title: 2010/521/EU: Decision of the European Parliament of 5 May 2010 on the closure of the accounts of the European Chemicals Agency for the financial year 2008

text:
               25.9.2010

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 252/150

         DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   of 5 May 2010
   on the closure of the accounts of the European Chemicals Agency for the financial year 2008
   (2010/521/EU)
   THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
   having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Chemicals Agency for the financial year 2008,
   having regard to the Court of Auditors’ report on the annual accounts of the European Chemicals Agency for the financial year 2008, together with the Agency’s replies (1),
   having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 16 February 2010 (5827/2010 — C7-0061/2010),
   having regard to Article 276 of the EC Treaty and Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
   having regard to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (2), and in particular Article 185 thereof,
   having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) establishing a European Chemicals Agency, and in particular Article 97 thereof,
   having regard to Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 19 November 2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (4), and in particular Article 94 thereof,
   having regard to Rule 77 of, and Annex VI to, its Rules of Procedure,
   having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinion of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (A7-0089/2010),

               1.

               Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Chemicals Agency for the financial year 2008;

               2.

               Instructs its President to forward this Decision to the Executive Director of the European Chemicals Agency, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

            The President

         Jerzy BUZEK

            The Secretary-General

         Klaus WELLE

      (1)  OJ C 304, 15.12.2009, p. 33.

      (2)  OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

      (3)  OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1.

      (4)  OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 72.


Avis juridique important

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31990D0499

90/499/EEC: Commission Decision of 1 October 1990 making an initial allocation to Denmark of part of the resources to be charged to the 1991 budget year for the supply of food from intervention stocks to designated organizations for distribution to the most deprived persons in the Community

Official Journal L 277 , 09/10/1990 P. 0042 - 0042

COMMISSION DECISION  of 1 October 1990  making an initial allocation to Denmark of part of the resources to be charged to the 1991 budget year for the supply of food from intervention stocks to designated organizations for distribution to the most  deprived persons in the Community  (90/499/EEC) THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,  Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,  Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3730/87 of 10 December 1987 laying down the general rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks to the most deprived persons in the Community (1),  Having regard to Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3744/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the detailed rules for the supply of food from intervention stocks to the most deprived persons in the Community (2), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2736/89  (3), and in particular Article 2 (3) thereof,  Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 1676/85 of 11 June 1985 on the value of the unit of account and the conversion rates to be applied for the purposes of the common agricultural policy (4), as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2205/90 (5),  and in particular Article 2 (4) thereof,  Whereas on 10 September 1990, Denmark requested Commission authorization to initiate already in 1990 the action on its territory to be financed by resources chargeable to the 1991 budget and indicated the quantities of produce that it wished to  distribute, whereas it is desirable to initiate the scheme now in Denmark by making an allocation to that country, whereas this allocation shall not exceed 50 % of the resources allocated by Commission decision to Denmark in respect of the plan for  1990;  Whereas in order to facilitate the implementation of this scheme it is necessary to specify the rate of exchange to be employed in converting the ecu into the national currency and to do so at a rate which reflects economic reality,  HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:    Article 1   1. The allocation for Denmark of the appropriations referred to in Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3744/87 to be charged to the 1991 budget shall be ECU 590 000.  This sum shall be converted into national currency at the rate applicable on 3 January 1990 and published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Communities.  2. Subject to the limit set out in paragraph 1, the following quantities of produce may be withdrawn from intervention for distribution in Denmark:  - 20 tonnes of butter,  - 250 tonnes of beef.  3. The withdrawals referred to in paragraph 2 may be made from 1 October 1990.  Article 2   This Decision is addressed to the Member States.   Done at Brussels, 1 October 1990.  For the Commission   Ray MAC SHARRY   Member of the Commission   (1) OJ No L 352, 15. 12. 1987, p. 1.  (2) OJ No L 352, 15. 12. 1987, p. 33.  (3) OJ No L 263, 9. 9. 1989, p. 19.  (4) OJ No L 164, 24. 6. 1985, p. 1.  (5) OJ No L 201, 31. 7. 1990, p. 9.


title: 2002/262/: EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision No 262/02/COL of  18 December 2002  amending for the thirty-fifth time the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid by introducing new guidelines relating to the methodology for analysing state aid linked to stranded costs

text:
               25.5.2006

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 139/1

      EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

   No 262/02/COL
   of 18 December 2002
   amending for the thirty-fifth time the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid by introducing new guidelines relating to the methodology for analysing state aid linked to stranded costs
   THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY,
   HAVING REGARD TO the Agreement on the European Economic Area (1), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 thereof,
   HAVING REGARD TO the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (2), in particular to Article 24 and Article 1 of Protocol 3 thereof,
   WHEREAS under Article 24 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall give effect to the provisions of the EEA Agreement concerning State aid,
   WHEREAS under Article 5(2)(b) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall issue notices or guidelines on matters dealt with in the EEA Agreement, if that Agreement or the Surveillance and Court Agreement expressly so provides or if the EFTA Surveillance Authority considers it necessary,
   RECALLING the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid (3) adopted on 19 January 1994 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority (4),
   WHEREAS, on 26 July 2001, the European Commission adopted a Communication setting out the principles on which it will analyse State aid linked to stranded costs in the electricity sector (5),
   WHEREAS this Communication is also of relevance for the European Economic Area,
   WHEREAS a uniform application of the EEA State aid rules is to be ensured throughout the European Economic Area,
   WHEREAS, according to point II under the heading ‘GENERAL’ at the end of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Surveillance Authority is to adopt, after consultation with the Commission, acts corresponding to those adopted by the EC Commission, in order to maintain equal conditions of competition,
   HAVING consulted the European Commission,
   RECALLING that the EFTA Surveillance Authority has consulted the EFTA States in a multilateral meeting on 19 October 2001 on the subject,
   HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

               1.

               The State Aid Guidelines shall be amended by adding a new Chapter 21; Methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs. The new chapter is contained in Annex I to this Decision.

               2.

               The EFTA States shall be informed by means of a letter, including a copy of the Decision and Annex I. The EFTA States shall be requested to signify their agreement to the proposed appropriate measure (reporting obligation in point 21.4.(5)(c)) as set out in Annex I within 20 working days from the date on which the letter is notified to them.

               3.

               The European Commission shall be informed, in accordance with point (d) of Protocol 27 of the EEA Agreement, by means of a copy of this Decision, including Annex I.

               4.

               The Decision, including Annex I, shall be published in the EEA Section of and the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities after the EFTA States have signified their agreement to the appropriate measures.

               5.

               The Decision shall be authentic in the English language.

      Done at Brussels, 18 December 2002.

            For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

         Einar M. BULL

            President

         Hannes HAFSTEIN

            College Member

      (1)  Hereinafter referred to as the EEA Agreement.

      (2)  Hereinafter referred to as the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

      (3)  Hereinafter referred to as the State Aid Guidelines.

      (4)  Initially published in OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, EEA Supplement No 32.

      (5)  The Communication is available on the Commission’s website:
   http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/stranded_costs/en.pdf

      ANNEX

         ‘21.   METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING STATE AID LINKED TO STRANDED COSTS
         21.1.   INTRODUCTION

                     (1)

                     European Parliament and Council Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (1) (hereinafter referred to as “the Directive” or “Directive 96/92/EC”) laid down the principles for opening up the European electricity industry to competition.

                     (2)

                     The abovementioned Directive was incorporated into the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 168/1999 (2).

                     (3)

                     The gradual transition from a situation of largely restricted competition to one of genuine competition at EEA level must take place under acceptable economic conditions that take account of the specific characteristics of the electricity industry. This concern is already reflected to a very large extent in the text of the Directive itself.

                     (4)

                     In order to enable them to cope with a number of very specific situations, Article 24 of the Directive allows EFTA States to defer application of some of the provisions of the Directive for a transitional period. State aid mechanisms designed to allow electricity undertakings to adapt to the introduction of competition under favourable conditions do not fall within the scope of the derogations provided for in Article 24.

                     (5)

                     The purpose of these Guidelines is to clarify how the Authority intends, in the light of Directive 96/92/EC, to apply the rules of the EEA Agreement to State aid of this kind. These Guidelines does not prejudice the rules on State aid that result from other relevant frameworks, guidelines and notices. In particular, the Authority will continue to authorize regional aid and environmental aid in accordance with the respective guidelines. Similarly, aid that could not be authorized under Article 61 of the EEA Agreement will, where appropriate, be open to examination in the light of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

               21.2.   TRANSITIONAL MEASURES AND STATE AID

                     (1)

                     Article 24 of the Directive 96/92/EC, as adapted by Article 1(i) of Decision No 168/1999 of the EEA Joint Committee of 26 November 1999, stipulates that transitional measures derogating temporarily from the Directive may be authorized by the Authority (3):
                     “Those EFTA States in which commitments or guarantees of operation given before the entry into force of Decision No 168/1999 of the EEA Joint Committee of 26 November 1999 may not be honoured on account of the provisions of that Decision, may apply for a transitional regime pursuant to Article 24(1) and (2). Applications for a transitional period must be notified to the EFTA Surveillance Authority no later than six months after the entry into force of Decision No 168/1999 of the EEA Joint Committee of 26 November 1999”.

