title: 2014/616/EU: Decision of the European Parliament of 3 April 2014 on the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2012

text:
               5.9.2014

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 266/300

         DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   of 3 April 2014
   on the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2012
   (2014/616/EU)
   THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

               —

               having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2012,

               —

               having regard to the Court of Auditors’ report on the annual accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2012, together with the Agency’s replies (1),

               —

               having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 18 February 2014 (05849/2014 – C7-0054/2014),

               —

               having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

               —

               having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (2), and in particular Article 185 thereof,

               —

               having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (3), and in particular Article 208 thereof,

               —

               having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (4), and in particular Article 21 thereof,

               —

               having regard to Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (5),

               —

               having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1271/2013 of 30 September 2013 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 208 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), and in particular Article 108 thereof,

               —

               having regard to Rule 77 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure,

               —

               having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A7-0184/2014),

               1.

               Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2012;

               2.

               Instructs its President to forward this Decision to the Director of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

            The President

         Martin SCHULZ

            The Secretary-General

         Klaus WELLE

      (1)  OJ C 365, 13.12.2013, p. 245.

      (2)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

      (3)  OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1.

      (4)  OJ L 53, 22.2.2007, p. 1.

      (5)  OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 72.

      (6)  OJ L 328, 7.12.2013, p. 42.


title: Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP of 22 January 2013 amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces

text:
               23.1.2013

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 20/57

      COUNCIL DECISION 2013/44/CFSP
   of 22 January 2013
   amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 42(4) and 43(2) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 15 February 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/96/CFSP (1).

               (2)

               On 28 July 2011, the Council adopted Decision 2011/483/CFSP (2) amending and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP for a further period of one year.

               (3)

               On 14 May 2012, the Council underlined the importance of ultimately handing over security responsibilities to Somali authorities and, to that end, of enhancing the international support to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). It commended the contribution of trained Somali soldiers in bringing security to Somalia and committed itself to continue supporting, through the EU military mission, the development of the SNSF including their command and control structure, in cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Uganda, the United States of America and other relevant actors.

               (4)

               The United Nations Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council dated 1 May 2012, recommended encouraging the international community to invest seriously in the long-term recovery and development of Somalia, including through support for the strengthening of the security sector.

               (5)

               The second International Conference on Somalia, held in Istanbul on 31 May and 1 June 2012, commended the Union for its support to AMISOM and to the Somali security institutions. The Conference recognised the need for the international community to continue supporting the re-establishment of a professional, inclusive, disciplined and well-equipped security apparatus, including the Somali national army, police, navy, coastguard and intelligence agencies, and emphasised the need to bring all Somali forces under a unified command.

               (6)

               The President of the Somali Republic adopted a six-pillar policy aiming to promote stability, economic recovery, peace building, service delivery, international relations and unity, where the security sector reform is considered a basic foundation to constitute a viable Somali state, and requested the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) to continue the Union’s engagement in support of Somalia.

               (7)

               The Government of Uganda has expressed its satisfaction with the partnership with the Union built around the EU military mission and its willingness to continue cooperating in this context.

               (8)

               On 27 November 2012, the Prime Minister of the Somali Republic addressed an invitation letter to the HR with regard to the deployment of the EU military mission, welcoming the Union’s support to the training of the Somali Armed Forces.

               (9)

               On 10 December 2012, the Council approved the revised crisis management concept for the EU military mission.

               (10)

               In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. Denmark does not participate in the implementation of this Decision and therefore does not participate in the financing of this mission.

               (11)

               The EU military mission should be further extended with an adapted mandate,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   Decision 2010/96/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

               (1)

               Article 1 is replaced by the following:
               ‘Article 1
               Mission
               1.   The Union shall conduct a military training mission, in order to contribute to the building up and strengthening of the Somali National Armed Forces (‧SNAF‧) accountable to the Somali National Government, consistent with Somali needs and priorities.
               2.   In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the EU military mission shall be deployed in Somalia and in Uganda in order to mentor, advise and support the Somali authorities with regard to the build-up of SNAF, the implementation of the Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan and SNAF training activities. The EU military mission shall also be ready to provide support, within its means and capabilities, to other Union actors in the implementation of their respective mandates in the security and defence area in Somalia.
               3.   The implementation of the mandated activities in Somalia shall depend on the security conditions in Somalia and political guidance by the Political and Security Committee.’.

               (2)

               Article 2(1) is replaced by the following:
               ‘1.   Brigadier General Gerald AHERNE is hereby appointed EU Mission Commander with effect from 1 February 2013.’.

               (3)

               Article 3 is replaced by the following:
               "Article 3
               Designation of the Mission Headquarters
               1.   The Mission Headquarters shall initially remain located in Uganda with a view to their possible transfer to Somalia in the course of the mandate in accordance with the planning documents. It shall perform the functions of both Operational Headquarters and Force Headquarters.
               2.   The Mission Headquarters shall include a liaison office in Nairobi and a support cell in Brussels.".

               (4)

               Article 7 is replaced by the following:
               "Article 7
               Consistency of the Union’s response and coordination
               1.   The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the Union’s external action as a whole, including the Union’s development programmes.
               2.   Without prejudice to the chain of command, the EU Mission Commander shall receive local political guidance from the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa and relevant Union delegations in the region.
               3.   The EU military mission shall maintain and enhance coordination with EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor. The EU Operations Centre shall, in accordance with its mandate laid down in Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP of 23 March 2012 on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa (3), facilitate such coordination and information exchange with a view to increasing coherence, efficiency and synergies between the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the region.
               4.   The EU military mission shall operate in close cooperation with other international actors in the region, in particular the United Nations, AMISOM, and the United States of America and Uganda in line with agreed requirements of the Somali National Government.

               (5)

               Article 10 is replaced by the following:
               ‘Article 10
               Financial arrangements
               1.   The common costs of the EU military mission shall be administered in accordance with Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 19 December 2011 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena) (4) (‧ATHENA‧).
               2.   The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military mission for the period until 9 August 2011 shall be EUR 4,8 million. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of ATHENA shall be 60 %.
               3.   The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military mission for the period from 9 August 2011 until 31 December 2012 shall be EUR 4,8 million. The percentage of this reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of ATHENA shall be 30 %.
               4.   The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military mission for the period starting on 1 January 2013 shall be EUR 11,6 million. The percentage of this reference amount referred to in Article 25(1) of ATHENA shall be 20 %, and the percentage for commitment referred to in Article 32(3) of ATHENA shall be 30 %.

               (6)

               Article 11 is replaced by the following:
               "Article 11
               Release of information
               1.   The HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Decision, as appropriate and in accordance with the needs of the Mission, EU classified information generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (5):

                           (a)

                           up to the level provided in the applicable Security of Information Agreements concluded between the Union and the third State concerned;

                           (b)

                           or up to the “CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL” level in other cases.

                     2.   The HR shall also be authorised to release to the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) in accordance with the operational needs of the Mission, EU classified information up to “RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED” level which are generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with Decision 2011/292/EU. Arrangements between the HR and the competent authorities of the UN and the AU shall be drawn up for this purpose.
               3.   In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State any EU classified information up to “RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED” level which are generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with Decision 2011/292/EU. Arrangements between the HR and the competent authorities of the host State shall be drawn up for that purpose.
               4.   The HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Decision any EU non-classified documents connected with the deliberations of the Council relating to the Mission and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure (6).
               5.   The HR may delegate such authorisations, as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to above to staff of the European External Action Service and/or to the EU Mission Commander.

               (7)

               In Article 12, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
               "2.   The mandate of the EU military mission shall end on 31 March 2015.".

         Article 2
   This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
   It shall apply from 1 January 2013.

      Done at Brussels, 22 January 2013.

            For the Council

            The President

         M. NOONAN

      (1)  OJ L 44, 19.2.2010, p. 16.

      (2)  OJ L 198, 30.7.2011, p. 37.

      (3)  OJ L 89, 27.3.2012, p. 66.".

      (4)  OJ L 343, 23.12.2011, p. 35.’.

      (5)  OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, p. 17.

