalf of the European Community, and on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis

   (2008/261/EC)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 62, 63, points 3(a) and (b), Articles 66 and 95 in conjunction with the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 27 February 2006, the Council authorised negotiations with the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Swiss Confederation concerning a Protocol on the accession of Liechtenstein to the Agreement of 26 October 2004 between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol and the Agreement, respectively). Those negotiations have been finalised, and the Protocol was initialled in Brussels on 21 June 2006.

               (2)

               Subject to its conclusion at a later date, it is desirable to sign the Protocol.

               (3)

               The Protocol envisages the temporary application of certain of its provisions. Those provisions should be applied on a temporary basis pending the Protocol's entry into force.

               (4)

               Insofar as the development of the Schengen acquis which falls under the Treaty establishing the European Community is concerned, it is appropriate upon signature of the Protocol to make Decision 1999/437/EC (1) apply, mutatis mutandis, to relations with the Principality of Liechtenstein.

               (5)

               This Decision does not prejudice the position of the United Kingdom, under the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community and Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis
                   (2).

               (6)

               This Decision does not prejudice the position of Ireland under the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community and Council Decision 2002/192/EC of 28 February 2002 concerning Ireland's request to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis
                   (3).

               (7)

               This Decision does not prejudice the position of Denmark, under the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,

         HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
   Article 1
   Subject to its conclusion at a later date, the President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to sign, on behalf of the European Community, the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis and related documents.
   The texts of the Protocol and the related documents are attached to this Decision (4).
   Article 2
   This Decision applies to the fields covered by the provisions listed in Article 2(1) and (2) of the Protocol and to their development to the extent that such provisions have a legal base within the Treaty establishing the European Community, or to the extent that it has been determined under Council Decision 1999/436/EC (5), that they have such a base.
   Article 3
   The provisions of Articles 1 to 4 of Decision 1999/437/EC shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the association of Liechtenstein with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which falls under the Treaty establishing the European Community.
   Article 4
   In accordance with Article 9(2) of the Protocol, Articles 1, 4 and 5(2)(a) first sentence of the Protocol and the rights and obligations set out in Article 3, points (1) to (4), Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Agreement shall be applied on a provisional basis as of the time of signature of the Protocol, pending its entry into force.

      Done at Brussels, 28 February 2008.

            For the Council

            The President

         D. MATE

      (1)  Council Decision of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31).

      (2)  OJ L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43.

      (3)  OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20.

      (4)  Council document 16462/06; accessible on http://register.consilium.europa.eu

      (5)  OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 17.