                     (2)

                     Given the present state of play, the Authority considers that decisions taken by it pursuant to Article 24 can create a transitional regime only where it has previously found that the measures notified by the EFTA Member States pursuant to that Article are incompatible with the Directive’s provisions set out in Chapters IV, V, VI and VII. Under Article 24 of the Directive, the Authority alone may authorize derogations from those provisions.

                     (3)

                     Accordingly, a system of levies introduced by an EFTA State via a fund to offset the costs of commitments or guarantees that might not be honoured on account of the application of Decision No 168/1999 does not constitute a measure that could benefit from a Authority decision granting a transitional regime under Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC; such a measure does not require a derogation from the relevant chapters of the Directive. It may, on the other hand, constitute State aid, which is covered by Article 61 of the EEA Agreement and Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice.

                     (4)

                     The purpose of these Guidelines is to show how the Authority intends to apply the EEA Agreement rules on State aid in the case of aid measures designed to compensate for the cost of commitments or guarantees that it might no longer be possible to honour on account of Decision 168/1999. In particular, the Guidelines do not apply to measures that could not be classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

               21.3.   DEFINITION OF ELIGIBLE STRANDED COSTS

                     (1)

                     Such commitments or guarantees of operation are normally referred to as “stranded costs”. They may, in practice, take a variety of forms: long-term purchase contracts, investments undertaken with an implicit or explicit guarantee of sale, investments undertaken outside the scope of normal activity, etc. In order to rank as eligible stranded costs that could be recognized by the Authority, such commitments or guarantees must satisfy the following criteria:

                                 (a)

                                 The “commitments or guarantees of operation” that could give rise to stranded costs must predate 27 November 1999, the date of entry into force of Decision No 168/1999.

                                 (b)

                                 The existence and validity of such commitments or guarantees will be substantiated in the light of the underlying legal and contractual provisions and of the legislative context in which they were made.

                                 (c)

                                 Such commitments or guarantees of operation must run the risk of not being honoured on account of the provisions of Directive 96/92/EC. In order to qualify as stranded costs, commitments or guarantees must consequently become non-economical on account of the effects of the Directive and must significantly affect the competitiveness of the undertaking concerned. Among other things, this must result in that undertaking’s making accounting entries (e.g. provisions) designed to reflect the foreseeable impact of the commitment or guarantee.
                                 Especially where, as a result of the commitments or guarantees in question, the viability of the undertakings might be jeopardised in the absence of aid or any transitional measures, the commitments or guarantees are deemed to meet the requirements laid down in the preceding paragraph.
                                 The effect of such commitments or guarantees on the competitiveness or viability of the undertakings concerned will be assessed at the consolidated level. For commitments or guarantees to constitute stranded costs, it must be possible to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the entry into force of Decision 168/1999 and the difficulty that the undertakings concerned have in honouring or securing compliance with such commitments or guarantees. In order to establish such cause-and-effect relationship, the Authority will take into account any fall in electricity prices or market share losses suffered by the undertakings concerned. Commitments or guarantees that could not have been honoured irrespective of the entry into force of Decision 168/1999 do not constitute stranded costs.

                                 (d)

                                 Such commitments or guarantees must be irrevocable. Should an undertaking have the possibility of revoking against payment, or modifying, such commitments or guarantees, account will have to be taken of this fact in calculating the eligible stranded costs.

                                 (e)

                                 Commitments or guarantees linking enterprises belonging to one and the same group cannot, as a rule, qualify as stranded costs.

                                 (f)

                                 Stranded costs are economic costs that must correspond to the actual sums invested, paid or payable by virtue of the commitments or guarantees from which they result: flat-rate calculations cannot, therefore, be accepted unless it can be shown that they reflect economic realities.

                                 (g)

                                 Stranded costs must be net of the income, profits or added value associated with the commitments or guarantees from which they arise.

                                 (h)

                                 Stranded costs must be valued net of any aid paid or payable in respect of the assets to which they relate. In particular, where a commitment or a guarantee of operation corresponds to an investment, which is the subject of State aid, the value of the aid must be deducted from any stranded costs resulting from the commitment or guarantee.

                                 (i)

                                 Wherever stranded costs arise from commitments or guarantees that are difficult to honour on account of Decision 168/1999, calculation of the eligible stranded costs will take account of the actual change over time in the economic and competitive conditions prevailing on the national and common electricity markets. In particular, where commitments or guarantees could constitute stranded costs because of the foreseeable fall in electricity prices, calculation of the stranded costs must take account of actual movements in electricity prices.

                                 (j)

                                 Costs depreciated before the transposition of Decision 168/1999 into national law cannot give rise to stranded costs. However, provisions or depreciation of assets entered in the balance sheet of the undertakings concerned with the explicit aim of taking account of the foreseeable effects of the Decision may correspond to stranded costs.

                                 (k)

                                 Eligible stranded costs may not exceed the minimum level necessary to allow the undertakings concerned to continue to honour or secure compliance with the commitments or guarantees called into question by Decision 168/1999 (4). Consequently, they will have to be calculated by taking into account the most economic solution (in the absence of any aid) from the point of view of the undertakings concerned. This may involve, among other things, the termination of commitments or guarantees giving rise to stranded costs or the disposal of all or some of the assets giving rise to stranded costs (where this does not run counter to the very principles of the commitments or guarantees themselves).

                                 (l)

                                 Costs which some undertakings may have to bear after the time horizon indicated in Article 26 of the Directive (26 November 2006) cannot, as a rule, constitute eligible stranded costs within the meaning of this methodology (5). However, if it appears necessary, the Authority may in due course take into account such commitments or guarantees and, if appropriate, consider them as eligible stranded costs during the next stage of opening up the common electricity market.

                                 (m)

                                 For EFTA States which open up their markets more quickly than is required by the EEA Joint Committee Decision No 168/1999, the Authority may agree to regard as eligible stranded costs under this methodology costs which some undertakings may have to bear after the time horizon indicated in Article 26 of the Directive if such costs result from commitments or guarantees which meet the criteria under points (a) to (l) in section 21.3 above and provided that they are limited to a period not extending beyond 31 December 2010.

               21.4.   STRANDED COSTS AND STATE AID

                     (1)

                     The general principle laid down in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is that State aid is prohibited. However, paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article provide for a number of derogations from this general rule. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, “undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-enhancing monopoly” are subject to the rules contained in the EEA Agreement, in particular the rules on competition, in so far as the application of those rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. In any event, trade must not be affected to an extent contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.

                     (2)

                     The State aid corresponding to the eligible stranded costs defined in these Guidelines is designed to facilitate the transition for electricity undertakings to a competitive electricity market. The Authority may take a favourable view of such aid to the extent that the distortion of competition is counterbalanced by the contribution made by the aid to the attainment of a common objective that market forces could not achieve. Indeed, the distortion of competition that results from aid paid to facilitate the transition for electricity undertakings from a largely closed market to one that has been partially liberalized cannot be contrary to the common interest where it is limited in time and in its effects, since liberalization of the electricity market is in the general interest of the EEA market and supplements moves to establish the internal market. The Authority also takes the view that aid granted for stranded costs enables electricity undertakings to reduce the risks relating to their historic commitments or investments and may thus encourage them to maintain their investments in the long term. Finally, if there were no compensation for stranded costs, there would be a greater risk that the undertakings concerned might pass on the entire cost of their non-economical commitments or guarantees to their captive customers.

                     (3)

                     Aid to compensate for stranded costs in the electricity industry can be further justified in relation to other liberalized sectors by the fact that liberalization of the electricity market has not been accompanied by either faster technological progress or increased demand and by the fact that it is hardly conceivable, in the interests of environmental protection, security of supply and the smooth operation of the EEA countries’ economies, to wait until electricity undertakings encounter difficulties before considering whether to grant them state support.

