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31998D0019

98/19/EC: Commission Decision of 6 January 1998 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea

Official Journal L 007 , 13/01/1998 P. 0047 - 0055

COMMISSION DECISION of 6 January 1998 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea (98/19/EC)THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2331/96 (2), and in particular Article 23(1) thereof,Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Economic Community (3), and in particular Articles 9(1) and 15,After consulting the Advisory Committee,Whereas:A. PROCEDURE (1) The Council, by Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 (4), imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong and terminated the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to imports of video tape reels originating in those same countries.At the same time, the Commission accepted an undertaking offered by one Hong Kong exporter, Wing Shing Cassette Mfg Ltd (5).(2) At the request of Hong Kong companies which had not exported during the original investigation period, newcomer reviews were subsequently carried out, pursuant to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation 2423/88). As a result of one of these reviews, no measures were imposed on the imports concerned; in the others, variable and ad valorem duties were imposed (6).(3) Following the publication of a notice of impending expiry of the measures in force (7), a request for a review of the Regulation imposing the anti-dumping measures was lodged by the European Chemical Industrial Council (Cefic), acting on behalf of two producers of video cassettes in the Community, allegedly representing 45 % of total Community production.Cefic claimed in its request that the expiry of the measures would lead to a recurrence of injury and that, despite the measures in force, continued and aggravated injurious effects from imported video cassettes from South Korea and Hong Kong were being felt, due to the low prices of these imports resulting from increased dumping. The evidence presented was considered sufficient, and in May 1994, the Commission gave notice of its intention to carry out a review (8).(4) It should be recalled that in 1991 anti-dumping measures were adopted with regard to the same product originating in the People's Republic of China (9).These measures expired on the grounds that the Community industry failed to cooperate in the recently conducted expiry review investigation (10).B. REVIEW INVESTIGATION (5) By a notice published in September 1994 (11), the Commission announced the initiation of a review investigation in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation 2423/88.(6) The Commission officially advised the complainant Community industry, the exporters and the importers known to be concerned and the representatives of the exporting countries, and gave the parties directly concerned the opportunity to make their views known in writing and to request a hearing.(7) The Commission sent questionnaires to the parties known to be concerned and received replies from the two Community producers on behalf of which the review request had been lodged, from three Korean exporters and from importers in the Community related to two of the Korean exporters. Only one Hong Kong exporter cooperated by submitting a questionnaire response, from which it appeared that the company had not been exporting the product concerned during the investigation period, as defined in recital 11 below. No other Hong Kong exporters sent in questionnaire replies, although a number of companies in Hong Kong indicated that they were no longer exporting video cassettes to the Community.The Commission received a submission from the Hong Kong government.(8) The questionnaire response submitted by one of the two Community producers was considered to contain insufficient information; in addition, the company failed to submit a non-confidential version of its questionnaire response. Therefore, for the determination of injury, the Commission could not take into consideration the information supplied by this producer [see also recital (17)].(9) On the basis of a request put forward by the Korean exporters, the three cooperating Korean exporters concerned and the Community industry met and exchanged views, in accordance with Article 7(6) of Regulation 2423/88.(10) During the investigation, the Commission sought and verified all information it deemed necessary for the purposes of a determination and carried out verification visits at the premises of the following companies:(a) Community producer:- BASF Magnetics, GmbH, Mannheim (Germany), and its related sales companies,- BASF Magnetics France, SA, Levallois-Perret (France),- BASF, plc, Wembley, Middlesex (United Kingdom),(hereinafter jointly referred to as BASF Magnetics);(b) Producers/exporters in the Republic of Korea:- SKC Ltd, Seoul,- Kolon Industries Inc., Seoul,- LG Electronics Inc., Seoul;(c) Importers in the Community related to Korean producers/exportersGermany:- Kolon International GmbH, Frankfurt,- SKC Europe GmbH, Frankfurt,- LG Electronics Deutschland GmbH, Willich,United Kingdom:- Kolon Industries Inc., London (branch office),- LG Electronics UK Ltd, Slough;France:- LG GoldStar France SARL, Marne La Vallée.(11) The investigation period applied in the present proceeding was from 1 July 1993 until 30 June 1994. For the purposes of establishing whether the Community industry had suffered injury caused by the imports in question, the period from 1989, the year in which the measures under review were adopted, to the end of the investigation period was analysed. However, in that analysis, account had to be taken of two factors: first, for the period before 1991, the import data are only available in weight, and it is only from 1991 that more detailed statistical information has become available in respect of imports of video cassettes in units (both in volume and value), thus permitting a better analysis of the imports and their impact. Secondly, as outlined in recital 18, a significant change in the structure of the Community industry occurred in 1991, and consequently the analysis of the performance of the Community industry could only be done in a meaningful manner using figures from 1991 onward.Consequently, the period between 1991 and the 30 June 1994 has provided the principal basis on which the existence of material injury to the Community industry has been examined.(12) The investigation exceeded the indicative period of one year mentioned in Article 7(9)(a) of Regulation 2423/88, in the main due to the voluminous data to be analysed for a commodity product such as video cassettes which are sold in many varieties (i.e. different qualities and playing lengths), and the fact that the quantity of transactions was extremely large. Furthermore, extensions were granted for replying to questionnaires upon request from various parties, including the Community industry. In addition, the Commission had to ask some parties to provide additional information on crucial issues.Another element which influenced the investigation was the change of ownership of one of the complainants, as explained below (recital 18), which could have affected the continuation of the investigation. These negotiations, which led to the sale of BASF Magnetics to the Korean KOHAP group, were started in 1996 and came to a conclusion in January 1997.C. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE PRODUCT (13) The product which is covered by this review investigation is video tape in cassettes, prepared for recording but not recorded upon (i.e. video cassettes) operating under VHS standard, falling under CN code (ex) 8523 13 00.As stated in Commission Regulation (EC) No 4062/88 (12) imposing provisional duties on video cassettes from Hong Kong and Korea, video cassettes are in general manufactured under licence from JVC (Japan Victor Company). They are used in video cameras to take video films, or in video cassette recorders to record and play back television programmes, as well as pre-recorded movies or films taken with a video camera. Video cassettes may differ in relation to the length of the tape inserted in the cassette and the quality of the tape used, but can be considered as one category of products.The investigation has shown that video cassettes produced and sold on the respective domestic market of Hong Kong and Korea and those exported to the Community from these countries have the same basic technical and physical characteristics, and have identical uses. The same is true when comparing the imported video cassettes from these countries into the Community and the video cassettes produced and sold by the Community industry. Furthermore, in terms of customer perception and sales channels, video cassettes from Hong Kong and Korea, and video cassettes sold by the Community industry are competing directly with each other.Therefore, and in line with the findings of the Regulation under review, it was found that video cassettes originating in Korea and Hong Kong and those sold in the Community by the Community industry, form a like product within the meaning of Article 2(12) of Regulation 2423/88.D. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY (14) At the time of the original investigation, the Community industry on behalf of which the complaint had been lodged, consisted of four producers. These producers were Agfa-Gevaert AG, BASF Magnetics GmbH, Magna Tonträger Produktions GmbH and PDM Magnetics.After the imposition of the measures under review, Magna Tonträger Produktions GmbH ceased production of video cassettes. The production of Agfa-Gevaert was taken over by one of the other Community producers (BASF Magnetics GmbH). Furthermore, the production of PDM Magnetics was taken over by another company, Sauerland-Kunststoffe GmbH & Co., KG (hereinafter Sauerland). As a result, of the four complainant companies in the original investigation, two remained: BASF Magnetics and Sauerland. These two producers represented some 45 % of total production of video cassettes in the Community.(15) One of the exporters claimed that, based on Article 4(5) of Regulation 2423/88, BASF Magnetics should have been excluded from the definition of the Community industry, since BASF Magnetics was itself an importer of video cassettes. It was established during the investigation, however, that imports by BASF Magnetics from one of the countries concerned had indeed taken place in the past, but at low levels and during a limited period of time. The imports of video cassettes took place on an OEM basis, and consisted of specific orders for a particular market of a Member State where price competition was most severe. The volume of the imports was small in relation to total sales (at around 4 % for one year) and had been undertaken by the Community producer in an attempt to defend itself against fierce competition, including that from low priced imports, on that particular market. No imports were made by BASF Magnetics during the investigation period.For these reasons, it was considered that BASF Magnetics should not be excluded from the definition of 'Community industry` in the sense of Article 4(5) of Regulation 2423/88.