      (6)  Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure (OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35).".


title: 2006/38/EC: Commission Decision of  22 December 2005  amending Commission Decision 1999/572/EC accepting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of steel wire ropes and cables originating,  inter alia , in India

text:
               26.1.2006

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 22/54

      COMMISSION DECISION

   of 22 December 2005
   amending Commission Decision 1999/572/EC accepting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of steel wire ropes and cables originating, inter alia, in India
   (2006/38/EC)
   THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
   Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
   Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1) (the basic Regulation), and in particular Articles 8 and 9 thereof,
   After consulting the Advisory Committee,
   Whereas:
   A.   PREVIOUS PROCEDURE

               (1)

               In August 1999, by Regulation (EC) No 1796/1999 (2), the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables (the product concerned) originating, inter alia, in India.

               (2)

               By Decision 1999/572/EC (3), the Commission accepted a price undertaking from an Indian company, i.e. Usha Martin Industries & Usha Beltron Ltd. This company has changed its name in the meantime and is now known as Usha Martin Ltd (UML). The change of name in no way affected the activities of the company.

               (3)

               As a result, imports into the Community of the product concerned of Indian origin, produced by UML or by any other related company worldwide, and of a type covered by the undertaking (the product covered by the undertaking), were exempted from the definitive anti-dumping duties.

               (4)

               In this regard, it should be noted that certain types of steel wire rope currently produced by UML were not exported to the Community during the investigation period which led to the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures and were not, therefore, within the scope of the exemption afforded by the undertaking. Accordingly, such steel wire ropes were liable to the payment of the anti-dumping duty when entered for free circulation in the Community.

               (5)

               In November 2005, following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 121/2006 (4) decided that the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of the product concerned originating, inter alia, in India should be maintained.

         B.   BREACHES OF THE UNDERTAKING
   1.   Obligations of companies with undertakings

               (6)

               The undertaking offered by UML obliges it (and any related company worldwide) to, inter alia, export the product covered by the undertaking to the first independent customer in the Community at or above certain minimum import price levels (MIPs) laid down in the undertaking. These price levels eliminate the injurious effects of dumping. In the case of resales in the Community to the first independent customer by related importers, the resale prices of the product covered by the undertaking, after appropriate adjustments for selling, general and administrative costs and a reasonable profit, must also be at levels which eliminate the injurious effects of dumping.

               (7)

               The terms of the undertaking also oblige UML to provide the Commission with regular and detailed information in the form of a quarterly report of its sales (and resales by its related parties in the Community) of the product concerned originating in India to the Community. Such reports are intended to include the products covered by the undertaking which benefit from the exemption to the anti-dumping duty as well as those types of steel wire ropes not covered by the undertaking and which are therefore liable to the anti-dumping duty.

               (8)

               Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed by the Commission that the sales reports of UML (and the reports of resales of related companies established in the Community) are, as submitted, complete, exhaustive and correct in all particulars.

               (9)

               It was also acknowledged by UML that, with regard to the exemption to the anti-dumping duties afforded by the undertaking, such exemption is conditional upon presentation to Community customs services of an ‘Undertaking Invoice’. Moreover, the company undertook not to issue such Undertaking Invoices for sales of those types of the product concerned not covered by the undertaking and which are therefore liable to the anti-dumping duty.

               (10)

               It is also a condition of the undertaking that the terms and provisions thereof apply to any related company to UML, worldwide.

               (11)

               For the purposes of ensuring compliance with the undertaking, UML also agreed to provide all information considered necessary by the Commission and to allow on-spot verification visits at its premises, and those of any related companies, in order to verify the accuracy and veracity of data submitted in the said quarterly reports.

               (12)

               In this regard, verification visits were carried out at the premises of UML in India and at those of a related company to UML in Dubai, i.e. Brunton Wolf Wire Ropes FZE (BWWR).

         2.   Results of the verification visit to UML

               (13)

               Examination of the company’s accounting records showed that significant volumes of the product concerned not covered by the undertaking had not been included in the quarterly undertaking sales reports submitted to the Commission. Furthermore, the goods in question had been sold by UML to its related importers in the UK and Denmark and included on Undertaking Invoices.

               (14)

               It is considered that the omission of the sales in question from the sales reports and their incorrect inclusion on Undertaking Invoices constitute breaches of the undertaking.

         3.   Results of the verification visit to BWWR

               (15)

               It should first be noted that finished steel wire rope produced by BWWR has previously gone through two main production stages, namely: (i) a given number of individual steel wires are first twisted into what is known as a ‘stranded wire’, and (ii) a given number of such stranded wires formed from individual steel wires are then twisted together to form the finished steel wire rope.

               (16)

               The verification at the premises of BWWR established that significant quantities of stranded wire of Indian origin had been sold by UML to BWWR and that BWWR had transformed this stranded wire into steel wire rope, some of which was then sold to the Community and exported as having United Arab Emirates (UAE) origin.

               (17)

               In view of this transformation process, it was considered necessary to examine the question of the origin of the steel wire rope sold to the Community by BWWR. Reference was therefore made to Article 22 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (5) (the Community Customs Code), which provides that the non-preferential rules of origin apply to measures other than tariff measures established by Community provisions governing specific fields relating to trade in goods, such as anti-dumping measures.

               (18)

               The provisions regarding determination of the non-preferential origin of products, the production of which involves more than one country, are set out in Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Customs Code and Articles 35 and 39 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 (6) laying down the provisions for the implementation of the Community Customs Code. As concerns the concept of the ‘last substantial transformation’ referred to in Article 24 of the Community Customs Code, in the case of steel wire ropes, it is considered that this product has undergone its last substantial processing or working when it is classified in a four-digit Harmonised System Tariff Heading (the four-digit Heading) distinct from the four-digit Headings where the materials used in the manufacturing of this product were classified.

               (19)

               In accordance with the above, the transformation of Indian stranded wire falling within the four-digit Heading 73.12 into steel wire rope also falling within four-digit Heading 73.12 does not confer UAE origin on the finished product, in this case steel wire rope, but instead it keeps Indian origin.

               (20)

               Accordingly, steel wire rope sold by BWWR and made from stranded wire of Indian origin is considered to be of Indian origin and should therefore be subject to the current anti-dumping measures applicable to imports originating in India. Consequently, these products are either subject to the terms of the undertaking or liable to anti-dumping duties when entered for free circulation in the Community if they do not fall under any product category covered by the undertaking.

               (21)

               Furthermore, it was found that the steel wire ropes in question, considered to be of Indian origin, sold by BWWR to the Community had not been reported in UML’s or its related companies’ quarterly undertaking sales reports to the Commission, nor had they been declared as being of Indian origin on importation for free circulation in the Community. It follows that, in the absence of an Undertaking Invoice, such imports of the product concerned into the Community from Dubai, considered to be of Indian origin, should have been liable to payment of anti-dumping duty when entered for free circulation in the Community.

               (22)

               Moreover, it was established that such steel wire ropes of Indian origin produced in Dubai had been sold on the Community market below the relevant MIPs established in UML’s undertaking for the steel wire ropes in question.

               (23)

               Accordingly, in view of all the above findings, UML was informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to withdraw the Commission’s acceptance of the undertaking and to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty in its place. A period was granted within which representations could be made both in writing and orally. In this regard, UML submitted comments both in writing and verbally.

         4.   Submissions
   (a)   Breaches of reporting obligations

               (24)

               With regard to the issue of the product concerned exported by UML and not reported in the quarterly undertaking sales reports, it was stated that although the goods in question figured on Undertaking Invoices, they were imported into the Community under an inward processing scheme and were either subsequently entered for free circulation in the Community upon payment of the anti-dumping duty, or re-exported outside the Community. It was submitted, therefore, that their omission from the undertaking sales reports was simply due to clerical error, that no harm had been caused, and that no material infringement had occurred.

               (25)

               In support of this argument, UML considered that the primary aim of an undertaking is to ensure that sales are made at levels which eliminate injury. In this respect, it submitted that, as it had fully complied with these conditions, the accuracy of the undertaking sales reports was of secondary importance. Similarly, as long as products not covered by the undertaking but appearing on Undertaking Invoices had ultimately had the anti-dumping duty paid or had been re-exported outside the Community, it was considered by UML that the substance at the heart of the undertaking had been respected. It was therefore the view of UML that no change in the status quo of the Community market had occurred due to its actions in this regard or those of its related companies in the Community.