                     (4)

                     In this context, the Authority takes the view that aid designed to offset stranded costs normally qualifies for the derogation under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement if it facilitates the development of certain economic activities without adversely affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

                     (5)

                     Without prejudice to the specific provisions resulting from the Authority’s guidelines on the application of the EEA State aid provisions, including the guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (6), the Authority may, in principle, accept as being compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement aid designed to offset eligible stranded costs which satisfied the following criteria:

                                 (a)

                                 The aid must serve to offset eligible stranded costs that have been clearly determined and isolated. It may under no circumstances exceed the amount of the eligible stranded costs.

                                 (b)

                                 The arrangements for paying the aid must allow account to be taken of future developments in competition. Such developments may be gauged in particular by way of quantifiable factors (prices, market shares, other relevant factors indicated by the EFTA State). Since changes in the conditions of competition have a direct effect on the amount of eligible stranded costs, the amount of the aid paid will necessarily be conditional on the development of genuine competition, and the calculation of aid paid over time will have to take account of changes in the relevant factors in order to gauge the degree of competition achieved.

                                 (c)

                                 The EFTA State must undertake to send to the Authority an annual report that, in particular, describes developments in the competitive situation on its electricity market by indicating among other things the changes observed in the relevant quantifiable factors. The annual report will give details of how the stranded costs taken into account for the relevant year have been calculated and will specify the amounts of aid paid.

                                 (d)

                                 The degressive nature of aid intended to offset stranded costs will be viewed favourably by the Authority when making its assessment; it will, in fact, help the undertaking concerned to speed up its preparations for a liberalized electricity market.

                                 (e)

                                 The maximum amount of aid that can be paid to an undertaking to offset stranded costs must be specified in advance. It must take account of productivity gains that may be achieved by the undertaking.
                                 Similarly, the detailed arrangements for calculating and financing aid designed to offset stranded costs and the maximum period for which such aid can be granted must be clearly spelt out in advance. Notification of the aid will specify in particular how calculation of the stranded costs will take account of changes in the various factors mentioned in point (b).

                                 (f)

                                 In order to avoid any cumulation of aid, the EFTA State will undertake in advance not to pay any rescue or restructuring aid to undertakings that are to benefit from aid in respect of stranded costs. The Authority takes the view that the payment of compensation for stranded costs linked to investments in assets that offer no prospects of long-term viability does not facilitate the transition of the electricity industry to a liberalized market and cannot therefore qualify for the derogation under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

                     (6)

                     However, the Authority entertains the most serious misgivings regarding aid intended to offset stranded costs which do not satisfy the above criteria or which are likely to give rise to distortions of competition contrary to the common interest for the following reasons:

                                 (a)

                                 The aid is not linked to eligible stranded costs that meet the above definition or to clearly defined and individualized stranded costs or exceeds the amount of eligible stranded costs.

                                 (b)

                                 The aid is intended to safeguard all or some of the income pre-dating the entry into force of Decision 168/1999, without taking strictly into account the eligible stranded costs that might result from the introduction of competition.

                                 (c)

                                 The amount of aid is not likely to be adjusted to take due account of the differences between the economic and market assumptions initially made when estimating stranded costs and real changes in them over time.

               21.5.   METHOD OF FINANCING AID INTENDED TO OFFSET STRANDED COSTS

                     (1)

                     EFTA States are free to choose the methods of financing aid intended to offset stranded costs which they consider to be the most appropriate. However, in order to authorize such aid, the Authority will make sure that the financing arrangements do not give rise to effects that conflict with the objectives of Directive 96/92/EC or with the interests of the Contracting Parties. The interests of the Contracting Parties take into account, among other things, consumer protection, free movement of goods and services, and competition.

                     (2)

                     The financing arrangements must not have the effect of deterring outside undertakings or new players from entering certain national or regional markets. In particular, aid intended to offset stranded costs cannot be financed out of levies on electricity in transit between EEA States or from levies linked to the distance between the producer and the consumer.

                     (3)

                     The Authority will also ensure that the arrangements for financing aid intended to offset stranded costs result in fair treatment for eligible and non-eligible consumers. To this end, the annual report referred to in point (c) in section 21.4. will give the breakdown by eligible and non-eligible consumers of the sources of finance intended to offset the stranded costs. Where non-eligible consumers participate in the financing of stranded costs directly through the tariff for the purchase of electricity, this must be clearly stated. The contribution imposed on either group (eligible or non-eligible) must not exceed the proportion of stranded costs to be offset that corresponds to the market share accounted for by those consumers.

                     (4)

                     Where funds are raised by private undertakings with a view to financing aid mechanisms designed to offset stranded costs, the management of those funds will have to be clearly separate from that of the normal resources of those undertakings. Such investments must not benefit the undertakings managing them.

               21.6.   OTHER ASSESSMENT FACTORS

                     (1)

                     In examining State aid intended to offset stranded costs, the Authority takes particular account of the size and level of interconnection of the network concerned and of the structure of the electricity industry. Aid for a small network with a low degree of interconnection with the rest of the EEA will be less likely to give rise to substantial distortions of competition.

                     (2)

                     This methodology for stranded costs is without prejudice to the application, in the regions covered by Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, of the guidelines on national regional aid (7). Pursuant to Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement, where application of the rules on State aid to stranded costs obstructs the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly, those rules may be derogated from provided that trade is not affected to an extent contrary to the interests of the Contracting Parties.

                     (3)

                     The rules laid down in this methodology for State aid intended to offset stranded costs arising from Decision 168/1999 apply independently of the public or private ownership of the undertakings concerned.’

         (1)  OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20.

         (2)  OJ L 61, 1.3.2001, p. 23, and EEA Supplement No 11, 1.3.2001, p. 221.

         (3)  Article 3 of Decision No 168/1999 states: “This Decision shall enter into force on 27 November 1999, provided that all the notifications under Article 103(1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee.”

         (4)  In the case of a long-term contract of sale or purchase, the stranded costs will, therefore, be calculated by comparison with the conditions on which, in a liberalised market, the undertaking would normally have been able to sell or purchase the product under consideration, all things being equal.

         (5)  It must be understood that investments which cannot be recouped or are not economically viable as a result of the liberalisation of the internal market in electricity may constitute stranded costs within the meaning of this methodology, including in cases where they are, in principle, to extend beyond 2006. Furthermore, commitments or guarantees which must absolutely continue to be honoured after 26 November 2006 because failure to do so might give rise to major risks concerning protection of the environment, public safety, social protection of workers or the security of the electricity network may, if duly justified, constitute eligible stranded costs according to this methodology.

         (6)  OJ L 237, 6.9.2001, p. 16.

         (7)  OJ L 111, 29.4.1999 and EEA Supplement No 18. See in this context chapter 25 of the State aid Guidelines.


Avis juridique important

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E1997C0187

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 187/97/COL of 16 July 1997 on the 11th amendment of the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid

Official Journal L 316 , 20/11/1997 P. 0023 - 0036

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION No 187/97/COL of 16 July 1997 on the 11th amendment of the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITYhas amended the Procedural and Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid (1), adopted on 19 January 1994 (2), as last amended on 11 September 1996 (3), as follows:The following rules on State aid to maritime transport shall be added to the State Aid Guidelines as a new Chapter 24A and a new Annex VIII:'24A. AID TO MARITIME TRANSPORT (1)24A.1. Introduction24A.1.1. Previous guidelines on aid to shipping companies and the EEA Agreement(1) In 1989, the European Commission adopted "Guidelines for aid to shipping companies" [SEC(89) 921 final]. However, these guidelines, which were not published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, are not listed in Annex XV to the EEA Agreement as an act of which the European Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall take due account when applying and interpreting the State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement. In view of this, the above guidelines were not integrated in the initial version of the present State Aid Guidelines of the EFTA Surveillance Authority adopted on 19 January 1994. The basic State aid provisions of the EEA Agreement (including Articles 61 and 62) nevertheless apply in full to the maritime transport sector, and irrespective of the above omission, the EFTA Surveillance Authority has considered the Commission guidelines of 1989 on aid to shipping companies to be EEA relevant.24A.1.2. Maritime policy in the context of the EEA Agreement and the free market principle(1) The European Community has developed a maritime policy which has been laid down in several communications to the Council. The EEA Agreement does not provide for a common external trade policy and therefore does not embrace all aspects of the Community maritime policy. As concerns trade relations with third countries and cooperation at international level, the EFTA States independently pursue their own maritime policies. However, Protocol 19 of the Agreement foresees that the Contracting Parties will coordinate their actions and measures towards third countries, according to specific provisions, and may consult each other, inter alia, on shipping matters dealt with in international organizations. In general terms the objectives of the EFTA States maritime policies appear broadly similar to those underlying the maritime policy of the European Community (2), which covers the promotion of Community shipping, external relations and maritime safety, together with shipbuilding and maritime technology. The aim of both the Community and the EFTA States has been to ensure freedom of access to shipping markets across the world for safe and environmentally friendly ships, preferably registered in EEA States with EEA nationals employed on board. This approach has to a certain extent succeeded in opening up markets particularly in Europe, and given the consumer a wide choice of competitive shipping services. On the other hand, the proportion of ships entered in EEA States' registers and the number of EEA seafarers employed have both declined significantly, especially over the last decade.(2) Underpinning the above philosophy is legislation at international, EEA and national levels. In particular on safety standards and working conditions, international conventions and resolutions apply and the European Community and the EFTA States actively promote the raising of world standards in the appropriate forums, such as, in particular, the International Maritime Organization. At Community level, in 1986, the Council adopted a basic package of legislation on shipping, based on an open market non-protectionist philosophy (3). Broadly speaking, the Community decided that generally there should be no further requirement than establishment in the Community to confer the right to provide shipping services between the Community to confer the right to provide shipping services between the Community and third countries or between Member States. Thus, for example, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 provides for the freedom to provide services for all Community established carriers, irrespective of whether they operate vessels under Community or third country flags. Regulations (EEC) No 4055/86 and (EEC) No 4056/86 are included in the EEA Agreement as acts referred to (binding acts) in Annexes XIII and XIV of the Agreement, and Regulations No 4057/86 and (EEC) No 4058/86 are listed as acts of which the Contracting Parties shall take note.(3) The exceptions to this open trade philosophy, where trades are still restricted to vessels registered in EU Member States and under EU Member States' flags, are mainly related to certain cabotage trades (4). This implies that in general registration of a vessel in an EEA State offers few economic advantages; on the contrary, there may be disadvantages, such as strict manning conditions to be respected and EEA States' fiscal and social arrangements for companies and their employees which mean that in most cases, it is relatively expensive to operate EEA-registered ships with EEA seafarers on board. Further, there are few costs for third country operators entering the open trades. In addition, while there are no direct or indirect taxes or duties, such as apply to many imported goods and services, applicable to shipping services to ensure some comparability between EEA and non-EEA operators' costs, there is direct competition between EEA-registered ships and third country vessels not only in international trades but also in most trades within the EEA.(4) Moreover, the shipping industry is extremely mobile and an onerous regime can easily be avoided through registering vessels in other countries (giving absolute freedom in manning) and, if necessary, establishing a nominal level of administration or management outside an EEA State (to avoid its fiscal systems). Furthermore, there has, in recent years, been a large supply of seafarers available from low-wage third countries, giving shipowners a low-cost option when selecting crews. There is also at present cyclical and structural overcapacity which means that the industry is demand-led and shippers can push down freight rates; this, combined with high fixed costs for shipowners, means that the incentive to cut costs and possibly corners increases and the pursuit of high quality in operations may not be commercially attractive. This may then undermine the long-term interests of the Contracting Parties in safe, efficient, environmentally friendly transport.24A.1.3. Development of the EEA shipping sector: decreasing competitiveness of EEA flags(1) The European shipping industry faces stiff international competition and according to the Community Guidelines of 6 May this year, referred to in the introduction, the size of the Community registered fleet in total worldwide maritime transport has been decreasing steadily over the last three decades. In 1970, 32 % of the world tonnage sailed under the flags of EC Member States; by 1995 this share had decreased to 14 %. The share of the major open-registry countries increased from 19 % to 38 % over the same period. There has also been a correspondingly steady decrease in the number of EC seafarers employed on board. In an EEA context it may be pointed out that the fleet under the Norwegian flag declined substantially in the years up to 1987, whereafter registered tonnage in the Norwegian International Shipping Register has grown considerably.(2) In the absence of measures at EEA level providing a degree of harmonization (5), EEA States have taken initiatives independently in order to preserve their maritime interests. Important economic considerations, maintaining employment and know-how and the strategic value of the fleet have all been identified as influencing national policy decisions. It is also recognized that quality must not be prejudiced by cost-cutting by shipowners simply in order to survive in the face of low-cost competition emanating particularly from flags of convenience, quality must be preserved and improved, both in terms of the technical standards and the operation of the vessels which implies a continuing need for training and employing people with the requisite skills.(3) Measures were, therefore, progressively introduced to slow down the trend to flag out, such as relaxing conditions applicable to national first registers, developing second or international registers or using State aid measures or a combination of these, but no single approach has been wholly successful.(4) Flagging-out of vessels is, however, not the end of the problem. Where flag States outside the EEA offer an attractive international service infrastructure, flagging-out has tended in recent years to be followed by relocation of ancillary activities (such as ship management) to countries outside the EEA, leading to an even greater loss of employment, both on board ship and on shore. A further consequence has been a loss of maritime know-how. A perception that there are a limited number of positions available at sea, a difficult working environment and few opportunities to develop a career has led to a decrease in the number of students at maritime training institutes and in the recruitment of young seafarers, which has compounded the negative effects on board and on shore.24A.1.4. The rationale behind the approach to State aid to maritime transport(1) The competitive difference between ships registered in the EEA and those registered outside, especially those operated under flags of convenience, depends primarily on fiscal costs. This is because the cost of capital is essentially the same worldwide and equally there is no differential in the technology available. The fiscal costs (corporate taxation and wage-related liabilities in respect of seafarers), however, have been shown by different studies to be the critical and distortive factor.(2) In principle, operating aid should be exceptional, temporary and degressive. In the case of maritime transport, however, the problem of the competitiveness of the EEA fleet on the world market is a structural one, deriving in large part from external factors. As the immediate prospects of resolving this cost-gap problem do not appear good, the need for aid measures to allow shipowners to operate EEA-registered ships competitively in the global market is not likely to be short term.(3) In the international context, the European Community and the EFTA States have pressed for liberalization of world maritime transport services in discussions under the WTO framework but important trading partners were unwilling to accept the proposals tabled and further debate has been postponed until the next round of comprehensive negotiations on services, which is due to take place no later than the year 2000. It also seems unlikely, in the immediate future, that there will be international agreements on the application of competition rules for maritime transport, including restriction of national aid schemes.(4) In the future, the level of aid may be progressively reduced, provided that the world economic and political situation allows it. In particular, if the new disciplines which are presently being negotiated in the framework of GATS relating to the potentially distortive effects of subsidies on trade in services entered into force, the current rules would be amended accordingly. For the present, the situation should be monitored through regular review of aid in the light of the competitiveness of EEA fleets in the world market.24A.2. Scope and General Objectives(1) The approach to State aid under the EEA Agreement needs to accommodate differences in the priorities and approaches of the States party to the EEA Agreement while ensuring that competitive distortions are kept to a minimum.(2) The EFTA Surveillance Authority's role is to set the parameters within which State aid in the EFTA States will be approved. Aid schemes should not be at the expense of other EEA States' economies and must be shown not to risk distorting competition and adversely affecting trading conditions between the Contracting Parties to an extent contrary to the common interest. State aid must always be restricted to what is necessary to achieve its purpose and be granted by State authorities (including at national, regional and local levels) must always be taken into account.24A.2.1. Scope of the rules(1) These rules cover any aid granted by EFTA States or through State resources in favour of maritime transport. This includes any financial advantage conferred in any form whatsoever funded by public authorities (whether at national, regional, provincial, departmental or local level). For these purposes, "public authorities" may also include public undertakings and State-controlled banks. Arrangements whereby the State guarantees loans or other funding by commercial banks may also fall within the definition of aid. The guidelines draw no distinction between types of beneficiary in terms of their legal structure (e.g. companies, partnerships or individuals), nor between public or private ownership, and any reference to companies, shall be taken to include all other types of legal entity.(2) These rules do not cover aid to shipbuilding (within the meaning of the act referred to in point 1b of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement (6), or any successor instrument intended to give effect to the State aid provisions of the OECD Agreement respecting normal competitive conditions in the commercial shipbuilding and ship-repair industry when it enters into force) or aid for fishing vessels. Investments in infrastructure are not normally considered to involve State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement, if the State provides free and equal access to the infrastructure for the benefit of all interested operators. However, the Authority may examine such investments if they could directly or indirectly benefit particular shipowners. Finally, the Authority has established the principle that no State aid is involved where public authorities contribute to a company on a basis that would be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions (7).24A.2.2 General objectives(1) Increased transparency of State aid is necessary so that not only national authorities in the broad sense but also companies and individuals are aware of their rights and obligations. These rules are intended to contribute to this and to clarify what State aid schemes may be introduced in order to support the maritime interest of the Contracting Parties. Since this is considered to be enhancing the competitiveness of the fleets of the Contracting Parties, State aid may generally be granted only in respect of ships entered in EEA States' registers (8). This policy should:- safeguard EEA employment, (both on board and on shore),- preserve maritime know-how in the EEA and develop maritime skills,- improve safety.(2) However, State aid may, in certain exceptional cases, be granted in respect of ships entered in registers under point 3 of Annex VIII to these Guidelines, provided the EFTA State concerned establishes that the register contributes directly to the objectives mentioned above.(3) Additionally, flag-neutral aid measures may be approved in certain exceptional cases where it is clearly demonstrated by the State concerned that common objectives of the Contracting Parties are served (see sections 24A.3.1 and 24A.7).