(16) Furthermore, it was claimed by Korean exporters that there was production in the Community by assemblers of video cassettes which should have been considered as part of the total production in the Community. The inclusion of this output would mean that the Community producers requesting the review would fall short of the required major proportion of Community production. However, when assessing the level of representativeness, it was considered, that the output of companies involved in mere assembly operations could not be regarded as genuine Community production. The value added in the assembly process of video cassettes is indeed limited. In addition, none of these assemblers claimed to be a Community producer. Consequently, only BASF Magnetics and Sauerland could be considered to be Community producers.One of the two above companies, i.e. Sauerland, submitted an insufficient reply to the questionnaire. Therefore, the situation of this producer could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of the injury findings. It was found that the remaining cooperating Community producer, BASF Magnetics, representing by far the largest part of the total output of these two producers.(17) On the basis of the above factors, it was concluded that for the purpose of this proceeding, BASF Magnetics, alone fulfilled the requirements of Article 4(5) of Regulation 2423/88 and thus was considered as the Community industry within the meaning of this Article.(18) It is noted that after the investigation period, on 22 January 1997, change in ownership of BASF Magnetics occurred, and BASF Magnetics became part of the Korean KOHAP group. Subsequently the name of BASF Magnetics GmbH was altered to EMTEC Magnetics GmbH. This company expressed its continued support to the review request and the ongoing investigation.E. INJURY 1. Community consumption of video cassettes (19) The most appropriate way to determine developments on the Community market was to carry out an analysis in unit terms. As regards Community consumption, it was found that figures coming from independent market research, and supplied by the Community industry, constituted the most reliable source, for two basic reasons; First, the calculation of apparent consumption was not possible, since individual sales data from other market participants could not be obtained and secondly, official import statistics present data by weight (and not in units).(20) As regards the level of consumption, it appeared that after a steady rise in preceding years, Community consumption reached a peak in 1992 at 394 million units. On the basis of data available for 1993 and 1994, it was estimated that consumption in the investigation period was at 380 million units.2. Factory relating to the imports (a) Volume and market share of imports (21) It is recalled that the information available to the Commission from Eurostat covers a CN heading which includes video tape in cassettes as well as video tape on reels. Therefore, the Communities' official import statistics cannot give a precise picture of the level of imports of video tape in cassettes taken in isolation. For this reason, it was found necessary to consider other sources of information alongside Comext, such as official export statistics from the countries concerned, and other Community import data, containing more detailed information. These other Community import data, giving individual statistics for each type of video cassettes, are only available however from 1991, and conclusions drawn on this basis can therefore only relate to the period after 1991.The Community industry claimed that the assessment of imports from Hong Kong should include imports from Macao, as these were allegedly of Hong Kong origin and were simply exported through Macao. However, an investigation conducted in 1994 by the Commission showed that the imports from Macao in question should be considered as being of Chinese origin. Consequently, there were no grounds to view imports from Macao as originating in Hong Kong.With regard to imports from both Hong Kong and Korea, it is noted that the volume of imports recorded by Eurostat under CN heading 8523 13 00 (in tonnes) dropped drastically following the imposition of the original measures in 1989 as compared to 1988: in 1988, imports from Hong Kong were at 8 289 tonnes and fell to 1 314 tonnes in 1989, i.e. a drop of 84 %. Imports from Korea were at 17 511 tonnes in 1988, compared to 11 491 tonnes in 1989, i.e. a decline of 34 %.Between 1989 and the end of the investigation period, imports form Hong Kong under the above CN code remained at a very low level, being at 1 279 tonnes in the investigation period. For Korea, imports showed in fact an increase between 1989 and 1990/1991 (from 11 491 tonnes to 20 938 tonnes), but steadily declined afterwards to 13 500 tonnes showing an overall decline of 23 % between 1988 and the investigation period.As far as the development of imports in units is concerned, it appeared on the basis of data available that imports from Hong Kong remained at low levels between 1991 and the investigation period (4,8 million units). For Korea, imports declined from 37,3 million units in 1991 to 26,7 million units in the investigation period, i.e. a fall of 28 %.(22) As mentioned above (recital 19), Community consumption of video cassettes is expressed in units, whereas official import statistics present data by weight. Since not all imports of video tape from Hong Kong and Korea under the relevant customs code necessarily consisted of video tape in cassettes, the statistics of Comext could not be used to establish market share. Consequently, in order to assess the market share of the dumped imports, the information available from the above mentioned sources regarding imports in units was used.That assessment showed that between 1991 and 1993, the market share for Hong Kong remained below 1 %, increasing to just 1,3 % in the investigation period, as a result of a slight increase in imports against a decrease in consumption. For Korea, market share decreased from 9,8 % in 1991 to 7 % in the investigation period.(23) The above evaluation of imports from the countries concerned and their market shares demonstrated that in general, imports from the countries concerned had decreased significantly over the period considered.(b) Prices of the imports Price developments (24) Given the fact that the data from Comext cover video tape in cassettes as well as video tape on reels, and the fact that these data covered a mixture of all types of video cassettes, import price data from Comext would not be meaningful.An evaluation was therefore made using the information available in units. This was based on the two types of cassettes (E-180 and E-240) which were most commonly imported and which represented the majority (more than 75 %) of the cassettes imported from the countries concerned during the investigation period.It was established for these two types of cassettes that prices of imports from Hong Kong in fact increased between 1991 and the investigation period, by 57 % for the E-180 model and by 17 % for the E-240 model. For Korea, prices of imports of the E-180 model showed a certain increase (9 %) and prices of the E-240 model remained stable.Price undercutting (25) It was examined whether the sales in the Community of video cassettes originating in Hong Kong and Korea were made at prices which undercut the prices of the Community producers. This analysis was done on the basis of sales made in three Member States which were considered representative given that their consumption of the product concerned accounted for more than two thirds of overall Community consumption.(26) It was found that for imports from Korea there was a certain amount of undercutting in two of the three Member States which were analysed, at levels varying between different types of video cassettes. For imports from Hong Kong, it was not possible to establish any particular level of undercutting as none of the exporters in Hong Kong cooperated in the investigation. Moreover, the Community industry was not able to provide any further evidence of sales on the Community market of video cassettes originating in Hong Kong, which in itself can be explained by the very low level of imports and market share held by imports from Hong Kong. Therefore, in accordance with Article 7(7)(b) of Regulation 2423/88, findings were made on the facts available to the Commission.It was considered that statistical data provided the most appropriate source of information. The import figures, which were analysed for the two types of cassette most commonly imported, showed that during the investigation period imports from Hong Kong were sold at prices very similar to those of imports from Korea. Although a higher anti-dumping duty is applicable to imports from Hong Kong, 21,9 %, as opposed to 3,8 % for Korea, it was nevertheless concluded that imports from Hong Kong were also sold at prices which to a certain degree undercut those of the Community industry.3. Factors relating to the Community industry (27) In describing the situation of the Community industry, account had to be taken of the fact that in 1991 the acquisition of Agfa by BASF AG took place. A comparison with prior years would, therefore, not be meaningful, as explained in recital 11. Given that the Community industry in the sense of Article 4(5) of Regulation 2423/88 consists of a single company, the figures relating to that company are, for reasons of confidentiality, given only in relative terms.(a) Sales volume and market share (28) Between 1991 and 1993, sales of the product concerned by the Community industry decreased by some 27 %. However, between 1993 and the investigation period, an increase of nearly 6 % was recorded. The same trend applied to its market share, which after a decrease between 1991 and 1993, rose in the investigation period by 10 index points.(b) Sales prices, turnover and profitability (29) As to the sales prices of the Community industry, a decrease of more than 20 % between 1991 and the investigation period was noted. This decrease was accompanied by a larger decrease of the cost of production. Some of this cost reduction was realised through the closing of one of the plants used for a part of video cassette production. The closure was due to a decision to outsource a particular part of the production process. Even though the Community industry had lost turnover as a result of decreasing sales and lower selling prices, it was able, as a result of important cost reductions, to achieve a significant improvement of its financial situation. From the period 1991/92, financial losses were progressively eliminated, with a situation of around break-even reached in the investigation period. However, in spite of this positive trend, the financial situation of the Community industry was still unsatisfactory in the investigation period.(c) Production, capacity and capacity utilisation (30) Taking into consideration the abovementioned acquisition by BASF AG of Agfa in 1991, an increase in total production was recorded for 1992. Between 1992 and 1993, production dropped by 19 %, but increased again between 1993 and the investigation period (by 3 %). Capacity utilisation, according to BASF Magnetics, could be adjusted in line with production requirements at any given time, resulting in a stable utilisation of the capacity available.(d) Personnel employed (31) Between 1991 and the investigation period, the Community industry reduced the workforce involved in the production and sales of video cassettes by more than 40 %. This reduction of employment was to a significant degree the result of closure of the production site referred to above, which alone led to the disappearance of more than 450 jobs.