               (26)

               In response to these arguments, the Commission would agree that the function of any undertaking is to remove the injurious effects of dumping. However, it does not consider the obligation to provide accurate reports of sales or the inclusion of goods not covered by the undertaking on the Undertaking Invoices to be of secondary or subordinate importance to any other provisions of an undertaking. Only by being in possession of the full details of sales of the product concerned to the Community can the Commission effectively monitor an undertaking and determine whether it is being respected and the injurious effects of dumping removed. If sales reports are incomplete or inaccurate, this casts doubt on the company’s respect of the undertaking as a whole. Compliance with the reporting formalities must therefore be regarded as forming part of the primary obligations of the companies concerned, in so far as those formalities are not only intended to simplify administrative procedures, but are also necessary for the proper functioning of the undertaking system as a whole.

               (27)

               It follows from this that with regard to the question of whether the status quo on the Community market has been maintained (and, implicitly, whether harm has been done to the Community industry), it is considered that breaches of reporting obligations put the efficacy of the undertakings system into jeopardy, a system set up to specifically defend the Community producers of steel wire ropes from injurious dumping. The absence of complete and reliable reports also casts doubts on whether the substantive provisions of the undertaking have been complied with and therefore prevents the Commission from determining if all of the company’s obligations have been met. Accordingly, the Commission must consider such violations as detrimental to the Community producers.

               (28)

               In addition, under the undertaking, UML and its related companies, worldwide, have to respect all the different provisions of that undertaking and to take effective measures to ensure that the provisions thereof were complied with. In the present case, the internal checks and procedures necessary to enable UML to fully meet its obligations in accordance with the terms of the undertaking were not present.

               (29)

               Accordingly, the arguments presented by the company with regard to the reporting formalities do not alter the Commission's view that a breach of the undertaking has occurred.

         (b)   Proportionality

               (30)

               It was also submitted that there should exist a reasonable relationship between action taken by the Community Institutions within the framework of the present system of price undertakings for the product concerned originating in India and the intended aims of the measures (i.e. proportionality).

               (31)

               As concerns the issue of proportionality, it should first be pointed out that in accordance with Article 8(7) of the basic Regulation, failure to comply with the obligation to provide relevant information (e.g. non-compliance with any of the reporting requirements) shall be construed as a breach of the undertaking. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 8(9) of the basic Regulation, a definitive duty shall be imposed in case of a breach of the undertaking. It is considered that these Articles underline the ‘stand alone’ importance of the reporting obligation. This is further emphasised by the clear and precise language of the undertaking itself, in which all the reporting obligations are set out.

               (32)

               This approach has also been confirmed by the jurisprudence of the Court of First Instance which has ruled that any breach of an undertaking is sufficient to justify the withdrawal of acceptance of an undertaking (7).

               (33)

               Accordingly, the arguments presented by UML with regard to proportionality do not alter the Commission's view that a breach of the undertaking has occurred.

         (c)   Developing country

               (34)

               UML also argued that as it is an exporting producer situated in India, a developing country as defined by the WTO, in accordance with Article 15 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, ‘special regard’ should be given to it and, because of this, the Commission should not withdraw acceptance of the undertaking as this was a ‘first minor issue of non-compliance’.

               (35)

               With regard to the issue of whether UML being situated in a developing country is a ground for not withdrawing acceptance of its undertaking, it should be recalled that UML is the mother company of a multi-national group of companies and one of the largest producers of the product concerned in the world. In view of the apparent competence of the management and the structure of the UML group seen by the Commission during its verification visits, it cannot be accepted that complying with a reporting requirement would create any difficulties for the company. Moreover, if a company offers an undertaking, it has to ensure that it is subsequently able to comply with the obligations arising from the undertaking. The arguments of the company on this point are therefore rejected.

         (d)   Non-preferential origin for import purposes

               (36)

               As concerns the question of the origin of the steel wire ropes exported to the Community from Dubai, made from stranded wire of Indian origin, it was submitted by UML that the goods in question did not keep Indian origin at the final processing stage (i.e. twisting and finishing of stranded wire into steel wire rope) but, instead, UAE origin was conferred on the goods by virtue of these final processes.

               (37)

               In this regard, it was argued by UML that the Commission was wrong to rely on a change in the four-digit Heading as being the only determinant factor for non-preferential origin. It was further submitted by UML that, according to Articles 24 and 25 of the Community Customs Code, a change in the four-digit Heading is only one factor taken into account and is not necessarily conclusive as local value addition to imported inputs is another vital issue. In this regard, it was submitted that the local value addition in Dubai was in excess of 25 %. Furthermore, UML also contended that determining origin of goods by reference to changes (or not) to the four-digit Heading was the Community’s negotiating position in ongoing WTO rules of origin negotiations and was ‘… not adopted Community law’.

               (38)

               It was also stated by UML that it was not aware of the non-preferential rules of origin and that when the Dubai factory was set up in 2003 it was assumed by the group’s management in Dubai and in India that steel wire ropes produced in Dubai from stranded wire of Indian origin would acquire UAE origin.

               (39)

               With regard to these arguments raised by UML on the origin of the products in question exported to the Community from Dubai, the Commission would first point out that if two or more countries are involved in the production of goods, for non-preferential origin the concept of ‘last substantial transformation’ indeed determines the origin of the goods. However, in general, the criterion of last substantial transformation is expressed in one of the following three ways, namely (i) by a rule requiring a change of tariff (sub)heading in the Harmonised System nomenclature, or (ii) by a list of manufacturing or processing operations that do or do not confer on the goods the origin of the country in which these operations were carried out, or (iii) by a value added rule.

               (40)

               In this case, steel wire ropes are one of the products covered by the rule requiring a change in the tariff (sub) heading. Therefore, as the four-digit Heading for stranded wire and steel wire ropes are the same, the transformation process carried out in Dubai does not change the Indian origin for the determination of non-preferential origin.

               (41)

               Furthermore, although it was not necessary to address the question of ‘value addition to imported inputs’ in Dubai, for the sake of good administrative order, an examination was also made of figures provided to support the submission of UML that the local value addition in Dubai was substantial. This examination showed that the actual value added in Dubai was, in any event, lower than the 25 % threshold claimed by the company, when expressed as a percentage to the ex-works price of steel wire ropes.

               (42)

               As concerns the submission of UML that the change to the four-digit Heading approach is a negotiating position of the Commission with regard to WTO origin negotiations and not adopted law, it is noted that the four-digit Heading rule is a well-established practice in applying Article 24 of the Community Customs Code. As such, it is the rule applied by the Community Institutions and the competent customs authorities of the Member States in determining the non-preferential origin of a series of products, amongst which is the product in question.

               (43)

               With regard to the statement that the company was unaware of the non-preferential rules of origin, the Commission would first of all repeat that UML is the mother company of a large multi-national operation with related production sites, distributors and sales offices situated around the world. Given the movement of raw materials, finished and semi-finished goods between member companies in the group, it appears unlikely that the company was not aware of the non-preferential rules of origin or the origin of key products produced at one of its sites. Moreover, it should be pointed out, in any event, that companies are deemed to know the applicable Code and rules and cannot invoke ignorance as a justification for non-respect of the rules in force.

               (44)

               In view of the foregoing, the Commission considers that the goods in question, exported from Dubai, were of Indian origin and should therefore have been subject to the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of steel wire ropes originating in India.

               (45)

               Accordingly, the arguments presented by the company with regard to the origin of the goods in question were not accepted and, therefore, did not alter the Commission's view that breaches of the undertaking have occurred.

         C.   AMENDMENT OF DECISION 1999/572/EC

               (46)

               In the light of the foregoing, it is considered that acceptance of the undertaking offered by Usha Martin Industries & Usha Beltron Ltd, now known as Usha Martin Ltd, should be withdrawn. Article 1 of Commission Decision 1999/572/EC accepting an undertaking from Usha Martin Industries & Usha Beltron Ltd should be amended accordingly,

         HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
   Article 1
   Acceptance of the undertaking in relation to imports of steel ropes and cables offered by Usha Martin Industries & Usha Beltron Ltd is hereby withdrawn.
   Article 2
   The table in Article 1(1) of Decision 1999/572/EC is replaced by the following table:

               Country

               Manufacturer

               TARIC additional code

               South Africa

                           Haggie

                           Lower Germiston Road

                           Jupiter

                           PO Box 40072

                           Cleveland

                           South Africa

               A023

         Article 3
   This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Done at Brussels, 22 December 2005.