(4) Further common objectives of the Contracting Parties concerning transport policy (9) may also be taken into account, such as the construction of a framework for sustainable mobility and, as part of this, the promotion of short-sea shipping and development of its full potential.24A.3. Fiscal and social measures to improve competitiveness24A.3.1. Fiscal treatment of shipowning companies(1) In the shipping sector, EEA States have responded to the difficulties caused by the diverse factors affecting international competition in different ways, reflecting the different circumstances. Some have been able to rely on general measures while others have resorted to State aid.(2) Many third countries have developed significant shipping registers sometimes supported by an efficient international service infrastructure, attracting shipowners with a fiscal climate which is considerably milder than within the European Economic Area. The low tax environment has resulted in there being an incentive for companies not only to flag out their vessels but also to consider corporate relocation. It should be emphasized that there are no effective international rules at present to curb such tax competition and few administrative, legal or technical barriers to moving a ship's registration from an EEA State's register. This leaves all EEA States having significant fleets with a common problem; the creation of conditions which allow fair competition with flags of convenience seems the best way forward.(3) Tax harmonization as such is not an objective of the EEA Agreement. However, the question of fiscal competition between EEA States should be addressed. There appears to be an increasing degree of convergence in EEA States' approaches to shipping aid. Flagging-out between EEA States is a rare phenomenon. As concerns maritime transport, fiscal competition is mainly an issue between EEA States on the one hand, and third countries on the other hand since the cost savings available to shipowners through third country registers are considerable, in comparison to the options available within the EEA. Furthermore, profits in shipping, which would be subject to tax, have been depressed in recent years so that the differences between effective rates of tax in the EEA States have in practice been of relatively little importance. The continual decline of the fleets registered in EEA States, while the proportion of world shipping under control of EEA shipowners has remained relatively stable over the last decade, testifies to this.(4) In order to counter this tendency, many EEA States have taken special measures to improve the fiscal climate for shipowning companies, including, for instance, accelerated depreciation on investment in ships or the right to reserve profits made on the sale of ships for a number of years on a tax-free basis provided that these profits are reinvested in ships.(5) These fiscal alleviation measures which apply in a special way to shipping are considered to be State aid. Equally, the system used in certain EEA States and third countries of replacing the normal corporate tax regime by a tonnage tax is a State aid. Tonnage tax means that the shipowner pays an amount of tax linked directly to the tonnage operated. The tonnage tax will be payable irrespective of the company's actual earnings, or profits or losses made.(6) Such measures have been shown to safeguard high quality employment in the on-shore maritime sector, such as management directly related to shipping and also in associated activities (insurance, brokerage and finance). In view of the importance of such activities to the economies of the Contracting Parties and in support of the earlier stated objectives, these types of fiscal incentives can generally be endorsed. Further, safeguarding quality employment and stimulating a competitive shipping industry established in an EEA State through fiscal incentives taken together with other initiatives on training and enhancement of safety will facilitate the development of European shipping in the global market.(7) The Authority is aware that the income of shipowners is nowadays often obtained from the operation of ships under different flags, for instance, when making use of chartered vessels under foreign flag or by making use of partner vessels within alliances. It is also recognized that the incentive for expatriation of management and ancillary activities would continue if the shipowner obtained a significant financial benefit from maintaining different establishments and accounting separately for EEA flag earnings and other earnings. This would be the case, for example, if the non-EEA flag earnings were liable either to the full rate of corporate taxation in an EEA State or a low rate of tax overseas if overseas management could be demonstrated.(8) The objective of State aid to maritime transport is to promote the competitiveness of the EEA fleets in the global shipping market. Consequently, fiscal alleviation schemes should, as a rule, require a link with a flag of an EEA State. However, they may also, exceptionally, be approved where they apply to the entire fleet operated by a shipowner company established within an EEA State's territory liable to corporate tax, provided that it is demonstrated that the strategic and commercial management of all ships concerned is effectively carried out from within the territory and that this activity contributes substantially to economic activity and employment within the European Economic Area. The evidence furnished by the State concerned to demonstrate this economic link should include details of vessels owned and operated under EEA States' registers, EEA nationals employed on ships and in land-based activities and investments in fixed assets. It must be stressed that the aid must be necessary to promote the repatriation of the strategic and commercial management of all ships concerned in the EEA and, in addition, that the beneficiaries of the schemes must be liable to corporate tax in the EEA. Also the Authority would request any available evidence to show that all vessels operated by companies benefiting from these measures comply with the relevant international and EEA safety standards, including those relating to onboard working conditions.(9) Where fiscal schemes are approved on the above exceptional basis, the Authority will require the provision of regular reports, demonstrating the effect of the measure (in conjunction with any other State aid scheme operated in the EFTA State) on the EEA-registered fleet operated from the EFTA State and on employment of EEA seafarers. The Authority will closely monitor the situation regarding possible distortion of competition in trade between Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.(10) In all cases, the benefits of schemes must facilitate the development of the shipping sector and employment in support of the common interest. Consequently, the fiscal advantages mentioned above must be restricted to shipping activities; hence in cases where a shipowning company is also engaged in other commercial activities, transparent accounting would be required in order to prevent spillover to non-shipping related activities. This approach would help EEA shipping to be competitive, with tax liabilities comparable to levels applying elsewhere in the world, but would preserve an EFTA State's normal tax levels for other activities and personal remuneration of shareholders and directors.24A.3.2. Labour-related costs(1) Public measures directed towards specific sectors for alleviation of labour costs involve a risk of upsetting the proper functioning of the EEA Agreement and can thus be detrimental to the competitiveness of European industry and long-term job creation (10). In particular, the effects of this approach are likely to be particularly negative with regard to sectors with overcapacity or in crisis (defined as those in which the the demand for EEA products is stagnating or falling), sensitive sectors (those where there is significant intra-EEA trade and competition), and sectors in international competition.(2) However, maritime transport can be considered to present a special case (11). In its guidelines of 1989, the Commission considered that "aid in the field of social security and seafarers' income taxation, tending to reduce the burden borne by shipping companies without reducing the level of social security for the seafarers and resulting from the operation of ships registered in the Community may be considered compatible with the common market". The Authority considers this approach to remain valid also in the EEA context.(3) Maritime transport is a sector experiencing a certain overcapacity worldwide and where international competition is fierce. However, the problem identified in the industrial sectors with overcapacity or in crisis is that aid can have the effect of transferring difficulties, and unemployment problems, to EEA competitors who do not enjoy such advantages. In maritime transport, demand for quality is increasing and there is estimated to be a growth potential in the market; further, there is a lack of trained and qualified seafarers worldwide. It can therefore be concluded that aid supporting employment of, particularly, skilled EEA seafarers should not be discouraged on this basis. The degree of cooperation between carriers through conferences and consortia, etc. in liner trades and the proportion of cross-trading in bulk operations mean that the centre of gravity in competition is between EEA and non-EEA carriers. Finally, wage-cost differentials between the low-wage countries and the EEA States are very significant, and integrating new production technology, innovation, quality and training can more durably improve performance in terms of competitiveness and employment. While this is true for most industrial sectors, it is largely not the case in maritime transport for the reasons outlined in section 24A.1.(4) Support measures for the maritime sector should, therefore, aim primarily at reducing fiscal and other costs and burdens borne by EEA countries' shipowners and EEA seafarers (i.e. those liable to taxation and/or social security contributions in an EEA State) towards levels in line with world norms. They should directly stimulate the development of the sector and employment, rather than provide general financial assistance.(5) In line with the objective, therefore, the following action on employment costs should be allowed for EFTA States' shipping:- reduced rates of contributions for the social protection of EEA seafarers employed on board ships registered in an EEA State,- reduced rates of income tax for EEA seafarers on board ships registered in an EEA State.(6) For this type of aid, a maximum reduction of liabilities to zero may be permitted, allowing EFTA States to bring employment-related costs to levels in line with world norms which often entails exemption from tax and social security liabilities for seafarers. However, no subsidy on net wages of EEA seafarers may be granted, as this might lead to a distortion of competitive conditions between EEA States. The alleviation of fiscal burdens would not remove the interest of the shipowner in negotiating an appropriate salary package with potential crew members and their labour representatives. Seafarers from EEA States with lower wage levels would still, therefore, have a competitive advantage over those from other EEA States with higher wage expectations. In any event, EEA seafarers will continue to be more expensive than the cheapest available in the global market. Hence, there is no danger of overcompensation entailed in this measure.(7) For internal reasons some EEA States prefer not to apply reduced rates as mentioned above, but instead may reimburse shipowners, partially or wholly, for the costs resulting from these levies. Such an approach may generally be considered as equivalent to the reduced rate system as described above, provided that there is a clear link to these levies, no element of overcompensation, and the system is transparent and is not open to abuse.24A.4. Crew relief(1) Aid for crew relief is a separate measure which can be in the common interest of the Contracting Parties. Such aid tends to reduce the costs of employing EEA seafarers, especially those on ships operating in distant waters. Whereas the Commission's guidelines of 1989 limited aid of this type to 50 % of the total costs incurred for these reasons, the new approach in the present rules to limiting the levels of State aid (see section 24A.10) implies that it is not necessary to impose a specific limitation for this type of measure. Aid may therefore be granted in the form of payment or reimbursement of the costs of repatriation of EEA seafarers working on board ships entered in EEA States' registers.24A.5. Investment aid(1) At present, some EEA States grant aid for newly built vessels only, others also for the purchase of certain categories of second-hand vessels or for conversion or modernization of existing vessels. These schemes have tended to create or maintain overcapacity, leading to lower freight rates, thus stimulating EEA operators to cut costs in many cases by flagging-out. Further, the system has induced shipowners in some instances to make decisions about buying and selling ships for fiscal rather than commercial reasons.(2) Subsidies for fleet renewal are not common in other transport modes (road haulage, aviation). Since they tend to distort competition, the approval of such schemes is rarely justifiable, except where part of a structural reform leading to reductions in overall fleet capacity.(3) Investment aid for new ships must comply with the provisions of the act on aid to shipbuilding referred to in point 1.B of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement (see paragraph 24A.2.1 (2)) or any other EEA legislation which may replace it.(4) Within the framework of the present rules, other investment aid may however be permitted, in line with safe-seas objectives, in certain restricted circumstances to improve equipment on board vessels entered in an EEA State's registers or to promote the use of safe and clean ships, such as providing incentives to upgrade EEA-registered ships to standards which exceed the mandatory safety and environmental standards laid down in international conventions and anticipating agreed higher standards, thus enhancing safety and environmental controls. Such aid must comply with the shipbuilding provisions, as referred to in paragraph 24A.2.1 (2), when applicable.(5) Since shipping is essentially very mobile, regional aid for maritime companies in disadvantaged regions, which often takes the form of investment aid to companies investing in the regions, may only be permitted where it is clear that the benefits will accrue to the region over a reasonable time period. This would, for example, be the case if the investment related to the construction of dedicated warehouses or purchase of fixed transhipment equipment. Investment aid for maritime companies in disadvantaged regions may then only be permitted where it also complies with the regional aid rules (see section 24A.6).24A.6. Regional aid on the basis of Article 61 (3) (a) and (c)(1) In the context of regional aid schemes, the Authority will apply the general rules set out in Part VI of the present Guidelines (Rules on regional aid) or future amendments thereto.24A.7. Training(1) Many training schemes followed by seafarers and supported by the State are not considered to be State aid because they are of a general nature (whether vocational or academic). These are, therefore, not subject to notification and examination by the Authority.(2) If a scheme is to be considered to include State aid, notification is, however, required. This may be the case if, for example, a particular scheme is specifically related to on-board training and the benefit of State financial support is received by the training organization, the cadet, seafarer or shipowner. State aid to training will be approved, provided the aid meets the Authority's general criteria (e.g. proportionality, non-discrimination and transparency as well as, where appropriate, relating to training carried out on board ships entered in EEA registers). Exceptionally, training on board other vessels may be supported where justified by objective criteria, such as the lack of available places on vessels in an EEA State's register.