(e) Conclusion (32) The examination of the above mentioned indicators shows that negative developments occurred during the period 1991-1993. However, the situation of the Community industry has been more positive between 1993 and the investigation period, showing signs of a recovery and an improving trend. Nevertheless, in spite of the improvement, the financial position of the Community industry remained unsatisfactory, notably as regards its financial performance.F. CAUSATION (33) The Commission investigated whether the volumes and prices of the imports concerned were responsible for the situation of the Community industry, and had an impact thereon to a degree which enables it to be classified as material injury within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Regulation 2423/88. Care was taken to ensure that any effects on the situation of the Community industry caused by other factors was not attributed to the imports concerned.(34) As far as Hong Kong is concerned, imports strongly decreased from 1988 levels and, during the investigation period, held only a 1,3 % market share. As a result, it cannot, in the specific circumstances of the case, be maintained that imports from Hong Kong continued to have an impact which can be classified as material on the situation of the Community industry.(35) In respect of Korea, imports also diminished, with a market share of 7 % in the investigation period, compared with a market share of about 9,8 % in 1991. This loss of market share was, in percentage terms, stronger than that recorded for the Community industry.(36) As to the developments of import prices for video cassettes of Korean origin, a stable slightly increasing trend was observed while for cassettes originating in Hong Kong, import prices rose significantly.(37) The investigation also showed that the downward movement in BASF's sales prices was accompanied by an even stronger decrease in its costs of production, leading to an improvement of the company's financial situation.(38) As regards imports from third countries, some of them increased their import volumes substantially over the period examined. Between the year of the adoption of the measures (1989) and the investigation period, imports in particular from India, Macao, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey increased from 4 415 tonnes to 21 310 tonnes. Between 1991 and the investigation period, the number of units imported from these countries went from nearly 32 million units to 82 million units. In terms of market share, this represents a move from an 8,5 % to 21,7 %, to which the market shares of the USA (2,2 %) and of Japan (6,7 %) in the investigation period must be added. It is also important to note that an assessment for the investigation period showed that prices of imports from these countries were considerably below those of imports from Hong Kong and Korea and consequently undercutting substantially those of the Community industry.In summary, at the same time that imports from other countries were increasing, imports from Hong Kong and Korea were falling.(39) It should be noted that a number of other (non-complainant) producers exist in the Community together with a certain number of assemblers of video cassettes. None of these other producers/assemblers presented themselves in support of the request lodged on behalf of BASF Magnetics and Sauerland.On the basis of the facts available, it was determined that in the investigation period some 40 % (in terms of market share) of the Community market was supplied by imported video cassettes, with the remaining 60 % accounted for by suppliers within the Community, including the Community industry. It is therefore likely that competitive pressure from these other Community sources has played a considerable part in the price decline on the Community market, to which the Community industry was forced to align. In this respect, it should also be noted that competition from suppliers within the Community increased since Saehan Media, one of the Korean exporters subject to the measures under review, set up a production plant in Ireland in order to supply the market from within the Community.Conclusion on causation (40) In the light of the above, it is concluded that the combined imports from Hong Kong and Korea did not, in isolation, have an impact on the situation of the Community industry which can be classified as material. The fact that the Community industry did not obtain better results appears rather to be attributable to imports from other third countries and competition from other sources within the Community.G. RECURRENCE OF INJURY (41) In accordance with Article 15 of Regulation 2423/88, it was assessed whether the expiry of the measures would be likely to lead to a recurrence of injury.In the light of the following arguments and the above analysis, the following was considered:- As regards the volume of imports, the above mentioned factors show the existence of low imports from Hong Kong, and decreasing imports from Korea. In the light of this and the imports from other countries and competition from other sources, it cannot be expected that imports from Hong Kong and Korea will again increase to injurious levels should the existing measures expire. Regarding the claim of the Community industry that the potential for exports from Hong Kong could be demonstrated by imports from Hong Kong origin being shipped through Macao, this allegation could not be accepted, for the reasons outlined in recital 21.Furthermore, it is worth recalling that imports from Korea are subject to relatively low anti-dumping duties and that, although these duties have in themselves had a remedial effect, it can not be expected that their disappearance would in the foreseeable future, have a strong impact on the export behaviour of the Korean producers and lead to significantly higher quantities of imports of video cassettes originating in Korea.- As regards price depression, the limited volumes and higher prices of the imports from Hong Kong and Korea in comparison with imports from other countries, and the strong competition from other sources within the Community, do not suggest that the expiry and the anti-dumping measures concerning these two countries will have an appreciable price depressing effect on the Community market.- As to the existence of unused capacity in the countries subject to this proceeding, the statistics have shown that imports from Hong Kong have been at very low levels since the measures under review were imposed. It cannot be expected that, for this extended period of time, a significant production capacity has remained in place. This conclusion is strengthened by an analysis of Hong Kong export statistics, which show that world-wide exports from Hong Kong have strongly decreased since 1988. This is also an indication that its production capacity has also diminished. In this regard, it is noted that the estimate made by the Community industry of idle production capacity in Hong Kong of 28 million units has not been supported by evidence.As to Korean production capacity, it should first of all be recalled that production capacity fell as a result of the relocation of production by Saehan to a site within the Community. Furthermore, the investigation showed that the average production capacity utilisation of the three cooperating producers, which in the investigation period accounted for the quasi totality of exports to the Community, was above 80 %. On the basis of these factors, it is concluded that, although the unused capacity would still represent a significant amount of video cassettes, large scope for increasing production and exports does not exist. In addition, no circumstances exist, such as the imposition of anti-dumping duties by third countries, which clearly indicate that the remaining production potential would be directed towards exports to the Community. The trends in Korean exports to the Community would indeed indicate the contrary, as the investigation showed a strong decrease in the volume of imports from Korea between 1992 and the investigation period, and a decrease in its market share, a trend which is confirmed by developments in more recent years.- As regards stocks, the investigation showed that with average stocks being at slightly over 8 % of production for the co-operating Korean firms, no important excess volumes existed.(42) In view of the fact that the length of the investigation has substantially exceeded the normal time period, and in view of the changes in the structure of the Community industry mentioned in recital 18 it was deemed appropriate to assess whether the foregoing developments were sustained after the investigation period: this assessment revealed a further fall for the imports from Hong Kong to a level of 0,5 % market share in 1996 in the market of the 15 Member States and a drastic fall in imports from Korea which fell to a market share of 0,5 % in 1996 (in the Community of 15). At the same time, the Community industry showed further signs of recovery.(43) From the above factors, the conclusion is drawn that it cannot be expected that, as a result of the expiry of the current anti-dumping measures, imports originating in Hong Kong and Korea will have a renewed injurious impact on the Community industry which could be qualified as material.H. DUMPING (44) In view of the above conclusions, i.e. that imports from Hong Kong and Korea have not had an impact which can be classified as material, and the fact that a recurrence of injury as a result of a lapsing of the measures is not expected, the conditions for a continuation of the current measures have not been met. The existence or not of a particular level of dumping for imports from individual sources could not alter the conclusions reached and has, therefore, not been established.I. CONCLUSION (45) Given the above findings, it is considered that any existing injury suffered by the Community industry has not, to a degree which allows it to be classified as material, been caused by dumped imports of video cassettes from Hong Kong and Korea but by imports from other third countries and competition from non-complainant Community operators. Furthermore, as set out in recitals (41) to (43) it can not be expected that, as a result of the expiry of the current measures, there will be a recurrence of injury, or a threat of injury, caused by imports from these two countries. It is considered therefore that the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea should be terminated, and that the anti-dumping measures in force should expire forthwith. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of videocassettes originating in the People's Republic of China have expired as mentioned in recital (4) and that any discriminatory treatment of imports originating in Korea and Hong Kong should be avoided.(46) The Commission communicated its conclusions to the Community industry, which expressed its disagreement on particular points and on the conclusion reached. However, after examination of the information and arguments provided, the Commission confirms the above conclusion.(47) The Member States did not raise any objections to the termination of the review proceeding.HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:Sole Article The anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports into the Community of video tapes in cassettes, falling within CN code ex 8523 13 00 originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea is terminated.Done at Brussels, 6 January 1998.For the CommissionLeon BRITTANVice-President(1) OJ L 56, 6. 3. 1996, p. 1.(2) OJ L 317, 6. 12. 1996, p. 1.(3) OJ L 209, 2. 8. 1988, p. 1.(4) OJ L 174, 22. 6. 1989, p. 1.(5) OJ L 174, 22. 6. 1989, p. 30.(6) OJ L 343, 7. 12. 1990, p. 1;OJ L 139, 22. 5. 1992, p. 1;OJ L 182, 2. 7. 1992, p. 6.(7) OJ C 344, 22. 12. 1993, p. 3.(8) OJ C 142, 25. 5. 1994, p. 2.(9) OJ L 293, 24. 10. 1991, p. 12.(10) OJ L 304, 7. 11. 1997, p. 19.(11) OJ C 260, 17. 9. 1994, p. 10.(12) OJ L 356, 24. 12. 1988, p. 47.