            For the Commission

         Peter MANDELSON

            Member of the Commission

      (1)  OJ L 56, 6.3.1996, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2117/2005 (OJ L 340, 23.12.2005, p. 17).

      (2)  OJ L 217, 17.8.1999, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1674/2003 (OJ L 238, 25.9.2003, p. 1).

      (3)  OJ L 217, 17.8.1999, p. 63. Decision as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1678/2003 (OJ L 238, 25.9.2003, p. 13).

      (4)  See page 1 of this Official Journal.

      (5)  OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 117, 4.5.2005, p. 13).

      (6)  OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 883/2005 (OJ L 148, 11.6.2005, p. 5).

      (7)  Case T-51/96 Miwon Co. Ltd v Council [2000] ECR II-1841, paragraph 52.


title: EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 45/98/COL of 4 March 1998 on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid

text:
23. 4. 98       ¬ EN ¬               Official Journal of the European Communities                              L 120/27
                                      EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA
                        EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY
                                 EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION
                                                       No 45/98/COL
                                                      of 4 March 1998
          on the 13th amendment to the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State
                                                              aid
          THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,
          has amended the procedural and substantive rules in the field of State aid (1), adopted on 19
          January 1994 (2), as last amended on 17 December 1997 (3), as follows.
          The following rules on short-term export-credit insurance and list of marketable risk countries
          (for the purpose of application of the rules in Chapter 17A on short-term export-credit in-
          surance) shall be added to the State aid Guidelines as a new chapter, Chapter 17A, and a new
          Annex IX, respectively:
          ‘17A.     SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT INSURANCE (1)
            17A.1. Introduction
            (1)     Export subsidies directly affect competition in the market place between rival potential
                    suppliers of goods and services. Recognising their pernicious effects, the European
                    Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority have consistently condemned export
                    aid in intra-EEA trade (2). However, although EEA States’ support for their exports
                    outside the EEA can also affect competition within the EEA (3), neither the Commission
                    nor the EFTA Surveillance Authority have systematically intervened in this field under
                    the respective State aid rules of the EC Treaty (Articles 92, 93 and 94) or the EEA
                    Agreement (Article 61 and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agree-
                    ment). There have been several reasons for this. First, within the European Community
                    this area is partly governed by the provisions of the EC Treaty relating to external trade
                    (Articles 112 and 113). Secondly, it is not only competition within the Community or
                    the EEA that is affected by aid for exports to third countries, but also the competitive-
                    ness of EEA exporters vis-à-vis those of the EEA States’ trading partners, which give
                    similar aid. Finally, progress in controlling aid has been achieved in the OECD and
                    WTO.
          (1) Hereinafter referred to as the State aid Guidelines.
          (2) OJ L 231, 3. 9. 1994, p. 1; EEA Supplement to OJ 32, 3. 9. 1994.
          (3) OJ C 38, 5. 2. 1998, p. 19; EEA Supplement to OJ 5, 5. 2. 1998, p. 214.
 ---pagebreak--- L 120/28     ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                             23. 4. 98
         (2)    While the Commission has, until the adoption of the communication corresponding to
                the present rules, refrained from exercising its State aid control powers in the areas of
                export credits and export-credit insurance, work by the European Council’s Export
                Credits Group (4) and cases before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (5)
                have, in the Commission’s opinion, shown that in one area at least, that of short-term
                export-credit insurance, the actual or potential distortions of competition in the
                Community may justify action by the Commission under the State aid rules without
                waiting for progress on other fronts.
         (3)    The EEA Agreement does not provide for a common trade policy vis-à-vis third coun-
                tries and consequently does not contain provisions corresponding to those in Articles
                112 and 113 of the EC Treaty. The Agreement therefore does not restrict the freedom of
                the EFTA States, in the same way as the EC Treaty does for EC Member States, to
                promote trade with third countries, provided such measures do not affect trade between
                the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. However, as stated above, measures of
                this kind can affect competition and trade within the EEA. Furthermore, distortions of
                competition can occur not only between exporters in different EEA States in their trade
                within and outside the EEA, but also between export-credit insurers offering their
                services within the EEA. The Authority therefore considers that as concerns applic-
                ability of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article 1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveil-
                lance and Court Agreement to short-term export-credit insurance, the situation is
                similar as for the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. In other words the
                actual or potential distortion of competition and trade within the EEA calls for action
                by the Authority under the State aid rules.
         (4)    The purpose of these rules is to remove distortions of competition due to State aid in
                that sector of the export-credit insurance business in which there is competition
                between public or publicly supported export-credit insurers and private export-credit
                insurers. This commercial sector of export-credit insurance relates to the insurance of
                short-term export-credit risks on trade within the EEA and with many countries outside
                it. Such risks are termed “marketable” and will be defined in Section 17A.2. The defini-
                tion currently comprises only so-called “commercial”, as opposed to “political”, risks in
                trade within the EEA and with the majority of OECD countries, listed in Annex IX to
                these guidelines. While EFTA States have made considerable efforts to eliminate aid
                from the commercial sector of export-credit insurance, the good functioning of the EEA
                Agreement requires safeguards to ensure a level playing field in all circumstances.
         (5)    The present rules do not deal with the insurance of medium and long-term export-
                credit risks which are largely non-marketable at the present time. In that area, the
                factors which have led the Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to refrain
                from extensive use of its State aid control powers still militate against such action.
         (6)    Section 17A.2 of these rules describes the structure of the export-credit insurance
                market. As for the commercial or market sector, in which private insurers operate and
                which is covered by these rules, it distinguishes between, on the one hand, private
                export-credit insurers and, on the other hand, public or publicly supported insurers. It
                also explains why and to what extent the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement
                apply. Finally, in Section 17A.4, the Authority states what action it considers necessary
                to ensure that any remaining State aid of the types listed in Section 17A.3 is removed
                from the market sector and requests the EFTA States pursuant to Article 1(1) of Protocol
                3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to take such action, if required.
 ---pagebreak--- 23. 4. 98     ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                                 L 120/29
          17A.2. Market and non-market sectors of short-term export-credit insurance
          (1)    The report of the Council’s Export-Credit Group referred to in a footnote to paragraph
                 17A.1(2) (hereinafter referred to as “the report”), complaints to the Commission by
                 private export-credit insurers and cases before the Court of Justice of the European
                 Communities, have shown that in some Member States the same “official” export-credit
                 agencies that insure the medium and long-term risks of exporters for the account or
                 with the guarantee (6) of the State also operate for the account or with the guarantee of
                 the State in parts of the short-term export-credit insurance market where they are in
                 competition with private export-credit insurers that have no such links with the State.
                 Preliminary examination by the EFTA Surveillance Authority indicates that this is also
                 the case in two of the three EFTA States parties to the EEA Agreement, namely Norway
                 and Iceland. The “official” export-credit agencies in question may be government
                 departments, State-owned or State-controlled companies or wholly privately-owned and
                 controlled companies. For the purposes of these rules, such agencies will be termed
                 “public or publicly supported export-credit insurers”. As well as the “official” agencies
                 operating in both the medium/long and short-term fields, some privately owned and
                 controlled export-credit insurers that only provide short-term insurance may be
                 supported by their governments through guarantees or equivalent reinsurance arrange-
                 ments for some segments of their business. These insurers, too, must be categorised as
                 “public or publicly supported”. On the other hand, export-credit insurers mainly or
                 exclusively engaged in the short term that do not operate for the account or with the
                 guarantee (7) of the State for any of their business will be termed “private export-credit
                 insurers”.
          (2)    The report showed that when public or publicly supported export-credit insurers
                 operated for the account of or with the guarantee of the State on parts of the short-term
                 market where they were in competition with private insurers, they enjoyed certain
                 financial advantages which could distort competition against private insurers. In no
                 country did public or publicly supported export-credit insurers have a monopoly for
                 short-term business.
          (3)    One of the most difficult areas dealt with by the report was the provision of reinsurance
                 by the State, either directly or indirectly. The report identified reinsurance arrangements
                 which provide 100 % cover and are equivalent to guarantees as a subsidy. It is now
                 recognised that reinsurance facilities whereby the State only participates in or supple-
                 ments a private-sector reinsurance treaty may also give insurers benefiting from them an
                 advantage over private insurers not receiving such cover, thereby distorting competition.
          (4)    Despite the recent improvements made, with public or publicly supported export-credit
                 insurers increasingly hiving off their short-term business to separate companies or intro-
                 ducing separate accounting, it has been noted above that action is still needed to create
                 the desired level playing field. The first task is to identify the sector in which a compet-
                 itive market exists. The report used as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the
                 market sector, whether or not private reinsurance was available generally, rather than
                 only in individual cases. It was observed that the answer was generally “yes” for commer-
                 cial risks on non-public buyers, but that for political risks (including risks on public
                 buyers, currency transfer risks and non-commercial, catastrophe risks) the capacity
                 available was so inadequate that cover for such risks was clearly not to be regarded as a
                 market activity. On the basis of an analysis of the private reinsurance market by
                 reference to the three criteria of duration, location and nature of risks insured, the report
                 considered “marketable” risks to involve commercial risks with a risk period of normally