(3) Where financial contributions are paid for on-board training, the trainee may not, in principle, be an active member of the crew but must be supernumerary. This provision is to ensure that net wage subsidies cannot be paid for seafarers occupied in normal crewing activities.(4) Similarly to safeguard and develop maritime expertise in the EEA and the competitive edge of the EEA maritime industries, further extensive research and development efforts are necessary, with a focus on quality, productivity, safety and environmental protection. For such projects, State support may also be authorized within the limits set by the EEA Agreement (12).24A.8. Restructuring aid (including privatization)(1) Although the rules on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (13) apply to transport only to the extent that the specific nature of the sector is taken into account, the Authority will apply those guidelines in considering restructuring aid for maritime companies.24A.9. Public service obligations and contracts(1) Direct aid aiming at covering operating losses is, in general, not compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. However, subsidization can, in principle, be accepted for public service obligations (PSO). A PSO is defined as any obligation imposed on a carrier to ensure the provision of a service satisfying fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity and pricing, which standards the carrier would not assume if it were solely considering its economic interest.(2) PSOs may be imposed for scheduled services to ports serving peripheral regions in the EEA States or thinly served routes considered vital for the economic development of that region, in cases where the operation of market forces would not ensure a sufficient service level.(3) The Authority's practice in assessing contracts relating to PSOs is generally to consider that reimbursement of operating losses incurred as a direct result of fulfilling certain public service obligations is not State aid within the meaning of Article 61 (1) of the EEA Agreement. Notification is not, therefore, required within the meaning of Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, provided that the following criteria are met:- for public service contracts to be consistent with the functioning of the EEA Agreement and not to constitute State aid, the Authority expects public tenders to be made, as the development and implementation of schemes must be transparent and allow for the development of competition,- adequate publicity must be given to the call for tender and all requirements concerning the level and frequency of the service, capacity, prices and standards required, etc. must be specified in a clear and transparent manner to ensure that all EEA carriers with the right of access to the route (according to EEA legislation) have had an equal chance to bid,- the EFTA State can then award a contract to the successful bidder (except in exceptional and duly justified cases, whichever bidder requires the lowest financial compensation) and reimburse the extra costs incurred by the operator as a result of providing the service. This should be directly related to the calculated deficit made by the operator in providing the service. It should be accounted for separately for each such service so that it can be verified that there is no overcompensation or cross-subsidy and that the system cannot be used to support inefficient management and operating methods. Where a grant is made by the EFTA State on this basis and it is limited to reimbursement of extra costs incurred (together with a reasonable return on capital employed), the scheme will be considered not to amount to State aid.(4) The duration of public service contracts should be limited to a reasonable and not overlong period (normally in the order of five years), since contracts for significantly longer periods could entail the danger of creating a (private) monopoly. After expiration of the contract period, such contracts should be subject to re-tendering in accordance with the procedure described above.(5) Restrictions of access to the route to a single operator may only be granted if, when the public service contract is awarded according to the abovementioned procedure, there is no competitor providing, or having a demonstrated intention to provide, scheduled services on the route. The terms of any restriction or exclusivity must in any case be compatible with the provisions of Article 59 of the EEA Agreement.(6) It must be stressed that if there is evidence that an EFTA State has not selected the cheapest offer or if complaints are received alleging unfairness in the awarding procedure, the Authority will request information in order to verify whether the award includes State aid elements. If aid has been granted in breach of the procedural requirements of the Surveillance and Court Agreement, the Authority may issue an interim order suspending payment of aid and will in appropriate cases open the procedure pursuant to Article 1 (2) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.(7) Although it is considered appropriate for EFTA States to make maximum use of the above procedures, exceptions may be justified, such as in the case of island cabotage involving regular ferry services. In those instances, measures must be notified and will continue to be assessed under the general State aid rules. In its assessment of compatibility with the EEA Agreement, the Authority will verify whether or not the aid may divert significant volumes of traffic or involve overcompensation, which could allow the selected carrier to cross-subsidize operations on which other EEA carriers compete.24A.10. Limits to aid(1) As was explained above, certain EEA States support their maritime sectors through tax reduction while other EEA States prefer to make direct payments, for instance, by providing reimbursement of seafarers' income tax. In view of the fact that the fiscal systems of the EEA States are not harmonized, it is felt that the two alternatives should remain possible. Obviously, those two approaches may, in some instances, be combined. However, this risks cumulation of aid to levels which are disproportionate with the common objectives of the Contracting Parties and could lead to a subsidy race between EEA States.(2) A reduction to zero of taxation and social charges for seafarers and of corporate taxation of shipping activities is the maximum level of aid which may be permitted. To avoid distortion of competition, other systems of aid may not provide greater benefit than this. Consequently, although each aid scheme notified by an EFTA State will be examined on its own merits, it is considered that the total amount of aid in the form of direct payments in the framework of sections 24A.3 to 24A.6 should not exceed the total amount of taxes and social contributions collected from shipping activities and seafarers; to do so would, it is considered, affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the EEA provisions as the aid would be disproportionate to the objective.24A.11. Final remarks(1) The implementation of these rules presupposes discipline on the part of both national authorities and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, particularly in respect of the formal obligations to provide notification and the time limits to be adhered to. To expedite the examination of aid measures, the EFTA States are urged to notify the Authority of proposed aid measures at the draft stage, supplying all the particulars necessary for their assessment, in accordance with Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. The Authority considers that an EFTA State has failed to fulfil its procedural obligations where an aid measure, which has not been notified to and approved by the Authority, has been put into effect either in accordance with national law or by giving a financial commitment to potential beneficiaries.(2) The Authority will use all the measures at its disposal to ensure that the EFTA States fulfil their obligations pursuant to Article 1 (3) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement, see Chapter 6 of the present Guidelines (specificities regarding aid unlawful on procedural grounds).(3) The EFTA Surveillance Authority and the Commission, according to the Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, seek to ensure that nationals and companies of all EEA States have full access without discrimination to the facilities, products and services found in one EEA State (14). In the case of establishment by entry in shipping registers, this principle has been applied since the judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 July 1991 in Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd, et al (15). Without prejudice to the provisions laid down in the specific adaptations (g) and (h) to the Act referred to in point 1 of Annex XII to the EEA Agreement (Council Directive 88/361/EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty), the Authority considers this same principle, by virtue of Article 6 of the EEA Agreement, to be applicable also in the context of the EEA Agreement. Similarly, State aid may not discriminate on grounds of nationality between companies established in EEA States.(4) The EFTA Surveillance Authority will closely monitor the effects of aid schemes to ensure that competition in trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is not distorted and that their common objectives are being served.(5) These Guidelines will apply from the date of their adoption by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. Schemes existing at the time of entry into force of the EEA Agreement on 1 January 1994 and schemes which the Authority has subsequently authorized will be subject to review pursuant to Article 1 (1) of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.(1) This chapter corresponds to the Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport adopted by the Commission on 6 May 1997 (OJ C 205, 5. 7. 1997).(2) This observation is inter alia based on comments, dated 24 October 1996, by the Standing Committee of the EFTA States on the Commission communication 'Towards a new maritime strategy`.(3) The 1986 package (OJ L 378, 31. 12. 1986, pp. 1, 4, 14 and 21) consists of four Regulations: Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 applying the principle of freedom to provide maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries, as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 3573/90 (OJ L 353, 17. 12. 1990, p. 16), Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, Regulation (EEC) No 4057/86 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport, Regulation (EEC) No 4058/86 concerning coordinated action to safeguard free access to cargoes in ocean trades.(4) It should be noted that Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within the Member States (maritime cabotage) has, at the time of writing, not yet been integrated in the EEA Agreement, but the matter has been on the agenda of the EEA Joint Committee for a long time.(5) It is noted that recognizing the declining competitiveness of the EC flags, the Commission proposed a series of positive measures in 1989. These included a Community ship register (Euros), which was to be operated in conjunction with Member States' first national registers and to guarantee shipowners State aid in return for accepting certain obligations as to employment of Community nationals in the crew. However, in the end, the Council was unable to accept the Euros approach.(6) Council Directive 90/648/EEC on aid to shipbuilding (OJ L 380, 31. 12. 1990), as last amended by Directive 94/73/EC (OJ L 351, 31. 12. 1994), and as prolonged by Regulations (EC) No 3094/95 (OJ L 332, 30. 12. 1995) and (EC) No 1904/96 (OJ L 251, 3. 10. 1996). The act has been adapted for the purpose of the EEA Agreement by Decisions of the EEA Joint Committee No 21/95 (OJ L 158, 8. 7. 1995; EEA Supplement No 25, 8. 7. 1995), No 16/96 (OJ L 124, 23. 5. 1996; EEA Supplement No 22, 23. 5. 1996) and No 58/96 (OJ L 182, 10. 7. 1997; EEA Supplement to the Official Journal No 29, 10. 7. 1997).(7) See Chapters 19 and 20 of the present Guidelines.(8) See Annex VIII to these Guidelines for a definition of EEA States' registers.(9) Commission White Paper: "The future development of the common transport policy", COM(92) 494 final.(10) This matter was addressed in the Commission notice on monitoring of State aid and reduction of labour costs (OJ C 1, 3. 1. 1997). This notice has not been integrated in the present State Aid Guidelines of the EFTA Surveillance Authority.(11) The special situation of the maritime transport sector in this regard was accepted by the Commission in 1989, when it adopted its first guidelines on aid to the sector.(12) See Chapters 14 (Aid for research and development) and 15 (Aid for environmental protection) of the present Guidelines.(13) See Chapter 16 of the present Guidelines.(14) Reference is made, however, to the fact referred to in a footnote to paragraph 24A.1.2.(3), that Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 (maritime cabotage) has not yet been integrated in the EEA Agreement.(15) [1991] ECR I-3905.`'ANNEX VIIIDEFINITION OF EEA STATES' REGISTERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE RULES IN CHAPTER 24A ON AID TO MARITIME TRANSPORT"EEA States' registers" should be understood as meaning registers governed by the law of an EC Member State or an EFTA State party to the EEA Agreement and applying to the territories forming part of either the European Community or an EFTA State.1. All the first registers of EEA States are EEA States' registers.2. In addition, the following registers, located in EEA States and subject to their laws, are EEA States' registers:- the Danish International Register of Shipping (DIS),- the German International Shipping Register (ISR),- the Madeira International Ship Register (MAR),- the Canary Islands Register,- the Norwegian International Shipping Register (NIS).3. Other registers are not considered to be EEA States' registers even if they serve in practice as a first alternative for shipowners based in that EEA State. This is because they are located in and subject to the law of territories where the EC Treaty and hence the EEA Agreement do not, in whole or in substantial part, apply. Hence, the following registers are not EEA States' registers:- the Kerguelen Register (the EC Treaty does not apply to this territory),- the Dutch Antilles' Register (this territory is associated to the European Community; only part IV of the EC Treaty applies to it. It is responsible for its own fiscal regime),- the registers of:- Isle of Man (only specific parts of the EC Treaty apply to the Isle of Man - see Article 227 (5) (c) of the EC Treaty. The Isle of Man Parliament has sole right to legislate on fiscal matters),- Bermuda and Cayman Islands (they are part of the territories associated to the European Community; only part IV of the EC Treaty applies to them. They have a fiscal autonomy).4. In the case of Gibraltar, the EC Treaty applies fully and, although the territory is not considered part of the United Kingdom, the Gibraltar register is, for the purposes of the rules in Chapter 24A of these Guidelines, considered to be an EEA States' register.`Done at Brussels, 16 July 1997.For the EFTA Surveillance AuthorityHannes HAFSTEINActing President(1) Hereinafter referred to as 'the State Aid Guidelines`.(2) OJ L 231, 3. 9. 1994, p. 1; EEA Supplement to OJ No 32, 3. 9. 1994.(3) OJ L 42, 13. 2. 1997, p. 33; EEA Supplement to OJ No 7, 13. 2. 1997.