title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2005 of 10 November 2015 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Afghanistan

text:
               11.11.2015

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 294/53

         COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/2005
   of 10 November 2015
   extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Afghanistan
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 22 July 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/393/CFSP (1) appointing Mr Franz-Michael SKJOLD MELLBIN as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Afghanistan. The EUSR's mandate is to expire on 31 October 2015.

               (2)

               The mandate of the EUSR should be extended for a further period of 16 months.

               (3)

               The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   European Union Special Representative
   The mandate of Mr Franz-Michael SKJOLD MELLBIN as the EUSR in Afghanistan is extended until 28 February 2017. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).
   Article 2
   Policy objectives
   The EUSR shall represent the Union and promote Union policy objectives in Afghanistan, in close coordination with Member States' representatives in Afghanistan. More specifically, the EUSR shall:

               (a)

               contribute to the implementation of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, the EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-2016 and, as appropriate, the EU-Afghan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD);

               (b)

               support Union-Afghanistan political dialogue;

               (c)

               support the pivotal role played by the United Nations (UN) in Afghanistan with particular emphasis on contributing to better coordinated international assistance, thereby promoting the implementation of the Bonn, Chicago, Tokyo and London Conference Communiqués, as well as relevant UN Resolutions.

         Article 3
   Mandate
   In order to fulfil the mandate, the EUSR shall, in close cooperation with Member States' representatives in Afghanistan:

               (a)

               promote the views of the Union on the political process and developments in Afghanistan;

               (b)

               maintain close contact with, and support the development of, relevant Afghan institutions, in particular the Government and the Parliament as well as the local authorities. Contact should also be maintained with other Afghan political groups and other relevant actors in Afghanistan, in particular relevant civil society actors;

               (c)

               maintain close contact with relevant international and regional stakeholders in Afghanistan, in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN and the Senior Civilian Representative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other key partners and organisations;

               (d)

               advise on the progress achieved in meeting the objectives of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, of the EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-2016, the EU-Afghan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) and of the Bonn, Chicago, Tokyo and London Conference Communiqués in particular in the following areas:

                           (i)

                           civilian capacity building, especially at sub-national level;

                           (ii)

                           good governance and the establishment of institutions necessary for the existence of the rule of law, in particular an independent judiciary;

                           (iii)

                           electoral and constitutional reforms,

                           (iv)

                           security sector reforms, including the strengthening of judicial institutions and the rule of law, the national army and the police force, and in particular the development of the civilian police service;

                           (v)

                           promotion of growth, namely through agriculture and rural development;

                           (vi)

                           respect for Afghanistan's international human rights obligations, including respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities and the rights of women and children;

                           (vii)

                           respect of democratic principles and the rule of law;

                           (viii)

                           fostering participation of women in public administration, civil society and, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325(2000), the peace process;

                           (ix)

                           respect for Afghanistan's international obligations, including cooperation in international efforts to combat terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and proliferation of arms and weapons of mass destruction and related materials;

                           (x)

                           facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and

                           (xi)

                           enhancing the effectiveness of Union presence and activities in Afghanistan and contributing to the formulation of the regular implementation reports on the EU Strategy in Afghanistan 2014-2016, as requested by the Council;

               (e)

               actively participate in local coordination fora such as the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, while keeping non-participating Member States fully informed of decisions taken at these levels;

               (f)

               advise on the participation and the positions of the Union in international conferences with regard to Afghanistan, and in particular on the next international Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan, to be co-hosted by the Union in Brussels, in close liaison with the Afghan authorities and the main international partners;

               (g)

               take an active role in promoting regional cooperation through relevant initiatives including the Istanbul Process and the Regional Economic Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA);

               (h)

               contribute to the implementation of the Union's human rights policy and the EU Guidelines on Human Rights, in particular with regard to women and children in conflict-affected areas, especially by monitoring and addressing developments in this regard;

               (i)

               provide, as appropriate, support to an inclusive and Afghan-led peace process leading to a political settlement consistent with the ‘red lines’ agreed at the Bonn Conference.