                 a maximum of three years for exports worldwide.
 ---pagebreak--- L 120/30      ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                                23. 4. 98
         (5)     Subsequent comments from EC Member States, EFTA States, business associations and
                 insurers indicated that generally speaking that definition was too broad. Most of those
                 submissions agreed with the report that political risks should be excluded because the
                 private reinsurance market was not large enough, and they preferred a maximum risk
                 period of two years for commercial risks. Also, it appeared to be very difficult to reinsure
                 on the private market the commercial risk of protracted default in non-OECD coun-
                 tries.
         (6)     In view of the close links between protracted default and insolvency, protracted default
                 risks being liable to turn into insolvency, and the resulting need to classify both risks in
                 the same category (marketable or non-marketable), it is prudent to exclude all commer-
                 cial risks on non-OECD countries from the definition of marketable risks and from the
                 scope of these rules for the time being. Finally, it appears that at present there are still
                 difficulties in obtaining private reinsurance of commercial risk in some OECD coun-
                 tries.
         (7)     In view of the above, “marketable” risks are defined for the purposes of these rules as
                 commercial risks on non-public debtors (8) established in the countries listed in Annex
                 IX to these guidelines. For such risks the maximum risk period (that is, manufacturing
                 period plus credit period with normal Berne Union starting point and usual credit term)
                 is less than two years.
         (8)     All other risks (that is, political, catastrophe (9) risks and commercial risks on public
                 buyers and on countries not listed in Annex IX) are considered not yet to be mar-
                 ketable.
         (9)     “Commercial risks” are defined for the purposes of these rules as:
                 — arbitrary repudiation of a contract by a debtor, that is, any arbitrary decision by a
                     non-public debtor to interrupt or terminate the contract without legitimate reason,
                 — arbitrary refusal by a non-public debtor to accept the goods covered by the contract
                     without legitimate reason,
                 — insolvency of a non-public debtor or his guarantor,
                 — non-payment by a non-public debtor or by a guarantor of a debt resulting from the
                     contract, that is, protracted default.
         (10)    The capacity of the private reinsurance market varies. This means that the definition of
                 marketable risks is not immutable and may change over time; for example, it might be
                 extended to cover political risks. The definition will therefore have to be reviewed regu-
                 larly (namely, at least once a year) by the Authority. The Authority will consult the
                 EFTA States and, if appropriate, other interested parties on such reviews. In so far as
                 necessary, changes to the definition will have to take account of the scope of EEA legis-
                 lation governing export-credit insurance, in order to avoid any conflict or legal uncer-
                 tainty.
         17A.3. Factors distorting competition between private and public or publicly
                 supported export-credit insurers
         (1)     The factors that may distort competition in favour of public or publicly supported
                 export-credit insurers insuring marketable risks include (10):
                 — de jure or de facto State guarantees of borrowing and losses. Such guarantees enable
                     insurers to borrow at rates lower than the normal market rates or make it possible
                     for them to borrow money at all. Furthermore, they obviate the need for insurers to
                     reinsure themselves on the private market,
 ---pagebreak--- 23. 4. 98     ¬ EN ¬               Official Journal of the European Communities                                L 120/31
                 — any difference in obligations, compared with private insurers, to maintain adequate
                     provisions. It should be noted than when Council Directive 73/239/EEC (11) was
                     amended by Directive 87/343/EC (12) it was understood that the exclusion of export-
                     credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by the State (Article
                     2(2) (d) of the original Directive) did not include operations in the field of short-term
                     commercial risks which public or publicly supported export-credit insurers effected
                     for their own account and not guaranteed by the State (13). This means that to insure
                     short-term commercial risks, public or publicly supported insurers must have a
                     certain amount of own funds (solvency margin, including guarantee fund) and tech-
                     nical provisions (notably an equalisation reserve) and must have obtained authorisa-
                     tion in accordance with Article 6 et seq. of Directive 73/239/EEC,
                 — relief or exemption from taxes normally payable (such as company taxes and taxes
                     levied on insurance policies),
                 — awards of aid or provisions of capital by the State. With regard to the latter, the prin-
                     ciple should be observed that, unless the State is acting as would a private investor in
                     a market economy, capital injections involve State aid (14); provision by the State of
                     services in kind, such as access to and use of State infrastructure, facilities or priv-
                     ileged information (for instance, information about debtors gathered by embassies)
                     on terms not reflecting their cost, and reinsurance by the State, either directly, or
                     indirectly via a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer, on terms more
                     favourable than those available from the private reinsurance market, which leads
                     either to under-pricing of the reinsurance or to the artificial creation of capacity that
                     would not be forthcoming from the private market.
          (2)    The types of treatment listed in paragraph 17A.3(1) give, or may give, the export-credit
                 insurers that receive them a financial advantage over other export-credit insurers. Such
                 financial advantages granted to certain enterprises distort competition and constitute
                 State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.
          (3)    Article 61(1) is applicable to all measures which grant a financial or economic advantage
                 to certain enterprises or products and involve a charge on, or a loss to public funds,
                 whether actual or contingent, and for which nothing or little is required from the bene-
                 ficiary concerned, in so far as such measures affect trade between Contracting Parties
                 and distort or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
                 production of certain goods (15).
          (4)    The financial advantages listed in paragraph 17A.3(1) in respect of marketable risks as
                 defined in paragraphs 17A.2(7) to (9) affect intra-EEA trade in services. Moreover, they
                 lead to variations in the insurance cover available for marketable risks in different EEA
                 States, thereby distorting competition between companies in EEA States and having
                 secondary effects on intra-EEC trade regardless of whether intra-EEA exports outside
                 the territories of the Contracting Parties are concerned (16). The exceptions provided for
                 in Article 61 of the EEA Agreement do not apply to aid for the insurance of marketable
                 risks. The distorting effects of such aid within the EEA outweigh any possible national
                 or common EEA interest in supporting exports. That view has been confirmed by the
                 judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, which was directly
                 concerned with the issue addressed by the present rules. The Court held that although
                 the Directive on partial harmonisation of equalisation reserves for insurance companies,
 ---pagebreak--- L 120/32      ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                                  23. 4. 98
                 which exempted export-credit insurance operations for the account of or guaranteed by
                 the State, was not unlawful, the factors distorting competition between private and
                 public or publicly supported export-credit insurers “might justify recourse to legal action
                 to penalise infringement of the provisions” (i.e. of Article 92 of the EC Treaty) (17). In its
                 judgment in Case C-44/93, the Court assumed that the advantages in question consti-
                 tute State aid and confirmed that the Commission might take action to secure their
                 withdrawal.
         17A.4. Action required to eliminate distortions of competition in short-term export-
                 credit insurance with respect to marketable risks
          (1)    State aid of the types listed in paragraph 17A.3(1), which is enjoyed by publicly
                 supported export-credit insurers for the marketable risks defined in paragraphs 17A.2(7)
                 to (9), may distort competition and would therefore be ineligible for exemption under
                 the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.
          (2)    The EFTA States are therefore requested within the meaning of Article 1(1) of Protocol
                 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement to amend, where necessary, their export-
                 credit insurance systems for marketable risks in such a way that the granting of State aid
                 of the following types to public or publicly supported export-credit insurers in respect
                 of such risks is ended before 1 January 1999:
                 (a) State guarantees for borrowing or losses;
                 (b) exemption from the requirement to constitute adequate reserves and the other
                     requirements listed in the second indent of paragraph 17A.3(1);
                 (c) relief or exemption from taxes or other charges normally payable;
                 (d) award of aid or provisions of capital or other forms of finance in circumstances in
                     which a private investor acting under normal market conditions would not invest in
                     the company or on terms a private investor would not accept;
                 (e) provision by the State of services in kind, such as access to and use of State infra-
                     structure, facilities or privileged information (for instance, information about debtors
                     gathered by embassies), on terms not reflecting their cost;
                 (f) reinsurance by the State, either directly, or indirectly via a public or publicly-
                     supported export-credit insurer, on terms more favourable than those available from
                     the private reinsurance market, which leads either to under-pricing of the rein-
                     surance cover or to the artificial creation of capacity that would not be forthcoming
                     from the private market.
          (3)    However, pending the outcome of the review mentioned in paragraph 17A.4(6), existing
                 complementary State reinsurance arrangements remain permissible for an interim
                 period, provided that:
                 — the State reinsurance is a minority element in the insurer’s overall reinsurance
                     package,
                 — where the reinsurance treaties of the insurer combine marketable and non-mar-
                     ketable risks, and any State reinsurance thus unavoidably attaches to marketable risk,
                     the level of State reinsurance for marketable risks must not exceed that which would
                     have been available from the private reinsurance market if reinsurance had been
                     sought for those risks in isolation,
                 — the State reinsurance does not act so as to enable the insurer to insure business on
                     individual buyers beyond the limits set by the participating private-market rein-
                     surers,
                 — the premium for State reinsurance demonstrably reflects the risk, is calculated using
                     commercial market techniques and, where an equivalent market premium rate is
                     available, is at least equal to that rate,
                 — the State reinsurance for marketable risks is open to all credit insurers who are able
                     to satisfy the common eligibility criteria.
 ---pagebreak--- 23. 4. 98      ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                               L 120/33
          (4)     For the purposes of complying with paragraphs 17A.4(2) to (3), public or publicly-
                  supported export-credit insurers will, at the very least, have to keep a separate adminis-