Avis juridique important

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41998D0472

98/472/EC, ECSC, Euratom: Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 8 July 1998 appointing a member of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities

Official Journal L 209 , 25/07/1998 P. 0052 - 0053

DECISION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES of 8 July 1998 appointing a member of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (98/472/EC, ECSC, Euratom)THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 168a thereof,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, and in particular Article 32d thereof,Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 140a thereof,Having regard to Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (1),Whereas the terms of office of Mr Josef Azizi, Mr Cornelius Paulus Briet, Mr Marc Jaeger, Mr Andreas Kalogeropoulos, Mr Koenraad Lenaerts, Mr Rui Manuel Gens De Moura Ramos, Mrs Virpi Tiili and Mr Bo Vesterdorf expire on 31 August 1998;Whereas seven members were appointed by a Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on 27 May 1998;Whereas, to complete the partial replacement of members of the Court of First Instance, it is necessary to appoint an eighth member,HAVE DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:Article 1 Mr A.W.H. Meij is hereby appointed Judge to the Court of First Instance for the period 1 September 1998 to 31 August 2004.Article 2 This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities.Done at Brussels, 8 July 1998.The PresidentM. SCHEICH(1) OJ L 319, 25. 11. 1988, p. 1 as corrected by OJ C 215, 21. 8. 1989, p. 1. Decision as last amended by Decision 95/1/Euratom, ECSC, EC adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new Member States to the European Union (OJ L 1, 1. 1. 1995, p. 1).


title: Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/332 of 2 March 2015 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia

text:
               3.3.2015

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               L 58/70

         COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/332
   of 2 March 2015
   extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia
   THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
   Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 33 and Article 31(2) thereof,
   Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
   Whereas:

               (1)

               On 8 July 2014, the Council adopted Decision 2014/438/CFSP (1) appointing Mr Herbert SALBER as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia. The EUSR's mandate is to expire on 28 February 2015.