         Article 4
   Implementation of the mandate
   1.   The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
   2.   The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR's primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
   3.   The EUSR shall work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the relevant departments thereof.
   Article 5
   Financing
   1.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR in the period from 1 November 2015 to 28 February 2017 shall be EUR 7 625 000
   2.   The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
   3.   The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.
   Article 6
   Constitution and composition of the team
   1.   Within the limits of the EUSR's mandate and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall promptly and regularly inform the Council and the Commission of the composition of the team.
   2.   Member States, institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of personnel to work with the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to work with the EUSR. Internationally contracted personnel shall have the nationality of a Member State.
   3.   All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, the sending institution of the Union or the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate of the EUSR.
   Article 7
   Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the staff of the EUSR
   The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the mission of the EUSR and the members of the EUSR's staff shall be agreed with the host country, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.
   Article 8
   Security of EU classified information
   The EUSR and the members of his team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU (2).
   Article 9
   Access to information and logistical support
   1.   Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
   2.   The Union delegations and/or Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.
   Article 10
   Security
   In accordance with the Union's policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the EUSR's mandate and the security situation in the area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the EUSR's direct authority, in particular by:

               (a)

               establishing a specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, including specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures, governing the management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the area of responsibility as well as the management of security incidents and including a contingency and evacuation plan;

               (b)

               ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high-risk insurance, as required by the conditions in the area of responsibility;

               (c)

               ensuring that all members of the EUSR's team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the area of responsibility, based on the risk ratings assigned to that area by the EEAS;

               (d)

               ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented, and providing the Council, the HR and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress and the mandate implementation reports.

         Article 11
   Reporting
   The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.
   Article 12
   Coordination
   1.   The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union's policy objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Commission, as well as with the Union's Delegation in Pakistan. The EUSR shall provide Member States' missions and Union delegations with regular briefings.
   2.   In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the Member States' Heads of Missions and Heads of the Union delegations. They shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR shall provide the Head of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) with local political guidance. The EUSR and the Civilian Operations Commander shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.
   Article 13
   Assistance in relation to claims
   The EUSR and his staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs in Afghanistan, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.
   Article 14
   Review
   The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a progress report by the end of June 2016 and a comprehensive mandate implementation report by the end of November 2016.
   Article 15
   Entry into force
   This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
   It shall apply from 1 November 2015.

      Done at Brussels, 10 November 2015.

            For the Council

            The President

         P. GRAMEGNA

      (1)  Council Decision 2013/393/CFSP of 22 July 2013 amending Decision 2013/382/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Afghanistan (OJ L 198, 23.7.2013, p. 47).

      (2)  Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).


title: Council Decision 2005/851/CFSP of  21 November 2005  concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations

text:
               1.12.2005

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 315/20

      COUNCIL DECISION 2005/851/CFSP
   of 21 November 2005
   concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 24 thereof,
   Having regard to the recommendation from the Presidency,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               Conditions regarding the participation of third States in EU crisis management operations should be laid down in an Agreement establishing a framework for such possible future participation, rather than defining these conditions on a case-by-case basis for each operation concerned.

               (2)

               Following authorisation by the Council on 23 February 2004, the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative, negotiated an Agreement between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations.

               (3)

               The Agreement should be approved,

         HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:
   Article 1
   The Agreement between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations is hereby approved on behalf of the European Union.
   The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.
   Article 2
   The President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to sign the Agreement in order to bind the European Union.
   Article 3
   This Decision shall take effect on the day of its adoption.
   Article 4
   This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Done at Brussels, 21 November 2005.

            For the Council

            The President

         J. STRAW

         AGREEMENT

      between the European Union and Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations
      THE EUROPEAN UNION,
      of the one part, and
      CANADA,
      of the other part,
      hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parties’,
      Whereas:

                  (1)

                  The European Union (EU) may decide to take action in the field of crisis management.

                  (2)

                  The European Council at Seville on 21 and 22 June 2002 has agreed the arrangements for consultation and cooperation between the European Union and Canada on crisis management.

                  (3)

                  The European Union will decide whether third states will be invited to participate in an EU crisis management operation. Canada may accept the invitation by the European Union and offer its contribution. In such case, the European Union will decide on the acceptance of the proposed contribution of Canada.

                  (4)

                  If the European Union decides to undertake a military crisis management operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Canada may express its intention in principle of taking part in the operation.

                  (5)

                  General conditions regarding the participation of Canada in EU crisis management operations should be laid down in an Agreement establishing a framework for such possible future participation, rather than defining these conditions on a case-by-case basis for each operation concerned.

                  (6)

                  Such an Agreement should be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the European Union, and should not prejudge the case-by-case nature of the decisions of Canada to participate in an EU crisis management operation,

            HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
      SECTION I
      GENERAL PROVISIONS
      Article 1
      Decisions relating to participation
      1.   Following the decision of the European Union to invite Canada to participate in an EU crisis management operation, and once Canada has decided in principle to participate, Canada shall provide information on its proposed contribution to the European Union.
      2.   Where the European Union has decided to undertake a military crisis management operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Canada shall inform the European Union of any intention to participate in the operation, and subsequently provide information on its intended contribution.
      3.   The assessment by the European Union of Canada’s contribution shall be conducted in consultation with Canada.
      4.   The European Union shall communicate in a timely fashion the outcome of the assessment to Canada by letter with a view to securing the participation of Canada in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
      Article 2
      Framework
      1.   Canada shall associate itself with the Joint Action by which the Council of the European Union decides that the EU will conduct the crisis management operation, and with any Joint Action or Decision by which the Council of the European Union decides to amend or extend the mandate of the EU crisis management operation, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and any required implementing arrangements.
      2.   The participation of Canada in an EU crisis management operation is without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the European Union.
      Article 3
      Status of personnel and forces
      1.   The status of personnel seconded to an EU civilian crisis management operation and/or of the forces contributed to an EU military crisis management operation by Canada shall be governed by the agreement on the status of mission/forces, if available, concluded between the European Union and the State(s) in which the operation is conducted.
      2.   The status of personnel contributed to headquarters or command elements located outside the State(s) in which the EU crisis management operation takes place, shall be governed by arrangements between the competent authorities regarding the headquarters and command elements concerned and the competent authorities of Canada.
      3.   Without prejudice to the agreement on the status of mission/forces referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, Canada shall exercise jurisdiction over its personnel participating in the EU crisis management operation.
      4.   Without prejudice to the agreement on the status of mission/forces referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, Canada shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to its participation in an EU crisis management operation, from or concerning any of its personnel.
      5.   In case of death, injury, loss or damage to natural or legal persons from the State(s) in which the operation is conducted, Canada shall, when its liability has been established, pay compensation under the conditions foreseen in the agreement on status of mission/forces, if available, as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
      6.   Canada undertakes to make a declaration as regards the waiver of claims against any State participating in an EU crisis management operation in which Canada participates, and to do so when signing this Agreement. A model for such a declaration is set out in the Annex to this Agreement.
      7.   The European Union undertakes to ensure that Member States make a declaration as regards the waiver of claims against Canada, when it is participating in an EU crisis management operation, and to do so when signing this Agreement. A model for such a declaration is set out in the Annex to this Agreement.
      Article 4
      Classified information
      1.   Canada shall ensure that, when EU classified information is handled by Canadian personnel in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation, Canadian personnel respect the basic principles and minimum standards of the Council of the European Union’s security regulations, contained in Council Decision 2001/264/EC (1). Canada shall also ensure that Canadian personnel respect further guidance concerning EU classified information issued to them by competent authorities, including by the EU Operation Commander in the context of an EU military crisis management operation or by the EU Head of Mission in the context of an EU civilian crisis management operation, without prejudice to Articles 6(2) and 10(2).
      2.   If the EU receives classified information from Canada, that information shall be given protection appropriate to its classification and equivalent to the standards established in the regulations for EU classified information.
      3.   Where the EU and Canada have concluded an Agreement on security procedures for the exchange of classified information, the provisions of that Agreement shall apply in the context of an EU crisis management operation.
      SECTION II
      PROVISIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
      Article 5
      Personnel seconded to an EU civilian crisis management operation
      1.   Canada shall ensure that its personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation undertake their mission in conformity with:

                  (a)

                  the Joint Action and subsequent amendments as referred to in Article 2(1) of this Agreement;

                  (b)

                  the operation plan;

                  (c)

                  implementing measures.