                  tration and separate accounts for their insurance of marketable risks and non-marketable
                  risks for the account or with the guarantee of the State, demonstrating that they do not
                  enjoy State aid in their insurance of marketable risks. The accounts for business insured
                  on the insurer’s own account should comply with the act referred to in point 12b of
                  Annex IX to the EEA Agreement (18).
          (5)     Furthermore, an EFTA State providing reinsurance cover to an export-credit insurer by
                  way of participation or involvement in private sector reinsurance treaties covering both
                  marketable and non-marketable risks will have to demonstrate that its arrangements do
                  not involve State aid within the meaning of paragraph 17A.4(2)(f).
          (6)     For this purpose the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in close liaison with the EFTA
                  States, will continuously, as from the publication of these rules, monitor such arrange-
                  ments on the basis of six-monthly reports submitted by EFTA States concerned and by
                  February 1999 will carry out a complete review of such arrangements. The review will
                  take into account all the knowledge and experience acquired in the mean time about
                  the operation of the short-term export-credit insurance market, and EFTA States’ inter-
                  vention therein, from the reports on implementation supplied under paragraph
                  17A.4(14) from the first of the annual reviews to be undertaken under paragraph
                  17A.4(15) and from any notifications of use of the escape clause under paragraphs
                  17A.4(8) to (13). Should the review find that the arrangements in an EFTA State involve
                  State aid, the EFTA State will be required to terminate them by the end of 1999 at the
                  latest.
          (7)     The principle that export-credit insurance for marketable risks should be provided by
                  public or publicly supported export-credit insurers only if the financial advantages listed
                  in paragraphs 17A.4(2), subject to paragraph 17A.4(3), are withdrawn from them may be
                  departed from in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (8) to (13) (escape clause).
          (8)     In certain countries, cover for marketable export-credit risks may be temporarily un-
                  available from private export-credit insurers or from public or publicly-supported
                  export-credit insurers operating for their own account, owing to a lack of insurance or
                  reinsurance capacity. Therefore those risks are temporarily considered to be non-mar-
                  ketable.
          (9)     In such circumstances, those temporarily non-marketable risks may be taken on to the
                  account of a public or publicly-supported export-credit insurer for non-marketable risks
                  insured for the account of or with the guarantee of the State. The insurer should, as far
                  as possible, align its premium rates for risks with the rates charged elsewhere by private
                  export-credit insurers for the type of risk in question.
          (10)    An EFTA State intending to use the escape clause should immediately notify the EFTA
                  Surveillance Authority of its draft decision. That notification should contain a market
                  report demonstrating the unavailability of cover for the risks in the private insurance
                  market by producing evidence thereof from two large, well-known international private
                  export-credit insurers as well as a national credit insurer, thus justifying the use of the
                  escape clause. Alternatively, evidence of unavailability of cover in the private insurance
                  market may possibly be demonstrated by means of a market report by an independent
                  consultant which the Authority considers reliable and impartial. The notification
                  should, moreover, contain a description of the conditions which the public or publicly
                  supported export-credit insurer intends to apply in respect of such risks.
          (11)    Within two months of the receipt of such notification, the Authority will examine
                  whether the use of the escape clause is in conformity with the above conditions and
                  compatible with the EEA Agreement.
 ---pagebreak--- L 120/34       ¬ EN ¬              Official Journal of the European Communities                                   23. 4. 98
          (12)     If the Authority finds that the conditions for the use of the escape clause are fulfilled, its
                   decision on compatibility is limited to two years from the date of the decision, provided
                   that the market conditions justifying the use of the escape clause do not change during
                   that period.
          (13)     Furthermore, the Authority may, in consultation with the EFTA States, revise the condi-
                   tions for the use of the escape clause; it may also decide to discontinue it or replace it
                   with another appropriate system.
          (14)     These rules will apply from 1 January 1998 until the end of the year 2002. The EFTA
                   States are requested to inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority within two months of
                   notification of these rules, whether they accept its recommendations. Furthermore, by 1
                   January 1999 at the latest, the EFTA States must inform the Authority of the action
                   they have taken to comply herewith. Should it appear either through those reports or
                   otherwise that the systems in operation in the EFTA States still involve State aid, the
                   Authority will assess such aid pursuant to Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Article
                   1 of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, in accordance with the policy
                   set out above.
          (15)     In cooperation with the EFTA States and interested parties, the Authority will review
                   the definition of marketable risks and the operation of the present rules in the light of
                   market developments and possible EEA-relevant legislation. All information received by
                   the Authority from EFTA States and interested parties in connection with such reviews
                   will, with the permission of the supplier of the information, be made available to all the
                   other participants in the review.
         (1) This chapter corresponds to the communication of the Commission to the Member States
             pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short-
             term export-credit insurance (OJ C 281, 17.9.1997, p. 4).
         (2) In its Seventh report on competition policy (1977), point 242, the European Commission
             stated that export aids in intra-Community trade “cannot qualify for derogation whatever
             their intensity, form, grounds or purpose”.
         (3) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission [1990] ECR
             I-959. See also Case C-44/93 Assurances du Crédit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829,
             paragraph 30.
         (4) “L’assurance crédit et le marché unique 1992 (court-terme)”, report presented to the coordi-
             nation group, rapporteur P. Callut.
         (5) See Case C-63/89 Assurances du Crédit and Cobac v. Council and Commission [1991] ECR
             I-1799, and Case C-44/93 Assurances du Crédit v. OND and Belgium [1994] ECR I-3829.
         (6) In some cases, medium and long-term business may be conducted not under a guarantee, but
             under a comprehensive reinsurance agreement with the government.
         (7) Or with equivalent reinsurance arrangements.
         (8) Or non-public guarantors. A public debtor or guarantor is a debtor or guarantor who, in one
             form or another, represents the public authority itself and cannot either judicially or adminis-
             tratively be declared insolvent. For the purposes of these rules, publicly-owned or publicly-
             controlled companies resident in the countries listed in Annex IX to these guidelines as a
             marketable risk country and subject to the normal provisions of private company law are
             considered to be non-public debtors/guarantors.
         (9) That is, war, revolution, natural disasters, nuclear accidents, and so forth, not so-called
             “commercial, catastrophe risks” (catastrophic accumulations of loss on individual buyers or
             countries) which may be covered by excess of loss reinsurance and are commercial risks.
 ---pagebreak--- 23. 4. 98        ¬ EN ¬               Official Journal of the European Communities                           L 120/35
          (10) The tying by a public or publicly supported export-credit insurer of insurance of non-marke-
               table risks to the acceptance of cover for marketable risks might infringe Article 54 of the
               EEA Agreement. Such action could both be the subject of proceedings by the EFTA Surveil-
               lance Authority or the Commission and challenged in the courts and before national compe-
               tition authorities.
          (11) First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations
               and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct
               insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 228, 16.8.1973, p. 3), see point 2 of Annex IX to
               the EEA Agreement.
          (12) Council Directive 87/343/EEC of 22 June 1987 amending Directive 73/239/EEC on the
               coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and
               pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance (OJ L 185, 4.7.1987, p.
               72), see third indent of point 2 of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement.
          (13) See judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-63/89, Assurances du Credit and Cobac v.
               Council and Commission, cited in footnote 5, p. 1848 (paragraph 22).
          (14) See Chapters 19 and 20 of the present State aid Guidelines.
          (15) See judgments of the Court of Justice in Case 30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority
               [1961] ECR pp. 1 to 19; Case 173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR, p. 709, Case 730/79
               Philip Morris v. Commission [1980] ECR, p. 2671.
          (16) In its judgment in Case C-142/87 Belgium v. Commission, cited in a footnote to paragraph
               17 A.1(1), the European Court of Justice held that not only aid for intra-Community exports,
               but also aid for exports outside the Community can influence intra-Community competition
               and trade. Both types of operation are insured by export-credit insurers and aid with respect
               to both can therefore have effects on intra-Community competition and trade.
          (17) See paragraph 24 of the Judgment by the European Court of Justice in Case C-63/89 cited
               in a footnote to paragraph 17 A.1(3). Advocate-General Tesauro, in his opinion in the case,
               considered that when there is competition between private and public or publicly backed
               export-credit insurers, “it is highly doubtful whether the States can legitimately provide
               financial backing for public operators. To do so might be incompatible with the rules on
               public aid . . .” ([1991] ECR I-1835, point 15).
          (18) Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the annual accounts and consoli-
               dated accounts of insurance undertakings (OJ L 374, 31.12.1991, p. 7), as adapted for the
               purpose of the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 7/94 (OJ L 160,
               28.6.1994; EEA Supplement to OJ 17, 28.6.1994).’
                                                        ‘ANNEX IX
          LIST OF MARKETABLE RISK COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLICA-
          TION OF THE RULES IN CHAPTER 17A ON SHORT-TERM EXPORT-CREDIT
                                                       INSURANCE
          Countries which are Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement
          Austria
          Belgium
          Denmark
 ---pagebreak--- L 120/36       ¬ EN ¬          Official Journal of the European Communities                      23. 4. 98
         Finland
         France
         Germany
         Greece
         Ireland
         Italy
         Luxembourg
         Netherlands
         Portugal
         Spain
         Sweden
         United Kingdom
         Iceland
         Liechtenstein
         Norway
         Other countries which are members of the OECD and which are considered to be marketable
         risk countries
         Australia
         Canada
         Japan
         New Zealand
         Switzerland
         United States of America’
         Done at Brussels, 4 March 1998.
                                                          For the EFTA Surveillance Authority
                                                                    Knut ALMESTAD
                                                                     The President