               (2)

               The mandate of the EUSR should be extended for a further period of eight months.

               (3)

               The EUSR will implement the mandate in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union,

         HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
   Article 1
   European Union Special Representative
   The mandate of Mr Herbert SALBER as the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia is hereby extended until 31 October 2015. The Council may decide that the mandate of the EUSR be terminated earlier, based on an assessment by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR).
   Article 2
   Policy objectives
   The mandate of the EUSR shall be based on the policy objectives of the Union for the South Caucasus, including the objectives set out in the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting held in Brussels on 1 September 2008 and the Council Conclusions of 15 September 2008, as well as those of 27 February 2012. Those objectives include:

               (a)

               in accordance with the existing mechanisms, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its Minsk Group, to prevent conflicts in the region, to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, by promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and through other appropriate means, and to support the implementation of such a settlement in accordance with the principles of international law;

               (b)

               to engage constructively with the main interested actors regarding the region;

               (c)

               to encourage and to support further cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and, as appropriate, their neighbouring countries;

               (d)

               to enhance the Union's effectiveness and visibility in the region.

         Article 3
   Mandate
   In order to achieve the policy objectives, the mandate of the EUSR shall be:

               (a)

               to develop contacts with governments, parliaments, other key political actors, the judiciary and civil society in the region;

               (b)

               to encourage the countries in the region to cooperate on regional themes of common interest, such as common security threats, the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking and organised crime;

               (c)

               to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in accordance with the principles of international law and to facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close coordination with the United Nations, the OSCE and its Minsk Group;

               (d)

               with respect to the crisis in Georgia:

                           (i)

                           to help prepare for the international talks held under point 6 of the settlement plan of 12 August 2008 (‘Geneva International Discussions’) and its implementing measures of 8 September 2008, including on arrangements for security and stability in the region, the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, on the basis of internationally recognised principles, and any other subject, by mutual agreement between the parties;

                           (ii)

                           to help establish the Union's position and represent it, at the level of the EUSR, in the talks referred to in point (i); and

                           (iii)

                           to facilitate the implementation of the settlement plan of 12 August 2008 and its implementing measures of 8 September 2008;

               (e)

               to facilitate the development and implementation of confidence-building measures;

               (f)

               to assist in the preparation, as appropriate, of Union contributions to the implementation of a possible conflict settlement;

               (g)

               to intensify the Union's dialogue with the main actors concerned regarding the region;

               (h)

               to assist the Union in further developing a comprehensive policy towards the South Caucasus;

               (i)

               in the framework of the activities set out in this Article, to contribute to the implementation of the Union's human rights policy and the Union Guidelines on Human Rights, in particular with regard to children and women in areas affected by conflicts, especially by monitoring and addressing developments in this regard.

         Article 4
   Implementation of the mandate
   1.   The EUSR shall be responsible for the implementation of the mandate, acting under the authority of the HR.
   2.   The PSC shall maintain a privileged link with the EUSR and shall be the EUSR's primary point of contact with the Council. The PSC shall provide the EUSR with strategic guidance and political direction within the framework of the mandate, without prejudice to the powers of the HR.
   3.   The EUSR shall work in close coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its relevant departments.
   Article 5
   Financing
   1.   The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mandate of the EUSR during the period from 1 March 2015 to 31 October 2015 shall be EUR 1 350 000.
   2.   The expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
   3.   The management of the expenditure shall be subject to a contract between the EUSR and the Commission. The EUSR shall be accountable to the Commission for all expenditure.
   Article 6
   Constitution and composition of the team
   1.   Within the limits of the mandate of the EUSR and the corresponding financial means made available, the EUSR shall be responsible for constituting a team. The team shall include the expertise on specific policy issues as required by the mandate. The EUSR shall keep the Council and the Commission promptly informed of the composition of the team.
   2.   Member States, the institutions of the Union and the EEAS may propose the secondment of staff to the EUSR. The salary of such seconded personnel shall be covered by the Member State, the institution of the Union concerned or the EEAS, respectively. Experts seconded by Member States to the institutions of the Union or the EEAS may also be posted to the EUSR. International contracted staff shall have the nationality of a Member State.
   3.   All seconded personnel shall remain under the administrative authority of the sending Member State, the sending institution of the Union or the EEAS and shall carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mandate of the EUSR.
   4.   The EUSR staff shall be co-located with the relevant EEAS departments or Union delegations in order to ensure coherence and consistency of their respective activities.
   Article 7
   Privileges and immunities of the EUSR and the staff of the EUSR
   The privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the EUSR's mission and the members of the EUSR's staff shall be agreed with the host countries, as appropriate. Member States and the EEAS shall grant all necessary support to such effect.
   Article 8
   Security of EU classified information
   The EUSR and the members of the EUSR's team shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2013/488/EU (2).
   Article 9
   Access to information and logistical support
   1.   Member States, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council shall ensure that the EUSR is given access to any relevant information.
   2.   The Union delegations in the region and/or the Member States, as appropriate, shall provide logistical support in the region.
   Article 10
   Security
   In accordance with the Union's policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty, the EUSR shall take all reasonably practicable measures, in accordance with the mandate of the EUSR and the security situation in the geographical area of responsibility, for the security of all personnel under the direct authority of the EUSR, in particular by:

               (a)

               establishing a mission-specific security plan based on guidance from the EEAS, providing for mission-specific physical, organisational and procedural security measures governing the management of the secure movement of personnel to, and within, the mission area and the management of security incidents, and providing for a contingency plan and a mission evacuation plan;

               (b)

               ensuring that all personnel deployed outside the Union are covered by high risk insurance, as required by the conditions in the mission area;

               (c)

               ensuring that all members of the EUSR's team to be deployed outside the Union, including locally contracted personnel, have received appropriate security training before or upon arriving in the mission area, based on the risk ratings assigned to the mission area by the EEAS;

               (d)

               ensuring that all agreed recommendations made following regular security assessments are implemented, and providing the Council, the HR and the Commission with written reports on their implementation and on other security issues within the framework of the progress report and the report on the implementation of the mandate.

         Article 11
   Reporting
   The EUSR shall regularly provide the HR and the PSC with oral and written reports. The EUSR shall also report to Council working parties as necessary. Regular reports shall be circulated through the COREU network. The EUSR may provide the Foreign Affairs Council with reports. In accordance with Article 36 of the Treaty, the EUSR may be involved in briefing the European Parliament.
   Article 12
   Coordination
   1.   The EUSR shall contribute to the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's action and shall help ensure that all Union instruments and Member States' actions are engaged consistently, to attain the Union's policy objectives. The activities of the EUSR shall be coordinated with those of the Commission. The EUSR shall provide regular briefings to Member States' missions and the Union's delegations.
   2.   In the field, close liaison shall be maintained with the Heads of Union delegations and Member States' Heads of Mission, who shall make every effort to assist the EUSR in the implementation of the mandate. The EUSR, in close coordination with the Head of Union Delegation to Georgia, shall provide the Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) with local political guidance. The EUSR and the Civilian Operation Commander for EUMM Georgia shall consult each other as required. The EUSR shall also liaise with other international and regional actors in the field.
   Article 13
   Assistance in relation to claims
   The EUSR and the EUSR's staff shall assist in providing elements to respond to any claims and obligations arising from the mandates of the previous EUSRs for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, and shall provide administrative assistance and access to relevant files for such purposes.
   Article 14
   Review
   The implementation of this Decision and its consistency with other contributions from the Union to the region shall be kept under regular review. The EUSR shall present the Council, the HR and the Commission with a comprehensive mandate implementation report by the end of August 2015.
   Article 15
   Entry into force
   This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.
   It shall apply from 1 March 2015.

      Done at Brussels, 2 March 2015.

            For the Council

            The President

         D. REIZNIECE-OZOLA

      (1)  Council Decision 2014/438/CFSP of 8 July 2014 amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia (OJ L 200, 9.7.2014, p. 11).

      (2)  Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).