            2.   Canada shall inform in due time the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union of any change to its contribution to the EU civilian crisis management operation.
      3.   Personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation shall undergo a medical examination, vaccination as may be deemed necessary by the competent Canadian authority, and be certified medically fit for duty by a competent authority from Canada. Personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation shall produce a copy of this certification.
      Article 6
      Chain of command
      1.   Personnel seconded by Canada shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the EU civilian crisis management operation in mind, without prejudice to paragraph 2.
      2.   All personnel shall remain under the full command of their national authorities.
      3.   National authorities shall transfer operational control to the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission, who shall exercise that authority through a hierarchical structure of command and control.
      4.   The Head of Mission shall lead the EU civilian crisis management operation and assume its day-to-day management.
      5.   Canada shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as European Union Member States taking part in the operation, in accordance with the legal instruments referred to in Article 2(1) of this Agreement.
      6.   The EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over EU civilian crisis management operation personnel. Where required, disciplinary action shall be taken by the national authority concerned.
      7.   A National Contingent Point of Contact (NPC) shall be appointed by Canada to represent its national contingent in the operation. The NPC shall report to the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission on national matters affecting the operation and shall be responsible for day-to-day contingent discipline.
      8.   The decision to end the operation shall be taken by the European Union, following consultation with Canada, provided that Canada is still participating in the EU civilian crisis management operation at the date of the adoption of the decision on termination of the operation.
      Article 7
      Financial aspects
      Canada shall assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operation apart from the costs, which are subject to common funding, as set out in the operational budget of the operation. This shall be without prejudice to Article 8.
      Article 8
      Contribution to operational budget
      1.   Canada shall contribute to the financing of the operational budget of the EU civilian crisis management operation, subject to paragraph 3.
      2.   Any financial contribution of Canada to the operational budget shall be the lower amount of the following two alternatives:

                  (a)

                  that share of the reference amount which is in proportion to the ratio of its GNI to the total of the GNIs of all States contributing to the operational budget of the operation; or

                  (b)

                  that share of the reference amount for the operational budget which is in proportion to the ratio of the number of its personnel participating in the operation to the total number of personnel of all States participating in the operation.

            3.   The European Union shall, in principle, exempt Canada from financial contributions to a particular EU civilian crisis management operation when the European Union decides that Canada’s participation in the operation provides a significant contribution which is essential for this operation.
      4.   Where appropriate, an arrangement on the practical modalities of the payment shall be concluded between the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission and the relevant administrative services of Canada on the contributions of Canada to the operational budget of the EU civilian crisis management operation. This arrangement shall, inter alia, include the following provisions:

                  (a)

                  the amount concerned;

                  (b)

                  the arrangements for payment of the financial contribution;

                  (c)

                  the auditing procedure.

            5.   Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, Canada shall not make any contribution towards the financing of per diem allowances paid to personnel of the European Union Member States.
      SECTION III
      PROVISIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
      Article 9
      Participation in the EU military crisis management operation
      1.   Canada shall ensure that its forces and personnel participating in the EU military crisis management operation undertake their mission in conformity with:

                  (a)

                  the Joint Action and subsequent amendments as referred to in Article 2(1) of this Agreement;

                  (b)

                  the operation plan;

                  (c)

                  implementing measures.

            2.   Canada shall inform the EU Operation Commander in due time of any change to its participation in the operation.
      Article 10
      Chain of command
      1.   Personnel seconded by Canada shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interest of the EU military crisis management operation in mind, without prejudice to paragraph 2.
      2.   All forces and personnel participating in the EU military crisis management operation shall remain under the full command of their national authorities.
      3.   National authorities shall transfer the Operational and Tactical command and/or control of their forces and personnel to the EU Operation Commander. The EU Operation Commander is entitled to delegate his/her authority.
      4.   Canada shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of the day-to-day management, of the operation as participating European Union Member States, in accordance with the legal instruments referred to in Article 2(1) of this Agreement.
      5.   The EU Operation Commander may, following consultations with Canada, at any time request the withdrawal of Canada’s contribution.
      6.   A Senior Military Representative (SMR) shall be appointed by Canada to represent its national contingent in the EU military crisis management operation. The SMR shall consult with the EU Force Commander on all matters affecting the operation and shall be responsible for day-to-day contingent discipline.
      Article 11
      Financial aspects
      Without prejudice to Article 12, Canada shall assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operation unless the costs are subject to common funding as provided for in the legal instruments referred to in Article 2(1) of this Agreement, as well as in Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (2).
      Article 12
      Contribution to the common costs
      1.   Canada shall contribute to the financing of the common costs of the EU military crisis management operation, subject to paragraph 3.
      2.   Any financial contribution of Canada to the common costs shall be the lower amount of the following two alternatives:

                  (a)

                  that share of the reference amount for the common costs which is in proportion to the ratio of its GNI to the total of the GNIs of all States contributing to the common costs of the operation; or

                  (b)

                  that share of the reference amount for the common costs which is in proportion to the ratio of the number of its personnel participating in the operation to the total number of personnel of all States participating in the operation.

            In calculating 2(b), where Canada contributes personnel only to the Operation or Force Headquarters, the ratio used shall be that of its personnel to that of the total number of the respective headquarters personnel. Otherwise, the ratio shall be that of all personnel contributed by Canada to that of the total personnel of the operation.
      3.   The European Union shall, in principle, exempt Canada from financial contributions to the common costs of a particular EU military crisis management operation when the European Union decides that Canada’s participation in the operation provides a significant contribution to assets and/or capabilities which are essential for this operation.
      4.   Where appropriate, an arrangement shall be concluded between the Administrator provided for in Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications, and the competent administrative authorities of Canada. This arrangement shall include, inter alia, provisions on:

                  (a)

                  the amount concerned;

                  (b)

                  the arrangements for payment of the financial contribution;

                  (c)

                  the auditing procedure.

            SECTION IV
      FINAL PROVISIONS
      Article 13
      Arrangements to implement this Agreement
      Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 8(4) and 12(4), any necessary technical and administrative arrangements in pursuance of the implementation of this Agreement shall be concluded between the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the appropriate authorities of Canada.
      Article 14
      Non compliance
      Should one of the Parties fail to comply with its obligations laid down in this Agreement, the other Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by serving a notice of one month.
      Article 15
      Dispute settlement
      Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by diplomatic means between the Parties.
      Article 16
      Entry into force
      1.   This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the first month after the Parties have notified each other of the completion of the internal procedures necessary for this purpose.
      2.   This Agreement shall be subject to review not later than 1 June 2008, and subsequently at least every three years.
      3.   This Agreement may be amended on the basis of mutual written agreement between the Parties.
      4.   This Agreement may be denounced by one Party by written notice of denunciation given to the other Party. Such denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of notification by the other Party.
      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, have signed this Agreement.