title: Council Decision of 4 June 1974 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of the Niger on the supply of maize and sorghum as food aid

text:
19 . 7 . 74                       Official Journal of the European Communities                        No L 196/ 1
                                                         II
                                     (Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
                                                 COUNCIL
                                               COUNCIL DECISION
                                                   of 4 June 1974
               on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Economic Community
                  and the Republic of the Niger on the supply of maize and sorghum as food aid
                                                    (74/354/EEC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN                                   HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS :
 COMMUNITIES,
                                                                                Article 1
 Having regard to the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, and in particular                The Agreement between the European Economic
 Articles 113 , 114 and 228 thereof;                          Community and the Republic of the Niger on the
                                                              supply of maize and sorghum as food aid, the text
Having regard to the recommendation from the                  whereof is annexed hereto, is hereby concluded on
 Commission ;                                                 behalf of the Community.
 Whereas the European Economic Community has                                        Article 2
 deposited a Declaration of provisional application of
 the 1971 Food Aid Convention ; whereas that                  The President of the Council is hereby authorized to
 Convention has been applicable since 1 July 1971 ;           designate the persons empowered to sign the
                                                              Agreement and to confer on them the necessary
 Whereas by its letter of 9 October 1973, the                 powers to bind the Community.
 Republic of the Niger has requested food aid ;
                                                              Done at Luxembourg, 4 June 1974.
 Whereas in view of the grain supply situation in
 Niger that country should be accorded, by way of
 gift, 20 000 metric tons of cereals, in the form of                                     For the Council
  15 000 metric tons of maize and 5 000 metric tons
                                                                                The President
 of sorghum under the Community Food Aid
  Programme ( Cereals) for 1973/74,                                                           J. ERTL


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31977D0455

77/455/EEC: Council Decision of 27 June 1977 amending Decision 75/365/EEC setting up a Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health

Official Journal L 176 , 15/07/1977 P. 0013 - 0013 Finnish special edition: Chapter 6 Volume 1 P. 0209  Greek special edition: Chapter 05 Volume 2 P. 0182  Swedish special edition: Chapter 6 Volume 1 P. 0209  Spanish special edition: Chapter 06 Volume 2 P. 0014  Portuguese special edition Chapter 06 Volume 2 P. 0014

COUNCIL DECISION  of 27 June 1977  amending Decision 75/365/EEC setting up a Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health  (77/455/EEC)  THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,  Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,  Whereas by its Decision 75/365/EEC (1) the Council set up a Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health with the task of identifying and analyzing any difficulties which might arise from the implementation of the Directives relating to the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services of doctors, collecting all relevant information on the conditions under which medical care is given in the Member States and delivering opinions which could guide the Commission's work on possible amendments to those Directives;  Whereas the application of the measures adopted by the Council as regards the effective exercise of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services and the coordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of the activities of nurses responsible for general care, may give rise to problems which should also be examined jointly;  Whereas it is also desirable that the problems which might face other categories of nursing personnel should be taken into consideration within this framework;  Whereas the Committee of Senior Officials on Public Health set up by Decision 75/365/EEC should be entrusted with this task;  Whereas the terms of reference of that Committee should therefore be extended,  HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:    Sole Article  Article 2 of Decision 75/365/EEC is replaced by the following:  "Article 2  The task of the Committee shall be:    - to identify and analyze any difficulties which might arise from the implementation of Directives 75/362/EEC (2), 75/363/EEC (3), 77/452/EEC (4) and 77/453/EEC (5),       - to collect all relevant information on the conditions under which general and specialist medical care is given by doctors in the Member States,       - to collect all relevant information on the conditions under which nursing care is given by nurses responsible for general care in the Member States,       - to deliver opinions which could guide the Commission's work on possible amendments to the abovementioned Directives."           Done at Luxembourg, 27 June 1977.  For the Council  The President  J. SILKIN  (1)OJ No L 167, 30.6.1975, p. 19. (2)OJ No L 167, 30.6.1975, p. 1. (3)OJ No L 167, 30.6.1975, p. 14. (4)See page 1 of this Official Journal. (5)See page 8 of this Official Journal.


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31990D0253

90/253/Euratom, ECSC, EEC: Commission Decision of 29 May 1990 adjusting the weightings applicable from 1 March 1990 to the remuneration of officials of the European Communities serving in non-member countries

Official Journal L 143 , 06/06/1990 P. 0014 - 0015

*****COMMISSION  DECISION  of 29 May 1990  adjusting the weightings applicable from 1 March 1990 to the remuneration of officials of the European Communities serving in non-member countries  (90/253/Euratom, ECSC, EEC)  THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities,  Having regard to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities laid down by Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (1), as last amended by Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 3728/89 (2), and in particular the second paragraph of Article 13 of Annex X thereto,  Whereas pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 13 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations, Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EEC) No 1051/90 (3) laid down the weightings to be applied from 1 January 1990 to the remuneration of officials serving in non-member countries payable in the currency of their country of employment;  Whereas the Commission has made a number of adjustments to these weightings in recent months, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 13 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations (4);  Whereas some of these weightings should be adjusted with effect from 1 March 1990 given that the statistics available to the Commission show that in certain non-member countries the variation in the cost of living measured on the basis of the weighting and the corresponding exchange rate has exceeded 5 % since weightings were last laid down or adjusted;  HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:  Sole Article  With effect from 1 March 1990 the weightings applicable to the remuneration of officials serving in non-member countries payable in the currency of their country of employment are adjusted as shown in the Annex.  The exchange rates for the payment of such remuneration shall be those used for implementation of the budget of the European Communities during the month preceding the date on which this Decision takes effect.  Done at Brussels, 29 May 1990.  For the Commission  António CARDOSO E CUNHA  Member of the Commission  (1) OJ No L 56, 4. 3. 1968, p. 1.  (2) OJ No L 364, 14. 12. 1989, p. 1.  (3) OJ No L 108, 28. 4. 1990, p. 1.  (4) See page 12 of this Official Journal.  ANNEX  1.2 //  //  // Country of employment  // Weightings   //  //   // Brazil   // 44,12   // Egypt   // 57,26   // Jordan  // 65,62   // Lebanon   // 31,52   // Peru   // 203,37  // Poland   // 4,85   // Somalia   // 24,18   // South Korea  // 94,17   // Syria   // 142,70   // Tanzania   // 28,40  // Uganda   // 77,31   // Uruguay   // 52,50   // Venezuela  // 56,67   // Yugoslavia   // 43,44   // Zambia   // 75,60  //    //


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31979D0846

79/846/EEC: Council Decision of 9 October 1979 appointing the members and alternate members of the Advisory Committee on Medical Training

Official Journal L 260 , 16/10/1979 P. 0012 - 0013

****( 1 ) OJ NO L 167 , 30 . 6 . 1975 , P . 17 .  ( 2 ) OJ NO L 101 , 15 . 4 . 1976 , P . 51 .    COUNCIL DECISION   OF 9 OCTOBER 1979   APPOINTING THE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL TRAINING  ( 79/846/EEC )   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ,   HAVING REGARD TO COUNCIL DECISION 75/364/EEC OF 16 JUNE 1975 SETTING UP AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL TRAINING  ( 1 ), AND IN PARTICULAR ARTICLES 3 AND 4 THEREOF ,   HAVING REGARD TO COUNCIL DECISION 76/385/EEC OF 6 APRIL 1976 APPOINTING THE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL TRAINING ( 2 ), FOR THE PERIOD 6 APRIL 1976 TO 5 APRIL 1979 ,   WHEREAS EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES HAS SUBMITTED A LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE REPLACEMENT OR RENEWAL OF THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THESE MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS ;   WHEREAS IN VIEW OF ITS SPECIAL POSITION , LUXEMBOURG WILL DESIGNATE IN PLACE OF EXPERTS FROM UNIVERSITY MEDICAL FACULTIES EXPERTS PROPOSED BY THE COMMISSION D ' HOMOLOGATION  ( STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE ) FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL DIPLOMAS ,   HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS :   SOLE ARTICLE   THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN APPOINTED MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL TRAINING FOR THE PERIOD 6 APRIL 1979 TO 5 APRIL 1982 :   A . EXPERTS FROM THE PRACTISING PROFESSION   //  //  MEMBER //  ALTERNATE MEMBER // BELGIUM : //  MR ANDRE WYNEN //  MR MARC DEKESEL // GERMANY : //  MR HANS-JOACHIM SEWERING //  MR WOLFGANG BECHTOLDT // DENMARK : //  MR ERIK HENRICHSEN //  MR MOGENS K . HANSEN // FRANCE : //  MR AUTIN //  MR POUYAUD // IRELAND : //  MR P . A . FARRELLY //  MR C . GALVIN // ITALY : //  MR ANTONIO SPINELLI //  MR BRUNO BARUCHELLO // LUXEMBOURG : //  MR MATHIAS DEMOULLING //  MR GUY MEISCH // NETHERLANDS : //  MR C . L . C . VAN NIEUWENHUIZEN //  MR J . I . VAN DER LEEUW // UNITED KINGDOM : //  MR ROGER BREARLEY //  MR J . C . CAMERON //   B . EXPERTS FROM THE MEDICAL FACULTIES OF THE UNIVERSITIES   //  //  MEMBER //  ALTERNATE MEMBER // BELGIUM : //  MR JOZUE VANDENBROUCKE //  MR ANDRE CASTERMANS // GERMANY : //  MR EDUARD SEIDLER //  MR CLAUS HINRICHSEN // DENMARK : //  MR BENT SOERENSEN //  MR JOHANNES MELCHIOR // FRANCE : //  MR RAPIN //  MR BORDE // IRELAND : //  MR P . N . MEENAN //  MR J . S . MCCORMICK // ITALY : //  MR ALESSANDRO BERETTA ANGUISSOLA //  MR RAFFAELLO CORTESINI // LUXEMBOURG : //  MR MARIO DICATO //  MR HENRI KUNTZINGER // NETHERLANDS : //  MR F . VAN FAASSEN //  MR M . T . JANSEN // UNITED KINGDOM : //  MR R . WHELAN //  MR STANLEY CLAYTON //   C . EXPERTS FROM THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES   //  //  MEMBER //  ALTERNATE MEMBER // BELGIUM : //  MR PIETER DE SCHOUWER //  MRS YVONNE ROMBOUTS // GERMANY : //  MRS MARILENE SCHLEICHER //  MR GEORG SCHOLZ // DENMARK : //  MR HANS KARLE //  MR ERNST GOLDSCHMIDT // FRANCE : //  MR DORMONT //  MR PIERRE LABROUSSE // IRELAND : //  MR A . WALSH //  MR M . P . BRADY // ITALY : //  MR CARLO VETERE //  MR VITO DI LEO // LUXEMBOURG : //  MR JOS . KOHL //  MRS PIERRETTE HUBERTY-KRAU // NETHERLANDS : //  MR N . J . DERSJANT //  MR F . A . VORST // UNITED KINGDOM : //  MR J . N . WALTON //  MR J . J . A . REID //   DONE AT LUXEMBOURG , 9 OCTOBER 1979 .   FOR THE COUNCIL   THE PRESIDENT   D . O ' MALLEY


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31992D0578

92/578/EEC: Council Decision of 30 November 1992 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the carriage of goods by road and rail

Official Journal L 373 , 21/12/1992 P. 0026 - 0027 Finnish special edition: Chapter 11 Volume 20 P. 0072  Swedish special edition: Chapter 11 Volume 20 P. 0072

COUNCIL DECISION of 30 November 1992 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the carriage of goods by road and rail (92/578/EEC)THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 75 thereof,  Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,  Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (1),  Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (2),  Whereas the agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the carriage of goods by road and rail can provide a solution to the various current problems of trans-Alpine goods traffic; whereas it is necessary to ensure  the non-discriminatory development of transit so as to enable international trade to be conducted at the least possible cost to the public at large and to reduce to a minimum the administrative and technical obstacles which affect transit;  Whereas these objectives must, at the same time, take account of respect for users' freedom of choice and aspects relating to road safety, protection of public health and the environment in Alpine regions;  Whereas the objectives and the content of the Agreement fall within the scope of the common transport policy and the technical standards play their part in attaining these objectives;  Whereas it is appropriate to lay down a procedure with a view to approving the administrative arrangements provided for by the Agreement,  HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:  Article 1  The Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the carriage of goods by road and rail is hereby approved on behalf of the Community.  The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.  Article 2  The President of the Council shall give the notification provided for in Article 21 of the Agreement.  Article 3  The administrative arrangement provided for in point II.4 of Annex 6 to the Agreement shall be approved in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4 of this Decision.  Article 4  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the representatives of the Member States and chaired by the Commission representative.  The representative of the Commission shall submit to the Commission a draft of the measures to be taken. The Committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time limit which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The  opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of the Treaty in the case of decisions which the Council is required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the  Committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that Article. The chairman shall not vote.  The Commission shall adopt the provisions envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee.  If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without delay, submit to the Official Journal of the European Communities No L 373/27 21. 12. 92 Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken. The Council shall act by a qualified majority.  If, on the expiry of a period of four weeks from the date of referral to the Council, the Council has not acted, the proposed measures shall be adopted by the Commission.  Article 5  The Commission shall adopt the necessary measures for implementing the administrative arrangement referred to in Article 3 in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 4.  Done at Brussels, 30 November 1992.  For the Council The President T. EGGAR (1) OJ No C 305, 23. 11. 1992.(2) OJ No C 313, 30. 11. 1992, p. 16.