         Done in duplicate at Brussels, on the twenty-fourth day of November in the year two thousand and five, in the English and French languages, each version being equally authentic.

               For the European Union

               For Canada

         (1)  OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. Decision as amended by Decision 2004/194/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 48).

         (2)  OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 68. Decision as last amended by Decision 2005/68/CFSP (OJ L 27, 29.1.2005, p. 59).

         ANNEX
         TEXT OF DECLARATIONS
         Declaration by the EU Member States
         The EU Member States applying an EU Joint Action on an EU crisis management operation in which Canada participates will endeavour, insofar as their internal legal systems so permit, to waive on a reciprocal basis, as far as possible, claims against Canada for injury, death of their personnel, or damage to, or loss of, any assets owned by themselves and used by the EU crisis management operation if such injury, death, damage or loss:

                     —

                     was caused by personnel from Canada in the execution of their duties in connection with the EU crisis management operation, except in case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct, or

                     —

                     arose from the use of any assets owned by Canada, provided that the assets were used in connection with the operation and except in case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct of EU crisis management operation personnel from Canada using those assets.

               Declaration by Canada
         Canada associating itself with an EU Joint Action on an EU crisis management operation will endeavour, insofar as its internal legal system so permits, to waive on a reciprocal basis, as far as possible, claims against any other State participating in the EU crisis management operation for injury, death of its personnel, or damage to, or loss of, any assets owned by itself and used by the EU crisis management operation if such injury, death, damage or loss:

                     —

                     was caused by personnel in the execution of their duties in connection with the EU crisis management operation, except in case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct, or

                     —

                     arose from the use of any assets owned by States participating in the EU crisis management operation, provided that the assets were used in connection with the operation and except in case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct of EU crisis management operation personnel using those assets.


Avis juridique important

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31996D0817(01)

European Parliament Decision of 17 July 1996 setting up a temporary commitee of inquiry

Official Journal C 239 , 17/08/1996 P. 0001 - 0004

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISIONof 17 July 1996setting up a temporary  commitee of inquiry(96/C  239/01)The European Parliament, - having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 138c  thereof, - having regard to the decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19  April 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of  inquiry  (1), - having regard to Rule 136 of its Rules of Procedure- having regard to the request, appended to  this Decision, by more than one quarter of its Members for a temporary committee of inquiry to be  set up to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of  Community law in relation to BSE, - having regard to the legal actions which, according to its information, have been brought before  Community and national courts, - having regard to the interim orders issued by the Presidents of the Court of Justice and the  Court of First Instance on 12 and 13 July 1996 in Cases C-180/96R and T-76R respectively, - having regard to the proposal of the conference of Presidents of 17 July 1996 concerning the  request referred to above, 1.  Decides to set up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged  contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to BSE,  without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the national and Community courts; 2.  Decides that the temporary committee of inquiry shall submit a report to Parliament within  three months of the publication of this Decision in the Official Journal of the European  Communities; 3.  Decides that the temporary committee of inquiry shall consist of 19 members. (1) OJ No L 113, 19. 5. 1995, p. 2.   ANNEX Request for the setting up of a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate  alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to  bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) Pursuant to Article 138c of the EC Treaty, the undersigned  members request the setting up of a committee of inquiry with a view to investigating alleged  contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law in relation to BSE1.  Subject of the inquiry1.1. The BSE problemBSE, the so-called 'mad-cow disease` was identified for  the first time in the United Kingdom in 1986. Since 1988, more than 160  000 confirmed cases of BSE  have been identified in British herds, according to figures supplied by the Unitd Kingdom in May  1996. Cases of BSE have also been reported in France, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland. A number of preventive measures have been enacted in the United Kingdom since 1988 and at the level  of the Union since 1990. Since 1990 the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions related to BSE and has made a  number of proposals with a view to eradication of the disease  (1). In March 1996, the independent body advising the United Kingdom Government on matters related to  BSE published new information on the recent appearance of certain atypical cases of  Creutzfeld-Jakob disease in the United Kingdom and stated that in the absence of any credible  alternative, the most likely explanation was at present that these cases are linked to exposure to  BSE. On 22 March 1996, the Scientific Veterinary Committee of the European Union recognized the need to  review the adequacy of the current Community measures in the light of the new information; the  Committee also recognized that the risk of spread of BSE could be further reduced by excluding from  the food chain animals most likely to have been exposed to infection. On 27 March 1996, the Commission adopted Decision 96/239/EC which prohibits exports from the United  Kingdom to the other Member States and non-member countries of live bovine animals, meat of bovine  animals slaughtered in the United Kingdom, a number of products obtained from bovine animals  slaughtered in the United Kingdom as well as bone meal. On this occasion, the Commission stated  that the risk of transmission of BSE to man could not be excluded. On 11 June 1996, the preventive measures imposed by Commission Decision 96/239/EC were partially  relaxed. The export ban with regard to bovine semen was lifted. On other products (essentially  gelatine and tallow) the lifting of the export ban was made subject to the application of certain  manufacturing measures. This new decision also requires the Commission to carry out Community  inspections, before exports of tallow or gelatine may be resumed. On 16 July 1996, following and invitation by the European Parliament, the President of the  Commission, Jacques Santer, and the Commissioner responsible for Agriculture, Franz Fischler, made  declarations on the Commission's information policy on BSE since 1988 and measures it has taken to  ensure compliance with the export ban and to eradicate the disease. 1.2. Current problemsThere are significant indications that the BSE problem has not been managed  with the necessary vigilance by the Commission or the national authorities in their responsiblity  for monitoring the activities of economic operators and that the measures and initiatives taken  have not proved sufficient to protect the health of the public in the European Union and  effectively to combat 'mad-cow disease`. - According to an internal Commission document published in the press the Commission underestimated  its duty to inform the Member States in an appropriate manner about the risks connected with BSE  and encouraged one Member State no longer to publish its research findings. - Recent press revelations indicate that the export ban imposed by the Commission on 27 March 1996  has not been observed by certain Member States. The Commission, in cooperation with the Member  States, is currently carrying out investigations to shed light on these allegations. - Although the British Government banned the sale, in July 1988, of feeding stuffs for ruminants  containing ruminant protein, the Council did not adopt the first measures in this connection until  1990. Moreover, the European Parliament had called on the Commission as early as 1990 to bring  forward a proposal with a view to prohibiting the use as animal feed of animal protein recycled  from carcases  (1). - Further to a technological change in the manufacturing process of meal of animal origin, the  disease seems to have appeared without the Member States or the Commisison taking the precaution of  effectively ascertaining the harmlessness of these new processes and the practices of the  businesses concerned. 1.3. The aim of the temporary committee of inquiryThe aim of the temporary committee of inquiry is  to establish the facts about these allegations and the implications for the various authorities and  operators without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and national courts. The  Commission may, where appropriate, formulate recommendations as provided in Article 4 (3) of the  decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995 on the  detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry and in  Rule 136 (10) of Parliament's Rules of Procedure. 2. Explanatory statement2.1. Attitude of the Commission towards the dissemination of information  about BSEIn the abovementioned internal Commission document the conclusion is drawn that it is  necessary to 'practice disinformation` with regard to BSE and that 'it was better to say that the  press has a tendency to exaggerate`. The committee of inquiry will investigate whether and to what  extent this attitude was generally characteristic of the action taken by the Commission and the  relevant Member States with regard to the real data relating to the spread of BSE and to their  duties from the point of view of Community law as regards the protection of the health of European  consumers and the necessary checks on the relevant products within the internal market. It will also consider the implications and repercussions on the Member States' administrations and  the national supervisory and research departments. 2.2. Publication of research findings about BSEThe committee of inquiry will verify whether the  Member States' administrations, individuals or other bodies were the subject of enticements or  recommendations to the effect that they should not disclose the information in their possession  about the nature and seriousness of the disease and the development of relevant scientific  knowledge. 2.3. Controls on the production and exports of recycled animal proteinIn July 1988 the British  Government prohibited the sale of cattle feed containing cattle protein. Subsequently the United  Kingdom reportedly continued to export animal protein recycled from carcases to the other Member  States and to third countries. These exports, to France in particular, allegedly increased  substantially after the use of these animal proteins was prohibited on the British market. The committee of inquiry will check the measures taken to control the quality and distribution of  animal feed by the competent departments in the Commission and the Member States following the  introduction of new manufacturing processes for meal of animal origin in the United Kingdom and in  other Member States. 2.4. Controls on the temporary ban on exports of cattle, beef and meat-based productsThe  Commission's decision of March 1996 to ban the export of beef from the United Kingdom to other  Member States and to third countries is apparently not being observed. The committee of inquiry  will review the effectiveness of administrative checks at Member State level. 3. Brief of the temporary committee of inquiryThe temporary committee of inquiry will be set up in  order to clarify the nature and causes of the alleged contravention or maladministration of the  application of Community law by the competent authorities of the European Union and the Member  States with regard to BSE, without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Community and national  courts. It will identify any malfunctioning and will formulate conclusions in the light of the requirements  of public health. It will recommend improvements as regards in particular: - the transparency of the policy to combat BSE through the widest possible dissemination of  relevant research data and findings, - the procedures for monitoring the ban on exports of the products in question, - the adoption of all relevant measures for the protection of public health and the restoration of  the smooth operation of the markets. 4. Duration of the temporary committee of inquiryThe temporary committee of inquiry will submit  its report within three months of the publication of the European Parliament's decision setting up  the committee.(1) Minutes of 6. 6. 1996, Part II, Item 11; OJ No C 117, 22. 4. 1996, p. 55; OJ No C 42, 15. 2. 1993, p. 273; OJ No C 175, 16. 7. 1990, p. 173.  (1) OJ No C 175, 16. 7. 1990, p. 173.


title: EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 185/16/COL of 12 October 2016 approving the Network Performance Plan for the second reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme (2015-2019) [2017/134]

text:
               26.1.2017

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 21/116

         EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION
   No 185/16/COL
   of 12 October 2016
   approving the Network Performance Plan for the second reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme (2015-2019) [2017/134]
   THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,
   Having regard to the act referred to at point 66t of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky, as amended), as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto, and in particular Article 11(1) thereof,
   Having regard to the act referred to at point 66xf of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013 of 3 May 2013 laying down a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions), as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto, and in particular Article 6(d) thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               In accordance with the act referred at point 66wn of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Commission Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 of 7 July 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of air traffic management (ATM) network functions and amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010), the Network Manager is to contribute to the implementation of the performance scheme.

               (2)

               In accordance with the Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013, the Network Manager drew up the Network Performance Plan for the second reference period of the Single European sky performance scheme (2015-2019).

               (3)

               The Network Performance Plan has been assessed against the Union-wide performance targets (1) and, mutatis mutandis, the criteria laid down in Annex IV to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013, as well as other requirements of that Regulation.

               (4)

               The assessment has shown that the Network Performance Plan is in accordance with those targets, criteria and requirements. In particular, as regards the key performance areas of safety, environment and capacity, the targets set out in the plan are equal to the respective Union-wide targets and they are consequently consistent with those Union-wide targets. As regards the key performance area of cost-efficiency, the targets set out in the plan are also consistent with the Union-wide targets, given that the trend of determined unit cost reduction is above the Union-wide target.

               (5)

               It is therefore appropriate for the EFTA Surveillance Authority to approve the final version of the Network Performance Plan, in its edition of June 2015, as drawn up by the Network Manager,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   The Network Performance Plan for the second reference period of the Single European Sky performance scheme (2015-2019), in its edition of June 2015, as submitted by the Network Manager, is approved.
   Article 2
   This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Done at Brussels, 12 October 2016.

            For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

         Sven Erik SVEDMAN

            President

         Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

            College Member

      (1)  The act referred to at point 66xe of Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (Commission Implementing Decision 2014/132/EU of 11 March 2014 setting the Union-wide performance targets for the air traffic management network and alert thresholds for the second reference period 2015-19).


title: Council Decision of 15 November 2013 appointing two members and three alternates of the Administrative Board of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators

text:
               19.11.2013

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/8

         COUNCIL DECISION
   of 15 November 2013
   appointing two members and three alternates of the Administrative Board of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
   2013/C 337/07
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
   Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (1), and in particular Article 12 thereof,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 provides that the Council is to appoint five members and their alternates to the Administrative Board of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.

               (2)

               In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, a member of the Administrative Board is not to be a member of the Board of Regulators and the members of the Administrative Board are to act independently and objectively in the public interest.

               (3)

               By Decision of 22 December 2009 (2), the Council appointed to the Administrative Board three members and three alternates for six years, and two members and two alternates for four years.

               (4)

               Following the expiry of the four-year mandates of two members and two alternates, and the resignation of one alternate from his six-year mandate, two members and three alternates should be appointed to replace them,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   The following persons shall be appointed members of the Administrative Board of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators for a period of four years from 28 January 2014:

               —

               Guy LENTZ, Luxembourg,

               —

               Jochen PENKER, Austria.

         Article 2
   The following persons shall be appointed alternate members of the Administrative Board of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators for a period of four years from 28 January 2014:

               —

               Detlef DAUKE, Germany,

               —

               Pal KOVACS, Hungary,

               —

               Romas SVEDAS, Lithuania.

         Article 3
   This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

      Done at Brussels, 15 November 2013.

            For the Council

            The President

         R. ŠADŽIUS

      (1)  OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 1.

      (2)  OJ C 21, 28.1.2010, p. 1.


title: 2014/102/EU: Council Decision of 28 January 2014 on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (2013-2018)

text:
               22.2.2014

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 54/1

      COUNCIL DECISION

   of 28 January 2014
   on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (2013-2018)
   (2014/102/EU)
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 43, in conjunction with Article 218(6)(a) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
   Having regard to the consent of the European Parliament,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 17 March 2008, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 242/2008 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (1) (hereinafter the ‘Partnership Agreement’).

               (2)

               The Union has negotiated a new Protocol with the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire granting Union vessels fishing opportunities in waters in which the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire exercises its sovereignty or jurisdiction with respect to fishing (hereinafter the ‘new Protocol’).

               (3)

               The new Protocol was signed on the basis of Council Decision 2013/303/EU (2), and will be provisionally applied as from 1 July 2013.

               (4)

               The new Protocol should be concluded,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   The Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (2013-2018) (hereinafter the ‘new Protocol’) is hereby approved on behalf of the Union (3).
   Article 2
   The President of the Council shall, on behalf of the Union, give the notification provided for in Article 14 of the new Protocol (4).
   Article 3
   This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

      Done at Brussels, 28 January 2014.

            For the Council

            The President

         G. STOURNARAS

      (1)  OJ L 75, 18.3.2008, p. 51.

      (2)  OJ L 170, 22.6.2013, p. 1.

      (3)  The new Protocol has been published in OJ L 170, 22.6.2013, p. 2, together with the decision on signature.

      (4)  The date of entry into force of the new Protocol will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by the General Secretariat of the Council.